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The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity

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The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity

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The Phenomenology
of Embodied Subjectivity

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Editors' Introduction

Introduction: Some Themes in the Phenomenology of Embodiment

This volume, *The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity*, aims to explore the rich legacy of phenomenological thinking about the embodied subject, including the phenomenon known as 'intercorporeality', i.e. the interaction between living embodied subjects. Original and innovative phenomenological explorations of embodiment are currently taking place not just through critical and creative appropriations of the classical analyses of embodiment found in the phenomenological tradition (specifically Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein and Scheler) but also through close dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind and action, scientific psychology and the cognitive sciences, the medical sciences as well as psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

As many of the contributors to this volume point out, phenomenology is all too often portrayed in a rather narrow manner as a philosophy of consciousness, an account of the first-person perspective, a description of experience as it is experienced, a philosophy of subjectivity. Indeed, many critics of phenomenology have seized on the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl's allegiance to Cartesianism (he even characterised phenomenology as a 'new Cartesianism') to highlight phenomenology's supposed preference for the subjective standpoint of an individual consciousness, the 'I think' (*ego cogito*). But phenomenology has from the outset, i.e. from the beginning of the twentieth century (usually marked by the appearance of Husserl's two-volume *Logical Investigations* in 1900/1901), always had a much richer appreciation of the complexity of subjective experience and has recognised that subjects are intrinsically embodied, embedded in social and historical life-worlds, and essentially involved with other embodied subjects and in an intersubjective cultural world. Indeed, Husserl himself said that we should not say '*ego cogito*' ('I think') so much as '*nos cogitamus*', ('we think') (see Husserl 1965: 316). But even emphasising the inherently intersubjective, social and cultural nature of our conscious lives does not fully capture the manner of our 'being in the world'

(*In-der-Welt-sein*) to use Heidegger's term (Heidegger 1962). Human beings are embodied intentional agents—expressive, meaning-construing and meaning intending beings embedded in a world that is loaded with significance, overlain with fantasy, imagination, memory and all kinds of projection. The overall term 'embodiment', then, is meant to capture this idea that human conscious subjects are intrinsically connected to the world in complex and irreducible ways, some of which are explored in depth in this volume.

Of all the philosophical movements of the twentieth century, phenomenology in particular has been to the forefront in the exploration of embodiment. Embodiment, corporeality, incarnation—these are all terms that express the conception of *Leiblichkeit* found especially in the writings of Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and other members of the phenomenological movement. Husserl himself speaks of 'the phenomenology of embodiment' (*die Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit*) in his *Phenomenological Psychology* lectures of 1925 (Husserl 1968, 1977, § 39). Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the French inheritors of the Husserlian tradition, similarly speak of 'the flesh' (*la chair*)—their translation of Husserl's *Leib*—and of 'incarnation' (*incarnation*) to express the idea that human beings, as embodied, are embedded in a very specific way both in the material world and in the cultural and symbolic world (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 1968; Sartre 1943, 1986).

In general, the classic phenomenologists begin their reflections from the distinction they draw between two aspects of the body—between *Leib* and *Körper*—between the living, animate, organic 'lived body' (what Merleau-Ponty calls '*le corps vecu*'), the body as it is personally experienced, and the body understood as a purely physical, corporeal thing, extended in space, the material body, the body as the object of science, or as 'corpse'—as Sartre puts it in his illuminating chapter 'The Body' in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre 1943, 1986). The term 'physical body' (*Körper*) is used by Husserl primarily to refer to the physical body which occupies space and is subject to causal laws as described by physics and the natural and biological sciences. He used the term *Leib* (e.g. in his *Ideas* II § 18, Husserl 1952, 1989), translated usually as 'lived body' or 'animate body', to refer to the body as a living organic entity. In one sense the body is a physical thing like other physical things; it is governed by gravity, has the character of weight, impenetrability, having 'parts outside of parts', is affected by cold and heat, can be cut or damaged, is affected by disease, and so on. In another sense, the body is the animate body which I possess or which more accurately *I am*. This lived body is much more difficult to describe, precisely because it is experienced so close to me that it is indeed, as Husserl puts it, the living centre of my experience. It is with this animate body that I navigate in the world, experience the physical world as such. All my perceptual interaction with the world is mediated by this body which I am. The world appears to me in colours, shapes, textures, tastes, smells, hardness and smoothness, resistance and penetrability precisely because of the way my living organic body is constituted and coordinated with the physical world that surrounds me. I am constantly adjusting my body in relation to the world, shifting my balance

while walking, tilting my head to listen better, turning around to see what is behind me and so on. The body is a centre not just of sensation and perception but of proprioception and kinaesthesis.

Moreover, I also experience other human beings and animals (across a very wide range of living things) primarily through encountering their living bodies—their outward forms, movements, expressive faces, and gestures. Even a phone call is experienced as communication with the other person embodied in his or her voice. Everywhere our bodies meet and interact, as in handshakes, sports, fighting, or making love. Moreover, our bodily movements, functions and needs always rise above the material realm and are constituted as meaningful in complex symbolic terms. All our bodily organs are saturated with excess meanings and functions. The mouth, for instance, is an instrument for breathing, eating, but also for speaking, kissing, and even—a phenomenon regularly observed in car-parks—for temporarily holding parking tickets. The body contains a number of organs that can be used as signs—pointing is a very important part of the body's actions. The body is involved in symbolic activity at all levels—in dance, mime, singing, speaking and writing, in ritual and religious activity. The body not just writes but can be written on, the skin can be tattooed and so on. Everyday bodily activities such as eating and washing can be invested with extraordinary symbolic significance in religious ceremonies.

Edmund Husserl's and—following him—Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologies, in particular, provide very rich accounts of the experience of embodiment, including the crucial encounters with other living bodies in what Husserl, following the German psychological tradition of his day, called 'Einfühlung' (empathy). The encounter with others and the manner in which humans are co-subjects cooperating together or conflicting with one another is given the general name of 'intersubjectivity' (Intersubjektivität), and many of Husserl's research manuscripts in this area are only now being studied and mined for their insights, a mining that is undertaken by a number of papers, in particular in Part II and III of this volume. Husserl describes the lived body as a 'bearer of sensations' (Ideas II § 36, Husserl 1952, 1989) and as the 'organ of my will' (§ 38). It is, in Husserl's terminology, the centre of my 'I can' (Ich kann), i.e. it is through my body that I exercise powers such as movement, touch, turning my heading, seeing things, gripping things and so on. Indeed, Husserl claims—and here he is followed by Merleau-Ponty—that the body is present in all our perceptual experience and is involved in all other conscious functions (Ideas II § 39), and yet at the same time the body is peculiarly absent or transparent in our perceptions. We normally focus on the objective element in experience. When we have a visual experience we normally directly experience how things are in the world and only start to thematise our eyes if they are blurred, or affected by grit or tears. Similarly, we normally just feel the cool surface of the desk and only focus on our finger tips if in some sense they are blistered or experiencing discomfort.

With regard to visual perception, Husserl gives extensive, detailed descriptions of just *what* we see and *how* we see it, involving the nature of the act of perception, the nature of the perceived object, the sense of perception, the role of temporal awareness in the structure of perceiving, the dynamic nature of perceptual content, the nature of the indeterminate accompanying horizons, and so on. Perception, of course, is much more than visual perception, and from very early on Husserl (e.g. in his 1907 *Thing and Space* Lectures, Husserl 1973b, 1997) was attentive to the complex relations between sight and touch (he has much less to say about the senses of hearing, smell and taste) and how the sense of space is constituted from the interplay between these sensory modalities combined with kinesthetic movements (movements of the eyes, head, hands, etc.). Perception is also integrated with action and here phenomenology has offered very deep accounts of freedom and agency. These accounts have recently become the centre of attention in the McDowell-Dreyfus debate (Schear 2013), which is also taken up in the essays of Erik Rietveld, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc and Rasmus Thybo Jensen in this volume.

Embodied experience is not just a matter of deliberate intentional willed action, but also a matter of routines, habits, practices, skills and intended but non-deliberative actions generally. The nature of habit has been extensively discussed in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and others, in a manner that has been taken up by contemporary sociologists (e.g. Pierre Bourdieu) and philosophers (e.g. Hubert Dreyfus). Dreyfus places a very heavy emphasis on a kind of motor intentionality in habit which takes places at the pre-personal or pre-reflective levels, and here Dreyfus draws his inspiration from Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* as well as a certain reading of human behaviour as found in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. A major part of our acting in the world involves a kind of pre-reflective expert navigating—what has come to be called by Hubert Dreyfus 'coping' (his rendering of Heidegger's *Verhalten*, comporting oneself, or behaviour in a rich sense, see Dreyfus 1991).

This concept of coping has led to a rich discussion in the contemporary literature that has drawn in not just Charles Taylor but also John McDowell, Sean Dorrance Kelly and others. Similarly, the concept of 'affordances' found in the ecological psychology of the American psychologist James J. Gibson (1904–1979) has been productively used to explain how the world appears to the embodied agent (Gibson 1977). A rock can present itself as a good place to sit, a rock-climber will perceive potential grips in the rock face, and so on. In the papers in this volume, the notion of affordance as a kind of significance that also invites a certain action is one of the recurring themes (see especially the papers in this volume by Rietveld, Romdenh-Romluc, Morris and Ratcliffe). Romdenh-Romluc, for instance, endorses Dreyfus's interpretation of Merleau-Ponty to say that perceived opportunities to act can draw forth the agent's behaviour without the need for any intervening mental representation.

Perception, for Husserl, is the bedrock of consciousness, but it is not the only form of consciousness he explored. As he saw it, all other forms of conscious experience are in one way or another *founded* on perceptual, sensory consciousness. In this

regard Husserl contrasts the 'self-givenness' (*Selbstgegebenheit*) of perceived objects with a very large class of conscious forms that he characterizes as 'representational' (*vergegenwärtig*) in one way or another. Representation, or more accurately 'presentification', 'presentation', or 'calling to mind' (*Vergegenwärtigung*), includes memory, fantasy, wishing, and symbolic thinking—all forms that do not have the sense of the immediate presence of the object. When one remembers, imagines, or fantasizes about an object, there is not the same sense of the immediate, actual, bodily and temporal presence of the object. Indeed, in memory and in expectation, the object is experienced as not presently there, but there is some kind of reference to its being, it is still being posited (as future or past) in a specific way. Unlike imagination, memory posits the real 'having-been' of something. Imagination entails no such positing of the real existence of its object in any temporal mode. It is increasingly recognized that perception, memory, and imagination are all intertwined. Several of the contributions in this volume discuss the nature of imagination and its close links with bodily movement, intentional action, and empathy, in particular the papers by Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Julia Jansen, Joona Taipale and Carlos Lobo.

The phenomenology of embodiment also involves close attention to the manner in which the self or ego experiences itself. The body is experienced not as identical with the ego or 'I' pure and simple, but rather as something which is 'mine', albeit that this particular 'mineness' (what Heidegger calls *Jemeinigkeit*) is subject to very many kinds of variation, intensification and even alienation. I can alienate myself from certain parts of my body (hair, nails, even inner parts of the body can be removed, e.g. the appendix or gall bladder) without feeling *myself* altered or changed in any significant way. Yet there are other experiences of my body which are experienced as violations or intrusions. There are extreme examples, such as torture, rape, sexual abuse, where bodily violation can lead to damage to one's sense of self, but there is undoubtedly a very broad spectrum of experiences where the nature of self is intimately related to experiencing one's body. Dorothée Legrand's contribution in this volume for instance examines the complexity of self-experience and the other's experience of oneself in the case of anorexia. The body—as Sartre and others have recognised—is also the 'body-for-others' (Sartre 1943, 1986). The body can also be experienced as something over and against the ego (as Husserl writes in *Ideas* II § 54). In other words, the body can be a site of resistance to my will. I want to keep walking but my legs are tired. I try to stand up but I feel dizzy. Intimately experienced with the body are of course not just sensations and perceptions, but acts of willing, feelings, emotions, moods and the whole affective sphere. In depression or melancholia, a phenomenon discussed by Stefano Micali and Matthew Ratcliffe in their contributions, I may feel unable to act, I experience time in a different way, or the world itself seems drained of meaning.

Embodiment includes the fact that humans live *temporal* lives that evolve in developing bodily form from infancy through maturity to death. The body in this regard is constantly if subtly changing. Finitude, facticity and historicity belong to the very essence of the human as embodied. Heidegger, for instance, sees

human finitude with its necessary incompleteness as belonging to the very essence of the human being as being-in-the-world. In addition Husserl, as demonstrated by Sara Heinämaa in her paper, regards the awareness of one's historical placement within a generation and the horizon of past and future generations, as an essential for the intersubjective constitution of objectivity. The fact that human lives take many forms that makes for differences between individuals and between different stages of any given individual's life gives rise to a host of questions: If we claim that we can only make objectivity intelligible by appealing to a manifold of subjects, i.e. to intersubjectivity, then who belongs to the "we" that can be said to play such a constitutive role? If certain subjects are excluded from playing such a constitutive role, can a phenomenological approach still deliver a meaningful understanding of the experiences of such subjects, for instance the experiences of infants or people suffering from psychiatric disorders? These questions are discussed by amongst others, Heinämaa, Taipale and Micali in this volume.

Several of the papers in this volume deal with Husserl's very important and influential conception of the life-world. In the *Crisis of European Science* (Husserl 1970, 1976) and related writings, Husserl provides an extensive if somewhat formal treatment of the concept of the 'life-world' or 'world of life' (*Lebenswelt*). Husserl claims to have uncovered the life-world as a fundamental and novel phenomenon previously invisible to the sciences and to have identified it for the first time as a 'universal problem' (*Crisis* § 34). Indeed, there is—as Husserl himself insists—a specific and entirely new science of the life-world itself (*Crisis* § 51) that would, among other things, offer a new basis for grounding the natural and human sciences through an investigation of 'subsoil' (*Untergrund*) for all forms of theoretical truth (Husserl 1976, 127;1970 124). Several of the papers in this volume discuss aspects of Husserl's account of human life in the life-world, specifically the papers by Sara Heinämaa, Ignacio de los Reyes Melero, Simo Pulkkinen, and Tom Nenon.

The Plan of This Volume

This volume brings together a total of 17 new contributions to many of the current issues concerning embodiment. Most of the papers collected in this volume were originally presented at an international conference on 'Embodied Subjectivity' held at the Royal Irish Academy on 25–27th of May 2010 under the auspices of the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences research project 'The Phenomenology of Consciousness and Subjectivity' (PI: Professor Dermot Moran; Postdoctoral Fellow: Dr. Rasmus Thybo Jensen). This conference brought together leading international researchers from a variety of disciplines—predominantly philosophy, but also cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and other related disciplines. The primary aim of the original conference was to explore the nature of embodied subjectivity generally and more specifically the contribution

of phenomenology as a methodology for exploring this first-person dimension of human experience.

The editors have grouped the papers in this volume into four parts in a way that highlights the research themes involved. *Part I* contains four papers that all address ongoing debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action and the cognitive sciences, drawing on resources from the phenomenological tradition, in particular Merleau-Ponty. The four papers of *Part II* are all concerned with Husserl's account of the constitutive role of the body in perception, the intersubjective constitution of the life-world and the distinction between normality and anomality/abnormality. *Part III* encompass four papers that in different ways engage with cases of disturbances of bodily self-awareness and the importance of such breakdowns for our view of the constitutive role of the body. The papers in *Part III* again draw specifically on the works of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, but also Sartre plays a crucial role. In the last section, *Part IV*, we have joined together five papers that explore the self-other relation from infancy to the level of scientific and political community where language and symbolic representation embodies idealities and ideals.

In what follows we provide a survey of the papers of each of the four parts, and draw attention to some common concerns, not only between papers within each of the four parts of the volume, but also between papers in different parts.

Part I: The Acting Body: Habit, Freedom and Imagination

Part I contains four papers which all address ongoing debates in philosophy of action and in the cognitive sciences drawing on resources from the phenomenological tradition, in the first three papers mainly the works of Merleau-Ponty and in the fourth paper by Julia Jansen by drawing on the works of Husserl.

In her paper 'Habit and Attention' Komarine Romdenh-Romluc addresses an issue that has only recently become the focus of more intense discussions within philosophy of action, namely how to account for habitual, non-deliberative actions and how to understand the role of bodily skills in the performance of intentional actions in general (see Dreyfus 2000, 2005; Pollard 2011; Levine 2012). Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's discussion of habit and motor intentionality in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 1962), Romdenh-Romluc here expands the account of bodily agency that she has been developing in a series of recent papers (Romdenh-Romluc 2007, 2011, 2012). On what is often called the standard story of human agency, a bodily movement is considered an action if it is caused in the right way by the right kind of conative state or event such as a belief-desire pair or an intention that also constitutes the agent's reasons for acting (see Davidson 1963 for the original formulation of this model). Against the standard causal theory Romdenh-Romluc argues that there are instances of actions where what one does is in fact act contrary to one's intentions namely in cases of so called "slips of actions". A case of such a slip of action would be the person who

intends to unlock her bike but, having forgotten to lock the bike the night before, instead inadvertently ends up locking the bike. In such a case, Romdenh-Romluc argues, the person responds to the perceived affordances and when she out of habit locks the bike, this cannot be considered a mere happening, but should be counted as something involving her agency. The behaviour seems to lie within the realm of her responsibility, which indicates that it should be considered an expression of her agency. She furthermore argues that contrary to what is proposed by the standard model we should think of even our successful intentional actions as often initiated and guided by perception of affordances in a way that leaves out the need to have the action in question represented by a mental state such as an intention.

In addition to drawing attention to the role of bodily habits in the performance of actions, Romdenh-Romluc also emphasises the role attention plays for the successful completion of actions. The function of attention is said to be to gather information that is salient for the task at hand. Attending to what one is doing is further described as an attunement to the action possibilities that are relevant to the completion of one's task. These characterizations of attention can be seen as attempts at capturing the characteristic kind of freedom involved in skillful, unreflective action which is the focus of Erik Rietveld's paper.

In his paper "Affordances and Unreflective Freedom" Erik Rietveld's aim is to bring into focus the specific kind of freedom that he argues is intrinsic to the kind of skillful, habitual actions discussed by Romdenh-Romluc. Rietveld argues that the understanding of freedom in unreflective action found in the works of Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly is insufficient. The reason why these accounts fail is that they do not manage to characterize the relevant kind of freedom 'on its own terms', i.e. without reference to a higher level capacity to reflectively step back from what one is doing and critically assess one's reasons. Though Rietveld recognizes that such a capacity to step back is essential for the specifically human aspects of the freedom we enjoy, he also argues that there is an important sense in which we share an element of freedom with non-linguistic infants and animals. If an account of the kind of freedom characteristic of our unreflective actions ignores this common element, there is a risk that infants and non-linguistic animals are reduced to automata enslaved by the stimuli of their environment. Rietveld argues that neither Dreyfus' nor Kelly's account avoid this pitfall because they do not provide a sufficiently rich account of how the freedom in question manifests itself in the experience of the subject engaged in unreflective, skillful action.

When Rietveld emphasises that there is a kind of freedom in action which is shared between mature human beings, infants and non-linguistic animals, he can seem to contradict the view of skillful coping activities that McDowell has put forward in his response to Dreyfus (McDowell 2009). This is not Rietveld's intention. As Rietveld points out, McDowell fully endorses the idea that there are certain aspects of our embodied coping that we share with other animals, namely a responsiveness to affordances, i.e. possibilities for action provided by the environment (McDowell 2009, 315). What McDowell opposes is the idea that we can

somehow make the specificity of our coping skills intelligible by beginning with an independent understanding of what is shared between us and other animals and then *add* capacities on top of these more basic shared capacities in order to reach a full blown rational agent. Rietveld's focus on the shared experiential elements between us and other animals does not commit him to such a building block model of rational animals. Such would only be the case if he claimed that a phenomenology of the shared features exhausts all there is to be said about the phenomenology of the unreflective actions of mature human beings.

In his contribution "Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Problem concerning Bodily Agency", Rasmus Thybo Jensen focuses on a line of argument against any theory of action that conceptually divorces our rational capacity to form intentions and our bodily capacity to carry out our intentions. Jensen argues that we find at least a germ of this line of argument in Merleau-Ponty and he exploits the works of G.E. Anscombe, Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell to articulate it. Jensen spells out the line of argument while focusing on what Romdenh-Romluc in her paper calls *the dominant view*, namely the Standard Causal Account, which basically claims that a movement is an action if and only if it is caused by the right kind of conative items in the right kind of way. What the Standard Causal Account shares with many other accounts in the philosophy of action is the basic idea that the bodily movements involved in intentional actions are themselves to be regarded as agency-neutral events. These movements are agency-neutral events in the sense that they are of the same basic kind as the movements that occur when the limbs move because of a reflex or because of the force of a heavy wind, i.e. the movements are of a kind that are not intrinsically agency-involving. Jensen compares this assumption about the agency-neutral movement with the idea that perceptual appearances are as such veridiciality-neutral; an idea criticized by both Merleau-Ponty and McDowell. Jensen argues that we find a line of argument in Merleau-Ponty to the effect that the conception of appearances that sees these as merely externally related to the appearing object, will not only make it difficult to account for our empirical knowledge, it will undermine our ability to make sense of our sensory awareness as an awareness of even appearances. It is this element in Merleau-Ponty that Jensen, alluding to McDowell's similar line of argument, calls transcendental. The argument pertaining to bodily agency that can be detected in Merleau-Ponty, Jensen argues, also has a transcendental nature. The argument, as Jensen reconstructs it, is an argument to the effect that any conception of action that begins with the assumption about the agency-neutrality of movements will not only make it difficult to see how our bodily motility could ever come to effectuate our intentions, it will also risk undermining even the possibility of making sense of ourselves as having intentions in the first place.

In her paper "Imagination, Embodiment and Situatedness: Using Husserl to Dispel (Some) Notions of 'Off-Line Thinking'" Julia Jansen challenges certain widespread assumptions in the debate about what have been called 'the 4 E's' of situated cognition research, i.e. the four related ideas that cognition is embedded, enactive, embodied and extended. In the current debate, it is most often Merleau-Ponty who is invoked when people arguing for one or more of the

4 E's appeal to the phenomenological tradition. However, as Jansen notes, there has recently been a growing realization that Husserl's work cannot so easily be associated with the kind of Cartesian internalism about the mind which proponents of the 4 E's oppose (see Zahavi 2008; Smith 2008). The argument to the effect that an externalist picture of the mind is embodied in Husserl's writing is often made via an interpretation of Husserl's analysis of perception. In her paper Jansen expands on these arguments by focusing on Husserl's analysis of sensory imagination. She argues that this analysis challenges the assumption that imagination is a cognitive phenomenon that we should all agree is in no need of any appeal to the 4 E's in order to be explained. The two aspects of Husserl's analysis of sensory imagination which Jansen's focus on are: (1) Husserl's claim about the quasi-perceptual character of imagination; (2) Husserl's claim about a foundational relation between any act of imagination and a background of actual perceptual experience.

The quasi-perceptual nature of sensory imagination is revealed by the way imagination inherits many of the essential features of perceptual experience. An imagined object is given with both an internal and an external horizon. If you imagine Pegasus flying over a lake in a mountain area you can imagine seeing Pegasus from different angles, you can zoom in and out and make Pegasus fly so as to show different aspects of its body (this example is taken from Marbach 2013); if we abstract from the freedom involved in the imaginative exercise these possibilities correspond to the way any perceptual object is given with an internal horizon of possible appearances.

Though sensory imagination mimics perception, the essential difference between imagining an object and having the object "present in person" also shows up in experience. One of the ways the difference shows up is in the experiential contrast between the imagined scene and one's actual field of perception that under normal circumstances isn't confused with the imagined scene. Without such a contrastive background the act of imagination would no longer be able to establish itself as a phenomenon distinct from hallucinations or dreams. In agreement with Husserl, Jansen argues that the contrastive element is constitutive for the sensory imaginative experience.

How do the two features of imagination highlighted by Jansen feed into her arguments for a situated cognition approach to imagination? The first feature, the quasi-perceptual nature of imagination, might not immediately support the idea that the cognitive processes involved in imagination are constitutively dependent on extra-cranial features. But, as Jansen argues, it does challenge certain conceptions of sensory imagination, such as the picture theory of mental imagery, and it suggests that imagination might depend crucially on sensorimotor areas of the brain. The second feature, the constitutive relation of imagination to perception provides what seems to be the strongest argument in favour of a situated cognition approach to imagination. If sensory imagination constitutively depends on actual perceptual feedback, and if such perceptual experiences are best understood within a situated cognition framework, then it seems we need to understand imagination within such a framework too.

Part II: The Body in Perception: Normality and the Constitution of Life-World

Sara Heinämaa, in her paper "Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Normality: Constitution by Mortals," explores Husserl's controversial claim that the unique intersubjectively agreed sense of the world is constituted by 'normal' subjects only, by which he means mature, rational acculturated adults. In his research manuscripts, especially those in the Intersubjectivity volumes (Husserliana XIII, XIV and XV, Husserl 1973a) Husserl quite bluntly states that the community which constitutes the sense of the world only includes *normal* subjects. Accordingly, Husserl excludes children, the insane, the mentally impaired, those with severe disabilities, and other 'anomal' subjects from playing a role in world-constitution. For Husserl, it is important that world be constituted as an open potentially endless context of meanings that continues seamlessly from the past into the future. Subjects—for example children and animals—that cannot constitute a sense of such continuity cannot be involved in the constitution of the world. According to Heinämaa's reading of Husserl, infants and animals lack the sense of themselves as members of a generation and as members of an open series of generations. This prevents them from taking part in the constitution of the world as a temporally continuous open-ended infinity. However, Heinämaa qualifies this claim in that she points out that children, animals, the insane, and other abnormal subjects are actually constituted as belonging to the world by other subjects. They are therefore not excluded from participation in the world and in intersubjective sociality. However, it is clear that these 'anomal' subjects do not participate in the communal and communicative constitution of the *sense* of the world in so far as they operate within their 'anomalies'. Husserl claims that the very *sense* of the one common world itself includes the possibility of universal sharing, and therefore, if someone is not capable of this sharing then they lack the world, even while living in and towards it. Husserl's conception of being-in-the-world, then, is rather close to that of Heidegger. Heidegger too thinks that animals especially (he has little to say about children) are, as he puts it, 'poor in world' (*Weltarm*).

For Husserl, the world is constituted by an open set of subjectivities acting in consort. The world is an intersubjective accomplishment. This constitution has to take place across time and history and hence there is need for a process called 'generativity' according to which subjects constitute themselves and their culture across generations. Husserl uses the model of Leibniz's monadology to express the manner in which transcendental intersubjectivity cooperatively generates the concept of world and guarantees its stability across time. Husserl has been accused of racism or at least ethnocentrism for excluding Gypsies, Eskimos and 'primitive peoples' generally from his conception of an open community of humans progressing through scientific knowledge with a commitment to universal rationality. In this regard, Husserl's exclusion of the 'anomal' including children and the mentally ill may seem cruel. However, according to Heinämaa, Husserl's work also contains more explorative and philosophically interesting lines of thought,

which are in tension with his more dismissive remarks about 'primitive people'. In addition to the idea of awareness of generativity as essential for rationality, Husserl also argues that the meeting with other cultures is crucial for true understanding of the sense of the world. It is only by engaging in a self-critical communication with other "home-worlds" that are at first alien to ourselves, that we can pass from living in an environment to an appreciation of the world as such, i.e. to an understanding of the world as the horizon of all communal horizons.

Ignacio de los Reyes Melero's paper "The Body as a System of Concordance and the Perceptual World" takes up a challenge one faces if one accepts the Husserlian account of objectivity expounded in Heinämaa's paper, where objectivity is understood as intersubjectively constituted by a community which includes only mature, rational beings who are capable of acting autonomously and have a sense of possibility, past and future. The challenge arises once we take into account that no actual mature, rational subject can be said consistently and infallibly to function in an optimal way. De los Reyes Melero's focus is on the, under normal circumstances, coherent flow of perceptual appearances, where the coherence consists in a constant fulfillment of sensory anticipations correlated with the movements of the body given in kinesthetic experiences. However, as we know, appearances can be deceiving. I can be surprised by the presence of a transparent glass door, when I walk straight into it or by the absence of a door when I'm fooled by a trompe l'oeil painting. Or, unknown to me, I might be under the influence of some drug (Husserl mentions santonin) which distorts my experiences, or I might suffer from colour-blindness. It is part and parcel of the phenomenology of perception that any given perceptual appearance provides at most inadequate evidence, in the sense that it can never allow the perceiver to rule out with absolute certainty that further perceptual exploration could reveal the present appearance as illusory.

De los Reyes Melero frames the central issue of his paper in terms of a question also raised by Husserl himself: Should an acknowledgment of the constant possibility of annulment or 'cancelling out' (*Durchstreichung*) of any given appearance lead us to conclude that the two kinds of appearances, i.e. the ones that are revealed as discordant and the ones that place themselves in a stream of coherent appearances, are really equivalent in the sense of having the same epistemic validity. Related issues have recently been discussed by A. D. Smith in the context of the modern debate about externalism and the so-called disjunctive conception of appearances (Smith 2008). What makes the question raised by de los Reyes Melero distinct from the discussion of the so-called "Highest Common Factor" model of perceptual appearances is that his question does not as such concern the skeptical worry stemming from the idea that all our appearances could in principle be misleading (see Jensen 2013 for a discussion of the Highest Common Factor Model and Merleau-Ponty; see Alweiss 2013 for a discussion of Husserl and Humean skepticism); rather the issue is what entitles us to believe that the appearances we have now could not in principle be replaced by another "world of appearances" that would be just as coherent and therefore just as legitimate; or, put it in a different way, whether the constitutive relation between the normality of

bodily capacities and objectivity, does not force us to allow different, mutually incommensurable "worlds of appearances" relative to different normalities.

The central reason for Husserl's denial of such a possibility of internally coherent but mutually exclusive worlds, brought out by de los Reyes Melero, is that admitting such a possibility commits one to the idea that two distinct subjects or communities of subjects could constitute each their world without any possibility that the two subjects or communities could ever enter into meaningful communication. It is this very same emphasis on the communicability between different mutually alien home-worlds that Heinämaa argued plays a constitutive role for the notion of an objective world. We can tentatively formulate Husserl's thought here in terms of a dilemma: Either we conceive of the alternative world of appearances as having at least a minimum of overlap with our world, in which case we are not conceiving of a radical replacement of our phenomenal world with another; or there is no overlap whatsoever, in which case we lose our grip on the idea that what we have in mind is a world at all since there is, *ex hypothesi*, no possible way for us to make sense of the content of the appearances of that world. By bringing out the role of communicability and language in Husserl's conception of objectivity, Melero and Heinämaa's papers can be read as an invitation to a further dialogue with work in analytical philosophy, for instance that of Davidson (cf. Davidson 1973/1974) and with the Hermeneutic development of phenomenology through Gadamer.

Simo Pulkkinen, in his paper "Lifeworld as an Embodiment of Spiritual Meaning: The Constitutive Dynamics of Activity and Passivity," investigates a different aspect of the way in which perceptual content is, according to Husserlian phenomenology, relative to the subject. Pulkinnen's starting point is a certain apparent contradiction in Husserl's account of the relation between *passivity* and *activity*, or to use more traditional, Kantian terms, between *sensibility* and *understanding*. On the one hand, Husserl claims that what is passively received in sensibility includes the spiritual or cultural meaning of material objects that function as implements in the life-world: When I see a fork *as* a fork we shouldn't understand this phenomena as a two-stage process, where first I have a mere material object given in sensory consciousness and then I, through the intervention of a higher cognitive faculty, project the meaning 'fork' onto the object presented. On the other hand, Husserl also claims that the content we are presented with in the 'personalistic attitude', i.e. the attitude that allows the cultural or specifically human meaning of material objects to appear, is always the product of activities of the ego and therefore something that exceeds that which is given in *pure passivity*. Pulkkinen argues that we find the resources within the works of Husserl to show why this apparent contradiction is merely apparent. In order to dissolve the contradiction, Pulkkinen suggests, we need first to we recognize the logical independence of the following two claims about the relation between passivity and activity:

> Claim (A): All active modes of consciousness are founded upon passive modes of consciousness.
> Claim (B): All content received in passive modes of consciousness is independent of the meaning-contribution of any active modes of consciousness.

Claim (A) is a claim about the formal founding relation between two modes of consciousness. It states that any active mode of consciousness, i.e. any mode that involves an attending ego, presupposes the existence of a passive mode of consciousness: something must be given passively before the attention of the ego can be activated. Claim (B) concerns the constitution of the possible content given in passive modes of consciousness, for instance in the horizon of an intentional act of attending visually to a fork on the table. According to Pulkkinen, these two claims have often been conflated within Husserl scholarship, but there is no necessary logical connection between the two. The constitution of the passively given cultural meaning of an object might very well depend on some prior activities of the ego, without this endangering the claim that in any given case of an active taking up of such meaning, either via attention or via a judgement, the meaning must be first given in a passive mode of consciousness.

In the latter part of his paper, Pulkkinen explicates how Husserl's notion of a *secondary passivity* and the accompanying concepts of habitual and associative transferences of meaning can be read as giving us exactly an account of how the meaning that is directly and passively given in perception, can encompass the cultural meaning constituted through the prior activities of the subject or the community that she belongs to.

In his analysis of the Husserlian account of passivity, Pulkkinen draws extensively on the manuscripts on the life-world recently published in Husserliana Volume XXXIX (Husserl 2008). Tom Nenon's contribution, "Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl's Research Manuscripts on the Life-world," offers an important evaluation of exactly these manuscripts. Nenon begins by tracing the evolution of the concept of the 'life-world' in Husserl's work. As Nenon points out, Husserl actually spends very little time in the *Crisis* describing the structures of the life-world itself, rather, in the first half of that book, he concentrates on retracing the stages of the emergence of the modern scientific notion of an idealized and mathematized 'nature' as the proper object of scientific knowledge (in the figure of Galileo), and later in the book on how the theoretical attitude emerges out of the life-world, and how the philosophical attitude and eventually transcendental philosophy emerge. *Ideas* II does contain a large number of analyses of everyday life in the life-world, and Nenon claims that the manuscripts in Husserliana Volume XXXIX (Husserl 2008) offer a real enrichment of our understanding of Husserl's accounts of the life-world which go beyond but do not contradict the earlier analyses in *Ideas* II.

Nenon is particularly struck by what he calls Husserl's 'ontological realism', in that he stresses the foundational role by natural objects, "realities" (*Realitäten* is Husserl's own word) that at first blush appear to reverse the emphasis that Husserl had placed in the *Ideas II* on the foundational priority of the personalistic attitude. This also appears to run counter to Husserl's explicit adherence to transcendental idealism. Nenon however argues that this impression is somewhat misleading, and that the priority of "realities" is not to an attempt to reduce all objects to natural items in the sense of modern natural science, but is rather a consequence of a recognition of the crucial role that "realities" play in mediating interpersonal communication. Nenon argues that the "realities" encountered in the life-world

have different and more complex structures than the mathematically idealized and non-intuitive entities that populate the realm of nature as described in the modern mathematical and natural sciences. Husserl's ontology of realities, according to Nenon, is actually a kind of Aristotelian everyday natural realism according to which the world is an aggregate of individual spatio-temporally located objects, including human beings and other animals, experienced through their sensibly intuitable properties that are intersubjectively identifiable and describable. With his emphasis on the ontological dimension of Husserl's notion of life-world, Nenon complements the discussion of Pulkinnen. With Nenon's interpretation of "realities" we get a notion that seems to escape the dichotomy between the natural and the cultural and as such it seems to support Pulkinnen's claim that for Husserl there is no layer of perceptual givenness that is not already permeated by meaning constituted in the personalistic attitude.

Like de los Reyes Melero, Nenon emphasises that for Husserl, the kinds of objects and properties we encounter in the life-world depend on the kinds of bodily organs we have, and he also argues that such relativity does not take away the objectivity of the 'realities' we encounter. In addition Nenon elucidates, how even our awareness of non-real objects, is, according to Husserl mediated by the ability to be affected in a bodily way through them. On Nenon's account of Husserl, it is only through the movements of our bodies that we can interact with and change the realities that populate the world; even our interactions with non-real objects such as mathematical entities are mediated by embodied activities such as writing, counting on one's fingers, and so on. Husserl, moreover, does not think of rationality as simply added on to an animal set of capacities, our whole human being is spiritual through and through, and hence even the most physical of corporeal activities is shot through with transcendent meaning. Here again Nenon and Pulkkinin's papers supplement one another as they both highlight how the idea of an interpenetration of sensibility, motricity and understanding that Jensen and Morris find in Merleau-Ponty's work was already at work in Husserl's thinking.

Part III: The Body in Sickness and Health: Some Case Studies

The four papers in Part III supply concrete examples of how the constitutive interaction between bodily self-experience, the experience of an intersubjective life-world and the experiences of others investigated in Part II can undergo dramatic changes in cases of illness. The papers of Katherine Morris and Dorothée Legrand both begin with a critical discussion of definitions found in DSM-IV (the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). Morris' focus is on pain disorders, in particular 'chronic pain syndrome', whereas Legrand investigates eating disorders, in particular anorexia. Both papers combine a phenomenological approach mainly inspired by Merleau-Ponty, with a specific

other discipline, namely medical anthropology in the case of Morris and Lacanian psycho-analysis in the case of Legrand.

In the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's integrative phenomenology, Katherine Morris in her paper "Chronic Pain in Phenomenological/Anthropological Perspective" offers us a prolegomenon to a future integration of the anthropology of medicine and the phenomenology of the body in the form of a phenomenology of chronic pain. As such her paper is a part of a growing interest in the phenomenology of illness and medicine and the phenomenology of pain in particular (cf. Svenaeus 2000; Käll and Zeiler 2013; Käll 2013). In her paper, Morris brings into focus three interrelated aspects of the experience of chronic pain: (1) the disruption of the subject's life-world, (2) the transformation of her lived body, and (3) the diminished possibility of bodily reciprocity. Morris in effect presents a case study that illustrates the general point about the intersubjective nature of our life-world and its foundedness upon a shared bodily normality made by de los Reyes Melero, Heinämaa and Nenon in their contributions to this volume. As to the first aspect, the constant pain or fear of pain affect the way the world shows up for the subject. Affordances that used to be unambiguously inviting now appear as obstacles or even deterrents. Rather than showing up as an unproblematic opportunity for action, a staircase leading up to the bathroom now raises a bodily alertness and evokes an anticipation of pain. This alteration of what Rietveld in his essay calls the field of affordances is intimately related to the second aspect investigated by Morris, namely the transformation of the lived body. Morris uses Iris Marion Young's descriptions of 'feminine intentionality' in order to articulate the kind of ambiguity she identifies in the pain-sufferer's experience. The appearance of the world as presenting obstacles and deterrents is correlated with an experience of a lack of bodily ability, an "I cannot" rather than Husserl's "I can", which should not be confused with an experience of one's body as a mere object, as *Körper*. The experience is exactly of one's body as *both* object and subject, as *Leibkörper*, partly because the habits ingrained in the body aren't simply erased with the inhibitions introduced by the pain.

The third aspect of chronic pain highlighted by Morris is an outcome of the alterations in the expressive behaviour of pain sufferers which results from the constant surveillance of the body and the accompanying inhibitions of action. The sufferer is caught in a kind of intersubjectivity dilemma, because pain has become the norm rather than the exception in her life. If she expresses her pain as one would normally do, namely with what Legrand calls merely expressive symptoms, such as cries and grimaces, then these will, because of their frequency, most likely call forth suspicion and annoyance rather than empathy or sympathy in others. But if she represses such immediate bodily expressions, which is commonly the case, her verbal communication of her pain will also become the object of suspicion and disbelieve: Isn't she just someone in need of attention? Morris here appeals to Merleau-Ponty's notion of a bodily reciprocity that forms the basis for mutual empathy. If Merleau-Ponty is right that the basis for empathy lies in a reciprocity of bodily gestures and expressions which takes place at the level of the

lived body itself then a disturbance of the expressivity of the lived body is bound to have consequences for the possibility of mutual empathy.

In her paper "Inter-Subjectively Meaningful Symptoms in Anorexia," Dorothée Legrand makes a plea for a certain general conception of at least one kind of symptoms characteristic of psycho-pathologies through an investigation of the more specific symptoms of anorexia. Legrand's aim is to articulate an understanding of the symptoms which steers clear of both a purely bio-medical approach and an abstract psycho-analytic approach, where the former reduce the symptoms to those measurable from a third person stand-point and the latter reduce the specific symptoms encountered in a clinical settings to the variables of a general theory of the unconscious. The central claim of Legrand's proposal is that certain symptoms of anorexia and of psycho-pathologies in general are meaningful because they are expressive, or even communicative. The symptoms are expressive in the sense that their visible manifestation is inherently related to their meaning. Legrand here makes an analogy with Merleau-Ponty's conception of the relation between the meaning expressed by a word and the word expressing the meaning as one of embodiment rather than a merely contingent relation whose non-existence could leave the meaning intact.

Legrand's central claim about the expressive nature of the symptoms implies that they are also inherently intersubjective. The expressive symptoms are public manifestations of the experiences of the anorexic person, and Legrand argues that at least in some cases the meaningful symptoms should be understood as communicative. Such communicative expressions may be conscious or unconscious, but what distinguishes them from merely expressive symptoms is the way they must be understood as orientated towards someone, perhaps someone specific, the family of the person or even the therapist.

Legrand proposes a general understanding of the refusal of eating by the anorexic patient as a refusal to be reduced to a mere thing and a refusal to reduce intersubjective relations to a mere transaction of food or things, but she also urges that one must in each case understand the meaning of symptom's in their specific communicative context. At this point we can see how Morris' and Legrand's paper mutually supplement and perhaps to some extent challenge one another. Morris also emphasises the possibility of an understanding of the meaning of bodily expressions of chronic pain sufferers, and, like Legrand she also notes that the mere possibility does not imply that an actual understanding takes place. By bringing in the work of anthropologists, Morris substantiates the idea that the specific social context must be taken into consideration when we are trying to understand meaningful symptoms. The anthropologist S. M. Low's notion of embodied metaphors, as reconstructed by Morris, exactly regards chronic pain as a bodily expression that can convey social, cultural as well as political meaning. Morris urges that the understanding of repressed desires that find a bodily expression is not solely the task of the psychoanalyst but also of anthropologists, and in general the people around the person in question. Nothing in Legrand's paper contradicts this claim, but her paper offers a framework that, if successful, would allow us to understand how the meaning of symptoms can be at once singular and subjective and available to be understood by others.

The notion of expressive symptoms developed by Legrand has a certain affinity with the notion of a 'feature' or an 'essential characteristic' (*Merkmal*) as it has been developed in the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry pioneered by Karl Jaspers and further developed in the twentieth century by, among others, Eugene Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger, Kurt Schneider and Victor von Gebsattel. As Stefano Micali makes clear in his paper, "The Alteration of Embodiment in Melancholia," the notion of essential characteristics also supplies an alternative to the usual understanding of symptoms in medicine, where a symptom is understood as a sign that is only contingently related to that which it is a sign of, like smoke can be a sign of fire.

Micali's paper stands firmly in the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry. It offers a detailed and critical discussion of the way this tradition has conceived of severe depression or, as it is known in this tradition, melancholia, and in particular the way disturbances of the experience of embodiment has been considered an essential characteristic of the melancholic condition. He identifies three interrelated dimensions in which we find disturbances of embodiment in melancholia, which to a large degree correspond to the three aspects of chronic pain identified by Morris: (1) The relation between the body and the surrounding environment, (2) the way in which the body feels itself, and (3) the relation between the subject's body and the body of another (intercorporeality). Micali discusses how the notion of corporealization has been used by authors in this tradition to capture the way the three dimensions are altered in melancholia. The three different understandings of the process of corporealization distinguished by Micali has as their common denominator the negative claim that corporealization consist in the loss of the usual transparency of the lived body. At this level of abstraction, the notion could also be used to characterize what Morris calls the ambiguity of the bodily experiences of people who suffer from chronic pain syndrome.

In the latter parts of his paper, Micali argues that though the tradition is right to characterize the experience associated with corporealization as an experience of void, it has failed to provide a positive description of this phenomenon. According to Micali, the experience of void must be understood as involving both a distortion of the primal impression of inner time-consciousness and of the passive synthesis which normally constitutes our spatial experience of our life-world including our fellow subjects. Micali here deploys some of Husserl's basic notions investigated in other essays in this volume (Pulkinen and Nenon discuss passive synthesis and de los Reyes Melero's discusses time-consciousness). He thereby presents an alternative to the dominant approach within the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry which conceptualizes melancholia in Heideggerian terms as a vanishing of Dasein's ecstatic projection of possibilities. Such a conceptualization, Micali warns, risks simplifying the complex relationship between bodily self-experience, experience of the world and experience of others, and thereby risks overlooking that the experience of void is a positive phenomenon which cannot be reduced to the experience of "Not" (*Erfahrung des Nicht*).

In his contribution "The Structure of Interpersonal Experience," Matthew Ratcliffe also draws on the understanding of melancholia developed within

phenomenological psychiatry. However, the psychiatric cases play a different role in Ratcliffe's paper since his aim is to argue for a general phenomenological claim and then support it with phenomenological studies of depression, rather than, as does Micali, to argue for a certain understanding of a specific psychiatric illness exploiting some general phenomenological analyses.

The main claim made by Ratcliffe is that the sense of the presence of another person is an irreducible experience which consists in the appreciation of the specific kind of potential of the other to transform the possibilities or affordances offered to one by the world. Against, or at least supplementing, the approach to social cognition found in Theory Theories and in Simulation Theories, Ratcliffe argues that our basic experiential recognition of the presence of another person consist in a specific change in our bodily self-awareness that cannot be explained in terms of a theory-based inference or a simulation procedure, be they implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious. He finds his general thesis expounded in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre's famous example of a voyeur who is caught looking through a keyhole illustrates the claim. When the person hears a creaking floorboard behind him there is an immediate change in the way the world shows up for him which is inseparable from an instant change in his bodily self-awareness in the form of an overwhelming sense of awkwardness and shame. We can imagine how the world now shows up for him as empty of hiding places and how the key hole no longer appears as an alluring possibility for seeing without being seen. Ratcliffe attributes to Sartre the general insight that the sense of the presence of another person consists in a certain (potential) modification of the possibilities offered one by the world, but argues that this modification need not consist in a deprivation of one's own possibilities. The change in the appearance of the world could just as well consist in an opening up of a new horizon of relevant affordances and in that sense be an extension of the kind of freedom described by Rietveld.

What is then the specific kind of potential modification of the possibilities offered by one's world that is characteristic for the experience of the presence of another person? Ratcliffe argues that it is in fact a possibility for a specific kind of interaction with the other person herself which is appreciated when one senses the presence of her qua person. He explicates the characteristically personal relation involved with the Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup's notion of a trustful relation, understood as a relation of mutual openness and responsibility that allows one to enter a self-transformative interaction with the other. It is at this point that Ratcliffe brings in psycho-pathological conditions in order to substantiate his general claim. Ratcliffe argues that cases of severe depression, paranoid schizophrenia and autism in different ways support his claim that the sense of others as persons is inextricably connected to how one experiences one's own embodiment and to how one experiences the possibilities offered by the world. As is brought out in detail in Micali's paper, this is particularly convincing in the case of severe depression or melancholia, where we can find a significant alteration of one's own bodily presence accompanied by a flattening of the world and a lack of sense of the presence of the other as another person.

Ratcliffe also touches upon a theme that runs through all four papers of this chapter: When one is faced with a person who has a significantly reduced or altered ability to enter into the basic kind of mutual recognition that marks the interpersonal relation, then one can be faced with the challenge of keeping intact one's own experience of the other as another person exactly because the experience of the other as a person is confirmed through an interaction characterized by such mutual recognition. As pointed out by Micali, the phenomenology of melancholia, and we might say illness in general, should not restrict itself to the perspective of the one who is suffering from the illness, but needs to include the experience of the one who interacts with the sufferer.

Part IV: Intercorporeality and Intersubjectivity: Ideality, Language and Community

Joona Taipale's paper, "Facts and Fantasies—Embodiment and the early Formation of Selfhood," adds a new dimension to the understanding of intersubjectivity by investigating the kinds of relations we have with others who are not present but who still influence us. As Taipale suggests, other persons feature in our lives even when we are not in fact present with them, perceive, remember or imagine them. They are, as it were, embedded in our psychic stream and their absent 'presence' exercises a subterranean but very real force on us. I can be conscious of—and be guided in my action by—what my (now dead) mother would think of me if she were to see me performing some action. Or I may realize that I am aware of my father's hopes for me and may share his imagined disappointment. Furthermore, as Taipale points out, our relations with others begin from our earliest conscious moments and progress and develop through our lives. Early life experiences are sedimented in our current adult stances and attitudes, just as others are also embedded in our psyches.

Taipale simultaneously targets what he regards as two common misconception: on the one hand the idea that the psychoanalytic tradition is split between two mutually exclusive accounts of the relation between self and other in infancy, namely the 'symbiosis' theory and the 'primal differentiation' theory; on the other hand the view that Husserl's conception of the relation between self and other is incompatible with Freud's theory, as well as that of later theorists such as Margaret Mahler, exactly because these psychoanalysts adhere to the symbiosis theory whereas Husserl is committed to a version of the primal differentiation theory.

There can be no doubt that in opposition to William James, for instance, Husserl laid a strong stress on the presence of the ego in all our experiences including early infant experiences: "The infant or rather the embryo that is entering the world [. . .] is not a person, but it is nevertheless an ego-pole" (Husserl 2008: 230). It is also certain that we find explicit statements in the works of psychoanalysts such as Freud, Mahler and Winnicott to the effect that prior to any differentiation between self and other the infant lives in a state of undifferentiated fusion with the mother.

What Taipale draws attention to is the fact that the same authors also seem committed to something that looks very much like the Husserlian idea of a basic kinesthetic sense of self that is present or at least emerging from the beginning of the infant's conscious life. Taipale argues that rather than revealing an internal inconsistency, this indicates the possibility of a theoretical reconciliation of the symbiosis and the differentiation theory. The difference between the approaches should be seen as stemming from different emphases. The symbiosis theories emphasise the pleasure seeking fantasies of the infant that results in the experience of merger in an incorporation of the other; whereas differentiation theories emphasise the veridical kinesthetic self-awareness of the infant, where, as we might put it, the lived body of the infant corresponds to the body perceivable by others. It is on the basis of this interpretation of the relation between the two theories that Taipale makes his claim that rather than contradicting Husserl's account, the psychoanalysts who emphasise the symbiotic nature of the early self-other relation should be read as offering a supplementary account that highlights the crucial role of fantasy in the development of selfhood.

Carlos Lobo's contribution "Self-variation and Self-modification—or the Different Ways of Being Other" is a subtle analysis of Husserl's complex accounts of empathy, especially as conducted in the Fourth and Fifth Cartesian Meditations. In those Meditations, Husserl attempts to arrive at the constitution of the other subject through a process that begins from a rigorous examination of the nature of 'self-experience' (*Selbsterfahrung*) and through a set of variations, modifications and modalisations arrives at the possibility of the other. Husserl calls this apprehension of the other 'other-experience' (*Fremderfahrung*) or 'empathy' (*Einfühlung*). Lobo points out that Husserl was very uncomfortable with the term 'empathy' which was inherited from German psychology and aesthetic theory especially Volkert and Lipps. In the end, Husserl seems to have abandoned this task of giving an account of empathy built on self-experience as hopeless and he was heavily criticised by Emmanuel Levinas and others for downgrading the other to a mere modification of oneself, literally an *alter ego*. Lobo charts how Husserl begins by developing an 'eidetic egology'—an essentialist account of what belongs to any ego whatsoever—through the exercise of imaginative variation as well as through a genetic phenomenological account. As Lobo quotes Husserl: "The Other (unknown Other) has in advance for us a ontological sense as a variant of ourselves."

Husserl believes one can move from the direct experience of the ego to examine possible variations and thereby arrive at the essence 'ego' in general. Lobo claims that Husserl distinguishes between 'self-variation' (*Selbstvariation*) and 'self-modification' (*Selbstmodifikation*). The alter ego is constituted through a process of self-modification and through the process of taking into consideration not just motivated variations of my ego but freely imagined empty possibilities. The nature of possibility, then, is crucial and indeed possibility itself is a core question in Husserl in regard to his general account of the nature of essences. As Lobo explains, Husserl distinguishes between different kinds or levels of possibilities. There is an important distinction to be made between motivated possibilities and empty

possibilities. Furthermore, as Husserl describes it, his methodology of eidetic variation seems to consist in running through possibilities understood as unmotivated possibilities—empty possibilities rather than remaining in the sphere of motivated possibilities.

Dermot Moran's paper "The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Intertwining and Reflexivity" focuses on the concepts of 'intertwining' and 'chiasm', normally associated primarily with the late Merleau-Ponty of *The Visible and Invisible* (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 1968), and shows how prevalent these notions are in the mature Husserl. Moran argues that the concept of 'chiasm' (*le chiasme, le chiasma*) is often understood to be original to Merleau-Ponty—and indeed the term itself drawn from rhetoric and from medical science (relating to the opting nerve) is first found in him—but in fact it is part of the French phenomenologist's brilliance that he was able to identify the centrality of this conception—without the name—in Husserl, despite the paucity of references to it in the published works available to him. Husserl's idea of 'interwining' (*Verflectung*) is the original inspiration for Merleau-Ponty's '*chiasme*' or '*interlacs*'. Husserl's radical phenomenology of the lived body (*Leib*) already lays the ground for the new way of conceiving conscious embodied conduct that overcomes the Cartesian separation of thought from sensibility that comes to the fore in the late Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's brilliance primarily resides, for Moran, in identifying key themes in Husserl which Husserl himself had not made explicit. As is well known, throughout his work, beginning with *The Structure of Behaviour* (Merleau-Ponty 1942, 1963) right through to his last unfinished *Working Notes* (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 1968), Merleau-Ponty was attempting to overcome both empiricist or sensualist and rationalist or intellectualist approaches to conscious life. The living organic manner in which conscious awareness unifies with the body requires a break with the history of Western philosophy and the generation of new metaphors and images. Merleau-Ponty even coins the term 'body subject' (*corps sujet*)—although he uses it very rarely—to express the indissoluble unity of body and subjectivity. But in his last work especially, Merleau-Ponty tried to overcome the dualisms that he felt still haunted his account in *The Phenomenology of Perception*. Merleau-Ponty in fact proposes a new monism of the 'flesh'. 'Flesh', according to Merleau-Ponty's account in *The Visible and the Invisible*, is essentially characterized by 'reversibility' (*réversibilité*), 'the finger of the glove that is turned inside out' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 311; 1968, 263) and 'doubling'—'the doubling up of my body into inside and outside' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 311; 1968, 264). Indeed, he identifies 'chiasm' with 'reversibility' (see Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 312; 1968, 264). For Merleau-Ponty, 'chiasm', 'intertwining' or 'interlacing' (*l'interlacs*) essentially expresses the manner in which my bodily awareness is both drawn together into a unity and also 'doubled' and even 'reversed', e.g. when one hand touches the other. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a general 'duplicity' (*duplicité*) and, as he puts it in 'Eye and Mind', a 'reflexivity of the sensible' (*une réflexivité du sensible*, Husserl 1964b, 24, 168). Merleau-Ponty speaks of the 'insertion of the world between the two leaves of my body' and 'the insertion of my body between the two leaves of each thing and of the world' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 312; 1968, 264). Reflection and higher-level

thought, furthermore, must be reinterpreted on the model of this intertwined sensuous incarnation with its inner reversal, doubling, self-emptying and self-distantiation. The conscious subject has to be understood as 'the sensible that hollows itself out' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 260; 1968, 210).

Tom Baldwin's paper "Language as the Embodiment of Geometry" offers a very interesting and sustained reflection on Edmund Husserl's discussion in his late work 'The Origin of Geometry' of the role of language in the constitution of idealities. Baldwin is interested in Husserl's assumptions concerning the kind of a priori intuition involved in the apprehension of geometry and how that maps on to perceptual experiences of space in the life-world. In particular Baldwin focuses on Husserl's use of the term 'living body of language' (*Sprachleib*) to characterize the way geometric idealities (ideal objects or truths such as 'the Pythagorean Theorem') are preserved and transmitted across time through being expressed in written symbols and diagrams. Husserl's question is how we can move from the intersubjective practices of humans to the establishment of trans-temporal idealities as objective. As Baldwin points out, it is not just a matter of having written symbols temporally outlast the activities of the originating geometers, but rather that the insights of those geometers can somehow be *re-activated* and the kinds of original self-evidence that they had can be re-experienced. Baldwin's argument is that Husserl is correct to claim that language embodies geometry and mathematics but he believes the justification for this claim is not the one Husserl himself adduced. In part, this is because, as Baldwin argues, Husserl did not sufficiently appreciate the role of formal proofs and he went astray in his foundationalist attempt to anchor scientific insights in experiences in the life-world. Baldwin thus challenges Husserl's return to the life-world and thereby also challenges, at least to a certain point, points made by Nenon and Pulkkinen in their contributions in this volume.

For Baldwin, Husserl makes two basic and interrelated mistakes: first, he holds that geometrical discoveries are based upon 'prescientific' practices or experiences which can be reactivated through geometrical demonstrations; and secondly, he maintains that the content of those experiences as reactivated is *self-evident*. Against the latter claim, Baldwin suggests that what matters is the procedure of logical proof. Against the former claim, Baldwin maintains that the experiences in the life-world are of no help when it comes to understanding matters such as the curvature of space-time. These scientific concepts find their validity within the network of scientific claims that support them—and are not relatable to everyday experience. It is not the case, furthermore, Baldwin suggests, that somehow Euclidean geometry is closer to our life-world than contemporary geometry.

Baldwin contrasts Husserl's confidence in self-evidence with Bertrand Russell's strong scepticism about the possibility of arriving at self-evidence and its overall usefulness in logical and mathematical proof. In agreement with Russell, Baldwin suggests that in fact intuition involves a degree of reasoning and, moreover, reasoning that can be confirmed by others. Baldwin believes that a shared understanding of geometrical thoughts can be substantiated by adding that this shared

understanding is essentially a matter of the understanding and acceptance of patterns of geometrical reasoning *as manifested in written demonstrations*. The true criterion of evidence, Baldwin suggests, is that the geometric insight can be presented as a formal proof in which each step draws only on formal rules of inference that have been specified in advance. It is this whole *process* that language encapsulates and preserves. In sum, Baldwin argues that Husserl here is remaining a foundationalist, a position he regards as outmoded in relation to contemporary theorizing about science.

Timo Miettinen's paper, "The Body Politic: Husserl and the Embodied Community," explores the contribution of Husserlian phenomenology to the areas of social cognition and social ontology, two topics that are generating a great deal of interest among contemporary analytic philosophers. Miettinen is specifically focused on the problem of collective embodiment. He interrogates the metaphor of the body that is found in the expression 'the body politic', a metaphor that recurs in Western philosophy from Plato onwards. As Miettinen recognises, the discussion of sociality and communality was central to early—and often neglected—phenomenologists such as Gerda Walther and Edith Stein. Furthermore, there is a long tradition (referred to by several contributors in this volume, including Heinämaa) that presumes Husserl's own phenomenology was built around the solitary subject, *solus ipse*, and thus, it falls into the trap of *solipsism* or *subjective idealism*. In opposition to this view, Miettinen offers a compelling account of Husserl's own phenomenology of sociality. In his writings in the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl became very interested in the description of life lived in the plural, what he often calls 'we-subjectivity' (*Wir-Subjektivität*). He was also concerned to overcome what he took to be the rigidification of social life and to generate a creative renewal of society. Husserl was one of the first to explicitly talk about 'social acts' (a conception also developed by Adolf Reinach). He also sees social groupings, societies and corporations—what he calls generally 'socialities'—as behaving like human persons 'writ large'. Husserl explicitly speaks of these social groupings as 'personalities of a higher-order' (*Personalitäten der höherer Ordnung*). Miettinen claims that Husserl employs the analogy of the body in relation to social groupings for three main purposes: to describe the peculiar *materiality*, *autonomy* and the *normative ideal* of the social collective. Husserl discusses many different kinds of group and social collectives—each with their own principle of organisation—and he arranges them in a hierarchy. But his highest ideal—the normative ideal of community—he calls the 'community of love' (*Liebesgemeinschaft*). Husserl believes that communities have certain communal identities, can make decisions, and have a form of agency that is not equal to the agency and activity of the sum of the individual members, although the communal agency and decisions are *founded* on those of the individual members. Husserl even speaks of the 'unity of super-personal consciousness'. In several manuscripts also, Husserl speaks of communities as having a kind of body. There is a "collective bodily existence" (*kollektive Leiblichkeit*) that communities

develop through their individual members. Communal personalities are always tied to a particular place or region. A family, for instance, often defines its collective spatial orientation with regard to home, which serves as its zero-point for orientation. Higher-order personalities have specific kinds of organic unity—members can be replaced, e.g. members of a football team, without the team losing its identity.

Miettinen sees Husserl's contribution primarily as emphasising the passive elements in social experience whereas much recent social ontology (e.g. Raimo Tuomela) focuses more on active co-operation or active commitment between social agents. Husserl speaks about our participation in an "open intersubjectivity" (*offene Intersubjektivität*) where others are encountered as anonymous subjects who co-constitute the world with me. This is Husserl's version of what Heidegger calls '*das Man*'. We drive on roads that others have built and that others use. Houses, streets and parks all belong to the public 'they'. Mietinnen—and Moran—both emphasise the manner in which humans live lives that are interwoven. People do not live side by side, but intertwined, *Ineinander*, to use one of Husserl's terms.

The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Themes for Future Research

It is not entirely surprising that the majority of contributors to this volume focus on the insights of the classic phenomenologists: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, in particular and to a lesser degree Heidegger. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are philosophers of embodiment par excellence. Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have shown how much perception is an embodied activity and how it interweaves with other cognitive states such as imagination, memory, and intentional action generally. One of Sartre's great strengths as a phenomenologist is that he has many insights to convey about the emotions and about the dynamics of human intercorporeal relations generally. Heidegger, with his strong emphasis on a kind of 'ready-to-hand' coping within the lived world, is also a major inspiration to contemporary philosophers of mind and cognitive sciences as several of the contributors to this volume have shown. But it is clearly the case that there is much more to the phenomenological tradition—including the work of Edith Stein and Max Scheler on the emotions and on empathy, and the work of Alfred Schutz on intersubjectivity and the phenomenology of the social world. A further volume would be needed to explore these fruitful areas.

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Part I
The Acting Body: Habit, Freedom and Imagination

Habit and Attention

Komarine Romdenh-Romluc

The things we do – our actions – can be contrasted with the things that merely happen to us. The dominant view distinguishes actions from happenings on the grounds that the former are essentially brought about and guided by intentions. Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative account, according to which doings are primarily initiated and guided by the agent's apprehension of her environment. Intentions may still play a role in bringing about action, but they are not essential, and the way they influence behaviour is conceived differently on his view. In this chapter, I consider two important factors that contribute to our actions: habit and attention. Surprisingly, these have been largely ignored by proponents of the dominant view, despite their significance for agency. Here, I argue that whilst neither can be satisfactorily accommodated on the dominant model, Merleau-Ponty's framework offers a nice explanation of them. This gives us some reason to prefer a Merleau-Pontyian account to the dominant view. I will begin by outlining the dominant model in more detail. After this, I will present three cases that illustrate the importance of habit and attention, and provide arguments to show that their role in action cannot be adequately explained by the dominant view. I will then present Merleau-Ponty's alternative model, and show how it accounts for the contribution made by attention and habit to agency.

1 The Dominant View of Action

The dominant view is that actions are essentially brought about and guided by the agent's intentions. Intentions are mental states that represent the agent's performance of action. They are conceived as propositional attitudes. Having an intention involves taking up an action-initiating attitude – Mele (1992) calls this an

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'executive' attitude – towards a certain proposition. Theorists usually distinguish intentions that bring about action at some later date, and those that bring about action now. Bratman (1984) calls them 'future-directed' and 'present-directed' intentions, respectively. There are two variants of the dominant account. The Simple View holds that an intentional act of φ-ing is brought about by an intention with the content, 'I φ'. The Single Phenomenon View, in contrast, holds that the agent need not have an intention to φ; instead, her intentional act of φ-ing may be brought about by intentions with other relevant content – such as intentions that represent the performance of the component actions that constitute φ-ing.[1] For some movement to count as an action, it must be brought about by the agent's intentions in the right sort of way, i.e., non-deviantly. Theorists disagree over how this should be cashed out, but the debate need not concern us here. Suffice to say that it rules out cases of the following sort. I have my rifle trained on the prime minister, whom I intend to shoot. I am very nervous and sweating profusely as a result of my plan. My finger slips, my rifle goes off, and a bullet lodges in the prime minister. In this case, my intention to shoot the prime minister brings about my shooting of her. However, the shooting is not an action I perform, but something that happens accidentally. It is not an action because whilst it is brought about by my intention to shoot, my intention does not bring about the shooting in the right way.

There is a further distinction between types of intention that corresponds to the difference between two sorts of explanation one might give of agency. Agency is a personal level phenomenon – only animals, *qua* animals, can be agents. However, there are subpersonal mechanisms that underlie the performance of action. We can therefore distinguish between an explanation of agency, which will be an explanation at the personal level, and an explanation of the mechanisms that underlie agency, which will be an explanation at the subpersonal level. Correspondingly, a distinction is drawn between personal and subpersonal intentions. Personal intentions are the sort of state that may enter into explanations at the personal level. They are, in principle, available to consciousness (even though the subject may not, in fact, be conscious of all of them), and can figure in her practical reasoning. Subpersonal intentions may enter into explanations of the mechanisms that underlie action. They are, in principle, unavailable to consciousness, and are incapable of figuring in the subject's practical deliberations. Instead, they are components of hypothesized subpersonal mechanisms, responsible for executing action. One may hold that actions essentially involve one sort of intention without holding that they essentially involve the other. Thus one may think that personal intentions are essential for agency without supposing that the mechanisms that underlie action involve subpersonal intentions. Conversely, one may hold that subpersonal intentions are essential components of the mechanisms that underlie action without thinking that personal intentions are necessary. I take it that the dominant view of agency is intended to be a personal level explanation of action. It

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[1] This distinction is due to Bratman (1984).

is an account of what agency – a personal level phenomenon – essentially is, rather than an explanation of the mechanisms that underlie it. It follows that we should understand the dominant view as claiming that actions are essentially brought about by the subject's *personal* intentions, and that this claim is neutral with respect to the question of whether subpersonal intentions are essential for action.

2 Habit and Attention: Problems for the Dominant Model

I will argue that habit and attention play important roles in action, and that this cannot be properly captured by the dominant model.

I will begin by considering two cases that illustrate the contribution of attention and habit.

- Case 1: suppose that I consciously deliberate about what to do and decide to go for a picnic. I make some sandwiches and set off on my bicycle for the picnic spot. I become distracted thinking about the paper I am writing, and rather than cycling straight up the road to the picnic spot, I turn off and cycle along my habitual route to work. I realise this with some annoyance after a short interval, and turn back.
- Case 2: this case is the same as the first, except that I do not become distracted. I pay attention to what I am doing, and cycle to the picnic spot.

Case 1 illustrates the fact that that an agent's habit of φ-ing plays a role in producing her subsequent episodes of φ-ing behaviour. It is because I habitually cycle to work a certain way that I set off along this route when I am not paying attention. Case 2 illustrates attention's role in keeping one's actions on track. It is because I am paying attention to what I am doing that I successfully cycle to the picnic spot. My attentiveness blocks the performance of the irrelevant – i.e., unrelated to my current task – habitual action of cycling work-wards. A satisfactory account of agency must be able to capture these facts. I will first discuss how the dominant view might account for habit, before considering the role of attention.

The dominant view claims that every action is essentially brought about by intentions that represent its performance, or the performance of some other relevant action(s) – e.g., actions that are components of the one performed. The dominant view must therefore explain the contribution of habit in these terms.

One acquires the habit of φ-ing through repeatedly doing so. To explain the contribution habit makes to action, the dominant account must therefore hold that the past repetition of φ-ing behaviour that leads to developing a habit plays some role in producing further intentions to φ. One might suppose that there is an obvious way to make sense of this proposal. It is sometimes claimed that to build up a habit is to develop a motor routine, which is a template for performing the behaviour in question. The motor routine can be thought of as including intentions that represent the action's performance, or the performance of other relevant action(s). One might then hold that habitual actions are produced by the activation of this motor routine.

In case 1, I develop a motor routine that specifies my cycling a certain route to work. This motor routine is activated, and so I form an intention to cycle to work, which then brings about my behaviour of cycling work-wards.

However, whether or not it is plausible to suppose that acquiring a habit involves developing a motor routine, the dominant account cannot appeal to this analysis to explain the role of habit in agency. The dominant view is an analysis of agency, and as such, it is a personal level explanation of action, which should be read as claiming that actions are essentially initiated by the agent's *personal* intentions. But the most plausible way to understand the analysis suggested above is as a subpersonal explanation of the mechanisms that underlie action. There are different accounts of the personal/subpersonal distinction. Nevertheless, I take it that there is widespread agreement on the following two distinguishing factors. First, subpersonal explanations make no reference to the person or agent *qua* agent. Second, subpersonal explanations are mechanistic, which means that the processes they posit admit of the sort of regularity that can be captured by causal scientific laws. The explanation of habit suggested above fits this conception of the subpersonal. The activation and running of a motor routine is not something that involves the agent *qua* agent. The motor routine is not something followed, implemented, or developed by the agent herself. Each event in the process is set in motion by the previous event, and it in turn causes the next. It is an impersonal process that merely happens. Motor routines exhibit law-like regularity – a routine produces exactly the same sequence of behaviour every time it is activated. It follows that the intentions supposedly produced as part of motor routines must be conceived as subpersonal. Even if this is a correct account of the mechanisms underlying habitual action, it does nothing to vindicate the dominant view, which claims that all actions are essentially brought about by personal intentions.

The dominant view must hold that habitual actions of φ-ing are brought about by personal intentions that represent φ-ing, or the performance of other relevant actions. But there are serious difficulties with this proposal that can be brought out by thinking about case 1. On the present proposal, I cycle work-wards in case 1 either because I intend to do so, or I because I intend to perform some other relevant action. However, it is highly implausible to suppose that I have any such intentions. I intend to go for a picnic. This intention cannot give rise to cycling-towards-work behaviour in the non-deviant way required for this behaviour to be construed as an action. One might try to argue that although I start off intending to go for a picnic, I lose this intention and gain intentions that can produce a cycling work-wards action. But this does not fit the facts of the case. I am annoyed when I notice that I am no longer cycling to the picnic spot, and am instead cycling towards work. The reason for my annoyance is surely that I still intend to go for a picnic. Moreover, although there are cases that we would ordinarily describe as one intention being replaced with another, these are cases where the agent changes her mind. My cycling towards work in case 1 is not the result of my having changed my mind about what to do. Alternatively, one might hold that I do not lose my picnicking intention. Instead, I have conflicting intentions – a picnicking intention and intentions that can produce cycling work-wards. However, this will not do

either. People do sometimes have conflicting intentions. But these are either cases where the agent consciously desires conflicting things and is pulled in two different directions, or where she has simply failed to realise that her intentions are incompatible. The case where I absentmindedly begin cycling to work is not like this. I do not desire to do anything relevant to cycling work-wards. Neither have I simply failed to realise that I cannot both cycle to work and go to the picnic spot at the same time. Furthermore, the appeal to habit in case 1 is supposed to explain why I begin cycling work-wards, even though I intend to go for a picnic. In other words, the explanation holds that my habit produces my action *in the absence of any relevant intentions*. It follows that it is implausible to suppose that my intentions initiate and guide my habitual action of cycling work-wards in case 1. Thus there are some cases of habitual action that are not brought about by the agent's intentions.

One option available to the dominant model at this point is to deny that unintended habitual behaviour, such as my cycling work-wards in case 1, counts as action. However, it seems we should reject this claim. The concept of action is connected with the concept of responsibility. The exact relation between these two notions is complex, but in general, one is responsible for those things one does, or those things one has a hand in bringing about. Intuitively, I am responsible for my cycling work-wards. We can see this by considering the situations in which I am blameworthy. Suppose, e.g., that in turning down the road towards work, I knock over a small child. I am worthy of blame. Similarly, if I am late to meet my friend at the picnic spot because I cycled work-wards, she would be justified in being annoyed with me. In both cases, the fact that I can be blamed for my behaviour shows that I am responsible for it, and the fact that I am responsible for my cycling work-wards in turn strongly suggests that it is an action.

Moreover, I take it that an important difference between an agent's *actions* and those things that merely happen to her, is that the agent has direct control over the former. (Indeed, it is the fact that she has direct control over her actions that confers responsibility for them on the agent, since one can only be responsible for those things one has the power to change.) Her control is *direct* insofar as she does not exercise it by first doing something else. We can contrast cases of direct control with those where control is mediated. For example, I have a certain amount of control over my brother's driving in that if I ask him to drive me to the dentist, he will take me there. But my control over his driving is indirect, since it is mediated by my requests. In my own case, however, I do not need to ask myself in order to drive myself to the dentist. I can simply drive myself to where I want to go. In this way, my control over my driving is direct. The agent has control over at least some of her unintended habitual behaviour in that she can intervene in it, changing its course, or bringing it to a halt. The control she has is direct because she does not need to do anything else in order to intervene in her activity. As Pollard notes, '[b]y an act of will, one can stop oneself from exercising a given habit... merely by paying attention to what one is doing' (Pollard 2006: 59). This is what happens in case 1, where I realise with annoyance that I am cycling work-wards, and by paying attention to my behaviour, I intervene in it, turning round and cycling back towards the picnic spot. The fact that I can directly intervene in my unintended cycling

work-wards means that it is an action. It follows that there are at least some instances of unintended habitual behaviour that we should class as actions. These actions cannot be accommodated on the dominant view of agency.[2]

The dominant view also faces problems in accounting for the role of attention in action. There seem to be two options for understanding attention's role in the production of action. These are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, one might think that to pay attention to what I am doing is to keep my intended course of action before my mind. One might then take this to consist in my intention's occupying my mind, i.e., my having a conscious intention. It follows that a way to try and accommodate the role of attention on the dominant account is to claim that intentions only have the power to produce action when they are conscious. On this proposal, my picnicking intention must be conscious to produce action. When my attention is occupied by other things in case 1 and the intention becomes unconscious, it loses its action-initiating power. But there are problems with this suggestion. For one thing, it's not clear that conscious intentions *do* have greater power to initiate and control action. It is commonly accepted that people may have suppressed mental states that manifest themselves in their behaviour. The subject has no knowledge of her suppressed states, and will often sincerely avow the contrary. Since the dominant account takes all action to be brought about by intention, it must hold that a suppressed state manifests in the subject's behaviour by giving rise to corresponding intentions. My suppressed love for Archibald, e.g., leads to my constantly visiting his house and spending an improper amount of time with him. On the dominant view, this behaviour must result from relevant intentions. However, as the subject avows the contrary of her suppressed state, she may well have conflicting conscious intentions. I may sincerely avow that I do not love Archibald, and consciously intend to only spend a socially acceptable amount of time with him. But these conscious intentions do not prevent the manifestation of the suppressed state. I continue to spend an improper amount of time visiting Archibald. In such a case, the subject's unconscious intentions have greater power to initiate and control her actions than her conscious intentions.

Furthermore, on the present proposal, the attentiveness that enables me to successfully cycle to the picnic spot consists in my consciously thinking about what I am doing. But there are other cases that are at odds with this understanding of attention. I have in mind, the exercise of certain sorts of expertise. Here is one example:

- Case 3: Joan is an expert baseball player. When playing to the best of her ability, she enters a state that has been called 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988). This state is partly characterised by 'intense and focused concentration on what one is doing in the present moment' (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2002: 90). I take this to mean that for Joan to play to the best of her ability, her attention must be focused on what she is doing (although it

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[2] See also, Rietveld's discussion in this volume, which explores in some detail, the sort of freedom that is involved in our unreflective reference after.

does not follow that simply paying attention to the game is sufficient to enter a state of flow).[3] However, if she starts to consciously *think* about where and how to hit the ball, or what her opponent and team-mates are doing, this disrupts her playing.[4]

In a case such as 3, the agent's attentiveness plays a role in bringing about and controlling her activity. Conscious thought – having thoughts occupy one's mind – gets in the way of her performance. It is thus plausible to think that having a conscious intention – having *this* thought occupy one's mind – will similarly disrupt performance. It follows that the agent's attentiveness cannot consist in her having conscious intentions. Moreover, attention's role in this case seems to be the same as its role in case 2. In both, paying attention to what one is doing keeps one's activity on track. This suggests that my attentiveness in case 2 does not consist in my having a conscious intention. We should reject the analysis of attention as awareness of one's intentions.

The second way to understand attention is as a perceptual phenomenon. On this understanding, paying attention makes a difference to my perceptual experience, and it is this difference that accounts for the difference in my behaviour. Intuitively, paying attention allows one to gather the information about the world and one's orientation with respect to it that is required for successful performance of the relevant action. However, it is clear that the difference between paying attention and being inattentive is not the difference between perceiving and not perceiving. It is common to distinguish between background and focal modes of perceptual awareness. One is focally aware of something when it is the focus of one's attention. One has background awareness of the things in one's visual field when one is not paying attention to them. It follows that my inattentiveness in case 1 does not mean that I receive *no* perceptual information about the world and my orientation. Indeed, my inattentiveness in case 1 results in my cycling work-wards. To perform this action, I must perceive the turning to work, my bike, and its relation to my body. Thus I must still perceive these things, even though I am not paying attention.

Instead, one might think that paying attention allows the subject to gather *salient* information. According to this suggestion, my inattentiveness in case 1 means that I do not gather information about the route to the picnic spot. Instead, I gather information about the route to work. By paying attention in case 2, I prevent the gathering of information about the way to work, and gather information relevant to picnicking. There is something right about this suggestion, and I will examine it in

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[3] My description of Joan's expert activity should not be taken to imply that *all* expert activity is characterised by flow, or requires attention.

[4] This phenomenon is well-documented. For example, cricketer Ken Barrington describes loss of form as follows: '*Everything* went wrong with my batting ... You can't change a habit instinctively. When you're playing well you don't think about *anything* and run-making comes naturally. When you're out of form you're conscious of needing to do things right, so you have to think first and act second. To make runs under those conditions is mighty difficult' (Barrington 1968: 97f).

more detail below. But notice that it cannot be developed on the dominant account. The problem is that doing so requires an explanation of why my habit of cycling a certain route to work every day results in my gathering information relevant to this activity when I am not paying attention in case 1. The dominant view cannot explain this because it cannot account for habit.

This is perhaps the central problem the dominant view faces in trying to accommodate the role of attention in action. Paying attention to what one is doing keeps one's activity on track. Case 2 is an example of this. It is because I am paying attention to what I am doing in case 2 that I stay on course for the picnic spot, rather than take the turning for work. My attentiveness blocks the performance of the irrelevant habitual action. Since the dominant account cannot explain how my habitual action in case 1 is produced, it cannot explain how my paying attention in case 2 prevents its production.

3   Merleau-Ponty's Account of Action

In this section, I will present Merleau-Ponty's alternative account of agency.

On Merleau-Ponty's view of action, an agent's doings are initiated and guided by the way in which she apprehends her environment, without the need for any intervening mental states that represent her performance of action (such as intentions). The fundamental way in which the agent apprehends her environment is perceptual, and her perceived environment is able to bring about action without the need for any thought. It is clear from this that his view of action goes hand-in-hand with an account of what it is to perceive. Merleau-Ponty holds that agents do not perceive the world 'neutrally' as possessing merely 'objective' properties such as size and shape. Instead, an agent perceives the world as having a value for her in terms of her capacities for action. She perceives her environment as 'requiring' or 'demanding' or being 'appropriate for' certain actions. Thus she perceives lasagne as for-eating, tennis balls as for-throwing, and ladders as offering an opportunity to climb. The values for action that the agent perceives are sometimes called 'affordances' (Gibson 1977).

The agent perceives these opportunities for action as differing in their 'attractive power', which varies with their saliency. One might say that she perceives her environment as *demanding* that she perform certain actions, whilst merely *suggesting* that she perform others. Some of the things I *could* do in my environment may have so little saliency for me I will not perceive them as opportunities for action at all. Various factors affect the saliency of perceived affordances. These include (but are not restricted to) the agent's current task, her emotional state, and her desires. For example, the faulty brake cable solicits me to mend it more strongly when I am actually engaged in the task of servicing my bike. When I feel bored of working, the television draws me to turn it on. My desire for a new pair of roller skates makes the roller skate shop stand out for me as offering an opportunity to buy some. There are also some things that one cannot help but perceive as demanding

urgent action, no matter what one is doing. A charging bull, e.g., will always be perceived as urgently demanding that one avoid it. We might say that a demand like this is always salient for the agent, given that her nature as an embodied creature continually imposes the task of surviving on her. The agent may sometimes be solicited by conflicting affordances. For example, an agent about to perform a bungee jump may both perceive the drop as demanding that she move away from it, whilst simultaneously inviting her to jump.

Merleau-Ponty holds that the perceived opportunities to act can draw forth the agent's behaviour without the need for any intervening mental states that represent its performance. Her action will be initiated and controlled by the affordances with the strongest 'attractive power'. This is made possible by the possession of motor skills and habits. Motor skills are physical abilities, which range from very simple abilities such as being able to scratch one's foot, through to more complex capacities like the ability to play the clarinet. Motor skills are acquired through practice, which is a process of the body becoming familiar with the activity, until engaging in it feels like 'second nature'. Motor skills are twofold abilities. When one develops a motor skill, one acquires a pattern of behaviour. But one also acquires a capacity to perceive appropriate environments as offering opportunities to engage in that behaviour. Thus when I learn to surf, e.g., I learn to move my balance on the surfboard and steer it with my legs to position myself on the crest of a wave, and I learn to perceive certain waves as offering me opportunities to ride them, and others as 'prohibiting' surfing by being too big or small. On Merleau-Ponty's account, once one has acquired a motor skill, one can perceive opportunities to engage in the relevant form of behaviour, and then immediately respond to this perception by acting, without the need for any intervening mental states that represent one engaging in that activity.

It is clear that the agent's thoughts – including her intentions – sometimes play a role in bringing about her actions. Merleau-Ponty does not offer any detailed analysis of thought's role in action, but his account can be developed to accommodate the role of thought in the following way. Thought brings about action by affecting the way the agent apprehends her environment. There are many ways that thought may do this. First, we saw above that the affordances the agent perceives differ in their 'attractive power', which varies with their saliency. A number of factors can affect the saliency of an affordance. These include the agent's thoughts. For example, the agent's current task or project affects the saliency of affordances. In at least some cases, the agent takes on a project or task by deciding or forming the intention to do so. A decision/intention to engage in some particular project is a thought. In this way, the agent's decisions/intentions influence which opportunities for action are salient for her, and so which affordances draw forth action. Similarly, the agent's desires affect the saliency of affordances – those things she desires or which are relevant to her desires, will be salient for her. Thus her desires affect how strongly an affordance solicits the agent, and so whether it draws forth action.

Thought can also affect the agent's perceived environment by adding merely imaginary entities to her surroundings, which then affect the opportunities for action the agent perceives her environment as offering. The suggestion is *not* that

the agent perceives what she imagines. To do so would be to have some kind of hallucination. Instead, the claim is that by imagining that one's surroundings contain certain non-existent entities, one influences the possibilities one perceives one's real surroundings as offering. Consider this case. Adrian is playing with his young daughter Bella. Bella has an imaginary friend called Chris. They are having a tea party. Adrian and Bella pretend that Chris is sitting on one of the seats. Bella decides that teddy will join them. Adrian looks for a spare chair and adds it to the table. Adrian does not use the chair that he pretends Chris is using. The rival account of action can analyse this case in the following way. Adrian imagines that Chris is sitting on a particular seat. His imagining changes the field of affordances that he perceives. When Adrian looks for an empty chair for teddy, he perceives Chris' chair as empty – he sees that no-one is really sitting on it – but he does not perceive it as appropriate for seating teddy. He does not perceive it as inviting him to seat teddy on it because Adrian *imagines* that it is occupied by Chris. Instead, a spare chair in the corner stands out as salient for seating teddy. Adrian's perception of the spare chair as affording teddy-seating draws him to add it to the table. In this way, Adrian's imagining affects the opportunities he perceives his environment as offering, and so his imagining influences his behaviour. Insofar as imaginings can be classed as a type of thought, this is another way that thought can bring about action on the rival view.

A third way that thought can affect the agent's apprehension of her environment is by adding a further layer of significance to her perceived surroundings. On the rival model of action, this accounts for *some* cases of acquiring a new skill. Once one possesses a skill, one is able to perceive appropriate parts of the world as offering one the opportunity to engage in the relevant sort of behaviour. Perception of these opportunities to act then draws forth one's actions. Prior to acquiring the skill, however, one does not perceive appropriate environments as offering the opportunity to act. One might thus wonder how one does something for the first time, and so begins to acquire a skill on Merleau-Ponty's account. In some cases, this is explained by our capacity to copy another person, which is arguably something that does not require thought. (Very young children can imitate adults before they are capable of thinking.) But one does not always learn a new skill by copying someone else. Moreover, it is undoubtedly the case that we sometimes learn new skills by consciously thinking about what to do. When I first learn to drive, e.g., I have to think about the pedals and what they do. I perceive the pedals as for-pressing. But I do not yet perceive one as for-braking, one as for-accelerating, and one as for-changing-gear. The rival account of action can hold that I represent the pedals' functions in thought. My thought about what the pedals do adds an extra layer of significance to them. Their value for my actions does not just consist in their perceived value as for-pressing; it also includes their mentally represented value – the way that I *think* about them. The combination of the pedals' perceived values and the values I give to them in thought calls forth my actions of pushing the pedals in appropriate situations. Again, my thought influences my actions by affecting the way in which I apprehend my environment.[5]

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[5] See Romdenh-Romluc (2012) for a more detailed account of thought's role in action.

4   Habit and Attention on Merleau-Ponty's Account

The Merleau-Pontyian account presented above offers a nice explanation of the role of habit and attention in agency.

Merleau-Ponty (1962) places habits in the same category as motor skills. Indeed, what later writers such as Dreyfus (2000) call 'motor skills', he simply refers to as 'habits'. It is easy to see why. A motor skill is the capacity to engage with the world in a certain way. It is a particular sort of behaviour that can only be produced in environments of the appropriate sort. Motor skills are acquired through practice, which is a matter of the body's familiarising itself with the behaviour in question. Habits are likewise forms of behaviour that one produces in certain situations. My habit of cycling to work a certain way each day, e.g., is a particular sort of behaviour that I produce in a particular part of the world – my usual route to work. Like motor skills, one acquires a habit by repeatedly doing something in the same way – one's habits just are one's usual patterns of behaviour. Since habits fall into the same category as motor skills, Merleau-Ponty can analyse both in the same way. As we saw above, he holds that motor skills are twofold capacities to both perform certain actions and to perceive relevant parts of the world as affording that behaviour. Once one has acquired a motor skill, one can perceive opportunities to exercise it, and then respond to that perception by acting, without the need for thought. Similarly, when one develops a habit, one both acquires a pattern of behaviour, and a way of perceiving the world – one comes to perceive relevant parts of the world as offering opportunities to perform the habitual actions. Moreover, one can immediately respond to these perceived affordances by performing the actions they invite, without thinking about what one is doing. Thus once I have developed the habit of cycling a certain way to work every day, I come to see that route as soliciting me to take it, and I can immediately respond to this solicitation by cycling along that route, without the need for any intervening thought that represents my cycling (or any other relevant actions).

Whilst Merleau-Ponty categorises habits and motor skills together, in ordinary talk we usually distinguish between them. We might ordinarily say, e.g., that I am skilled at knitting, but not in the habit of doing it because I do not knit very frequently. Merleau-Ponty accommodates this ordinary distinction between skills and habits, even though he places them in the same category. Moreover, this plays an important role in his analysis of habitual action. He thinks of skills and habits as lying on a spectrum. Habits are more frequently repeated patterns of activity. Thus, e.g., I have knitted a sufficient number of times to be a skilled knitter, but I do not knit enough to be in the habit of knitting. On Merleau-Ponty's account, the more one does something, the more vividly opportunities to do that thing will show up for one. It follows that we should expect the affordances related to what we would ordinarily call an agent's habits to show up quite strongly for the agent. What this means, in other words, is that the agent's habits tend to make certain possibilities for action stand out as salient for her – those involved in the habitual behaviour. My habit of eating an apple for breakfast every morning, e.g., means that the apples in

my fruit bowl solicit me to eat them more strongly than if I was merely an occasional apple-eater. The claim that my habits *tend* to make possibilities to engage in habitual behaviour salient for me does not mean that I *always* perceive those opportunities as salient. Instead, it means that my habits will be one of the factors that contribute to salience. This provides a way to understand the difference between intended and unintended habitual behaviour. Habitual action will be intended where the affordances made salient by that habit correspond to those made salient by the agent's current task. A habitual action will be *un*intended where the affordances that bring it about do *not* correspond to those made salient by the agent's current task.

One might raise the following objection at this point. I argued above that a satisfactory account of agency must provide a personal level analysis of habitual behaviour. However, it seems that Merleau-Ponty has not done this. He takes unintended habitual actions to be unthinking responses to the agent's environment. He thus appears to conceive of them as caused by environmental stimuli in a way that does not involve the agent *qua* agent, and which can be adequately described by scientific laws. It follows that his explanation of habitual behaviour is subpersonal.

Merleau-Ponty (1962) offers the following response. First, his account acknowledges and accommodates the fact that habitual behaviour does not admit of the kind of regularity that would allow it to be captured by scientific laws. Consider, e.g., someone who, unlike me, is in the habit of knitting each evening. Although his habit involves a repeated pattern of activity, it will nevertheless exhibit considerable variation, i.e., irregularity. The agent may be knitting a jumper. One evening he may knit a sleeve. The next evening he may knit part of the back. The sleeve may be knitted in stocking stitch, whilst the back incorporates a cable pattern. Similar points apply in the case of my habit of cycling to work. Whilst one may initially suppose that my behaviour is regular, there is, on closer inspection, much variation in my cycling, even though I cycle the same way each day. Some days the path will be dry, other days it will be wet. Sometimes I will have to navigate through a crowd of schoolchildren. On other days, there will be no-one about. Sometimes I will cycle to work carrying a large bag of books. Other days I will carry a picnic. It follows that no two manifestations of this habit will be exactly the same. The variations in the instances of habitual behaviour defy a causal, mechanistic description. But they can be accommodated on Merleau-Ponty's account of habitual actions as drawn forth by the agent's apprehension of her environment, because this model does not require the agent's responses to her surroundings to be regular.

One might object that these variations could be merely perceived, which is consistent with habitual behaviour actually being regular in a way that allows for causal analysis.[6] However, there are different ways to interpret this objection.

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[6] Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.

On one reading, the objection claims that the appearance of irregularity is an illusion. Whilst it may seem that, e.g., knitting a sleeve in stocking stitch involves different physical movements from knitting a back piece that incorporates a cable pattern, we are deceived about this. Understood in this way, the objection is a sceptical worry about the reliability of our perceptual experience. Such sceptical worries may or may not be legitimate. But since they are not specific difficulties faced by the Merleau-Pontyian account of action offered here, I set them aside. A second way to understand the objection is as the claim that whilst habitual behaviour appears irregular to our human senses, there is regularity at the level of neurophysiological processes, which are thus amenable to causal analysis. However, this possibility is consistent with the claim that habitual behaviour does not exhibit law-like regularity. I have taken it for granted here that human agency is a personal level phenomenon, and as such, a proper explanation of it should be non-mechanistic, whilst at the same time, our actions are underpinned by subpersonal processes that can be explained causally. Insofar as habitual behaviour is a type of human action, it follows that we should describe it as a personal level phenomenon, whilst taking it to be underpinned by causal processes at the subpersonal level. Neurophysiological goings-on are subpersonal, and so we should *expect* them – including those that underpin habitual behaviour – to exhibit law-like regularity. But it is hopefully now clear that this is consistent with also claiming that habitual behaviour – understood as a personal level phenomenon – is *ir*regular.

There is a second reason why Merleau-Ponty's analysis of habit is non-causal and thus a personal level explanation of the phenomenon. Mechanistic causal processes involve the brute, physical characteristics of the entities/events that partake in them. But although habitual actions, on Merleau-Ponty's account, are responses to the agent's physical environment, they are not responses to it *per se*. Instead, they are responses to the agent's physical environment *apprehended in a certain manner* – where this can include the way she perceives it, and the way she represents it in thought. Notice that this is so, even if one takes affordances to be objective properties of the physical environment. The agent does not respond to the affordances *per se*. Indeed, this would be impossible, since any environment will afford a huge number of actions to the agent, some of which will be inconsistent (e.g., a bed affords both sleeping and using as a trampoline, but one cannot do both at the same time). The agent responds to those affordances that stand out for her as most salient. In other words, what is important for the Merleau-Pontyian analysis of habitual behaviour I have offered here is the *meaning* that those affordances have for the agent. Action is not a response to the mere physical elements of the agent's surroundings; but to her environment considered in terms of the meaning it has for her. But this is not something that can be captured using a causal analysis.[7]

Finally, the fact that habitual actions are a response to the agent's perception of her environment also points to the way in which habitual behaviour involves the agent *qua* agent, on Merleau-Ponty's account. Perception is a personal level state.

It is the *agent* – rather than some subsystem of the agent – who perceives her surroundings. Moreover, the agent's perception of her environment reflects what is salient for her, given her tasks, desires, and so on – i.e., it reflects what is salient for her *qua* agent. One might object that since many habitual actions are *unthinking* responses to the agent's apprehended environment, they cannot be considered responses of the agent *qua* agent. Instead they must be thought of as the responses of the agent's subpersonal systems. Only thinking responses can be those of the agent as such.[8] But actions are responses of the agent *qua* agent. (Although, not all of the agent's responses will count as actions.) The objection therefore implies that a response will only count as an action if it is a thinking response. In other words, it implies that actions essentially involve thought. But this is exactly the claim that I have argued against in this chapter. As I have shown, we should reject this view. It follows that the objection should also be rejected. Merleau-Ponty's conception of habitual behaviour construes it as involving the agent *qua* agent. It is a properly personal level account of habitual action.

We saw above that some actions are performed attentively. In these cases, the agent performs the action whilst focusing her attention on what she is doing. Moreover, we think that her attentiveness plays some role in producing her action. I argued above that paying attention to what one is doing does not consist in consciously thinking about it. Whilst it is correct to think that one's attentiveness allows one to gather salient perceptual information so that one may complete this task, this thought must be developed to produce an adequate analysis of attention's role in producing certain actions. So what is it to pay attention to what one is doing? Merleau-Ponty does not discuss this phenomenon in any detail, but his account provides the resources to provide the following analysis. Paying attention to what one is doing should be thought of as a sort of 'centring oneself in one's activity', where this can be understood as becoming attuned to those possibilities for action that are relevant to the completion of one's task, so that they stand out as salient for one. 'Centring oneself in one's activity' also sustains this attunement by reducing one's propensity to be distracted.

Distraction makes possibilities for action that are not relevant to one's current task stand out as salient. There are various ways in which this can happen. Here are just two examples. Recall that the agent's thoughts affect the salience of affordances, and so how strongly those possibilities solicit the agent. My desire to buy a new coat, e.g., makes coat-buying opportunities stand out as salient for me. It follows that distracting thoughts – those that arise and have no connection with the agent's current task – will influence the pattern of salience in the field of possibilities facing the agent. If my desire to buy a new coat arises when I am walking my dog, it will make an opportunity for coat-buying stand out as salient for me, even though I am engaged in a different task – dog-walking. The second example concerns habit. We saw above that the agent's habits tend to make certain possibilities for action stand out as salient for her – those involved in the habitual

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[8] Thank you to an anonymous referee for this objection.

behaviour. One's habits are one of the things that affect salience. When I am distracted, I am no longer centred in my task. In other words, I am no longer attuned to those possibilities for action that relate to my current activity, so they no longer stand out as salient for me. My lack of attunement to my task means that my habits can take over in determining what is salient for me, and so I start to see opportunities to engage in habitual behaviour as salient.

We can now see the role played by attention in action on the Merleau-Pontyian account we are developing. Paying attention to what one is doing allows possibilities for action that relate to one's task to stand out as salient, and to continue to stand out as salient. The agent's actions are drawn forth by her apprehension of affordances. Those with the strongest 'attractive power' – i.e., the ones she experiences as most salient – will be the ones that bring about her actions. Where these are the possibilities made salient and sustained as salient by attention, the agent's attentiveness plays a role in bringing about her behaviour. This is not to say that attention is *always* required to keep one's activity on track. In cases where completing one's task involves habitual behaviour, e.g., the affordances made salient by one's intentions will coincide with those made salient by one's habits. Forming the intention to now φ makes those affordances stand out as salient. But once this pattern of salience has been instituted by the agent's intention, it can be sustained by the habits with which it is also associated, allowing the agent to direct her attention elsewhere.

The account provides the following explanation of the three cases discussed above. In case 1, I consciously deliberate about what to do, and decide to go for a picnic. I set off, but become distracted thinking about my chapter, and absentmind-edly turn off and start cycling along my usual route to work. We think that I start cycling towards work because I habitually cycle this way. Case 2 is the same as the first, except that I pay attention to what I am doing, and so continue towards the picnic spot. We think in this case my attentiveness plays a role in my action – it blocks habit. When I am paying attention to what I am doing in case 2, I am attuned to those possibilities for action that are relevant to my plan of going for a picnic. Those possibilities stand out as salient for me, and as such, they draw forth my actions. Thus when I am paying attention, the route to the picnic spot stands out for me as the right way to go. It solicits me to cycle along it, and I immediately respond to this solicitation by acting. However, when I am distracted in case 1, I am no longer attuned to those possibilities for action that are relevant to picnicking, and so the route to the picnic spot no longer stands out as salient for me. Moreover, the fact that I habitually cycle towards work a certain way means that I tend to see the route to work as salient – I tend to see it as the right way to go. The fact that I am distracted allows this habit to take over in determining what is salient for me. I thus see the route to work as the way to go, and this perception of it draws me to cycle along it.

The final case is that of the baseball player, who must pay attention to what she is doing to play to the best of her ability. However, thinking about what she is doing gets in the way of her doing it. By paying attention, the agent is attuned to her activity of baseball playing, so that opportunities to act in relation to this task stand

out as salient to her. Paying attention also reduces her propensity for distraction so that these opportunities continue to stand out as salient for her. These perceived affordances then bring about her actions. Thinking disrupts the flow of her behaviour by getting in the way of her ability to discern and then respond to the opportunities for action afforded by the game. As we saw above, it is not only perceived affordances that bring about an agent's activity. Thought can also play a role. One way it does this is by adding extra value for action to the agent's surroundings. She conceptually represents them as requiring certain actions, and then responds by acting accordingly. It is plausible to suppose that conceptually represented requirements for action are more coarsely-grained than perceived affordances – most theorists accept that perception's content is more finely grained than what can be represented in thought.[9] Thus in some – but not all – cases where one's behaviour is guided by conceptually represented requirements for action, it will be less accomplished. If the player starts to think about what she is doing, she effectively replaces perceived requirements for action with conceptually represented ones. Since these are much cruder, her behaviour will be correspondingly less successful than when it is brought about by perceived affordances.

5   Conclusion

The literature on action is dominated by the view that actions are essentially brought about by intentions. Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative model, according to which actions are initiated and controlled by the way in which the agent apprehends her environment. The agent's apprehension of her environment is primarily perceptual, but it can also incorporate thought about it. In this chapter, I have argued that the dominant view cannot adequately explain how habits and attention contribute to agency. But Merleau-Ponty's account offers a nice explanation of these phenomena. This gives us some reason to prefer his view to the dominant account. I thus hope to have established that a Merleau-Pontyian analysis of agency is a promising line of inquiry, and so worthy of further consideration.

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[9] There are some, however, who dispute this – e.g., McDowell (1994).

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Affordances and Unreflective Freedom

Erik Rietveld

1 Introduction

Inspired by Immanuel Kant, John McDowell (1996) discusses one way to look at freedom in both reflective and unreflective decision making and action: as mature human beings we are acting freely because we have the possibility to step back and reflect on our reasons for action. Following Charles Taylor (2002) I will call this type of freedom 'spontaneity in the strong sense' or, for the sake of brevity, 'strong spontaneity'.[1] Strong spontaneity is relevant even when one acts unreflectively because one could step back and reflect. I would like to stress that this claim of McDowell will remain undebated here. I fully acknowledge the reality of our possibility to step back and reflect as well as its importance for understanding human action.

However, I am interested in developing an account of freedom in skillful *unreflective* decision making and action (for the sake of brevity henceforth 'unreflective action') from the perspective of embodied cognition. My primary focus is on the phenomenology of freedom in unreflective action as shared by human adults and pre-linguistic children. In this type of activity we, in a sense, *allow* ourselves to

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[1] Let me briefly sketch the context in which freedom (strong spontaneity) appears within McDowell's (1996) framework. McDowell wants to place strong spontaneity steadfastly in nature. He argues that conformity to natural law does not exhaust the notion of nature. Second nature is nature too. The notion of *Bildung* (upbringing) clarifies how we acquire the conceptual capacities (second nature, again remembering that this really is nature) that belong to strong spontaneity and make it possible to step back and reflect. We acquire these conceptual capacities thanks to our being initiated into language (McDowell 1996: 125–126). This account should make sure that such freedom is not considered as supra-natural or spooky.

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be responsive to relevant affordances. Affordances (Gibson 1979; Michaels 2003; Chemero 2003) are possibilities for action provided by the environment.[2] Even though we respond to affordances with instinctive ease, we do not experience our skillful unreflective activities as fully automatic or beyond our control. I propose that if we want to understand the phenomenon of freedom in unreflective action well, we should investigate that phenomenon *on its own terms* and not start by assuming that it is a derivative of the freedom to step back and reflect.[3] By "on its own terms" I mean a phenomenological or descriptive account that sheds light on the characteristics of the pre-reflective experience of freedom as it shows up in unreflective action; i.e. a detailed phenomenological analysis that does more than just pointing to a capacity to reflect in the context of unreflective action without paying attention to the specific phenomenological richness of the kind of unreflective freedom that adults share with pre-linguistic children.[4] That McDowell (2002) would probably not deny the relevance of such a phenomenological investigation becomes clear in his discussion with Taylor (2002). Taylor gives the following example of unreflective action, or what he calls here 'pre-understanding' or 'pre-conceptual' responsiveness to affordances:

> Dealing with things pre-conceptually can't involve rational, critical reflection on world or action; it doesn't exhibit Kantian spontaneity at its fullest. [. . .] Living with things involves a certain kind of understanding (which we might also call 'pre-understanding'). [. . .] As I navigate my way along the path up the hill, my mind totally absorbed anticipating the difficult conversation I'm going to have at my destination, I treat the different features of the terrain as obstacles, supports, openings, invitations to tread more warily, or run freely, etc. [. . .T]hese things have those relevances for me; I know my way about among them.
>   This is non-conceptual; or put another way, language isn't playing any direct role. (Taylor 2002: 111)

That unreflective action is not a brute causal event shows itself in its responsiveness to relevance and norms (Rietveld 2008a). Since in an episode of unreflective action one does not, by definition, reflect explicitly, we must refer to something other than reflective accounts of intentionality if we want to understand the phenomenon of freedom in unreflective action on its own terms. Although McDowell objects to calling unreflective action 'non-conceptual', he (2002: 283) does agree with Taylor that we need another, weaker, notion of freedom for understanding freedom in unreflective action.[5] McDowell's response to Taylor (2002) was:

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[2] Both humans and non-human animals (henceforth 'animals') can perceive affordances. McDowell, for instance, recently wrote: "[R]esponsiveness to affordances, necessarily bound up with embodied coping skills, is something we share with other animals." (McDowell 2007a: 344).

[3] Note that this leaves open the possibility that in the end the possibility to step back is relevant in unreflective freedom. I just want to avoid presupposing it, because that could easily lead to an over-intellectualization.

[4] Thanks to Rasmus Thybo Jensen for helpful suggestions on how to make my approach explicit.

[5] It is crucial to see that strong and weak notions of freedom are not necessarily exclusive. Someone can hold that our understanding of freedom in unreflective action benefits from using a weaker notion of freedom, without committing herself to denying that mature human beings in unreflective action have the capacity to step back and reflect (that is, strong spontaneity).

> I agree with Taylor that there is something between spontaneity in what he calls 'the strong Kantian sense, turning crucially on conceptual, reflective thought,' on the one hand, and conformity to Galilean law, on the other. We need this middle ground for thinking about non-human animals, and it is what is supposed to be occupied by pre-understanding even in our case. (McDowell 2002: 283)

However, as far as I know, neither McDowell nor Taylor develops such a *middleground*-notion of the phenomenon of freedom in unreflective action that would be relevant for understanding a specific kind freedom that is shared by non-human animals, pre-linguistic children and humans who are simply unreflectively responsive to available affordances. For me the point of developing this middleground-notion of freedom is certainly not to argue that McDowell of strong spontaneity is wrong – I do not believe that it is –, but rather to develop a *complementary* account of freedom for a different purpose than his, namely understanding better the rich and complex phenomenon of unreflective action that adult human beings (henceforth "humans") and pre-linguistic children share.

From a phenomenological perspective, both Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly have developed some new ideas on this issue. Given their expertise in the phenomenology of unreflective action it makes sense to investigate their positions on this matter.

Dreyfus has since his (2005a) *APA Pacific Division Presidential Address* been engaged in a debate with McDowell (Dreyfus 2007a, b; McDowell 2007a, b). McDowell, as mentioned above, characterizes human freedom in terms of the capacity to step back and reflect. According to McDowell, such strong spontaneity is the freedom 'rational animals' (mature human beings) enjoy and 'mere animals' lack. As far as 'absorbed coping'[6] is concerned, Dreyfus generally stresses the similarities rather than the differences between animal behavior and human behavior, for instance that both types of behavior are responsive to affordances (see for example Dreyfus 2005a). Nevertheless, Dreyfus (2007a) agrees with McDowell that human freedom is of a special kind. However, according to Dreyfus (2007a: 354), the "most pervasive" type of human freedom is not the strong spontaneity emphasized by Kant and McDowell. Dreyfus (2007a: 355) argues that another type of freedom, which he characterizes as "pervasive human freedom" (henceforth 'pervasive freedom'), is more important. Pervasive freedom is the freedom to let oneself be bound by the world's solicitations (Dreyfus 2007a). Kelly develops this idea in a lecture and unpublished draft manuscript titled 'Perceptual Normativity

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[6] Merleau-Ponty gives a good description of an episode of absorbed coping: "For the player in action the football field is [...] pervaded with lines of force [...] and articulated in sectors (for example, the 'openings' between the adversaries) [...]; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the 'goal', for example, just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body. It would not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhabits this milieu. At this moment consciousness is nothing other than the dialectic of milieu and action. Each maneuver undertaken by the player modifies the character of the field and establishes in it new lines of force in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the phenomenal field." (Merleau-Ponty 1983/1942: 168–169).

and Human Freedom' (henceforth Kelly 2006).[7] The issue of freedom in skillful unreflective action is important for Dreyfus and Kelly because they both emphasize that in such action we are bound by the solicitations of the world, which immediately draw us to act in a certain way. Such an immediate responsiveness to the experienced demands of the world may seem to leave no room for agency (precisely because of being bound by these solicitations), but that is not what Dreyfus and Kelly want to say. They hold, rightly I believe, that there is a kind of agency inherent in this responsiveness to solicitations. However, ultimately they do not manage to account for that in a satisfying way, as we will see.

Dreyfus' and Kelly's accounts of freedom are ambitious because they try to characterize at once the distinction between human and animal freedom as well as the freedom humans have in unreflective action, for example when drawn by a solicitation. I have a more limited ambition. My starting point is the sole wish to give a rich account of human unreflective action as shared by adults and pre-linguistic children, including the freedom involved in this. This methodological move allows me to postpone the discussion of issues related to animals to another occasion and scales down the complexity of the issues we encounter in this chapter.

My *central question* is simply: what is freedom as experienced pre-reflectively by an individual *in* an episode of unreflective affordance-responsiveness (henceforth 'unreflective freedom')?

Even though I am focusing on unreflective freedom, it will not be possible to ignore completely what Dreyfus and Kelly have said about the distinction between human and animal freedom, because, as we will see, their accounts of freedom in unreflective action presumably run into trouble as a result of their acceptance of their Heideggerian assumption that animals are 'captured' or 'enslaved' by their world. I will focus my discussion on human unreflective responsiveness to affordances, which is a paradigmatic form of skillful unreflective action and is shared by adults and pre-linguistic children.

In the first part of Sect. 2 I will present Dreyfus' alternative to McDowell's notion of freedom. Kelly's ideas on perceptual normativity and human freedom are the topic of the second part of that section. I will raise some issues regarding their respective accounts in Sect. 3. Despite their goal to arrive at an account of (pervasive) freedom that precedes the freedom to step back and reflect, we will see that they are ultimately committed to an account of freedom that presupposes the possibility of stepping back. They do not succeed in their goal of differentiating their accounts from McDowell's (which is an aim I do not have). In Sect. 4 I will sketch my own proposal.

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[7] Sean Kelly gave a lecture on this topic at Cornell University's 'Perception and Action Symposium' on May 7, 2006. I would like to thank him for allowing me to discuss a text that is only a draft manuscript. The draft is available online: http://philpapers.org/rec/KELPNA.

2   Dreyfus and Kelly on Freedom in Unreflective Action

Human freedom in McDowell's strong sense (strong spontaneity) is the capacity to step back and reflect on reasons for action as such. Dreyfus (2007a: 354) agrees with McDowell that we possess that type of freedom. Dreyfus, however, suggests that another important kind of freedom plays a role both in reflective and unreflective action, as we will see in Sect. 2.1. Dreyfus' notion of pervasive freedom contains an aspect that is a good starting point for developing a phenomenological account of freedom in unreflective action. Kelly (2006) further develops Dreyfus' insight, which I will discuss in Sect. 2.2. As mentioned in the introduction, in Sect. 3 I will assess their Heideggerian accounts of freedom. I will sketch my own proposal in Sect. 4.

2.1   Dreyfus' Notion of Human Freedom: The Freedom to Let Oneself Be Bound

According to Dreyfus, humans have two types of freedom: strong spontaneity and what he characterizes as pervasive freedom. In this section I will present Dreyfus' account of this latter kind of human freedom. In Sect. 3.1 I will evaluate its relevance for understanding the freedom inherent in unreflective action.

Pervasive human freedom, in Dreyfus' Heideggerian account, is allowing oneself to be bound:

> I claim that the freedom intermittently to step back presupposes a truly pervasive human freedom not shared by mere animals. We have a freedom not to exercise our freedom to step back but rather to let ourselves be involved. [...] Heidegger sees as essential the fact that human beings are *free to open themselves to being bound* – a freedom that animals lack because they are constantly captivated by their current activity and can never step back [...]. (Dreyfus 2007a: 355, my italics)

I will not go into Martin Heidegger's ideas on animals here but focus on humans. What is it exactly that humans can let themselves be bound by in an episode of unreflective action? By the solicitations of the rich world which immediately draw us to act in certain ways. Dreyfus uses the notions of 'letting' or 'allowing' oneself to be bound presumably to emphasize that this responsiveness to solicitations is free rather than un-free or automatic, but these notions do not themselves clarify why such an unreflective act is free. Clarifying this is precisely a task of the phenomenological account of unreflective freedom Dreyfus, Kelly and I are trying to develop. Note moreover, that terms like 'letting' or 'allowing' are used without any intention to suggest a temporal succession of events. So it is not the case that there is first a solicitation and then one's allowing to act on the solicitation. Dreyfus' use of, for example, the words "*letting* ourselves be drawn" (2007a: 355, my italics) aims to stress the agency *inherent* in the immediate and unreflective response to the solicitation.

An example of being bound by the world is the way we are drawn to move to a greater distance from a painting we are looking at, the phenomenon of the tendency towards an optimal grip (Merleau-Ponty 2002/1945; Dreyfus 2005b, 2007c; Dreyfus and Kelly 2007; Rietveld 2008a, 2012). The painting, in a sense, *demands* this greater distance from us and we normally immediately give in to this demand. However, although one is bound by this solicitation to act, we can say that one 'freely opens' oneself to being bound, so one is not enslaved by the solicitation (Dreyfus 2007a). In what sense is this letting or opening a form of agency? According to Dreyfus, one is in control in the sense that one is able to interrupt or "break off" responsiveness to solicitations (Dreyfus 2007b: 375). He suggests that one's unreflective response to the solicitation *could be stopped*:

> Of course, the coping going on *is* mine in the sense that the coping can be interrupted at any moment by a transformation that results in an experience of stepping back from the flow of current coping. (Dreyfus 2007a: 356)

The human freedom to let oneself be bound is "truly pervasive" (Dreyfus 2007a: 355) because it is inherent in both unreflective action and reflection. Crucially, while engaged in reflection, pervasive freedom is what makes it possible to switch back from an intermittent episode of reflection to a new episode of absorbed coping. In Dreyfus words:

> Our involved freedom makes possible on some occasions finding ourselves becoming detached and *choosing* a course of action which, like all willful actions, we can perform at best competently, while on other occasions, letting ourselves be drawn to *reenter* [emphasis added, ER] our involved expert coping. (Dreyfus 2007a: 355)

How does such a switch from reflection to absorbed coping come about? Dreyfus does not explain this, but we can quite easily imagine ourselves how the change from detachment to involvement happens (for example by allowing oneself to respond to an attractive solicitation on the horizon of one's current reflective activity, similar to being attracted by a cup of coffee during an episode of explicit deliberation). More important is that Dreyfus also does not make clear how the transformation that results in the movement from absorbed coping to detached reflection happens, although he suggests that it happens as the result of "analytic attention" (Dreyfus 2005a: 61). (Note that he does not claim that he has clarified this transformation. On the contrary, Dreyfus (2005a: 61) sees this as an important open question. Below we will see that Kelly is working on this issue.) As mentioned above, I will evaluate Dreyfus' ideas in Sect. 3.1. Let me first introduce Kelly's ideas on freedom in unreflective action.

2.2 Kelly on Freedom in Unreflective Action

Like Dreyfus, Kelly holds that solicitations have a directly motivating force, they immediately draw us to act in a certain way. A question Kelly (2006) wants to answer is how we can resist solicitations, given that they have this directly

motivating force in absorbed coping. As far as normativity is concerned, Kelly's focus is on experienced normativity, which is what I have called 'lived normativity' elsewhere.[8] Kelly understands "a *norm* as that from which one immediately feels oneself to be deviating – to a greater or lesser extent – in performing the activity regulated by it" (Kelly 2006, my italics). He wants to explain how the world can solicit us to act normatively and, moreover how, even though we are *bound* by the world, we can nevertheless understand ourselves as free agents. The aim of this section is to present Kelly's account of freedom in unreflective action. In Sect. 3.2 I will critically assess his account.

2.2.1 Humans *Allow* Themselves to Be Lured by Solicitations by Not Resisting Them

Kelly says that an essential aspect of our skillful activity in for example distance standing is that "one immediately feels compelled to perform it in a way that, in Merleau-Ponty's words, lessens a certain tension" (Kelly 2006: 4). So there is an immediate tendency to lessen the experienced tension of this specific situation by means of some activity. Importantly, there is no representation of the goal; no "pre-existing sense" of the appropriate distance before the actual performance (Kelly 2006: 4). What is the nature of agency here, given that we are bound by the world, motivated directly to respond to its affordances? We will see that Kelly tries to answer that question by answering another one, aiming to understand the freedom involved: What is the nature of the *freedom* humans have in this type of skillful activity?

Both animals and humans are bound by the world and as such "immediately motivated to respond to its solicitations" (Kelly 2006: 6). According to Kelly, the nature of this bond is different, however, for humans than for animals. He writes:

> We [humans] are not enslaved by environmental solicitations, but rather we 'freely hold ourselves open to be bound' by them. There is an important question what this free choice amounts to. (Kelly 2006: 7)

According to Kelly, the answer to this question is that our freedom resides in having "a check" on our tendency to respond immediately to solicitations (Kelly 2006: 8). The core of this difference is that, thanks to this capacity to stop responding, one allows affordances to steer one's activity. Our human freedom

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[8] The role of such lived normativity (Rietveld 2008a) becomes, for instance, clear in Dreyfus' and Kelly's elaboration on Sartre's (1954) example of running to catch a streetcar: "[T]here is no ego [...] in the runner's mind when he is absorbed in reaching the streetcar [...] But [...] the experience of chasing a streetcar *does not leave the mind empty*. It essentially involves *a felt solicitation* to act in a certain way with respect to the streetcar." (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007: 53, my italics). This "felt solicitation" contains a normative tension. The mind is not empty in absorbed coping because we "experience our current bodily situation as a tension away from the optimal stance" (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007: 53), and are immediately drawn to improve, running faster and getting closer.

consists always in *letting ourselves be* bound, simply because whenever we *are* bound by the environment it is a result of our *not having resisted it*. (Kelly 2006: 7)

This 'check' is a type of "negative freedom" (Kelly 2006: 8). The freedom to resist or not to resist the lure of solicitations is at the core of our control over the situation, according to Kelly.

So by not resisting, humans can freely be bound by the world. This state of being bound

is a matter of being immediately motivated to respond to [the world's] solicitations. The worldly environment, in other words, is a *normative* environment – I immediately experience it in terms of how *well* it allows me to engage in my activities. (Kelly 2006: 6)

I sense immediately that by moving to that other position over there I will have a better view on the painting. Or as I would formulate it myself, the experienced solicitations to which I am unreflectively responsive already reflect an appreciation related to how things can be improved.

2.2.2   On Resisting Solicitations: Noticing Them Is a Precondition

Freedom is an essential part of normativity in perception-action cycles for humans according to Kelly (2006). Unreflective human action might be unmediated by a choosing subject, but it does not lack freedom:

To take an example, I can, in the midst of unreflectively reaching out to grab the doorknob to open the door, all of the sudden resist the continuation of the action, stopping my arm in mid-flight. This capacity arbitrarily to resist what the world solicits us immediately and unreflectively to do seems to me an essential feature of the way we experience perceptual norms. (Kelly 2006: 8)

This suggests that Kelly holds that our responsiveness to solicitations possesses a certain kind of freedom (namely to resist/stop).

Solicitations normally simply pull us. But this does not mean that they cannot be resisted. Indeed, Kelly argues that in order to be resisted, *noticing* a solicitation is a necessary precondition. He writes:

After all, how is one to resist a solicitation to act that one doesn't even recognize? To resist something, in other words, it must be something that one can *identify*, for otherwise it is nothing that one can stand against. (Kelly 2006: 8; cf. Kelly 2005: 20)[9]

Humans have the ability to identify solicitations as something that motivates one to act and that can be resisted. So resisting in Kelly's sense is characterized by 'noticing', that is identifying a thing using attentive observation, which is the same detached form of attention that characterizes attention in the case of a worldly breakdown, for example when a keyboard stops functioning while one is typing a

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[9] Note that this seems to presuppose that resisting an affordance is something that *I* as a reflective subject must do.

text.[10] This noticing "*reifies*" (Kelly 2006: 9) the solicitation and is itself immediately able and sufficient to break its "motive force" (Kelly 2006: 9; cf. Kelly 2006: 20) so that it is no longer a normative power that immediately motivates us to act, according to Kelly.

Noticing, understood as "attentive observation" (Kelly 2006: 15), reifies some *thing* as the source of the solicitation or reifies the motivation as a desire (Kelly 2006: 9).[11] In both cases the immediate hold of the (attractive or repulsive) environment on behavior is broken. According to Kelly, noticing a solicitation is not only a requirement for resistance of this solicitation, it is also "constitutive" of this resistance (Kelly 2006: 10; cf. Kelly 2005: 19–20).

2.2.3 Solicitations Cannot Be Attentively Observed but Can Be Experienced

As far as the experience of affordances is concerned Kelly holds an interesting position:

> [E]nvironmental solicitations and agential motivations cannot, even in principle, be noticed. For to notice a solicitation or a motivation is to turn it into an *entity that* solicits or motivates, and to do this is *ipso facto* to strip its motive force. (Kelly 2006: 11; cf. Kelly 2005: 20–21)

Solicitations cannot be noticed, because noticing, for Kelly, implies a form of detached attention that is incompatible with being sensitive and responsive to the attraction of the solicitation. In the absorbed type of normative sensitivity, environment and agent are not relevant *as* environment or agent:

> [F]or the phenomenologist the essential point is that knowing myself as the agent of the act is not required. (Kelly 2006: 13)

But the fact that we cannot 'notice' (i.e. attentively identify) solicitations does not preclude the possibility that we can *experience* them, for example as tensions drawing us to improve. In other words, solicitations do not have to be fully transparent. For instance, in the distance standing example presented above, it is clear that, according to Kelly, there is an experience involved when someone stands too close: namely an experience of tension (see also Dreyfus and Kelly 2007).

Crucially, in the case of normative motivation in absorbed coping, one cedes authority to the world and without paying actual attention to one's actions one still

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[10] Kelly models his account of a change in the nature of attention (from engaged to detached) on Heidegger's (1927) account of a worldly breakdown: "The phenomenological story I've sketched so far involves moving from the kind of sensitivity to environmental norms that is involved in skillful absorbed coping to the kind of *detached* experience of an independent world that one can have when one is paying attention to it. In the metaphor from the introduction, it involves the crystallization of self and world." (Kelly 2006: 14, my italics).

[11] Note that sometimes Kelly (2006) uses the word 'attention' as shorthand for this attentive observation or detached attention.

has the *capacity* for attentive observation.[12] Notwithstanding this lack of detached attention, this is, according to Kelly, a case of freedom because "I am the type of animal that *could have* paid attention [...]" (Kelly 2006: 12). Human freedom in his account is to be found in someone's *allowing* that his or her comportment is solicited by the environment.

This allowing does not involve any choice or decision, but is simply a matter of not resisting by someone who *could*. So Kelly's perspective is that the world is the basic motive force in which humans nevertheless have the freedom to allow it to have this effect on them (Kelly 2006: 14).

It is important to note that the person's autonomy, rooted in the type of being that she is, remains crucial in Kelly's account. In absorbed coping one has a sensitivity to the norms of one's world and one is free to be switched from absorbed coping to the detached experience of paying (detached) attention to the solicitations. This switch does not result from being pushed into detachment by a breakdown in the world, nor, according to Kelly (2006: 14–15), is it done willfully or reflectively. Still it is done freely by the coping agent. A consequence of the switch is that self and world are '*crystallized*' (Kelly 2006: 14). Kelly calls his perspective an account of human freedom precisely because not a worldly breakdown but the individual is the source of the switch (Kelly 2006: 15).[13]

2.2.4 On the Transformation from Absorbed Coping to Noticing

Kelly finally stresses an important subtlety: since in absorbed coping there is no reflective subject, ego or (reflective) I involved,[14] there is nobody who could (willfully) *decide* to notice. So it just happens without anticipation, just like a flat

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[12] Note the analogy of this aspect of Kelly's proposal with McDowell's account of strong spontaneity, which is based on the *capacity* to step back and reflect. A difference is that, as we will see below, Kelly stresses that the individual cannot exercise this capacity for attentive observation willfully in absorbed coping.

[13] "[T]he source of the movement [from absorbed coping to attentive observation is] not the world but the coping agent himself. That is why it is a story about human freedom, rather than a story about worldly breakdown." (Kelly 2006: 15).

[14] Dreyfus and Kelly convincingly make this point by means of Sartre's (1954) streetcar example: "When I run after a streetcar...there is no I.... I am plunged into the world of objects ... which present themselves ...with attractive and repellant qualities – but me, I have disappeared." (Sartre 1954: 48, as quoted in Dreyfus and Kelly 2007: 46). This description suggests that we should not speak of a reflective subject or ego in absorbed coping: "[T]here is no ego [...] in the runner's mind when he is absorbed in reaching the streetcar [...]" (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007: 53). Note that this example does not exclude the possibility that there is *pre-reflective* self-awareness in such an episode of absorbed coping. Even though *in* this episode of absorbed coping we do not experience ourselves as a reflective subject, on the basis of this example we cannot say that there is no self-awareness at all. We have to understand what is means that the mind is not "empty" (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007: 53). Minimally this type of skillful engagement with the world includes an experience of the lived body being drawn by solicitations.

tire just occurs. Attentive observation in unreflective action just happens to one and is not something under the ego's control. Kelly therefore likes to say that noticing is "given to one":

> [W]e move from immediately being motivated to act by environmental solicitations to *noticing that* we are being so motivated. [. . .A]ll of a sudden *I find myself* noticing my activity and the environment towards which it is directed. [. . .T]here is nobody who *decides to notice*, just noticing being given to one. Only after the movement has been made out of motivated agency is there any sense in talking about someone who decides to act. (Kelly 2006: 15–16)

We encountered a similar point earlier in Dreyfus' account of basic freedom: we "find" ourselves stepping back (2007a: 6). It is not a reflected choice I make, but, as a human, I am "the kind of being to whom it could be given that I find myself no longer being bound" (Kelly 2006: 16). Suddenly, without anticipation, without having to choose or having had any other active influence, self and world are crystallized and I find myself noticing a thing in the environment or my desire (Kelly 2006: 15). According to Kelly this means that our most basic form of freedom is not controlled by us:

> The picture one ends up with, then, is one in which our spontaneity, our freedom, is in the most basic case completely outside our control. But because we are the kinds of beings to whom this freedom is sometimes given, we are not only responsive to the world's demands, but also capable of seeing them as such. (Kelly 2006: 16)

Of course this reference to what he calls spontaneity being given to one or "The Gift" (Kelly 2006: 16) does not illuminate the transformation from unreflective action to reflection very much, because of the opaqueness of the term 'noticing being given'. But at least Kelly sheds light on how we can recognize that the transformation has happened: the difference is made by attentive (detached) observation of an aspect of the situation, be it the noticing of a thing or a desire.

2.2.5   Concluding Remarks with Respect to Kelly's Account

Let me summarize Kelly's account. The world is the basic motive force and binds our actions. Together with an account of the acquisition of skills this explains how we can be motivated directly to act in a normative way. But we consider ourselves to be free agents. How does this freedom fit with being bound by the world? Kelly's answer is that we freely allow the world to effect us. By *not resisting* the pull of the solicitation, at once we allow ourselves to be bound and the world to bind us. In this lies our basic freedom. Noticing, like stepping back, is not something that we can choose when we are absorbed in a flow of activity, according to Kelly, but is something that can be given to us. Freedom in unreflective action is not a choice, but the result of noticing given to us.

3 Assessment of the Accounts of Dreyfus and Kelly

In the former sections I have presented Dreyfus' as well as Kelly's account of freedom. In this section I will evaluate their relevance for understanding unreflective freedom. We will see that both Dreyfus' account (Sect. 3.1) and Kelly's account (Sect. 3.2) are unable to characterize this type of freedom on its own (unreflective) terms.

3.1 Two Problems with Dreyfus' Account of Freedom in Unreflective Action

In his debate with McDowell, Dreyfus makes, as we have seen, a crucial point for understanding freedom in unreflective action: human beings are free while being bound. However, in this section I will argue that, not withstanding the importance of this insight, Dreyfus' account of freedom as it emerges in his debate with McDowell is not fully satisfactory for the case of absorbed coping, because ultimately his account makes freedom in a flow of absorbed coping dependent upon the possibility to step back and reflect. This means that he does not succeed in his aim of developing an alternative to McDowell's account. For my own purpose it is more important that Dreyfus' account does not characterize the freedom in unreflective action on its own (unreflective) terms. For given that we aim to do justice to the freedom inherent in the responsiveness to solicitations manifested also by pre-linguistic children, on its own terms would imply that neither language nor reflection plays a role in the account given.

3.1.1 Dependence upon Detached Reflection

Dreyfus' (2007a) attempt to account for the distinction between human and animal coping by pointing to a difference in the nature of their freedom, in particular by accepting the Heideggerian assumption that animals are constantly 'captivated' by their current activity, brings him into difficulties because it makes his notion of pervasive human freedom dependent upon the possibility to step back and reflect, which is exactly the McDowellian position he was trying to avoid.[15] Let me explain this.

In Dreyfus' (2007a) account, both animals and humans are bound by the world, but, assuming that animals do not step back to reflect, the latter can never be free to 'open' themselves to be bound; to "reenter" (Dreyfus 2007a: 355) being bound. A first consequence of this position is that the distinction between humans and

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[15] Just to be clear: this is an aim my chapter does not share with Dreyfus.

animals is first and foremost related to the human possibility of detached attention and reflection. Only this supposedly uniquely human possibility allows us to move somehow from our absorbed coping to an intermittent episode of deliberation, for example about properties of objects (Dreyfus 2005a: 60–61). In this type of reflective situation we willfully choose our actions.

But, ironically, and this is the second and presumably most unwanted consequence given Dreyfus' aims, it is only because we humans can be in such an episode of detached *reflection*, that we are free to '*reenter*' unreflective action, that is, that we are free to let ourselves be bound again by solicitations.[16] Animals cannot make this switch from reflection back to absorbed coping, because they "can never step back" in the first place (Dreyfus 2007a: 355). The result of such a position is that their being bound by the world is better characterized as a being always 'captivated' in a state of unreflective coping, whereas human freedom in unreflective action, which for Dreyfus is the possibility of *re*-entering being bound, *depends on the possibility of making a detour via reflection*. But this latter position was exactly McDowell's position for which Dreyfus wanted to offer an *alternative* for with his notion of pervasive freedom. I will now explain how this presumably unwanted result also undermines a related claim made by Dreyfus.

3.1.2   Does Pervasive Freedom Have Priority Over Strong Spontaneity?

Dreyfus makes a claim about the priority relationship between pervasive freedom and strong spontaneity. He suggests that freedom in his sense is "our most pervasive and important kind of freedom" (Dreyfus 2007a: 354), because McDowell's strong spontaneity "presupposes" (Dreyfus 2007a: 355) our pervasive freedom, the freedom to let ourselves be involved. When absorbed, we do not *choose* to step back since there is no reflective "I" or ego steering one's actions, but we are "finding ourselves" stepping back (Dreyfus 2007a: 355). This means that the movement from an episode of absorbed coping to an intermittent episode of reflection is not triggered by any explicit thought or conscious willful act, but occurs in some other way. (As mentioned above, Dreyfus does not say much about how this transformation occurs.) The problem with Dreyfus' priority claim is that, based on Dreyfus' (2007a) own characterization of human freedom, presented above, one could also argue that pervasive human freedom presupposes the capacity to step back and reflect. Without such a possibility for reflection humans would, just like animals, not enjoy the freedom to be bound in Dreyfus' sense, but have the same lack of freedom as animals and be enslaved by solicitations.

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[16] To repeat Dreyfus' own words: "Our involved freedom makes possible on some occasions finding ourselves becoming detached and *choosing* a course of action which, like all willful actions, we can perform at best competently, while on other occasions, letting ourselves be drawn to reenter our involved expert activity." (Dreyfus 2007a: 355).

To conclude, Dreyfus has the important insight that there is no contradiction between being bound and freedom. But he (2007a) does not succeed in characterizing freedom in unreflective action on its own terms. Presumably without wanting it, his account hinges on the possibility to "reenter" coping from *reflection*. Why does he run into these difficulties in his response to McDowell? I suspect because he tries to deal with two complex problems at once: the issue of unreflective freedom and the issue of the distinction between human and animal coping.

3.2 Assessment of Kelly's Account of Freedom

Kelly's (2006) account is innovative in that it links freedom and normativity in unreflective action by asking how our unreflective responsiveness to norms can be free. Just like Dreyfus' account it is also highly ambitious in trying to account at once for both the crucial distinction between human and animal coping and the freedom we have in our unreflective responsiveness to solicitations. He locates the freedom of unreflective action in the possibility to resist solicitation by noticing it. Noticing requires a detached form of attention, 'crystallizes' subject and object, and ends the flow of coping. Kelly's proposal, however, is also not fully satisfactory as an account of both adult and pre-linguistic human freedom *in* an episode of unreflective action as I aim to develop.

The most important shortcoming of his account for that purpose is that it effectively includes a detour of (potentially) stepping back from the flow of skillful action, because his technical term 'noticing' introduces a switch from absorbed coping to detached attentive observation in which subject and object are 'crystallized'. Kelly's account of freedom in unreflective action is dependent upon the possibility of an attentively observing ego. Such a position is similar to McDowell's, but now with detached attention taking the place of reflection. In both cases terms are introduced that are characteristic of strong spontaneity and that are not limited to the investigation of what happens *within* the flow of unreflective activity. This is the same problem we encountered when evaluating Dreyfus' account. This means that both of them are unsuccessful in their attempt to differentiate their accounts from McDowell's. (Recall that I do not share that aim, because I consider my account to be complementary to McDowell's.) More importantly for my purpose, their accounts does not fit with the aim of developing a middleground-account that sheds light on the kind of freedom *inherent* in the unreflective actions of both adults and pre-linguistic children.

A second important shortcoming of Kelly's proposal is that it is hard to see how Kelly could account for a *sense* of freedom *in* unreflective action, that is, a sense of freedom that precedes the arrival of an intermittent episode of detached noticing.[17]

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[17] He writes for instance the following about such an experience in absorbed coping: "My experience of environmental norms is always such that resistance could occur, and this differentiates me from the animals. And to the extent that the norms continue to hold me, there is a sense in which I have allowed them to do so." (Kelly 2006: 16). Kelly describes the experience of freedom in unreflective action well here, but the account he gives in terms of "noticing" does not do justice to this phenomenon.

According to him, noticing is wholly unanticipated and occurs as suddenly as a breakdown in the environment, for instance, like being disturbed by a flat tire:

> It is as if the noticing is given to one from nowhere, created *ex nihilo*, just as the breakdown in the environment was. (Kelly 2006: 15)

Although in absorbed coping there is indeed neither a reflective I who decides anything, nor someone who notices the solicitation, I wonder how Kelly could make the phenomenological claim that we "freely" (Kelly 2006: 7) allow ourselves to be bound by solicitations if there were not some (perhaps only minimal) experience of this freedom present in the episode of unreflective action itself. Notwithstanding its many excellent phenomenological descriptions and analyses, this problem makes Kelly's (2006) account sometimes appear to be more like that of a theoretical inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of freedom, than an account of actually *lived* freedom *in* unreflective action.

A third limitation is that Kelly's exclusive focus on negative freedom (interrupting the response to solicitation) leaves one wondering if there is no positive freedom involved in unreflective action. Does positive freedom (in the minimal sense of the possibility to do one thing rather than another) require detached reflection, according to Kelly?

I would also like to articulate a doubt. Is it really productive for our understanding of freedom in unreflective action to assume too easily that non-human animals are completely enslaved or captivated by their current activity? Kelly and Dreyfus seem to share this attitude with McDowell who writes that what characterizes the lack of freedom of animals is "enslavement to immediate biological imperatives" (McDowell 1996: 117).[18] Kelly writes that the "dog who is solicited by the bone, or by the running cat, immediately finds himself running after it" (Kelly 2006: 7). But we could easily come up with descriptions of other episodes of animal behavior that do suggest at least some degree of freedom. For example, are we sure that there is no freedom in the behavior of a chimpanzee who, on seeing a distressed chimpanzee friend, comes over, puts an arm around the other and calms the friend down?[19] And what about the observation that this chimpanzee does not console a distressed enemy? My point is that when we inform ourselves well on the results of the various

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[18] However, we have seen also in the introduction that McDowell (2002) acknowledges in his response to Taylor (2002) that it is important to develop a better understanding of freedom in animal behavior.

[19] This example comes from the work of primatologist Frans de Waal (2004). This example is also interesting because it reminds us of the importance of the network of social relationships for understanding freedom, the crucial link between care and freedom, emphasized in the closing sentences of Merleau-Ponty's (2002/1945) chapter on freedom. Moreover, De Waal quotes Jane Goodall (1990: 213, in De Waal 2004: 389) saying: "In some zoos, chimpanzees are kept on man-made islands, surrounded by water-filled moats . . . Chimpanzees cannot swim and, unless they are rescued, will drown if they fall into deep water. Despite this, individuals have sometimes made heroic efforts to save companions from drowning – and were sometimes successful." De Waal (2004: 389) notes that studies of animal behavior show that dolphins and elephants have similar powerful tendencies to help others.

sciences investigating animal behavior, it may become difficult to accept the Heideggerian denial of the freedom of animals as self-evidently correct. However, given the trouble Dreyfus and Kelly run into with respect to doing justice to the freedom involved in unreflective action, I prefer for methodological reasons to postpone treatment of the issue of the distinction between human and animal freedom until we have developed a good understanding of the freedom in human responsiveness to solicitations. As mentioned in the introduction, this scales down the level of complexity and avoids projecting aspects of reflective action (detached attention or the possibility to reenter unreflective coping) back into human unreflective freedom, covering adults and pre-linguistic children only.

A final observation is that both Dreyfus and Kelly leave the affective component of absorbed coping implicit. But why is it so important that absorbed coping or attention is not detached but *engaged*? What difference does this engagement make? Could it be that neglecting affective engagement not only conceals an important aspect of the phenomenon of absorbed coping, but also blocks sight on what is crucial with respect to freedom in unreflective action?

In the final section I will sketch an alternative account of freedom in skillful unreflective action.

4   Freedom in Skillful Unreflective Action: Sketch of an Alternative

In this section I would like to sketch an alternative account of freedom in episodes of adequate unreflective action that neither directly nor indirectly grounds this freedom in the possibility to step back or in the possibility to use language. For McDowellians this may seem like a merely theoretical exercise at first sight, because, as they rightly point out, we actually always have the possibility to step back and reflect. However, as we have seen above, it was McDowell (2002) himself who agreed with Taylor that an account of freedom in unreflective action would improve our understanding of responsiveness to relevant affordances in the case of humans, pre-linguistic children and animals. Moreover, for phenomenologists like Dreyfus and Kelly this endeavor is important because of the need to understand how we are able to switch freely from unreflective action to reflection when there is no reflective subject present to willfully choose to step back.[20]

As mentioned in the introduction, my point is not to sketch an alternative to McDowell's strong spontaneity, but rather to present a complementary perspective on the nature of unreflective freedom in action for a different purpose, focusing on the affordance-responsiveness that human adults and pre-linguistic children have in

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[20] Dreyfus (2005a: 60) calls the question about this transformation an "urgent" one.

common. This does not exclude the possibility that for understanding the freedom of adult human beings in all its complexity we also need to take strong spontaneity into account. What I present here is not supposed to be incompatible with that. McDowell, for instance, could thus simply accept what I say and integrate it by adding that there are other important characteristics of freedom that are specific to mature human beings.[21]

Recall that the central question that guides my investigations here is: what is freedom as experienced pre-reflectively by an individual *in* an episode of unreflective affordance-responsiveness? My proposal for answering this question is simple at its core: we experience freedom in a flow of unreflective skillful action because in such an episode we are always situated in a *field* of multiple relevant affordances soliciting us, which makes it always possible to allow oneself to begin something new, to be bound differently. In other words, we are not only drawn by the one affordance we are currently dealing with, but we are also affected to some extent by other significant affordances in the background. This field of affordances is not some amorphous sum of affordances. This field is structured and reflects the dynamically changing concerns of the individual (some affordances stand out and are privileged over others in the particular situation because of these concerns). In sum, I propose that the freedom characteristic of unreflective action *is* being responsive to a *field* of relevant affordances.

This proposal builds upon a foundation I have developed elsewhere (Rietveld 2004, 2008b, 2012). An aim of these chapters was to increase our insight into the way we switch from doing one thing to doing another thing without explicit deliberation. Using primarily Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002/1945) I argued that a flow of unreflective action contains perturbing affective influences as a result of the fact that a multiplicity of affordances in our surroundings attract or repel us (2004, 2008b).[22] Their affective allure is often strong enough to induce a switch from our current activity to another 'I can' *while staying within the flow of skillful coping*. I concluded there that,

> affective perturbations by attracting or repelling objects seem to be able to clarify how within a flow of [absorbed] coping we are able to switch from 'I can' to 'I can' [...] (Rietveld 2004: 18)

This means that thanks to the presence (in the background of our current activity) of a multiplicity of affordances affecting us, we can switch activities, say from

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[21] On the other hand, we should not presuppose that intuitive responsiveness to possibilities for action does not also play a role in the activity of explicit deliberation. It might well be the case that explicit deliberation, as a form of skillful action, shares more characteristics with skillful unreflective action than is generally assumed at the moment. Moreover, the balance between reflection and unreflective action is typically maintained unreflectively (De Haan, Rietveld & Denys 2013).

[22] A Wittgensteinian case of such a transition in a flow of unreflective action could be the situation in which the lapels have adequately been dealt with by the tailor and now he is moved to improve by another part of the same suit.

typing to eating an apple, without making a detour via detachment or explicit deliberation.

In his reply to a paper by Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2007) and Dreyfus (2007c) develops a similar interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's ideas on this issue. His interpretation is more refined than mine (2004) in that it also makes two relevant distinctions. Dreyfus' (2007c) reading integrates the Husserlian notions of the inner and the outer horizon and, more over, distinguishes between switching tasks and switching situations:

> Merleau-Ponty as I read him has an answer to Romdenh-Romluc's [. . .] hard question: How do we shift tasks while staying fully involved? We do so by turning to a potential task already summoning us from the inner horizon of the current task in which we are absorbed, or else by turning from the current situation in which we are engaged to some other situation already summoning us from the current situation's outer horizon. (Dreyfus 2007c: 67)

So while engaged in one activity other affordances, tasks and situations present on the (inner or outer) horizon are sensed and summon or invite the skillful body. One's giving in to such a solicitation generates an unreflective transition to another activity.

What do these Merleau-Pontian ideas on the phenomenology of unreflectively switching activities mean for our understanding of *freedom* in unreflective action? Whether or not an actual switch occurs is less important for understanding this than the observation that the very presence of these solicitations in the background constitutes a *field* of relevant affordances and allows one to commit elsewhere without having to make a detour via reflection. In my opinion these possibilities for action constitute a basic form of freedom, the freedom characteristic of unreflective skillful action.

To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to note that these possibilities in the background are not *mere* possibilities or possibilities in some abstract sense, for example as counterfactuals. On the contrary, the type of possibilities I am talking about are affordances, possibilities that exert a direct influence on our unreflective activity, perturb us, attract us or repel us, and 'awake' or '*ready' our potentialities for interaction with the affordance*. To use Dreyfus' (2007c: 65) words, "one's body is already being drawn (not just prepared)" to do something. These affordances show up, albeit often only indeterminately, in our field of perception and action, because they are relevant to our concerns. But they are not only relevant for understanding our first-person experience because, simultaneously they impact and involve also the physically active body by inducing 'changes in action readiness' (Frijda 1986, 2010).

According to Nico Frijda (1986), emotions are *changes in action readiness* that are generated as a reaction to objects or events that are relevant to the individual's concerns. These "states of action readiness [. . .] flexibly motivate flexible actions" (Frijda 2007: 115). He makes the following important observation:

> Emotions should not be primarily understood as reactions. They are best viewed as modulations of a prevailing background of continuous engagement with the environment. (Frijda 2007: 38)

Frijda's eye for the background of continuous bodily engagement with the world dovetails nicely with my efforts to call attention to the importance of not only figure-affordances but also ground-affordances (See figure 1 in De Haan, Rietveld, Stokhof & Denys, 2013, p. 7).

By way of summary, let me give an example to clarify this position of mine in relation to the various accounts of freedom we have encountered in this chapter. Imagine a brief episode in the life of an excellent Brazilian tailor at work. This excellent craftsman is able to unreflectively switch from cutting, to sewing, to taking a bite from his apple, to answering the phone. In McDowell's account this tailor's unreflective action is free because he could step back and reflect on his reasons for, say, sewing or being a tailor. In Dreyfus' account the tailor's unreflective action is free because were he to find himself reflecting on his reasons for sewing, he could let himself be drawn back into unreflective action; he could reenter absorbed coping. In Kelly's account the tailor's unreflective action is free because he has the possibility of noticing being given to him, in which case he would notice in a detached way (i.e. become reflectively aware of) his desire to sew this piece of fabric and thereby he could, as a reflective subject, effectively resist this desire.

In my account, freedom in unreflective action does not require that one ends the flow of skillful unreflective action. The tailor's unreflective action is free because, while sewing for instance, he is situated in a field of multiple relevant affordances affecting him, attracting or repelling him. These other affordances on the horizon, which are more or less indeterminate and experienced pre-reflectively, could for instance be: sewing something else, eating an apple, stopping working and going to the beach, drinking water or turning on the radio. The field of relevant affordances is a field of freedom.

It is important to note that resisting an affordance presupposes the possibility to begin something new; resisting an affordance can only be done by committing elsewhere. But starting such a new activity can be done *unreflectively* by allowing oneself to be solicited by possibility for action on the horizon. More generally, the central activities emphasized in the accounts of McDowell, Dreyfus and Kelly, respectively the possibility of stepping back to reflect, switching to another activity, and stopping and resisting a response, are all *possibilities for action* that can solicit mature human beings while being engaged in an unreflective flow of actions. As such they are action opportunities that can be integrated in the field of relevant affordances, which is the central notion in my account of unreflective freedom.[23] Seen from *within* an episode of unreflective action of adult human beings a possibility for reflection can be lived as one of the affordances in the field of possible actions.

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[23] Note that in the case of mere movements that are not actions, for example when we are unexpectedly pushed by someone, the initial movements we make are not instances of responsiveness to relevant affordances. On the other hand, the way we respond briefly after being pushed, for example by grasping someone's arm (but not her breasts or hair) to avoid falling, and the way the compensatory movements develop over time after the initial automatic reaction, can be understood in terms of such responsiveness to affordances.

Pre-linguistic children by definition lack the ability to reflect explicitly and do not have this particular possibility for action. Nevertheless, it makes sense to say that they possess unreflective freedom in so far as they are situated in a field of multiple solicitations to act as well. This simultaneous responsiveness to multiple affordances is something that can be investigated empirically (De Haan, Rietveld, Stokhof & Denys 2013).

Due to their idiosyncrasy the examples of eating an apple or turning on the radio may seem to omit the observation that the socio-cultural environment is also crucial for understanding how humans are freely responsive to *relevant or appropriate* affordances. But we can distinguish conceptually between, on the one hand, the *normativity*[24] inherent in unreflective action and, on the other, the *freedom* inherent in this type of action. The aim of this example of the Brazilian tailor (and of this chapter) is to shed light on the aspect of freedom, not on the aspect of normativity (for a discussion of this latter aspect, see Rietveld 2008a).

Given the possibility of making this distinction, an interesting open question is: how are these aspects of freedom and normativity in unreflective action related? A detailed discussion of this complex question will have to wait for another occasion. For now I can say that I believe that the aspects of freedom and normativity are internally related. These notions stress different aspects of one and the same phenomenon of *allowing oneself* to be moved to *improve* by relevant affordances. So it is *not* the case that no matter what the craftsman does next, his unreflective action is free as long as he acts in response to one of the affordances in his field of affordances. That would neglect the particular and rich socio-cultural context in which the action is situated (see Rietveld 2008a, 2010).

One important objection to my proposal that the freedom characteristic of unreflective action *is* being responsive to a field of relevant affordances, could be that it is not an account of freedom but of being captivated or enslaved by solicitations in the world since there is no willful choice made by the individual. I do not believe that this objection provides a real problem for my account. First of all my focus on unreflective freedom does not imply any underestimation of the importance of willful choice or reflective freedom. It is simply another topic. I will not elaborate on this because this should be clear by now thanks to the presentation of my account as complementary to McDowell's one.

Secondly, this objection neglects the fact that we are embodied and situated beings. Being embodied and situated implies being constrained. As Merleau-Ponty (2002/1945) and Hannah Arendt (1958, 1977/1961) have shown, being bound by the world does not contradict freedom. Invoking Arendt may come as a surprise in this context of studying freedom in unreflective skillful action. However, I think that her (1977/1961) account of situated freedom is exemplary in that it avoids an overly individualistic conception of freedom while at the same time stressing that

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[24] I mean here situated normativity in the basic sense of distinguishing in the context of a particular situation between better and worse, optimal and suboptimal, appropriate and inappropriate, what is significant and what it less significant, etc.

freedom is inherent in action, even in unreflective action (see Rietveld 2008c for a discussion).

Thirdly, even though there is no willful choice by a deliberating subject, that which the individual cares about nevertheless motivates the way she acts freely. The structure of the field of affordances, with relevant affordances that solicit action right now and other possibilities for action that are on the horizon, reflects the individual's dynamically changing concerns. The sensitive body, which is a dynamic structure of affective engagement, plays a crucial role for our selective openness to relevant solicitations. These sensitivities should be understood in the context of our histories in a natural and socio-cultural world in which we have developed our skills and concerns, including our bonds with others. What we care about in the concrete situation is reflected in the structured field of relevant affordances that draws us to act unreflectively.

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Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Problem of Bodily Agency

Rasmus Thybo Jensen

In Merleau-Ponty's early works he draws attention to a problem concerning bodily agency which he presents as analogous to the problem of perception that is his primary concern. The analogy between the two problems is implicitly recognized when Merleau-Ponty in his first book *The Structure of Behavior* (1942) writes:

> Our intentions find their natural clothing or their embodiment in movements and are expressed in them as the thing is expressed in its perspectival aspects. (SC 1983, p. 188/ 1990, p. 203)[1]

In both cases the initial problem is to recognize the *sui generis* character of the intentionality that characterize the phenomena in question. For Merleau-Ponty the basic problem concerning perception consists in understanding how perception, as the occurrence in our subjective life it is, can constitute an openness to the world that confronts us with the object itself *in person* rather than a mere proxy which remains at a distance from reality itself. What I suggest in the following is that there exists an analogous problem concerning how we can regard the objective occurrence of a bodily movement in the life an organism, as the bodily presence and direct intervention of a mind in the objective world rather than as a mere emissary of the mind. My aim is to flesh out this parallel problem concerning bodily agency and to show that it is in fact a problem that is more or less explicitly articulated in Merleau-Ponty's early works exactly via an analogy to what he explicitly calls the problem of perception.

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[1] I use "SC" to refer to Merleau-Ponty's *La structure du comportement*/*The Structure of Behavior* (1942). I refer first to the pagination of the English translation of SC (1983) and then to the page numbers in the French edition (1990). I shall use "PP" to refer to *phénoménologie de la perception*/ *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) and refer to the page numbers of Donald. A. Landes' recent translation, which contains indication of the corresponding pages in the French edition.

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In order to expose the problem concerning bodily agency in question I will exploit more recent work in philosophy of action, in particular the works of Hornsby and McDowell. In Hornsby's work we find the perhaps most articulate formulation of what I take to be the problem concerning bodily agency also pointed out by Merleau-Ponty; in McDowell's work we find what I take to be the same basic problem exposed via an analogy to the specific problem concerning perception that he analyses in *Mind and World* (1996).

The general idea of analyzing problems concerning agency via analogies to problems in philosophy of perception is of course an old idea. Such a "Methode der Analogie", as Husserl called it, is often motivated by the idea that the more extensive work on perception and in general theoretical intentionality can serve as guideline for our understanding of practical intentionality (Husserl 1988, p. 349).[2] This is also in a certain sense my motivation. In the first instance my aim is simply to bring out how reading Merleau-Ponty through the lens of such an analogical approach is exegetically fruitful. In this chapter I won't attempt to evaluate the extent to which prominent modern theories of action, or, for that matter, prominent interpreters of Merleau-Ponty or Merleau-Ponty himself, escape the problem in question. In the second instance my aim is, through my reading of Merleau-Ponty's analysis and diagnosis of the problem in question, to contribute to our understanding of the nature and pertinence of the problem.

1   The Problem of Perception

Merleau-Ponty states that the 'problem of perception' consists in the fact that perception is an original mode of knowledge (PP, p. 45). The originality of perception is said to reside in the fact that perception essentially is a *cognition of* or *acquaintance with* existences (*connaissances des existences*, PP, p. 42). Sometimes Merleau-Ponty also refers to the problem of perception as the "problem of the *presence* of the object" (PP, p. 26). In perception we are said to be presented with presences or existences rather than with a propositional content that would be properly expressed with a *that*-clause "It is true that ..." (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 14). Perceptual experience, Merleau-Ponty argues, does not at its most fundamental level present us with facts or true propositions but with objects and their features in their bodily presence or bodily reality (*présence charnelle*, PP, p. 111, p. 211, p. 269; *réalité charnelle*, SC 1983, p. 187/1990, p. 202; cf. Husserl 1992, p. 51: *körperliche Gegewart/leibhaften Wirklichkeit*):

> My perception does not turn toward a content of consciousness: rather it turns toward the ashtray itself. (PP, p. 271)

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[2] Some more recent philosophers of action who explicitly take such an analogical approach to action are: Danto (1973), Hornsby (1980), Searle (1983), Hurley (1998), Enç (2003) and Dokic (2003).

Merleau-Ponty's problem of perception therefore isn't just the problem of how to account for the specific sensuous way that perception presents us with facts understood as true propositions in contrast to a mere thought.

For Merleau-Ponty genuine perception consists in an acquaintance with existing objects, and in this sense it is a relational phenomenon that requires the existence of the object perceived, but this doesn't imply that that which is given in perception is an unarticulated, raw presence without any inner structure.[3] Perception isn't simply "a blind contact with a singular object" present merely as "a compact ensemble of givens" (Merleau-Ponty 1983, p. 197/1990, p. 213). Referring to the findings of Gestalt-psychology and the phenomenological analysis of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty claims that it is an essential feature of object-perception that the object itself is given through its appearances, or to use Husserl's expression through its adumbrations:

> The perceived is grasped in an indivisible manner as "in itself", that is, as gifted with an interior which I will never have finished exploring; and as "for me", that is, as given "in person" through its momentary aspects. (SC, 1983 p. 186/1990, p. 201)

In the first instance the problem of perception is simply to get the description of how things strike us in perception right, i.e. to recognize that what Merleau-Ponty calls our *naïve consciousness* of perception has an intrinsic duality (SC, 1983, pp. 185–186/1990, p. 202): On the one hand it is characterized by a naïve realism, perception is lived through as a being in the presence of an actual object itself; on the other hand it is evident in the experience itself, that this perceptual presence of the object shouldn't be understood as a full possession of the object, since our view of the object is always limited, i.e. we always see the object from a certain angle which reveal some aspects of the object while hiding others.

When characterizing how the relation between the object and its profiles or appearances shows up in un-reflective experience Merleau-Ponty use the word "magical", and like in the quote I began this paper with, the relation is likened to the relation between intentions and movements or gestures:

> One can say, if you like, that the relation of the thing perceived to perception, or of the intention to the gestures which realize it, is a magical relation in naïve consciousness; but it would still be necessary to understand magical consciousness as it understands itself and not to reconstruct it from subsequent categories. (SC 1983, p. 189/1990, 204)

As emphasized by Jacques Taminiaux Merleau-Ponty's use of "magical" in contexts such as these isn't an expression of some "exotic taste for the irrational", but rather serves to emphasize the contrast between the phenomenon as it is lived through pre-reflectively and the way it has been typically reconstructed in philosophical reflection (Taminiaux 1991, p. 208). The point is not that we normally

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[3] It is controversial whether we should read Merleau-Ponty as committed to a relational account of perception. I have argued that he is committed to such in an account in Jensen (2013); Romdenh-Romluc presents a different line of argument, with the same conclusion (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, pp. 159–167).

experience the givenness of the object through its appearances as magical in the sense of the magic performed on stage that seems to defy logic and the laws of nature. On the contrary, we normally take for granted that the appearances are proper 'manifestations' of the object itself, in a sense that contrast with how signs, for instance smoke, are signs of something not actually present in experience, for instance the fire causing the smoke (SC, 1983, p. 186/1990, p. 202). The fact that there is "for-us" an *in-itself* (PP, p. 74), is, as Husserl put it, the most commonplace for the philosophically naïve, but becomes the *the riddle of riddles* through philosophical reflection (Husserl 1996, Beilage V, §12).

It is one thing to *describe* the characteristic phenomenology of object-perception accurately, but yet another to make this phenomenon intelligible or to *think* or *conceptualize* it (SC, 1983, p. 188/1990, p. 202). According to Merleau-Ponty what makes it difficult to get the phenomenon in view in the first place, and secondly to make it intelligible, is a certain attitude or frame of mind which he calls Objective Thought. What is particularly difficult is to theoretically grasp the relation between the appearing object and the appearances of the object without reducing it to something else than what it appears to be from the perspective of *naïve consciousness*, namely an original, i.e. irreducible kind of intentional, or meaning-bearing relation that allows us to *accede to things themselves* through their perspectival appearances and have the object and its features revealed to us *in propria persona* (SC 1983, 219/1990, p. 236).

2 Objective Thought

Merleau-Ponty maps out the modern debates about perception (and action), philosophical as well as empirical, as caught up in a dialectic oscillation between two broad theoretical frameworks that he calls empiricism and intellectualism. He diagnoses the restless oscillation between empiricism and intellectualism as a symptom of an adherence to a deeper metaphysical presumption which he calls the prejudice of determinate being or the prejudice of the world (PP, p. 510, n. 60). It is the frame of mind or attitude which is dominated by such a prejudice that he calls "Objective Thought" (PP, p. 50). It is as long as we work within the boundaries of Objective Thought that we will, according to Merlea-Ponty, be unable to recognize the originality of perceptual intentionality as a kind of intentionality that lets the object itself manifest itself through the manifold of its appearances.

Merleau-Ponty provides different characterizations of Objective Thought, but one core feature of Objective Thought as it finds expression in debates about perception and action, is a commitment to the idea that all items that belong to the natural or empirical world exist *partes extra partes* and therefore can only stand in external or merely causal relations to one another (PP, p. 55, p. 75, pp. 77–78; SC, 1983, p. 202/1990, p. 218). The idea that anything that is a part of the natural world must be susceptible to an exhaustible explanation in purely natural scientific

terms, is part and parcel of the prejudice of the determinacy of being as it finds expression in philosophical reflection.[4] Such a scientific naturalism often regards the mathematical laws of physics as the paradigmatic case of science, and tends to regard the science of physics as the ultimate determination of being (PP, p. 55).[5] However, what defines such a naturalism is not physicalism or even scientific realism as such but rather the idea that anything which can be legitimately regarded as part of the empirical or natural world must be completely determinable by scientific means:

> It was no use denying any ontological value to the principles of science and leaving them with only a methodical value, for this reservation made no essential change as far as philosophy was concerned, since the sole conceivable being remained defined by scientific method. (PP, 55)

Objective Thought is more like an ideology than a commitment to any specific ontology. What matters is not whether one is for instance a scientific realist or a transcendental idealist but rather a commitment to a privileging of the scientific mode of understanding when it comes to the empirical world. What is defining of Objective Thought is a specific idea about how something must be able to be made intelligible if it is to count as a natural phenomenon, namely via an explanation that only deals in relations that are external to the relata and therefore excludes modes of explanation that ascribe meaning to the items made intelligible (cf. PP, p. 61). It is the idea that a proper understanding of nature must exclude any reference to meaning if it is to stay clear of superstition and mysticism.

What hinders both empiricism and intellectualism in recognizing the original intentionality of perception (and action) is, according to Merleau-Ponty, the fact that they both take the determinate universe of science as a datum (PP, p. 58), and construct their notion of perception and bodily agency accordingly. Let us take a closer look at some of Merleau-Ponty's reasons for thinking that a commitment to scientific naturalism necessarily obscures the recognition of the original intentionality

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[4] At times Merleau-Ponty seems to use Husserl's expression *the natural attitude* as synonymous with *Objective Thought* and contrasts it with *the transcendental attitude* (PP, p. 41, p. 510, n. 60). Qua natural attitude the assumption of scientific naturalism doesn't seem to be a necessary feature of Objective Thought, but given the historical development of modern science, such naturalism has, on Merleau-Ponty's reading, become an almost inescapable conception of the natural world.

[5] Merleau-Ponty mentions different conceptions of causality: as transmission of movement or energy and a functional conception which doesn't constrain the possible variables of the function to for instance spatio-temporal, physical events (PP, p. 75). Merleau-Ponty sometimes indicates that he takes modern physics to have undermined "Causal Thought" from within: He refers to Goldstein's analogy between a proper understanding of organisms and the break with the classical notion of causality which Goldstein finds in quantum mechanics (SC 1983, p. 154/1990, p. 167; 1983, p. 193/1990, p. 208). Most likely it is also quantum mechanics Merleau-Ponty has in mind when he states that even physics itself recognizes the limits of its determinations and demands a reworking and a contamination of its own pure concepts (PP, p. 57).

of perception, in order to prepare the grounds for an articulation of the parallel problem concerning bodily agency.

3   The Empiricist Model of Perception

Empiricism rests on a scientific monism which takes the world to consist in the totality of spatio-temporal events standing in merely causal relations (PP, p. 42). Its fundamental mistake is, according to Merleau-Ponty the attempt to insert perception in nature as just one among such merely causally related events (SC, 1983, 193/1990, 208).

The version of empiricism which is the target of Merleau-Ponty's critique in the long Introduction chapter of *Phenomenology of Perception* is committed to the project of naturalizing consciousness and intentionality and the creation of "an objective science of subjectivity" (PP, p. 11), where an objective science is one that deals only in causal explanations devoid of reference to intentional terms. This empiricist is committed to the idea that sensory consciousness is a matter of receiving impressions caused by external stimuli, themselves determinable in natural scientific terms. On this picture our subjective impressions can only be connected to the environment via causal correlations with external stimulation of our sense organs and therefore we must conceive of the impressions in the same atomistic fashion as the sensory stimulation. Such empiricism is committed to what Merleau-Ponty with the gestalt-psychologist Köhler calls the Constancy Hypothesis: There is a one-to-one correlation between sensory stimuli and subjective impressions (SC, 1983, p. 165/1990, p. 179; PP, p. 7). In order to build up an experience that is recognizable as the experience we actually enjoy, the empiricist in question appeals to classical Humean principles of association (PP, pp. 15–16). Our actual experience can amount to no more than atomistic impressions and associative relations between actual, imagined or remembered impressions and such associative relations are themselves thought of on the model of a merely causal, i.e. external relation (PP, p. 15, SC, 1983, p. 165/1990, p. 178). As a consequence, the relation between the appearance of the object and object appearing as it is experienced in naive consciousness, i.e. as a proper manifestation, cannot be made intelligible on this model (SC, 1983, p. 187/1990, p. 202). The sense of the presence of the object is on such an empiricist model reduced to the actual presence of an impression in a context of remembered previous impressions and expectations of future impressions. In so far as the different appearances of a perceived object correspond to something actually present to consciousness, they are reduced to a series of impressions that simply replace one another without any intrinsic normative or meaningful relations between them, i.e. without any internal reason to the process (PP, pp. 15–16). This is the reason why Merleau-Ponty can say that for the empiricist rationality is reduced to a fortuitous accident (*hazard heureux*, PP, p. 61). At this level of abstraction Merleau-Ponty's agrees with Kant's critique of Hume when Kant argues that on the Humean model the relation between

representations and objects of representations remains haphazard or arbitrary and therefore undermines the very idea of both rationality and of the objective world.[6]

The commitment to an atomistic conception of sensory consciousness, what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the *myth of sensation* is hardly shared by any modern defender of the project of naturalizing consciousness and intentionality or by any defender of a representationalist theory of perception (SC, 1983, p. 165/1990, p. 179).[7] Some of Merleau-Ponty's arguments against empiricism, however, do seem directly relevant also to present day discussions. On the general empiricist picture perceptual experience itself will be identified with an event taking place in the body and this event will be understood as merely contingently related to the worldly object:

> But the body appears capable of fabricating a pseudo-perception. Thus certain phenomena of which it is the seat must be necessary and sufficient for perception; the body must be the necessary intermediary between the real world and perception which are henceforth dissociated from one another. (SC, 1983, p. 190/1990, p. 205)

The empiricist conceives of the experience of seeing as a result of the irritation of certain sections of the nervous system and hallucinations are to be explained by activation of the parts of the brain that are involved in a normal seeing (PP, p. 351), which is why Merleau-Ponty implies that on such a view perceptions of a real object is nothing but veridical hallucinations (*des hallucinations vraies* PP, p. 308). A similar line of argument is familiar from contemporary discussions and is often used as an argument against the relational account of perception and in favour of an internalist conception of perception. The problem with such an internalist conception, which makes the revelatory character of perception an extrinsic feature of the experience, is, according to Merleau-Ponty, not only epistemic, rather it is of what we might call a transcendental nature: the internalist position raises skepticism not only about the trust-worthiness of what experience tells us, but about the very possibility of making sense of perception as seeming to present us directly with objects through the object's appearances, i.e., as having objective purport ("a claim to objectivity"/*prétention á l'objetivité*, PP, p. 249). According to Merleau-Ponty the internalist idea that perceptual appearances are, qua the subjective occurrences

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[6] Kant writes: "Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object" (Kant 2007, A104–105).

[7] Quine claims to go beyond the discussion on whether sense-data or Gestalt has epistemic priority by replacing the concept of sense-data with the concept of observational sentences, i.e. sentences with a constant causal connection between stimuli and judgments manifest in behaviour (Quine 1969, p. 76). Merleau-Ponty's arguments against the possibility of a finding a lawful connection between intentional or content-involving understandings of behaviour and stimuli describable in non-intentional terms delivered in *The Structure of Behavior*, seem, if successful, also to rule out Quine's proposal.

they are, mere appearances (*simple appearance*, PP, 418, 401), in the sense that they are always compatible with things being otherwise than they appear, renders what he calls the *phenomenon of being* or *the phenomenon of truth* impossible (PP, p. 418, 308). What is rendered impossible is that perceptual appearances should be what they pretend to be, namely a direct manifestation of the object appearing. The consequence of this is, according to Merleau-Ponty, that we lose our grip on the very notion of an appearance; we "render impossible the consciousness of anything, even as appearance" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 310). Merleau-Ponty's argument here is intricate, but the basic idea is that if we are to make sense of perception as seeming to be a direct manifestation of the object itself, then we must have knowledge about what it would be like to actually have such a direct manifestation occur in one's experiential life, which in turn requires that one has actually had such experiences and known that that was what one had. This argument parallels what I elsewhere call McDowell's negative transcendental argument against what McDowell terms the Highest Common Factor model of perceptual appearances, which is exactly the view that regards even the appearances of an object present in a case of a genuine seeing as 'mere appearances', i.e. as of the same fundamental kind as those we find in hallucinatory cases.[8] Merleau-Ponty, like McDowell, regards the consequences of the idea that perceptual appearances must be regarded as a reaction to the sensory impression made on us by the world and therefore as always one step removed from the world itself, as fatal (McDowell 1996, p. 143): we will no longer be able to make our perceptual awareness, even qua consciousness of appearances, intelligible.

4   The Intellectualist Model of Perception

The (Kantian) intellectualist realizes how the classical empiricist model fail because what is supposed to tie the impressions together so as to give them the power to represent a mind-independent object, is reduced to non-normative, merely associative links. On this point Merleau-Ponty is in agreement with his contemporary the neo-Kantian Lachiéze-Rey. Lachiéze-Rey's diagnose the basic problem of empiricism as residing in the fact that it makes it unintelligible how our thinking could have so much as a "hold on things" and therefore makes our apparent understanding of the world an "illusion of thought" (PP, p. 389, p. 16). The intellectualist instead conceives of the intentional relations between different appearances of an object and between the object and the appearances present in experience in terms of explicit reasons or at least reasons that can be made explicit in judgements, i.e. can be articulated on a propositional form (PP, pp. 50–51). According to intellectualism the experience of a singular cube is a made possible by an a priori structure provided by the understanding which dictates how the appearances must vary according to the position of the subject and the perceived object in objective space (PP, pp. 210–211).

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[8] See Jensen (2013) for a comparative analysis of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell's versions of the negative transcendental argument.

However, in order for intellectualism to avoid making the perceived world into a mere projection or construction of the mind and thereby undermine the *aseity* or mind-independence of the perceived object (PP, p. lxxix, p. 242), it is forced to maintain an element of the empiricist idea of a manifold of sensory matter which is synthesized by the forms of understanding. Intellectualism in the form of critical or Kantian Idealism might reject the realistic idea of sensory input but it still sees itself forced to appeal to an at least *ideally separable* sensuous moment of perception (SC, 1983, p. 200/1990, p. 216, PP, p. 251, p. 543, n. 60). Without such an appeal the very idea of receptivity will be undermined, since all we are left is a putative idea of affection which amounts to no more than the mind thinking that it is being affected (PP, p. 391).

According to Merleau-Ponty the basic mistake of intellectualism is that it takes for granted that the natural world equals the *determinate universe of science* (PP, p. 48). The empirical realism of Kantian intellectualism amounts to a scientific realism only now in the framework of transcendental idealism. What is ruled out by both the empiricist and the intellectualist model is that the impression that the natural world makes on our natural sensibility can itself be intrinsically meaningful and so as such constitute our most basic cognition of objects as singular existences. Intellectualism tries to introduce meaning via the synthetic activities of the understanding, but faces the fundamental problem of accounting for how the sensory manifold, itself devoid of any *rational intention* or *meaning* (PP, p. 53), could ever *motivate* or *guide* the synthetic activity so as to give us access to an world that is not just a creation of our own mind (PP, pp. 37–38). Exploiting Merleau-Ponty's own invocation of a well-known Kantian image, we can state the basic problem of intellectualism as follows: Because intellectualism begins with the idea of *blind* intuitions its compensatory attempts are bound to end up in *empty* concepts (PP, p. 34), i.e., to paraphrase McDowell, with concepts that would really not be concepts at all (McDowell 1996, p. 4). Merleau-Ponty concludes that the consequences of accepting a picture of our natural sensibility as reducible to what can be explained in merely natural scientific terms have made both the idea of our sensory contact with the world and the idea of judgements with empirical content *unthinkable* ("impensable", PP, p. 54, see also p. 251).

5   The Problem of Bodily Agency

Within the framework of Objective Thought the human body is conceived as an object consisting of parts that stand in merely external causal relations to one another, *partes extra partes*, and all events involving the body must, at least in principle, be exhaustibly explainable by natural scientific means (SC, 1983, p. 161/1990, p. 174, PP, p. 55, p. 75, pp. 77–78). According to Merleau-Ponty's analysis the basic problem of perception haunting both empiricism and intellectualism is generated by this naturalistic conception of the body and more specifically the implied conception of our sensibility; in what follows I argue that it is the same

conception of the body which gives rise to what I call the problem of bodily agency via the implied conception of our motility. In the case of perception the basic obstacle to recognizing the originality of perceptual intentionality is the idea that the world's making a sensory impact on our sensory organs cannot as such constitute our basic openness to the world itself but can at most be the external cause behind our subjective appearances. In the case of bodily agency the basic problem is generated by a conception of the motor output of the mind as an agency-neutral event, a mere bodily movement which in itself doesn't involve the agency of the subject but can at most be a mere effect of our conative modes of consciousness.

In *The Structure of Behavior* Merleau-Ponty explicates the problem of bodily agency in terms of a dualism between consciousness and action. According to such a dualistic conception *action* is understood as the merely physical component of the event that takes place whenever a bodily intentional action is carried out; it is the "purely motor notion" of action as the sum of movements understood as a series of bodily events that are merely causally related, what Merleau-Ponty refers to as juxtaposed realities connected by external and blind relations (SC, 1983, pp. 163–164/pp. 177–78; SC, 1983, 202/1990, 218). All bodily movements involved in actions are, on this picture, agency-neutral events, in the sense of events that could have happened had no agency been in play. This leaves our conscious conative states or occurrences as merely externally related to the movements involved in any given intentional action:

> Correlatively, perception and action taken in that which is specific to them, that is, as the knowledge and the modification of reality, are rejected from consciousness. (SC, 1983, p. 164/1990, p. 177)

We can compare the situation with the theoretical picture of perception we get on the assumption of scientific naturalism. In the case of perception we get a conceptual divorce of the cognitive, mental occurrence of an appearance of an object from the natural event of the object affecting our sensibility. Because we think of the stimulation of our senses as something that must be exhaustibly explained in merely scientific terms we have excluded that the impression made on us by the world can as such amount to an occurrence with meaning like that of an appearing of an object to a subject. The appearance is conceived as something that is intrinsically *veridicality*-neutral in the sense that it is, qua the subjective occurrence it is, compatible with things being completely different from the way they seem. The impression made by the world on our senses is on the other hand conceived as meaningless, in the sense that it is not, qua the natural occurrence it is, something that can be seen as having any intrinsic, normative or motivational relation to the appearance qua content-bearing conscious occurrence. In the case of bodily action we get a conceptual divorce of the conative state or occurrence of the subject, her trying or intention, and the bodily movement through which the intention is effectuated. The conative item is conceived as something that is intrinsically *efficacity*-neutral; qua mental item it is compatible with nothing getting done in the world, i.e. with no actual movement of the body taking place. The bodily movement is on the other hand conceived as agency-neutral, in the sense that a movement of the very same

fundamental kind could occur even if no conative item of the person whose body moves had been present.

When discussing the problem of bodily agency Merleau-Ponty doesn't make as sharp a distinction between empiricism and intellectualism as in his discussion of the problem of perception. However, we can recognize the behaviourist model of action which reduces all intentional actions to complicated collections of reflexes (resulting from classical or operant conditioning) as one possible outcome of the empiricist project of naturalization. Here we find a parallel between the basic idea of the reflex arc which postulates a correlation between any piece of behaviour and some independently specifiable stimuli and the constancy hypothesis, i.e. the idea that any given subjective sensory impression must correspond to an objective stimulus specified solely via its physical properties (PP, p. 7; SC 1983, p. 165/ 1990, p. 179). The intellectualist on the other hand distinguishes bodily movements as actions by their relation to representational states or occurrences of the mind, representing at a minimum the goal of the action and possibly the bodily movement itself and its composing parts, and even the bodily automatisms that are to be triggered by the representations and assure the execution of the action (PP 525, n. 99; SC, 1983, p. 173/1990, p. 188).[9] The intellectualist conception of actions as bodily movements caused in the right way by a representational state, is compatible with what is often called the Standard Causal Theory of action, which is committed to something like the following: a bodily movement is an action if and only if it is caused in the right way and causally explained by some appropriate conative mental item that mediates or constitutes the agent's reasons for performing the action in question.[10]

The empiricist conception of intentional action could of course allow a representational consciousness as an essential component of intentional actions, but what would still distinguish the empiricist model from the intellectualist conception would be the intellectualist's insistence on the need to invoke irreducible intellectual capacities to explain our representational awareness. In opposition to at least the reductive naturalist version of empiricism the intellectualist would insist on what Davidson calls the anomalousness of the mental (Davidson 1980), i.e. on the idea that our representational capacities cannot be exhaustibly explained in merely naturalistic terms. What both intellectualism and empiricism remain committed to is

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[9] In his discussion of the Schneider case and related neuro-pathological cases Merleau-Ponty distinguished between empiricist and intellectualist psychology, where the latter explains disturbances of motor behaviour with reference to disturbance of a representational function and the former explains the same disturbances in purely mechanistic, causal terms (PP, pp. 125–126, see Jensen 2009 for a discussion of these two models of action as they are played out in Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the Schneider case).

[10] The exact formulation of the Standard Causal Theory is a matter of controversy. This definition is appropriated from the one provided in Aguilar and Buckareff (2010). See Romdenh-Romluc's contributions to this volume for a detailed discussion of how Merleau-Ponty's positive account of bodily agency can be read as challenging the Standard Causal Theory (Romdenh-Romluc 2013).

that in so far as action involves a bodily movement such movement must be amenable to a purely natural scientific explanation, and therefore much be intelligible in terms that are agency-neutral and impersonal in the sense of terms that do not imply the presence of an intentional agent.[11]

6   The Problem from the Physical Side

In several places Merleau-Ponty explicates the problem of agency as a result of a dualism between being-for-itself and being-in-itself as two mutually exclusive modes of being. However, I do not think that the problem of agency that Merlea-Ponty draws attention to is a result of a substance dualism as such. The problem rather resides in the assumption that the subjective component (the intention or trying) and the objective component (the movement) of a bodily action can be made intelligible independently of one another, i.e. in a conceptual dualism.

We find Merleau-Ponty's perhaps clearest statement of what I take to be the basic problem of bodily agency in the context of his discussion of certain cases of motor disturbances, which the neuro-physiologist Liepmann dubbed *motor apraxia*:

> So long as consciousness is defined through representation, the only possible operation for it is of forming representations. Thus, consciousness will remain a motor consciousness insofar as it provides itself with a "movement representation". The body, then, executes the movement by reproducing it according to the representation that consciousness adopts and according to a movement it receives from it (Cf. Otto Sittig, *Über Apraxie: Eine Klinische Studie* (Berlin: Karger, 1931), 98). We must still determine through which magical operation the representation of a movement gives rise in the body to precisely this very movement. The problem is only resolved if we cease distinguishing the body as a mechanism in itself and consciousness as being for itself. (PP, p. 525, n. 99)

Though this critique is voiced in the context of a discussion of Liepman's specific neuro-physiological model it is raised as a perfectly general critique of any model that assumes a dualism of representational capacities on the one side and motility or bodily capacities to move on the other. In order to spell out this critique it is helpful to take a brief look at the way Merleau-Ponty makes use of Liepmann's work in his argument.

Liepmann used the notion of motor project (*Bewegungsentwurf*) in order to account for certain cases of motor disturbances, which he dubbed *motor apraxia* (cf. Rothi and Heilman 1996). In Liepmann's classic case of the *Regierungsrat*, the patient, Mr. T., was unable to perform the most simple tasks with his right hand, but

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[11] The assumption of the agency-neutrality of bodily movements involved in bodily action is the common starting point of much modern philosophy action. For a survey of recent authors who ascribe to the idea of agency-neutral movements see Grünbaum (2008, p. 246, n. 4). The assumption is opposed with different versions of a so called disjunctive conception of bodily movements by amongst others Hornsby (1997), Haddock (2005) and Stout (2010).

if he was forced to respond to a command with his left hand he could respond swiftly and accurately (Rothi and Heilman 1996, 112). The case is neither a case of simple paralysis, as the motility of the hand is not completely missing, nor is it a case of a disturbance of the intellectual capacities of the patient, what Liepmann called the 'ideational preparation of the action'. The fact that the patient is perfectly able to perform actions with his left hand was taken by Liepmann to show that the intellectual capacity to represent the action is intact. The representational under-standing is furthermore demonstrated by the fact that the patient can respond immediately and correctly to whole-body demands such as 'walk to the window' (Rothi and Heilman 1996, 112).[12] Merleau-Ponty now argues that when Liepmann demonstrates that what is disturbed in cases of motor apraxia is a power or a 'know how' (*pouvoir*//*ein Können*) and not a piece of intellectual knowledge or a 'know-ing that' (*savoir*/*ein Kennen*), he is on the verge of breaking the spell of Objective Thought and dismantling the dualism of mind and body. However, when Liepmann regards this "power" as a "property of the nervous system" and reduces the power to a system of *automatic reflexes* that somehow ensures the innervations of the right muscles, then he, according to Merleau-Ponty falls back into the dualistic picture (PP, p. 524, n. 99).

My aim here is not evaluate whether Merleau-Ponty's delivers a fair critique of Liepmann's neuro-physiological model, but rather to articulate the general point made by Merleau-Ponty in these passages.[13] The general problem concerning bodily agency, pointed to by Merleau-Ponty, appear whenever the power to move so as to carry out one's intentions, i.e. the motility of the body, is understood as belonging solely to the body conceived as a system of "blind mechanisms". The mechanisms are blind in the sense that the working of the mechanisms is supposed to be intelligible in merely causal terms, something that rules out that they can be understood as responsive to the meaning of a representation. If one intends to wave one's arm then one's intention can be said to have representational content in the minimal sense of having satisfaction-condition that sets a norm for when I have successfully carried out my intention. The problem is now how we are to under-stand that a set of mechanisms blind to meaning can nevertheless be understood as capable of "grasping" and carrying out the intention of the subject: "philosophy does not possess an idea of consciousness and an idea of action which would make internal communication between them possible" (SC, 1983, p. 164/1990, p. 177). The problem goes in the opposite direction but is analogous with the problem of

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[12] The argument via Liepmann's patient Mr. T. is structurally similar to at least one strand in Merleau-Ponty's argumentation via Gelb and Goldstein's case of Schneider. See Jensen (2009) for a more detailed analysis of the structure of Merleau-Ponty's arguments for the existence of non-representational motor intentionality via the case of Schneider.

[13] I leave it an open question to what extent a modern defenders of a representationalist picture of the mind could defend a model similar to Liepmann's by restricting the model to the sub-personal level.

accounting for the transition from the sensory impression to the appearance of a mind-independent object, if the impression made by the world on our sensibility is understood as, using Quine's expression, mere "surface irritations" without any worldly content.

7   The Problem from the Mental Side

Let us take a further look at the claim that the intellectualist model in question makes the relation between intention and movement unintelligible. So far, I have tried to explicate the alleged mystery from the side of the body: How is the body, understood as a collection of meaning-blind mechanisms, supposed to be responsive to the meaning of intentions? We can also explicate the mystery beginning from the side of the subject who intends to do things. What belongs to the agentive power of the subject on the picture in question? The power of the agent seems to be restricted to the forming of intentions, i.e. to a control over the mental component of bodily action, since the bodily movement itself is understood as simply the results of the workings of blind mechanisms of the bodily movement. Merleau-Ponty expresses this confinement of the sphere of the will when he writes:

> The motor intentions of the living being were converted into objective movements: the will was accorded but an instantaneous fiat and the execution of the act was delivered over to nervous mechanism. (PP, p. 56)

The "motor intentions" (*intentions motrice*) in question here corresponds to what Liepmann called the "motor project" (*Bewegungsentwurf*) for which Merleau-Ponty also uses the expression "motor intentionality" (*intentionalité motrice*, PP, 113). The conversion of the motor intentions into objective movement corresponds to what Merleau-Ponty criticize as Liepmann's reduction of the bodily power (*Können*) to carry out movements in accordance with one's intentions to a property of the nervous system. On the intellectualistic model the power of the agent is restricted to an initiation of a series of events which are external to the will of the agent. This is a consequence of the scientific monism about bodily movements shared between empiricism and intellectualism, according to which, to use Brewer's succinct phrasing, bodily behaviour is reduced to "a mentally induced reflex" (Brewer 1993, p. 311). As Merleau-Ponty points out, on this picture our motility, understood as the capacity to carry out movements according to the intentions of the agent, is not a power which the agent can know herself to possess just by being an agent, since it belongs to the objective body, i.e. to the body as "an ensemble of organs of which we have no notion in immediate experience and which impose their mechanisms, their unknown powers, between ourselves and things" (SC 1983, 190/1990, 204). As Hornsby notes Hume raised an apposite question concerning the consequences of such a view of our capacity to move (Hornsby 2004b, 176):

> How indeed can we be conscious of a power to move our limbs when *we have no such power*, but *only* that to move certain animal spirits which, though they produce at last the motion of limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension? (Hume 1748/2000, § 7, pt. I)

A modern version of Hume's question would speak not about the production of animal spirits but more likely of neural and neuro-physiological events as the immediate effects of a conative mental event, such as an intention or a trying. Assuming a denial of substance-dualism, on the intellectualist model my power as an agent must reside in the causal power of my intention *qua* brain event, with the consequence that my actual power is limited to the bringing about of the most proximate effect of the brain-event to be identified by the appropriate science. My true sphere of influence is restricted to the immediate environment of my brain, which, as Hornsby puts it, is not the world we know and inhabit as agents (Hornsby 2004b, 177). McDowell nicely captures the picture of ourselves we get once we accept that the mental items and the bodily movements involved in bodily actions are merely causally related, with the bodily movement in themselves being agency-neutral events:

> Our powers as agents withdraw inwards and our bodies with the powers whose seat they are – which seem to be different powers, since their actualizations are not doings of ours but at best effects of such doings – take on the aspect of alien objects. It comes to seem that what we do, even in those of our actions that we think of as bodily, is at best to direct our wills, as it were from a distance, at changes in those alien objects. (McDowell 1996, 91)

McDowell here suggests that if the picture in question leaves us with an intelligible conception of ourselves at all, it is one that heavily distorts the phenomenology of bodily actions. Merleau-Ponty also indicates that the intellectualist is forced to draw a distorted picture of our conative phenomenology when he, opposing the intellectualist model for bodily agency, writes:

> The subject does not live in a world of states of consciousness or representation from which he would believe himself able to act on and know external things by a sort of miracle. (SC, 1983, p. 189/1990, p. 204)

If the intellectualist model was correct it seems that the only way the agent could makes sense of her own power to carry out her intentions through her bodily movement would be by appealing to a kind of miracle that occur every time she intends to for instance raise her arm. Since the power of the agent has shrunk to the power of forming an intention and setting in motion a causal chain of events beyond her ken and control, her conative phenomenology, if it were true to the facts, should leave it completely mysterious how she ever succeeds in performing the movements that leads to exactly the intended outcome; she would have to believe in a miraculous pre-established harmony since nothing less seem capable of explaining by which "magical operation" the exact movements that satisfy her intentions are brought about.

In our actual experience of performing intentional actions we experience the relation between intentions and relevant movements as, using Merleau-Ponty's word, magical, but not in the sense that it seems to us that we perform a miracle every time we successfully move our body. The relation is experienced as magical

in the sense that it is unproblematic and smooth, i.e. not in need of any mediation from a further power, just like we think of a magical power as a power to bring things forth immediately:

> I move external objects with the help of my own body, which takes hold of them in one place in order to take them to another. But I move my body directly, I do not find it at one objective point in space in order to lead it to another, I have no need of looking for it because it is always with me. I have not need of directing it toward the goal of the movement, in a sense it touches the goal form very beginning and it throws itself toward it. In movement, the relations between my decision and my body are magical ones. (PP, pp. 96–97)

This quote can seem to be contradicting something said by Anscombe in response to someone who says "I can get my arm to move by an act of will but not a matchbox" (Anscombe 1957, p. 52). Such a person might be sitting starring at a matchbox as she makes her utterance. Anscombe responds that if we try to lift our arm in the way such a person tries to move the matchbox, our efforts will be just as much in vain, and that if the problem is how to move the matchbox like we can move our arm, then there really is no problem (Anscombe 1957, p. 52): We can simply reach out and move the matchbox. I find it helpful to bring out why Anscombe's point here is exactly not contradicting Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the special role of the body in action. What Anscombe is dismantling in these passages is a picture of the will which corresponds to the picture that McDowell described as the consequence of the conceptual divorce of the mental and the physical elements of actions. Her point is that our mind doesn't have a special relation to the object we call our body by virtue of the body being the only object we can direct our will at and then it will obey us as if under a magic spell. There is an important respect in which the way I can move the matchbox from side to side is just like the way I can move my hand from side to side. Under normal circumstances both actions are actions I perform without making use of any means-end knowledge about how to perform the action; they are in that sense teleologically basic actions.[14] As Anscombe points out it is often the case that the description under which we are aware of what we are intentionally doing is "at a distance from the details of one's movement" (Anscombe 1957, p. 54). The teleologically most basic description under which one knows what one is doing without having to observe what one is doing might be a description like "I'm tying my shoelaces". When Merleau-Ponty stresses that we can move our body directly, this is exactly a way of saying that we can move our body without our teleologically basic intention being a body-directed intention, in which, for instance, I intend to move my hand with a certain force and velocity in a specified direction. I can move the matchbox in a teleologically basic way exactly because I have a bodily capacity to grasp things and move them that does not require me to direct my will at my bodily organs as if from a distance.

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[14] See Grünbaum (2006, p. 86) for the relevant notion of teleologically basic actions, developed via Hornsby's notion (Hornsby 1980).

8 Concluding Remarks on the Transcendental Problem of Bodily Agency

We are now in position to see more clearly the radicality of the basic problem of bodily agency I'm arguing is the analogue of Merleau-Ponty's basic problem of perception. If we are unable to make sense of ourselves as having the power to actually carry out our intentions because the motility of the body is regarded as system of blind mechanisms only externally related to our conative life, then it seems that even our ability to make sense of ourselves as at least possessing intentions to do something is endangered. The reason why we normally have no problem with understanding ourselves as capable of having intentions, such as the intention to pick up a match box, is that we know ourselves to possess basic bodily capacities that correspond to our teleologically basic intentions. I do not know the power, weight and reach of my body as an engineer knows a machine; I know my hands as my grasping power and my legs as my ambulatory power, and it is in virtue of my possession of these powers that I can immediately see an object as within reach and form the intention to grasp, and see a place as within walking distance and intend to walk there (cf. PP, p. 147). If someone sits starring at a matchbox and claims that she is trying to move it, then we will not, at least not at first sight, be able to make sense of her as actually having the intention to move the matchbox, because we cannot see how her intention could correspond to any teleologically basic bodily capacity. The problem with the conception of the bodily movements involved in actions as agency-neutral events only externally related to intentions is that it leaves us as theoreticians in a generalized version of the predicament we are confronted with when facing the match-box starrer. If we fail to make sense of ourselves as possessing teleologically basic bodily capacities, our actual capacity to move our body in accordance with our intentions, come to appear as a mysterious, telekinetic power.[15] It is this problem I think deserves to be called a transcendental problem concerning bodily agency, since it is a problem that concerns the very possibility of us possessing intentions with practical content at all. The problem is the analogue of the problem we saw Merleau-Ponty pinpoint as the consequence of a conception of our perceptual appearances as merely externally related to the appearing object. In the case of perception what is under threat if we accept the conception of our sensibility dictated by scientific naturalism, is the very possibility of regarding ourselves as having so much as an awareness of appearances, because the conception empties the impressions made on us by the objects of the world of any rational

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[15] This line of argument draws heavily on Hornsby's way of arguing for the alienating character of the picture in question (Hornsby 1998, pp. 388–89; Hornsby 2004a, b). Hornsby borrows the image of telekinetic powers from Bernhard Williams account of Descartes' mind-body problem (Hornsby 1998, p. 389). McDowell indicates a comparable line of argument against the functionalism of Loar, which drives the explanandum of psychological explanations inwards and "away from the agent's involvement with the world" (McDowell 1998, p. 333). Hornsby pursues a similar argument against a functionalist conception of the mental (1997, p. 114).

meaning. In the case of bodily agency it is the possibility of seeing ourselves as so much as trying to make a difference in the world we perceive that we risk undermining, if we accept a scientific naturalism that reduces our motility to an ensemble of meaning blind-mechanisms.

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Imagination, Embodiment and Situatedness: Using Husserl to Dispel (Some) Notions of 'Off-Line Thinking'

Julia Jansen

During the long reign of behaviourism, imagination almost seemed to disappear into "the outer darkness of intellectual irrelevance" (Morley 2005: 117). Now, after cognitive science's early 'iconophobia' (Thomas 2007), imagination research has grown into what has been described as a 'flourishing' (Chalmers and Bourget 2007) field of investigation. This relatively recent phenomenon happens to coincide, more or less, with the arrival of "a new way of thinking about the mind and things mental that has started to seep out of the ivory tower and set up residence in popular consciousness" (Rowlands 2010: 1) – a way of thinking that is said to be "sweeping the planet" (Adams 2010: 619). What is meant is a new model of the mind, the model of 'situated cognition', which I take to comprise '*e*mbedded', '*e*nactive', '*e*mbodied' and/or '*e*xtended' theories of cognition.[1] While these 4*e*'s significantly diverge, and even conflict in some respects (more about this in Sect. 4), they share the view that cognition does not, or not exclusively, depend on mental representations understood as well-individuated 'internal' symbols. Instead, cognition may also depend on the cognitive system's embeddedness in the surrounding environment (Rupert 2009; Haugeland 1998); on aspects of its activity (Noë 2004; Hurley 1998; Varela et al. 1991); on features of its embodiment (Thompson 2007; Gallagher 2005; Haugeland 1998); and/or on material vehicles or processes that extend into the world (Clark 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998).

And yet, crossovers between the two exciting developments are rare. Imagination does not lend itself, or so it seems, to a situated account. In what follows I propose that serious challenges notwithstanding, there are also reasons to think that these may not be insurmountable, at least not for all features of imagination. With the help of Husserl's phenomenological analysis of 'phantasy'

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[1] I follow Robbins and Aydede (2009: 3) in my use of the term. For an important alternative understanding see Wilson (2002). I return to this point in Sect. 3 (see fn. 9).

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('Phantasie'), i.e., sensory imagination, I highlight some of those aspects and begin to show how they might be accommodated by some strands (some *e*'s) of situated cognition. To begin with, however, some clarifications are in order. Some of the terms that are most relevant to the discussion here are used in specific technical senses in situated cognition theory or Husserlian phenomenology, and some are used in both discourses but in incongruent ways. Some of these incongruities are due to important differences in the scope of research, which, if overlooked, can obscure both points of connection and points of divergence. I therefore begin by laying out the necessary vocabulary and some key coordinates of scope, i.e., of the aim and purview of situated cognition theory and Husserlian phenomenology respectively.

1   How to Begin: Some Terminology and Clarification of Scope

Within the cognitive sciences *cognition* is usually understood as information processing, which, within the prevalent functionalist framework, is not tied to a specific (human or non-human) processing architecture, but is meant to cross over boundaries between human, animal and A.I. cognition. Researchers are mostly concerned with subpersonal processes associated with adaptive flexible, not necessarily human, behaviour. Within philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular, cognition is, on the contrary, usually understood as human cognition (for notable, mostly recent, exceptions *see* Andrews 2012). Philosophers, especially those who work in philosophy of mind, epistemology and phenomenology, investigate some of the same cognitive processes as cognitive scientists, such as perception, memory, and problem solving. However, at least traditionally, they do so in terms of potentially *conscious* (human) subjects and agents.

Husserl gives a wide definition of *consciousness* as a "comprehensive designation for any 'mental acts', or 'intentional experiences'" (Husserl 2001b: V, §1). The phenomenological slogan 'all consciousness is consciousness of' expresses Husserl's understanding that consciousness and intentionality are inextricably linked. By this he does not mean that all intentionality is 'conscious' in the sense that we are always explicitly aware of what we, for example, perceive (this is evidently not the case). Instead he claims that intentionality is 'lived through' ('erlebt') in a mode of tacit self-awareness (Husserl 2001a: 607; Zahavi 1999, 2003). Translated into the terms of current philosophy of mind, this means that, for Husserl, there is no intentionality without *phenomenal consciousness*, even though we ordinarily pay attention to the intentional contents (the objects) of experience. Arguably the most dominant (functionalist) view in philosophy of mind and cognitive science is, in contradistinction to Husserl's, that intentionality can be regarded in isolation from phenomenal consciousness. Intentionality is here understood in a narrow sense as the 'aboutness' of, for example, mental

or neural states or processes and computational symbols (also referred to as 'representations'). Phenomenal consciousness, 'consciousness' for short, is then attributed only to experience for which there is 'something it's like' subjectively to undergo it (often taken to be equivalent to 'qualia'). However, the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness is highly contentious. *Intentionalism* here refers to the view that phenomenal consciousness supervenes on intentionality (Byrne 2001; Harman 1990), which in its strong version involves the view that phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to, or is identical with representational content (Kind 2007; Tye 1995, 2000; Dretske 1995).[2] Although currently less dominant, non-reductive views of phenomenal consciousness, which are more compatible with a Husserlian position, have also received considerable attention and have in some cases even involved arguments for the inverse dependence of intentionality on phenomenal consciousness (Fasching 2012; Klausen 2008; Pitt 2004; McGinn 2004; Loar 2003; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Siewert 1998; Strawson 1994, 2004; Searle 1992).

The issue of *representation* is one of the longest standing issues in philosophy and arguably one of those most central to modern philosophy in particular. Very generally speaking, it concerns the different ways in which (human) minds or, to put it neutrally, cognitive systems refer to, or represent the world. With the emergence of cognitive science and its increasing influence on philosophy of mind, philosophical debates have shifted significantly from traditional concerns with representational *contents* to (scientifically testable) concerns with the roles representations play in cognition. In this context, representations are often considered in their function as material (e.g., neural) *vehicles* of content. Through British empiricism, German (Neo-Kantian) philosophy and early psychology, the term 'representation' ('Vorstellung') also became a key term for Husserl. Mostly, he uses 'representation' and 'consciousness' interchangeably ('perceptual consciousness' and 'perceptual representation'; 'phantasy consciousness' and 'phantasy representation', etc.). While, as a phenomenologist, Husserl is not equipped to investigate the physical nature of representational vehicles, it can still be argued that a particular version of the content-vehicle-distinction applies to his account (see Sect. 3).

The focus on representations has led to various divergent senses of *representationalism* and *anti-representationalism* (see fn. 2), but only one is directly relevant to our concerns here. It is the view that cognition is exclusively mediated by representations as its only vehicles, which are individuated inside a (natural or artificial) mind (henceforth: '*representationalism*'). The corresponding 'anti-representationalism' accordingly refers to the view that cognition does not, or not exclusively, depend on such representations as its only vehicles (henceforth: '*anti-representationalism*'). It is important to note that the oppositional pair 'representationalism/anti-representationalism' is

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[2] Intentionalism is also referred to as 'representationalism'. I exclusively use 'intentionalism' in order to avoid confusion with the sense of representationalism I outline below.

not congruent with the further oppositional pair 'internalism/externalism'. Internalism regarding vehicles of cognition (henceforth: '*vehicle internalism*') involves the claim that all vehicles are internal to a (natural or artificial) brain, while the corresponding externalism (henceforth: '*vehicle externalism*') denies this claim. However, the rejection of the claim that the vehicles of cognition exclusively consist of discretely individuated representations does not necessarily entail the rejection of the claim that all vehicles of cognition are intracranial. It is, for example, possible to be an anti-representationlist to the extent that one believes that the vehicles of cognition are systematically distributed (rather than discretely individuated); *and* to be an internalist to the extent that one believes that vehicles are so distributed only intracranially (see Sect. 4).

While Husserl has often been taken for a traditional Cartesian internalist (Rowlands 2003; Dreyfus 1991; Rorty 1979), more recent scholarship has produced persuasive evidence for an externalist reading. It has been suggested more recently that he is not only an externalist regarding content – nowadays a less contentious issue – but also a vehicle-externalist (Zahavi 2008). Since one cannot, by means of Husserl's phenomenology, directly confirm or disprove claims concerning the material nature of representational vehicles, a particular notion of 'vehicle' must be in play for this to be true (see Sect. 3). Further, since Husserl is concerned not with cognition but with consciousness (in his wide sense of the term), the case of his alleged externalism raises the question of phenomenal externalism. *Phenomenal externalism* claims that the phenomenal quality of a given experience depends upon more than just states or processes internal to the brain of the experiencer. This position is still considerably more contentious than other versions of externalism, at least in part because conscious experience does not lend itself as easily to the strong functionalist approach that undergirds much of vehicle externalism.[3] Since imagination is commonly considered intrinsically tied to phenomenal consciousness, the issue of phenomenal externalism is critical for a situated approach to imagination (see Sect. 4).

Any attempt to integrate imagination in a situated cognition framework with the help of Husserlian phenomenology must be aware of the above differences in terminology and scope, and of some of the difficulties they cause. It also has to specify which, if any, strand of 'situated cognition' it considers fitting for an account of imagination (see Sect. 3). In what follows I focus exclusively on sensory imagination and argue that some of its features, described by Husserl under the name of 'phantasy', do not rule out, and perhaps even call for a situated account.

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[3] Even Byrne and Tye, themselves defenders of phenomenal externalism, admit that it is generally thought "an absurd thesis, accepted by a handful of philosophers with too much respect for philosophical theory and not enough common sense" (Byrne and Tye 2006: 242).

2 Husserl's Account of Imagination: From Phantasy to Simulation

Husserl describes 'phantasy' (henceforth: 'imagination' or 'imagining') as a sensory experience of something in its absence. He argues that perceiving and imagining share a number of features and even describes imagination as 'quasi-perception'. In perception as well as imagination objects are given in a modal (visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory or gustatory) sensory way – even though in the case of imagination the object is not normally present to the senses.[4] Moreover, perceived and imagined objects are given perspectivally, or from a (usually not explicit) point of view.[5] They are experienced as near or far, as left or right, as below or above, as close or distant; they appear from certain angles and show partial profiles of themselves. Both perceived and imagined objects have 'internal' and 'external' horizons (Marbach 1993: 77). Their internal horizons unfold in a series of profiles. They can be, at least potentially, moved or rotated; or, one may move further towards or away from them, 'look' at them from above or below. Their external horizons (minimally, a figure on a background) are present as perceptual or imaginary contexts or environments.

Moreover, perception and imagination constitute *immediate* intuitive awareness of objects. In perception as well as in imagination "the intention aims at the thing itself" (Husserl 2005: 192) – in the former case, it does so in the mode of 'being present in person'; in the latter case, it does so in the mode of 'as if'. Husserl vehemently rejects any 'image-theory' (or 'sense data' theory) of imagination, which uses the "crude talk of internal images (as opposed to external objects)" (Husserl 2001b: V, appx. to §§11, 20). Imagining is not viewing mental images or being aware of mental representations. It is *simulating* possible experiences. When I, for example, visualize a summer meadow, I do not 'see' it 'in my mind's eye' but instead *I simulate possible experiences* ('quasi-perceptions') of it. Such simulation can be described in noetic as well as in noematic terms.[6] Imagining requires, according to these analyses, not only the 'making present' *of an object* in a sensory mode (the summer meadow), but also what Husserl calls the 'reproduction' *of the experience* of perceiving it (Husserl 2005: 372 f.), e.g., feeling the warm grass underneath my feat, or the sensation of seeing the sun play with its colours. Those noetic and noematic moments together constitute imagination as a

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[4] It is possible, for example, to visualize an object that is perceptually available at the same time. Whether one is in this cases presented with, in the metaphysically rigorous sense, the same identical object, is a discussion for a different paper.

[5] The point of view need not be occupied by an explicitly imagined self but can be merely implicit in the perspectival appearance of imagined objects (Martin 2002).

[6] In Husserl's terminology, noetic analyses describe the experiencing of objects; noematic analyses describe the experienced objects as they are experienced.

simulation of possible experience.[7] Imagining in this sense is evidently distinct from merely supposing or considering something (which, by contrast, do not require any simulation of sensory experience).

Imagining, then, is *like* perceiving, but in the mode of 'inactuality'. When I imagine something (visually, aurally, or in any other sense mode) it is *as if* I perceive it, *but not quite*. Whereas in perception "the object appears to us, so to speak, 'in person,' as itself present," in imagination the object appears as merely represented or as only possible (but not actual); "it is as though it were there, but only as though" (Husserl 2005: 18). Husserl therefore also speaks of perception as 'presentation' ('Gegenwärtigung') and of imagination as 'presentification' ('Vergegenwärtigung').[8] This distinction is not reducible to a difference between perceptual and imagined intentional content, but rather points to a difference in the modes in which those contents are taken (as 'real' or 'unreal'). According to Husserl, this is inextricably linked with the fact that the experience of the *activity* of imagining is also significantly different from the experience of the activity of perceiving.

When I imagine something I am (implicitly) aware that I can change its attributes and that I can spontaneously begin or stop imagining it – options that I do not have when I perceive something. Moreover, while I am imagining something (the summer meadow again), I am still tacitly aware of my actual, and still perceived, surroundings (the dull artificial light in my office, the computer screen I am staring at, the keyboard under my fingers). No matter how vivid my imagination, under ordinary circumstances something (e.g., an incoming email, a phone call, hunger or thirst) will sooner or later make me again explicitly aware of my perceptual environment. In fact, when I lose this anchoring in the actual situation, I may be hallucinating or dreaming, but not imagining in the sense in which I use the term here (Marbach 1993: 83–85). To the extent that this duality – Husserl even speaks of a 'conflict' (Husserl 2005: 72–75) – is not only a by-product of the experience of imagining, but is *intrinsic* to it, it can be said to be *constitutive* of imagining. This helps to explain why, under normal circumstances, we can easily tell whether we are currently perceiving something or imagining it (even if we can be mistaken, as in cases of illusion or hallucination), and why we need not refer to differences between intentional properties of the objects in question when we do so.

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[7] Recent accounts of imagination as simulation, which, however, do not make use of Husserl's analyses, include Thompson (2007), Thomas (2007), Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), Martin (2002).

[8] I use 'presentification' instead of Brough's 'representation' (Husserl 2005) in order to avoid confusion between different senses of 'representation'.

3   How Hungry Is the Imagination? Some Problematic Assumptions in Situated Cognition

There are strong prima facie reasons to doubt the applicability of situated cognition to imagination. First, imagination is commonly taken to occur 'off-line', i.e., in the absence of the imagined objects or state of affairs. If one thinks of situatedness in terms of "the densely coupled . . . ongoing perceptual link with some external goings-on" (Clark 2005: 233), then imagination appears impervious to situated cognition. Margaret Wilson puts it simply: "Any cognitive activity that takes place 'off-line,' in the absence of task relevant input and output, is by definition not situated" (Wilson 2002: 626).[9] Moreover, the issue of phenomenal externalism poses considerable difficulties. Situated cognition, as the term suggests, typically deals with cognition, and not with consciousness. Imagination, however, is commonly understood as tied to phenomenal consciousness. Unsurprisingly, this poses less of a problem for situated positions with strong sympathies for phenomenology (Hurley 2008; Thompson 2007; Gallagher 2005; Noë 2004; Noë and Thompson 2004; Hurley and Noë 2003; Varela et al. 1991). However, serious objections have been raised (Clark 2009; Prinz 2009), and it is still the case that situated cognition overwhelmingly deals with explanations of non-conscious, subpersonal cognitive states and processes.

Finally, situated cognition research is generally functionalist in its outlook and therefore, in its most strongly functionalist strands, neutral to specific material realizations of cognitive systems. True to some behaviourist ancestry, researchers are mostly concerned with subpersonal processes associated with adaptive flexible, not necessarily human, *behaviour*. 'On-line' cognition involves *task relevant* inputs and outputs (Wilson 2002) and the exploitation of "the continuing presence of some tangible *target*" (Clark 2005: 234; my emphasis). Imagination, however, is usually regarded as paradigmatic of specifically human capacities for high-level cognition, creativity and non-purposive activity, which may or may not involve observable behaviour.

These three challenges to a situated approach to imagination get some of their traction from a misconstrual of imagination, which is so pervasive that it is often taken to be self-evident. It assumes that imagining, because it usually occurs in the absence of the imagined object, is non-relational, or non-world-involving, and, further, that it therefore exclusively involves internal representations. Depending on whether one is committed to a sense-datum theory or to intentionalism, one may consider these representations as mental images (mirroring the corresponding percepts), or as intentional contents (just like the contents of the corresponding perception, but without the commitment to things being as they are represented). The so-called 'imagery debate', which held the

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[9] Note that Wilson uses a far narrower definition of 'situated cognition' than I do throughout this article (see fn. 1).

field in its grip for about 30 years,[10] can be read as an expression of cognitive science's oscillation between these two alternatives. It thereby inserts itself seamlessly into a long tradition of internalist representationalism in philosophy; and it reduces the difference between perception and imagination to the difference between a mental representation with or without the presence of a perceptual stimulus (Kosslyn et al. 2006: 4).

Husserl's account of imagination as a *simulation* of perception does not necessarily challenge internalist representationalism (simulation could still be 'all in the head'), unless one considers three further assumptions prevalent in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, which I believe are all problematic. First, I believe that the widely accepted distinction between *on-line and off-line cognition* deserves more critical attention. Off-line cognition has been associated with cases of cognition that Clark and Torribio (1995) have dubbed 'representation hungry', such as cases of "counterfactual reasoning or abstraction, that are by their very nature out of bounds to explanations that do not utilize representations" (Shapiro 2011: 207). The inclusion of imagination in this group of 'hungry' cases seems natural. An examination of this assumption has been hampered by what we may call the 'perception bias', which is motivated by a commitment to the investigation of 'densely coupled' processes that facilitate observable 'adaptive flexible' behaviour in the 'presence of a tangible target'. Perception clearly fills these slots, and, especially with an intentionalist/functionalist model in hand, its phenomenal qualities can easily be ignored.

While he readily adopts the on-line/off-line distinction in his work, Clark has challenged the rigidity with which it is applied. He argues that at least some cases of off-line thinking occur within structures that offer "surrogate situatedness" through "real- world models, diagrams, and other concrete external symbols" (Clark 2005: 234). He blames the widespread failure to recognize the importance of surrogate situatedness on the common conflation between 'disengaged' and 'decontextualized' cognition. Disengaged cognition operates "in the absence of its ultimate target, as when we think of that which is not close to hand" and ought to be distinguished from decontextualized cognition, which operates "without the kinds of dense, perceptually saturated local couplings that most obviously reward treatment in dynamical and situated terms" (Clark 2005: 233 f.). Off-line cognition that involves surrogate situatedness, Clark argues, is disengaged but still contextualized, which is to say that it is "disengaged but not disembodied" (Clark 2005: 236). True to the perception bias, Clark insists on the perceptual nature of the surrogates in question. Thus he speaks of "real world" models and symbols understood as "stable

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[10] Here is a reminder of that debate: On one side, Hannay (1971, 1973), Kosslyn (1980, 1994), Tye (1988, 1991), Cohen (1996) and others have defended pictorial or imagistic accounts of imagination. On the other side, it has been claimed that mental imagery is too indeterminate to represent pictorially (or even 'quasi-pictorially') (Fodor 1975) and that therefore imagining is more likely to require the use of amodal descriptions (Dennett 1969; Pylyshyn 1973, 2003).

external structures that stand in for absent states of affairs" (Clark 2005: 234) that "augment" or "amplify" human cognition (Clark 2005: 236, 239). And he further insists, in keeping with the deep functionalist commitments of much of situated cognition, "that surrogate situations should be purpose-built" to provide "some leverage for real-world action and intervention" (Clark 2005: 237). This goes some way to drawing in some, perhaps less paradigmatic, cases of imagination into situated cognition, and into an extended account in particular. And yet, imagining often occurs independently from external perceptual structures or real-world purposes. Clark's account, while it shows that imagination is not 'representation starving', still leaves it for the most part 'representation hungry'.[11]

It is not possible to give a fully satisfying account here, but I want to suggest that considering a further distinction (besides 'on-line/off-line') can help us see a way towards a more comprehensive account, namely the distinction between an *empirical* and a *transcendental* stance towards representations. The *empirical stance* considers them empirical objects, which can be observed and described as, for example, neural processes or psychological items, such as mental images. However, the very idea of a 'stance' implies that a different stance is possible. The *transcendental stance*, in contradistinction to the empirical one, considers vehicles not simply as empirical objects but as processes that *make possible* the experience of objects on the personal level (without, of course, thereby denying their material nature). The shift from the empirical to the transcendental stance does not necessitate but encourages the shift from taking vehicles as states to taking them as processes; for it highlights unnecessary objectifying tendencies in thinking about vehicles as individuated, object-like items in the mind's 'machinery'. Even more importantly perhaps, it discourages any reductive tendencies that dismiss phenomenological accounts as irrelevant to scientific explanations of subpersonal cognition; for it highlights that such explanations are only explanatory across non-human and human cognition, if, in the case of human cognition, they consider phenomenological descriptions of what the vehicles under scrutiny are said to make possible.

The recognition of the two distinct stances has been hampered by what we may call the 'naturalist bias', which is motivated by the necessary reliance of science on the investigation of observable objects. The practice of scientific observation comes with the perfectly understandable inclination to consider all objects as empirical objects, that is, as items or processes that can be examined by scientific observation. This is trivially true when one adopts the empirical stance. The transcendental stance, on the contrary, considers vehicles not only in terms of their material nature or location but also as (neural and extra-neural) processes *in virtue of which* cognition occurs.[12] It thereby considerably expands the scope of

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[11] I take the distinction between 'representation hungry' and 'representation starving' cognition from (Shapiro 2011: 208).

[12] I am not suggesting that one has to commit to one or the other stance, or that one or the other stance is 'better' than the other. Although I cannot argue for it here, I believe that investigations not only of consciousness but also of cognition more generally require awareness of both stances and probably switches between them, depending on the concrete task at hand.

what can count as vehicle (not only empirically observable, well individuated objects/processes with determinate locations!) and spurs *dynamic* and *holistic* models, not only for personal cognitive engagements but also for subpersonal, vehicular explanations of cognition. It turns the focus away from vehicles as individual *parts* (empirical object in their own right) and towards their contribution to the dynamic cognitive process *as a whole*.[13] Moreover, the transcendental stance allows for a certain 'agnosticism' concerning vehicles *of consciousness*, in the sense that it makes no demands for token-token correlations between neural and conscious states.[14] It thereby circumvents some of the worries about phenomenal externalism and thus encourages attempts to integrate consciousness into a situated account of cognition. Husserl takes this transcendental stance when he describes imagination not only in terms of the ways in which imagined objects appear, but also in terms of the complex tacit and explicit, noetic and noematic processes *in virtue of* which they can appear in the way they do. He thus delivers an account not only of the contents of the experience but also, in a certain sense, of its vehicles.[15]

I think of the transcendental stance as a stance that is readily adopted in a range of strands of situated cognition theories, even though it is rarely made explicit (for exceptions to this rule *see* Ward 2012 and Rowlands 2010). Approaches influenced by phenomenology and/or dynamic systems theory, in particular, are likely to reflect both empirical and transcendental stances. This might explain differences amongst different strands of situated cognition that cut across the standard distinctions of the 4 *e*'s. The assessment of whether imagination is susceptible to situated cognition must take these differences into consideration.

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[13] Gallagher has recently illustrated this point by making the analogy between cognition and digging 'by means' of a shovel. The point of including the shovel as an 'extension' of the process "is not that I extend my musculature – the point is that my *digging* is something extended from my bodily musculature across the shovel and into the ground" (Gallagher 2011).

[14] Sceptics of phenomenal extension whose doubts seem to be based on a strictly empirical stance include, for example, Fodor who points out that we do not know "even to a first glimmer, how a brain (or anything else that is physical) could manage to be a *locus* of conscious experience. This ... is, surely, among the ultimate metaphysical mysteries; don't bet on anybody ever solving it" (Fodor 1998: 83; my emphasis). See also Prinz: "We have never found any cells outside the brain that are candidates as correlates for experience. Such cells would have to co-vary with conscious states in content and time course" (Prinz 2009: 425). Both are cited by Clark who concludes that "the machinery of conscious experience is (probably) all in the head" (Clark 2009: 987) because he believes that extra-cranial processes can only causally, but not constitutively, drive consciousness (as opposed to cognition).

[15] Although I cannot argue for it here, I believe that the transcendental stance is fully compatible with and even should be part of empirical research. I thus do not see it standing in conflict with (some) recent attempts to 'naturalize' phenomenology.

4 Husserl's Account of Imagination in the Context of Situated Cognition: Embodied? Enacted? Embedded? Extended?

Let us return to the general description of situated cognition I gave in the introduction. In most general terms, what unites the 4*e*'s under the umbrella of situated cognition is the hypothesis that cognition does not, or at least not exclusively, depend on mental representations understood as well-individuated 'internal' symbols. Instead, cognition may also depend on the cognitive system's embeddedness in the surrounding environment; on aspects of its activity; on features of its embodiment; and/or on material vehicles or processes that extend into the world. However, with the idea of situated cognition increasingly gaining influence in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, more attention has been paid to the significant differences between the approaches it comprises (Menary 2010; Rowlands 2010). These differences include, but are not exhausted by, the difference between the various cognitive extensions suggested (body, action, environment, etc.).

Much rides on what one believes is the right interpretation of the general expression 'depend', as in 'cognition may also depend on . . .'. For example, it is in one sense trivial that cognition 'depends' on the (extra-neural) body. Living organisms need living (digesting, blood-circulating, etc.) bodies in order to do anything, including cognizing; and even software needs to be instantiated in some hardware. The much more interesting and more controversial claim of embodied cognition is that the links between brain and body are not merely causal but *constitutive*. This is to say, bodily processes are not merely externally, i.e., causally or dispositionally, supporting but are intrinsic *parts of* cognition. Something similar holds for enactive and extended approaches, while the embedded approach has been singled out as the least ambitious, or most cautious, approach of the four. For embodied, enactive and extended approaches, it has been argued that the relevant cognitive extensions of situated cognition "are *not merely* noncognitive accompaniments that facilitate the 'real' process of cognition that occurs inside the head or in which the 'real' process is causally *embedded*" but "are genuinely cognitive components of the overall cognitive process" (Rowlands 2010: 129, my emphasis).[16] It seems almost trivial to claim that imagination is, in a modest sense, 'embedded' in bodily, technological, cultural etc. structures and processes. But what about an embodied, enactive or extended approach to imagination?

The answer to this question is made more difficult by the fact that it is not entirely clear what it means to be a 'genuinely cognitive component of cognition'. Neither is it clear what it means to be 'constitutive of cognition'. Much of the many disputes amongst advocates of different *e*'s are fueled by disagreements about whether some supposed cognitive extension really is constitutive, or merely causal,

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[16] This has also been positively recognized by advocates of the embedded approach (Rupert 2009).

or 'supportive', after all. In an attempt to clear some of the thicket of these debates, Itay Shani (2013) has recently proposed that there are at least two principal ways of understanding the contested issue: in terms of mental states, which motivates what Shani calls 'Mental States Externalism (MSE)'; and in terms of processes, which motivates what Shani calls 'Process Externalism (PE)'. I take MSE to be typical for an empirical stance, and PE to be typical for a transcendental stance towards vehicles of cognition. The point of this for our purposes here is that it is perfectly possible to hold both PE and not-MSE. That is, it is not contradictory to claim that "at least some cognitive processes are constituted, in part, by trans-cranial (that is, bodily and environmental) variables" *and not* that "mental states may be similarly externalized", which is the position that Shani actually holds (Shani 2013).[17] Clark and Chalmers, on the contrary, seem to advance a far less moderate and far less inclusive position: 'PE *iff* MSE' (Clark 2008, 2009, 2012; Clark and Chalmers 1998). In that sense, as Shani points out "MSE is philosophically more radical: for while PE says that there is more to cognition than the workings of inner mental states, MSE implies that there is more to mental states than inner mental states!" (Shani 2013).

With this distinction in hand it becomes much easier to answer the question, which, if any, strands of situated cognition could accommodate imagination. On the one hand, approaches involving MSE – no matter whether embodied, enactive, or extended – would imply the claim that there is more to mental states of imagination than inner mental states. If one assumes that imaginative mental states are tied to phenomenal consciousness, then this amounts to the claim that there is more to conscious mental states of imagination than inner mental states. This is indeed a hard position to argue for, as it seems to imply a rather literal sense of phenomenal externalism. On the other hand, approaches involving only PE – no matter whether embodied, enactive, or extended – would imply the far more moderate claim that there is more to imagining than the workings of internal mental states. This is the claim that Husserl's account of imagination invites us to consider. He proposes a notion of sensory imagination as an unfolding dynamic and complex process of simulation that involves not only an intentional directedness towards, but also an embodied engagement with objects that are taken by the cognitive system to be unreal or absent, but nonetheless 'external', i.e., different from the system itself and situated in an environment other than the system's actual, i.e., presently perceived surroundings.

I am not claiming that this will open up an entirely new direction but I believe it may support and perhaps even invigorate research already in progress that explores anti-representationalist cognitive processes involved in imagination. Most of the research undertaken in this regard is still internalist. In fact, as Robbins and Aydede point out, in "that sense, 'embodied cognition' is something of a misnomer, at least as far as the bulk of research that falls under this heading is concerned." (Robbins and Aydede 2009: 5) And the same would have to be said about enactive models.

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[17] At the time of writing this, Shani's article is pre-published online without page numbers.

The idea of on-line embodiment/enaction usually refers to the dependence of cognition on dynamic interactions between the sensorimotor brain and the relevant parts of the body. Off-line embodiment refers to the dependence of cognition on sensorimotor areas of the brain even in the absence of sensory input and motor input (Gallese 2005; Niedenthal et al. 2005; Barsalou 2003; Bartolomeo 2002; Jeannerod 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001).

However, the transcendental stance and PE allow for a much wider sense of both embodiment and enaction and therefore, at least potentially, for a much wider scope of embodiment and enaction in imagination.[18] While a typical MSE-question concerning imagination may ask whether "the most local machinery whose activity is sufficient" for imagining will "include more than the brain" (Clark 2009: 987), a typical PE-question may ask far more generally whether some of the activity of imagining intrinsically involves engagement with trans-cranial (embodied, enactive, environmental) structures. A further possible sense of situatedness might follow from Husserl's claim that the conflict between imagining and perceiving is *constitutive* of imagining. This would suggest that it is impossible to investigate imagining accurately or appropriately without investigating its relation to simultaneously occurring perceptual processes.[19] If that is the case, then the respective perceptual situatedness might have to be considered 'part of' imagining, and imagining would not be quite as off-line as it first appeared.[20]

Finally, not only embodied and enactive accounts, but also extended accounts of imagination may rid themselves of some of their counter-intuitiveness in light of this discussion. For this, I return to Clark's proposal that something like 'surrogate situatedness' might be at play in some cases of imagination, which makes use of 'real world' models. A loosening of the perceptual and naturalist biases, and a departure from MSE, allows for the consideration that not only 'real world' models but also imagined environments and situations can contribute cognition, e.g., through complex feedback loops that involve simulated scenes not only as products of prior imagining but also as transformative elements of further imagining.[21] We could call this 'simulated situatedness'. Such a conception might even hold a key to the functionalist extension of imagination to non-human and even

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[18] This might include even 'over-extended' factors, such as the ones Gallagher has recently mentioned, namely legal systems, language systems, etc. (Gallagher 2011).

[19] Romdenh-Romluc (in this volume) points out that imagining can affect perceptions about the actual environment of a perceiver/imaginer.

[20] Empirical research on the 'dual visual systems' hypothesis might be helpful in testing this. Even though Clark uses it to argue against a specific enactive account of cognition, other interpretations and applications to imagination might be possible (*see* Ward et al. 2011). Clark also points to the "duality of perception and imagination" in one of his recent rejections of enactivism and uses it to argue for the complexity of intra-cranial processes of perceptions (Clark 2012: 761). I cannot argue for it here but I believe that a transcendental stance and PE allow for the inverse interpretation of the same empirical data, namely in support of a trans-cranial account of imagination.

[21] The vague term 'constitutive' has recently been specified by the term 'transformative' in order to respond to objections of 'cognitive bloat' (*see* for example Shani 2013; Gallagher 2011).

non-conscious minds. Surprisingly, then, Husserl may have provided us with an account that enables a conception of non-human imagination. After all, the idea that computers 'simulate' alternative scenarios and possibilities is hardly a shocking idea, and nobody expects those simulations to involve phenomenal consciousness. Giving up some problematic assumptions concerning the nature of imagination might just help to establish a coherent account that crosses over boundaries between human, animal and A.I. cognition.

5   Conclusion

Husserl's phenomenological account of imagination helps to make visible certain conceptual blindspots that I believe obscure potential avenues for an integration of imagination in situated cognition. In particular, the insistence on a narrow and rigid application of the on-line/off-line distinction stands out as misleading in this regard. I argue that the inclusion of a transcendental stance in the interpretative repertoire and the adoption of process externalism facilitate a loosening of this distinction. They might also facilitate a more effective interchange between imagination research in cognitive science and phenomenology. Given that Husserl has provided us with the most extensive material on imagination (exceeding by far even Sartre's), it is critical to this aim that Husserl is not excluded from the range of relevant resources based on outdated representationalist and internalist interpretations of his work.[22] While his phenomenological reflections do not themselves provide the methodological tools to test empirically any claims regarding subpersonal processes, they certainly encourage us to challenge some of the traditional background assumptions concerning cognition, consciousness and imagination that could otherwise close off valuable avenues for empirical as well as non-empirical research.

   My observations here are restricted to cases of sensory imagination, and only to some of its most obvious features at that. There are, of course, many more senses of imagination, and even sensory imagination includes many more aspects than those I have discussed. Among those aspects, the issue of affectivity is undoubtedly one of the most important. It has been argued (*see* Ratcliffe, Micali; both in this volume) that affect permeates our perceptual openness to the world and potentially constrains or transforms the ways in which an environment can appear to a perceiver. If this is true for perceiving, then we can expect it to be at least as relevant for imagining. Moreover, what and how we imagine is unlikely to be independent from intersubjectively spread beliefs, values and wishes. A comprehensive investigation of imagination would therefore profit from research motivated by Husserlian notions of 'transcendental intersubjectivity' and 'life-

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[22] For a powerful demonstration of Husserl's resourcefulness in this regard *see* Moran (in this volume).

world' (*see* Heinämaa, Pulkinnen and Nenon, all in this volume). In this context, Gallagher's recent suggestion that "certain social institutions (including social practices)" should be considered "mental institutions" because "without them, specific classes of cognitive processes would simply not exist" can be expected to have direct implications on imagination (Gallagher 2011). Finally, a rich account of imagination must consider issues of possibility and freedom. Phenomenological approaches tend to be sensitive to the complex ways in which possibility and freedom (both real and apparent) are bound by embodiment and enculturation (*see* Romdenh-Romluc, de los Reyes Melero, Micali, Ratcliffe; all in this volume). They therefore have much to offer us for a potentially situated account of what used to be considered the most 'mental' of human projects.[23]

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Part II
The Body in Perception: Normality and the Constitution of Life-World

Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Normality: Constitution by Mortals

Sara Heinämaa

For Husserl, the sense of the world is an intersubjective accomplishment. The experiencing subject, the ego or the person, does not establish the sense of the world by itself or in solitary activities but constitutes this sense in communication with other subjects. "Subjectivity is what it is – an ego functioning constitutively – only within intersubjectivity," Husserl famously states in *The Crisis* (Hua6: 175/172; cf. Hua1: 166/139–140, 173/146–147; Hua6: 189–190/185–186, 202/206; Hua7: 252, 276; Hua15: 16–17, 73, 76, 111, 190, 199, 228; Hua29: 332; Hua39: 485–486). And in a later text he writes:

> The transcendence of the world consists in its being constituted by means of others, by means of generatively constituted co-subjectivity. It is through the others that the world acquires its ontic sense as an infinite world (Husserl 1956: 303).

Focusing on such arguments, contemporary Husserl scholarship rectifies the surprisingly persistent misconception according to which transcendental phenomenology is a reformulation of Cartesianism or Kantianism.[1] It demonstrates that for Husserl the constitutive source of worldliness is not in an ego that isolates itself from everything alien nor in a universal principle or form shared by all egos equally and without distinction but is in a harmonious collective of transcendental persons.[2]

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[1] Husserl experimented with several different lines of thought and he also constantly developed the concepts that he used in formulating his views on intersubjectivity. Thus his writings allow several different readings of the ways and orders in which egos take part in the constitution of the different senses of being. He is quite clear and unambiguous, however, in arguing that the full sense of the world is an intersubjective accomplishment; and on this point commentators agree (e.g. Hua1 151–167/122–140; cf. Steinbock 1995; Zahavi [1996] 2001; Carr 1999; Rinofner-Kreidl 2003; Donohoe 2004; Heinämaa 2007; Bernet 2010; Zahavi 2011).

[2] I have argued elsewhere that Husserl distinguishes the person as a mundane or empirical being from the person as a dynamically evolving structure of pure subjectivity (Heinämaa 2007).

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The method of phenomenological reduction, Husserl emphasizes, must be kept apart from Descartes' hyperbolic doubt that questions the validity of our connection with other subjects (Hua3: 50–57/93–100; cf. Hua1: 58–64/18–24); and the eidetic reduction should not be confused with Kant's apriorism (e.g. Hua6: 202–206/ 199–202, cf. 114–118/112–116; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: 75–77/61–63).

If one wants to find a proper philosophical predecessor for Husserl's transcendentalism one must take seriously his references to Leibniz' monadology (e.g. Hua1, Hua6, Hua13, Hua14, Hua15). This comparison helps to accentuate Husserl's argument that the constitutive ground of the objective world is in an endless multiplicity of subjects that harmoniously interact with one another. In *Cartesian Meditations*, we read for example:

> Consequently *the constitution of the world essentially involves the harmony of the monads*; precisely this harmony among particular constitutions in the particular monads; and accordingly it involves also a harmonious generations that goes on in every particular monad (Hua1: 138/108).

The monadic harmony is not a pre-established state for Husserl but is a historical task. The radically historical reformulation of the idea of harmony becomes possible for him, since he conceives subjectivity as essentially and deeply temporal and as including sensibility and living bodiliness (*Leiblichkeit*). What we have therefore is not a stable fraternity of pure spirits but a communicative becoming of living persons.[3]

This implies that transcendental intersubjectivity must not be described as an expansion or extension of constituting subjectivity or as a transition or imposition of the accomplishments of one self to other selves. Rather it must be realized as a clarification and specification of the very meaning of subjectivity: the constituting subject is intentionally tied to other constituting subjects, and together, in communicative interaction, these subjects establish the sense of the world.

> Thus subjectivity expands into intersubjectivity, or rather, more precisely, *it does not expand*, but transcendental subjectivity understands itself better. It understands itself as a primordial monad that intentionally carries within itself other monads (Hua15: 17, emphasis added).

1 Constitution by Normals

We find the general idea of transcendental intersubjectivity emphasized and paraphrased in several ways by Husserl himself as well as by his early interpreters.[4] However, in his manuscripts, Husserl quite bluntly states that the community that

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[3] For a detailed account of Husserl's idea of historicity and his phenomenology of communal subjectivity, see Miettinen (2013).

[4] Merleau-Ponty, for example, underscores the operative bodiliness of transcendental subjects and writes: "Transcendental subjectivity is a revealed subjectivity, revealed to itself and to others, and is for that reason an intersubjectivity" (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: 415/361). In another context, he uses the metaphors of crossroads to illuminate the constitutive connection between separate selves: "The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which is revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own and other people's intersect and engage each others like gears. It is thus inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity when I either take up my past experiences in those of the present, or other people's in my own" (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: xv/xx, cf. 515/452).

constitutes the sense of the world only includes *normal subjects*.[5] To be true, the world as such – as constituted – contains a great variety of different kinds of subjects, all intentional and conscious in their own ways (e.g. Hua15: 177–178, 622–627; Hua29: 68–69), but not all of these subjects take part in the constitutive process that gives the world its objective sense as the one and only world shared by all. In the Intersubjectivity manuscripts from the 1930s, we find, for example, the following reflection:

> But not all are, as transcendentally reduced, co-bearers of the world that I have as pregiven as mine and that "we" have as pregiven – "we" understood as the open plurality of co-bearers that together in a community co-constitute the one and the same world (in no way the animals or the insane 'humans', even if they too are experienced by us as related to and directed at the world, the one and same 'real' world, in their inner lives) (Hua15: 162, cf. 178).

And further:

> *The labeling that is stuck in the We and Everybody is normality*, but this is distinguished as such only through the co-occurrence of the anomalies. (. . .) This [the normal] becomes (. . .) a labeled class of such beings, who are humans in the full and proper sense, fully mature and fully "reasonable" or "rational" [*vernünftigen*] human beings, the ones who are the correlates of the really or truly existing world (Hua15: 165–166).

The exclusion of anomalies from the community of co-constituters does not imply that the irrational subjects, such as infants, animals, or the insane, would remain outside of "the world for all" or at its margins (e.g. Hua15: 166, 621–622, 626–627). It only means that these subjects do not take part in the communal and communicative constitution of the sense of the world in so far as they operate within their anomalies. So in Husserl's understanding, the world is essentially a common field of all conscious, experiencing and intentional beings, but the experience of this communality and sharing of the world is not equally possible for all.

This argument should not be taken in a relativistic sense. The point is not to claim that *for us* – e.g. human beings or adults – the true world has the sense of the common ground, but *for others* – e.g. animals or infants – it is given with a different meaning (e.g. Hua15: 627). Husserl's idea is more radical: the sense of the world itself includes the possibility of universal sharing, and thus, whoever lacks this sense of sharing also lacks the world – even while living in the world and towards the world (in our experience).

The ones excluded from the community of co-constituters are not just animals, infants, and the insane, but also the blind and the deaf, the sick, the demented, the old, and the "primitive ones." We read for example:

> So what is excluded is everything pathological, color blindness, "bad eyes" (. . .), etc. (Ms. D 13 I, 213a; cf. Hua1: 154/125–126; Hua4: 58–74/63–79, 307–308/321; Hua15: 157–159).
>
> (. . .) excluded are the children, and also the mentally ill and sick in general, in so far as they live in the anomaly. At least these are not counted in anymore completely or are counted in only in so far as their resources of co-living are partially co-operating with the

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[5] Cf. Zahavi ([1996] 2001: 86–97); Zahavi (2011).

others and the fully normal. Only the mature as normal human persons and in the unity-nexus of their communicative lives are subjects for the world which is their world (…) Also the old (…) are counted as anomalies here, as well as the sick (Hua15: 178, cf. 618; Hua39: 669).[6]

Moreover, a considerable and central part of Husserl's discussion of normality and abnormality concerns cultural differences and differences between civilizations, and to exemplify his distinctions between different kinds of communities, he also mentions particular nations and races (e.g. Hua15: 622, 627, 632). His statements about Eskimos, Indians, and Gypsies in the Vienna lecture from 1935 are notoriously well-known and extensively criticized: while arguing for a non-territorial teleological concept of Europe,[7] Husserl distinguishes Europe in a spiritual sense from Europe in a geographic sense and states that the former includes the Americans but not "the Eskimos or Indians presented as curiosities at fairs,[8] or the Gypsies, who constantly wander about Europe" (Hua6: 318–319/273).[9]

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[6] It is noteworthy that Husserl does not discuss women and men under the headings of abnormality/ normality. He thematizes sexual difference while discussing drive intentionality and its generative function but does not use the comparative concepts of normality and abnormality in this discussion (Hua6: 191/188; Hua15: 183, 593–612; Hua29: 318–319, 378; cf. Stein [1932–1933] 2004: 34; Stein 2000). In a historical consideration this is significant, since many Husserl's contemporaries argued that women lack the full capacities of rationality and creativity that are essential to full humanity. The best know of these arguments is Otto Weininger's Nietzschean reasoning in *Sex and Character Geschlecht und Charakter* (1903) that discusses women as a lower human species and at the same time systematically employs the concepts of femininity and masculinity to put different races and ethnic groups in a hierarchy of excellence (e.g. Weininger 1906: 189; cf. Harrowitz and Hyams (eds.) 1995). Weininger's work had several admirers and critics in twentieth century philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, negated Weininger's conclusions but was impressed by his discourse on greatness (Wittgenstein 1995: 205, letter dated 23.8.31; cf. Stern and Szabados 2004).

[7] For a constructive and explorative reading of Husserl discourse on Europe and European spirit, see Miettinen (2013).

[8] Husserl's formulation (may) sound brutal to us who live in the time of ethnic sensitivities but the statement describes a usual practice of his time in which representatives of alien cultures were exhibited in public fairs and markets. This practice was not a relic of premodern life-forms but was intimately related to the emerging new science of comparative anthropology. The world fair of Saint Louis in 1904, for example, displayed members of the Pygmy people who were transported from Kongo by a group of American anthropologists and nature conservationists. The Pygmies believed that they participated in the interchange as cultural diplomats but the American organizers displayed them as representatives of a "lower species". One of the Pygmy people, Ota Benga, ended up being displayed in the Bronx Zoo (Bradford and Blume 1992). The founder and promoter of the zoo, Madison Grant, later published a treatise in "scientific racism" and eugenics, *The Passing of the Great Race Or the Racial Basis of European History* (1916), which introduced the idea of a higher Northern race. Grant's book was translated into German in 1930 and it received the infamously well-know response by Adolf Hitler: "This book is my Bible."

Several of Husserl's contemporaries, colleagues and students, attacked his universalism as a form of outdated idealism and rationalism. Some of these critiques were motivated by and intertwined with Nazi-ideology and its historicist and relativistic conceptions of truth. For these debates and sources, see Moran (2011).

[9] The Kaizo essays add that the Japanese are included as the "newest branch" (Hua27: 95). For the personalistic approach in ethics that Husserl develops in the Kaizo essays, see Heinämaa (2013).

How should we understand Husserl's discourse of anomality which sounds, if not solipsistic or individualistic, then at least anthropocentric, adultcentric, and Eurocentric in a politically dubious and alarming way?[10] Is it the case, as many commentators claim, that Husserl gives a quasi-scientific or quasi-philosophical formulation to the cultural and historical prejudices of his own time without questioning their validity? This would mean that as a philosopher he did not live up to his own standards of rigorous thinking. Are Derrida and Foucault correct in arguing that all that Husserlian phenomenology is able to offer to social and political philosophy is an unhappy mixture of empirical and transcendental notions of intersubjectivity (e.g. Derrida [1962] 1974: 74–78/79–83; Foucault 1966: 336–337/326–327; cf. Lawlor 2002: 113–114)?

And, what is more important to my concerns here: How do Husserl's discourse of exclusion combine with his idea of universal intersubjectivity and "the absolutely unconditional accessibility for all" (Hua1: 160/132), and how does his categorical statements combine with his more explorative and interrogative lines of thought? To get an idea of the internal diversity of Husserl's reflections, compare his statements quoted above to his formulations at the end of the second part of *The Crisis*:

> But then new questions impose themselves in regard to this mankind [and the transcendental constituting subjectivity objectified in it]: are the insane also objectifications of the subjects being discussed in connection with the accomplishment of world-constitution? And what about children, even those who already have a certain amount of world-consciousness? After all, it is only from the mature and normal human beings who bring them up that they first become acquainted with the world in *the full sense of world-for-all*, that is, the world of culture. And what about animals? (Hua6: 191/187, emphasis added).

Similarly in the third Intersubjectivity volume, Husserl puts forward a series of self-critical questions:

> World as such, the real world, is the exclusive correlate of us humans, [understood] as the unity of our human ways of appearing, and within it further humanly normal and anomalous ways of appearing.
>   Still the question is if this really is correct, since one could remark or argue in opposition that in so far as animals are understood as relating to the world, at the same world that is ours, they could also operate occasionally as world constituting with us (. . .) It is exactly the same with animals, one argues further, as [it is] with the "primitive people". These are human beings, and why should we not include them constitutively (. . .) Are these not directed, all in their own ways, at the one world, the world for all, be they primitive, animal, or "normal" human beings? (Hua15: 166–167, cf. 228–229, 621–622; Hua1: 160/132–133).

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[10] E.g. DeGrood (1971); Levinas ([1972] 1987); Hadreas (2003).

It is of course possible that these questions function as mere rhetoric means which prepare way for the argument that the world is a constitutive accomplishment of normal – rational, mature, adult, and sane – human beings. And indeed the inquiry above is followed by the thesis: "I find also primitive, animals, insane in my world, but I still experience, that I do not experience them as equal to me or 'equal to us' [*nicht als meinesgleichen und 'unserensgleichen'*]" (Hua15: 169).

It seems to me however, that Husserl's thinking in respect to exclusion is much more refined and interrogative and less categorical than commentators usually argue or assume. Rather than simply stating that animals, children, and madmen are not part of transcendental intersubjectivity, Husserl explores different lines of thought and investigates different criteria of exclusion and inclusion. What we have then is not a repetition of the Aristotelian-Cartesian discourse on rationality but a radical rethinking of the basic concepts of subjectivity, personhood, and communality.

My aim in this Chapter is not to dwell on the historical, cultural, political, or personal background of Husserl's discourse on transcendentally constituting intersubjectivity, nor to solve the exegetic problems of how to interpret his concepts of normality, anomaly, and abnormality.[11] Rather I want to identify the reasons and grounds that Husserl gives for the exclusion of *different types* of others from the community of co-constitutors. The advantage of such an exercise is that it allows us to see that the excluded others are not treated as one unified group by Husserl but that they have different positions in respect to constitution and transcendental intersubjectivity. Moreover we will see that it is not just the privileged goals of reason and science that motivate and direct Husserl's reflections on objectivity and intersubjectivity but also his interest in temporality and generativity.[12] I will focus my discussion on two special cases of anomaly, the infant and the animal, and I contrast Husserl's treatment of these cases with his discussion of other types of anomaly. The task of providing a full account of Husserl's concepts of normality and constituting intersubjectivity is however left for later studies.

2   Three Preparatory Clarifications: The Sense of the World and the Types of Normality

Three remarks must be made before proceeding to study closer Husserl's discourse of infants and animals and his grounds for distinguishing between co-constitutors and the ones who belong among "us" without taking part in the constitution of the

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[11] For explications, see, de Folter (1983); Römpp (1992: 89–91); Steinbock (1995); Zahavi ([1996] 2001: 86–97); Taipale (forthcoming) 2014, Part 3.

[12] For Husserl phenomenology of drives and instincts, see Lee (1993); Bernet (1996); Depraz (2001); Bernet (2006); Smith (2010).

world's sense. My first clarificatory remark concerns the sense of the world and my two other remarks concern the types of normality that Husserl discusses and his criteria of distinguishing the normals from the abnormals.

(i) *The Sense of the World.*
Husserl does not pose his question of co-constitution in respect to the sense of world in general without any specifications, but aims at clarifying the constitution of the sense of the *true* world and the *objective* world. Moreover, as we saw above, in *The Crisis* Husserl poses the question concerning anomalous co-constitutors in respect to the "full" or "genuine" sense of the world, and this full sense, he says, is the world as the correlate of *rational cultural* practices (Hua6: 191/187).

In addition and in contrast to these principal senses of the world, Husserl also discusses the world with many other specifications: the environing world, the world of experience, the world of the sciences, the life-world, the natural world, the personal world, the homeworld, and the alienworld. All these are incorporated or included in the objective world, the world for all. So, the world has several different senses and several levels of sense constitution, and thus the question concerning its intersubjective constitution needs specifications. In other words, the sense of the world is not one simple accomplishment but includes several moments. The first task is thus to differentiate between the multiple senses of the world and to study their constitutive relations to different kinds of subjects and communities of subjects (e.g. Hua15: 235; cf. Hua1: 160–161/133–134).

(ii) *Permanence and Choice.*
My second remark concerns the temporal and genealogical variance of the anomalities and abnormalities that Husserl discusses.[13] The many human anomalies studied and mentioned by him as examples are different primarily in respect to time and permanence. Some abnormalities are temporary, such as sickness, and some are permanent conditions, such as colorblindness and "stupidity" (*Dummheit*, *Dummköpfe*) (e.g. Hua15: 231). Some of the temporary anomalities, for example childhood and old age, are developmental phases, but others are occasional states or repetitive conditions, for example physical and mental illnesses.

Moreover, some of the cases that Husserl discusses under the heading of normality and abnormality are involuntary states but others are voluntarily chosen life tracks. Mental illness and insanity, for example, are conditions into which we "fall," but normality in terms of occupation or profession implies choices and

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[13] Anthony Steinbock explicates Husserl's concept of anomaly as the *descriptive*, non-normative concept, and his concept of abnormal as the *prescriptive* and normative concept: "When we characterize something as discordant (. . .), discordance has merely a descriptive or normatively insignificant quality. It is not yet normatively significant as 'abnormal,' but rather 'anomalous'" (Steinbock 1995: 132). It seems to me that there is also another difference in Husserl's usage of the terms, one related to temporality: abnormality is used for relatively stable conditions or states in which one can live or operate for periods of time but anomaly is a broader concept that also covers occasional divergences, such eyesight blurred by tears.

decisions (e.g. Hua15: 161–170, see also 174–175, 227–228; cf. Heinämaa 2013). This means that Husserl's concepts of normality and abnormality are very broad and include many kinds of differences. They do not delineate any unified categories but carve out different types of deprivations that compromise the subject's possibilities of participating in the constitution of the full sense of the world.

(iii) *Capacities*, *Body Form*, *Practices*.

My third remark concerns the operative concepts with which Husserl describes and analyses anomalies. His discussions of anomalous or abnormal others include three different types of considerations. First, he distinguishes and discusses anomalous others on the basis of mental capacities and dispositions (e.g. Hua1: 154/125–126; Hua15: 157 ff., 230–231). I call this *capacity* anomaly. The most important distinctions here are between capacities of sense-perception and the "higher" spiritual capacities of valuing, willing, thinking, and reasoning. In the third Inter-subjectivity volume Husserl explains: "There are anomalies of memory, anomalies of intelligence, of the valuing behavior, of the will, of emotional life, of instinctive drives and needs etc. There are personal anomalies in the frames of a unitary personal life, within a unitary human life" (Hua15: 159; cf. Hua4: 164/172).[14] The blind and the deaf, for example, are abnormal in respect to their capacities of sense-perception but are fully normal in respect to the "higher" functions of thinking, reasoning, and valuing. They are abnormal only in so far as they live in the anomality of perception. The "stupid" and the idiot, in contrast, lack certain intellectual capacities, and the insane is deprived of reason.[15]

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[14] In appendix nr. XIII of Hua15, capacity anomalies are first discussed in terms of *typicality* and *average* (*Durchsnchittlichkeit*) – in respect to age and level of profession, for example. But after these considerations, Husserl remarks: "But the average representation of the world is not the world itself, the one that is valid for these people in general. And at the end, part of the generally familiar and accepted [*Mitgeltende*] is that there are exceptional human beings, over-normal, for whom much is accessible which is not accessible for the average human being" (Hua15). Thus, the statistical concept of the average is substituted by the eidetic concept of the *optimal*, i.e. the *best possible* (cf. Hua27; Steinbock 1995).

In text nr. 10, Husserl points out that the normal is an idealization of the mature (Hua15: 141). In my understanding this holds for both individual-personal normality as well as for cultural normality, and this means that ultimately Husserl's concepts of normality are capacity concepts.

[15] On *empirical* studies of capacity anomalities, Husserl states: "On these [different anomalies] there is enormous pre-scientific and scientific empirical material, from the past and from the present. But characteristically this material, as it is presented and described, is typified by an outer or external concepts in a senseless manner. Common sense interpretations and interpretations operating from outside on the basis of common sense psychology (and also 'modern' psychology) do not provide any scientific understanding, no reconstruction of the anomalously mental [*des anomal Seelischen*], no possibility for an internal psychology of the anomalous. For this one needs a considerably advanced phenomenology" (Hua15: 159–160). This distinction between two kinds of inquiries into the anomalous soul, the outer-empirical and the inner-phenomenological, motivates the question: Is Husserl's own discourse free from the categories and typifications of outer-empirical psychology, and is it phenomenological or phenomenologically solid in all respects? My aim here is not to answer to this question but to develop an explication that serves later critical work.

In addition to capacity anomaly, Husserl discusses anomaly and abnormality on the basis of lived *body forms* and *types* of body form. He argues that human bodiliness, in general, differs from animal bodiliness both in structure and in function. Our operative organs of sensing, perceiving, and acting – hands, feet, eyes, ears, skin, mouth, lips, and throat – form a specific kind of whole that is integrated with human activities of feeling, thinking, willing, and communicating (Husserl Hua15: 622–626; Hua27: 99).[16] This implies that our domestic animals, despite their nearness to us and despite their involvement in our practices and contribution to them, are less familiar to us in bodily experience than any alien human being living in a distant and exotic culture (Husserl Hua15: 184–185, 624–625). Consequently, alien human body-types, for example individuals of distant tribes, unconventional genders, or nonnative races, are not comparable to animal species or animal subspecies but must be understood as variations of the human body-form (*Gestalt*) (Husserl Hua15: 180, 623).[17]

On the other hand, Husserl also points out that the horse-shaped beings described by Jonathan Swift in *Gulliver's Travels* are anomalous to us only in respect to their body-shape but not in respect to their communicative behavior or bodily action (Husserl Hua15: 623; cf. Hua4: 120/127).[18] Similarly extra-terrestrials or Martians, i.e. communicating aliens from outside of the Earth, would share crucial forms of bodily action with us – the forms of communicative and practical behavior – despite drastic differences in body-shape and figure (cf. Husserl Hua4: 380/389, cf. 120/127, 196/206; Hua15: 164).

In addition to capacity anomaly and anomaly in terms of body form, Husserl also discusses normality and abnormality on the basis of *participation* and *membership in communities*. An abnormal member of a community is a member who is not experienced by all other members as sharing the same world. I call this *membership* anomaly.

This complicates the issue, since Husserl also uses the concepts of normal and abnormal to characterize, not just individual persons, individual bodies, and types of bodies, but also human communities. This means that we can speak about normal and abnormal individuals as members of normal as well as abnormal communities. In order to understand these distinctions, we need to explicate

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[16] Merleau-Ponty adds that human genitals belong to the integrated whole of human bodiliness and should not be assimilated with animality: "If, on the other hand, we conceive man in terms of his experience, that is to say, of his distinctive way of patterning the world, and if we reintegrate the 'organs' into the functional totality in which they play their part, a handless or sexless man is as inconceivable as one without the power of thought" (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: 198/170).

[17] Against the false notion that parallels alien humans with animals, Husserl argues: "In this consideration, to distinguish animals from racially different people, such as Negroes or Malesians from us European, would only be a gradual difference, and thus animals could be human beings" (Hua15: 626), or "lesser humans" (Hua15: 184).

[18] These intelligent horse-shaped creatures, the so-called "houyhnhnms," are described in the last part of Swift's satirical novel.

Husserl's concept of a normal community. This is defined by reciprocal experiencing:

> *A human community*, *in which each* [human being] *experiences every other as a with-subject of the same world of experience* in the sense that each has, in his or her own experience, direct or indirect access to all the realities of this world, *is a normal community*. Each [member] of such a community experiences the others and himself as normal. In this sense, the folk of "primitive people" is normal in relation to *their* world, the one pregiven to them and accommodated in reciprocal acquisition of experiences (Hua15: 230, first emphasis added).

So a normal community, for Husserl, is a community in which each capacity-normal member experiences each other capacity-normal member as equal, i.e. as a conscious subject in mutual and reciprocal communicative exchange of experiences. Husserl's examples of such communities include the so-called primitive cultures as well as the high cultures of China, Europe, and India. Also the practical communities of scientists, artists, and religious believers exemplify normal communities in so far as they their members share the same world of realities and practicalities (e.g. Hua15: 227–228; cf. Husserl Hua4: 186–190/196–199, 315–156/328–329; Hua6: 112–113/110–111).

As we saw above, abnormal individuals are distinguished from normal ones on the basis of their capacities and body form. Normal families, for example, include children as abnormal members in Husserl technical, descriptive and non-normative, sense. This is because children lack capacities that are needed in activities and practices that are constitutive of families, for example productive and reproductive capacities. Thus, we can have childless families but not families without adult members.

Normal communities may also include abnormal members with excellent and additional capacities, capacities that add to the ones that are constitutive of the community and its founding practices: "In a [normal] circle of people, there are differences in sense-experience and in other capacities, there are under-normal (temporarily or permanently, temporary under-normality also in sickness that can attack anybody) and over-normal and there are also permanently abnormalities such as color blind and deaf etc. and similarly [members with] over-normal [capacities of] understanding; undernormal, e.g. dummies etc.; also anormal such as idiots" (Hua15: 230–231).

The most important distinction between different kinds of normal communities and cultures for Husserl is the distinction between communities that have the *form* of a historical culture with a tradition mediated by *writing*, on the one hand, and communities that do not have this form, on the other. Examples of writing-based cultures include the "high cultures" of China, Europe, and India. These are opposed to "primitive cultures" that lack writing and the sense of written tradition. In Husserl's analysis, non-literate primitive cultures are abnormal to us Western people since the temporality of their practices is fundamentally different from ours, but they are also abnormal for the Chinese and the Indians for the very

same reasons.[19] Thus Husserl's point is not to argue that primitive cultures would be abnormal in any absolute sense; such cultures are just *anomalous to us*, because our own culture has the temporal form of a written culture. He writes: "But is not the primitive human being a human being of a primitive homeworld and in this same sense normal? Naturally" (Husserl Hua15: 233).

These conceptual factors condition Husserl's discourse on animals and infants as abnormal subjects of experiencing. In order to see what is at issue in their exclusion it is important to pay attention to the kind of world, the types of capacities, and the form of community which are denied them.

3 The Child and the Animal

Both the child and the animal are excluded by Husserl from the collective of co-constitutors on the same grounds: neither experiences itself as a *member of a generation* which is connected to other generations and to an open chain of generations by the means of narration and writing. In this respect both the infant and the animal differ, for example, from the mentally ill and the demented who despite their delusions consciously participate in chains of generations.

Husserl contends that both the child and the animal consciously participate and intentionally live in many different types of communities of contemporaries, and even in communities which use signs for multiple practical purposes. However, what he considers crucial is that neither the child nor the animal experiences itself as a being who is born and who will die, a being who shares a communal past and future with other similar beings that are not present, and cannot become present in flesh and blood.

The others that in our mature human experience are separated from us by birth and death, are not just contingently absent for us but absent in their very essence: some of these others live after our demise; others have lived before we were born. Neither kinds of others can be intended by infant and animal subjects in so far as these subjects lack the sense of themselves as natal and mortal beings (Husserl Hua15: 140, 168, 171, 184–185; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: 415–417/361–364, 489–492/427–430).

We mature adults can reach both types of absent other by the means of language, and this can be realized in several different ways. For example, we hear and read stories about our ancestors and we may address such others in prayer or orison, but we can also capture their very words as repeated by our older contemporaries and we can read their writing without any mediation of third parties. Analogously we

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[19] For example: "(. . .) when we are thrown into an alien social sphere, that of the Negroes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that for them are fixed, generally verified and verifiable, are by no means the same, as ours. But if we set up the goal of a truth about the objects which is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese etc., agree in spite of all relativity (. . .) then we are on the way to objective science" (Husserl Hua6: 141–142/139).

can address our successors by our own writing and we can rehearse our younger contemporaries to repeat our own words for others. This all is senseless for the child and for the animal in so far as they do not understand themselves as mortal and natal beings who have generations of others behind and ahead of them in time. Husserl explains:

> An animal (…) does not have a *unity of time that spans over generations* as historical time, nor a unity of the world that continues through time, it does not "have" this *consciously*. We, we human beings, are the ones who have the chains, the successions and branching of ant generations etc. in our world as valid for us.[20] *The animal itself has no generative world in which it would live consciously*, *no conscious existence in an open endlessness of generations* and correlatively no existence in a genuine environing world, which we humans, anthropomorphizing, attribute to it (Husserl Hua15: 181, emphasis added).

Several deprivations or lacks are implied by the fundamental lack of generative time and trans-generational communication: in so far as the child and the animal have no conscious membership in chains of generations, they cannot participate in transgenerational practices and cannot share the accomplishments of such practices. This deprives them of culture and tradition as a whole: cultural-historical goals that are shared with multiple generations in an endless openness; cultural-historical tools and utensils that are retained, maintained, and repaired in the view of coming generations; and ultimately the cultural-historical world with contains all this openness.[21]

Many familiar animals can of course use tools. We all have seen photographs and films in which apes and birds use sticks for capturing food, or an octopus unscrews a jar in order to grasp the crab inside.[22] Even rats and mice are reported to escape flood by clutching floating things. In Husserl's analysis, such tools are given, and can be given, to the nonverbal animals in question only in a temporally restricted way, and thus their givenness is crucially different from the givenness of human tools. Animal and infantile tools are used merely, or at

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[20] Much here depends on the character of the communication system. For Husserl, the distinction between indicative signs and expressive signs is crucial: in so far as the members of the animal community only have indicative signs at their disposal, they cannot have transgenerational communication. But if the members of a community can objectify expressions in spoken or written language, then they can use these as means to transgress the temporal breaks of death and birth and communicate with predecessors and successors. Cf. Sect. 5 below. For Husserl's distinction between expressive and indicative signs, see Heinämaa (2010a).

[21] For an account of intersubjective temporality, see Rodemeyer (2006: 177–197); cf. Heinämaa (2010b).

[22] I use the octopus as an example, since it is very different from us in its bodily form (being a invertebrate) but has interesting perceptual-motor and intellectual capacities, but also because it has a paradigmatic position in our philosophical tradition. In his *History of Animals*, Aristotle for example writes: "The octopus is a stupid creature, for it will approach a man's hand if it be lowered in the water; but it is neat and thrifty in its habits: that is, it lays up stores in its nest, and, after eating up all that is eatable, it ejects the shells and sheaths of crabs and shell-fish, and the skeletons of little fishes. It seeks its prey by so changing its color as to render it like the color of the stones adjacent to it; it does so also when alarmed" (2004: 273).

best, for present purposes and they are only shared with contemporaries (Husserl Hua27: 97–98; cf. Hua1: 141/111). They are not, and cannot be, experienced by animals and infants as objects inherited from predecessors nor as objects shared with successors, since the experience of permanently absent others – others that cannot be or become perceivable – is not articulated for these subjects.[23] In other words, animal and infantile tools do not, in their practical sense, imply asynchronous others who share goals with present users despite the fundamental separation in time. Thus, Husserl argues that the senses of *culture*, *tradition*, and *history* go hand in hand, and that all these senses depend on the senses of death, birth, and generations (e.g. Husserl Hua15: 141, 168–189, 177–181, 280; cf. Hua1: 169/142; Hua6: 191/188). For him, no subject who lacks these fundamental senses can intend cultural objectivities as such. He makes this point by describing his own experiential condition as a child:

> I had no notion of death and birth, even if I already had the words for these. I knew nothing about literature, science, art, nothing about historical culture in general, even if I already had an environing world with pictures,[24] with utensils etc. The ontic sense *world* that I had was under constant reconstruction of sense, and *not by mere extension of sense* through possessed horizons. The world-horizon had no determinate delineation [*Einzeihnung*], at least *no openly*, *endlessly continuing determinate delineation*, even if it already had a certain openness (Hua15: 140, emphasis added).

Husserl uses the concept of *person* for those subjects who experience themselves as members of generations and chains of generations and who consciously participate in activities and practices that are shared with others who are constantly absent.[25] He states: "Each human being, in so far as he lives in his world-consciousness (...) is for himself a person in an endlessly open chain of *generative connection*, in the chaining and branching of generations" (Hua15: 165, 177–178; Hua27: 98–99).[26]

The open endlessness of generations is necessary for the constitution of the sense of the world as an *infinitely open* whole. More limited senses of world, e.g. the world as an environment or the world as a perceptual or experiential field (e.g. Hua15: 168, 626) are possible for non-generative subjects, but the *full sense* of world as an infinity requires for its constitution subjects who consciously connect

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[23] Husserl's point is conceptual; he aims at making a conceptual distinction between humans and animals, not at investigating the capacities of any particular animals encountered in experience. So if we would come across a being who would look like, say, a horse and have the bodily form of the animals that we know as horses but who would verbally characterize itself as a member of generations and would address its companions verbally as members of generations, then this being would not be animal in Husserl's concepts but would be human.

[24] For Husserl's concept of pictorial presentation, see his *Phäntasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen* (Hua23).

[25] In addition to person as a historical being, Husserl also discusses person as a structure of pure subjectivity, cf. note 2 above.

[26] For the social and ethical aspects of Husserl's concept of person, see Hart (1992); Sokolowski (2000); Heinämaa (2013). For the relations to the concepts of act, ego and habituation, see Heinämaa (2007).

to other subjects in an endless and endlessly branching chain of generations. Thus, the world in the sense of an infinite "metahorizon" of all horizons[27] is the constitutive correlate of *historical* self-conscious intersubjectivity. We read:

> The universal Us is a generatively (temporally) closed human continuity (Hua15: 618).
>
> We, the subjects of world experience, have the endlessly open world completely according to its known realities and unknown possibilities, we each have it completely starting from us, each starting from him or herself through the mediation of others and finally through their participation (Hua15: 220).

So we can say that for Husserl, the most important and fundamental difference between mature human subjects, on the one hand, and infantile and animal subjects, on the other hand, is that the latter lack the experience of generations and the linguistic mediation which is implied in this experience. These lacks are mutually implicating since language is the means of intending others in multiple generations and in an infinite openness. Husserl discusses this under the heading "The function of language in the chain of generations" (Hua15: 224, cf. 169, 181) and writes:

> A communal life of humans becomes possible as life of a linguistic community that is of a completely different kind than the communal life of animals. *The homeworld of humans, that is the fundamental element [Grundstück] for the structure of the objective world for* <them> (…) *is essentially determined by language*. Only through [language] is established, not merely a sensible common world, a concrete world of presence (in an extended sense which also includes the horizons of co-presence and past, and in one part the living future), but a practical human homeworld with an incomparably extensive circle of experience which encompasses as operative also the linguistically mediated experiences of the comrades [Genossen], and not only [experiences] which are really fully intuitively understood according to others (…), but also linguistic knowledge-structures which are not understood intuitively at all (Hua15: 224–225; cf. Hua15: 181; Hua6: 307/328).

Animal use many sorts of signals and indicative signs. They leave traces and they mark their territories, their orientations, and their states, and they are able to grasp the marks produced and used by other animals. Thus they consciously live social lives not just in the immediacy of perceptual bodily contact but also in the mediation of sings and signals (Hua15: 180). However, they lack the linguistic system of *expressive* signs that makes possible a peculiar way of sharing, not by producing indications that point to intentions but by objectifying meanings themselves. This involves two inseparable aspects. On the one hand, linguistic meanings are special sorts of objects shared and known by all speakers of the language. On the other hand, these objects can be materialized in multiple ways, the very same sentence can be printed on paper or an a sheet of papyrus, it can burned into wood, hammered in stone, and drawn in sand. Transgenerational communication of linguistic signs requires some physical means but is not dependent on any particular means.[28] This is something that the animals do not have.

The same holds for the early members of the biological species *homo sapiens*. These "people" lived in clans and tribes and formed different kind of communities, practical and affectional. In so far as these primitive people did not have language

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[27] Or "the style of all styles," in Merleau-Ponty's terms ([1945] 1993: 381/330).

[28] Cf. Baldwin's chapter in this volume.

as the medium of communication, they did not experience chains of generations, predecessors and successors, reachable by recitation, narration, and written expression. Thus, the communities in which they belonged were communities of contemporaries, and in this respect these people were equal to animals.

Finally, we can imagine a community of pre-linguistic infants – or human shaped fairies – communicating directly by their bodily gestures and different types of indicative signs.[29] These subjects would have social relations and social practices and a community in which they share a practical world. They could not, however, intend other similar beings in an open series of generations and would thus not have a world in the sense in which we adult humans have a world.

4 Language as Our Link to Past and Future Generations

We have seen that Husserl's discourse on animals and infants highlights the fact that language – oral and written language – is our connection to past and future others and generations of such others, and that it alone makes possible the constitution of the world as *same for an infinity of temporally-historically alien others*.

It is important to notice that the two modalities of language – speech and writing – establish very different types of relations to constantly absent others in past and future. In respect to speech, we are dependent on narrators in the attempt to reach non-contemporary others: narrators tell us about past others and narrators also tell future others about us. Thus speech makes possible many types of contacts with past and future others but all these contacts are mediated by the practice of narration and by the chains of partially co-present narrators and listeners. Through writing, however, we can directly communicate with, address and understand non-contemporary others, we can understand the writing of our predecessors, and we can address our successors through our own writing (cf. Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1993: 208–209/179, 445/388).[30]

So Husserl agrees with Descartes in arguing that prelinguistic children and animals differ from us fundamentally and do not belong among "us,"[31] but the reasons that he gives to this exclusion are very different from the ones that we find

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[29] The group of the neighbor boys in Jeffrey Eugenides' *Virgin Suicides* offers a better example of such a community than the infantile communities of William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*, since the fundamental lack that characterizes the infant for Husserl is not in morality or political consciousness but in consciousness of finitude and generativity.

[30] In a letter to More, Descartes ([1964–1976] 1996) explains: "Such speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a body. All human beings use it, however stupid or insane they may be, even though they may have no tongue or organs of voice; but no animals do. Consequently this can be taken as a real specific difference between humans and animals" (AT V 278/366, cf. AT V 345/374; cf. Alanen 2003: 82–88; Osborne 2007; Lähteenmäki 2009).

[31] Cf. Arendt (1958: 178–184, cf. 169–170).

in Descartes. For him language is not just a general means of thinking and communicating with others but is more specifically our only means of intending non-contemporary others and intending the environing world as the world shared with such others.[32]

This gives us a better understanding of Husserl's reasons for emphasizing the difference between writing and speech in "The Origin of Geometry" (1939) (Hua6: 367–374/356–363).[33] For Husserl, language is not just one unified system but also two practices – the practice of speaking and the practice of writing – with two very different temporal horizons. Husserl's reflections on animals and infants explicated here show that these two modalities of language involve two different forms of mediation and immediacy. Speech is the direct means of communication between contemporaries; but writing is the direct means of communication between non-contemporaries since it is mediated merely by the universal means of language and not by any particular language users, reciters, narrators, or interpreters.[34]

So from the point of view of generativity, oral and written cultures differ crucially. In both we can discuss past and future others, i.e. we can narrate about past others and their experiences both in speech and in writing. In other words, in both types of cultures, absent others can function as *objects* of discourse. But only in written cultures, past others can address us in their very own words and correspondingly we can address our successors. So only written language allows non-mediated communication between two asynchronous language users (not just communication *about* non-present others). Only in written cultures permanently absent others can function as *subjects* of communication.[35]

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[32] Cf. Derrida (1967c: 104–111/93–99).

[33] Cf. Baldwin's chapter in this volume.

[34] In the light of this, it seems to me that Jaakko Hintikka and Martin Kusch go astray when they distinguish Husserlian phenomenology from Heideggerian phenomenology on the basis of Hintikka's distinction between language as calculus and language as universal medium (inspired by Heijenoort's (1967) distinction between logic as calculus and logic as language) (Hintikka and Hintikka 1986; Kusch and Hintikka 1988; Kusch 1989; Hintikka 1996). Cf. Hartimo (2006).

[35] In *Speech and Phenomenon*, Derrida argues that all linguistic meaningfulness and expressivity, both in speech and in writing, depends on fundamental structures of absence which are obvious and undeniable in the case of writing: "The absence of intuition (...) is radically requisite: the total absence of the subject and object of a statement – the death of the writer and/or the disappearance of the objects he was able to describe – does not prevent a text from 'meaning' something. On the contrary, this possibility gives birth to meaning as such, gives it out to be heard and read" (Derrida 1967a: 104/93; cf. 42, 60–61/27, 40–41; 1967b: 247–249/165–166). Derrida makes far-reaching conclusions from this analysis; he argues that since Husserl neglects this fundamental form of absence in his theory of linguistic meaning he re-establishes a new form of the metaphysics of presence. Even if I do not accept his argument, I find his analysis of writing and its temporality insightful.

5 Homeworld and the Objective World

We have seen that in Husserl's analysis, the experience of generativity is necessary for the constitution sense of "the world," the true world for all. However, it alone is not enough to establish the senses of "us all," "the world for us all," the true objective world. Generativity only gives us a unified community that temporally opens onto two directions, the past and the future. For the universal sense "all," more is needed. Husserl explains:

> Enchained communication would not give any tradition which would be a tradition for all, not any community of spiritual acquisitions which would be accessible for all, not "the real world" already horizontally outlined for all. What is missing is: *Homeworld* – alien homeworld, which is valid, not for us, but for them. From there a path to the relativization, but also the problem of the new world for all – all "humanities" (Hua15: 169n1; cf. Hua1: 159–162/131–135).

In effect, Husserl argues that a *plurality* of generative communities is implied in the sense of "us all." A mere temporal historical openness to past and future is not enough, what is needed is also an open plurality of alien communities with alien practices, goals, and means and their temporal horizons. In order to account for this other type of openness, one that connects us to alien cultures and peoples, Husserl introduces the concepts of homeworld (*Heimwelt*) and alienworld (*Fremdenwelt*).[36]

He argues that our world of experience is disclosed to us as a *limited* field of culturally specific, habituated and inherited practices and interests only when it is exposed to us a set of alien practices and interests and to an alien practical community. In this disclosure, our world looses its absoluteness as the totality of all things and the horizon of all individual-personal horizons, and we realize and rearticulate it as one particular horizon among other horizons in a more encompassing horizon which also includes the communal experiences of alien others. Moreover, this is the only way in which our world of experience can loose its absoluteness and gain a more specific sense as a homeworld, i.e. by being compared to subjects and objects of alien practices. Husserl explains:

> My homeworld, my people. The universe in the first form as homeworld only *stands out* [as such] when other homeworlds, other peoples are already in the horizon along with the homeworld. The lived environment [*Lebensumwelt*] in the horizon of alien lived environments, my people surrounded by alien people (Hua15: 176n1).
>
> There is constituted an alien humankind, an alien humanity, as alien people for instance. Precisely thereby there is constituted for me and for us "our own" home fellowship, fellowship of our people in relation to our cultural environing world [*Kulturumwelt*] as the world of our human validities, our particular ones. So I have a change [*Änderung*] (…) of my world-experience and our world-experience and [a change of] the world itself. In "the" world are we, my people, and the other people, and each has its environing world of people (with its non-practical horizon). Environing world is distinguished from world (Hua15: 214; cf. Hua27: 186–188; Hua39: 336–337).

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[36] For a comprehensive explication and discussion of these concepts, see Steinbock (1995). Husserl's concept of homeworld is wide since it is defined by shared activities and practices; it refers to ethnographically and religiously shared worlds but also to professional and literary worlds.

This means that three different senses of the world are constitutively stratified one upon the other, but in such a manner that each new layer of sense relativizes the prior one, encompasses it in a new, more-inclusive whole, and thus shows its limits. Thus we proceed from (a) the world as the totality of things, to (b) the world as the horizon of a temporally continuous and developing community, and finally to (c) the world as the horizon of all such communal horizons. The last sense is the intentional correlate of a plurality of generative communities in mutual implication, and the second one is the correlate of one such community functioning independently of or prior to its exposure to other similar communities. Thus the sense of the world as the common ground and infinite field for different historical peoples and for different cultures and societies is not a correlate of any conscious activities whatsoever, individual or communal, but is a complicated constitutional achievement which includes mutual recognition of historical communities (Hua15: 430).

6   Conclusion

The paper set to clarify the role of the normal ones in world-constitution. It first identified the grounds that Husserl uses in excluding different types of others from the community of co-constitutors and then focused the study on two special cases of anomality: the infant and the animal.

I have argued that mortality, generativity, speech and writing have a crucial role in Husserl's exclusion of infants and animals from the constitutive activity which gives the world its full sense. Both infants and animals lack the sense of themselves as mortal beings and as members of generations and open series of generations. This deprivation hinders both from taking part in the activity that provides the world with the sense of a temporally continuous infinity. Moreover, both the infant and the animal also lack the sense of the distinction between two generative wholes: the homeworld and the alien world. Since these two senses – generation and homeworld – are implied in the experience of the world as the world for all, neither the infant nor the animal can participate in this type of experiential sharing and thus both remain outside of the community that gives the world its full sense.

In this light, Husserl's arguments about infants and animals differ in an interesting way from the traditional Cartesian arguments that still dominate contemporary philosophy of mind and language. According to him, infants and animals are not anomalous to us because they would lack thinking, cogito, or self-awareness, but because their understanding of themselves as communal beings is severely limited.

By implication, what is infantile in us "mature" "Europeans" is the persistent conviction that we could realize the full sense of the world without entering into critical and self-critical interchange with aliens from traditions of different kinds.

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The Body as a System of Concordance and the Perceptual World

Ignacio de los Reyes Melero

1 The Body as a System of Concordance

For Husserl the body occupies a special place within his transcendental considerations. We could say that the constitution of a spatio-temporal world would be impossible without a body. In the first section of *Ideas II*, devoted to the constitution of material nature, Husserl writes an entire chapter about "the sensible data in relation to the sensible body", an aspect that elucidates the manner in which the living body (*Leib*) participates in the constitution of the natural world. In the second section he points out how the body takes part in the constitution of the psychic reality, that is, of the "natural reality man" or "animal being", a problem, which is linked to empathy (*Einfühlung*). In this article I will center particularly on the descriptions related to sensations and to the corporal concordance that makes it possible for the world to appear in a coherent and stable manner.

In the first pages of the manuscript entitled *Solipsistische und intersubjektive Normalität und Konstitution der Objektivität*,[1] dated between 1915 and 1917, we find a detailed analysis dealing with the relation between the body itself and the constitution of the world from a purely individual perspective: "At the same time as we encounter the causal relations between things and our body, we encounter in the solipsistic attitude conditional relations existing between things and the ambit of our subjectivity: a psychophysical causality in the solipsistic attitude"

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[1] Hua XIII, pp. 360–385. I will use the abbreviation "Hua" to refer to the volumes of Husserliana.

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(Hua XIII, p. 360).[2] On the one hand, the body obeys nature (which affects our own lived body in many different ways), and on the other hand, it obeys the psyche. The so-called "psychophysical causality" emphasizes an order without which we could not give a complete account of the reality of the body: corporal experiences and movements are interwoven according to an order that is not merely material, such as physical causality: "The entire content of the experiences [. . .] is dependent on the corresponding specific corporal, that is, psychophysically conditioned, organization" (Hua XXXIX, p. 662).[3] Husserl, certainly, is careful not to over-radicalize the use of the word "causality". Thus, it can be understood that what is being expressed with the term "psychophysical causality" is not a kind of material causality: "Naturally, one should not speak here of univocity or of a narrow 'parallelism'" (Hua XXXIX, p. 662).[4] We could say that with this distinction between material causality and psycho-physical causality Husserl wants to avoid conceiving the psyche as a mere object of the world. Psyche has to be considered in relationship with affections and motivations, which brings the role of consciousness into focus as a center of an active and passive life.

It should be noted that in all these texts Husserl uses the German term *Leib*. Unlike *Körper*, (which makes reference to the body considered as a spatio-temporal entity), the notion of *Leib* is inseparable from the idea of subjective experience. *Leib* refers to the body considered as a living entity. The discourse on psychophysical causality is really part of a more extensive investigation of the *Leib*. Husserl says that "the body is an 'organic individuality' and not merely physical (*physisch-physikalische*)" (Hua XIV, p. 67).[5] The notion of "organicity" refers to a coherent relationship and collaboration between parts and organs of the same body. To emphasize the organicity of this individuality, Husserl refers to the body as an "system of orthological perceptions" that involves a coherent collaboration in which every part is interwoven with the other parts and members of the body: "The system of orthological perceptions (as opposed to heterological ones), of orthological phenomena (aspects, things seen) respectively, that is, of those

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[2] "Aber in eins mit den kausalen Beziehungen zwischen Dingen und unserem Leib haben wir in der solipsistischen Einstellung gegeben konditionale Beziehungen zwischen Dingen und dem Bereich unserer Subjektivität: psychophysische Kausalität in der solipsistischen Einstellung". I will use two other manuscripts. The first one, dated in 1921/1922, devotes a whole paragraph to the same problem: *Die Regelungen in der Dingkonstitution. Der Leib als Index von psychischer Normalität und Anomalität* (Hua XIV, Nr. 3 (§ 7), pp. 67–70). The second one, dated in 1926, is entitled: *Paradoxie der psychophysischen Relativität. Natur und normale Leiblichkeit. Idee der Normalität* (Hua XXXIX, Nr. 57, pp. 650–666). I will use my own translations of Husserl's texts (Hua XIII, XIV, XXXIII, XXXIX), except where there exist an English editions of the work in question (*Ideas* I and II and *Cartesian Meditations*).

[3] "der ganze Gehalt der Erfahrungen [. . .] *ist* abhängig von der jeweiligen spezifischen Leibesorganisation, also psychophysisch bedingt".

[4] "Natürlich, von einer Eindeutigkeit ist hier nichts vorweg ausgesagt, nichts von einem strengen "Parallelismus", etc.".

[5] "Der Leib ist "organische Individualität" und nicht bloss physisch-physikalische".

perceptions that find a motivated place in the system of concordant experience, always have, as a consequence, a partially (in some respect) fulfilled character, or, in other words, 'correct' perceptions" (Hua XIII, p. 366).[6] Here we should bear in mind that the system of concordance presupposes the constitution of the living body by means of the sensations of touch, pain, etc. Even though I will not develop these constitutive descriptions in this paper, it is important to have in mind their decisive role in Husserl's analyses of the body.

Let us go a little deeper into the meaning of this "system of concordant experience". First of all, it has to be considered that "concordance" for Husserl is a very important term. In general, he recognizes as concordant those experiences that in some respect fulfill certain expectations. But from Husserl's perspective, that does not occur only in some moments of life. All the objects we experience (and even our own conscious life) need a sort of continuity, a nuclear stability, which is only possible when there is an expectation and a fulfillment. For Husserl, this structure and dynamism of consciousness is rooted in the experience of time: the whole life of consciousness, we could say, is possible by means of an essential concordance, that is, an essential unity between moments and contents of our mental acts. Only by means of the unity between past, present and future (or in phenomenological terms: retentions, actual present and protentions) is the apprehension or continuity of every single thing, even of self-consciousness, possible. Therefore, we can assert that a system of concordance (as I will show further) is an ordered group of concordances, which are internally related. Every single concordance is related to the whole system, experienced in relationship with other concordances within the temporal unity of our perceptual experiences. In this way, there is a system because there is more than one intentional "source"; our body, in fact, involves different intentional acts by means of its different senses, which are usually interconnected: I smell, touch and see the *same* object, which is experienced in different but concordant ways.

Obviously, it is possible to think of many different types of concordances (related to the world or to the self and the flow of consciousness), but they are always based on this essential structure of expectation and fulfillment. If we want to experience something, to apprehend something objective or our own mental acts, we need this structure of concordance within our bodily system and within our particular perceptions. Although some perceptual expectations may not be fulfilled, our own body is usually articulated as a coherent system (and prepared to re-establish the concordance when some discordance shows up). I will examine some concordances, related to the body and the constitution of the perceptual world.

Husserl gives us some indications of the way in which the body – as an organic unity – interacts with the world in a concordant manner. In *Ideas II*, he provides an

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[6] "Das System der orthologischen Wahrnehmungen (gegenüber den heterologischen) bzw. der orthologischen Erscheinungen (Aspekte, Sehdinge), d.h. solcher Wahrnehmungen, die im System einstimmiger Erfahrung ihre motivierte Stelle haben, daher zu ihrem Teil immer (in etwas) Erfüllungscharakter haben, oder, was gleichwertig: "*richtige*" Wahrnehmungen".

extensive explanation of the process by which kinesthesias are directly linked to a modification of the contents of sensation (which in this case are *visuellen Empfindungen*): "*if* the eye turns in a certain way, *then* so does the 'image'; if it turns differently in some definite fashion, then so does the image alter differently, in correspondence, we constantly find here this twofold articulation: kinesthetic sensations on the one side, the motivating; and the sensations of features on the other, the motivated" (Hua IV, p. 58). The same thing as happens with the eye happens with the other organs and with the body as the unity of them all. Furthermore, the organs of the body that are linked to different senses can relate to the others in multiple directions: they can assume the role of mere "perceivers" and also that of "perceived objects" from the standpoint of other organs.[7] Thus, my hand can touch the wall, and at the same time it can be seen by my eye, be touched by another hand, feel itself in contact with the wall, etc. In this way, not only are individual coherent networks generated (specific kinesthetic sensations related to corresponding contents), but also an interweaving that comprises all of them: the hand that touches the wall, the hand that feels itself touched, the eye that sees the hand and the wall that is seen and touched are elements that constitute a concordant network of anticipation and fulfillment. In *Ideas II*, Husserl calls this type of normal functioning of the body "orthoaesthetic"[8]: "The Body is said to be functioning throughout orthoaesthetically or 'normally' as long as the psychophysically dependent perceptions or appearances are orthoaesthetic" (Hua IV, p. 74).

We can identify multiple concordant directions linked to our organs. Although Husserl does not offer an exhaustive classification of all of them, his examples provide us with numerous pointers. We can offer examples with respect to kinaesthesias (I move my eye and the field of vision changes) and with respect to the content shown (the field of vision changes, as does what was expected). Thus we understand that different ways of speaking of "concordant systems" are possible, with the body acting, in general terms, as a large system in which the various organs and senses collaborate in a harmonious manner at the same time as they interact with the world in an orderly and coherent fashion.

The concordant system, as Husserl shows in different texts, is realized by way of a great complexity of activities and syntheses that can easily go unnoticed. The fractures or disillusions that emerge in experience in different ways make manifest the temporal unity of our personal experiences and their internal structure, based on continual anticipations and retentions. From this point of view, it is interesting to consider that every concordance is realized through a multiplicity of contents of

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[7] "Ich habe bei diesem Leibe *Systeme von Sinnesorganen*, und Erfahrung habe ich von den Dingen und den Sinnesorganen selbst durch Betasten, Besehen etc., durch ein "*Fungieren der Sinnesorgane*", wobei die Sinnesorgane zugleich fungierend sind und wechselseitig füreinander Objekte der "Wahrnehmungstätigkeit": durch wechselseitiges Betasten, Besehen sind für mich meine Leibesglieder und ihre Tätigkeit im Wahrnehmen da" (Hua XIII, p. 365).

[8] See Micali's contribution to this volume, for a discussion of the disturbances of this orthoaesthetic functioning in cases of severe depression in terms of Husserl's notion of *Innenleiblichkeit*.

sensation in continual change: I see a red sphere, but it changes every instant, depending on the light, the brilliance, the position, etc. We could say that there is a typical, schematic or normal mode of perception that embraces a variable arc of circumstances and contents. There is a typicality in perception because objects are given and perceived according to their different possibilities. Perhaps I have never before seen the book I am seeing on my desk, but as soon as I take a look I anticipate the hidden parts of it, the weight it might have, etc. The red sphere or the book that I have on my desk may undergo many changes (colour, position, brilliance, etc.) but I experience all those changes as concordant with the possibilities that I was expecting. But if they should undergo a brusque, sudden or unexpected change, we would be faced with a manifest discordance that would require a reestablishment of the concordant systems (for example, if the sphere suddenly changes color we have to understand why that happened).

It is obvious that if we consider more than the sense of sight, this tension between the multiple appearances and the unitary object grows in complexity: I see the wall, I feel the weight of my feet, I move around in the room, I am conscious of the distance I keep in relation to different objects, etc. In this perceptual process it is easy to understand what it means that the body is an organic system of "correct" perceptions. I not only take charge of my senses and my organs in an organized way (I move my hand, I turn my head, in short, I move my whole body),[9] but furthermore, the corporal unity between them refers concordantly to the world: after having seen the wall, I go to it, and I touch it. In general terms, we can say that within a concordant system everything speaks in a coherent manner: my spatial position, my senses and organs, the intentional capacity of each one of them, etc. The corporal unity of all these elements attaches us firmly in an elementary way to a worldly territory, which begins to take the form of a single space and time.[10]

2   Systems of Heterological Perceptions

Husserl also speaks of systems of heterological perceptions, that is, systems that activate some type of discordance. Sudden modalizations or those linked to extreme situations that interrupt the course of perception are considered heterological: "Perceptual phenomena can show up in cancelled perceptions, like illusions or

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[9] "Durch meine subjektive Tätigkeit bewege ich das Leibesglied Auge als Ding im Raume, erwirke ich die räumlichen Bewegungen meiner Hand, meines Fusses, etc." (Hua XIII, p. 363).

[10] Merleau-Ponty expresses similar ideas with respect to this point: "Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world. It is a marvel too little noticed that every movement of my eyes – even more, every displacement of my body – has its place in the same visible universe that I itemize and explore with them, as, conversely, every vision takes place somewhere in the tactile space. There is double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible; the two maps are complete, and yet they do not merge into one. The two parts are total parts and yet are not superposable" (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 134).

hallucinations, which demonstrate their heterological character" (Hua XIII, p. 366).[11] Husserl distinguishes two fundamental types of discordances; the first refers to discordances with regard to the world; the second indicates discordances linked to the body or to the perceptual system, such as, for example, a burnt finger, which indicates an anomalous situation and, consequently, discordant data. The following is an example linked to the first type, to the interruption of the perceptual course: imagine that on leaving an establishment, I unexpectedly crash into the glass of the door. I believed that there was no glass, but a second later I had no doubts about its existence. Not having taken visual note of it, I was preparing to leave. The sudden blow, however, made me realize the situation. Based on the doxic position and on my spatial situation (through which we "say": "the door is open" or "the way is free") we derive a series of expectations that are radically disillusioned by another sense source (in this case, the sense of touch and afterward also of sight). If something like this should happen, we could conclude that the concordant system had for an instant lost the concordant unity of all intentions and respectively fulfillments. After the blow, the concordant system is reestablished and the doxic position adapts to it ("in fact there is some glass"). But what exactly is the "doxic position" and how does it relate to the perceptual situation? According to Husserl, it is a certainty of being by which the subject "takes a position" regarding particular states of affairs: we say that things are this or that way, that they have particular characteristics, etc. In turn, the certainty of being can be modalized in the awareness of doubt, of possibility or of negation. What is of interest to point out here is that except in extreme cases, every perceptual situation is accompanied by a certainty of being that, in a way, emerges in the presence of the organic whole of perception. Later I will explain in more detail how the doxic position relates to perception.

The second type of discordances makes reference, as I have said, to a group of abnormalities linked to the body itself (a "pathological" [*pathologische*] system), which form part of the extensive group of the systems of heterological perceptions. Whenever the subject experiences a discordance linked to one of the organs or parts of the body, we can speak of a partially pathological system, which introduces discordant worldly elements. Husserl gives many examples: blindness, temporary blindness, perceptual disturbances as a result of the use of drugs (for example, santonin),[12] a burnt finger or hand, etc. The interest of these examples increases when we realize that it is not always easy to identify who experiences a pathology and in what way. Clearly, the discussion about what is pathological brings to light the tension between the first-personal perspective and that of others. As Husserl explains on different occasions, in a country of persons who do not have the faculty of sight, one could not speak of blindness or lack of vision. Being accustomed to this situation, they would not be aware of their abnormality and, without the

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[11] "Perzeptive Erscheinungen können auftreten in durchgestrichenen Wahrnehmungen, als Illusionen, Halluzinationen; sie erweisen damit ihren heterologischen Charakter".

[12] See Nenon (this volume), p. 151.

possibility of such an awareness there would not be an abnormality. Husserl's examples reveal different types of pathological systems. Some affect an entire sense, such as sight; others affect only one part, such as an eye or a hand; some appear by surprise, others as a consequence of some accident or illness; some can be present from birth, etc.

3   Normality and Abnormality Within the Passive Life

Husserl speaks (as we have just seen) about normality[13] and abnormality, and within this frame settles the body as an index of normality and abnormality. I maintain that Husserl developed his notion of normality to unify the universality and necessity of certain structures with the movement and contingency of historical life in an orderly fashion. Personal life needs to achieve a fundamental coherence within a network of specific and complicated relations (to others, to the products of cultural life, to the self memory, etc.), without which it would be an empty or disoriented life.

Nevertheless, in this paragraph I will focus exclusively on how Husserl articulates the notion of normality in relationship with the body and, more precisely, within the passive life. It is interesting to note that the normality of the body relates, as I will show shortly, not only to the contents of sensation linked to specific worldly situations, but also to instincts, sensations of pain or impulses, which also manifest normality in relation to the living body that defines different modes of experiencing the world. It is not to be forgotten that Husserl connects the living body not only to the constitution of spatio-temporal objectivities, but also to another group of experiences and objects related to the sphere of feelings, pleasures, pains, etc., as he shows in the paragraph 39 of *Ideas II*. Thus, the first face of normality shows itself in the sphere of feelings and impulses expressed by the body:

> Subjectivity has a normality in which it, tied to a certain normality of the physical living body [*des körperlichen Leibes*], has normal systems of experiences. In the same way, for example, it has normality in the feelings of pleasure and pain, in instincts, impulses, in its different conducts, and here too relations to the normality of the physical living body show themselves (Hua XIV, p. 69).[14]

The richness and complexity of this set of personal experiences point to the following: "Each subject has a possible normality and abnormality, not as a subject

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[13] See Heinämaa (this volume).

[14] "Die Subjektivität hat eine Normalität darin, dass sie, bezogen auf eine gewisse Normalität des körperlichen Leibes, normale Systeme von Erfahrungserlebnissen hat. Ebenso hat sie z.B. Normalität in Lust und Schmerzgefühlen, in Instinkten, Trieben, in ihrem sonstigen Verhalten, und auch da zeigen sich Beziehungen zur Normalität des körperlichen Leibes. So ist in der Erfahrung der Mensch von vornherein konstituiert als eine seelisch-typische Individualität mit einer Idee Normalität und davon sich abzweigenden Anomalitäten, bezogen auf eine typisch organische Individualität, auf normalen und anomalen Leib".

of acts but in relation to his passivity" (Hua XIV, p. 67).[15] It is important to note that in Husserl's view the experience of normality in relation to the body is primarily linked to the sphere of passivity. From Husserl's point of view normality is not primarily established via a sort of discourse. Rather, it is an aspect of all experiences, beginning with those associated with the body itself, by which the present that is lived, with all its contents, manifests itself in harmony – thanks to associative syntheses – or in concordance with old experiences. The last text cited shows to what extent discordances can take root in this elementary territory. One only needs to think of the experience of a pain that enters our sensitive horizon by surprise and that generates sensations never before experienced. Its novel irruption inevitably introduces a group of discordances, of unexpected sensitive contents, which will become relatively familiar if the pain continues or reappears periodically.

In the same way, an order could be established by which the experience of one's body (considered as a whole) opens out into different levels. The example that has just been given falls under a type of abnormality based on a relatively familiar experience, that of pain. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider another kind of abnormality that in a more radical way ruptures the normal order of experience: hallucinations, perceptual disturbances or even mental illnesses. We can tell that such "events" fracture the concordance and consistency of the world in many ways. Before analyzing these cases, Husserl emphasizes how the living body as a general rule is an indication of the difference between normality and abnormality; so much so that all external explanations (medical, etc.) that subsume or explain what has happened (for example, a pain) under a theory, can never eliminate the originally anomalous appearance of the experience lived.[16] I believe that the following text is a good synthesis of what has been said up to now about normality and its deviations:

> Normality is a form belonging to the constitution of spatial data, of external objectivities of the body itself; deviation from the norm is something that can affect particular organs (it is possible to describe it) and that is confirmed by the normal functioning of other organs that normally remain unaltered. The description of abnormality can proceed from this. An abnormality can affect modes of appearing manifested through an organ. The organ can also become unusable for perception. It can affect more and even all of the organs (Hua XIV, p. 68).[17]

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[15] "Jedes Subjekt hat nicht als Aktsubjekt, sondern in Hinsicht auf seine Passivität mögliche Normalität und Anomalität. Und der Index dieser Unterschiede ist der Leib".

[16] See Morris' essay in this volume for a discussion of the relation between a phenomenological and a medical perspective on chronic pain.

[17] "Normalität ist eine zur Konstitution gehörige Form für die Konstitution der Raumgegebenheiten, der Aussendinglichkeiten und Eigenleiblichkeiten, und Abweichung von der Norm ist etwas, das in beschreibbarer Weise einzelne Organe betreffen kann und durch normale Funktion normal verbleibender anderer Organe konstatierbar ist. Von da aus geht die Beschreibung der Anomalität weiter. Anomalität kann die Erscheinungsweisen, die ein Organ "ergibt", betreffen. Das Organ kann auch zur Wahrnehmung unbrauchbar werden. Es kann mehrere und alle Organe betreffen".

4 Are Normality and Abnormality Interchangeable?

As we have seen, partial ruptures, whether they are perceptual discordances or pathologies, depend on a prior normal order, which, as we shall see, might not be the order considered normal by other persons. If until now I have mainly focused on understanding this order and some of its most important modifications, I will now go on to examine more closely the legitimacy or the pretension of legitimacy of the doxic certainties rooted in such a system. "With regard to consciousness *a world of normality constitutes itself as the first and real world*, and opposed to these anomalous appearances of the real world constitute themselves, relative to the transformations of the experiencing corporality, of the organic individual, or, to put it differently, relative to the biological anomalies of the real biophysical body that are constituted within the framework of normal experience" (Hua XIV, p. 68) (italics ours).[18]

What does this text contribute to the reflections that I have been offering? Basically, it obliges us to extend the horizons of the problems that have to do with normality. It is true that there are certain experiences that say nothing about spatio-temporal realities: this is what we see, for example, in the case of pain. Nevertheless, normal perceptual experiences constitute for us a worldly situation that is considered, believed or affirmed in many different ways. In general, as we have seen, Husserl uses the terms "doxic thesis" or "doxic certainty" to refer to the conviction about any worldly situation. Even though we can undergo many discordances, the doxic certainty can be maintained thanks to those concordances that have more weight than any particular discordance.

Every single partial rupture of the concordant system obliges us to reestablish or verify the truth in different ways. The case of the blind, or of pathological affections, speaks in favor of this elemental dependency between system and world. To what extent can we recognize the provisionality of our doxic positions and, therefore, the possibility that they can be negated or corrected in an essential way? Husserl puts all these difficulties on the table with another question: "Can we conclude that things are not as they appear or, more exactly, that the things that are given in orthological phenomena may not be as they appear, and that the non-orthological phenomena may in the end have the same right as the orthological ones?" (Hua XIII, pp. 368–369).[19]

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[18] "Bewusstseinsmässig *konstituiert sich eine Welt der Normalität als erste wahre Welt* und ihr gegenüber anomale Erscheinungen der wahren Welt, bezogen auf Abwandlungen der erfahrenen Leiblichkeit, des organischen Individuums oder, wie wir auch sagen können, bezogen auf die im Rahmen normaler Erfahrung sich konstituierenden biologischen Anomalitäten des biophysischen realen Leibes".

[19] "Kann man [...] *entnehmen*, dass die Dinge nicht so sind, wie sie erscheinen, genauer, dass die in den orthologischen Erscheinungen gegebenen Dinge nicht so sind, wie sie erscheinen, und dass die nicht-orthologischen Erscheinungen schliesslich ebensoviel Recht haben wie die orthologischen?".

I shall attempt to reply to this question, thus eliminating a possible confusion. If by speaking of the interchangeability of the orthological and heterological phenomena, we mean to refer to a possible equivalence between them we would have to say that this misdescribes the situation, at least from the purely individual perspective, which is the perspective that Husserl considers as primary. If a series of concordant experiences is not negated in any way, or not in any substantial way, it would be completely out of place (for lack of sufficient motivation) to consider the normality of a certain situation as equal with the partial (either in thought or realized in some respect) or total abnormality of another. In fact, Husserl says this in affirming that "*psychophysical relations* (*taking into account a solipsistic subject*) *do not lead to relativizing the* "*phenomena*" *from the point of view of theoretical knowledge*, to equalizing the normal and the abnormal phenomena (the orthological and the heterological ones)" (Hua XIII, p. 369).[20]

Nevertheless, what I have just said does not a priori annul the possibility that the doxic certainty of one single situation may be replaced or corrected in essential points. In this case, by "interchangeability" of doxic certainties we would not understand that both are present with the same validity, but rather that the doxic certainty can be changed or substituted. Husserl considered this a possibility because of the lack of adequacy of perceptual life. The perception of one part or of one side of an object suggests or anticipates other sides and faces, which cannot be present at the same time. This impossibility, however, does not distance us from the perceptual thing. For Husserl, what is given perceptually is always given in an incomplete manner. Not only that. It is important to remember that the epoché puts the existence of things in parenthesis, so that what is given appears in itself as sufficiently consistent, independently of the fact that at a subsequent moment it may undergo a correction of what was given. In this way, the phenomenological method does not consider whether or not there is a reality beyond our perceptions (a reality beyond the appearance), but the inner order of our experiences and worldly contents. Of course, this phenomenological approach to perception does not cancel out the differences between perception and illusion. In this regard, it would be very interesting to show the different ways in which perception and other intentional experiences are rooted in the whole of our worldly horizons. But this is not the point I'm after here. What I wanted to settle here is that the inadequacy of any given perceptual experience does not prevent the unity and validity of our experiences, as long as we deal with concordant orders.

This lack of adequacy can bring us to consider two different ways in which further perceptual exploration can impact previous experience: the first is the improvement with respect to what appears; the second is the correction and annulment of what has been experienced. Considering the first possibility, we know that everything that we receive perceptually can always be given in a better

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[20] "*die psychophysischen Beziehungen geben also wohl keinen Anlass* (keinen Anlass *dem solipsistischen Subjekt*) *die* "*Erscheinungen*" *erkenntnistheoretisch irgendwie zu relativieren*, die normalen und anomalen (orthologischen und anorthologischen) gleichzustellen."

way by virtue of spatio-temporality. If we carefully consider the way in which objects are perceptually given to us we will find at least the following three features omnipresent in such experiences: (1) the distance that separates us from them (which increases and diminishes), (2) the "figure-ground" structure (that marginalizes at the same time as it focuses), and (3) the fact that we necessarily apprehend them from one single side (they show one face and hide the rest). Thus any spatio-temporal object presents itself to us as if it could be given in more detail: we can come closer or go farther away in order to observe it better, we can focus our eyes on what emerges from the background, we can go around it to observe the sides that were not visible at first, etc.

In the same way, just as we can conceive of an improvement with respect to our approximations to an object of perception, it is possible to conceive of an improvement or enrichment in our systems of concordances. If a man whose hand has been seriously injured were to recover the lost sensitivity, then his organism would have at its disposal more sensitive sources that would be integrated into the whole body, a circumstance that would lead him to experience the world in a richer way, at the same time as it would avoid old discordances. The same thing would happen if, in the future, evolution or technological innovations were to provide us with new organs or senses. All this would not cancel or replace the whole of our system of concordance; on the contrary, if we think about the partial limits characteristic of our various senses or organs, it is not difficult to imagine the different improvements that could correspond to them: greater visual acuity, new sensitive capacities (the recognition of sources of heat from a distance), etc., which could be integrated into the new concordant whole of our body.

The idea of "optimality"[21] (as the possibility of experiencing what we have perceived in the best way we can conceive) has to do with new possibilities of concordant perceptions (in the absence of a perspective that includes the possible totality of experiences), but on the other side of the coin we come up against the opposite possibility: that of the correction and annulment of what has been experienced. In one of the manuscripts that I have been making use of, Husserl refers to the possibility of annulment (*Durchstreichung*) that can affect every perception. In this way, we have to accept the provisionality of our perceptions (even though we experience them within a concordant order) and, therefore, the possibility that future experiences may correct the previous doxic positions or generate new

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[21] Cf. Hua XXXIX, p. 658. "Zugang zum Fernen ändert sich der Orientierungsstil in bekannter Weise, aber die bestimmte Orientierungsgegebenheit des Dinges als optimale des Nahdinges ist mir erst im wirklichen Zugang gegeben und damit es selbst, wie es in praktischer Wahrheit ist." (Hua XXXIX, p. 147). Without facing directly the problem of the notion of optimality in Husserl's phenomenology, I can set that Husserl says that optimality unfolds normality: "Es ist danach klar, dass sich das Normale als ein Optimales in der Erfahrung selbst auszeichnet, so dass selbst ein Einzelner zur Norm der Erfahrungswahrheit werden könnte." (Hua XXXIX, p. 658). I am not attempting to provide a full analysis of Husserl's notion of "optimality" in this paper; I only wish to highlight how perceptual experience (by means of its horizons) is constantly open to a recognition of better perspectives and ways of giveness.

ones. In fact, by virtue of the different types of distance that I have described, we consider it *normal* for such errors to appear, at least partially.

In this regard, it is not contradictory to think that a certain situation experienced as normal may become abnormal. This happens, for example, when I am convinced that I am seeing a tree in the night. All the appearances that I experience give me the idea of such a tree. Nevertheless, it can happen that I suddenly discover that the presumed tree is not a tree but a great piece of fabric over a long stick, for example. Everything was concordant, until we have experienced something that generated a new interpretation, which should be from that moment on concordant in turn.

We can go one step further and consider the possibility of a more global breakdown. Just as the corporal system can offer certain anomalies or pathologies, as we have seen in the case of the burnt hand or of color blindness, there is nothing to keep us from thinking that these partial discordances can multiply:

> But we cannot discard the idea that the destruction of the consolidated sense of things in experience might grow to extremes that men who are healthy do not know. This is what happens in the case of certain illnesses, but, especially, in the perturbations of schizophrenia or in the mental misfortunes that lock the person affected away for years or perhaps forever in a world of his own, without communication with the world that was his and where those who take care of him are waiting for him.[22]

This possibility obliges us to make the point of view I am using as a basis clearer. To be sure, many of the texts that I have cited refer to problems that have developed in the sphere of mere individuality. Nevertheless, the problem of concordance and discordance, of normality and abnormality, cannot be confronted exclusively from an individual perspective. One of the reasons is the one that I have already mentioned in the case of color blindness: an isolated subject can experience as normal a situation that the rest consider abnormal. Another reason is that for Husserl intersubjectivity is not just one more theme among others or a "detail" added in the margin of his writings. His considerations on intersubjectivity are of an extremely important nature and imply a limit beyond which it is not possible to conceive the idea of the world, at least a world of a spatio-temporal character, an aspect that is of decisive importance for research into the possibility of a cancellation of our concordant systems and of the corresponding restitution of a world. Clearly, the issue of intersubjectivity introduces many other problems that, without doubt, were for a long time the object of Husserl's investigations. Suffice it to mention the enormous number of texts, collected in the three volumes on intersubjectivity and in volume XXXIX, that refer to the problem of madness and of animal and infantile life, themes that precisely place the relation between the normal and the abnormal at the center of attention.[23]

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[22] García-Baró (1999), p. 235.

[23] See Heinämaa, p. 85 (this volume): "these subjects do not take part in the communal and communicative constitution of the sense of the world in so far as they operate within their anomalies."

5   Concordance and the Intersubjective World

In this paragraph I would like to widen the subjective perspective I have adopted up to now. We can tell that from the beginning subjectivity experiences (what Husserl calls "transcendental birth") many concordances and fulfillments. In fact, since we were children we have learned to overcome the accidental discordances and reestablish the previous concordances. At the same time, Husserl argues that the perceptual world (as a consistent one, spatio-temporal, individual one, etc.) is constituted and accomplished by intersubjectivity (in a constant link between me and others).[24] There is no contradiction here with what I have said about subjectivity, because the individual's consciousness of the perceptual world is constantly verified and experienced in relationship with others. On the following pages I will discuss what this perceptual single world means and what role perceptual concordance and others play in the idea of such a world, an idea that denies the possibility of two such separated worlds as well as the non-validity of such a world.

Would it really be possible to think of a total discordance, that is, that the world might appear to us in a totally different way? With respect to the type of discordances that I have analyzed in these pages, I would have to say that none of them endangers the entire system of concordance; quite the contrary, the condition of such fractures is the permanence of a more basic concordant system by virtue of which the contents and the discordant perspectives are corrected. For this reason, when Husserl speaks of a non-concordant system, he is always referring to a partial system. So we would have to distinguish between systems of concordances (limited to a particular time or particular circumstances, either corporal or worldly) and a system of elementary concordances by virtue of which the other concordances and discordances appear. Could it happen that this elemental territory might collapse? If this should happen, the world itself would collapse along with it. This is what Husserl affirms when he writes as follows: "Naturally, a total discordance is not possible: if a discourse based on communication is still to be possible, if men are there for other men, then they have to know themselves to be in relation to one and the same world" (Hua XXXIX, p. 657).[25] In this case Husserl has recourse to an intersubjective perspective. Of course it would be possible to have an absolutely heterological, chaotic system, but no communication would be possible with it, nor could it itself find the necessary stability to recognize its structural limit. We could say the same thing about death[26] or about all those illnesses that, seen from the outside, submit the person to radical transformations. With regard to these

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[24] See Heinämaa p. 98 (this volume): "The experience of generativity is necessary for the constitution sense of "the world," the true world for all."

[25] "Natürlich, völlige Unstimmigkeit ist nicht möglich, wenn noch von einer Kommunikation die Rede <sein soll>, wenn diese Menschen für andere da sein, also auch sich auf eine Welt und dieselbe bezogen wissen sollen".

[26] Cfr., Hua XIV, p. 69. If we speak about death we have obviously to do it within an intersubjective frame.

situations, Husserl firmly denies a possible abyss between any two circumstances or worlds. He highlights the essential unity that must exist between any two putatively separated worlds:

> Is it conceivable (to me, the subject who asks this, or, starting from me, any conceivable subject who might ask it) – is it, I ask, *conceivable* that two or more *separate pluralities of monads*, i.e. pluralities *not in communion*, co-exist, each of which accordingly constitutes *a world of its own*, so that together they constitute *two* worlds that are separate ad infinitum, *two* infinite *spaces and space-times*? Manifestly, instead of being a conceivability, that is a pure absurdity. (Hua I, pp. 166–167)

In this suggestive paragraph (§60) of the *Meditations*, Husserl – following Leibniz – distinguishes between merely conceiving of a possibility and its actual compossibility. It is possible, for example, to think of multiple variations of the Ego, but "each of which, however, is annuled by each of the others and by the ego who I actually am. It is *a system of a priori incompossibility*" (Hua I, pp. 167–168).[27] In the same way, it is possible to think of monadic worlds unconnected to each other, but this possibility is fictitious, that is, incompossible. To the extent that it is possible to imagine such worlds, a unity between them is automatically effected. This is what leads Husserl to affirm that "there can exist *only one Objective world*, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature. Moreover this one Nature *must* exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads" (Hua I, p. 167). Certainly, it is not necessary for alien, interstellar or merely animal worlds to be real. But if it is possible to conceive of them, although it be as mere possibilities, then it is necessary to affirm their elementary link to our world: "Their worlds, however, are surrounding worlds with open horizons that are only de facto, only accidentally, undiscoverable to them" (Hua I, p. 167). In these texts from the famous fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl links the constitution of objective space and time to the apprehension of other monads, or to the possibility of such an apprehension. This is like saying that if there are other *alter egos* within our worldly horizon, then there is a single world; if there is a single world, it is because there are or can be others. In short, from this point of view the apprehension of the others is not a secondary factor but, rather, absolutely decisive in the constitution of the concordant spatio-temporal world. From the horizontality of the world can be inferred almost automatically the possibility of the others, which in their effective appearance do nothing other than refer to the same world to which we refer, extending and indicating the open horizons of our world. Clearly, primordiality[28]

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[27] See Lobo's essay in this volume for a detail discussion of the distinction between conceivability and compossibility in relation to variations of the Ego.

[28] Sphere of "primordiality" (as Husserl explains in *Cartesian Meditations*) is conceived by Husserl as the "Sphere of ownness" (*Eigenheitsphere*), which is the field of the pure subjective life, the most radical core of subjective experience: "the trascendental ego and self-apperception as a psycho-physical man" are included in the ownness (Hua I, §46). For more on the sphere of "primordiality" see also Pulkkinen's and Lobo's contribution to this volume.

and intersubjectivity in the work of Husserl create a tension that is difficult to annul and difficult to understand. In any case, it seems that Husserl maintains this tension trying to preserve the constitutive role of both subjectivity and intersubjectivity: "Each appearance available to me is from the beginning a member of an openly infinite area, although not explicitly realized, an area of the possible appearances of this same thing. The subjectivity of these phenomena is open intersubjectivity" (Hua XIV, p. 289).[29]

For this reason it can be understood that total lack of concordance is impossible, at least if communication is possible. If such disorder should occur, we could hardly speak of a world (as happens in some moments or circumstances of life, such as dreams, phantasies, unconscious life, etc.), at least of a world sufficiently concordant to be a world that opens horizontally, and is, therefore, structurally open to others. If, as Husserl says, it is not possible to conceive of two totally different worlds, neither is it possible to conceive of passing from one to the other. Husserl's conclusion, which can serve perfectly as the conclusion of this section points in the same direction:

> In psychophysical causality, provided that we are speaking of living human and animal bodies that are in continuous phylogenetic development, in no case is there a place (a priori) on the psychic side for new concordant experiences and systems of experience by way of which can be sustained a totally different world bearing the seal of a perfectly established truth as the factual world, that is, the world that is announced to us in our concordant worldly representations. (Hua XXXIX, pp. 653–654)[30]

If my reflections are correct, we would have to say that the alternative presented to us is not that of different worlds that compete with each other, but rather the possibility of one world faced with its own impossibility. If a world is possible, Husserl seems to say, then it is possible to conceive of different ways for the worldly to reveal itself, radical correction of the worldly contents, more stable and coherent ways, but not absolutely opposite ways or worldly forms. The concordant systems expressed through the body begin to announce this single world. Even though we know that such a world can disappear or dissipate in many directions (madness, dreams, perceptual disturbances, unconsciousness), Husserl wants to settle the essential relationship between the world and the concordant subjective (and intersubjective) orders. It is impossible to conceive of the world without such orders, without the unity of experiences that subjectivity lives in a coherent manner. As long as our subjective life is open to others (context) and to the

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[29] "Jede Erscheinung, die ich habe ist von vornherein Glied eines offen endlosen, aber nicht explizit verwirklichten Umfanges möglicher Erscheinungen von demselben, und die Subjektivität dieser Erscheinungen ist die offene Intersubjektivität".

[30] "In der psychophysischen Kausalität können, solange wir von menschlichen und tierischen Leibern sprechen und von phylogenetisch weiter sich entwickelnden, niemals und prinzipiell (also a priori) <nicht> auf psychischer Seite derart neue und allgemein zusammenstimmende Erfahrungen und Erfahrungssysteme möglich sein, <dass> durch <sie> eine ganz andere Welt den Stempel wohlbegründeter Wahrheit erhalten könnte als die faktische, d.i. die uns in unseren einstimmigen Weltvorstellungen sich vorzeichnende".

perceptual background, there is a world.[31] It is only possible to live a world if the perceptual background and context are interwoven in a concordant manner. In this regard, Husserl asserts that the world can never be annulled with respect to its elementary validity, which is made possible by concordance, and which extends and becomes rooted in intersubjectivity. Intersubjective life makes the stability of a world clearly manifest. The world can change in many respects (and it can even disappear), but it is not possible to speak of a single world without the stability that a system of concordance offers.

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[31] Welton (2000), p. 87.

Lifeworld as an Embodiment of Spiritual Meaning: The Constitutive Dynamics of Activity and Passivity in Husserl

Simo Pulkkinen

1   Introduction

In this chapter I explore a less well known part of Husserl's theory of embodiment: the idea that subjectivity is not present in the world merely in "lived-bodies" (*Leib*) but rather, in a specific sense, is spread all over the lifeworld and "embodied" (*verkörpert, einverleibt, inkorporiert*) in all sorts of things that we are dealing with. As Husserl puts it for example in a manuscript from around the year 1928: "[all sorts of] things, which are not lived-bodies, [. . .] are nevertheless analogous to lived-bodies [. . .]. Things harbor a spiritual meaning that is incorporated [*inkorporiert*] in them, a meaning that is not truly corporeal [*körperlich*], but that is 'em'-bodied ['*ver*'-*körpert*] in them – a spiritual meaning that refers to meaning constituting subjects."[1] Husserl is here referring to the experiential givenness of the "cultural world" (*Kulturwelt*), which he understands in a very broad sense, i.e. as comprising everything in one way or another "humanly significant" ranging from everyday utensils to works of art and even to those purely natural entities that have for instance a practical or mythical meaning for us. In fact, for Husserl, the experiential world is for the most part conceived in terms of its human significance and thus given exactly as a cultural world.[2] And, in Husserl's terms, this means that the world is given as something that harbors within itself "a kind of inner life" by "embodying" various kinds of higher "spiritual meaning" (*geistige Sinn*), i.e. meaningfulness related to different dimensions of human life.[3]

This idea of "embodiment of meaning" is interesting in its own right and I will explicate it in short in the first section. However, as I will show in more detail, it

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[1] HuaXXXIX: 427. All translations of Husserl's texts are my own unless stated otherwise.

[2] cf. HuaIX: 113, 410; HuaIV: 238.

[3] cf. HuaIX: 111ff.; HuaIV: 236ff., esp. 239, fn.1.

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seems that Husserl is claiming two contradictory things in terms of the constitution and givenness of this type of spiritual meaningfulness. On the one hand, Husserl argues that the spiritual meaning, as it exceeds the sensibly given characteristics of the environment, stems always and by necessity from a specific active constitutive achievement of the subjectivity; it is something that we have to actively give to things, not something that could be found from the material makeup of the things themselves or received purely passively through the senses.[4] On the other hand, Husserl is claiming that in our experience this meaning is not a product of our actual active understanding or meaning-articulation; rather, it is something that is simply "embodied" in the environment in the sense that it is given to us on the level passive consciousness and *pre*givenness, i.e. before and without any specific conscious activity.[5] However, in the latter parts of this chapter I will argue that this seeming contradiction can be avoided by carefully examining how Husserl reworks the traditional distinction between activity and passivity. I will first show that for Husserl the relationship between activity and passivity is determined by a reciprocal dynamics instead of a static opposition, and then argue that this dynamical relationship broadens the notion of passivity, and thus opens up the possibility of understanding the manner in which actively constituted cultural meaning can be experientially given as something simply embodied in the environment.

2   The Spiritually Meaningful Lifeworld

Husserl's famous notion "lifeworld" is quite often taken to simply denote the world both as something experientially given and as something humanly or subjectively significant. In general, the term itself does indeed denote a fundamental relationship and correlation between subjectivity and world. However, it is important to note that this relationship between subjectivity and world can have two fundamentally different senses, i.e. a more general *formal sense* and a more specific *substantial sense*. On the most general and formal level the term lifeworld simply denotes the basic theme of transcendental phenomenology: world as something that is encountered in our conscious life. "Lifeworld" in this sense is simply the name for the "experiential world" (*Erfahrungswelt*) or the "world that we live in" (*Welt des Lebens*) in contrast to a hypothetical "world in itself" (*Welt an sich*) and to the various idealized worlds operative in the sciences.[6] In this formal sense "lifeworld" covers all possible objects of consciousness insofar as they are simply regarded as correlates of our subjectivity. However, the term lifeworld can also denote a more specific, substantial relationship of the world to subjectivity. This is the case when an experienced object is not only formally related to subjectivity in the sense of

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[4] cf. HuaIX: 112, 114; HuaI: 124; HuaIV: 239.

[5] cf. HuaIV: 237ff; HuaIX: 111, 115; HuaMatIV: 124.

[6] cf. HuaXXIX: 181; HuaVI: 176, 207f.; HuaIX: 111f.

being experienced (or experienceable) by a subjectivity, but when it is *experienced as something that is related to subjectivity* by its very sense as this specific type of an object. As we shall see in more detail, according to Husserl this is the case with all cultural objects, for instance with all tools and utensils: they can be experienced as "tools" only insofar as they are experientially related to various practical engagements of a singular subjectivity or a community of subjects. In this sense the term lifeworld denotes the world as something that is not only formally speaking *accessible to our experience* but that is experienced as having a *substantial meaning-relation to our life*.[7] Our interest lies exactly in this substantial sense of the lifeworld. It is namely here that Husserl speaks about the environing world as something that "has a kind of inner life" and that "embodies a spiritual meaning", as something that instead of existing simply on its own right is "animated" or "given a soul" (*begeistet*) in the sense that is experienced as being intimately related to the goals and aims of our lives.[8] In this section I will first explicate the experiential structure of this "humanized world" and its so called "subjective-relative" or "spiritual" meaningfulness,[9] then study the exact sense in which this meaningfulness can be said to be "embodied" in the environment, and finally consider the challenges that the question of the constitution and mode of givenness of this meaningfulness poses for Husserl.

Husserl stresses in numerous occasions that even though the environing world is in terms of its "core" (*Kern*) a material world,[10] this world is in our everyday experience "always also something more": in our experience we are not confronted with a homogenous and meaningless totality of mere material objects but rather we are confronted with objects that have meaning for us – objects such as tools, works of art, roads, cars, houses, churches, and so on.[11] What makes these "cultural objects" (*Kulturobjekt*) special, is that they are in Husserl's words "in a specific sense subjective": instead of being merely "present to us", the cultural objects also "address themselves to us" as usable, valuable or otherwise meaningful in the

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[7] cf. HuaIX: 110ff., esp. 111.

[8] cf. HuaXXXIX: 427; HuaIX: 112.

[9] Husserl's terminology is in regard to this "spiritual meaning" (*geistige Bedeutung/Sinn*) very rich and multifarious but not systematically developed. First of all Husserl uses equally and synonymously both expressions "*geistige Sinn*" and "*geistige Bedeutung*". In general the qualifying term "*geistige*" has two basic connotations: on the one hand, it refers to a meaning that originates from subjective act of institution and meaning-constitution, and, on the other hand, it refers to meaning that is related to the broadly speaking practical engagements of the human subjectivity and community. The emphasis is most often on the latter. Throughout his published works and manuscripts Husserl also uses synonymously lots of other terms that have similar but slightly varying connotations, e.g. *praktische Sinn*, *humane Bedeutung*, *teleologische Sinn*, *subjektiv-relative Sinn*, *Kultursinn*, *kulturale Bedeutung, humane/menschliche Gesicht der Welt* and also speaks equally for instance of a *humanisierte Welt, menschliche Umwelt* and *Kulturwelt*.

[10] For a detailed analysis on Husserl's idea of material nature, i.e. a totality of spatio-temporally existing realities, as the fundamental core of the experientially given world, see Nenon (Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl Research Manuscripts on the Life-World (Hua XXXIX), in this volume).

[11] cf. HuaIX: 112; HuaIV: 236ff.; HuaVIII: 151.

context of our lives. Thus these objects harbor a special type of "relation to subjectivity" (*Subjektbeziehung*) that Husserl terms as "spiritual" or "subjective-relative" meaningfulness.[12]

In the case of cultural objects and their spiritual meaning, this relation to subjectivity is not reducible to a merely *formal relation* to an actual or possible experiencing subject, which in Husserl's words "belongs universally to the concept of object" and *a priori* determines each and every possible object of consciousness.[13] Rather, the spiritually meaningful cultural objects have also a *substantial relation* to subjectivity in the sense that this relation lies in the very meaning of the object itself.[14] As Husserl puts it, in the case of cultural objects, "a reference to subjectivity belongs to that *ownmost essential substance* [*Inhalt*] *of the object* with which it is meant and experienced."[15] In other words, whereas all things are phenomenologically speaking something *subjectively experienced*, cultural objects are special in that they are subjectively experienced *as subjectively meaningful*. Husserl elucidates this difference by contrasting the subjective experience of a "mere material thing" to the subjective experience of some usable and subjectively relevant "cultural object": according to Husserl, "a material thing [. . .], like any object, can *a priori* be related to a subjectivity in the sense that it is experienceable and knowable by a subjectivity; but a [mere] thing harbors *within its experienced content*, *within its meaning as an object*, nothing from a subjectivity that would be related to this thing. [. . .] In contrast, a relatedness to a personal community belongs to the very sense of all cultural objects."[16] This is to say that the cultural objects that we experience in our environment are not given as mute and meaningless objects existing simply in their own right; rather, they are given as related to our lives and thus, *vice versa*, our lives are experienced as a part of the being and meaning of these things.[17] In Husserl's words, the "spiritual" or "subjective-relative" meaningfulness comprises "all such predicates of objects that, as object-predicates, can be experienced only insofar as subjects themselves are objects of experience and these predicates are at the same time related to these

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[12] HuaIX: 111ff., 118, 384f., 408f.; HuaIV: 236ff.

[13] HuaIX, 118, 384.

[14] cf. HuaIX: 118, esp. 384. Husserl in fact argues that because the *formal* and *universal* subject-relation of "experienceability" applies equally to all objects, it cannot in any way determine the meaning of these objects, i.e. what these objects are as objects. In contrast to this formal universality, the *substantial* subjective-relative meaningfulness belongs exactly to "specific meaning-determination" (*besondere Bestimmungsgehalt*) of the object: it is something that determines the meaning of the object exactly by relating it in a specific way to subjects and their practical engagements. (cf. HuaIX: 384–5). For a more detailed analysis on the subjective-relative experienceability of things and the limitations that its universality has in terms of normality and abnormality of our bodily capabilities, see Nenon, Heinämaa and de los Reyes (Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl Research Manuscripts on the Life-World (Hua XXXIX), Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Normality: Constitution by Mortals, and The Body as a System of Concordance and the Perceptual World, in this volume).

[15] HuaIX: 118, my emphasis; cf. HuaIX: 384.

[16] HuaIX: 118, my emphasis; cf. HuaIX: 384–5, 408ff.; HuaIV: 197; HuaXV: 8.

[17] cf. HuaIX: 118, 406ff.; HuaXXXIX: 311ff., 319ff., 325; Husserl 1948, 55.

subjects thematically."[18] For instance, when we experience something as a tool, say as a fork, we necessarily relate this thing to a whole nexus of conventions and practices of human subjects; the object of our experience is in this case itself and by its very meaning subject-related.[19] In contrast, this type of substantial meaning-relation to subjectivity is completely missing, for instance, when a stone is experienced as a mere object of nature. As Husserl puts it, through this inherent reference and address to human life, the cultural world is never experienced simply as pure nature but rather "there is a richer spiritual meaning embodied"[20]; the cultural environment "harbors so to speak an inner life".[21]

It would of course be trivial just to say that material things can have subjective-relative meaning for us. Most of the traditional ontology would, at best, give this kind of subjective or spiritual meaning a status of a "secondary quality", if not deeming it altogether as a detached "subjective coloring" instead of any kind of actual determination of the object itself. By stating that reality "embodies spiritual meaningfulness", Husserl in contrast wants to stress that in our experience this meaning is something that forms a primordial and seamless unity with the materiality that incorporates it – a unity "thoroughly analogous" with the essential unity of the spirit and the lived body.[22] According to Husserl it is not the case that when we experience cultural objects there would be two separate dimension or objective-layers, namely materiality and meaningfulness. In his words, the spiritual meaning rather "thoroughly penetrates" the givenness of materiality to the extent that in our experience all we have is a unity, unitary whole of a spiritually meaningful material thing: the spiritual meaning is "not externally associated, but internally fused within as a meaning belonging to [the thing] and as expressed in it and – it could be said – as meaning incised into the thing".[23] By this Husserl not only means that at times the "material makeup of things" can reflect their spiritual meaning and also co-constitute it, as is the case for example with the shape and the heaviness of a hammer. Rather, the point is that it is this meaning that in the first place constitutes the object as what it is and thus belongs essentially and internally to our experience of it.[24] For example, a fork can be experienced as a "fork" *only insofar as* it is in this

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[18] HuaIX: 385.

[19] Whereas the material nature is, according to Husserl, equally shared by all human beings, this fundamentally subjective-relative nature of cultural objects exposes them to yet another relativity, i.e. relativity in terms of accessibility and sharedness in relation to different cultures and cultural homeworlds. For a more detailed account on cultural relativity and relativism in Husserl, see Heinämaa and Nenon (Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Normality: Constitution by Mortals and Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl Research Manuscripts on the Lifeworld (Hua XXXIX), in this volume).

[20] HuaIX: 112; cf. HuaIV: 197; HuaMatVIII: 402.

[21] HuaIV: 239.

[22] HuaIV: 236–247; HuaIX: 111f.; HuaXXXIX: 427f. Molly Flynn (2009) develops a more thorough analysis on the peculiar unity of material body and spiritual meaning in the case of cultural objects by analysing how this unity can be approached through Husserl's idea that cultural objects "express" a spiritual meaning in a similar manner as our bodies express our spirit.

[23] HuaIX: 112.

[24] cf. HuaIX: 112, 118; HuaIV: 238f., 242f.

experience at least tacitly and vaguely referred to some parts of the culinary culture and various conventions of nutrition – and thus intermediately to the life of the whole human community. And put the other way around, insofar as we encounter something as a cultural object, we necessarily refer its being in one way or other to the cultural context in which it has its specific meaning. It is exactly in this sense that Husserl claims that subjective meaningfulness is not a separate addition but belongs to the "ownmost essential substance of the object".[25]

However, in addition to claiming that this type of "subjective-relative meaning" thoroughly penetrates the givenness of material objects *insofar as* we regard them as "cultural objects", Husserl also claims that the environment is *for the most part* and *in the first place* given exactly as a cultural world: in our everyday life the givenness of "spiritual meaningfulness" actually precedes the givenness of pure materiality and forms the most fundamental and original level of the experienced.[26] This needs further clarification. First of all, it is to be noted that Husserl would be the first to concede that our experience is not homogenous and uniform but rather multifarious and contains various possible modes and attitudes with equal multitude of corresponding objectivities. The experience of spiritual meaning is no exception but only one possible mode of experience among others. According to Husserl, this type of meaningfulness is precisely a correlate of "*one* fundamental mode of apperception, *one* specific experiential attitude."[27] For example in *Ideas II*, Husserl calls this attitude "personalistic" since in it we are not merely conscious of the material environment, but rather tacitly aware of a whole human community of personal subjects and of their relation to the environing world, and thus conscious of the world as something inherently related to this community. This attitude is of course not the only possible one. According to Husserl, there is for example the possibility of purely "naturalistic attitude" (*naturalistische*/*naturhafte Einstellung*), in which attention is directed towards objects only as parts of nature, i.e. in their mere materiality.[28] But although there are different attitudes and correlatively different types of objectivities, this doesn't mean that these attitudes or the objectivities confronted through them would be simply equiprimordial.

Firstly, Husserl points out that our "natural", everyday attitude is not the naturalistic but rather the personalistic attitude.[29] We are *de facto* not primarily conscious of the mere materiality of the environment; rather, we live in consciousness of the cultural meaningfulness of the things. As Husserl puts it for example in the *Erste Philosophie*: "In actuality, a mere nature is never experienced but rather an environment that has been given a life as a cultural environment – an environment that comprises houses, bridges, tools, works of art and so on."[30] Or as Husserl

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[25] HuaIX: 118, cf. 384f.

[26] cf. HuaVIII: 151; HuaXXXIX: 319; HuaIV: 180ff., 238ff.; HuaIX: 407f.

[27] HuaIV: 238, my emphasis.

[28] cf. HuaIV: 181–185, 239.

[29] HuaIV: 183, 238f.

[30] HuaVIII: 151.

puts it in recently published *Lifeworld*-manuscripts: "the un-natural, the spiritual, prevails everywhere in the concrete experiential world, it attaches itself to everything."[31] In other words, we are "naturally" and most often directed to the subjectively meaningful environment whereas it requires a specific and rather radical *change of attitude* to really try to see things as mere material objects.[32]

Moreover, the primacy of the spiritual meaning over pure materiality is not reducible to a mere frequency or habituality of certain attitude; rather, there is a special reason why the personalistic attitude reigns in our everyday life. In the following parts of this chapter, I will argue in more detail that this primacy is rooted in the very structure of experience, more accurately in the essential dynamics in which the experience proceeds. For now, it suffices to point out that even though there is a special attitude or mode of experiencing that correlates to spiritual meaningfulness, the constitution of the environment as a material-spiritual unity is, according to Husserl, not a result of this or any other attitude: as he puts it, "the attitude [in which spiritual meaning is seen] does not itself constitute the spiritual entity, the material-spiritual is already *preconstituted, prethematic, pregiven*".[33] That is to say that even before we actively take any specific attitude – and regardless of what kind of an attitude we take – the environing world is *always already* revealed to us in its subjective meaningfulness. This is why the naturalistic attitude is according to Husserl an "abstractive attitude", i.e. a subsequent attitude only made possible through a special abstraction in which one detaches oneself from the already pregiven spiritual meaningfulness. And this is why the personalistic attitude is in contrast our most natural attitude: it is a *purely receptive attitude* towards something that is *always already there* – an attitude towards the world simply as it is always already available and pregiven to us.

Even if we take this view to have phenomenological evidence, things start to get problematic here especially in terms of the constitution of this "always already present" and "*pregiven*" spiritual meaningfulness. As Husserl himself notes, in closer inspection the grounds for this constant pregivenness of culturally meaningful environment are hard understand: "'always already' – that seems impossible, sounds like a paradox and becomes a problem."[34] The problem is that the spiritual meaning is, according to Husserl, subjective in a threefold sense: as said, this meaning is first of all in its content intrinsically related to subjective communal life, and then, secondly, like all objectivity, something that is subjectively experienceable; it is, however, necessarily subjective also in the sense of being an "achievement stemming from subjective acts" (*Leistungskorrelat der Subjektakte*): spiritual meaning has to have a "subjective genesis" in the understanding *activity* of anyone who is to be able to grasp it. In a rather common sense manner, it seems clear that as all cultural meaning exceeds the sensible characteristics of the

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[31] HuaXXXIX: 273, cf. 266, 306–334.

[32] HuaIV: 173ff., 180ff., 242–244; HuaXXXIX: 326ff.

[33] HuaIV: 238, fn. 1; cf. Husserl 1948, 35; HuaI: 111–113; HuaIX: 408–409.

[34] HuaXXXIX: 328.

environment, it cannot be simply "received" purely passively through our senses. Rather, it has to be in one way or other actively conceived and grasped by our intellect – either in an original act of creativity or in an "understanding-in-following" (*Nachverstehen*) of the spiritual accomplishments of our predecessors.[35] In other words, the culturally meaningful reality is literally and by its very essence a "cultivated" reality, something actively formed and tilled by subjective activity of understanding and meaning-formation. But this would, of course, seem to be in direct contradiction with the above mentioned idea of cultural and spiritual meaning as the primary and immediately present level of the experienced reality: if spiritual meaning is by its very essence something actively constituted, something that originates only on the basis of explicit acts of understanding and meaning-constitution, how can Husserl also claim that it is something that is original and primordial and as such "embodied" in the environment – something that is passively pregiven already before any actual conscious activity takes place?

In the following I will argue that things are not so straightforwardly contradictory – that Husserl in fact overcame this seeming contradiction by fundamentally rethinking the traditional distinction between what is actively formed by the ego and what is passively received as something "simply given". By drawing on a variety of Husserl's later writings and manuscripts, especially the recently published *Lifeworld-manuscripts*, I will show that from the 1920s onwards Husserl discovered a reciprocal two-way dynamics between activity and passivity and thus ended up broadening his understanding of the scope of passivity from simple sensual experiencing to a much broader "secondary passivity". I will furthermore argue that it is exactly this secondary passivity that explains the constitution of spiritual meaning as something that, regardless of its origin in conscious activities, is afterwards simply and directly experienced as integral part of the environment. My aim is not to get into any detailed description of the constitutive processes that form various types of spiritual meaning. Rather, I will try to show in a general manner how Husserl's analyses of the constitutive dynamics of activity and passivity pave the way for understanding the "simple" and "direct" givenness of spiritual meaning and thus the manner in which the environment can be said to embody this type of higher meaningfulness.

3   Activity and Passivity of Consciousness

The defining feature of the distinction that Husserl makes between activity and passivity within the field of consciousness is that it is in the first place a purely formal and modal distinction, not a substantial one: it is not a distinction between separate faculties of the mind or between different types of experiences, e.g. passive perceptions and acts of reasoning; rather, it is a distinction between two

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[35] cf. HuaIX: 112f., 114–115, 118; HuaI: 124; HuaMatIV: 123f., 138; HuaXXXIX: 266.

fundamentally different "effectuation modes" [*Vollzugsmodus*] of consciousness, i.e. a distinction between two possible ways of carrying out or living through any particular experience. In other words, for Husserl, activity and passivity name two fundamental and essentially different possible *modes* of intentional consciousness.[36]

The fundamental difference between activity and passivity as modes of consciousness lies in the participation of the ego. Husserl defines activity as attentional and explicit consciousness: activity comprises all those instances of consciousness in which the attention of the ego is present, where the ego is explicitly and "consciously" directed towards the object of the act in question. As Husserl puts it, all conscious activity "moves in the medium of explicit attentional turning to, [...] takes place within the field of attention."[37] For Husserl, the "lowest level" of conscious activity is thereby "receptivity": a simple turning of attention to something.[38] But although all activities of the ego are determined by attentionality, the sphere of activity is not restricted to mere turning of attention. Rather, it comprises also all kinds of higher forms of attentional and meaning-forming consciousness, for example all forms of axiological, practical and theoretical reason and predicative thinking. In these higher forms of conscious activity, the ego is not active merely by taking part in an otherwise "passive" and receptive consciousness; rather, it is active also in the pregnant sense of productive functioning: the ego forms new meaning by transforming and cultivating the content it has taken into its attentive regard. As Husserl puts it, in these higher forms of reason, "the ego functions through specific acts of the ego as creatively constitutive."[39] To these higher levels of conscious activity belong also all those forms of consciousness where the higher spiritual-cultural meaningfulness is formed, where things are actively grasped or interpretatively understood as meaningful in relation to various cultural contexts.

This type of attentional activity is, according to Husserl, an inseparable part of the subjectivity: we are always explicitly conscious of something, and for the most part also actively broadening our understanding of the environment. However, consciousness cannot be simply reduced to the actual "attentional focus". First of all, our focal point of attention always has an "external horizon": we are never conscious of just the one thing we focus on, but rather we are always tacitly aware of the surrounding world in the background of explicit attention. Moreover, Husserl points out that every activity of the ego by its very structure presupposes a more fundamental and grounding way of givenness. As said above, all active forming of meaning resides in the dimension of turning ones attention to something. Thus, these activities presuppose a preceding givenness of this "something" as an object of possible attention. As Husserl puts it, every active functioning of the ego "presupposes that we already have something *pregiven*, something to which we

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[36] cf. HuaXVII: 365; HuaMatVIII: 203; HuaXIX/1: 423; HuaXXXI, 4–8.

[37] HuaXXXI: 4; cf. HuaI: 111; HuaIX: 411; Husserl 1948: 83; HuaXIX/1: 423; HuaXV: 203.

[38] Husserl 1948, 83, 299–300; HuaXI: 409; HuaIV: 335.

[39] HuaI: 111; cf. Husserl 1948, 233.

can turn to in perception."[40] This dimension of *pre*givenness is exactly a correlate of the essential and necessary counterpart of activity, namely "passivity".

Similarly to his definition of conscious activity primarily as a particular *mode* of consciousness, i.e. as attentional consciousness, Husserl defines the sphere of passivity in the first place modally and formally: passivities are in his words "modes of background-consciousness, modes of having something in consciousness without being directed towards it."[41] As a mode of consciousness, passivity is thus the exact opposite of attentional focus of conscious attention: it denotes the silent and anonymous functioning of consciousness in the background of attention. But even though passivities or "passive syntheses" by definition take place outside of our attention and without our conscious participation, this does not mean that their constitutive effects would belong to the sphere of utter unconsciousness. Rather, passive functioning of consciousness result in a mode of givenness and presence that Husserl terms "affectivity" or "affective prominence" (*affektive Abgehobenheit*). In Husserl's terms, affectively prominent contents of consciousness are something that are not in our attentional focus, and on which we don't actively exercise any effect, but that rather themself *affect us* from the margins of our awareness and call for our attention.[42] In contrast to the active functioning and meaning-formation of the reason, affectively prominent sphere of passivity is thus the sphere of "direct experience" and "simple givenness", i.e. something that is simply given to us as such whether we want it or not. In this sense, Husserl often refers to passivity as a dimension of the simply given "*hyletic* materiality" of consciousness and furthermore contrasts it to activity as a "form-giving" dimension of subjectivity.[43] It is also exactly in contrast to the attentional activity that passivity can be said to be the dimension of *pre*givenness: instead of being given in and through our attentive regard or formed subsequently by ones conscious activity of understanding, everything that belongs to the affectively given background-horizon is passively *pregiven* already before we even turn our attention

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[40] Husserl 1948, 74, my emphasis; cf. HuaI: 112, HuaIX: 209, HuaMatVIII: 260.

[41] HuaXXIX: 247; cf. HuaXXXI: 4.

[42] As for example Victor Biceaga notes, Husserl's usage of the term "affectivity" (*Affektivität*) is idiosyncratic in the sense that the notion is neutral in respect to feelings and strivings and simply denotes something that stands out as prominent in the margins of awareness (cf. Biceaga 2010, 31f.; HuaXI: 148ff.; HuaXXXI: 3ff.). According to Husserl, all affection relies on associative constitution of a contrast: things can stand out as prominent only against a contrasting background (cf. HuaXI: 149f., 159ff.; Husserl 1948: 78f.). Affection is, however, not a matter of simple contrast but rather can have various intensities. According to Husserl, the marginal background of attention thus forms a kind of a "relief" (Husserl is here alluding to the relief sculptures, where figures arise in various heights from the background), i.e. a heterogeneous field that consists of different intensities or "heights" of affective forces (cf. HuaXI: 166–168). However, the distinction between active focus of attention and affective background is absolute, not relative: there is no smooth transition in degree from background to foreground, but rather our attention is always solely on some particular thing while everything else remains in the background, no matter how strongly something affects us and lures our attention towards itself (cf. Ibid., HuaXXXIX: 357 ff.).

[43] HuaMatVIII:100, 269–270; HuaXXXIX: 327–328, 432.

to it.[44] In Husserl's words, "pregiven is everything to which I [. . .] can 'simply' direct myself to, everything that 'is already' in the momentary field of vision and in its horizon."[45] Ultimately this passively pregiven background-horizon is not even restricted to the momentary field of vision but comprises the whole of the world insofar as it always surrounds our attention as a marginal background that we are tacitly conscious of.[46]

To recapitulate, for Husserl activity and passivity name two fundamentally different but necessary modes or sides of consciousness and subjectivity: first, the attentional focus of the ego and its possible active participation in the formation of new meaning; second, the marginal awareness that consists of simply and passively pregiven content that necessarily surrounds and underlies the attentional focus. In terms of the formal relationship of activity and passivity two things immediately stand out. *First*, as passivities and their constitutive results belong to the background of our attentional focus, they cannot be affected by our current active participation; rather, the sphere of passivity essentially exceeds and precedes the scope of all actual conscious attention and active meaning-formation as an independent dimension of simple presence and pregivenness. That is to say that the passively formed background-horizon of consciousness is not there *through* or *because of* our conscious participation; rather, it is always already there *before* and *for* our attention and activity. *Second*, not only does the sphere of passivity precede and exceed the scope of actual conscious attention and participation, it also gives all conscious activities their necessary foundation and ground. As said, if the possible objects of attention were not already pregiven, there would be nothing to which the attentional gaze of the ego could direct itself to, and thus there could be no conscious activity. As Husserl puts it, "passivity is what is in itself primary because all activity essentially presupposes a foundation in passivity and an objectivity that is already pre-constituted in passivity."[47] Whereas the givenness in the sphere of passivity precedes all active conscious participation and thus seems to be unaffected by it, the very possibility of exercising any conscious activity rests on the foundation of having something passively pregiven. In other words, and as has been widely acknowledged in Husserl-scholarship, there is clearly a *one-sided formal relation of foundation* between activity and passivity as modes of consciousness.

It is now crucial to note that this one-sided relation of foundation pertains to activity and passivity exactly and *only* formally and structurally: attention requires *something* passively pregiven, something to which it can turn to and which thus has to be already there before and regardless of our current active participation. This one-sided formal relation does not, however, necessarily determine the materiality

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[44] For more elaborate analysis on different senses of "passivity" in Husserl, see Steinbock 2001, xxxviii ff.

[45] HuaXXXIX: 63, cf. Husserl 1948, 24.

[46] cf. Husserl 1948, 23f.

[47] HuaXXXI: 3, cf. HuaMatVIII: 260; Husserl 1948, 24.

of passive pregivenness; it does not mean that the actual content or objectivity that is pregiven in the margins of our awareness would have to be free from all influence of conscious activities. More accurately, from the fact that we cannot now in any way actively affect the content of our marginal background of attention, it does *not* follow that this background would have to be free of all influence of our preceding conscious activities. However, in the Husserl-scholarship the formal relation of activity and passivity is often taken to pertain also to the constitutive accomplishment and to the content of these modes of consciousness: i.e. whereas activity is identified with all the higher meaningful formations, passivity is taken to be a self-enclosed sphere of "primordial constitution", where there is nothing present from the various intellectual activities of the reason. For the most part, the whole sphere of passive pregivenness is thus at least tacitly identified with what Husserl sometimes terms more accurately as "pure passivity" (*reine/pure passivität*), i.e. a dimension of subjectivity and experience that contains no trace of our conscious activities. This type of notion of passivity seems to underlie for example Anthony Steinbock's recent claim that "we only gain this level of experience of passivity for reflection when we *abstract* from the accomplishments of activity."[48]

This reading of passivity as a dimension free from any and all influence of conscious activity does seem to be supported by loads of textual evidence. In fact, when speaking of passivity, Husserl is most often and for methodological purposes mostly interested in the aforementioned sphere of "pure passivity". Pure passivity refers in the first place to the functioning of the internal time consciousness and correlatively to the constitution of sensations as unities within immanent time. This level of constitution is exactly "purely passive", since there is *no possibility of any kind of participation* by the active ego: we cannot consciously affect the way in which our streaming experiential life is arranged to a temporal horizon nor actively produce the sensible data, which, by its very nature, is simply given to us. As the reception of sensible stimuli forms a self-enclosed sphere of simply given material, it is the prime example of passivity, i.e. a sphere of constitution free from any active participation on our part.[49] In other words, according to Husserl there clearly is

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[48] Steinbock 2004, p. 23. This line of thought of emphasized in the writings of some of the most influential and well read Husserl commentators. (cf. Sokolowski 1964, pp. 138f., 197, Zahavi 2003, p. 73, Steinbock 2001, pp. xxxviii–xliii.) The focus on "pure passivity" has helped greatly to uncover Husserl's analyses on the deepest core structures of consciousness and to defy some traditional criticisms that allege that Husserl's phenomenology is focused solely on conscious activity. In the following I however want to put more weight on the often disregarded "secondary passivity" and in the end argue that the sphere of pure passivity is not a concrete part of our experience but rather an abstract domain that is in the concretion of our experience taken over and even substituted by the secondary passivity – which is exactly *not pure* in the sense of being free of any influence of higher conscious activity. The fundamental significance of secondary passivity is emphasized recently also by Biceaga (2010) and Smith (2010), but not directly in this connection.

[49] This is why Husserl often thematizes the purely passively given sensible data as the "*primordial hyletic materiality*" (*Urhyle, Urmaterial*) of consciousness, and sharply contrasts the passive sensibility, the "animal grounds" of subjectivity, to the dimension of active "reason" and its possible higher meaningful formations (cf. HuaXI: 161; HuaXV: 384f.; HuaXXXIX:16f.; HuaMatVIII: 70). Concerning the traditional distinction between "reason" and "sensibility" as a distinction between "activity" and "passivity" in Husserl see HuaIV: 222, 332 ff.; HuaXI: 342; HuaMatIV: 176.

dimensions of subjectivity that are purely passive and he in fact spends quite a lot of time analyzing them. However, if we simply equate the dimension of passivity with this "pure passivity", the idea of primal embodiment of spiritual meaning, i.e. the idea of simple, direct and *passive* pregivenness of actively constituted higher meaningfulness, would seem to remain unintelligible: in fact we would seem to be dealing with a straightforward contradiction in terms here. But as we shall see, the above reading of the relationship between activity and passivity, which results in the reduction of passivity to "pure passivity," is fundamentally insufficient, or more accurately one-sided, for grasping the full breadth of passivity and passive pregivenness: it altogether neglects the possible influence of conscious activity in the sphere of passivity simply because of the formally one-sided relationship of foundation in which these modes of consciousness stand. Against this reading, Husserl himself stresses that "under the title passivity, [there is] also the *secondary passivity*, passivity that has issued from activity."[50]

As we shall see in more detail, for Husserl the "secondary passivity" denotes a *passive and marginal pregivenness* of various higher levels of meaning, which have originally issued from our conscious activity. Now, the task is of course to solve the seeming paradox that lies within this notion itself: how and in what way can there be actively formed meaningfulness present and pregiven in the passive background consciousness, i.e. in the sphere that is by its very structure independent of our actual conscious attention and active participation? Here it is decisive to note that even though passivity is mode of consciousness that takes place outside the scope of our *current* active participation, this does not mean that the content and constitutive functioning of passivities would also have to be free of any influence from our *previous* conscious activities. In the following I will take a look at Husserls analyses on two, in this context often overlooked, fundamental structures of passivity, namely "habituality" and "association".[51] Modally and formally habituality and association belong to the passive functioning of consciousness as they take place without our conscious participation and in the background of attention; however, their material content and constitutive accomplishment draws heavily on previous activities of the reason. As we shall see, it is exactly through the interplay of habituality and association that activity and passivity are set in to a reciprocal two-way dynamics through which the sphere of passivity is radically broadened to encompass previous active constitutive accomplishments. And it is exactly through this broadening that the idea of direct, passive and immediate givenness of spiritual meaning becomes intelligible.

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[50] HuaXV: 203, cf. HuaXXXI, 3; HuaIV: 11f.; HuaXXXIV: 64.

[51] The most comprehensive analysis on Husserl's notion of association is to be found in Holenstein (1972). However, Holenstein does not take up association in the context of constitution of higher cultural meaning but rather focuses on its role in the more primal levels of experience.

4 Habituality, Association and the Constitutive Dynamics of Activity and Passivity

Above I first discussed passivity as the general dimension of pregivenness and then shortly brought out purely passive sensibility as one principal mode of this pregiven materiality. What Husserl calls "habituality" is another, equally important and even more prominent mode of passive pregivenness – a mode that nevertheless is exactly not *purely* passive but rather draws its content from previous activities of the ego.[52] According to Husserl the formation of "habitual familiarity" is an essential part of all conscious activity. Although all meaning forming activities are by definition attentional forms of consciousness, their constitutive results are not restricted to the exact moment of attention. In this connection Husserl speaks about the so called "original institution" (*Urstiftung*): instead of simply disappearing after their effectuation, our various constitutive and meaning forming activities have a lasting effect; they *institute* an abiding possession. In Husserl's words, "every act institutes a persisting (habitual) validity, a lasting position in the widest sense of the word (belief, decision, resolution of the will) that exceeds beyond the flowing act itself".[53] For example, when I for the first time notice that there is a pathway in my surroundings that greatly shortens my way to work, this perceptive act does not disappear without an effect after it is over; rather, from now on this pathway remains as a part of my pregiven environment exactly as a preferred route that I always tacitly know I can choose to use. This is of course quite simply to say that through our conscious activity we *learn to know* our environment and thereafter simply take it for granted: the meaning that we have originally actively conceived is afterwards present to us as an already formed preconception. As Husserl summarises it: "my activity of positing and explicating being institutes a habituality of my ego. By virtue of this habituality, I permanently appropriate the object in its determinations. These abiding accomplishments make up my current familiar environment."[54]

For our discussion the decisive point here is the following: although habituality is, in terms of its content, a result of conscious activity and explicit attention, habitual familiarity is nevertheless fundamentally a *mode of passive background-consciousness and pregivenness*. As Husserl defines it, "all habitual belongs to passivity, and this includes also all the active that has become habitual".[55] This is to say that we don't have to actively conceive and produce the habitually familiar meaningfulness of the environment over and over again; rather, after its initial

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[52] A more detailed account on Husserl's phenomenology of habituality and its relationship with the broader discourse of habits and habituality can be found in Moran (2011). For an account on habituality both in subjective and intersubjective setting, see Nenon (Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl Research Manuscripts on the Life-world (Hua XXXIX), in this volume).

[53] HuaXXXIX: 47.

[54] HuaI: 102; cf. HuaIV: 332; HuaI: 112ff.; HuaVI: 371–2.

[55] HuaXI: 342.

institution, this meaningfulness is something that is simply pregiven to us without any need or possibility of active conscious participation. In essence this also means that habituality broadens the scope of passive experiencing and pregivenness to an already familiar and meaningfully articulated lifeworld; as Husserl puts it, instead of a mere realm of sensation or blind drives, "passivities [...] turn out to be sedimentations of activities (of acquired convictions)".[56] For its part, habituality thus explains the direct experiential embodiment of higher, actively conceived meaningfulness in the environment: because of the constant functioning of habituality, the subjectivity *inhabits* an already familiar lifeworld – a lifeworld whose passive pregivenness comprises all the meaningfulness that we have actively conceived and retained in the course of our lives.[57] However, according to Husserl, the constitutive significance of habituality is not even restricted to a static preservation of actively acquired knowledge of the individual things of the world. Rather, through another fundamental structure of passive consciousness that Husserl terms "association", our habitual familiarity with the world dynamically takes over the whole landscape of the lived consciousness – starting from and including the purely passive sensibility.

For Husserl, association is not a separate act but a necessary and fundamental part of the purely passive functioning of consciousness, "an absolutely necessary regularity without which the subjectivity could not exist."[58] The silent functioning of association forms a universal medium through which all the data of consciousness has to pass in order to affect us in any way – i.e. to even enter into the field of marginal consciousness. In Husserl's words "without [association] there is no affection, association is present everywhere."[59] Or put the other way around: whatever affects us in our marginal consciousness, affects us only after it has already passed through the functioning of association. Association has this overarching and universal role in all affectivity and marginal consciousness because all affective prominence rest upon contrasts between different contents, and because the constitution of contrasts is for its part possible only insofar as different contents are connected and related to each other in the first place. In the most general sense association denotes exactly this primordial connectedness and relatedness of contents of consciousness and thus it is, among other things, the precondition for anything to be individualized as something that stands out in relief.[60] But association is not only about simply connecting and differentiating contents of consciousness; rather, it exercises a purely passive constitutive effect on these contents. In Husserl's terms, the overarching associative functioning of consciousness consists

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[56] HuaXV: 367.

[57] HuaVI: 141, ft. 1, 465; HuaIV: 333; HuaXXXVII: 334; HuaI: 102.

[58] HuaIX: 118.

[59] HuaXXXIX: 34; cf. Husserl 1948, 207.

[60] cf. HuaXXXIX: 34f.; HuaMatVIII, 251, 295f.; Husserl, 1948, 74ff., esp. 78–79. For this reason Husserl even at times names association as the "general title for unity-formation [Einheitsbildung]" (HuaMatVIII: 298, cf. HuaXI: 153).

of two equally important and necessary parts: "pairing" (*Paarung*) and "transfer of meaning" (*Sinnesübertragung*).

In "pairing", which is a fundamental and necessary starting-point of all associations, similar contents of consciousness are organized into pairs and groups purely passively and without any conscious participation. For example, if there are two similar sensible contents in the actual field of vision, they are, according to Husserl, instantly and without any active participation conceived as a "pair", where each member points to the other.[61] Moreover, the associative pairing exceeds from the present to our past and to all of our habitual familiarity.[62] For example, when a purely sensible givenness of a previously unknown thing resembles the outlook of a chair that is not present but is habitually familiar to me, these two contents are instantly paired: instead of a completely unique and unarticulated sensible content, I have in front of me something that reminds me of the familiar chair. The decisive point, which Husserl stresses especially in the *Lifeworld*-manuscripts, is that the functioning of association is not restricted to a mere pairing, mere acknowledgement of similarity of some contents of consciousness. Rather this pairing is always and by necessity accompanied by a creative constitutive force that Husserl calls "apperceptive transfer of meaning".[63]

In the apperceptive transfer of meaning, the contents of consciousness that are paired according to their at least partial similarity acquire purely passively from each other also those layers of meaning that *exceed* the parts that are actually given as similar. In Husserl's words, here the experience "breaks through its legitimate limits"[64]; in association there takes place "an analogizing transfer of meaning-validity [*Soseinsgeltung*] from A to a similar B that for its part is not yet valid in this meaning".[65] In most cases this means that the new, unarticulated data acquires a richer and more articulated meaning from a similar, already familiar object. And, according to Husserl, this all happens "passively, instantly and with one stroke".[66] For example, as associatively paired with familiar chairs, the aforementioned "new thing" acquires without any explicit conscious activity *a prefigured meaning* from these familiar chairs: it is immediately, purely passively and as soon as we lay our eyes upon it seen as a "chair" with all the subjective meaningfulness that I am accustomed to connect to chairs – even though I have never seen the particular thing before and even though all that my senses provide is a set of unarticulated sense-data. The decisive point here is exactly that the scope of associative transfer of meaning is not restricted to the specific dimension and layer of meaning in which the pairing takes place; rather, a simple sensible resemblance can result in a transfer of higher, actively produced meaningfulness from one content to another – even to a

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[61] cf. HuaI: 142f.; HuaXV: 15.

[62] HuaXXXIX: 431–432, Husserl 1948, 336, 385; HuaXI: 121, 123.

[63] cf. HuaXXXIX: 7ff., 431,450, 465; HuaI: 142–144; HuaMatVIII: 253, 269–270.

[64] HuaXV: 252.

[65] HuaXXXIX: 450; cf. HuaXXXIX: 465.

[66] HuaXV: 252; cf. Husserl 1948, 210.

content that does not in itself have this type of higher meaningfulness. Thus association denotes an overarching enrichment of experience with layers and levels of meaning that do not have to reside in or originate from this experience itself. As Husserl puts it when describing the constant and passive work of association in experience: "association [. . .] is always at play and produces from objects of lower levels those of higher order."[67]

It is hard to overstate the significance that association has for the whole landscape of lived consciousness. Most notably, this constant and passive functioning of association and associative transfer of meaning results in "contamination" of even the most elementary structures of passive consciousness by previous experiences and the resulted habitual familiarity with things. As said, association is at play everywhere where there is even marginal awareness: its functioning is the precondition for anything to stand out from the background and to affect us. This means that even the unarticulated and purely passively received data that the senses provide is never *given* to us in the raw. Already before it is able to enter our marginal awareness or to affects us in any way, the sensible data is taken into a play of associative pairings and apperceptive transfers of meaning. As Husserl puts it, we are never simply affected by sensible data, but rather "association together with apperceptive transfer [of sense] is at play already in the lowest levels"; what happens even in simplest perception is that "I transfer the being-sense that stems from [previous] activity to the new affective [manifold] [. . .] as a preconception [. . .] i.e. I live in continuous apperceptive transfers."[68] In general, this is to say that the whole of our consciousness, its marginal background and the purely receptive sensibility included, is always already "contaminated" and prefigured by our previous active meaning-formation and the resulted habitual familiarity with the world. As Husserl puts it, it is because of association that "everything that affects us [. . .] has a meaning-structure that stems from activity."[69] Thus the very ideas of pure passivity or purely sensible experiencing are only abstractions that are never present to us as such – apart from the beginning of a stream of consciousness as an ideal limit-case.[70] We never simply sense things but rather see, hear and even taste things that are always already laden with all sorts of higher meaningfulness. In Husserl's words, in the concrete living present where we already have actively constituted higher levels of meaning, "all other levels are resolved into the higher ones"[71]; there is no "pure experiencing" but rather in "every experience a

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[67] HuaXXXIX: 35.

[68] HuaXXXIX: 431–2, cf. HuaXV: 148.

[69] HuaXXXIX: 36.

[70] cf. HuaMatVIII: 100.

[71] HuaXI: 218. Husserl uses here the Hegelian notion of "*Aufhebung*" (translated here as "resolving") and clearly in a very Hegelian sense: to indicate that in the course of consciousness lower levels of experience are taken over by higher ones. However these levels are not altogether dissolved or annulled: in fact the quotation continues in a very Hegelian tone "[. . .] but not altogether lost in these higher levels, but rather at any time ready at hand for corresponding orientations of interest and demonstrations."

re-activation takes place and every 'background-experience' is a sedimented modus of an ideal primordial constitution."[72] This is to say that through the interplay of habituality and association, the scope of habitually familiar meaningfulness is at least in principle broadened also to everything that we have never actually seen before.[73] As Husserl concludes in *Experience and Judgement*: "The fact that all objects of experience are already from the start experienced as familiar in their type has its grounds in the sedimentation of all apperceptions and in their lasting habitual effect on the basis of associative awakening."[74]

It now becomes possible to see that the seemingly one-sided formal relation between activity and passivity is breached and that activity and passivity are bridged into a reciprocal two-way dynamics that results in formation of a broader, secondary passivity. Moreover, through this dynamics these dimensions of active reason and passive pregivenness both acquire new depth and complexity. In the first place, through the habitual sedimentation of meaning and the resulting associative constitution of "typically familiar" environment it becomes evident how Husserl can claim that the *scope of passive and direct experiencing* is not restricted to purely passive reception of sensations; rather, the direct and passive experience comprises, at least in principle, all the higher meaningful formations of previous conscious life. In this way Husserl ends up speaking about our "direct" experience of the world, not as mere sensing, but as a "secondary sensibility [. . .] that is born out of productive reason" and correlatively as a "reason that has fallen into the [form of] sensibility."[75] On the other hand, this transformation and enrichment of the sphere of passivity means that the meaning-forming activities of reason are not free floating acts of creation starting from the purely passive sensibility. In Husserl's terms, the "hyletic materiality" that is pregiven for our active *formation* of meaning is not restricted to purely formless sensible data, but comprises also the habitual pregivenness of all the previously actively constituted higher meaning.[76] Instead of drawing from some formless sensible material, our actual conscious activities cultivate and give new layers of meaning to an already cultivated and meaningfully prefigured environment. These new levels of meaning in turn become part of the habitual pregivenness and thus the scope and the extent of our familiar lifeworld is step by step enriched and broadened.[77] Instead of being reducible to

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[72] HuaMatVIII: 203.

[73] I'd like to thank Professor Dermot Moran for pointing out that this cannot mean that the environing world would be *fully* prefigured and *completely familiar* to us. However, it is equally important to note that, at least according to Husserl, this is a quantitative restriction, not a qualitative one: although the world that we are marginally conscious of is to a large extent unknown or only partially determined, this partial determination can consist of any kind and level of habitual meaningfulness.

[74] Husserl 1948, 385, cf. HuaXXXIX: 3ff., 35; HuaXI: 190.

[75] HuaIV: 334; cf. HuaXI: 342; HuaXV: 203, 367; HuaIV: 12, 332ff.; HuaXXXIX: 34–38; HuaIX: 408–409.

[76] HuaMatVIII: 70, 100, 269–270; HuaXXXIX: 8, 327–328; HuaXIV: 379.

[77] HuaMatVIII: 372, 410.

singular acts of spontaneous creation, constitution of meaning forms a dynamic process of genesis, in Husserl's words a "sedimented history" (*sedimentierte Geschichte*) that has to be seen "as a structure of different levels of constitutive accomplishments, in which ever new objectivities, objectivities of ever new kinds are constituted in ever new levels or layers."[78]

In other words, even though activity and passivity – or more traditionally reason and sensibility – are according to Husserl fundamentally different possible modes of consciousness, in terms of their content they are not fundamentally separated but rather determined by a reciprocal two-way dynamics. As we have seen, according to Husserl, in each of its moments, this dynamics results in a purely passive experiential givenness of a lifeworld that is already laden with ever new layers and levels of pregiven meaningfulness that is drawn from the habitually retained previous conscious activities. And although this type of "secondary passivity" is by definition a product of "subsequent" constitutive activity, in our concrete experience it is nothing secondary. Rather it is the most dominant and overarching constitutive force that is responsible for everything that falls between purely passive reception of sensations and the actual conscious activity of meaning formation; in other words, it is responsible for the whole pregivenness of the world as a meaningfully prefigured whole.

5 Conclusion

The above described dynamics of activity and passivity explains Husserl's idea of the lifeworld as something that in our experience "simply as such" embodies various levels of higher spiritual meaningfulness. Accordingly, the seeming contradiction between the active origin and passive pregivenness of spiritual meaning melts away. In terms of its mode of givenness, the world is, according to Husserl, not our actual active accomplishment. Rather it is something simply experienced and pregiven, something that affects us from the margins of our awareness instead of being formed by our active reasoning. But in terms of its content, this pregiven and simply perceived world is literally laden with meaning: it comprises also all the various dimensions of higher spiritual and cultural meaningfulness that we have actively conceived and understood in the course of our lives. In the lived, momentary concretion of our consciousness, these levels of meaning are, according to Husserl, an inseparable and always already present part of our experience: they indeed appear to us as something "incised" and "embodied" into the perceptual environment. Because of the dynamics of activity and passivity, the lifeworld is in other words simply given – and already pregiven – as something that embodies various levels of higher spiritual meaning. Thus, it also becomes understandable

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[78] HuaXI: 218; cf. HuaVI: 170, 176, 371–2; HuaI: 111–4, 156–9; HuaXI: 216–22; HuaXVII: 252, 257; HuaIV: 186ff.; HuaXXXVII: 292; HuaMatVIII: 395.

why Husserl is claiming that the personalistic attitude is our natural one and reigns over all other possible attitudes: this attitude turns out to be a simply receptive attitude towards something that in the concretion of our experience is always already "pregiven and preconstituted", i.e. towards a lifeworld that as such embodies vast depths of subjective-relative cultural meaningfulness.

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Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl's Research Manuscripts on the Life-World (Hua XXXIX)

Thomas Nenon

The recently published research manuscripts[1] for the most part from the 1920s and early 1930s that were edited and arranged by Rochus Sowa under the title *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution*, deal with a whole array of issues related to the structures and genesis of our everyday experience of the world and the different kinds of things we relate to within it. They are by far the most extensive and richest reflections by Husserl on topics related to the life-world published up until now.

Prior to their publication, there have been several other sources of texts related to the life-world and the topics discussed in these manuscripts. The term "life-world" itself is of course best-known from Husserl's claim in his last major publication, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, that the starting point not just for philosophical analysis of the foundations of science, but also for any adequate description of our everyday experience that is the ultimate ground for all of the specialized sciences must begin with an analysis of the life-world and the things within it that are the objects of such experience. However, instead of providing a systematic or even extensive description of the life-world there, he concentrates in the first half of the book on retracing the steps by which the modern scientific notion of an idealized and mathematized "nature" as the proper object of knowledge emerged, then in the second half of the book on comparing leading modern philosophers' approaches to questions in ontology, epistemology, and philosophical methodology to a phenomenological approach that would take the life-world and its essential rootedness in structures of subjectivity as its starting-

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[1] Edmund Husserl, *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution*, edited by Rochus Sowa as Volume XXXIX of the *Husserliana* (Springer: Dordrecht, 2008). Citations from this volume will be listed by page numbers in parentheses within the text or in footnotes. All translations are my own. For passages where the German text is particularly important, the German original will also be included in a footnote.

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point. Yet he says little about the actual structure of the life-world itself in that work. The more detailed analyses presented in *Experience and Judgment* and in *Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis* contain detailed descriptions of the life-worldly experience of physical objects ("*Dinge*") and how we come to form judgments about them, and thus overlap with some of the material presented in these research manuscripts, and the same could be said of the analyses one can find in various texts assembled in volumes XII–XV of the *Husserliana* under the heading of "intersubjectivity," especially in the latter two of them that contain texts from the end of Husserl's Göttinger period and from the Freiburg years. One recalls the brief remarks from the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* in which Husserl points out that, if the aim is to present a "logic of truth" – what one might term a logic of "soundness" instead of merely a "*Konsequenzenlogik*," logical analysis of validity –, then one would have to go beyond the bounds of a merely formal logic and have recourse to the "life-world" that is the ultimate source of truth for the various judgments that are presupposed as premises in any actual arguments whose form is consistent with the demands for valid arguments that are the identified in various versions of formal logic. In the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, he also shows how these forms emerge from and therefore mirror the formal structures of judgments, i.e. first-order knowledge of objects of experience in the life-world, but here too the range of topics discussed is more narrowly focused in light of the concentration there on the question of the nature, limits, and origin of formal logic itself. Even in the Supplementary Texts to the *Crisis* that appeared a few years ago as Volume XXIX of the *Husserliana* that do indeed mention the life-world countless times, the focus is less on the structure of the life-world itself than on questions about how the theoretical attitude emerges out of the life-world, how the philosophical attitude itself arises, and how transcendental philosophy is different from psychological reflections on mental life. Of course, the most extensive discussion of these topics that will later in Husserl's development come to be addressed under the specific heading of the life-world that were available prior to the appearance of this selection of research manuscripts has been the *Ideas II*. That earlier work still remains invaluable because it provides a general framework within which to locate the much more expansive and detailed analyses presented in *Husserliana* XXXIX that are arranged around specific topics such as "The Horizonal Structure of World Experience and the Experience of Real Things in the World" or "General Aspects of the Temporal Constitution of the Life-World and the Aspect of their Constitution in Periodicities." As near as I can tell, the life-world research manuscripts do not contradict any of the general findings presented in the *Ideas II*, but they do add many specific additional insights and, in particular, they go into much greater detail on the way that Husserl's increasing shift to a genetic approach to those questions can add to what we learn in the general overview laid out in the *Ideas II*.[2]

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[2] One other important and helpful text about the genesis of value judgments and of normative standards of reason in the life-world is an excursus to the lectures *Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924* (*Hua* XXVII), pp. 259–320.

In this essay, I would like to begin by concentrating on just a few topics that are striking because of the counter-points they represent in comparison to some positions and views much more commonly associated with Husserlian transcendental phenomenology – and even with his reflections on what he means by life-world as presented in the *Crisis*, the supplementary volume to the *Crisis*, and in *Experience and Judgment*. I will then follow up in more depth what Husserl has to say here that adds new insights or more detailed analyses of the essential relativity of human experience, and I will do so with a special emphasis on Husserl's remarks on how embodiment and intersubjectivity also throw a new light on what we have now come to call questions of "interculturality." At the end of the essay, I will try to indicate how what he calls "realities" (as opposed to "relativities") continue to play a crucial role in our life-worldly experience, and how we need to think of our experience of "realities" as itself dependent upon the relativities in human experience that modern science had mistakenly attempted to eliminate or claims it has overcome.

Two general points are particularly noteworthy in these manuscripts. The first is what I will be calling Husserl's "ontological realism." His emphasis on the foundational role that natural objects, "realities," play which in these texts seems at first to reverse the emphasis that Husserl had placed in the *Ideas II* on the foundational priority of the personalistic attitude that permeates our everyday lives in the *Umwelt* over against the naturalistic attitude that leads to the view of nature that guides modern natural science. I will ultimately argue that this impression is somewhat misleading, and that the arguments for the priority of "realities" can be traced back not to an attempt to reduce all objects back to nature in the sense of modern natural science, but rather to the crucial role that "realities" play in mediating interpersonal communication. The second striking point is the way that he stresses that "realities" and "relativities" are not actually oppositions, but have to be thought together. The "realities" we encounter in the life-world exhibit very different and much more complex structures than the mathematically idealized and non-intuitive entities that populate the realm of nature as the correlate of modern natural science or belong to reality as it has been conceived by modern philosophical approaches oriented on that ideal.

Generally speaking, Husserl has normally been taken at his word – and often criticized – for his characterization of transcendental phenomenology as a form of "idealism." But even in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl first gained philosophical notoriety by defending the legitimacy of what Frege had called a "third realm." His refutation of the attempt to reduce ideal entities – the laws of logic – to either of the two realms commonly accepted as existing in much of modern philosophy, namely to either to the physical or to the psychological realm, is well-known. In the "Prolegomena" to the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl made clear that the arguments he presented about the irreducibility of logic to psychology or any other empirical discipline, also apply to mathematics and its objects; and then in the investigations themselves, he also includes "meanings" among the entities populating the realm of non-real, ideal objects as well. It was these features of his philosophy that attracted many of his early followers in Munich and Göttingen who

later would worry that his transcendental idealism undermined the gains of his earlier work that supported a robust "realism," not just about moral and logical entities, but with regard to values as well. In recent years, of course, Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith have reminded us of that movement (see, for example, Smith 1994). From the standpoint of these critics, even in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl's analysis of real (and categorical objects) in the fifth and sixth investigations through an analysis of the way that they are always presented to us as intentional objects has been faulted as a first step on the way to an idealist, subjectivist philosophy. The texts that were published between 1913 and the end of Husserl's life are well-known for their emphasis on the role of subjectivity in the constitution of every kind of objectivity. The emphasis on what Husserl calls "transcendental subjectivity" as the ultimate reality that in the famous passage from the *Ideas I*, could be conceived even after the "annihilation of the world,"[3] along with later quotes from discussions with Fink where Husserl had spoken of "transcendental subjectivity" as somehow existing completely "outside the world" certainly could be seen as good reasons for locating Husserl and his phenomenological in a long tradition of idealism or as a kind of modern Platonism.

In the life-world volume, by contrast, there are many passages that seem to suggest an ontology consistent with an everyday modern natural realism that sees the world as composed of an aggregate of individual natural, i.e. spatio-temporally located objects, including human beings and other animals, all of whom are experienced in terms of sensibly intuitable properties that can ultimately be traced back to "objective," intersubjectively identifiable and describable properties of those things. Husserl calls these things "realities" (*Realitäten*) (61). For instance, he says on p. 283 that the conception of "an ontology of the world, purely as the world of experience" is "the world as the all-encompassing unity of realities, or more specifically, it is the infinity of the extension (*Aussereinander*) of realities." Realities are defined as "Spatiotemporally individualized existing objects" (61). Moreover, as he puts it in another passage, "The world as world of actual experience and of experiences that are predelineated as possible is the object-universe. Furthermore, each object has existence as an individual of its type, its kind. Each actual experience within the experience of the world is experience of the specific object of a kind" (65). Throughout numerous passages in the manuscripts, it becomes clear that *ontologically* Husserl's position is closer to Aristotelian than Platonic – the primary beings are not universals, but rather particular individuals, and each particular individual is always experienced as of this or that type (*Typus*) or kind (*Artung*).

Of course, Husserl recognizes other kinds of things we talk about and experiences that derive from them that are not spatio-temporally located individuals – for instance, classes of things (*Allgemeinheiten*), ideal objects, and higher-order objects such as states or other forms of social life that he calls "higher-order personalities." For instance, he says about more general classes of things, what he

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[3] *Ideas I*, §49 (*Hua* III, 104).

calls "multiplicities" (*Mehrheiten*): "It is essentially possible to move on to other real things, and to determine them and synthetically to construct them categorically into higher levels of foundation, that at once relate several realities and ever more multiplicities and multiplicities of multiplicities" (68). What he is describing here as multiplicities are things like classes or groups of things, i.e. "cows" or "trees," and then the way that they can also be grouped with other groups to give us more general groups of things like "mammals" or "animals." It is important to note, though, that this process of the recognition of individuals in terms of the kinds of things they are in our daily experience is not the same thing as the subsuming of intuitions under concepts. In describing how we recognize individual objects in terms of the kinds of things they are, he says: "Experience always has the structure of familiarity (*Bekanntheitsstruktur*), even if the object is one we have never perceived before: the very being of a kind of thing (*Artmäßigkeit*) and this in different levels of "generality" (*Allgemeinheit*), that should by no means be interpreted as conceptual universality (*Allgemeinheit*) based on comparison and an anticipatory emergence of something common. The latter presupposes rather the generality that is implicit in the structure of kinds (the structure of familiarity)" (65). *Allgemeinheit* in daily life takes the form of generality in terms of similarities, recognition by association with things that we are already familiar with.[4] It does not usually imply explicit judgments in terms of universal concepts with clearly defined contours that express the essential predicates that a thing must possess to be a member of this class of things.

So Husserl does recognize the possibility, even the necessity of categorical syntheses that generate multiplicities, classes of things as such, and even classes of classes of things, but in these manuscripts he does not describe the world as composed of the realities, on the one hand, and classes, on the other, but as ontologically composed of the realities that are recognized in terms of the types and kinds and these realities are the building blocks upon which all of the higher levels of categorical objects are founded. Similarly, when he speaks of ideal objects here, we find a passage where he talks about ideal entities as nonetheless "real" precisely because, even though they do have being and we can predicate things about them that are true and false, and even though we can consider ideal objects on their own, they have *Dasein* in the world through the relationship to things that actually exist, realities.[5] This too is consistent with a position we could loosely term Aristotelian – a position that Husserl espouses in the *Logical Investigations* as well. Most importantly perhaps, is the fact that human beings as subjects (what in some places he calls "pure egos" as the most abstract level of formal self-awareness) are also unique kinds of realities because, even though pure egos are different ways of seeing ourselves than seeing ourselves as persons or than seeing

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[4] Compare on this point Simo Pulkkinens' chapter in this volume, "*Lifeworld as an Embodiment of Spiritual Meaning*: *The Constitutive Dynamics of Activity and Passivity in Husserl*," p. 22.

[5] See Text 29, §2 (pp. 298–300).

our mental lives as what he calls "souls," egos are nonetheless numerically identical with human beings since it is part of the essential structure of even the pure ego that it is aware of itself not only in its purity as an "ego-pole," but that it is necessarily also aware of itself as identical with a specific individuated person, an empirical ego with a history, that it necessarily also has an awareness of its bodily states and of other things we experience through the mediation of the body. So in this sense even the "pure ego" is a stratum or "*Schicht*" of a comprehensive organism that in each case also necessarily possesses a bodily aspect so that each person, and even the "pure ego" itself is also aware of him- or herself as a person who is located in space and time and can be perceived by others. I will return to this point later.

In the Second Logical Investigation, Husserl had discussed the way that ideal objects such as classes of things, "species" he calls them there, can be the object of intentions and expressed through meanings, and it becomes clear that meanings themselves are also ideal entities (though he will later qualify this position and make clear that, although both logical principles or meanings are ideal entities, they are very different kinds of ideal entities with very different origins). This has been taken as evidence that Husserl is in some sense a Platonist, arguing for the independent existence of universals such as meanings or values. What is often overlooked is the way that the Third Logical Investigation also establishes that some meanings, the dependent meanings, necessarily point to other meanings, the independent meanings in which they are founded, because the former depend on the latter for their existence. The common example is colors and surfaces. Even though "to be a color" and "to be a surface" mean different things so that colors are not reducible to surfaces or the other way around, colors are always actually encountered only as the colors of some surface that has that color and – and although Husserl doesn't say it there, we can only find surfaces as surfaces of things in the broadest sense. And Husserl's own analyses are consistent with this approach. Husserl begins his analysis of meanings in the First Logical Investigation with an investigation into expressions. Meanings are actually found as the "*geistige*" aspect of a concrete physical thing, a word, a sentence that has a physical side as well so that it is correct to say that meanings do not exist on their own, but only in something like a written or spoken word or sentence that itself is the concrete reality in which meanings are founded. So Husserl's overall position is that meanings are distinct from expressions and cannot be reduced to them, but this is far from a Platonic view that meanings exist all on their own. This point will also be crucial for Husserl's emphasis on the centrality of the experience of "realities" and hence of "embodiment" for the life-world experience of any kind of entities whatsoever, including those that are not themselves "realities."

The foundational relationships described in the Third Logical Investigation, then, function much along the lines of the Aristotelian between the kinds of things like forms that can exist only as the properties of other things and the kinds of things – substances – that can exist on their own. So Husserl's ontology of the world as the sum of realities then is in some sense like the Aristotlean view that what there are most truly are substances that can exist on their own and properties that cannot.

What does it mean to say they exist on their own? Here it is important to remember that Husserl addresses these things, these realities, in terms of how we experience them. Husserl is consistent with his approach from the outset of addressing objects in terms of the meanings through which we intend them and the possible fulfillments that would confirm that our intentions are indeed justified, that these objects do indeed exist and in the ways we intend them, or in the *Ideas I* in terms of the necessary correlation between noesis and noema and the structures of reason that lay out the kinds of experiences that would count as the givenness of the objects themselves. In the life-world essays, the intentions through which objects present themselves to us are most commonly called "experiences" – *Erfahrungen* – and the world and the objects that populate the world as described through an analysis of our experiencing of the world, the various kinds of realities we encounter there in our daily lives, and various other kinds of categorical and high-order practical realities that we construct on the basis of our experiences of these realities through high-order synthetic acts. Experience itself is what Husserl calls here the "*Urtatsache*," the basic fact that is the starting point for all further phenomenological analyses (233). And here, in spite of what I have been calling Husserl's ontological realism, he ends up showing how these experienced realities necessarily involve a whole host of traits that reveal the insufficiencies of any philosophical account of the objects of our experience without recognizing the role of "subjective" aspects of our experience, "relativities" he calls them, that are constitutive for any experience as such.

The most important and most basic relativity is that the things we call and think of as objects are always accessible to us in terms of the actual or possible experience of them. Even things that we think of as inaccessible and unknowable for us are posited on the basis of the experience of objects that we are familiar with and do experience. So, for Husserl, to talk about "the world" or "objects within the world" without reference to the subjects who experience them, the ways they experience them, and the structures of that experience makes no sense. Over and again, Husserl emphasizes that the terms "subject" and "world" are two poles of the one basic phenomenon that is given to us, namely experience. So, to echo Kant's famous dictum, whatever is a priori necessary for the experience of objects will at the same time be a condition for the possibility of the objects of experience, and – to make a point that Kant is less clear about – for the experiencing of the object and hence for subjectivity in general because subjects are not things, but what are sometimes called "the dative of experience," those to and for whom objects (whatever kinds of objects they may be) are given in experience as an event. Moreover, for Husserl, "experiencing" is not limited simply to perceiving. Rather the objects of experience are things that matter to us, things we not only perceive, but interact with, that influence us and how we are, and things we sometimes ourselves influence and shape. This general view is reflected in Husserl's assertion that the "*geistige*" realm, the realm of mental activities, encompasses three basic kinds of functions, namely judging or believing in a general sense ("*Meinen*"), valuing ("*Werten*"), and willing or acting ("*Wollen*," "*Handeln*"). Each of these three realms presupposes or is

"founded in" the prior realm without being reducible to it and each of them at bottom has a bodily capacity. So one of the most basic apriori requirements for experience is that the subject of experience must be embodied and embodied in such a way that are objects are not only given to us, but given in ways that matter to us, and that this embodiment involves the capacity not just for the passive givenness of those objects to and for us, but also for the active shaping of the world and objects within it. Hence the experience of reality will also be relative to some form of embodiment and for each of us it will be relative to the specific form of embodiment we have and the ways we can physically, emotionally, and intellectually find possibilities for overcoming the initial limitations that our specific embodiment and other empirical limitations place on us.[6]

First of all, the body is necessarily and most basically the seat of affections. Our awareness of objects, even of non-real objects, is mediated by the ability to be affected in a bodily way through them. We know about them through the way that they affect our bodies. What kinds of things we can learn about them and how we do that depends upon the specific nature of our bodies. We see colors, hear sounds, feel hot and cold, rough or smooth textures. We don't see ultraviolet light, hear very high-pitched sounds, or perceive magnetic fields directly. The metaphor that modern philosophy has developed to name the information we receive through the way things affect our bodies is "impressions" – Husserl uses the German terms "*Empfindungen*" or often "*Empfindnisse*" for them, stressing the receiving of them more than just the product. However, one of Husserl's key insights was that the subject and even the body is not passive in the process of perception, and that the ability to sort through the succession of perceptions to discover what objects are like also involves the perception of our bodies themselves, their positions relative to the rest of the objects in the world, and changes in those bodies, as well as the ability to move and position parts of our bodies or the position of the body as a whole in order to get more or better information about those things. Husserl's name for these distinct but related abilities is kinaesthesis, a term that most narrowly refers to our ability to sense the position and movements of parts of our bodies without having to rely on other senses such as sight or touch. For instance, if you hold one of your hands behind your back and spread the fingers so that they are not touching each other, you still can sense how many of your fingers are extended and how many are not ("Are you holding out one finger or two?"). If you wiggle one of those fingers, you can sense that movement (kin-aesthesis) without seeing it or feeling it touch one of the others. I know if I am looking up or down without looking in a mirror and not just because of the changes in the things I see when I shift my gaze. Husserl

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[6] "If I am a human ego, then I am one as the ego of this one single body in which I operate, and operating in it I not only have it, but, by means of it, I have the world in general as existing for me and, as a further consequence, the world as the realm of my actual and enabling practice (*vermöglichenden Praxis*)" (247). Text 24 (pp. 243–250) makes clear that embodiment is not merely one of the essential structures of the life-world as a fundamental structure of egoic life, but also that it involves being affected, stimulated, and involved in practices by and with the world.

points out how important this sense is in sorting out which changes in the things I am seeing are due to changes in the things in the world and which ones are due to changes in my body – a process as a whole that he also occasionally refers to as kinaesthesis. And finally, the changes are not always or perhaps even usually accidental. We move around "to get a better look." We do not just wait for impressions to come to us, we do something to get better access to them or – put more correctly – to put ourselves in a position to have the impressions that help us know the things we want to know about better, i.e. more completely, more clearly, or more reliably perhaps. So kinaesthesis in the broadest sense involves the "I can" in a full bodily sense that includes the ability to move ourselves and manipulate the surroundings in which we experience objects so that we get a better idea of what things there are in the world and what they are like.[7]

So the body is not only the seat of affections but also the source of mobility in the world. Our bodies are, as Husserl famously calls them in numerous investigations, "the null-point of orientation" for us. To say that all perceptions are perspectival, then, is to say that realities are given to us as located in some position relative to the position of our bodies, but also to say that they are given to a great extent in the way they are because of the specific make-up of our bodies and the way that they mediate and influence the kinds of impressions we have.[8] Husserl's notion of "*Abschattungen*" refers to both of these kinds of perspectival relativities, but also to the fact that the experience of a specific reality may involve different sets of our senses, but normally not all of them at once (it is not easily possible to see what you are eating and taste it at exactly the same moment, for example).

Moreover, it is only through the movements of our bodies that we can interact with and change the realities that populate the world – and, as Husserl points out in other places – even our interactions with non-real objects such as mathematical entities are mediated by the interaction with some sort of realities as well, such as writing on a white-board, a piece of paper, or a napkin. The world is not just something we perceive, but something we shape to our own ends.

Where do these ends come from? According to Husserl's theory, we as persons are capable of regulating and setting our own ends. But whenever we do so, it is always against the background of passivities whose ultimate origins include aspects of our corporality. The first of these "passivities" has already been mentioned, namely the body as seat of affections through which things in the world show themselves to us in various ways that are related to the make-up of our bodies themselves. It is through the body that we receive information about things and events in the world, so to speak But it is also important to mention that the

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[7] Ignacio de los Reyes Melero describes this phenomenon in terms of the notion of "concordance". See his contribution to this volume, *The Body as a System of Concordance and the Perceptual World*".

[8] This is true, by the way, not just for bodily states. Husserl describes how changes in my mental states, for instance, when I take "Santonin", also influence the way that objects appear to us.

affectivity of the body involves not just its ability to provide us "information" about the world, but that it does so in ways that we experience as pleasant or unpleasant, attractive or unattractive – sometimes in a vague and general way, sometimes in very specific ways such as "too loud" or "too cold": "The concrete fact of life bears within itself the basic decision between the ego, the identical ego of life, existing as an ego in its egoic ways of conducting itself, of being touched by something, being aroused, awakened, affected, moved by something, to state it briefly: being affected, and subsequently to that of acting, actively conducting oneself towards them in different modes" (689).[9]

This passage makes clear that the receptivity that is here opposed to the activity of the ego's conduct, consists not just in receiving information about the world, but in being affected in ways that matter to us, that "interest" us in various ways. We are stimulated, awakened, touched in manners that evoke responses. At the level of a pure passivity,[10] we could speak of stimuli that almost automatically call for certain actions as responses. Our hand automatically withdraws from the hot surface, a loud noise causes us to turn around and see what is going on without having to make a "decision" to do so.

As Husserl embarks into the difficult question of reconstructing what childhood must be like and of the most elementary affections, he discusses the necessary structures that we have to suppose were at work in the constitution of things like visual fields, but even there – or perhaps most particularly there – the ego is not merely passive, and its interest is not merely in gathering information: "The ego is always already an ego with abilities (*Vermögen*), an ego with kinaestheses, but also always already an ego that possesses non-egoic, hyletic elements, that affect it in the mode of a *Gemüt* in joy and suffering, and against which it actively, first of all kinaesthetically, reacts" (472).[11] Of course, as former passage illustrates, as grown human beings, we are not just active in the sense of "reacting" passively and do not necessarily always simply follow those immediate urges, but can also respond to them actively in a further sense, not just in actions in the sense of interactions with things in the world, but also in our own responses to these immediate impulses.

This consideration leads in the direction of a different point, namely that human life as "*geistige*" is something that we as persons not only experience, but also shape and perform, but that is a different point to which I will return a little later. But even at the most elementary stages, Husserl make clear, what is perceived is

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[9] "Die konkrete Tatsache des Lebens trägt in sich selbst die Grundentscheidung zwischen dem Ich, dem identischen Ich des Lebens, seiend als Ich in seinen ichliches Verhaltungsweisen, des von etwas Berührtwerdens, von etwas Erregt-, Geweckt-, Affiziert-, Betroffen-, kurz gesprochen: Affiziertwerdens, und daraufhin des Tuns, des Aktiv-sich Verhaltens in verschiedenen Modis."

[10] For a more extensive discussion of the notion of "pure passivity," see Pulkkinen's chapter in this volume, pp. 17 ff.

[11] "Ich ist immer schon Ich von Vermögen. Ich von Kinästhesen, aber auch immer schon Ich, das ein Nicht-Ichliches, ein Hyletisches hat, das es in der Weise des 'Gemüts' affiziert in Freude und Leid, und wogegen es aktiv, zunächst kinästhetisch reagiert."

perceived as affecting our *Gemüt* in welcome or unwelcome ways that evoke active responses. What is important here is to see that Husserl's three-fold distinction of cognitive activities into the theoretical, the axiological, and the practical – which corresponds to the correlative three-fold strata of theoretical predicates, values or axiological predicates, and practical predicates in terms of means and ends, necessarily correspond to three fundamentally different aspects of the capacities of the body in our experience. We never – even in our reconstructed childly lives – experienced simple sense data, but rather things that have some positive or negative value for us – at first simply at the bodily level – and evoke a (bodily) response. Husserl asks "Is the sensibility of our impressions not simultaneously a sensibility of instincts and thereby interwoven with intentionalities of feelings? Does it not contain a habituality that takes on a habitual genesis based on continued fulfillments or lack of fulfillments, and hence within the form of temporalization and association, and is always already there?"[12] And the answer for Husserl is, of course, clearly "yes." They are referred to as "instincts" precisely because the responses they evoke do not presuppose any authentically egoic activities or reflective self-consciousness that is aware of and assents to these responses as appropriate. However, even at this lowest level, our experiences are colored by what he calls "value intentionality." Things matter to us and evoke responses, and these experiences and the results of our responses point to possible confirmation or disconfirmation in the course of further experience – here in the form of mere "associations." At higher levels, we can form second-order mental states, feelings about our feelings and actions, beliefs about the well-foundedness of our other beliefs and feelings, and these can change our responses and our actions, but at the most basic level, these can be traced back to our bodily capacities for being affected in ways that provide us information about other things in the world that we are not, that matter to us, and that we can and do respond to in a bodily way. But even in our adult lives, Husserl maintains, "I pose . . . general genetic questions and encounter there also the instinct in addition to the acquired habitualities, I also find transformation of the instincts during the course of a life, but – viewed from the inside – they are always still instincts" (476).[13]

The passivities related to our embodied experience continue to exert themselves throughout our lives, be they the passivities of the immediate givenness of certain features of things in the world, of the ways they matter to us, or the responses they evoke in us. Hence Husserl's position regarding the foundational dependency of values on perceptions, or rather on representations (*Vorstellungen*), and of actions

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[12] "Ist die Empfindungssinnlichkeit nicht zugleich Instinktsinnlichkeit und dabei mit Gefühlsintentionalität verwoben? Ist darin nicht eine Habitualität, die eine Schicht des habituellen Genesis aus fortgehenden Erfüllung oder Nichterfüllung annimmt, also innerhalb der Form der Zeitigung und Assoziation, und doch immer schon da ist?"

[13] For a more comprehensive study of Husserl's theory of instincts from a phenomenological perspective, see Lee (1993).

on values, must also be seen as reflected in his analyses of how these three very general bodily capacities are essentially interrelated but not reducible to one another. For the most part in the life-world manuscripts, Husserl discusses the two-fold opposition between merely knowing and acting, between the theoretical and the practical, and he stresses the priority of the practical in the life-world, but it is also important to keep in mind that the practical itself is also founded in and hence implies the evaluative dimension as well, which has every much a bodily dimension as the theoretical and practical dimensions of our experience do.

Perhaps I should note just how complicated the relationship among the various strata is in concrete life in order to avoid the impression that things proceed unilaterally in one direction or the other. Although the foundational relationships are clearly one-directional, they all play a crucial role and permeate all of our experiences so that a higher-level interest can have an influence on relatively lower levels.[14] We have described, for example, how the perception of our own body and its movements represents an essential element of the process of perception so that specific kinaesthetic activities (practices) contribute to the constitution of the perceptual object and its surrounding field, but Husserl also describes the way that, in the life-world, epistemic priorities can be governed by practical interests. What interests us, what we want to know is what is practically relevant for us and that depends of course on what we value and want. On the other hand, we can also reflect theoretically on the values and goals we have set or accepted up until now, consider their justification or lack of it, and what we discover can either reinforce them or motivate us to modify them.

It is also important to emphasize that even at the most elementary levels of so-called "pure passivity," Husserl characterizes these affections in motivational terms instead of in terms of natural causality. For, in concrete life, they function as elements that "make sense" to us and as elements that the ego has recourse to in order to understand how they impinge on us and to subject them and the tendencies towards which they give rise to critical reflection. They are processes that are part of the *geistige* life of a really existing bodily subject that is at the same time a subject in the sense of an I that not only lives in and through its own mental (*geistige*) experiences but also is implicitly and often prepredicatively aware of them and has the ability to make them the object of explicit reflective awareness as well. Even if one does not impute full personhood in the sense of reflective self-awareness and self-control to the child – or even to ourselves as adults in all of our interactions with things and events in the world – Husserl's analyses are conducted from the standpoint of beings that have the capacity (even if only perhaps in a nascent and developing sense in a small child) for reflective self-awareness, or, as he says quite simply, they are "ichlich."

The opposite of the "*Geistige*" for Husserl is then not the "bodily" (*Leibliche*) but rather the merely "natural" in the sense of the modern natural sciences that

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[14] For a more detailed discussion of passivity, see also Pulkkinen's chapter in this volume.

recognize only "objective" (supposedly non-subjective) theoretical predicates as genuine predicates of an entity. The *geistige* world is not the natural world of theoretically determinate realities, but rather the practical world in which our understanding of value-predicates and ends is constitutive for our experience of the realities (and idealities) that we experience there. The description of the life-world as one that is above all a practical world also casts a new light on the issue of the "types and kinds" of realities that we encounter in the world that surrounds us. Of course, they exhibit characteristics that can be described in terms of strictly theoretical predicates, but the way we normally experience and classify the types and kinds of objects we find around is in terms of their practical relevance *for us*. We see houses, pencils or pens, streets and cars and not just surfaces or colored objects. We see them as possible use-objects whose meaning we "understand" because we understand the practical uses to which they can be employed, because we ourselves have goals and priorities, and see them in terms of positive or negative evaluations of the way they further or impede practical possibilities we have ourselves have or understand in others.

I mentioned above that the fact that one of the central aspects of our bodily relativity is that the kinds of experiences we can and do have of things are mediated by the particular abilities and states of our bodies. "Normal" human beings see certain colors, but cannot see others without some sort of additional mechanical aids – infrared goggles for instance. The same holds for sounds, tastes, and all other sensory abilities. What other animals can normally see is different – they might see colors or hear sounds we can't or perhaps lack some of the abilities we have. They might be able to sense things like electromagnetic fields that we have discovered only over the last few centuries with the aid of modern scientific theories and technologies. Some human beings might have more heightened or a wider range of sensory abilities than normal; others, e.g. the color-blind or people who have spent too much of their lives at rock concerts, might have less. It is also the case that how we perceive the sense properties of an object will depend on the circumstances, whether it is daylight or dark, or if there is a lot of background noise. What we in the life-world think of as the real sensible properties of the realities we encounter in our daily lives, depends not just on the object and the specific sense impressions we are given, but also on a range of other "relativities" like the abilities and limitations of our own bodies, and the circumstances under which we perceive them. A person who is color-blind still knows that the light at the top of a stop light is red even if what others would call red appears as grey to him. We see a dog look up and know that the dog is hearing something we can't, so we conclude that something is going on that we can't perceive. Just like kinaesthesis involves taking into account the awareness of our own bodily positions and activities in the perceptual process, so too do we constantly factor in our awareness of the abilities and limitations of our bodies and the circumstances in which we find ourselves as we strive to figure on what is actually going on around us. "Normalcy" is of course not the same thing as optimality. It is normal that we can't hear the sounds a dog can hear. We commonly

think of optimality in terms of the circumstances and our bodily position (daylight, being close enough to hear or see something), but it also has to do with the state of our body (which is why we cleanse our palate before tasting an fine wine) and sometimes even in overcoming its limitations through technologies like a microscope, a telescope, or radar screen.[15]

Part of the story of the genesis of modern science is the attempt to overcome the limitations of such "relativities" either through the invention of new technologies or through the reliance on those properties that can be measured and calculated without reference to specific human abilities (recall here the whole discussion of primary vs. secondary qualities, the project of defining colors in terms of wave lengths instead of our everyday "subjective" perceptions). Of course, Husserl's point about the continued dependence of modern natural science on our life-worldly experience is that even the scientist still has to see something that counts as evidence of those objective properties, such as black and white or red lines on a print-out, flashing lights of some color on a meter, or a specific sound that signals and counts as evidence of what the scientist thinks she is "finding" in the lab. When the researcher instructs a new apprentice researcher into the lab, she uses the everyday language of the life-world when she tells her which things to look for when using the apparatus, waiting for the red light to come one or tracking the different colored lines on the screen of the computer or on the printout of the results. And even if she has adopted the philosophical position of a naturalistic or even a physicalistic ontology according to which everything in the world is simply constellations of molecules or electrical charges, she doesn't describe the machines they are using in terms of their molecular structures, but rather describes them (accurately and much more appropriately) as spectrometers, electron microscopes etc., i.e. in terms of the uses they have in the activities of the life-world of scientific research.

There is much more that could be added on that topic, but there are two other dimensions of the life-world that also must be mentioned as central aspects of the "relativity" of the life-world, namely, first of all, the historicity of the life-world that is also an essential element in the constitution of the realities that we encounter there, and secondly, its intersubjective or – better stated – the social and interpersonal character of the life-world.

To the first point: Historicity itself has both an individual and a social dimension. The *geistige* life of a person is not just a succession of experiences, but as experience always involves the incorporation of each new event or experience into an always already existing context. We saw a brief description of the way that every

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[15] De los Reyes Melero, in his chapter in this volume, discusses "normality" and "optimality"; Sara Heinämaa, in her contributions to this volume, offers a detailed discussion of the different kinds of anomalies and abnormalities that can be distinguished within Husserl's account of the constitution of the life-world.

reality is always perceived in terms of types and kinds that have been built up based on their similarities with previously experienced realities.[16] Whatever is new is never grasped as something completely and fully new, but rather at best as something unexpected that is nonetheless categorized and classified in terms of its similarity and dissimilarities with other realities that also populate what is always the one continuous world in which it shows up. Moreover, each new experience always gives rise to new tendencies that reinforce or modify previously established tendencies in the way that we make sense of subsequent experiences:

> Indeed it is a basic principle (*Grundgesetz*) that whatever we have posited as valid in the unity of life through any position-taking acts (in experiencing, judging, valuing, willing, etc.) 'for the first time' – in originarily establishing (*urstiftenden*) acts, as we also call them –, remains valid until further notice. Each act establishes a lasting (habitual) validity that extends beyond the momentary act. This means that the acts that occur throughout ones further life subsequent to the originarily established ones and possess a meaning and character of validity consistent with the earlier ones do not emerge merely as instances of the same belief conjoined with memories of the earlier acts and ultimately of the originarily establishing ones, but rather all such acts show themselves as repeated actualizations of one and the same belief that is still valid based on the original establishment. The new instances of these acts in the mode of a belief that is repeated as still valid perform a re-establishment (*Nachstiftung*) and, depending on the completeness of the actualization, exercise different degrees of reinforcement. Lacking such reinforcement, the subsequent force exerted by the original establishment increasingly wanes, as does its motivational force in the broader context of consciousness." (47)

Two things are noteworthy here. First of all, Hussserl is very clear that he is using beliefs (*Meinungen*) here as an example of just one kind of position-taking, but that the genetic structure of originary establishment, reinforcement, and reestablishment is a basic structure of mental life that sets up tendencies for all subsequent mental life and applies not only to theoretical beliefs, but to values, desires, and practical decisions as well. Secondly, Husserl explicitly acknowledges the possibility of error, of having a prior conviction be refuted so that a reality that one had previously posited shows itself as being different from the way one had thought or as illusory. What cannot be negated, what cannot turn out to be an illusion, however, is the world itself as the pre-given horizon for the experience of specific individual realities:

> For us as subjects of a natural life there are not only things that we see (each of them with a horizon of familiarity regarding the unseen rear sides <whose manifestation> is eventually to be expected, however, as a mixture of determinate sense and horizonsense), and on top of them those that we don't see, which are valid for us because we have seen them before and we still possess them as valid. Rather, in every waking moment of life a whole world is there for us, a world that reaches into the infinities of space and time (and which is structured in particular ways according to a real-categorial typical pattern). (3)

Whereas in the *Ideen I*, Husserl had still maintained the cogency of the idea of an "annihilation of the world,"[17] in these manuscripts he criticizes Cartesian

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[16] For a detailed discussion of association and pairing, see Pulkkinen's chapter in this volume.

[17] See FN 3, above.

approaches that entertain such wrong-headed notions.[18] When he now comes to view the idea of a pure consciousness with a merely contingent relationship to a world (*ohne Weltbezug*) the non-existence of which is supposed to be conceivable, as lacking any phenomenological basis, this means that he also cannot imagine a consciousness without a concrete relatedness to really existing objects even if specific individual objects may be different than the subject takes them to be or might not exist. What doesn't change and cannot be disconfirmed is the structure of the world as such, a unity over time. Moreover, as we saw at the beginning, it belongs to the sense of individual realities and hence to the world as a whole that they have "validity" not just as solipsistic unities – but rather are "*vorgegeben*" in the sense that they are there and at least in principle accessible to anyone, including not just other humans but other animals.[19]

One sense in which experience is relative is that it is historical, i.e., it always occurs against the background of prior experiences. The world is not just a set of currently existing realities, but involves all the things that emerge for us as they do against the backdrop of our prior experiences that set up more or less determinate expectations for how things will unfold in the future. Even though we are often mistaken about individual realities, that doesn't mean that the world itself unravels, it means that we make adjustments against the background of our entire experience, including the new unexpected ones, to our notions of the world that normally evolve instead of completely collapsing.[20] And in order to make sense of the new realities we encounter, we must assume some patterns, not exceptionless laws, but at least patterns of persistence and change. On the subjective side, this means that our experience itself has a history with patterns of continuity and change; correlatively, on the object side, it means that the world and the realities within it exhibit patterns that can be recognized and used for sorting things and dealing with them in terms of their types and the typicalities that are associated with them.

So the world turns out to be pre-given in two senses: first of all, as the apriori horizon of any experience whatsoever, and secondly in the particular historically evolved background into which any newly experienced reality is incorporated. This second sense involves both the individual experiences of the specific experiencing subject, but also as the broader horizon of the "world we all share in common," the intersubjectively accessible world of experience that itself has a historical genesis that extends far beyond (and far back behind) the experience of any individual subject. The world is *vorgegeben* as never having an absolute beginning or being from or for one absolute person, also though as *aufgegeben*, as something that must

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[18] See for instance, Text 25, pp. 251–258.

[19] In her chapter in this volume, Sara Heinämaa offers an extensive discussion of the ways that for Husserl animals do and the ways they do not belong to a common world with adult humans.

[20] De los Reyes Melero explains why the notion of a complete collapse is nonetheless not unintelligible in his contribution to this volume.

be constantly reconfirmed and shown to be consistent with the experience of others. "Under the title ‚world of universal experience,‘ I not only have an existing world and, within it, other existing subjects, but rather under this title I have universal communal subjectivity, living, accomplishing, apperceiving, activity comporting itself in this or that way in relation to what it apperceives, in a community bringing together what is apperceived as identical by individuals, etc. and I have constantly laid out in advance (*vorfindlich*) as the result of specific common performances an 'objective' uniquely so determined world, always being enriched by new performances and always also presupposing a constantly performing (*immerzu leistende*) subjectivity . . ." (45).

Hence another aspect of the historical nature of the life-world and persons within it is that individual human beings find themselves always as parts of communities, literally groups who share certain commonly accepted beliefs, values, and ends. Much of what I believe, value, and will is attributable not just to my own personal history, but to the experiences of the communities in which I was raised and in which I find myself. Husserl lists family as a basic form of community, but also communities that have a geographic determinacy, a home-land or territory such as a city, a region, or a nation, but there are communities such as certain professions or interest groups that share specific unique beliefs, values, and ends but are not geographically defined. In any case, though, the world is always already pre-given to me before I ever undertake active reflection in terms of a set of sedimented theoretical, evaluative, and practical position-takings that the specific community shares and that define it as a community. These communities, then, are cultures in at least two senses: (1) they share not only beliefs, but certain commonly accepted values and practices that define them, and (2) these shared beliefs, values, and practices are the result of specific historical experiences and responses to them that shape those communities and become part of the sedimented backdrop for all further experiences and actively personal position-takings.

Each community therefore also has its own *Umwelt* or surrounding world not just as the specific kinds of realities that happen to exist in the geographic territory in which they find themselves, but as a set of common understandings of the significance of those realities, their values, and their uses.[21] The notion of *Umwelt* involves not only relative spatial and temporal orientations and predicates that derive from them, but also predicates related to our normal sensing, the normal practices, and the common values of that community – i.e. their culture. Of course, not everyone belongs to the same communities or cultures, which is why it makes sense to talk of home worlds and alien worlds (*Heimwelten und Fremdwelten*).

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[21] See, for instance, p. 32: "The world becomes a human world, divided into communities, the communities [each] related to a historical tradition that belongs essentially to it, in which a common culture arose that is accessible to every one of them and as a whole is identifiable, commonly valid for all."

The *Heimwelt* is the *Umwelt* in which I know and understand the shared beliefs, values, and practices of this community and in which they serve as the default beliefs, values, and practices of that culture for me. The *Fremdwelt* is the culture with which I am not familiar or whose beliefs, values, and practices I do not share. Part of what it means to say that I am not a member of that group is to say that their history is not part of my own, whereas part of what it means to be a member of one's own community is that this shared history is part of my own history. That does not necessarily mean that I cannot reflect upon it, take a stance towards it, and perhaps modify or reject some parts of it, just as my own personal history does not by itself determine my future beliefs, values, and actions as a person, since as a person I can reflect on my own specific beliefs, values, and ends that I may hold as a result of my shared cultural background and my own personal history, assess them critically for their justification and appropriateness, and as a result develop different evaluative stances and feelings towards them that can change my own individual feelings and actions.

The realities I encounter in the *Umwelt* are not just things whose perceptual properties I know about, but rather entities like houses, cars, or carriages, whose uses I understand and whose values I also comprehend. As a member of a community I understand these commonly shared uses and values even if I am personally indifferent to them. To use an example that is of course not Husserl's: I do not have to have a personal interest in riding a motorcycle to recognize immediately what a Harley-Davidson motorcycle is for and I do not have to have or desire one to know that they count for many or most people in the general community in which I live (America in general, Memphis in particular) as a status symbol or to know that owning and riding one would count as unusual or gauche among most academic philosophers.

Intercultural differences then are not simply or even primarily a matter of different perceptual encounters in the narrow sense of disagreements about the perceptual features in the narrow sense of the realities we might each encounter. It is not usually a matter of one group seeing yellow and another green or one group seeing something as 3 cm long that another group perceives as 2 m long. Groups occasionally do disagree about which events actually ever happened and how they happened, but normally those differences do not stem from different perceptual abilities of their bodies, but from having different interests and histories that lead to different interpretations of what happened or make it convenient or important to highlight and remember or downplay and forget those same events.

That is why the modern scientific approach to the avoidance or resolution of cultural difference in its attempt to abstract from all relativities is misguided. It abstracts from value and practical predicates as merely subjective or cultural relativities in the view that what there is must be the same for all and hence cannot be subjectively or culturally relative. It then proposes to address what we take to be the perceptible properties of things in ways that are not relative to our own specific

forms of embodiment and hence not dependent upon the specific capacities or lack of them that I or anyone else may have or even upon the specific capacities of human bodies in general. So blue and red (along with ultraviolet and infrared) become measurable wave-lengths that are the same regardless of individual differences or even of differences across the specific perceptual capacities of different species. The project of natural science is to eliminate the dependence on such relativities. Armchair ontologists or academic philosophers who take this project to provide the ultimate arbiter of "what there really is" come to claim that such narrowly defined natural objects and their natural, measurable objective properties are the only things that truly exist. The key to intercultural understanding, according to this project, would be to avoid any such relativities altogether and reduce questions of truth and validity to the standards of verification that are consistent with the approach of the modern natural sciences. The ontology of the natural world would then be, to use Boyle's formulation, particles in motion, or – to use a more recent view, different kinds of molecules in different arrangements that show up for us as the realities we perceive in our daily life. If we wanted to speak truly, we would be describing things in terms of their molecular, atomic, or sub-atomic structures.

Husserl's critique of the life-world shows us that this project is misguided for at least two very basic reasons. First of all, it is impossible. Even the scientist does not walk into the lab and see arrangements of molecules or fields of electrical charges. She sees spectrometers and computer screens, devices for measuring and tracking, other devices for recording or reporting the results of her work. She doesn't see wave lengths, but rather silver switches or black buttons to turn the machine on. She has specific interests and goals and undertakes actions to achieve them. She never leaves the life-world, but just lives in a specific one, namely that of the lab scientist.

Secondly, even if it were possible, it would not resolve cultural differences because that is not what they are about. Cultural differences are not usually about the molecular structure or even about the narrowly defined perceptible qualities of things. They are usually about different values and interests, different priorities and different views about what is important or not, what kinds of actions are acceptable, and how people should think and act.

In fact, the view that all real questions, all questions with genuine truth values can be reduced to theoretical scientific questions and reasonably adjudicated with the methods it recognizes as valid, is not only not helpful but pernicious, because it relegates all cultural differences to the realm of the irrational. But Husserl's conception of reason involves the claim that not all values and ends are equally valid and equally acceptable. Reason involves not escaping these relativities, but looking at how they arose in order to understand them. It involves the willingness to look at our own beliefs, values, and practical priorities and practices, assessing their justification and limitations, and being willing to change them. That is why Husserl proposes an investigation into the rationality of the life-world as an alternative to

the narrowly defined rationalism of modern natural science as the appropriate project for philosophy in general and phenomenology in particular.[22]

Nonetheless, however, as embodied subjects, our interpersonal and intercultural communications and understandings, even about non-real objects, necessarily involves realities. To communicate about very abstract, perhaps non-intuitable mathematical entities or philosophical issues, I have to use things like words or gestures, marks on a blackboard or a napkin, or click a key on a keyboard or a button on a remote control to bring up a powerpoint presentation that will show on a screen or a wall – all of which are realities. And even perceiving others as other subjects or persons also involves perceiving them as realities: "In order to have others self-given, I must already have been given his corporeal body" (30). In order to understand others, we have to see or hear actions, gestures, or words. But at the same time, all of these actions involve relativities – they have to be in some language we understand, using some colors we see or sounds we hear given the nature of our own bodies. They will be located here or there, but perceptible from the specific position of the audience. And there have to be people that share the common practices of sitting in a lecture, being initiated into high-level mathematics or philosophy, and they have to care about it. The point is not to overcome relativities that make it possible for the realities to be there for us and to mean something for us but for us to find common relativities for us as embodied and historically and culturally located subjects for whom these realities have meanings.

In closing just one brief remark about optimality. Throughout these manuscripts, the optimality that Husserl most often discusses is optimality of perception. At the same time, the analyses make clear that perception is not only accompanied by, but generally also guided by values, interests, and decisions that are not strictly theoretical and are not directed to knowledge for its own sake. It would be an interesting question to augment these discussions by consideration of the optimalization of values, of optimizing right actions, of the best life. Of course, in a few other places, for instance in the Kaizo articles and in his lectures on ethics, especially the 1920 and 1924 volumes on ethics, Husserl does explicitly address these issues, albeit in a fairly general way. The task then would be to take what we can learn from the analyses presented in the life-world volume, augment them with what Husserl tells us about values and willing in those other writings, and see what this would tell us about the most important questions for us as embodied persons living in a world together with other human beings (and animals) and how this can help us deal with contemporary issues about human life and humane interactions with each other in our world today. In this much, Husserl is certainly right, namely that the natural sciences alone and other sciences oriented strictly on their models cannot even begin to address those problems.

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[22] The life-world manuscripts build on Husserl's general conception of reason that I have described in another essay, Nenon (2003).

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Part III
The Body in Sickness and Health: Some Case Studies

Chronic Pain in Phenomenological/ Anthropological Perspective

Katherine J. Morris

This essay is a kind of prolegomenon to an anthropologically informed phenomenology of chronic pain.[1] It has the wider purpose of establishing the potential fruitfulness of a deeper dialogue between phenomenology and anthropology. Chronic pain seems a natural subject for phenomenological exploration as part of a tradition of work in the phenomenology of illness and the phenomenology of pain. It has also been extensively explored by medical anthropologists; their accounts provide a window onto the ways in which culture is embodied and enters into experience. However, on the one hand, although a number of these medical anthropologists have, to some degree, actually been influenced by phenomenology, on the whole this influence is rather thin. On the other, phenomenology, as these anthropologists observe, generally pays scant attention to culture (DelVecchio Good et al. 1994a: 201), despite phenomenologists' recognition that human behaviour and experience are cultural all the way down (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2002: 220).[2] Both parties to the conversation, I think, have something to offer and something to gain.

I begin with a medical perspective (what the medical anthropologists call a 'biomedical perspective') on pain and chronic pain. *Pain* is defined by the widely

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[1] Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the University of Hull, University College Dublin and the University of Warwick. I am grateful to the participants on all of those occasions for their comments. My principal intended audience is phenomenological rather than anthropological (although I hope that anthropologists will find it of interest as well); as a consequence I expend more effort explicating the anthropological than the phenomenological background and terminology. For the latter, I draw mainly though not exclusively on Merleau-Ponty, implicitly or explicitly.

[2] The word 'despite' is of course contestable, but once we allow 'phenomenologies *of...*' where the ellipsis is filled in by a non-universal type of experience, it would seem strange to ignore culture altogether.

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cited International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP 1994) as 'an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage', adding the note that '[m]any people report pain in the absence of tissue damage or any likely pathological cause'.[3] *'Chronic'* (as opposed to *'acute'*) pain is defined in various ways by different sources; frequently its definition has two components: (i) duration, often arbitrarily set at either more than 3 months or more than 6 months; and (ii) absence of biomedical explanation, since the pain persists in the absence of, or after the removal of, identifiable disease or tissue damage.

There is, however, a further label 'chronic pain *syndrome*': sometimes 'chronic pain' is reserved for pain fitting the duration criterion, and 'chronic pain syndrome' for pain fitting both criteria; here the label 'chronic pain syndrome' (also called 'persistent somatoform pain disorder', 'psychogenic pain disorder' or just 'pain disorder') signals the conviction that the pain, lacking any clear biomedical basis, is part of a *psychiatric* condition. It is classified as a 'somatoform disorder' in the so-called 'psychiatrists' bible', the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM, now in its fifth edition) as well as in the World Health Organization's International Classification of Disease (ICD) Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders (now in its tenth revision, the eleventh in preparation).[4] DSM-III (1980) used the label 'psychogenic pain disorder'; DSM-IV (1994) has dropped the term 'psychogenic', but continues to list 'psychological factors' among its diagnostic criteria.[5] ICD-10's (1993) 'persistent somatoform pain disorder' does not mention psychological factors, adding instead the clause that the pain 'is consistently the main focus of the patient's attention'.[6]

The first criterion for chronic pain is the one that most obviously raises phenomenological issues. The second criterion, and with it, the contestable nature of 'chronic pain syndrome' or 'pain disorder', indexes many of the issues raised by the medical anthropologists. These issues prove to have phenomenological resonances that might have gone unnoticed without the anthropological contribution.

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[3] They add 'usually this happens for psychological reasons'; see below.

[4] The essential features of somatoform disorders are seen by DSM-III as 'psychical symptoms suggesting physical disorder . . . for which there are no demonstrable organic findings or known physiological mechanisms and for which there is positive evidence, or a strong presumption, that the symptoms are linked to psychological factors or conflicts', and by DSM-IV as: 'the presence of physical symptoms that suggest a general medical condition. . . and are not fully explained by a general medical condition, by the direct effects of a substance, or by another mental disorder'. DSM-V was published while this book was in press; there are no significant to changes to the diagnostic criteria for pain disorder.

[5] DSM-IV also relates pain disorder and its subtypes to the diagnostic axes developed in the IASP.

[6] Some chronic pain patients may receive a different diagnosis, 'somatization disorder', whose diagnostic criteria include 'a history of pain related to at least four different sites or functions' (DSM-IV). I ignore this complication in what follows.

I begin (in Sect. 1) with a bit of background on medical anthropologists' interest in chronic pain and chronic pain syndrome, by way of orienting the phenomenological reader. Their studies are rich sources for the voices of chronic pain patients,[7] and they enable us to sketch some of the basic outlines of a phenomenology of chronic pain (Sect. 2); but this sketch is *not* yet anthropologically informed. Sections 3 and 4 point the way toward a more anthropologically informed phenomenology of chronic pain. First, Sect. 3 looks at the ways in which medical anthropologists have modelled what psychiatrists call 'somatoform disorders', and exhibits these as revealing dimensions of *bodily expressivity* that tend to go unnoticed by phenomenologists. Secondly, medical anthropologists urge that biomedicine and Western psychiatry have grown out of a kind of mind/body dualism as a *cultural* phenomenon; Sect. 4 brings out the ways in which cultural phenomenon is played out in chronic pain syndrome, and highlights the possibility of seeing phenomenological critiques of objective thought as critiques of *culture*.

1 Background: Medical Anthropology, Chronic Pain and Chronic Pain Syndrome

Medical anthropology itself began as a 'poor cousin' of anthropology proper: a practice 'committed to putting anthropology at the service of improving the public health of societies in the Third World' (Good 1994a: 4), often working in close conjunction with the World Health Organization, and thereby not only presupposing the validity of the WHO's political agenda but the pan-cultural correctness of a biomedical approach to health. Such presuppositions sat uncomfortably with developments in anthropological theory more generally, and many medical anthropologists, including most of those on whom this study is based, have since taken a 'critical' turn; they see themselves, *inter alia*, as thematizing and problematizing the cultural assumptions embedded in biomedicine. Chronic pain is an interesting vantage point from which to do this, since it is 'an important health problem that biomedicine has handled with an astonishing lack of success... [It] suggests the importance of more systematic criticism of efforts to contain and manage fundamental aspects of human suffering through technical mastery and instrumental rationality' (Kleinman et al. 1994: 6–7; cf. Hadolt 2000: 19).

An additional strand feeds into the medical anthropologists' thinking about 'chronic pain *syndrome*'. The so-called 'somatoform disorders' (including 'chronic pain syndrome' or 'pain disorder') represent, for medical anthropologists, a meeting-point[8] for

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[7] Some of these are full-fledged narratives that give a real sense of individual pain patients and the ways in which their chronic pain experience is embedded in their lives; others offer only 'snippets from patient's narratives that illustrate points which the author wishes to make' (Finkler 2008). My own use of these narratives, I fear, falls in the latter category; in my defense, I am a philosopher and not an anthropologist.

[8] There are other meeting-points, e.g., eating disorders (which in DSM-III fall under the general heading 'Infancy, Childhood or Adolescence Disorders', but in both DSM-IV and ICD-10 have a heading to themselves; anthropologists who have explored eating disorders include Warin (2003) and Eli (2011).

anthropology of the body[9] and psychiatric anthropology.[10] Critical medical anthropologists note that 'the language of medicine is hardly a simple mirror of the empirical world' – contrary to the story that it tells itself. 'It is a rich *cultural language*, linked to a highly specialized version of reality and system of social relations' (Good 1994a: 5). Its 'deep cultural logic' involves a dualistic fragmentation of experience into '[p]hysiological, psychological; body, soul … subjective, objective; real, unreal' (Kleinman et al. 1994: 8), and indeed 'individual/cultural'. The psychiatric classifications of DSM and ICD are *part* of this 'deep cultural logic': they manifestly presuppose a mind/body distinction; and psychiatry too sees itself 'a simple mirror of the empirical world', and its descriptions as pan-cultural. It is noteworthy that culture was only allowed a place in DSM in edition IV (1994), where it is largely confined to an appendix (Appendix I) which lists a variety of exotic-sounding 'culture-bound syndromes'; ICD-10 has a similar annex (Annex 2), which goes further by trying to relate these syndromes to its own classificatory codes, thus encouraging the conviction that these are nothing but local variations on universal themes.[11] Medical anthropologists note that the term 'syndrome' is itself a biomedical import, and some have preferred expressions like 'idiom of distress' (Nichter 1981); they may therefore use phrases like 'bodily idiom of distress' or 'embodied distress' in place of 'somatoform disorder'.

With this bit of background, we can begin to understand the routes by which phenomenology has swum into medical anthropology's vision. (i) *Experience*: The 'critical turn' entailed, in part, a focus on the *experience* of the sufferer – a focus that is itself fairly recent, since anthropological theory, according to one prominent practitioner, had hitherto viewed experience as 'suspect on the grounds that it was either undefinable or inaccessible' (Csordas 2002: 2; he is perhaps being disingenuous here: he should surely add 'irrelevant'). This new focus led in two (not incompatible) directions: first, to an approach grounded in the elicitation and interpretation of 'illness narratives'.[12] (Kleinman, one of my prime sources here, was a pioneer in this regard.) Secondly, to an approach with clear phenomenological credentials, centred on the body as 'creative source of experience'

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[9] Anthropology of the body is itself a relatively recent development; key theorists include Pierre Bourdieu, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, Marcel Mauss, and – yes – Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) played a major role in medical anthropology's taking-up of the anthropology of the body.

[10] Older terms for psychiatric anthropology have been 'cross-cultural psychiatry' and 'ethnopsychiatry'.

[11] Although this is seen as 'a positive step toward greater cultural inclusiveness in otherwise ethnocentric diagnostic definitions', it presupposes that cultures are themselves bounded entities, and it still largely assumes that 'culture-bound syndromes' are variants of universal psychiatric entities (Rebhun 2004: 320). Some anthropologists have gone down the route of identifying 'culture-bound syndromes' much closer to home. (Candidates include 'road rage', 'shopaholism', 'sex addiction', 'stress' and 'ADHD'; see Helman 2001: 187.)

[12] Narratives are seen not only as providing access to experience – although these anthropologists fully recognise that this access is anything but unmediated – but as constructing and reconstructing that experience (see, e.g., Good 1994a: ch. 6; Garro 1994).

(Good 1994a: 118, drawing mainly on Schutz) or 'the existential ground of culture' (Csordas 2002: 241, drawing mainly on Merleau-Ponty). Csordas sees explicit attention to 'embodied being-in-the-world' as the beginning of an answer to the 'anthropological challenge' to '*give access* to experience' (*ibid.*; cf. DelVecchio Good et al. 1994b: 200–01). Csordas' theoretical writing is unfortunately rather dense, with the consequence that the 'phenomenology' of some of those ostensibly working within his 'embodiment paradigm' consists of little more than a few slogans. (DelVecchio Good et al. [1994b: 201] are right to take phenomenologists to task for their 'self-referencing analytical terminology', but it does have a point.) (ii) *Critique of the 'medical body'*: In their hugely influential, agenda-setting 1987 article, Scheper-Hughes and Lock put forward the idea of 'the three bodies': three 'levels of analysis' of the body attention to which, they hoped, would help medical anthropologists avoid falling prey to 'the biological fallacy and related assumptions that are paradigmatic to biomedicine' (1987: 6). Phenomenology's contribution was to 'the individual body': 'the lived experience of the body-self' (1987: 7). (It was taken for granted that it had nothing to say either about 'the social body' or 'the body politic'.)[13] Phenomenology's conception of the 'lived body' constituted a powerful antidote to the 'Cartesian legacy' within biomedicine, viz. the objectified 'medical body' (Becker 2004: 125).[14]

Many of the sources I draw on here use 'anthropological methods, especially ethnographic interviews and case studies, to construct a cultural phenomenology of pain' (Singer 1994: 457); the above remarks may help to contextualize this claim.

2   The Phenomenology of Chronic Pain: Initial Orientations

There are three main phenomenologically resonant themes which emerge from these studies[15]: (1) the idea that chronic pain 'unmakes the world' and that the sufferer endeavours to 'remake it' (Hadolt 2000:19); (2) the notion that illness

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[13] See Miettinen's contribution to this volume for a discussion of Husserl's 'body politic'.

[14] Becker's article (in the recent *Encyclopedia of Medical Anthropology*) comes under the heading 'Medical systems', which might seem odd were she not seeing phenomenology's contribution in this light.

[15] A fourth widely discussed theme picks up Scarry's (1985) principal thesis that pain 'shatters' language; full treatment of this is beyond the scope of this essay, though the considerations in Sect. 3 have some relevance. A further theme which space prohibits my elaborating is that of lived time: the idea that for some chronic pain patients, 'inner and outer time' seem 'out of synch', and 'time itself seems to break down, to lose its ordering power' (Good 1994a: 126; cf. 1994b: 41). Jackson (1994b: 215) ascribes this fragmentation of time to pain patients' moving between two 'worlds': the everyday world and the 'pain-full world'. Micali's contribution to this volume has some discussion of the phenomenology of time. See also Toombs' (1988) classic article on the phenomenology of illness.

(including chronic pain) 'transforms the "lived body", in which self and body are unified and act as one in the world, to the "object body"' (Garro 1994: 104); and (3) the observation that 'at some point those around [chronic pain sufferers] . . . come to question the authenticity of the patient's experience of pain' (Kleinman 1988: 57). Phenomenologists might find some of these expressions imprecise; they might also note that the *internal relations* between these apparently disparate themes are seldom made clear. These are areas in which anthropology can benefit from phenomenology.

2.1   The Life-World

Many of these medical-anthropological accounts take their rise from Elaine Scarry's classic 1985 study *The Body in Pain*, particularly her subtitle *The Making and Unmaking of the World*: 'the dissolution of the lifeworld' in chronic pain 'is countered by a human response to find or fashion meaning' (Good 1994a: 128). But the notion of 'world' here is often left vague. Moreover, one is often left with the impression that the chronic pain patient is *worldless* prior to his 're-making' of the world (Hadolt 2000: 19). Many, however, are more careful: what is at issue is '*the disruption of the taken-for-granted world of everyday life*' (Garro 1994: 104, italics added).[16]

So how exactly does chronic pain disrupt the taken-for-granted life-world? It is easy enough to see how the patient's daily *occupations and preoccupations* (what Good 1994a: 126 calls his 'everyday life goals') radically shift: one of Kleinman's patients,[17] Howie, 'has gone through almost every available orthodox and alternative treatment for his chronic lower back pain during the 20 years that it has, as he puts it, "screwed up my life".' He has seen dozens of physicians and other health professionals, as well 'chiropractors, health food advisors, a polarity therapist, a fundamentalist minister who does charismatic healing, and an expert in Korean martial arts.' The search for alleviation dominates his whole life (Kleinman 1988: 60–1). Thus everyday life goals are 'subverted by the prominence of pain, and the world of suffering and of medicine come to be the paramount reality' (Good 1994a: 126–7).

By itself, a change in occupations and preoccupations does not seem to constitute a *radical* disruption of the everyday life-world. Howie used to be a building contractor; having injured his back on a building site, and once it became clear that the pain was not going to go away, he left that job and became a police officer (largely

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[16] This conception is presumably implicit in Byron Good's otherwise somewhat confusing description of his subject Brian: 'his pain has a "world-destroying" quality. It shapes his world to itself . . . and threatens the structure of his everyday life' (Good 1994a: 121).

[17] Kleinman is both a medical anthropologist and a psychiatrist, hence 'patient'. If I focus more on this case study than on Kleinman's others, it is because it is phenomenologically the richest.

engaged in desk work). Now, anyone who changes career like this undergoes some *alterations* in his everyday life-world; a whole set of old solicitations, affordances, obstacles, and deterrents is replaced by a new set.[18] (His working life is no longer filled with solicitations from cement mixers and cranes, but from members of the public reporting crimes and superiors demanding paperwork; the obstacles he encounters are no longer damp having ruined the cement but broken pens and word-processors, etc., etc.) Yet this type of change seems insufficiently radical for our purposes. Even if we regard Howie's change of 'career', not as from building contractor to police officer but from (pain-free) building contractor to pain-remedy-seeker, the same point applies. (He is now solicited by adverts offering acupuncture or chiropractic, and encounters obstacles in the form of the pharmacy being closed, etc., etc.).

In order to make sense of the idea that his life-world is *radically* disrupted, we need to remind ourselves that Howie's back pain, or at least the threat of it, is an ostinato in his entire life. The life-world of the person who changes career in the ordinary way may well, outside of work, remain largely unaltered: the garbage bag will continue to solicit being picked up on garbage day; the telephone still affords making phone-calls, and so on. For Howie, *none* of the solicitations of the life-world is untouched. One might almost say that every solicitation is at the same time a deterrent, so that the normally smooth, flowing and 'automatic' responses to solicitations are inhibited. 'Reaching for something in the kitchen, bending over to pick up a small garbage bag, twisting to lift up the receiver of the telephone, ... bending the wrong way at his desk to grab a file, even doing the therapeutic exercises – all can trigger a flash of pain' (Kleinman 1988: 63–4), so that Howie must perform each of these actions unnaturally watchfully, he must be 'hypervigilant' (cf. Kleinman 1988: 61; cf. Garro 1994: 105). Moreover, obstacles are far more widespread, and some affordances have become barriers: the stairs once afforded reaching the lavatory but are now a barrier to doing so; the height of the top shelf never used to be an obstacle to fetching the tin of biscuits down, but now is, etc. More generally, the world is just more *difficult* (cf. Sartre 1986: 332). There are (of course) barriers and obstacles in every life, yet with chronic pain we seem to have a 'transition from quantity to quality'.[19] This seems to me to be the *sort* of thing which one ought to mean by 'a radical disruption of the everyday life-world'.

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[18] I presuppose broad familiarity with these terms. The terms 'solicitation' and 'affordance' have come into widespread usage among Merleau-Ponty commentators to characterise the qualities of the world which appeal to the body's motor habits and skills or to which the body is 'geared'; the term 'affordance' comes from J.J. Gibson and appears to be a direct translation of the Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin's (1936) term '*Aufforderungscharakter*', sometimes translated as 'valence'. Lewin heavily influenced Sartre's descriptions of the 'hodological' nature of the life-world. The term 'obstacle' is Sartre's (1986: esp. 481ff.), the term 'deterrent' my own rendering of Lewin's 'negative valences'. Rietveld's and Romdenh-Romluc's contributions to this volume provide further elaboration of some of these phenomenological notions.

[19] This may be what Kleinman is getting at when he describes suffering as 'the result of processes of resistance (routinized or catastrophic) to the lived flow of experience' (1994: 174). He cites Scheler as the source of this conception of resistance, but could equally have cited Sartre.

This sketch of the disruption in the everyday life-world of the chronic pain patient already implicitly links that disruption to our second theme, the body.

2.2   The Body

Consider the notion that chronic pain 'transforms the "lived body", in which self and body are unified and act as one in the world, to the "object body"' (Garro 1994: 104). Can we express what she is trying to say more phenomenologically accurately?

We connected the global alteration of the solicitations of the life-world of the chronic pain patient in part to the 'inhibition' of the normally smooth, flowing and automatic responses to these solicitations. We might borrow Iris Marion Young's term '*inhibited [motor] intentionality*' (originating in her analysis of 'feminine motility') to describe this[20]: the bodily existence of the chronic pain patient 'simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an "I can" and withholds its full bodily commitment to that end in [an] … "I cannot"' (Young 1990: 148). Equally, we might speak, as she does, of '*ambiguous transcendence*', finding this in Howie's 'hypervigilance': rather than the lived body being 'pure fluid action, the continuous calling-forth of capacities that are applied to the world', the bodily existence of the chronic pain patient, like feminine bodily existence, remains '*overlaid* with immanence' (Young 1990: 148): that is, the painful body part, *even as* the body 'moves out toward the world in motions of grasping, manipulating, and so on', is always as it were factored in: the body is never the pure 'power to reckon with the possible' (in Merleau-Ponty's famous phrase, e.g. 2002: 125), but is always something to be *reckoned with* (*ibid*). (Thus 'ambiguous transcendence' is distinct from the fact that the painful body part *sometimes* 'dys-appears' [Leder 1990], i.e., that it becomes an object when, for example, there is a sudden twinge, a sudden exacerbation of the pain.) We might also discern '*discontinuous unity*' ('women tend to locate their motion in part of the body only, leaving the rest of the body relatively immobile', Young 1990: 149–50) in Howie's 'rigid posture controlling a tentative, mincing gait… [He] sits bolt upright, both feet on the floor about one foot apart, his lower back and upper torso rigid' (Kleinman 1988: 61).

Young sums up her complex analysis by saying that the woman 'lives her body as **object** as well as subject' (Young 1990: 155, bolds added); this is a somewhat more accurate way of expressing Garro's claim that the body in chronic pain is transformed into an 'object body', as long as we distinguish it, as Young does, from the sense in which *every* lived body is both subject and object, i.e. from 'the ever-present possibility of any lived body… to be touched as well as touching' (1990: 148).

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[20] Young herself makes a broadly similar comparison in the opposite direction when she says that '[w]omen in sexist society are physically handicapped' (1990: 153).

Illuminating though this analogy with Young's analysis may be, it has its limits: these modes of feminine embodiment 'have their source in the particular situation of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression in contemporary society' (1990: 153); for the chronic pain patient, by contrast, their source is rather – as we might want to say – *in their own bodies*. Hence many people with chronic pain 'describe an irrational sense of *betrayal*, the feeling that faith in their body and the taken-for-granted world have been stolen away' (Good 1994a: 127, italics added). (cf. Howie's 'expectation that nothing about his back can be taken for granted', Kleinman 1988: 61.) The patient's body may even 'become personified as an aversive agent... invested with menacing autonomy. "I think it's against me, that I have an enemy", Brian said of his body' (Good 1994a: 125). I take it that this is what Garro is indicating by her suggestion that in chronic pain 'self and body' are no longer 'unified', no longer 'act as one'; it seems more accurate to speak of a disunity *within the body itself* (cf. the amputee's disunity between the habit-body and the body at this moment, Merleau-Ponty 2002: 95). Although this type of disunity merits a fuller phenomenological analysis than I can give it here, chronic pain suggests an ambiguity *within* the body at this moment: the body whose motor intentionality is geared to the world's solicitations, and the 'affective body' which is (in this case at least) more geared to the world's deterrents.

2.3 Others

Both of these dimensions of chronic pain experience have implications for intersubjectivity.

First, normally, the world is an 'interworld': 'my perspective of the world... slips spontaneously into the other's' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 411). Yet if the everyday life-world is radically disrupted for the chronic pain patient, there is a clear sense in which his perspective no longer 'slips spontaneously into the other's', or *vice versa*. For Howie's wife Ellen, the ringing telephone unambiguously solicits the 'automatic' action of answering it; for Howie, this solicitation is imbued with deterrents via the dangers it poses for exacerbating his pain. Again, he sees obstacles where his wife does not, the whole world is more difficult for him than for her, etc.[21] This justifies Jackson's claim that 'A pain-full body occupies a world *different* from the everyday world' which Ellen's body occupies (Jackson 1994b: 213, italics added).

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[21] This could be said to describe a breakdown in the kind of change of one's world that normally comes with the presence of the other and which is the subject of Ratcliffe's contribution to this volume. The anthropologists offer their own gloss on the word 'everyday' here, which also has some relevance for the interworld: when Good calls attention to his subject Brian's absorption 'not with the relevance of career, relationships, or other of the orienting rhythms of social life in North America, but ... by the pain' (Good 1994a: 125), he is indicating a cultural dimension to Merleau-Pontyan 'inter-perspectivity'.

Secondly, normally, '[i]t is through my body that I understand other people' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 216); mutual understanding 'comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my intentions and gestures discernable in the conduct of other people' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 215). This bodily reciprocity is seriously disrupted in chronic pain patients. I want tentatively to suggest that, negatively, the motility and comportment of the chronic pain patient will often *not* be experienced by others as that of a human being in pain, and positively it often *will* be experienced by others as that of a human being who is *not* in pain (and possibly even as that of someone who is, for example, 'just not trying', or who is a 'whinger' or even a 'faker'). On the first point, the bodily expressions which we, through bodily reciprocity, recognise as expressive of pain are typically cries and grimaces; we respond with bodily 'empathic comprehension' (Jackson 1994b: 211). The chronic pain patient's body typically does *not* express his pain thus: rather, it is expressed at every moment through inhibited intentionality, hypervigilance and rigidity. On the second point, if the chronic pain patient *were* to express his pain through cries and grimaces, those cries and grimaces would seldom stop, though they might rise and fall like waves; and our bodily reciprocity is finely attuned to the length of time others' pain expressions continue. Eventually we respond to these, not with bodily empathy but with annoyance or suspicion (cf. Jackson 1994b: 211). Chronic pain patients may learn to suppress those normal bodily expressions of pain; in this case, all others' bodies will have to engage with is the inhibited intentionality, hypervigilance and rigidity, which is likely either to go unnoticed, or to come over (as girls' 'throwing like a girl' does) as their simply 'not trying'.

It is in this context that we must read the observation that '[i]f there is a single experience shared by virtually all chronic pain patients it is that at some point those around them . . . come to question the authenticity of the patient's experience of pain' (Kleinman 1988: 57); cf. the title of Jackson (1994a): 'After a while no-one believes you'. This pervasive distrust undermines family relationships and alienates the sufferer from others. Ellen says of her husband's illness: 'It's miserable, it's ruined our family life . . . I know he's in pain. But every day? Can it always be that bad? I think he is a part of the problem. He's a bit of a hypochondriac' (quoted in Kleinman 1988: 67).[22] According to Brian, 'People really can't understand the TMJ person at all. . . They don't believe in you. They think you're just a bit different and strange . . . Maybe this is just something you're making up' (Good 1994a: 125).[23]

Two qualifications: first, the lack of bodily reciprocity can be partially compensated for by an explicit *intellectual* understanding: that our bodies don't

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[22] Indeed the one good result of Howie's back surgeries, on which 'his overall judgement . . . is that they have made things worse', is they have 'created icons of his travail, scars that he can show people' to convince them that his pain is real (Kleinman 1988: 68).

[23] TMJ is temporomandibular joint disorder; it is significant that TMJ falls between at least two stools in most medical systems, viz. medicine and dentistry, and that its status as a disease entity, like a number of other diagnoses of conditions that may involve chronic pain and chronic illness, is contested (see Garro 1994).

understand 'the sexual pantomime ... of the cockchafer or the praying mantis' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 214) still allows for intellectual understanding on the part of the entomologist, and likewise others (e.g., members of the medical profession) are capable of *this* sort of understanding of chronic pain. Secondly, chronic pain sufferers at a pain clinic may experience bodily reciprocity with their fellow patients, who also occupy the 'pain-full world': they may find 'forms of communication, intuitive and involving a kind of *communitas*' (Jackson 1994b: 213); at the clinic 'they know when you don't grimace that you aren't necessarily free of pain' (Jackson 1994b: 219).

This is no more than the bare outline of (some aspects of) a phenomenology of chronic pain. Although it draws on the voices of chronic pain patients which appear in anthropological sources, there is little of substance here which could not have been said simply through phenomenological reflection on those voices. Moreover, it really only accommodates the first (duration) criterion for chronic pain; as I indicated in the introduction, it is this criterion which most *obviously* raises phenomenological issues, but, I then suggested, the second criterion does so too, as Sects. 3 and 4 bring out.

3 Embodied Distress and Bodily Expressivity

As we might expect, anthropological treatments of chronic pain will begin from the thought that 'although pain is a deeply subjective and uniquely individual experience indeed, a forcefully intense one capable of cleaving body from self and sufferer from nonsufferer ... it is nonetheless a culturally embedded one' (Singer 1994: 457).

The anthropological literature contains two principal models of embodied distress. Of these, one (Kleinman's idea of *somatization*)[24] is theoretically carefully elaborated but in ways that phenomenologically-minded anthropologists have found theoretically flawed; the other (Low's idea of *embodied metaphor*) is phenomenologically more attractive but less precisely theoretically elaborated. (Additionally, although the somatization model has been applied specifically to chronic pain syndrome, the embodied metaphor model has to my knowledge only been applied to other 'somatoform disorders'.) Very broadly, both designate ways in which certain so-called mental disorders are 'expressed in a bodily idiom'; the focus tends to be on mental disorders where this mode of expression is *culturally* sanctioned (or even demanded) and (sometimes at least) culturally understood.

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[24] Somatization is most carefully articulated in Kleinman 1980, but this is also the most phenomenologically dubious expression; some of its rougher edges are softened in his later work. For present purposes I focus on the earlier work. Low's model is unclear and in places contradictory; what I present below is my own attempt at making sense of it.

A useful object of comparison and contrast here may be Freud's conceptualization of conversion hysteria. (Although psychiatrists no longer use the term 'hysteria', the heir of this diagnosis lives on in the DSM-IV somatoform disorder called 'conversion disorder'.) Dora's bodily 'symptoms' – her limp, her persistent cough – are said by Freud to express certain desires, desires which, because they are forbidden, have, according to Freud, been repressed and can only be expressed in this inarticulate and indirect way. Phenomenology can contribute to the clarification of this description by elaborating a concept of the 'expressive body' which allows us to make sense of the idea that the body may express desires, indeed desires which the individual in a one sense knows but in another sense does not know that she possesses (see, e.g., Merleau-Ponty 2002: 185ff.). Anthropology can contribute by highlighting the social, cultural and political factors which 'forbid' the desires in question, by arguing that these desires are not as idiosyncratic to the individual as Freud may appear to suggest, and by urging that understanding their expression is not, or not entirely, the task of the psychoanalyst but equally the task of the anthropologist. (Indeed one might suggest that all members of the culture are *equipped* to understand their expression, even if all too few of them actually do: one may discern in these medical anthropological accounts a plea, on behalf of chronic pain sufferers in Western cultures, for understanding by others in their culture, an understanding that many other cultures find unproblematic).[25]

Kleinman offers various definitions of somatization; here is one: 'the substitution of somatic preoccupation for dysphoric affect in the form of physical symptoms and even illness'; he goes on to characterize it as a 'coping mechanism' (1980: 149). His model distinguishes between 'primary affects' – 'fundamental psychological phenomena engendered in an individual by external (e.g., interpersonal) and internal (e.g., intrapsychic or somatic) stimuli' – and 'secondary affects', which are the consequence of the operations of 'cognitive processes: perception, labeling, classifying, explaining, valuating' on primary affects (1980: 147). The primary affects are meant to be universal to all cultures, with culture only entering at the level of secondary affects – although, somewhat inconsistently, Kleinman suggests 'in passing' (1980: 170) that culture may have 'a more fundamental and far-reaching effect', namely on which 'stimuli' are to be attended to (cf. 1980: 171); hence (it would seem) even primary affects are not universal. Culture determines the evaluation of stimuli as what Kleinman calls 'stressors', and operates principally through the 'cognitive processes' referred to earlier. In particular, it affects the very adoption of somatization as a 'coping mechanism' through the values it places on dysphoric affect. Thus in Howie's case (although this no doubt oversimplifies), the primary dysphoric affect might be something like the need for nurturance, on which the hegemonic norms of masculinity of his culture place a negative value; so he copes with them by 'substituting' a culturally acceptable secondary dysphoric affect, back pain, 'in order' (as we might misleadingly say) to receive the nurturance he needs in a culturally sanctioned way.

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[25] Cf., in some respects, Bordo's celebrated analysis of anorexia nervosa (1993: 139–64).

Both anthropologists and phenomenologists will find this model problematic: they may point to the unreconstructed notion of a 'stimulus', to the sharp distinction between primary and secondary affects, and to the intellectualist conception of culture (not to mention of perception); it moreover remains unclear how a (mere) 'cognitive operation' could bring it about that a need for nurturance can be *experienced* as a back pain.

Low's model takes its rise from an awareness of some of these deficiencies. Her study concerns *nervios* or 'nerves', a condition that would be likely to receive a diagnosis of 'somatization disorder', another 'somatoform disorder'. Low's analysis construes nerves as an 'embodied metaphor', attempting to combine the idea that 'the physical/emotional experience of nerves ... [is] the embodiment of distress' with the idea that 'metaphor conveys lived experience in a culturally meaningful way' (1994: 142).

Many cultures recognize a condition under some such name (*nervos*, *nervosa*, *nevra* etc.). Low notes that nerves sufferers recite a litany of 'sensations' – e.g., trembling, prickling, hot and cold, dizziness, debility, fainting; 'feeling outside of oneself', 'going to pieces' – which they see as 'indicators' (rather than 'symptoms', Low 1994: 140) of nerves; these sensations themselves suggest a 'disturbed sense of body': the sense that the surface of the body is moving, that its functioning is reduced, or that the body is falling apart (see Low 1994: 158). Strikingly, their descriptions of these sensations – and, by implication, the sensations themselves – come in different (though overlapping) clusters in different cultures. On this basis she interprets these sensations as expressive, their specific meanings depending, in part, on *cultural values*. E.g., '"being tranquil" is a cultural goal expressed by all Costa Ricans' (Low 1994: 146); in urban Costa Rica *nervios* most commonly manifest in ways which indicate that the sufferer feels 'out of control' (Low 1994: 147), in rural Costa Rica *nervios* is more often experienced as being 'out of balance' (Low 1994: 149), each being in its own way an absence of that favoured 'tranquility'. Thus a sensation of twitching (the body's literally feeling 'out of control') metaphorically expresses a feeling of life's being out of control; a sensation of dizziness (the body's literally feeling 'unbalanced') metaphorically expresses a feeling of the situation's being out of balance. (There is an added twist: 'out of balance' and 'out of control' may be argued to have *originated* – in various languages – as literal descriptions of the body; their use as descriptions of lives or situations is itself metaphorical: cf. Low 1994: 143.) Scheper-Hughes stresses the point that expressing what is thus metaphorically expressed through bodily sensations more directly may be culturally or politically forbidden: her roughly contemporaneous study is set in the Alto do Cruzeiro in northeastern Brazil, where '*nervos* has become the primary idiom through which both hunger and hunger anxiety... are expressed', in a political context in which hunger is a 'disallowed discourse' since a hungry body – unlike a sick body – 'exists as a potent critique of the society in which it exists' (Scheper-Hughes 2007: 460).

One can imagine how this model might be applied to chronic pain, although none of these applications of the model will be wholly persuasive outside the context of the ethnographies or case studies that surround them; moreover, work

remains to be done fully to clarify the notion of 'embodied metaphor'. (It may be argued, for example, that Low's thesis is not so much that the bodily sensations associated with *nervios are* metaphors, but that their expressions are *expressions* of metaphors, but this is no more than a gesture in the direction of clarification.) Nonetheless these applications allow us to glimpse the possibility that the body can not only express distress, but can, through the ways in which it expresses its distress, metaphorically convey not just individual but social, cultural and political meanings. From the point of view of phenomenology, these suggestions indicate a cornucopia of possibilities for cashing Merleau-Ponty's promissory note '[i]t is impossible to superimpose on man a lower layer of behaviour which one chooses to call "natural", followed by a manufactured cultural or spiritual world' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 220).

4 Biomedicine as a Cultural Phenomenon

The rationale of the medical anthropologists' term 'biomedicine' is this: to call it simply 'medicine' would have the ethnocentric implication that systems of medicine not based on Western scientific biology are therefore *not* really medicine, but rather mere 'ethnomedicine' or 'folk medicine' based on 'beliefs' rather than 'knowledge' (see Gaines and Davis-Floyd 2004). Biomedicine is as much an ethnomedicine as shamanic healing is; and its 'deep cultural logic' is as rooted in Western culture (Kleinman et al. 1994: 8; Kleinman 1994: 169) as that of shamanic healing is in the culture of Siberian and other hunter-gatherer societies. 'The common assumptions that states of health and illness are confined to individual bodies, that illness and disease are best managed by medical specialists, that an absence of measurable disease in effect signifies that nothing is amiss, and that the preservation of health is primarily the responsibility of the individual are products of the biomedically inflected times in which we live' (Lock and Farquhar 2007: 436). This basic claim has important implications for the experience of those with so-called chronic pain syndrome. Bear in mind:

(a) that these patients are diagnosed with a *psychiatric* disorder,
(b) that differential diagnosis must rule out both 'factitious disorder' (whose motivation is 'to assume the sick role and to obtain medical evaluation and treatment': so-called 'primary gain') and 'malingering' (whose motivations include 'more obvious goals such as financial compensation, avoidance of duties related to military service or incarceration, evasion of criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs': so-called 'secondary gain') (DSM-IV). In factitious disorder and malingering but not in pain disorder, the symptoms are 'intentionally produced or feigned' (DSM-IV); and
(c) that '[p]sychological factors are judged to have an important role in the onset, severity, exacerbation, or maintenance of the pain' (DSM-IV) 'judged to be etiologically involved in the pain' (DSM-III), on the basis of '(1) a temporal

relationship between an environmental stimulus that is apparently related to a psychological conflict or need and the initiation or exacerbation of the pain; (2) the pain's enabling the individual to avoid some activity that is noxious to him or her [a form of 'secondary gain']; [or] (3) the pain's enabling the individual to get support from the environment that otherwise might not be forthcoming [a form of 'primary gain']' (DSM-III).

How do patients hear such language? Consider a) first: when Molly was told that she had a psychiatric condition and 'that there was no organic basis for her problems' (Garro 1994: 112),[26] this seemed to her to downplay her pain: 'After all, her problems were not minor; they entered into every aspect of her life' (Garro 1994: 115). Others interpret the diagnosis as suggesting that that they are somehow to blame for their suffering ('You obviously have some character defect because you can't handle your stress like everyone else'), or that they're 'crazy' ('so in addition to your pain, you've got someone telling you you're crazy', both quoted in Garro 1994: 104); some were suspicious about pain clinics, 'having heard from their families or physicians that pain centers are "for crazy people"' (Jackson 1994a: 163 n.19, cf. 165 n.29) Yet others take it that what is being said is 'that the pain is not real, that it's in your mind, in your head, it's not a real pain' (quoted in Jackson 1994a: 165 n.30; cf. Kleinman 1994: 170). This in turn may even lead patients to think that they ought to be able just to 'will the pain away': 'I *tried* willing it away. I figured "Well, if I did it to myself, I can get rid of it." . . . Didn't work' (quoted in Jackson 1994a: 154). In any case, psychiatric diagnoses carry a stigma; chronic illnesses in general carry more stigma than acute illnesses, and '[t]o the extent a pain condition has mysterious origins, it invites stigma more than an illness whose cause is clearly understood' (Jackson 1994a: 160).

Now consider the difference between pain disorder, factitious disorder and malingering (b) and c)): the main factor which distinguishes '(psychogenic) pain disorder' from factitious disorder or malingering is whether the symptoms are intentionally produced. All three are thought to involve primary and/or secondary gains, although only the first two are said to be *motivated* by the gains. (It may be suggested that the motivations are *unconscious* in the case of pain disorder, Jackson 1994a: 163–4 n.21.)[27] That patients may in fact *gain* something from chronic pain is beyond doubt: they may get a much needed respite from work or from social expectations; consideration and affection that might otherwise be lacking in their lives; and so on (see Brodwin 1994; Kleinman 1994). However, referring to these as 'gains', much less describing their pain as 'motivated' by these gains – even if 'unconsciously' – is inevitably going to be heard as asserting that they are being 'manipulative' (Kleinman 1994: 185).

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[26] Molly was actually diagnosed with somatization disorder rather than pain disorder; see note 6. She was independently diagnosed with TMJ; see note 23.

[27] Although DSM-IV no longer explicitly refers to primary and secondary gain in pain disorder, it seems that many medics continue to think in these categories.

We might of course conclude that these patients are simply *misunderstanding* the technical terminology of the medical profession: 'having a psychiatric disorder' does *not* mean that you're 'crazy', or that the problem is 'all in your head', or that it's somehow 'your fault'; to ascribe *unconscious* motives of primary and secondary gain is not to accuse you of being manipulative, etc. (Unfortunately, these patients are all too often *right*: medical practitioners do regard them as manipulative, as in some sense responsible for their condition, and as 'excessively demanding, hostile, and undermining of care', cf. Kleinman 1994: 177.)

This however misses the point: given that the 'deep cultural logic' of biomedicine is part of the culture of the chronic pain patients here studied, they *themselves* are inclined to accept both that culture's dichotomy into 'mental' or 'physical' and that culture's equation of 'real' with 'physical, i.e. [when it comes to pain] possessing a biomedical explanation'. Thus they seek a biomedical name for the cause of their suffering – and not merely because they suppose that that will give them access to an effective treatment (all too often it does not, and they may know this), or avoid the stigma of mental illness. It is rather, first, that they feel that the question 'mind or body, psyche or soma?' *must* have an answer – so Brian torments himself with the thought 'Is it my body? Is it my thinking process that activates physical stresses? Or am I, or is it the other way around? It's all that uncertainty' (quoted in Good 1994b: 46). Secondly, they *themselves* feel that unless the answer is 'soma', their pain is somehow less real or not real at all. 'No organic cause' means to these patients that nothing is wrong with them (Garro 1994: 109, cf. 115, 132).[28] Thus 'patients and physically minded clinicians *collude* in their search for "objective" evidence showing an underlying organic condition causing the pain' (Jackson 1994a: 142, italics added). They lack the cultural resources to understand that '[t]he demon within answers to neither name [psyche or soma]' (Good 1994b: 47).

Moreover, part of this same cultural logic is that 'symptoms' must either be intentionally produced or not, that the 'gains' from illness must either be motivating the patient or not, so that the illness must either be the patient's fault or not and the patient must either be manipulative or not, and, we might add, that either he feels the amount of pain he claims to feel or he does not. Patients torment each other with charges of being manipulative, seeking gains, or exaggerating the amount of pain felt (cf. Kleinman 1994: 180): one patient may say of another that he doesn't *want* to get rid of his pain: 'He likes it, he thrives on it' (quoted in Jackson 1994a: 165 n.27). They 'confess' that they themselves 'had been manipulative . . . "they've learned how to con the professionals into sympathy"' (Jackson 1994a: 156). And they worry about whether they are themselves seeking 'gains': 'I can't distinguish the reality of when I feel sick because I want to escape [e.g., from a rehearsal of the

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[28] In the 'tough love' (Jackson 1994a: 145) pain clinic described by Jackson, patients 'are reluctant to state outright that a change in attitude has actually reduced the amount of pain they experience': 'articulating that one's improvement is due to "motivation" or the "kick in the butt" has far-reaching implications for one's original model of one's pain problem' (Jackson 1994a: 155).

church music group] from when I'm really sick' (quoted in Brodwin 1994: 88); 'I'm beginning to wonder whether … [my chronic pain] is not a disguised form of avoiding failure' (quoted in Kleinman 1994: 179). These tormenting concerns *presuppose* the unambiguous reality of 'objective thought'; they presuppose those culturally sanctioned 'either/ors'.

What ought we as phenomenologists to make of this? I am inclined to say that it shows that phenomenology is – or could be – as much a *cultural* as a purely theoretical critique of what Merleau-Ponty calls 'objective thought'. Of course, in a sense phenomenology began from the recognition of a 'crisis' in culture; but I wonder whether we academic philosophers are in danger of losing sight of the new forms which that 'crisis' takes today, and the new forms of human suffering it causes.

This essay was offered as prolegomenon to an anthropologically informed phenomenology of chronic pain, with the wider purpose of establishing the potential fruitfulness of a deeper dialogue between phenomenology and anthropology. I hope that medical anthropologists may learn that phenomenology has more to offer than simply a general directive toward attending to 'patient experience' and a critique of the 'medical body'; I hope that phenomenologists may begin to think of incorporating those rich layers of cultural, social and political bodily expressivity in their phenomenologies, and even to come to see the radical possibilities of *cultural* critique in their theoretical critiques of 'objective thought'.

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Inter-subjectively Meaningful Symptoms in Anorexia

Dorothée Legrand

1 Symptoms

Anorexia is most often described, following more or less closely the characterization given by the DSM, as involving (a) a refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally normal weight for age and height, (b) an intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, (c) a disturbance in the way in which one's body weight or shape is experienced, (d) amenorrhea in postmenarcheal females (American Psychiatric Association 2000).

Notice that no mention of others is made in this characterization of anorexia. The description/definition of anorexia it proposes concerns the patient herself, her mental and physical states, independently of any relation such states might have to other subjects relevant in the patient's life. In this sense, the DSM proposes an individualistic conceptualization of anorexia. By contrast, it is underlined by patients themselves that "a disappearing act, the act of becoming invisible, is, in fact, a visible act, and rarely goes unnoticed" (Hornbacher 1998: 129); in other terms the anorexic body is visible as such, and thus involves others, at least as onlookers (Legrand 2010). The present chapter aims at further specifying the role of others in (anorexic) symptomatization.

To start doing so, let us be reminded of another way DSM-based characterization of anorexia dissociates the patient from others: by focusing on signs rather than symptoms, the latter being relevant from the first-person perspective of the patient herself, while the former would be measured from the third-person perspective of the practitioner. It is not the only difference one can make between sign and symptom but if one retains it, low body weight and disturbance of body representation wouldn't be symptoms but signs of anorexia, when the patient denies those phenomena while her doctor can measure them and objectify them. Beyond the

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terminological issue, what is important here is that a description of anorexia which focuses on low body weight and disturbed body representation does not make sense from the patient's perspective, in her world, but only in the objective and objectifying world of the psychiatrist and/or nutritionist. On this basis, it is argued in the DSM that anorexics "may be unreliable historians" as they "frequently lack insight into, or have considerable denial of, the problem" (American Psychiatric Association 2000: 540). In other words, anorexics should not be trusted when it comes to "evaluate the degree of weight loss and other features of the illness" (*Ibid*.).

Quite evidently, anorexics themselves disapprove of this judgment. To mention only one example, Carrie Arnold, a woman fighting against her own anorexia, reports on her blog the following opinion: "the DSM doesn't really do service to the underlying drivers of anorexia. [. . .] Yes, there are days when I "feel fat," but this mostly translates to "I feel stressed." Somehow, they got linked in my mind (stress–>fat–>eat less–>less stress), but that doesn't mean the driver is for me to be thin; the driver is for me to be calm, and thinness was the result" (Arnold 2010). This report may be read as departing from the DSM in two complementary directions: on the one hand, the focus is put on symptoms vs. signs, i.e. it here matters to (re) describe how one experiences one's own anorexia; on the other hand, such (re) description is believed to help determining "underlying drivers" of anorexia, on the basis of symptomatic descriptions.

Beyond patients' views on this, a lot of work is being done to uncover the "underlying drivers of anorexia", in more than one field. From a neuroscientific point of view, one is drawn to investigate what the causes of the anorexic symptoms are, this questioning being readily translated into the characterization of cerebral processes of regulation of appetite and body representation. Obviously, such investigation makes sense only on the basis of an acceptance (tacit or not) of the DSM-based description of anorexia, focusing on body weight and body representation. In general, it also assumes that the subject would be passively subjected to some organic (dys)functioning, internal to his body/brain but external to the realm of what he can ever identify with, what he can give meaning to in relation to his own (hi)story.

One may (alternatively or complementarily) look for the "underlying drivers of anorexia" from a psychoanalytic point of view. Here, the anorexic symptoms are not taken at face-value, but are rather taken as messages expressing in disguise the subject's desire. This view will be unfolded below but let me first mention that a frequent temptation in this framework is to ignore the symptoms in their specificity, as well as the behaviors correlated to them in their concreteness, in order to focus on the hidden drives, often thought to be rooted in the early history of the patient. As denounced by Assoun about somatic symptoms, "the magical evocation of the Unconscious is the worst destiny of psychoanalysis conceivable in this domain" (Assoun 2009: 57).

All together, these views seem to suffer from two complementary flaws: (a) they devalue the symptom itself, either by focusing on *signs* or by seeking the discovery of *underlying drivers*; and (b) they impose a hierarchy between the

patient and her caretaker, the former being untrustworthy while the latter is self-proclaimed as the one supposed to know – whereas this posture may only be attributed to him by a patient accepting a given therapeutic relation.

With the aim of avoiding these two flaws, the present chapter will put to work a conceptualization of *symptoms as inter-subjectively meaningful*, a conceptualization which is here considered as a working hypothesis in the sense that it is posed and evaluated in terms of its conceptual and clinical relevance: what does happen to our understanding of psychopathology in general and of anorexia in particular, if we conceive of symptoms as inter-subjectively meaningful? In the aim of addressing this question, it will be argued that:

– symptoms themselves have meaning (see Sect. 2) – therefore there is no need of digging underneath of symptoms in the hope of uncovering some hidden meaning;
– the meaning manifested by the symptoms is a disguise (see Sect. 3) – therefore symptoms should not be taken at face value, even if they don't hold any meaning other than the one they display;
– symptoms do not have meaning on their own, but only when inserted into specific and contextualized signifying *chains* delivered by a given patient, in particular in the inter-subjective context of a clinical encounter (see Sect. 4) – therefore one should avoid abstracting symptoms from their context, by reifying them in ready-made interpretations;
– meaningful symptoms are expressive or communicative (see Sects. 5, 6 and 7) therefore their formation is an intrinsically inter-subjective process.

While this chapter seeks to make a (theoretical) case for the importance of (re) describing (anorexic) symptoms as inter-subjectively meaningful, the (clinical) task of (re)describing such symptoms has to be left for another time. In other words, the present chapter will not propose any description of specific symptoms; it rather intends to provide some arguments in support of approaches which allow themselves to learn *from* symptoms, rather than *about* the symptom. "In learning *from* we do not treat the thing we are studying as merely an object to be exposed and explained but as a teaching subject to be learned from. In this spirit, we might usefully begin by considering what anorexia can teach us [...], as opposed to presuming that if we learn *about* the supposed "causes" of anorexia, we will then have the tools to stamp it out (or to force-feed it, as it were)" (Failler 2006: 106).

2   Symptoms Have Meaning

Instead of (only) trying to uncover the details of what, in a given life story or in the pattern of activation of a given brain area, might have led to "typical" anorexic symptoms (as described in handbooks), it is crucial to (also) (re)describe the specific and concrete (anorexic) symptoms themselves. The reason why it is here believed that symptoms are important is that symptoms are not taken to be opaque

surfaces which would have no meaning in themselves, and under which one should dig in order to access some hidden drivers. The meaning of symptoms is not hidden behind them but is rather given in and by the symptoms themselves. Let me try to clarify this point by drawing an analogy between symptoms as conceptualized here and Merleau-Ponty's characterization of speech – this is no more than an analogy since symptoms are not equivalent to words.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the word does not derive its meaning from the hidden thoughts it would secondarily express; rather "*the word has a meaning*" (1945: 206 [1962: 188]); likewise, symptoms have meaning. The word is not "only the external sign of an internal recognition, which could take place without it, and to which it makes no contribution" (1945: 206 [1962: 188]); likewise, the symptom is not the external sign of a process to which it makes no contribution, it is the manifestation of meaning which it contributes to elaborate. Like "speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it" (1945: 207 [1962: 190]), symptoms do not translate ready-made psychic states, but participate to the accomplishment of what is meaningful to the patient. "Speech is not the 'sign' of thought, if by this we understand a phenomenon which heralds another as smoke betrays fire. Speech and thought [. . .] are intervolved, the sense being held within the word, and the word being the external existence of the sense" (1945: 211–2 [1962: 194]); likewise, a symptom is not a sign of some hidden psychic state; rather, the meaning is held within the symptom, the symptom is the external existence of some meaning.

So far, this amounts to saying that symptoms, like words, are inseparable from their meaning. This conception of words leads Merleau-Ponty to claim that "language is [. . .] uncommunicative of anything other than itself [*ne dit rien que lui-même*], that its meaning is inseparable from it" (1945: 219 [1962: 201]). Following the analogy drawn here between words and symptoms, this leads to state that a symptom is uncommunicative of anything other than itself, that its meaning is inseparable from it. That is not to say that symptoms are uncommunicative, but that they are not communicative of any hidden carrier of meaning; their own meaning is not to be found anywhere else than on their own surface. The meaning of words (in Merleau-Ponty's quote) and the meaning of symptoms (here), do not pre-exist their own manifestation.

3   Symptoms as Satisfying Manifestations in Disguise

That symptoms manifest meaning does not guarantee that they are successfully understood; rather, they most often remain misunderstood both by the sufferer himself and by others bearing witness to such sufferance. The difficulty to read symptoms understandably may be due to their very formation. To unfold this idea, it is relevant to note, from a psychoanalytically-oriented perspective, the temporal difference between symptoms and other formations of the unconscious (slip, joke, mistake): the latter phenomena "all obey a temporality of the moment (*instant*)

[. . .]. Nothing kills a joke like asking the person who made it to repeat it. Duration and permanence, on the other hand, are essential to the symptom as psychoanalysis distinguishes it. [. . .] now we can understand what Lacan called the "et cetera" of the symptom. A symptom is destined to repeat itself, it takes all its clinical significance from this contrast with the flash and surprise of the three other formations" (Miller 1997).

Now, the idea that the symptom takes its significance from the fact that it repeats itself points to the idea that the symptom is satisfying. If it didn't satisfy anything, it would just stop. But who is satisfied by the symptom? Normally, if one may say so, there is a disjunction between the satisfaction obtained through the symptom and the dissatisfaction experienced consciously by the subject. "Symptoms – and of course we are dealing now with psychical (or psychogenic) symptoms and psychical illness – are acts detrimental, or at least useless, to the subject's life as a whole, often complained of by him as unwelcome and bringing unpleasure or suffering to him" (Freud 1917b: 3417). Even though the conscious subject is typically not satisfied with his symptoms, symptomatization is thought to be satisfying, because the lack of manifestation of what is meaningful to oneself is thought to be unsatisfying for the subject as a whole. If literal expression is vetoed, a symptom may thus form itself, but its message will have to be transformed before being and in order to be manifested: the formation of symptoms involves compromises (Freud 1917b). In other words, in order to be a satisfying manifestation of meaning, the symptom must be an "ingeniously chosen piece of ambiguity" (Freud 1917b: 3418), a disguise.

Notice that in the case of anorexia, the patient, according to herself, doesn't suffer from what is typically described as a symptom: low body weight. Quite on the contrary, she *seeks* low body weight, and feels relieved as she gets thinner. This symptom of anorexia, therefore, seems to satisfy the patient herself at the conscious level. Does that suggest that anorexic symptoms manifest something other than the pursuit of low body weight as such, something that would not be satisfying to the anorexic herself at a conscious level, but would be painful to her and rejected by her, and would be too damaging if manifested without its symptomatic disguise into low body weight?

The question thus becomes: what is manifested by the anorexic sufferer? Under psychoanalytic light, one understands that symptoms typically disguise a source of sufferance, which would be too damaging if manifested without disguise. In this sense, symptoms "cannot be taken at face value. We would be missing the point, for example, to take anorexia literally as being about not wanting to eat" (Failler 2006: 102). Eating nothing is a meaningful disguise. That symptomatic meaningfulness is displayed in a disguised manner in such a way, however, does not imply that the symptom covers some 'inner' or 'true' meaning which an interpretation should uncovered. Rather, as proposed above, the symptom is meaningful in itself. As such, it may be compared to a foreign language: it does not hide but manifest its own meaning, even though coming to understand it involves a process of translation and the consideration of its context of enunciation.

4 Reading Symptoms

Armed with the notion of symptom as a satisfying manifestation in disguise, one is lead to the following question: "what does the anorexic secretly wish for in the disguise of refusing to eat?" (Failler 2006: 101). According to the present view, one should avoid (a) digging underneath of symptoms in the hope of uncovering some hidden meaning, since symptoms themselves have meaning (see Sect. 2); one should also avoid (b) taking symptoms at face value, since they are manifestations in disguise (see Sect. 3); and one should avoid (c) covering symptoms with some ready-made interpretations. To consider this latter issue, let us be reminded that "unlike a sign – or smoke which is never found in the absence of fire, a fire that smoke indicates with the possible call to put it out – a symptom can only be interpreted in the signifying order. A signifier has meaning only through its relation to another signifier" (Lacan 1966: 234 [2002: 194]). What matters here is that (psycho)analyzable symptoms "can be distinguished not only from diagnostic indices but from all graspable forms of pure expressiveness insofar as they are sustained by a structure that is identical to the structure of language" (Lacan 1957: 444 [2002: 370–1]). Accordingly, symptoms would not have meaning *on their own*, but only when inserted into the signifying *chains* delivered by a given patient. For example, losing weight, *per se*, does not *mean* anything. Negating food neither. If it means something, it means something only in the context of the patient's own structured chains of signifiers with which he knits his world: "As particular unconscious formations, symptoms are not significations, but their relation to a signifying structure that determines them" (Lacan 1957: 445 [2002: 371]). There is no way to read the symptomatic 'letters' without considering their articulation to each other, the way letters form words and non-words, sentences, texts.

Therefore, characterizing what is written on anorexic bodies *in general* runs the risk of typifying what is singular: the texts written by a given patient in particular, in a given (inter-subjective) context, the clinical encounter for example. The enterprise remains worth pursuing, however, if we follow Freud for whom "if the individual symptoms are so unmistakably dependent on the patient's experience, it remains possible that the typical symptoms ["approximately the same in all cases"] may go back to an experience which is in itself typical – common to all human beings" (Freud 1917a: 3350). The exploration of this point will be left for another time, in order to focus on a crucial issue which remains to be discussed here: the role of others in (anorexic) symptomatization (Legrand 2010, 2011, 2012).

5 Inter-subjective Symptoms

It may be thought that a symptom emerges when the subject cannot express himself and communicate with others. This way of putting it is problematic in the current framework because it reduces the symptom to a bodily manifestation of inner states

which could be neither expressed meaningfully nor contained. On the contrary, stating that a symptom is meaningful (as proposed in Sect. 2) involves that a symptom would emerge when words cannot be uttered, the body then *expressing the meaning* which cannot be put into words. As captured concisely by an anorexic subject: "[anorexia] is not about beauty. This is about body language when every other language failed" (http://self-starvation.tumblr.com/). According to Lacan, a muzzled speech lies in symptoms [« *dans ses symptômes mêmes gît une parole bâillonnée* »] (Lacan 1953b: 31). Moreover, like parapraxes and dreams, symptoms are symbols organized in language, they express something that is structured and organized like a language (Lacan 1953b: 26). This is not to say that symptoms are words. Rather, they occur when speech is muzzled, they come about when words are missing. The symptom stands in for silence and occurs at the moment when words threaten to collapse (Assoun 2009: 294). Nonetheless, and precisely because they are meant to substitute words, they retain the structure of language – this view involving that there is more to language than words.

In this perspective, the path to the formation of symptoms is "the symbolic path. [...] the symptom manifests itself supported by a signifier whose signified is repressed, that is to say, it has not been communicated to, or accepted by, the Other" (Miller 2003); reciprocally, what is not repressed but expressed is tailored according to what can be communicated to, or accepted by, the Other. Lacan insists: a symptom "is a fully functioning [language], for it includes the other's discourse in the secret of its cipher [*chiffre*]" (Lacan 1953a: 281 [2002: 232]). As (bodily) language, the symptom thus involves others; it is in this sense that symptoms are inter-subjective: what is at stake in symptoms is the relation of the symptoms with the entire system of language, the system of signification of interhuman relations as such (Lacan 1953b: 37).

To unfold this claim, one ought to differentiate, among inter-subjective symptoms, between *expressive symptoms* and *communicative symptoms*. In expressive symptoms, what is meaningful to us is "conveyed outside us" (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 226 [1962: 207]). However, the very fact that meaning is manifested in a space sharable with others, as the word is uttered or the symptom manifested, may be enough for the word and symptom to be *expressive*, but it does not seem enough for a speaking subject to *communicate* with a listener, nor for a suffering subject to *communicate* meaning. Communicative symptoms, indeed, are not only determined by the *ex*pression (etymologically, the act of pressing *out*) of what is meaningful to oneself, but by the whole context of enunciation. The latter is determined by the presence or absence of an audience, by the type of audience that is present and absent, notably by the relationship the audience holds to the speaker, in turn determining its alleged ability to receive what is expressed (the context of enunciation does not include only particular others to who one's message is addressed, as I consider here, but also the society and culture into which one's message may hold a meaning or another, or no meaning at all; on this latter point, see Morris, this volume).

In order to communicate, one picks up words and gestures that are meant to be understood in a given context of enunciation. Communicating thus involves not

only expressing what is meaningful to oneself, but also doing so according to what can allegedly be received by the audience (present and present by proxy). Moreover, the audience is not only taken to receive what is uttered, strictly speaking, but also to do so according to the whole context of enunciation. To say it with Grice: "for *x* to have [communicated] anything, not merely must it have been 'uttered' with the intention of inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an 'audience' to recognize the intention behind the utterance" (Grice 1957: 382), this latter intention being the intention to communicate. For it to be communicative, an expression must occur with the intention to be received as so intended. For example, I might frown spontaneously or intentionally. In the former case, my frown may be *expressive* of my disapproval; in the latter case, my frown would *communicate* my disapproval only if I intend it to be received as intentional.

The relevance of this view here is that it allows drawing a crucial distinction between a "space of expression" and "communicative behavior" (Ingerslev 2010, 2012). The former involves the manifestation of what is meaningful to oneself (be it a sensation or a thought) into a space sharable with others; the latter involves in addition the intention to convey meaning and the tailoring of expression according to a given context of enunciation, which is determined by one's intentions to convey one's intention to communicate. "Shortly, perhaps, we may say that 'A [communicated] something by *x*' is roughly equivalent to 'A uttered *x* with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention'" (Grice 1957: 384).

Depending on what is meant precisely by "intention" in the present context of enunciation, this view can raise the standard of communication too high. To avoid narrowing down communication to situations of deliberate expression, I propose to re-read Grice in a phenomenological context. In particular, the notion of intentionality can be interpreted in a phenomenological sense, i.e. as directedness. In phenomenology, consciousness is thought to be intentional as one is not conscious *simpliciter*: one's act of consciousness is intentional in the sense that it is "directed at" what one is conscious of. By analogy, communication would be intentional, not in the sense that the speaker would necessarily express deliberately what is meaningful to him, but in a phenomenological sense: communication would be "directed at". In particular, a communicative subject would necessarily direct his expression to a purported audience, while an expressive subject would not. In this sense, one can be expressive alone while one cannot communicate alone: the audience is constitutive of the act of communication, be it an audience really out there or merely imagined/represented. Importantly, the difference between expression and communication, as characterized here, is not that the latter does while the former does not involve others. Both involve others, but in different ways. Expression is at least potentially shared with others, as it is a manifestation of meaning in a space sharable with others. Communication is directed to others and shaped so as to comply with such directedness; it is not only shared but shaped according to what is thought to be shared.

On the basis of the characterization of symptoms as having meaning (Sect. 2), what is proposed here is that symptoms may either express meaning or

communicate meaning. If it is accepted that symptoms have meaning, it should be uncontroversial that any of their manifestation expresses meaning. But (some) symptoms are (at least partly) not only expressive but also communicative. Let us follow Lacan here: "Lacan says that the symptom is a phenomenon of belief, constituted by the fact that one believes in it: *one believes it*, one believes in it, as one believes in an entity that could say something. [...] the belief that Lacan talks about is like a belief in the "wanting-to-say" of the symptom" (Miller 1997). The symptom, or at least the symptom after its "analytic domestication", is not only 'saying' (expressing) something (meaningful) but involves a "wanting-to-say", i.e. it involves an expression that is intentionally meaningful, an expression the meaning of which is 'directed at' the purported receiver of the expression, an expression which is thus believed to reach a receiver, i.e. a communication. Therefore, the wanting-to-say of the expression involves the wanting-to-be-listened-to by the one the expression is directed at. It involves a belief that the expression wants-to-say something to its receiver (be it oneself). For example, as we saw above, I may frown spontaneously and that may express a disapproval; or I may frown as I intend (consciously or not) to communicate my disapproval to the one experiencing this frown; but I do so only if I believe (consciously or not) that "frowning" in the given context wants-to-say "I disapprove". This belief implies that my frown is directed specifically at someone whom I take to be able to receive what I want my frowning to say: I take my interlocutor to understand that I intend to express my disapproval, that I intend him to receive my disapproval as expressed intentionally, communicated to him. Likewise, I may eat nothing as I intend (consciously or not) to communicate my refusal to reduce the relationship between me and others to the transaction of food; but I can do so only if I believe (consciously or not) that refusing to ingest food in the given context wants-to-say "refusal to reduce the relationship between me and others to the transaction of food", i.e. if I believe that the one bearing witness to my refusal to ingest food can possibly witness it as holding such meaning: this is what I intend you to understand by refusing to ingest food. In that case, the symptom does not only express (press out) some inner tension but communicate to relevant others what is meaningful to the sufferer. Such symptoms would be communicative in the sense that they would not be held alone, or would not be held equivalently in front of any random audience. Rather, they are tailored according to how they are meant to be received.

Importantly, what is at stake here is how one's expressions may *possibly* be received, not how they are actually received. Moreover, and just as importantly, one's acts of communication need not be consciously communicative: I may not be able to consciously utter "this is what I intend you to understand by refusing to ingest food" and if I were able to consciously and explicitly utter what I intend you to understand, I would not need to refuse ingesting food to communicate it. Nonetheless, my act of refusing to ingest food remains communicative if it is tailored – be it unconsciously – according to its possible audience.

Considering that anorexic symptoms are both expressive and (partly) communicative, we understand that "responses that refusals provoke [in others] may in fact be crucial to uncovering something about why refusals are endeavored in the first

place" (Failler 2006: 100). In this view, "anorexia is not only an *intra*personal matter; it is a way of relating that implicates the other" (Failler 2006: 104). In this sense, anorexia is an intrinsically inter-subjective process. On this basis, if indeed anorexics write for others on their body, one ought to ask how food may become a meaningful pencil.

6 Communicative Feeding and Inter-subjective Bodily Feeling

To submit her eating behavior to a voluntary control that abuses her minimal nutritional needs, the anorexic subject must have a meaningful relation to food (-intake) that bypasses the homeostatic regulation of the physiological constants of her body. Acknowledging this raises the question of what the regulation of food-intake can be vulnerable to, so as to possibly violate its own condition of viability. Typically, eating is partly regulated on the basis of the subject's experience of her need for food: hunger. The hypothesis here, which can be exploited to understand both anorexic and typical bodily experiences, is that the subject's experience of hunger, of her body more generally, as well as her relation to food(-intake), is not a private affair but is rather vulnerable to her relation to others.

It would be (at least) from birth on that one's (bodily) experience would be inter-subjectively structured (for a detailed consideration of this issue from both psychoanalytic and phenomenological perspectives, see Taipale, this volume). A primary form of inter-subjectivity has been characterized by Trevarthen as the "linking of subjects who are active in transmitting their understanding to each other" (1979: 347). Since such form of communication takes place when the child cannot yet exchange lexical meaning with adults, some other tools for communicating must be in place. As argued for by D. Stern (1985: 85), "infants inhabit a sensory world in which they integrate cross-modal experience, recognizing the patterns of sounds, sights, and touches that come from self and those that come from an other as separate phenomena, each with its own singular temporal structure". More precisely, a self-synchrony involves that "starts, stops, and changes in direction or speed" in different parts of one's own body, such as limbs, torso, and face occur synchronously with each other (Stern 1985: 83); likewise for others, but with a different tempo. More generally put, "all the stimuli (auditory, visual, tactile, proprioceptive) emanating from the self share a common temporal structure, while all of those emanating from an other share a different temporal structure" (Stern 1985: 84).

On the basis of a temporal, rhythmic differentiation between oneself and other, different matching operations occur. In particular as developed in details by Stern (1985: 223), social referencing allows the other to lower the ambivalence of one's own feelings. This is done notably by affect attunement thanks to which the other manifests that he is sharing such and such feelings experienced by the infant,

thereby accentuating these feelings at the expense of other feelings which would not be shared. In line with Stern's framework, Trevarthen and collaborators argue that "communicative musicality" (Malloch and Trevarthen 2008; Malloch 1999–2000) would play a crucial role to put primary inter-subjectivity in place, as only appropriately timed gestures and vocalizations allow for the instauration of dynamic, dyadic and dialogical exchange of address and response. Micro-analyses of patterns of vocalizations exchanged by the baby and her mother have shown that together they "generate a coherent system which is constrained by matching rhythmic and emotional factors in the two subjects" (Malloch 1999–2000: 30): a 'family melody' is hummed.

Interestingly for the present discussion, in his account of communicative behavior, Trevarthen leaves aside feeding behaviors which, "while invoking others, are self-regulatory for the infant and disruptive of reciprocal intersubjectivity" (1979: 325). In the same text, he also mentions that, while in the lab, the "mother rarely talked about what needed to be done to attend to the baby's physiological needs. Nearly all the mother's utterances were about how the baby felt, what the baby said and what the baby thought" (Trevarthen 1979: 340). In Trevarthen's account, therefore, need-related behaviors are not communicative while, reciprocally, communicative behaviors are not need-related. This dissociation, however, seems factually inaccurate. In normal everyday life – if not in the lab – communication is not only about smiling to each other and looking at each other's eyes. Behaviors primarily directed to the baby's physiological needs do not interrupt 'family melodies' but provide a context to it. Mother and child can vocalize only for the fun of it but it may be just as crucial that communication is given some space even when physiological needs come to the fore. A mother feeding her baby is communicating with her: the baby receives nutritious elements and communication cues at once, as the feeding mother is talking to the baby or not, caressing her or not, etc. More precisely, "feeding [. . .] is one of the first major recurrent social activities, an occasion that repeatedly brings parent and infant into intimate face-to-face contact, during which the infant cycles through various states, including alert inactivity. (The newborn sees things best at a distance of about 10 in. – the usual distance from a mother's eyes to the eyes of an infant positioned at the breast.) The feeding activity thus assures that the infant, when in an appropriate state to be attentive and attracted to stimulation, will be offered an engagement at appropriate distances with a full array of human stimulation, in the form of the parental social behavior that generally accompanies the feeding activities" (Stern 1985: 236).

Moreover, be it during feeding or not, the baby is not only *reactive* to the caretaker's gestures and vocalizations. Quite on the contrary, the caretaker is typically subordinated to the baby's expressions (Trevarthen 1979: 338), as the baby calls for interaction, signaling her physiological needs and what she wants the world to be like (Trevarthen and Reddy 2007: 45). The baby's call is heard, or not. When the call of a hungry baby is replied to with food, the tension of hunger is appeased; by the same token, the mother's responsiveness to her baby's call validates the baby's developing consciousness of her own bodily sensations – in this particular case the sensation of hunger. Depending on whether or not her call

receives a response, the baby is given or not the power to impact her world on the basis of her bodily sensations. In particular, the baby may or may not influence her mother's behavior on the basis of her sensation of hunger (Bruch 1973 [1994: 73–75]). The mother elicits feeding behaviors in or out of tune with the baby's bodily sensations of hunger; a 'family melody' emerges or not between the feeding mother and her hungry baby. In this sense, feeding is communicating.

We understand that, as conceived of here, the experience of one's bodily sensations is neither inner nor innate: through one's ongoing experiences and depending on the (in)validating feedback received from one's physical and social environment, bodily sensations are sharpened – *do I feel something in my stomach really*, *or is this only in 'my head'*? – and differentiated from each other – *do I feel hunger or anger*? As experiencing one's body partially depends on inter-subjective validation, one's bodily experience can be said to be heteronomous.

In the present view, organic/physiological, subjective/experiential and inter-subjective/relational bodily dimensions jointly compose one's bodily experience. In the intermeshing of these multiple dimensions, however, a tension might appear (see Micali, this volume, for a consideration of a melancholic breakdown of what I call here "communicative musically" and which he investigates via the Merleau-Pontian notion of intercorporeality). In general, Trevarthen finds that mother's responses are confirmatory and highly supportive of the baby's vocalization. On the contrary, when the mother is active but unresponsive, i.e. when she does not act in tune with the baby's own gestures and vocalizations, the baby reacts first by protesting and then by withdrawing if his protest remains unsuccessful (Murray and Trevarthen 1985). Moreover, the recurrent or systematic lack of 'family melodies' from early on would lead the child to distrust her bodily sensations and to feel that her heteronomy is reducing rather than permitting her autonomy. Heteronomy is enhancing one's autonomy when signals from others come as a validation of signals coming from one's own body. Such validation is not necessarily a confirmation, in the sense that signals from others might – and most often do – differ from one's bodily signals. Nonetheless, even in such case, what matters is that others respond to one's calls – if only to say no. Contrastively, heteronomy becomes disruptive of one's autonomy when others are active but unresponsive. Here, calls are not only contradicted by the caretaker's aversive reply; they are not heard. Lacking inter-subjective validation, the baby may feel she's crying in silence. She may keep crying until someone replies to her call, or she may adjust her developing experience of her bodily sensations: in the long run, her needs may be silenced by the lack of validating response from her physical and social environment – silenced for others if she stops calling and more radically silenced for herself in her attempt to make her feelings fit with how others perceive her – *as I am unknown to myself*, *I am trying to be(come) who the others perceive I am*. Such processes may be radicalized if the caretaker does not present her own vulnerability to the child – *if the other*, *who does not hear my calls*, *is infallible*, *it means the sensation grounding my calls are not legitimate and ought to be silenced*. Likewise, such radicalization may happen if the child seeks to constantly (re)validate others to avoid witnessing their vulnerability – *if what I feel isn't received by others*, *it is not because others fail to be*

receptive but because my calls are not receivable. The impact of such detrimental dialectic would be especially acute on the experience of hunger (Bruch 1973 [1994: 82]), since the hungry baby is left with no other choice than preserving some balance with her caretaker on whom she entirely depends to be fed. Thus, she must incorporate the ways others perceive her body, recalibrating her bodily experiences according to these external cues, be it at the expense of her internal sensations (*Ibid.*: 81).

All together, we see here that food provides one of the most meaningful tools to write on one's body with a view to expressing oneself and communicating with others. In this light, the anorexic radical restriction of food can be revisited.

7 Expressive and Communicative Anorexia

On the basis of the distinction, among inter-subjective symptoms, between expressive symptoms and communicative symptoms (Sect. 5), a question that arises here is the following: are anorexic symptoms only expressive or also communicative? I am here proposing that they are both at once.

That anorexic symptoms are expressive should not be a matter of too much debate. Indeed, at first glance, anorexia involves a transformation of one's body, the body that is not only represented by oneself but also expressed visibly in a space sharable with others (Legrand 2010).

As far as one's own representation of one's body (image) is concerned, it is crucial to consider the meaning her body image might have for the anorexic. Typically her "vigilance", as she constantly checks her body as the mirror reflects it, does not reveal "vain pride" but "*a need for reassurance that* [*she is*] *still* there" (Hornbacher 1998: 13–4). This suggests that the mere experience of her body as she feels it 'from the inside' does not suffice to attest her existence. Quite the opposite, she seeks to validate her self-experience/self-existence in the experience of her body image. It would be as if, facing her image in a mirror, a surprising thought – conscious or not – would suddenly come to her mind: "so all this really *does* exist!" (Freud 1936: 4825). To exploit here Freud's description of his experience of incredulity when he faced the Acropolis (*Ibid.*), it is as if the person who would express such surprise would be divided from herself. On the one hand, such person would behave as though she were obliged, under the impact of an unequivocal observation (the sight of the Acropolis for Freud, the sight of her own body for the anorexic), to believe in something the reality of which had hitherto seemed doubtful – or has been denied (Freud encountering himself as *a man who really has gone a long way*, while facing the Acropolis; the anorexic encountering *the visibility of the transformation she operates on her own body*, when seeing her body). On the other hand, such a person is justifiably astonished, because she had been unaware that she ever doubt/denied what she now witnesses (the real existence of the Acropolis, in Freud's case; the visibility of her bodily transformation, in the anorexic's case). This points to the idea that the transformation operated by the

anorexic is meant to be a transformation which she needs to place in the visible world, its manifestation 'out' there verifying the very existence of what she doubts about (Legrand 2011, 2012).

The visible body, of course, is visible not only when it faces a mirror, but also when it faces others. Arguably, it is a serious mistake to believe that anorexics 'just' seek to be seen as thin-therefore-beautiful. Meeting an anorexic subject, giving a simple look at any picture of her, or reading any clinical description, is intuitively convincing that "anorexia nervosa is an extremely complex illness, much more than dieting gone wild" (Bruch 1978: 94). What is at stake is not beauty – even from the supposedly distorted perspective of the anorexic: she doesn't think she is seen as beautiful by others. She doesn't want to please others' gaze. "The anorexic's rituals – her food compulsions, her exercise routines, her militaristic regimenting of every aspect of her life, every movement and action of her body – have a goal, a purpose, which only peripherally has to do with being thin to be thin, and has everything to do with changing and modifying the self, while at the same time communicating the 'attitude' of the self" (Lester 1997: 485).

As the notion of communication steps in here, we must turn to Lacan again, to understand that anorexia is not only an issue of (expressing one's body) image but also a symbolic (communicative, other-directed) issue. According to Lacan indeed "mental anorexia is not a *not eating*, but a *eating nothing*. I insist: this means *eating nothing*. Nothing is precisely something that exists on the symbolic plan*" ["*L'anorexie mentale n'est pas un ne pas manger*, mais un* rien manger, *j'insiste – cela veut dire* manger rien. *Rien c'est justement quelque chose qui existe sur le plan symbolique*"] (Lacan 1998: 184–5).

To understand what might be the symbolic existence of nothing, we must underline that inter-subjective sharing cannot be reduced to the transaction of things. Inter-subjective relations are shaped by signs of love, attention, understanding, listening of the subject('s desires) (Lacan 1998: 140). The clearest sign of inter-subjectivity (love) is not the gift of a thing, is the gift of no-thing, the gift of what one lacks (Lacan 1998: 142; Johnstone 2005). A gift is an object received as a sign of the sensitivity of the giver to the receiver's desire. As such, it is not reducible to the transaction of any particular object but materializes the interaction of subjects. A gift materializes no-thing and as such, it exists symbolically, the materializing object being replaceable by any other object. It may be replaced by words (Lacan 1998: 175), and it may as well be replaced by no-thing at all.

Any object can be received as a gift but the ambivalence of the object-as-gift (thing-as-nothing) would be particularly acute in the case of food. Indeed, as proposed above, due to human's prematurity which forces the child to receive food from others, one's reception of need-fulfilling food is linked from early on to inter-subjective relations: receiving food as a thing which nourishes is thus linked to the gift of nothing.

Eating relies primarily on the goodwill of others and the demand to be fed, addressed by the subject to others, is the simplest oral demand. To this demand, the (m)other responds by the inverse demand that the subject lets himself be fed. We see here that the feeding behavior involves an inter-subjective link, which

overflows the nutritional demands. Due to this interlacing of nutritional demands and inter-subjective sharing, the fulfilling of nutritional needs may silence both at once the nutritional needs and the inter-subjective desire (Lacan 1998: 189). A satiated body may thus come to be experienced as just a thing satisfied by the ingestion of things, neither in needs of food, nor engaged in inter-subjective sharing (see also Micali, this volume, for a consideration of the increased feeling of materiality of one's body which may be experienced as just a thing in melancholia). Starving the body is thus avoiding its reduction to a thing; starving the body is manifesting, within the need for food, the desire for others.

In this context, desire is "what is evoked by any demand beyond the need that is articulated in it, and it is certainly that of which the subject remains all the more deprived to the extent that the need articulated in the demand is satisfied. Furthermore, the satisfaction of need appears only as the lure in which the demand for love is crushed, by sending the subject back to sleep [. . .]. But the child does not always fall asleep in this way [. . .], especially if the Other, which has its own ideas about his needs, interferes, and in place of that which it does not have, stuffs him with the choking pap of what it has, that is to say, confuses his needs with the gift of its love. It is the child one feeds with most love who refuses food and plays with his refusal as with a desire (anorexia nervosa)" (Lacan 1958: 627–628 [2001: 200]). Abandoning one's desire to others, enslaving one's desire to the power of satisfaction which the (m)other is endowed with, eating, is accepting that one's existence as a desiring subject may be shattered by the fulfillment of one's bodily needs. In a nutshell, this view sheds light on why a subject who is hungry may not allow himself to be fed, as he may refuse to be fulfilled as demand, refusing to disappear as desire (Legrand 2011).

8 Conclusion

In the view proposed here, anorexia is not understood as primarily involving the construction of a body image with obsessive care for its shape and weight. What anorexics primarily seek is rather a manifestation of themselves as someone irreducible to a thing, someone who ought to be addressed by others without involving the transaction of things. Patients don't only express this in the world but also communicate it to others: what the anorexic writes on her body is the following message which she directs at (relevant) others who may possibly read it: *this* (*body*) *is how I want to be loved by you*, *as a subject irreducible to any object*. Such anorexic subject does not only express in a space sharable with others what she is as subject: nothing. She also communicates to others how she wants to relate to them beyond the transaction of objects and exchange of bodies. In this sense, anorexia is intrinsically inter-subjective.

More generally, it is my hope that this chapter manages to convey the idea that symptoms are meaningful and thereby inter-subjective, i.e. expressive or even communicative.

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The Alteration of Embodiment in Melancholia

Stefano Micali

This study endeavors to describe the transformation of embodiment in melancholia, conceived as a severe form of depression, from a phenomenological point of view.[1,2] The article is divided into three sections: the first part illustrates several particular disturbances of the embodied experiences in melancholia. The research on these particular phenomena will lead us to consider the transformation of the embodied experience in more general terms under the notion of corporealization. The second section aims at highlighting essential characteristics of corporealization by means of a critical discussion of the significant interpretations of this notion given in phenomenologically oriented psychiatry. In the third section the notion of corporealization is revised in light of the experience of the void.

1 Specific Disturbances of Embodiment in the Melancholic Condition

Before addressing different forms of alteration of the lived body in melancholia, it is appropriate to make a brief methodological remark.

The aim of this section is to describe different kinds of disturbances in melancholia, although it is not to assert that all these disturbances *clearly* appear in each

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[1] I would like to thank Rasmus Thybo Jensen and an anonymous referee for their careful reading, comments and suggestions.

[2] Following previous research, I will attempt to highlight a major disorder without drawing a clear-cut distinction between depression and melancholia; in the present article I prefer to use the word melancholia because greater emphasis has been placed on this word in the phenomenological psychiatry (Minkowski 1933; Gebsattel 1954; Jaspers 1957; Straus 1960; Binswanger 1960; Tatossian 1979; Tellenbach 1980; Maldiney 1991; Theunissen 1991; Kraus 2001; Fuchs 2005).

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single case. At the same time the identification and verbalization of these disturbances requires remarkable introspection skills, which should not be taken for granted in all patients. Nevertheless, the analysis of such disturbances is extremely significant as it shows the essential direction of the tendencies proper to *all* forms of depression/melancholia in the particular fields of experience (proprio-perceptive system, oral sense etc.). These alterations should not to be conceived as symptoms of a syndrome, but as essential characteristics (*Merkmale*) of the melancholic condition in Kurt Schneider's sense (Schneider 1973).[3] It is worthwhile recalling Tatossian's thoughts in this context: "If the alterations of lived time, the troubles of the lived space or the phenomena of depersonalization-derealization were merely symptoms, they would have little clinical significance because of their rarity. They are relevant because, although clinically contingent, they still manifest the essence of the melancholic disorder more or less hidden in other expressions" (Tatossian 1979, 121, my translation). In this respect, the difference between a phenomenologically oriented psychiatry and the objectivistic-neo-behavioristic psychiatry is particularly evident (Parnas and Bovet 1995). From a phenomenological perspective melancholia/depression has to be conceived as a unitary phenomenon that transforms and deforms all different dimensions of experience in a coherent way (embodiment, time-consciousness, intersubjectivity, the relation to God and to the ultimate concerns). It is during its most acute and severe phases that the essence of the melancholic condition in the distinct fields of experience becomes apparent. The discovery of this essence allows us to recognize the tendencies already present but not clearly recognizable in other expressions of previous stages.

Regarding the disturbances of embodiment in melancholia it is possible to introduce a distinction of three different dimensions: (a) disturbances mainly concerning the relation of the body with the surrounding environment; (b) disorders mainly related to the way in which the body feels itself; (c) disturbances mainly concerning the relation between my body and the other's body (intercorporeality). These three dimensions are closely interdependent in experience.

In this section the disturbances concerning the intersubjective dimension of embodied experience will not be examined; instead, some essential aspects of the first and, in more detail, of the second dimension will be emphasized.[4]

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[3] In this regard it is not possible to address the fundamental distinction between symptoms and *Merkmale* in the phenomenological paradigm of psychiatry. Here it suffices to consider that symptom as a medical term has the categorial status of a *sign/indication* (*Anzeichen*) that *refers* to a something else (the objective presence of a syndrome): we infer from the appearances of many symptoms the presence of a disease. The *Merkmal* does not refer to anything else: it is a primal manifestation of the disorder as such. It is the disorder. Regarding the debate about the difference between symptoms and characteristics (*Merkmale*) the following studies are used as reference: Blankenburg (1980), Müller-Suur (1958), Kraus (1991), Tatossian (1978), Wyrsch (1946).

[4] The subject "intercorporeality" is under-researched in psychiatric literature. For an extensive research on the alteration of the communication in terms of pre-reflexive resonance between the

1.1 Disturbances Primarily Concerning the Relation of the Body with the Surrounding Environment

In melancholia, the emotional resonance or affectability of the surroundings is diminished, if not completely lost. The melancholic person inhabits a colorless world dominated by the feeling of not feeling. Br. L., a melancholic patient of Gebsattel, says in this sense: "So there is a place in me that is receptive to the things, the colors, the sounds, the faces – but of course nothing of this remains (in the melancholic condition)" (Gebsattel 1954, 27, my translation). It becomes impossible to "host" the pervasive atmosphere of the surrounding world. In this regard, it is important to emphasize the alteration of the oral sense (smell and taste) in severe forms of depression. The oral sense has an essential role in our perception of the atmospheric character of the surrounding world (Tellenbach 1968). This disturbance can take the form of an increasingly weaker capability (*Entstimmung*) to feel the qualitative differences related to tasting and smelling: the person is able to recognize a specific smell or taste, but he/she does no longer feel or enjoy it. He/she is not embraced, wrapped, and pervaded by all the different aromas: "The ability to determine smell does not suffer any losses. The receptivity to the atmospheric – receptivity that is mainly felt through the oral sense – is rather extinguished. The atmospheric (*stimmunghaft*) content of the object of perception is no longer captured. Its existence is known and always expected but never felt" (Tellenbach 1968, 126, my translation).

The transformation of the oral sense can assume another and more invasive form: the person may start to perceive an unpleasant or even a horrible smell – all kinds of food can have a disgusting character. In this case Tellenbach speaks not of *Entstimmung*, but of *Verstimmung* (negatively toned mood). The stench can come from the outside (a disturbance of receptive nature) or from the person's own body, in which case the person perceives a smell of rotting and putrescence coming from him/herself.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that the loss of the atmospheric character is related to an alteration of the perception of space (Binswanger 1955). It is particularly important to mention a modification of the experience of depth: everything appears to be flat. One of Tellenbach's patients reports in this sense: "I saw everything as flat, it did not have any dimension anymore. The people were also flat. I had to touch everything, the objects in the space [...], in order to convince myself that they really had more dimensions" (Tellenbach 1956, 13, my translation)."

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lived body of the melancholic person and Other's lived body (see Micali 2013). The aspect of intercorporeality with regard to the notion of corporealization as *chrema* will be considered in the second section of the present article.

1.2 Disturbances Centered on the Ways in Which the Body Feels Itself

The following description of the different disturbances concerning the *sense-experience of one's own lived body* has a concise and almost schematic character. Nevertheless, it can be helpful for realizing the extent and the significance of the transformation of the lived body in melancholia.

(a) *Sense of gravity*. Melancholia is essentially characterized by the phenomenon of *gravity*: everything appears to be heavy (Kraus 1977, 2001). Not only the objects are felt heavier, but even one's own body has to be carried, almost dragged. The spatialization of the melancholic existence is vertically arranged not only in terms of *gravity*, but also in terms of falling down (Tatossian 1979).

(b) *Alteration of the Innenleiblichkeit*. A significant modification of the embodied experience in melancholia regards the way in which the unification of one's own lived-body is felt, of what in Husserl's terms could be defined as the organic system of *Innenleiblichkeit* (Hua, XIV, 327). This transformation concerns the ways in which one feels oneself inside one's body as a whole. Many melancholic patients report the emergence of a gap between themselves and their own body. In some cases of melancholia the organic sense of the union of one's own limbs is weakened, too. "Yesterday I still had the feeling that I have to press the hand into the arm, in order to stabilize it, as I recently said: I have to implant myself into the body in order to have at last the impression of existing (for existing)" (Gebsattel 1954, 25, my translation). The limbs neither immediately respond to the affections and affordances coming from the environment, nor do they immediately respond to one's own will. One of Borgna's patients says in this sense: "It is as if I have to walk on two broken legs" (Borgna 2001, 42, my translation). If the *Innenleiblichkeit* as sense of being inside of one's own body – in which the body is felt as a whole and its different limbs and parts are in a relation of a reciprocal resonance – is modified, then a sense of detachment from one's own body takes place. The melancholic person conceives of his relation to the body in instrumental terms, as if the body would be a tool used from outside completely detached from sense-experience. A kind of desynchronization between the receptive-psychomotor movements of the body and the awareness of these movements contribute to creating the sense of detachment from its own body and from the world. As one patient puts it – "I have often noticed that the pressure of the hand came to consciousness much later – I probably was not inside the hand. Is it because you're not inside your limbs that walking was not walking, but rolling, as a forward movement on wheels?" (Gebsattel 1954, 27, my translation).

(c) *Disturbances concerning particular and local pains*. In melancholia the patient often feels a sharp pain in the upper part of the throat or a kind of an acute bite to the stomach. This acute pain takes an emblematic value: it becomes the mark of the melancholic condition. A patient of Kurt Schneider said "she was always sad" (Schneider 1973, 137). Schneider, speaking about the sadness of the patient, continues: "It consists rather of an inner turmoil and irritation that

stuck in the chest. She once complained about feeling pressure in the chest and stomach. If someone asked her what her feeling was, she replies: 'This is more than sadness.' – Another patient points to her chest: horrible sadness I have inside. She often blamed the pressure for the melancholia: 'only the pressure has made me melancholic'" (Schneider 1973, 137, my translation).

The patients immediately recognize that this bodily disturbance is also essentially related to their personal (psychic and existential) condition. As Kraus stated, the pressure on the chest is immediately related to a heavy task or to anguish, the feeling of tiredness is associated to apathy (Kraus 2001). The intertwining of these two aspects clearly appears in Tellenbach's report about his patient Th. H.: "The patient lost all joy of life and every interests, had an inner fear, first sensed by a feeling rising from the center of the chest to her neck – like a foreign body of the size of a fingertip in the throat which she tried 'to cough out', later as a feeling of emptiness, of being hollow in the chest" (Tellenbach 1956, 12, my translation).

This local pain should not be understood as a symptom of the melancholia, but is in a certain sense the emblematic mark of this condition. The patient has the feeling of being overwhelmed by this acute pain. This feeling of being-overwhelmed can be brought about by one or more of the following three characteristic features of the pain-experience:

1. In many cases the pain is so acute and sharp that it is almost paralyzing.
2. These acute pains do not have any correlation to organic diseases. There is no explanation for them. The contingency and absurdity of this pain additionally confuses the patient.
3. Many of these disturbances have an extremely abnormal character. They have nothing in common with the past experiences or with the experiences of others. The strangeness of the disturbance increases the sense of detachment from the intersubjective life-world.

A characteristic example of a local and abnormal disturbance concerning one's own body can be found in the text *Ver Heen*, written by the famous Dutch psychiatrist Kuiper who suddenly suffered from a severe form of depression. During a walk he had a strange feeling at the level of the diaphragm. "I had to hold my breath because 'it' came from my body up. I did not know. I pressed my diaphragm down, the anxiety went into panic. Now I felt 'it', while I maintained my throat in a cramped condition. It was the intestines itself that surfaced. I imagined that if it continues, I will vomit my guts out. Noortje [his wife] asked what was wrong. I told her that I absolutely was not able to explain" (Kuiper 1988, 56, my translation).

Kuiper is not even able to name the disturbance: he can only refer to it by saying "it". Language fails him. The failure of language not only betrays the impossibility of communicating the experience to others, but also shows the incapacity of the subject to relate him/herself to the disturbance.[5]

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[5] The whole of Section I aims to give an overview of the distinct disturbances regarding the relation of the body with its own environment and the *sense-experience of one's own lived body*. I do not aim at giving an exhaustive list of these kinds of disorders.

2   Alteration of Embodiment as Corporealization

After having taken into account particular aspects of the bodily alteration in melancholia, I will investigate this transformation from a more systematic point of view. In the phenomenological tradition, the alteration of the embodiment in melancholia has principally been described as a disturbance of the relationship between the lived body (*Leib*) and the objective body (*Körper*), or more precisely, as a process of corporealization. In this section, I aim to address different interpretations of the notion of corporealization given in phenomenologically-oriented psychiatry. By means of the critical discussion of these interpretations, it is possible to emphasize some essential aspects of the alteration of the melancholic experience. Here I will address the interpretation of corporealization as (1) alteration of the transparency of the lived body, (2) as withdrawal into the immanent sphere, (3) as a vanishing of intersubjective reciprocity in the encounter with the other.

2.1   *Corporealization as Alteration of the Transparency of the Lived Body (*Leib*)*

The process of corporealization signifies an alteration of the transparency and mediality of the lived body (*Leib*). Thomas Fuchs has recently developed this interpretation of the notion of corporealization. The body is "the medium through which we perceive and interact with the world" (Fuchs 2005, 95). This implies that there is no explicit awareness of mediation of the body. Therefore the functioning of the body could be characterized as a "mediated immediacy" (Plessner 1981). A constitutive invisibility belongs to the body's processes, which allows the self to gain access to the world.[6] Most of the changes in the proprio-perceptive systems have a tacit and anonymous character. As Polanyi remarked, "every time we make sense of the world, we rely on our *tacit knowledge* of impacts made by the world on our body and the complex responses of our body on these impacts" (Polanyi 1967, 147f.). The interplay between the world and the lived-body occurs in a pre-reflexive dimension that does not come to light if it properly functions. The process of corporealization can be described as a loss of the transparency and as a transformation of body into something solid and rigid that does not immediately and spontaneously obey one's own will (Fuchs 2005, 99). Additional efforts are requested in

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[6] "Consciousness as the luminosity which reveals the world to a subject is the result of this mediation. Miraculously, our body, a solid and material object, is capable of a transformation that turns matter into mind and lets the world appear. By multifarious assimilations, sensorimotor interactions and their further processing, the body becomes transparent to the world we are living in and allows us to act in it" (Fuchs 2005, 95).

order to accomplish the desired movements and actions. The psycho-motor inhibition has to be compensated by additional efforts motivated by the rigidity and solidity of the body.[7] "*Corporealization* thus means that the body does not give access to the world, but stands in the way as an obstacle, separated from its surroundings" (Fuchs 2005, 99). The process of corporealization also has a specific affective atmosphere. The self is surrounded by the shadow of death. The corporealization both prefigures and anticipates the process of becoming a corpse: "The exchange with the environment is inhibited, excretions cease; processes of slowing down, shrinking, and drying up prevail. All this literally means a corporealization, in the sense of resembling a corpse, a dead body" (Fuchs 2005, 99).

2.2 *Corporealization as a Withdrawal into the Immanent Sphere*

The phenomenon of corporealization can be understood as a process in which the self withdraws into an immanent sphere. Among others, Eugenio Borgna has particularly emphasized this aspect in the study *Melancolia* (Borgna 2001). According to Borgna, the melancholic condition implies an alteration of the relationship between *Leib* and *Körper*. The lived body loses its ecstatic ability and tends to close in itself. It does not immediately respond to the affordances of the surrounding environment. It becomes an obstacle to communication with the other and with the world. The melancholic person feels him/herself as an empty, almost dead body. One of Borgna's patients says: "I am only flesh and blood. I am not any longer a human being. I do not know: I am just a bag of bones. I become a meaningless thing, a nothingness. I cannot walk. Can a nothingness walk?" (Borgna 2001, 79, my translation).

In this context it is important to make a remark concerning the relationship between *Leib* and *Körper*. Borgna affirms that the body transforms itself into a objective body (*Körper*) in melancholia: the body loses, at least contingently, "the possibilities of oscillating between lived body (*Leib*) and objective body (*Körper*), that [these two forms – *Leib/Körper*] in the usual and everyday life of embodiment alternate and intersect dialectically" (Borgna 2001, 78, my translation). Yet what does it mean that the lived body becomes rigid and solid? What does it mean that the tacit dimension becomes explicit? These descriptions aim at highlighting a process of damping in receiving both the atmospheric resonances of the world and

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[7] "Its materiality, density, and weight, otherwise suspended and unnoticed in everyday performance, now come to the fore and are felt painfully. Sense perception and movement are weakened and finally walled in by this rigidity, patients have to overcome their psychomotor inhibition and push themselves to even minor tasks, compensating by an effort of will what the body does" (Fuchs 2005, 99).

the impressions of the Other's existence in the feeling of being trapped in one's own empty body (that does not immediately respond to the will). It is nevertheless essential to escape a possible misunderstanding. The relationship between *Leib* and *Koerper* should not be conceived in terms of an alternation in temporal terms, as if the operative intentionality of the lived body would be put out of play during the phase of the objective body (*Körper*) and vice versa. The *feeling* of being an empty thing implies the functions of the operative intentionality of the lived body: although modified and distorted, the transparency of the lived body is a necessary condition for this specific experience of one's own body. The understanding of this aspect needs a clarification of the different dimensions of the bodily experience.

If we consider our normal, everyday life experience, the bodily dimension should not be exclusively reduced to the lived sense-experience in terms of the organic system of *Innenleiblichkeit*. From a systemic point of view the bodily experience is in itself divided in the dimensions of *Innenleiblichkeit*, *Aussenleiblichkeit* and *Körperlichkeit*. Here it is not possible to address the chiasmatic relationships between these three dimensions that are essentially interdependent. The investigation of this complex issue will lead us too far from our subject. It suffices to say that sense-experiences of *Innenleiblichkeit* (but also all different phenomena related to the multilayered structures of the intentional life) both reverberate and express themselves in the *Aussenleiblichkeit* that is irreversibly both exposed to the Other and affected by the Other. The *Innenleiblichkeit*, as sensing (*Empfinden*) always connected to kinesthetic activities, is essentially intertwined to *Außenleiblichket* as an immediate expression of this sensing visible from outside.

At the same time the body is part of the world: it occupies a limited space; it has a specific weight; it is in continuous exchanges with the surrounding environments. In this sense it is an objective and material body (a *Körper*). The lived body is able to perceive itself as an object, for example when a hand touches the other hand. The materiality of the body is also experienced from inside (*innenleiblich*) as a source of resistance against one's own will, for example a resistance against the accomplishment of desired movements in the proprio-perceptive/kinesthetic fields. These moments (*Innenleiblichkeit*, *Aussenleiblichkeit*, *Koerperlichkeit*) are constitutive conditions of every bodily experience. To speak of a temporal fluctuation between lived body and objective body, as Borgna does, is therefore ambiguous. Such expression tends to confuse the different levels of the phenomenological analyses: the constitutive order and the experiential dimension.

Once aware of this conceptual framework, it is possible to speak in more general terms of the transformation of *Leib* into a Körper in order to emphasize *the increased feeling of the* "*materiality*" of one's own body. This materiality manifests itself in the phenomenon of resistance of one' own body and in the loss of a vital contact with the world. Borgna describes "the loss of transparency" of the body in melancholia in a way similar to that of Thomas Fuchs and many other phenomenologically oriented psychiatrists (Tatossian 1979; Maldiney 1991; Kraus 2001). However, he insistently emphasizes a specific aspect: a process of withdrawal in

the immanent dimension occurs in the melancholic condition. The melancholic person is not able to move toward the world. He/she exclusively turns his/her gaze to him/herself: "the gaze is radically interiorized: it turns toward the inner sphere and goes away from all the things. The hands are not hands that allow grasping an object that is not close to its own body: and this happens because the body loses its own transcendent dimension" (Borgna 2001, 79). In this regard, Borgna's thesis is close to that of Kranz, who, in his studies (Kranz 1962), introduced the notion of depressive autism. From this perspective melancholic persons are described as radically introverted and exclusively worried about themselves, their own errors and faults. They live in a kind of existential withdrawal.

2.3 Corporealization as Absence of Intersubjective Reciprocity: Body as Chrema

In relation to a paradigmatic case of melancholia (Elfriede), Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach remark that the melancholic condition makes a necessary condition of an authentic inter-subjective relationship impossible: the encounter as an event of reciprocity (Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach 1980). In the most acute phase of depression, Elfriede let herself be treated as an object (*Gegenstand*). Elfriede is surely "before the Other", but this being-before-the-Other is altered: "A counterpart in this sense [a face-to-face–encounter] is not possible with Elfriede. The behavior-of-me-towards-her does not have the character of mutuality. [. . .] Elfriede stays insensitive to my attempt – by addressing her – to bring her in a contraposition. The counterpart (the antikry) is here not enantonic (i.e. does not have the character of mutuality, of reciprocity), but chrematic"[8] (Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach 1980, 115, my translation). The notion of *chrema* refers to a pragmatic dimension. It has to be understood in terms of use, i.e. of using a tool. Elfriede is "commensurable to an object", or more precisely, to a broken object, not any longer "use-ful" (here it is important to recall how melancholic patients incessantly repeat such phrases as "I do not function any more", "my body is broken", etc.). At the same time the process of corporealization has its own structural limit. Evidently, corporealization cannot reduce the melancholic person to a broken thing: the gaze of the patient betrays a desperate appeal to the doctor for receiving help and for having his/her life back. The silence of a person requires and commands, in a specific way, the doctor to transform his/her "chrematic" condition to what Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach call human *physis* – a bodily dimension which allows the subject to access to the world

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[8] "Ein Gegenüber dieser Art ist mit Elfriede nicht möglich. Das Sich-zu-ihr-hin-verhalten hat nicht den Charakter der Gegenseitigkeit. Es gibt zu ihr kein 'anti'. [. . .] Elfried bleibt unempfindlich für mein Versuch sie – indem ich sie anspreche – in eine Kontraposition zu bringen. [. . .] Das Gegenüber (Das Antikry) ist hier nicht enantonisch (d.h. vom Charakter der Gegenseitigkeit, des Einander), sondern chrematisch. Chrema ist im Griechischen der Gegenstand" (Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach 1980, 115).

and to other's existences.[9] The distinction between *chrema* and *physis* corresponds to the phenomenological distinction between *Körper* and *Leib*. The concept of human *physis* corresponds to the notion of Leib, i.e. to a well "functioning" operative functioning in which the self immediately experiences itself, the world and the other. It is noteworthy that Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach do not use the word corporealization as such. Nevertheless they describe the same process. This thesis is confirmed by their interpretation of the notion of *chrema* in terms of *Körper* described from a phenomenological point view: the melancholic disturbance manifests itself in the transformation of the lived body in something rigid, reified, and detached from the life of the self as if the lived body already were a corpse. This transformation shows itself in the invasive feeling of being trapped in one's own body detached from the world.

Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach particularly highlight the transformation of the bodily experience in relation to inter-subjective dimension: the relation between my gaze and the melancholic person's gaze is altered. If we ask the question whether we are watching each other in this case, what should we answer?

"Yes and No! Because Elfriede is not "enantionic", does not show mutual relatedness in the sense of reciprocity. Her gaze is rather 'chrematic'. There is no back and forth between my gaze and her gaze that is dull and does not send me any message. In place of this indescribable splendor of the eye something slightly murky with the quality of the opaque appears. The gaze is almost located behind the eyes – which is not commensurable with the phenomenon of a gaze that turns itself inward. [. . .] The gaze, instead of being directed at the interior of existence, falls back into something insubstantial (*ins Wesenslose*)" (Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach 1980, 115, my translation).

This passage is particularly interesting for two different reasons: (a) on the one hand it shows a disturbance on the level of intercorporeality. In *The Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty addresses the phenomenon of intercorporeality in the following terms: "The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and the intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person's intentions inhabited my body and mine his" (Merleau-Ponty 1945/ 1962, 185). This mutual ability to inhabit the other's body becomes impossible in relation to a melancholic person. The process of corporealization signifies the impossibility of a mutual resonance between me and the Other. (b) On the other hand, corporealization gives an important indication regarding the phenomenon of "inversion" of the gaze into the immanent sphere. The gaze does not turn into immanence, but loses itself in the empty space. The dimension of *Wesenslose* (insubstantiality) refers to a sphere that does not belong to either the self-relation

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[9] "Elfried ist in diesem Sinne kommensurabel einem unbrauchbaren Gegenstand, der, statt widerständig zu sein, an meinen Behandlungs– oder Formungsimpuls appelliert – an meinem ärztlichen Willen, das Chrema wieder in die menschliche Physis" (Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach 1980, 115).

or to the world. The melancholic gaze does not reach anything and is not reachable by the Other. It loses itself in an empty and anonymous space that could not be understood in terms of self-relation in the sense of autism. In my view, the inversion of the gaze into the immanent sphere is a consequence of the experience of the void. To the extent that the self does not reach anything and is not affected by anything, he/she feels him/herself lost in a vacuum. In this anaffective condition arises an anguish in which one is constantly asking oneself: "What happens to me?" "Why do I not feel anything?" "Where is my real ego gone?" The person detached from the affective resonance both with the world and with the other cannot do anything but invert the gaze into him/herself in the trembling anguish that his/her life is definitively gone. In the third section, I will further develop the comprehension of the melancholic condition by means of a phenomenological analysis of the void-experience.

Before doing so, it is appropriate to make a short methodological remark. Tellenbach and Dörr-Zegers's analysis does not articulate the relationships among the intertwining gazes in a rigorous way from a phenomenological point of view. A phenomenological investigation of the exchanges of gazes requires a description of the encounter both from the point of view of the psychiatrist and from the point of view of the patient. Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach alternate between these two perspectives without any clear distinction and explanation of the form of their relationships. In a rigorous phenomenological investigation it is essential to describe the specific intertwining of the gazes emphasizing their heterogeneity and their different responsiveness to one other. It is also necessary to show that the experience of the psychiatrist transforms itself vis-à-vis the melancholic person. As soon as the other (the melancholic person) is not affected by the psychiatrist's expressions or he/she is not able to take over and to respond to the psychiatrist's expressions, the psychiatrist feels estranged and struck by this lack of resonance. Phenomenological investigations should not limit themselves to a fundamental statement according to which the gaze of melancholic person loses itself in the insubstantiality (*Wesenslose*), rather should emphasize the specificity of the genetic processes that lead the patients to a condition in which they feel like falling into an abyss.

3 Melancholia as Experience of the Void: The Transformation of Temporalization and Spatialization

We have considered different interpretation of the process of corporealization: corporealization as loss of transparency, as withdrawal into an immanent sphere, as chrema and lack of reciprocity in an intersubjective sense. None of these interpretations has recognized the crucial role of the experience of the void with regard to the bodily alteration in the melancholic condition, although several reports of the patients directly or indirectly referred to this phenomenon. The

position of Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach is paradigmatic in this sense. Despite their remark about the melancholic gaze losing itself in the insubstantiality, Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach explicitly reject the thesis according to which the experience of the void could be conceived as a fundamental feature of melancholia. The estranging encounter with the "chrematic" gaze of the melancholic person confirms the interpretation according to which melancholia has to be defined as the experience of the "Not" (*Erfahrung des Nicht*). This experience of the Not is radically different from the experience of void: "Phenomenologically it would certainly not be legitimate to speak of void here. A phenomenon such as Elfriede's stupor requires a conjoined view of the premorbid and post-stuporic state, through which it will be shown, that where we suspect void, just a 'Not' (*ein Nicht*) is encountered – a 'Not' that is equivalent to the non-flowing of a frozen creek in the cold of winter (ein 'Nicht', das dem Nicht-Fließen des im winterlichen Kälte erstarrten Baches gleichkommt)" (Dörr-Zegers and Tellenbach 1980, 115–116, my translation).

I will argue for the opposite. If correctly understood, the void is a positive phenomenon founding the experience of "Not" (*Erfahrung des 'Nicht'*).

The experience of void has to be understood (1) in relation to the temporal dimension as a modification of the inner time consciousness and (2) in relation to a spatialization as the emergence of a desperate sense of detachment from oneself, from the world and from the other.

1. Corporealization has to be characterized primarily as a specific form of experience of the void conceived as being dead inside. Melancholic persons "are not properly speaking full of sadness, but they complain about an unspeakable/ inexpressible emptiness, of a cavity, of a being dead inside" (Zutt 1963). Nothing can strike, invite or seduce the melancholic person. He/she is lost in an empty world that has lost its fragrances and its colors. Nothing awakens his/her interests or is capable of appealing to him/her. A sentence of Th. H., a patient of Tellenbach, gives an idea of the extent of being dead inside: 'The feeling is dead inside. For example if today one of my kids dies, I will not even notice it" (Tellenbach 1956, 14, my translation).

   The person lives in the constant and distorted consciousness that "nothing happens". In another study I used this common expression ("nothing happens") as a guiding thread for an understanding of depression, by referring in particular to the transformation of time-dimension (Micali 2011). The melancholic experience of void implies an alteration of the structure of inner time-consciousness. In relation to Husserl's time-phenomenology of temporality, the melancholic alteration of time-consciousness primarily concerns the moment of the primal impression. Here it is not possible to analyze the complex relation between protention, retention and primal impression or to go into detail regarding the inner ambiguity of the notion of primal impression in Husserl's phenomenology of time (Micali 2008, 2011). It suffices to say that the primal impression in depression/melancholia modifies itself in a specific sense. In the famous Appendix I of his lectures on inner time consciousness, Husserl describes the primal impression as irruption of the new, alien to the consciousness: "The primal

impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. [...] It does not spring from anything (it does not have seed); it is primal creation" (Hua X, 100, English tr. 106). It is "what is primally produced, the "new', that which has come into being alien to consciousness, that which has been received, as opposed to what has been produced through consciousness's own spontaneity" (Hua X, 100, English tr. 106). Primal impression is here conceived as the emergence of the surprising "new" that is alien to the consciousness. If one examines more closely the description of this phenomenon, it is clear that the primal impression is conceived as an affection which comes from elsewhere, as Levinas points out (Lévinas 1967, 1974). At every moment of our life we find ourselves in a new and unique situation. This new situation breaks in from elsewhere: it is out of our control and surpasses our expectation. The primal impression as primal affection opens up "at each new moment" a new being-situated in which possibilities and constraints, creative answers and sedimented passivities form themselves. The disturbance of the ecstatic capacity of living in the world has to be connected to the time-disturbance of the primal impression that opens up my new being-situated in relation to myself, to the other and to the world: as soon as nothing new emerges and affects me (nothing happens), time is experienced as an eternal reoccurrence of the same. It is essentially empty.[10]

In order to understand the extent and the relevance of the unbearable sense of void, it is helpful to consider more closely the case of Br. L., reported by Gebsattel. The sense of void becomes particularly apparent in contrast to what the patient names the "discoveries". The discovery is the sudden irruption of a meaningful experience in which she is able to feel the world around herself: "I *discover* a beech leaf, I feel it between my fingers, I feel the smooth and rough surface as something completely new. It was only a moment – the narrow beech leaf, it was a thousand times more meaningful than seeing the faces of my children over Easter. At that time I took the head of my children into the hands to feel them, but *I felt nothing* – nothing in-between my hands. The leaves, suddenly I discover them, and then it was gone" (Gebsattel 1954, 25, English

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[10] Here it is not appropriate to speak of an alteration of the intentional character of subjectivity as such. It is important to specify that the alteration primarily regards the affective character of the experience. In order to fully understand this difference it is necessary to refer to the ambiguity of Husserl's notion of primary impression. It is possible to highlight (at least) four different meanings of this notion. (1) Primal impression signifies a specific orientation in the time: I am (pre-reflectively) aware that something happens now. (2) Primal impression is also conceived as the beginning phase of the intentional process. (3) Primal impression signifies the lived sensing (*das lebendige Empfinden*) of immanent sense-data. (4) Primal impression also means the emergence of the new. As already mentioned, I have tried to describe the multifaceted relations between these different notions of the primal impression in another study (Micali 2011). My thesis is that a vanishing of the primal impression in the fourth sense occurs in melancholia. Such a vanishing, however, does not imply that the other moments related to the notion of primal impression are also put out of play. The primal impression as irruption of the new can vanish, while the pre-reflective awareness that a coherent intentional process is happening now is still at work.

tr. 106). Even while embracing her kids, she does not feel anything. However, some discoveries suddenly emerge. The event of touching a beech leaf is almost a revelation because it interrupts the ubiquitous sense of emptiness of the world, a sense that immediately returns. The patient affirms that in melancholia the world is there, but "it does not show itself (*zeigt sich nicht*)." "Of course I know that the world is there, but for me it's just a cavity, a vacuum" (Gebsattel 1954, 23, my translation). The world does not show itself, it is a cavity. If one recalls that phenomenology aims at describing the phenomena in their specific style of appearance, i.e. how the phenomena show themselves, the relevance of this expression becomes apparent. Melancholia could be described as a condition in which a suspension of the phenomenality of the world appears.[11]

2. We have hitherto considered the experience of the void in relation to a modification of the original impression as affection. I would now like to take into account a second essential mode of void that stands out in melancholic condition. This second sense appears as an opening of an abyssal distance in every elementary connection (*Zwischenraum*) that both unites and separates us from ourselves, from the world, and from the others: "According to the information provided by the patient, the abyss is also between her and the world, between her and the people, indeed, between the things themselves, for example, the chair does not constitute a whole, because between the chair legs there was no gap, but an abyss opened up – also between the image and mirror on the wall was no gap, but an abyss. The loss of connection and relatedness of world contents with each other is described as an abyss" (Gebsattel 1954, 25). The abyss is here conceived as coldness, darkness, a condition without any consolation. The void is experienced as absolute isolation, "unbridgeable distance from the others, and especially from the loved persons" (Gebsattel 1954, 25). These observations of the patient show a modification concerning the modes in which the appearances are connecting with each other before any voluntary activities of the subjectivity. In Husserl's terminology, this modification regards the dimension of passive synthesis. This modification has not only to be interpreted in terms of inhibition or of negation. Surely, in the melancholic condition the person is not capable of reaching the other and the world; he/she is *not* able to feel himself. But, at the same time, this modification signifies a positive experience of inhabiting the void in a specific way. Where before there was a connection that functioned as a "point" of transition and intersection – which guarantees both unity and difference and an interplay between the self and the other without any coincidence, now an abyss appears. One feels lost in this empty space in which it is not possible to grasp or to reach anything. Between the self and the things, between the self and the other a gap opens up in which one lives in a state of suspension. While the first sense of void (as vanishing of the primary affection) mainly concerns the temporal dimension, the void as abyssal detachment from oneself,

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[11] It is not possible in this article to do justice to what is at stake here. An accurate examination of the patient's expression "die Welt zeigt sich nicht" will lead us too far from the present subject.

from the world, and from the other primarily regards the dimension of spazialization. Although it is crucial to make a distinction of these two senses of void, – a distinction that has not been adequately articulated in phenomenological oriented psychiatry – these two senses are essentially intertwined in the melancholic condition.

The present interpretation of the experience of the void differentiates itself from the dominant approach within the phenomenological tradition *in a specific way*. If we consider the approach of those phenomenologically oriented psychiatrists who emphasize the centrality of the experience of the void in melancholia (Gebsattel 1954; Tatossian 1979; Maldiney 1991; Kraus 2001), it is particularly apparent that they share a metaphysical presupposition regarding the notion of self: the experience of void is defined in light of an inability of ecstatic projection of *Dasein* (in Heidegger's terms). In this perspective, the self as being in the world is primarily defined by means of the categories of possibility. Once the projectuality of the *Dasein* vanishes, the world loses its consistency. In my view this approach does not properly articulate the complex and specific relationship between the experience of the void and the transformation of being-in-the world in the melancholic condition.

The inability of the projection of *Dasein* in ecstatic terms should not be taken as a principle of explanation of bodily experience of melancholia, but it is a consequence of the experience of void in the two already described positive senses as (1) a vanishing of the primal impression as affection and (2) as a modified form of spatialization, in which an abyssal detachment from the him/herself, from the Other, and from the world takes place.

I would like to clarify this approach in relation to the process of the body's becoming rigid and heavy in melancholia. The transformation of *Leib* into a rigid and heavy *Körper* is related to the experience of the void that has to be understood in both of the senses that I have stated above. The intimate connection between rigidity of the body and experience of the void is particularly apparent in Roland Kuhn's description of one of his patients (Odette), a case which also has been deeply investigated by Henry Maldiney. "She [Odette] froze *staring into emptiness* and, in this attitude, saying things she did not notice and had nothing to do with the situation" (Kuhn, quoted from Maldiney 1991, 16). The patient is freezing and her gaze is lost, both rigid and fixed in an empty space. Odette is alienated from her actual situation. She is not aware of anything. To the extent that she is not affected by anything, she is not able to move. If you are surrounded by vacuum, you cannot move. Rigidity and stagnation are linked to the anaffective emptiness. Maldiney affirms an essential relation between this absence of awareness and the bodily rigidity/frozenness. "She [Odette] is not properly in any situation whatsoever. She is not aware of anything, excluded from the communication of feeling. And precisely to the extent that her rigidity is an exclusion from moving herself" (Maldiney 1991, 16, my translation). Here it is important to illustrate two different dynamics that are closely intertwined. As soon as nothing affects us, our kinesthetic reactions and responses cannot be "activated": the body becomes more rigid and heavier. At the same time the increasing rigidity and heaviness of the body makes

us less sensitive to the surrounding world, i.e. it has as consequence a minor affectability by the outside world. So the feeling of being suspended in a vacuum detached from the other, the world and from oneself appears. Some patients have the feeling of being suspended also in *their own body*: "I do not have the force in the bones that pushes me downwards. I make no headway. When I stay in bed, I feel as if I fly around in the air" (Tellenbach 1956, 12, my translation). The different aspects of this process – absence of affection, the invasive sense of being suspended in a vacuum, the decreasing capacity of moving him/herself, the increasing rigidity and heaviness of one's own body – are mutually reinforcing: a negative spiral develops.

I would like to conclude with a significant quote of one of Borgna's patients who succinctly expresses essential aspects of the present interpretation of melancholia: "The body is the source of my suffering and my distress: its endless demands restrict my fulfillment and threaten my freedom. It hinders my communication with the outside. I neither communicate with my body nor can I identify myself with the body: I identify myself only with the void that is created in the middle of my existence" (Borgna 2001, 78, my translation). It is surely not illegitimate to say that that in melancholia the body tends "to collapse in its boundaries" – to use the fitting expression of Thomas Fuchs – or to emphasize the inability of the body to live in the world. However, these approaches show a limit in a privative sense with the form "the body is no longer capable of x, y, z." In my view it is also essential to describe this negative experience in positive terms: the spatialization and temporalization of the embodied self is modified. The self lives and experiences the distorted relations between his/her body, the world, and the others in the form of being in the vacuum: "I identify myself only with the void that is created in the middle of my existence."[12]

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[12] The different forms of corporealization we have considered in the second section – corporealization as loss of transparency, as withdrawal into immanent sphere and as absence of reciprocity – can be fully understood only if they are rethought in light of this positive experience of the void in the two stated senses. An accurate attempt of this reformulation of these different notions of corporealization in light of the experience of void is something I intend to investigate in future research.

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The Structure of Interpersonal Experience

Matthew Ratcliffe

This chapter sketches a phenomenological account of what it is to encounter someone as a person. I take, as a starting point, Sartre's view in *Being and Nothingness* that our sense of others involves a bodily response that is inextricable from a distinctive way of experiencing *possibilities*. I concede that Sartre's emphasis on the *loss* of possibilities is too restrictive, but defend this more general claim. In so doing, I consider alterations in the structure of interpersonal experience that can occur in psychiatric illness. These, I propose, are best interpreted as changes in a felt sense of possibility that constitutes our sense of others as persons.

1 Experiencing Persons

Recent approaches to interpersonal understanding tend to focus upon an ability to attribute beliefs, desires and other kinds of mental state to people, their primary concern being whether this depends upon employment of a theory, an ability to 'simulate' the minds of others, or some combination of the two.[1] In this paper, I explore something that has been neglected: our sense of others as persons. One could maintain that this amounts to no more than the recognition that others possess minds or certain kinds of mental state. However, it has also been argued that the concept of a 'person' plays a more fundamental role in our thinking about each other than 'minds' and 'mental states'. For instance, Strawson (1959) maintains that 'person' is a primitive concept – it is not derived from other concepts and therefore

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[1] See Ratcliffe (2007, Chapter 1) for a survey of 'theory' and 'simulation' accounts of belief-desire psychology.

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resists further analysis.[2] He points out that our thought does not respect a clear distinction between two kinds of entity – minds and bodies. It is not that one entity has arms and legs, while another has thoughts and feelings; the same 'I' has both mental and physical characteristics. Furthermore, the properties attributed to persons do not divide neatly into 'mental' and 'non-mental' categories. Strawson distinguishes between M- and P-predicates, where the former are possessed by material things and persons, whereas the latter are specific to persons. For example, a rock and a person both have weight, but only a person can have feelings of jealousy. Although, jealousy may well be an uncontroversial example of a 'mental state', other P-predicates, such as 'is smiling' and 'is going for a walk', seem to straddle the two categories.

Such a position does not imply that there is a distinctive *phenomenology* associated with encountering persons. However, I think there is. It can be illustrated by those occasional moments of ambiguity when we experience a flickering between personal and impersonal experiences of an entity. Consider looking at a waxwork, first taking it to be a person and then realising that it is not. There is a kind of 'gestalt switch', and sometimes a feeling of ambiguity that is not fully resolved. Perhaps, as Freud (1919/2003) maintained, such 'uncanny' feelings sometimes arise due to conflicting experiences of an entity as animate and, at the same time, inanimate. However, they can also be associated more specifically with the personal / impersonal distinction. For instance, being stared at by a chimpanzee can produce an odd feeling of personal-impersonal indeterminacy, without any disturbance in one's appreciation of it as an animate organism.[3]

As the waxwork example shows, we can of course be mistaken when we experience an entity as a person. But I am concerned with what the relevant experience consists of, regardless of whether or not it is veridical. One might object that there is no generic sense of 'personhood' incorporated into our experience of others. I can experience a given person in any number of ways – I might be indifferent to her, uncomfortable with her, in love with her or afraid of her. These experiences have little in common. However, the diverse ways in which we experience, think about and respond to others do, I suggest, presuppose a more general sense of personhood. This can be illustrated by reflecting upon forms of anomalous experience where it is absent. For example, in *Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl*, 'Renee' describes how others no longer appeared as persons:

> I look at her, study her, praying to feel the life in her through the enveloping unreality. But she seems more a statue than ever, a manikin moved by mechanism, talking like an automaton. It is horrible, inhuman, grotesque. (Sechehaye 1970, p. 38)

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[2] See Ratcliffe (2009a) for a more detailed discussion of Strawson's work and its significance for current debates about 'folk psychology'. See Lowe (1996) for a recent defence of the view that 'person' is metaphysically primitive. Others have defended a broadly Strawsonian view of persons on developmental grounds (e.g. Hobson 1993, 2002; Reddy 2008).

[3] I do not wish to deny the possibility of non-human persons. However, for the purposes of this paper, I remain agnostic over whether animals such as chimpanzees are indeed persons.

The complaint is not that a perceived property or set of properties has changed. Rather, a *feeling* of the personal, which does not depend upon perception of anything specific, is absent. This leaves Renee with a peculiar experience of others as physically unchanged and yet disturbingly different.

Experiencing someone as a person (hereafter 'personal experience') does not depend upon ascribing propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires. As Gallagher (2001, 2005) and others have pointed out, it seems likely that many interpersonal interactions are facilitated by a perceptual appreciation of agency, embedded in a context of shared practice, which does not require the attribution of propositional attitudes.[4] It would be implausible to insist that these interactions involve no sense at all of being with a person and that personhood is only established once propositional attitudes are assigned. One might respond that recognising personhood is not a matter of *actually* attributing propositional attitudes to an entity but of recognising that one *could* legitimately do so. But it is doubtful that possession of beliefs and desires is fundamental to our sense of others as *persons*. We understand non-human organisms, institutions and even certain artefacts in such terms, and it is not clear where to draw the line between metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses. One might instead appeal to a wider range of mental states. Goldman, amongst others, points out that a comprehensive theory of interpersonal understanding or "mindreading" will need to include a lot more than just beliefs, desires, and propositional attitudes more generally. There are "other kinds of mental states: sensations, like feelings and pain, and emotions, like disgust and anger" (Goldman 2006, p. 20). Why should appreciating that an entity possesses these states involve a distinctive way of *experiencing* that entity? It could be maintained that we perceive their behavioural effects or perhaps even the mental states themselves (for instance, it is arguable that certain perceivable expressions of an emotion are partly constitutive of the emotion), and that the relevant perceptual contents are what make personal experience distinctive.[5] However, personal experience is not always associated with perceived expressions, gestures, actions, words or, indeed, any specific set of perceived properties. It can be associated with a diverse range of perceptual stimuli. I might hear the door creak, feel a touch on my back or hear breathing and be immediately struck by the feeling that *someone* is there.

Another possibility is simulation; maybe appreciating someone as a person is associated with a distinctive experience because it sometimes or always involves simulating his experiences and, by implication, having an experience.[6] This would account for the distinctiveness of the personal, because we do not generally *recognise* other kinds of entity by simulating them. So, when you hear the creak at the door, you adopt – perhaps automatically – the perspective of a person at the

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[4] See also Ratcliffe (2007) and Hutto (2008) for defences of this view.

[5] Many philosophers have argued that we are able to perceive, to some extent, the mental states of others. See, for example, Scheler (1954) and, more recently, Gallagher (2001, 2005).

[6] See Goldman (2006) for a detailed recent discussion and defence of simulation theory.

door. It is unclear, though, how an experience of this kind could constitute our sense of others as persons. As Scheler (1954, p. 10) points out, recognition of someone as a person, and thus a legitimate target for what is these days referred to as 'simulation', is an achievement that simulation presupposes. One would not attribute mental states of whatever type to an entity unless one took her to be an entity of the kind that possessed them. Another objection raised by Scheler is that, although we recognise others as like ourselves in some respects, personal experience equally involves a sense of their distinctness – we react to their experiences *as theirs rather than ours*: "To commiserate is [. . ..] to be sorry at another person's sorrow, *as being his*. The fact that it is his is part of the phenomenological situation" (Scheler 1954, p. 37). We respond to others' predicaments, rather than just replicating them, and our response is not always preceded by replication.[7]

In response, one could distinguish 'high level' from 'low level' simulation (e.g. Goldman 2006), and maintain that experiencing others as persons involves the latter. Hence there is no awareness of the simulation routine that underlies the experience. But before we attempt to account for a kind of experience in terms of low-level simulation, we first need to be clear about what the relevant experience consists of. In what follows, I will suggest that personal experience is constituted by a felt sense of *connectedness* to others, rather than by the achievement of replicating, in whatever way, some aspect of their psychology. Maybe this does depend upon 'low-level' matching, amongst other things, but an appeal to 'matching', 'simulating' or 'replicating' does not explain or even acknowledge the kind of relational structure that makes it distinctive. Simulation is not so much wrong as beside the point. My account will similarly imply that personal experience cannot be explained in terms of an implicit or explicit 'theory', as our sense of what persons *are* originates in a distinctive kind of *feeling* rather than in a body of knowledge.

2   Bodily Feelings, Possibilities and Other People

In his discussion and defence of simulation theory, Goldman (2006) discusses several ancestors of modern simulation theories, including the work of Adam Smith. His characterisation of Smith as a proto-simulationist is hard to resist.[8] However, consider the following passage, quoted by Goldman (2006, p. 17), which at least gestures towards something different:

> When we have read a book or poem so often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion. To him it has all the graces of novelty; we enter into the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites

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[7] See, for example, Zahavi (2007) for a good account of Scheler's work and its importance as a corrective to assumptions made by both theory and simulation theorists.

[8] See, for example, Smith (1759/2000, p. 4).

> in him, but which it is no longer capable of exciting in us; we consider all the ideas which it presents, rather in the light of which they appear to him, than in that in which they appear to ourselves, and we are amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus enlivens our own. On the contrary, we should be vexed if he did not seem to be entertained with it, and we could no longer take any pleasure in reading it to him. (Smith 1759/2000, p. 11)

The passage is revealing because it does not merely describe the 'simulation' of one person by another, but interaction between two people. And there are various things going on. One person certainly appreciates something of the other's experience, but the appreciation is at the same time self-transformative. Engaging with the other person's experience of the book changes and enriches one's own experience of it. Furthermore, it is not clear that there are two distinct experiences of the book co-existing in the same person: an experience of a dull book and a simulated experience of an exciting book. Rather, the book that previously seemed dull has had new life breathed into it through a shared experience. It is 'us' who perceive the book together, shaping each other's experiences in the process. Simulation alone fails to capture the relational and self-affecting character of the experience, which Smith refers to in terms of the "pleasures of mutual sympathy" (1759/2000, p. 10).

This alone poses no threat to a simulationist account. One could say that the example involves three separate steps: there is the simulation, which causes certain feelings or thoughts, and these then affect one's own experience of the book. However, interpersonal experience does not always respect linguistic distinctions between (i) a person's own experiences of the world; (ii) her appreciation of how someone else experiences the world; and (iii) kinds of feeling that might be causally associated with (i) or (ii). I concede that, in many instances, the three are indeed separate occurrences. However, when it comes to experiencing someone *as a person*, I propose that they are aspects of a single, unitary experience, rather than separate perceptual and/or cognitive achievements that are causally associated with each other. Personal experience consists in a bodily feeling that *is* at the same time (a) an acknowledgement of the other person as a locus of experience and activity distinct from oneself and (b) a change in how one experiences the world. To illustrate how this might is so, I turn to Sartre's discussion of how we experience 'the other' in *Being and Nothingness*.

For Sartre, our most fundamental sense of 'the other' (which I will instead refer to as 'a person') is not a matter of attributing internal mental states, analogising, inferring, hypothesising, deploying a theory, simulating, or anything of the sort. Instead, it consists of a feeling, a change in how one's body is experienced. Take his description of shame:

> I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me; I neither judge it nor blame it. I simply live it. I realize it in the mode of for-itself. But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed. (1989, p. 221)

On one view, what happens here is that I first perceive the presence of another person, then reflect upon what she has seen me doing, and finally experience shame. But this is not what Sartre claims. Instead, he suggests that shame is a reflex-like

reaction to a stimulus, which does not depend upon prior recognition that someone is present or upon an evaluative judgement concerning the shameful nature of one's deeds. It is, he says, "an immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot without any discursive preparation" (1989, p. 222). This feeling is not just *associated* with awareness of someone's presence. Instead, it *incorporates* that awareness. Put simply, one cannot feel ashamed without having a sense of being ashamed before somebody. What shame reveals, according to Sartre, is the relation of "being-seen-by-another", "the look" (1989, p. 259). There are two inextricable aspects to this: (i) recognising someone as a locus of experience; (ii) recognising oneself as an object of their experience. 'The look' is not to be interpreted literally, as seeing a pair of eyes. It is not a matter of perceiving that one has actually been seen but of having a sense of being perceived. Hence it is something more abstract, which can be associated with any number of different perceived properties:

> Of course, what *most often* manifests a look is the convergence of two ocular globes in my direction. But the look will be given just as well on occasion when there is a rustling in the branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, or the slight opening of a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain. (Sartre 1989, p. 257)[9]

How is it possible for something to be a change in bodily experience and, at the same time, a sense of relating – in some way – to another person? Sartre's answer is that a change in bodily feeling can also be a change in one's experience of worldly *possibilities*, and that a certain kind of modification of those possibilities just *is* our most fundamental sense of the personal. He points out that we do not usually experience our bodies as conspicuous objects of experience. When I am involved in a project, my body is that through which I perceive and act upon things, rather than an object of perception or action: "My consciousness sticks to my acts, it *is* my acts" (1989, p. 259). When this happens, my body is not experienced as a thing with which I am intimately associated in a unique way, but instead as a kind of structure that the perceived world has. Entities are not experienced solely in terms of their actual features but also in terms of the significant possibilities that they offer me, and these possibilities are determined – at least in part – by a sense of the capacities and dispositions of my body. Hence a change in bodily experience can at the same time be a change in world experience. Take Sartre's famous example of peeping through a keyhole at somebody (1989, p. 259). The voyeur is absorbed in the perceived situation, in the project of spying. Then, as she hears a creak on the stair, there is a sudden shift in how her body feels. It ceases to be an inconspicuous medium through which she perceives the room and enters the foreground of awareness. As this happens, perception of her surrounding is altered too. The possibilities that the situation incorporated were – in part – a reflection of her bodily dispositions. As her body becomes object-like and awkward, these

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[9] In fact, even when the look *is* manifested by a pair of eyes, one does not perceive the eyes as objects but as openings onto the person's situation, a situation that includes oneself (Sartre 1989, p. 258). And the look presumably does not depend upon specifically *visual* perception either, as it is essential to a sense of the personal that people without sight also possess.

dispositions change. Hence the possibilities offered by the world change too. The world *looks* different, as significant possibilities that perceived things previously offered, such as 'useable in the context of my current project', are lost.

For Sartre, a feeling of being object-like amounts to a feeling of being an object of perception for someone else, of inhabiting a world that is now configured in terms of her projects and purposes: "I grasp the Other's look at the very centre of my act as the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities" (1989, p. 263). As he makes clear, this experiential shift is not primarily a matter of knowing or believing something. It is a change in a felt sense of one's relationship with the world. I do not simply "know" that I am being looked at; I am "suddenly affected in my being"; I "live" it (1989, pp. 260–261). It is not a three-step process of recognising the presence of someone, feeling ashamed and then experiencing the world differently, regardless of the order in which these steps are placed. The three are one and the same.

Are there any grounds for accepting Sartre's view that (a) a change in our bodily phenomenology can at the same time be a change in possibilities that are integral to the perceived world and (b) such a change constitutes our sense of others as persons? We can do so without also accepting his more specific emphasis upon a certain kind of interpersonal encounter. It is routinely pointed out that Sartre's approach over-emphasises confrontational relations. For example, Merleau-Ponty complains that it best captures those awkward occasions when "each of us feels his actions not to be taken up and understood, but observed as if they were an insect's" (1962, p. 361).[10] However, the more general view that this emphasis presupposes is, I think, right. And it is not specific to Sartre. Phenomenologists consistently emphasise that bodily experience and world experience are inextricable, offering a range of illustrations in the process. For instance, Husserl (e.g. 1973, 2001) stresses that the body is not just an object of perception but also an organ of perception, and that our bodily dispositions are reflected in the kinds of possibility that things offer. Possibilities, he says, can appear variably "enticing", and the degree to which they entice us is symptomatic of an experienced "affective force"; it is through the perceiving body that we experience their pull (2001, p. 90). Merleau-Ponty (1962) adopts a similar view, according to which the body as perceiver cannot be phenomenologically dissociated from a structured system of possibilities that we experience as integral to the world:

> To have a body is to possess a universal setting, a schema of all types of perceptual unfolding and of all those inter-sensory correspondences which lie beyond the segment of the world which we are actually perceiving. (1962, p. 326)

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[10] As Sartre recognises, even experiences like this do not involve a sense of being wholly object-like. The look does not extinguish an awareness, shared by both parties, of the objectified person's potential to set up a new system of possibilities: "the Other-as-object is an explosive instrument which I handle with care because I foresee around him the permanent possibility that they are going to make it explode and that with this explosion I shall suddenly experience the flight of the world away from me and the alienation of my being" (Sartre 1989, p. 297).

There is also empirical support for such a view.[11] Hence I think it is plausible to maintain that certain changes in our bodily phenomenology also amount to changes in world experience (Ratcliffe 2008). As for the claim that our sense of others as persons involves a change in the perception of possibilities, this too is not exclusive to Sartre. For instance, Merleau-Ponty observes that "no sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in process of acting than the objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of significance" (1962, p. 353). In other words, there is a shift in one's sense of the possibilities that things offer; now they are perceived as offering possibilities for him too. And again, the view has least some empirical support. There is evidence to suggest that the experienced significance of entities depends, to a degree, on perception of what others are doing, and is influenced by factors such as their expression and direction of gaze. This effect is something perceptual and unavoidable, which is present from an early age (Gallagher 2009, p. 302).

3   Interpersonal Connection

Something Sartre emphasises, which is not sufficiently acknowledged by simulation and theory theories, is that recognising someone as a person is invariably self-affecting; it involves a change in the experience of one's possibilities. But this can take various forms, some of which are quite different from what Sartre describes. Take his example of walking in the park and seeing a figure on a bench. You feel, he says, the pull of the world away from you and towards him. The park ceases to be a realm of significant possibilities *for you* and becomes *his* park, where you take your place among his objects (Sartre 1989, p. 254). Now contrast this with J. H. van den Berg's example of showing a guest around the town where you live:

> . . ..one can learn to know another best by travelling with him through a country or by looking at a town with him. One who often shows the same town to different people will be struck by the ever new way in which the town appears in the conversation that is held about the sights during such a walk. These different ways are identical with the people with whom one walks, they are forms of subjectivity. The subject shows itself in the things. . . .. (1952, p. 166)

Here, the significance of one's environment is not stolen by one's companion. Instead, the possibilities it offers are enriched by the experience of relating to him;

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[11] For example, Declerck and Gapenne (2009) address the concept of 'affordance' (Gibson 1979), which they accurately describe as "actually perceived possibility" (a description that fits equally well with the accounts offered by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty). They discuss various sources of evidence for the view that motor dispositions affect perceived properties of the environment such as distance. See the chapters in this volume by Rietveld and Romdenh-Romluc for further discussion of affordances. See also Gallagher (2005) for a detailed account of how bodily dispositions shape perception, and for discussion of a wide range of relevant empirical evidence.

new life is breathed into one's surroundings.[12] We do not live in a world of fixed systems of possibility but in a realm where our relations with specific others reshape the ways things appear, sometimes fleetingly and sometimes in enduring ways. The interpersonal world is a dance of changing possibilities, some of which are experienced as 'mine', others as 'belonging to someone else' and others as 'ours', the three being inextricably linked. All interpersonal experience retains a sense of the other person as distinct from oneself and, with this, of certain possibilities being hers and others one's own. But experience of *being with* another person also involves *our* having possibilities and our transforming a shared space of possibilities together. Elsewhere, van den Berg also offers this example:

> We all know people in whose company we would prefer not to go shopping, not to visit a museum, not to look at a landscape, because we would like to keep these things undamaged. Just as we all know people in whose company it is pleasant to take a walk because the objects encountered come to no harm. These people we call friends, good companions, loved ones. (1972, p. 65)

Experience of our surroundings can vary considerably, depending on who we are with. It can be shaped by non-localised and pervasive feelings of discomfort, threat, vulnerability, openness, connectedness, ease, calm, safety, tension or effortlessness. The other person need not say or do anything specific; the simple feeling of being with another person can at the same time amount to enrichment of one's world or impoverishment of it. And this feeling is not just a matter of connecting with other persons; there is also an experience of connecting with them *as* persons.[13]

Given this emphasis on how we *affect* each other, it is clear that *interaction* between persons better exemplifies the structure of personal experience than seemingly detached, unaffected contemplation of one party by another. Feelings of connectedness not only determine how we perceive a person; they also shape how we interact with him. And these feelings can be enhanced or diminished, depending on how the interaction progresses. Several philosophers have criticised both 'theory' and 'simulation' theories for over-emphasising detached, spectatorial

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[12] Leder (1990, p. 94) offers a similar example, involving walking through a forest with a friend. He remarks on how "we are cosubjectivities, supplementing rather than truncating each other's possibilities. I come to see the forest not only through my own eyes but as the Other sees it". He calls this process "mutual incorporation". Such descriptions are complemented by work in developmental psychology. See, for example, Tronick et al. (1998) for the view that bodily, affective interaction between people can serve to somehow "expand" one's state of consciousness, a process that Tronick claims is central to cognitive development.

[13] As Colombetti and Torrance (2009, p. 509) observe, there is a "basic feeling of being connected" to another person that characterises interpersonal relations, a feeling that varies considerably in its degree and quality. Various authors have pointed out that *feelings* of connectedness shape a child's relations with others from a very early age. To quote Trevarthen (1993, p. 151), "expressions of the self 'invade' the mind of the other, making the moving body of the self resonant with impulses that can move the other's body too". This, he says, remains so in adult conversation, which "is full of an immediate interpersonal vitality that goes beyond, or beneath, the words" (1993, p. 159). For similar views, see, for example, Stern (1985), Hobson (1993, 2002), Gallagher (2005, 2009) and Reddy (2008).

contemplation of one party by another, and have stressed the extent to which interpersonal understanding is not merely associated with interaction but somehow dependent upon it (e.g. Gallagher 2001; Ratcliffe 2007; Hutto 2008; de Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). Although I am sympathetic to this emphasis upon interaction, it is important to stress that the experience of interacting with another person need not be explicitly focused upon him, or upon the task of interpreting him. As pointed out by van den Berg, it is often more a matter of how the *shared world* is experienced and transformed. There is a pervasive feeling of being with someone that shapes perception of one's surroundings when in his presence.[14] Furthermore, a sense of others as persons is not constituted by interaction. We usually appreciate someone as a person *before* we initiate any kind of interaction with her, and it is the nature of this prior appreciation that I seek to articulate. Even so, reflecting upon the phenomenology of interaction can help illuminate the structure of personal experience. Interaction can take all sorts of different forms, and these do not just involve *different* ways of experiencing others; some clearly involve a *greater* receptivity to the personal than others. For instance, handing money to a cashier and saying 'thank you' does not involve the same level of personal engagement as looking into someone's eyes and sincerely saying 'I love you'. Hence we can approach the phenomenology of personal experience by first identifying which of these incorporate the most pronounced sense of the personal and then characterising what it is that makes them distinctive in this way. Appreciating someone as a person, I suggest, need not involve *actually* participating in the relevant relation. But it does require recognition of its *possibility* (along with that of other relations which are – by comparison – impoverished in some way). By analogy, recognising something as a cup need not involve actually drinking from it, but one would have no sense of what cups were if one did not recognise the possibility of drinking from them.

One approach is to maintain that second-person relations embody recognition of the other as a person, in a way that third-person 'I-she/he/it' relations do not (e.g. Gallagher 2001). However, it is not enough to distinguish second-person interaction from third-person observation and prioritise the former. First of all, some second-person interactions are rather impersonal compared to some third-person observations. Compare saying 'no thanks' to someone who attempts to sell you something on a busy street to watching one's child participating in a school play. The former might be a habitual response that involves virtually no acknowledgement of personhood. One encounters a token of the generic social type 'salesperson', rather than a unique individual, a 'who'. In contrast, watching one's child perform involves both a strong feeling of connectedness and also a much greater sense of him as a specific individual, a 'who'. Unlike recognising something as a coffee cup or a frog, an appreciation of being in the presence of a person is not just a matter of recognising that a nearby entity belongs to some type. In the cup or frog case, it does not usually matter that this is a particular cup or a particular frog. Any individual would instantiate the kind just as well. But engaging

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[14] See also Gallagher (2009) for discussion of this distinction.

with someone as a person is different. There is a receptiveness to the fact that someone is a 'who' rather than just a 'what'. Openness to someone as a person is thus very different from experiencing pragmatically indistinguishable members of a kind. Hence it does seem right to emphasise a certain *kind* of second-person relation, where one addresses a 'you' rather than scrutinises a thing. However, we need to be more specific than this. Personal experience is not at its most pronounced in those second-person interactions where one is guarded, defensive, reserved or uncomfortable, where one feels disconnected from the other person, where she seems somehow lacking, and so on. We can also disregard those cases where the exchange is brief or heavily constrained by norms and roles, although this is not to imply that a truly 'personal' relation must be or even could be completely unconstrained by norms either.

A plausible account of what is common to those relations where we are most open to others as persons is offered by the Danish philosopher Knud Løgstrup (1956/1997). He maintains, as I want to, that relating to someone as a person involves being receptive to the fact that we have the potential to alter each other's world:

> By our very attitude to one another we help to shape one another's world. By our attitude to the other person we help to determine the scope and hue of his or her world; we make it large or small, bright or drab, rich or dull, threatening or secure. We help to shape his or her world not by theories and views but by our very attitude toward him or her. Here lies the unarticulated and one might say anonymous demand that we take care of the life which trust has placed in our hands. (1997, p. 18)

He stresses that we have an unavoidable effect upon others, as they do upon us. Their gestures or expressions, however subtle, permeate us and affect us in ways that we cannot easily resist. It follows, Løgstrup says, that relating to someone as a person involves inescapable responsibility for her:

> A person never has something to do with another person without also having some degree of control over him or her. It may be a very small matter, involving only a passing mood, a dampening or quickening of spirit, a deepening or removal of some dislike. But it may also be a matter of tremendous scope, such as can determine if the life of the other flourishes or not. (1997, pp. 15–16)[15]

How does one 'shape' another's world? In referring to a world that can be large or small, threatening or secure, Løgstrup seems, like Sartre, to be talking about the possibilities it offers. A felt sense of being with the other person, which evolves as the interaction progresses, is at the same time a change in the possibilities that one's world offers. Specific possibilities might become more or less inviting – something that looked enticing before may appear less so now. However, changes might be much more encompassing in scope. Following an unpleasant encounter with someone, an air of threat or discomfort can pervade everything; the world as a whole takes on a different tone.

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[15] This is something that Gallagher (2009, p. 303) also recognises, in remarking on how "the presence of others calls forth a basic and implicit interaction that shapes the way we regard the world around us".

Løgstrup's emphasis is different from Sartre's. He identifies a kind of habitual trust as central to the personal.[16] Engaging with someone as a person involves being open to the transformative possibilities that she offers. Hence, in genuine communion with persons, "we deliver ourselves over into the hand of another" (1997, p. 14). 'Trust', in this sense, is not an explicit attitude, but a kind of felt, bodily openness to the other person. For Løgstrup, a fully rich interpersonal interaction involves mutual openness and mutual responsibility. It also involves at least some sense of vulnerability, as one could not be affected by someone in this sort of personal way without also being rendered more generally susceptible to her influence, to other forms of relation. In addition, Løgstrup stresses that personal relations do not take place in a social nowhere, emancipated from all norms and conventions. It is only in a context of established norms that interactions can take place in as structured and secure fashion. Norms, although they can facilitate evasion of the personal, also serve to regulate a relationship, preventing a form of over-exposure to each other (1997, p. 19).

I think something along these lines is right. The vulnerability that Sartre emphasises is an aspect of personal experience, but – as Løgstrup makes clear – there is a balance between this and an openness to self-transformative possibilities. It is this kind of balance that characterises our richest engagement with others *as* persons. Hence I propose that our sense of being in the presence of a person consists in a felt receptiveness to the potential for such a relation, along with that of various privations of it. How might we further support such a view? I will conclude by suggesting that we can do so by reflecting upon various changes in the structure of interpersonal experience that can occur in psychiatric illness. By appreciating what is lacking in such cases, we can gain insight into what an intact sense of the personal consists of.

4   Pathologies of Interpersonal Experience

Consider the experience of severe depression. Although it takes various different forms, a theme common to almost every autobiographical account is the loss of felt interpersonal connection. What people complain of is not just its absence but a painful feeling of absence. There is a felt need for something that at the same time presents itself as unobtainable:

> A paradox of depression is that sufferers yearn for connection, seem bereft because of their isolation, and yet are rendered incapable of being with others in a comfortable way. [...] Much of depression's pain arises out of the recognition that what might make me feel better – human connection – seems impossible in the midst of a paralyzing episode of depression. It is rather like dying from thirst while looking at a glass of water just beyond one's reach. (Karp 1996, pp. 14–16)

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[16] Thanks to Owen Earnshaw for pointing out to me the relevance of Løgstrup's work.

The problem is not just that one *actually* fails to connect with a large number of persons, perhaps even all persons. Rather, the kind of interpersonal connection that people more usually take for granted now seems *impossible*, irrevocably gone from the world. This is closely associated with the complaint that one is trapped, imprisoned, or cut off from everything and everyone by some impenetrable substance. One of the most famous statements of this is that of Sylvia Plath: "wherever I sat – on the deck of a ship or at a street café in Paris or Bangkok – I would be sitting under the same glass bell jar, stewing in my own sour air" (1966, p. 178). The same theme features in almost every first-person account of depression. For example:

> I couldn't feel anything for [my husband]. I couldn't feel anything for the children. It was like being inside a very, very thick balloon and no matter how hard I pushed out, the momentum of the skin of the balloon would just push me back in. So I couldn't touch anybody, I couldn't touch anything. (Interview with a 50-year-old woman on healthtalkonline.org; accessed 27.10.2008)

The precise nature of the 'enclosure' varies from one description to the next. It might be soundproof glass, a prison, a deep pit, a tunnel or a wall (Rowe 1978, p. 30). But much the same experience is conveyed in every case: a sense of being irrevocably estranged from others, which is inextricable from a more general change in how one experiences the world. Experience ordinarily incorporates a sense of the contingency of one's own perspective and its susceptibility to change. This is largely due to a potential that is integral to our experience of other persons, that of shaping and reshaping our world in unforeseen ways. With a sense of interpersonal connection gone from experience, the world no longer incorporates that potential. It is somehow small, closed and diminished, bereft of openness and dynamism. Hence, in just about every autobiographical account, the predicament of isolation in some inescapable and unchanging prison is tied up with the theme of being cut off from others. Associated with this are complaints of anomalous bodily feeling, a loss of vitality and movement. These corporeal changes are often described in such a way as to indicate that they are inextricable from alterations in interpersonal experience and world experience more generally (Fuchs 2005; Ratcliffe 2009b). Such experiences suggest an inversion of Sartre's view: being totally insulated from the possibilities offered by others is the death of one's possibilities. What other people ordinarily offer is not merely the potential to take away one's possibilities. The world is experienced as a dynamic space of significant possibilities in virtue of our potential and actual relations with them.

A loss of interpersonal connectedness like this can also amount to a diminished sense of others *as* persons. The phenomenologist and psychiatrist Eugene Minkowski (1970, p. 189) describes how, when certain kinds of felt contact with other people are lost, the potential for other kinds of relation can become all-encompassing. He discusses one patient suffering from what he terms 'schizophrenic melancholia'. The possibility of feeling connected to particular individuals was gone from experience, and his world was shaped by an all-pervasive feeling of guilt. The patient felt guilty *before oth*ers, and thus retained

some sense of relatedness to people. But this was his only way of relating to them. Consequently, they ceased to be distinctive individuals and instead became indistinguishable persecutors or judges:

> He no longer perceived the personal and individual worth of men; for him they were only faint, disfigured silhouettes cut out of the general ground of hostility. In fact, he was not persecuted by living men but by men who were transformed into persecutors and were only that. He no longer saw the total, complex life of the human being. Men had become schematic manikins. (1970, p. 189)

He offers the following description by another patient who was suffering from some form of depression:

> When I go out, the men that I see give me the impression of being phantoms. When I hear their voices, I am surprised that they are able to speak. I am astonished, and I admire others' ability to do things. [….] I have the feeling of being alone. Conversation with someone seems to me something from far away, airy, intangible. My words no longer correspond to my thought. I am condemned not to be understood. (1970, pp. 329–330)

Here too, there is a clear association between a loss of felt connection with others and an impaired sense of them as persons, but the estrangement does not take the more specific form of guilt.

Other kinds of alteration in the structure of interpersonal experience that can occur in psychiatric illness (and, more specifically, paranoid schizophrenia) *do* resemble what Sartre describes. For example, R. D. Laing remarks upon how "in psychotic conditions the gaze or scrutiny of the other can be experienced as an actual penetration into the core of the 'inner' self" (1960, p. 113). He quotes one patient as saying "I can't go on. You are arguing in order to have the pleasure of triumphing over me. At best you win an argument. At worst you lose an argument. *I am arguing to preserve my existence*" (1960, p. 45). Here, the sense of mutual influence is replaced by one-way influence from other to self, and the openness-vulnerability balance is skewed towards the latter. The other does indeed become the death of one's possibilities, an existential threat before which one is defenceless. Here too, there is a diminished sense of others as individuals; they are reduced to their roles in conveying threat. *Who* someone is becomes of little consequence. Laing also observes that the feeling of being perceived is not, in the more usual case, a matter of threat. Rather, it is something that human existence requires:

> The need to be perceived is not, of course, purely a visual affair. It extends to the general need to have one's existence endorsed or confirmed by the other, the need for one's total existence to be recognized; the need, in fact, to be loved. (Laing 1960, p. 128)

He goes on to say that, if you cut yourself off from others in some way in order to escape the threat, you lose a life-affirming connectedness in the process.[17]

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[17] One might worry about the reliability of Laing's account, as the experience he describes may be partly or wholly an artefact of his own interpretation. But such concerns are, in my view, unwarranted. People with paranoid schizophrenia sometimes do describe exactly this kind of change in the structure of interpersonal relations. See Ratcliffe and Broome (2012) for a

Because the experience of being with another person is self-affecting, we sometimes *feel* that something is not quite right when interacting with a person whose own sense of the personal is lacking. We all complain, from time to time, of being unable to relate to a specific individual or connect with her for whatever reason. A person might be distant, aloof, shy or self-obsessed. But I am thinking of those rarer instances where one is left with a feeling that something essential to the personal is lacking. For example, there is the 'praecox feeling' that sometimes characterises interaction with schizophrenic people, where one has an uncanny sense of the other person as somehow alien. Peter Hobson describes a not dissimilar experience that can occur when interacting with autistic people:

> A person can *feel* that there is something missing when relating to someone who is autistic – it is as if one is in the presence of a changeling, someone from a different world – but this escapes the net of scientific methods. (2002, p. 49)

I propose that feelings of oddness like these are at least partly attributable to absence of the sense that one could enter into certain kinds of mutually transformative relation with the person; there is something she ought to offer but fails to offer. This is exemplified by another case that Minkowski describes. He reports not failing to understand the patient but feeling that he understood him too well: "I know all about him"; "the psyche of the patient is too well understood" (1970, pp. 177–178). According to Minkowski, what this patient lacked was any sense of an open future in which he might actualise significant possibilities. The future appeared only in the guise of threat and he thus lived in a nostalgic and somehow closed world. This, Minkowski says, is something he could *feel* when interacting with him:

> The individual, separately so brutally from becoming, can experience it only as a hostile force. And we, confronted by this psyche, flattened and reduced to a single dimension, have the impression, in listening to the patient speak, of being constrained to read an open book, as if there were nothing behind the pages of that book. (1970, p. 179)

The book is open because it is complete. The patient is not oriented towards the future in any way, towards the possible. Instead, he wallows in the past, in what is already actualised. Hence, instead of his being a locus of possibilities and thus a potential influence upon one's world, he seems more like an object in that world, oddly complete and thus somehow diminished as a person. This example is especially interesting because it contrasts with the familiar view, common to both theory and simulation theories, that interpreting others involves solving an epistemic problem – one acquires knowledge about someone's psychology in order to predict or explain her behaviour. On this view, if one somehow had the good fortune to know everything about the psychology of another person, it would make no difference to the ontological status of that individual as a person. But Minkowski's description, which also resonates – in my view – with many kinds of less extreme and more everyday interpersonal experience, suggests otherwise. Not knowing everything about a person is integral to our sense of her as a person. The

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discussion. Laing is not the only one to have applied a Sartrean approach to the phenomenology of schizophrenia. See, for example, Lysaker et al. (2005, pp. 343–4).

reason for this is that persons are not merely experienced as objects within one's world – a sense of their *being* persons involves an appreciation of their potential to reshape one's world, to transform to varying degrees the possibilities it offers. Hence one cannot know everything about them, as they could not then open up new possibilities and would therefore not be experienced as persons. The lack of knowledge and sense of unpredictability that is so central to our experience of others is not principally a matter of ignorance about the ingredients of their heads. It is constitutive of our sense of personhood. A person is intrinsically unpredictable (to an extent, at least) in a way that a rock is not, because the former is never fully inserted into one's own world and points instead to something beyond it.[18]

All the descriptions of anomalous interpersonal experience mentioned here, along with numerous others, complement Sartre's view that our sense of the personal has a bodily, *felt* phenomenology and is at the same time a sense of the possible. They also suggest that a fully rich experience of the personal approximates the kind of relation described by Løgstrup, in so far as anything that interferes with one's sense of being able to enter into such relations also diminishes one's sense of the personal. Thus the phenomenological study of psychiatric illness can, I suggest, serve to support the view that a sense of others as persons incorporates an appreciation of the potential to enter into a kind of self-transformative relation with them, involving a balance of openness and vulnerability.

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[18] We find similar themes in Levinas (1961/1969).

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Part IV
Intercorporeality and Intersubjectivity: Ideality, Language and Community

Facts and Fantasies: Embodiment and the Early Formation of Selfhood

Joona Taipale

1 Introduction: The Question of the Original Stance

Other persons are present in our experiences in so many ways that most – if not all – of our experiences contain references to them. Besides *explicitly* – that is, as objects of our love, hate, desire, contempt, curiosity, admiration, and so on – others are also present *implicitly*. In this latter sense, others are experientially present even when we are not actually with them and, moreover, even when we do not actually perceive, recollect, or imagine them. Most of this presence either goes unnoticed or remains unconscious in a more fundamental sense. Examples of the latent presence of others can easily be found in our everyday lives: we move and gesticulate in ways that are customary in our cultural community; we express ourselves in language that we have learned from others; we perceive objects that have been invented, produced or created by others; and we may feel guilt or shame for our mere thoughts. In this sense, otherness permeates all our actions and perceptions, and our self-consciousness is throughout intersubjective.

Yet community and society are something that we have grown into in the course of time. Since our early childhood we have established reciprocal relations with others, we have gradually appropriated the intersubjective norms of our community, as well as a shared language, whereby we have gradually *entered into* a community.[1] To be sure, from the point of view of the "natural attitude" or "third-person perspective" our parents, community, cultural tradition, and the human kind were already existent before we were born. In contrast, from the point of view of our subjective experiential history, or "genetic constitution", the situation appears to be almost the opposite: the meaning of parents (including their meaning as something existent) was not readily constituted for us as we entered the world; it has rather been constituted

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[1] See Taipale 2014: 99–117.

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for us in our subjective stream of consciousness, so that even before we knew anything about the fact that there are other conscious beings, we ourselves already were conscious.

Our relationship with others cannot therefore be the same throughout our lives; it is rather something that develops, evolves, and transforms in the course of time. In other words, the self-other relationship has a temporal constitution. In the phenomenological inspection, experiences are discovered as involving a cumulative structure. By becoming something past, experiences do not vanish without a trace. Instead, they invest subjectivity with beliefs, preconceptions, and tendencies that, again, shape the course of our further experiences and even predetermine them to some extent. Each of our experiences carries something from our previous experiences, and in this sense refers back to them, whereas these prior experiences again contain references to the ones preceding them – and so on. The layered structure of experiences thus raises the question of how to interpret the earliest layers and the original stance starting from which the sedimentation of experiences is set off in the first place. As to the question of the self–other relationship, this eventually leads us to questions of early infancy. If we accept that experiences are thus "sedimented", that each of them refers back to earlier layers, we are forced to admit that the self-other relationship in early infancy is not an isolated issue, but something that at once vastly effects our interpretations of the self-other relationship in general – an issue the interpretation of which also bears consequences to how we tackle the questions of responsibility, ethics, community, history, and reality.

In this article I will approach the genetic unfolding of the self-other relationship by assessing certain psychoanalytic developmental theories. I will be discussing the self as an experiential dimension and thus leave aside questions concerning the self as an objective thing or metaphysical entity.[2] The main question that I wish to address here is the following: in what sense, if any, is the self-other relationship present at the outset of experiential development? Yet, the fact that I wish to focus on psychoanalytic developmental theories is prone to raise some doubts. Are not such theories hopelessly obsolete, as has often been declared? Is not psychoanalysis (as to its developmental story at least) part of a tradition that has been proven outdated by a vast and ever-growing number of empirical data? And what kind of affinities could one possibly find between the psychoanalytic developmental theory and the Husserlian account – and we not dealing with views that are simply contradictory and incompatible with one another?

William James famously claimed in his *Principles of Psychology* (1890) that the mental life of a suckling is nothing more than chaotic stream of sensations, where no distinction unfolds between self and non-self: "the baby [. . .] feels it all as one

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[2] I will not distinguish between self and ego in this article. For a detailed discussion on the psychoanalytic concepts of ego and self, see Blum 1982; Kernberg 1982; Rangell 1982; Richards 1982; Ticho 1982. For a discussion on the relation between the psychoanalytic and phenomenological terminology, see Ricoeur 1986; Chessick 1992; Karlsson 2010.

great blooming, buzzing confusion" (James 2007 [1890], 488). In developmental psychology, this view reigned for almost a century. Jean Piaget likewise believed that neonates are at first unable to differentiate between themselves and the external environment, and that they accordingly lack self-awareness: "[the infant] confuses himself with the universe; in other words, [. . .] he is unconscious of his self" (Piaget 1973: 151). An alleged empirical evidence for this claim was attained in the 1970s by several psychologists who argued from the basis of the so-called "mirror tests" that self-awareness does not arrive until the age of 12–24 months (e.g., Gallup 1970). In recent decades, however, several empirical studies have contested this traditional view, providing a credible amount of data that challenges the assumption of an early indistinction between self, other, and world. This trend begun to emerge already with the publication of the monumental anthology *The Competent Infant* (Stone et al. 1973), and it culminated in Daniel Stern's highly influential contribution *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (Stern 1985). The received view today is that infants begin to differentiate between themselves, the environment, and other people already from birth, and that they are social beings from the start (e.g., Trevarthen 1977, 1978, 1979; Reddy 2008; Malloch and Trevarthen 2009), and parallel neurophysiological results have been provided by the discovery of the "mirror neurons" (Gallese et al. 1996; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Iacoboni et al. 1999; Iacoboni 2008).

The Husserlian view would seem to find strong support in these recent theories. Husserl famously emphasizes throughout that even though the subjectivity of experience normally remains non-thematic and implicit for itself while intentionally experiencing something else (i.e., even though experiencing essentially involves a "self-forgetfulness"), it is nevertheless the case that we are never in doubt of whose experiences we lived through. In this elementary sense, selfhood amounts to one of the essential and primordial features of experience, and as such it allegedly must pertain to infantile experience as well: "The infant or rather the embryo that is entering the world [. . .] is not a person, but it is nevertheless an ego-pole" (Husserl 2008: 230).

So why introduce psychoanalysis in this connection? In the classical Freudian account, the experiential world of the infant is characterized by an initial state of "undifferentiation": the neonate is claimed to form a "symbiotic" unity with the caretaker, so that no self separate from the mother exists. Selfhood allegedly begins to unfold within this fusional matrix, instead of preceding the latter as something original. To be sure, the Husserlian view as well as the results of recent empirical studies immediately seem to collide with this kind of view. If we take a look at the works of Freud, this interpretation seems to be well-grounded at first glance. Freud encapsulated his view on infancy in 1914 in *On Narcissism*: "we are bound to suppose that no unity comparable to the ego [or self] can exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed" (Freud 1975d: 44). He held on to this view until the end of his career, and still in 1974b he wrote the following:

> Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything else. [...] Further reflection tells us that the adult's ego-feeling cannot have been the same from the beginning. It must have gone through a process of development, which cannot, of course, be demonstrated but which admits of being constructed with a fair degree of probability. An infant does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns to do so, in response to various promptings. [...] In this way, then, the ego detaches itself from the external world. Or, to put it more correctly, originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. (Freud 1974b: 199–200)

Freud accordingly seems to believe that at the beginning infants are unable to differentiate themselves from the external environment – and hence from other people as well.

The question of how to interpret the so-called original stance, the infant's developmental point of departure, and the idea of an undifferentiated experience, have given rise to vast debates among psychoanalysts, and, as we shall see in what follows, even Freud himself formulates this idea in many ways. In respect to the question of early infancy there are, roughly speaking, two different accounts in the psychoanalytic research literature.[3] As already indicated, according to the classical psychoanalytic theory there is at first a fusional or "symbiotic"[4] relation between infant and the mother. The second theory argues instead that the relation between the infant and the mother is to be interpreted as an actual *bilateral relation*, an "object-relation" – and this presupposes that the infant is already invested at least with an elementary form of self-awareness. This latter theory began to emerge already in the work of Freud's contemporary Paul Federn, who instead of "sense of selfhood" spoke of a constant, yet unconscious "ego-feeling" (*Ichgefühl*) (Federn 1952: 25–37; cf. Bergmann 1963). Donald Winnicott likewise speaks of an initial feeling of existence, of "an I AM feeling" (Winnicott 1965: 239).

It should also be pointed out that the "symbiosis theory" is largely based on clinical and therapeutic observation, and it has proven useful in explaining certain pathologies of later life in terms of a regression to earlier stages of development, in which the self–other relationship was allegedly constituted in a different way. In contrast, the theory defending the idea of early differentiation of selfhood, the "primary differentiation theory", arises from a more theoretical background, and it openly

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[3] Otto Kernberg notes that this division to some extent runs parallel with the division between psychoanalytic "schools": whereas Melanie Klein and other advocates of the so called "object-relation theory" conceived the infant to have the capacity to differentiate himself from his mother from the beginning of life, Freud, Jacobson, Mahler, Kerberg, and Winnicott instead question this idea and assume an initially undifferentiated state (see Kernberg 1982: 901). The idea is that an object-relation already presupposes an elementary differentiation (see, e.g., Sander 1980: 185). It seems, however, that Winnicott's account is not clear, since he admits the presence of an original subjective feeling of existence (see Winnicott 1965: 239).

[4] It should be noted right away that even though the concept of symbiosis is derived from the field of biology, in Freud and others it relates not first and foremost to an objective biological fact, but to an experience.

aims at reconciling the psychoanalytic view with the data gained by empirical research. Depending on which developmental theory is appropriated, the structure and etiology of pathologies can be understood in two very different ways, and hence the study of the relationship between the two theories is extremely important, both theoretically and clinically.

I will suggest in the following that both theories advocated in the field of psychoanalytic research – that is to say, the symbiosis theory and the primary differentiation theory – have something important to say about experience in general. By discussing the relationship between them, my aim is to address the question of the relationship between the classical psychoanalytic developmental theory and Husserlian phenomenology. My claim is that, unlike how it first seems, the classical psychoanalytic view is not simply contradictory or incompatible with the view claiming that selfhood is differentiated from the start. I shall suggest, instead, that these two theories are addressing the issue in two different registers so to speak, and that they do not exclude but complement one another. In this manner, I will at once be suggesting that the classical psychoanalytic theory can complement, not only empirical psychology, but also phenomenology.

2 Symbiosis and Differentiation

2.1 The Symbiosis Theory

One of the most influential pioneers and proponents of the symbiosis theory is Margaret Mahler, a Hungarian psychoanalyst, who wrote her main works in the 1960s and 1970s. Following Freud, Mahler argues with Fred Pine that the first months of the infant's life are characterized by a state of "undifferentiation" which can be divided into two subphases. The first two months of the infant's life are labeled by Mahler as the phase of "normal autism". What Mahler attempts to emphasize with her choice of words is that at the beginning neonates experience no "others" or "outside" *as such* – the infant accordingly is a kind of solipsist in the sense that his self originally covers everything that exists for him. During the first 2 months, "[n]either the self, nor even the bodily self, seems to be distinguished from the inanimate objects of the environment" (Mahler 1968: 64; Mahler et al. 1975: 52, 204–205)[5]: the infant so to speak "melts" into the mother's body (Pine 1990: 238; Pine 2004: 517), so that no difference unfolds between the infant's body and the body of the mother.

It is not before the age of 2 months or so that there arises, according to Mahler, a "dim awareness of the need-satisfying object" (i.e., the mother), marking the

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[5] The parts of the latter book that I discuss here are written either by Mahler or by Mahler and Pine – the third author, Anni Bergman, wrote the third part, which is the reason that she is not mentioned in the text.

beginning of the second subphase called "normal symbiosis".[6] In this subphase, the mother is present as an "auxiliary ego" or as the "mothering side of [the] symbiotic self" (Blum 1982: 969; Mahler et al. 1975: 52; Spitz 1965: 114: 263). Mahler explains that, during this phase, "the infant behaves and functions as though he and his mother were an omnipotent system – dual unity within one common boundary" (Mahler et al. 1975: 44). In the words of René Spitz, the mother "supplements" the child so that as a result there is a "psychologically undifferentiated organism", a "non-differentiated totality" (Spitz 1965: 4–5; cf. Sander 1980: 185). Instead of a child in relation to his mother (and, hence, instead of a proper "object-relation"), there is a "mother-child unit" (M. Balint 1952b: 105). Mahler specifies her concept of symbiosis in the following manner:

> The term *symbiosis* [...] describes that state of undifferentiation, of fusion with mother, in which the 'I' is not yet differentiated from the 'not-I' and in which inside and outside are only gradually coming to be sensed as different. Any unpleasurable perception, external or internal, is projected beyond the common boundary of the symbiotic *milieu interiour* [...][7] which includes the mothering partner's gestalt during ministrations. (Mahler et al. 1975: 44)[8]

Accordingly, the infant at this phase "molds and unfolds in the matrix of the mother-infant dual unit" (Mahler et al. 1975: 5),[9] in a "symbiotic orbit" (Blum 1982: 971), whereas separation and individuation are subsequent "cognitive-affective achievements." (Mahler et al. 1975: 5)

Mahler assumes that it is not until 4 or 5 months of age that the process of "differentiation" begins (Mahler et al. 1975: 52), whereby the original symbiosis is gradually ruptured. Before this period, the infant is allegedly unaware of its own separateness and lacks even the most rudimentary self – in Mahler's terms, a "pre-ego", "ego nucleus", or "nuclear pre-ego" (Mahler et al. 1975: 52, 204, 205; cf. Pine 2004: 516). Mahler's view is embraced by many psychoanalysts. Freud himself believed that the foetus's intrauterine sensations have no psychic content (Freud 1971: 275–276); Otto Fenichel claimed in 1945 that "the newborn infant has no ego" (Fenichel 1945: 34; cf. Peterfreund 1978: 427ff.); Winnicott wrote in 1965 that in the newborn "there is not yet a self. It could be said that the self of the infant

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[6] Pine argues later that terms such as *undifferentiatedness, merger*, and *boundarylessness* might had been more appropriate over *symbiosis* which is derived from the field of biology (see Pine 2004: 515–516). Louise Kaplan embraces Mahler's idea but favors the term "oneness": "From the infant's point of view there are no boundaries between himself and mother. They are one" (Kaplan 1978: 28: 72). Stern criticizes Mahler's choice of terms when he writes that to become more and more social does not mean to become less and less autistic (Stern 1985: 234).

[7] Mahler refers here to Freud's concept of purified "pleasure-ego" (*reines Lust-Ich*) (see Freud 1974b: 200). I will come back to this notion later.

[8] See also Mahler et al. (1975: 8), where symbiosis is characterized as "a feature of primitive cognitive life wherein the differentiation between self and mother has not taken place, or where regression to that self-object undifferentiated stage has occurred".

[9] Alice Balint (1952a: 127) critically notes – or, more precisely, critically anticipates such an account by noting – that the idea of a "dual-unit" already involves a "very primitive object-relation".

at this very early stage is only potential" (Winnicott 1989 [1965], 25). Spitz (1965) even goes so far as to claim that neonates have "neither awareness nor conscious experience" (Spitz 1965: 4): "the newborn cannot distinguish one 'thing' from another; he cannot distinguish an (external) thing from his own body, and he does not experience the surround as separate from himself" (Spitz 1965: 36). Mahler (1975) summarizes the symbiosis theory in the following manner:

> Normal autism and normal symbiosis are the two earliest stages of nondifferentiation – the former is objectless, the latter, preobjectal. The two stages occur before differentiation of the undifferentiated or nondifferentiated matrix; that is, before separation and individuation and the emergence of the rudimentary ego as a functional structure. (Mahler et al. 1975: 48; cf. Spitz 1965: 16)[10]

2.2   The Primary Differentiation Theory

In the last four decades, the reception of the view articulated by Mahler has been discordant (e.g., Richards 1982: 939ff.). Many clinically oriented psychoanalysts value highly Mahler's pioneering work on the infant-mother symbiosis, whereas many theoretically oriented psychoanalysts have criticized it as being outdated and incompatible with recent empirical findings. One of the earliest critics of symbiosis theory is Emanuel Peterfreund.[11] He writes in 1978:

> [Mahler's] conception of a 'dual unity within a common boundary' is no more meaningful than the conception of an 'undifferentiated' phase of infantile development. Every living organism manifests some degree of differentiated functioning, some ability to classify input, some ability to make decisions and selections, even if of the most rudimentary kind. [. . .] In sum, already at birth there must be some separation and some boundaries between mother and infant. (Peterfreund 1978: 435)[12]

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[10] In contrast, Husserl writes: "The ego remains concealed insofar as it is not thematic as ego. Yet it is a centrum of affection and action, identification, [and] ability" (Husserl 1973b: 605). Elsewhere Husserl specifies that this is the case already in the womb: "Das Neugeborene oder vielmehr der in die Welt tretende Embryo [. . .] ist keine Person. Aber es ist doch Ich-Zentrum und Feld" (Husserl 2008: 230).

[11] Peterfreund's main criticism toward the symbiosis theory is focused on its alleged tendency to *adultomorphize* and *pathomorphize* infantile experiences: "many of the problems inherent in the [classical] psychoanalytic characterizations of infancy stem [. . .] from two fundamental conceptual fallacies especially characteristic to psychoanalytic thought: the adultomorphization of infancy, and the tendency to characterize early states of normal development is terms of hypotheses about later states of psychopathology" (Peterfreund 1978: 427; see also Gergely 2000: 1199).

[12] Peterfreund illustrates: "The simple observable fact that a hungry infant roots to and nurses from the breast and not from a stick of wood or from its own fingers negates any idea of an undifferentiated phase in which the infant cannot distinguish inner and outer stimuli or distinguish between himself and inanimate objects. The infant's nursing behavior indicates that that some rudimentary distinctions are being made, which, when more fully developed, will eventually be classified by adults and called 'inside' and 'outside' as well as 'animate' and 'inanimate'" (Peterfreund 1978: 433).

To be sure, this capacity to "classify input" and to make preliminary "selections" and "decisions" is probably not well-articulated and perhaps purely instinctual, but according to critics like Peterfreund it nevertheless serves as a proof of differentiation.

This view is developed further by Daniel Stern. In his influential book *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (1985), Stern discusses an extensive research data and argues that from the age of 2 months or so the infant's sensations, perceptions, and experiences clearly begin to manifest as his own, and that even before this age the child is self-aware in another sense (I will come back to this latter type of self-awareness later). That is to say, the infant originally develops what Stern calls a "sense of self" (Stern 1985: 3–12). Stern emphasizes that the "sense" in question is not a form of reflection or any other kind of objectifying awareness, but a "simple" and "non-reflexive" bodily feeling (Stern 1985: 7). We can nevertheless speak of "self-awareness" in this connection, provided that we keep in mind that self-awareness is here not to be identified with reflection or self-objectification, but with "pre-reflective self-awareness".[13]

The Sternian account can be easily reconciled with the phenomenological account. Husserl argues that experiences are essentially *conscious* or – better – *lived* experiences, and that in this elementary sense they are essentially characterized by self-awareness. Experiences are inseparable from a feeling of going through an experience; to rephrase Thomas Nagel, there is "something it is like" to go through an experience. In the minimal form, self-awareness refers to the "livedness" of experiences. And as is well-known, Husserl claims on this basis that there is always already an "insurmountable difference" (*unüberbrückbarer Unterschied*) (Husserl 2008: 615) between self and other. The existence of the experiential difference (i.e., the difference between what is lived through and what is not) is independent on whether the difference can yet be articulated or thematized as such.

In this light, the so-called mirror recognition tests lose their weight as evidence for the late arrival of self-awareness. In the 1970s certain Darwinian developmental psychologists arranged tests in which a red dot was placed in the forehead of a child during sleep, and after the child woke up, a mirror was placed in front of her so that the red dot soon caught her attention. The tests showed that until the average of 18 months of age children tried to reach for the red dot from the direction of the mirror, whereas after this age they started reaching the dot from the direction of their own forehead. This was interpreted as a proof of self-awareness, and it was assumed that a child who does not as yet "pass" the mirror test is not yet self-aware. As we can easily see, however, what we have here is a rather advanced type of self-awareness. After all, it is the case that already while reaching to the mirror the child experiences or feels the difference between the movements of his own hand and the movements seen in the mirror: his own hand provides a kinaesthetic sensations, the

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[13] On prereflective self-awareness, see Zahavi (1999) and (2003).

mirror does not. This qualitative experiential difference – even if not articulated or thematized as such – is present from the start. Hence by clarifying the concept of self-awareness, it can be claimed that failing the mirror test serves as a proof for the fact that a *particular advanced type of self-awareness* is still in waiting, but not the implicit self-awareness, to say nothing of self-awareness in general. In other words, passing the mirror test serves as a proof of "objective self-awareness", "explicit sense of self", or perhaps "self-concept", none of which can be identified with self-awareness as such (see Case 1991: 215–216, 227; Lewis 1991: 234–236; Reddy 2008: 125).

Before the infant learns to *thematically* differentiate himself as an object in the world, he already implicitly experiences the difference between his own movements and the movements of the (m)other via his bodily "feel". As Stern argues: "In order for the infant to have any formed sense of self, there must ultimately be some organization that is sensed as a reference point. The first such organization concerns the body" (Stern 1985: 46). Ulric Neisser, who defends the so called ecological theory of perception, likewise writes:

> Infants are aware of themselves virtually from birth. Like other primates (including those that fail the rouge test), they know where they are, what they can do, and what they have done. (Neisser 1993: 16; cf. Pipp 1993: 200; Grossman 1982: 934–935)

Developmental psychologist Philippe Rochat agrees:

> Prior to the expression of explicit self-awareness such as self-recognition and self-identification in a mirror or a photograph, infants from birth manifest an implicit sense of themselves. (Rochat 2003: 718; cf. 722–723)

What we here call "primary differentiation theory" can accordingly be captured in Stern's following words:

> Infants begin to experience a sense of an emergent self from birth. They are predesigned to be aware of self-organizing processes. They never experience a period of total self/other undifferentiation. There is no confusion between self and other in the beginning or at any point during infancy. They are also predesigned to be selectively responsive to external social events and never experience an autistic-like phase. (Stern 1985: 10, cf. 69–70; cf. Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996: 229; Reddy 2008: 125ff.)

In this light the two theories – the symbiosis theory and the primary differentiation theory – seem to hopelessly contradict one another. After all, the first theory claims that the neonate is invested with no selfhood apart from the infant-mother unit. According to the second theory, instead, the infant has from the start an elementary form of self-awareness, "a sense of self" – and hence the alleged symbiotic or merger-like experiences must already presuppose an elementary differentiation. Likewise it seems that the Husserlian account is incompatible with the classical psychoanalytic theory and compatible only with the primary differentiation theory.

3 Symbiosis as a Bodily Experience

Before we decide to reject the classical psychoanalytic theory, however, we should pay attention to the fact that most advocates of the symbiosis theory – including Freud and Mahler – seem to explicitly subscribe to the view that, at the level of bodily experience, already neonates differentiate between "inner" and "outer" from the start. This obviously causes some perplexity, since at first glance it seems to render merger-like experiences impossible. In order to illustrate what is at stake here, we should take a closer look at the experience of merger with regard to its bodily aspects. This will eventually enable us to question the alleged incompatibility of the two theories under discussion – and hence at once the alleged incompatibility of phenomenology and classical psychoanalysis as well.

As we saw while discussing the mirror tests, the experience of moving one's own body has a central role in arguments defending the primary differentiation theory. This role is acknowledged by the symbiosis theorists as well. Freud (1975a) explicitly considers the perceptual system as the core of the ego (Freud 1975a: 292), and he states accordingly that "the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego" (*körperliches Ich*) or a "body-ego" (*Körper-Ich*) (Freud 1975a: 294, 295).[14] Following Freud, Mahler likewise argues that "the infant's inner sensations form the *core* of the self" (Mahler et al. 1975: 47): the "infant's earliest sense of himself is conveyed, from the beginning, through sensations from within his own body, especially by proprioception" (Mahler and McDevitt 1982: 829); "at this very earliest stage of development, proprioception [. . .] conveys the first glimmerings of a primitive core of a body self" (Mahler and McDevitt 1982: 829).[15] That is to say, according to Mahler, "self-boundary formation derives from touch, smell, taste, sight, and the coming age of motor coordination, which complements the important vestibular kinaesthetic positional schemata of our selves" (Mahler and McDevitt 1982: 831).[16]

Furthermore, like the primary differentiation theory, the symbiosis theory too assigns *kinaesthesia* a central role in the differentiation of own and alien – and of self and other. Freud (1975c) writes:

> Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an almost entirely helpless living organism, as yet unorientated in the world, which is receiving stimuli in its nervous substance. This organism will very soon be in a position to make a first distinction and a first orientation. On the one hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes to an external world. On the other hand, it will also be aware of stimuli against which such action is of no avail and whose character of constant pressure persists in spite of it; these stimuli are the signs of an internal world, the evidence of instinctual needs. The perceptual substance of the living organism will thus have found in the efficacy of its muscular activity a basis for distinguishing between an 'outside' and an 'inside'. (Freud 1975c: 83)

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[14] On the psychoanalytic concept of body-ego, see Fliess (1961), A. Freud (1992): 28ff.; Lehtonen (1997).

[15] The empirical evidence for the claim that infantile self-awareness is fundamentally body-based is discussed in, e.g., Pipp (1993: 186).

[16] The emphasis of the *boundaries* reminds us of the Husserlian view that the "ego is not conceivable without the non-ego, to which it is intentionally related" (Husserl 1973a: 244).

What Freud means is that I can, for instance, escape the bright light of the sun by turning away or by closing my eyes (that is to say, by moving my own body), but I cannot make hunger, for instance, disappear simply by changing the scene or by altering my posture – such experiential differences motivate the constitution of the inner/outer distinction. Later on (1929) Freud sums up this idea with the following words:

> [The infant] comes to learn a procedure by which, through a deliberate direction of one's sensory activities and through suitable muscular action, one can differentiate between what is internal – [i.e.] what belongs to the ego – and what is external – [i.e.] what emanates from the outer world. In this way one makes the first step towards the introduction of the reality principle which is to dominate future development. (Freud 1974b: 200)[17]

Moreover, in order to differentiate between self and non-self the ability to *control* body-movements is not presupposed. After all, many of our elementary reflexes and purely instinctual bodily functions are accompanied by kinaesthetic sensations, even though they stand outside our volition. As an example, Mahler speaks of the sucking reflex which arguably is both present already in the womb and involves kinaesthetic sensations:

> Early developmental psychologists, as well as we, agree that activity is the most important trigger of the developing sense of self. The trigger for the first pattern of activity of the newborn and very likely the fetus *in utero* is the sucking reflex, which the touch of the cheek elicits much earlier than vision. (Mahler and McDevitt 1982: 835)[18]

Husserl too emphasizes the role of kinaesthesis in the formation of the basic distinctions between self, non-self, and other. He assigns a "fundamentally essential role of the vocalization of one's own self-produced voice, related to one's own, originally given kinestheses of the vocal muscles":

> It seems, from my observation, that in the child the self-produced voice, and then, analogously, the heard voice, serves as the first bridge for the objectification of the ego or for the formation of the '*alter*' – [and this occurs] before the child already has or can have a sensory analogy between his visual lived-body and that of the 'other' and, afortiori, before he can acknowledge to the other a tactual lived-body and a lived-body incarnating the will. (Husserl 1952: 96)[19]

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[17] Further, in psychoanalysis too, the so called "double sensations" have an important role to play in the constitution of selfhood. As Pine puts it: "The point regarding the difference between touching the mother and touching oneself is important. While this distinction has been present all along, and does not first come into being in the differentiation subphase, we assume that it contributes heavily to the infant's learning about otherness in this subphase. After all, touching one's own body produces a double stimulation (in the fingertips or hand and in the touched place), whereas touching the mother, or objects, or any "not me" thing produces only the single stimulation felt in the fingers or hand. The correlation is in each case perfect (double sensation equals "me"; single sensation equals "not me"), and we have assumed that this regularity underlies some of the learning of differentiation all along" (Pine 2004: 521–522; Cf. Gergely 2000: 1203ff.).

[18] Mahler also argues that the mouth thus originally pertains to the body-self, the hands are to be understood as subsequent "active extensions" of the body-self (Mahler and McDevitt 1982: 837).

[19] Cf. Rochat (1998, 102ff).

In a later manuscript (from 1935) he explains:

> By involuntarily effecting kinaestheses, the child involuntarily makes sounds and repeats them [. . .]. The mother utters similar sounds, imitating the sounds made by the child. The child hears them [. . .], but without kinestheses that pertain to them; kinestheses are associatively awakened [with the heard sounds], but they are not accompanied [by them]. (Husserl 1973b: 606)

Elsewhere Husserl admits that "the infant has kinaestheses already in the womb", and he concludes that an "elementary primordiality" (*eine Primordialität in Urstufe*) as well as the difference between self and non-self must emerge already during intrauterine life (Husserl 1973b: 604–605).[20] As a curiosity, let me note that Husserl, like psychoanalysts, believes that in early infancy kinaesthetic striving is purely instinctual and unconscious – in a rather Freudian manner Husserl even maintains that in the first instance such striving (or, "conative activity") is guided by elementary emotions and determined solely by the seek and prolongation of pleasure (see Cairns 1976: 65).[21]

The compelling question is the following: How can the representatives and advocates of the symbiosis theory (including Freud and Mahler) accept the view that the difference between self and non-self is present from the beginning? What can concepts such as "symbiosis" and "merger" mean if neonates can originally differentiate between themselves and what is external to them? In order to address these questions, one more psychoanalytic concept must be introduced. The theory of symbiosis is founded on the idea that infantile nervous system is regulated by a so called *stimulus barrier* (cf. Freud 1975b: 19). Kaplan explicates this notion in the following manner:

> The newborn's out-of-the-womb environment is a terrain of unpredictable and unfamiliar sights, sounds, odors, temperatures and movements. Only a few stimuli, such as the rocking motion of the mother's body and the mother's heartbeat, are vaguely familiar. In general, the newborn's surroundings consist of unorganized and fragmented stimuli. If the infant's nervous system were not protected, his first weeks in his new environment would be experienced as an onslaught of intolerably intense stimulation. Fortunately, the inborn

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[20] It is worth noting here that Husserl thinks that though originally uncontrolled, kinaesthesis is essentially a subjective, volitional matter (see Cairns 1976: 64).

[21] cf. Husserl (2008: 477): "Das Ego im Uranfang (der Urgeburt) ist schon Ich gerichteter Instinkten"; cf. Husserl (2008: 475): "Habitualitäten [. . .] verflochten mit Instinkten"; Husserl (2008: 476): "*Ist die Empfindungssinnlichkeit nicht zugleich Instinktsinnlichkeit und dabei mit Gefühlsintentionalität verwoben?*" In another recorded conversation with Cairns, six days earlier than the one quoted above, Husserl explicitly subscribes to the view that elementary emotions do not yet relate to external objects, since objects in this proper sense do not yet exist; instead, "objects" are originally simple sources of pleasure: "the infant is impelled to evoke actively those kinaesthetic sequences which show themselves to bring about the endurance or recurrence of something valued, in the first instance something pleasant. Yet not a pleasant 'object' in the full sense – such objects are not yet constituted – but a pleasant feeling. The whole psychic life is determined to evoke or constitute the enduring, the self-identical, the recurrent" (Cairns 1976: 64). In psychoanalytic terms, what Husserl means is that objects are first and foremost "libidinal objects", and they emerge as such before they are (or can be) objectified as mere things (see e.g. Spitz 1965: 15; Freud 1975c: 86).

> equipment of a newborn features a nervous system that is relatively impervious to outer stimulation. This relative imperviousness is called a *stimulus barrier*. (Kaplan 1978: 70)

This is not to say, however, that the infant would not "register" data originating from the environment; it is rather that her psychic regard, her *cathexis*, originally recedes back to itself – hence the alleged "autoeroticism" of infants. René Spitz explains:

> The stimulus barrier is not to be understood as an obstacle in the path of the reception of stimulation originating in the environment [or from within]. It is to be understood as consisting in the *uncathected condition of the sensorium*. In other words, the receiving stations are not energized as yet. (Spitz 1955: 234)

Spitz accordingly claims that thanks to the stimulus barrier, in the earliest period, "all perception goes through the interoceptive and proprioceptive systems" (Spitz 1965: 36). Mahler subscribes to this view and argues that, at the beginning, the infant's "internal sensations are more fundamental and more elementary than external ones" (Mahler et al. 1975: 52). Accordingly, the first "environment" (or "world") of the infant is congruent with her bodily self-awareness.[22] This is how we should understand Freud's already quoted puzzling statement that "the ego first comprises everything".

Developing this claim further, we can think that during the first postnatal weeks the caretaker presents herself to the infant not through *external* but through *internal* sensibility (Blum 1982: 968. See also Spitz 1965). Winnicott explains that "the infant and maternal care form a unit" (Winnicott 1965: 39): the child may not grasp the mother as a separate, external being, but *maternal care* – insofar as it is persistent and continuous, i.e. "good enough" in Winnicott's words – is nevertheless incorporated into the infant's bodily (self-)experience. That is to say, instead of being constituted as a particularly helpful and attentive external being or as a source of warmth, the mother is constituted as an integral structural moment of the infant's familiar bodily atmosphere, so that the absence of this moment makes the child experience *himself* as inadequate and incomplete.[23] To employ a famous example, if the infant starts to cry when his familiar caretaker leaves the room, this

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[22] "The body begins by being interoceptive", as Merleau-Ponty puts it (Merleau-Ponty 1997: 183). That is to say, the frequent, constantly repeating bodily rhythms, such as heart-beat and "the whole respiratory apparatus [give] the child a kind of experience of space (Merleau-Ponty 1997: 183). It might be worthwhile to compare this with what Levinas says about *enjoyment*: "Subjectivity originates in the independence and sovereignty of enjoyment" (see Levinas 1969: 114 and ff.). See also Bergmann (1963: 100): "The ego boundary coincides with the entire world." Here yet another direction of comparison can be found in what Freud wrote about animism: "Animism came to primitive man naturally and as a matter of course. He knew what things were like in the world, namely just as he felt himself to be" (Freud 1974a: 379).

[23] One can find resemblances of this idea to the phenomenological analysis of incorporation: the clothes that we are wearing, e.g., become part of our perceiving body so that instead of primarily feeling our gloves as being *on* our hands, or our t-shirt as *surrounding* us, we palpate and feel the world *with* our gloved hands and clothed bodies: in a somewhat similar manner the mother is "incorporated" into the lived-body of the infant.

accordingly is a signal of the feeling of an unpleasant change in the infant's own bodily existence.[24] In other words, instead of the objective body of the mother, what the infant incorporates is the maternal bodily presence or "care" – that is to say, everything (positive) that the mother signifies in respect to the infant's bodily self-awareness.[25]

More generally speaking, others present themselves primordially as moments or elements in the infant's bodily self-experience. As the infant in the course of development increasingly learns to voluntarily control his attention, the stimulus barrier becomes broadened whereby the infant gradually learns to direct his attention to external things and objects. According to the symbiosis theorists, this point marks the beginning of the process of "separation": the infant learns to grasp himself as a being separate from the environment that is given by his external sensibility – and hence separate from the mother too, who now is constituted as an other (cf. Mahler and McDevitt 1982: 830).

4   Toward Reconciliation: Facts and Fantasies

What we have established until now is that *both* the representatives of primary differentiation theory *and* the proponents of the symbiosis theory subscribe to the view that, due to its embodied nature, self-awareness begins to emerge from very early on, even before birth. The apparent incongruity between the two theories thus begins to dissolve. This becomes even clearer when we note that advocates of the primary differentiation theory too endorse the view that there are experiences in respect to which speaking of symbiosis, merger, or amalgamation is justified. The advocates of primary differentiation theory do not disallow or abandon the idea of symbiotic experiences; what the disagreement is about is the *fundamentality* of such experiences. We should now take a closer look at this debate.[26]

Stern incarnates the main critique addressed to the symbiosis theory: "First comes the formation of self and other, and only then is the sense of merger-like experiences possible" (Stern 1985: 70). The critics suggest that symbiotic experiences should be interpreted in terms of the infant's occasional *illusion* or *fantasy*, and not as signs for a symbiotic "phase" (Stern 1985; Silverman 2004: 245–246). As Peterfreund formulates, instead of "a state of undifferentiation", merger-like experiences ought to be understood in terms of "complex

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[24] As Merleau-Ponty puts it: "rather than truly perceiving those who are there, he [the infant] feels incomplete when someone goes away" (Merleau-Ponty 1997: 186).

[25] One might also add that Winnicott thinks that the mother is part of the infant's stimulus barrier in the sense that she protects her child from overstimulation.

[26] Concerning the relationship between Stern and Mahler, see also Weinberg (1991).

configurations of differentiated processes" (Peterfreund 1978: 435). Doris Silverman likewise suggests that instead of being escapist regressions to preceding stages in development, "symbiotic fantasies develop along with emergent patterned interactions that entail merger" (Silverman 2004: 246). Stern formulates this view in the following manner:

> There is no symbiosis-like phase. In fact, the subjective experiences of union with another can occur only after a sense of a core self and a core other exists. Union experiences are thus viewed as the successful result of actively organizing the experience of self-being-with-another, rather than as the product of a passive failure of the ability to differentiate self from other. (Stern 1985: 10)

Fred Pine, with whom Mahler wrote her pioneering book, admits that instead of a full-scale *stage* of development, having an "absolute domination of experience", it might be more appropriate to give the early symbiosis a "relative significance" (Pine 2004: 517). Harold Blum claims that instead of "undifferentiation" one perhaps ought to speak of "incomplete differentiation" (Blum 1982: 972). Mahler too is claimed to have changed her mind with respect to this issue: according to one of her closest colleagues, in the final stage of her career she abandoned the idea of an autistic phase (Bergman 2000: xvi).

Be that as it may, this by no means implies that Mahler, Pine, and others would simply relinquish the theory of symbiosis. Pine answers the critics in the following manner:

> Today it seems clear that the assumption of no awareness of differentiation in the infant was not all that wise, or even cautious, since it runs so counter to what evolution would require. But it is equally clear that research evidence of *moments* of differentiated perception in the infant does not rule out the presence of moments in which the infant experiences an undifferentiatedness, an enveloping surround of inarticulable states with the mother. (Pine 2004: 516)

What Pine suggests is that early infantile experiences involve both: moments of merger *and* moments of differentiation. However, latter moments occur mainly during periods of so-called *alert inactivity*, and the existence of such moments does not exclude the possibility of the other kinds of experiential modes and capacities – after all, the newborn infant (or the adult) is not *constantly* "reality-attuned" in this sense,[27] and one could perhaps even argue that this is not the case *most of the time*. Pine therefore concludes:

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[27] Pine illustrates: "The reality-attuned cognitive performances of the infant will be mainly during the periods of alert inactivity [. . .] which occur sporadically through the day (and for progressively longer time periods through the early months), but not [e.g.,] at moments of vigorous sucking, melting into the mother's body, and falling asleep. A sense of boundarylessness can be present; and conversely, articulated awareness of boundaries [. . .] will fade. [. . .] But these are only the intense moments. The many quiet and sustained background moments when the half-asleep infant is cradled in the mother's arms, sensing her warmth, her smell, her sounds in another prime candidate for subjective merger experiences. [. . .] I have in mind those moments when the infant is being carried in the mother's arms while she is in motion, the infant moving with her body, the two of them in complete synchrony" (Pine 1990: 238–239). Stern suggests that during moments of alert inactivity the infant either "reaches through" the stimulus barrier or the "threshold" of the latter "sinks to zero" (Stern 1985: 232).

> Stern (1985) has suggested that symbiosis can only be a fantasy added on later in development – added on, that is, to a primary sense of differentiation. First the facts and then the fantasies, so to speak. One need not go so far as to argue the opposite: first the fantasies and then the facts. And certainly there can be later elaborations of symbiotic fantasies that *are* added on. In the light, however, of what we now know both about development and about the general functioning of the human mind, one can imagine a jumble of fact and fantasy from the outset, with the two carried along in mind and only slowly, and never completely, getting sorted out. Reflect that undifferentiatedness need not be thought of as a fantasy; it may be regarded as an *experience* during nursing, even though we *on the outside* "know" it is "incorrect"; it is an experience as interpreted by the infant with its still undeveloped cognition. (Pine 2004: 518–519. See also Pine 1990: 237ff.)

What is here suggested is that selfhood is *fundamentally* outlined both by facts (i.e., factual kinesthetic "feel", perception, etc.) and fantasies (i.e., desire-oriented experiences). As Pine nicely summarizes: "we have 'both/and' minds, not 'either/or' ones. New research data on infants can be seen as additive rather than contradictory" (Pine 2004: 516; cf. Pine 1990: 238).[28]

Stern assumes that the constitution of selfhood emerges hand-in-hand with the constitution of a coherent perceptual environment (Stern 1985: 71), and he thereby embraces the classical phenomenological view. As Husserl puts it, perceptual environment and the embodied subjectivity stand essentially in "correlation" (e.g., Husserl 1954: 161–163),[29] or, to quote Merleau-Ponty:

> The thing, and the world, are given to me along with [...] my body [...] in a living connection comparable, or rather identical, with that existing between the parts of my body itself". (Merleau-Ponty 1945: 237)[30]

I wish to suggest that the manner in which Stern employs the classical phenomenological account is not as far from the classical psychoanalytic view as it might seem. According to this account, by learning to perceive unitary external things the

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[28] Pine adds: "the more realistic (in adult terms) perceptions will not automatically be dominant. They are not reliably dominant in all adults, even when the fact of self-other differentiation is far more strongly established. In fact, if the realistic perceptions were automatically the dominant ones, there would be no need for psychoanalytic or psychodynamic psychotherapic treatments at all. Quite the reverse is the case" (Pine 1990: 239). In psychoanalysis, "fantasy" refers to a realm in which the reality-principle serves the pleasure-principle. *Fantasy* accordingly means "[a]n imaginary scene in which the subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfilment of a wish (in the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that that is distorted to greater or lesser extent by defensive processes" (Laplanche 1988: 314).

[29] According to the so called ecological theory, perceptual environment appears as the realm of "affordances" (for example, the bottle on the table appears as something that can be grasped, which is another way of saying that it affords grasping). On the ecological theory, see Neisser (1991) and (1993).

[30] In a similar vein, psychoanalyst Robert Fliess writes: "sensory spheres are fusion points with the outside world. It is at these points that the two environments, body and outside world, adhere to each other and are mutually requisite to each other. The existence of these particular parts of the body ego is dependent upon the perception of the object-world" (Fliess 1961: 210).

infant also comes to constitute himself as a unitary perceiver (Stern 1985: 47).[31] Yet, we must recognize that this kind of learning is always already on the way, and so too is the correlative sense of self. This must have major consequences, since the infant's perceptual capacities are not yet properly developed at birth – to say nothing of intrauterine life.[32] Stern argues that in waiting for a well-organized environment (the correlate of well-developed perceptual abilities), infants already experience the *process* of organization and also anticipate its outcome (Stern 1985: 45). As he elsewhere puts it, infants are natural "hypothesis-generators" (see Sander 1980: 184): the environment never appears as fragmented and chaotic, but from the beginning it appears as having a rudimentary meaningful structure. *In retrospect*, the formed associations, expectations, and "hypotheses" guiding the infant's perceptions may indeed turn out to be based on sheer fantasies, but *before they do* they contribute to the structuring the environment and to presenting it as a meaningful horizon. That is to say, the subjective formation of a meaningful environment is initially determined not only by perceptions and other reality-attuned experiences alone, but also by the infant's unconscious desires, needs, wishes, and the pleasure-seeking fantasy in which the latter are processed. And, correlatively, while the reality-attuned self-awareness is still unorganized, it is complemented by the infant's fantasies.

This picture would seem to leave space for fantasy – and hence to symbiosis as well. Namely, insofar as the experiential environment of the infant is not chaotic but manifests a rudimentary associative meaningfulness from the start, and insofar as self-awareness develops hand-in-hand with the experiential environment, we ought to conclude that self-awareness begins to emerge already before reality-attuned experiences gain a dominate position. Self-constitution strives at coherence, and this striving is not hindered by the inadequacy of actual data. In Husserl's words, not object-constitution alone, but also self-constitution is "guided by a *telos*" in the sense that it is "directed toward the achievement of consistency or harmony".[33] That which in adulthood motivates us to subordinate our fantasies and day-dreaming to facts, does not yet dominate in the experiential life of infants.[34]

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[31] Stern explains that learning does not primarily aim at forming a "sense of self", but the latter is one of the "by-products" of the former (Stern 1985: 47). He also formulates that "the emergence of organization is nothing but a form of learning" (Stern 1985: 45). Husserl, too, endorses the view that infants must first *learn* to perceive external things: "Das vorgebende Wahrnehmungsfeld in der *frühen Kindheit* enthält also noch nichts, was in bloßem Ansehen als Ding expliziert werden könnte" (Husserl 1950: 112).

[32] For some reason that does not become clear, Stern maintains that the sense of self does not begin to emerge until birth. I see no reason why this development could not begin already in intrauterine life. As Sandor Ferenczi provocatively puts it, "[I]t would be foolish to believe that the mind begins to function only at the moment of birth" (Ferenczi 2005 [1945], 112).

[33] See Cairns 1976: 35: "The whole of life and the activity self-constitution and the constitution of objects is guided by a telos, is directed toward the achievement of consistency or harmony".

[34] Cf. Freud (1975b: 18–19); *my italics*: "It will rightly be objected that an organization which was a slave to the pleasure principle and neglected the reality of the external world could not maintain itself alive for the shortest time, so that it could not have come into existence at all. The

I believe that this is what Freud has in mind as he argues that the ego is first and foremost a "pleasure-ego" (*Lust-Ich*) (Freud 1974b: 200). Let me quote Freud:

> A tendency arises to separate from the ego everything that can become a source of such unpleasure, to throw it outside and to create a pure pleasure-ego which is confronted by a strange and threatening 'outside'. The boundaries of this primitive pleasure-ego cannot escape rectification through experience. Some of the things that one is unwilling to give up, because they give pleasure, are nevertheless not ego but object; and some sufferings that one seeks to expel turn out to be inseparable from the ego in virtue of their internal origin. [...] Our present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive – indeed, an all-embracing – feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it. If we may assume that there are many people in whose mental life this primary ego-feeling has persisted to a greater or less degree, it would exist in them *side by side* with the narrower and more sharply demarcated ego-feeling of maturity, like a kind of *counterpart* to it. In that case, the ideational contents appropriate to it would be precisely those of limitlessness and of a bond with the universe – the same ideas with which my friend [R. Rolland] elucidated the 'oceanic' feeling. But have we a right to assume the survival of something that was originally there, *alongside* of what was later derived from it? Undoubtedly. (Freud 1974b: 200, *my italics*)[35]

In accordance with the pleasure principle the infant originally incorporates "the care it receives from its mother", and by gradually becoming aware of its factual boundaries, the infant does not cease to outline herself in the register of fantasy.

5 Concluding Remarks

I have here explicated how in the psychoanalytic framework selfhood is outlined, demarcated, and constituted in a twofold manner: it is outlined in pleasure-seeking fantasy, on the one hand, and in factual bodily experiences, on the other. In other words, in the psychoanalytic account facts have no monopoly in self-constitution, but fantasy too partakes in constituting the self. Instead of founding fantasy on reality, or vice versa, and thereby subordinating one to the other, the psychoanalytic theory offers a possibility of considering facts and fantasies as being "co-founded".

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employment of a fiction like this is, however, justified when one considers that the infant - *provided one includes with it the care it receives from its mother* - does almost realize a psychical system of this kind. [...] [T]he dominance of the pleasure principle can really come to an end only when a child has achieved complete psychical detachment from its parents". Cf. Freud (1975b: 20–21): "A general tendency of our mental apparatus, which can be traced back to the economic principle of saving expenditure, seems to find expression in the tenacity with which we hold on to the sources of pleasure at our disposal, and in the difficulty with which we renounce them. With the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought-activity was split off; it was kept free from reality-testing and remained subordinated to the pleasure principle alone. This activity is phantasying, which begins already in children's play, and later, continued as day-dreaming, abandons dependence on real objects."

[35] Cf. Stern (1985: 31–32): "all domains of relatedness remain active during development. The infant does not grow out of any of them; [...] none become developmentally obsolete or get left behind. [...] Once formed, the domains remain forever distinct forms of experiencing social life and self. None are lost in adult life".

In spite of their apparent contradiction, the symbiosis theory and the primary differentiation theory (including Husserlian phenomenology) can therefore be viewed as compatible with one another. The difference between them could perhaps be interpreted as a matter of emphasis: whereas the advocates of the "primary differentiation theory" emphasize the *fact-based* aspects of self-awareness (kinaesthesis vs. non-kinaesthesis), and the self that they are speaking of resembles what Freud calls the "reality-ego", the advocates of the symbiosis theory, in contrast, emphasize other important constitutive aspects of self-awareness, and the self that they are discussing comes closer to the what Freud calls the "pleasure-ego". As far as I see it, both theories succeed in capturing important aspects of self-awareness and the self–other relationship, and they should not be assessed as mutually exclusive accounts. The manner in which we experience the environment, other people, and our situation in life is not purely reality-based. As a matter of fact each of our perceptions serves as a proof – after all, we cannot see the hidden sides of things around us, and yet in spite of lacking an all-encompassing evidence, we all the time assume that these hither sides would manifest certain visual and tactual qualities. We can always realize that we were mistaken with respect to such assumptions or "hypotheses", but until we do, this essential "co-positing" is a constitutive part of our experience, and not a contingent annex the absence of which would leave our experience unaltered. And just as our sense perceptions involve assumptions concerning the hidden aspects and qualities of things, fantasy fills in other dimensions of our experiences as well. Even if in adulthood fantasy is represented in terms of mere "subjective dreaming", it is not convincing to assume that in early infancy fantasy would likewise distinguish itself from other forms of consciousness as something merely subjective. Our more or less tacit preconceptions and assumptions originate not merely from the basis of active remembering, deliberation, or reasoning, but also from the basis of our passive associations, tendencies, and desires. What the work of Freud and his followers serves to highlight is this constitutive role of fantasy in the emergence of selfhood.

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Self-Variation and Self-Modification or the Different Ways of Being Other

Carlos Lobo

Since I would like to investigate some preliminary requirements of any self-discourse, self-description, or self-narration (be they factual or fictitious), let me start by a confession in a counter-factual mode. For anybody who does not know who I am (i.e. potentially everybody, not excluding to some extent myself), this should be taken as a pure (viz. fictitious) example applicable to anybody, just by taking each term referring to a person, a place or a time as mere variables, and applying them to individuals, place or time, at will: "It's good to be back in Dublin, a place I left, with many hopes and regrets, twenty years ago. *Had I not done that*, *I surely would have become other*. I imagine, sometimes, how different I would have been if I had stayed. Not only because I really have become another by changing places and living amongst other people, but because the manifold of non-accomplished possibilities, as much as those possibilities which have been realised, determine who I actually am, here and now. For instance, and this is obvious, I would not and could not have begun this talk by expressing and feeling *sincerely* such regrets and wishful thinking." While taking the italicised sentence as an example, I have already entered the question I would like to investigate. The statement I have just pronounced belongs to a group of propositions called counterfactuals. In order to cope with the tremendous variety of possibilities counter to those I have already accomplished and which makes me who I am, I could use the procedure of modal semantics (of possible worlds) (Lewis 1968: 113–126; 1973: 13). But as Bartleby[1] would have said, "*I would prefer not to*". Instead, following Husserl, I would like to deal with them by using the transcendental and phenomenological methods of *free variation* and of *genetic constitution* (as in the too often neglected Fourth Cartesian Mediation), because, as it will appear, this is the proper way of dealing with possibilities as *constituents* of the

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[1] Melville (2004).

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actual and real in general. More precisely, it seems to be the proper way to disclose the extensive realm of possibilities of imaginary lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*), and to draw, within it, the limit between two spheres of possibilities: [i] the narrower sphere of counterfactual but motivated possibilities which continuously weigh on *me*, determining who I actually, factually and ethically am (with my memories, regrets, expectations, ideals, and above all convictions, decisions, and more generally position-takings), on the one hand, and [ii] the larger sphere of ideal pure possibilities, imaginary counterparts of myself, determining the very fact that *I* simply and really *am*, on the other hand. All the possibilities excluded by our actual (present and past) theoretical, ethical, political, etc. positions incompatible with my actual monad (and its motivated possibilities), belong to this realm of pure and empty possibilities.[2] The latter is disclosed, through a process of free variation, as the eidetic extension of the eidos ego, without which any process of empathy—be it of an alter ego considered as another human (rational being) or of another living being, normal or abnormal—would be unconceivable. According to some manuscripts and indications, the former seems to coincide with the sphere of practical (ethical) possibilities, in the most encompassing sense of the term.

If so, the theoretical requirements for a solution of the transcendental problem of constitution of the objective world are the followings:

First: an eidetic egology obtained through a self-variation of the pure ego (obtained through a first transcendental reduction). The aim of this eidetic is to disclose the pure manifold of pure possible egos (each of them with its own world constituted through its own flow of lived experiences, i.e. constituted as a monad).

Second: a transcendental genesis of groups of co-posited egos, accessible through a radicalised form of transcendental reduction (implemented in the *Fifth Cartesian*

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[2] Concerning the notion of "pure possibility", among a numerous number of texts, in Husserl's posthumous publications, such as the XXIII Husserliana volume, we can read in *Ideas I*, § 140, that motivated possibilities which lead to actual rational positions "must be firmly distinguished from empty possibilities" (Husserl 1950a: 292). The former are motivated by that which is included in the 'proposition' [or the *positum*], fulfilled such as it is given", whereas "empty possibilities" are not [translation mine]. Husserl gives the following examples: It is an empty possibility that the now unseen underside of this desk here has ten legs instead of four, *which is actually the case*. In contrast, the number four is a motivated possibility for the determinate perception which I am in the process of effecting" [emphasis mine]. This distinction gives the phenomenological foundation for a logical distinction between pure possibilities and probabilities: "This is one of the most essential ambiguities of the term 'possibility', though there are still others (the formal-logical possibilities, mathematical-formal freedom from contradiction). It is of intrinsic importance that the possibility which plays its part in the theory of probabilities, and consequently that the consciousness of possibility (the attitude of suggestion) of which we spoke in connexion with the theory of doxic modalities as a parallel to the presumption-consciousness, has *motivated* possibilities as its correlates. A probability never builds itself up out of unmotivated possibilities, only motivated possibilities have weight, and so forth" (Husserl 1962a: 360–361). See also Husserl (1999): 70, 73, 84. The eidetic variation by which we obtain the eidos of an object X consists in placing a "*Faktum*" (taken as an example of that object X) in a pure possibility and among other fully arbitrary pure possibilities" (*in eine reine Möglichkeit und unter anderen ganz beliebigen reinen Möglichkeiten*).

Meditation), and, correlatively, the re-constitution (i.e. genetic constitution) of the layers of motivation leading to the positing of a common world. The crucial step, as it is well known, consists in a specific self-modification through which a first alter-ego is posited as such (*a Thou*), i.e. as a real other and an equivalent perspective on a world—whatever it may be—which becomes thus a common world, that can be absorbed neither into my own nor into the primordial world of my alter-ego/the other. But the question arises: how is an eidetic egology implied in the transcendental genesis of groups of co-posited egos? While addressing this question, unexpectedly we enter the domain of a *complex modal ontology* consisting in a two-level sys*tem of a* priori incompossibility.[3] What does this system consist in? Can it help us to reach a more precise understanding of the self-modification involved in the manifold apprehension of the other, starting from the first modification that transforms the "proper space" into a (minimal) common space, i.e. a space where an "encounter"—which is, so to speak, the *transcendental scheme* of empathy—becomes possible?[4]

Each possible ego ("every possibly variant of mine"),[5] within this ideal sphere (the larger one, as we called it), is itself defined as a bearer of a multiplicity of modifications. It is important to confront this self-variation with the larger group of modifications, including the peculiar self-modification through which the other is apprehended as another real and contemporary ego (Fifth Cartesian Meditation).

1 The Real Problem

Until 1935, using a Cartesian method to elucidate a Leibnizian distinction between two kinds of possibilities,[6] Husserl had been struggling with difficulties in delineating these two different spheres of possibilities, and in explaining how

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[3] Husserl (1999: 74).

[4] We find a suggestive commentary on this transition in Weyl (1949: 117). Weyl recalls the necessity of "opening myself to the mystery of intersubjective communication". This mystery is partially dissipated with reference to Husserl, and the eidetic laws governing the full range of kinaesthetic and affective possibilities of displacements. "By walking toward the indefinitely far horizon of the centred space and by displacements connected therewith, by the feeling of the free possibility of bodily movement in response to voluntary intentions , the homogeneous space arises from the centred one. Only at this stage the body becomes an equal among other spatial objects, and we become capable of adopting in imagination someone else's standpoint. Only this space can be conceived as being one and the same for several subjects; it is the presupposition for the construction of the intersubjective world. And thus the ascertainment of the orientation of objects in it is capable of intersubjective control and correction". (p. 129).

[5] Husserl 1950a, b: 106, 154, 167; 1999: 71, 126, 141.

[6] The possibilities finitely analysable and those analysable *in infinitum*. Although both are logical and rational in the most encompassing sense of the term, the second are designated as "compossibles" (a special kind of conditional possibilities) and the former pure "logical" possibilities. Correspondingly, in Husserl: *pure possibilities* and *compossibilities* (Husserl 1950b: 105, 108, 1999: 71, 74). But we can't go deeper here into the confrontation between Leibniz and Husserl.

they come into play in the constitution of the Other. In order to obtain free pure possibilities, he argues, we must first go beyond the limits of our personal individuality, of the accessible and motivated counterparts of our *de facto ego*, of our "personal ego" with its sphere of motivated practically realisable possibilities,[7] which could thus be called as well the sphere of ethical possibilities. In order to reach the ontological (i.e. eidetic) level of the *ego sum*, such as it is expressed in the *ego cogito*, *ego sum*, I must go beyond the sphere of my personal (real, dependent) possibilities, I must disclose, as Husserl insists, "completely free imaginary possibilities" (Husserl 2006: 217).[8] But here two objections arise.

1. Why should I take into account this sphere of "free imaginary possibilities", since they are only possibilities of being otherwise, of being other, and eventually of being another that I am not and never will be, and since, as Husserl puts it, it is in this "by no means question of others" ("*Bei all dem war von Anderen keine Rede*"). (Husserl 2006: 217).
2. As it is well known, the other as such becomes accessible only through empathy (*Einfühlung*), or, as Husserl prefers to say, through a kind of experience he calls "experience of the other" (*Fremderfahrung*).

To this last objection (2), I shall answer that the concept of empathy is not properly Husserlian, and that Husserl never uses it without some hesitation and explicit restriction (see Husserl 1962a). As some commentators have noted it,[9] Husserl points out the limits of this form of intentionality. Respectively: "Thus the problem is stated at first as a special one, namely that of 'thereness-for-me' of others, and accordingly as the theme of a *transcendental theory of experiencing someone else*, a transcendental theory of so-called 'empathy'. But it soon becomes evident that the range of such a theory is much greater than at first it seems, that it contributes to the founding of a *transcendental theory of the Objective world* and, indeed, to the founding of such a theory in every respect, notably as regards Objective Nature" (Husserl 1950b: 124, 1999: 92). And: "The theory of

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[7] Husserl writes : "Mich also umphantasieren, das ergibt, wenn ich mich als identisches Ich der Akte und als das Ich in der Identität meines 'Charakters' festhalte, zwar die Faktizität überschreitende Möglichkeiten, andererseits aber doch nur Möglichkeiten *meines faktischen Ich*, wie ich jetzt bin, an mich "individuell" (im personalen Sinne) gebunden. *Überschreite ich nun auch diese Schranke meiner personalen Individualität*, *so erhalte ich völlig freie Phantasiemöglichkeiten*, *die für mich in keinem Sinne "reale" Möglichkeiten sind*; und nur wenn ich sie, die mit meinem Sein, wie ich als dieser bin, in Widerspruch stehen, in der Einstellung der Beliebigkeit heranziehe, ansetze und wandle, kann ich eine Wesensallgemeinhei t <6a "13" "5×"> gewinne n, in welcher ich, das faktische Ich, zu einem Ich im Universum meiner frei fiktiven Möglichkeiten, meiner eidetischen, werde. So gewinne ich (das scheint zunächst klar) ein allgemeines Wesen, Eidos Ich.» (*Variation und Ontologie*, KIII 12, Kollationierte Manuskripte, see Lobo (French ed. and translation), 2006: 217. Here comes into play the *Beliebigkeit* performance (see Lobo 2000: 250–260).

[8] See also Husserl 1999: 73–74.

[9] See. (Kassis 2001: 213–252; Zahavi 2001a: 151–167; Zahavi 2003: 111-sq; Petit 2004: 143–145).

experiencing someone else, the theory of so-called 'empathy', belongs in the first storey (*Stockwerk*) above 'transcendental aesthetics'" (Husserl 1950b: 173, 1999: 146). Even if elaborated phenomenologically, the concept of empathy seems inadequate to provide us with a coherent solution to the fundamental problem of *the possibility of real objectivity*, and, which is worse, *it impedes a correct setting of the problem*. We can sum up this problem in the following way: How is it possible that a unique real objective and all-encompassing whole (be it abstractly thought as a space, or as a pure nature or as a world), embracing all realities including myself and all the (past, present and future) others, becomes accessible to me *as* something which is, at the same time, in one way or another accessible to every living entity capable of awareness? The central reason why this concept, inherited from Vischer,[10] through Lipps,[11] is unable to provide us with an answer to the ontological question (the motivation of the positing of an ego *as such and as real*), is simply that it would lead us into a vicious circle. For any kind of *empathy*, even in its phenomenological purified sense, presupposes the existence of the real world. It presupposes that I (as a human being or at least as a living being) can *meet* other beings that I perceive them as other human or living beings—thinking, willing, wishing, feeling, or at least living as I do. Of course, in Husserl's published and unpublished works, we find a whole bunch of fine descriptions of the *so-called* act of empathy, as a specific form of intuitive act, founded on plain and full perception, i.e. non-modalized perception of individual bodies (see *Ideas*, § 1).[12] And he even suggests, in 1913, that empathy could contribute to the intersubjective constitution of the world. But he never uses the term without some inner restriction. For instance in *Ideas I*, when trying to come to the *upper level of constitution*, *upper to the* "*aesthetics level*", i.e. where the thing is fully constituted as such, Husserl states that the mediation of "empathy" is necessary to constitute the intersubjective world as the correlate of intersubjective experience:

> The level next above is then the intersubjective identical thing; a constitutive unity of higher order. Its constitution is related to an indefinite plurality of subjects that stand in a relation of 'mutual understanding' [*des* '*Einverständnisses*']. The intersubjective world is the correlate of the intersubjective experience, mediated, that is, through '*empathy*'. We are

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[10] See Vischer 1873. The concept of *Einfühlung* is introduced for the first time in the *Vorwort* (pp. vi-v), in reference to Scherners' on *Das Leben des Traums*, (famous posthumously through Freud's *Traumdeutung*). "*Besonders die Stelle über die* '*symbolischen Grundformationen für die Leibreize*' *schien mir ästhetisch verwertbar. Hier wird nachgewiesen, wie der Leib im Traum auf gewisse Reize hin an räumlichen Formen sich selber objektiviert. Es ist also ein unbewusstes Versetzen der eigenen Leibform und hiermit auch der Seele in die Objektform. Hieraus ergab sich mir der Begriff, den ich Einfühlung nenne.*" This notion is extended in the chapter on *Gefühl und Gemüth* (Vischer 1873: 18–33).

[11] Lipps, Theodor, 1909; see chap. xiv: *empathy* in general is defined as the specific mode of perception which is the source of knowledge of others. "*Die Quelle der dritten Erkenntnisart . . . ist die Einfühlung* ". The other two sources being respectively "*die sinnliche Wahrnehmung*" for the knowledge of things, and "*die innere Wahrnehmung*" for the knowledge of myself and the inner life.

[12] Husserl (1950a: 8).

therefore referred to the various unities of sensory things already constituted individually by the many subjects, and thus in further sequence to the corresponding perceptual manifolds belonging to the different personal subjects and streams of consciousness; *but before all to the new factor of empathy and to the question how it plays a constitutive part in 'objective' experience and gives unity to those separated manifolds.* (*Ideas*, § 151)[13]

The word "*Einfühlung*" is introduced in inverted commas, and is followed by a question, because far from affording a solution to the ontological problem, the mediation of "empathy" gives way to a new question: *how does it play* "*a constitutive part* in 'objective' experience" and give unity to those separated manifolds of perceptions proper to each individual subject.

The most straightforward critiques of the concept are to be found in Husserl's *opus magnum* on the subject: the *Cartesian Meditations*. Far from giving a solution to the transcendental problem just recalled, empathy is part of the problem. Empathy as well as any transcendent perception of a thing presupposes that the constitution of the real and objective existing world, and to begin with, that of an all-encompassing whole called space, have already been performed (Husserl 1962a: 386; 1950a: 370).[14] As other terms (such "association", "motivation", etc.) the originally empirical and psychological notion of "empathy" is not only neutralised (because of its equivocal meaning) and given a transcendental meaning (MC, § 43),[15] it is itself part of the problem of the constitution of the world, and cannot solve it.

> The theory of experiencing someone else, the theory of the so-called "empathy", belongs in the first upper storey [*Stockwerk*] of this 'transcendental aesthetics'. There is need only to indicate that what we said about the psychological problems of origin in the lower storey applies here as well: For the first time, the problem of empathy has been given its true sense, and the true method for its solution has been furnished, by constitutional phenomenology. Precisely on that account all previous theories (including Max Scheler's) have failed to give an actual solution, and it has never been recognised how the otherness of the *others* is transferred to the whole world as its 'objectivity' (*wie sich die Fremdheit des* Anderen *auf die ganze Welt überträgt als ihre Objektivität*), by giving it this sense in the first instance. (Husserl 1950b: 173, 1999: 147).

What is the true sense of the problem of empathy? In answering that question, I will provide an answer to objection (1), which says that the eidetic detour is useless for the solution of the so-called problem of "empathy". The setting of the problem still belongs in the sphere of transcendental aesthetics in Husserl's sense of the

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[13] Husserl 1950a: 317; 1962a: 387 [emphasis mine].

[14] "The problem of the 'origin of the presentation of space' (*Ursprung der Raumvorstellung*), the deepest phenomenological meaning whereof has never yet been grasped, reduces itself to the phenomenological analysis of the *essential* nature of all the noematic (and noetic) phenomena, wherein space exhibits itself intuitively and as the unity of appearances (*Erscheinungen*) and of the descriptive modes of such exhibiting 'constitutes' the spatial".

[15] Husserl 1950a, b: 124; 1999: 92: "The problem is stated at first as a special one, namely that of the *Thereness-for-me* of the others, hence as the theme of a *transcendental theory of the experiencing of someone else*, of the so-called '*empathy*'." (translation slightly modified).

term[16] and consists in asking for the grounds that motivate the positing of a (possible) ego (which is always "an 'intentional modification' of the ego of mine which is objectivated in the first instance") *as* another real ego. And its solution requires the distinction just mentioned between *two spheres of possibilities of being other*, *of pure self-variants*,[17] considered as *a two level system of incompatibility*.[18] If we recall the formula by which this solution to the problem of constitution of the other is expressed, we notice immediately that it is connected with the *two levels transcendental aesthetics* Husserl has been seeking for, at least since the *Ding und Raum* lessons. In those lessons, he at last explored exclusively the group of modifications[19] constituting the "thing-phantom"[20] and a "phantom of space", but not those constituting real objective space or real objective things. The "new manifolds of modifications" of the sensory fields "brought under one general heading" of kinaesthetic presentations (*Darstellungen*), combined together into beams "like forces" and penetrated by the "consciousness of unity", constitute the "order of space" (*Raumordnung*), *but not an objective space in the proper and minimal sense of the term*. The constitution of a real objective space presupposes that of an absolutely transcendent "there-ness", and must avoid the vicious circle consisting in tacitly interpreting the *Here* of the ego reduced to its primordial sphere and the *There* as located into a space, although we could *metaphorically* speak of the manifold of kinesthetic modifications as a "space" or even say that all those determinations belong, in a broad sense, to a "space of possibilities" of the ego abstractly reduced to the proper sphere. The first step leading beyond the sphere of transcendental aesthetic is given by the following formula:

> I do *not* apperceive the other ego *simply as* a duplicate of myself and accordingly as having mine or a similar to mine original sphere, more particularly, having the spatial modes of appearance that are proper to me from the Here which is mine; rather, as we find on closer examination, I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance *like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is*. (*CM*, § 53; Husserl 1999: 117.

I shall give a comment of this formula later on. Meanwhile we must underline that if, according to this apperception, the other is *not simply* a duplicate of myself,

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[16] See. Steinbock's introduction to Husserl 2001: xxiii. Among other aspects, Husserl's transcendental aesthetics is twofold: the first is equivalent with the traditional definition of transcendental aesthetic, where time and space are taken as the forms of co-existence and succession;, as "a fix system of locations", and correlatively, as a "system of positions with an empty horizon which is a freedom horizon"; the second is limited to proper sensations and to the constitutive functions belonging in the proper sphere of own-ness (kinesthetics groups of modifications), a "system of kinaesthesis" in which all the modes of appearance and all unites in them are built up into a "system of series of imperfection and perfecting, directed toward a unique limit", a system, which has a "resemblance group structure" For further justifications see my commentary (Lobo 2006: 157, 174–178, 205, 223). I diverge here clearly from Dan Zahavi's interpretation (Zahavi 1997: 314–316; Zahavi 2001b: 56).

[17] Husserl 1950a, b: 105, 1999: 71, 2006: 220, 221.

[18] Husserl 1950a, b: 167–8; 1999: 141.

[19] Respectively, Husserl 1973: 207, 208, 217; 1997: 175, 174, 183.

[20] Husserl 1950a, b: 171–172; 1973: 343; 1997: 299; and 1999: 145.

this does exclude that it be *in some complex way* a duplicate, or that, *in some complex way*, a duplicate intervenes as a foundation of this apperception.[21] How otherwise would I know anything about the "modes of appearances I should have if I should go over there and be where he is"? Empathy within the natural attitude presupposes this apperception and this level and form of spatiality, which, according to Weyl,[22] represents the *nec plus ultra* of the phenomenological investigation. And as Weyl insists, Husserl's a priori is much reacher than Kant's, but many questions are left open in particular that regarding "the aprioristic features of space", and any attempt to go beyond without the means of a "theoretical physical construction" seems unsatisfactory,[23] and without influence upon it (Weyl 1949: 124). Weyl affirms that he has solved the space problem with a « rather deep group-theoretical theorem" exposed and proved in his Barcelona Lectures[24]; the Euclidian group of rotations is indeed the only group determining the infinitesimal translation, i.e. "the non-rotational progression from a point into the world". Nevertheless, he does not exclude that the postulate on which this demonstration rests, namely that the determination of "straight progression" is unique, "can be justified on the basis of the requirements posed by the phenomenological constitution of space" (Weyl 1949: 137). And it seems that it is precisely such a justification that Husserl is seeking with the complex group structure of his transcendental monadology. The strange "choreography" exposed in the text quoted above accomplishes the pairing of *an actually appearing duplicate of mine* (There) *with an appearing body* (Körper) without transcendence (since as appearing it belongs to my sphere of ownness) and an ego which its own body (Leib) which remains imaginary (purely "counterfactual") as long as it considered as a pure possible modification of myself, and which becomes (presumably) real as soon as I consider it as really and actually impossible for me, in any real time, to be that Ego There. To follow the analogy with complex number theory, the position of the Other is complex, in as much as it combines an *imaginary* purely possible since it is in-compossible with my actual position—*counterpart* of mine with a *real immanent modification* of mine. And this is generally so for every position of a transcendence. But the constitutional method asks whether this assumption is motivated or not.

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[21] The manuscript from 1935, *Variation und Ontologie*, converges with that view: "The Other (unknown Other) has in advance for us a ontological sense as a variant of ourselves." (Husserl 2006: 218).

[22] "The penetration of the This (Here-now) and the Thus is the general form of consciousness. A thing exists only in the indissoluble unity of intuition and sensation, through the surimposition of continuous extension and continuous quality. Phenomenologically it is impossible to go beyond this". (Weyl 1949: 130).

[23] Weyl already insisted on that point in his letter to Husserl, and maintained his doubts throughout his correspondence with Becker, as well as in Weyl 1949:137.

[24] Weyl 1949: 137. This conferences will be edited by Julien Bernard and Eric Audureau: *L'Analyse mathématique du problème de l'espace*, édition commentée bilingue français-allemand de *Mathematische Analyse des Raumsproblem* d'H. Weyl, (Weyl 2013).

Now, this motivation occurs if and only if we can establish that the various manifolds of (visual, tactical, etc.) kinaesthesis which are properly mine can be built up into a quasi-algebraic group for which the various kinaesthetic modifications such as quasi-displacement and quasi-rotation, expansion and contraction, covering and uncovering,[25] etc. are well defined operations. This I presuppose when I simply imagine how things should look like if I were there, and this I go on presupposing when I imagine, on that basis, how things could appear to someone else perceiving from there.

2 The True Method of Constitutive Phenomenology

Now, what is the true method for the solution of the "true problem of empathy" ? Or more precisely, why should constitutive phenomenology be "the [only] true method"?

This question can be answered when we clarify the method of transcendental constitution as a conjunction of two chief operations. (1) A free self-variation through which the realm of my pure variants is disclosed by which the *eidos* ego is obtained. (2) A tracing of the specific self-modification through which the possibility of otherness becomes accessible, and according to which the otherness of the other ego reveals itself as prior to that of any thing or any living being (be it a rational or simply living being) posited as realities (Husserl 1950a, b: 108; 1999: 74).[26]

The first methodological act (1) is necessary in order to found the possibility of a scientific and logical discourse on the ego [i.e. a scientific monadology]. The second act (2) represents a crucial test for the foundational claims of transcendental phenomenology. One of the key acts of this second methodological phase lies in the *abstractive reduction* or *reduction to the sphere of ownness*, or in other words in the *reduction to the primordial sphere*. This radicalisation of phenomenological reduction is indispensable in order to clear the way to the zero point of the genesis, by bringing to light the sub-layer or substratum of every upper and subsequent intentionality. On that basis alone, one can expect to retrace the transcendental genesis of constitutive "events" (consisting in a series of self-modifications) ending up with the position of an objective world. More precisely, this second act aims at founding the specific mode of accessibility corresponding to every real existence of another ego, i.e. "this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible" (Husserl 1950b: 144, 1999: 114).

Although these operations are exposed separately in the *Cartesian Meditations*, respectively in the Fourth and the Fifth Meditations, while describing them, I shall

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[25] Cf. Husserl 1973: §§. 58 & sq.

[26] We put here aside, as Husserl does, the important distinction between normality and abnormality (see Sara Heinämaa's and Ignacio de los Reyes Melero's paper in this volume).

focus mostly on their interplay. This is not an easy task, since, on each path, we come up against a statement apparently forbidding such interplay.

Talking of (1) Husserl declares that

It should be noted that, in the transition from my ego to an ego in general, neither the actuality nor the possibility of other egos is presupposed. I phantasy only myself *as if I were otherwise*; I do not phantasy others. (Husserl 1950: 106, 1999: 72)

Talking of (2), i.e. on the path to the self-modification by which I become aware of an other, "conceivable only as an analogue of something included in my peculiar own-ness", an "intentional modification" of myself, Husserl warns us (*MC*, § 52), as we have already seen, [i] that the Other *is neither a duplicate*, *a self-variant of my ego*, [ii] nor a real *modificatum* of myself, that I would be ("since I am not he ")— rather this *modificatum* is "another I ".[27]

2.1   Self-Modification, Self-Variation and Self-Ideation

In order to know what the *self* which is to be varied through self-variation is, we must recall briefly and schematically the general features of a monad. Following the *Ideas I* (§§ 77–127), and in order to avoid many puzzles and objections, we must first recall that each act of consciousness must be defined as a kind of *modification* (*Modifikation*, *Abwandlung*) of a lived experience (*Erlebniss*). These modifications can be differentiated into many groups: passive and active, real and ideal (intentional), potential and actual, engendering and attentional, etc. Considering its reflective and immanent character, one of the first tasks of phenomenology is "to elucidate systematically all the modifications of lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*) which fall under the heading of 'reflexion', in connection to all the modifications they stand in essential relation with and which they presuppose" (Husserl 1950a: 182). Thus, generally speaking, the concrete flow of my lived experiences is constituted by the manifold of modifications and modifications of modifications, actual or potential, real or ideal, etc…The stock of ideally possible modifications pertaining to each *Erlebniss* defines its "essence-stock" (*Wesensbestand*). Among real modifications of *Erlebniss*, Husserl mentions those constitutive of its temporality. They are "originally productive", "original engenderments" (*ursprüngliche Erzeugungen*). As such they contrast with "reproductions" which Husserl designates as "ideal 'operative' transformations of the original" *Erlebniss*; such are: recollection, anticipation in a possible fancy, or else "repetitions of such modifications" (Husserl 1950a: 182–183). By essence, a modification refers back

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[27] Cairn's translation says: "On the other hand, to every alien (as long as it remains within the appresented horizon of concreteness that necessarily goes with it) centers in an appresented Ego who is not myself but, relative to me, a *modificatum*: an other Ego". I understand and translate this passage as follow: "But to every alien (. . .) belongs an apprehended Ego that I myself am not, but [who is] rather my *modificatum*, another I".

to an original (unmodified) *Erlebniss*. But at a closer view the only unmodified core of perception (i.e. "impression"), as well as the original flow of *lived experiences*, is itself "an *Idea* in a Kantian sense": "no concrete lived experience (*Erlebniss*) can pass as independent in the full sense of the term" (Husserl 1950a: 202). From this Husserl "deduces" two major eidetic laws (important for the setting of a transcendental monadology, as well as for the method of self-variation): "thus the perception itself changes according to changes in the determination of the context (*Umgebungsbestimmtheit*)", i.e. every *Erlebniss* is absolutely individualised. Consequently: every *Erlebniss* belongs to a unique flow and it is impossible to conceive "two streams of lived experiences (two sphere of consciousness of two pure Egos) having an essential content identically the same" (ibid.). The main groups of modifications are indicated in the paragraphs §§ 77–127 of *Ideas I*. They are listed sometimes quite systematically, sometimes just indicated at random, as in § 88. "On the ground of sense-givings (*Sinngebungen*) and further performances (*Leistungen*) which can be performed therewith, and are thanks to it 'full of sense'", we have the following group of noetic modification : "lines of sight of the pure Ego" (*Blickrichtungen des reinen Ich*), "grasping" (*Erfassung*), "tight holding" (*Festhaltung*), "explicating" (*Explizieren*), "referring" (*Beziehen*), "seizing together" (*Zusammengreifen*), "various position-takings of belief" (*mannigfachen Stellungnahmen des Glaubens*), "presumption" (*Vermutens*), "valuating" (*Wertens*), etc. (Husserl 1950a: 219). Among the ideally "operative" ("*Operative*") modifications, the important subgroup named "functions" (*Funktionen*) is pointed out (Husserl 1950a: 212). Further, investigating the group of "performances" (*Leistungen*), Husserl divides the (sub)group of modifications of belief into the subgroup of modalisation in the narrow sense of the term and (2) the genuine modification of belief (the neutrality-modification) which is not a "performance"—the iteration functioning in this context as a criterium (Husserl 1950a: 262). Further, Husserl introduces the notion of *syntheses* or *syntactic forms* of consciousness (Husserl 1950a: 291, 1962a: 307), and in particular "*the doxic syntaxes*" (Husserl 1950a: 297, 1962a: 312–313).[28] The syntactical (or synthetical) modifications of position (*Setzung*) divides also into *doxic* and *non-doxic theses* (Husserl 1950a: 278, 1962a: 234): acts of feeling are indeed in "a very wide but essentially unitary sense '*positings*', only not of the doxic kind" (Husserl 1950a: 287, 1962a: 303). Belonging to the wider group of modifications of belief, we must mention also the modes of attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*) and position-taking (*Stellungnahme*) which are ego-orientated; the ego is implied in them as a "pole". Now the synthetic acts entailing ego's commitments are double-faced. As modes of appearance of something, they are orientated toward something other than the *I*, but at the same time they are actually or potentially *referred back to the ego*, who goes on "continuously constituting himself as existing"

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[28] For an introduction to a systematic reading of this dimension of constitutional phenomenology, see Lobo 2010: 117–119, 154–163.

The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as *I*, who lives this and that subjective process, who lives through this and that cogito, *as the same I*. (. . .) Now we encounter a second polarisation, a *second kind of synthesis*, which embraces all the particular multiplicities of *cogitationes* collectively and in its own manner, namely as belonging to the identical Ego, who, *as active and affected subject of consciousness*, lives in all processes of consciousness and is related, *through* them, to all object-poles.[29] (*CM*, §§ 30–31)

This second kind of synthesis is particularly important for memories, since the consciousness of past perceptions include intentionally the memory of the I—an I belonging now to the past of the actual I. Once we recognise this, it becomes possible to set the following general law: To every lived experiences (*Erlebniss*) there corresponds a property (*Eigenheit*) of the I.

But, firstly, that does not entail that the ego should be a substratum in a naively realistic sense; for this properties are nothing outside the *modes of appearances*, *of givenness*, *and*, *correlatively*, *of apprehension*, *i.e. products of a manifold activity of modification*, and that each *I* as a subject is nothing *outside* his system of self-modifications. Every theory presupposing the I as a pure and monolithic pole of identity[30] can be defined as naïvely realistic. The "centring *ego* is not an empty pole of identity, any more than any object is such".[31] From a critical point of view, by ignoring this, psychology or sociology, at every steps of their investigations, are exposed to the risk of proceeding to undue constructions,[32] to tacit (mathematical) "substructions", such as positing the individuals as empty identities or as considering societies as *sets* of such empty identities. Moreover we are no more justified in simply establishing a *strict equivalence* between properly lived experiences and ego-properties. This would be the case, of course, if the *owning of lived experiences by the ego* was determined exclusively by the fact that they occur in inner time consciousness. But this is not the case.[33] The properties constituting the ego are

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[29] Husserl (1950b: 100, 1999: 66).

[30] This seems to be the case with the reconstruction of the empathy proposed by Vittorio Gallese (2003: 171–180).

[31] Husserl (1950b, § 32: 66).

[32] The question arose for the lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*) in the *Ideas*, § 79, as W. H. Watt's objection against "introspection" or "self-observation (*Selbstbeobachtung*)" (Husserl 1950a: 152). The *free imaginary variation combined with transcendental reduction*, appeared as the only practicable *procedure* capable of ensuring the scientific claims of every empirical approach of such a field of phenomena. Even a descriptive science such as psychology can rest on some form of nomological necessity as long as the empirical data can be transformed into eidetic data. This self-variation is carried out *within* the sphere brought out by the transcendental reduction. This point is essential. Without the clear awareness of the *eidetic dimension*, any phenomenological descriptions of the I and of the monad are unsteady. Otherwise phenomenology as any kind of psychological exploration is exposed to the system of sceptical objections, that Husserl has been refuting in *Ideas I* (Husserl 1950a: 189–191). (See Lobo 2010: 119–120, 125–128, 152–154.)

[33] "The persisting, the temporal enduring, of such determining properties of the Ego, or the peculiar change that the Ego undergoes in respect of them, manifestly *is not a continuous filling of immanent time with subjective processes*—just as the abiding Ego himself, as the pole of abiding Ego-properties, is not a process or a continuity of processes, even though, with such habitual determining properties, he is indeed related back to the stream of subjective processes." (Husserl (1950b: 101), (1999: 67)

mostly composed of a manifold of self-modifications such as *decisions*, or *convictions*, which are not simply events attributable to the same *ego*, but "abiding habits" (*CM*, § 32).

> For example: If, in an act of judgment, I decide for the first time in favour of a being and a being-thus, the fleeting act passes; but from now on *I am abidingly the Ego who is thus and so decided*, 'I am of this conviction'. That, however, does not signify merely that I remember the act or can remember it later. This I can do, even meanwhile I have 'given up' my conviction. After cancellation it is no longer my conviction; but it has remained abidingly my conviction up to then. As long as it is accepted by me, I can 'return' to it repeatedly, and repeatedly find it as mine, habitually my own opinion or, correlatively, find myself as the Ego who *is* convinced, who, as the persisting Ego, is determined by this abiding *habitus* or state. Likewise in the case of decisions of every kind, value-decisions, volitional decisions. (Husserl 1950b: 101, 1999: 66–67)

A habitus can be in turn modified later on, but it remains as a feature of the character of the monad. What has been my conviction *up to now* can be modified, and more precisely *modalised*. From now on, for instance, I am no more quite sure that I should have taken the decision of getting married before leaving Dublin, or I may be completely certain that this was a bad or the worst decision. But even once renounced, the former decision is still mine, "*as a modalised decision*". Through such processes the ego modifies himself and constitutes himself. My personal identity is nothing apart from these manifold processes of modifications.

In all this, there is still no question of *self-variation*. By delineating the sphere of the monad, we learn nonetheless how to distinguish *dependent possibilities* from *free possibilities*. A little girl fancying that she is a princess is no more freely varying herself than the fool who thinks he is a king , in as much as these fantasies are motivated by the wish of becoming it, the *belief* that this could still happen, will happen, should happen, etc. Or to put it in other words: as long as they are inserted in the chain of motivations (*habitualities*, positions, decisions, etc.) constituting the proper life of the person. But as soon as I (presumably mature, simple citizen of the French Republic, male, etc.) imagine that I could be that girl, or that king, or a girl fancying she is a king, etc., with the clear conscious of the fact that it is fully unmotivated, *in a full conscious of arbitrariness*, as possibilities necessarily detached from the realm of *probable possibilities*, without any "weight", I start an arbitrary process of self-variation. According to its sense and his process can be extended at will. From a phenomenological point of view, the aim of this free self-variation is to gain the basis for an eidetic grasp of the *eidos ego*, and not of course, to explain how others are accessible to me.

> The variation being meant as an evident one, accordingly as presenting in pure intuition the possibilities themselves as possibilities, its correlate is an *intuitive and apodictic consciousness of something universal*. (Husserl 1950b: 105, 1999: 71)

On the ground of this free variation, we obtain the eidos ego, without which there would be no basis for a true universal concept of *ego*. Indeed the eidos as such, in its intuitive Husserlian sense, is "*prior to all concepts, in the sense of verbal significations*", and even pure concepts (such as mathematical or transcendental

concepts) "must be made to fit the [corresponding] *eidos*".[34] This applies to the concept *I* or *ego*, if it must become at all a concept. Transcendental reduction uncovers the extensive sphere of the *de facto* ego that I actually am, i.e. including the sphere of lived experiences, of my actual and potential self-modifications as well as my possibly actual and potential self-variations. But all this uncovering of the egological sphere, says Husserl, can "become genuinely scientific, only if I go back to the apodictic principles that pertains to this ego as exemplifying the eidos ego: the essential universalities and necessities by means of which the fact is to be related to its rational grounds (those of its pure possibility) and thus made scientific (logical)".[35] Accordingly any scientific discourse—be it that of empirical sciences—on an ego as such and, subsequently, on any possible collections of egos presupposes a concept of "ego", which cannot be obtained by simple induction or by an empirical identification. Our daily life inductions and identifications as well as scientific inductions and identifications with the always opened possibility of deception, illusion, error, etc. presuppose it.[36] But, as in any eidetic variation, in order to disclose this field of pure possible egos, a *pure example* of the eidetic extension is already required as a starting point.[37]

This requirement is parallel to Weyl's concerning mathematical thought. Mathematics emerges from the conjugation of a real (the given or constructed) and a possible (a back-ground of possibilities, a manifold freely created by our mind). This back-ground of free created possibilities is no chaos. It is produced according to a "fixed process and yet opened towards infinity".[38] If we want to generate the sequence of integers, a fixed procedure is required, and by its repetition we go through the series of the followers of zero. But this iteration itself and the very first application of the procedure already presupposes the projection of the being, of the given "upon the background of the possible".

In phenomenology too, the first application of transcendental reduction already presupposes the projection of the ego practicing phenomenology (of the ego spectator) with its lived experiences upon the background of pure possible egos and pure possible lived experiences. But this extension and the transposition to other (possible) egos of what I uncover through transcendental reduction, are actually performed from this *de facto* ego that I am; they require resources that

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[34] Husserl (1950b: 105, 1999: 71).

[35] "Geht auch mein eigentliches Interesse nach der transzendentalen Reduktion auf mein reines Ego, auf seine, dieses faktischen Ego Enthüllung, so kann diese Enthüllung zu einer echt wissenschaftlichen nur werden unter Rekurs auf die ihr, das ist dem Ego als einem Ego überhaupt, zugehörigen apodiktischen Prinzipien, auf die Wesensallgemeinheiten und Notwendigkeiten, mittels deren das Faktum auf seine rationalen Gründe, auf die seiner reinen Möglichkeit zurückbezogen und *damit verwissenschaftlicht (logifiziert) wird*." (Husserl 1950b, § 34: 106).

[36] Husserl (1950a, b: 373–374, 1962a: 388).

[37] Husserl (1962b: 72–87).

[38] One of Weyl's most recurrent formula is: "*das Wirkliche wird projiziert auf den Hintergrund des Möglichen, einer nach festem Verfahren frei vom Geiste erschaffenen, ins Unendliche offenen Mannigfaltigkeit*" (1968: 530).

cannot be found anywhere else than in my *de facto* ego. Not in my real stock of experience, but in my "essence-stock" (*Wesensbestand*). Thus from within this sphere, I must and can go beyond the sphere of my factual possibilities and open this sphere upon the ideal multiplicity of ideally possible egos. Such is the eidetic "substratum" of any empathy, and of any subsequent act presupposing empathy.

From that eidetic point of view, the ego reveals himself as the unitary form of a system, or more precisely a manifold system of com-possibility.

> The universal Apriori pertaining to a transcendental ego as such is an eidetic form, which contains an infinity of forms, an infinity of *a priori* types of actualities and potentialities of life, along with the objects constituable in a life as objects actually existing. But in a *unitary possible* ego [i] *not all singly possible types are compossible*, and [ii] *not all compossible ones are compossible in just any order*, at no matter what *loci* in that ego's own temporality. (Husserl 1999, § 36: 74)

The more general and formal systems, determining the compossibilities of the real temporal flow of life, are those of *succession and coexistence* of lived experiences. They are the deepest, but probably the poorest levels of constitution.[39] A second system framed by the former embraces the possibility of any modification of a lived experience, taking into account other groups of modifications. This system corresponds to the syntactical level of intentionality,[40] i.e. the level of motivated compossibilities. For example, not every possible ego is capable of the rational activity of theorising. The type of ego "rational animal" prescribes some possibilities and excludes others so that this activity of theorising can't occur at random in any time and in any context of a "rational animal".

> I cannot imagine the theorising I do or can do now as shifted arbitrarily within the unity of my live; and this too carries over into the eidetic. Eidetic apprehension of my (transcendentally reduced) childhood life and its possibilities of constitution produces a type, such that in its further development, but not in its own nexus, the type 'scientific theorising' can occur. Restriction of this kind has its grounds in an *a priori* universal structure, in a conformity to universal eidetic laws of coexistence and succession in egological time. (Husserl 1999: 74)

2.2   Self Modification and Apperception of the Other

We can now come back to the problem of the so-called empathy, or more precisely to the problem of the universal motivation by which an *ego as such* posits another ego, and thus gives way to the transcendental constitution of a common space and time. In order to trace back this genesis, the ego must be deprived of any mundane transcendence whatsoever, and correlatively, of all possibilities of intentional activity which would presuppose or imply intentionally, in a way or another,

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[39] Husserl (1966: 301–303).

[40] For a justification of this expression, Husserl's *Ideen*, § 118 passim, and § 121. And my essay, Lobo (2010: 117–163).

other egos. This exclusion is carried out through a radicalised form of reduction and *epochè*, the abstractive reduction and *epochè* of consciousness to its primordial sphere (Husserl 1950a, b: 126, 1999: 95).

But, phenomenologically, there is no sense in considering the abstractly reduced monad, the "single subjectivity", as being either isolated or located in a common space, since the objective space and world both emerge from the acceptance of an alien proper sphere as really co-existing with mine, as an incompossible counterpart of mine, and thus necessarily appresented as an *imaginary* counterpart of mine. This acceptance alone enables "further constitutive functions" among which we find the group of intentional functions constituting space as the form of real co-existing individual bodies. As Husserl notes: "single subjectivity" is to be understood as "the primordial immanency, the primordial stream of consciousness, the course of actual experience with the *de facto* 'I move' and the facultative possibilities of the Ego's moving primordial, *with the sense of an abstraction from acceptances of being that involved empathy*" (Husserl 1950a, b: 239, 1999: 64; emphasis mine). At any stage of this constitution phase, the monad is, properly speaking, nowhere. Nonetheless by a certain conjunction of monads obtained, for each one, through a system of ordered modifications, something like a common space gets constituted.

Let us now describe the act instituting the first form of "exteriority". The modification described as "analogising apprehension". It is composed of [i] a *real* auto-modification by which a monad (*from its absolute and primordial Here*) accepts to be itself a *There* for another ego (*primordial There*), and to become (*Here and Now*) for that other ego (*from its absolute Here*) its actual and relative (*There*); combined with [ii] an *imaginary* self-variation (i.e. the position as real of an absolutely incompossible variant of mine).

> Because of its sense-constitution it [the 'other'] occurs necessarily as an 'intentional modification' of that Ego of mine which is the first to be objectivated, or as an intentional modification of my primordial 'world': the Other as phenomenologically a 'modification' of myself (which, for its part, gets this character of being 'my' self by virtue of the contrastive pairing that necessarily takes place). § 52 (Husserl 1950b: 144, 1999: 115).

Any solution to the problem of the apprehension of the other which presupposes a plurality of egos displayed in a place (whatever its structure) is phenomenologically a *vicious circle*. As we already said, a place must first be constituted. And this "happens" only through an *imaginary* displacement of myself and *not*, for instance, through a synthesis recovering a present perception of my position with a memory of past kinesthetic positions. Although this modified I intervening in the apprehension of the other can be compared to that of memory, it is radically different, since a real memory of my being there produces, no real There distinct from my absolute Here, and consequently no real association of two egos.[41]

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[41] "It [the body of the other there] reminds [*erinnert*] the way my body would look 'if I were there'. In this case too, although the awakening does not become a memory intuition [*Erinnerung-Anschauung*], pairing takes place." (trans. modified. § 54, Husserl 1950b: 147, 1999: 118).

The imaginary component of the "analogising pairing" is, in turn, double: [a] the *Other is imagined* as having spatial modes of appearance *like those I do have from my absolute and actual Here*, he is provided with a Here, which nonetheless remains necessarily for me a There; [b] I *imagine myself as having from There modes of appearances like those I have from Here*. The fusion of these two imaginary kinaesthetic standpoints realises the analogising pairing. This analogising pairing is the phenomenological fundament (*Fundament*) of any spatial congruence, which should be articulated with the mathematical solution to the problem of space given by Weyl in his 1923 Spanish Lectures.[42] While qualifying these components as *imaginary*, we must keep in mind, as Husserl surely does, the mathematical sense of the term, according to which any number having as one of its roots $\sqrt{-1}$ is "unreal". The same holds for the modification and its components [a] and [b] mentioned. They are reciprocally incompatible and separately *incompatible* with the very fact that I am Here. But as in complex analysis, this mediation, although logically problematic, is mathematically necessary and fruitful.[43]

> That which is primordially incompatible, in simultaneous coexistence, becomes compatible: because my primordial ego constitutes the ego who is other for me by an appresentative apperception, which, according to its intrinsic nature, *never demands and never is open to fulfilment by presentation*. (Husserl 1950b: 148, 1999: 119).

The simultaneity as well as the co-existence here in question have nothing to do with any kind of objective time and existence. The only accessible mode of simultaneity at this stage is that of the *Zugleich*, combined with the other primitive temporal modalities (and correlatively, the subgroup of "real" modifications: impression, retention and protention); those of the *now*, the *before* and the *after* (*Jetzt, Vorhher und Nachher*) (Husserl 1950a: 197). An essential law states indeed that every lived experience "comes not only under the standpoint of temporal succession (*der zeitlichen Folge*) in an essentially self-contained connexion of lived-experiences, but also under the standpoint of simultaneity" (*Gleichzeitigkeit*) (ibid.). This original and pre-spatial simultaneity entails that time consciousness, with its three dimensional flow (now, before, after), forms the original horizon (*Horizont*) of the pure Ego (Husserl 1950a: 201).

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[42] See, Weyl's Spanish Lectures, edited by E. Audureau and Julien Bernard, *L'Analyse mathé matique du problème de l'espace*, (Weyl 2013). And J. Bernard's paper (Bernard 2009: 14).

[43] Cf. VI. Abhandlung [*Das Imaginäre in der Mathematik*], from 1901, *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (Husserl 1970). The problem of complex numbers and the "passage through" imaginary numbers are treated only as examples and in connection with the problem of axiomatic completeness. We find later a significant use of the mathematical notion of imaginary in the *Prolegomena*, for instance in §§ 4, 46, 64 and 66 (Husserl 1975).

Husserl explicitly takes the distinction between real and imaginary numbers (taken in an extended sense) from its "pure arithmetics" and transfers it into the logical domain, in order to elaborate on renewed grounds the logical distinction between possibility and impossibility, possibility and probability.

Within the frame of kinaesthetic fields and the fixed frame of inner time consciousness, the only compatible simultaneous coexistences are those of sensible modes of appearance (for instance a visual and a haptic one), and in general of kinaesthetic associations. In order to render compatible what is incompatible, the whole sphere of possibilities must be *transposed* at a higher level. The laws of the former groups must be enriched and modified. As it happens, the Other appears as a long-lasting lack in my kinaesthetic fields, since the two primitive monads, « mine which is for me as ego the original sphere and *his* which is for me an appresented sphere", appear as "separated by an abyss I cannot actually cross, since crossing it would mean after all, that I acquired an original (rather than an appresenting) experience of someone else" (Husserl 1950b: 150, 1999: 121). But it institutes new modes of intention and fulfilment of intention, new modes of experiences presupposing empathy (for example: image-consciousness of a portrait, imagination of human or brute-like gods, love, contempt, respect, etc.), but also to begin with: all the perceptive modes described under the title "transcendental aesthetic" acquire the new sense of transcendence.[44]

Two steps are required in the Cartesian-like meditation to make the transition from the constitutional level of transcendental aesthetic to that of transcendental intersubjectivity, and from the latter to real being (a common objective world). The first step is that of temporal co-existing monads.[45] Once this first step taken, I get for the first time a contemporary (*Zeitgenossen*) alter-ego and, from now on, although persisting to live as a monad, I am transcendentally born, as a worldly creature, perceptively, affectively and practically opened, accepting to become one point of view among many in an *intersubjective nature* (which is not limited to the perceptive dimensions, but includes also affective, and correlatively, axiological dimensions). The second step is that of spatial, timely-spatial succession and coexistence. As a "metaphysical" consequence: it is *not* "*conceivable* that two or more *separate pluralities of monads*, i.e. pluralities *not in communion*, co-exist, each of which accordingly constitutes *a world of its own*, so that together they constitute *two* worlds that are separate ad infinitum, *two* infinite *spaces and space-times*"; "that is pure absurdity" (1950b: 166–167, 1999: 140). The principle underpinning this assertion is a kind of law of absorption, or at least a law having as a consequence, such a law of absorption. If w_1 and w_2 are two worlds, either they are appearing worlds and then are immediately absorbed into one unique world, or they are not appearing worlds and then are purely imaginary (incompossible) worlds.[46]

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[44] As in the Göttingen conferences on imaginary numbers that he gave in 1901 (Husserl 1970: 431–447, particularly: 442), the guiding line seems to be here also the problem of theoretic completeness of the phenomenological monadology, of the field opened by the abstractive reduction.

[45] "It is essentially necessary that togetherness of monads, their mere co-existence, be a *temporal* co-existence and then also an existence temporalized in the form: 'real' temporality." (§ 60, Husserl 1950b: 166, 1999: 139–140)

[46] see also Ignacio de los Reyes Melero's paper in this volume.

3 A Few Steps into Husserl's Monadology

We have here, as it seems, another way of dealing with ontological modalities, based, so to speak, on a radically Cartesian reading (and re-writing) of Leibniz's metaphysics. Husserl's monadology differs essentially from Leibniz's, in many respects. As we already saw, he agrees with Leibniz, on the fact that a metaphysical deduction of the world (and space order) must start from the distinction between two ranges of possibilities.

> Naturally Leibniz is right when he says [i] that infinitely many monads and groups of monads are conceivable but [ii] that it does not follow that all these possibilities are *compossible*; and, again, [i] when he says that infinitely many worlds might have been 'created', but [ii] not two or more at once, since they are incompossible. (Husserl 1950b: 167, 1999: 140).

But instead of starting *as if* God's *calculus* was based on the *whole set of possibilities and the set of all the subsets of com-possibilities*, as if they could be actually given in a country—this country is, as you know, God's Understanding—, we have to conquer step by step the open field of transcendental possibilities starting from the fixed and definite procedure of reduction and continuing with the systematic explication of the different spheres of constitutive possibilities of the monad, exploring the strata and levels that constitute it. We could call it for this reason a *Cartesian Monadology*. Instead of composing a world *from the outside* or *from above*, starting from the whole set of possibilities and from the whole set of subsets of compossibilities (possible worlds), with individuals, groups (sets of individuals), and systems of individuals (societies), Husserl's ontology is deeply rooted in the primitive ontological fact of the *living ego*. The manifold of possibilities is admitted only in so as far as it is actually or potentially accessible by an efficient procedure from my *de facto* ego, that of self-variation. The world emerging from this manifold is the remaining result of a system of a *priori* incompossibility. This system functions as a filter for sets of possibilities, and sub-sets of possibilities of possibilities. This is no vague machinery, but consciousness, with its vital and complex dynamics of intentions and fulfilment (Husserl 1974: 170).[47] It is an open and free system producing possibilities from facts and facts from possibilities and, while doing it, absorbing them. According to that system: (1) infinitely many possible groups of monads are conceivable, but only one is compossible; (2) infinitely many possible worlds are conceivable, but only one is compossible; (3) infinitely many possible variants of my- self are conceivable, but only one is compossible.

Generally speaking, infinitely many possible variants from *a* monad are conceivable, but, for each monad, there is only one compossible universe. This « uniqueness of both the monadological world and the Objective world 'innate' in it must be correctly understood". These restrictions to the metaphysical naive

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[47] Cf. *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, Husserliana, XVII, § 60, Paul Janssen ed., M. Nijhoff, 1974, p. 170.

construction are imposed by the methodological requirements of transcendental phenomenology: the field of pure possible egos must be produced starting from my own transcendental de facto I ("in a free variation, I can phantasy *first of all myself*, this apodictic *de facto* ego, as otherwise and can thus acquire the *system of possible variants of myself*") (Husserl 1950b: 168, 1999: 141). Consequently, each variant of my ego is in that respect *incompossible* with my *de facto* ego, since it "is annulled by each of the others and by the ego who I actually am". Each ego is thus, in the frame of this monadology, absolutely individual in as much as it is "a system of *a priori* incompossibility". As a further consequence, this prescribes the mode in which the other are constituted as such ("I can only find them; I cannot create others that shall exist for me") and the fact whether something constituted is another or not, an other ego or a mere thing (whether other monads are others for me and what they are for me). Last: those prescriptions are transferred to the other monads (whatever it may be, "*rational*" or not, normal or not). All this stems from the concrete transcendental situation and conditions of the self-variation:

> If I phantasy myself as a pure possibility different from what I actually am, that possibility in turn prescribes what monads exist for him as others. And, proceeding in this fashion, I recognise that *each monad having the status of a concrete possibility pre-delineates a compossible universe*, a closed 'world of monads', and that two worlds of monads are incompossible, just as two possible variants of my ego (or of any presupposedly phantasied ego whatever) are incompossible. (Husserl 1950b: 168, 1999: 141).

I do not actually compute this infinity of possibilities, but they are sketched as soon as I project the *primitive fact that I am* upon the background of open possibilities. Once I start doing that I appear immediately to myself (and to anybody) as an instance among indefinitely many, and that simple twinkling appearance gives me the *natural certainty* that I am in the world and that Others exist. This twinkling appearance proceeds from the complexity of being, from its composition of real and ideal, effective and imaginary, factual and possible.

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The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Intertwining and Reflexivity

Dermot Moran

Edmund Husserl regularly employs the image of 'intertwining' (*Verflectung*), already in the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901)[1] but more extensively in his mature writings of the 1920s and 1930s, to express the manner in which the various strata of lived experience are in complex relations of mutual foundation and interpenetration. He particularly emphasizes the intertwining of lived, animate body (*Leib*) and consciousness or what he calls 'spirit' (*Geist*). Husserl's distinct way of describing this intertwining between body and consciousness, especially in his *Ideas* II[2] was picked up by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and rearticulated in numerous reconceptualizations, including most famously 'intertwining' ('*l'entrelacs*' or

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[1] E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen,* 2 Vols. (Leipzig: Verlag von Viet, 1900–1901). The critical edition is *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage*, hrsg. E. Holenstein, Husserliana vol. XVIII (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1975) and *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*. In zwei Bänden, Husserliana XIX/1 and XIX/2, hrsg. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984), trans. John Findlay, *Logical Investigations*, 2 Vols. ed. with a New Introduction by Dermot Moran and New Preface by Michael Dummett. (London & New York: Routledge, 2001). Hereafter 'LU' followed by the Investigation number, paragraph number, volume number (vol. 1 = **I**; vol. 2 = **II**) and page number of English translation, followed by Husserliana volume and page number. Hereafter Husserliana will be abbreviated as 'Hua'.

[2] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, hrsg. Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1954 reprinted 1991), trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer as *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). Hereafter '*Ideas* II' followed by English pagination, Husserliana ('Hua') volume and German pagination.

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'*l'entrelacement*') and 'chiasm' ('*le chiasme*' or *le chiasma*),[3] especially in the posthumously published *Le Visible et l'invisible* (*The Visible and the Invisible*, 1964, hereafter 'VI'), and the associated 'Working Notes' (*Notes de travail*), that were selected and edited by Claude Lefort.[4] In those working notes, for example, Merleau-Ponty speaks of '*Chiasme—Réversibilité*' and of the '*Chiasme moi-le monde moi-autrui*' (VI, p. 263; 311), among other chiasmic relations. He speaks variously—in *The Visible and the Invisible* and in 'Eye and Mind' of entanglements, interlacings, doublings, duplicity, reversals, foldings, overflow or excess (*Überstieg*, VI, p. 259; 307). He describes the mind as 'the *other side* of the body' (l'*autre côté* du corps, VI, p. 259; 307) and the body as the image of the mind (in a way that parallels Wittgenstein's locution: 'The human *body* is the *best picture* of the human *soul*'[5]).

In a late interview with Jean-Paul Weber, published in *Le Monde* on 31 December 1960, Merleau-Ponty asserts that the body is at the same time seer and seen (*à la fois visible et voyant*) and that as such is not a duality but an indissoluble unity. One cannot separate consciousness and thought from the body.

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[3] The term '*chiasme*' (from the Greek χιασμός, 'criss-crossing', a cross-piece of wood, or the shape of the Greek letter chi, χ—the verb *khiazein* means 'to mark with an X') is found in Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* where it features in the title of Chapter Four, *L'entrelacs—Le chiasme* (The Interwining—The Chiasm). See M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le Visible et l'invisible,* texte établi par Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), trans. Alfonso Lingis, *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1968). Henceforth 'VI' and page number of English translation, followed by the page number of the French edition. The reference here is VI, p. 130; 170). See also the working note of February 1960 (VI, p. 239; 287) where he speaks of '*le chiasme*'. The term has several meanings. The term 'chiasmus' normally refers to a rhetorical figure of speech where elements are inverted or repeated in a reversed pattern, e.g. Cicero's 'one should eat to live and not live to eat'. The term 'chiasm' or 'chiasma' also refers to a nerve in the eye which crosses over to the opposite side of the brain. In fact, Merleau-Ponty refers to it in two forms: *chiasme* and *chiasma*. He speaks of '*chiasma*' (see VI, p. 160; 210 and in the notes of 4th June 1959, VI p. 199; 249 and 1 November 1959: 'Le *chiasma*'). Merleau-Ponty uses the term generally to refer to an overlapping that produces a unified experience, e.g. the combining of the two eyes to produce a single vision (VI, p. 215; 264). He also links it directly to Husserl's notion of 'being-within-one-another' (*Ineinander*), as found in *Ideas* II: '*L'idée du chiasme et de l'Ineinander*' (VI, p. 268; 316). The term 'chiasm' does not appear in his 1960 essay, 'Eye and Mind', see M. Merleau-Ponty, *L'Oeil et l'esprit* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964; reprinted ed. Lambert Dousson, Paris: Folio Plus, 2006), trans. Carleton Dallery, 'Eye and Mind', in M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 159–190. Hereafter 'EM' followed by the page number of the English translation followed by the pagination of the French edition of 2006. On the other hand EM contains many other related terms including the 'intertwining' (*entrelacs*) of vision and movement (EM, p. 162; 12).

[4] A selection of the 'working notes' edited by Claude Lefort was published in the 1964 edition of *Le Visible et l'invisible*. A revised complete edition of these notes is planned and is necessary to illuminate Merleau-Ponty's late thought.

[5] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. and ed. Elizabeth Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p. 178e and p. 178, *Der menschliche Körper ist das beste Bild der menschlichen Seele*.

It is precisely this deep 'circularity' within the body that is called 'flesh' (*la chair*).[6] It is precisely this doubling over of flesh that accounts for our humanity (EM, p. 163; 15). Already in the resumé for his 1956–1957 lecture course on Nature at the Collège de France, he speaks—in a meditation on Husserl's initial interpretation, in *Ideas* II § 11, of nature as 'mere things' (*blosse Sachen*)—of the 'intertwining' (*l'entrelacs*) of my corporeal life and the perceived object. The experienced object is within my corporeal experience as in a 'cocoon' (*comme dans un cocon*).[7]

Husserl's overall influence on Merleau-Ponty is, of course, well acknowledged and documented.[8] Indeed, Merleau-Ponty records his own ambiguous relation to the master he never met in his brilliant and complex essay 'The Philosopher and His Shadow' written in 1959 for Husserl's centenary and published in *Signs* (1960).[9] And in his *Le Monde* conversation with Jean-Paul Weber of 31 December 1960, he denies he ever separated from phenomenology and has always been particularly struck by the different tone that Husserl's descriptions took when he talked about the body.

Among other key Husserlian concepts (these include *Einfühlung*, *Ineinander*, *Urstiftung*, *Überstieg*, *Übertragung* –terms usually left in the German), Merleau-Ponty himself often cites *Verflechtung* as a concept that inspired him. In this regard Leonard Lawlor has carefully documented Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Husserl's concept of *Verflechtung*, especially as it occurs in

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[6] See M. Merleau-Ponty, *Parcours deux, 1951–1961*, ed. Jacques Prunair (Lagrasse: Verdier, 2000), pp. 303–304.

[7] See M. Merleau-Ponty, *La Nature, Notes, Cours du Collège de France*, ed. Dominique Séglard (Paris: Seuil, 1995), p. 366.

[8] See, *inter alia*, Dan Zahavi, 'Merleau-Ponty on Husserl. A Reappraisal', in Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree, eds, *Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 3–29; and Ted Toadvine, 'Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl—A Chronological Overview', Appendix to *Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl*, op. cit. See also A. D. Smith, 'The Flesh of Perception: Merleau-Ponty and Husserl', in T. Baldwin, ed. *Reading Merleau-Ponty on Phenomenology of Perception* (London & New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1–22. Leonard Lawlor, while rightly emphasising the influence of Heidegger on Merleau-Ponty's later thinking about the role of language, acknowledges 'the pervasive influence of Husserl in Merleau-Ponty's thought up to the very end', see Leonard Lawlor, 'Essence and Language: The Rupture in Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy', in L. Embree, ed., *Essays in Celebration of the Founding of the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations, Proceedings of a conference was held in Prague, Czech Republic, November 2002 "Issues Confronting the Post-European World" and that was dedicated to Jan Patočka (1907–1977)*. (http://www.o-p-o.net/).

[9] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), trans. R. McCleary, *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 125. Hereafter '*Signs*' followed by English translation page number and pagination of original French edition.

Merleau-Ponty's lecture course notes on 'The Origin of Geometry'.[10] Despite Merleau-Ponty's obvious dependence on Husserl, many influential commentators, e.g. Samuel Todes,[11] Hubert L. Dreyfus,[12] and Taylor Carman,[13] continue to insist that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body-subject[14] (with its intertwining and reversibility) represents an original contribution that overcomes the legacy of Husserl's supposed Cartesianism. In this chapter[15] I shall show that the mature Husserl (from *Thing and Space*, 1907, onward—the Husserl who operated from within the *epochē*)[16] develops a paradigmatically

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[10] See Leonard Lawlor's Foreword, '*Verflechtung*: The Triple Significance of Husserl's Course Notes on Husserl's "Origin of Geometry"', in *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, ed. Len Lawlor and Bettina Bergo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002), esp. pp. ix–xi and pp. xvi–xxi. See also David Brubaker, 'Merleau-Ponty's Three Intertwinings', *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 34 (2000), pp. 89–101. The original text of Merleau-Ponty's notes can be found in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours sur l'origine de la géométrie de Husserl*, *suivi de Recherches sur la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty*, sous la direction de R. Barbaras (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998). In the notes, Merleau-Ponty writes: 'language, man, world are 'interwoven' ('*entrechêtrés, entrelacés*'), *Verflochten*' (Bibliothèque Nationale 25), *Notes de cours sur l'origine de la géométrie de Husserl*, op. cit., p. 45.

[11] See Sam Todes, *Body and Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). Todes writes: 'Merleau-Ponty is the first to discern the subject body, to see the body as ineliminable from all perceptual sense' (p. 265).

[12] See, for instance, Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Husserl's (and Searle's) Concept of Intentionality', in *Rereading Merleau-Ponty: Essays Beyond the Continental-Analytic Divide*, ed. Lawrence Hass and Dorothea Olkowski (New York, NY: Humanity Books, 2000); and idem, 'Intelligence without Representation—Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation', *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, Vol 1, No. 4, Special Issue: *Hubert Dreyfus and the Problem of Representation*, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson (Kluwer Academic Publishers: 2002); and idem, 'Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science', *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty*, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark Hansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[13] See Taylor Carman, 'The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty', *Philosophical Topics* Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 205–226. Carman writes: 'Unlike Husserl, but like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty looks beyond the subjectobject divide to try to gain insight into the concrete structures of worldly experience. But whereas Heidegger does little more than mention the problem of embodiment in passing, Merleau-Ponty bases his entire phenomenological project on an account of bodily intentionality and the challenge it poses to any adequate concept of mind. Embodiment thus has a philosophical significance for Merleau-Ponty that it could not have for Husserl' (p. 206).

[14] Merleau-Ponty rarely uses the term '*corps-sujet*' but it does appear in *La Nature* where he is translating Husserl's *Subjektleib*, see *La Nature*, *Notes, Cours du Collège de France*, op. cit., p. 365.

[15] Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Embodied Subjectivity Conference, Royal Irish Academy. Dublin, 25–27 May 2010, the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle, Gonzaga University, Florence, Italy (27–30 April 2011), and 50th Anniversary Conference, SPEP, sponsored by Villanova University and Penn State, Philadelphia 19–22 October 2011. I would like to thank Patrick Burke, Burt Hopkins, Steve Crowell, Filip Mattens, Andrea Staiti, Richard Kearney, Sara Heinämaa, Eileen Rizo-Patron, and Rasmus Thybo Jensen, for their comments.

[16] E. Husserl, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*, ed. Ulrich Claesges, Husserliana XVI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), trans. by R. Rojcewicz, *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, Husserl Collected Works VII (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). Hereafter 'DR' with English and then Husserliana (hereafter 'Hua') volume number and pagination of German edition.

new and radical way of thinking about embodied conscious comportment or behaviour (*Verhalten*)[17] that not only inspired Merleau-Ponty but which sought to overcome Cartesianism from within, as it were, or as Husserl would prefer to say 'from below' (*von unten*). In this study, then, I shall explore the complexity, subtlety and centrality of *Verflechtung* in Husserl, documenting its appearance in his own work and show how he regarded in as crucial for moving to a new way of conceiving of embodied experience, in just the way that Merleau-Ponty brilliantly divined in the master whom he had never met.

Of course, on more than one level, Husserl was always—as the *Cartesian Meditations* attest—a radical Cartesian and he even styled his philosophy as a 'new Cartesianism'.[18] We have to begin from a radical examination and critique of self-experience (CM § 16). On the other hand, and at the very same time, Husserl understood that all transcendental subjectivity involves an intrinsic relation to others and operates within an interlocking 'nexus' (*Zusammenhang*) of intersubjectivity, as he articulates in the *Crisis* texts that had such a powerful influence on Merleau-Ponty when he read them both on his initial visit to Leuven and later in Walter Biemel's Husserliana edition of 1954.[19] Husserl's mature conception envisages transcendental subjectivities interpenetrating each other in an *Ineinander* of mutual implication which he chose to express in terms of a revised version of the Leibnizian conception of a 'monadology' (albeit that Husserl's monads *have* windows). Husserl struggled to articulate this transcendental 'we', this *nos cogitamus*. In notes of a night conversation from 22 June 1933, printed in his *Intersubjectivity* volume, Husserliana XV, for instance, Husserl writes:

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[17] Husserl was aware of the 'behaviourists' whom he occasionally refers to using the English word. He speaks of the 'exaggerations of the behaviorists' (employing the term '*Behavoristen*', the English word 'behavior' is crossed out, see *Crisis*, p. 247n.4; Hua VI 541; elsewhere he talks of the 'behaviourists') to establish a completely objective science of behavior that eliminated the subjective altogether. As we shall see, he sided with the German Gestalt psychologists in rejecting behaviorism as a crude atomistic sensationalism that can monitor only the 'external sides of modes of behavior' (*Aussenseite der Verhaltungen*, *Crisis*, p. 247n; 251n.1).

[18] E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, hrsg. Stephan Strasser, Husserliana I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), trans. Dorion Cairns, *Cartesian Meditations* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). Hereafter 'CM' followed by the page number of the English translation and the Husserliana volume and page number. The French edition is E. Husserl, *Méditations carté siennes: introduction à la phénoménologie*, trans. G. Peiffer and E. Levinas (Paris: Almand Colin, 1931; reprinted Paris: Vrin, 2001).

[19] E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, edited by Walter Biemel, Husserliana (hereafter 'Hua') Volume VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954). This edition includes the published parts of the *Crisis* as well as a selection of associated documents. It is substantially translated by David Carr as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern U. P., 1970), although some supplements have been left out of the Carr edition. Hereafter the *Crisis of European* Sciences will be cited as '*Crisis*' followed by the page number of the Carr translation (where available) and the Husserliana volume and page number.

Then I come back to this point that my primal ego (*mein urtümliches ego*) contains an infinity of primal egos, each of which, departing from itself (*von sich aus*) contains also this infinity: my ego is included within this infinity in which all this is included (*in dem alles das impliziert ist*), just as my ego is included again in each. All being, in any imaginable sense, is in me (*liegt in mir*)—with the teleological harmony which makes possible the totality as an all-unity (*All-Einheit*). But all the others in their totality of infinity are (*liegen*) in me and they are in me as including each other in every sense... (my translation)[20]

Again Merleau-Ponty was very quick to insist that transcendental subjectivity is always an intersubjectivity in his Preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception*[21] (PP, p. xiii; vii).

The later Merleau-Ponty sought, from several different approaches, to overcome what he himself perceived to be the chief failing of his *Phenomenology of Perception*, namely, that that work presupposed and could not overcome the 'consciousness/object' distinction, a distinction that in fact was 'insoluble', as Merleau-Ponty put it in a working note of July 1959 (VI, p. 200; 250). In his final decade he proposed a new ontology of *flesh* (*la chair*)[22] that sought to 'draw up the picture of wild being' (*l'être sauvage*, VI, p. 165; 217) with its complex 'doubling up' (*dé doublement*) and 'reversal' (*renversement*) which at the same time enfolds a 'gap' (*écart*) as a way of resolving this consciousness/object split and removing it altogether from his new ontology. In working notes from January and February 1959, Merleau-Ponty connects wild being with Husserl (see VI, p. 165; 217 and VI 183; 234), in the latter entry remarking 'Disclosure of the wild or brute Being by way of Husserl and the *Lebenswelt* upon which one opens' (*Dévoilement de l'Être*

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[20] See E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil. 1929–1935*, hrsg. Iso Kern, Husserliana XV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 587–88 : «*Dann komme ich also wieder darauf zurück, dass mein urtümliches ego eine 'Unendlichkeit' von urtümliches auch mein ego, in dem alles das impliziert ist, wie eben dieses auch wieder in jedem impliziert ist. Alles in jedem erdenklichen Sinn Seiende liegt in mir–mit der teleologischen Harmonie, die Allheit als All-Einheit möglich macht. Aber alle Andern liegen in mir in ihrer Totalität der Unendlichkeit, und liegen in mir als alles in jedem Sinn in sich implizierend...*». The manuscript of 1935 K III 12 p. 9 says: '...what does variation mean here? Variation of a possible subject in a compossible all-subject' (...was besagt hier Variation? Variation eines möglichen Subjekts in einer kompossiblen Subjekt-Allheit).

[21] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), trans. C. Smith as *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). Henceforth 'PP' followed by page number of English translation; then, pagination of French edition.

[22] Merleau-Ponty's account of flesh has been criticized from various points of view, see, for instance, Luce Irigaray, 'The Invisible of the Flesh', in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, trans. Carolyn Burke and Jillian Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U. P., 1993). This critique has generated a large scholarly literature, see Elizabeth Grosz, 'Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray in the Flesh', *Thesis Eleven*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1993), pp. 37–59; Cathryn Vasseleu, *Textures of Light: Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty* (London: Routledge, 1998); and Tina Chanter, 'Wild Meaning: Luce Irigaray's Reading of Merleau-Ponty', in Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor, eds, *Chiasms. Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000), pp. 219–236. I do not intend to address this critique in this paper. Rather I want to point out the manner in which Husserl's conceptions of *Leib* and *Leiblichkeit* already articulate many of the paradoxes of fleshly being later explored by Merleau-Ponty.

sauvage ou brut par le chemin de Husserl et du Lebenswelt sur quoi on ouvre). We know also that Merleau-Ponty was deeply inspired by Husserl's mention of 'mute' or 'dumb' experience (*stumme Erfahrung*; which Merleau-Ponty, following the Levinas and Peiffer translation,[23] renders as *l'expérience muette*) in his *Cartesian Meditations* § 16.[24] In Merleau-Ponty's eyes, Husserl was trying to name that wild order of being and nature that precedes conscious thought, that belong to 'pre-reflective experience', the domain of the 'tacit *cogito*'.

Merleau-Ponty is seeking a way to overcome both empiricist sensualist and rationalist or intellectualist approaches to consciousness. The living organic manner in which conscious awareness unifies with the body requires a break with the history of Western philosophy and the generation of new metaphors and images (in this regard the later work of Merleau-Ponty moves in the same sphere as the writings of Gaston Bachelard whose *Psychoanalysis of Fire* was published in 1938).[25]

'Flesh', according to Merleau-Ponty's account in *The Visible and the Invisible*, is essentially characterized by 'reversibility' (*réversibilité*), 'the finger of the glove that is turned inside out' (VI, p. 263; 311) and 'doubling'—'the doubling up of my body into inside and outside' (VI, p. 264; 311). Indeed, he identifies 'chiasm' with 'reversibility' (see VI, p. 264; 312). For Merleau-Ponty, 'chiasm', 'intertwining' or 'interlacing' (*l'interlacs*) essentially expresses the manner in which my bodily awareness is both drawn together into a unity and also 'doubled' and even 'reversed', e.g. when one hand touches the other. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a general 'duplicity' (*duplicité*) and, as he puts it in 'Eye and Mind', a 'reflexivity of the sensible' (*une réflexivité du sensible*, EM, p. 168; 24). Merleau-Ponty speaks of the 'insertion of the world between the two leaves of my body' and 'the insertion of my body between the two leaves of each thing and of the world' (VI, p. 264; 312). Reflection and higher-level thought, furthermore, must be reinterpreted on the model of this intertwined sensuous incarnation with its inner reversal, doubling, self-emptying and self-distantiation. The conscious subject has to be understood as 'the sensible that hollows itself out' (VI, p. 210; 260). There has always to be recognised a unity, a complication and an essential gap.[26]

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[23] E. Husserl, *Méditations cartésiennes*, trans. G. Peiffer and E. Levinas, op. cit., p. 73.

[24] Husserl writes: 'It is the experience … still mute which we are concerned with leading to the pure expression of its own meaning' (Husserl, *CM*, pp. 38–39; Hua I 77). Merleau-Ponty refers to this sentence in *Phenomenology of Perception* (PP, p. xv; x) as well as *The Visible and the Invisible* (VI, p. 129; 169). See Jacques Taminaux, 'Experience, Expression, and Form in Merleau-Ponty's Itinerary', in his *Dialectic and Difference. Finitude in Modern Thought* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1985), pp. 131–54.

[25] Gaston Bachelard, *La Psychanalyse du feu* (Paris, 1938; reprinted Paris: Gallimard 1949), trans. *Psychoanalysis of Fire* (Boston: Beacon, 1968).

[26] Gaston Bachelard also emphasises the breaks and interruptions in the intertwining. For Bachelard, unlike Bergson, the fabric of duration that we weave in-and-out is full of breaks (life/death), as is the living tissue of our bodies. See his *La Dialectique de la durée* (1936), trans. Mary McAllister Jones as *Dialectic of Duration* (Manchester: Clinamen, 2007).

The late Merleau-Ponty brilliantly identifies the radical thought at stake in Husserl's *Verflechtung*. He emphasizes, following Husserl's lead, that this intertwining is exhibited not just in embodiment in the usual sense (in individual animate organisms), but in cultural productions, in language and speech, in the intertwining of physical sound and intended meaning (Husserl speaks of the 'body of language', *Sprachleib*, in his 'Origin of Geometry', *Crisis*, p. 358; VI 369), in cultural institutions, and so on. For Merleau-Ponty, as for Husserl especially in *Ideas* II, nature itself is intertwined with culture such that the two cannot be separated. Embodiment should not be thought of as belonging solely to 'nature' (as recent naturalistic philosophies of mind have sought to do) but manifests itself culturally and in the symbolic domain. Intertwining belongs to the very essence of human symbolic activity. For Merleau-Ponty, for instance, this intertwining captures the being of art, especially painting which is both an embodied activity of brush strokes and a produced visual meaning sense. Indeed, the very title of his famous 1960 essay 'Eye and Mind' (one of the last pieces he published before his death) suggests the intertwining between painter's body with his or her expressive movements (brush-strokes) and the expressed thought that is embodied by the strokes. A similar intertwining is found in music and in all dimensions of incorporated, incarnate meaning. Intertwining is the very meaning of incorporation, embodiment, incarnation, transubstantiation (and Merleau-Ponty is not hesitant to use terms drawn from Catholic theology). In its highest form, this intertwining, for Merleau-Ponty—as for Husserl as we shall see—expresses a profound *ontological* relation between presence and absence, between present and past, between what he calls in his last writings the 'visible' and the 'invisible', or in more orthodox Husserlian terms, also employed by Merleau-Ponty, 'original presentation' (*Urpräsentation*) and the 'non-originally presentable' (*Nicht-Urpräsentierbar*, see VI, p. 217; 266 and VI, p. 218; 268)

In the remainder of this chapter I shall explore how much Merleau-Ponty's creative musings (his interrupted efforts at a theory) echo and develop Husserl's own quite distinctive phenomenology of embodiment. The great genius of Merleau-Ponty is to bring to manifestation the embodied phenomenology that was obscured under Husserl's own Neo-Cartesian methodology and ponderous terminology.

1 The First Intertwining of *Leib* and *Körper*

The first and perhaps most important sense of intertwining as found in Husserl is that between the body as physical object and as animate organism. The phenomenology of embodiment—a term Husserl himself employs[27]—begins by

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[27] Husserl speaks of 'the phenomenology of the body' (*die Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit*) in his *Phänomenologische Psychologie* § 39, when he is speaking of *Verflechtung*, see E, Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, ed. W. Biemel, Hua IX (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968); trans. J. Scanlon, *Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977). Hereafter '*Phen. Psych.*', followed by pagination of English and then Husserliana edition. The reference here is *Phen. Psych.*, p. 153; Hua IX 199.

distinguishing the physical body (*Körper*) from the animate lived body (*Leib*). Classical formulations can be found in Husserl's *Ideas* II § 18; *Ideas* III[28] § 2 and *Cartesian Meditations* § 44.[29] The distinction between *Leib* and *Körper* is a commonplace of the phenomenologists[30] and is found also in Max Scheler,[31] and Edith Stein.[32] Scheler, for instance in his *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (1913, hereafter 'FE') comments:

> We wish to make a sharp distinction between "lived body" (*Leib*) and "thingly body" (*Körper*), a distinction which unfortunately, is not found nowadays in scientific terminology. (FE, p. 399)

Merleau-Ponty and Sartre translate *Leib* as 'flesh' (e.g. '*la chair*' is equivalent to *Leib* for Merleau-Ponty, VI, p. 255; 303).

Körper (from the Latin *corpus*; literally: 'body') represents the body as a physical, material, extended thing in the natural world, subject to all the natural laws and causal interactions with other bodies. It is the body as located in time and space governed by causation, movement, and so on. The English word 'corpse' captures well the idea of the inanimate body which is simply a piece of the material, extended world. *Leib* signifies the animate, living body, the living organism, the body which is experienced in a specifically subjective, first-person way. The difference between accidentally falling out a window, entirely under the control of gravity, and jumping out a window illustrates clearly the difference between *Körper* and *Leib*. Husserl also sees *Leib* as the seat of an ego and as a centre of capacities and of agency, of what Husserl calls 'I can's', and which has a unitary sense and voluntary control (Hua V 119) and 'governs' or 'reigns' (*waltend*) over itself. Husserl writes

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[28] See Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, hrsg. Marly Biemel, Husserliana V (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), trans. by Ted E. Klein and W.E. Pohl as *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book*, Husserl Collected Works Vol. 1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980). Hereafter '*Ideas* III' followed by Husserliana volume and page number.

[29] The reference here is CM § 44, p. 97; Hua I 128. See also CM § 50.

[30] See Bernhard Waldenfels, *Das leibliche Selbst. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Leibes*, 3rd edition (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000) and Stephan Grätzel, *Die philosophische Entdeckung des Leibes* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989).

[31] Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus*, vol. 1 (1913); vol. 2 (1916), now in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Maria Scheler, Band 2 (Bern/München: Francke Verlag, 1954); trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk as *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt Toward a Foundation of An Ethical Personalism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Hereafter 'FE' followed by pagination of the English translation.

[32] See E. Stein, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Halle: Buchdruckerie des Waisenhauses, 1917; reprinted, Munich: Verlagsgesellschaft Gerhard Kaffke, 1980), trans. Waltraut Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964; reprinted, Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1989).

> In the apprehension of the lived body (*Leib*) accordingly there is determined the distinction between passive movements, of the purely mechanical movements of the lived body as a physical thing and the free movements of the lived body, which are characterized in the mode of 'I perform a movement of my hand', 'I lift my foot', and so on. (*Ideas* III, Hua V 121, my translation)[33]

As physical, the human body belongs to nature and is subject to the laws of gravitation, impact, and so on. As the organ of my will, however, the living body is what Husserl's terms 'I-body' (*Ichleib*) in his *Logical Investigations* (V § 4). The animate body (*Leib*) is primarily given as *my own* body (*Crisis* § 28), it is a zone of 'mineness' (Heidegger's *Jemeinigkeit*), although not all aspects of my body are equally close. Some aspects of my body are not directly perceptible. In this regard Husserl in *Ideas* II speaks of the lived body as incompletely constituted.

One should not absolutize the contrast between *Körper* and *Leib*, since my living body is always physical body too, and thus Husserl speaks of *Leibkörper* (*Ideas* II § 45) of 'living-embodied egoity' (*leibliche Ichlichkeit*, *Crisis* § 28).[34] The inanimate body and lived body are on a continuum, which can be traversed. I can 'play dead', making my body feel heavier to lift. On the other hand, I can, in jumping, swimming or dancing, make my body feel light. When my arm falls asleep, it becomes heavy, insensitive and wooden. With increasing fitness, my footsteps up a hill can feel lighter; my living body can be trained, developed, sculpted, starved into submission in cases of anorexia, and so on. There is an *intertwining* between *Leib* and *Körper* and this is precisely how Husserl describes the relation, employing his term '*Verflectung*', e.g. in *Cartesian Meditations* (CM § 52, p. 114; Hua I 143), a term which is translated in the French version of Emmanuel Levinas and Gabrielle Peiffer as '*liaison*'.[35]

There is also a kind of intertwining or double-sidedness relating internal and external in embodiment. Husserl initially adopted the nineteenth-century psychologist's distinction between external and inner perception (found *inter alia* in Wundt and Brentano) but in his Appendix to the Sixth Logical Investigation he recognized how problematic this distinction is. Inner perception of course picks out one's awareness of the flow of conscious processes but it is not immediately clear if the experience of a pain for instance belongs to outer or inner perception. As Edith Stein points out, some pains sit on the surface of the ego, as it were, while others are genuinely egoic. In his mature writings Husserl speaks of the 'attitude of inwardness' (*Inneneinstellung*, *Ideas* II § 42 Hua IV 161) as opposed to the 'attitude of externality' (*Außeneinstellung*, IV 161). He advocates the need for a genuine 'inner

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[33] *In der Leibesauffassung ist dadurch bedingt die Unterscheidung der passiven Bewegungen, der bloß mechanischen Bewegungen des Leibes als physischen Dinges und der freien Leibesbewegungen, die charakterisiert sind im Modus des "ich vollziehe eine Bewegung meiner Hand", "ich hebe den Fuß" usw.* (Husserl, *Ideas* III, Beilage, Hua V 121).

[34] Husserl's terminology is wide-ranging and fluid. He speaks *inter alia* not just of 'animate body' (*Leib*), but of 'human-I' (*Ich-mensch*),'ego-body' (*Ichleib*), 'I-life'(*Ichleben*), 'living body' (*Leibkörper, Körperleib,* depending on the emphasis), 'soul' (*Seele*), 'psychic life' (*Seelenleben*), my 'psychic' or 'soulful' being (*mein seelishes Sein*, Hua I 129), the 'sphere of ownness' (*Eigenheitssphäre*), my 'self-ownness' (*Selbsteigenheit*, Hua I 125), and so on.

[35] E. Husserl, *Méditations cartésiennes*, op. cit., p. 186. See also CM § 54, *Méditations cartésiennes*, p. 194.

psychology' (*Innenpsychologie*) to replace current scientific psychology which has objectified consciousness (he repeats this theme in CM § 16 where he speaks of the need for a genuine psychology of interiority). He clearly explicates what he means by this 'inner attitude' at *Ideas* II §§ 54–55, where he writes of the states of self (including sensations, and 'somatic corporeality' as being grasped in this inner attitude, *Ideas* II § 55, p. 217; Hua IV 215). There are also parts of my body that are almost completely 'external' (e.g. hair, nails) that can be removed from my body; albeit they can be experienced as deeply personal, e.g. sudden alopecia can be traumatic. If I lose feeling in a limb it may take on this character of pure physical entity and indeed there are pathological situations of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD)[36] where people reject parts of their body as ugly, or alien limb syndrome, where people become convinced that a part of their body is not their own but an alien limb controlled by others. Sufferers of the latter condition may even seek amputations to remove these 'alien' appendages. On a more 'normal' level, I can seek to remove a mole from my skin, and so on, because it is alien to me. External and internal are inextricably and fluidly *intertwined* and I dwell into a kind of interleaving between these dimensions.

Even the much maligned concept of 'inner perception' speaks to a certain truth, according to Husserl, there is definitely a kind of *inspectio sui*[37] (*Ideas* II § 54,

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[36] See Katharine A. Phillips, *The Broken Mirror: Understanding and Treating Body Dysmorphic Disorder*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[37] The term *inspectio sui* comes from the Cartesian philosopher Arnold Geulincx (1624–1669). References to Geulincx and to *inspectio sui* are extremely rare in Husserl's writings but features in *Ideas* II § 56 (Hua IV 212), § 57 Hua IV 247, Supplement VI Hua IV 311 and Supplement X (Hua IV 321–322), *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, in E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1905–1920*, hrsg. I. Kern (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), Hua XIII 93, trans. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester 1910–1911*. Husserl Collected Works Volume XII (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), p. 169. and in the Kaizo-articles, see E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1922–1937*, hrsg. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), Hua XXVII 23. It is possible that Husserl learned of Geulincx from one of the standard histories of philosophy that Husserl owned, e.g., Wilhelm Windelband's *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 4th revised edition (Tübingen: Mohr, 1907), where Geulincx is discussed in a chapter on causation and occasionalism, see Windelband's *Lehrbuch* vol. VIII, p. 342 [This work is listed in Leuven Husserl Archives as KUL—FHUS BQ 507 -> 0002086765]. There are, however, no underlinings or reader's marks (*Lesespuren*) in Husserl's copy of the book. According to Windelband, for Geulincx the mind can only be truly said to do what it knows how to do (*Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non faci*, 'what you do not know how to do, you do not do'). Since the mind does not know how to raise the arm, it does not in fact raise the arm. The mind, then, cannot be the cause of bodily movements. There is no direct knowledge of the body in the way in which there is direct knowledge of the mind. The only true cause is God. God puts ideas in the human mind which are far richer than anything in the outer world. We proceed through *inspectio sui* or 'autology'(*autologia*—it is notable that Geulincx also uses the term 'somatology' which is found also in Husserl). I am grateful to Hanne Jacobs and Thomas Vongehr for assisting me in this research on Husserl and Geulincx. Heidegger also refers to the phrase *inspectio sui* in his 1925 *History of the Concept of Time Prolegomena* lectures, see M. Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 20 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), pp. 169–70; trans. T. Kisiel, *History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena* (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1985), p. 122.

p. 223; Hua IV 213, see also Hua XXVII 23), an immediate awareness of one's interiority, a certain 'intimacy' or 'innerness' (*Innerlichkeit*) with which I occupy my body, feel the way I am sitting or standing. This is not just what psychologists now call 'proprioception', quasi-sensory experiences of my own body, but also involves emotional states and moods in which I apprehend myself.[38] Some emotional or feeling states are localized, some pervade the whole body. Some sit on the surface of my ego; some go deep into my ego, e.g. the inner spaced that is designated as my 'heart' (of which Stein speaks).[39] The idea of 'intertwining' expresses the complex double-sidedness of self-presence and self-distantiation within the ego itself. One can take 'ownership' of one's body or treat it as external, as mere thing, as Sartre discusses in *Being and Nothingness* when he talks of my hand going 'dead' and appearing as alien to me.[40]

2 Intertwining (*Verflechtung*) as an 'Operative' Concept in Husserl

The verbal noun *Verflechtung* and its various verbal forms (*verflechten*, *verflicht*, *verflochten*) become increasingly common in Husserl's mature writings of the 1920s. To use Eugen Fink's terms, it is an operative rather than a thematic concept.[41] Husserl never explicitly reflects on it. He had first used the term

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[38] In *Ideas* I § 64, § 65, §79 (and also in Hua XXV 36 footnote) Husserl argues against the criticism that the phenomenological method is only a kind of psychological 'self-observation' (*Selbstbeobachtung*). In *Ideas* I § 79, he mentions James Watt's 'Über die neueren Forschungen in der Gedächtnis- und Assoziationspsychologie aus dem Jahr 1905', *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, Bd. IX, 1907. See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* 1, hrsg. K. Schuhmann, Hua III/1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), trans. F. Kersten as *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983). Hereafter '*Ideas* I' followed by the page number of the English translation and the Husserliana volume and page number.

[39] Stein claims that pain takes place at a distance from the ego, see Edith Stein, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Halle, 1917; reprinted München: Gerhard Kaffke Verlag, 1980), p. 46; trans. Waltraut Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, The Collected Works of Edith Stein Sister benedicta of the Cross Discalced Carmelite 1891–1942, Volume Three, 3rd revised edition (Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1989), p. 42.

[40] See Dermot Moran, 'Husserl and Sartre on Embodiment and the "Double Sensation,"' in Katherine J. Morris, ed. *Sartre on the Body*, Philosophers in Depth Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010), pp. 41–66.

[41] See E. Fink, 'Operative Concepts in Husserl's Phenomenology', in W. McKenna, R. M. Harlan and L. E. Winters, eds, *Apriori and World. European Contributions to Husserlian Phenomenology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), pp. 56–70. This article deeply influenced Merleau-Ponty, see Stephen H. Watson, 'Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological Itinerary From Body Schema to Situated Knowledge: On How We Are and How We Are Not to "Sing the World"', *Janus Head* vol. 9 no 2 (2007), pp. 525–550.

(*Verflectung* and the past participle *verflochten*) in his discussion of expression and meaning in the First Logical Investigation § 1,[42] using an expression that is commented on by Jacques Derrida in his Introduction to the translation of 'The Origin of Geometry'. As Leonard Lawlor has pointed out, Merleau-Ponty, in his *Course Notes on Husserl's Origin of Geometry*, comments on Husserl's use of the term 'interwoven' (*verflochten*) in the First Logical Investigation to expresses the manner in which world of humans and language are related and intertwined (*Crisis*, p. 359; Hua VI 370).[43] Merleau-Ponty interprets this *Verflechtung* (which he translates as '*entrelacement*'[44] or '*enchevêtrement*') as a 'thick identity . . . which truly contains difference'. Derrida, subsequently, translated Husserl's '*verflochten*' by '*entrelacée*' in his version of 'The Origin of Geometry' (1960) which was known to Merleau-Ponty and he even wrote to Derrida shortly before his death in May 1961.[45] Interestingly Derrida returns, in his *Speech and Phenomena* (1967),[46] to the theme of *Verflechtung*, when he comments that Husserl uses the word '*verflochten*' to express the interwovenness between the 'indicative sign' and its 'meaning' in the First Logical Investigation (LU I § 1, Hua XIX/1 31) and between the meaning and what is expressed (LU I § 9, Hua XIX/1 37).[47]

In his *Phenomenological Psychology* and also in his *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl employs the term *Verflechtung* to express the manner in which lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*) intertwine with one another (perceptions can give rise to or re-enliven memories, memories can infect perception, and so on). Intertwining is also used by Husserl to express the relations between protentions and retentions *within* specific lived experiences.

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[42] The reference here is LU I § 1, **I**, p. 183; Hua XIX/1 31: *Verhältnis jenes Anzeichenseins verflochten ist, und dieses wiederum begründet dadurch einen weiteren Begriff, daß es eben auch ohne solche Verflechtung auftreten kann.* Findlay's English translation renders *Verflectung* here as 'connection'.

[43] See Leonard Lawlor, '*Verflechtung*: The Triple Significance of Husserl's Course Notes on Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry', in *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, op. cit., p. x.

[44] The term *entrelacement* ('intertwining') appears only twice in *Signs*, once in relation to Husserl's *Ideas* II in 'The Philosopher and His Shadow' (*Signs*, p. 127; 225) and once in relation to Freud in 'Man and Adversity' (*Signs*, p. 230; 235) where Merleau-Ponty talks of the intertwining of the sexual and the aggressive in Freud as a recognition of the very ambiguity of incarnation. Indeed Merleau-Ponty's later reading of Freud—and Melanie Klein—is important for his new understanding of intertwining. The essay 'Man and Adversity' is interesting as it was originally delivered as a lecture in 1951.

[45] See Derrida's translation of 'Origin of Geometry' in E. Husserl, *La Crise des sciences europé ennes et de la phénoménologie transcendentale*, traduit de l'allemand et préfacé par Gérard Granel (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 409. In fact Derrida told me once in Dublin that Merleau-Ponty wrote to him to ask if he would be willing to translate the whole of the *Crisis* text. Derrida however had had enough of translation and declined. Merleau-Ponty died shortly afterwards and the two never met.

[46] J. Derrida, *La Voix et le phénomène* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), trans. by David B. Allison, with additional essays, *Speech and Phenomena and other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1973), p. 20.

[47] See also LU V § 24, **I**, p. 132; Hua XIX/1 433.

For Merleau-Ponty, the canonical occurrences are in *Ideas* II where Husserl uses the term *Verflechtung* in relation to the 'intertwining' or 'interweaving' between sensing and sensed (see *Ideas* II § 37, p. 157; Hua IV 151) in the case of the 'double sensation' when one hand touches another, but Husserl already spoke of 'intertwining' precisely in the context of the double sensation in his 1907 *Thing and Space* § 47:

> Our present concern will only be the intertwining in a remarkable correlation, of the constitution of the physical thing with the constitution of the Ego-Body. (DR § 47, p. 137; Hua XVI 162).[48]

Although Merleau-Ponty does not advert to these passages, '*Verflechtung*' features significantly in Husserl's *Phenomenological Psychology* lectures of 1925 in several very interesting contexts. In this text Husserl speaks in general of the holistic 'intertwinings' (*Verflechtungen*, plural) in our flow of conscious life such that all experiences combine into a single stream:

> For the single datum is a mere abstraction for the psychic. A feeling, a mood, an emerging thought, a hope which makes itself felt, etc.—nothing of this sort is ever an isolated lived experience; it is what it is in the psychic milieu, in its intertwinings (*Verflechtungen*), its motivations, indications, etc.; and these are moments of the nexus, of the psychic function, which are lived together inseparably. Thus the great task is to analyze systematically and describe in their typology the many-sided intertwinings which unite in the respective unity of a structural nexus. (*Phen. Psych.* § 1, p. 6; Hua IX 9)[49]

Husserl then sets it as a task of phenomenology to identify the types of intertwining and their compositional forms. It also seems to be suggested here that the intertwining itself is a phenomenological experience that can be reflected on. Later in these lectures he states:

> By the phenomenology of embodiment (*Leiblichkeit*) in its intertwining (*Verflechtung*) with the phenomenology of physical thinghood (*Dingheit*), including here the phenomenology of organisms considered biophysically, fundamental segments of a phenomenology of nature are produced, that is, of the phenomenological clarification of subjectivity as constituting nature in itself experientially, namely as experiential sense and experiential tenet, or as a system of free accessibility—but only fundamental segments (*Phen. Psych,* § 39, p. 153; Hua IX 199, translation modified)[50]

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[48] The German reads: '*hier kommt es nur darauf an, daß sich die Konstitution physischer Dinglichkeit in merkwürdiger Korrelation mit der Konstitution eines Ichleibes verflicht*'.

[49] *Die Einzelheit ist ja im Seelischen bloss Abstraktion. Ein Gefühl, eine Stimmung, ein auftauchender Gedanke, eine sich regende Hoffnung, usw- — all dergleichen ist nie ein isoliertes Erlebnis, es ist, was es ist, im seelischen Milieu, in seinen Verflechtungen, seinen Motivationen, Indikationen usw., und diese sind untrennbar miterlebte Momente des Zusammenhangs, der seelischen Funktion. So ist es die grosse Aufgabe, die vielseitigen Verflechtungen, die sich zur jeweiligen Einheit eines Strukturzusammenhangs einigen, systematisch zu zergliedern und in ihrer Typik zu beschreiben. (Phen. Psych, Hua IX 9).*

[50] *Durch die Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit in ihrer Verflechtung mit der Phänomenologie der physischen Dinglichkeit, hier eingeschlossen die der biophysisch betrachteten Organismen, werden schon die Grundstücke einer Phänomenologie der Natur, das ist der phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Subjektivität als in sich Natur erfahrungsmässig, nämlich als Erfahrungssinn und Erfahrungssatz bzw. als System freier Zuganglichkeit konstituierende, geleistet, aber nur Grundstücke. (Phen. Psych. IX 199).*

This is an important programmatic claim. Something like a phenomenology of experienced nature is being proposed. In these lectures Husserl even speaks of the 'universal intertwining' of all 'spiritual beings' (*Geistigen*) cooperating together to produce culture and the life of spirit.[51]

In the German version of *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl uses the term *Verflechtung* about half a dozen times and it is normally translated as '*liaison*' in the French version of 1931 (CM § 13 Hua I 68 or § 21 Hua I 87).[52] He speaks of the 'synthetic intertwining' of different forms of conscious acts (e.g. perceiving, remembering, etc.), and also of the interweaving of presentation and presentification; expressing the two-sidedness of every experience which has both what is primarily present and what is absent. This is clearly the source of Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the intertwining of presence and absence in *The Visible and the Invisible*.

Intertwining, then, in Husserl, covers not just the relation between expression and meaning, and between physical and lived body, but also the intersection of nature and culture, indeed the very manner in which 'spiritual' subjects cooperate together to produce the world of spirit (*Geistigkeit*). It is in this later context that Husserl uses the term *Ineinander* which is also picked up by Merleau-Ponty[53] (see VI, p. 116;154 and VI, p. 172; 224) along with the enigmatic conception of *Einströmen,* VI, p. 173; 224).[54] James Dodd identifies 'flowing in' or 'influx' (*Einströmen*) as a central but neglected transcendental concept in Husserl. He explains:

> The mechanism whereby transcendental philosophy enriches the sense unities of natural life is designated in Husserl's later writings by the term "*Einströmen*," which describes the manner in which the transcendental dimension, or the consciousness of the subjectivity of meaning on a transcendental register, "flows into" natural life, enriching its content, above all the content of the sense of "subjectivity" itself.[55]

Einströmen, then, is another kind of interpenetration—that between natural and transcendental life. Merleau-Ponty writes in a particularly dense passage in a working note of February 1959:

> *Because there is Einströmen*, reflection is not adequation, coincidence: it would not pass *into* the *Strom* if it placed us back at the source of the *Strom*... The *Einströmen* a particular case of sedimentation, that is, of secondary passivity, that is, of *latent* intentionality. ... intentionality ceases to be a property of consciousness ... to become intentional life—it becomes the thread that binds, for example, my present to my past in its temporal place ...

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[51] ... *universalen Verflechtung alles Geistigen, ist in der universalen Geisteswissenschaft die universale Geistigkeit*, (*Phen. Psych.* Hua IX 377).

[52] See also CM § 50, p. 109; Hua I 139; CM § 52, p. 114; Hua I 143; and CM § 54, p. 119 (here *Verflechtung* is translated infelicitously as 'association' by Cairns); Hua I 148.

[53] See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Notes de cours, 1959–61* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), p. 148.

[54] The concept of 'flowing in' (*Einströmen*) is found in Husserl's *Crisis of the European Sciences* §§ 59–60, further discussed in Text No. 7, '*Einströmen* (Sommer 1935)', Hua XXIX 77–83), see James Dodd, *Crisis and Reflection: An Essay on Edmund Husserl's* Crisis of the European Sciences, Phaenomenologica 174 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), p. 215.

[55] See Dodd, *Crisis and Reflection: An Essay on Edmund Husserl's* Crisis of the European Sciences, op. cit., p. 219.

Husserl's error to have described the interlocking (*l'emboîtement*) starting from the *Präsenzfeld* considered as without thickness, as immanent consciousness: it is transcendent consciousness, it is being at a distance ... (VI, p. 173; 224)

Merleau-Ponty invests the concept of intertwining with deep ontological significance; it also names the deeply mysterious relations between what is given and what is supposed, between what is involved in presencing and absencing, between the given and the horizon of the non-given but somehow still apprehended possibilities, between being and non-being.[56] In short, Husserl's vision of phenomenology as tracing the forms of intertwining at all levels of the constitution of both *nature* and *culture* is developed further by Merleau-Ponty as an account of being itself. This is the new project for a phenomenological which Merleau-Ponty's late reflections brilliantly illuminate and without Merleau-Ponty's elaboration we would never see the theme in the palimpsest left by Husserl. Indeed in another note from February 1959, Merleau-Ponty affirms that his new work must make clear that the *Phenomenology of Perception*, usually considered as 'psychology', is in fact ontology (VI, p. 176; 228).

3   Merleau-Ponty on Interlacing or Entwinement

Merleau-Ponty himself explicitly credits Husserl for what he calls his 'prophetic' discovery of the concept of *Verflechtung*. In his 1959 essay commemorating Husserl, 'The Philosopher and His Shadow' in *Signs* (the very essay which he considers expanding in order to develop his account of 'wild being' (*être sauvage*):

> No doubt this is why Husserl does not seem to be too astonished at the circularities he is led to in the course of his analysis. . . .There is another circularity between Nature and persons. . . . No doubt this is also why Husserl, in a prophetic text in 1912, did not hesitate to speak of a reciprocal relation between Nature, body and soul; and as it has been well put, of their 'simultaneity'. (*Signs*, pp. 176–77; 222–23)

In a footnote Merleau-Ponty references Marly Biemel's editorial introduction to *Ideas* II (Hua IV xvii)[57] which cites a passage from (the then unpublished) *Ideas* III (Hua V 124).[58] Biemel quotes a text that reads 'an important result of our treatment is that 'nature' and lived body, in their intertwining (*Verflechtung*) with each other and also with the soul, are constituted altogether in a reciprocal relationship with one another' (Hua V 124).[59] The full passage in *Ideas* III reads:

> If we limit ourselves however now to the pure givens of theoretical experience, if we exclude all value and all practical objectivities then the most important result of our

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[56] Here undoubtedly the influence of Heidegger—stressed by Leonard Lawlor—is also evident.

[57] In her Editor's Introduction to *Ideas* II Marly Biemel goes on to talk about the 'simultaneity' ('*Gleichzeitlichkeit*') in the constitution of thing, lived body and soul (Hua IV xvii), in quotation marks by her but without giving a specific reference to Husserl (this term does not appear in Hua V).

[58] *Ideas* III contains further references to *Verflechtung*, see e.g. Hua V 2 and V 117.

[59] '. . . *ein wichtiges Ergebnis unserer Betrachtung, daß die "Natur" und der Leib, in ihrer Verflechtung mit diesem wieder die Seele, sich in Wechselbezogenheit aufeinander, in eins miteinender konstituieren*' (Hua V 24).

treatment is that 'nature' and lived body, in their intertwining (Verflechtung) with each other and also with the soul, are constituted altogether in a reciprocal relationship with one another.[60]

In this context, Merleau-Ponty speaks of Husserl's 'adventures of constitutive analysis—these encroachments, reboundings and circularities' (Ces aventures de l'analyse constitutive,—ces empiètements, ces rebondissements, ces cercles, Signs, p. 177; 223). He is identifying these encroachments and circling back not just as belonging to the style of Husserl's thinking but as characterizing the essence of the subject-matter being described by phenomenology.

In terms of the evolution of Merleau-Ponty's own thought, the general idea of interweaving (the verb 'entrelace' occurs at PP, p. 357; 410 and PP, p. 347; 399, although Colin Smith's English translation does not make this clear) appears already in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception published in 1945.[61] The idea of an interwoven fabric of body and perceived objects also appears in the following passage:

> My body is the fabric (la texture commune) into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension'. (PP, p. 235; 272)

The same idea of the inseparability of body and objective world is constantly underlined:

> Our own body (Le corps propre) is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system. (PP, p. 203; 235)

The body and the world are interwoven and form a single system.

This interwovenness is exemplified by the manner in which the senses combine with one another. In Ideas II Husserl speaks only of the combining of the senses of sight and touch, but, for Merleau-Ponty, the phenomena of reversibility and doubling of sensation are characteristic of all five sensory modalities and precisely illustrate what he will later calls the 'chiasm' ('le chiasme', or 'le chiasma'), 'overlapping' or 'encroachment' (l'impiétement, , EM, p. 162; 13), 'blending' (recroisement, EM p. 163; 16), 'coiling over' (l'enroulement), 'inversion' (renversement), 'double inscription outside and inside' (VI, p. 261; 309), and even the 'metamorphosis' (EM p. 169; 25),[62] of the flesh (la chair) and of the activity of 'sensing' (le sentir).

Merleau-Ponty explicitly connects reversibility with the phenomenon of mirroring and especially with the image of 'two mirrors facing each other' (VI, p. 139; 181) and

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[60] Beschränken wir uns aber noch auf die bloßen Gegebenheiten der theoretischen Erfahrung, schließen wir alle Werte und alle praktischen Objektitäten aus, so ist das in wichtiges Ergebnis unserer Betrachtung, daß die "Natur" und der Leib, in ihrer Verflechtung mit diesem wieder die Seele, sich in Wechselbezogenheit aufeinander, in eins miteinander konstituieren (Hua V 124).

[61] Taylor Carman has helpfully identified these passages, see his Merleau-Ponty (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 125–127.

[62] Here Merleau-Ponty again reiterates that the metamorphosis of seeing and the visible 'defines' flesh.

again where he states, 'the flesh *is a mirror phenomenon*' (VI, p. 255–56; 303–304).
He also invokes the figure of Narcissus (VI, p. 141; 183 and again p. 256; 304) and
speaks of the 'fundamental narcissism of all vision' (VI, p. 139; 181)[63]:

> ... the seer and the visible reciprocate one another (*se réciproquent*) and we no longer
> know which sees and which is seen. (VI, p. 139; 181)

Similarly, in 'Eye and Mind', Merleau-Ponty writes:

> The mirror appears because I am seeing-visible (*voyant-visible*), because there is a reflexivity
> of the sensible. ... My outside completes itself in and through the sensible. (EM, p. 168; 24)

For Merleau-Ponty, the look (*le regard*), already given ontological primacy by Sartre
with whom Merleau-Ponty again wants to engage in his writings of the late 1950s, is a
'connective tissue [*tissu conjonctif*] of exterior and interior horizons' (VI, p. 131n;
171n). My hand, felt from within, is 'also accessible from without' (VI, p. 133; 174).
There is an internal 'synergy' in the senses such that I can, for instance, feel myself
touching and touched at the same time (VI, pp. 142; 184–85). There is an essential
'undividedness' ('*l'indivision*', EM, p. 163; 15) between sensing and sensed, and,
similarly, between thinking and self-reflection. Subjects touch each other in a handshake
(an example of intercorporeality, *intercorporealité*, VI, p. 142; 184) and this reversibil-
ity is already prefigured in the single subject. The world is actually an 'intercorporeal
being'; my body 'couples' with the 'flesh of the world' (VI, p. 144; 187). It is for this
reason that Merleau-Ponty concludes that the world is 'universal flesh' (VI, p. 137; 179),
'a texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself' (VI, p. 146; 190). This reversibility
has within it, however, a certain distancing and a gap. Merleau-Ponty speaks of this
reversibility as always 'imminent' and never in fact consummated or 'realized in fact'
(VI, p. 147; 191). There is a 'hiatus' between the touching hand and the touched.
I cannot never completely coincide with myself in the act of self-touching, rather
I have a presence to myself which at the same time indicates the absence of self
('*une presence à Soi qui est absence de soi*'). There is an overlapping and intertwining
but also a gap (*écart*), a 'dehiscence of the sensible' (VI, p. 145n; 188n).[64] There cannot
be complete coincidence (*Deckung*); there always remains a 'fissure' or 'fission':

> ... fission of appearance and Being—a fission that already takes place in the touch (duality
> of the touching and the touched) and which with the mirror (Narcissus) is only a more
> profound adhesion to Self ... The vision-touch divergence (not *superposable*, one of the
> universes overhangs the other [*en porte à faux sur l'autre*]) to be understood as the most
> striking case of the overhanging that exists within each sense and makes of it "*eine Art der
> Reflexion*". (VI, p. 256; 304)

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[63] Gaston Bachelard draws a similar analogy in his *L'Eau et les rêves. Essai sur l'imagination de la
matière* (Paris: Corti, 1942) pp. 31–45; trans. Edith Farrell, *Water and Dreams: An Essay on the
Imagination of Matter* (Dallas: The Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture, 1999), pp. 21–31. I
am grateful to Eileen Rizo Patron for pointing this out.

[64] The term 'dehiscence' (*déhiscence*), which is a botanical term referring to the spontaneous
opening of a plant at maturity in the form of a fruit, seed, etc., also appears in 'Eye and Mind' (EM,
p. 187; 57).

Again Husserl is invoked—the 'kind of reflection' (*Art der Reflexion*)[65] is actually an inaccurate reference to Husserl's phrase '*Art von "Reflexion"*' (*Ideas* II Hua IV 5), where Husserl speaks of the doubling of the sense of touch as already a kind of reflection. Indeed, in 'The Philosopher and His Shadow', Merleau-Ponty finds a new account of reflection in Husserl:

> From *Ideen II* on it seems clear that reflection does not install us in a closed, transparent milieu, and that it does not take us (at least not immediately) from "objective" to "subjective," but that its function is rather to unveil a third dimension in which this distinction becomes problematic. (*Signs*, p. 162; 205)

As is well known, the late Merleau-Ponty, 'intercorporeality' (*intercorporéité*, VI, p. 141; 183), with its flesh-touching-flesh, offers a new 'ontology' (a term Merleau-Ponty himself uses and which he glosses as '*l'être sauvage*') to replace subject-object dualism. Merleau-Ponty sees this intertwining as intrinsic to what he calls 'wild being' (a concept which he believes he found in Husserl and especially in his *Cartesian Meditations* as we saw above). The late Merleau-Ponty wants to break with Cartesian dualism and to develop 'a theory of the savage mind, which is the mind of praxis' (*l'esprit sauvage, qui est esprit de praxis*, VI, p. 176; 228). It is clear that his inspirational model here is Husserl's otherwise overlooked (aside from the work of Leonard Lawlor) phenomenology of embodiment understood as intertwining (*Verflechtung*). Merleau-Ponty of course invests it with his own particular inflexion. He introduces the term '*chiasm*' and offers 'flesh' as the basis of a new ontology. He also introduces a kind of Marxist social dimension to the understanding of chiasm such that the very last phrase in the current edited version of the 'Working Notes' in an entry from March 1961 is 'Worked-over-matter-men = *chiasm*' (VI, p. 275; 322). In these very last notes Merleau-Ponty is planning a new work which moves from the visible to nature to logos. But nature is not here to be understood naturalistically but as the 'man-animality *intertwining*' (*l'entrelacs homme-animalité*, VI, p. 274; 322), as 'the other side of man (as flesh. . .)'. It is clear that Husserl's *Verflechtung* is being reconsidered in entirely new contexts (e.g. Freud), but it is still Husserl to whom Merleau-Ponty constantly returns, who provides his constant inspiration, and with whom his thought is inextricably intertwined, in whose shadow he worked.

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[65] See also VI, p. 193; 243, where he writes 'The looks that cross = *eine Art der Reflexion* (*Les regards qui se croisent = eine Art der Reflexion*)'.

Language as the Embodiment of Geometry

Thomas Baldwin

In his essay 'The Origin of Geometry' Husserl wrote:

> Our problem now concerns precisely the ideal objects which are thematic in geometry: how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity? In advance we see that it occurs by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic living body (*Sprachleib*). But how does linguistic embodiment make out of the merely intrasubjective structure the *objective* structure which, e.g. as geometrical concept or state of affairs, is in fact present as understandable by all and is valid ....? (HUA 368–9, Carr 357–8[1])

This is a striking passage. Given Husserl's assumption that geometry has an 'intrapersonal origin', the suggestion that it attains objectivity by means of its 'linguistic embodiment' provokes the question Husserl himself poses, – how does language bring about this transformation. I shall argue that Husserl's answer to his own question, though of great interest, is not altogether satisfactory. I shall then consider Merleau-Ponty's lectures on Husserl's essay, partly to see how he responds to Husserl's position but also to see whether he offers a more satisfactory account of the objectivity of geometry. My conclusion will be that he does not. I shall also argue that neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty appear to have appreciated the importance of formal proofs in abstract sciences such as geometry and mathematics. What is then ironic about this observation is the fact that once this requirement is taken seriously, the thesis that language is the embodiment of

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[1] I use 'HUA 368–9' (etc.) to give the page reference for the relevant passage in *Husserliana VI* (Husserl 1962); and I use 'Carr 357–8' (etc.) to give the page reference for Carr's translation of this passage, which I use here, in Husserl (1970a).

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geometry and mathematics can be seen to be more firmly warranted than it is by the positions of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.[2]

1 Husserl on 'The Origin of Geometry'

Husserl begins his essay with an odd remark, that these are 'reflections which surely never occurred to Galileo' (HUA 365, Carr 353). This abrupt reference to Galileo seems particularly out of place in the context of an essay on the origin of geometry, since Galileo was not one of the founders of geometry. But once one bears in mind the fact that the essay was written in 1936, the reference to Galileo suggests that Husserl had intended to include the essay in *The Crisis of European Sciences* which he was working on then, since he starts Part II of the *Crisis* by declaring that he proposes to discuss the questions raised by Galileo's 'mathematisation of nature' (Husserl 1970a, 23).[3] However that may be, one might have expected a philosophical essay on geometry written in 1936 to address the issues raised by non-Euclidean geometries and Einstein's general theory of relativity. But Husserl says nothing at all about these issues in his essay. Indeed there is only one reference to Einstein in the *Crisis* itself (Husserl 1970a, 125–6, 1970b), and this does not concern the content of Einstein's theories. Instead, right at the start of the essay on geometry Husserl sets to one side the 'ready-made, handed-down' (HUA 365, Carr 353) tradition of geometrical demonstrations, such as Pythagoras's theorem (HUA 368, Carr 357) and Euclidean geometry in general (HUA 366, Carr 354), and declares that his intention is to inquire into 'the submerged original beginnings of geometry as they necessarily must have been in their "primally establishing" function' (HUA 366, Carr 354). Thus, although Husserl does not here use this language, we are in effect invited to bracket the familiar tradition of geometrical proof in order to make evident to ourselves the 'primitive formation of meaning' (HUA 367, Carr 356) inherent in the simple practices of measurement and construction which 'the original founder of geometry had at his disposal and which must have served as the material for his idealisations' (HUA 383, Carr 375). Husserl motivates this quasi-historical imaginative exercise by claiming that

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[2] In the talk which I gave in Dublin from which this paper derives I also discussed Derrida's introduction to his translation of Husserl's essay (see Derrida 1978). I have decided not to discuss Derrida's introduction here, interesting though it is, because it raises rather different issues from those which I deal with here, though I plan to return to it on another occasion.

[3] Following Husserl's death in 1938, with the *Crisis* uncompleted and unpublished, Eugen Fink published an edited version of the essay in the special 1939 edition of the *Revue Internationale de philosophie* dedicated to Husserl's memory. Fink modified Husserl's 1936 text a good deal, perhaps following discussions with Husserl. Almost every sentence in Fink's version differs from Husserl's 1936 text. Fink also omitted the first two paragraphs which include the references to Galileo, perhaps in order to make the essay appear self-standing. But Walter Biemel went back to the original 1936 text for his edition of the *Crisis*, where the essay occurs as 'Beilage III' (Husserl 1962, 365–86), and David Carr included a translation of this text as 'Appendix VI' in his translation of the *Crisis* (Husserl 1970a, 353–78, 1970b).

those whose understanding of geometry remains confined to the 'ready-made concepts and sentences' that are to be found in 'elementary geometrical instruction and its textbooks' are not in a position to know 'whether geometry had or ever did have a genuine meaning' (HUA 376, Carr 366); and, he continues: 'this is our situation, and that of the whole modern age' (HUA 376, Carr 366). For Husserl, then, the tradition of geometrical proof constitutes a kind of natural attitude which we need to bracket in order to appreciate the prescientific knowledge which is a 'knowledge of unassailable self-evidence' (HUA 366, Carr 355) and which provides 'the primal materials of the first formation of meaning' (HUA 378, Carr 369).

While Husserl's approach to geometry exemplifies his phenomenological method, it raises questions about the purpose and value of this method. For Husserl not only sets aside arguments internal to geometry as traditionally taught, he also ignores the challenges to that tradition which were prevalent at the time. Basic geometrical concepts such as that of a straight line and of a surface were called into question at the start of the twentieth century by the general theory of relativity and the development of algebraic geometry. So while those whose understanding remained confined to text-books of Euclidean geometry were not in a position to make much sense of concepts such as that of a geodesic or an n-dimensional space, the way to achieve an understanding of these concepts was to acquaint oneself with algebraic geometry and with the debates about space-time and gravity which are central to the special and general theories of relativity. Going back to 'prescientific' presumptions about space and time is certainly not going to provide one with the ability to understand the central themes of modern geometry, physical or abstract. Towards the end of his essay Husserl puts a good deal of emphasis on the importance of adding a historical dimension to the understanding of geometry, thereby blurring the traditional distinction between the contexts of justification and discovery. We have learnt from Kuhn and others how right this is, but once a historical dimension is introduced into the philosophy of geometry it really does need to be combined with some serious attention to history, rather than dismissively setting such a concern aside as just an interest in the details of 'philological-historical' questions (HUA 366, Carr 354). A properly historical approach to the foundations of geometry will be one in which Husserl's very brief indication of the origin of geometry (HUA 383–5, Carr 375–7) is taken as a speculative sketch of the first stage in the emergence of geometry as a mathematical science,[4] but in which subsequent radical developments in the understanding of the world and in mathematical technique are seen to motivate the adoption of radically new approaches to geometry which modify many of the presumptions inherent in that first stage of geometry. Husserl's description of these presumptions as a 'knowledge of unassailable self-evidence' is simply not tenable.

However, once Husserl's essay is considered from the standpoint of the *Crisis*, with the emphasis there on the theme of Galileo's 'mathematisation of nature', one can envisage a different way of thinking about the essay by connecting the concern

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[4] For an extended discussion of the early development of geometry in Babylon, Egypt and Greece, see Kline (1972).

that Husserl expresses here about the understanding of geometry with the 'mathematisation of geometry' which took place in the seventeenth century, and in particular with the use within geometry of algebraic formulae and derivations in place of the construction of diagrams that is characteristic of classical Euclidean geometry. This algebraic 'mathematisation of geometry' was largely due to Descartes, whose work on analytic geometry was published in 1637 as an appendix to his *Discourse on Method*. Nonetheless it is very much of a piece with Galileo's foundational work on falling bodies which led him to his kinematic laws of motion; indeed it was Descartes's analytic geometry which provided the mathematical resources that made it possible to characterise properly the parabolic trajectories of projectiles which Galileo had identified. Hence although Husserl never actually suggests this line of thought in his essay, one can read it as, in part at least, a reflection on this mathematisation of geometry[5]; and once one does so one is better able to make sense of his appeal back to more primitive ways of thinking about space. For one can certainly make sense of the suggestion that it is through a grasp of demonstrations constructed by means of geometrical diagrams, as opposed to algebraic derivations, that one is able to grasp some basic steps in geometrical reasoning. This is not at all a novel thesis: it was common in the seventeenth century and a nice expression of it is to be found in John Aubrey's 'brief life' of Thomas Hobbes. Aubrey describes both Hobbes's enthusiastic discovery of traditional Euclidean geometry and his dislike of the new Cartesian algebraic treatment of the subject:

> He was 40 years old before he looked on geometry; which happened accidentally. Being in a gentleman's library, Euclid's Elements lay open, and 'twas the forty-seventh proposition in the first book. He read the proposition "By God", sayd he, "this is impossible:" So he reads the demonstration of it, which referred him back to such a proposition; which proposition he read. That referred him back to another, which he also read. Et sic deinceps, that at last he was demonstratively convinced of that truth. This made him in love with geometry. ……..
>
> I have heard Mr. Hobbes say that he was wont to draw lines on his thigh and on the sheetes, abed, and also multiply and divide. He would often complain that algebra (though of great use) was too much admired, and so followed after, that it made men not contemplate and consider so much the nature and power of lines, which was a great hinderance to the growth of geometrie; for that though algebra did rarely well and quickly, and easily in right lines, yet'twould not *bite* in *solid* (I thinke) geometrie (Aubrey 1898, I 332–3).

One feature of Husserl's position which supports this approach to it is the importance he attaches to the capacity for the 'reactivation' (*wiedererinnerung*) of what he describes as the self-evidence of the primary experiences which provide the original sense of geometrical concepts (HUA 371–2, Carr 361). For the implication of his discussion is that this 'reactivation' is achieved through the construction of geometrical diagrams which enable the subject to recover the self-evident 'ideal construction' (HUA 385, Carr 377) of shapes and surfaces accomplished by

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[5] This algebraic 'mathematisation' of geometry had been famously studied by Jacob Klein in the 1930s: see Klein (1968). For a discussion of the relationship between Klein's work and Husserl's *Crisis* see Hopkins (2011).

the first geometers which are 'valid with unconditioned generality' (HUA 385, Carr 377). Husserl's description of this process is reminiscent of Plato's famous description in the *Meno* of the way in which a slave-boy is brought to appreciate abstract geometrical truth through the construction of a diagram in the sand; indeed Husserl's conception of 'reactivation' seems to be modelled on Platonic *anamnesis* (recollection). And the important claim in both cases is that the construction of idealised diagrams enables one to reactivate/recollect the self-evidence of the primary experiences which fix the original sense of geometrical concepts.

This approach to Husserl's essay also accommodates the Kantian tone of Husserl's conception of geometry as an a priori science (HUA 385, Carr 377). For one can take it that the sense of geometrical concepts uncovered by reactivating the self-evidence implicit in primary experiences enables us to recognise the a priori intuitions which provide the foundations of geometry. Kant of course took it that the geometry thus founded is Euclidean, and one might therefore worry that this Kantian reading of Husserl brings with it a commitment to Euclidean geometry, which Husserl will have known had been superseded within physical geometry. One way of responding to this worry this might be to attribute to Husserl Strawson's tentative suggestion in *The Bounds of Sense* (Strawson 1966, 283) that the 'phenomenal geometry' of the visual world is distinct from the geometry of the physical world, and that this phenomenal geometry is indeed Euclidean. However, it turns out that this suggestion does not withstand critical scrutiny; for the difference between Euclidean geometry and the non-Euclidean geometry of the physical world affirmed by the theory of general relativity is not visually discernible (Hopkins 1973). The most one can say is that the geometry of the visual world is approximately Euclidean. But in fact this conclusion should be acceptable to Husserl, since although he writes of geometry as an a priori science with an 'apodictically general content, invariant throughout all conceivable variation, of the spatiotemporal sphere of shapes' (HUA 385, Carr 377), he does not specify that this content is Euclidean. Instead his main claim is just the higher-order thesis that geometry is an idealised construction whose primary institution (*Urstiftung*) is best discovered by reactivating the practices of those early geometers whose measurements and constructions led them to adopt abstract geometrical norms for their idealised representations of spaces, shapes and distances. So far as it goes, this claim is consistent with the fact that the geometry of the visual world is only approximately Euclidean, though it needs also to be acknowledged that these early geometers did in fact settle on Euclidean rules (as exemplified by the argument presented in the *Meno*).

Thus this interpretation makes reasonably good sense of Husserl's essay, although it places more emphasis than one finds in Husserl's text on the suggestion that, as far as geometry goes, the 'crisis' which has left geometry 'a tradition empty of meaning' (HUA 376, Carr 366) lies primarily with the results of the Cartesian mathematisation of geometry. There is then more to be said about this issue; but I need first to take account of Husserl's discussion of the role of language in geometry before returning briefly to it.

2   Geometry and Language

Husserl's account of the role of language is sketched in the passage quoted at the start of this paper, in which Husserl proposes that the 'ideal objectivity' characteristic of geometry 'occurs by means of language' (HUA 369, Carr 358). Husserl's proposal is suggestive but in some respects puzzling. He starts from an anti-psychologistic claim reminiscent of his early work, that while the origin of geometry was due to the creative thought of some hypothetical 'inventor' whose thought's content 'lies exclusively within his mental space', 'geometrical existence is not psychic existence' (HUA 367, Carr 356). On the contrary, geometrical existence has a kind of '"ideal" objectivity', 'which is peculiarly supertemporal and ... accessible to all men' (HUA 368, Carr 356). So, Husserl asks, 'how does geometrical ideality ... proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity?' (HUA 369, Carr 358). Husserl's answer to this question is that language plays a crucial role in securing this transition, but recognising that this answer is not obviously correct he proceeds to ask 'how does the linguistic embodiment make out of the merely intrasubjective structure the *objective* structure ...?' (HUA 369, Carr 358).

Husserl's answer to this further question starts from a brief general account of the relation between the use of language and 'the world as the horizon of human existence' (HUA 369, Carr 358). His central message is that the objectivity of our thoughts about the world is dependent upon our ability to share these thoughts with others by expressing them in a common language; '[the world's] objective being presupposes men, understood as men with a common language'. So 'men as men, fellow men, world ... and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably intertwined (*verflochten*)' (HUA 370, Carr 359). Husserl recognises, however, that when it comes to geometry more needs to be said: for although the intertwining of language and world implies that the existence of real things in the world, including people, is objective, this falls short of securing the objectivity of geometrical objects which, unlike people, are not real but 'ideal'. Husserl's account of their objectivity has two parts. The first part is that once there is a common language, people can share thoughts, including geometrical thoughts; and he takes this to imply that these shared thoughts thereby acquire a common 'object of consciousness':

> In the unity of the communication among several persons the repeatedly produced structure becomes an object of consciousness, not as a likeness, but as one structure common to all. (HUA 371, Carr 360)

This common structure, however, does not yet have the full ontological status of ideal geometrical objects; for it does not underwrite their '*persisting existence*' (HUA 371, Carr 360; Husserl's emphasis), for example when the inventor and his fellows are not thinking about them, or are even dead. To deal with this aspect, therefore, Husserl introduces the second part of his account, which is that the existence of *written* signs underwrites the persistence of geometrical objects (HUA 371, Carr 360–1). What lies behind this suggestion is not simply the fact

that these written signs persist after they have been written, as if this alone would warrant the persisting existence of the geometrical objects they describe. What is much more important for Husserl is a thesis we encountered earlier, concerning the possibility of 'reactivating' the original 'self-evident' experiences which give meaning to signs. His claim is that the key contribution of the written signs used to express geometrical thoughts is the fact that they underwrite the persisting possibility of reactivating the self-evidence which is characteristic of the experiences which give meaning to geometrical thought.

In considering this line of thought it is worth comparing this case with Husserl's brief discussion of the way in which the objectivity of the 'real' world is warranted by the shared understanding of it achieved by speakers with a common language who understand each other. This claim is persuasive because it draws on a presumption inherent in perceptual experience that the experience with its content manifests the subject's perceptual relationship with the real world. For where that relationship is confirmed by the subject's sharing of her understanding of the world with others whom she understands and who understand her, for example through her capacity to recognise her mistakes in the light of what she learns about the world from others, it makes sense to suppose that her perceived world is indeed a real, objective, world that she shares with others. Since the ideal objects of geometry are not perceptible, their objectivity is obviously not secured by this argument. However, as we have seen, Husserl suggests that the use of perceptible diagrams (whose objectivity is secured by this argument) makes it possible to reactivate the original self-evidence of the experiences in which ideal geometrical objects are postulated, and he takes it that where, as a result, there is a shared sense of the self-evidence of these experiences, it is legitimate to infer the objectivity of these ideal objects; for what is important is that 'in the chain of the understanding of these repetitions what is self-evident turns up as the same in the consciousness of the other' (HUA 371, Carr 360).

If the line of thought here is to be comparable to that concerning the objectivity of the real world, a key question is whether our apprehension of a geometrical proposition as self-evident provides a warrant for its truth because this apprehension constitutes a quasi-perceptual insight of truth. For if this is the case, then, as with the objectivity of the perceived world, when the self-evidence of an apparently self-evident judgment is confirmed by others who understand and share it is indeed reasonable to conclude that its truth is indeed objective even if it concerns what is merely 'ideal' and thus not straightforwardly perceptible. In his essay Husserl explains self-evidence in the following way: 'Self-evidence (*Evidenz*) means nothing more than grasping an entity with the consciousness of its original being-itself-there (*selbst-da*)' (HUA 367, Carr 356). The import of this passage is not unequivocal, but it is reminiscent of his discussion of self-evidence in §51 of his 'Prolegomena to Pure Logic' in the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*, where he writes:

> A thing adequately perceived is not a thing merely meant in some manner or other: it is a thing originally given in our act as what is meant, that is, as itself present and grasped without residue. In like fashion what is self-evidently judged is not merely judged . . . but is

> given in a judgment-experience as itself present, ... The analogy which connects all
> experiences of originary givenness then leads to analogous ways of speaking, and self-
> evidence (*Evidenz*) is called a seeing an insight, a grasp of the self-given ('true') state of
> affairs, or rather, by a slight stretch of meaning, of the truth. (Husserl 1970a, b, 195, trans-
> lation modified)

So in this early work Husserl certainly affirmed a conception of self-evidence
which includes an analogy with perception, indeed with the kind of 'adequate'
perception in which the thing perceived is perceived as present and 'grasped
without residue', so that where a proposition is grasped as self-evident, this grasp
is a kind of insight which makes the truth of the proposition manifest to the subject.
This conception clearly fulfils the requirements sketched above for Husserl's
argument in the later essay, and since there is no reason not to attribute this
conception to him in this later essay, it confirms the suggested elucidation of
Husserl's claim that the ideal objectivity of geometry 'occurs by means of lan-
guage'. That is, given the presumption that genuinely self-evident judgment is a
way of 'seeing' the truth 'without residue', where one person's putatively self-
evident geometrical judgments, arrived at by reactivating the originary experiences
implicit in written geometrical demonstrations, are confirmed by others who have
used similar demonstrations to arrive at their own putative self-evident judgments,
it is reasonable to conclude that the truth of these judgments is objective, and thus
that the existence of the ideal geometrical objects characterised in these judgments
is objective.

Although in this way one can provide a plausible interpretation of Husserl's
position, the merits of the position depend on the conception of self-evidence
presented in the passage cited above from the *Logical Investigations*. The obvious
objection to it is that while in the case of perception our understanding of ourselves
and the world confirms the existence of real relationships between the content of
perception and the properties of the object perceived, in the case of our beliefs
concerning 'ideal', and hence unreal, geometrical objects, our understanding of
ourselves does not support the view that these convictions derive from quasi-
perceptual intuitions whose content is dependent on the structure of the ideal
objects in question. We have no such quasi-perceptual faculty for 'ideal' intuition.
Thus the comparison with perception does not provide a way of substantiating the
objectivity of apparently self-evident convictions.

By itself this objection is not decisive. Husserl can respond that the analogy with
perception is primarily intended to clarify the standards for the self-evidence that is
needed if there is to be knowledge of fundamental abstract truths, as in geometry
and mathematics, at all: the choice lies between self-evidence and scepticism. Now
if that really was the choice, we might bracket our doubts about the possibility of
this kind of self-evidence; but of course, there are other alternatives, and the deeper
objection to Husserl's position is that it assumes a kind of Cartesian
foundationalism concerning geometry and mathematics which developments in
these sciences during the nineteenth century had already shown to be inappropriate.
For example the debates surrounding Euclid's parallels postulate and the develop-
ment of non-Euclidean geometries showed that the demand that the axioms of

geometry be self-evident is unhelpful and unnecessary. Although axioms play an essential role in systematising geometrical theory by organising proofs, from an epistemological point of view what is important about a geometrical theory are its theorems. An even better illustration of the mistake in demanding self-evident foundations for abstract theory comes from set theory. Having discovered an inconsistency in the apparently self-evident axioms of naïve set theory Russell embarked on a 10-year search for alternative axioms which would provide the logicist foundation of mathematics he sought without generating inconsistency. Towards the end of these travails, in his 1910 paper 'The Theory of Logical Types', he introduced the axiom of reducibility in order to vindicate classical mathematics, but he recognised that there was no way in which this axiom could be held to be self-evident:

> That the axiom of reducibility is self-evident is a proposition which can hardly be maintained. But in fact self-evidence is never more than a part of the reason for accepting an axiom, and is never indispensable. The reason for accepting an axiom, as for accepting any other proposition, is always largely inductive, namely that many propositions which are nearly indubitable can be deduced from it, and no equally plausible way is known by which these propositions could be true if the axiom were false, and nothing which is probably false can be deduced from it. (Russell 1992, 30)

The axiom of reducibility has not passed Russell's inductive test; but his sceptical attitude to self-evidence, and his pragmatism concerning the reasons for accepting fundamental principles, be they axioms, rules of inference or other fundamental assumptions, has been amply vindicated by the course of twentieth century logic, mathematics and geometry.

Russell's scepticism about self-evidence in fact predates his discovery in 1902 of his contradiction. In a 1901 paper on 'Recent Work on the Principles of Mathematics' in which he discusses the fundamental role of deductive proof in mathematics, he wrote:

> But the proof of self-evident propositions may seem, to the uninitiated, a somewhat frivolous occupation. To this we might reply that it is by no means self-evident that one obvious proposition follows from another obvious proposition; so that we are really discovering new truths when we prove what is evident by a method which is not evident. But a more interesting retort is, that since people have tried to prove obvious propositions, they have found that many of them are false. Self-evidence is often a mere will-o-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide. (Russell 1993, 368)

Russell's conclusion here, that 'Self-evidence is often a mere will-o-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide' is a decisive challenge to Husserl's emphasis on the importance of the 'reactivation' of the self-evidence of original experiences through attention to written demonstrations. But Russell's emphasis in this paper of the importance of proof suggests a line of thought which can be used to restore a variant of Husserl's claim that written demonstrations play a crucial role in vindicating the objectivity of geometry. For what is characteristic of reasoning is precisely that it incorporates a claim to objectivity; the claim that a conclusion really does follow from the stated premises. Furthermore, the mental acts involved, the reasonings of those involved, are

explained by reference to the presumed validity of the steps taken, so that in this respect reasoning is similar to perceptual experience. This similarity does not, however, depend on the assumption that reasoning is based on quasi-perceptual intuitions of self-evident rational connections; instead it is based on the thesis that the understanding of many concepts, including in particular geometrical, mathematical and logical concepts, is centred on a grasp of the immediate implications inherent in the application of these concepts. This thesis can be substantiated in many ways, for example by conceptual role semantics; but it is not necessary here to discuss the epistemology of reasoning. The important point is that where one person's reasoning is confirmed by the reasonings of others, it is legitimate to take it that the reasoning is objectively valid. Of course, agreement in judgment is no guarantee of objective validity, as the history of geometry shows only too well; but the same fallibilist point applies to perceptual beliefs. My suggestion, therefore, is that Husserl's brief discussion of the way in which the objectivity of geometry is legitimated through a shared understanding of geometrical thoughts can be substantiated by adding that this shared understanding is essentially a matter of the understanding and acceptance of patterns of geometrical reasoning as manifested in written demonstrations.

In fact this suggestion gives a more substantial role to the written expression of geometrical claims than Husserl's position does. For whereas his account of the role of written expressions of geometrical thought is primarily just instrumental, in that they are supposed to facilitate the reactivation of the original self-evidence of the geometrical thesis that they represent, on my suggestion written expressions have a much more fundamental role, in that geometrical reasoning, whether it involves Euclidean diagrams or algebraic equations, makes essential use of written expressions. Some reasoning can be achieved 'in the head', as we say, but the austere discipline of achieving formal rigour reflects the fact that, as Aristotle, Leibniz, Frege and Russell recognized, the criterion of the validity of any such reasoning is that it can be written down as a formal proof in which each step draws only on formal rules of inference that have been specified in advance. For this reason writing is essential to the achievement of objectivity in any logico-mathematical discipline, including geometry. So Husserl's emphasis on the importance of writing to the objectivity of geometry is correct, even though his reason for this claim is unsatisfactory.

Husserl himself would not agree that the importance of writing derives from its role in formal proof. For although he acknowledges that deductive reasoning has a role in mathematical sciences such as geometry, he takes it that its role is simply to transmit self-evidence from premises to their conclusions: his 'fundamental law' is that 'if the premises can actually be reactivated back to the most original self-evidence, then their self-evident consequences can be also' (HUA 375, Carr 365), at least where the inference draws on its own 'formal-logical self-evidence' (HUA 376, Carr 366). Thus what is central to Husserl's position is the original self-evidence of geometrical experience and our capacity for reactivating it on the basis of our understanding of written demonstrations. It is this capacity which explains the way in which he thinks of geometry as having a 'linguistic living

body (*Sprachleib*)' (HUA 369, Carr 358); for it is by our understanding of the material propositions before us (the *Sprachkorper* one might say, though Husserl does not use this phrase) and thereby reactivating their original self-evidence that these propositions come to life as the *Sprachleib* of geometry. The metaphor is attractive. But it rests on his conception of the self-evidence supposedly inherent in the original pre-scientific experiences of the 'original founder of geometry', on this founder's supposed capacity to communicate the self-evidence of these experiences to others in such a way that the mutual recognition of this self-evidence transforms their subjective similarity into an objective, but ideal, identity, and on our persisting ability to reactivate this self-evidence through our understanding of written demonstrations. As we have seen, there is no defensible conception of self-evidence which will satisfy these conditions. Husserl's belief to the contrary rests on his belief that unless there is a way of grounding geometry in the way that he envisages 'geometry would be a tradition empty of meaning' (HUA 376, Carr 366); the formal-deductive apparatus of scientific geometry would be just an empty shell. There is something right here: the concepts employed in physical geometry (space, line, point, direction etc.) need criteria of application which are not part of the formal theory itself; and something similar holds for algebraic geometry, though at a higher level of abstraction. But Husserl makes two connected mistakes concerning these informal criteria which contribute to the meaning of geometrical concepts; first, that they are based upon 'prescientific' practices or experiences which can be reactivated through geometrical demonstrations; second, that the content of the experiences thus reactivated is self-evident. I have already said enough the second of these points. In addressing the first point, it is sufficient to remark that the practices which surround geometry and give meaning to its concepts have continued to develop ever since geometry first emerged, and it is absurd to think that geometry as we now understand it draws its meaning from 'the primal materials of the first formation of meaning, the primal premises, so to speak, which lie in the prescientific cultural world' (HUA 378, Carr 369). One has only to think about, say, the curvature of space to recognise that the concepts we employ now are remote from earlier prescientific worlds and draw meaning instead from our own scientifically-informed understanding of the world. These mistakes are connected aspects of a foundationalist presumption which is deeply embedded in Husserl's phenomenology. I have argued that as applied to abstract sciences such as geometry and mathematics this presumption is misconceived, and I shall not attempt to address this presumption in full generality here. However the present case is one which seems to me to possess 'an exemplary significance', – to turn Husserl's own phrase (HUA 365, Carr 353) against him, – for an assessment of his phenomenology.

In these comments I have been contrasting Husserl's attachment to that 'will-o-the-wisp', self-evidence, with the austere virtues of formal proof which, I have argued, provide a much more solid ground for the objectivity of geometry and mathematics, and thereby a better vindication of Husserl's own claim that language, and in particular writing, have an essential role as the embodiment of geometrical truth. But having set out this contrast, let me mitigate it slightly. As I noted earlier,

Hobbes disliked the use of algebra to express geometry, and in fact Descartes himself might have agreed with Hobbes on this point since he thought of his analytic geometry as a way of representing algebra geometrically rather than, as we now think of it, representing geometry algebraically – so that it was misleading to speak of the 'Cartesian mathematisation of geometry', as I did earlier, since it was Leibniz, and not Descartes, who realised the potential of analytic geometry for mathematising geometry (see Hacking 1973). What underlies the attitudes of Hobbes and Descartes was not a conservative attachment to geometrical proof as such, but the fact that geometrical proofs are generally easily understood and often provide some intuitive insight into the proposition proved. As the history of geometry shows (Lakatos 1976), there are many traps here, and one should neither aspire to Husserlian self-evidence nor dismiss algebraic proofs which often also provide their own compelling intuitive insight. Nonetheless one can take it that proof requires more than formal rigour, in that it also needs to exhibit a way of understanding both the way the proof works and the significance of its conclusion, the theorem proved. Wittgenstein captured this view nicely in his *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*:

> Perspicuity is part of proof. If the process by means of which I get a result were not surveyable, I might indeed make a note that this number is what comes out – but what fact is this supposed to confirm for me? I don't know 'what is *supposed* to come out'. (Wittgenstein 1978, I – 154)

A different way of putting this suggestion would be that there needs to be a proper phenomenology of proof in addition to the requirements of formal validity. This is not the place to explore this suggestion, though it is worth noting the prevalence of visual metaphors in this context, as in Wittgenstein's comments and in the common talk of 'seeing a proof'; and one needs to bear in mind putative counterexamples such as, say, Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's last theorem, which is far from perspicuous. But it does offer a way of rescuing a mitigated version of Husserl's position; more importantly, it is, I think, a suggestion that merits investigation for its own sake.

3   Merleau-Ponty and Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry'

Because Fink's version of Husserl's essay[6] was published in 1939 it was available to Merleau-Ponty when he was writing his *Phenomenology of Perception* and it is listed in his bibliography. There is one (and, I think, only one) explicit reference to the essay in the book, in a note which occurs the middle of his discussion of speech (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 208 n. 6). Merleau-Ponty is here discussing the way in which language enables us to understand others in a way which enriches our own thoughts, and he alludes to a passage in Husserl's essay in which Husserl says

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[6] See note 3 above.

something similar.[7] *Phenomenology of Perception* also contains a discussion of geometry in the chapter on the 'cogito' (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 446–451). But it is a striking fact that there is no explicit reference here to Husserl's essay and in fact, as I shall indicate in the next section, Merleau-Ponty's position is not that which Husserl advocates. However, Merleau-Ponty gave a course of lectures at the Collège de France in 1959–1960 under the title 'Husserl at the limits of phenomenology' which includes an extensive discussion of Husserl's essay (in this case of Biemel's edition of the essay). Merleau-Ponty's notes for these lectures have been preserved, and an edition of them prepared by R. Barbaras (Merleau-Ponty 1998).[8]

At the time when Merleau-Ponty was delivering these lectures he was working on the text that we know as *The Visible and the Invisible*, and one might therefore have expected there to be significant references to Husserl's essay in Merleau-Ponty's 'Working Notes' for this period. In fact there is only one explicit reference, in a note dated 'February 1960' (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 235). Merleau-Ponty refers here to a passage (which, as Merleau-Ponty notes, occurs only in Fink's version of the essay) in which, as it appears to him, Husserl suggests that when we create new ideal meanings our activity is a manifestation of a type of free creativity which is distinctively human. Merleau-Ponty then comments 'I don't like that', rejecting what he takes to be the implicit conception here of radically free creativity which he associates with Sartre. In its place he advocates the thesis that creative activity takes place in a context in which there are already on-going practices which are not being called into question; so that, as he puts it, 'the invisible [i.e. the new meaning] is a hollow in the visible, a fold in passivity, not pure production' (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 235). Merleau-Ponty's Sartrean reading of Husserl (or is it of Fink?) is questionable; but the underlying point here connects with Merleau-Ponty's later response to Husserl's essay which I discuss below.

4   Geometry in *Phenomenology of Perception*

Merleau-Ponty's discussion of geometry in his *Phenomenology of Perception* occurs in the context of his critical discussion of the Cartesian conception of the distinctive absolute certainty we are supposed to enjoy with respect to our own thoughts and feelings as opposed to our fallible grasp of the external world. Merleau-Ponty's famous claim is that 'either I enjoy no certainty with regard to things themselves, in which case neither can I be certain about my own perception... Or else I grasp my thought with certainty, which involves the simultaneous acceptance of the existence

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[7] There is a similar reference to Husserl's essay at the start of Merleau-Ponty's essay 'On the Phenomenology of Language' (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 85, n. 3).

[8] A corrected edition of these notes was translated into English by Leonard Lawlor in Merleau-Ponty (2002b), and I use this for my page references although I have occasionally modified the translations.

towards which it is projected' (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 436). Merleau-Ponty then acknowledges that the case of perception might be held to be special, and one of the cases he turns to consider is 'pure thought' (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 446), of which he takes geometrical understanding to be a test case. For, he suggests, if one were to uphold a conception of absolute certainty with respect to geometry, that would return us to a conception of ourselves according to which 'we would truly find ourselves only in thought' (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 446 (translation modified)). It is not obvious how this conclusion is supposed to arise, but the issue is not important here; what matters for us is that Merleau-Ponty now embarks upon a discussion of geometry, and especially of the nature of geometrical proof.

Merleau-Ponty defines his position by reference to the position which he rejects, the Platonist view that there is an 'essence of the triangle' which 'includes in advance the properties subsequently to be demonstrated' (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 448). On this view the conception of geometrical proof is of a formally rigorous sequence of propositions which demonstrate the essential necessity of these properties. According to Merleau-Ponty, however, this position fails to do justice to the creative aspect of geometrical demonstration (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 451), and in particular to the ways in which geometrical demonstrations draw tacitly on 'intuitive thought:

> But the fact that formalization is always retrospective proves that it is never otherwise than apparently complete, and that formal thought feeds on intuitive thought. It reveals those unformulated axioms on which reason is said to rest, and seems to bring to reason a certain added rigour and to uncover the very foundations of our certainty; but in reality the place in which certainty arises and in which truth makes its appearance is always intuitive thought, even though, or rather *precisely because*, the principles are tacitly assumed here. (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 448)

Merleau-Ponty's argument rests on the distinction he draws here between 'formal' and 'intuitive' thought. He develops this conception of intuitive thought by maintaining that the way in which we grasp a geometrical demonstration of the properties of a triangle is an extension of the way in which in visual experience the properties of a real, physical, triangle become evident to us (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 451). This sounds at first like the kind of quasi-visual intuition that we associate with Platonism – except that we already know that Merleau-Ponty rejects that position. What makes the difference is that Merleau-Ponty takes visual experience to have a constitutive, and not just a receptive, role in respect of the properties of physical objects; and it is then this constitutive role that he transfers to the 'intuitive' thought which occurs in a geometrical demonstration and to which he assigns a foundational role. Only a brief familiarity with the history of geometry, however, will make one doubt that an appeal to intuitive thought of this kind can serve as the basis of geometric truth – how, for example, does it deal with debates about Euclid's fifth axiom, the parallels' postulate, and the development of non-Euclidean geometries? There is no alternative here to the use of different formalisations to make these alternatives precise. Even though one can provide intuitive models for some aspects of them, such as the familiar models of

2-dimensional non-Euclidean spaces (as the surface of a sphere or of a saddle), there are no similarly intuitive models of the corresponding 3-dimensional non-Euclidean spaces.

One might mitigate this criticism of Merleau-Ponty by making the move which I suggested at the end of the discussion of Husserl's essay of introducing a requirement for an intuitive phenomenology of proof alongside the requirement for formal rigour. As I indicated, this looks to be an attractive compromise, but it remains to be seen how far the proposal can be vindicated. One might also invoke here the constructivist tradition in mathematics which shows how one can combine an acknowledgment of a constitutive role for proof in geometry and mathematics generally (which Merleau-Ponty takes to be covered by his account of intuitive thought – Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 451) with an acceptance that proofs are achieved by formally rigorous derivations. All one has to do is to impose constructive requirements on the methods of proof that are permitted. Whether the resulting restriction on proof is tenable remains disputed – classical analysis, for example, cannot be straightforwardly accommodated; and it can be argued there are other ways of providing an intuitive phenomenology of proof which meet the Wittgensteinian requirement of surveyability. For example, although Cantor's famous diagonal method of proof is not constructive, it certainly provides an intuitively compelling way of arguing for his famous theorem that there is a transfinite sequence of infinite cardinal numbers. These issues need not be settled here, but they show that although Merleau-Ponty's treatment of geometry and mathematics is unsatisfactory, there might be a way of developing a modest version of his position which shows how there can be a worthwhile phenomenological contribution to the philosophy of geometry and mathematics.

Before moving on to Merleau-Ponty's later discussion of Husserl's essay in his lectures, it is worth briefly comparing Merleau-Ponty's position in *Phenomenology of Perception* with that presented by Husserl in his essay. There are some areas of agreement: they both take it that formal rigour and logical derivations are a secondary phenomenon, dependent upon informal practices and intuitive demonstrations. But there are also significant areas of disagreement: where Merleau-Ponty rejects talk of the ideal 'essence' of a triangle whose implications are exhibited through geometrical proof, Husserl takes it as central to his task to clarify the '*ursprung*' of the 'ideal objects' that are characteristic of geometry; and his acceptance that geometry brings with it proofs concerning these ideal objects is connected with his emphasis both on the 'unconditioned generality' of the truths of geometry (HUA 385, Carr 377) and the 'primal self-evidences' (HUA 375, Carr 365), the experiences whose contents are somehow precipitated into these truths. Husserl therefore remains committed to a conception of geometry as an abstract a priori science (HUA 385, Carr 377) which Merleau-Ponty rejects, since he holds that geometrical demonstrations are fundamentally dependent upon the spatiality inherent in perceptual experience (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 448–9). Finally, and most important here, is the striking fact that Merleau-Ponty does not allude at all to Husserl's fundamental thesis – that the ideal objectivity characteristic of geometry

is achieved by means of language. Of course the fact that language is involved in geometrical demonstration is implicit in Merleau-Ponty's discussion; but perhaps because he wants to emphasize the dependence of such demonstrations upon concepts rooted in our ordinary perception of the physical world, it is perception, and not language, which for him provides, so to speak, the 'living body' of geometry. For Merleau-Ponty in 1945 it is the 'original intentionality' of the body inherent in perception and action (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 450) which 'implants me in space' (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 451) and thereby enables me to understand the geometrical conception of space. Language plays no part in the constitution of geometry.

5   Merleau-Ponty's Lectures

Fourteen years later Merleau-Ponty chose to lecture on the topic 'Husserl at the limits of phenomenology'. He indicates at the start of his lectures that his aim is to elucidate the way in which our familiar consciousness of the world is grounded on that which is 'pregiven' (*Vorgegeben*) (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 15), and it is this, he says, which has led him to look at some of Husserl's late texts, in particular the essay 'The Origin of Geometry' which he has chosen to study because it shows how -

> In order to introduce us to this relation with the new Being, *Tiefenleben* <"life of depths">, it is necessary to excavate below ideal identity, *Bedeutung* <"meaning">, Platonism, essence as the given unity of the individual, of the world, and of history. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 16)

As the lectures proceed, three main themes then emerge: (i) an attempt 'to reach the originary sense, the emerging or arising sense of the geometry that we are receiving' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 18); (ii) a discussion of the 'Language-humanity-world relation' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 37); (iii) a discussion of language and the 'ideality' of geometry. It is easy to associate these with themes in Husserl's essay and one thing is immediately notable – the attention Merleau-Ponty now gives to language as compared with his lack of attention to it when discussing geometry in *Phenomenology of Perception.*

Merleau-Ponty's aspiration to 'reach the originary sense' of geometry is motivated by his interpretation of Husserl's thesis of the 'crisis' of European science. For Husserl this crisis was the result of a failure to appreciate the role of the *Lebenswelt* in forming the practices and presumptions which are unnoticed necessary conditions for scientific inquiries, including geometry. Merleau-Ponty takes it that this failure is indicative a forgetful lack of attention to these practices which is characteristic of the natural sciences. Nonetheless, he maintains, because sciences such as geometry retain traces of that which has been passed over, there is a role for a form of philosophical/historical reflection which has the potential to take us back to the originary sense of geometry and 'unveil the *Lebenswelt*' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 32). So far Merleau-Ponty is largely following Husserl; but his

account of this philosophical/historical reflection is different from Husserl's. Husserl's thought was that by starting from contemporary geometrical demonstrations one should be able to reactivate the self-evident experiences inherent in historical practices such as measurement and thereby confirm the unconditioned validity of geometry. Merleau-Ponty, however, is sceptical concerning any such reactivation: he notes 'Impossibility of total reactivation' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 26); he also rejects Husserl's talk of geometry's 'unconditioned validity' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 30), and, significantly, never alludes to its supposed self-evidence. In place of all this misconceived foundationalism, Merleau-Ponty emphasises the constitutive role of traditions in sciences such as geometry which sustain the future development of the subject as well as maintaining contact with its past:

> Science has a futural horizon (i.e. is not apodictic evidence) in which in principle what it calls true now will be recollected – overcome and conserved – conserved without its *Einseitigkeit* <"one-sidedness">, as a moment of a totality … The idea of tradition is this double movement: being other in order to be the same, forgetting in order to conserve, producing in order to receive, looking ahead in order to receive the entire force of the past. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 31)

In order to describe the way in which such a tradition works within our understanding Merleau-Ponty borrows the term 'field' ('champ') from his discussion of perception in *Phenomenology of Perception* (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 60 ff.) and remarks that 'We are moments of the open field' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 19). This conception of an evolving tradition within an area of inquiry as an open field is attractive and suggestive. It can be associated with one aspect of Kuhn's conception of the role of 'paradigms' in scientific inquiry – not paradigms as exemplary experiments or proofs, but as the 'disciplinary matrix' of a science, – the evolving nexus of assumed generalisations, research techniques, textbooks and values which is characteristic of a scientific community and which is manifested especially in the practices and beliefs through which aspiring young scientists are trained to become professionals, members of the community in question (Kuhn 1970, 182 ff.). Admittedly this conception is somewhat removed from that of the originating *Lebenswelt* as conceived by Husserl to which Merleau-Ponty alludes when discussing the originary sense of the evolving tradition of a science such as geometry; so it would be inappropriate to offer the Kuhnian disciplinary matrix as a straightforward interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's 'traditions'. Nonetheless Kuhn's conception does capture an important aspect of the practice of science which is at work 'below' the level of the content of established theory, and to that extent it satisfies Merleau-Ponty's aspiration 'to excavate below ideal identity, *Bedeutung* <"meaning">, Platonism, essence as the given unity of the individual, of the world, and of history' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 16).

Turning now to Merleau-Ponty's attitude to Husserl's conception of the role of language as the embodiment of geometrical truth, it is manifest that in his lectures Merleau-Ponty takes it that language plays a central role in establishing and maintaining traditions such as that which sustains geometry. He does not allude at all to the position he had taken in *Phenomenology of Perception* that geometry

inherits the basic structures of perception, though that is not in fact inconsistent with the role that he here assigns to language. Instead, in introducing this role for language Merleau-Ponty starts off from Husserl's holistic 'intertwining' thesis, that 'men as men, fellow men, world … and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably intertwined (*verflochten*)' (HUA 370, Carr 359). This thesis is of course altogether congenial to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy at this time: insofar as his incomplete final work *The Visible and the Invisible* comes to a conclusion it is one of an all-embracing intertwining of perception, the body, language and the world (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1968, ch. 4 'The Intertwining'). In the lectures on Husserl's essay he introduces Husserl's intertwining thesis in the context of a contrast between the closed *Umwelt* of animals who lack language and the indefinitely open *Welt* characteristic of humanity which possesses a language (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 39). Merleau-Ponty's claim here seems to be that the open-ended capacity to engage with new possibilities that he takes to be characteristic of human life is intertwined with possession of a language which has the capacity to represent these new possibilities in virtue of the fact that it provides an objective conception of the world. This is an interesting thesis, reminiscent of Kant. As it stands it is suggestive rather than completed, for what needs to be spelled out is the way in which possession of an objective conception of the world as it actually is makes it possible to represent new non-actual possibilities, and vice-versa. Merleau-Ponty writes of using the method of eidetic variation to 'bring to light … a nonlogical possibility' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 39); but the assumptions here remain unspecified (perhaps something like Gareth Evans's famous 'Generality Constraint' (Evans 1982, 100–5) is in play).

However that may be, Merleau-Ponty develops his position by introducing the conception of 'operative language' as the ground of this objective conception of the world which is bound up with the open horizon of human life. Merleau-Ponty elucidates his conception of 'operative language' by means of a double contrast: on the one hand with a type of 'original intentionality' which is 'nonobjectifying'; on the other hand with factual language ('langage de fait') which he regards as uncreative and fundamentally derivative (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 41). The first of these types of intentionality is that which is central to the position developed in *Phenomenology of Perception* where he writes of the 'operative intentionality' which is fundamental to our existence (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 498–9). In his lecture notes he shows that he still upholds a version of this kind of intentionality:

> 1. before language, a "mute" experience and an experience which calls from itself for its "expression," but a "pure" expression, i.e., foundation and not product of language. Therefore a *Vor-sprache*, a down-side or "other side" of language, an *Ur-sprung* of language. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 43)

Clearly the intentionality of operative language is not of this type, since it is not 'before language'; nonetheless, as the contrast with factual language indicates, operative language is a form of language which is itself fundamentally creative. Hence it looks as though operative language is a development of the conception of 'authentic language' which Merleau-Ponty presents in his discussion of speech in

Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002a, 207 n. 4) and which is there contrasted both with the ante-predicative operative intentionality inherent in perception and action and with the second-hand meanings characteristic of ordinary language. In *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty gives the impression that authentic language is the kind of expressive, poetic, idiom that is characteristic of literature rather than objective science. But in these lecture notes, although Merleau-Ponty retains a dismissive attitude to factual language which draws on established distinctions, he allows that there is genuine creativity in identifying and characterising objective aspects of the world, and it is, then, this objectifying 'operative language' which is in play within the evolving traditions which develop and sustain a science such as geometry. Thus, in the passage which continues the note cited above, he writes:

> 2. after language, through it, constitution of the nameable, of *Dinge überhaupt*, of objectivity, coextensive with the *Welt*. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 43)

So far Merleau-Ponty's discussion of language provides a valuable commentary on Husserl's 'intertwining thesis', and he sums up his attitude to Husserl in the following passage:

> Husserl takes language seriously, gives it an ontological function, makes it carry a 'leaf' of Being, (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 43)

It is then a pity that he continues this passage with a remark that manifests ignorance or misunderstanding on his part:

> precisely because he is not enclosed (Wittgenstein) (the British) in the immanence of language, conceived as a thing (*pensé comme chose*), but follows its implications of sense: they unconceal. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 43)

Wittgenstein's conception of a language-game, so far from involving a conception of language 'as a thing', in fact provides a way of thinking about operative language much as Merleau-Ponty conceives it; and Austin's account of speech-acts such as the naming of objects could readily be used to contribute to Merleau-Ponty's claim (cited above) that language provides the 'constitution of the nameable'.

This discussion of language is supposed to lead into an account of the objectivity of geometry; after all our starting point has been Husserl's thesis that the objectivity of geometry 'occurs by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic living body'. So how does Merleau-Ponty address the issue of the connection between language and geometry? He certainly poses a version of Husserl's question: 'how does expression objectify geometry?' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 22); but it is difficult to identify his answer to this question. He recognises that Husserl's answer includes the hypothesis of a connection between our understanding of written demonstrations and our capacity to reactivate the originating self-evidence of geometry which, according to Husserl, secures its a priori objectivity. But Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that he rejects this backward-looking account of reactivation: a better account of reactivation, he initially suggests, is one according to which 'reactivation is no longer lost time, reconquest of a certain

forgetfulness; it consists in going farther in the same direction' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 64); but he quickly moves on from this suggestion to recognising that it would be better to abandon Husserl's talk of reactivation altogether: 'The fact is that I do not need to reactivate in order to think along the thread of my thought of yesteryear or along the thread of a thought of someone else' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 65).

There is good sense to this change, since, as Merleau-Ponty remarks 'But can we reactivate everything? In fact, it is impossible' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 65). But the change rules out endorsing Husserl's answer to his question concerning the objectivity of geometry, in particular concerning the status of 'ideal' geometrical objects. What, then, is Merleau-Ponty's answer to this question? It is this that is very difficult to pin down, partly because we have only his fragmentary lecture notes in which it is not always clear which passages are supposed to be primarily an exposition of Husserl and which passages provide his commentary upon it, but mainly because he just does not come up with a clear line of thought. He is certainly clear enough about the issue, the objectivity of an 'ideal science'. For he remarks, in a rather Moorean way, 'I know that geometry is not natural like a rock or a mountain' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 28), and he follows Husserl in distinguishing geometry, with its ideal truths, from psychological truths concerning real people. As subjects, he says, we have the ability to organise the spatial frame of experience, but even though that ability enables us 'to overcome the frame of passive, psychical, events, [it] does not overcome the frame of the abilities of a subject, and it does not provide ideal being' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 43). How, then, does he think that a legitimate conception of geometry as 'ideal being' is provided?

The initial claim is that geometry is constructed, or 'produced' as Merleau-Ponty usually puts it, not discovered, as the Platonist supposes. Merleau-Ponty's starting-point, let us recall, was to 'excavate' below the Platonist's ideal objects, not just to accept them without question (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 16). But because geometry is 'produced' in the first instance within an individual thinker's thoughts 'in this emergence, geometry is the complete opposite of objective being' (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 54). How then does it acquire objective status as 'ideal being'? The next stage, according to Merleau-Ponty, comes with the work of operative language in building and sustaining a tradition of geometry that connects both the temporally separated thoughts and experiences of one person and the thoughts and experiences of different people. Merleau-Ponty seems to take it that this last aspect, which involves mutual understanding and the sharing of geometrical thoughts is crucial. He claims that it brings with it a conception of geometry as objective but ideal:

> Ideality is at the hinge of the connection between me and others. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 24)

> the self-relation in *Erzeugung* [production] is exemplary for understanding ideality, provided that we apply it to the self-other experience and to speech. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 43)

As I indicated in the discussion of Husserl, however, it is hard to accept this. A good case to think about is that of shared religious faith: does the establishment and

maintenance of a shared religious tradition show that this faith deals with an objective ideal being? Surely not. Husserl, of course added his thesis about the use of written demonstrations to reactivate the originating self-evidence of geometry, and one can see how, given a suitable conception of self-evidence, that thesis might be thought to support a defence of the objectivity of geometry – though I drew on Russell's authority to suggest that in the case of geometry and mathematics there is no such conception of self-evidence which is defensible. Merleau-Ponty, of course, follows Husserl in alluding to writing, but since he rejects Husserl's conception of reactivation, all that writing achieves in his account is a way of emphasizing the role of historical tradition in sustaining a science such as geometry without the need for individuals to reactivate that tradition (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 64–5). So writing adds little of substance to Merleau-Ponty's attempted vindication of geometry.

Could one do better? As I have argued earlier, the key point that is lacking from the accounts provided by both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is a proper recognition of the role of formal proofs in underpinning the objectivity of abstract sciences such as geometry. In the present context, it is then worth observing that it would be easy to add this point to Merleau-Ponty's discussion. Instead of just relying on mutual understanding of geometrical thought to vindicate the ideal objectivity of geometry, if one enriches the assumed geometrical tradition to include formal geometrical demonstrations and proofs, set out in a way in which they can be challenged, debated and endorsed by others, then, as I have argued earlier, the presumed objectivity of geometry has a good claim to legitimacy. But would the addition of this point be compatible with other aspects of Merleau-Ponty's position? I fear not. For in the lectures he dismisses 'logical proof' as superficial and lacking any deep insight into the grounds of geometrical truth:

> There is therefore a truth which is the result of *Idealisierung*, forgetfulness of its genesis – and there is a more profound truth which consists in rediscovering the instituting movement of the universe of ideas.
>
> The first is logical truth: it assumes that the capacity for reactivating the operations that found ideality is sedimented. It does not interrogate the sediments that are there. It moves about in the given universe of *Sätze*, ... it crystallizes idealities into figures and at the same time into statements. It explains (for example, the logical explanation of constructive operations in calculus, the logical explanation of technical abbreviations of intuitive thought. But it does not explain the *Sinnbildungs-traditions* . . .. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 66)

Although it is clear from the context that in these remarks Merleau-Ponty is presenting what he takes to be Husserl's position, it is also apparent that he broadly endorses it. Yet this position is misconceived. The '*Sinnbildungs-traditions*' at work in mathematical sciences are largely constituted by the methods of proof that are taught and refined through the proofs of theorems made up of figures and statements which belong to 'the given universe of *Sätze*'. So the 'instituting movement' is not a creative process that is only after the event 'crystallised' into formal proofs which settle as inert sediments in textbooks. On the contrary, the creative process is essentially one of deploying established methods of proof in new ways in order to construct new proofs; and these proofs, which belong to 'the given

universe of *Sätze*', have to be rigorous. Indeed the hard labour that is characteristic of all serious creative work is to be found in the construction of such proofs (Andrew Wiles's first 'proof' of Fermat's Last Theorem was undermined when it was pointed out that it contained an error in his use of the algebra of groups, which it took him a year to mend).

Merleau-Ponty concludes his critical commentary by remarking that

> The militant truth, the one that puts constituted idealities and ready-made language in question and wants to rediscover outside of every "technique" – "technicisation", the very genesis of ideality, is philosophy. (Merleau-Ponty 2002b, 66)

But this remark should be turned against him. A philosophy which does justice to the achievements of geometry and mathematics will have to put in question the ready-made language of phenomenology with its misguided dismissal of formal proof and take seriously the implications of a *Sinnbildung-tradition* that is precisely oriented around the creative construction of proofs. As I have indicated, such a reversal would provide a much better basis for Husserl's thesis that language provides geometry with its living body than Husserl himself offers; but since it would require one to set aside Husserl's faith in a capacity for reactivating the informal prescientific 'knowledge of unassailable self-evidence' (HUA 366, Carr 355) which supposedly provides the foundation of scientific geometry it is not surprising that Husserl nowhere shows any sympathy for it. However, since Merleau-Ponty rejects Husserl's foundationalist faith and invokes instead the role of informal traditions in sustaining scientific inquiries, there is no good reason why he should have been so strongly opposed to acknowledging that in the case of the mathematical sciences these traditions precisely point to the central role of formal proofs in establishing objective truth. On this issue Merleau-Ponty's hostility to rigorous science and formal reasoning has led him astray.[9]

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[9] I am much indebted to Rasmus Jensen for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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The Body Politic: Husserl and the Embodied Community

Timo Miettinen

> *"It is true that Marx tells us that history does not walk on its head, but it is also true that it does not think with its feet. Or we should say rather that it is neither its 'head' nor its 'feet' that we have to worry about, but its 'body'."*
>
> – Maurice Merleau-Ponty 1962: xix

For that part of our Western philosophical tradition that has aimed at establishing a theory of community, the image of the human body has served as one of the most important points of departure. This tradition, often discussed under the heading of *body politic*, derives already from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly, from Plato and Aristotle who both rely on the analogy between the community (*polis*) and the human body in their "political" writings. For Ancient authors, it was common to employ the metaphor of the body in order to emphasise the "naturality" of human sociality – *polis* is not primarily an active accomplishment of the will, but rather something that necessarily belongs to human life – but also its *normative* ideal: as in the case of Plato's *Republic*, the righteous form of human community is derived from its analogical congruence with the human body.[1]

This "classical" view of state as a natural unity was of course radically challenged by several of the early modern theorists, who discussed the origin of human collectives in terms of an imagined pact: the social contract. However, even these theorists – such as Grotius, Hobbes, or Rousseau – did not completely abandon the corporatist vision of the state, but articulated it with such central notions as *corpus politicus*, *magni homines* and *personae moralis*. However, as in the case of Hobbes, the state-as-person was commonly interpreted in explicitly

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[1] Plato, *Republic* V, 462c-e.

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artificial terms: as a "fictious" person (*persona ficta*)[2] that, in the manner of individuals, can be subjugated to legal constraints. Still, the image of the body politic contributed significantly to the establishment of European constitutional monarchies at the end of the seventeenth century: as Ernst Kantorowicz has shown in his study on King's two bodies, our European figure of monarch relied significantly on the imminent relation between the natural body of the sovereign, and its sublimated embodiment in the organic body politic.[3] For the language of modern political and social philosophy, the image of the human body remains an insuperable feature; even the most idealist philosopher of the state, G.W.F. Hegel, resorted to bodily and dietary metaphors in his writings on statehood.[4]

In this article I wish to elucidate Edmund Husserl's theory of community by examining its critical relation to the tradition of body politic. Since the beginning of the 1920s, Husserl urged to broaden his earlier critique of naturalism in order to tackle some of the main implications that were inherent to the early twentieth-century debate on crisis. This debate, as Husserl saw it, was presenting cultures as essentially passive entities; it needed to be overcome through a phenomenological social ontology that would have showed the possibility of a collective responsibility and renewal. This venture, as it was fulfilled in Husserl's analyses on "We-subjectivity" (*Wir-Subjektivität*) and "personality of a higher-order" (*Personalität der höherer Ordnung*), drew heavily on his elaborations of individual consciousness. However, he never ignored the idea of collective corporeality: despite his insistence of seeing communities as essentially spiritual wholes, Husserl resorted to bodily and organic metaphors in describing the inner dynamic of the communal subject – metaphors that are also at play in Husserl's own normative ideal of community, the "community of love" (*Liebesgemeinschaft*).

As I argue, the organic and corporeal metaphors elucidate some of the most significant aspects of Husserl's social ontology and social ethics. These concepts point towards the necessity of distinguishing between the unique "form" of the collective and its respective "accomplishments" – a correlation that was neglected by the classic Hegelian view of "objective spirit". Most importantly, these analyses point towards the fundamentally intertwined character of social reality according to which the personal ego finds its genuine essence only within intersubjectivity. Rather than dividing the realm of phenomenology into two different domains – the individual and the social – Husserl aimed at articulating this difference in terms of two modalities of the single phenomenological absolute. This provided the fundamental starting point for Husserl's social ethics, which aimed at reconciling the essential autonomy of the individual person with its inextricably social character.

1   Phenomenology and the Problem of Community

For a long time, the relation between phenomenology and the sphere of social and political life has appeared as problematic. Although the questions of sociality and communality were central to some of the early, often neglected

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[2] Hobbes 1928: 93.

[3] Kantorowicz 1957.

[4] Hegel 1993: 81.

phenomenologists – such as Gerda Walther and Edith Stein – there is a long tradition of critique proposing that Husserl's phenomenology promotes an idea of an abstract, solitary subject, and thus, it falls into the trap of *solipsism* or *subjective idealism*.[5] From early on, this critique was based on an interpretation of Husserl's notion of constitution as a subjectivist construction, according to which the ego was said to "edify" the world and other subjects from the particular contents of consciousness – an idea that was coined with the Kantian notion of *atemporal* transcendental subjectivity. Although Husserl worked sedulously on the problematic of temporality from 1904 onwards, the first volume of *Ideas* devoted only a single paragraph to the problem of time-consciousness.[6] Thus it is not surprising to find that Adorno, one of the first critics of phenomenology-as-idealism, considered Husserl the "the most static thinker of his period".[7]

Secondly, a more refined line of critique – formulated also within the phenomenological tradition – acknowledged Husserl's interest in intersubjectivity, but saw it as conceptually and methodologically insufficient with regard to the concrete phenomena of the social sphere. Alfred Schütz, for one, emphasized the significance of Husserl's constitutional analyses for his reinterpretation of the Weberian interpretive sociology, but argued that Husserl's own philosophy was not "conversant with the concrete problems of the social sciences".[8] Behind Schütz's position was his conviction that one could not advance very far with the transcendental analyses of Husserl, and that one needed to accompany these analyses with a "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude",[9] an investigation of social relations as they appear within concrete experience. During the past decades, the development of sociology and cultural studies has benefitted perhaps more from the non-Husserlian currents of phenomenology such as structuralism and (Heideggerian) hermeneutics.

Thirdly, because of the specific importance that Husserl bestowed upon the *descriptive* element of phenomenology, many critics have been discontent with the apparent lack of a normative dimension in his philosophy. Habermas, for one, has put forward the notion of Husserlian "scientism" that focuses on "pure theory", and has contrasted this with the "emancipatory sciences" of the Marxist tradition as well as the Frankfurt School.[10] It is often stated that phenomenology has nothing to say to the concrete problems of social existence, that it withdraws from the sphere of politics, or, that it is negligent with regard to the ideological constellations of, for instance, today's capitalist market economy. In this vein, phenomenology may help us to see, but not to act – it may provide us with an analysis of truth and falsity, but not of right or wrong.

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[5] On the early critiques of Husserl's idealism, see esp. Adorno 1940; Hook 1930.

[6] This was the paragraph §81 ("Die phänomenologische Zeit und das Zeitbewußtsein") of *Ideas* I, see HuaI 196 ff.

[7] Adorno 1940: 7.

[8] Schütz 1959: 88.

[9] Schütz 1967: 132.

[10] Habermas 1971: 316 ff.

However, through the publication of the three intersubjectivity volumes of *Husserliana* as well as the texts on social ethics, we have been provided with a vast amount of Husserl's own phenomenological analyses that deal with the problems of the social-communal sphere. We know that since the late 1910s, Husserl worked sedulously on the themes of community and culture as well their peculiar modes of temporality, discussed under the topic of "generativity" (*Generativität*), as well as their normative ideals.[11] Especially with the publication of the so-called *Kaizo* essays (1919–1923) in *Husserliana* 27, the background and development of Husserl's cultural-critical motive has received new clarification. It seems clear, that Husserl's preoccupation with the topic of European crisis was pushed into forefront through the First World War; consequently, his urge for a "rational reform of culture"[12] was spurred by the loss of meaning this event had entailed. Most importantly, what these texts reveal is the fact that Husserl needed to formulate the whole phenomenological project in a novel fashion: as a philosophical undertaking which seeks to work out the possibility of a rational culture, ultimately working towards the ideal of self-responsible and self-governing humanity.[13]

Of course, the question of intersubjectivity is by no means an untreated domain in Husserl-scholarship. Through the extensive treatises of Georg Römpp, Michael Theunissen and Dan Zahavi, we have been provided a detailed picture on the topic of intersubjectivity and social ontology in Husserl; however, these analyses have mostly focused on this topic solely on the perspective of the first-person singular.[14] James G. Hart's extensive treatise *The Person and the Common Life*: *Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics* (1992) is a fine elucidation on the topic of social sphere in Husserl – however, because of the rather salient emphasis on the ethical-normative aspects in Husserl's social ontology, many of the most fundamental questions remain unanswered, questions such as: What is the relation between the subjective and the communal constitution of meaning? How does a genuinely intersubjective constitution arise from the fact of being-together?

Perhaps the most intuitive way of approaching the idea of community-as-subject is to begin with Husserl's idea of transcendental intersubjectivity. Contrary to the current theories of social ontology that usually begin with the idea of "social

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[11] With the topic of generativity (*Generativität*) Husserl basically referred to the "unity of historical development in its widest sense", that is, to all those forms of meaning-constitution that take place in the intersubjective and intergenerational processes of co-operation, expressing themselves in the form of lasting cultural accomplishments. See HuaXXIX 63. Cf. HuaVI 191–192.

[12] Cf. HuaXXVII 5. See also Miettinen 2011.

[13] This ultimate motivation is shown clearly by Fink's outline for *Crisis* (Husserl 1976, *Beilage XXIX*). The fifth and final part, to which the whole project would have culminated, was titled simply as "The indispensable task of philosophy: humanity's self-responsibility" ("Die unverlierbare Aufgabe der Philosophie: Die Selbstverantwortung des Menschentums", HuaVI 516). Cf. Husserl 1994a: 224. For a more detailed discussion, see Miettinen 2013.

[14] Römpp 1991; Theunissen 1965; Zahavi 2001.

interaction" and "collective commitment",[15] Husserl argued that already with our passive relatedness to other subjects, a certain form of communality is being created:

> My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others. One and the same thing-world is constituted for us as well as the one and the same time as objective time so that my "now" and the "now" of others [...] are objectively simultaneous. [...] My life and the life of another do not merely exist, each for themselves; rather, one is "directed" toward the other.[16]

It should be noted that at this very fundamental level of world-constitution – what Husserl calls "open intersubjectivity" (*offene Intersubjektivität*)[17] – we are not still dealing with other subjects per se, but rather, the others as anonymous subjects who co-constitute the world with me.[18] However, without the co-constitutive role of others, there could be no idea of objectivity, reality, or world; simply because I would possess no justification for the idea that my perspective is not the absolute one – that a particular object can be perceived from two distinct perspectives at the same time, equally valid. Every kind of object is given to me as such that it affords itself as being potentially perceived from multiple perspectives; without the idea of several equally valid "horizons", no idea of objectivity could ever come about. It was namely this insight that led Husserl to claim in the *Cartesian Meditations* that it is actually the "transcendental We" (*transzendentale Wir*) that is the true subject of objective world.[19] Thus even when I do not have an explicit experience of the other subjects, their being is validated in my apperceptive experience of the world.[20]

Because we are dealing here with "pure others", other subjects devoid of any concrete attributes or definitions, this primal form of 'We' is, so to speak, *anonymous*: the latent, unarticulated first-person plural is merely the correlate of the openness or "publicity" of the common world. As such, it is also experienced as undivided and *universal*.[21] However, as soon as we take in the other subjects, not merely as someone who co-constitute the world with me, but as someone with whom I can engage in communication, the sense of universal communality is broken. This is due to the fact that through the empathic encounter with the other, our experience takes on a normative structure by which the experience of the other is specified in its qualitative character: I discover that although every subject shares a relation to the same world, they perceive it in various ways depending on their

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[15] See, e.g. Searle 1995; Tuomela 2008.

[16] HuaXI 1966: 343. See also HuaIV 1952: 191: "We are in a relation to a common surrounding world – we are in a personal association: these belong together. We could not be persons for others if a common surrounding world did not stand there for us in a community, in an intentional linkage of our lives. Correlatively spoken, the one is constituted essentially with the other."

[17] On the idea of open intersubjectivity, see HuaIX 394, HuaXIV 289. Cf. Zahavi 2001: 39 ff.

[18] Cf. Lobo's paper in this volume.

[19] HuaI 1950: 137.

[20] HuaIX 1968: 394.

[21] HuaXV 135–139.

perceptual capabilities and "normative frameworks", such as different cultural backgrounds, beliefs, customs, and practices.[22]

Through the introduction of the normative dimension of experience, the 'We' is, so to speak, demarcated in different respects. First of all, I find myself as belonging to a 'We' that is separate from 'Them': subjects of other species, peoples of other cultures, or, folks of another town. Moreover, the 'We' itself is also dispersed into several parts – family, hometown, nation, culture etc. – which are, of course, intertwined with one another in several ways.[23] Lastly, as soon as I discover my finitude and situatedness within a historical framework of inherited beliefs, values and practices, the idea of community is demarcated in yet a more precise manner. I discover that in a manner similar to that of an individual consciousness, the different communities have their peculiar temporal continuity, and that they are also exposed to the phenomenon of periodization, which divides them into cycles of generations, of eras and epochs.

2 The Community as a Personal Whole

Although Husserl had worked on the question of intersubjectivity already from 1905 onwards, it was not until the late 1910s that he first approached the idea of community in terms of a *personal* whole that can be viewed as analogous to individual subject. In the early lecture courses there are brief references to Hegelian notions of "collective spirituality" (*Gemeingeistlichkeit*) embracing the plurality of I's, but this notion is used mostly in passing.[24] The rather late introduction of the collective person was due to the fact that in his earlier manuscripts, Husserl had discussed the field of intersubjectivity mainly from the perspective of I-Thou relation, and particularly, in critical relation to the contemporary theories of empathy (*Einfühlung*).[25] However, this approach seemed to restrict the scope of inter-subjectivity merely to those subjects with whom I can identify myself – leaving out, for instance, the question of past generations. Moreover, by taking its point of departure from the first-person singular, it seemed to exclude the whole problem of interpersonal constitution, which takes place in all sorts of social collectives.

In the second volume of *Ideas* (1917) – in connection to the analysis of personhood – Husserl first took up the notion of "*personal unities of a higher order*", which, as he proclaimed, "*have their own lives*, preserve themselves by lasting through time *despite the joining or leaving of individuals*".[26] There is some

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[22] HuaIV 202.

[23] HuaXV 174–178. See also HuaXV 222, 604.

[24] See for instance, HuaXIII 92. See also Lobo's paper in this volume.

[25] HuaI 161; HuaXIV 165–166; HuaVI 320. Consequently, he considered the broad field of "socialities" merely in terms of *correlates of consciousness*, as something that the ego constitutes in its relations to other subjects – not as something in which the ego is embedded. HuaXXXV 409.

[26] HuaIV 182.

evidence that these formulations may have emerged from Husserl's collaboration with Edith Stein who edited the second volume of *Ideas* and was working on the problematic of communal subjectivity and its higher-order acts in the second part of her *Habilitationsschrift*.[27] What is clear, however, is that during the 1920s the notions of "personality of a higher order", "We-subjectivity" and "communal person" became central themes for Husserl's reflections of intersubjectivity as well as his social ethics.[28]

In the preface to the *Kaizo* essays, Husserl went on to claim that the Platonic analogy of body politic should not be treated as an "inventive coincidence of natural thinking" (*ein geistreicher Einfall eines das natürliche Denken*), but as an expression of the common apperception mounting from the actuality of human existence.[29] What Husserl meant was basically the idea that communities too have a peculiar constitutive force that cannot be simply returned to the individual subjects. As Husserl claimed, the analogy between an individual and a community is not merely heuristic but real (*wirklich*)[30]: communities and "humanities" (*Menscheiten*) are to be understood as self-regulating subjectivities that can be defined through such attributes as "consciousness",[31] "personal act",[32] "style",[33] "memory"[34] a "collective will".[35] They are not self-enclosed entities, for they are founded upon the acts of individuals; however, they constitute a dimension that is genuinely something more than these acts.[36] Communities have their own accomplishments – such as language, religion and science – that cannot be attributed to any particular, individual subject, for these accomplishments are constituted only through the manifold social acts of communication, mutual understanding and the continuation of a tradition.[37]

Does this mean that after the introduction of the "personality of a higher order", the notion of phenomenological constitution was split into two distinct spheres – individual and collective? Not exactly: methodologically speaking, Husserl never gave up the idea of phenomenology as a first-person philosophy. As he says in the

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[27] This work, titled as *Individual and Community* (*Individuum und Gemeinschaft*), was published in Husserl's phenomenological *Jahrbuch* in 1922.

[28] One of the best clarifications on these notions can be found in the short text "*Renewal as a problem of individual ethics*" ("*Erneuerung als individualethisches Problem*"). See HuaXXVII 20–43. For a more detailed discussion on this idea, see Miettinen 2013.

[29] HuaXXVII 3.

[30] HuaXXVII 21.

[31] HuaXXVII 49.

[32] *Ibid*.

[33] HuaVI 326.

[34] HuaXIV 205.

[35] HuaXXVII 53.

[36] HuaXXVII 49. See also HuaXIV 201; HuaXV 218–221.

[37] HuaXXVII 22.

Crisis, the whole problem of intersubjectivity can be approached only through a personal inquiry that investigates the givenness of other subjects within individual experience.[38]

To speak of the collective persons as "higher order" phenomena refers exactly to this idea: communities as personal wholes are inextricably *founded* on the acts of individual egos. However, as the acts of individual subjects associate with each other, they are also able to constitute lasting unities that have their unique style and habitus. A music orchestra, for instance, acquires for itself a personal form through the association of individual acts (e.g. different musicians playing different patterns) and affects (feelings, moods etc.) – its unique style is due to its common history constituted in the group activity. This entails that the performed musical piece is to be conceived, not only as an end product of distinct individuals, but as something whose uniqueness originates from the personal style of the community itself. Thus, on the basis of this specific conjoining of individual acts, we are able to acknowledge a conscious life of a higher order:

> Consciousness unites with consciousness, overlapping time in the form simultaneity as well as in chronological order. Personal consciousness becomes one with others [...] and constitutes a unity of a suprapersonal consciousness.[39]

Accordingly, it is possible to articulate a crucial difference between Husserl's position and the Hegelian account of "objective spirit". Although Husserl's earlier manuscripts occasionally refer to the Hegelian notions of "objective spirit" (*objektiver Geist*)[40] and "collective spirit" (*Gemeingeist*),[41] his theory of community differed from that of Hegel's in one crucial respect. Husserl insisted that in order to arrive at an accurate transcendental account of human communities, one should insist on the conceptual difference between the intrapersonal collective and its accomplishments, that is, the difference between community (*Gemeinschaft*) as a habituated form of individual activities and culture (*Kultur*) as the objective accomplishments of this community.[42] A particular social whole, Husserl suggested, cannot be simply reduced to its own accomplishments – language, religion, science, or even the relations of production – for this would entail that we fail to appreciate the different modes of temporality that characterize the being of a community and its accomplishments.

In other words, the phenomenological correlation must also be articulated on the level of community and culture. A community has its habitual character only within the life of the individuals and the unity of their social acts, but culture has its

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[38] HuaVI 206.

[39] "Bewusstsein vereinigt sich so mit Bewusstsein, alle Zeit übergreifend, übergreifend die Zeit in Form der Gleichzeitigkeit wie in Form der Zeitfolge. Personales Bewusstsein wird eins mit anderem, individuell von ihm notwendig getrennten Bewusstsein, und so wird Einheit eines überpersonalen Bewusstseins." HuaXIV 199.

[40] HuaXIII 65n2; HuaXV 559.

[41] HuaXIV 165, 192, 200; HuaXXVII 53.

[42] On the definition of culture in Husserl, see Orth 1987: 116 ff.

permanent duration in the objective accomplishments (e.g. accomplishments that are materialized in writing).

3 The Materiality of the Collective

I believe that it was this problematic relationship between the *individual* and the *collective* that led Husserl to formulate the question of communality in relation to the idea of body politic. Indeed, many of the shortcomings of the popular nineteenth-century theories of community seemed to emerge from an inadequate understanding of this relation: particularly, from the conceptual unclarities relating to the questions of *ideality* and *materiality* of communities as well as their inner cohesion. According to my reading, Husserl employed bodily metaphors with regard to the problem of community in three senses:

1. To denote the specific *materiality* of human communities;
2. To describe the *interwoven* character of human sociality and the specific *autonomy* of the communal person;
3. To articulate the *normative ideal* of community, bringing together the idea of common good with the individual responsibility.

Let me address these points one by one.

Firstly, one of the shortcomings of the nineteenth-century theories of community – especially the idealist formulations of objective spirit (Hegel) – was that they had failed to address the *concrete* or *material* aspects of communal life. Even those theories that explicitly wanted to address the material conditions of social structures seemed to lead them back into a very restricted aspect of cultural life such as "production relations" (Marx) or distribution of resources (T.R. Malthus). To tackle the abstract vagueness of the quasi-personal "objective spirit", Husserl insisted on the distinction between the producing higher-order subjectivity (community) and the produced accomplishments (culture).[43] Both have their material aspect: as there is no community without the body of the people, there is no culture without relation to the material conditions (resources, landscape etc.), ultimately, earth. In connection to his late ontology of the lifeworld, Husserl developed a transcendental theory of territoriality – discussed under the topic of "homeworld" (*Heimwelt*) or "nearworld" (*Nahwelt*) – which sought to explain how exactly a certain sphere of acquaintance delimits itself with regard to concrete frontiers.[44] Although these frontiers are primarily based on the experience of familiarity, and as such, they are spiritual phenomena, they are never separate from concrete geo-historical conditions. Rather, as it is often the case, certain geographical

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[43] HuaXXVII 20.

[44] On the concept of homeworld in Husserl, see e.g. HuaVI 302; HuaXIV 64, 214–218, 613–630; HuaXXIX 145 ff.; Steinbock 1995; Waldenfels 1997, 1998.

entities such as rivers or mountain chains become embedded with spiritual meaning: they assume their demarcating character by becoming a part of the human lifeworld.

In a couple of manuscripts, Husserl entertains the idea of "collective bodily existence" (*kollektive Leiblichkeit*) that communities acquire for themselves through their individual members.[45] Although this idea could be taken in several directions, Husserl discusses it primarily in relation to the spatial orientation. Recall that for Husserl, one of the main constitutive functions of the living body was related to the directionality of experience: every object is perceived as being "there" with regard to the "here" of the living body.[46] The living body (*Leib*) is the primal indexical "here", according to which every object is perceived as being "there", either "left" or "right", "up" or down", and so on. However, as being part of a certain community, our experience defines itself also with regard to another set of indexicals, those of the collective. As single bodies interact with one another in a certain place, these relations give birth to a higher-order directionality, which, for instance, allows a broader definition of the indexical "here". This is what Husserl means when he says that communities, like individual subjects, embody a form of I-centering.[47] A family, for instance, often defines its collective spatial orientation with regard to home, which serves as the zero-point for things and places outside ("The train station is 20 kilometres from *here*"). Communal persons do not float around abstractly, but are always tied to a particular place or region.

Secondly, in his elaborations of the relation between individual and the collective, Husserl resorted to metaphors that seemed to push towards an even more organic notion of the body politic. In his attempts to sketch out the relation between individual and collective, Husserl sometimes calls upon the analogy of "a cell and an organism built on cells", and also, on the analogy between organ and organism.[48] Moreover, this organic unity is not restricted merely to social relations between individuals, but Husserl uses it also to describe the intertwining of communities such as nations.[49]

One of the primal reasons behind these metaphors was Husserl's insistence on the peculiar autonomy of collective subjects. "The organic unity of humanity", writes Husserl, "maintains itself in the birth of its individual members as well as their death, as in the case of the recreation of *multicellular organs* and their withering".[50] In other words, a certain social body is never tied to any particular subject, but has its existence regardless of the entry or withdrawal of particular members. Naturally, there are gradations with regard to different forms of community. For a family, a loss of member is probably a more shattering experience than,

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[45] HuaXXXIX 181.

[46] HuaIV 158 ff. See also HuaI 128; HuaIII 76.

[47] HuaXIV 206.

[48] HuaXIV 203. See also HuaXXVII 118.

[49] HuaVI 322. On historical relations as organic, see HuaVI 502.

[50] HuaXIV 205 (My italics).

say, in the case of nation – one that can catalyse the extinction or dispersion of the "We". Still, it belongs to the very notion of communal person that it is always transgresses its particular members – it is something that cannot be reduced back to individual subjects.

Moreover, the idea that an individual always finds herself as being part of a "social tissue" (*soziale Gewebe*)[51] helps us to articulate the peculiar *reciprocality* that is at stake in the relation between individual and community. As I already indicated, one of the key theses of Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity was the idea that without the apperceptive experience of other (possible) subjects, no form of objectivity could ever be constituted. Everything transcendent rests upon the transcendence of foreign subjectivity: like individual cells, we cannot sustain our ownmost "function" – the constitution of world and meaning – without being embedded in a community of subjects.[52] Thus what we have in the case of organic analogy is not a split between two autonomous spheres of being, but rather, a shift of perspectives. Constitution can be examined from the perspective of both the "abstract" perspective of the individual (the organ) and the "concrete" totality of the community (the organism).

Indeed, in a manuscript from the beginning of the 1920s, Husserl approaches the relation between subjective and intersubjective constitution in terms of abstract and concrete constitution. As phenomenologically philosophizing subjects, everything that makes sense must be finally led back to ourselves and our conscious life, but this does not mean that all of our constitutional analyses would remain solely on the level of individual experience. The transcendental ego, as Husserl puts it, is indeed the "final absolute" – *but it is not the sole absolute*. Or, to be more precise, the ego is not the sole modality of phenomenological absolute, but rather, an abstraction from what Husserl calls the "concrete absolute" (*konkrete Absolute*) that is constituted within the manifold of subjects.[53]

The third point – the fact that Husserl sometimes employs bodily and organic metaphors to describe the *normative ideal of community* – is perhaps the most controversial one. Recall that for the late Husserl, the early twentieth-century debate on cultural diseases – *crisis* – was spurred by false organic categories, which presented the whole notion of culture as essentially passive. Husserl criticized, for instance, Oswald Spengler's morphology of culture as it was presented in his *Decline of the West* – a work that discussed cultures as organic and necessarily *finite* entities that all have their limited existence in the great cycle of life. Instead of regarding 'crisis' as a transitional phase from one historical epoch to another, Spengler conceived it as a kind of "fatal disease" denoting the incipient "death-struggle" of culture.[54] This struggle is something that all cultures descend into by necessity without the possibility of prevailing. The false use of corporate

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[51] HuaXV 413.

[52] HuaVIII 495.

[53] Cf. "Die Vielheit des Subjekte als das konkrete Absolute", HuaXIV 272.

[54] Spengler 1991: 157.

metaphors was also central to the texts of National Socialist philosophers, who portrayed the Jewish people as a "foreign element", even a disease, in the organic "body of the people" (*Volksleib*).[55] Thus it is understandable that in an appendix to the *Crisis*-work, Husserl defined the crisis of Europe as a "sickness [that] has its root in all of its forms from crude materialism to a more subtle objectivism that dominates psychophysical naturalism".[56] Moreover, Husserl's attitude towards the popular philosophers of cultural crisis – which he ironically referred to as the "naturopathy of culture"[57] – was highly sceptical. Thus the question: Why did Husserl want to fight against the organic prejudices by *returning* to the organic metaphors of the body politic?

Let me try to answer this question. Now, as Husserl stressed from early on, the ultimate motivation of phenomenological philosophy was not theoretical, but *practical* – or to be exact: *ethical*. Phenomenology was supposed to provide the conditions of rational justification according to which individuals as well as communities could function in a self-responsible and self-regulating manner. The ideal of a self-regulating and autonomous community was sometimes characterized by Husserl as that of a "healthy" (*gesund*) or "vital" (*lebendig*) culture.[58] With this metaphor, Husserl did not mean a simple well-being of the community – each individual is "happy" and social conflicts are absent etc. – nor did it entail mere cultural productivity ("a healthy society creates art" etc.). What he meant was a more specific claim on the role of *philosophy* within the body politic. For according to Husserl, philosophy was supposed to be the very caretaker of reason,

> [...] the spiritual *organ*, in which the community establishes the consciousness of its true definition (its true self), and they are also called to be the *organ* for the *reproduction* of this consciousness among the "laypeople".[59]

Out of passages like this, one is quite tempted to draw the Platonic conclusion that a "healthy" Husserlian body politic is one which *thinks with its head*. Apropos, in his Vienna lecture, Husserl did in fact attribute philosophers the role of an "operating brain", whose "healthy functioning" was essential to the present-day European humanity.[60] Politically speaking, Husserl would have committed himself to what Hannah Arendt considered to be the ultimate fallacy of the Western political discourse, namely, that it takes absolute truth – and not the plurality of opinions – as its basic framework.[61] Since Plato, philosophy has claimed for a privileged position within the body politic – manifested most evidently in the figure

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[55] For a good clarification on this matter, see Neumann 2009.

[56] HuaVI 550.

[57] HuaVI 315.

[58] HuaVIII 242, HuaXXVII 4. See also discussion on Fichte and cultural sickness in HuaXXV: 282–284.

[59] HuaXXVII 54.

[60] HuaVI 336.

[61] Arendt 1993: 227–264. See also Arendt 1958: 225–226.

of the philosopher-king – by insisting that it embraces the particular situations of the individuals, and provides the way to the common good.[62]

As I would like to claim, Husserl's conclusion is more subtle. Within the ideal body politic there is no place for a sovereign philosopher-king, for – as he often accentuates – this would contradict the very idea of rationality: we can never give up on our personal responsibility. Rather, it is exactly the idea of self-critique and self-responsibility that ought to *emanate from philosophy* to other branches of culture. What philosophy fights against is not merely untruth, but above all, passivity.[63] In line with the proverb *mens sana in corpore sano*: what philosophers ought to do is to nurture the essential "*habitus* of critique"[64] within the body politic, to call for a constant self-reflection within particular cultural practices, political and social institutions, and so on. The societal function of philosophy does not consist of informing individuals on "what to do" or "how to live" – rather, as in the case of Socrates, its task is that of *motivation*, the constant calling forth of critical self-inspection.

4   The Ideal Body Politic: Community of Love

One of the names that Husserl gives for the ideal body politic is the "community of love", *Liebesgemeinschaft*.[65] The use of this term – which dates back to Christian thought – was motivated by several factors, most importantly, by Husserl's interest in the notion of love in the ethical writings of the early 1920s.[66] However, as I would like to claim, it is also crucial for social ethics. For it is *love* that opens up the peculiar form of "organic", reciprocal unity of perpetual striving towards good that constitutes the ideal form of communal life.

As Husserl put it in his lectures on ethics, as we think of the human individual within the community, we discover a "wonderful intertwining" (*wunderbare Verflechtung*), which binds all of the self-determinations of the individual human beings together.[67] I cannot assess the ethical character of my life apart from the life of the others, but my life must also be measured by my capability to make others free and responsible. I must understand my actions as a part of a chain of actions (of others), which permeates my life and gives it a more concrete form:

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[62] For Husserl's reading of Plato's political insights – Plato as the "establisher of social ethics as true ethics" (HuaVII 1956: 16) –, see especially the historical introduction of *Erste Philosophie* in HuaVII 14 ff.

[63] HuaXXVII 119.

[64] HuaXXVII 64.

[65] On *Liebesgemeinschaft*, see especially HuaXIV 172–175; HuaXV 512; HuaXXIX 270. For a more detailed discussion, see Miettinen 2013.

[66] Melle 2007: 3.

[67] HuaXXXVII 240.

> We do not live merely next to each other, but in one another. We define ourselves from person to person, from I to I, and our wills do not merely work on others as the components of our surrounding but in the others: our wills extend themselves to the will of the other, into the will of the other which is at the same time ours, so that the actions of the other can become ours, even if in a modified manner.[68]

For Husserl, this "living common" has its basis in the experience of love. Not only does love entail an intimate affection to the other but it builds up the basic experience through which life acquires a value for itself. "There is no life without love", as Husserl put it – simply because the very value of life is realized first through a "loving" relationship, for instance, that of a parent and a child.[69] This simply means that the value of life can only be acknowledged within a social context: it is only through other conscious subjects that my life can be treated not as means but as an end in itself. Here, Husserl ends up affirming the basic insight of Aristotle and Fichte according to which "self-love" is the essential condition for the love of the other. In order to value others, I must be acknowledged as valuable myself:

> My life is nothing for itself; it is one with the life of the others; it is a piece in the unity of the life of the community and reaches beyond this into the life of humanity. I cannot evaluate my life without evaluating the interwoven life of others.[70]

This is not to say, however, that the value of the individual would be completely determined by other subjects. "For itself" does not mean "in itself". Rather, this idea points towards the essential intertwinement of my ethical comportment in regard to the life of others, which gives this comportment its proper form. As I already pointed out, Husserl conceived the individuality of the transcendental subjectivity as the *abstraction* of the *concrete* monadic totality. In ethical terms, this would mean that my freedom and my responsibility, which are the necessary factors of my ethical stance, achieve their concrete form only *with* the freedom and responsibility of others. Therefore, as Husserl puts it, love must include within itself "an interest in assisting the other"[71] – love expresses the ethical imperative to help

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[68] "Wir leben nicht nur nebeneinander, sondern ineinander. Wir bestimmen einander personal von Person zu Person, von Ich zu Ich, und unser Wille geht nicht nur auf die anderen als umweltliche Sachen, sondern in die anderen, er erstreckt sich in das fremde Wollen hinein, das Wollen des anderen und zugleich unser Wollen ist, so dass seine Tat, wenn auch in verschieden abgewandelter Weise, zu unserer Tat werden kann." Husserl, WL 217. Hart 1992: 248. Translation modified.

[69] "Kein Leben ohne Liebe, und jedes Leben wird erst bewusst in eins mit einem Liebesbewusstsein, einer Liebesdeckung." WL: 210. See also HuaXIV 165–166.

[70] "Mein Leben ist aber nichts für sich; es ist einig mit dem Leben der anderen, es ist Stück in der Einheit des Gemeinschaft lebens und reicht darüber hinaus ins Leben der Menschheit. Ich kann nicht mein Leben werten, ohne das mitverflochtene Leben der anderen zu werten". WL 209–210 Translation in Hart 1992, 294. See also Ratcliffe's comments on Knud Løgstrup in this volume.

[71] "Die Liebe bestimmt ein Interesse der Fremdförderung [. . .]." HuaXIV 166. Take, for instance, a parent who encourages her children to pursue a completely different vocation than her own: while this encouragement implies that the child must be treated as someone who makes her own choices, it also implies that the parent is, in a way, irreplaceable. Alienating one's dreams, wishes, or inclinations into another person would also imply that this person can simply replace me – that I was only a contingent agent of my actions. For this reason, love must be seen as the inclination to sustain one's personality through an encounter with the other.

the other to enhance and preserve the value of his or her own life. Love aims at helping the others to attain their true self in practice (*dem Anderen zu seinem wahren Selbst praktisch zu helfen*).[72]

> As a lover in the community of love (friendship) [...] I observe the beloved not merely as someone who lives so-and-so [...] he is not there in my field of being, but I live in his life, I live with it, and the same goes the other way round.[73]

As in the case of the body of an individual, physical pain is never merely in a particular limb or section but is felt in the whole body, a suffering that takes place in a "healthy community" never affects only its particular members. Joy, happiness, pain, or social injustices are all of course experienced by individual subjects, *but they can be lived as common*.[74] In a way, Husserl comes remarkably close to Hegel's definition of love as having self-consciousness in the other, and at the same time, establishing one's own identity through this relation. As Hegel accentuates, love is not assimilation: in love, I do not simply want to become *like* the beloved nor do I wish to make the beloved like me. On the contrary, in the act of love it is namely the *radical otherness of the other* that I wish to sustain and cherish. As he puts it in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*:

> For love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each other. The consciousness or feeling of the identity of the two – to be outside of myself and in the other – this is love. I have my self-consciousness not in me but in the other. [...] This other, because it likewise exists outside itself, has its self-consciousness only in me, and both the other and the I are only this consciousness of being-outside-ourselves and of our identity; we are only this intuition, feeling, and knowledge of our unity. This is love, and without knowing that *love is both a distinguishing and the sublation of the distinction*, one speaks emptily of it. [75]

As I would like to see it, for Hegel as well as for Husserl, *love* is the title for the identity-in-difference that constitutes the compassionate unity of the ideal community. The ideal body politic is not one which seeks to reduce the particular subjects under a single model of existence, as in the case of totalitarian ideologies. Instead, it aims to adhere to the differences of the particular subjects so that through the ideal unity of a higher order – the community of love – the subjects are able to preserve their ownmost essence. As Simone de Beauvoir later put it in her *Ethics of Ambiguity*: "It is only by prolonging itself through the freedom of others that [my freedom] manages to surpass death itself and to realize itself as an indefinite unity."[76] For it is the *telos* of love to do away – not with differences in the world –

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[72] HuaXXXVII 241.

[73] " Als Liebender in der Liebesgemeinschaft (Freundschaft) [...] betrachte ich [...] ihn nicht nur als so und so Lebenden, er ist nicht nur als das in meinem Seinsfeld, sondern ich lebe in seinem Leben, ich lebe es mit, und auch ich bin für ihn evtl" HuaXV 512.

[74] Cf. Paul: "If one part suffers, every part suffers with it" (1. Cor. 12:26).

[75] Hegel 1984: 201–202. My italics.

[76] Beauvoir 1994: 32.

but with those obstacles that hinder us from seeing the other in ourselves, and conversely, ourselves in the other.

As I have argued, the basic challenge of Husserl's theory of community was to articulate an idea of body politic that would hold common good as its utmost ideal, but at the same time, would not compromise the inalienability of the individual will. He did this with the help of the notion of "community of love". Love – and this is also an essential characteristic of the Christian notion of *agapē* – is a form of existence in which we renounce our subjective, egoistic motives for the common good by setting ourselves into the position of the anonym other.[77] In this relating we do not lose our personal existence, but we gain it anew by realizing our essential interdependence with other people. We suffer and rejoice as a whole while sustaining our personhood and self-responsibility.[78]

The ideal form of communal person should not be taken for granted; it is a unity that can be broken. This happens when a body politic experiences a certain *paralysation* by which we lose the ability to empathise with the pain (or joy) of others. This is the when moment when culture turns "barbaric": when a society experiences an inner dispersion by which the ability to mirror oneself through others, to feel for others, is lost. The loss of empathy or living with-and-in others can obviously take place through growing class divisions or ethnic conflicts, but it can also be fostered through such intellectual practices that present the other as somehow fundamentally alien, differentiated by an alleged cultural-historical abyss. Husserl's late debates with his contemporary anthropologists, especially with Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, revolved around the question whether the evident cultural distance to the so-called primitive tribes should lead us to posit two (or more) fundamentally distinguished notions of rationality as Lévy-Bruhl had suggested.[79] Therefore, Husserl presented the *Liebesgemeinschaft* not only as an essentially all-inclusive society but also as ultimately cosmopolitan, leading to a universal world-state (*Weltstaat*).[80]

What makes Husserl's adhesion to the tradition of body politic deeply *apolitical* is his indubitable dismissal of relations of power. With the exception of a few Hegelian developments on the dialectic of Master and Slave, Husserl never really paid attention to those social and political mechanisms that presume the truly empathic relations to other subjects, and that would have contributed to the creation of his normative ideal of communal being. What we are still lacking is indeed a Husserlian phenomenology of the political sphere, a constitutional analysis of structures of power or the embeddedness in a socio-symbolic order as they appear in human lifeworld. How can a particular body politic decide on its fate, its mode of

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[77] In the Christian tradition, this otherness is articulated in terms of a "neighbour", *plēsion*. See especially Matt. 22:39.

[78] Husserl sometimes employs the notion of "communistic unity of will" in contrast to imperialistic central will. See HuaXXVII 53.

[79] Husserl's critique of Lévy-Bruhl's relativism, see Husserl 1994b: 163. See also Moran 2011.

[80] HuaXXVII 59. See also HuaVIII 338; HuaXIV 177.

organization? What kind of social or political institutions would contribute to the enhancement of a rational community?

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