Political Memories and Migration

Belonging, Society, and Australia Day

J. Olaf Kleist

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

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Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies
ISBN 978-1-137-57588-3 ISBN 978-1-137-57589-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57589-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016946181

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

Synopsis

In Australia, Europeans' original migration to the continent has been commemorated for well over two hundred years. Following the history of this commemoration, the author develops a concept of Political Memories. References to the past convey contested notions of belonging and society, with particular relevance for migration politics and policies.

Acknowledgments

This book was many years in the making and took various twists and turns before it reached its final stage. I would not have gotten to the end without the support and help of many.

First of all, I would like to thank my dissertation supervisor Prof. Wolf-Dieter Narr who encouraged and inspired me by giving me great freedoms to explore, ideas to ponder, and the necessary push to finish. I would also like to thank Prof. Klaus Neumann who with great generosity took me under his wing during my research in Australia where he opened up new paths, perspectives, and opportunities for me.

I also want to express my gratitude to the Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne and its staff who were very generous in welcoming me as a Visiting Fellow in 2007 and 2009. I am also grateful to the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford and its faculty, especially to Dr. Matthew Gibney.

I acknowledge Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung and the Australian government who supported my dissertation with research scholarships. I would also like to thank Viv Szekeres, Padmini Sebastian, John Petersen, Joachim Baur, Steve Biddulph, Beth Gibbings, Dirk Moses, the National Australia Day Council, and my interview partners for providing me with materials and valuable information. My editors at Palgrave Macmillan have shown great patience and provided much appreciated support.

I could not have realized the task of writing the dissertation without the moral support of my friends and family. In particular, I cannot thank my

parents enough for always supporting me—in so many ways. This book is dedicated to them. Finally, Tai Sayarath went through this experience with me from beginning to end. I would not have been able to write this book without her.

Oxford, November 2015 J. Olaf Kleist

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CHAPTER 1

Memories and Migration: Politics of Belonging

On Friday Night, 18 October 2001, just after sunset, about a dozen inconspicuous people in several small groups approached Sydney's Opera House. Prior to their descent onto Australia's famous landmark, they had discussed various responses to the government's treatment of boat refugees arriving on the country's shores. Now, these activists were in the process of setting their plan into action. Without forewarning, the apparent strollers stopped to unpack a mini power generator and a household slide projector on the stairs leading up to the Opera House. Using this equipment, the group turned one of the large, sail-like structures that constitute the building's façade in to a glowing billboard. On its white surface, they projected an image of a tall ship with the words 'BOAT PEOPLE' emblazoned underneath. The event lasted only for a few minutes before security guards asked the organizers, participants of a nearby artist and media activist conference, to pack up and leave.[1] Despite its short-lived display, the image became iconic of the then emerging refugee advocacy scene as it evoked the thoughts and sentiments Australians concerned about migrants, belonging, politics, and the past (Kleist 2013).

The 'boat people' stunt was a play on Australia's national memory, commemorating the First Fleet that brought the original European settlers to the continent, an event commemorated each year on Australia Day. At the same time, it was a political intervention in an ongoing debate about boat refugees. Sparked just a few weeks earlier by a standoff between the government and the MS *Tampa*, a freighter that rescued 438 refugees

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J.O. Kleist, *Political Memories and Migration*, Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57589-0_1

and transported them into Australian waters. The so-called *Tampa* Affair reignited the debate over how Australians should relate to migrants. As an immigrant country, did Australia have a special obligation to newcomers, as these activists implied? Or did the origin story of a European Australia, symbolised by the First Fleet, justify an exclusive nationalism sceptical of immigrants, as conservative interpreters saw it? In political contestation, so much is certain, the past seemed to hold answers about Australian belonging and migration policies.

The political action performed in Sydney drew on issues that are discussed in detail in this book: political struggles over migrant belonging in regard to memories of Australia Day, political conflicts about Australia's migration history, and about the formulation of migration policies in reference to this past. The connections between politics and memory, and between memories and migration, are not unusual or surprising. Yet, they lay bare new perspectives on the political nature of memory, redefining conceptual boundaries of belonging, and they provide a new take on analysing and understanding migration in relation to the receiving society's belonging.

Political memories are used to advocate who belongs and who is excluded, to draw lines between political opponents, and to give direction to political action. Political memories have been employed in numerous ways, for various ends, and for diverse policies. Utilizing the past to guide politics is not a novel phenomenon (Carruthers 2008; Harth 1991; Yates 1966), but in its ability to bundle diverse interests into shared sentiments it is a modern one. Political memories were particularly prevalent, for instance, during the nationalistic fervour in mid- and late-nineteenth century Europe, as Friedrich Nietzsche (1972) famously complained. Memories have since become an established and effective tool in politics. In Europe today, memories are enlisted for a plethora of purposes, not least to construct a pan-national ideology of belonging. The past is harnessed in manifold ways, and memories entail numerous implications, some desired and others not. In political debates, memories often seem ornamental, but in fact they have been imperative to establishing belonging and political action in time, space, and society. It may be widely acknowledged that memories are indeed fundamentally political, but what makes memories political and what memories do to politics, policies, and polities remains mysterious. Examining political memories in regard to migration, I contend, is an instructive exercise to go beyond traditional limitations in memory studies by situating concepts of remembering within inherent tensions and contradictions of political communities and modern society.

1.1 Political Memory and Migration in Australia: Integrating Pasts

Political Memory and Migration in Australia outlines in few words not only the content of this book but some of the conceptual implications of relating memory and migration as well as my approach to examining their political relevance. To do so, the phrase may be read in different ways, depending on pauses and emphasis.

One option is to pause after the first two words to emphasize 'Political Memory'. The term marks a distinction from studies about 'memory politics', 'memory policies', and 'politics of memory', a differentiation that will be considered in more detail below. The concept of 'political memory' that I introduce here considers political implications of memories in a very broad manner. It includes both the impact of memories on politics and vice versa. More specifically, I suggest that rather than *what* is remembered, the question of *how* something is remembered caters to particular political conceptions of society. I will analyse in detail the relationship between memory and politics and evaluate the implications of the various modes of this relationship, in reference to migration in Australia.

The second possible reading of the phrase pauses before 'in Australia' and emphasizes 'Political Memory and Migration' as a relationship. The connection between the two social practices, remembering and migrating, is the notion of 'belonging'. I define 'belonging' as bounded social relationships. At their nexus these fields of study are usually limited to questions of inclusion and exclusion (Agnew 2005; Benmayor and Skotnes 1994; Fortier 2000). As the word 'and' in the heading indicates grammatically, the relationship between memory *and* migration is indeterminate and, ultimately, the object of my interrogation. The impact between memory and migration goes both ways, and I will explore both directions. I am interested in how migration, specifically the politics of access and integration, influences the formation of social memories. This aspect emphasizes historical transformations in migration and political differences about migration policies and belonging as causes of particular memories. I am also concerned with the ways in which political memories impact policies of migration and migrant integration. Competing interests in political debates and in the formulation of policies refer to the past in various ways and for specific ends, rendering memories of migration highly relevant for politics of migration. Ultimately, the goal of this book is to substitute the

word 'and' between 'memory and migration' with a more complex understanding of their social and political relationship.

The last relevant option of reading the subheading is to pause again before the last two words, in order to highlight the country's name. Last but not least, this book is a study about Australia. Immigration has been central to Australian history and society since the arrival of the first European settlers. With unique implications for indigenous and new inhabitants, political memories remain hotly contested in the former settler colony. The country's self-perception has continuously been shaped by and in relation to migration and memories. European colonization since 1788 has meant that arrivals from overseas have always been constitutive of Australian politics. Australian (trans-)nationalism upheld narratives of an imperial or Diaspora link to Britain, then to Europe, and later to diverse origins. Thus, Australia delineated with regard to immigration its belonging beyond the borders of its polity, mostly to the detriment of the indigenous population. Consequences of settling the country, upon settler, migrant, and indigenous Australians, have defined politics and memories (Kleist 2009). The combined focus of this study on memory and migration thus aims to shed light on the history and society of the country from a new perspective. Not a comprehensive history of Australia by any measure, this book offers a novel narrative of social conflicts and political tensions in Australia's past and present by analysing select events of Australia Day commemorations in relation to migration.

Moreover, Australia's rich experiences with immigration and intensive struggles with its past provide material for new concepts about the theoretical relationship between political memory and migration. The phrase *Integrating Pasts* contains the fundamental challenges at issue here. Again, it can be read in different ways as either politically instructive or descriptive. Critically, this work is meant to be both. In the first instance, 'integrating' is an infinitive clause which implies that multiple pasts are to be integrated into something. Alternatively, the word 'integrating' may be understood as an adjective. In this case the phrase speaks of pasts that integrate. 'Pasts', in this context, means narrative versions of the past, or memories.

Both readings are relevant and I suggest that they are complementary aspects of one process. Memories are both result and cause of social constellations. *Integrating Pasts* implies a diversity of memories to be integrated as well as the ability of memories to evoke a belonging that relates and integrates people. Taken together, the phrase stipulates that there are

numerous ways in which memories can contribute to imagining and constituting immigration societies. In other words, there are various forms of memories with implicit modes of belonging and corresponding societal relationships into which people, citizens, and crucially migrants, may be integrated, or from which they may be excluded. Memories and migration relate politically in a complex array of constellations. I examine the ways in which memories are politically constructed in reference to migration and how memories in turn imagine a relationship between people that may include or exclude migrants in certain ways. This entails rethinking the political element of *memories* as well as re-evaluating political modes of *migration*.

1.2 Political Memories

The field of memory studies struggles with a plethora of conceptual challenges, which are seldom clarified or even named (Erll 2011a; Olick 2008; Olick et al. 2011; Olick and Robbins 1998). A fundamental problem of memory studies is the relationship between the individual and the social, usually distinguished by a prefix: individual or personal memory and social or collective memory. This difficulty goes back to the very origin of memory studies. One might go so far as to say that interest in the social relevance of memories was created from this dilemma. Henri Bergson, one of the first modern thinkers concerned with remembrance, famously founded his philosophy of human subjectivity on the assumption of individual memory (Bergson 1978). This approach failed in its search for purely internal remembering (Horkheimer 1988). Bergson's pupil Maurice Halbwachs tried to turn his mentor's philosophy 'on its feet' into a purely social theory developed from Emilé Durkheim's social morphology (Halbwachs 1980, 1992). In constant disputes with psychology, Halbwachs pushed the social into the realm of the individual, creating a purely sociological concept of memory (Halbwachs 1938, 1939; see also: Craig 1983; Ricoeur 2006: 120–124). His contemporary, British psychologist Frederic C. Bartlett, came to a similar conclusion about the social formation of remembering. Bartlett, however, considered memories as ultimately psychological and individually based (Bartlett 1932). The most important psychologist of the time, Sigmund Freud, argued in his speculative theory of the human's psyche that individual memories are stored subconsciously as traces that re-emerge or are remembered as mnemonic symbols in a distorted form to respond to a present situation

(Freud 1994; see also: Laplanche and Pontalis 1972: 138–140; Weinrich 1997). From this perspective, remembering is a psychological compulsion rather than a social condition, which nonetheless may be shared collectively (Freud 1997). Yet, to analyse the social and historical dimensions of memories was beyond Freud's psychoanalytical approach and was, despite some attempts at combining both (Gay 1985; Hutton 1993), the topic of Halbwachs' works.

While the topic of memory, including the dichotomy of the individual and the social, has a long tradition in western philosophy (Harth 1991; Klein 2000; Olick et al. 2011; Ricoeur 2006: Chap. 3; Yates 1966), these theorists of the early twentieth century are said to be the founding fathers of memory studies as it emerged since the early 1980s. Despite the coming of age of the field, the contradiction between the individual and the social of remembering has not been solved. Generally, it is accepted that memories are social. However, social memories relationship to the individual remains vague. Social psychologists have put forward a number of models and theories to demonstrate the social in individual remembering (Sutton 2008), the individual in social memories (Middleton and Brown 2005; Middleton and Edwards 1990), and parallels between both (Welzer 2002; Welzer and Markowitsch 2006; Echterhoff and Hirst 2002). Sociologist Jeffrey Olick (2007) has suggested a distinction between the individual *collected* memory, the cognitive ability to store and remember events, and the social *collective* memory that is shared and politically contested. Rather than describing an actual relationship, these methodological and conceptual differentiations have succeeded in expounding aspects of individual *or* social perceptions of the past but are unable to explain the association between individual and social memory.

I will not offer a theory of the entangled individual/social memory connection. In fact, I argue that such a theory is not possible. This work relies on basic assumptions about the conditions of remembering, expressed in Halbwachs' words (1980: 48): 'While the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember.' I agree with Halbwachs' observation, as well as with his assertion elsewhere that beyond such general statements about individual and social memory epistemological limits prevent us from grasping the relationship between the two perspectives (Halbwachs 2001). Drawing on Theodor W. Adorno (1997), I assert that the social and the psychological aspects of memory mean that memory mediates the totality of social relations on the one hand, with everyone's

individual subjectivity on the other. While the concrete entanglement of memories in its totality is beyond our grasp, which makes the theoretical mediation of the individual and the social in memories impossible, it still allows us to develop theoretical concepts of memories based on the assumption that memory is always individual *and* social. How the two elements are mediated depends on the socio-historical constellations of remembering. Memory is thus not a phenomenon that may be explained in a theory that is not at once a theory of society. This also makes the question obsolete whether memories are a result of social circumstances or whether it constructs these (Kansteiner 2010): memories are a mediating element of society. Ultimately, memory is in its various concrete forms, as an individual-social medium that relates people and conceptualizes social relations, which appear as belonging, a political issue.

That individual and social memories depend on and influence each other is an important premise for this work. As Halbwachs put it (1980: 48), 'I would readily acknowledge that each memory is a viewpoint on the collective memory, that this viewpoint changes as my position changes, that this position itself changes as my relationships to other milieus change. Therefore, it is not surprising that everyone does not draw on the same part of this common instrument. In accounting for the diversity, it is always necessary to revert to a combination of influences that are social in nature.' In other words, individuals' memories depend on their relative position in society, which varies from person to person and alters as the individual moves his or her position. Moreover, while individuals may appear to remain in a social position, memories are altered along with changing constellations of society. Thus, memories are contested for the various perspectives on society that they represent. In their specific mediation of individuals and society, and the mode of belonging evoked therein, which depends on the specific social and historical position of the person remembering.

1.2.1 Categories of Political Memory

Many problems in dealing with 'memory' derive from the topic itself, like the individual/social dilemma. Others are due to the inconsistency of memory studies, a field that due to its multidisciplinary topic has not developed a basic set of categories (Olick 2008). Any definition of terms is problematic as meanings change according to historical and social circumstances. Categories derive from and suit the constellations in which they

are used. Thus, categories of remembering are easily confused due to a variety of relationships in which social memories are relevant: individual/social, past/present, real/imaginary. For instance, the word 'memory' itself can denote both the capacity to remember and what is remembered. Moreover, memory needs to be distinguished from historiography and from history. In 'Figure 1.1', I suggest a model of social memory with categories related to five methodological roles of memory: practice, perception, past, present, and belonging. I do not attempt to ultimately define memory or terms, but I suggest a fundamental categorization of memory's forms and social roles.

References to the past are conducted in two ways, distinguished by their practice. Historiography is marked by conscientious research, a critical approach to sources, and weighing of possible interpretations. By methodological mediation it strives towards an objective perspective, the 'noble dream' as Peter Novick (1988) called it, that creates a distance between the historian and history. Although it is widely acknowledged that historiography never achieves that goal and in its narrative always retains a degree of subjectivity, as Hayden White has argued (2014), even the postmodern embrace of subjective narratives creates in its



Fig. 1.1 Model of memory categories

meta-reflection a conscious gap between the historian and their historical object. In contrast, memories are generally considered individual and subjective but, as argued above, are always also social and therein, objective. Memories are often spontaneous or even impulsive, but they may as well be written and constructed in a long process. Crucially, they relate to the past in an unmediated way and construct a connection between the person remembering and the past remembered. Thus, the difference between historiography and memory is not one between objectivity and subjectivity but rather a level of mediation between the now and the then, a question of whether the events of the past are presented as linked to the person in the present.

As mentioned above, memory is not just a practice but refers to the perception of the practice as well. In the latter case, it is differentiated from history, as compared to historiography, by its particular perception. The distinction between *history* and *memory* was first made by Halbwachs who argues that both are social but they construct the past differently. In history, which he calls 'historical memory', the past is a development of events which are distinct through individual meanings. In 'collective memories', a continuity of events is combined by one logic and meaning (Halbwachs 1980: Chap. 3; Ricoeur 2006: 393–397). Pierre Nora draws on this distinction for his *Lieux de Memoire* project. He suggests that memory is a pluralistic concept with an absolutist imagination of the past as an everlasting present while history is universal with a critical conception of past causes and results (Nora 1989). Paul Ricoeur, in his study of these and other Memory theories, adds that while memory is marked by continuity, history is especially concerned with differences and oppositions (Ricoeur 2006: 396). Moreover, both perceptions are 'condemned to a forced cohabitation' (Ricoeur 2006: 397). Building on and advancing from these models I understand memory as a homogenous version of the past and history as heterogeneous. Both perceptions of the past result from the practice of memory and each perception leads to a specific version of the past and ultimately, of the present.

Depending on how the past is perceived, the construction of the past varies. Memory focuses on an *origin* which defines the consequential time as the past remembered. The origin's assumed meaning unites all events leading up to the present in one homogeneous time and durable past (Assmann 1992: 52). Yet, the same past may be told as history in which case a discontinuity of events develops without a beginning or an end-point. History focuses on the heterogeneous *process* of time. Thus, the

past is made up of historical events which result from historical transformations and cause further change (Brändström et al. 2004). Whether the past is considered the duration of an origin or a process of events depends on the form of remembering. Moreover, the perception of the past affects its relevance in the present.

The social and political effect of memory varies with the perception of the past, imparting meanings differently onto the present. A memory unites the past with the present through a common meaning conveyed by the origin remembered. As the past is restricted to the time after the origin, its reach is also limited to the social relevance of the origin's meaning. Thus, memory emphasizes and delineates the collective past of a certain social group only. In other words, memories create *heritage* of a partial group and concurrently, imagine the group itself as a community (Anderson 1991: 155–162, 178–184; Lowenthal 1994: 41–57; Lowenthal 1998). In contrast, history transfers social facts of the past to the present as a *tradition* (Ricoeur 2006: 396). A tradition emphasizes a certain development of events in the past which may focus on a period or a group but stands in for a certain logic considered of universal relevance. In effect, memories are not only a perception of the past but imply a certain link to the present.

Accordingly, the way society is perceived is dependent on its imagined foundation in the past. What binds people may be imagined through identity stemming from a collective origin that persists in heritage and is then expressed as *culture*. Alternatively, belonging may be seen as the result of a historical process and the logical extension of traditions in which society appears *civic*. Social belonging is imagined either in terms of culture as a community bounded by heritage or as a civic association defined by traditional actions and processes. Moreover, the apparent link between the past and the present, as well as the perception of social belonging, informs ideas about how to proceed forth into the future, to preserve or to change. Hence, forms of remembering determine social interactions with the past and in the present on several levels, and impact political action. Ultimately, I distinguish references to the past with respect to their effect and function in society using two categories: *cultural memory* and *civic memory*.

1.2.2 The Political of Memories

Having defined some categories central to this work, the meaning of these is further complicated by the variety of disciplines involved in memory studies. Each discipline—historiography, literature, sociology, media

studies, and in this case, political science—implies specific labels, concepts, and expectations of memories (Gudehus 2010). Moreover, disciplines and their attention to memory can be further differentiated into areas of research, denoting specific relationships and perspectives. Above, I have pointed out the inherently political essence of memories. For the considerations at hand, I distinguish three areas concerned with memory and politics, namely 'politics of memory', 'memory politics', and 'memory policies'. Finally, I will combine these areas to derive a new perspective called 'political memory', laying down a conceptual foundation to my specific research interest: how memory and politics influence social belonging and cohesion, specifically in relation to migration.

First, possibly the most researched area of the memory and politics relationship is known as 'politics of memory'. It describes political intentions expressed through memories and conflicts about them, specifically regarding manifestations of memories in memorials, museums, or school curricula (Henrich 2013; Hodgkin and Radstone 2003; Lebow et al. 2006). Politics of memory, as collective practice of a group or society, are considered 'memory work', contested attempts in dealing with a common historical legacy. Particular memories are understood as political instrumentalisations of the past (Haug 2008; Rousso 1991). Collectively, they represent a 'memory culture', defined by a specific mode of conflict (Olick 2007; Reichel 1999). Studies about 'politics of memory' are concerned with the causes of commemoration and the questions *who* remembers something, and *why*.

Secondly, political effects of memories on society, rather than society's impact on memories, are researched as 'memory politics' (Foucault 1977; Maier 1988; Wolfrum 1999). Manifestations of memories are not interrogated as expressions of conflicts but on the background of conflict as catalysts of unity. In addition to memorials, museums, and curricula, 'memory politics' include normative objectifications of memories like apologies, reconciliation commissions, and reparation payments. 'Memory politics' may be further distinguished by their international or domestic focus. The first is concerned with 'transitional justice' to foster human rights through memories, specifically after regime change (Barahona de Brito et al. 2001; Levy and Sznaider 2004). In the latter case, memory politics aim at 'historical justice' by creating a historically inclusive society (Barkan 2000; Berg and Schaefer 2008). As the *why* is given by the objective of remembering, research about memory politics asks *what* is remembered and by *whom*. Its aim is to interrogate reconfigurations of power.

The third and most recent area of politics in memory studies is the relevance of memories for the process of politics. This approach asks this question: *to which end* are memories employed? On societal level, the political relationship between different memories is conceptualized as 'contested', 'tangled', or 'multidirectional', leaving open the common point of reference of these memories (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003; Seaton 2007; Sturken 1997; Rothberg 2009; Walkowitz and Knauer 2009). On the state level, the political utilization of memories may deliver an assumed shared 'national' interest of remembering. Its success and failure have been studied in a number of policy fields and been aptly called 'governing by looking back' (Brändström et al. 2004; Khong 1992). However, for this area that is concerned with the political consequences of memories I take up the more specific term 'memory policies', coined by Marie-Claire Lavabre in regard to party politics. Her concept describes the combined political use and function of memories. Its additional benefit is that it brings together the conflicting and the uniting potential of memories in the context of a modern democratic system (Lavabre 2005, 2006). Lavabre describes memory policies as a means of political distinction, which are concurrently a point of reference that provide civic unity. Memories are regarded as utilities of the political process, partisan and shared, but are disconnected from the political interest for which they are used. *What* is remembered, *why* it is remembered, and by *whom* are secondary questions are secondary questions as the concept of memory policies focuses on the functional and organizational outcome of using memories.

All three areas of research refer to very specific aspects of politics in which memories are relevant. Specific epistemological interests delineate the areas of concern, which are ultimately elements of a larger political process. Memories and politics constitute a mutually dependent process covering the areas above.

Here, all three areas and their concepts are of interest. In practice, they never appear isolated. For example, political debates about memories often include considerations about the political impact of those memories, while inadvertently the memories employed propel the political process of which they are part. I argue that the interplay between memories and politics can be considered more fully by asking *how* the past is remembered rather than why or for which ends memories are used. Epistemologically, this question draws carefully on the categorical distinction between memory and history, or between civic and cultural memory described above. I differentiate and evaluate conflicting positions in 'politics of memories' by considering how

the past is distinctly remembered by engaged interest groups. This allows me to illustrate social and political constellations and their transformations over time rather than essentializing political uses of the past in generalized terms like 'liberal' or 'conservative', 'left' or 'right', 'national' or '(sub-) cultural'. In turn, memories imply concepts of social belonging and policy formation, integrating considerations of 'memory politics' and 'memory policies' complementary to 'politics of memory'. The application of civil and cultural memories for political ends impacts the conception of society, the understanding of sovereignty, and consequently the construction of policies. Thus, as memories form and transform society through politics they reconfigure their own political conditions in which and to which they respond. Within this overall process, I consider and examine them as '*political memories*'.

1.2.3 Political Memories and the Study of Migration

As political memories are concerned with how the past is perceived and how the present is organized, they are specific to the historical and socio-political context in which they are employed. The political use of memories depends on the period and society it applies to. Memories and politics are context-specific categories that respond to and reconfigure social belonging. As such, they are relevant to all policy fields as they construct and distinguish between applicable and non-applicable groups. This is most prevalent in regard to the very basic categories of political belonging, drawing boundaries of the polity. Memories and politics of a country shape society's core and periphery, imaginatively and factually. They determine categories of inclusion and exclusion, transform them over time, and underpin their politically contested alternatives. This is nowhere more obvious and important than in relation to migration. Migration is retrospectively and politically judged according to how one may belong to society and is hence closely related to the central concerns of political memories.

Migration is regarded to be of critical relevance to probing the limits of memories in identity politics (Benmayor and Skotnes 1994; Rothberg and Yildiz 2011; Urry 1996). The perception of a continual past through both individual and social memories is often conceptualized as 'identity' (e.g., Assmann 1995). These 'identities' become political where they are in conflict with each other over the definition of the past (Kunow and Raussert 2007). Migration has been recognized as one of the major social

processes that pit different memories against each other. On an individual level, the notion of 'hybridity' has been introduced in postcolonial studies to describe 'multiple identities' emerging due to colonial influences and migratory experiences (Bhabha 1996; Sen 2006). 'Personal identity' of migrants is thus regarded as alternating between two memories, of the original pre-migration life and the past of the host society (Raasch 2012). On a national level, social memory studies have encountered similar problems in attempts to integrate migrant memories into the national imagination of the receiving country. The contrast between the two pasts of migrant and non-migrant groups leaves a choice between 'shared' and 'divided memories' in immigrant societies (Motte and Ohliger 2006). The challenges confronted by both approaches to migration memories are real and considerable as immigration inadvertently poses questions about belonging and integration. However, the dilemmas of 'hybridity' and 'shared/divided memories' stem also from epistemological assumptions (Handler 1994). With cultural and national models as frameworks of remembering, studies about migration memories are caught in an 'identity trap': memories are exclusive and predetermined as they delineate belonging based on heritage, 'culture', and 'identity' (Glynn and Kleist 2012b).

Instead, models of identity and identity politics are here treated as objects of critical analysis. Additionally, I propose that memory studies need to consider migration as a history of social processes, of experiences, and of policies of the host society. Memories have changing points of reference including and beyond imaginations of identity, with imperative implications for migration politics. Integration in particular raises questions about belonging for both migrants and non-migrants, to which memories can give numerous answers. This work is considered a contribution to the synergy between memory and migration that has been increasingly recognized in memory studies as well as in migration studies.

1.3 Migration and Terms of Belonging

The field of migration studies has expanded exponentially over the last few decades (Castles 2007; Favell 2007; Portes and DeWind 2004). It has not only become more international in its outlook but ever more differentiated by policy implications and migrant practices. Overall, two research areas may be differentiated. Douglas S. Massey discerns international migration from migrant integration (Massey 1998). The first is concerned with global movement of people, its determinants, processes, and patterns.

The latter is differentiated by models of migrant inclusion in receiving countries, including differential exclusion, assimilation, and multiculturalism. Stephen Castles and Mark Miller go beyond this differentiation. They see international migration as being influenced by political-economic factors which impact the situation in sending countries, migration movements, and migrant integration in host countries, altering citizenship models that regulate both access and settlement (Castles and Miller 2009). Thus, immigration is subject to historical transformations of society and global shifts, in particular after 1945, from mono- to multicultural imaginations of the nation state (Castles 2004; Castles and Davidson 2000).

Others view the field of migration studies as being defined less by historical processes than through international differences. Christian Joppke compares citizenship models of immigration regimes as well. He differentiates conceptually, not unlike Massey, immigration control from models of belonging (Joppke 1999). However, he views them as not so much as depending on society and its process but on the *longue durée* of the state and its institutions. Immigration control is based on sovereignty, he argues, and belonging on citizenship. His comparison is based on the assumption that a migration regime is determined by a country's particular organization of its polity and increasingly decoupled from notions of cultural belonging (Joppke 1999: 274–275; Joppke 2010).

The universal-historical perspective of Massey and Castles/Miller and the particular-comparative approach championed by Joppke both make important observations about migration and belonging. The first emphasizes historical changes on a global level, focusing on a general development from assimilation to multicultural models of belonging. The latter highlights particularities of immigration countries that allow distinctions between ethnic and civic notions of belonging. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Stratham created a conceptual two-dimensional space from these two continuities: monocultural to multicultural on the horizontal axis, civic to ethnic-cultural on the vertical (Koopmans et al. 2005). A migration regime's position within this sphere depends within limits, they suggest, on political contentions about migration and ethnic relations (Koopmans and Statham 2000).

To some degree, this book is concerned with all three approaches to migration: a universal perspective on society, considerations about the particular polity in question and the political tension in between. I argue that political conflicts about belonging and integration delineate Australia's migration regime, both in its historical development and as a particular polity.

Social processes, the organization of the polity, and the politics of migration are related by the notion of belonging. The notion of belonging, however, is as contested as it is relevant to migration studies. I distinguish two modes of belonging, as I did in relation to memories: communal belonging and civic belonging. The first is based on identity, related to origin stories, heritage, and cultural memories, while the latter is a mode of association, relying on narratives of change, traditions, and civic memories. Both modes of belonging are closely related but yet distinct in their relevance for immigrants and the receiving society.

1.3.1 Civic and Communal Belonging

Since at least the 1990s, the question of belonging has been intently discussed in the social sciences, primarily in view of the contrasting concepts of 'ethnic' and 'civic' belonging. After Rogers Brubaker's influential dichotomy of French and German citizenship, other studies insisted, Michael Ignatieff most prominently, that civic and ethnic belonging only together form political bodies (Brubaker 1992; Ignatieff 1993). These studies were important to accentuate fundamental categories of societal and political organization. Yet, they mostly glanced over the question of how the interplay of these two modes of belonging constitutes societies and impacts policies, how together they bind members and omit others. Migration is often considered an ideal trope to study societies' notion of belonging (Bauböck 2010; Brubaker 2010). Fundamental to this work is, therefore, how the tension of civic and ethnic/communal belonging, expressed in civic and cultural memories, constitutes an immigrant society and impacts its social relations and migration policies.

While many have recognized that societies are not exclusively defined by either civic or ethnic belonging, curiously little examination of how the two modes of belonging relate has been undertaken. Most studies have stopped at the assertion that civil society requires narratives (Smith 2003) and community (Yack 1996), or that nationalism needs to complement ethnicity with civic elements (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004) or constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1992). While emphasizing the complementary disposition, they fall short at explaining what the relevance of the relationship of the two polar modes of belonging is for societies and political bodies. In an attempt to bridge the divide, Taras Kuzio (2002) suggests that states develop from ethnic to civic models in a continuum of sorts. However, this teleological assumption is not only empirically ques-

tionable, it misses the ongoing and politically crucial interplay between both modes. Consulting cross-country surveys, Stephen Shulmann (2002) shows that mass conceptions of political belonging always mix civic and ethnic notions of membership, although, it has been added critically (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010), the meaning of the categories varies from country to country.

Part of the problem of relating civic and ethnic belonging may lie in broad claims for often vaguely defined categories which led Brubaker (2004: 144) to give up on the civic/ethnic distinction altogether. Yet, I contend that the categories can be conceptualized in less ambiguous and more analytical terms that allow for an examination of social relations and political bodies. The concepts of 'civic' and 'ethnic' belonging are usually credited to Hans Kohn (1944), but the conceptual distinction can be traced to early twentieth-century German social science (Meinecke 1962), reflecting nineteenth-century political opposition between ideas of *Kulturnation* and *Staatsnation*. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001) made the categorical distinction between *community* and *civil society* on which Max Weber (2005: 29–32) built his distinction of rationalities of the communal nation and of the institutions of the civil state. Notably, these early theories used terms and concepts slightly different from today's debate, specifically referring to culture and community rather than ethnicity. Communal belonging is now often replaced by 'ethnic' belonging, which is a rather narrow concept, sometimes elusively defined as based on kinship and ancestry (Smith 1986). Kymlicka (2001) suggests that the narrow definition of 'ethnicity' requires the addition of 'culture' as a more open concept, while cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1996) argues that the 'term ethnicity acknowledges the place of history, language and culture'. To overcome these ambiguous concepts (Brubaker 2004), I suggest using the category of 'communal belonging', referencing Benedict Anderson's 'imagined community' (1991), to encompass essentialist concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'culture', as well as 'race' and 'nation', as socially constructed yet politically effective, ostensibly immutable 'collective identities' based on perceived common heritage. In contrast, I understand the notion of civic belonging, or civil society, as one of association that is not historically given but requires certain actions (Arendt 1998) which can be either political, as exemplified in citizenship, or economic, as manifested in market relations. Thus, I argue, communal and civic belonging are two categorically distinct and polar modes, but not distinct models of societies by themselves.

Appeals to either civic or communal belonging claim belonging exclusively for political bodies, but only together do they constitute societies in the continuing struggle of coming to terms with the boundaries of membership. Thus, I contend that irrespective of the political issue at hand, the question who may be part of a political body and who is excluded refers to these two modes of belonging, civic and communal, in various constellations. This means that I look at belonging not in isolation as ideas but in regard to collective actions or policies, as two interdependent elements of Australian society and migration policies.

Migration policies depend on shifting concepts of communal and civic belonging. The first affords cultural identification that may lead to assimilation, integration, or multiculturalism; the latter implies participation in the political sphere of the host society, accessible through citizenship. However, civic and cultural belonging exist together only, in interdependence and in political contradiction, and never in isolation. The traditional distinction in academia between cultural notions of integration on the one hand and civic notions of citizenship on the other is artificial. Integration and citizenship are ideals and institutions respectively, of the same political belonging. Civic and communal belonging interact, construct models of the host society, and structure migrant policies. Their historically specific constellation configures political debates about migration policies, manifested in ideals of integration and the institution of citizenship.

Political belonging is the underlying notion that requires analysis to understand transformations of migration policies. In order to distinguish the categories of cultural and civic belonging empirically, I refer to the use of political memories in debates about migration as indicators or 'social facts' of their socio-political bearing. The impact of migration on social memories has received some attention in memory studies (Bodnar 1986; Bungert 2008; Creet and Kitzmann 2011; Erll 2011b; Glynn and Kleist 2012a; Hintermann and Johansson 2010). The same cannot be said to the same degree for studies about the relevance of memories for migration policies, except when it comes to refugees (Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013; Malkki 1995; Marfleet 2007; Neumann and Tavan 2009). Setting political belonging at the centre of my enquiry links memory studies and migration studies rather than bringing one into the other. Australia, where both the past and immigration are central to the notion of what it is to be Australian, provides an ideal case for this study of the memory and migration nexus.

1.4 Australia and Divisions in History

The impact of migration on Australia is hard to deny in that Australian society today is a result of immigration. The National Museum of Australia presents in its gallery dedicated to migration a history of mobility from early Pacific Islanders to modern-day backpackers.[2] The image of the migration continent conceals, however, the crucial differences of experiences between groups and periods travelling to and from Australia. Not only was immigration marked by privilege, force, or discrimination, but it had a broad variety of effects on the population living on the continent, depending on heritage, status, and other social factors. Thus, the way migration is perceived and remembered, and how perceptions and memories of migration changed over time, depends on these differences and divisions in Australian history. This is true in particular for the founding event of the European settler society that is commemorated each year on Australia Day.

1.4.1 Divisions in Australian History

When Captain Arthur Philip landed in Sydney Cove on the 26th of January 1788 and founded the new colony New South Wales in the name of the British Crown, he marked the beginning of European 'immigration' as well as the onset of British territorial sovereignty on the continent. Politically, all inhabitants, indigenous and newly migrated, convict and free settler, were now to be considered British subjects through the newly established order. While a common legal status made them all equal under the power of the empire—at least in theory—political, social, and cultural differences amongst them drew sharp lines through the freshly established community (Atkinson 1997).

The British settlement was originally set up to accommodate two politically distinct groups: the convicts who had been brought over to bear their punishment on the one hand and the colonial administration, including the corps in charge of executing imperial powers, on the other hand. Over time, convicts completed their sentence or were pardoned, becoming so-called 'expirees' or 'emancipists' respectively. Yet, even after casting off their convict yolk they remained politically distinct from 'emigrants', aptly known as 'exclusivists', who had left for the colony as free men, civil and military officers, and soon also as private entrepreneurs (Hirst 2008: 139–158). In a penal colony like New South Wales the difference between

convicts and those who were politically free was an intended distinction with long-lasting effects but not the only or even the most explicit division.

To the indigenous population the concept of a penal society founded upon a centralized and territorial government, and the idea of sovereignty and subjecthood, was a far cry from anything they had experienced and known (Stanner 1979a: 23–40). Likewise, their political and social inclusion in the new community was not part of the settlers' agenda, despite some rare attempts of coexistence, initially inspired by a lack of power to enforce British order (Atkinson 1997: 145–167; Reynolds 1990). Various laws drafted in the spirit of liberal civic equality, mixed with missionary aims and racist ideas of civilizing 'the wild', sought to protect Aborigines. However, such laws were rarely observed in local practice (Broome 2002: 105–146). Soon after the establishment of the colony various degrees of violence against Aborigines spread (Finzsch 2007; Moses 2004). The indigenous population was depleted to almost a quarter by the time of Australian federation in 1901 (Vamplew 1987: 4). The arrival of settlers took on the character of invasion much more than that of migration, the latter of which presupposes recognition by the host society into which one is immigrating. Extended conflicts left a bloody trail through the nineteenth century, marking the domination of Aboriginal British subjects on the fifth continent by the newly settled.

In British legal tradition the status of the subject engendered basic rights and equal protection for all, in theory. British subjecthood was in this sense a rudimentary form of citizenship. Yet, where it created belonging of common legal equality, it also gave rise to exclusion from social and political participation, privileges that would sit at the heart of fully fledged citizenship. It was not until 1967 that Aborigines finally achieved full recognition of social and political citizenship in the Australian constitution (Attwood et al. 2007). For non-indigenous Australians too, political belonging was not always a given. The status of penal society was abolished for most Australian colonies, with Western Australia legging behind, just before the mid-nineteenth century when political participation was broadened for non-indigenous settlers through the introduction of partial self-government. Constitutional voting rights were introduced for 'White' men in the lower house of parliament during the 1850s, in Western Australia not until 1890 though. The colonies were rather progressive, with South Australia introducing the 'one man, one vote' principle and, in 1856, joining Victoria as one of the first places in the world to introduce the 'secret ballot'. Also, women's suffrage was introduced in the

Commonwealth and most states in 1902. Yet, in all colonies the democratic impact was severely restricted by high property requirements for the politically strong Upper House (Macintyre 2004: 90–94). Crucially, Westminster retained overriding powers through the colonies' governors in all 'imperial matters' in some form, even after federation, limiting self-government severely.

This distinction between colonial self-rule on the one hand, and imperial powers on the other, was not unusual for settler colonies, although it was highly problematic. To legitimize its colonial expansion as the universal extension of civility, the British Empire introduced the notion of imperial citizenship in the eighteenth century (Gorman 2006; Pagden 2005). It claimed to extend the sovereign rule of the United Kingdom beyond the British territory and thus to widen its jurisdiction within which protection was guaranteed to include the population of the colonies. The novel concept seemed to justify the expansion of British rule because it was thought to be advancing the project of universal enlightenment. Of course it should be noted that imperial citizenship was not extended to dominions where 'White' British settlers were not the majority and enfranchisement would have threatened their powers (Pagden 2005: 42–43). Yet, in settler colonies dominated by a 'White' British population such as Australia, imperial citizenship enabled limited self government of the colony in the image of Westminster, but ultimately imperial rule was maintained. Where imperial citizenship was applied, the unspecified relationship between powers posed considerable challenges. 'The central conflict in the evolution of an imperial citizenship'. Daniel Goreman points out, 'was whether to value inclusion [of the Empire] or democratic responsible government as one's highest imperial value.' (Gorman 2002: §43) The ideological distinction between two civic belongings on the fifth continent, British and Australian, found expression in social and political conflicts. With the development of democratic institutions in Australia, first in the colonies and then in the federated Commonwealth, independence appeared as the logical end of the historical trajectory. Despite the introduction of Australian citizenship in 1949, civic bonds to the Empire remained strong, at least until 1984 when the last references to Great Britain were removed from Australian citizenship laws. Considering the origin and tradition of common law, Australian civic belonging may be said to be both British and Australian, (Barwick 1980: 145–161) and thereby even reproducing to a degree the contradictions of imperial citizenship (Zines 2004).

The British influence on Australian belonging was not only civic but also cultural. Australian settlers brought with them a British heritage

which they continued to cultivate under Australian conditions. This is what Keith Hancock meant when he called Australians 'transplanted British stock' (Hancock 1930: 24). Around the same time as the onset of self-government, the gold rush of the 1850s in southern Australia brought the first large influx of new immigrants. While these immigrants were overwhelmingly of British origin, rapid population growth posed two significant problems. On the one hand, those who were now Australian-born began to feel that their status of self-determination was being undermined by the arrival of new settlers who took on important posts in the colonial government and were often better educated. This led Australian nationalism to flourish, directed in part against British 'emigrants'. On the other hand, non-British and non-'White' immigrants were often confronted with much prejudice as they were accused of eroding the British foundation of Australian societies. The Irish, who made up a considerable proportion of the first settlers, were often discriminated against in early colonial life (O'Farrell 2000: 159–161). The small numbers of continental Europeans, who immigrated from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century in search of adventures, political exile, or in most cases, for a better life, were eyed with much suspicion but were eventually accepted. However, the greatest resentment was reserved for Chinese and other Asian immigrants. Even as legal British subjects, if they were from Hong Kong, they were rejected and often met with violence. Following escalating animosities from the 1850s on, discriminatory laws that restricted their free movement and their immigration were adopted throughout all Australian colonies (London 1970: 3–23). Cultural prejudices and legal restrictions came to form one of the foundations of the federated Commonwealth of Australia, and as such, in the first one-hundred-and-sixty years of immigration the original British colonial population came to be only slightly diversified. With an expanded immigration program after the Second World War, a greater range of immigrant nationals reached Australia. However, to preserve a 'homogenous' society, only British migrants were actively encouraged to settle in Australia while others were outwardly discriminated against up until 1973 (Jupp 2004). The common bond of society, whether considered Australian or British, was perceived in these instances to stem less from civic traditions and more from cultural heritage. Overall, however, ideas and sentiments of Australian belonging were marked by deep divisions and conflicts.

1.4.2 Interpreting Australia and Its History

With countless stories told of its history and innumerable studies written about its society, a myriad of versions exist about what Australia is (West-Pavlov and Schwarz 2005; Whitlock and Carter 1992). For a country continent that seems clearly delineated by shores and that appears to have a dateable origin in history, its character has always been shrouded in mystery (Crotty and Eklund 2003: 9). So much so that it was noted in European maps, long before any European had set sight on its coast, as the imagined *terra incognita australis*—the unknown land in the south (White 1981: 1–15). Spurred by various expectations, European imperial powers explored the foreign land beginning in the seventeenth century, and finally, British settlement began 26 January 1788 with the landing of the so-called First Fleet. Of course, the indigenous population, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who are thought to have lived all across the land in about 600 distinct language groups at the time, had inhabited the continent for up to 60,000 years prior (Macintyre 2004: 9–15; Manning 2004: 33). While the continent was already settled when the colonialists first landed, their arrival marked the beginning of a new epoch of social and political relations that would soon envelope all of the continent's population—and under which many of the original inhabitants were coerced, displaced, and killed. Ever since the beginning of overseas arrivals, altering imaginations of Australia have expressed and impacted the construction of the resulting modern society.

What all imaginations of Australia have in common is the relevance they ascribe to the past and to immigration. Both notions imply ideas about heritage and tradition, historical on the one hand and geographical on the other. The perceptions of the past and of immigration changed dramatically over time, along with particular interests in society and ideas about social belonging (Shaw 1995). The first historical accounts in the early-nineteenth century about the colony on the Australian continent viewed the new settlement simply as one element of the British Empire (Wentworth 1819). It was not until the 1880s that, in anticipation of the federation of Australian colonies, particular histories of Australia were written (Jose 1899, Rusden 1883). Nonetheless, even long after federation and the founding of the semi-independent Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, Australia was understood only in relation to the colonial mother country. Consequently, Australian immigration law, known as the White Australia Policy, offered preferential treatment for British migrants and

excluded non-European immigrants. Until the second half of the twentieth century, Australia was exclusively viewed as a result of imperial politics and inter-colonial migration rather than an endeavour in itself.

The discovery of Australian history began only after Australia had shifted away from its reliance on Great Britain in the Second World War (Davison 2006). This turn to greater autonomy included an immigration policy aimed at economic and military independence but still exclusively focused on British and European sources. The policy change was also reflected in historiography, in particular in Manning Clark's groundbreaking, six-volume *A History of Australia* (1962–1988). In the vein of a national foundation myth with socialist undertones, it describes Australian historical achievements as a culmination of imported European enlightenment. Even a more conservative version of Australian history by Geoffrey Blainey (1966) examined the relationship to Britain at least as a problematic although formative 'tyranny of distance'. The history of British and European immigration was always implicit in these narratives as a pillar of Australian society. It was not until the 1970s that this narrative was challenged when the project of 'White' Australia was discredited.

The greatest challenge to a European-focused Australian historiography arose from the integration of Aboriginal history, beginning in the 1970s (Rowley 1970; Stanner 1979b, see also: Veracini 2006). Indigenous experiences were increasingly taken into account as the 'other side' of the Australian story (Attwood 1989; Reynolds 1982). Ultimately, attempts were made to reconcile the indigenous and non-indigenous history of Australia (Attwood 2005; Grattan 2000). This perspective was rejected by conservatives as a 'black armband view' that, they argued, discriminated against the settlers' achievements in Australian history (Blainey 1993; Windschuttle 2002; Brantlinger 2004, critically: Moses 2003). The ensuing conflict about the definition of Australia's past and present, which lasted until the early years of the 2000s, came to be known as the 'History Wars' (Kleist 2008; Macintyre and Clark 2004).

Immigration was only a minor but always underlying issue in the History Wars, relevant in particular at its beginning and its end. After the abolishment of the White Australia Policy in 1973, multiculturalism became the official and widely accepted migrant integration policy. However, Blainey referenced his credentials as historian in 1984 to warn about Australia's apparent limits to accepting Asian immigrants (Blainey 1984). This was swiftly rejected by his Melbourne University colleagues (Markus and Ricklefs 1985).[3] In preceding years, national and 'ethnic' immigrant

groups moved into the focus of historiography as the building blocks of Australia's new cultural diversity (e.g., Jupp 1988). In the 1990s, historians and social scientists began shifting the focus to the development of immigration policies in Australia's history (Jordens 1997; Jupp 1991). By the end of the century, multiculturalism was well entrenched in Australian historiography and society while conservatives remained sceptical about multiculturalism and diversity was openly opposed by nationalists (Ricklefs 1997). Since 2001, the arrival of boat refugees has dominated the debate about immigration. Triggered by the so-called *Tampa* Affair, interest in the history of Australian immigration, and in Australia's history of refuge more specifically, grew rapidly (Jupp 2002; Mares 2002; Markus 2003; Neumann 2004; Tavan 2005; Tazreiter 2004).

More generally entwined with the History Wars, Australia's past and historiography have been reconsidered also epistemologically, with increased attention to cultural belonging. As in many other countries, Australia saw a boom in heritage research and preservation since the late 1970s as well as the establishment of numerous history museums (Bennett 1988). Moreover, public commemorations enjoyed increased interest (Carter 2006: Chap. 5), in particular ANZAC Day (25 April), remembering Australia's and New Zealand's military achievements, and Australia Day (26 January), in memory of the landing of the First Fleet. These social engagements with Australia's past have also received increased academic attention. Graeme Davison (2000) examined the use and abuse of public history for political purposes, and Paula Hamilton (2003, Hamilton and Darian-Smith 1994) has analysed conflicts of social memories in Australia. Yet, the role of immigration in public remembrance has been surprisingly neglected by academia.

1.5 Commemorations as Memories

Examining and analysing memories is complicated by the problem that they are not tangible. However, there are indeed different circumstances in which they crystallize, materially and in time (Nora 1984–1992). Commemorations are one such social institution in which a group's social memories are crystallized utilizing important qualities of remembering in relation to time. In 2003, almost one quarter of Australians feel 'extremely connected' with the past through anniversaries (Ashton and Hamilton 2003). Maurice Halbwachs (1980: 88–90) argued that time is social in as far as it is broken up into an infinite number of social contexts among which

individuals may transverse. A Commemoration reminds members of a collective group of their communality. Celebrating an anniversary, a regular event, a reoccurring date, etc., marks a moment in time, which is exclusively significant to them (Halbwachs 1980: 98–99). 'Commemoration', Barry Schwartz (1982: 377) declared, 'lifts from an ordinary historical sequence those extraordinary events which embody our deepest and most fundamental values.' Halbwachs (1980: 117–120, 1992: 191–235) added that individuals partake in many such commemorations, formal and informal, which in connection with a recognizable impression, a certain space, symbol or person, organize time to a group-specific logic. This logic appears to emanate from the group's origin that is commemorated at the set date and thus, through its repetition, establishes a *longue duree*. Commemorations are therefore important events for groups to reassure their shared logic which binds them together and motivates their actions.

While commemorations manifest a group through the apparent continuity of its logic, sometimes over centuries or even millennia, they are in fact partial to social and political factors, which transform their memories to suit the current circumstance of the group (Halbwachs: 1980: 120–123). As John R. Gillis (1994: 5) notes, '[c]ommemorative activity is by definition social and political, for it involves the coordination of individual and group memories, whose results may appear consensual when they are in fact the product of processes of intense contest, struggle, and, in some instances, annihilation.' As the impression of durability is important for a groups' cohesion, the social and political aspects of commemorations permits us to examine shifting notions of belonging in groups over time.

Groups that commemorate events of the past may be composed of two people or of millions of people; they may be a group of friends or a world religion. As the memories of the commemoration are located in space to situate and amalgamate the group, they invoke a local, regional, national, or transnational context. In this study I will concentrate on the latter two. Although Halbwachs (1980: 65) points out correctly that the nation is not a group that remembers with a shared logic, to imagine a nation may be the result of a particular group's memories, especially in association with a state. National commemorations are sometimes supported by the state and in a few cases are designated an official holiday. In those instances, national commemorations are public ceremonies, but they view national belonging in a certain light and are not necessarily agreed upon by all nationals concerned.

In contrast, transnational commemorations, such as those of religions, diasporas, social classes, or political movements, are celebrated by groups to define their membership through a logic which is thought of as their belief, culture, struggle, or ideal. These transnational groups are simultaneously partial within the national context—i.e., a minority in their country—and universal on a global level, partaking in memories shared worldwide. The origins of their commemorations mostly stem from countries outside where they are celebrated. For example, Christians' Christmas originated in Bethlehem, Muslims' Eid al-Adha originated in Mecca, Jews' Chanukah originated in Jerusalem, and Buddhists' Vesākha originated in Bodhgaya. While members of these groups commemorate the relevant locations with important festivals, they do so around the world and thus create a transnational belonging.

In terms of a diaspora, immigrants continue to celebrate national commemorations in their new societies rendering them transnational, the most famous example of which is the Irish St. Patrick's Day (O'Farrell 1994). Many commemorations in a country are transnational, not always but often brought along by immigrants. Their memories are partial as they are celebrated by only a fraction of the national population, but at the same time, they are universal as their memories are shared all over the world.

Australia is host to a great variety of transnational and national commemorations (Curran and Ward 2010: 191–223). Some transnational commemorations have taken on the status of official holidays, including Christmas, Easter, Labour Day, and the Queen's Birthday. National commemorations linked to events or moments in Australian history are, for example, Sorry Day and Citizenship Day. Moreover, ANZAC Day and Australia Day are the most widely celebrated national commemorations and the only ones that are official holidays (Carter 2006: 89–130; White 2003). However, the memories of the latter national commemorations at times take on a rather transnational character. For instance, ANZAC Day, which remembers World War One's Battle of Gallipoli, is Australia's most popular national commemoration but also highly relevant in New Zealand. The transnational character has also led to conflicts with Turkish memories (Ziino 2006). Australia Day, which commemorates the landing of the First Fleet on the 26th of January 1788, while very particular to Australian national history, is also crucially connected to British imperial history and the transnational memories of immigrants. As a memory of arrival and settlement, the commemoration of Australia Day was always closely connected to questions of immigration. The memory looks back to

the country's past with implied ideas about who Australian's are as much as who may join their society.

Australia Day has developed tumultuously throughout Australia's history to become a central and increasingly popular commemoration over the last thirty years. Today, celebrations are arranged for 26 January every year by local, state, and federal organizations. With federal and state governments supporting and funding the commemorations, and one in three Australians taking part in festivities, Australia Day has become a central feature in Australia's memorial culture.[4] Yet, it has not always enjoyed such unequivocal attention. From early on, Australia Day has been a carrier for political messages but different meanings for different people. Accordingly, commemoration of the First Fleet's landing has carried many names, from Anniversary Day and Foundation Day, to A.N.A. Day and Invasion Day, each of which indicated different associations with the occasion's memories. Australia Day was marked by political conflicts over questions of belonging, highlighting a line of contestation in Australian society that appears retrospectively as a trajectory of its particular history. These conflicts about memories and belonging were always, sometimes implicitly often explicitly, linked to questions about immigration and integration.

I illustrate the development of Australia Day as a commemoration related to migration. Over a course of two hundred years, the national day has been employed and contested by various political interests, which is shown in an overall chronological development. The following chapter focuses on how social and political conflicts in Australia's colonial history and in the process of establishing an Australian people brought about contested views of the past that impelled varying rationales for policies of migration. The chapter after that examines how, once Australian citizenship was established, memories of Australia Day supported and structured state policies of migrant integration. Over time, memories shifted from a civic to a multicultural notion of belonging, a process in which both memories and migration policies were continuously contested. Overall, this history of migration memories demonstrates how the concept of political memory can introduce remembrance as a social fact in complex and critical analysis of society, not least to examine modes of belonging migration policies.

Notes

1. Interview with members of the artist and activist group boat-people.org (Deborah Kelly, Enda Murray and Pip Shea), Sydney 19.09.2009.

2. See http://www.nma.gov.au/exhibitions/journeys/about_the_gallery (accessed 09.11.2015).
3. '24 Colleagues Disagree With Blainey', *The Age*, 19 May 1984, p. 3.
4. Australia Day Council New South Wales: *Australia Day History*, http://www.australiaday.com.au/about/history-of-australia-day/ (accessed 09.11.2015).

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CHAPTER 2

Australia Day from Colony to Citizenship: 1788–1948

During a re-enactment of the First Fleet's landing, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary in 1938, the Captain Arthur Phillip character declared: 'It may be that this country will become the most valuable acquisition Britain has ever made. It is, therefore, appropriate that I should express the vision which comes to me of a city stupendous in area and population, and this magnificent harbour visited by merchantmen of all sizes, designs and nationalities, bringing goods for the growing population in this land and taking away the surplus produce of its soil' (Thomas 1988: 83–84). This speech was never actually delivered by the real Captain Phillip. The re-enactment's pretend version, however, was referred to long afterwards. Not only was it taken for real but as proof of the founders' farsightedness in being able to predict a prosperous Australia.[1] Only, the British settlement on the fifth continent was not founded to be a model of freedom and progress. Instead, it was conceived as a penal colony, the evolution of which was far less straightforward than it seems in retrospect.

Throughout the history of Australia, memories of the First Fleet have been more telling of the context of commemoration than of the events commemorated. They have thus been revealing of Australian society and political culture. In various situations, political memories have been elicited to realize cohesion but also to express dissent. In this regard, the commemoration of the First Fleet on Australia Day is of particular relevance. It is marked to remember the origin of Australia and the link to Great Britain, the onset of British/European/White settlement, and the invasion of the continent. All such interpretations have been voiced over thefirst 150 years, not one after the

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J.O. Kleist, *Political Memories and Migration*, Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57589-0_2

other but in unison and in contention. While the competing interpretations of Australia Day referred to the same event, it was how they did so, either with civic or with cultural memories, that gave them their political implications. Thus, memories of Australia Day were at once cohesive, each take on the past providing a notion of belonging, and divisive, pitting their interpretations of the past and of belonging against each other. Memories of the First Fleet were promoted by those wielding authority to underpin undivided rule, asserted by those who felt or were marginalized to claim economic, political, or cultural participation, as well as proclaimed by a majority to exclude others.

The modes of belonging implied by these commemorations endorsed existing political structures as well as challenged their economic, political, or other forms of exclusion. The British Empire, the most dominant political institution during the first decades of colonial Australia, advanced a conducive version of the past that was, in turn, challenged by interest groups from within, including free settlers, ex-convicts, indigenous Australians, and later, Australian nationalists, federalists, and finally the Australian Commonwealth. Until 1948 the Empire played a diminishing but crucial role in the struggle over belonging in Australia. This is significant because one crucial element of belonging in the colonies and later in the Commonwealth was always transnational; thus part of Australian belonging always transcended its own boundaries. This created a constant tension that prevented a cohesive notion of Australian belonging, conveyed by memories through Australia Day commemorations in various modes and forms.

Aside from the Empire, immigration was another constant transnational element of belonging in Australia, from convicts, to settlers, to immigrants, to refugees. The increase in population by way of immigration largely went unquestioned because of economic necessity. Politically and culturally, however, migration was an ever-imposing challenge, not least of which was the question of who may immigrate and who should be barred. Modes of belonging were evoked to restrict access to migrants or to exclude them from participating in Australia's society. At the same time, modes of belonging needed to include immigrants, albeit selectively, to foster a cohesive society. Accordingly, memories and commemorations created belonging that, on the one hand, included new Australians, while on the other hand, also excluded particular groups of actual or potential migrants. Over the course of Australian history, political memories of migration politics changed in content, form, and relevance as well as in their relationship to each other.

2.1 Rebellion and Reform: The Beginning of Australian Commemoration, 1788–1837

'Australia is among the most cohesive and harmonious societies on earth,' James Jupp (2007: 9) claimed in a book from 2007. He argued this cohesion and harmony was 'based on stable institutions, high living standards, economic expansion and isolation from zones of conflict. Since 1788 it has never had a revolution, never been invaded, and no public figure has been assassinated.' While this assessment conveys an image of a peaceful and prosperous country, many of those who have suffered throughout Australia's often marred history might disagree with Jupp's summation, from Aborigines and convicts to those discriminated against by the White Australia Policy to those disadvantaged based on class, gender, or political views (Carter 2006; Connell and Irving 1992; Cotter 2004: chap 4, Moses 2004). Social cohesion achieved through the establishment of authority was always relative to the many and often shifting divides in Australian society. In particular, in the early decades of the New South Wales colony, uprisings by convicts and resistance by Aborigines contradicted the ideological character of British subjecthood under the authority of the Crown which granted all subjects legal equality (Shaw 1973). While Australia never witnessed a full-fledged revolution, the ruling government was violently disposed of only twenty years after the landing of the First Fleet. This rebellion, however, was not undertaken by those most suppressed in the colony, that is, Aborigines or convicts, but by free settlers. By 1800, with new convict boats landing more regularly, the population of the new society increased to 7,750. Of those around 1,100 were free persons, predominantly civil or military servants without political representation (Vamplew 1987: 4). Based on the convicts' labour, the colony soon established economic self-sufficiency from which free pastoralist and merchants gained great profits. Despite rising economic power, entrepreneurs remained subjected to the imperial rule of the empire. Thus, power struggles between settlers and the colonial authority were imminent.

In 1808, the so called 'Rum Rebellion', the only government coup in Australian history, was a rousing expression of the conflict of interests between local capital and the colonial state (Evatt 1971; Dando-Collins 2007). Two years earlier, William Bligh, better known as the infamous captain of the MS Bounty, was made governor of New South Wales. His rule has been described, depending on political views and historical context, as either a tyranny of digressing force and cruelty against all those subjected

to his powers, or as legitimate authority trying to reign in special interests and duly enforcing the Crown's wishes, including the establishment of a middle class.[2] Intense conflicts soon boiled up between the new governor and John Macarthur, a former officer who had become the largest landowner and wool producer in New South Wales. In fact, contrary to what the uprising's name suggests, alcohol trade played only a minor role in the tensions. More significant factors that led to the 'Rum Rebellion' were claims to property and land rights or, in the eyes of the rebels, claims to entrepreneurial freedom and security versus the rule of power and constraints of the colonial government. Macarthur was eventually arrested and put on trial for 'inciting the people to hatred and contempt of the government' (Clark 1962: 218). Although the presiding judge convicted him he was spared because the six officers of the New South Wales Corps who were sworn in to try Macarthur refused to partake in the arrest of their former colleague. This display of resistance demonstrated that Macarthur still had close connections to the Corps. Crucially, it illustrated also that many officers had considerable stakes in trade and property themselves, which they sought to protect. Bligh then charged the seditious officers with treason. In retribution, soldiers of the New South Wales Corps led by George Johnston, a Lieutenant of the First Fleet, arrested the governor. For almost two years Macarthur and Johnston installed themselves as new rulers of the colony, as they stood in for the interests of the colony's free entrepreneurs and, of course, their own (Atkinson 1997: 264–291).

The 'Rum Rebellion' was an uprising of local racketeers who had private economic interests that were at odds with the goals of the Empire. While it may have been a coincidence, it was highly symbolic that the rebellion occurred on the 26th of January. Historian Manning Clark recalled the rebellion in his classic *A History of Australia* (1962: 218): 'The following day [after Macarthur was put on trial] was 26 January, the anniversary of the foundation of the colony, a day traditionally observed by soldiers, the emancipists, the expirees and the convicts in drinking and merriment.' After the governor was ousted the same day, Clark (1962: 220) writes, '[a]ll night the carousing, the cheering, and the singing went on in Barrack Square, while no one so much as lifted a finger to help Bligh […].' A new sentiment had taken hold in the colony that imagined itself as its very own society and not just as a British territory. Ken Inglis (1967: 26) noted, '[t]he men who celebrated 26 January in the early days of New South Wales were marking themselves off from Englishmen, affirming that they belonged not to the land from which they or their fathers had been sent in shame, but to the

new land.' The distinction was probably not as clear-cut asInglis suggests. All inhabitants of the colony were still British subjects and thought of themselves as such. Even the rebellious officers themselves did not object to the King's rule (Macmahon 2006: 141). Nonetheless, the conflict of interest could not have been more pronounced on this particular commemoration. The rebellious settlers conveyed the foundation of a new society.

To reinstall imperial claims and to remind the settlers of their duties to the Crown, the colony was soon brought back under British rule. Lachlan Macquarie arrived from London in December 1809 as the newly appointed governor, only to find the rebels had already left to stand trial in England (Clark 1962: 266). Macquarie had learned the lesson of the rebellion: Instead of returning to the heavy-handed rule of Bligh, he sought to balance contending interests that had developed in the colony. The new governor reorganized the colony to the benefit of free settlers and convicts, providing Sydney with new traffic, health, and cultural infrastructure. Macquarie broadened economic freedoms for exclusivists and involved them in the governing of the colony; he bettered working conditions for convicts and, to some degree, integrated emancipists in the colony's social and public life, even granting them land titles after their sentence ended (Parker 2010). Indirectly, the events of the rebellion left a lasting legacy in regard to the colonial structure, politics, and welfare but arguably also in Australian consciousness and memory (Spigelman 2008).[3] The rebellion enshrined in the Australian body politic a division between an imagined Australian people on the one hand and external ruling and authority on the other. While underlying tensions between settler interests and the Empire persisted, material well-being created unifying sentiments that also permeated the celebration of Australia Day.

Contending interests in the colony were contained by providing better living conditions, which enabled ideological notions of colonial communality. The rapid influx of new convicts and free settlers resulted in growing economic strength and wealth. This was accompanied and explained by a belief in special qualities of the colony that settlers had in common. The anniversary of the colony's foundation came to serve as a fitting date to manifest this idea of special qualities. Clark (1962: 317) described one such celebration:

> For many years it had been customary to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of the colony with a dinner. On Monday, 27 January 1817, a party of about forty sat down to dinner at 5 p.m. in the house of Isaac Nichols. Nichols, who had been transported in 1791 [and was a former

> participant in the Rum Rebellion], had accumulated fourteen hundred acres of land by 1815 […]. At the dinner a Mr Jenkins sang some verses of his own composition to the tune of 'Rule Britannia', in which he sang not only of the day when Australia first rose to fame, and seamen brave explored her shore, but of one difference between Europe and Australia for here was a country free from the old world scourge of war.

This commemorative act hailed the new life, rationalizing it ideologically as a peaceful event of great importance while veiling the suffering endured and inflicted in the course of settlement. Memories of Australia's origin and the shared sentiment of progress were the beginning of civic debate about the direction of the young society (Inglis 1993). The refrain sung at the commemoration predicted: 'Rise Australia! with plenty crown'd,/The name shall one Day be renown'd'.[4] Anniversary Day commemorated the origin of a shared experience and evoked a society in the midst of being built, setting it apart from Britain and from the agonies of a bygone era.

The new life and commonly shared experience was encapsulated at the commemoration and in the song, as Clark points out, by naming the new continent 'Australia' and thus distinguishing it as its own entity (Clark 1962: 317). In contrast to the colonial term 'New South Wales', which defined the colony as no more than a version of the mother country, the new name expressed the settlers' understanding of their society as original and distinct from the Empire. The term 'Australia' had been used for centuries prior to the First Fleet's landing in reference to a mystical land in the south, *terra australis incognita*. It was put forth as the name of the new continent by Matthew Flinders in his journal *A Voyage to Terra Australis* published in 1814 and quickly popularized by settlers, especially at Anniversary Day celebrations (Macintyre 2004: 50). Governor Macquarie, sensitive and well disposed to the settlers' sentiments, recommended the name to Westminster in December 1817 (Macintyre 2004: 50).

The following year Macquarie went further in accommodating local sentiments by institutionalizing the celebration of the Australian Foundation Day as an official commemoration. Thirty gunshots were fired on 26 January in 1818, one for each year since the beginning of European immigration. A military review took place in Sydney's Hyde Park, and labourers in the service of the government received a holiday and an extra allowance of meat.[5] In the evening at the Government House a dinner was held for civil and military officers, and a ball was arranged by Mrs. Macquarie. At the event a figure portraying Governor Phillip, Captain of the First Fleet, was displayed alongside a banner honouring his achievements in founding the colony.[6] The commemora-

tion was skilfully devised to integrate early patriotic and potentially dissenting voices under British rule, from convicts to emancipists to emigrants. Official civic and military representations were utilized by Macquarie to subsume the Australian commemoration under imperial signs of power. Thus, the colonial past was transformed from an Australian memory into memories of the British Empire. The landing of the First Fleet was turned from the origin of a new society into a moment in British colonial history. Subsequent governors continued to alter the meaning of the commemoration in their favour by introducing British traditions in the Australian celebration. By the 1820s, horse races were arranged for Foundation Day and since 1837 boat races have been organized in Sydney's harbour.[7] These traditionally British sporting events conferred an imperial meaning upon Australia Day in which the First Fleet appeared as a link that connected the colony to its mother country.

Today, boat races belong to the oldest traditions and the greatest attractions of Australia Day (Cheater and Debenham 2014). In fact, many elements which have become habitual for Australia Day commemorations were established before the fiftieth anniversary of the first settlers' arrival. The public dinners of the early nineteenth century, organized officially and privately, were precursors to what is now an official reception and the usual 'barby' with friends and families. Celebrating on the nearest Monday rather than on the 26th of January itself, officially practiced until 1994,—for which Australia came to be known as the 'land of the long-weekend' (White 2003: 60)—dates back to 1817.[8] Thus, the commemoration of Australia Day has created its own traditions. Even the conflict about its memories has become enshrined in Australia Day. The meaning of the landing of the First Fleet, whether it was the beginning of a new Australian heritage or an important turning point in British history, remains hotly disputed. At the heart of this conflict about the interpretation of the past was always a question about political inclusion, not least in regard to migrants.

2.2 Nation and Empire: Pasts of Australia and Their Boundaries, 1838–1888

By accommodating the interests of settlers into his agenda, Macquarie succeeded in developing the colony of New South Wales as a project shared by the Empire and Australian settlers. Although the colonial society inherited its culture and its imperial institutions from the British mother country, it also developed its own Australian interests and character, which manifested themselves in the celebration of Foundation Day. Since its institutionalization, public Foundation Day celebrations were

held to foster 'unanimity' under the auspice of the Empire.[9] While the initial conflict between colonial settlers and the Empire appeared to be resolved through benign rule and shared commemorations, the relationship between Australianess and Britishness remained vague and subject to dispute. How being Australian and the common past was being interpreted by Australians depended on opportunities of their social and political participation in the settler society and on their relationship to Britain. In 1837, a question emerged around Australia Day that would become pivotal to Australia's political future namely: Who should be included in the commemoration and thus, in Australian society?

After Macquarie had promoted social recognition of emancipists despite resistance from exclusivists, his successors since 1821 drew a sharp line between former convicts and free settlers, the latter considered the backbone of the new society. Both convicts and free migrants arrived in Australian colonies in large numbers during the first half of the nineteenth century, numbering approximately 145,000 and 191,000, respectively (Vamplew 1987: 4). Convicts worked for the government or for exclusivists and were burdened with hard, mostly rural labour. After Macquarie was replaced, they lost some of the rights he had bestowed upon them so that after serving their punishment, they would no longer receive a land grant and were now barred from public positions. While many former convicts were economically successful, their social and political participation was severely limited. The New South Wales colony was ruled by the governor as the representative and executive authority of the British Crown. The governor exercised his power in cooperation with appointed exclusivists, settlers, and officials in the legislative council, and through colonial administration run by well-educated emigrants. With land being sold rather than granted, passages for free settlers were now assisted and paid for from the revenues of the land sales. Consequently, the numbers of exclusive emigrants increased exponentially with more than 66,000 people arriving on the Australian continent in the 1830s alone (Vamplew 1987: 4). As emigrants increasingly held a central role in the colonies, a new conflict emerged that pitted convicts and emancipists against free settlers. Both sides created their particular memories of the colony's past and modes of belonging that were contested in reference to Foundation Day.

2.2.1 'United Australians'

During the 1820s and early 1830s, Foundation Day was celebrated and received varying degrees of public recognition.[10] On 26 January

1837, however, besides events like the official regatta, a group dubbing themselves the 'United Australians' organized an anniversary dinner at the local theatre, attended by 160 mostly young people.[11] Their aim was to protest social and political discrimination against those born in the colony, who were barred from public life. Indeed, only those who were born in the colony, about thirty per cent of the entire population at the time (Vamplew 1987: 10), were invited, while British emigrants were explicitly excluded.[12] In one newspaper it was reported that the United Australians went so far as to pull down the corn stalks with which the venue had been decorated because it was 'no emblem of their country, it being originally imported into this colony'.[13] To the organizers, Foundation Day marked the origin of what they considered 'their' Australian society, against colonial memories of imperial rule. Derived from their heritage as natives of Australia,[14] they demanded political rights against the dominance of British emigrants. They based their demands on issues of migration and heritage rather than referring to established social categories, like convict versus exclusivist, by which they were discriminated against. A social and political claim was thus expressed through memories, defining Australian belonging in opposition to those who were perceived as wielding power in the colony.

The United Australians invited William Charles Wentworth to chair their dinner. Wentworth was a well-respected liberal who had acquired much land and wealth under Macquarie. He was born to a convict aboard a transport ship and was thus himself an emancipist, one who became renowned for fighting for emancipists' rights. Eleven years earlier, on 26 January 1826, Wentworth had presided over the anniversary dinner commemorating 'Australia's Establishment as a British Colony'.[15] In his toast he had recalled the great sense of justice possessed by the founder of the colony, Governor Phillip. From this memory he proceeded in his speech to strongly urge the establishment of 'trial by jury' and a 'House of Assembly', two political institutions of utmost importance to emancipist political claims and, *The Sydney Gazette* noted, of 'the greatest good fortune to that Country which possessed it'.[16] Decidedly, Wentworth was considered a fellow native Australian by the organizers of the 1837 anniversary dinner, by letter and in spirit.

Nevertheless, Wentworth declined the United Australians gesture because it was at odds with 'his political principles'; he claimed, that the governor was not invited because he was not a native.[17] Indeed, rather than uniting all Australians by demanding equal rights for all people on

the continent, the commemoration of the United Australians established a new line of distinction, between native Australians and new migrants from Britain. The implication of this conflict about a broader or narrower definition of what it meant to be Australian was political, as Wentworth noted. However, newspapers of the time were not alone in alleging the organizers of the United Australians dinner were not anti-British or against the empire.[18] The first five toasts of the United Australians dinner were dedicated to representatives of the imperial motherland, beginning with the King, and moving on to the Queen, the navy, the army, and even the governor.[19] The dinner actually promoted non-discriminatory policies like giving greater political rights to ex-convicts and their children, and in particular to give public positions to Australian rather than British-born colonists.[20] Wentworth on the other hand now supported the restrictions on voting rights, as reforms of the legislative council distributed more powers to landowners and proprietors like him (Kwan 2007). This conflict over the commemoration of Australia's foundation was highly political as it created selective memories and mutually exclusive ideas about belonging. On the one hand were those in power, justifying their position under the rule of the Empire, and on the other hand were those without power, calling upon an imaginary right of heritage to constitute the political community.

Such political conflicts about belonging found expression in Foundation Day and posed questions about the colony's political structure. The question, 'Who should be included in the commemoration?', also meant, 'Who should be Australian and to what benefit?' 'Australia' was not a dominion exclusively defined by the Empire anymore but had become an imagination of belonging in itself, associated with rights and power. Both versions of Australian belonging held sway, though they existed in competition. Ex-convicts were excluded or included depending on whether Australia derived from British imperialism or from Australian settlement. In official Foundation Day ceremonies, Australia was defined through British power, which included continual migration but excluded emancipists from public life. To the United Australians, only the original migration to Australia aboard the First Fleet offered a common heritage in which emancipists belonged. The experiences of early settlers became distinctive memories which seemed to distinguish native Australians from recent British emigrants, establishing the difference between 'original' and new migration. Behind this symbolic rhetoric the commemoration carried a political contradiction between broader society and institutional power, cultivating a constitutive contradiction of Australian society.

2.2.2 *The Birth of Australian Nationalism*

Attempts to organize another exclusive dinner for native-born Australians in 1838 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary came to no avail. Instead, the United Australians hired a steamer to salute the foundation of New South Wales (Atkinson and Aveling 1987: 8). In subsequent years, drastic political changes made the commemorations of emancipists obsolete altogether. Convict transports to New South Wales were suspended in 1840, and political power was increasingly distributed on the basis of property, rendering the status of convicts, emancipists, and exclusivists largely irrelevant (Hirst 2008b: 275). With the attainment of self-government in New South Wales in 1856, general voting rights were introduced for the lower house of the new parliament. The upper house remained appointed by the governor, leaving power in the hands of wealthy landowners and, ultimately, with the Empire. As the context within which the struggle for equality took place was transformed from a penal to a semi-free society, convicts morphed into a proletariat, and the notion of being native born took on a social rather than political implication. Alongside this, the commemoration of the First Fleet created the basis for nationalist sentiments.

Moves towards self-government, as in New South Wales, occurred in other Australian colonies as well. Aside from public pressure for greater political representation, the Victorian gold rush beginning in 1851 dramatically affected democratic movements all over the continent, particularly in Victoria itself. In 1854, gold diggers met in Ballarat, a miners' town West of Melbourne, to protest mining fees and taxes while calling for greater political representation and guarantees of basic rights (Macintyre 2004: 88–89). Though colonial forces subdued the so-called 'Eureka uprising', the democratic impetus of the rebellion was soon realized through a royal decree of self-government. Victoria, as well as South Australia and Tasmania, gained responsible government in 1856; Queensland followed in 1859 and Western Australia in 1890 (Macintyre 2004: 90–96). John Hirst (2008b) argues that it was less the rebellion than the gold rush itself that catalysed Australian democracy by freeing the economy from its dependency on pastoralist industry and landowners' privileges (Hirst 2008b: 289–294). The advent of self-government and the end of reliance on agriculture restructured Australia's economy in which the distinction of class became tenable in socio-political questions. Moreover, the movement that grew in the gold fields was not just republican in its claims, calling for general male suffrage, but celebrated a rural and plebe-

ian consciousness. This was deeply embedded in imaginings of Australia's past and land that were to be protected against external threats, in particular from immigration. The diggers' revolts, in Ballarat and across the continent, manifested an Australian nationalism in their opposition to Britain and the Empire.

The promise of gold attracted large numbers of immigrants, leading the Australian population to triple to 1.15 million over the course of ten years. In Victoria the population rose sevenfold (Macintyre 2004: 86). Besides Brits and various other Europeans, around 40,000 Chinese migrants came in search of luck (Macintyre 2004: 87). The presence of Chinese was not a new phenomenon in the Australian colonies. Indentured Chinese labourers had been brought to Australia before, and while their numbers were minuscule, they raised fears of cutting standard wages (London 1970: 8). Increasingly, Chinese migrants were perceived as easily identifiable competition in the race for gold, especially as mining deposits depleted. In 1855, riots against Chinese at Bendigo fields led to the passing of legislation in Victoria which restricted the arrival of Chinese, followed by similar attacks and laws in New South Wales (London 1970: 8–9). As gold diggers moved to fields in Queensland in the early 1870s, a hefty mining license tax was imposed exclusively on Chinese fortune seekers. Later, restrictions would bar them from working in gold fields altogether. At the same time, Queensland limited entry for Pacific Islanders who had previously been brought to work in sugar plantations (London 1970: 9–10). The opposition to non-'White' immigration, and Chinese immigration in particular, became central to Australian nationalism in its ethnic territorial claim against an 'Other'. More than Aborigines or the British, who represented some degree of 'Australianness', the Chinese were feared as an anti-Australian civilization (Markus 1979: 240). Since the 1880s, legal restrictions on Chinese were not limited to the control of immigration and work anymore but focused on race-based belonging. Efforts were undertaken under the guise of protecting Australian heritage to exclude them from naturalization as well as from welfare benefits, first in the states and later in the anticipated federation (Irving 1999b: 107).

The social, political, and economic transformations, originating from riches and promises of the gold, were formative of Australian societies. 'The goldfields were the migrant reception centres of the nineteenth century, the crucibles of nationalism and xenophobia, the nurseries of artists, singers and writers as well as mining engineers and business magnates,' Historian Stuart Macintyre (2004: 90) suggests. The events of the gold

fields, in which memories of the First Fleet were utilized to foster nationalism, became themselves crucial memories of Australian nationalism and constitutive of Australian heritage. In retrospect, rebellions like the one in Ballarat seemed determined by romantic sentiments of the land as well as by allegiance of mateship and against imperial authority. Alan Atkinson points out, moreover, the relevance of universities, museums, debating societies, and journals that were established in the second half of the nineteenth century as places to discuss national history, interests, and sentiments (Atkinson 2014: 120–131). Communality was derived not from British but Australian heritage, and in opposition to migration. In the tradition of the United Australians, the central criterion of Australian national belonging, as set apart from British heritage, was birth in one of the continent's colonies. This personal heritage was a condition to be considered part of the Australian heritage of original European settlement (Ward 1958: 179). According to nationalists, new immigrants, in particular non-European immigrants, had no place in this Australian society of natives.

While in theory colonial self-rule established political equality among the 'White' male population in the colonies, British emigrants still held most influential positions. The new settlers were better educated, better connected, and, in a society formed by British culture where being colonial-born was considered a stigma, had also a habitual advantage (Birrell 2001: 102–105). Moreover, with the Empire granting political power to wealthy landowners through the upper house of parliament, class struggles against social inequality were perceived to be directed at a foreign authority. In other words, British domination persisted within colonial societies despite increased local self-determination. In response, social or political interests were formulated as a national ideology of colonial belonging against imperial influences.

The sentiments of belonging and solidarity in Australian colonies were based on memories of the settler past. In accordance with experiences of stratification in the present, references to the past focused on the socially low strata of convicts, Bushmen, and workers. These memories established a legend of Australian sentiments (Birrell 2001: 126–129, White 1981: 85–109) that has been carried far into the twentieth century (Ward 1958: 223, Hirst 1978, 2008b). The struggle of colonization was said to have created shared ideals of endurance, egalitarianism, and compassion that have continued to underpin politics today (Ward 1958: 12, Neumann 2007). Thus, politically created social inequalities of class and social deprivations

were cloaked in categories of collective heritage and belonging like 'the people' and 'the nation'.[21] This particular notion of national belonging was widely understood in and expressed through Australia's unique non-European nature, reflecting, quite ironically, the romantic attitudes of European national movements at the time (Arthur 2001; McCann 2001).

2.2.3 The Politicization of Australian Nationalism

Australia's national sentiments soon found organizational structures. In 1871, a 'friendly' welfare society that offered support in cases of illness or death, open to all 'White' men born in Victoria, was founded in Melbourne. One year later, as membership was opened to all who were born in Australia, the society was renamed Australian Natives' Association (ANA).[22] Branches were set up across Victoria and later in other Australian colonies, finding particular popularity in former gold mining centres like Ballarat. The association promoted patriotism, to 'advance Australia', as an ideological foundation for national egalitarianism. In ANA's official centenary history, its nationalist aspiration was pointedly explained: 'There was a feeling existent in the community that a form of dedicated service to one's fellow citizens and one's country was needed to meet the changing scene in the Australian way of life. The discovery of gold in 1851 had not only brought great riches to Australia, but also a remarkable influx of migrants, and a multitude of other problems' (Menadue 1971: 5). The association was first and foremost a welfare society based on the principle of solidarity. That solidarity and mateship was exclusively extended to 'native' Australians was not done despite the presence of migrants but because of the 'problem' of migration, which was a central concern to the ANA. In absence of Australian citizenship or any other positive identification with Australian belonging, the nationalists endorsed Australian memories, including the 'discovery' by Captain James Cook (Birrell 2001: 110), and in particular the celebration of Foundation Day and the achievements of settlement, to define a common heritage which concomitantly did not include recent migrants. Conveniently, this nationalist identification overlooked the fact that most of ANA's early supporters were offspring of migrants in search of gold, with little or no connection to the celebrated convict and bush ideals.

Foundation Day lent itself to representing national unity. An ANA conference in 1886 passed a resolution, calling for 'a National holiday [to] be fixed and that 26 January be suggested as the most desirable date, that being the anniversary of the Foundation of Australia' (quoted in Menadue

1971: 185). Two years later, the ANA was actively involved in commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the First Fleet's landing at the grassroots level. 'Centenary celebrations in the Victorian countryside', Graeme Davison writes, 'were organised almost single-handedly by the Australian Natives' Association; where it [the ANA] was strong the day was well kept up, where the Association was weak it passed almost without remark' (Davison et al. 1987: 20). In Melbourne, the ANA arranged a 'monster ball and art union' for Foundation Day, the profits of which were given to the Old Colonists House (Menadue 1971: 186). The commemoration was such a success that for years thereafter celebrations lasted a whole weekend, devoted to the memory of Australia's original European settlement (Menadue 1971: 186). Thanks to the ANA, Foundation Day, in some regions known as ANA Day, soon became a fitting date to remember Australia's national history and to promote national belonging.

As Australian nationalism was moulded from memories of a common colonial experience, it necessarily excluded from belonging, geographically and ideologically, all those it deemed opposed to its imagination. Between 1885 and 1901, ANA branches adopted numerous resolutions against Chinese migrants, condemning their immigration and even trade with them (Menadue 1971: 248–249). When in 1888, the year of the hundredth anniversary of the First Fleet's arrival, boats with Chinese migrants approached the continent, groups of angry Australians stormed Parliament House in both Melbourne and in Sydney, demanding that the vessels be prevented from landing. Only after they had been guaranteed that the Chinese would not set foot ashore—there had not been much hesitation about it among politicians—the crowds dispersed (Clark 1981: 16–18). Asians' residency in Australia questioned the historical legitimacy and boundaries of 'White'-European settlement.

In turn, the British presence was not just a reminder of imperial rule but undermined the ideological importance of Australia's origin on 26 January 1788. In the long and universal history of the imperial mother country, the First Fleet and Australian settlement were no more than a footnote in the overall colonial narrative. Thus, *The Bulletin*, a nationalist journal with a socialist and democratic agenda, founded in Sydney in 1880, and Australia's most sold weekly by the 1890s, claimed in 1887 that to be Australian it was not enough to be born in Australia, it was necessary to have left behind 'the memory of the class-distinction and the religious differences of the old world' (quoted in Irving 1999b: 132). Memories of Australia's foundation in 1788 stood for the national egalitarianism

that with the landing of the First Fleet drew a line in the sand between Australia on the one hand and Great Britain on the other, in the past and consequently in the present.

Australian nationalism was a strong and politically important claim to belonging during the second half of the nineteenth century but not the only one on the continent. As the Empire was still in power in the colonies, its history and political traditions equally warranted recognition of British influences on Australian societies. In particular, the traditions of colonial institutions and memories of British culture allowed claims to a civic unity, in particular in the lead up to the federation of Australian colonies. These versions of the past implied less hostility to immigrants, to varying degrees, than nationalist memories and their imagination of belonging. Inadvertently, the nationalist and the imperial interpretations of Foundation Day came to be in contention.

2.3 Towards Federation: Memories of Britain and the Unity of Australia, 1838–1900

Australian nationalism was based on the imagination of an Australian heritage that had its origin in the landing of the First Fleet. In its opposition to Britain as well as to everything foreign, this version of belonging fostered unity across the continent beyond colonial borders. In the nationalists' memory, the first settlers' arrival represented the origin of their society. Yet, Foundation Day also marked the link to Europe and the colonial mother country. Britain was a point of common reference that all Australian colonies shared.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, three competing memories of Australia Day provided syllogistic ideologies of belonging in the political process leading towards federation. First, the tradition of the Empire and its institutions was regarded as central to the endeavours of creating a Commonwealth of Australia. Civic memories of the First Fleet as a moment of British colonial history contributed to this civic mode of Australian belonging. In contrast, cultural memories contributed to communal modes of belonging ahead of federation. Australian nationalism, secondly, as endorsed by ANA, constructed a cultural unity of Australians conducive to federation and independence. Its memories of the First Fleet as Australia's origin were in opposition to immigration in general. The third variant was British nationalism in the colonies that shared with its Australian variant the communal ideal of a White Australia. In contrast

to Australian nationalism, however, its imagined 'identity' as Britons was open to British immigration. In this interpretation, Foundation Day was a reminder of the British heritage that seemed to define Australian culture.

All these memories, of Australia and Britain, and their different modes of belonging, civic and cultural, were shared across the colonies and were relevant in constructing a shared interest in the lead up to federation in the last decades of the nineteenth century. However, in the 1830s, when Australia's proto-nationalism emerged out of the political struggle of the emancipists, the Australian colonies and their particular memories were still largely at odds with each other, and imaginations of belonging were far from Australian unity.

2.3.1 Australia's Civic Federation

When the United Australians embarked on their commemorative cruise to celebrate Foundation Day on 26 January 1838, New South Wales marked the official semi-centennial anniversary with a 50-gunshot salute, fireworks, obligatory banquets, and a regatta. In the continent's sister colonies, however, it was a day like any other (Atkinson and Aveling 1987: 9–10). Van Diemen's Land, Western Australia, and South Australia each celebrated their 'Foundation Day' on their own date—Victoria and Queensland would do so later, once they separated from New South Wales in 1851 and 1859, respectively.[23] In Van Diemen's Land, 'Regatta Day' was celebrated in early December to commemorate the colony's discovery by Abel Tasman in 1642 as well as its independence from New South Wales in 1825. In Western Australia the arrival of the first settlers in 1829 was remembered on the first of June. In South Australia, though 28 December 1836 marked the proclamation of British rule, it was not officially observed in 1838 as the young colony was struggling to come to terms with other problems (Atkinson and Aveling 1987: 9–10). The impression of separate 'imagined communities' with specific colonial pasts and foundations fostered intercolonial indifference towards a common Foundation Day. No other Australian colony would commemorate 26 January, usually regarded as New South Wales' Foundation Day, until 1880 (Inglis 1967: 28).

Despite their many differences, the colonies were all British and shared much in experiences and difficulties. They also shared a great sense of solidarity. At numerous anniversary dinners in New South Wales, the oldest and most prosperous of the colonies, toasts were given to the 'sister

colonies' of the Australian continent (Inglis 1967: 28). What was binding the colonies was their economic successes and political development *vis a vis* their common imperial mother country. Specifically, while they all prospered as agricultural societies in the first half of the nineteenth century, they continued to depend on Britain in all political matters, domestic and international. Therefore, the 26th of January could be understood as Australia's common anniversary, existing alongside the diverse colonial foundations, when it appeared beneficial.

Among the many similarities shared by the Australian colonies was their demographic make-up of mostly British populations, their economic structure and the arrangement of their colonial administrations. With the advent of self-government, beginning in the 1850s, they all undertook a similar reshuffling of their political organization, internally and externally. Domestically, they all instituted parliaments with a freely elected lower house, varying slightly in their powers. The colonies developed active civic societies with distinct but contested social, political, and economic interests. On an intercolonial level, self-government meant also less involvement on the part of the Empire to mediate between the colonies in matters including migration, citizenship, and funding. Migration and funding, crucial resources for the development of the colonies, were no longer overseen by Commissioners in Britain but became the responsibility of the self-governing colonies. The new governments had to compete for both investments and migrants which were mutually dependent upon each other (Macintyre 2004: 95). As the colonies stood in economic and political competition they were forced to renegotiate their relationships (Martin 1988).

Thus, the semi-independence of the colonies posed a challenge for notions of political belonging and thus, for migration. Domestically, self-rule meant that governors lost power to ministers who in turn were responsible to elected parliaments and ultimately, to their colonial constituency. In penal societies everybody had been recognized as a British subject and enjoyed guarantees of basic rights while only a tiny proportion of the population was involved in public affairs, namely wealthy landowners. Possibilities and realities of political participation changed dramatically with the end of the penal society and the advent of self-government. Now, all 'White' males were political members of the colonial society. Though legal and practical limitations restricted participation, a consciousness of common civic power and a sense of 'citizenship' grew strong (Davidson 1997: 48). Yet, colonies were not sovereign and could not provide security

and 'citizen' rights. In these matters, the colonists remained British subjects and the colonial governors were still ultimately accountable to the Crown. This contradiction of imperial citizenship, with belonging torn between quasi-citizenship of the semi-independent colonies and the subject status of the empire, posed vexing political challenges. Practically, the question was who should be able to gain membership in the colonies and how. More fundamentally, the question was how to define the colonial societies that new members could or could not join.

In the early nineteenth century, naturalization was determined on a case-by-case basis, with the authority to grant such a status vested in the governor as representative of the Empire. With the power of self-government each of the colonies introduced its own Naturalization Act under which migrants could become British citizens (Davidson 1997: 59–60). Terms and conditions of how to acquire citizenship thus varied from colony to colony. A significant dilemma resulting from these discrepancies was that the status of British subjecthood acquired in one colony was not necessarily acknowledged in a neighbouring colony, at times making it impossible for naturalized citizens, especially those with Chinese background, to travel across borders. These were challenges not only to those naturalized but to the colonies as well. The integration of foreigners was a problem for intercolonial trade and thus, became a political challenge that had to be met commonly by all colonies of the continent. Intercolonial conferences provided a forum for such matters; they were, however, highly charged with rivalries (Irving 1999a: 385). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, January 26th crystallized as a unifying commemoration for the Australian colonies, bridging their contentions, reflecting their common interests, and anticipating their political federation.

Since the colonies had gained self-government, federation appeared inevitable, at least from a liberal point of view (Parkes 1892: 465–466; Ward et al. 2001: 30–36). Intercolonial trade, naturalization, immigration, and other trans-colonial matters were long-looming problems. External security concerns, however, catalysed institutional efforts for federation. Common defence interests sparked repeated attempts to politically unite the colonies, particularly when Germany and France established colonial interests in the Pacific region around 1880 (Deakin 2000: 18). It was then, under the impression of a common threat, that Henry Parkes, premier of New South Wales, first pushed for a federal structure. While the need for federation was generally acknowledged, political differences between the colonies and their leaders made cooperation almost impossible. When the

Federal Council first met in 1886, established by British law in 1885, South Australia, New Zealand, and Parkes' own New South Wales were absent. This was not due to a lack of interest in federation but to power struggles, in particular between New South Wales and Victoria. When Parkes suggested in 1889 to create a new body to prepare for Australian Federation, this was rejected by Victoria, which dominated the Federal Council and invited New South Wales to join the latter instead (Parkes 1892: 469). Parkes' proposal to relaunch the process of federation also met scepticism in the other colonies while they realized that federation was no option without New South Wales.

The rivalry between Victoria and New South Wales was a political question based on economic interests. In the younger and, since the gold rush, more prosperous colony federation was associated with independence from the imperial government, which was thought to bring about more economic independence and freedom. In the older and more conservative colony in contrast, federation was favoured for the protection of the Empire under which a federated Australia could assert itself. Economic interests fed those opposed expectations promoting liberalism on the one hand and protectionism on the other (Clark 1981: 18.24). Such economic, political, and ideological differences between the colonies threatened to derail the federation process in its early stages. Yet, the experience of the centennial celebration on Foundation Day in 1888, in which all Australasian colonies came together harmoniously, was a catalysing moment. On a whole, the Centennial commemoration has been much neglected in writings on the political process towards federation.[24] However, the celebrations in Sydney were not only crucial in bringing politically estranged politicians together who were important in the process leading towards federation. The centennial celebration also invited historical reflection on the situation of the colonies, imagining a trajectory towards federation. In remembering their common foundation, they imagined a shared history and interests that appeared as a common bond and implied a perceived innate right to independence and to federation. Not least, the commemoration of Foundation Day in 1888 encouraged national sentiments and support for federation in the colonial population.

The tension between intercolonial rivalries and the unity of Australians that a commemoration of a shared past could provide became evident less than a year before the Centennial celebrations. In spring 1887, Parkes introduced a bill to the New South Wales parliament that sought

to change the colony's name to 'Australia' (Davison et al. 1987: 8–10). By monopolizing the name that was earmarked for the prospective Commonwealth, Parkes risked jeopardizing a common denominator on the basis of which the centenary celebration had relevance beyond the original colony. For many people in New South Wales the 26th of January 1788 stood for the foundation of their colony, while in other Australian colonies it was the commencement of European migration to the continent. Adopting the name of the shared territory for the original colony was trying to symbolically secure New South Wales' predominance (Atkinson 2014: 185). Thus, the anniversary would have been robbed of a name under which a unified celebration and federation could be grasped. Consequently, Parkes' idea was widely criticized, and not only from those outside New South Wales. *The Brisbane Courier* called it a 'theft' and 'eccentric'.[25] The conservative *Sydney Morning Herald* warned its premier: 'It would be an unfortunate method of celebrating the centenary to set our neighbours against us' (quoted Davison et al. 1987: 15). The controversy culminated in Victoria's Premier Gillies sending a letter to the British government asking them not to sanction such a bill without the other colonies' consent. In the end, the governor of New South Wales, following instructions from Britain, convinced Parkes to drop the bill as it was not in the British Empire's interest (Davison et al. 1987: 8–9). The episode, which took place in the immediate lead up to the centennial celebrations, clearly highlighted how harmony between the rival colonial governments was not achieved by drawing away from the British mother country. In fact, it was the Empire's unifying power that in the end held them together. At the same time, the event also demonstrated the strong sentiments that were attached to the notion of being one Australian community, especially ahead of the hundredth anniversary.

Until a week before Foundation Day in 1888, delegates from Western Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, and Victoria had met for the second session of the Federal Council in Hobart.[26] It was the only intercolonial institution working towards Australian federation at the time. However, without New South Wales the meeting had no real political relevance. Victoria's representative Alfred Deakin (2000, 23) judged that '[i]t remained little more than a debating society, though very useful as a milestone and meeting place for representatives of the four colonies included. But above all it was a constant menace to the anti-Federalists of the mother colony [New South Wales].' Federation was an option only with New South

Wales included as Deakin (2000: 24) confessed: 'The Federal Council became influential by the excitement it occasioned around [Sydney's] Port Jackson.' The centenary celebration in Sydney then was an opportunity to create this excitement. At the Sydney Centennial state banquet on 26 January 1888, dedicated to the shared past, much of the talk was directed towards the anticipated federation (Deakin 2000: 14). Parkes told the participating politicians and delegates from across all Australasian colonies, '[t]hese English exiles [...], unconsciously were laying the foundation-stone of what I believe will be the greatest Empire in the world' (quoted in Davison et al. 1987: 15). Though Parkes and New South Wales were not part of the Federal Council at the time, he saw the colonies coming together in the shared tradition of Britain colonizing Australia. Duncan Gillies, premier of Victoria, pledged support to a federation of Australasian colonies under British rule, accepting New South Wales' conservative imagination of federation over the more independent version favoured by Victoria (Clark 1981: 25; Parkes 1892: 467). With politicians from all Australasian colonies dining and toasting together in Sydney in memory of their shared traditions, the commemoration appeared as an element of an ostensible trajectory from a British past towards an Australian future.

Only two years later, all the colonies (except Fiji) met again at the 1890 *Australasian Federal Conference* to discuss the creation of a federal convention. Modelled on Parkes' suggestions, the Federal Convention comprised delegates from the colonies' parliaments tasked with drafting an Australian constitution (La Nauze 1972: 15–16). It took another decade of meetings and debates at conferences, councils, and conventions before the constitution gained royal assent from Queen Victoria. The Commonwealth of Australia, now without New Zealand and Fiji, was inaugurated on the first of January 1901. Civic memories of British colonization were instrumental in facilitating this process, laying the foundation for civic belonging in federated Australia.

The decade-long official debates about federation created the institutional framework of the Commonwealth of Australia, formulated in its constitution, which was enacted by the parliament of the United Kingdom. Derived from previous colonial governments and based on the Westminster model, Australia's political system, as detailed in the constitution, features a federal structure and a bicameral parliamentary representation (Sawer 1977). The constitution provided also the legal *form* for Australian migration and citizenship laws, the content of which

was spelled out and enacted only after federation. Though immigration access and citizenship were awarded by colonial states, and then by the Commonwealth, they did so under and *in lieu* of British authority, not in the name of Australia (Chesterman and Galligan 1999: 41–44). The colonies' problem of 'imperial citizenship', the tension between local and imperial belonging, remained.

In achieving self-government, the colonies became responsible for immigration policies. In the 1880s, the colonies exercised their newfound discretion by excluding non-Europeans and promulgating anti-Chinese policies. From the 1890s onwards, policies touching on all aspects of immigrants' lives, from immigration restriction to naturalization to deportation, found their basis in discriminatory and racist principles (Evans 1988). These legislative acts contradicted the right of British subjects. According to the principle of equality before the law, British citizenship and subjecthood were principally not race-based. Thus, in 1891 the governor of South Australia appealed on this basis to the British government to suspend the colony's Chinese Immigration Restriction Act (Menadue 1971: 249). In 1897, the Empire rejected explicitly racism in legal formulations of its Australasian colonies, though it did not reject racist exclusion in practice (Evans 1988). The civic principle of the Empire under which Australia federated came into contradiction with Australian nationalism which propagated racist exclusion as the foundation of the bond unifying Australians.

As far as the process leading up to federation relied upon civic memories of British institutions, the constitution abstained from 'race' or 'ethnic' stipulations. 'White Australia' was no more than a peripheral issue in the immediate federation process of the 1890s (Irving 1999b: 100). The racist self-definition of 'White Australia' was broadly accepted, including by the drafters of the constitution, but its terms were not stipulated by the constitution. In fact, it mentioned 'the people', 'person', 'British subjects', or 'Elector' but not citizens, basic rights, or migration (Galligan and Roberts 2004: 21–26). Instead, migration and naturalization, and the boundaries of Australian belonging *ex negativo*, were regulated post-federation by the Commonwealth parliament (Galligan and Roberts 2004: 52–54). As the representative of the Australian people, parliament enacted migration laws, based on shared nationalist sentiments and exclusive European heritage, to protect the principle of a 'White Australia'. At the same time, the British principle of neutrality of the law was upheld in a legal twist. The constitution's legal *form* formulated in the federation process and derived from British civic traditions brought about civic

institutional belonging, while the legal content of 'White Australia' was the result of a separate federation debate, the *vox populi* on national belonging. Thus, civic and communal modes of Australian belonging came together while remaining separate. Australia Day was the occasion that brought these sentiments together in the run up to federation, while also highlighting the different imaginations of Australian belonging.

2.3.2 The Popular Centennial Celebration and Three Paths to Federation

That the colonies could put their differences aside and join into a common national sentiment was visible during the centenary celebrations in 1888, and not only among politicians. Public festivities in New South Wales lasted an entire week and included the usual activities such as the annual regatta and other sporting events. In the same year, celebrations also extended beyond borders to other Australian colonies. In Perth and Freemantle, *The West Australian* reported, numerous private picnic parties spread along the riverbanks in honour of the commemorative day.[27] Canning races and a regatta, as well as concerts and a masquerade, were also organized as '[the West Australian] public generally kept high holidays, and, by endeavouring to perfectly enjoy it, did their utmost to honor the hundreth [sic] anniversary of the settlement of Australia, and in a thorough, Australian fashion.'[28] The Brisbane Courier published a centennial greeting from Queensland to New South Wales. In its message the paper linked the past with an anticipated future, suggesting that federation of Australia was delayed by the prosperity and security 'which has been enjoyed by the different offshoots from the colony founded by Philip a hundred years ago. But federation, nationalization must come [...].'[29] Victoria, having accumulated much wealth and having expanded its population rapidly since its 1850s gold rush, directly supported the centennial celebrations of the older, economic-crisis riddled sister colony. Australia's largest international exhibition at the time opened in Melbourne in August 1888 in honour of the anniversary. Duncan Gillies, premier of Victoria, suggested in 1886 that the first fair dedicated to Foundation Day be staged in Melbourne because New South Wales could not afford it (Davison et al. 1987: 4). Overall, the colonies' gestures indicated the uniting nature of the commemoration. On a popular level, the colonies sharing the anniversary was less in reminiscence of British institutions and more in memory of a common Australian heritage. Yet, national sentiments were, in one way or another, closely related to civic memories of Britain.

The allegiance to Britain by the colonies, as well as by the Australian people, was demonstrated at the start of the centennial celebrations. The opening of the centenary week celebrations in Sydney was marked by the unveiling of a Queen Victoria statue in Sydney's Hyde Park on 24 January 1888 (Davison et al. 1987: 11).[30] The occasion was attended by the governors of all Australasian British colonies, including New Zealand and Fiji, who all met at one event for the first time (Davison et al. 1987: 9). The occasion was thus particularly symbolic as it presented the shared allegiance of the colonies to the Queen. To the approximately 50,000 spectators, the emphasis of the Crown's overarching authority, moreover, provided an impression of superior identity, Britain being the leading world power. The Queen's image eluded to Australia's British, drawing on British nationalism and communal heritage, thereby nominally including all British subjects of the colonies into the commemoration (Clark 1981: 2).

The popular and anti-monarchist weekly *The Bulletin* supported the commemoration of Foundation Day in principle but disapproved of the official celebrations, especially the unveiling of Queen Victoria's statue because it cost '£5000 or so, and has, no doubt, been paid for out of loan-funds or sales of the lands belonging to the people of the hard-up colony of NSW [New South Wales]' (quoted in Kingston 2006: 88). With high unemployment and growing poverty in the colony, the celebrations were marked by stark social rifts. Two days after the unveiling, tens of thousands of people joined the opening of the newly created Centennial Park on the 26th of January, the highlight of celebrations that year (Davison et al. 1987: 11–13). At the ceremony, a symbolic Cook Pine was planted in commemoration of the English discoverer of the Australian east coast.[31] While the new park was considered a present by the government to all the people of New South Wales it was created from swamps and built with back-breaking labour by hundreds of unemployed people (Davison et al. 1987: 12). Not without justification, *The Bulletin* criticized these celebrations for being solely for the elites rather than for all. The journal supported instead the aspirations of the growing working class that were brought to attention by a trade union rally during centennial week (Davison et al. 1987: 15–16). While banquets and feasts were organized for dignities throughout the week, little attention had been given to the great number of deprived in the city.[32] Only after leaders of the working class called on the government to attend to the poor more than 10,000 food parcels were distributed to a crowd of pre-chosen recipients (Davison

et al. 1987: 11–12). This was an attempt to integrate the broad population into the centennial celebration, but it also revealed social disparities and injustices within the propagated British-Australian community.[33]

The class divide of 1888 was mirrored by how the past was referred to in commemorations. The Australian elite referred to civic memories of the Empire in anticipation of federation, and the middle class felt represented by communal memories of British imperial culture. In contrast, *The Bulletin* and the ANA expressed social agendas of the working class in nationalistic memories of Australian heritage. Selective as civic and British memories were, and although subaltern classes opposed the official events, the public celebrations that indirectly aided social and nationalist ideals. The Australian nationalist poet Henry Lawson considered the centennial celebrations 'not wholly useless' because people were afforded to read and learn about 'their' Australian history (Headon 2004). From a nationalist perspective, commemoration was central to determining who belonged to Australia in an ontological and authentic way. Nationalist memories of the First Fleet and of settlement were to be communal, social, and Australian, remembering the origin of Australia rather than expressions of an imperial tradition or British heritage. The past, in this understanding, connected Australians innately to the continent and not to a British colonial history or through hierarchical, British institutions. Remembering the First Fleet as a pivotal moment of Australia's history was something that political elites and the working class shared. Thus, they could agree and build the political process of federation on this commemoration, despite fundamental differences about the meanings the elites and the subaltern assigned to the event in their memories.

As official commemorations sparked Australian nationalist memories they brought popular-nationalist sentiment closer to official aspirations and politics. On the basis of national unity of 'the Australian people', the Bulletin and the ANA actively supported the federation process (Birrell 2001: 102–135). Throughout the 1890s, the ANA campaigned vociferously for federation and in 1895 it finally formed a national Federation League (Menadue 1971: 235–247). At Foundation Day 1897, the growing West Australian chapter of the ANA lauded its close links to the colonial government and began to engage with the previously opposed authority in day-to-day political issues like taxes and state expenditures.[34] Nationalism was transformed from an ideology into a political movement that served as the foundation for federation and national politics.

In addition to the conception of Australian nationalism in the 1850s, British nationalism as evoked in official centenary celebrations became popular in the colonies in the 1870s. While British and Australian nationalism

in the colonies conflicted with one another based on class and in relation to belonging, they converged on central questions of cultural exclusion. What both had in common was the racist idea of a 'White Australia' (Meaney 2008: 363–402). The proportion of non-British Australians was still very small in 1891, with those born in Australia or on the British Isles making up 94 per cent while 2.6 per cent came from Continental Europe. Asian immigrants, including those from Turkey and Japan, but predominantly from China, made up only 1.5 per cent (based on Vamplew 1987: 8–9). Despite their tiny numbers, Asians were considered a cultural threat posited to undermine the European tradition of Australian society. From targeting Chinese, measures were extended in the 1890s to include other non-Europeans, in particular Pacific Islanders who had been recruited to work in the colonies' most demanding jobs, in the cane and pearling industries (Markus 1988). In the decade leading up to federation, laws were drafted by the separate colonies to restrict naturalization and migration of certain ethnic or national groups and to even expel them (Irving 1999b: 107–108). The ANA was strong in lobbying for such legislation (Menadue 1971: 249–250), but the racist sentiment behind these policies was shared throughout the Australian colonies across class divides (Markus 1988). Opposition to non-European migration was born out of romantic notions of Australian nationalism and the desire to protect British or European heritage: Australia was supposed to be 'White', a category vague enough to bind the majority of the population to one another across colonial borders and political lines. Henry Parkes referred to this sentiment in his speech at the 1890 Federal Conference when he spoke of the 'crimson thread of kinship' that united all Australians beyond institutional disputes (Cole 1971). Even slightly diversified migration was thought to threaten the myth of a homogenous culture, derived from British or Australian heritage. These racist definitions of Australian cultural belonging remained distinct however from the commemorative and political reference to the British Empire and its institutions in Australia.

The federation process drew upon three different references to the past and, concomitantly, three models of belonging and migrant policies. Australian nationalism commemorated Foundation Day for the origin of native Australian heritage. The nativism of its cultural memories bestowed egalitarian birthrights, expressed in social agendas, while its communal belonging was antagonistic towards immigrants altogether, and non-'Whites' in particular. British nationalism excluded non-'Whites' as well, but its cultural memories of British heritage imported to the colonies was open to British migration. Oriented towards the power of the Empire

rather than marginalized members of the colonies, this conservative communal belonging was elitist and popular with the middle class. In contrast to the nationalists' cultural memories, civic memories of the British Empire and of Australian colonization evoked a political tradition from the establishment of British institutions towards federation. Emphasizing acts of governing and economic developments, migration was not a concern to belonging but an object of policies and political ends. Belonging, like subjecthood and citizenship, was mediated through the political institutions that memories referred to but was neutral to the cultural or 'racial' background of the subjects. Civic memories of Australia's imperial past advanced a liberal view of federation and Australia, providing a logic for the new Constitution.

While all three references to the past represented distinct models of belonging and migration policies, they were often blurred in reality. Proponents would often refer to two or all three versions of the past at once. No one embodied this combination perhaps as much as Alfred Deakin, who would later become the second Prime Minister of Australia. As representative of Victoria, he was a leading figure in the federation process and deeply involved in the drafting of the constitution. He was also a figurehead of the ANA and is often cited as an example of the nationalist undertone of the Australian federation period (e.g., Birrell 2001: 150–151). Indeed, Deakin was concerned with both the civic-legal aspect of federation as well as with the national sentiments of belonging. In 1887, *The South Australian Advertiser* reported a speech he gave at an ANA banquet: 'The policy of native born Australians, therefore, he [Deakin] set down under three heads:—First, domestic policy; second Australian federation; third, Imperial federation […].'[35] These goals represented the contending modes of belonging that dominated the political debate towards the end of the nineteenth century: A.N.A.'s domestic policy of Australian nativism, civic institutional belonging of federation, and British nationalism that unified the colonies of the Empire. They were distinct yet complementary.

The blurring of contending concepts in political discourse was possible because the models of belonging and their memories shared certain aspects. British and Australian nationalism both evoked communal memories of a 'White' Australia. Civic memories of federation shared with British nationalism the allusion to a British past, to its institutions or to its culture, respectively. Australian nationalism recalled the history of Australia's colonial settlement (see Stokes 2004) just as civic memories of federation did.

Thus, the models of belonging existed in a political trinity, at the heart of which was the distinction between exclusively communal memories on the one hand and civic memories with liberal migration policies on the other. In 1901, both communal and civic belonging, along with their memories, came together in the Commonwealth of Australia. Despite federation, the relationship between communal and civic belonging continued to be ambiguous as Australia remained under partial control of the British Empire. After federation in fact, Australian belonging became highly contested once again, re-configuring national commemorations.

2.4 From Suzerainty to Citizenship: Conflicts About Commemorations and the Boundaries of the Australian Commonwealth, 1901–1948

In an article, published in the London *Morning Post* in early January 1901, Deakin anticipated a difficult start for the four million 'Independent Australian Britons', as he called them, as not even the imperial Parliament in Westminster could remove the frictions, misunderstandings, and antagonisms of thought that prevailed as the newly constituted Australians took their future into their own hands on a scale greater than which they were accustomed. He argued that bringing both civic and communal modes of belonging together bore inherent difficulties in the newly established Commonwealth of Australia:

> Because they are enriched by the acquisition of a Federal in addition to a State citizenship they will not be at once inspired with Federal feelings. There will be no complete break with the past. Their horizon will be wider than it was, but in all likelihood will fall short of the actual field of influence now open to them. The Union, as begun, will be formal and legal rather than vital. In a few years, no doubt, common interests will supply links capable of standing the strain of local divergences, and by degrees party lines will be drawn, determined not as at present largely by geographical consideration, but by principles of national import… (Deakin 2000: 174)

The unity of Australia, which seemed almost inevitable before federation, was difficult for Australians to grasp as a context of belonging once it was achieved. In fact, several contending imaginations of belonging drew 'party lines', in Deakin's words, according to political views, each with its own specific commemoration in the early decades of federation, from

Foundation Day to Empire Day to Anzac Day—before rediscovering Australia Day. These frictions were spurred on by underlying contradictions born, as Deakin alluded, from federation itself.

2.4.1 The Paradox of Immigration Policies and the Decline of Australia Day

The official debates leading up to federation were almost exclusively concerned with questions of institutional design (La Nauze 1972). Among the greatest challenges were calibrating the relationship of the states to the Commonwealth and configuring the structure of the federal institutions. Reliance on the British Empire was never seriously questioned—only the degree of dependence was discussed (Irving 1999b: 29)—giving, in the end, the independent Commonwealth of Australia the status of a vassal state to a suzerain. Ultimately, the Empire held control, in particular in matters of concern to Britain's foreign policy. The relationship between the institutions on the state, federal, and imperial levels was detailed in the constitution. Yet, domestically the relationship between Australian state institutions and citizens was left unspecified. In fact, citizens were not mentioned in the constitution at all.[36] Moreover, Australian citizenship had not yet been created. This established an obvious discord between the state's institutional system on the one hand and society on the other. The authors of the constitution made stipulations that impacted membership only indirectly, leaving it up to the Commonwealth legislative to specify Australian belonging.[37] Australian society was thus defined in relation to matters of immigration and naturalization as a set of civil rights, and not in relation to the Commonwealth state. In effect, Australians' relationship to their state and to each other was, and continues to be, characterized by control of migration (Davidson 1997: 149–158). In other words, Australian civic belonging is dependent upon the social perception of 'aliens' and newcomers. In contrast, Australians were also British subjects in the first half of the twentieth century, and thus their belonging was also defined by Australia's connection to the Empire. It was the link with Great Britain that provided Australians with a civic notion of unity, now supplemented by civic belonging formed in relation to migration. Thus, the contradiction of imperial citizenship continued to define Australians—or 'independent Australian Britons', as Deakin called them—and their conflict over belonging. What was new in the Commonwealth was that not only communal but civic belonging was formulated in direct reference to migration.

At the turn of the century, both Australia's economy and immigration numbers hit rock bottom. In both matters, the continent depended on Britain, and despite its need for investment and a growing population it did not, in contrast to other British colonies at the time, waver in its reliance on the Empire (Richards 2008: 39–40). The central role of migration and the Empire to Australia's self-perception was made most apparent in one of the first laws passed by the new Australian parliament, the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*. The act had its origin in pre-federal times when Australian colonies embarked on realizing the ideal of a White Australia by way of enacting racist laws in the 1880s and 1890s. The British secretary of state for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, urged the colonies to abandon discriminatory language from their legislation as it clashed with British principles and interests (Evans 1988: 10–11). At an intercolonial conference in 1897, he suggested an alternative model, just introduced in South Africa's Natal, in which immigrants had to pass a dictation test at the behest of a customs officer in a European language of the officer's choice. This measure was first introduced in Australian colonies and then instituted later by the Commonwealth through the Immigration Restriction Act, which came to be known as the 'White Australia Policy'. The advantage of the law was that it refrained from any mention of 'race' or nationality.[38] Instead, custom officers were directly instructed to apply the test in a way that prevented admission of 'undesirable aliens' and facilitated the repatriation of those already present (Richards 2008: 48–52). The definition of 'undesirable' was left to the officer. It particularly affected those perceived as non-White, such as Asians and Pacific Islanders but also Southern Europeans as well as politically undesired individuals, as Czech journalist Egon-Erwin Kisch experienced in 1935 (Kisch 1937). While 'White Australia' was undisputed at the time, the solution mirrored the friction of Australian belonging by vaguely accommodating desires of both the Empire and the Australian population without clear mediation. Effectively, the Empire's principle of non-discrimination was violated while the will of the Australian people was not democratically put into law. Still, both sides were sufficiently content. The law existed until 1958.

The tension between the allegiance to the British Empire and national sentiments of Australian belonging also affected memories and commemorations in the new Commonwealth, leading to the succession of an array of national days. In the early years after federation the ANA continued to organize celebrations for Foundation Day, by then often called 'Anniversary Day' and increasingly 'Australia Day', with events ranging

from athletic and musical competitions to exhibitions to formal occasions (Inglis 1967: 29–30; Menadue 1971: 186–187). At an ANA anniversary banquet on 26 January 1902, the Governor General and the Prime Minister lauded the organization's services to Australia (Menadue 1971: 179–184). The event was as much a celebration of Australia as of the ANA itself. The organization was, in its own assessment, stronger than ever before (Menadue 1971: 179). Yet, Anniversary Day, which had been a rallying point for federation for politically conflicting groups, was rendered wholly partisan in the Commonwealth. Before 1901, the commemoration crystallized cultural memories of British nationalism and of the Australian community, imagining a nation to be unified, as well as civic memories of the Empire and of imperial institutions in the federation process. After federation, the ANA continued to champion Australian nationalism but with its central objectives fulfilled, national unity and White Australia, it turned its attention to a related concern. The association was opposed to the influence the Empire had over the Commonwealth of Australia. In particular, it was worried about Britain dictating Australian immigration policy by aiding the import of coolie labour from India and China, as had been done in South Africa (Menadue 1971: 251). The ANA aimed Anniversary Day directly against what used to be a polar element of its official commemoration since Macquarie: the influence of the Empire on Australian belonging. The ANA advocated for Australia Day to become the official national holiday to promote a communal Australian belonging and to advance Australia's independence from Britain, thereby setting it apart from its civic and British national memories.

In fact, with the achievement of federation and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia, civic memories vanished from Australia Day commemorations and, only a few years later, came to focus on the Empire itself. In turn, as commemorations of Anniversary Day abandoned memories of Australia's British past, they lost their broad appeal. Only a few years previous to Australian federation, Foundation Day had been widely celebrated throughout the colonies.[39] In 1901, however, it was impeded by the death of Queen Victoria on 9 January, and was replaced by memorial services for the late monarch.[40] Subsequently, it was overshadowed by Empire Day. The Advertiser newspaper from Adelaide commented, on the 26th of January 1901, '[f]or many years past January 26 has been observed in the eastern colonies as a public holiday, as it is the anniversary of the earliest colonisation of Australia. It was in 1788 that the flag of the Empire was unfurled in Sydney Cove in the presence

of Governor Phillip.'[41] Notably, this positive perception of Anniversary Day was one of an imperial and civic commemoration, referring to the process of colonization and emphasizing the symbol of British power on the continent. The commemoration would have taken place, the paper explained, had it not been for the loss of the monarch. Yet, concurrently, *The Advertiser* cast doubt over the future of the commemoration as 'the arrival of six shiploads of convicts in Sydney Harbor is surely not a circumstance worthy of perpetual commemoration'.[42] After first presenting Australia Day as a commemoration well worth celebrating, the author dismissed it shortly after as irrelevant. In the first interpretation Anniversary Day was presented as an imperial commemoration which the author was happy to see being celebrated. In the latter passage the commemoration appeared as one of communal heritage of Australia's original European settlement, judged as not worthy of being remembered. For a free civil society the passive attribute of convict heritage was considered a 'birth stain'. It was predicted that '[t]he fact that January will now have a second public holiday—the anniversary of the King's Accession—will probably be fatal to the mistaken proposal to adopt January 26 as the annual holiday in honour of Federation.'[43] While Empire Day would eventually be celebrated on the 24th of May, Queen Victoria's birthday, the author was right that the new national day rivalled, and for a while superseded, the commemoration of Australia's foundation as the most popular memorial event of this newly created country.

2.4.2 Empire Day and Australia Day

Empire Day had its origin in 1890s Britain where it was founded to promote loyalty at home and in the dominions (French 1978: 62–63). It caught on in British colonies after the turn of the century, and in Australia the conservative British Empire League (BEL), established in 1902, lobbied for its recognition (French 1978: 63). Though it was claimed to stand for imperial unity, the commemoration was designed to be explicitly political, directed against pacifists, nationalists, and socialists (French 1978: 63). It achieved no official acknowledgment until 1905, when a conservative coalition of economically liberal parliamentarians, formed through an anti-socialist agreement, came into federal government (French 1978: 63). Empire Day was never an official public holiday but was sanctioned as a school function and quickly received widespread support. The BEL was active in promoting Empire Day and its ideals, determined to create

a 'Citizen's Empire Day' for the young and the old (French 1978: 65). Schools organized events including choirs singing imperial songs, lectures, and essay competitions on the merits of the Empire as well as picnics, sports competitions, and fireworks (French 1978: 66, Warden 2008: 15–16). For adults, the day was an opportunity to express loyalty and commitment to Great Britain. Rallies at the stock exchange would laud the economic and political advantages of the Empire. A show of Britain's naval strength on Empire Day emphasized the virtue of the allegiance ahead of World War One (French 1978: 66–67). Yet, the celebration of Empire Day in Australia, Maurice French suggests, served 'not only as a barometer of imperial patriotic fervour but also an indicator of social and political polarity, of a continued, if muted, "nationalist versus imperialist dichotomy"' (French 1978: 65).

Loyalty to the Empire was promoted in opposition to national sentiments to a point of ridicule of Australian politics, prompting Deakin to cautiously warn of 'a discordant note' in the celebration of the Empire (French 1978: 67). He went on to criticize the organizers of Empire Day for advertising 'their profound interest in the British politics in which they have no voice […] while belittling the politics here to which they ought to have constant attention' (quoted in French 1978: 69). Implicitly, he pointed to the paradox of celebrating a civic ideal in Australia where sovereign political authority was beyond participation and political participation was without sovereign authority.

The Australian labour movement was opposed to Empire Day as well. *The Bulletin* urged 'parents who are Australians first […] to gather their children round them on May 24 and tell them of their own land […]' (Warden 2008: 17). Nationalists saw a conspiracy in Empire Day to undermine Australia's national heritage and nationalist belonging. Indeed, due to the British-Japanese alliance in the early twentieth century, imperialists even overcame some of the traditional anti-Asian sentiments prevailing in the country (French 1978: 65). Others sceptical of Empire Day included Irish-Australians, who remembered their families' experiences under the British Empire, and the Catholic Church, which considered Empire Day a Protestant commemoration. Alternatively, the Church suggested celebrating St. Patrick's Day (French 1978: 63), and in 1911 the Catholic Conference of Australia decided 'to celebrate the 24th of May as "Australia Day" as a counter demonstration to Empire Day'.[44] Empire Day, despite its claim of being inclusive, excluded the labour movement through its anti-socialist stance, the Irish through its idea of Anglo-Saxon

superiority, and Catholics through the Protestant association with the Empire (French 1978: 70–71). To those excluded from imperial belonging, a national Australian heritage independent of Britain seemed to be the only viable alternative. In particular, the ANA continued to push for 26 January to be commemorated as the national holiday (Menadue 1971: 187–188).[45] In the dispute over the new Commonwealth of Australia's past, however, the civic memories of Empire Day trumped the cultural memories and national sentiments of Foundation Day or, as it was now increasingly called, Australia Day. Empire Day existed in some form or another until the 1960s, was renamed Commonwealth Day in 1958, and then became better known as Crackers Night, but its popularity peaked in 1915 and the commemoration was marginalized after World War One (Warden 2008: 17).

In the course of the war, during which Empire Day was mainly used to mobilize the population, imperialist memories lost their appeal as the war was increasingly perceived as an Australian effort. Instead, nationalistic commemorations gained greater appreciation again, including Foundation Day (French 1978: 71–74). The 26th of January was closely related to Australia's military commitment. In 1918, *The Advertiser* noted: 'The celebration of Australia Day has fallen appropriately this year at a time when our men at the front are making themselves unusually prominent by their achievements.'[46] The year after the victory of the Entente a Foundation Day celebration took place in London with Australian war hero General John Monash and representatives of the ANA in attendance.[47] In 1921, the Prince of Wales, in a speech for Foundation Day during his visit to Australia, applauded the achievements of Australian soldiers and complimented their reintegration after the war.[48] Yet, the commemoration of the First Fleet could not sufficiently capture the new nationalist sentiments that had developed during the war. Instead, a new national day was originated.

2.4.3 ANZAC Day and Migration

On 25 April 1915, Australian troops, emphatically called 'diggers',[49] attempted to capture Gallipoli, a half-island in Turkey, in their campaign against the Ottoman Empire (Prior 2009). Despite being defeated and enduring great losses, the battle was soon transformed into an event worthy of commemoration. It was the first military operation federated Australians undertook, ostensibly independent of Great Britain. While Empire Day was now little more than a recruitment event, and

the public resonance of Foundation Day had waned, the commemoration of the Gallipoli battle, called Anzac Day,[50] quickly became popular in Australia (French 1978: 72). Already in 1916, a number of small events commemorated the battle, while *The Sydney Morning Herald* claimed the 'diggers' of Gallipoli 'made a new Australia' (quoted in Inglis 1970: 373). After the war, soldier organizations pushed for 25 April to become an official commemorative date, and even to make it 'Australia Day'; by 1923 every Australian state recognized it as a public holiday (Seal 2004: 105–107). This day was, however, to be markedly different from other national days in Australia, muted rather than celebratory, with religious services, speeches, and marches instead of barbeques, fireworks, and sporting events. In 1922, the Sydney newspaper called it 'the outstanding festival of our people' (quoted in French 1978: 73) and it remains a central national day, with large and small orchestrated events (Pavils 2007).

In contrast to Empire Day, this commemoration was not associated with a religious denomination or with an Anglo-Saxon heritage and was thus culturally neutral, open also to Catholic Irish-Australians. The *Freeman's Journal*, the voice of Irish Australia, published an article entitled 'Anzac Day: the Birth of a Nation', in which it offered this assessment: 'we are at last a nation, with one heart, one soul, and one thrilling aspiration' (quoted in Inglis 1970: 374). The new commemoration was also considered superior to Australia Day, which had been promoted by Catholics as a national commemoration just before the war. 'Anzac Day', a Catholic priest in New South Wales claimed in 1921, 'seems to me to be the day for which we long have waited. We have celebrated Anniversary Day, but that is a day that is not national, and in the case of our own colony recalls events that it were better we should forget' (quoted in Inglis 1967: 30). While the convict past was considered shameful, the militaristic event was commemorated as heroic, despite the Australian troops being defeated in battle. It was considered truly national for it united every Australian under the authority of their own state, though some were more equal in this commemoration than others.

Melanie Oppenheimer and Bruce Scates assert that 'Anzac was invested with democratic rather than imperial traditions, the "mateship" and egalitarianism of the trenches likened to [...] the rough practicality of the "bushman"' (Oppenheimer and Scates 2005). The democratic appeal of memories of war, while evoking a truly odd association, is a valid claim as it refers not to a republican ideal but to the unity between the people and the state as a sovereign, a relationship that was otherwise missing due to the absence of Australian citizenship (Seal 2004: 14–18).[51] This is what

made Anzac Day so attractive. Seemingly, it solved the ideological contradiction and tension of Australian belonging, being of continental heritage and a subject under abstract rule, by violently merging the authority of the state with nationalist ideals of homogeneity. The Anzac ideology of belonging was thus not unlike Carl Schmitt's understanding of democracy as the power of the sovereign, formulated at about the same time and from similar experiences (Schmitt 1979). Reminiscences of blood, death, and the trenches evoked feelings of unmediated communal belonging, while civic memories of actions on the battle field and executive decisions made by the Australian government and military brought to mind the sovereign might of Australian powers. In their combination, the memories induced a sense of being at once an 'Australian' bound by community and a 'citizen' bound by the state.[52] The commemoration of Anzac Day was cultural and civic, without mediation. The memories were an authoritarian simulation of 'democratic'-nationalism in which the soldier ethos was substituted for citizen rights.

Though Australia relied heavily on the Empire, due to its war efforts it had achieved a seat at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and thus received its first international recognition of sovereignty. Prime Minster Billy Hughes immediately seized the opportunity of Australia's new status to oppose Japanese demands for a right to racial equality in immigration matters (Fitzhardinge 1970). At the conference in Paris he offered a declaration that echoes in contemporary Australian politics: 'We claim the right, however, to say in regard to Australia who shall enter and who shall not. This is our house. To keep it ours, our soldiers have sacrificed their blood, and they have placed the keys in our hands' (quoted in Kemp, Stanton 2004: 61). On Australia's initial foray into international diplomacy, the nationalist ideal of a 'White Australia' was fused with sovereign state power to reject Asian immigrants. Today, the link between war memories and the exclusion of migrants continues in Australia's national ANZAC commemorations with new Australians having few connections to the events remembered (White 1981: 62).

In spite of the racial exclusiveness, the demand for immigrants rose rapidly as the economy grew after World War One. Even with extensive emigration campaigns in Britain, Australia was unable to attract the number of migrants it desired. Only about 320,000 came over a period of eight years, between 1921 and 1929 (Richards 2008: 97). The program to attract new setters, including assisted passages, was almost exclusively focused on British emigrants and was organized in cooperation with the Empire. Although

some non-British migrants settled in Australia, the commitment to White Australia was as strong as ever, as the government was now also opposed to the arrival of nationals of former enemy states as well as communists of any nationality (Richards 2008: 78–79). After immigration came to a halt with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, a new migration scheme was negotiated with the British government in 1938. Yet, due to a lack of interest by Britons, Australia was forced to look elsewhere for immigrants. For the first time, agreements were signed with the Netherlands and Switzerland for small contingents of migrants (Richards 2008: 132). Apart from a few exceptions, further calls from employers and the Empire to fill labour shortages with non-British migrants were rejected (Richards 2008: 136–138). Australia began to slowly move away from its reliance on the Empire, devising a sovereign migration policy, and yet overall it remained highly sceptical of non-British immigration. Jewish refugees from Germany in particular felt the sting of rejection as they were considered 'non-assimilable'. At the refugee conference of Evian in 1938, the Australian delegation committed to taking on 15,000 Jewish refugees over three years, but its representative Thomas W. White, Minister for Trade and Customs, remarked,

> [u]nder the circumstances, Australia cannot do more, for it will be appreciated that in a young country man power from the sources from which most of its citizens have sprung is preferred, while undue privileges cannot be given to one particular class of non-British subjects without injustice to others. It will no doubt be appreciated also that, as we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one by encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign migration. (quoted in Neumann 2004: 17)

Between 7,000 and 8,000 refugees arrived before immigration ceased altogether with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 (Blakeney 1984). The ambitious immigration program of the interwar period had failed to attract the required quantities of new settlers due to the restrictions of the White Australia Policy. The two modes of Australian belonging, civic and communal, had come into conflict with the latter disabling an effective migration program according to economic or humanitarian needs.

2.4.4 *The Return of Australia Day*

National commemorations, from Australia Day to Empire Day to ANZAC Day, competed for the interpretation of what it meant to be Australian, and immigration policies were contested according to their ideals of Australian

belonging. In the interwar period, few Australians still celebrated Empire Day with its unwavering loyalty to Britain and ideal of a common Britishness. The commemoration had lost the appeal it enjoyed before the war and only briefly regained some momentum for its anti-communist stance, seen also in migration policies (French 1978: 73). The political conservatism of the middle-class that Empire Day had represented before the war was still widespread, though it was now associated with Anzac Day, by far the most popular commemoration in Australia in the 1920s (French 1978: 74). The latter, however, did not share the liberal and civic worldview related to the Empire. Rather, it imagined a community of the nation bound by the power of the state. While Australia's dependence on the Empire, in the past and the present, was acknowledged, Anzac entailed a move in politics towards greater national self-determination in matters including migration. In this instance, immigration policies were viewed as a state issue derived directly from national interests, in accordance with economic requirements and the ideal of a 'White Australia'.

As Anzac Day became the primary national holiday, the ANA still heavily promoted Australia Day as an alternative nationalist commemoration. However, Australia Day came to be acknowledged, mostly by Australian states and the Commonwealth, in a liberal rather than nationalist fashion.[53] While in the Anzac war commemoration the Australian nation and the Australian state were merged in an unmediated way as one, Australia Day served as a date of crystallization for either nationalist-cultural or state-civic memories that were distinct and unmediated. This subtle but important difference between Anzac Day and Australia Day had great influence on the flexibility of Australian migration policies.

Australia Day had become a marginal date after World War One. The ANA continued to organize events on 26 January, though by now much smaller in size, such as smoke socials rather than national sport competitions or exhibitions (Menadue 1971: 189). Besides, the day had lost a common designation and was called by diverse names, depending on the state and political views, including Foundation Day, Anniversary Day, and ANA Day. The ANA put much effort into unifying the many different titles. It lobbied the Commonwealth and all state governments to jointly adopt 'Australia Day' as a common name. The governments agreed in 1931 and finally officially approved the name in 1935.[54] The internal unity achieved by this move was central to Australia Day's commemoration.

Melbourne's leftist daily, *The Age*, remarked in a comment for 26 January 1934 that some 'forget that we are not only State citizens but also Australians.'[55] It continued: 'We are an autonomous community

within the British Empire: we are in no way subordinate in any aspect of our domestic or external affairs […]. We must demonstrate that we are also a nation in spirit.’[56] The author pointed out that the meaning Australian belonging was now independent of Britain, being defined by its distinction from the Empire but also being a question of ‘community’ and ‘spirit’. Thus migration, it was argued, would be based on heritage and on loyalty to the nation:

> We claim, and our claim is freely allowed, that we are the heirs of all the ages of Britain’s thrilling inspiring history. And so to our overseas kin we hold ever open the door that they may independently enter in […]. To the members of every division of Western civilisation we also offer opportunity to be citizens of our White Australia on the honourable understanding that they come free from any divided loyalty.[57]

In the move away from the Empire, the perception of Australia’s heritage seemed still rooted in Britain, but the definition of ‘White Australia’ and its limits of entry were widened from Britain to ‘Western civilization’. Communal belonging became more flexible but continued to restrict civic policies of immigration.

Statements of communal belonging, characteristically expressed along lines of heritage or ‘race’, were adaptable in regard to concrete migration policies. This does not mean that its proponents were indifferent regarding politics and the Commonwealth state. ANA conferences throughout the interwar period called on the government to assure the racial purity of ‘White Australia’ through a number of different measures.[58] With reference to cultural memories of Australia Day, ANA evoked a communal notion of the nation that was to be preserved by migration policies. In this logic, the federal state, to which ANA petitioned, was perceived as clearly distinct from the nation it saw as the realm of belonging. The state was imagined almost as a benign *superstructure*, in Karl Marx’s terminology (1978: 3–6), with a homogenous nation rather than the economy as its base. This was fundamentally different from Anzac Day’s interpretation of Australian belonging and politics in the Schmittian understanding in which the nation was intrinsically bound to the state, and policies derived from, rather than served, the nation. Yet, memories of Australia Day were not always exclusively cultural, devoid of the state and nationalistic sentiment. Australia Day was most successful when its commemoration was civic.

2.4.5 *The Sesquicentenary of Australia Day*

Though the ANA was well connected and respected politically, its commemoration of Australia Day and its ideal of belonging found little resonance in the Australian public. Concentrating on communal memories and the national side of belonging but not on their intrinsic connection to the increasingly sovereign Australian state and its civic belonging, Australia Day seemed insufficient, compared to Anzac Day, to express the complexities of Australian belonging. Overall, Inglis (1967: 30) concluded, '[b]etween the wars 26 January remained a date for perfunctory oratory and the following Monday remained a holiday whose main ritual function was to mark the end of school holidays.' A prominent exception to this neglect was the 1938 celebration of the one-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the First Fleet's landing, the sesquicentenary. A succession of events was organized stretching, almost as if the imaginative power of Australia Day itself was not trusted, three months from Australia Day to Anzac Day. In 1936, a Celebrations Council was set up with government funding by the New South Wales parliament to organize the commemoration. 'Although the venue is, quite appropriately, Sydney,' Melbourne's *The Age* noted, 'the function is essentially national.'[59] Amongst the many events, two occasions on 26 January stood out in particular.[60]

On the morning of Australia Day, a large crowd, among them politicians, the media, and regular Australians, watched the landing of Captain Arthur Phillip and his crew at Sydney's shore in a carefully staged re-enactment. The actor-settlers met a group of recruited Aborigines, depicted as shy but easily satisfied by coloured beads, 'watching the strangers taking possession of the country.'[61] Then, Captain Phillip gave an invented speech, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, before giving orders to hoist the Union Jack. The speech had been carefully crafted by a historian to inspire the audience of 1938, rather than to reflect the situation of 1788 (Thomas 1988: 83–84). In a rhetorical twist, the actor spoke as Captain Phillip of a made up future that to the audience was it's remembered history. 'In my mind', the Captain Phillip character announced, 'I see the inhabitants of this great country of the future reflecting with pride and gratitude upon an era of progress of which we this day lay the foundation' (quoted in Thomas 1988: 84). Inadvertently, the audience was told how to remember: the event they just witnessed marked not the origin of Australian heritage, the Phillip character explained, but of a civic development that had led directly to their prosperous present. British symbols like the flag

emphasized the British background of this trajectory. As Bertram Stevens, premier of New South Wales pointed out at the luncheon for the prime minister and premiers, Australia's social and economic system was built upon British traditions of equality and justice (Souter 1987). The memories of this particular Australia Day were not considered cultural, neither Australian nor British, but instead suggested a civic progression towards a prosperous and supposedly just society.

Because of Captain Arthur Phillip's central role, the re-enactment and the Sesquicentenary were, overall, civic commemorations as well. Julian Thomas has drawn attention to the prominent position Phillip received, as the founder of modern Australia, in the celebrations. Thomas suggested that this 'ruled collective agency out of Australian history in general. It constructed the 1938 crowds as the progeny of one patriarch's superhuman ability to imagine the future' (Thomas 1988: 87). In the commemoration of the Sesquicentenary overall, Phillip, as well as other leading historical figures and political bodies, was remembered and celebrated rather than the lives and experiences of regular people. The vision presented of a history of politicians and institutions almost mirrored the version of Australia Day offered by the ANA. Both drew a clear line between the people and the nation, as objects of history on the one hand and the state as a historical agent on the other. In the official commemoration, Australia's political institutions, derived from Britain and rendered independent, were remembered as having provided the framework under which the economy and society could thrive. This liberal perspective on Australia's past, as compared to the nationalist or militarist view, allowed for the inclusion of a diversity of memories.

The second pivotal event of Australia Day 1938 was a procession of 120 floats through the streets of Sydney. 'The March to Nationhood', as it was themed, expressed the liberal interpretation of Australia and its past. It was estimated that more than one million spectators watched the event, almost all of Sydney's population.[62] The parade celebrated Australia's development with floats depicting important figures and events of history as well as symbols of economic success. The parade was headed by a float with Aborigines, the same who had taken part in the re-enactment earlier that morning, and ended with representatives of Sydney's surf life-saving clubs (Atkinson and Aveling 1987: 19).[63] Missing were the convict past, which had been consciously excluded by the Celebrations Council because convicts were not seen to have contributed to progress, and the labour movement (Souter 1987; Thomas 1988: 82). More than just assembling

random events or groups, the Celebrations Council excluded from its interpretation of Australia's history a particular Australian tradition that reached from convicts to contemporary workers. This tradition was one of unrest and disobedience, in which the past, and during Australia Day in particular, had repeatedly and explicitly been called upon to represent Australian natives' or nationalists' interests against dominant powers. Accordingly, the paper *Australian Worker* welcomed the commemoration of Australia Day to express the demands of the labour movement, but it rejected the celebratory mood of the official celebration, 'the hypocritical pretence of prosperity in a land where tens of thousands are unemployed […]' (quoted in Souter 1987: 19). It was exactly this divide that the organizers of the official parade sought to repress and overcome in order for their historical trajectory of liberal progress not to be interrupted.

Yet, the official civic commemoration of Australia's anniversary offered under its liberal framework opportunities for the most divergent memories, civic and cultural, to be expressed in relation to Australian history. On May Day, the labour movement celebrated what it called its 'own Sesqui[centenary]', while about twenty days earlier Sydney had witnessed another anniversary parade, the March of Industry and Commerce, with floats sponsored by Australian companies (Souter 1987: 19). On Australia Day itself, indigenous activists staged a protest Day of Mourning against the treatment they had endured over the past 150 years. At a conference of Aborigines, that was a culmination of ten years of lobbying for basic rights, the delegates passed a resolution in which they 'ask[ed] for a policy which will raise our people to full citizen status and equality within the community' (quoted in Horner and Langton 1987: 29). Indigenous Australians were not just discriminated against and expected to 'die out', they were legally excluded from society by the constitution. The commemorative Day of Morning was thus a call upon the state, under the powers of which they lived as stateless persons, for civic integration. On the same day, the ANA organized one of its annual Australia Day smoke socials in Melbourne at which the director questioned the political ability and effectiveness of democratic institutions and parliament.[64] A few days later, ANA president Mr. J. W. Marrows sharpened the nationalist criticism of party politics. After paying tribute to the early pioneers and their legacy, he called for the abolishment of state parliaments and for 'supreme governing powers' to be placed in hands of the Commonwealth Parliament. 'Only by such methods', he argued, 'could we reach true nationhood.'[65] Finally, the celebrations came to an end with Anzac Day

and the commemoration of Australian achievements in war. In the larger context of the civic commemoration of Australia Day, diverse versions of the past with often contradictory notions of belonging were formulated, from demands by the working class to participate in economic success, to Aboriginals claiming to the right to have rights, to the nationalist defence of nationhood against the politics of statehood, to the celebration of 'soldier citizenship'. Australia Day in 1938 was highly inclusive of political differences under the rule of civic memories before it returned to the previous shadow existence it had had in the Commonwealth. These civic memories, however, had shifted from an imperial British to an Australian past, adjusting its inclusiveness to its own requisites.

The inclusiveness of civic commemoration extended not just to social and political differences but also, to a certain degree, to cultural variances. Protestants and Catholics integrated religious services in the sesquicentennial celebrations, and Irish Catholics merged Celtic and Australian symbols on St. Patrick's Day 1938 (Souter 1987: 22). Amidst the pre-war tensions, the official celebrations included a show of military strength in the form of an army, navy, and air force review in Centennial Park (Souter 1987: 23–24). Moreover, warships from foreign nations, from New Zealand, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States of America, paid their respects to Australia by visiting Sydney Harbour on Australia Day. While Australia was still closely bound to Great Britain in security matters, it began to reconsider its alliances along with its historical foundation. The conservative *The Sydney Morning Herald* argued on 26 January 1938 that Spain could have also sent a warship, because 'while we date the history of our Australian people from those first English ships under Phillip's command, the history of Australia itself among Europeans embraces the efforts in discovery of Spanish, Dutch, and French seamen.'[66] In this civic interpretation of Australia Day, Australia's past, and Australian belonging Europe became a point of reference rather than just the British Empire. The functional adjustment of Australian traditions, to shift the focus from Britain to Europe, was enabled by Australia's greater autonomy in security and migration matters, which altered but did not abolish the 'White Australia Policy'.

Flexibility in the interpretation of White Australia was also evident in a growing willingness to employ migrants from non-British European countries, though much scepticism was reserved for southern Europeans (Richards 2008: 138). In some instances, exceptions were applied even to Asians in order to satisfy economic labour requirements, as in the case

of the pearling industry. Japanese seamen were recruited on Australia's northern coast due to their superior pearl fishing capabilities, while local fishermen of European descent perceived them as economic competition. Despite often close working relationships, Japanese were excluded from 'White' Australian society (Bach 1962). At the time of the sesquicentenary, the commemoration was employed to bolster White Australia sentiments against Japanese sailors. At an Australia Day parade in Darwin in 1938, one depiction had a Japanese pearling boat being chased by a local Aboriginal tribe, and a Japanese seaman was shown with an Aboriginal woman in a sexual situation, which led to a formal protest by the Japanese government.[67] The association between Japanese and Aborigines presented at the Australia Day commemoration was intended to be demeaning to the former as well as to indicate their common dissimilarity from 'White' Australian society.

Dominant civic and cultural memories in the 1930s were to utilized by the government for civic matters like security and economic interests, advocating changes in notions of belonging and migration policies. The majority of society did not question the idea of 'White Australia' but with references to civic memories of Australia's history they accepted adjustments to the definition what 'White Australia' meant. This political plurality of memories was possible due to the civic framework that was created in official commemorations for the Sesquicentenary, under which various political streams and their interpretations of the past could fit. Memories were instrumental to the Commonwealth state, which increasingly possessed the potential to realize policies independently of the Empire, including economic and security questions, to promote its increased sovereignty. However, for Australia to be in charge of such policies, previously under the jurisdiction of the Empire, required an Australian civic belonging, which in turn related to migration. At an Australia Day ceremony in 1938, the former governor general Sir Isaac Isaacs commented, for example, that '[b]oth for the purpose of defence and development it is plain, that the Commonwealth should as an urgent matter be invested with larger direct powers in respect of population than it now possesses.'[68] Fundamental policies of security and the economy required state sovereignty over the population and, therefore, over migration. This was a matter of communal and, increasingly, civic belonging, negotiated with cultural and civic memories within the forum that Australia Day provided. Thus, political memories and definitions of belonging vied for influence with the ever-more sovereign addressee for political claims, the Australian Commonwealth, which allowed for more liberal and open

immigration policies. However, it was not the potential openness of civic memories but the manifold variations in which civic and communal modes of belonging could be combined under a liberal Australian state to form models of the Australian political body which increased the variations of potential migration policies.

During the Second World War both immigration and the celebration of Australia Day came to a virtual halt. Almost only 'enemy aliens' arrived, among them many German Jews deported from Britain, (Rutland 191–192) and only ANA continued to organize low-key commemorations on Australia Day (Menadue 1971: 304–305). Pre-war plans to increase Australia's population for security and economic reasons were stalled during the war. When, after 1945, Australia had become even more independent of Great Britain however, policies from the early 1940s to boost immigration were resurrected. Along with migration programs, Australia introduced its own citizenship, both of which, migration and citizenship, came to be actively supported by commemorations of Australia Day. Migration and belonging were always closely related in Australia. With citizenship, however, a novel circumstance was introduced that formalized civic and sovereign Australian belonging. After almost 160 years of dispute over how to remember Australia's past and how to imagine belonging, an intrinsic antagonism of cultural and civic memories emerged that was flexible enough to accommodate opposing demands of immigration.

2.5 The Relationship Between Civic and Cultural Memory Until 1948

The first 160 years of European settlement and immigration in Australia saw a social and political struggle over belonging that was waged in terms of memory. Australia Day, known by various names over time, crystallized as a central commemoration for the negotiation of belonging in the colonies and later in the Commonwealth of Australia. Nationalists of Australian and of British creed, as well as liberals, referred to the First Fleet and the ensuing settlement of the continent to imagine their mode of belonging. Different forms of memory, cultural and civic respectively, were instrumental in the conflict over belonging, having direct implications for migration policies. The relationship and the relevance of these forms of memory depended upon the political circumstances under which they competed for influence. The attainment of self-government in the colonies transformed native sentiments into nationalism while laying the

base for imagining independent political institutions in the tradition of the Empire's democratic history. A crucial turning point was federation when Australian belonging was amalgamated with political institutions and the powers of a democratic state, though it was still limited by the overriding authority of the Empire. At base, the tensions of imperial citizenship structured the political debate over belonging in which cultural and civic memories represented its conflicting poles. The shift of political context, from the Empire to the Australian state, to which the meaning of commemoration applied, altered conflicts of memories and belonging as well as contestations regarding migration.

That a settler in New South Wales could be anything but a British subject was inconceivable in the early years of the colony. Only when local interests began to clash with imperial authority did an imagination of a particular Australian past emerge. Macquarie's attempts to integrate these particular memories of Australia's foundation led to the establishment of two versions of commemoration, a colonial one and an imperial one, which augmented the social relevance of the annual day. Due to the Empire's 'distance of tyranny',[69] colonial rule was soon experienced as foreign, with English emigrants occupying the colonial administration and those born on the continent excluded from roles or representation in government. As expirees, united as natives of the land, commemorated their common origin in the First Fleet, a national sentiment was conceived *vis a vis* migrants born overseas. Australian nationalism was finally generated in the goldfields when its proponents reached for the power of self-representation and, asserting their European heritage, began excluding Asian 'aliens' from what was now considered Australians' own country. It was this communal understanding of belonging with its cultural memories, originated in absence of any real representation in colonial power, that has long been considered the beginning of radical Australianness, in particular by the labour movement and the left (Sunter 2001), but it is also seen a foundation of federation by conservatives (Livingston et al. 2001). In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Australian ethnic identity was merged with the new racial imagination of Britishness, which had seeped in from the mother country and that implied a promise of actual political power (Cole 1971). With a lack of sovereignty and full democratic representation, Australians retreated to such communal notions of belonging, Australianness or Britishness, which were built purely upon a defence of White Australia. Still, 'being Australian' and 'being British' were on opposite ends of the spectrum of communal belonging. The first

represented opposition to social and political dominance associated with Britain, and the latter signified a real or anticipated possibility of participating in imperial authority. What these communal imaginations had in common, beyond their strict opposition to non-White immigration, was their reliance on cultural memories that drew on Foundation Day as the origin of Australian heritage, or the connection to a British heritage.

The political institution of the state, Alastair Davidson noted, was long invisible in Australian historiography (Davidson 1991). Yet, Davidson also described a return of 'the state' in the literature of the 1970s, in particular as an adversary power in critical writings on the left. By the 1990s, questions of citizenship and the republican movement had pulled the state back to the centre of attention (Hirst 1994, 2008a). The history of federation and of the constitution regained their central positions in an effort to grasp Australian belonging (Hirst 1988). From this perspective, the power and relevance of official institutions, imperial or democratic, was undeniable in Australian colonial history, either due to the colonies' oppression of indigenous people, convicts and other margenisled groups or due to their role in developing colonial societies economically and politically. I have argued that Australia Day was employed in governing the colony and later in the process of federation in order to achieve cohesion in Australia under a political authority. The commemoration of settling the continent was utilized to subsume partial interest under imperial rule since the time of Macquarie. In early colonial times, oppositional sentiments, expressed in cultural memories against the imperial power, were symbolically integrated into British colonial rule by officially taking over their distinct Foundation Day celebrations. Later, signs of British power were combined with institutional ambitions of Australian federation, for example, by the inclusion of the British Crown at the 1888 colonial celebrations of Foundation Day. However, the acceptance of such discernments of the past and of belonging was limited. Civic memories of British achievements on the Australian continent were shared by the colonial elite alone. For the middle class, the British commemoration created the illusion of participation in an ideological, though not always personally distinct, cultural memory of British nationalism. The labour movement rejected both these commemorations of Australia Day. In reference to Australian nationalist memories, federation was the necessary validation of communal belonging that underpinned the rights and claims of the subaltern in the absence of real political and social participation. Thus, civic memories were one form of commemoration along with cultural memories, both of which found expression in Australia Day but for different political ends.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the interpretation of the past and the definition of Australian society were vehemently contested. By the end of the century, there were two nationalist interpretations referring to the past, each of which depended on perceived participation in social authority (generally Coakley 2004). The subaltern created an Australian nationalism that understood Australia Day as a commemoration of the origin of a particular community. In contrast, the affluent middle class and those who associated with the ruling power saw in Australia Day a representation of British heritage and a link to the British culture with which they identified. 'The focus of contestation, then,' Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (2003: 1) note regarding the politics of memory, 'is very often not conflicting accounts of what actually happened in the past so much as the question of who or what is entitled to speak for that past in the present.' The interpretations of the First Fleet's landing as either an Australian or a British event were politically exclusive of each other. While their implied notions of belonging found common ground in their opposition to non-'White' immigration, the Australian version was also sceptical about British immigration. Thus, cultural memories delineated politically varying boundaries of their imagined communities.

In addition, the civic form of commemoration presented another dimension of the political debate about the past—belonging and migration. Memories were employed not only for national identities but to derive conclusions on how to proceed in specific situations. This 'governing by looking back' (Brändström et al. 2004) was particularly relevant ahead of federation when references to the achievements of early settlers were instrumental to formulating policies. The emphasis on traditions of economic development, for example, pointed to the necessity of liberal politics in economic and migration matters, but it also impacted political processes like federation.[70] The civic memories of Australia Day were a reminder of imperial rule under which the European history of Australia was made possible. The actions of British officials like Captain Philip and Governor Macquarie, civic memories implied, brought about historical developments and joined people as British subjects, in the past as in the present. It was the memory of the Empire as the overarching power that unified Australian colonies and their subjects in the process of federation.

Cultural memories and civic memories differed in their perception of the past but also in their implications for migration. While cultural memories refused to accept migrants from communities other than their own, the criterion of civic memories was more functional. The latter remembered

trajectories of Australian development to which migration policies were supposed to contribute. At times, policies derived from cultural and civic memories were at odds with one another, for example when the colonial industry required more workers but Australian nationalists objected to further immigration. Though the logics of cultural and civic memories and their political implications differed, they did not necessarily exclude each other and were not always in direct competition with one another. They often existed in parallel and independently in their own realms, the nationalist and the liberal, as did their divergent commemorations of Australia Day. The two forms of memory only crossed paths in the public sphere where their imaginations of belonging either clashed, for example in regards to social questions or questions of migration, or complimented each other when they shared a common impetus, as in the case of federation.

The tenuous relationship between cultural and civic memories changed after the centralized and semi-independent power of the Commonwealth of Australia was established. The difference between commemorations before federation and thereafter was rooted in the shift in their political context, from outside Australia to a unified Australian authority. Now, Australian nationalists had an Australian state to compliment their ideology and claim a valid Australian nationalism. In the same instance, liberals were now able to reconsider the tradition of official institutions on the continent as 'Australian' rather than 'British', with an Australian state as its *telos*. Yet, I have argued that the unspecified relationship between Australian society on the one hand and the ruling power of the British Empire on the other made both communal and civic belonging inconsistent. While the new federal state offered an alternative point of reference for civic and cultural belonging, it was, with its limited authority, a weak substitute for the Empire. On the one hand, with Australia Day's implicit goal of unity nominally achieved, Empire Day and loyalty to Britain became the central focus of civic memories in the early years of the Australian Commonwealth. This new commemoration overrode independent Australian attitudes with the certainties of British power. On the other hand, the Australian state lacked authority under suzerain protection to sufficiently bind Australian communal belonging to the new institution in order to create Australian nationalism. Ultimately, this ambivalence of power led to the unmediated belonging of ANZAC commemoration that dismissed the role of the Empire and violently merged the inconsistent belonging of cultural and civic Australia in memories of war. Thus, political claims in the first third

of the twentieth century referred to the Empire or the nationalist ANZAC legend to create a sense of belonging from memories.

It was not until the late 1930s, during the sesquicentennial commemoration, that the relationship between cultural and civic memories of Australia was reconfigured. Australia's increasing political and economic independence from Great Britain was a prerequisite of this reconfiguration, achieved not least through World War One. Anzac Day was an early ideological expression of this new-found independence. Yet, only Australia Day had the capacity to integrate independently both cultural and civic memories of an Australian belonging. Moreover, with the Australian state becoming the main point of reference for policies of belonging and migration, the commemoration was able to mediate the divergent interpretations of the past and their corresponding claims. Civic memories at the Australia Day celebration of 1938 began to construct an Australian trajectory of achievements that represented an Australian rather than a British ability to advance social progress, cohesion, and prosperity. The imagined Australian tradition offered a point of reference for a range of political interests, including indigenous Australians and Australian nationalists, industry associations and labour unions, all of which addressed the Australian state rather than the Empire. The civic commemoration of Australia Day offered a liberal framework under which civic as well as cultural memories could reference a common past and be mediated as 'Australian', despite conflicting interpretations. However, this mode of remembering was still in its preliminary stages and only a projection of sovereign aspirations. An independent Australian belonging was yet to be institutionalized politically.

During the Second World War, Australia began to re-evaluate its immigration policies which were based on pre-war considerations and it came to the realization that it needed to establish self-reliance in the face of military threats. It had achieved a greater degree of independence from Britain during the war, and it introduced its own citizenship soon after. In the course of this process, Australia constructed a comprehensive notion of belonging in relation to migration in which civic and cultural memories of Australia's past were to be balanced in order to meet the challenges of belonging and migrant integration in the post-war era.

Notes

1. For example, Immigration Minister Harold Holt quoted the speech at the first Citizenship Convention in 1950, see 'Delegates Saw an Impressive Ceremony of Naturalisation on Australia Day', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra Department of Immigration 1950, p. 16.
2. Taking the rebels side: 'Michael Duffy: Proof of history's rum deal', *The Age* 28.01.2006. Taking the governor's side: 'Eighteen Hundred & Eight!', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser* 01.12.1825; Tom Frame: 'Who'll watch guardians when ex-officers rule us?', *The Australian* 23.01.2008. On other interpretations: Macmahon (2006: 126–127).
3. At its bicentennial anniversary the occasion's relevance has gained greater acknowledgment, for example, in an exhibition at the Sydney Museum: 'Rebellion—The ever memorable 26 January 1808', 17.11.2007–05.04.2010. See also the multimedia show 'The Rum Rebellion' by the Sydney Morning Herald, available at http://www.smh.com.au/multimedia/2008/rumrebellion/main.html, accessed 12.11.2015.
4. 'Song to the Tune of Rule Britannia', *Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 01.02.1817, p. 3.
5. 'Government and General Orders', *Sydney Gazette and New south Wales Advertiser*, 24.01.1818, p. 1.
6. 'Sydney', *Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 31.01.1818, pp. 2–3.
7. 'The Regatta', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, Saturday 28 January 1837, p. 2.
8. 'Sydney', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, Saturday 1 February 1817, p. 2.
9. 'Commemoration of the First Landing', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 28.01.1830, p. 3; 'Advance Australia', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 21.01.1836, p. 2.
10. 'First Landing', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 27.01.1829, p. 2; 'Commemoration of the First Landing', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 28.01.1830, p. 3; 'Advance Australia', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 21.01.1836, p. 2.
11. *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 21.01.1837, p. 3; Advertisement in *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 24.01.1837, p. 3.
12. 'United Australian's Dinner', *Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 30.01.1837, p. 2.

13. 'Sydney News', *The Hobart Town Courier*, 17.02.1837, p. 2.
14. The notion of 'native' Australians did not include the indigenous population of Australia, a distinction that even in the 1880s was not always that clear to some English people; see Irving (1999b: 124).
15. 'Seventeen Hundred and Eighty Eight. The First Landing', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 28.01.1826, p. 3.
16. 'Seventeen Hundred and Eighty Eight. The First Landing', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 28.01.1826, p. 3.
17. 'Qualms of Conscience', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 28.01.1837, p. 2.
18. 'The Currency Dinner and Address', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 04.02.1837, p. 2; in this article, the United Australians are also denounced as Irish. 'The Australian' newspaper, owned by Wentworth, is quoted in: 'Qualms of Conscience', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 28.01.1837, p. 2. In defence of the dinner, see 'United Australian's Dinner', *Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 30.01.1837, p. 2.
19. 'United Australian's Dinner', *Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 30.01.1837, p. 2.
20. 'The Currency Dinner and Address', *The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser*, 04.02.1837, p. 2.
21. Alastair Davidson describes this as a confusion of 'working class' with the notion of 'the people' in Australian politics, see Davidson (1997: 53–59).
22. The indigenous population, though native to the land, was excluded from the ANA, which was open to white, 'native' men only.
23. The Northern Territories were never a colony but came into existence in 1963 only when control of the land passed from New South Wales to South Australia.
24. Leading figures of federation like Alfred Deakin (2000), Samuel W. Griffith (1897), and Henry Parkes (1892) hardly mention the 1888 celebration in political writings about federation or in their memoirs. More recent historical accounts of federation, too, almost always omit the celebrations of Foundation Day; see for example (Birrell 2001; Irving 1999b; La Nauze 1972). Exceptions that take the celebration into account are Irving (1999a) and Trainor (1994: 66–86).
25. 'Queensland to New South Wales. A Centennial Greeting', *The Brisbane Courier*, 26.01.1888, p. 4.
26. 'The Federal Council of Australasia', *The Mercury* (Hobart), 21.01.1888, p. 1.
27. See 'News and Notes', *The West Australian*, 27.01.1888, p. 3.
28. 'News and Notes', *The West Australian*, 27.01.1888, p. 3.

29. 'Queensland to New South Wales. A Centennial Greeting', *The Brisbane Courier*, 26.01.1888, p. 4.
30. The opening event was partially the result of New South Wales' financial impasses at the time. The unveiling was an inexpensive event as it was a remainder from the previous year, the 1887 Queen Victoria Jubilee, when the statue had not been ready for official celebrations.
31. See 'Nurturing Visions: the Creation of a Grand Victorian Park': *Parklands. The Magazine of the Centennial Parklands* 28, no. Spring (2004): p. 9.
32. Another of the many social divides was put on display at the state banquet, restricting wives of the dignitaries to the gallery of the venue. When in a toast later that evening the celebrating men honoured the women of the colonies, this gendered divide was ideologically ascertained. See Kingston (2006: 88).
33. When it was suggested, that something should also be done for Aborigines the idea seemed beyond the possibility of social and mnemonic inclusion. 'And remind them that we robbed them?' was Parkes' reply, inadvertently revealing the colonial partiality of the commemorations; quoted in Davison et al. (1987: 7).
34. 'Anniversary Day: Australian Natives 'Celebration'', *The West Australian*, 27.01.1897, p. 5.
35. 'Banquet to the Hon. A. Deakin', *The South Australian Advertiser*, 12.07.1887, p. 5.
36. The only exception is section 44(i) in which citizens of *other* states are mentioned. Australians are referred to as 'people', 'person', 'elector', and 'subjects'.
37. See the Australian Constitution section 51 (xix) and section 51 (xxvii).
38. It needs to be noted though, that while the Immigration Restriction Act did not speak of 'race', the constitution did, in particular in section 51(xxvi), giving the legislative the power to make laws pertaining to 'The people of any race, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws'. The term provides a legal challenge until today, see Malbon (1999).
39. See for example 'Anniversary Day: The Holiday Arrangements', *The West Australian*, 26.01.1899; PATRIOT: 'To the Editor: Australia's Day', *Brisbane Courier*, 21.01.1898.
40. 'In the Other States: Memorial Services', *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), 28.01.1901, p. 5.
41. 'Anniversary Day', *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), 26.01.1901, p. 6.
42. 'Anniversary Day', *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), 26.01.1901, p. 6.
43. 'Anniversary Day', *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), 26.01.1901, p. 6.
44. 'Australia Day', *The Evening Post*, Vol. 81/21, 26.01.1911, p. 7.
45. Donald Mackinnon: 'Letter to the Editor: Australia Day', *The Argus* (Melbourne) 29.01.1916.

46. *The Advertiser*, 26.07.1918, p. 7.
47. 'Australia Day in London. Programme of Celebrations', *The Argus* (Melbourne), 21.01.1919, p. 5.
48. 'The Prince of Wales. Speech on Australia Day', *The Argus* (Melbourne), 29.01.1921, p. 17.
49. The term 'diggers' stemmed from mid-nineteenth century Australian gold miners and is a reference to the nationalism of the Eureka rebellion. It was in common use for and among Australian soldiers since 1917. See Seal (2004: 18–22).
50. ANZAC is the abbreviation for 'Australian and New Zealand Army Corps', and since it was a joined army, the day is commemorated in both Australia and New Zealand.
51. Seal (2004: 17) points out that the Anzac ideology was also directed squarely against Britain and imperial immigration.
52. The Returned Soldiers League used this fact, that diggers had fought for 'the nation *and* the Empire', to claim for them a superior status as citizens. See Crotty (2007).
53. See for example Firmin McKinnon: 'Why we keep Australia Day', *The Courier-Mail* (Brisbane), 27.01.1934, p. 12.
54. See the summary in 'Australia Day', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1934, p. 8 and Memorandum from the Prime Minister's Department to the Attorney-General's Department, 10.07.1935, NAA CA5 A432, 1931/1749. Government agencies in New South Wales returned to the term 'Anniversary Day' from 1938 to 1940 to then finally settle on 'Australia Day' after ANA exerted much public pressure. See Menadue (1971: 191).
55. 'Australia a Nation', *The Age*, 26.01.1934, p. 12.
56. 'Australia a Nation', *The Age*, 26.01.1934, p. 12.
57. 'Australia a Nation', *The Age*, 26.01.1934, p. 12.
58. E.g., 'A.N.A. Conference. Migration Problems. "Made In Australia"', *The Argus*, 18.03.1925, p. 23; 'Importance of Migration. A.N.A. Urges Action. Foreigners Not Favoured', *The Argus*, 16.09.1927, p. 15; 'A.N.A. Conference. Alien Migration Restrictions', *The Argus*, 09.02.1928, p. 5; 'Alien Migrants in Australia. Preserving Our Racial Purity', *The Age* 23.03.1939, p. 12.
59. 'A Memorable Foundation Day', *The Age*, 26.01.1938, p. 12.
60. For a list of organized events see 'Details of Anniversary Day Events', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1938, p. 10.
61. 'Eighteenth and Twentieth Century Meet', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 27.01.1938, p. 11.

62. 'Telling a Story. History Given in Floats. Ingenuity and Beauty', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 27.01.1938, p. 12; 'Australia's Day of Rejoicing', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 27.01.1938, p. 11.
63. 'Brilliant Anniversary. Sydney's Great Carnival. Huge Crowds View Impressive Historical Pageants', *The Age*, 27.01.1938, p. 11.
64. 'Curse of Politics. Speech by A.N.A. Director', *The Age*, 27.01.1938, p. 7.
65. 'What of Australia? Address by A.N.A. President', *The Age*, 31.01.1938, p. 8.
66. 'Anniversary Day', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1938, p. 12.
67. See newspaper clippings and a letter from C.L.A. Abbott, Administrator of the Northern Territories to Department of the Interior, Canberra, 16.02.1938, in NAA A1/15, 1938/3036.
68. 'Australia Day. A.N.A. Celebration. Address by Sir I. Isaacs', *The Age*, 27.01.1938, p. 12.
69. This is different from the technocratic 'tyranny of distance' under which Goeffrey Blainey (1966) saw Australian society develop.
70. On the functional impact of memories on political decisions see Khong (1992).

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CHAPTER 3

Australia Day from Citizenship to Multiculturalism: 1948–1988

Plans to exponentially increase the Australian population after the war had been discussed by the federal government since late 1944. A population figure of up to 30 million was projected as a reasonable bulwark against potential future attacks from Japan or China as well as a necessity to develop Australia's economy (Richards 2008: 179–180). To facilitate this undertaking, the Labour government established the Ministry for Immigration in July 1945. It was headed by Arthur A. Calwell, who, in his first Ministerial Statement before the House of Representatives announced, '[o]ur first requirement is additional population. We need it for reasons of defence and for the fullest expansion of our economy.' (quoted in Lack and Templeton 1995: 17–18) Two requirements needed to be realized for the migration program to work, the Minister emphasized: first, Australia needed to show a willingness to adopt new Australians who were determined to be good citizens, and secondly, new Australians would be able to achieve a reasonable economic future (Lack and Templeton 1995: 18). The task at hand was thus two pronged: to convince Australian society of its need for immigrants, and to integrate into society these immigrants, who were largely expected to work in construction and new industries such as the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Scheme. For the Labour Party, this meant an immense shift away from its own nationalist anti-immigration stance, and it did its utmost to convince trade unions and the labour movement of the necessity and advantages of the program (Jordens 1995: 25–31). In order to be acculturated to Australian society, new Australians were expected to come from the imperial mother country.

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J.O. Kleist, *Political Memories and Migration*, Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57589-0_3

The Immigration Restriction Act from 1901 still applied, and under its conditions, the immigration program was supported across party lines. The commitment to the White Australia Policy was axiomatic throughout Australian society, although its meaning was being redefined (Markus 1988). Early intentions to recruit new Australians exclusively from Great Britain were soon recognized as being unrealistic. In 1947, Calwell travelled Europe to assess the potential of admitting migrants from other countries and began to propagate and implement an Europeanization of the immigration program (Richards 2008: 182–191). Jewish Holocaust survivors were permitted with some restrictions. Selected displaced persons from Eastern Europe were recruited according to settlement requirements. The government also signed treaties to recruit migrants for specific occupations, first with Malta in 1948 followed by the Netherlands and Italy in 1951 and Austria, Belgium, West Germany, Greece, and Spain in 1952 (Jordens 1987). The task of attracting more people made satisfying the definition of who was an acceptable immigrant increasingly difficult, so the definition was adjusted accordingly. Calwell even combined the category of 'Middle East' with 'European' instead of 'Asian', thus allowing Christian Lebanese to conform to the White Australia Policy and be nominated for immigration (Calwell 1987). Yet, British immigration remained the first priority. While continental Europeans were welcome under specific conditions, travelling at their own expense, British applicants were offered assisted or even free passage to Australia. Despite these policies to preserve the British character of Australian society while boosting its population, non-British arrivals between 1945 and 1952 outnumbered British immigrants (Lack and Templeton 1995: 44).

The Department of Immigration was faced with the dilemma of, on the one hand, organizing mass migration that was necessarily diverse, while on the other hand facilitating their integration into a society imagined as homogenous. Australian nationalism and British heritage no longer sufficed to underwrite Australian belonging under the new circumstances. Legally, however, Australians were still British subjects, a status enshrined in the Nationality Act (1920) and acquired either by birth or, in the case of immigrants, granted through naturalization, until which time they were considered 'aliens'. The presence of 'aliens', people who as non-British subjects belonged neither culturally nor civically, conflicted with the idea of cultural and social cohesion. In the 1930s, the government had already made regulations demanding an oath of allegiance from 'aliens' and forced new citi-

zens to renounce their former nationality at the time of their naturalization. The government also introduced extra restrictions to their admission as well as their naturalization.[1] In 1945, shortly after the establishment of the Department of Immigration, the government's Aliens Classification and Advisory Committee made recommendations for further amendments to the treatment of 'aliens'. For the committee, it was problematic that 'there is no such thing as "Australian" nationality and that naturalisation under Australian law confers the status of a British subject.'[2] In a memorandum it suggested emphasizing 'Australia' in the naturalization ceremony by referencing Australia's constitution and laws in the pledge as well as displaying the Australian flag.[3] The memorandum even spoke of 'Australian citizenship' years before it was introduced.[4] To legally achieve Australian cohesion in addition to British belonging, parliament finally passed the Nationality and Citizenship Act in 1948, adding Australian citizenship to the British subject status. The main goal of the Nationality and Citizenship Act was, however, to integrate migrants into Australian society.

The Department of Immigration was tasked with administering citizenship and its responsibilities, including regulating its acquisition, facilitating adjustments, and promoting it to the public. The last point was difficult because Australian citizenship did not extend any extra rights to its bearers in addition to their British subject status. For immigrants of non-British origin, its acquisition meant greater legal security but only insofar as they implicitly became British subjects, a status conferred by naturalization that existed before the introduction of Australian citizenship. Yet, Australian citizenship institutionalized a civic notion of Australian belonging that bound new citizens to Australian society rather than to Great Britain, independently of their original nationality.[5] In general, for immigrants citizenship carried with it a notion of belonging to Australia. In turn, civic belonging in Australia was for the first time not only defined through but institutionally guaranteed by the Australian state, nominally distinct though not legally and politically independent from British subjecthood.

Nonetheless, the Department of Immigration had great difficulties defining Australian citizenship and explaining why it should be taken up, not only because it did not extend rights beyond British subjecthood but because its legal definition entailed no qualitative meaning (Jordens 1995: 6). Australian belonging had to be reinvented, not least in reference to the past, under conditions of diverse immigration. Caroline Kelly, an anthropologist who had been working with the Immigration Department, told the summer school of the Institute of Political Science in Canberra in

1953 that Australians lived on a 'borrowed tradition'.[6] 'We tried to think of ourselves as partly British and then as British-Australian, but neither of these has got to "holts" with the problem that we are Australian in a new world and evolving a new patter of life.'[7] She was sceptical about commemorations like Australia Day, which was, in her opinion, 'apart from a few people who come to Canberra and talk a lot, [..] mostly regattas and races.'[8] The Department of Immigration agreed in principle that Australian belonging had to be reinvented, but it saw more potential in Australia Day than did Kelly. The people she mentioned who went to Canberra for Australia Day 'to talk a lot' actually spoke about migration on invitation by the department. Since 1950, the Department of Immigration organized Citizenship Conventions for social scientists, practitioners, and volunteers to discuss matters concerning immigration and settlement.[9] The event took place annually around Australia Day.[10] It utilized, as I will argue, the commemoration of Australian settlement to integrate new Australians by evoking traditions and a civic belonging to Australia.

Civic memories of Australia Day had begun to shift imaginations of belonging from British to Australian traditions even before the war, as shown above. At the same time, cultural memories of British and Australian heritage were widespread with commemorations arranged by conservative organizations like the ANA. After 1945, Australia Day commemorations, civic and cultural, were innately linked to questions of new settlement policies, due to the constitutive bond between Australian belonging and migration, but in particular because of the post-war policies to increase Australia's population. At an Australia Day celebration in 1947, Robert Menzies remarked as leader of the federal opposition that without bold immigration it would be idle for Australians to talk of independence.[11] However, not everyone was as content with mass immigration, considering it instead a risk to Australian belonging. The president of the ANA argued, at the same gathering at which Menzies spoke, that immigrants had to conform to the Australian way of life or they would breed contempt for the country.[12] Few at the time would have disagreed with that statement, but conservatives continued to propagate communal models of belonging which immigrants appeared to undermine or were unable to conform to. The Victorian Returned Soldiers League demanded in 1949 that Australia Day should foster more nationalism because migration was 'breeding a mixture of national loyalties'.[13] The principles of White Australia had not been affected directly by the introduction of Australian citizenship, and generally they were not questioned

by any political faction, but the turn from British to Australian traditions gave leeway to Continental–European immigration. Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell proposed a middle way, accommodating both British heritage and mass migration, in his Australia Day speech in 1947. He hoped that ten Englishmen would be brought out for every one from other countries, but all would be welcome if they could fulfil the requirements of good citizenship.[14] Even though Calwell's quota was never realized, its logic prevailed. While on the one hand, Australian belonging continued to be determined by national belonging and cultural heritage, while on the other, citizenship proposed a civic understanding of belonging, in theory free of discrimination for those being admitted.[15] After its diminished significance in the first half of the twentieth century, Australia Day stood once again as a commemoration that posed questions over how to mediate between migration and belonging. The memories of Australia Day were politically contested, their relationship to each other shifted, and their relevance changed with transformations of their social circumstances, with modifications in migration, and the dynamics of belonging.

In the previous section of this chapter, I argued that civic and cultural memories were competing interpretations of belonging with sometimes contradicting, sometimes complementing implications for immigration policies. Different interpretations of the past vied for political influence, but because of the lack of full sovereignty and citizenship, civic and communal notions of belonging remained institutionally unrelated. The Empire and memories of British settlement offered a reference point before 1901, through which Australian federation was made possible. Only in the 1930s did Australian civic memories finally create an independent framework under which competing versions of the past could be formulated. However, only with the introduction of Australian citizenship, were civic and communal notions of Australian belonging also institutionally mediated. Thus, civic memories were representative of the Australian people as citizens rather than as British subjects, and in turn, cultural memories could provide a nationalist foundation for the Australian polity. It was with the introduction of Australian citizenship that the contentious relationship between civic and cultural memories moulded Australia's society and polity in reference to migration. Australia Day, as a multifarious commemoration of belonging and settlement, was an ideal date to crystallize the various memories of Australia and their contested policies. Over time, the commemoration also traced the trajectory of the social transformations that mediated the politically contending forms of Australian memories.

3.1 Australia Day and Citizenship Conventions: Civic Integration in the 1950s and 1960s

Australia introduced Australian citizenship on Australia Day 1949 after the federal parliament passed the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 in November that year. Arthur Calwell declared, according to Tasmania's *The Mercury*, that this act rendered that year's Australia Day to be of utmost importance 'as it marked another step forward in the development of Australian nation-hood'.[16] Only, the Australian public and other newspapers did not appear to share the impression that Australian citizenship would make a significant impact upon their lives. Most papers buried the news of the introduction of citizenship in a brief note.[17] The tenor of the news stories was that it would not change anything for Australians except that now, in addition to being British subjects, Australians possessed an extra status. The Empire-loyal *Sydney Morning Herald* went as far as to mock the new law in an ironical comment on the front page: 'Greetings, citizens of Australia! Or have you forgotten that to-day—by Act of Parliament—you become citizens of your own country, which is just what you were before.'[18] In another comment, entitled 'The Puzzle of Citizenship', the paper called Australian citizenship 'deplorable' for weakening British subjecthood. It wondered about the status of Australian citizenship: 'But just what that implies remains obscure.'[19] Indeed, little changed for British subjects living in Australia, and in the years that followed few British immigrants felt compelled to take up Australian citizenship. The Nationality and Citizenship Act did not add any further rights to bearers of the new status. Instead, it only regulated the relationship between Australian citizens and other British subjects, and crucially, the act detailed the acquisition of Australian citizenship.

In the tradition of Australia's constitution, the Nationality and Citizenship Act characterized belonging in relation to migrants and so-called 'aliens'.[20] The introduction of the Act was only tenuously relevant to British subjects in Australia as they automatically received Australian citizenship and little seemed to have changed for them at first. For immigrants, Australian citizenship meant that requirements and procedures for naturalization were amended, as many newspapers informed their readers the day after the Act's introduction. Citizenship also meant that immigrants' relationship to their new society had changed.[21] Before 1949, Australian laws determined naturalization for the British Empire, indicating the schism of Australian belonging between democratic Australian

legislation and British sovereignty. Since 1949, migrants who were naturalized in Australia joined a distinct society with jurisdiction over its own membership. In this regard, Australian citizenship was an opportunity for migrants to become part of the society to which they had migrated. To mark the occasion of receiving citizenship and joining Australian society as a special and impressive event, the Nationality and Citizenship Act also introduced mandatory naturalization ceremonies to be held in courts, and later in civic proceedings. Soon after the introduction of citizenship, non-British migrants received for the first time, as *The Age* announced, Australian citizenship in an 'impressive' naturalization ceremony.[22]

Thus, Australia Day 1949 was a turning point for immigrants and subsequently for all Australians. Renowned Australian journalist Peter Russo shared this assessment in an article he wrote for *The Argus* titled 'An Australia Day Study, 1949: New Citizens and Natives'. He regarded Australia Day to be of profound significance for thousands of immigrants that year as the Nationality and Citizenship Act would reassure them of their status. 'Now, [the naturalized immigrant] can feel that he belongs. His citizenship derives from the country in which he lives, towards whose progress he is devoting his energies, whose defence is identified with the national security of himself and his children.'[23] Australian citizenship would do much to persuade immigrants to become an integral part of their adopted country to which, he argued, most were happy to adjust. Moreover, Russo noted the crucial implications for Australian society itself. He reminded those who viewed Australian citizenship as a threat to loyalty to imperial Britain that allegiance to Britain was only one of many allegiances in Australia as '[u]nconsciously, whether we like it or not, we are culturally loyal to habits and customs which have had their origin in the most outlandish places, from Palestine and Egypt to Greece and Rome.'[24] Rather than always looking towards Europe, he urged his readers to emphasize Australia's academic and scientific achievements, because Australia could 'better determine the objectives of the new Citizenship Act by pointing out methodically that she also has a few things to teach'.[25] The new relationship between Australian belonging and immigration was now mutually conditioned rather than mediated through the British Empire or exclusive on cultural grounds. Citizenship offered a legal and social structure for immigrants to integrate into and contribute to, conveniently imagined on Australia Day. In turn, citizenship in relation to immigration allowed for the recognition of Australian traditions and achievements, rather than heritage and sentiments. Australian belonging continued to be

defined by migration; now, for the first time, it was also defined in civic and legal terms rather than solely in cultural notions, binding migration and belonging into one comprehensive polity.

3.1.1 Promoting Citizenship

For the Department of Immigration, the ability to create a comprehensive Australian belonging that could accomplish the integration of immigrants was the most important feature of citizenship. Despite its efforts to offer an accessible Australian belonging through naturalization, Australian citizenship was not as popular with immigrants as the government had hoped. Before 1952, 75 per cent of migrants had not naturalized, and less than half of all migrants had declared their intention to do so (Davidson 1997: 93). A significant challenge at hand was to encourage immigrants to take up citizenship without diluting its meaning. The department had already suggested in 1945 that attractive naturalization ceremonies be devised 'to impress upon the applicant the seriousness of his responsibilities'.[26] In 1946, Calwell pledged to parliament that elaborate, dignified citizenship ceremonies would be organized, and a booklet would be prepared that would

> give the alien an outline of our historical and cultural background, our social structure and mode of government, an appreciation of our way of life, and what Australia stands for as a nation. It will bring home to him the privileges and benefits which derive from Australian citizenship, and will better fit him to take his place as a partner in our great Commonwealth. (quoted in Jordens 1995: 172)

The goal was to convince immigrants of the relevance of obtaining citizenship as a means of belonging to their new society. Considering the difficulties the department had in defining citizenship as a notion of Australian belonging, referring to Australia's 'historical and cultural background', as the booklet was intended to do, was one important method of conferring upon citizens, both new and existing, a common understanding of citizenship.

In 1949, soon after Australian citizenship was introduced, the Department of Immigration pushed ahead with its policy of harnessing citizenship as a means of integrating migrants. It organized a Citizenship Convention with the objective, as Calwell explained in a letter to Prime

Minister Chifley, to promote 'a nation-wide movement towards a deeper appreciation of the privileges and obligations of Australian Citizenship, and the realisation that our lack of numbers places upon Australians the particular responsibility of sharing these privileges and obligations with the many thousands of newcomers now reaching our shores under the Commonwealth Government's Immigration Schemes'.[27] The convention was intended to target Australians as well as immigrants through its message that migration and citizenship were of great importance to Australia. After the election of the Liberal Party later that year, which remained in power for the next 22 years, the new Minister for Immigration Harold Holt and Prime Minister Robert Menzies wholly supported the organization of The Citizenship Convention, arguing that the government's immigration scheme was only viable if the Australian community could be won over to support the settlement of new arrivals.[28] The coordinator and organizer of the convention for the federal government, J.T. Massey, travelled the country to find support in the states and communities and to invite involvement from representatives from the governments, administrations, and civil society, spanning churches and various voluntary organizations, including organizations set up by the Department of Immigration called the 'Good Neighbour Councils'. The community organizations were engaged to promote the integration of migrants and to assist them in becoming 'British subjects and Australian citizens, in the fuller sense and not merely in the legal sense of the words'.[29] Selected immigrants were also invited to be part of the occasion's entertainment, or to take up citizenship during the Convention at an official naturalization ceremony that was to be the culmination of the event.

The first Citizenship Convention was arranged around Australia Day from January 23rd to 27th 1950, with the naturalization ceremony falling on the national day to honour the first anniversary of Australian citizenship.[30] It took place at Albert Hall in the Commonwealth capital and was attended by 200 delegates representing 100 national organizations.[31] Over the course of the event, delegates listened to addresses from politicians, officials, social scientist, practitioners, and from a 'new Australian'. In the following year, a special commemorative Citizenship Convention was organized for the fiftieth anniversary of federation, which was also considered a great success by the Department of Immigration.[32] Thereafter, Citizenship Conventions became an annual event until 1966; two more events followed in 1968 and 1970, with up to 400 delegates at each convention. In addition to disseminating information about emerging policies

and successful programs through speeches and lectures, beginning in 1951 the conventions were also increasingly used as a forum. Practitioners exchanged experiences at workshops where they discussed the specific challenges of immigration, settlement, and integration, leading to a number of resolutions.[33] The Department of Immigration took those resolutions very seriously and moved to integrate recommendations into its policies where it could.[34]

Overall, The Citizenship Conventions were part of the government's larger objective to assimilate migrants.[35] Generally, assimilation is understood as means to preserving a homogenous community, in particular by way of new members adopting the culture of the established society (Jupp 2002: 21–23). Partially, this was an objective of settlement policies during the 1950s, and the term of assimilation was widely and positively used at Citizenship Conventions at the time. New Australians were expected to be educated in the English language, Australian cooking, and the national flora and fauna (Tavan 1997: 82–83). Immigrants had to adopt what was considered the 'Australian way of life', though it proved difficult to explain what exactly that entailed (Tavan 1997: 84–85). The task of assimilating immigrants was left to the Good Neighbour Councils that were introduced at the first Citizenship Convention and then established throughout communities in Australia (Tavan 1997: 77–78). These councils were run by an Anglo-Celtic middle class that attempted to facilitate the settlement of New Australians through personal relations. While the idea behind the assimilation process was to transform 'aliens' into 'Australians', it was not a one-way transmission and not exclusively cultural (Tavan 1997: 81).

The actual meaning of assimilation was rather nuanced. Much of the program of The Citizenship Conventions, since the very first meeting, was directed at established Australians to help them to come to terms with a new and more diverse Australia. This included entertainment and artistic presentations prepared and presented by new Australians, from folk dances and musical performances to exhibitions of cultural crafts and artefacts typical of their origin countries. The digests of the early Citizenship Conventions featured many pictures of children and adults in folk dresses.[36] The cultural heritage of immigrants was openly celebrated and appreciated rather than suppressed and denied as one might assume at an event concerned with assimilation. However, cultural tolerance was strictly reserved for Europeans as Asians continued to be barred from naturalization. Moreover, European divergences from Australian-British culture were met with suspicion in Australian society. Several speakers at the 1950

convention called, therefore, for tolerance for cultural differences, seemingly contravening the message of assimilation.[37] Officially, assimilation was not necessarily cultural and exclusive. New Australians were urged to become Australian citizens, and the formal process of becoming a citizen was considered the culmination of all assimilation efforts.[38] With citizenship being a central means of integration, assimilation was the adoption of Australia's civic principles under which a variety of heritages and diverse memories could be included.

The presentation of migrant cultures had two objectives. On the one hand, the acceptance of non-British heritage was considered to ease the transition for migrants from their former home to their new country. For instance, delegates showed great support for publications about citizenship for migrants in foreign languages.[39] On the other hand, presentations of migrant cultures confronted Australians with new appearances and transnational traditions as new elements of their society. However, new Australians were not explicitly invited to take part in the regular discussions of The Citizenship Conventions until 1953 (Jordens 1995: 81). At first, they were only regarded as objects of the assimilation policy, and only gradually were their voices and opinions heard (Jordens 1995: 82). While migrant cultures were always accepted under the assimilation policy, the diversity of immigrants shifted over time from simply being *presented* to being *represented* at the conventions and in Australian society.

3.1.2 Australia Day and Naturalization

From the beginning, assimilation was considered to be as much about adjusting the immigrant to Australian society as about transforming Australia into an immigration country. One way of achieving the goal of fostering an inclusive society was reference to the past. At the opening speech of the first Citizenship Convention, Prime Minister Menzies was reported to have told the delegates, according to The *Citizenship Convention Digest*, that 'a certain hostility towards migration still existed in Australia and [he had] pointed out that Australians must remember that they were all either migrants themselves or the descendants of migrants.'[40] In a radical about-face from traditional Australian nationalism, which had defined Australia by a heritage in opposition to immigration, Australia came to be understood explicitly as a traditional immigration country. For immigrants this meant that, '[w]hen a member of a foreign nation is made a member of the Australian nation by naturalisation he becomes

an heir of all the traditions of his new country,'[41] as the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council noted in a discussion paper for workshop groups at The Citizenship Convention in 1951. According to this view, the adoption of memories followed the act of joining the immigrant society. Memories were promoted as a shared attribute, uniting imaginations of old and new Australians and bringing together experiences of migration with the history of Australia.

Australia Day in particular served as a frame for commemorations that spoke to migrants and established Australians and was, therefore, especially adequate for the assimilation of new citizens to be. At the naturalization ceremony on Australia Day during the first Citizenship Convention, Immigration Minister Harold Holt informed the audience

> that the date of the ceremony had been especially selected as it was Australia's national birthday [and] a ceremony held on that day would focus the attention of Australians as well as recently arrived migrants on the privileges and responsibilities possessed by Australian citizens.[42]

Australia Day was directly linked to citizenship. One year later, Holt expounded on the commemorative meaning of citizenship:

> There could be no more appropriate day than this—Australia Day in our Jubilee Year of Federation—for Australians generally to take fresh thought of the implications of citizenship and to reflect upon the responsibilities as well as the privileges which are ours.
> The task which may be ahead of us, to ensure the development and security of our country, are at least as great as those which faced our pioneers. We shall need all patriotism of those earlier generations who gave us the united Australia we know today, all their appreciation of what is to be an Australian, if we are to build upon the foundations of a greater and happier Australia.[43]

It was the liberal imagination of a long and successful tradition of Australian settlement and immigration into which the new citizens were being integrated. As citizens, they joined a history of building the political institutions of a democratic polity. Civic memories mediated existing citizens and the new as members of one Australian history and political society.

In 1953, and for many years thereafter, Citizenship Conventions were held in the proximity of Australia Day, rather than on the date itself, while municipalities and councils throughout the country were asked to

organize naturalization ceremonies on Australia Day. Community organizations pushed for this date, considered by some to be 'Citizenship Day', to be utilized for the granting of citizenship. Delegates of almost every Citizenship Convention called for naturalization ceremonies to be held on Australia Day.[44] They resolved at the first convention, for example, that '[i]n its plans for a fitting annual celebration of Australia Day on January 26, the Federal Government should make a feature of special naturalisation ceremonies on a Commonwealth-wide basis on that day.'[45] There was little dispute between delegates and the government about the desirability of holding naturalization ceremonies on Australia Day, though there were differences in opinion about how they should be organized. While community groups such as the ANA wanted the events to be large and centralized, the government preferred small and local events which would be more personal and welcoming rather than intimidating.[46] After the 1952 convention, the Department of Immigration suggested that 'steps could be taken to ensure that a naturalization ceremony is held on 26th January, 1953 in every city and town of Australia where there are candidates for naturalization and where ceremonies are normally held—i.e., every country town of any size, and not merely capital cities'.[47] The Department of Immigration moved away from the centralized approach where ceremonies were arranged at The Citizenship Convention and in courts of state capitals only. Instead, it encouraged local municipalities to hold civic ceremonies attended by local citizens on Australia Day.[48] The Department involved the community organizations such as the Good Neighbour Councils and the New Settler League. The idea was to give the ceremony more relevance, to make a greater impression on the applicants through a more personal note, and to promote a national recognition of immigration and citizenship.[49] Reasons for this change of policy were that it would 'have beneficial results from an all-round assimilation point of view', that 'it would impress on "new" and "old" citizens a sense of the full implication and true value of Australian citizenship', and that the press and radio might be more interested in 'down-to-earth' ceremonies.[50]

The Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council of the Department of Immigration was sceptical at first as this shift towards the local level meant that officers would have to attend to work on a public holiday.[51] Over the years, however, small-scale naturalization ceremonies were increasingly organized on Australia Day. For example, The *Daily News* reported in 1954 that the Immigration Department had arranged five ceremonies throughout Western Australia on Australia Day. 'Many of us tend

to forget [Australia Day] was the day, 166 years ago, on which Captain Phillip landed at Sydney Cove. But 49 people, scattered throughout WA, will have a special reason for remembering Australia Day, 1954. For on that day they will become Australian citizens—and they will be able to celebrate Phillip's landing.'[52] Australia Day memories became a right as well as a symbol of membership. Moreover, the Good Neighbour Movement, with support from the government, encouraged already existing citizens to attend the citizenship celebrations, to represent Australian society, and to partake in the commemorations. The small-scale and intimate ceremonies gave the illusion of all participants, new and old Australians, being united by their shared memories on a grassroots level. The memories of Australia Day conveyed civic membership in the imagination of an Australian tradition in which they all participated as citizens. Immigrants were thus considered to be assimilated, not because they remembered anything new, but because they joined into the logic of Australia's past, crystallized in Australia Day, qua naturalization.

3.1.3 Australia Day and Assimilation

Others were not so easily convinced that citizenship entailed assimilation. The ANA had embraced the post-war immigration policy, despite its traditional opposition to non-Australians, but remained sceptical. In 1948 it suggested to the federal government the idea of holding formal naturalization ceremonies at court, at High Court if possible.[53] The organization was adamant about the importance of naturalization ceremonies being impressive, and a few years later it protested the change from the formal and legal procedure to the civic model of naturalization ceremonies.[54] It supported naturalization on Australia Day but was not involved in Citizenship Conventions like the Good Neighbour Councils. Naturalization was relevant to the ANA as it perceived Australia as a nation of an exclusive culture requiring protection. Thus, the bar was to be set high for gaining membership. By the late 1950s, it regarded White Australia as superior, and up until the mid-1960s, it continued to defend 'ethnic' homogeneity, despite widespread criticism of the policy by then.[55] In 1960, an attempt failed to amend the regulations of the ANA to admit non-native Australians to the association in a case concerning naturalized Australians originating from the British Commonwealth outside Australia.[56] To the ANA, being Australian derived from an exclusive heritage which one gained from being born in the country, not through a legal procedure. Australian citizenship

was not enough for them to be regarded as Australian. In the logic of this White Australian nationalism Australia Day should reinforce cultural exclusiveness rather than offer participation to immigrants.

To the ANA, Australia Day was of much broader relevance than an appropriate date for naturalization. In October 1946, the ANA in Melbourne founded the Australia Day Committee, which later became the Australia Day Council (Menadue 1971: 192–195). Similar councils were subsequently formed in other states, with the objective 'to promote the national celebration of Australia Day'.[57] In 1957, the Australia Day Federal Council was established to coordinate between the state branches and to liaise with the Commonwealth government.[58] A large number of activities were organized by the Australia Day Councils over the years and included, aside from traditional smoke socials, flag raising events, an Australian of the Year Award, and the distribution of silver spoons to babies born on Australia Day, in addition to naturalization ceremonies.[59] At a naturalization ceremony in the early 1960s the chairman of the Australia Day Council Victoria welcomed new citizens. He empathized that for those coming from countries with old traditions, the adoption of the Australian way of life might include unpleasant experiences. 'Such experiences are common to all of us, even to the oldest of our native born [sic] Australians,'[60] he pointed out, drawing a line between migrants and native Australians. Australia Day Councils considered the national day as more than a functional date to assimilate immigrants; it was a national commemoration for native Australians, as well as for new ones. It expressed a heritage which immigrants should adopt.

As the councils reckoned that they were fulfilling a national deed, they repeatedly sought funding from the federal government. The Australia Day Federal Council was established at least in part to lobby for financial support. The federal secretary of the Council wrote to the Prime Minister in 1958 for the first time, asking for a substantial annual grant to finance the Councils' promotion of Australia Day. The request was declined. Repeated attempts were made by the federal council in 1959, 1964, 1966, and 1971.[61] The Australia Day Councils received support from a distinguished Liberal Member of Parliament, the Australian Association of Advertising Agencies, and the ANA, but the Liberal government, under Prime Ministers Menzies and then Holt, rejected any request for such funding.[62] The government declared that 'Australia Day celebrations should, as far as possible, reflect a natural spontaneity on the part of the public rather than stem from Government notions'.[63] Contrary to this

position, federal government agencies, such as the News and Information Bureau of the Department of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Australian Broadcasting Commission, all were active in promoting Australia Day.[64] The government made a distinction between promoting Australia Day, which it supported in theory, and the organization of specific celebrations, which it thought ought to be left to private initiatives. Australia Day was promoted as a civic framework under which a variety of commemorations and interpretations could be organized, including the cultural memories of ANA. Thus, the national holiday was celebrated in a number of ways, while political differences about its interpretation were a question of individual preference rather than political contestation. To most Australians, by the 1960s Australia Day had become no more than a public holiday and any historical meaning was widely ignored.[65] To the government, Australia Day commemoration was relevant only in its function as an effective means for the integration of immigrants.

3.1.4 Assimilation to Integration

In the debate over the funding of the Australia Day Councils, the Immigration Department concurred with the Prime Minister. It noted that it welcomed any promotion of Australia Day, as it regarded the national commemoration to be associated with 'maximum naturalisation effort by the community' but that it was not interested in directly assisting the Australia Day celebration.[66] Instead, the department funded Citizenship Conventions and settler organizations like the Good Neighbour Councils, who utilized Australia Day for their own purpose of migrant integration (Jordens 1995: 79–83). The Good Neighbour Councils' 'monthly bulletin for migrants', *The Good Neighbour,* informed readers about Australia Day in its January 1965 issue. An article recalled Captain Arthur Philip's landing as the beginning of an ever-progressing Australian history: 'One hundred and seventy-seven years later, Australia has grown into a bustling, highly-developed and diversified nation [...].'[67] The piece stressed the role of immigrants in this evolution, arguing that '[s]ettlers have added variety to the Australian way of life, and have brought new skills to the work force.'[68] It was the historical development and process, in which old and new Australians were joined by their involvement in creating that history, that was remembered on Australia Day, rather than a permanent 'way of life', or even a national heritage. Moreover, migrants no longer seemed to join the development of democratic and political institutions,

as their integration used to be commemorated in the early 1950s. While the commemoration evoked civic memories they were not applied to the shared notion of citizenship but rather to achievements on a social level. It was the economic progress of the past in which Australians were united through their skills, inclusive of diversity and theoretically independent of their heritage. In light of social and cultural diversity, the equality promised by citizenship appeared to have lost its unifying power.

By the mid-1960s, the limits of citizenship were widely recognized, although citizenship remained the lynchpin of integration. The 1965, The Citizenship Convention's theme was 'Every Settler a Citizen'. Yet, the challenges discussed at the convention went far beyond the promotion of naturalization. Minister for Immigration Hubert Opperman made this declaration in his speech: 'But our principle debt over our short history has been to rapid immigration. And for this, the dynamic force of our history, to be effective every settler must become a citizen in the full sense, not only, or even mainly, by naturalisation, as soon as possible.'[69] Australian progress depended on immigration rather than being threatened by it, but immigrants had to be more than just citizens. They were expected to actively contribute to Australian history rather than to just participate in the Australian polity. 'We are not merely trying to make newcomers conform to our natural pattern', Opperman emphasized, 'nor submit passively to our traditions. We expect them actively to inject themselves, their ideas, their traditions into the fusion with ours that will give Australia distinction and significance among the nations.'[70] This was part of the gradual abandonment of assimilationist policies, which had expected new Australians to adopt Australian politics, memories, and traditions through naturalization (Mann 2013). The new policy of integration focused on the integration of the social capital and traditions that immigrants brought to Australia.

On the flip side of emphasizing migrants' social contributions, greater attention on the economy led also to an increased awareness of social obstacles that immigrants faced in their integration process. The Good Neighbour Councils used to be concerned with helping individual migrants with challenges in their new environment. Now, social obstacles and discrimination in public life were acknowledged to be a structural problem of integration that Australian society rather than individual migrants had to tackle.[71] At The Citizenship Convention in 1966, two successful migrants offered their view on the state of integration.[72] They lauded the acceptance of the artistic, cultural, and gastronomic variety immigrants had brought from Europe. As one

of them noted, 'there has come about a more intelligent awareness of the thought, traditions and history of the countries of Europe. These things are sinking into the public consciousness and wreaking if only slowly, a changed attitude to great and small things.'[73] Australian attitudes and society had indeed changed, as did the public's growing recognition of immigrants' cultures, though these were still strictly European. In subsequent discussions, delegates of the convention stressed 'the necessity to educate old Australians about the traditions and aspirations of our fellow citizens, their problems, their fears and their hopes. In particular, they should be told that we did not expect migrants to discard their own cultures and conform to Australian patterns.'[74] The new perception of immigrants as carriers of heritage and culture forced Australians to reconsider their own belonging.

The integration of immigrants also allowed the construction of new Australian memories. At the last Citizenship Convention in 1970, the New South Wales Minister responsible for immigration, E. A. Willis, who was also responsible for the Captain Cook Bi-Centenary Celebrations that year, referred to the structural hardships of migrant integration. Integration, he argued, was as a historical constant of Australian history that united old and new Australians as a common experience. Speaking to the forum he said, with a slight hint of irony,

> [t]he Convention is concerned with integration of new settlers, so it is relevant for me to mention that this is nothing new; our first settlers also had integration problems—very big ones, and not really different in principle from those of more recent newcomers. Their housing problems, for example, were much worse than those of today, simply because there were no houses. In those first days nobody complained about the cost of medical services for two reasons—there were no hospitals and food was more important than money.[75]

The underlying message of these memories was twofold. First, social problems like those faced by immigrants had been overcome before and were part of the immigration tradition rather than an obstacle to it. Secondly, Australia had always been an immigration country with settlement problems. Rather than evoking a process of change in which integration was the *telos*, as policies of assimilation promised previously, integration was a structural process, viewed as a continuous feature of Australia's immigration history. Memories now began to imagine an immigrant heritage in which old and new Australians were simply Australians, all faced with the same problems.

Between 1947 and 1972, Australia's population increased from 7.5 to 13 million. Three-and-a-half million Australians were first or second generation migrants. Half of the total number of migrants were non-British (Richards 2008: 226). When mass migration began after the Second World War, the establishment of Australian citizenship seemed to offer access to Australian society for an increasingly diverse pool of migrants. At the same time, Australian citizenship created a new reference of belonging for established Australians. Memories, in particular those of Australia Day, were employed to make sense of this new state-related membership in which old and new Australians began to share a history of Australia's democratic development. Migrants were integrated as nominally equal Australians who participated in the shared polity and in traditions stemming from Australia Day's civic memories. Assimilation, the adoption of Australian culture, was considered indispensable but a secondary by-product of naturalization and the promotion of civic belonging (Markus and Taft 2015). At Citizenship Conventions in the 1960s, the history of Australia's immigration and integration programs were generally considered a great success, with only minor political controversy.[76] Indeed, immigration had always been a bipartisan policy since 1945. However, as social and cultural matters came to dominate conventions and migration debates overall, memories adjusted the perception of social relations by which immigrants could become Australian. In the new policy of integration, economic rather than political developments dominated civic memories that imagined a tradition in which new Australians were expected to contribute to society but also claimed their share of benefits.

While civic memories accompanied the integration policies of the 1950s and 1960s, from assimilation to integration, cultural memories persisted in a subterranean manner in opposition to the official version. The ANA and Australia Day Councils accepted the governments' policy of mass immigration but were sceptical about the mode of civic belonging by which immigrants were naturalized. Their commemoration of Australia Day emphasized a communal belonging by which cultural heritage and the ideal of being native to Australia dominated. While this was a minority position with a strong lobby, cultural ideas of a White Australia were the largely unmentioned foundation of a selective immigration policy. The exclusion of Asians was hardly a topic of conversation until the mid-1960s when cultural issues were more widely discussed (Tavan 1997).[77] With the recognition of cultural diversity as an element of Australian society, heritage and cultural memories came to influence the debate about integration

more strongly. However, Australia Day commemorations, which had always been known for exclusive cultural memories or for inclusive civic memories, seemed to offer no recourse for the newly emerging Australian society that came to imagine an inclusive cultural memory. It took drastic changes during the 1970s, both in immigration as well as in heritage policies, for Australia Day to emerge again as a central and integrating national commemoration.

3.2 The Decade of Transformations: From Civic to Communal Belonging in the 1970s

In 1968, the Department of Immigration set up an internal National Liaison Group to identify and work with migrant communities across the country. Various associations had formed over the years in which migrants from the same national background collaborated for specific purposes, from celebrating folk and home culture to providing welfare to publishing foreign language journals (Jupp 2002: 27–30). Over 900 officials from almost 2000 such groups were interviewed, and in 1970, the department asked representatives how it could assist them and their members with the process of settlement. Ann-Mari Jordens (1997: 162–164) points out that this helped both migrant groups and the government to focus on and tackle the challenges of settlement. 'Ethnic' organizations coordinated their work with the Australian state and in turn received the recognition of contributing to Australian society.

With this new access to immigrants through migrant communities, traditional programs became redundant. The last Citizenship Convention was conducted in 1970 and the Good Neighbour Councils, despite being reformed in 1968 to work more broadly and more closely with migrant groups, found it difficult to accept the new diversity in which migrants no longer needed to be represented by others but now represented themselves (Jordens 1997: 165–168). In 1973, the Department of Immigration began delegating citizenship and settlement activities to migrant communities as much as possible (Jordens 1997: 229). In the same year, parliament passed anti-discrimination laws and the Minister for Immigration released a publication entitled *A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future* in which he called for the acknowledgement and celebration of cultural pluralism.[78] The Good Neighbour Councils were abolished in 1978 with the official introduction of multiculturalism as the federal government's settlement policy. The recognition of national groups played a central role in the way settlement was re-evaluated in the 1970s. This development and

the parallel abolishment of racial discrimination were influenced by both domestic and external developments.

The changes in settlement policies were closely linked to a radical transformation of immigration control. The dictation test of the Immigration Restriction Act was abolished in favour of a more discreet mode of selection in 1958. By 1966, Asians received the same legal options and restriction in regard to immigration and naturalization as Europeans, at least in theory, although a bias against non-British immigrants continued.[79] The White Australia Policy was brought to an end in 1973 when the Australian Nationality and Citizenship Act was renamed the Australian Citizenship Act and any legal discrimination based on nationality or 'ethnicity' was abolished. Domestically, public pressure from reform groups was a major factor in this reform (Tavan 2001). The unsatisfied industrial demand for workers in the late 1960s, spurred by a stronger economy and the fact that increasing ease of movement within the European Community dried up traditional migrant flows, were another important factor for abolishing restrictions of the immigration program (Richards 2008: 252–253). Australia now began recruiting from Yugoslavia, Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria, while restrictions for Asian immigrants were also loosened. Moreover, in the context of the Cold War and especially the Vietnam War, Australia had forged closer ties with formerly feared Asian states, and thus it felt the pressure to abolish legal discriminations against these new allies' citizens (Ward 2001). Internal and external transformations in the late 1960s and early 1970s played hand in hand to alter Australia's immigration and settlement policies.

To fill the required immigration quota, the Department of Immigration relied not only on recruiting migrants from a greater variety of source countries, it also looked towards new settlement policies. The acceptance, understanding, and, crucially, support of 'ethnic' migrant groups and of the plurality of their cultures as elements of Australian society was first suggested by Jerry Zubrzycki in an influential contribution to the 1968 Citizenship Convention (Zubrzycki 1968). The recommendation was taken up by the Department of Immigration, and in 1971 its new Migrant Studies Group began planning a survey of migrants' social issues as well as their past history (Jordens 1997: 164). Migrants were notably perceived not just by their social needs but explicitly by their cultural heritage.

Jordens (1995: 152–153) points out that international and domestic transformations, from the Vietnam War to more diverse immigration, had indirectly affected the redefinition of Australian belonging. When Australian citizenship was introduced, establishing a civic notion of Australian belonging, naturalized immigrants also received the status of a

British subject, something already granted to Australian citizens. As Great Britain retreated from its colonial and global engagements after the Second World War towards a more European perspective, and Australia oriented its foreign policies in alliance with the United States of America and in relation to its Asian neighbours, the dependence on the former Empire was rendered increasingly superfluous (Jordan 2006; Ward 2001). Pro-British discrimination, taking the form of, for instance, assisted passages and a low threshold for naturalization, was questioned by parliamentarians on both sides of the aisle by the end of the 1960s (Jordens 1995: 154). Incentives for British subjects to acquire Australian citizenship were abolished through the amendment of the Citizenship Act in 1973. Ahead of parliament passing this Act, however, the assumed relevance of Australian society's move away from Britain was disputed. Some politicians saw a validation of a homogenous Australian nationalism in this clear distinction between British and Australian belonging, while others saw in this policy change a condition for re-evaluating Australian society based on non-British immigration and cultural plurality (Jordens 1995: 154–157). In a press release in May 1972, Liberal Immigration Minister L.B. Forbes pronounced, in repudiation of a suggestion that Australia admit Asians and other non-Europeans, '[t]he expression "homogenous society", when applied to the aim of immigration policy, is intended to mean a cohesive integrated society, one that is essentially undivided, without permanent minorities and free of avoidable tensions.'[80] This statement provoked an intense debate in which members of both major parties could be found to defend either side.[81] One year later, new Labour Immigration Minister Al Grassby declared, a few months before the Citizenship Act was enacted, that new settlers '[w]herever they are born, whatever their nationality, whatever the colour of the complexion, they should be able to become Australian citizens under just the same conditions' (quoted in Jordens 1995: 157). Australia had to redefine itself, still in relation to migration but with the new perception of migrants as 'ethnic' minorities.

3.2.1 *In Search of a New Belonging*

In the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s, these 'questing years', as Zubrzycki has termed them, Australian belonging was politically contested, with memories employed on both sides (Zubrzycki 1968). By the end of the 1970s, a new consensus about Australian belonging had emerged and Australia Day in particular received renewed interest as a commemo-

ration contributing to imagining Australia under altered conditions. In the early years of the decade, Australia Day Councils, which were private civil society initiatives, were the only significant organizations interested in promoting commemorations of the national day. The Australia Day Council in Victoria, the biggest and most dominant branch of Australia Day Councils, organized various programs, in the tradition of the ANA, for 26 January and the following long weekend. Its annual activities across the state included several events such as a flag raising ceremony, an official luncheon, and the presentation of the Australian of the Year Award as well as attendance of dozens of naturalization ceremonies each year.[82] In New South Wales, an Australia Day Movement, founded in 1968 and associated with the state's Australia Day Council, aimed to involve the entire country in the commemoration in order to challenge 'the present generation to display the same qualities which made Australia great'.[83] Yet, a survey by the Australian government in 1973 found, as Minister for Immigration Grassby wrote in a letter to the Prime Minister, 'that Australia Day is not observed by the majority of Australians; it is not observed by the majority of Australian organisations and there is no observance in the majority of Australian communities.'[84] A commentator in *The Sydney Morning Herald* offered this judgment: 'Despite some official pomp and ceremony, Australia Day as a national celebration remains a flop.'[85]

The nationalist Australia Day Council should have been content about Australia's move away from Britain, but its conservative interpretation of Australia found little resonance in society. Rather, it saw its understanding of Australian belonging under threat when a public campaign lobbied for the introduction of a new Australian flag and an Australian National Anthem in the mid-1970s.[86] More than 400 entries were received in a private national anthem competition on Australia Day 1972.[87] One year later, the federal government initiated another quest to replace signs of the Empire on Australian insignia, the Union Jack on the Australian flag, and 'God Save the Queen' as national anthem.[88] Public reactions were mixed. Some opposed the changes out of imperial loyalty, while many others were open to the idea but sceptical about the outcome.[89] In the end, though the flag never changed, the Australian national anthem, after unsatisfactory entries were rejected and several polls conducted, was changed to 'Advance Australia Fair', based on a patriotic song from the nineteenth century. The new national anthem was officially introduced in 1984, while the traditional 'God save the Queen' became Australia's royal anthem (Warhurst 1993).[90] The Australia Day Council was undecided about how

to judge the move towards this new representation of Australian belonging. The Council saw behind the changes forces 'who would destroy everything Australian including the flag'[91] and it was also concerned that the oath of allegiance to the monarch might eventually be abolished.[92] In reference to the anthem, the council was torn between loyalty to the monarchy and enhancing an independent Australian belonging.[93] Amid Australia's move away from Britain, the Australia Day Council had to re-evaluate its conception of Australia. In terms of community, the council had always advocated an Australian heritage independent from Britain, but it also supported the Australian monarchy, which was intrinsically intertwined with the United Kingdom. This allegiance was ideologically consistent as the royal-British aspect of Australia's past was referred to in civic terms regarding Australians' subject status. Nonetheless, Australian nationalism was forced to accommodate divergent pasts in its model of Australian belonging, not just in regard to Britain but also concerning increasingly diverse immigration.

The promotion of Australian belonging remained central to the work of the Australia Day Council. According to the council, Australia Day needed to be an opportunity for individuals and societies to 'annually display their joy and pride in their country's heritage and development.'[94] The Council, governed by diverse opinions,[95] moved on from its exclusively communal perception of belonging and evoked both cultural and civic memories, of origin and process, defending its traditional nationalism as well as a liberal notion of subjects and citizens. In regard to migrants, Australia Day was considered most suitable 'to induct new citizens into the land of their adoption', employing a civic understanding that used to be promoted by the government in the 1950s.[96] Yet, migrants and civic memories played a secondary role in the Council's overall conception of the national day. To them, Australia Day was primarily about creating an Australian community from an awareness of Australia's cultural memories, and civic memories were only used to bring in those groups that were otherwise excluded. Though promoting the national commemoration to all Australians to create a common belonging was the main concern of the Australia Day Council, public interest was marginal in the mid-1970s.

The Department of Immigration was concerned about how little interest Australians showed in Australia Day. Minister Grassby, in a letter to the Prime Minister in 1973, was adamant in promoting awareness of Australia Day 'to build a unifying national spirit in the new era of independence'.[97] In contrast to the Australia Day Council however, for the Department,

belonging was a means rather than an end of commemoration. Grassby lauded the Australia Day Councils but announced in a press release that he 'would like to see on Australia Day 1974, apart from the commendable activities of Australia Day councils, a citizenship ceremony in each local government area.'[98] The Australia Day Movement in New South Wales was also criticized in a paper published by the Department of Immigration for 'trying to create an awareness of our historic origin as a nation, rather than of our achievements and present situation.'[99] The Department and its minister tried to move the commemoration away from Australia Day organizations in an attempt to facilitate the integration of immigrants as the central task of the national commemoration rather than creating a national identity. It was suggested that the Good Neighbour Council, rather than Australia Day Councils, should be employed to promote Australia Day since the former was concerned with settlement and naturalization. For the Department of Immigration Australia Day was not just about a 'national spirit' that needed to be adopted by immigrants but also about promoting inclusive belonging that itself integrated new Australians. This included, for example, a process of legalization for undocumented migrants on Australia Day in 1974 and again in 1976.[100] As in the 1950s and 1960s, Australia Day and immigration were once again closely linked by the federal government. However, the national day had changed from being used by the government to impress a civic notion of belonging upon migrants and citizens at naturalization ceremonies, a view now advocated by the Australia Day Council, to being promoted as an Australian commemoration of, in Grassby's words, 'our national heritage and […] the spirit of national independence'[101] that implicitly entailed all Australians, old and new. The interdependence between commemoration and citizenship as means of belonging had shifted, with memories, rather than underpinning citizenship, taking the lead in defining Australian belonging and integration as being communal.

For the Department of Immigration, Australia Day needed to encapsulate migrants as active members of Australian society while advancing a national community and taking in account also the newly perceived cultural diversity. Neither the Australia Day Council nor the Good Neighbour Council was capable of fulfilling this task. To the former, Australian belonging was communal but exclusive of migrants as the commemoration was considered to be a framework for naturalization in civic terms only. Therefore, the Department of Immigration refused to collaborate with or offer government funding to Australia Day Councils.[102] The

Good Neighbour Council in turn, was not familiar with public promotion and while it began to acknowledge cultural pluralism, the national day was no more than a secondary means to the Good Neighbour Council's actual objective of settling migrants. Its only involvement in Australia Day celebrations was the attendance of citizenship ceremonies on the day.[103] While the department saw great potential in facilitating memories for the integration of migrants, it lacked cooperating partners that could implement and promote Australia Day in a manner conducive for a diverse society.

Other attempts by the Department of Immigration, and especially by Labour Minister Grassby, to enlist the past to impel an inclusive belonging included the commissioning of a popular history book, which was never written, and supporting the establishment of a migration museum.[104] After the Liberal Party came into power in 1975, the federal government and what was now the Department for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs neglected the use of memories for integration and settlement policies during the first few years of its reign. It was only after Australia Day had been completely reinvented outside the government's administrative structure to imagine an inclusive and pluralistic belonging that the idea of utilizing the commemoration was taken up again by the Department and then fully supported by the federal government.

3.2.2 A New Australia Day

The transformation of the national day began with the 'Australian of the Year' Award. The accolade was launched by the Australia Day Council Victoria and its long-time chair Norman Martin in 1960.[105] It was inaugurated one year later with its presentation to Nobel laureate Macfarlane Burnet on Australia Day in 1961. The organizers explained their selection criterion: 'We regard the Australian of the Year as the person who has brought the greatest honour to Australia in the calendar year.'[106] Indeed, until the mid-1970s award holders were of international reputation and reflected the desired Australian character of a worldly rather than inward-looking nation.

While Australian of the Year recipients were of international calibre, the award was closely associated with Melbourne where it was presented at the annual Australia Day Luncheon at Town Hall. For two decades, the selection panel was made up of the same five esteemed Victorian office holders, rather than from persons from across Australia.[107] The

award was organized and presented by the Victorian Australia Day Council, which stood in the tradition of the ANA that was always particularly active and popular in the former gold rush state. This branch was the strongest and biggest of all Australia Day Councils and a leader in the promotion and celebration of Australia Day. Even when the federal umbrella organization of the Australia Day Councils decided in 1973 to expand the Australian of the Year Award into a nation-wide project, the Victorian branch continued to administer it and the president of the federal council was forced to come to Melbourne to announce the recipient.[108] This Victorian dominance was soon challenged by a brazen attack on the Australia Day tradition, not from within the established Australia Day Council federation but by an external group.

In the mid-1970s, a group of young professionals in the Australian capital formed the Canberra Australia Day Council, independent from the Australia Day Federal Council. They presented their own 'Australian of the Year' award on Australia Day 1975, which was a direct affront to the Australia Day Council Victoria. For a couple of years, two parallel 'Australian of the Year' Awards were bestowed from competing Australia Day Councils.[109] The organizers of the new council were left-leaning and sympathetic to the emerging republican movement, rejecting the conservative and monarchist devotion of the Victorian branch, but they were also staunchly nationalist.[110] The recipients of the Victorian award were not necessarily more conservative and included, for example, Aboriginal leader and land rights advocate Galarrwuy Yunupingu in 1979, while the Canberra prize winners were often closely associated with federal politics.[111] Yet, the two Councils were distinguished by political differences and were in direct competition regarding the idea of national belonging. What made the younger Council a threat to the established Council was the political connections the Canberra group was able to utilize. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam conferred the Canberra's inaugural award, conferring considerable prestige to the new 'Australian of the Year' title. Moreover, the Canberra group had links to the federal political establishment and the Commonwealth government, even after Whitlam was ousted from power in 1975, a political standing which the Australia Day Federal Council had never achieved.

In December 1979, Malcolm Fraser's Liberal government established the National Australia Day Committee (NADC) to advise the government on all aspects of Australia Day. At the first Australia Day Forum in Canberra in April 1980, the Australia Day Committee replaced the Australia Day Federal Council in coordinating all state/territory Councils

and to represent them on a national level, including the Australian of the Year Award.[112] Both the Canberra and the Victorian branch were also part of this new association. However, the Labour Premier of Victoria established a new Victorian Australia Day *Committee* in 1982 which took the place of the Victorian Australia Day *Council* at the NADC, forcing the older and more conservative council out of all official roles.[113] The Canberra branch, in contrast, exerted great influence over the new National Council. Within just a few years, the Canberra Australia Day Council had revolutionized the organizational structure of Australia's national day celebrations as well as its outlook. This victory was marked by the controversial selection of the radical left-wing historian and republican Manning Clark as NADC's first Australian of the Year in 1981. In a contribution to the Canberra Australia Day Council Newsletter that year the laureate noted that Australia's national sentiment was under threat and needed to be restored: 'National sentiment fed on difference: industrialization breeds sameness and conformity as well as the great calm down.'[114] The challenge for NADC now was to establish, through the celebration of the national day, a national sentiment, not to say an Australian nationalism, that respected and 'fed' on difference.

Within a decade, the relationship between Australia Day and migration had been entirely transformed to suit the new imagination of Australian belonging. Previous to this, the national commemoration had been about social processes, democratic ideals, and economic progress. Citizenship Conventions in the 1950s and 1960s, and Australia Day Councils into the mid-1970s, utilized civic memories to create a mode of Australian belonging that migrants could conform to through either assimilation or integration. The Department of Immigration was the first to challenge this perception of Australia Day as unsuitable for an Australia that it saw increasingly being made up of migrant groups. Memories had to create a national Australian sentiment to which migrants belonged as migrants. While the Australia Day Council Canberra was not particularly interested in migrant integration, they promoted cultural memories and a communal belonging open to everyone. The 1970s saw a turnaround in Australian belonging, parallel to the transformation of Australia's immigration policy, from being predominantly defined by civic memories to being identified by cultural memories. It was, however, not until the commemoration received recognition from the Australian state by establishing NADC that it became a representation of the Australian nation which, under the novel circumstances of a culturally diverse society, had to be multicultural.

While the White Australia Policy was abolished under a Labour government, multiculturalism as a federal settlement policy was introduced by the Liberal Party. In 1978, Frank Galbally tabled the *Review of Post Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants* in parliament which adopted, with bipartisan support, the recommendations made to foster cultural diversity in Australian society. 'In the course of the Review we became convinced', the authors of the report noted, 'that it was essential for the Government to encourage a multicultural heritage of different ethnic groups and promoting intercultural understanding.'[115] The Australia Day Councils became one of the government's instruments to create such a multicultural heritage. Delegates of the first Australia Day Forum in 1980 stated in a motion that 'the focus of Australia Day should be based on the meeting and the unity of people and cultures. [...] All have contributed immensely to our heritage as a nation. We are today a multi-cultural society, and Australia Day should recognise and celebrate that simple fact.'[116] The nature of multiculturalism, whether it was a 'simple fact' or whether the integration of cultural diversity in a national commemoration was a challenge to be met, was to be substantiated in the course of the 1980s.

3.3 Australia Day and Multiculturalism: Struggles of Communal Belonging in the 1980s

A survey conducted just after Australia Day 1980 revealed that three quarters of Australians were aware of Australia Day.[117] By the end of the decade, this proportion had significantly increased to more than ninety per cent and in 1988, when the 200th anniversary of the First Fleet's landing was celebrated, ninety five per cent of Australians knew about Australia Day.[118] NADC had played an important role in promoting the national day throughout the 1980s, along with another Commonwealth organization, the Australian Bicentenary Authority (ABA). Both had been established in 1979, reflecting the importance the government began to place upon the commemoration of the national day. Moreover, the NAD *Committee* became the National Australia Day *Council* in 1984, giving it Commonwealth funding, representatives on state/territory and federal level, and tasking it, in addition to its advisory role, with popularizing Australia Day (Kwan 2007: 12). ABA in contrast, was a public-private partnership under control of the federal government with the mission to organize the celebration of the bicentenary in 1988, commemorating the

same event that Australia Day stood for (Spillman 1997). The two organizations operated not in competition with each other but rather cooperated from early on in their mission to create a multicultural commemoration of the First Fleet's landing.[119] They had to tackle the question what Australia Day and its past stood for and consequently, what 'Australia' was and how migrants fit into this perception. Much more than just increasing the awareness, the challenge was to create memories and a sense of belonging appropriate for the new decade.

3.3.1 Australia Day's Multiculturalism

The 1980s had begun with much uncertainty about immigration and Australian belonging. Just as Australia had lifted its racist restrictions, introduced multiculturalism, and began admitting non-Europeans on a large scale in the 1970s, the demand for immigrants plunged due to the global economic crisis. Immigration intake was reduced in 1981 and 1982, and although it grew thereafter, it remained relatively low until the end of the 1980s (Richards 2008: 271). Until 1973, immigration had been greeted generally and largely indiscriminately within the ever-widening bounds of a White Australian Policy. Now, however, selection criteria had to be defined. A points-based system was introduced that distinguished three streams: family, economy, and humanitarian intake (Richards 2008: 275–281). Assisted passages for British immigrants were abolished in 1981, and the proportion of non-Europeans immigrating, in particular Asians, increased. The international distribution of immigration spots was, however, soon questioned as the character of Australian society seemed to be transformed by the new, multicultural immigration policy (Richards 2008: 281–289). The ideal make-up of Australian society was contested, with proponents of multiculturalism, including the government and the Department of Immigration, on the one hand, and those considering it a threat to national cohesion on the other.

As Australians wondered how to understand their society amid diverse immigration in the early 1980s, they did not have a clear idea of their past either. Half of them either did not know or were not interested in what kind of activities they would like to see on Australia Day. Australian history, in any case, was the least popular option.[120] A market research survey conducted for the Australia Day Forum revealed that, half of the population wanted national pride to be enhanced, and for that end developing historical awareness ranked highest among respondents.[121]

The question for the government-sponsored Australia Day organizers then was how to make the commemoration of Australia's past relevant to Australians. This meant in particular, asking how to remember in a multicultural society.

The National Australia Day Forum in April 1981 sought answers to these questions. The meeting was opened by Prime Minster Fraser, and in his speech to the delegates from Australia Day Councils countrywide he reminded them that 'Australians have many pasts, a rich diversity which means that our nation can draw upon the experiences of the whole world.'[122] Accordingly, in the commemoration 'the arrival of the First Fleet need not be played up in the celebration of Australia Day' he insisted. Instead, Australia Day stood for various origins: 'For such is our history that the unity of both our nation and of our future is certain to be a case of unity in diversity.' Ralf Harry, a former ambassador to the UN and member of NADC, seconded with a paper that examined 'the Australian identity which Australia Day seeks to enhance'.[123] He suggested for Australia, in contrast to the United States' '*e pluribus unum*', the motto '*in uno plures*'—'many in one'.[124] To begin with, however, he spelled out the challenge of imagining an Australia Day that respected in its perception of the past the diversity of Australian society in the present. The national day could not be just about the arrival of the British, as this could not be celebrated by all Australian citizens, meaning in particular the indigenous population but also 'citizens of European ethnic origin'.[125] The national and state councils agreed to stress instead that 26 January marked 'the first contact of the British with the pre-existing aboriginal culture'[126] and that there had been three waves of immigration thereafter, with the third being neither British nor Aboriginal. The difficulty then was to encapsulate these particularities in one commemoration. 'It is one of the roles of Australia Day to develop a proper balance between national unity and cultural diversity,' Harry argued.[127]

The difficulty stemmed from two interrelated novelties that had become central concerns of Australian society by the early 1980s. First, cultural memories came to define social belonging. The discussion surrounding Australia Day was infused with terms such as 'heritage', 'origin', 'culture', 'community', and 'identity'.[128] Politically, the social recognition of cultural memories was of particular relevance to Aborigines who claimed land rights based on their heritage and community attachment to certain terrains, as well as for immigrant groups who preserved their culture as a communal bond upon which they based special interest claims (Castles and Davidson 2000: 141–153; Kymlicka 1995: 107–130). Secondly,

issues of identity politics came to be addressed in the context of what it meant to be Australian. Multiculturalism was thus elevated from a policy that was primarily concerned with the settlement of migrants to become the defining *modus operandi* of Australian society as a whole. However, while cultural diversity was acknowledged as a reality, the cohesive ability of multiculturalism as a policy was viewed with scepticism by the majority of Australians (Callan 1983). To bind the diverse memories of multiculturalism was the challenge faced by Australia Day in the 1980s.

Australia Day commemorations had to consider and integrate the diverse memories and experiences of communities in Australian society. This was not only a question of what was remembered but how the past was recalled. Harry pointed out that the emphasis on political achievements and developments in Australian history, which were the preferred civic memories evoked on Australia Day during the 1950s and 1960s, were problematic because they implied actions that inclined Aborigines to 'put the flag at half-mast rather than "raising the standard"'.[129] Instead, Australia Day was to be organized in a way that included aboriginal citizens, albeit through their culture. Furthermore, Australia Day was viewed as a chance to pay tribute to the multicultural contributions of immigrant communities to Australian national life.[130] NADC endorsed the idea of commemorating a diversity of cultural memories, including indigenous peoples, migrants, and other Australians, as the mode of Australian belonging. Multiculturalism and cultural memories came to be closely intertwined in Australia Day celebrations.

NADC sought to achieve its aim of celebrating multiculturalism by way of encouraging its state/territory councils and municipal bodies across the country to organize communal activities. Such events involved established community groups putting on for example sporting competitions, commemorative church services, and ethnic folk performances. These events served to set existing cultural memories—of a club's history, a religious episode, or one's home land, respectively—and thus notions of communal belonging within the context of Australia Day celebrations. More than ever before, Australia Day Councils also urged citizens to become actively involved in celebrations on an individual level in the company of their families and peers.[131] This initiative was an attempt on the part of NDAC to create more personal approaches to Australian commemoration. Therefore, rather than partaking in standardized commemorations, people were encouraged to create their own Australia Day celebrations during which they could share their memories with others and give their

own meaning to Australia's past. Australia Day commemorations became a way in which people could identify with an Australian past that was perceived as a personal heritage, imagined through communal belonging. Overall, the celebration of Australia Day became more informal, lowering the hurdle to participate, including for new Australians, by offering a setting for diverse cultural memories.

The overall emphasis of Australia Day, as promoted by NADC, was on cultural memories and community belonging which—and here was the challenge—had to be connected somehow to Australian belonging. At the same time, cultural memories had to remain distinct from an underlying demeanour of Australian belonging that was either binding as a civic notion of multiculturalism, or dividing if it was perceived in cultural terms, namely as a national community. NADC stressed primarily cultural belonging on a communal level but employed also, though independently, civic memories for Australian belonging to bind together the cultural diversity of multiculturalism.

Alongside the communal celebrations, the financing of Australia Day commemorations ventured further into the private sphere. Australia Day Councils sought to procure corporate sponsorship for almost all of their events and activities. Private funding was used for official events including parades, concerts, and parties as well as for the most publicized element of the celebrations, the 'Australian of the Year' Awards, which were televised nationally (Spearritt 1988).[132] The private funding and explicit market appeal of celebrations was economically as well as ideologically useful as it provided a civic bond beyond diverse communities. Liberal market forces of mass consumption, the culture industry in other words (Adorno and Horkheimer 1998: 141–191), mediated the notion of belonging in civic terms for Australians as consumers of the campaigns and broadcasts. In addition, a few, less prominent state-centred classics of Australia Day, flag raising and citizenship ceremonies, mediated commemorative belonging through and in allegiance to the Commonwealth. All these events functioned as socially binding elements without connection to communities and cultural memories by celebrating Australia Day as a civic commemoration. In fact, the civic memories of events such as citizenship ceremonies or Australian of the Year Awards had to neglect the otherwise-celebrated communal particularities of those involved to provide national cohesion among the otherwise distinct communities. Overall, NADC followed a two-pronged approach in its celebration of Australia Day: it promoted cultural memories of diverse communities on the one hand, and created social cohesion by evoking civic memories on the other, without relating the two forms of commemoration.

3.3.2 *The Multicultural Bicentenary*

ABA struggled even more with the question of how to achieve national unity in a multicultural society. In planning one large project, which condensed almost ten years of preparation into one year of celebrations, it was under greater political scrutiny. The slogan for the bicentenary was changed several times, from 'Living Together' to 'The Australian Achievement' and back again due to intervention on the part of the government. The slogan finally settled on, 'Celebration of a Nation', was taken from an advertisement jingle for the bicentenary (Spearritt 1988: 7–12). The celebration was to be inclusive of diversity and reflect multiculturalism. In light of this, the central concern in the lead up to events was how an inclusive commemoration could be presented. The initial slogan emphasized diversity, its focus on achievements evoking civic and economic progress. In contrast, the prevailing slogan, which placed greater emphasis on the 'nation', suggested instead a cultural memory of Australian nationhood. The development of the celebration's slogan also reflected a trajectory that evolved from an enthusiastic promotion of multiculturalism to affirmation of a nationalist mood as the bicentenary was approaching. In the end, Prime Minister Bob Hawke congratulated and thanked the organizers 'for providing all Australians with an opportunity to take part in the celebration of a nation in ways that suit their lifestyles and their interests.'[133] Indeed, the ABA tried to be as pluralistic as possible by offering distinct memories for almost every community or group to participate in the overall commemoration, and was thus criticized by most parties involved.

One problem was that the event that was to be celebrated, the landing of the first European settlers in 1788, just did not appeal to all groups as a date to rejoice, in particular it was not appealing indigenous Australians. The method of setting distinct memories apart was only ostensibly convincing. In 1984, after Labour had regained power of the federal government and took over the bicentenary project, the Minister for Home Affairs and Environment, Barry Cohen, made an important announcement at the launch of ABA's national programme: 'The Aboriginal People first settled this country thousands of years ago. Very few of us had ancestors who came to Australia with the First Fleet in 1788. Many of us arrived here much more recently. The Bicentenary celebrates the fact that Australians are one people composed of many […].' (quoted in Spearritt 1988: 8) Thus, the commemoration had to consider the thousands of years prior to the First Fleet's landing and 200 years of history thereafter. An ABA com-

missioned publication about the 200 years of 'white peopling' of the continent (Molony 1988), taking the commemorated event of European settlers arriving at face value, was officially launched a few days before Australia Day 1988 at Sydney's bay. During the event a copy of the book was thrown into the water by an Aboriginal protester (Macintyre and Clark 2004: 113). For most indigenous Australians, the year was one of mourning and protest (Spearritt 1988: 18). Other history books published for the anniversary, both independent and official, employed the same method as the ABA which opted to presented a disintegrated past. Those books' narratives circumvented the maelstroms of Australian history by detailing historical events in diachronic slices or listing the histories of 'ethnic' groups living in Australia in an attempt to downplay historical developments, causes, and consequences; in other words, the method attempted to reduce political conflicts in the present (e.g., Gilbert and Inglis 1987–1989; Jupp 1988).

The multicultural attempt of including all cultural groups, and thus levelling disparities between them, had its limits. Within its pluralistic approach, ABA had included Aboriginal aspects in its multicultural program, and initially it had even given a forum to critical voices that were, however, shut down for being too political as 1988 drew near (Macintyre and Clark 2004: 100–101, 112–113). The inclusiveness ran counter to the intentions of Aboriginal activists who sought to draw attention to the fact that they had been deprived and excluded throughout colonial history and beyond (Kleist 2008: 158–160). For them, the commemoration of Australia Day was not an opportunity to celebrate multicultural harmony but a chance to recall civic memories of their struggle, and to confront those who had immigrated since 1788 with political claims in the present, in particular calls for land rights (Treaty 88 Campaign 1988; Yunupingu and Rubuntja 1988).

The Australian history of immigration, which for indigenous inhabitants of the land was a history of dispossession, was pivotal to the multicultural celebration as envisioned by ABA. In some instances, the historical narrative began with the indigenous populations as the first to arrival on the continent, as was the case in an official cross-country travelling exhibition that focused indiscriminately on various 'journeys' (Cochrane and Goodman 1988). This approach rendered irrelevant the significant difference between the original peopling of the continent, the colonizing project since 1788, and the selective immigration of the twentieth century. Moreover, the ABA's highlight of the 1988 celebrations set immigration centre stage, but without explicit reference to the indigenous population.

Inspired by the 1976 United States Bicentenary, tens of thousands of ships from all over the world sailed into Sydney Harbour on Australia Day. The tall ships spectacle was viewed by somewhere between one to two million onlookers along the shores of the harbour and broadcast live on television (Macintyre and Clark 2004: 102). In contradistinction to events promoted by NADC, which accommodated an array of cultural memories at the communal level, multicultural commemorations organized by the ABA provided an Australian memory of a multicultural society for mass consumption on a grand scale. In other words, the bicentenary celebration evoked a cultural diversity of Australian heritage as national memory—a multicultural Australia—instead of remembering a diversity of cultural heritages in Australia—an Australian multiculturalism. In both cases, the historical dominance of British settlement in Australian history had to be played down to reflect the multicultural reality of the present.

The 'Tall Ship' event on Australia Day was a peculiar commemoration of the occasion 200 years earlier when only eleven ships arrived, all from England. A traditional re-enactment of Captain Phillip's landing, which was a highlight of the celebrations fifty and one hundred years earlier, was however consciously omitted from the official commemoration in 1988 so as not to offend Aborigines.[134] In a controversial move, replicas of the First Fleet's ships sailed into Sydney Harbour on Australia Day, alongside the international array of vessels. Organized by a private initiative, the imitation fleet sailed all the way from England to Australia, restaging the voyage of the first European settlers, ultimately becoming one of the premier symbols of the bicentenary.[135] Journalist Jonathan King had initiated the project ten years earlier, as he later recalled, to emphasize the English heritage he had 'rediscovered' in the 1970s (King 1989: 9). This was around the same time as when migrants in general were first widely perceived by their heritage. Like other migrant communities, English communities were organized locally and thus existed mainly in areas of high Anglo-Australian concentration, with a self-perception as Australians of distinguished heritage (Jupp 1988: 199–201). The significance King (1989: 2) attributed to the project was that 'ancestors of hundreds of thousands of Australians travelled on the First Fleet and millions sailed out on later ships along the same route.' Apparently, the re-enactment was just one of many diverse memories commemorated at the multicultural bicentenary, of Anglo heritage incidentally. However, as the voyage commemorated the heritage of all Anglo Australians in connection with the colonial settlement program, and perhaps even to a certain extent of all

European Australians, it utterly excluded indigenous and, reminiscent of the White Australia Policy, Asian Australians.

In the early stages of the project, King and his colleagues had applied to the ABA to fund the re-enactment. After initial consideration, the ABA had chosen not to support the First Fleet voyage, partially for financial reasons, but more importantly because the display contradicted the multicultural message that the bicentenary was supposed to uphold.[136] The organizers of the re-enactment believed the ten years of preparation were a constant struggle by them to represent the interests of 'the people' against a government authority (King 1989: chap. 2, 3). They received support from conservative intellectuals who regarded the official commemoration as an affront to Australian heritage and national identity, which were accordingly imagined to be Anglo-European. 'Where were the people of Australia as distinct from the officials on the first Australia Day [in 1788]?', historian Geoffrey Blainey asked in 1984, looking back but anticipating the bicentenary celebration ahead.[137] 'The white Australians were locked aboard the convict ships. The black Australians were not invited and had no reason to be present.' Blainey's statement was a projection back on history of his perception of a bicentenary dominated by the official ABA and of a commemoration which should be, according to his vision, a celebration by 'the people', 'White' people as he specified. Two years later, the leader of the opposition Liberal Party, John Howard, demanded that the bicentenary should not 'apologise in any way for Australia's European Christian origin' (quoted in Macintyre and Clark 2004: 109). These moods were enhanced by conservatives in the year of the bicentenary in a campaign against multiculturalism. 'What is often forgotten by supporters of radical multiculturalism', Ken Baker (1988: 35), editor of the influential conservative *IPA Review*, alleged, 'is that the individualism, freedom and tolerance that generate a creative cultural diversity are characteristic of the British heritage which they so disparage. The cost of weakening this heritage in the name of multiculturalism may well weaken our freedom and tolerance. Few other cultures, if any, have traditions as liberal as ours.' Pitching the cultural memory of Anglo-Celtic heritage, disguised by characterizing the culture in references to civic traditions, against cultural heritages of Aborigines or other migrants to justify a British foundation of Australian belonging was at the heart of the conservative critique of the bicentenary. The First Fleet re-enactment was a representation of the Anglo-Australian heritage which they considered legitimate in contrast to the official celebration of the Tall Ship spectacle and its narrative of diversity. For an Australian nationalism

to flourish, conservatives argued, Australia's British colonial origin needed to be remembered rather than falsifying historical facts for a multicultural commemoration.

It was not that Conservatives were entirely against immigration or diversity per se, but rather they feared that multiculturalism as a mode of belonging would undermine Australia's heritage and social cohesion. In the same year that Blainey spoke out against the bicentenary, he ignited a further controversy by claiming that Asian immigration was against the interests of most Australians (Macintyre and Clark: 72–92). According to Blainey (1984: 169), '[e]very nation relies on a sense of community. That sense of belonging is delicate and can easily be upset by too rapid entry of peoples who unintentionally challenge the sense of cohesion.' Once again, he evoked a dichotomy between official policy and 'the people' in regard to Australian belonging. While he may not have been against Asian immigration altogether, he clearly sought to express popular fears about multiculturalism.[138] At the time, Blainey received much criticism for provoking racist conflict, with many university colleagues questioning his historical judgment (Markus and Ricklefs 1985). The debate was a struggle of politics in the arena of historiography as much as it was a struggle of memories in the political arena (Jordan 1985). The two versions of Australian belonging proposed by Blainey and his opponents, nationalism on the one hand and multiculturalism on the other, not only increasingly divided academia but also society throughout the 1980s.

3.3.3 Multicultural or National Australia

In the year of the bicentenary, *The Age* published 'A Special Report on the Issue Confronting Australia: Immigration.' In special contributions, the leaders of the main parties took a stance and presented their migration policies and their interpretation of Australian belonging. Opposition leader John Howard asserted 'that we have moved on from multiculturalism to a new vision and a new ideal of one united Australia.'[139] Prime Minister Bob Hawke, in contrast, refused to give up on multiculturalism: 'By respecting cultural diversity it makes it easier for all Australians to give their first loyalty to this nation.'[140] The conflict about Australian migration was not about nationalism versus multiculturalism but whether national belonging should be axiomatic on a single meaning or a diversity of meanings. What both propositions had in common was that their interpretations of belonging were communal. In regard to memories then,

integration was premised on evoking the right cultural memory, either of Australia's past or of migrants' pasts.

The Age special report was inspired by the publication of an official immigration policy review, the FitzGerald Report.[141] It recommended increased immigration based on a continued policy of racial non-discrimination, albeit with stronger emphasis on skilled migration and economic needs. While the economy came to be the underlying rationale of immigration control, the report gave enough leeway for all political parties to be suported in their views on migrant integration. The catch-phrase was 'commitment to Australia', the title of the report and a slogan repeatedly evoked by politicians. Howard suggested a program called 'One Australia' which 'means that loyalty and commitment to Australian values and institutions transcend but by no means preclude other affections.'[142] Hawke responded: 'As I said on Australia Day this year—long before John Howard borrowed and distorted the concept of 'One Australia'—the one thing needed to be a true Australian is a commitment to Australia.'[143] In his Australia Day speech the Prime Minister had elaborated on this: 'For, let us ask ourselves, on this day of all days: What is it that links us, in our generation, with the generations which have gone before? It is not only the fact that, for the past 200 years, and to this day, we have been a nation of immigrants. [...] In Australia, there is no hierarchy of descent; there must be no privilege of origin. The commitment is all.'[144] By the end of the 1980s, the cultural memories evoked for integration were no longer primarily those of diverse migrant communities but cultural memories of Australia that imagined either a mono-cultural or multicultural heritage. It was the 'commitment' to either 'one Australia' or to a diverse Australia that new members had to adopt in order to belong.

As notions of commitment came up, citizenship and naturalization re-entered the public debate. Over the next decade, the 1990s, civic memories were evoked in public debates about citizenship (Davidson 1997: 118–124). During the 1980s, the topic of citizenship was not absent but was of little relevance in public debates about migration and belonging. The Citizenship Act was amended twice, in 1984 and 1986, shifting belonging further from Britain to an increasingly independent Australia, while lowering the residency requirements for naturalization without stirring much debate. Civic belonging was also evoked in commemorations, including Australia Day commemorations. Australia Day Councils were still involved in citizenship ceremonies on a state/territory level, for example, by distributing Australia Flag badges to participants.[145] Moreover,

indigenous counter-commemorations of the bicentenary in 1988 were of a civic nature as they demanded rights in relation to the mistreatment they had suffered during colonization. Citizenship and civic memories were employed in Australian commemorations and in political debates about belonging in the 1980s, sometimes in addition and sometimes in opposition to communal belonging. Yet, they were always subordinate to notions of cultural diversity. Liberal Minister Ian Macphee noted in parliament in 1982, '[o]ur vision of our multicultural society shares, with our concept of citizenship, a strong emphasis on building a cohesive and harmonious society which is all the more tolerant and outward looking because of the diversity of its origin' (quoted in Davidson 1997: 120). Civic belonging was after all a relevant pillar of political membership but only complimentary to a diversity of origins or a multicultural belonging based on heritage.

The FitzGerald Report brought citizenship back on to the agenda by recommending that naturalization be encouraged by restricting some benefits for immigrants who did not take up citizenship.[146] While the major parties did not pursue this suggestion, they agreed that citizenship needed to receive greater awareness. Howard intended to 'strengthen' the process of awarding citizenship and to make it more attractive by increasing the residency requirement from two to four years.[147] This hard-to-get strategy was to accentuate the 'meaning' of national identity. The ruling Labour Party took another path and announced a 'Year of Citizenship' from 1988 to 1989 for the 40th anniversary of Australian citizenship, promoting naturalization to those residents who had not applied for Australian citizenship.[148] This campaign was fairly successful and doubled the number of those who took up citizenship in its first month, with applications mostly from former refugees.[149] The campaign was directed, however, at the one million or so residents from Anglo countries like New Zealand, the UK, and North America who saw no benefit in acquiring Australian citizenship.[150] Rather than to force differences into one unified Australian national framework as the opposition suggested, the government promoted citizenship in order to incorporate existing cultural differences into Australian differences in a multicultural Australia.

Citizenship and civic memories re-entered the public debate about belonging as a means of promoting multiculturalism. In 1988, NADC recommended to local councils nationwide that they introduce the following formal pledge to Australia at all Citizenship Ceremonies: 'In our freedom and security, we remember the sacrifice made by generations before us, to

establish this great nation and our way of life. We recognise this freedom carries with it responsibility, and we pledge to demonstrate goodwill and citizenship for our own success, for our community, nation and all mankind.'[151] While the past was evoked in civic terms entirely in this pledge, the lessons from those memories were supposed to serve essentialized entities of communal belonging, oneself, one's community, the nation, and humankind, rather than the sovereign, the state, or fellow citizens.[152] In other words, cultural memories provided the point of reference for personal 'identities', of which being Australian was one among others. These identities were accommodated by citizenship and civic memories that allowed for cohesive diversity. By the 1990s, Australia Day and citizenship were again closely linked but in contrast to 40 years earlier, when this relationship began and memories of Australia Day underpinned the civic belonging of citizenship, by the 1990s, cultural memories of Australia created a belonging that allowed citizenship to integrate a diversity of origins.

3.4 Epilogue: Memories, Belonging and Migrant Integration Since the 1990s

The conflict between proponents of multicultural and national belonging that came to a head in the 1988 bicentenary commemoration defined the political debates of the 1990. In the so-called History Wars, conservatives attacked multiculturalism for undermining Australian identity (Macintyre and Clark 2004: 119–170). In particular with regard to Aboriginal and colonial history, the acknowledgement of systematic crimes against the indigenous population and of the dispossession and suffering of Aborigines was considered to be a 'blackening' of the Australian past (Hirst 1988/89). Immigration played a minor role in this debate but was nonetheless a reoccurring topic, in particular Asian immigration that was either welcomed on the grounds of multiculturalism or rejected for nationalistic reasons (Ricklefs 1997). Since the end of the White Australia Policy and until the mid-1990s, federal governments were deeply hesitant about nationalism and emphasized multiculturalism in particular with respect to Asian neighbours (Curran 2002). By the end of the 1990s, the populist right-wing 'One Nation' party entered federal parliament on an explicit anti-multiculturalism ticket, defending Australian nationalism based on an Anglo-Celtic heritage (Jupp 2002: 123–140). Since 1996, the conservative Liberal Party had been in power under Prime Minister John Howard, and in his long-standing commitment to Australian nationalism,

first the term ‘multiculturalism’ and then its corresponding policy were abolished from federal politics in favour of a unitary model of belonging (Tate 2009). Cultural diversity had become an irreversible reality of Australian society, and the non-racist immigration policy that was limited in determining source countries could not be reasonably abolished. The demise of multiculturalism was caused by the dissolution of its underlying perception of community. However, as the foes of diversity abandoned the policy of multiculturalism, nationalism was transformed as well into a civic notion of cohesion. This transformation was also expressed in the celebration of Australia Day and other commemorations.

Cultural memories marked Australia Day throughout the 1980s and 1990s and continued to play an important role beyond the turn of the century. The Australia Day Council of New South Wales estimates that between 1996 and 2002 the number of Australians who participated in festivities rose from six-and-a-half to seven million. It also noted that the celebration of Australia Day changed to include fewer historic re-enactments.[153] *The Daily Telegraph* wrote in 2002,

> Australia Day has evolved into a much more important day than it used to be. Australia Day has become a community day. There are still formal ceremonies throughout the country—flag raising, citizenship ceremonies and the presentation of important community awards [...], but 26 January has become much more for the average Australian. Celebrations now include a strong festive aspect with special events encouraging the participation of the entire family and all members of a community.[154]

As a national community commemoration, Australia Day increasingly integrated the diversity of the private sphere previously encouraged by Australia Day Councils. This meant also that indigenous history was increasingly incorporated into the celebration, even in rural towns (McAllister 2009). However, the relationship between indigenous history and Australia Day remained and still is complicated. (Bond 2015). At the same time, civic memories gained greater relevance, in particular for migrant integration. In fact, three events in 2001 illustrated and contributed to this transformation.

In addition to Australia Day, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock introduced a so-called ‘Citizenship Day’ in 2001 as an event for citizenship ceremonies and as an incentive for eligible residents to pursue naturalization.[155] The Minister suggested 17 September was chosen to commemorate the renaming of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 to Australian Citizenship Act 1948 on the same day in 1973.[156] Moreover,

what he did not mention was that the amendment removed all distinctions between British subjects and other immigrants, thus ending the White Australia Policy. The removal of culturally based distinctions and the establishment of equality of citizens, hallmarks of the 1973 legislation, were also characteristic of Citizenship Day itself. The officially instituted commemoration not only asked immigrants to give a pledge of commitment during their naturalization ceremony, it called in particular on established Australian citizens to affirm their citizenship in a ceremonial pledge.[157] Thus, in naturalization and reaffirmation ceremonies citizenship was viewed as a common bond for new and established Australians. With the establishment of a new commemoration, the civic belonging instituted in these ceremonies was disconnected from memories of Australia's immigration past and instead was meant to be commemorative of Australian Citizenship itself and the legal equality it conveyed.

Incidentally, just three weeks before the first Citizenship Day was held, the political importance of citizenship in migration matters became strikingly clear. The government's contentious deterrence policy against the arrival of boat refugees took a grave turn (Mares 2007) in late August 2001 with an event which came to be known as the *Tampa* Affair (Marr and Wilkinson 2004). This resulted in navel deterrence of incoming boats and offshore detention for unauthorized arrivals in Australian territorial waters, and it triggered a sudden shift, as I argue in Chap. 4, from cultural to civic memories in the justification of state action and control (Kleist 2013). Pointing to generous refugee policies in the past, the Prime Minister repeatedly contended that it was the sovereign right of Australians to determine who was to be let into the country. Citizenship became an instant distinctive feature *vis-a-vis* boat refugees, derived from past experiences.

Another event of the time had delayed consequences for civic memories and citizenship, becoming crucial for immigrant integration years later. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 led, among other changes, to the introduction of a citizenship test. Australia was a close ally of the United States in the 'war against terror' with the government claiming it was acting to protect its citizens and their interests, and in doing so inadvertently reconfiguring the relationship between the state and its citizens (Hocking 2004). On the one hand, citizens became repeatedly targeted in terrorist attacks abroad, including the 2002 Bali Bombings; on the other hand the state encroached on citizens' democratic rights with anti-terror initiatives. Thus, the state was a force that was both representative and

protective of its citizens but also one distinct from citizens that encroached on basic rights. On the domestic front, continual debates about Islam and Islamism in Australian society, as well as racist attitudes that infamously found expression in the violent outburst of the Cronulla Beach riot against Lebanese youth in 2005, posed questions about Australian cohesion (Jupp et al. 2007). All this impacted upon the growing call for a civic reinterpretation of Australian belonging and, incidentally, the introduction of a citizenship test.[158]

In April 2006, Parliamentary Secretary for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Andrew Robb, who initiated the Australian citizenship test, remarked in a public speech,

> [o]verwhelmingly, people of Muslim faith have come to Australia from over 128 countries for the sake of their children, for education and opportunity, for a better life. But that quest for a better life has been seriously confounded by the evil acts of global terrorists. These evil acts have generated widespread anxiety across the broader Australian community including, it must be said, the Muslim communities.[159]

After having outlined what he considered the challenge of immigration to Australian social cohesion, he concluded,

> For these reasons people have suggested that those seeking to take out citizenship should pass a compulsory test […]. It is asserted that a citizenship test which requires a functional grasp of English, and a general understanding of Australian values, customs, systems, laws and history, will help people integrate more successfully into our community. It is in their interest, and in the community's interest.[160]

Over the course of 2006, a commission established by Robb consulted the public about the possibility of instituting a citizenship test and published a discussion paper in September, aptly entitled 'Australian Citizenship: Much more than a ceremony'.[161] In his foreword to the paper Robb added, '[…] citizenship lies at the heart of our national indentity [sic] and gives us a strong sense of who we are and our place in the world. Australian citizenship is a privilege not a right.'[162] The latter part of this statement came to be central to the new understanding of citizenship, it being a 'privilege' granted by the state. The meaning of citizenship and of 'national identity' remained highly contested though, and the test would reflect one interpretation that drew strongly from history.

When John Howard announced the introduction of the citizenship test together with Andrew Robb in December 2006, he explained that it would 'require people to have an understanding of basic aspects of Australian society, our culture, and our values and certainly some understanding of our history.'[163] Indeed, Australian history was considered central to the test and to Australian cohesion generally. Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews underlined this when he introduced the Citizenship Testing Bill into parliament:

> Australia can be proud of its history and have confidence in its future as one of the world's most stable democracies, where men and women are treated equally and the rule of law is paramount. A citizenship test will ensure a level of commitment to these values and way of life from all Australians, regardless of where they may originally come from.[164]

After the bill passed in early September, the citizenship test was officially launched on Citizenship Day in 2007.[165]

Despite the initial reasoning behind the test being civic in nature, its use of history was twofold, implying that new citizens should internalize both civic and cultural memories. The government distributed a resource brochure for potential applicants to prepare for the questions in the citizenship test. About one-third of its forty-six pages were devoted to Australian history. In the introduction the double role of the past is shown: new citizens

> are expected to know something of Australia's history and heritage [...]. This knowledge will help new citizens to embrace education, employment and other opportunities in Australia. It also helps to foster a cohesive and integrated society with a sense of shared destiny and, should the need arise, shared sacrifice for the common good.[166]

The authors intended to both present history as a development of Australian society and its participatory civic structure as well as impart essential values derived from a common heritage, on which to base a national sentiment.

Historian John Hirst volunteered to draft the history section for the brochure. He noted that his main consideration was to write in a balanced fashion but to counter the nationalistic narrative structure favoured by the conservative Prime Minister for its nationalistic capacity.[167] The thematic

structure that made its way into the pamphlet presented a variety of perspectives and topics which, as Hirst remarked later, 'should attempt to capture what Australians of today knew and valued and celebrated in their history. That is, I should be the recorder of myth and memory and not simply the critical historian.'[168] Though non-nationalistic in intention and also highlighting civic traditions, the history drew heavily on heritage and a cultural understanding of belonging. Instead of retelling one version of Australian history, but building the Australian story upon various cultural memories, the brochure offered a broad base for a nationalistic interpretation of belonging rather than undermining such a reading. The citizenship test, as developed under the conservative Liberal Party government, based Australian citizenship on civic memories in reaction to contemporary challenges as well as on cultural memories that reflected nationalistic history writing of the 1990s. It encouraged new citizens to identify with both the Australian state and the nation (Tate 2009: 113–117).

Both supporters and opponents of the test highlighted the nationalistic or, what is called in a more affirmative manner, 'patriotic' understanding of citizenship expressed by its policy and design. Political scientists Katharine Betts and Bob Birrell (2007: 47) supported the government's citizenship test as it reflected, they argued, the attitude of a majority of Australians who were overwhelmingly in favour of its introduction.[169] They saw a patriotic approach to citizenship in this policy, enhancing its value by making it harder to acquire and making the perceived 'national family' more exclusive. Subsequently, others rejected the test for the same reason, it being based on an exclusive cultural-normative model.[170] Gwenda Tavan, for example, critiqued the test as a form of collective memory-making that was mono-cultural and partial towards a dominant national view (Tavan 2009). The history offered in the pamphlet, she argued, ignored controversial aspects for the sake of a nostalgia of supposed cultural certainties. Some critics themselves referred to memories and saw Australian traditions that linked the test to the former White Australian Policy (McNamara 2009; Tavan 2009: 133–136).

Soon after, the Liberal Party was replaced by Labour in federal government elections in late 2007. New Immigration Minister Chris Evans set up a committee to review 'aspects of the content and operation of the citizenship test'.[171] Besides other recommendations, the committee suggested that the content of the test questions and the resource brochure be fundamentally reworked by professional civic educators.[172] It found in community consultations that most participants 'said that it [the 2007 brochure]

represented a particular view of Australian society and history that might not be shared by all Australians'.[173] Yet, the committee saw the main problem not in the interpretation of Australian history but that the vague requirement to have 'knowledge of Australia' had been added to the original requirement of the Citizenship and Naturalisation Act 1948, to have 'an adequate knowledge of the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship'.[174] The testable knowledge should instead be limited, the committee argued, to 'democratic values', 'responsibilities and privileges', and 'the system of government'.[175] Indeed, the minister presented a new and revised brochure on Citizenship Day 2009 entitled, 'Australian Citizenship: Our Common Bond', that was based on the committee's recommendations.[176] A revised version of the history of Australia was now moved into the 'non-testable' second section of the brochure, while the test would just focus on civic elements of belonging and integration.[177] The new citizenship test was the attempt to eradicate exclusive-nationalistic aspects of cultural memories and belonging by removing historical references altogether from the knowledge required to become Australian.

However, there is no citizenship without history, no belonging without memories, and no integration without references to the past. The 2009 version of the test was not free from history and memories either. Though extremely condensed to one page, the 'testable' section of the brochure also aimed to make applicants 'understand how Australia developed from its uncertain beginnings as a British colony to the stable and successful multicultural nation it is today'.[178] The past presented as relevant for the test was not one of cultural memories and heritage but of events and turns that contributed to particular social and political processes in the Australian present. Memories are not the opposite of a civic interpretation of Australian cohesion, but they are in their specific form a crucial element thereof, just as they were in the 1950s and 1960s.

Reminiscent of that former civic period, the review committee even suggested that, thirty-eight years after their demise, regular Citizenship Conventions be organized again.[179] Though the government did not take up this recommendation, the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of Australian citizenship in 2009 was a welcome opportunity for the government to promulgate civic belonging to immigrants and the whole of Australian society through memories of Australian democracy.[180] Moreover, numerous regular citizenship events continued to evoke civic memories as inspirations for contemporary paths of immigrant integration. At a naturalization ceremony on Australia Day 2010, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship Chris Evans asserted,

> More than four million have committed to Australia since we introduced the citizenship back in 1949. They bring their own cultures, their own language, and their own contributions, and become part of a new Australia story. And as I say, I think [it is] really special to do it on Australia Day [...].[181]

After more than sixty years, Australia was back to integrating immigrants through civic memories. While now officially accepting and welcoming cultural diversity, not as a distinct feature but an asset for all Australians, a 2011 study revealed that an exclusive, anti-immigrant nationalism was widely but privately displayed on Australia Day (Fozdar et al. 2015). If anything, the ambivalence and political conflict over the memories of Australia Day continue.

3.5 The Relationship Between Civic and Cultural Memory After 1948

The era after the Second World War was marked not so much by a specific policy of immigration and a certain form of commemoration as by their transformations. Migration policies and perceptions of the past were constantly adjusted and continuously contested, albeit in close association with each other, as they followed and defined Australia's quest for belonging. The introduction of Australian citizenship was pivotal to the political debate about belonging and immigration in the second half of the twentieth century. On the one hand, it resulted from changed perceptions of Australia's past before the war and from the introduction of a mass migration program just after the war. On the other hand, it was the condition of creating a comprehensive notion of Australian belonging that for the first time added a civic institution distinct from the Empire to the long-held imagination of Australian nationalism. The new citizenship status and nationalism were complementary modes of Australian belonging that existed in tension with each other.

The contradiction of imperial citizenship that had defined debates about belonging and immigration almost since the beginning of European settlement was not solved by the introduction of citizenship but was instead integrated into the Australian body politic. For the first time, civic belonging afforded Australians a vote, at least in theory, on their own political membership and its modes of adoption. Yet, the civic notion was supplemented by a communal imagination, and each mode of belonging was underpinned and expressed by their particular memories. In turn, civic

and cultural memories respectively evoked particular relationships among Australians, as well as between established Australians and migrants, that fostered certain political positions, not least regarding immigration. In addition, I argue that the politically employed modes of belonging, civic or communal, were historically sensitive to and dependent on the processes and dynamics of Australian society during the period in question. The particular constellation and political organization of social contradictions at any one period impacted the social role and significance of civic and cultural memories respectively. Thus, one form of memory was politically more appropriate and dominant than the other at certain times. Moreover, the forms of political memories adjusted their corresponding modes of belonging to shifts in social relations.

3.5.1 The 1950s and 1960s

Contrary to suggestions that compare Australia to countries founded in bourgeois revolutions, both civic and cultural belonging were not foreign but instead were common features of Australian politics long before citizenship was introduced (Zappalà and Castles 2000). With a continued insistence on 'White' and preferably British immigration, the cultural definition of Australian and British nationalism was clearly still influential. While, as argued above, belonging and integration were characterized by a dominant civic notion in the 1950s and 1960s, the creation of an inclusive imagination of a national community, based on cultural memories of a 'White' European settlement, was an alternative model clearly available to Australian society then. In fact, historical narratives like Russel Ward's 'The Australian Legend' (1958) and a little later, Manning Clark's 'A History of Australia, Volume One' (1962) offered, despite stark differences, cultural European versions of the Australian past that challenged from the position of the radical left society's dominant imagination of political belonging being civic (Macintyre and Clark 2004: 38–40). While immigration played no major role in the new historians' considerations their narratives provided an inclusive 'Euro-Australian nationalism'. Instead, the integration policy of the post-war mass immigration program concentrated on the new civic model of Australian belonging and evoked memories of Australia's past since the inception of Australian citizenship on Australia Day 1949.

The introduction of citizenship after the Second World War, amid a move away from Great Britain and the mass migration program, was generally greeted as a step towards greater independence and in particular as a tool

of migrant integration. Conservative nationalists, represented by the ANA among other organizations, perceived a threat to their Anglo-Australian community model of belonging, expressed in reference to Australia Day, but offered no heritage independent of Britain that could have integrated immigrants. The government's decision to combine Citizenship Conventions and naturalization ceremonies with the commemoration of Australia Day was a potent indication of how civic belonging was fused with the imagination of Australia's past, and that this belonging was intrinsically bound to immigration. Citizenship Conventions were practical in intention but were also highly symbolic events in which a unity of interest was demonstrated between the Commonwealth state and the Australian people as active citizens. The civic memories evoked in speeches and carried into workshops, in the classic model of a civic forum, advanced a tradition of 'Australian' achievements without distinction between settlers and the Empire, between citizens' interests and government policies. The common goal was the integration of new Australians who were inadvertently invited to join this civic tradition. Yet, while a unity of citizens was imagined, a clear distinction remained in which the state provided the forum for the memories, represented the body politic to which citizens appealed, and enacted the policies to which citizens contributed. The memories evoked at these events accordingly recalled certain activities like working for a civic polity or contributing to the national economy, as the pioneers allegedly did, and as was now expected of all citizens, including immigrants. The civic memories were thus political but appeared to be above politics as shared civic interests.

Immigrants were both invited but also expected to join into this civic tradition of Australian society by becoming citizens. The Department of Immigration utilized Australia Day commemorations explicitly for naturalization ceremonies. Rather than confronting new Australians with a cultural past to which they had to assimilate, the civic tradition presented on Australia Day was an offer and a stipulation to integrate into its particular logic in order to become Australian. The civic memories of Australia's past were a presentation of Australian processes and attainments which the naturalized immigrant joined upon becoming a citizen. Civic memories of pioneers and settlers were a crucial reminder not only of the meaning of citizenship, which entailed being useful as citizens, but of the role of citizens as Australians. As new citizens, migrants turned into participants in Australian society and were subsumed as sovereigns of Australian history under the Commonwealth through which shared interests and activities, like devel-

oping the country, were mediated as the agent of historical change. Thus, the commemoration of Australian federation on Australia Day 1951 was of particular relevance because it stood for the Commonwealth as the culmination of the pioneers' efforts, which in turn was a model for how citizens were to relate to the federal state. Every Australia Day at the time represented the entire history of Australian settlement, which was remembered in the light of the contemporary sovereign Australian state by constructing a trajectory from the First Fleet to independent Australian citizenship. Australia Day did retrospectively to naturalization ceremonies what the oath of allegiance intended to achieve for the future: to stipulate civic commitment to the Australian state and concomitantly to fellow citizens.

The adoption of Australian citizenship and its traditions did not necessarily imply giving up one's former culture. Renunciation of the former citizenship, a symbolic pledge demanded at naturalization ceremonies until 1986 (Millbank 2000), was an additional condition of assurance that the new citizen's interest stemmed, in the light of Australia Day commemoration, from shared Australian history rather than from a foreign history. While loyalties to foreign sovereigns and, indirectly, to the traditions of foreign sovereigns had to be renounced, foreign cultures and their heritages were officially tolerated in Australia. Participants of Citizenship Conventions witnessed folk music and dance performances, presented in European 'ethnic' costumes, as well as exhibitions of migrants' art and artefacts. Culture was not celebrated but acknowledged, and tolerance for other cultures was writ large at Citizenship Conventions. In turn, Australian culture was acknowledged but on a private rather than a public level.

Assimilation was the term most commonly used in discussions about migrant integration during the 1950s, but the ultimate goal was to have immigrants take up Australian citizenship rather than culture, and therefore become Australian. As the Assistant Secretary for Assimilation at the Department of Immigration, Noel W. Lamidey, said in a talk in 1956, '[t]he culmination of all our efforts is of course naturalisation.'[182] He laid down the responsibilities of being naturalized, which were all legal obligations of an Australian citizen rather than cultural requirements.[183] Official assimilation policies implied no cultural assimilation. The adoption of Australian culture, in particular learning the English language, was only relevant in so far, Lamidey explained, as it was relevant for civic participation.[184] Rather, as had also been recommended by delegates of Citizenship Conventions, foreign language newspapers published by migrant groups were harnessed by the government to disseminate information in its

assimilation endeavour.[185] In accordance with these policies, official commemorations of Australia Day neither suppressed nor evoked or promoted cultural memories in the first decades of the mass migration program, though their existence was acknowledged.

While civic belonging and civic memories dominated the integration of immigrants during the 1950s and 1960s, expressions of communal belonging and the celebration of cultural memories on Australia Day were part of the period. In addition to Australian nationalists on the radical left mentioned above, conservative nationalists evoked a cultural heritage as well. The Good Neighbour Councils, central to the government's settlement strategy, were motivated by ideas of cultural assimilation to an Anglo-community, at least until the late 1960s (Tavan 1997). ANA's Australia Day Councils also worked from the idea of a national culture and they continued to evoke differences between native and non-native Australians. Their insistence on large and impressive naturalization ceremonies, when the government preferred to organize them at the local level, can be interpreted as promoting the all-encompassing perception of belonging projected by cultural memories, akin to cultural assimilation. The nationalists' cultural memories imagined community to be inclusive of the authority of the state, which was to impress the common Australian culture upon migrants. The government did not reject cultural memories altogether but viewed funding and promoting the Australia Day Council's commemorations as inappropriate. It rejected requests for grants by the federal council repeatedly with the argument that such memories had to spring spontaneously from the people. Cultural memories were considered acceptable as partial and private expressions within the population, either on the political left or the political right, but not for a cohesive model of belonging that was capable of integrating new members, in the way that Australia Day was utilized by the government through civic memories.

3.5.2 The 1980s

Two decades later, the relationship between civic and cultural memories had turned. The argument put forward by the Department of Immigration throughout the 1950s and 1960s that Australia Day commemorations should not be funded by the government seemed ludicrous by the 1980s. By then, the Commonwealth and state governments sponsored not one but two federal organizations, NADC and ABA, with many local subsidiaries concerned with promoting memories of Australia Day..Moreover,

Liberal and Labour governments explicitly demanded the commemoration of cultural memories on Australia Days. The regular invocation of 'heritage' and 'origins' by officials when talking about the past strengthened perceptions of culture and community as foremost instances of belonging. Notably, official promotion of cultural memories was to advance multiculturalism, at least until the late 1980s, and was clearly distinct from if not opposed to a nationalist interpretation of Australian heritage.

Official Australia Day commemorations were decidedly about a plurality of heritages and cultural memories that could all be celebrated on the day, individually or combined. Organizers of Australia Day Councils were hesitant about emphasizing the event being commemorated because the landing of the First Fleet had varying implications for different people, in particular indigenous and non-indigenous Australians. Moreover, in the cultural perception of the past the event did not seem to be relevant for non-Anglo-Celtic Australians, let alone non-Europeans. Instead, the cultural heritage commemorated on Australia Day looked back at the diverse national or 'ethnic' origins of Australians.

Yet, interpretations of cultural diversity differed. First, NADC celebrated Australia Day by suggesting that every Australian possessed a certain cultural heritage as their identity. Later, the Tall Ship spectacle on Australia Day 1988 suggested that all Australians, with the exception of Aborigines, shared the arrival in Australia from all over the world, not personally but as bearers of their Australian heritage. Australia Day was the official commemoration of a multicultural belonging, made up of cultural memories by which every Australian was defined. Cultural memories had moved from informing 'ethnic' belonging in *Australian multiculturalism* to underwrite communities' belonging to a *multicultural Australia*. The role of cultural memories changed, but throughout they were the eminent form of remembrance.

While multiculturalism was endorsed as settlement policy and as the official mode of public belonging by Liberals and by Labour in the early 1980s, nationalist scepticism arose in the public sphere, as expressed by Geoffrey Blainey in 1984. A nationalist perception of Australian cultural belonging, one opposed to multiculturalism and in particular to Asian immigration, entered the high ranks of the Liberal Party with John Howard becoming its leader in the mid-1980s and then of the Commonwealth government with his election to Prime Minister in 1996. Australian nationalism was markedly expressed through the First Fleet re-enactment in 1988, which limited Australian heritage to a mono-cultural British or European origin.

Australian belonging under this provision was defined not by a diversity of cultures but by one homogenous community that was identified as Australian, British, or European.

The evocation of cultural memories and of homogenous community did not entirely exclude civic belonging and sometimes even provided the context for civic memories. Naturalization ceremonies remained components of Australia Day celebrations throughout the 1980s, and since the FitzGerald Report in 1988, citizenship gained public relevance in particular as a civic belonging that would create cohesion between the communities of Australian multiculturalism. Moreover, conservatives, including the Liberal Party, underpinned their cultural conception of an Australian nation with a restricted citizenship model. Citizenship and community have in common that they are mnemonically derived from a unitary perception of the past, either a tradition or a heritage. Most poignantly, Aboriginal rights activists combined civic and communal belonging in their land rights claims, which relied on arguments of cultural heritage—the communal link to land—when they referred to civic memories in their commemoration of Australia Day in an effort to claim rights. Civic memories and civic belonging played a role for partial political claims distinct from the publicly dominant cultural belonging of the 1980s. Yet, the social and political role of civic notions was not merely derivative but moreover dependent on the cultural conceptions of multiculturalism and nationalism.

3.5.3 Comparing the 1950s and 1960s with the 1980s

Concerning belonging, the periods of the 1950s and 1960s on the one hand and the 1980s on the other could be of no stronger contrast. Notably, civic and cultural memories are not bound to certain institutions or social spheres but shifted in their political role and in their relevance for Australian belonging. In the decades following the Second World War, the Commonwealth government relied on civic memories to create social cohesion and to integrate new members. Civic belonging, derived from such memories and embodied in the new citizenship status, defined Australia's public sphere. While the government also used the public sphere to promote a civic form of memory and its mode of belonging, this sphere was not exclusive to civic notions of belonging. Cultural memories vied for political influence in the public but were no more than partial interests, or in other words, private expressions of views on Australian belonging. Yet, cultural memories were not shared by the general public as a viable form of imagined belonging.

In the 1980s, in turn, the public sphere was defined by cultural memories and communal modes of belonging. The Australian government promoted such forms of belonging in the public and for the public. Its model of multiculturalism was challenged, however, by another conception of communal belonging, Australian nationalism. The two political factions, multiculturalists and nationalists, referred to communal belonging but disagreed about its relationship to the state, being either external to or included in the imagined communities advocated. In other words, with the state and communal belonging considered to be distinct, community was perceived to be 'ethnic' and diverse, while the state and citizenship were regarded as culturally neutral. In contrast, with communal belonging deemed implicitly bound to the state and to citizenship, Australia was perceived as a nation of a single homogenous culture as opposed to being composed of a diversity of communities. This meant that partial interests in their struggle over the communal conception of society, as multicultural or national, referred to civic perceptions of belonging, namely to the role of citizenship to underpin their particular version of community in Australia. Civic memories persisted also by underpinning partial interests from particular communities. Aboriginal activists fought for their private interests as indigenous people based on their cultural heritage by voicing their claims in public, in which they had a role and legal rights as Australian citizens (Dodson and Strelein 2001; Goodall 1988; McNamara 2004).[186] The public in the 1980s was defined and dominated by communal belonging and cultural memories, while private and partial positions were expressed in relation to civic memories.

Overall, the relationship between civic memories and cultural memories was characterized by the public-private contradiction of modern society. Rather than being clear-cut categories, the two spheres of society have been described by Jeff Weintraub (1997) as protean, assuming different roles and being interactive on variable levels. In fact, I argue it is the content of the public and private sphere, rather than the spheres themselves, that takes on different roles and thus allows the spheres to be socially interactive on different levels. In each period one form of memories and its mode of belonging defined the public sphere and were thus the dominant mode of political debate and policies, while the other form and mode informed private interests that interjected into the public sphere. Over a 40 year time span the forms of memory reversed roles, which in turn meant that the public and private spheres took on opposite modes of belonging and social relations. In comparison, the social and political roles

of civic and cultural memories and, hence, the relationships of civic and communal belonging respectively, almost reflect each other, the 1950s and 1960s on the one hand and the1980s on the other, with the 1970s acting as a historical mirror of social constellations. The question then is what happened during this transitional period for this radical shift to have occurred, for the public and private spheres to exchange their dominant modes of belonging and forms of memory. To better understand the relationship between civic and cultural memories it is necessary to examine the transformation of belonging during the 1970s in a wider social context.

3.5.4 Social Dynamics and the Transformation of the 1970s

Key transformations in the 1970s—the abolition of the White Australia Policy, the introduction of multiculturalism, and the change in official commemorations from civic to cultural memories—were brought about by governments, interest groups, individuals—from officers in public office to social scientists to politicians—and other agencies. These domestic factors of change were influenced, I have pointed out, by shifts in migrant movements and other international developments, particularly in Asia and Europe. While all these aspects, domestic and international, affected social and political conflicts over the past and belonging, and influenced which policies were deemed relevant in Australia, they were set within dynamics and contradictions of society at large. This link between domestic and international developments does not mean that, for instance, memories were simultaneously global and local, though that might hold true for some memories (Levy and Sznaider 2006; Schindler 2008), or that memories were determined by global media (Alexander 2002). Rather, national changes of memories and of belonging were in step with global transformations in the organization of social relations. These global developments of society determined how people related to each other both materially, that is, economically and politically, as well as ideologically, that is, how they perceived these relationships, belonging, and their pasts (Adorno 1997). Thus, a transformation of memories and belonging as it occurred in Australia in the 1970s was bound to global transformations of social relations.

Historian Eric Hobsbawm (1995: 403–432) identifies in his global history of the short twentieth century a switch of social formations in the mid-1970s from the Golden Age, the post-Second World War years, to the Age of the Landslide, a period of uncertainties. The indicator of change was the global economic crisis that began in the

early 1970s, which was also a crisis of society and of social relations and, for Hobsbawm in particular, of the nation state. Before the crisis, Hobsbawm argues that the sovereign state was in control of the economy, creating stability for a highly successful accumulation process and for society in general (Hobsbawm 1995: 257, 274). The state had great bearing on the domestic economy and intervened into the organization of society and its social relations in both state-centred socialist and liberal-capitalist countries. Nation states regulated economic relations on a global level through the 1944 Bretton Woods system and its institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which crucially controlled currency exchange rates and thus global economic interactions. The sovereignty of nation states increasingly came into conflict with social and economic relations in the course of the 1960s, leading to political critique and economic crisis worldwide (Hirsch 1996: 83–94; Hobsbawm 1995: 320–340). The Bretton Woods system was finally abolished in 1970, though its central institutions survived, which led to the creation of a global financial market (Cecco 2002). Simultaneously, the state retreated from society for the benefit of 'self-regulation' based on competition. These new 'neoliberal' policies impacted society far beyond the economy (Hirsch 1996: 101–170).

Hobsbawm (1995: 424) notes that '[a]s the transnational economy established its grip over the world, it undermined a major, and since 1945, virtually universal, institution: the territorial nation-state, since such a state could no longer control more than a diminishing part of its affairs.' That society was substantially altered by the way it regulated social relations, fundamentally changing the way people relate, affected not only interpersonal actions but also perceptions of belonging and memories. One of the consequences, Hobsbawm (1995: 428) insists with resignation, was that

> 'the word "community" [was never] used more indiscriminately and emptily than in the decades [from the 1970s to the 1990s] when communities in the sociological sense became hard to find in real life [...]. The rise of "identity groups"—human ensembles to which a person could "belong", unequivocally and beyond uncertainty and doubt, was noted from the late 1960s by writers in the always self-observing USA. Most of these, for obvious reasons, appealed to a common "ethnicity" [...].'

Ethnic political identity, he summarizes (1995: 428–429), 'was the insistence that one's group identity consisted in some existential, supposedly primordial, unchangeable and therefore permanent personal characteristic shared with other members of the group, and with no one else.' The transformation from a civic- and state-mediated belonging to one of communal belonging, as a reaction to domestic and regional politics, was thus not just an Australian phenomenon but a global trend grounded in universal economic and social dynamics.

As a result of these transformations, Hobsbawm (1995: 430) observes a discrepancy between the socio-economic constellations and their ideological responses. Identity politics were 'not so much programmes, still effective programmes for dealing with the problems of the late twentieth century, but rather emotional reactions to these problems.' What then, was the reason for the appearance of politics based on community, identity, and heritage if they were imaginations inappropriate for the society from which they resulted? I suggest an explanation for how this perception of society changed in the 1970s along with the constellation of fundamental elements of society by referencing the work of Moishe Postone (1993). I draw on his interpretation of Karl Marx's theory of labour and, of particular relevance here, his theory of time and memory in capitalism.

In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that commemorations crystallize memories in the course of time for individuals to relate to particular social groups. Moreover, social memories allow people to locate themselves in time in relation to others. Therefore, the form of memories and how they perceive the group's past depends on the trajectory of time and how it relates people. Time is not ahistorical, Postone argues, but a historically specific dynamic of social relations. In capitalism, '[t]his complex historical dynamic is directional but not linear', he suggests (Postone 2003: 103). 'Rather, it is bifurcated: On the one hand, the dynamic of capitalism is characterized by ongoing and even accelerating transformations of technical processes, of the social and detail division of labor and, more generally, of social life […]. On the other hand, the historical dynamic entails the ongoing reconstruction of its own fundamental condition as an unchanging feature of social life […].' (Postone 2003: 103) Postone terms the first dynamic 'abstract time', which generates what is 'new', and the latter 'historical time', which regenerates what is the 'same' (also: Postone 1993: 293–294). This distinction corresponds to the forms of civic memory which view time also as a heterogeneous process, 'abstract' from qualitative conditions of change, and cultural memory which consid-

ers time to be continuous, unchanging, and homogenous, what Postone calls 'historical'.

In a chapter on the Holocaust and its aftermath, Postone relates the two dynamics of time to memories of the Nazi genocide. He argues that the periods of the 'Golden Age' and of 'The Landslide', as Hobsbawm called them, were characterized by specific orientations within time and modes of social relations (Postone 2003: 82–83). The first period seemed future-orientated in which politics could manage society by appropriating the past, guided by the ideal of universal abstract equality. The nation state was responsible for accommodating economic progress and equality of its citizens, either according to liberal or socialist standards. The latter period of the 1980s appeared caught by the past, with politics constantly referring back in an attempt to recreate it. Yet, because the past, in the attempt to hold on to it and recreate it through politics, thus appeared particular rather than universal and to be one of many interpretations, politics were driven by distinctions and competition. This pseudo-concrete (Anders 1948) particularism afforded identity politics and, in interpretations open to immigration, the appearance of diversity as an ideal. Thus, the dimensions of time distinguished by Postone have period-specific implications for politics and the overall dynamic of society.

Crucially, Postone (1993: 286) conceptualizes time not just as two perceptions of the past but as a 'double-sided social form' of the contradictions of capitalism. In reference to Marx, he examines the relationship between the concrete use value dimension, including concrete labour and historical time, and the abstract value dimension, including abstract labour and abstract time. 'The nonidentity of these two dimensions is not simply a static opposition', he asserts (1993: 287); 'rather, the two moments of labour in capitalism, as productive activity and as a socially mediating activity, are mutually determining in a way that gives rise to an immanent dialectical dynamic.' This dynamic is not a conscious result of politics or of actions but an anonymous and abstract form of domination that is the unconscious effect of conscious actions by people acting within this dynamic, basically what Adam Smith described as the 'invisible hand' (Smith 2000: 32). Rather than referring to a metaphysical hand, Marx (1990: 163–167) pointed out that this abstract dynamic was reified, or as he called it, fetishized, in concrete and static categories, as for example in money and capital, to make the dynamic manageable and possible at all (Grigat 2007). Fetishized categories seem to embody the social dynamics like an 'enigmatic' and 'mysterious character' of the category

itself (Marx 1990: 164). These abstract categories have counterparts that in turn appear concrete and natural, ostensibly devoid of a social character, namely the commodity and labour. The resulting perception of an abstract/concrete dualism is not an ideological addition to the social process of capitalism but inherently necessary for its continuation.[187] Postone adds (1993: 291–298) that time, a central element and category of production and exchange, also exists in this dualism of abstract and concrete (or historical) dimensions that seem to exist in contradiction but only together make the dynamic of society possible.

Forms of memory are the 'fetishized' or ideological interpretation of abstract and concrete time. Thus, memory participates in the dynamic and contradictions of society through its political interpretation of time. Yet, while in theory both dimensions of time, as well as both forms of memory, are equally important to society, they are not equally important in society at any one time. Their actual role depends historically on the particular formation of society at any one period, with either the state or the market dominating, in which either abstract or concrete time is more adept at propelling the dynamic of society. In the case of Australia, I have argued that civic memories fulfilled the official function of creating social cohesion at a time when the state had more control over society and that cultural memories were utilized to imagine belonging when the market was left to self-regulation. Thus, the role of the forms of memory in society was linked to shifts in the relationship between the state and the market and between the dimensions of time.

Just like memory, the state and the market are both fetishized categories, perceived as embodying the dynamics of society rather than as contributing to the dynamic as elements of society. Both elements represented the abstract and propelling dimension of society at times when they dominated the social relations in their period respectively. When the state was in control of social processes in the 1950s and 1960s, civic belonging offered participation in the dynamic of society in relating people to the state through citizenship. Membership could be objectified in civic memories by remembering abstract time and its processes. The conservative and left-wing opposition to social dynamics referred instead to the seemingly concrete and communal counterpart of the state, the nation. When in the 1980s the global market determined social relations, it replaced the state to reify the dynamics of society, though the state remained a crucial force in stabilizing society for the dynamic to continue. As the universality and individualism of the market allowed no notion of belong-

ing apart from pseudo-concrete 'humanity',[188] both people and governments turned to concrete, historical time to inform social relations in the form of belonging through cultural memories. Therefore, in absence of a strong state, seemingly natural non-social categories like 'community' and 'ethnicity', and ideals like 'difference' and 'identity', came to dominate the imagination of belonging (e.g., Benhabib 1996). These essentialist categories appeared as subaltern and opposed, as 'emotional reactions' as Hobsbawm noted (1995: 430), to the social dynamics of capitalism, dynamics that seemed to be embodied previously by the nation state, and now that the state was relatively impotent, by the 'global' financial market (Benhabib 1996: 4–5). In fact, however, these pseudo-concrete categories of belonging were utilized by the state and by other political actors to achieve social cohesion and to control social relations.

Concrete time and cultural memory of communities formed the basis of the social dynamic of the market in the 1980s by providing the indispensable foundation of production and belonging. Abstract time and civic memories, in turn—guarantees of cohesion and social dynamics in the 1950s and 1960s—were considered politically divisive. Thus, transformations of memories, as they occurred in the 1970s, corresponded with global shifts in the social dynamic and, yet, were political in their relevance for social relations within the context of a polity.

3.5.5 The Politics of Civic and Cultural Memory

While I have argued that transformations in memories are the result of a general social dynamic rather than of conscious decisions, the political character of memories is hard to miss in Australia. The History Wars dominated the political culture for almost two decades and extended into the early years of the 2000s; they are usually perceived as a conflict between two political fractions (Bonnell and Crotty 2004; Brantlinger 2004; Clendinnen 2006; Davison 2000; Macintyre and Clark 2004). Previous to and after the History Wars, perceptions of the past were also politically contested, while the aim of memories was widely seen to be creating unity. David Carter argues in a chapter on Australia Day that political interests altered references to the past in these events. However, he sees memories only as being evoked [or used] in reactive ways reactive and without any connection to the wider political structures in which they functioned, apart from their role in imagining national unity (Carter 2006: 89–107). Paula Hamilton (2003), in an essay on memories in Australia, points to a larger

mnemonic conflict between memory and history, roughly distinguished by creating historical continuity and 'group identity' on the one hand, and the scrutiny of an academic discipline on the other. She sees this conflict as driving the perception of the past towards memory and a greater unity of Australia, though not necessarily to a better understanding of the past. The latter interpretation gives the politics of memory a structure but implies a teleology of progress that follows a certain trend of memory. Both cases are typical of most memory studies as they share a common fault Jeffrey Olick (2007: 90) describes in his process-relational critique: 'Such approaches assume that collective memory is a thing or a set of things isolable from, and exogenous to, the process being measured, rather than being their very medium.' The study of memories in Australia, as in the examples above, usually presents memories as political but fails to relate them to society at large. Thus, memories' political relevance within Australia is unclear beyond self-referential cultural politics or questions of historical justice.

I have shown how memories are affected by the dynamic of global society. Beyond being a function of the social dynamic however, it is their role as a medium that gives memories their political significance for global and Australian society respectively. Looking at cultural and civic memories as two interdependent forms of the general social dynamic, politics concerning the past can directly impact not only belonging but the political structure of belonging. The global dynamic is not a process that exists outside of the political realms of nation states but only in and through them. The relationship of society's two dimensions of time, and correspondingly, the two forms of memory, is nationally arranged, in democracies in any case, by the public/private dichotomy.

Postone (2003: 104) points out that one dimension of time always continues to act subterraneously while the other dominates. After all, only the interplay between abstract and historical time, between civic and cultural memory can drive the social dynamic. On the national level, the dominant dimension of time and form of memory determine the content of the public sphere, while perceptions of the other dimension and form are limited to the private sphere where they can challenge the current content of the public. Through this political aspect in which forms of memory compete over social belonging, memories can also determine the relationship between abstract and concrete time, thus impacting the dynamic of society. While political memories and their role in the polity are subject to social dynamics, they are also capable of and relevant to transforming political relations and the overall social dynamic, within the limits of social contradictions.

Considering that the structure of belonging is located simultaneously on a global level, as the dimensions of time, and on a national level, in form of the public/private divide, the political relevance of memories is therefore twofold. First, political memories interact with the global dynamic, which is independent from individual decisions but depends on people's political and collective actions. Thus, changes and transformations of society's dynamic are after all subject to politics, though within the confines of its imperative contradictions. Secondly, the relationship between civic and cultural memories is generally bound to transformations of the social dynamic, but their particular correlation within a polity like Australia, defined by the public/private dichotomy, is historically determined and thus politically alterable. Moreover, the political relationship between forms of memory also determines the interpretation of the modes of belonging and policies of integration.

To understand the two political bearings of memories it is helpful to first revisit this chapter's post-war history of memory with particular attention to nuances in shifts of belonging. I have argued that the relationship between civic and cultural memory corresponds with the overall dynamics of society and its particular arrangements at certain periods, distinguished by a period of transition in the 1970s. However, the transformation of memories and imaginations of belonging was not as swift as the periodization suggests but instead was more gradual. An orientation towards cultural memories began in the 1960s with community and 'ethnic' groups coming to the fore and achieving increased political recognition, a phenomenon that was not limited to Australia (Jupp 2002: 27–29; Steinberg 1989: 49–51). While the state continued to embody the abstract social dynamic, and civic memories functioned as cohesive imagination of belonging in the public sphere, the market became more relevant, thus modifying civic belonging and shifting attention to communal belonging. In integration policies, as I have shown, this led the government to move from assimilation to integration, emphasizing interactions between old and new citizens rather than subjugation. Accordingly, official public commemorations shifted the focus from retrospective participation in the polity to contributions to it, while abiding by civic memories. On a private level however, the increasing importance of the market gave cultural memories a boost so that special interests were expressed increasingly through and by communities until the government replaced civic with cultural memories as the defining mode of the public sphere in the late 1970s. Cultural memories not only followed the market but contributed

to undermining the political ability of the state to guarantee cohesiveness through civic memories and thus perpetuated the social dynamic of belonging.

Similarly, the 1980s saw a shift in the relevance of cultural memories in relation to civic belonging. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Liberal and Labour governments promoted cultural commemorations to define the public sphere. They officially endorsed multiculturalism in which belonging was defined by communities. By the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, multiculturalism had been changed from Australian multiculturalism to a multicultural Australia, that is, to a belonging defined by a diverse Australian heritage (Carter 2006: 332–354). This was a result of nationalist sentiments, called upon by private voices in the 1980s and entering government in the 1990s, drawing on civic memories to posit cultural belonging around the nation state. This elevated multiculturalism to become the mode of belonging rather than a mode of diverse 'ethnic' belongings. It also implied a greater and stronger role for the state in social relations and in the social dynamic. Thus, civic memories and belonging became more important in relation to nationalism and multiculturalism, giving increasing attention to citizenship, until the early to mid-2000s when civic belonging came to determine the public sphere again, inspiring citizenship tests among other things and relegating cultural memories back to the private sphere.

This review of shifts in memories and belonging shows that belonging of civic memory and of cultural memory was expressed in numerous ways. Though periods were defined by one form of memory determining the public sphere, civic and cultural memories determined modes of belonging in some combination. While the government has a great impact on the form of memories and the mode of belonging in the public sphere, they are a historical result of political efforts and interventions from the private sphere. Thus, forms of belonging and, in regard to immigration, forms of integration are a result of political conflicts that rearrange, with the help of memories, the relationship between civic and communal belonging. For example, what has been identified in the early 2000s (Alba and Nee 2003; Brubaker 2001) as a return to the assimilation politics of the 1950s is in part at least the return of civic memories and belonging. But the impact of belonging on integration policies is very different in the 2000s, as the theorists of the new assimilation thesis admit (Alba and Nee 2003: 57–59; Brubaker 2001: 543–544). Belonging was less exclusive in terms of national or 'ethnic' heritage in the 2000s, following a period of

cultural diversity, rather in the 1950s after a period of war, racism, and heightened nationalism. The transformations of memories followed not just social dynamics but also particularities of history and challenges identified by politics that impacted modes of belonging. In addition to political disputes about the relationship between civic and communal modes of belonging, the question of what was remembered and to which political end the memories were employed impacted the historical and political response to social and political challenges as well. As we have seen, memories in Australia were political in both a universal or abstract sense, disputing modes of belonging, and a particular or concrete sense, regarding how to react to historically specific challenges.

3.5.6 Memories and the Mediation of Belonging

The transformation of memories has two contexts, I have argued, the global dynamic on the one hand and the domestic body politic on the other. The two contexts are, however, also mediated by memories that at once contribute to the first and are utilized in the second. The global dynamic of society is anonymous but not independent from people's actions, which are guided by memories and propel abstract social processes beyond intended consequences. Domestically, memories are utilized for concrete political ends and thus impact the constellation of modes of belonging. The relationship between the abstract global and the concrete domestic dimension of memories is a result of political-economic competition, itself mediated by memories. Thus, memories mediate between different levels of social abstraction, global and domestic in this case, as well as between competing political interests.

First, as competitors or political opponents negotiate modes of belonging domestically they relate the dimensions of time, of abstract processes, and of concrete continuity, and thus propel the social dynamic. While the dynamic is universal, modes of belonging are politically challenged within the public/private dichotomy of a polity. In other words, while the political use of memories aims to reconfigure modes of belonging domestically, it also rearranges the relationship between the two social dimensions of time on a universal level. However, it takes more than one country altering the form of memories and modes of belonging in its public sphere in order to transform the global social dynamic in a periodic shift. For example, migrant and political interest groups worked, in tension with civic belonging, towards a political recognition of heritage as it was introduced with multiculturalism in the 1970s. Yet, Australian politics responded to such

political claims as much as they followed them and they were inspired by Canada in this move (Hawkins 1989: 243–244). Moreover, other countries developed similar communal policies at the time, which were results of national political struggles as well (Joppke 1999). While political interests aimed at promoting private memories to rearrange modes of belonging in their country for private interests, the dynamic and formation of society were rearranged on a global scale, changing the social structure of society along with the political structure of the polities.

Second, memories mediated not just between global social processes and domestic politics but also political conflicts and processes in the polity itself. The polity provided the public/private dichotomy—which allowed and structured political contestation—necessary for social transformations. In turn, the global transformation of belonging defined periods as being civic or community dominated, which altered social and political structures domestically. Yet, political conflicts about memory also impacted the relationship between civic and communal belonging more subtly during certain periods. I have shown that the dominant mode of belonging was interpreted in different ways and was politically contested with memories mediating forms of belonging either through the state or through the market. In a country's polity the dominant form of memory in the public sphere can be supplemented by the other form of memory in the private sphere, in one way or the other. The manner in which civic and communal belonging relate to one another can alter the organization of a polity immensely and determine the difference between migrant integration policies, between assimilation and integration in the 1950s and 1960s or between multiculturalism and nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s. The question how to mediate the modes of belonging under one dominant mode is highly political and usually discussed in reference to the political challenges the polity is confronted with. For example, in the 1970s, multiculturalism was not the only option of organizing Australian society in accordance with cultural memories but politically it was seen as the better option than nationalism in order to integrate immigrants under the altered constellation of global society. Thus, the introduction of multiculturalism was a political decision but only one within the limits of a society organized by communal belonging. Therefore, migrant integration was determined by anonymous, global forces of society, providing a dominant mode of belonging domestically, and by political negotiation regarding how to mediate the public mode of belonging with private

modes. Memories provided the political mediation between the global and domestic and between the public and private spheres.

Belonging and memories have always been politically mediated in Australia, but Australia became a coherent political body only with the introduction of citizenship in 1949. Since civic belonging delineated the boundaries of the Australian polity, in contrast and cooperation with cultural memory, political contestation about the past concerned Australian belonging rather than a struggle in tension with and dependent on the British Empire. Yet, Australia's memories and political system of belonging have a long tradition of Australian commemoration, reaching back to the beginning of British settlement of the continent, if not beyond. This history and its impact on both civic and cultural memories is, and has always been, of particular relevance to migration and migrant integration. The constellation of the forms of memory and of the modes of belonging impacted integration policies, how membership could be acquired, and how joining Australian society was imagined. I have discussed the relationship between memory, belonging, and politics. In the conclusion I will not only consider the political role of memories for the integration of migrants more generally but reflect on how the concept of 'Political Memories', developed in this book, may benefit Memory Studies, Migration Studies and Social Research.

Notes

1. Statutory Rules, 1934, No. 157 and Statutory Rules, 1938, No. 103, Regulations under the Nationality Act; Department of the Interior: *Memorandum: Question of Amending Nationality Act Regulations*, 09.08.1934; J. McEwen, Minister for the Interior: *For Cabinet: White Alien Immigration—Review of the Policy of the Government*, 14.04.1938; all at NAA A1, 1938/10147.
2. Aliens Classification and Advisory Committee: *Memorandum on Proposed Amendments to Procedure Governing the Issue of Certificates of Naturalisation*, Canberra, 18.09.1945, p. 3, NAA A437, 1946/6/68.
3. Aliens Classification and Advisory Committee: *Memorandum on Proposed Amendments to Procedure Governing the Issue of Certificates of Naturalisation*, Canberra, 18.09.1945, p. 3–4, NAA A437, 1946/6/68.
4. Aliens Classification and Advisory Committee: *Memorandum on Proposed Amendments to Procedure Governing the Issue of Certificates of Naturalisation*, Canberra, 18.09.1945, p. 3–4, NAA A437, 1946/6/68.

5. However, the acquisition of Australian citizenship was not so independent of migrants' nationality. Non-Europeans were not able to naturalize until the Minister for Immigration received powers to grant rights to apply for citizenship in 1956. By 1969, 6,385 non-Europeans had become Australian citizens (Jordens 1995 20–23). The Department of Immigration was in fact a driving force behind the abolishment of discrimination against Asians (Jordan 2006).
6. 'Australians live "on a borrowed tradition" ', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1953, p.2.
7. 'Australians live "on a borrowed tradition" ", *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1953, p.2.
8. 'Australians live "on a borrowed tradition" ", *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1953, p.2.
9. Kelly had herself spoken at the first citizenship convention in 1950 about understanding the cultures and traditions of migrants. 'Must Understand Other Cultures', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1950, p. 13, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
10. In fact, The Citizenship Convention was organized annually until 1966 and then biannually until 1970.
11. 'Discussion On Migration. Better Plan Urged By A.N.A.', *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), 28.01.1947, p. 8.
12. 'Discussion On Migration. Better Plan Urged By A.N.A.', *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), 28.01.1947, p. 8.
13. 'Move to foster more national pride', *The Argus* (Melbourne), 07.10.1949, p. 7.
14. 'Discussion on Migration. Better Plan Urged By A.N.A.', *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), 28.01.1947, p. 8.
15. The distinction between communal and civic belonging was important, for example, in the case of an Indonesian family who had received asylum in Australia. The Minister for Immigration had ordered the family to be deported in January 1949, except for the mother who had married an Australian and thus had become Australian citizen herself. Thus, the White Australia Policy and Australian citizenship were served justice in the distinction between Asian nationals and Australian citizens; see 'Australian or not Australian', *The Canberra Times*, 31.01.1949, p. 2.
16. See 'New Status for Australians Starts Today und Citizenship Act', *The Mercury* (Hobart, Tasmania), 26.01.1949, p. 4.
17. 'Australians "Citizens" From To-day', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1949, p. 9; 'Today we become Australians", *The Argus* (Melbourne), 26.01.1949, p. 5; 'Citizenship Act Now In Operation', *The Canberra Times*, 26.01.1949, p. 2.
18. 'Column 8', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1949, p. 1.

19. 'The Puzzle of Citizenship', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1949, p. 2.
20. 'Aliens' were defined by the Citizenship Act of 1948 as immigrants who were neither British subjects nor Irish, nor did they hold a protection status.
21. 'Many Dual Citizens', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 27.01.1949, p. 9; 'Act Gives Many Dual Citizenship', *The Mercury* (Hobart), 27.01.1949, p. 5.
22. 'Ceremony to Make Aliens Australians', *The Age*, 11.01.1949, p. 2; 'Nationality Act Proclamation', *The Age*, 25.01.1949, p. 3.
23. Peter V. Russo, 'An Australia Day Study, 1949: New Citizens and Natives',*The Argus* 31.01.1949.
24. Peter V. Russo, 'An Australia Day Study, 1949: New Citizens and Natives', *The Argus* 31.01.1949. Manning Clark drew on a similar argument much later in his revisionist 'A History of Australia' (1962).
25. Peter V. Russo, 'An Australia Day Study, 1949: New Citizens and Natives', *The Argus* 31.01. 1949.
26. Aliens Classification and Advisory Committee: *Memorandum on Proposed Amendments to Procedure Governing the Issue of Certificates of Naturalisation*, Canberra, September 1945, p. 3, NAA A437, 1946/6/68.
27. Arthur A. Calwell, Minister for Immigration, to J.B. Chifley, Prime Minister, 25.08.1949, NAA A461, P349/1/1.
28. See Harold Holt, Minister for Immigration, to R.C. Menzies, Prime Minister, 22.12.1949; Reply from Prime Minister and copies of invitations from the Department of the Prime Minister; NAA A461, P349/1/1.
29. See Reply to Harold Holt, Minister for Immigration from Prime Minister R.C. Menzies; NAA A461, P349/1/1.
30. See Press Statement by the Minister for Immigration, The Hon. Arthur A. Calwell, 19.08.1949, NAA A445, 146/1/1.
31. 'A People United Met to Plan Welcome to Migrants', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra Department of Immigration 1950, p. 2, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
32. See Commonwealth Jubilee Citizenship Convention, 22–26th January 1951—Second Citizenship Convention 1951, NAA A438, 1950/7/759.
33. See News and Information Bureau, Department of the Interior, for the Commonwealth Department of Immigration, Canberra: *Australia's Citizenship Conventions, 1950-1-2*, Canberra/Sydney: Johnston Publishing, January 1953; NLA 325.94. A938.
34. See for example 'Report of Action Taken Departmentally and by Good Neighbour Organisations on the Resolutions of the Third Australian Citizenship Convention, 1952', Canberra: Department of Immigration, 1952, NLA Npf 325 94 A938; see also Jordens 1995: 78–79.

35. The conventions were funded from a Department of Immigration budget labeled 'assimilation activities' (Jordens 1995: 79).
36. For example: 'Hey Helen, Look at Them…', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1950, pp. 10–11, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
37. 'Must Understand Other Cultures' and 'New Australian Makes Plea for Tolerance', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1950, p.13, NLA N 325.94 AUS;
38. See Resolutions of all Citizenship Conventions in their respective digest publications; *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1950–1970, NLA N 325.94 AUS; also: Talk by Noel W. Lamidey (Assistant Secretary (Assimilation) Department of Immigration): Australia's Assimilation of Its Migrant Population, Canberra, 10.07.1956, typescript 20pp., p. 18, NAA C4688/c, box 1.
39. 'General Assembly Recommended that…', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra Department of Immigration 1950, p. 19, Citizenship §1, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
40. 'Case for Migration is Irresistible, Say Prime Minister', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra Department of Immigration 1950, p. 3, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
41. Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council, Item No. 13, Commonwealth Jubilee Citizenship Convention, Appendix B, p. 8, NAA A438, 1950/7/759.
42. 'Delegates Saw an Impressive Ceremony of Naturalisation on Australia Day', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1950, p. 16, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
43. Commonwealth Jubilee Citizenship Convention, Canberra 22.-26.01.1951, Report of Proceedings, Canberra: Department of Immigration, Federal Capital Press of Australia, p. 30, NLA NLp 325.94 COM.
44. See recommendations by delegates at Citizenship Conventions, published in *Australian Citizenship Convention Digests*, 1950–1970, Canberra: Department of Immigration, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
45. 'General Assembly Recommended that…', *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1950, p. 19, Citizenship §2, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
46. See communication between ANA and Department of Immigration, December 1952, NAA A445, 230/1/3.
47. H. McGinness, Senior Migration Officer to the Secretary, Department of Immigration, 14.05.1952, p. 4, NAA A445, 230/1/1.
48. Harold Holt, Minister for Immigration, to I.A.C. Wood, Australian Council of Local Government Association, letter dated 12.07.1952, NAA A445, 230/1/3.
49. See Department of Immigration: *Australia's Naturalization Ceremonies. A Handbook of Guidance for the Conduct of Naturalization Ceremonies*,

Canberra 1962; and adjoining letter from the Department of Immigration, NAA C3939, 1955/25/76086.

50. G.A.M. Edson, Commonwealth Immigration Officer for S.A., to Secretary, Department of Immigration, 28.10.1952, NAA A445, 230/1/3; to The Minister: Question of an Annual 'Citizenship Day' and the Presentation of a 'Manual of Citizenship' to Persons who have been Naturalized, 20.06.1952; and H. McGinness, Senior Migration Officer, to The Secretary, Department of Immigration, 14.05.1952, both NAA A445, 230/1/1.
51. Quoted in Memorandum: C.M.O. Brisbane by A.L. Nutt: Naturalization Ceremonies, 11.07.1952, NAA A445, 230/1/3.
52. 'This Will Really be a Day to Remember', *Daily News*, 20.01.1954, newspaper clipping, NAA A445, 230/1/1. For a later example see '4400 Migrants to Be Granted Citizenship', *The Age* (Melbourne), 23.01.1963, p. 9.
53. Letter from Syd. G. Herron, Australian Native Association Victoria, to Arthur Calwell, Minister for Immigration, 02.07.1948; NAA A446, 1965/46410. ANA and later Menadue (1971: 255–257) claimed that the government had adopted their recommendation to introduce naturalization ceremonies. In fact, as Arthur Calwell noted in response to that claim, the idea for naturalization ceremonies stemmed from the Aliens Classification Committee during the war years; letter from Arthur Calwell, Minister for Immigration, to J.J. Dedman, Minister for Defense and Post War Reconstruction, 15.10.1948, NAA A446, 1965/46410.
54. Australian Natives Association Victoria, letter to Minister of Immigration, Harald Holt, 04.12.1952, NAA A445, 230/1/1.
55. See 'Citizenship for Asians', *The Age*, 09.04.1958, p. 2; James Hall: 'Are the barriers weakening?', *The Australian*, 28.06.1965.
56. 'Membership Move Fails at A.N.A.', *The Age*, 24.03.1960, p. 22.
57. 'Australia Day Proposals', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 12.06.1947, p. 17.
58. See the copy of the founding constitution of the Australia Day Federal Council, in NAA A463, 1971/2878.
59. See list attached to letter from Hubert Opperman, Minister of Immigration and Member for Corie, to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 27.02.1964, NAA A463, 1971/2878; also press statement by chairman of the Australia Day Council Victoria, 16.01.1967, NAA M4250, 57.
60. Norman Martin: *Welcome to a new citizen of Australia*, speech draft, undated (ca. 1962), NAA A446, 1963/45251.
61. See NAA A463, 1971/2878.
62. The Minister for Immigration Hubert Opperman, as Member for Corie, wrote to the Prime Minister in support of the Australia Day Council on 27.02.1964; the Australian Association of Advertising Agencies wrote on

10.06.1966 and on 24.08.1966; ANA Federal Council wrote on 13.09.1971; NAA A463, 1971/2878.

63. Prime Minister's Department to Senator Gorton, 14.09.1966; J.G. Gorton, for the Prime Minister, to J.A: Burke, Federal Secretary, Australia Day Federal Council, 16.09.1966; NAA A463, 1971/2878.
64. See letters to Prime Minister dated 23.03.1964, 24.03.1964 and 25.05.1964 respectively; NAA A463, 1971/2878.
65. 'How we fail on our national day', *The Age*, 27.01.1964, p. 2; Stephen Nisbet: 'Flags out- but not many know why', *The Age*, 25.01.1969, p. 2.
66. S.J. Dempsey, for the Secretary of the Ministry of Immigration, to the Prime Minister's Department, 18.08.1966, NAA A463, 1971/2878.
67. "Australia celebrates its national day", *The Good Neighbour* (Department of Immigration), January 1965, p. 6; NAA M2607, 107.
68. "Australia celebrates its national day", *The Good Neighbour* (Department of Immigration), January 1965, p. 6; NAA M2607, 107.
69. Hubert Opperman: 'There is no facile way to promote naturalization", *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1965, p. 20, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
70. Hubert Opperman: 'There is no facile way to promote naturalization", *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration 1965, p. 20, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
71. At the 1968 Citizenship Convention, the objective of the Good Neighbour Councils was in fact broadened to coordinate organizations dealing with migrant issues and supporting migrants in areas where they faced problems; see Phillip Lynch: 'Facing the new Challenge', *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest* Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 18, 1970, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
72. Sergio Giudici: 'Migrant Viewpoint', *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 16, 1966; J.A.L. Matheson: 'Australia, present and future', *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 17, 1968, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
73. Giudici: 'Migrant Viewpoint', *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 16, 1966, p. 28, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
74. Justice Egglestone: 'Mr Justice Egglestone sums up group discussion', *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 16, 1966, p. 38, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
75. E.A. Willis: 'Two Centuries After Cook', *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 18, 1970, p. 11, NLA N 325.94 AUS.

76. See for example speeches from politicians printed in the *Australian Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 16, 1966, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
77. See e.g., Rachelle Banchevska: 'The Migrant in a New Community", *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canberra: Department of Immigration, no. 18, 1970, p. 30; Andrew Fabinyi: 'Social and Cultural Issues of Migration', *Australia Citizenship Convention Digest*, Canerra: Department of Immigration, no. 18, 1970, p. 26, NLA N 325.94 AUS.
78. A.J. Grassby, *A multi-cultural society for the future: A paper prepared for the Cairnmillar Institute's symposium "Strategy 2000: Australia for tomorrow"*, *Reference Paper*, Department of Immigration (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1973), NLA NLp 301.2994 G768.
79. In reality, the changes of 1966 had rather little effect on Asian immigration (London 1970: 25–52).
80. Press Statement by the Minister for Immigration, A.J. Forbes: *On 'Homogenous Society'*, 14/72, 02.05.1972, NAA C3939, 1963/75182.
81. A summary of the debate is provided by Allan Banres: 'All a Chipp off the old Gorton', *The Age* (Melbourne), 05.05.1972, p. 9.
82. See Australia Day Council Victoria: *Annual Report 1970/1971*, Melbourne, presented to the Annual General Meeting 07.06.1971, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS, and Australia Day Council Victoria: *Reports of the Executive Committee*, 1971/1972–1975/1976, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
83. John K. Lavett, Chairman Australia Day Movement: *Australia Day 1969*, 07.01.1969, SLV 394.26994 AU 7A.
84. A.J. Grassby, Minister for Immigration, to E.G. Whitlam, Prime Minister, stamped 23.08.1973, NAA A463, 1973/3562.
85. 'Just another holiday', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 04.02.1973, p. 44.
86. See Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for 1971/1972*, Melbourne, presented to the Annual General Meeting 01.05.1972, and Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for1972/1973*, Melbourne, presented to the Annual General Meeting 30.03.1973, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
87. Australian National Anthem and Flag Committee, NAA AA1975/370, C1969.
88. 'Matilda's swagman will have to go', *The Gazette* (Montreal, Canada), 16.11.1973, p. 9.
89. 'Wanted, an Anthem', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 04.02.1973, p. 44.
90. 'Matilda's swagman will have to go', *The Gazette*; (Montreal, Canada), 16.11.1973, p. 9.
91. Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for 1971/1972*, p. 2, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.

92. Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for 1971/1972*, p. 2–3, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
93. Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for 1972/1973*, pp. 2–3, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
94. Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for1975/1976*, Melbourne, presented to the Annual General Meeting (no date), pp. 2–3, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
95. In its discussion of the national anthem quest, the annual report points to dissenting views within its own organization; Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for 1971/1972*, p. 2, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
96. Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for 1972/1973*, p. 7, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
97. A.J. Grassby, Minister for Immigration, to E.G. Whitlam, Prime Minister, stamped 23.08.1973, NAA A463, 1973/3562.
98. A.J. Grassby, Minister for Immigration, News Release 81/73, untitled, undated, NAA A463, 1973/3562.
99. P.N. Shaw, Memorandum: Australia Day Observance—Good Neighbour Council Participation, undated (circa August 1973), NAA A463, 1973/3562.
100. Department of Immigration, News Release 2/74, untitled, undated, NAA A463, 1973/3562; 'Migrants Amnesty Open 3 Months', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 25.01.1976, p. 2.
101. 'No national pride, says Grassby', *The Age* (Melbourne), 30.01.1973, newspaper clipping, NAA A446, 1973/3562.
102. See Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for1975/1976*, p. 8, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
103. See for example The Good Neighbour Council of New South Wales: *Annual Report 1975/1976*, Sydney: The Council, 1976, NLA N 361.406 GOO.
104. The idea of a history book was repeatedly pursued by the Department of Immigration since the early 1950s, but never as extensively and fully as by Grassby in the 1970s. Interestingly, while previous ideas concentrated on departmental or economic history, Grassby insisted on a people's history of immigration to integrate immigration in Australian national identity. See Jordens: *Alien to citizen: settling migrants in Australia, 1945–75*, pp. 234–238.
105. See Samuel Furphy (2009): Australian of the Year Award—50th Anniversary History, unpublished paper for the National Australia Day Council, Canberra, 36pp, provided by National Australia Day Council, 6.
106. Quoted in Samuel Furphy (2009): Australian of the Year Award—50th Anniversary History, unpublished paper for the National Australia Day Council, Canberra, 36pp, provided by National Australia Day Council, 5–6.
107. Samuel Furphy (2009): Australian of the Year Award—50th Anniversary History, unpublished paper for the National Australia Day Council, Canberra, 36pp, provided by National Australia Day Council, pp. 5–6.

108. See Australia Day Council Victoria: *Report of the Executive Committee for 1975/1976*, p. 8, NLA Nq 394.26994 AUS.
109. A third Australian of the Year Award was in play, presented by *The Australian Newspaper*, which, however, was not linked to Australia Day; see Samuel Furphy (2009): Australian of the Year Award—50th Anniversary History, unpublished paper for the National Australia Day Council, Canberra, 36pp, provided by National Australia Day Council, 5.
110. Samuel Furphy (2009): Australian of the Year Award—50th Anniversary History, unpublished paper for the National Australia Day Council, Canberra, 36pp, provided by National Australia Day Council, 5.
111. See the list of former recipients on the official 'Australian of the Year' homepage: http://www.australianoftheyear.org.au/honour-roll/, accessed 12.11.2015.
112. National Australia Day Forum, Canberra, 12.-13.04.1980: Summary of Proceedings, 8 pp., Australia Day Ephemera, NLA Australian Ephemera Collection.
113. Samuel Furphy (2009): Australian of the Year Award—50th Anniversary History, unpublished paper for the National Australia Day Council, Canberra, 36pp, provided by National Australia Day Council, 5. The Australia Day Council Victoria continued as a patriotic, membership-based association that promoted the monarchy and the former imperial links to Great Britain while remembering Australian history as one of developments with an emphasis on the economy; see Australia Day Council (Victoria): Pamphlet, 1983, State Library Victoria LTP 394.268494 Au7A [wrongly dated 1982 in database].
114. Manning Clark, '1980 Australia Day Message', *Canberra Australia Day Council Newsletter*, no. 1, 1981, NLA Nef 919.471 CAN.
115. Frank Galbally et al.: 'Migrant Services and Programs. Report of the Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants', (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1978), pp. 11–12.
116. National Australia Day Forum, 1980: Summary of Proceedings, 8 pp., 1–2, Australia Day Ephemera, NLA Australian Ephemera Collection.
117. Results of Market Research Survey, 4 pp., p. 1, National Australia Day Forum, April 1980, NAA C4688, box 1.
118. AGB McNair: Awareness of Australia Day January 1989, prepared for the National Australia Day Council, February 1989, p. 1, NAA C4688, box 2.
119. Asher Joel: Organisation and Implementation of Australia Day, Australia Day Forum, Canberra 12.04.1980, typescript 12 pp., pp. 4–5, NAA C4688, box 1.
120. Results of Market Research Survey 1981, p. 2, National Australia Day Forum 1981, NAA C4688/c, box 1.
121. Ibid., p. 6.
122. Official Opening Speech at the National Australia Day Forum, April 1981, Summary of proceedings, NAA: C4688, box 1.

123. R.L. Harry: The Permanent Significance of Australia Day and Annual Themes for Emphasis, Australia Day Forum 1981, typescript 6 pp., 1, NAA 4688, box 1.
124. R.L. Harry: The Permanent Significance of Australia Day and Annual Themes for Emphasis, Australia Day Forum 1981, typescript 6 pp., 5–6, NAA 4688, box 1.
125. R.L. Harry: The Permanent Significance of Australia Day and Annual Themes for Emphasis, Australia Day Forum 1981, typescript 6 pp., 1, NAA 4688, box 1.
126. R.L. Harry: The Permanent Significance of Australia Day and Annual Themes for Emphasis, Australia Day Forum 1981, typescript 6 pp., 1, NAA 4688, box 1.
127. R.L. Harry: The Permanent Significance of Australia Day and Annual Themes for Emphasis, Australia Day Forum 1981, typescript 6 pp., 2, NAA 4688, box 1.
128. See the documentation of the Australia Day Forums 1980 and 1981, NAA C4688, box 1 and NAA 4688, box 1.
129. Harry: The Permanent Significance of Australia Day and Annual Themes for Emphasis, p. 4, NAA 4688, box 1.
130. Harry: The Permanent Significance of Australia Day and Annual Themes for Emphasis, p. 4, NAA 4688, box 1.
131. See National Australia Day Council: *100s & 1000s Ideas for Australia Day*, St. Leonards 1987, SLA LTP 394.268494 On2N.
132. See National Australia Day Council: *Australia Day Update*, Newsletter, published about twice a year 1983–1989, NLA Nq 394.268494 AUS.
133. 'The Bicentenary: The Official Magazine': (A Bulletin/Australian Bicentennial Authority Publication, 1988), p. 3.
134. Ibid., p. 105. The landing was nonetheless re-enacted independently of ABA a couple of days after Australia Day; see 'The second coming of the First Fleet', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 30.01.1988, p. 2.
135. In 1989, the re-enactment won the 'Australian Event of the Year' Award, presented by the Australia Day Council in 1981 (King 1989: 5).
136. In the end, the project did receive official funding from the New South Wales government and through a grant from NADC (Macintyre and Clark 2004: 102–107).
137. 'A farce of a day, says Blainey', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.01.1984, p. 2.
138. 'Migration debate is off course', *The Age*, 22.05.1984, p. 13.
139. John Howard, 'The meaning of "One Australia"', *The Age*, 09.09. 1988.
140. Bob Hawke, 'Resisting the rallying call of fear', *The Age*, 09.09. 1988.
141. Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies, Stephen FitzGerald: 'Immigration, a commitment to Australia', in *Parliamentary Papers*, ed. Commonwealth Parliament (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988).

142. Howard, 'The meaning of "One Australia"', *The Age*.
143. Hawke, 'Resisting the rallying call of fear', *The Age*.
144. 'What the PM and the prince have said', *The Age*, 27.01.1988, p. 6.
145. See Canberra Australia Day Council: *Newsletter*, 1984, NLA 394.2/684/94.
146. See Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration, Stephen FitzGerald: *Immigration, a commitment to Australia: the report of the Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies*, *Parliamentary paper* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988), pp. 119–127.
147. Howard, 'The meaning of "One Australia"', *The Age*.
148. See 'Hawke vow on Asian intake', *The Age*, 08.08.1988, p. 1.
149. See 'True blue—but only if its pays to be', *The Age*, 10.04.1989, pp. 10–11.
150. See 'True blue—but only if its pays to be', *The Age*, 10.04.1989, pp. 10–11.
151. National Australia Day Council: *Annual Report 1988*, Canberra, p. 16, Australia Day Ephemera, NLA Australian Ephemera (General).
152. In 1994, the oath of allegiance was officially amended to be a pledge of commitment as a citizen of Australia. Without reference to the past or to diversity, it evoked a communal belonging in its pledge of 'loyalty to Australia and its people' (McKeown 2002–03).
153. Australia Day Council of NSW: *Australia Day History*, available at http://www.australiaday.com.au/studentresources/history.aspx#1989topresent (accessed 11.04.2010).
154. Quoted Australia Day Council of NSW: *Australia Day History*, available at http://www.australiaday.com.au/studentresources/history.aspx#1989topresent (accessed 11.04.2010).
155. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Government invites more people to become Australian citizens, Media Release MPS 084/2001, 02.07.2010, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/31543/20070124-0000/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/ruddock_media01/r01084.html (accessed 12.11.2015).
156. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: First Australian Citizenship Day, Media Release MPS 159/2001, 17.09.2001, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/31543/20070124-0000/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/ruddock_media01/r01159.html (accessed 12.11.2015).
157. See http://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Citi/Citi (accessed 12.11.2015). In 2008, NADC in cooperation with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship has taken up this idea and introduced citizenship affirmation

ceremonies on Australia Day as well; see www.australianaffirmation.com.au (accessed 12.11.2015); also NADC: Annual Report 2007–2008, Canberra 2008, p. 10.

158. Citizenship tests had previously been introduced for similar reasons in Canada, the UK, the USA, The Netherlands, and New Zealand.
159. Andrew Robb: *Australian Migrant Integration—Past Successes, Future Challenges*, Speech to the Sydney Institute, Sydney 27.04.2006, available at http://www.andrewrobb.com.au/Media/Speeches/tabid/73/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/633/Australian-Migrant-Integration-Past-Successes-Future-Challenges.aspx (accessed 12.11.2015).
160. Andrew Robb: *Australian Migrant Integration—Past Successes, Future Challenges*, Speech to the Sydney Institute, Sydney 27.04.2006, available at http://www.andrewrobb.com.au/Media/Speeches/tabid/73/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/633/Australian-Migrant-Integration-Past-Successes-Future-Challenges.aspx (accessed 12.11.2015).
161. See Commonwealth of Australia (2006): *Australian Citizenship: Much more than a ceremony. Considerations of the merits of introducing a formal citizenship test*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/64133/20061005-0000/www.citizenship.gov.au/news/DIMA_Citizenship_Discussion_Paper.pdf (accessed 12.11.2015).
162. See Commonwealth of Australia (2006): *Australian Citizenship: Much more than a ceremony. Considerations of the merits of introducing a formal citizenship test*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 5, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/64133/20061005-0000/www.citizenship.gov.au/news/DIMA_Citizenship_Discussion_Paper.pdf (accessed 12.11.2015).
163. John Howard: *Transcript of the Joint Press Conference with Andrew Robb*, Philip Street, Sydney, 11.12.2006, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/20061221-0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview2295.html (accessed 12.11.2015).
164. Kevin Andrews: Speech, Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Testing) Bill 2007, Second Reading, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Representatives, 30.05.2006, p. 6, available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/2007-05-30/0010/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 12.11.2015). It should be noted that the test did not apply entirely regardless of where one came from as it was obviously not required from those born Australian.
165. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship: *Citizenship Test Launched on Australian Citizenship Day*, Media Release, 17.09.2007, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/67564/20071110-0000/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2007/ka07091.html (accessed 12.11.2015).

166. Commonwealth of Australia: *Becoming an Australian citizen. Citizenship: Your Commitment to Australia*, Canberra 2007, p. 1.
167. John Hirst: Australia: The official history, *The Monthly*, No. 31, Feb 2008, online version, available at http://www.themonthly.com.au/monthly-essays-john-hirst-australia-official-history-781 (accessed 12.11.2015).
168. John Hirst: Australia: The official history, *The Monthly*, No. 31, Feb 2008, online version, available at http://www.themonthly.com.au/monthly-essays-john-hirst-australia-official-history-781 (accessed 12.11.2015).
169. In September 2006, 77 per cent of respondents to a national poll were in favour of introducing a citizenship test with 19 per cent against; see http://polling.newspoll.com.au/image_uploads/0906%20Aust%20Citizenship%20Test.pdf (accessed 12.11.2015). See also for a favourable view: Gerard Henderson: 'Welcome to all who pass the test', *Sydney Morning Herald* 28.09.2007.
170. See for example Brian Costar, Peter Mares: A test that will divide, not unite, Australia Policy Online, 14 December 2006, available at http://www.apo.org.au/commentary/test-will-divide-not-unite (accessed 12.11.2015); Amnesty International Australia: "Refugees disadvantaged by Citizenship Test", 31.01.2008, available at http://www.amnesty.org.au/refugees/comments/8775/ (accessed 12.11.2015).
171. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship: Independent committee to review citizenship test, Media Release 28.04.2008, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/67564/20081217-0001/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2008/ce08039.html (accessed 12.11.2015).
172. Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee: *Moving Forward… Improving Pathways to Citizenship*, Canberra 2008, p. 4.
173. Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee: *Moving Forward… Improving Pathways to Citizenship*, Canberra 2008, 12.
174. Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee: *Moving Forward… Improving Pathways to Citizenship*, Canberra 2008, 22.
175. Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee: *Moving Forward… Improving Pathways to Citizenship*, Canberra 2008, 23–24.
176. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship: New Citizenship Test to Assess Knowledge of Civics, Media Release, 17.09.2009, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/67564/20091217-0059/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2009/ce09087.html (accessed 12.11.2015).
177. Commonwealth of Australia (2009): *Australian Citizenship: Our Common Bond*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
178. Commonwealth of Australia (2009): *Australian Citizenship: Our Common Bond*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 9.
179. Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee (2008): *Moving Forward… Improving Pathways to Citizenship*, Canberra, 47.

180. See Commonwealth of Australia: *Moving Forward… Improving Pathways towards Citizenship. Government Response to the Report by the Australian Citizenship Test review Committee*. Canberra 2009, p. 5, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/92481/20090513-0943/www.citizenshiptestreview.gov.au/_pdf/government-response-to-the-report.pdf (accessed 12.11.2015). For the introduction of Australian citizenship, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship wrote the following on its homepage: "The 60th anniversary of Australian citizenship is an opportunity for us to reflect on the changes that have shaped our nation over the past 60 years. It is also an opportunity for all Australians, whether an Australian citizen by birth or by choice, to understand the role Australian citizenship plays in building a strong, harmonious and unified nation."
181. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship: Australia Day, immigration detention, Indian students and Cuban refugees, doorstop interview, Canberra, 26 January 2010, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/67564/20100726-0802/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/speeches/2010/ce100126.html (accessed 12.11.2015).
182. Noel W. Lamidey: *Australia's assimilation of its migrant population*, talk held in Canberra, 19.07.1956, typescript 20pp., 18, NAA C4688/c, box 1.
183. Noel W. Lamidey: *Australia's assimilation of its migrant population*, talk held in Canberra, 19.07.1956, typescript 20pp., 19, NAA C4688/c, box 1.
184. Noel W. Lamidey: *Australia's assimilation of its migrant population*, talk held in Canberra, 19.07.1956, typescript 20pp., 8–9, NAA C4688/c, box 1.
185. Noel W. Lamidey: *Australia's assimilation of its migrant population*, talk held in Canberra, 19.07.1956, typescript 20pp., 14, NAA C4688/c, box 1.
186. This tension between Aboriginal civic and cultural belonging was manifest in particular in legal questions, most notably expressed by the High Court of Australia in its rulings about *Mabo v Queensland (No.2)* (1992) and *Wik Peoples v Queensland: Thayorre People v Queensland* (1996).
187. It is an ideology that is a necessary and necessarily wrong consciousness (*notwendig falsches Bewußtsein*), in the sense of Lukács 1968: 145–148.
188. This notion of 'humanity' contributed to a popularization of human rights since the 1970s (Moyn 2010).

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CHAPTER 4

Pasts and Politics: Beyond the Boundaries of Belonging

References to the past are important reactions to challenges, conflict, and even anxiety, as Homi K. Bhabha notes. 'Anxiety links us to the memory of the past while we struggle to choose a path through the ambiguous history of the present' (1994: xix). The political struggle with memories to construct a belonging and to find a path for the Australian immigration society was present throughout Australia's ambiguous history. In reference to memories and to migration, Australian belonging has been controversial and shared, transformed and preserved, opened up and restricted. Belonging is always highly ambivalent with variants of belonging conditioning each other. Cultural, social, political, and legal belonging were statuses relevant not only to immigrants joining Australian society in one or several ways but also to established members to negotiate their relationships with each other, and to others. Belonging to a privileged social class was necessary in the first half of the nineteenth century in order to belong to the colony politically; cultural belonging was a requirement to belong legally under the White Australia Policy; today, political belonging with full voting rights is conditional on being a legal citizen. Throughout, I have shown, references to the past were a tool in political contestations to negotiate these belongings. To speak of belonging raises more questions about social relations and their boundaries than it can answer regarding the demand to belong.

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J.O. Kleist, *Political Memories and Migration*, Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57589-0_4

No one experienced the ambivalence of belonging in Australia more than the indigenous population. The original inhabitants of the continent have been British subjects since British colonization, and later they were in many ways part of the continent's social fabric. Still, they were culturally, legally, and politically excluded until the second half of the twentieth century. Even as they gained full legal and political recognition as members of the Australian polity in 1967, their social and cultural belonging remained uncertain. The case of indigenous belonging is the most prominent and most widely discussed dilemma of belonging in Australia, concerning not just indigenous belonging but questioning as well the ostensible belonging of Australians who themselves or whose ancestors immigrated. Belonging, in this case also revealed in decades of ongoing conflict over immigration, was always a political struggle. As immigration and (access to) belonging were debated in reference to the past, political memories constructed social constellations and shaped contested policies.

This book is an exploration of the politics of belonging; it examines the relationship between memory and migration. In Chap. 1, I promised this study would substitute the 'and' between memory *and* migration with more complexity. This substitution cannot be summarized in a word like 'belonging' or in a phrase that emphasizes the political character of both. To be sure, 'belonging' is a pivotal issue at the intersection of both memories and migration and it was at the centre of much of this study. Consistently, I have pointed to the political matter of remembering and of migration. How the past is remembered impacts notions of belonging and corresponds with policies of migrant integration; these assumptions were explored throughout this book. The mediation between memory and migration conjured society and politics in various constellations that, in turn, formed memories and migration in a broader framework. Ultimately, to ponder the question of this book, how memory and migration relate politically, both concepts of 'memory' and of 'migration' had to be rethought. On the basis of a concept of 'political memory' and a migrant integration conditioned by modes of belonging then, the methodological advantage was that constellations of political organization and models of social relationships could be interrogated critically.

4.1 Political Memory and Migrant Integration

Commemorations in Australia were manifold, contradictory, and elusive. Tzvetan Todorov (2003: 133–134) warns that '[c]ommemoration may be inevitable, but it is not the best way to make the past live on

in the present: in a democracy we need something other than sanitized and sanctified images of the past.' Official institutions, as well as private interest groups, evoked memories that questioned previous and competing images of the past. Commemorations changed over time and adjusted their memories to new constellations in modes of belonging in order to facilitate social transformations and meet political challenges. As Maurice Halbwachs (1980: 86) notes: '[were] a conflicting event, the initiative of one or several members, or, finally, external circumstances to introduce into the life of the group a new element incompatible with its past, then another group, with its own memory, would arise, and only an incomplete and vague remembrance of what had preceded this crisis would remain.' I have shown how the social and political role of civic and cultural memories shifted throughout Australia's European history and transformed the politics of belonging.

How the past lived on in Australian society was relevant not only to established Australians and their belonging, but also and in particular to immigrants, their reception, and integration. No other commemoration in Australia was as closely connected to the country's migration history as Australia Day. This link was particularly prevalent in the second half of the twentieth century. When in the 1950s and 1960s Citizenship Conventions were organized in the proximity of the national day it was to emphasize the offer to migrants to become new Australians in a civic tradition of the country. Quite opposed and yet in the same vein, Australia Day commemorations in the 1980s offered integration by celebrating cultural memories of migrants' heritages. I have argued that notions of belonging in Australia have been transformed by global social dynamics as well as by domestic political conflicts regarding memories. Commemorations, moreover, offered a path of integration for migrants by promoting historically and socially appropriate, civic or cultural memories to be adopted in order to belong.

That national commemorations and memories more generally play an important role in the integration of migrants is not atypical in countries of immigration. In the USA for example, migrants experience the Fourth of July as an important date on which to express their new belonging.[1] In Australia, I argue, remembrance of the national day was inclusive in varying ways. The mode of belonging imagined on Australia Day was decisive for migration control and migrant settlement. The form of memories used in regard to migration implied ideas about who could become a new member of Australian society and, crucially, how they could do this. Over

time, the transformation of the social constellation of memories and concurrent modes of belonging in the public sphere determined changes in the policies of migrant integration. Beyond general observations however, questions remain about how memories impact the integration of migrants and how transformations of memories alter integration policies. I suggest that, as in the case of memories, migrant integration is dependent on global transformations but is also country specific.

In migration theory integration is far from being conceptualized in generally accepted terms. As discussed in the introduction of the book, an underlying problem is an epistemological contradiction between international and domestic conditions, not unlike in memory studies as discussed in Sect. 5 of Chap. 3. On the one hand, international migration is constantly changing along with historical transformations of global society, while on the other hand national societies and polities maintain distinct and historically specific forms of integration. Memories, I suggest, correspond with, contribute to, and combine both the global and the domestic aspect of migrant integration.

The first aspect, integration from a global migration perspective, has been described as a universal shift during the second half of the twentieth century from mono-cultural to pluralistic/multicultural integration models (Castles and Davidson 2000: 54–83). Considering memories as elements of society's dynamic however, the trajectory of belonging and integration is not directional. Multiculturalism was not a *telos* of migration politics but rather one option of many at a time of predominantly communal belonging. This scheme of integration was possible, I have argued, because cultural memories corresponded in providing modes of belonging with the dynamic of society and the role of the nation state in the 1980s and 1990s. In turn, transformations of the early 2000s have led to political challenges to multiculturalism and a return to assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Brubaker 2001; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Historical dynamics constantly change migration and integration policies on a global level beyond sovereign boundaries.

For the second aspect of integration, from a domestic perspective, the adoption of multiculturalism appeared as a break with traditional exclusivist nationalism in Australia (Smolicz 1997). From this point of view, countries seem to be characterized by particular modes of belonging, and integration models have thus been analysed, especially in comparative studies (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999; Castles and Miller 2003). However, Gary Freeman (2004: 960) points out that immigration countries seldom have a

comprehensive integration policy: 'Most countries have only a loosely integrated set of regulatory frameworks that do no more than create incentive (opportunity) structures for both migrants and natives. Taken together, these frameworks constitute the integration schemes of Western democracies.' Rather than looking at particular migration policies, he has suggested instead that scholars examine how migrant integration is impacted by certain domains of national politics, like the state, the market, social welfare, and culture. I agree that the integration of immigrants may be better understood in the context of a broader political domain. I suggest, however, that conflicts about memories are a particularly relevant domain of politics that create a framework of belonging for integration schemes.

The challenge remains of how to reconcile these two and sometimes contradicting aspects of integration: the global and the domestic sphere. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Stratham suggest that the two aspects form a two-dimensional sphere of migration politics in which political conflicts and negotiations determine a host country's integration model (Koopmans and Statham 2000). This corresponds with my argument that political conflicts about memories participate in the global social dynamic as well as in the public transformation of belonging on a domestic level. In reference to Freeman, I suggest then that examining the constellation of civic and cultural memories as a political domain can help to understand the integration scheme of specific immigration societies. Thus, rather than ascribing a certain mode of belonging or citizenship to a country, country-specific integration depends on the organization of political conflicts within a polity. The form of memories that dominates the public sphere changes in accordance with global social dynamics, while domestically their impact on integration policies is contingent upon the historical relationship between civic and communal belonging. In other words, while integration policies are determined by political conflicts, a country's particular integration scheme is defined by the way conflicts about belonging and memories are structured.

In Australia, the conflict about belonging was negotiated in memories of Australia Day and in relation to migration since the early years of colonial settlement. In the historical course of political contestation, a certain relationship between memories became instituted. When nativist movements used cultural memories to advance political claims in the 1830s, Australia Day was used to distinguish between Australians and new arrivals from Britain. Since the 1850s, Australian nationalism referred to the First Fleet as a common origin through which people, and in particular the ANA,

expressed their objection to the immigration of Asians. Additionally, cultural Britishness, to which the First Fleet was a reminder of the link with the colonial mother country, provided the Australian middle class with distinction since the late nineteenth century. In contrast, civic memories of Australia Day, of the British tradition of settlement on the continent, implied a pro-migration stance. In a British tradition, access was to be inclusive and non-discriminatory for subjects under the authority of the Crown. Remembering economic progress since the First Fleet's landing sometimes even trumped racist reservations about non-European immigration. Overall, Australia Day had varied implications for migrants, but it always crystallized memories that facilitated a mode of belonging relevant to immigrants. On the one hand were Australian cultural memories of nativist and later nationalists sentiments, including British nationalism, that imagined belonging as an exclusive community. On the other hand were the subjecthood of the Empire and the competition of the market that evoked civic memories of a continent being developed in political and economic terms. This dichotomy of belonging became the inherent contradiction of imperial citizenship in the second half of the nineteenth century and was enshrined in the Commonwealth of Australia in the twentieth century. I suggest that this historical relationship between clearly distinct and contradicting forms of memory and modes of belonging structure political conflicts in Australia today, in particular concerning questions of access and migrant integration.

A similar observation about the schism in Australian politics was made by Sociologist Sol Encel in his classic study about Australian society (1970). 'The colonial relationship [between Australia and Britain], like the filial relationship, is ambivalent', he remarked (Encel 1970: 184). 'Australians have been almost equally ready to stress their Britishness and to attack British snobbery, class-consciousness, and imperial arrogance.' He saw in Australian political consciousness a bifurcation. On the one hand Australians were drawn to the ideal of equality, a notion of communal egalitarianism closely linked to Australian bush nationalism. On the other hand Encel saw in Australians a trust and belief in state authority, traditionally derived from colonialism, as an institution which could foster equality. 'Equality and authority, egalitarianism and authoritarianism, are twin sides of one coin', he asserted (Encel 1970: 78). 'The price of institutionalised equality is institutionalised authority' (Encel 1970: 79). The Australian polity was defined and paradoxically held together by a strict divide between a communal and an authoritarian civic aspect of society.

I second Encel by both distinguishing distinct perspectives on political organisation in Australia as well as by pointing out their intrinsic relationship. However, as he also remarked, the distinction between equality and authority, or community and civic society in my terms, is not unusual and could also be observed in England or the United States, but how they relate is particular to each country (Encel 1970: 189–194). I suggest that we think of this specific divide as a *social fault line* that defines a country's polity. What is typical of Australia is the radical and unmediated distinction between the two modes of belonging and their corresponding memories as well as their easy shift across the public/private divide.[2] Both, the deep-seated tension as well as the occasional shifts are historical results from the contradictions of imperial citizenship born out in conflict between Australian nationalism and the Empire, institutionalized in the Commonwealth of Australia, the constitution, and ultimately, in Australian citizenship.

Throughout Australian history, major political conflicts were fought along the social fault line, between cultural and civic notions of belonging. Fundamental social and political divergences were expressed in reference to cultural memories on the one hand and civic memories on the other. In the nineteenth century, the great schism in Australian society concerning various social and political differences was expressed, on the one hand, in communal notions of belonging, from nativist to nationalist sentiments, and on the other, in civic notions of belonging that emphasized the privileges and obligations of the subject status under the British Crown and the traditional link to the Empire. The tension of this divide of imperial citizenship created the foundation of Australia's social fault line. With federation and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia, this social fault line was enshrined in the political system by carefully distinguishing between the civic framework of the political system and the communal imaginations of a 'White' Australian society, in the constitution and the crucial immigration policy respectively. Australia's political system remained closely linked to the British Empire and thus distinct from a particular Australian nationalism, leading to the unsatisfactory struggle over an appropriate national commemoration in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet, even with the introduction of Australian citizenship in 1949 and the beginning of a cohesive Australian belonging that was both cultural and civic, the social fault line continued to determine political conflicts concerning questions of belonging. Australian politics in the second half of the twentieth century cannot be understood without grasping the intrinsic contradiction that formed the polity's social fault line during the preceding one hundred and fifty years.

Together, communal and civic aspects of belonging moved the politics in Australian history through their contradictions. Nationalism was as important as civic institutions in the development of Australia's body politic, including their cultural and civic memories respectively. This was as true for the federal movement as for the push for greater independence between the two World Wars. With the introduction of citizenship the social fault line became intrinsic to Australian society in which the formerly distinct spheres of the Empire and Australian society had become the spheres of the body politic's public/private divide. Civic belonging and its memories dominated the public sphere in the beginning, during the 1950s and 1960s, due to the historical importance of the Empire and its traditional influence over political institutions. However, in the 1970s the shift from a civic- to a culturally dominated public sphere gave preference to communal belonging and cultural memories of Australian history. Despite the radical shift in how the public sphere was defined, from civic to communal belonging, the tension between the two modes remained across the social fault line and determined the political debate. Political conflicts were determined by not only the public sphere but also by partisan ideas about the relationship between civic and communal belonging, and civic and cultural memories respectively, one in the public the other in the private sphere. Modes of belonging created models of society for political contestation about migration only in combination across the social fault line. Thus, Australia's social fault line, distinguishing and relating modes of belonging and forms of memory, defined an ever-evolving and yet constant framework for political contestation about its society and migration in the sense of a *longue durée*.

For migrants this meant ideas about belonging and joining Australian society changed while the society and body politic they integrated into stayed the same. The particular arrangement between civic and cultural memories along Australia's social fault line created a lasting framework of belonging in which integration policies were transformed. Integration was conditioned and limited by the particular arrangement of modes of belonging in Australia at any one period. Sometimes, as in the 1950s and 1960s, civic belonging and thus, the acquisition of citizenship, was the first step of integration in becoming part of the Australian public. In the 1980s and 1990s communal belonging in the multicultural sense of the time was the first criteria of integration as publically propagated by the government for the public sphere. However, full integration always meant acquiring both, belonging to the right community, however defined, and acquiring citizenship. Thus, when citizenship was the pinnacle of public integration, the assimilation of

Australian culture in private was supported by organizations like the Good Neighbour Movement. In turn, citizenship remained a prerequisite to fully partake in Australia's political system when governments emphasized multicultural belonging. The overall framework of Australian belonging, characterized by the divide of the social fault line, provided Australian politics with a two step civic/cultural integration scheme in which integration policies were discussed in political conflicts about memories.

Memories informed and underpinned the political conflict about Australian belonging and migrant integration. Moreover, memories were important instruments of integration themselves, both for the receiving society as well as the new members. The receiving society was able to debate its understanding of belonging and which integration policies were appropriate in recourse to the past. For migrants, integration by memories was a necessity to locate themselves in history in ways appropriate for the constellation of civic and cultural memories in their new society. The publicly dominant form of memories and mode of belonging had to be adopted first, but the other form of memories was expected to be embraced as well. For migrants, in order to become fully accepted it was crucial to know the order in which memories were to be appropriated and the content of such memories. Integration meant to be able to cross the social fault line of society. In which direction the line had to be crossed by immigrants depended on the period and the dominance of either civic or cultural memories in the public sphere. Within its framework of belonging, Australia kept discussing the past and the relevance of memories for its society and, inadvertently, the relevance of these memories for those who wanted to belong.

Belonging, I have argued, is not a state or quality of a society but a process of political contestation mediated by memories. Markedly, it is never complete and is constantly evolving within the limits of its historically institutionalized framework due to the contradictions of civic and cultural memories along the society's social fault line. In the light of this, political memories provide a concept to locate remembering in complex social relations, while also functioning as a method for social critique and the analysis of the politics of migration.

4.2 Political Memory as a Concept: Memory Studies

The puzzling human capacity to remember has fascinated Western philosophers and political theorists since the time of ancient Greece. The ancient Greeks appreciated memory's role in the maintenance of political communities in which the relationship between the individual and society

needed mediation. Plato asserted in *Politeia* (*The Republic,* books v,471a-vi,487b, esp. 486c-d) that the 'philosopher king' required the ability to remember in order to learn and rule justly (Plato 2003b: 189–207). In *Phaedo* (books 74e–78d), he elaborated that learning was the recollection of the original *eidos* (idea/form), mediating the abstract with the particular, which was required to determine 'justice' and 'equality' in real life (Plato 2003a: 137–145). In early modern times, Thomas Hobbes considered memory not only a fundamental faculty of all 'men' but one necessary to recognize the ethics of the social contract and the sovereign. To maintain social cohesion on the basis of the contract over generations, Hobbes asserted (1985: 89, 96–98, 320), individuals had to remember experiences of wars that had led to the contract (Chap. II); they had to recall the original equality of all 'men' as the basis of the commonwealth (Chap. III), and they had to remember the constitution of the commonwealth as detailed in the contract (Chap. XXVI). Despite the mythical character of 'ideas' and 'social contracts', it has to be noted that memory has long been recognized and examined as an important faculty of political life. Yet, how human beings could remember at all was not of concern until much later.

Only in late modern thought did the functioning of memory, the process of remembering, become an object of interest. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1992, orig.: 1885) and Henry Bergson (1978, orig.: 1896) first analysed memory as an individual faculty at the end of the nineteenth century; Halbwachs began examining remembering as a social phenomenon in the 1920s. In their isolated focus on remembrance, memories were abstracted from political relevance, even when memories' social relevance was acknowledged. This neglect of the political intensified with attempts of developing a theory of memory and with the establishment of memory studies, a field that by its definition isolated social memories in abstraction. The social role of memory is largely seen as limited to creating identity as a self-serving end. Political conflicts about the past are an important issue in studies about memories as well, but the political appeared to be externally 'done' to memories and not inherent to its evocation of belonging. Examining memories as a function of self-serving identity restricted theoretical considerations to unfruitful ponderings of the individual/social relationship and of other narrow issues that shied away from analysing memories in society and politics at large. For example, being unaware that the individual/social divide is one of society at large in which memories play a role, as discussed in the introduction, and that this division is not a

problem of memory research that is in need of being resolved, theoretical approaches in memory studies have set themselves up for failure. Attempts at developing a theory of memory were made in the absence of a theory of society and politics. Theorists tried to establish a coherent phenomenon or social entity from what is in fact an ambivalent function of the contradictory processes of society and political organization. In their necessary abstraction from society's inherent conflicts and contradictions in order to reach theoretical harmony, influential theorists of memory relied therefore on other abstract theories and texts to establish their model rather than on empirical research and historical studies of memory (e.g., Assmann 1999; Ricoeur 2006). What is needed instead of theories of memory, I contend, and try to provide, are concepts of political memory that take account of the role of remembrance in society and politics, based on empirical research, with the ability to offer critique.

It is important to distinguish between the functioning of social memories, how people remember, and the function of memory in society, the social and political role that memories play. At the same time, it is crucial to recognize that the functioning and the function of memory are related. How we remember influences its political relevance. In turn, the social and political role of memories impacts how we remember. To create a concept of political memory, the social structure of memories, as analysed since Halbwachs, needs to be combined with theories and empirical research of politics and society.

I have argued that the political content of memory springs from memory's division between the individual and the social. I have made the case that it is memory's functioning, the mediation between the individual and the social, that evokes the notion of belonging in the process of remembering. Much of this idea was originally developed by Halbwachs who suggested thinking of 'social frameworks' as, at once, individual and social logics for making sense of the past and the present (Assmann 1999: 46–53; Ricoeur 2006: 120–124). Based on my empirical inquiry I have suggested furthermore that the past is reconstructed in two different forms (see also Kleist 2009, 2015). What I call 'cultural memory' perceives of time and the past as being in continuity with an origin, and it evokes a mode of belonging in terms of 'identity' that is based on common heritage. This category is well known in memory studies and is, in many variants, a standard of conceptualizing social remembrance. However, in recent years 'cultural memory' has come under criticism for its container model of belonging (Erll 2011). An alternative and additional form of memory, 'civic memory', I suggest,

perceives of the past as a heterogeneous development of events. Belonging, in this case, is the result of people being mediated by the process imagined. Together, cultural memory and civic memory are, in their polar definitions, new concepts of the functioning of memory. Together, they contribute to analysing society and politics, and the function of memories therein.

Based on these concepts, I scrutinized the political function of civic and cultural memory in the social and historical context of Australia. I illustrated how cultural and civic memories were utilized to inform politically contested modes of belonging. Yet, the political conflict was not primarily between civic and cultural memories but between their different constellations. It was through the contestation between civic and communal modes of belonging, expressed and debated through memories, that memories became political as a function of politics. However, the memories are not just political due to their function in society but due to their inherent political contradiction of the individual and social divide that transcends all levels of the civic and cultural memory contradiction.

The relationship between civic and cultural memory goes beyond a simple dualism. Its history is not just a development of their political role but an illustration of their conceptual relationship. The contradiction between civic and cultural memories of the nineteenth century evolved during the twentieth century into a contradiction between constellations of civic and cultural memories, without resolving in this development the original contradiction between the civic and the cultural/communal. The relationship is a dialectical one in which the forms of memory have developed through their contradiction into structures that overcome and carry on the contradictions on a higher level of organization (*Aufhebung*). The dialectical constellation is, moreover, not just a historical process—in fact, the trajectory is specific to Australian history—but an epistemological understanding of memories in modern political society. On both levels, on the level of political memories and on the level of their political organization, the contradiction is driven by political conflict. It also extends to the more abstract level of the individual/social contradiction in the functioning of memories. Furthermore, the contradiction of political memories applies also to the more concrete level of global capitalism where it corresponds with the social dynamics of time (Postone 1993, 2003). Political memory links in its concrete application all these theoretical levels of society. The dynamic of memories is driven on all levels by individuals, groups, societies, and global capitalism, but it is political in the social distinction and political conflict between civic and cultural memories.

The critical approach to memories and their role in debates and contestations about immigration helps to devise a concept of political memory that takes account of how constellations of references to the past relate in their evocation of belonging and action. The twofold concept of political memory, with its categories of civic and cultural memory, transcends the fixation of memory studies on the notion of 'identity' by adding the notion of civic belonging, without denying that 'identity politics' and culture are fixtures of political life that require conceptual recognition. However, memories should not be treated in isolated from the more complex politics of belonging. That is particularly apparent in relation to migration. The strength of the concept presented here is that it does not reject established concepts, but it attempts to put them into perspective. The categories of civic and cultural memory are relevant in politics and society only in relationship to one another.

The social and political milieu in which memories are constructed has been little theorized in memory studies. Yet, memories are not either the result of situations or the condition upon which society is constructed; they mediate the process of society and the relationship between people. Memories are to be conceptualized in this fundamental role in social and political relations by consciously inserting them into theories of society and politics. In turn, empirically based concepts of memory, like the concept of political, civic, and cultural memories proposed here, add new relevance to memory studies by providing understanding of memories' relevance in social and political processes at large. Within a critical notion of society and politics, this is a concept of memory that acknowledges memory's specific function in political life. It makes memory studies less inwardly focused and more relevant as a contribution to other fields in the social sciences.

4.3 Political Memory as a Method: Migration Studies

Political memories fulfil an important function in political life by devising competing notions of belonging for debates about social relations and their (prospective) organization. There is no policy field more relevant to the negotiation of belonging than migration, which challenges boundaries and static definitions of social relations. With growing conflicts in immigrant societies in recent years, the political role of memories has been challenged

accordingly. Museums and educational institutions tried to integrate immigration into their versions of the past in order to adjust their models of social cohesion to the new diversity (Hintermann and Johansson 2010). In turn, migration policies are discussed in relation to memories (e.g., Foner and Alba 2010). To integrate migrants, memories form policies by adjusting modes of belonging and inform policies with lessons from the past. Political memories are not simple accessories of migration debates, I argue, but a crucial element of negotiating belonging, the potential common denominator of the receiving society and of those to be integrated. In political contestations about migrant integration, memories are a facilitator of negotiating belonging for established members and for debating the appropriate path for integrating migrants into this belonging.

Recognizing the relevance of political memories for political and social issues helps us also to reconsider migration around the civic and cultural memory complex. I have argued that the political organization of belonging in the receiving society is discussed in relation to the integration of immigrants. Criteria for integration are in turn based upon modes and models of belonging deemed to define the immigration society.

If migrant integration is conditioned by notions of belonging, the challenge then is to examine belonging as an element of social relations and political debate. In studies of migrant integration, research is focused on obvious expressions of belonging relating directly to immigration: integration policies and programs as publically discussed and devised by states as well as citizenship laws and legal conditions of naturalization. The problem seems to be that the objects of analysis, concrete policies and laws, are also the phenomena to be explained theoretically. In other words, theoretical conceptualization is achieved by historical or international comparison, abstracting the concept ‘integration’ from concrete social and political integration. Integration is to be explained by ‘integration’. The concept of belonging however, a social and political notion that abstracts from concrete integration models, allows an analysis of integration with a theoretical model of social relations. Moreover, the theoretical model of belonging allows us to relate cultural policies with civic laws of integration. The concept of political belonging thus provides a broader context in which integration policies can be analysed.

The challenge then is researching and analysing the abstract notion of belonging as a context of integration without examining integration policies directly. Here, the social role of memories and the concept of political memories fill a methodological gap. In order to examine belonging,

with its specific forms, as a condition of integration models, memories figure as 'social facts' of analysis. Durkheim's (1982) 'social morphology', which was developed further by Halbwachs (1960), regards 'social facts' as manifestations of social relations. Thus, political memories, as they are expressed in speech or materialized in commemorations, artefacts, and memorials, are representations of belonging as a social relation. Political memories are a methodological tool or indeed, in their conceptual distinction between civic and communal belonging, a methodology for the analysis of belonging as a condition and criterion of migrant integration.

As shown throughout this book, memories are a tool to facilitate migrant integration. Yet, memories function also to veil the inherent violence and ideology of integration. Political memory is an effective concept for analysis that can also help to uncover the implicit contradictions and forces of belonging. Integration is problematic not just because it is required of immigrants to a degree not asked of non-migrant members of society but for its enforcement of conformity in general. It forces immigrants to adapt to society's dominant belonging either in their civic contribution to society, to be proven for example by oath or a citizenship test, or by identifying with either the nation or, in multiculturalism, with the immigrant community. The violence exerted on immigrants subsumes them under the civic power of the state and presses them into modes of belonging that conform to social expectations. In both cases, memories play an important role in expressing and controlling belonging required for integration. At the same time, memories assert modes of belonging, enforced upon immigrants, also for established members of the political community. Attempts by the government to promote the relevance of citizenship with Citizenship Conventions in the 1950s and with Citizenship Day in the 2000s, as well as of affirming communal belonging of multiculturalism with the bicentennial in the 1980s, were initiatives not just for immigrants but explicitly also for citizens. Moreover, transformations of belonging were felt by all Australians and not just by immigrants when grassroots groups such as 'ethnic' organizations began claiming power of communal identity in the late 1960s and 1970s. Society's and the government's demand to adjust to a dominant mode of belonging, enforcing a mode of social relations, is extended beyond the initial target group, immigrants, and affects all who want or were supposed to belong. Memories are utilized to structure and justify the authority of belonging in reference to a heritage or to traditions. The concept of political memory allows us to grasp the contradictions and the ideological character of belonging and integration.

4.4 Political Memory as Critique: Social Research

Political memory is relevant to social research in two ways: on the one hand, as a mediation of the individual and social, of civic and cultural belonging, of political conflicts within society as well as of polities and global dynamics. On the other hand, political memory is a social fact at the heart of these social and political contradictions that allows for formulation of a concept and critique. The distinction is one between memory's political function in society and its utilization in critically thinking about society. Yet, politics and critique have in common that they point to the discontent of social relations.

Capitalism is never free of the contradictions that appear in times of crisis. Political actions bridge these contradictions with force. The global social dynamic is a form of violence that subjects persons and their actions to the aim of preserving and overcoming the contradictions of their social relations. It is organized by the force of the market as well as the power of the state, which are in tension with each other over the mediation of the social dynamic's contradictions. In Sect. 5 of Chap. 3 I argued in reference to Moishe Postone (1993: 291–306) that the market appears as abstract and the state as concrete, and each is associated with a specific notion of social processes and time, abstract time and historical time respectively. While one element of the social dynamic dominates over the other at times, they have to be mediated with each other constantly. Practically, this is done in international and domestic actions of the market and states, with the violence this entails. Ideologically, however, political memories provide both an explanation of the social dynamics in reference to the past, civic or cultural, and an ostensible sovereign source of the actions that are in fact conditioned by the social dynamic.

Political memories mediate the market and the state in different sovereign models of society. The power of the state and the forces of the global market appear in memories as a 'tandem' with variations determining which form of violence leads 'in the front saddle' (Narr 2001). What has been called 'cosmopolitan memory' (Levy and Sznaider 2002, 2004) suggests a social dynamic beyond the nation state, which corresponds with globalized capitalism. What the analysis of those memories as political memories shows is that the partial violence of the state is implicit in this concept. In contrast, the state's partial powers dominate over the forces of the market. Crucially, memories contribute to the impression of a unified

global dynamic, driven by either power or force, with the consequence of concrete violence, bridging the contradiction of the state and the market. The exploration of such memories as political memories reveals, however, the implicit contradictions and violence of these ideologies, permitting a critique of the apparently cohesive memories and their models of society.

Different models of society, like nationalism, citizenship, and multiculturalism, used ideologically to bridge the market/state contradiction, are politically contested within the polity. Conditioned by social dynamics, variations of models of society are proposed in references to the past for supporting partial political interests. Depending on the historical period and political intent, civic or cultural memories determine models of society referenced in political conflict. The form of memories dominating the public sphere is employed to formulate a mode of belonging for the polity upon which policies are based. Memories of the other form evoke modes of belonging of the private sphere and alternative or oppositional policies. In each case, memories seem to provide a cohesive mode of belonging for the whole of the polity. Yet, as memories' political character of two competing forms reveals, models of society are constructed in relating civic and cultural memories across the social fault line of the polity. Indeed, the political contest is not just between the public and the private forms of memories and their modes of belonging but between their mediation across the social fault line, either through the state or the market. Thus, not only the modes of belonging that derive from forms of memory but also models of society, created from the different mediations of the two forms of memory, are politically contested. In turn, memories' claims about belonging that derive from forms of memory but also mould politically contested interests with dominant market forces and state powers organized in the polity. Political interests and policies are formed by the dominant mode of belonging in the public sphere. The critical approach to memories' political role in creating policies and societies' belonging illustrated the internal contradictions of memories and of the polity's social fault line. The polity, a political organization of violence, is not the cohesive model of society implied by memories. Rather, interests are mediated by memories into specific policies and their violent realization.

Political interests are moulded in civic or cultural forms of memories. In order to participate in public politics, interests have to conform to the dominant form of memory and mode of belonging. Thus, in order to belong to the polity, memories have to be adjusted to the publicly dominant mode of belonging. For immigrants this means that they have to adopt the predominant form of memories to integrate into the receiving

society. Moreover, those who do not conform to the memories relevant for integration are excluded from joining the polity. Thus, the public/private relationship between civic and cultural memories must be replicated by the individuals who participate in society. They conceive their interests as *bourgeois* and formulate their interest in public as *citoyen*. Thus, the contradictions of society and politics are extended into the individual and are experienced as a division of self. It is the social belonging afforded by memories that mediates this contradiction by offering an ostensible 'identity'. It is this 'identity', often even in plural as a persons' 'identities', that associates 'collective identity' with 'personal identity' in traditional 'cultural' memory studies. In considering civic memories as an alternative form of remembering and associated belonging, the ideological character of 'identity' and cultural memories becomes apparent. Only in their political interplay of civic and cultural memories, however, does the violence of memories force individuals to belong, either through identity or in civic relations. The contradiction of political memory contained the critique of belonging. It points back to the fundamental division between the social and the individual in memories.

Analysing political memories contributes to unveiling the ideology of memories that facilitate not only belonging and migrant integration but the forces of society and politics. I have shown how the integration of immigrants into the Australian polity and how social relations between citizens are enabled with memories by subjugating people under modes of belonging, and how political interests are moulded in forms of memory in the quest for power. With the political at the centre, memories are analysed as a function of society that, ultimately, renders them relevant for social relations. Focusing on the political, memories emerge as a function of society that ultimately renders them imperative to social relations. It is in the functioning of memories, however, by which individuals can connect with others in the recollection of the past, that memories are not only relevant to society but carry a moment and potential of freedom. The organization of social relations draws individuals and memories into politics and its discontent. Yet, memories let us remember the violence of politics and belonging, and potentially enable us to associate beyond power and borders.

Notes

1. 'How we adopted the Fourth of July', Room for Debate, The Opinion Pages, *The New York Times*, online edition, 03.07.2010, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/how-we-adopted-the-fourth-of-july/. Accessed 12.11.2015.
2. In the USA, in comparison, memories are similarly divided into cultural memories on the one side of the social fault line and civic memories on the other. However, the particular forms of memory remain more or less in the private and public realm respectively, with communal belonging gaining more leeway in the public during some periods but as a private mode of belonging after all. Correspondingly, John Bodnar (1992: 245–254) distinguishes 'vernacular' and 'official' memories in American culture, with cultural memories in the private realm and civic memories in the public, government-dominated realm.

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J.O. Kleist, *Political Memories and Migration*, Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-57589-0

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