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Terrorism and Violent Conflict

Women's Agency, Leadership, and Responses

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Introduction

They say behind every great man is a better woman but try telling bin laden that, in his case in front of every man is a worthy human shield #humanshield (Twitter, May 2011).

On May 2, 2011, US counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, discussed the US raid of Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan that ended in bin Laden's death. He stated, "Living in this million-dollar-plus compound, in an area that is far away from the front, hiding behind a woman: it really speaks to just how false his narrative has been over the years" (Swinford & Rayner, 2011). The following day the White House retracted the account of bin Laden using his wife as a human shield, explaining Brennan had confused the actions of the wife with those of a woman elsewhere in the compound. The narrative of bin Laden hiding behind a woman, however, enthralled the press for days to come, eliciting insights into the place of gender in a world wrought with terror.

The overwhelming sentiment in the media was that bin Laden's life ended with a "final act of indignity" and cowardice (Elliot, 2011, 1). But why, as one commenter said, "is hiding behind a man better than hiding behind a woman?" (Echidne, 2011). Why was the narrative of hiding behind a woman "indelibly imprinted in our collective consciousness despite being incorrect?" (Wilson, 2011, 4). Tweets with the hashtag #humanshield began discussing the gender ramifications of the bin Laden raid, questioning whether a "great man" would use a woman as a shield. Another tweet bluntly added, "…Osama used his wife as a human shield.... What a f***n disgraceful monster." A blog dedicated to debates about masculinity questioned why the White House portrayed bin Laden at "the height of unmanliness," as a "pantheon-level wimp," when "it should be enough that bin Laden was brought to justice" (Martin, 2011).

Goals of This Book

This book explores how gender intersects with political violence, including politics related to terrorism, state terrorism, and genocide. To this end, we practice a **gendered interpretation** of political violence, meaning we take gender into consideration when examining issues of violence. A gendered interpretation acknowledges that states, political institutions, and even democracies are comprised of gendered arrangements of masculinist power and privilege (Beckwith, 2000). Violent politics historically have been seen as a male domain, with men considered the perpetrators of violence, with power, and women as victims, without power. Whereas "men" and "masculinity" are associated with war and aggression, "women" and "femininity" conjure up socially constructed images of passivity and peace.

This bifurcation of men as aggressors and women as passive vessels denies women their voice, or their **agency**. Agency is defined as individual actors having the capacity to process social experience and devise ways of coping with life (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007). In this book, we investigate how women cope with and influence violent politics. The book's goals are both descriptive and analytical. We (1) *describe in what ways women are present (and/or perceived as absent) in political contexts involving political violence*, and (2) *analyze how women deal with gender assumptions, express gender identities, and frame their actions regarding political violence encountered in their lives*. As such, we do not view women as victims of terrorism or genocide, without agency, but recognize the gendered nature of political conflicts and how women respond to violence.

The above story about one of bin Laden's wives, Amal Ahmed al-Sadah from Yemen, elucidates how we approach description and analysis. First, the story illustrates women's presence and/or absence in terrorism politics. Bin Laden's wives were *perceived as absent* in the violent scenario of the raid. Commentators expected bin Laden to fight back, but did not expect his wives, or other "unnamed" women in the compound, to significantly act or intervene. Although reports later suggested that al-Sadah or another woman fought back in the raid, the media and government officials initially discussed women as inanimate, a shield at most, without agency. This book aims to *describe* women's presence in violent politics, whether as victims/survivors of terrorism or genocide, perpetrators of terrorism or genocide, activists in social movements, political leaders responding to terrorist acts, or as the public with opinions that shape policies.

Second, we *analyze* how terrorism and genocide interacts with gender to influence women's personal lives and political leadership, and how women *act* regarding gender assumptions and identities. In other words, we want to know how women's experiences are gendered and how women are "undoing gender" to challenge gender expectations (Deutsch, 2007). Thus, we seek to capture women's agency in international, national, and/or local politics. The media and public first saw Amal Ahmed al-Sadah as lacking agency and few stopped to ask how she would narrate her own account. At the moment, one blog commenter bluntly said about al-Sadah: "anyone bothered to ask HER what she was doing?" We argue that we should care

to capture women's stories, agency, and attempts to challenge gender assumptions. Thus, the second goal of the book is to explore what about gender facilitates and/or hinders women's agentic place in violent politics.

Definitions of Terrorism, Genocide, and State Terrorism

This book examines terrorism, state terrorism, and genocide as types of political violence. **Political violence** refers to a situation associated with politics in some way in which force is used as a means of inflicting harm on others. Terrorism is a subset of political violence. In the late 1980s, a research study by Schmid and Jongman uncovered 109 scholarly definitions of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1977; Schimd & Jongman, 1988). Arguably the landscape of terrorism has become more complex since then, thus, like other scholars, we admit that no one definition of terrorism encapsulates the violent phenomena of which we are interested. Terrorism is difficult to define because it is discussed synonymously with terror as a political strategy, it is both a state and non-state strategy, and it implies normative assumptions. Many political acts, such as gang violence, war, and guerrilla tactics, produce terror as an emotional response in a population (Griset & Mahan, 2003); thus, terrorism's main impact is not exclusive to it as a strategy. Definitions of terrorism, therefore, must distinguish what terrorism is not (e.g., it is not the combat actions of guerillas who engage regular, trained armed forces, although guerillas may use terrorism as a strategy at times).

Terrorism first appeared as a term in the 1790s during Jacobin rule following the French Revolution; later, in the late 1800s, European anarchists owned the term as they fought against autocratic states. During the interwar period of the 1930s and into the 1940s, terrorism became associated with states, specifically with "great terror" waged by totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union. In short, terrorism is a strategy used by and against the state. Finally, the adage that "one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist" demonstrates the normative dimension of terrorism that makes the term so difficult to define.

According to Schimd and Jongman (1988), the most common elements to appear in definitions of terrorism include acts of violent force that are political, provoke fear, and pose threats. The thirteenth most common element of definitions is that terrorism targets civilians and noncombatants. Admitting that demarcating "what is terrorism" is a scholarly puzzle, we define **terrorism** as a "political activity that relies on violence or [credible] threat of violence to achieve its ends" (Magstadt & Schotten, 1993, 586). Like Dekmejian (2007), we see state and non-state terrorism on a "spectrum of terror," running from genocide and state terrorism to terrorism by subnational groups to acts by individual terrorists. Subnational groups may include ethnonationalist, religious, or ideological terrorists. Furthermore, we see connections between the violent actions of the state and subnational terrorists, for the terrorism of one often provokes the terrorism of the other (Dekmejian). **State terrorism**

Table 1.1 Definitions of types of terrorism

Terrorism type	Definition
State terrorism	"Government activities that encourage violence against its own citizens by paramilitary groups and death squads…[used] as a horrific warning to [other citizens]" (Lutz & Lutz, 2005, 10)
State-sponsored terrorism	Also called international terrorism, it is when a government harbors terrorists within its borders or otherwise sponsors terrorism outside of its home country (Magstadt, 2009, 433)
Domestic terrorism	Domestic terrorism is practiced within a single country, without state sponsorship. The terrorist does not have ties to any country, but is usually a national of the country targeted in the attack (Magstadt, 2009, 433)
Ethnonationalist terrorism	Terrorism with the objective(s) of "independence, autonomy, or the reunification of a splintered homeland" (Pluchinsky, 2006, 40)
Religious terrorism	Terrorism by "cults, sects, and chiliastic offshoots of mainstream faiths that are propelled by fundamentalist zealotry into the political arena to shape it through violence" (Dekmejian, 2007, 13)
Ideological terrorism	Terrorism "designed to achieve political goals that are determined by some patterns of political beliefs or theories" (Lutz & Lutz, 2005, 11). This terrorism may be left or right wing in orientation
Individual terrorism	Terrorism by "persons who individually commit acts of violence against the state through assassinations, bombings, and any other means of sabotage and disruption available to them" (Dekmejian, 2007, 11)
Narcoterrorism	"The use of extreme force and violence by producers and distributors of narcotics against a government or population, intended to coerce that body to modify its behavior in their favor" (Dyson, 2012, 31)
Transnational terrorism	Terrorism by groups that have "shifted the arena of violence from the national to the transnational level…[to target] embassies, diplomats, soldiers, or even citizens located in other countries" (Dekmejian, 2007, 13)
Counterterrorism	"Any and all measures taken to oppose or 'counter' terrorist acts …[through] police and special agencies [or armed forces]" (Mockaitis, 2006, 103)

is defined as terrorism by states against "internal and external opposition groups" (Dekmejian, 14). Table 1.1 lists definitions of terrorism used in this book.

Genocide is another subset of political violence. It is similar to state terrorism, but is an extreme type of political violence that escalates to the point of total or nearly total destruction of a group. During the Holocaust in 1944, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer of Jewish decent, coined the term genocide, referring to the destruction of an ethnic group, for *genos* is Greek for family or tribe and *cide* is Latin for killing. The definition of **genocide** we use in this book is *the intentional murder of people because of their group membership, where group membership can be ethnic, racial, political, religious, or economic*.

The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) offers a legal and narrower definition of genocide. The UN defines genocide as

> any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Preventgenocideinternational, 2011).

It is also an international crime to plan, incite, conspire, or be complicit in genocide, even before the killing starts. Political groups are notably absent from the groups protected under the CPPCG due to the influence of Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union at the time of negotiation, who notoriously eliminated his own political rivals. Targeted killing of political groups is referred to as **politicide**.

Definitions of Sex and Gender

This book focuses on the intersection between sex, gender, and political violence. Whereas **sex** refers to "the categories of male and female and the biological characteristics and properties of bodies placed in these categories," **gender** is "the assignment of masculine and feminine characteristics to bodies in cultural contexts" (Oudshooen, 2006, 8). Gender uncovers how women *and* men act according to expectations of what is feminine and masculine and it references relations between men and women. Gender—unlike sex—is in flux as it emerges from assumptions certain men and women in given cultures attribute to "being a man," i.e., masculinity, or "being a woman," i.e., femininity.

Gender is contextual and plural in a given culture in that the "meanings of masculinity and femininity vary across cultures, over historical time" (Kimmel, 2010, 114). Because there is no universal way to "be a man" or "be a woman" and because gender does not solely rise from "individual attributes" but also from social structures that replicate and recreate gender, perceptions of women and actions by women, as related to political violence, will vary across the cases we discuss in this book.

Saying that gender is plural means that it varies within a national or cultural context. Although gender is a structure, different men and women experience and interact with it in a variety of ways. For example, a conservative, retirement-aged Christian woman in the United States likely feels and acts differently about gender and public policy than a secular, young adult woman in the United States. Thus, one's gender identity interacts with other personal identities—all the while interacting with gender structures. Intersectionality is a helpful term to make sense of the plural nature of gender. **Intersectionality** references one's interacting identities—such as race, gender, class, age, disability, and religion—that "intersect" and produce specific life experiences, many of which are experiences of discrimination (Crenshaw, 1991). Intersectionality may impact findings on terrorism as, for example,

scholars argue that age, social class, and religion influence participation in terrorist activities (Victoroff, 2005); thus, women of various ages and religions may experience terrorism differently. This book, therefore, attempts to portray the experiences and actions of a *variety of women* from particular cultural and political contexts.

Themes of the Book

Each of the following chapters elucidates one or more of the following five themes.

- First, we investigate the presence or absence of women in violent politics and discuss if/how women have agency. We find that women are agentic but often are viewed as invisible and passive and/or their actions are seen as tangential to the center stage of violent politics.
- Second, we show how women's private lives as related to family and motherhood involve and position women in terrorism and genocide contexts. When women are present and active in relation to political violence, they often are viewed as wives or mothers.
- Third, we explain how political actors, the media, and women themselves claim women possess special maternal and peaceful qualities *because they are women*. Women are expected to be peaceful and relational in a way that men are not.
- Fourth, we report how women influence violent politics through the framework of feminist activism. By **feminists**, we mean those who advance women's status as well as fight the "political, social, and other power arrangements of domination and subordination on the basis of gender" (Beckwith, 2000, 437).
- Fifth, because society, media, and women themselves understand gender and violence in various ways, we describe differences among women and between contexts in order to convey the varied landscape of political violence.

Organization of the Book

This book is organized around the various groups of women who influence and are influenced by political violence. We use several cases throughout the book to illustrate the larger points raised in each chapter. A summary of the cases can be found in Table 1.2. We rely methodologically upon case studies, but also draw from interviews, archival research, surveys, content analysis, and frame analysis.

Chapter 2 discusses women as "victims" of political violence and how women's agency is compromised during times of war, genocide, and terrorism. Chapter 3 shifts focus to women possessing agency as perpetrators of violence, and it focuses on women as terrorists, guerilla fighters, suicide bombers, and genocidaires. Chapter 4 develops the idea of women as agents in social movements, focusing on women's

movements and women in movements, both feminist and nonfeminist, responding to terrorism. Chapter 5 investigates women as political elites, exploring how terrorism influences the actions and framing of women elites. Chapter 6 examines the way in which public opinion—particularly the public opinion of women—shapes support for terrorism and influences voting behavior. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the chapters and relates them back to the above-mentioned themes.

Table 1.2 Case summaries

Case	Conflict year(s)	Conflict summary
Argentina	1976–1983	In the early 1970s, left- and right-wing extremists carried out kidnappings and assassinations. Through a coup, a junta of military commanders began ruling the country in 1976. The junta stayed in power until 1983, but committed most atrocities to root out Leftist extremists in the Dirty War during the late 1970s. Between 9,000 and 30,000 were disappeared and/or killed during the Dirty War
Basque country (Spain and France)	1959–2012(?)	ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) was founded in 1959 during the right-wing, authoritarian regime of Francisco Franco (Spain). ETA seeks independence and to retain local culture and language in the Basque homeland, which extends into France across the Pyrenees. More than 800 people have died in ETA violence, mostly police and politicians, but also those killed indiscriminately in bombings. ETA declared a permanent ceasefire in 2012, leading many to presume the cessation of conflict in the region. However, ETA has declared ceasefires before, only to break them later
Bosnia (former Yugoslavia)	1992–1995	Though the communist dictatorship of Josip Broz Tito held together the disparate republics of Yugoslavia, his death in 1980 left the country's unity in question. President Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Yugoslavia in 1987, seeking a greater Serbia through Serbian nationalism. Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia resisted and fought against Serbia, which held the reins of Yugoslav military and state power. It is estimated that over 100,000 people died during this violent conflict, particularly Bosnians and Croatians, from the early 1990s until the Dayton Peace Accords of late 1995

(continued)

Table 1.2 (continued)

Case	Conflict year(s)	Conflict summary
Chechnya (Russia)	1990-ongoing	In 1990 Chechnya declared itself an independent republic and attempted to secede from the USSR. The Soviets opposed this move, as has Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The first Chechen War took place between 1994 and 1996 when Chechen guerillas fought against Russian forces trying to regain control of the region. The conflict ended in a ceasefire and peace agreement in 1996. Full-fledged fighting resumed in 1999 under the Second Chechen War. After 1999, Chechen terrorists escalated violence and conducted their most well-known operations
Darfur (Sudan)	2003-ongoing	Darfur, a region in Sudan, has experienced violent conflict since the 1980s. Conflict escalated in 2003 when two Darfuri rebel groups (the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement) began fighting the Sudanese, Arab-controlled government. The rebel groups argued that the government was unable and unwilling to protect those in the Darfur region from attacks by nomads, and the government responded to the rebels by arming militias, called Janjaweed, that attacked Darfur villages. This genocide has claimed over 400,000 lives and displaced over 2.5 million people. Peace agreements have been signed in 2006, 2010, and 2011, but not all rebel groups follow the agreements
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	Early twentieth century-ongoing	Arabs in Palestine expected independence in the early twentieth century, but their expectations were not met. Arab nationalism grew in the 1930s and became tied to political violence. The Israeli state, established in 1948, trampled upon the Palestinians' dream of a homeland, and nationalism, along with armed struggle, increased. The first (1987–1993) and second (2000–2004) intifadas were mass rebellions of the Palestinian people. Hamas, having grown out of the first intifada, was established in 1987 and is the most well-known terrorist group in Palestine. Hamas seeks an Islamic state in Palestine and rejects the Israeli state

Table 1.2 (continued)

Case	Conflict year(s)	Conflict summary
Mexico (Drug War and narcoterrorism)	2006-ongoing	Felipe Calderon was elected president in 2006, vowing to take on the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico by using the military to fight them. Between 2006 and 2012, drug violence became bloodier and more brutal than before this time, with an estimated loss of life near 50,000. Politicians, journalists, and human rights activists have been assassinated, car bombs have been used, and kidnappings occur frequently. Many deaths, however, include members of the drug organizations. The drug organizations now function as domestic terrorists, engaging in narcoterrorism. Enrique Pena Nieto, elected to the Mexican Presidency in 2012, vowed to continue fighting drugs, but expressed a concurrent desire to reduce the intensity and violence of the fight
Pakistan	Twentieth century-ongoing	Al Qaeda terrorists occupy the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially following the United States' offensives in Afghanistan that drove many militants across the border into Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan relates to the cases of transnational terrorists and the US war on terror (see below). Pakistan is believed to be a safe haven for terrorists in that terrorist training camps function in Western Pakistan and top leaders in Al Qaeda are thought to reside there (including Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the former leader, now deceased, Osama bin Laden). The Pakistani government works with the US government to detain terrorists, yet it is considered less than successful in its counterterrorism efforts

(continued)

Table 1.2 (continued)

Case	Conflict year(s)	Conflict summary
Rwanda	1994	The Rwandan genocide ensued after the airplane carrying Rwanda and Burundi's presidents was shot down on April 6, 1994, setting off a violent response from governing Hutu extremists against the country's Tutsi minority (which had been prominent in the country's colonial history and often were more affluent than Hutus). The government empowered and armed Interahamwe militias, along with ordinary citizens, to kill Tutsi men, women, and children. It is estimated that 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed during the genocide's 3-month time frame
Sri Lanka	1983–2009	The Sri Lankan Civil War was fought between the government of Sri Lanka and a Tamil rebel group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (also known as the Tamil Tigers). The Tamils are ethnically distinct from the Sinhalese, the majority popula-tion in Sri Lanka. The LTTE started as militias of Tamil youth based upon tactics of assassinations of police and government officials. Hostilities eventually escalated into civil war. The Sri Lankan government is accused of committing human rights abuses during the war, and the LTTE is accused of engaging in terrorist activity. An estimated 80,000–100,000 people died during the course of the civil war. By 2009, the government had regained all territory and the LTTE was defeated
United States (War on Terror)	2001-ongoing	President George W. Bush declared the US "war on terror" in the days following September 11, 2001. The war was intended to eliminate Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and other transnational terrorist groups. The war's strategy relied on military action, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, which President Bush argued would occur with allies or unilaterally, if need be. Those associated with terrorism were to be defeated, whether abroad or at home, thus justifying increased domestic law enforcement as well. The war also intended to pursue the political and diplomatic goals of spreading democracy and curtailing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Table 1.2 (continued)

Case	Conflict year(s)	Conflict summary
Transnational terrorism, Al Qaeda and affiliates	1989-ongoing	Al Qaeda, meaning the "the base," grew out of the 1980s mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan against the USSR. Following the withdrawal of the USSR in 1989, Al Qaeda turned its attention to eliminating secular, Arab governments, and then focused its attention on the West, including the United States, which they saw as supportive of secular regimes. Al Qaeda committed terrorist acts in the 1990s, most notably waged the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, and it continues to act, from central command in Afghanistan and Pakistan or through its vast network of affiliates in the Magreb, Iraq, Indonesia, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, and in Southeast Asia. It also maintains terrorist cells in other parts of the world, including Europe

Chapter 2
Women as Victims of Violence and Terrorism

Introduction

The media often portray women as caught up in a situation of terrorism—not as protagonists but as bystanders or victims. Osama bin Laden's wives, discussed in Chapter 1, are often discussed collectively, along with their children, as a being influenced by terrorism but not related to it. In 2012, Pakistan placed three of bin Laden's wives, who were present during the Abbottabad raid, under house arrest for having illegally entered Pakistan. After serving their sentence, it was unclear where these women and children would go. While they were not believed to be active in Al Qaeda, their home countries, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, did not jump to get them back from Pakistan. The two Saudi wives, Khairiah Sabar and Siham Sabar, lost their citizenship along with Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, yet, on humanitarian grounds, Saudi Arabia eventually accepted them and bin Laden's younger, Yemenese wife, Amal Ahmed al-Sadah. These women and their children were portrayed as passive, bending to the will of governments. In a sense, they were "victims" of association with bin Laden, not actors with their own agency.

This chapter explores how political violence negatively influences women, thereby marking them as "victims." We investigate the assumption that political violence particularly hurts innocent women and children, contextualizing and critiquing it. We also discuss how political violence victimizes women and how/whether women see themselves as victims, survivors, and/or actors with agency.

The foci of the chapter are threefold. First, the chapter discusses state terrorism and genocide and introduces the concept of gendercide. Second, the chapter discusses rape as a weapon of war. Case studies—the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the Darfur region of Sudan in the 2000s—illustrate gendercide and/or rape during political violence. Third, the chapter looks at women who are victimized by terrorism and how terrorism's victims are gendered as women in the popular conscience.

Genocide and Gendercide

As explained in Chapter 1, genocide is the intentional murder of people because of their group membership, where group membership can be ethnic, racial, political, religious, or economic. Genocides have occurred throughout human history and throughout the globe. Notable among pre-World War II genocides was the mass killing of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I. Turkey, the largest state to emerge from the Ottoman Empire, denies the genocide. This brings up an important point—many societies engage in **revisionist thinking** after genocides occur, meaning they deny genocide happened or they present events in such a way as to not be seen as genocide. While many of the genocides discussed in this chapter take place in developing countries, developed countries are not immune from genocides and revisionist thinking. Other prominently disputed pre-World War II genocides include the killing of indigenous people in the United States during Westward expansion and the killings of indigenous people in Argentina and Australia.

The atrocities of the Holocaust during World War II led many in the international community to vow "never again" and inspired the CPPCG (UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide); however, according to experts, 37 genocides have occurred since the CPPCG. This number is disputed because not every mass killing is agreed upon as genocide. Mass killings may not be called genocide because they do not meet the CPPCG legal definition of genocide. This is true with politicides. Genocides also are disputed when revisionist denials of genocide exist. Furthermore, some countries use vetoes on the UN Security Council to block the labeling of killing as genocide. Finally, the CPPCG commits the international community to act once mass killing is deemed genocide. Thus, if the political will to act, often militarily, does not exist, the international community may not label mass killing as genocide. Even with these disputes, some atrocities universally are seen as genocides (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Non-disputed genocides since World War II

Country of origin	Year	Number killed
Bangladesh	1971	500,000 to 3 million, mostly Hindus (20,000 women raped)
East Timor	1975–1999	200,000 East Timorese
Cambodia	1975–1979	1.7 million ethnic minorities
Guatemala	1981–1983	200,000 mostly Mayan
Bosnia	1992–1995	200,000 Muslims killed, two million displaced
Rwanda	1994	800,000 mainly Tutsi and some moderate Hutus (250,000–500,000 women raped)
Darfur, Sudan	2004-continuing	70,000 non-Arabs killed, 1.5 million displaced

Mass grave of victims of the genocide in Bosnia, near Vitez. Photo courtesy of the ICTY

The Gendering of Political Violence and Gendercide

When genocide is perpetrated in a way that targets a particular gender it is referred to as **gendercide** (Jones, 2004, 2). According to Jones, a gendercide may target men, women, and/or those who identify with non-heteronormative sexuality, such as homosexuals who are seen as "asocial threats" as they challenge gender expectations (Jones, 2006, 474). Mary Anne Warren originally used the term gendercide in 1985 arguing, "'gendercide' is a sex-neutral term, in that the victims may be either male or female…sexually discriminatory killing is just as wrong when the victims happen to be male…" (Gendercide Watch, np).

In fact, political violence typically results in the deaths of more men—thus more gendercides of men—than women because battle-age men are targeted as potential combatants even if they are civilians (Jones, 2002; see also Yugoslavia case study below). "**Root and branch**" **genocides**, in contrast, lead to the extermination of all people, including women, children, and the elderly. Women give birth to a new generation of enemies, i.e., the children or so-called branches. Thus, perpetrators see all of the population as a threat and seek to eliminate everyone. The Rwandan genocide is an example of a "root and branch" genocide.

While gendercide is a gender-neutral term, **feminicide** or **gynocide** refers to the targeted killing of women or girls. Current cases of feminicide can be seen in Guatemala and Juarez, Mexico. In Guatemala, more than 3,800 women and girls have been murdered since 2000, prompting the government to set up a special unit on feminicide in March 2012. In Juarez, nearly 1,000, mainly indigenous, women working in the *maquila* industry have been killed over the past two decades.

Table 2.2 Select gendercides in history

Location	Time	Target
China (Nanjing Massacre)	1937–1938	Chinese women gang-raped and killed (200,000); Chinese men systematically murdered
Bangladesh (Civil War)	1971	Battle-aged Bengali men
Iraqi Kurdistan (Anfal Campaign)	1988	Battle-aged Kurdish men
Bosnia (Yugoslav War)	1992–1995	Muslim men

Violence in Iraq provides an example of gendercide against homosexuals. The gender identities of homosexual men and women threaten fundamentalist religious values, resulting in the harassment, torture, and assassinations of homosexuals by militias (Jones, 2010). In March 2012, the press reported, "at least 15 teenagers [in Iraq] have been stoned, beaten, or shot to death in the past month, while local activists put the toll far higher [at possibly 58]" (Rao, 2012, np). Militants targeted these youth because they are "Emo," i.e., they favor alternative-style, Western culture, dress in black, and are stereotyped as homosexual even if they are not.

As with genocide, it is difficult to pinpoint a definitive number of gendercides. Some of the better known and more universally agreed upon cases are in Table 2.2.

International Response to Genocide and Gendercide: Punishing Perpetrators

If the international community calls killings genocide, individuals responsible for conducting, aiding, and/or inciting genocide can be tried under international law. The most famous of these trials was the Nuremburg Trial (1945–1946) after World War II to try Nazis for crimes committed during the Holocaust.

Since the Nuremburg Trial, the international community has convened trials and/or tribunals to investigate genocides in four cases—Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and Darfur. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993, has convicted leaders involved in the Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990s. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created by the United Nations after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. As of 2012, 62 convictions have been handed down by the ICTR, including the first conviction for the crime of genocide as defined by the CPPCG.

The Cambodian genocide occurred in the late 1970s, but it was not until 2003 that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was created to try perpetrators. As of 2012, no convictions have been handed down. The International Criminal Court (ICC) tries cases of genocides occurring after 2002, thus the ICC is pursuing Darfur crimes. In 2009, the ICC issued a warrant for the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, for crimes committed and ongoing in Darfur. This was the first time the ICC indicted a sitting head of state, but as of 2012 he has not been convicted.

Poster for fugitives of the Rwandan genocide created by the US government www.state.gov

Rape as a Weapon of War and Genocide

While gendercides can target men or women, rape is the most common type of violence used against women during violent conflicts and often occurs alongside genocides or state terrorism as a strategy to humiliate, ethnically cleanse, or silence opponents (Lykes, Brabeck, Ferns, & Radan, 1993). The rape of women also is a way to victimize men *and* men are sexually tortured during genocides. **Rape** is defined by the United Nations as "sexual intercourse without valid consent" (United

Case Study: Gendercide and Rape in the Former Yugoslavia

Introduction

The former Yugoslavia—in which the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia fought a civil war against the seat of Yugoslav power, Serbia, is a case of genocide against Croatians and Bosnians. It is also considered a gendercide of men and a mass rape of women. President Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Yugoslavia in 1987 with plans for unifying Serbian populated areas, including those located in the other republics, into a "greater Serbia." Milosevic's Serbian ultra-nationalism prompted the breakup of Yugoslavia. The republics varied in religious identity, with Croatia and Slovenia being largely Catholic, Serbia being mostly Serbian Orthodox, and Bosnia as a Muslim society. Slovenia declared independence from Serbia in 1991 and had sufficient military resources to challenge Milosevic, but Croatia was not well equipped and lost its territories inhabited by Serbs. Bosnia's declaration of independence in 1992 left it more defenseless than Croatia, as it lacked the means to fight Serbia and incorrectly anticipated assistance from Western states (Kuperman, 2008). Serbia's conflict in Slovenia ended quickly, but its war with Croatia and Bosnia lasted until the Dayton Peace Accords of late 1995. The mass killings at Srebrenica, Bosnia took place in July 1995, just months before the Dayton Accords, even though the United Nations earlier had declared the area a safe haven.

Gendercide and Rape in Yugoslavia

It is estimated that over 100,000 people died in the Yugoslavian conflicts, with approximately 80% of those being men (Jones, 2002, 2010). Deaths from Srebrenica are estimated at 8,100 persons, mostly men shot in open fields and mass buried (Leydesdorff, 2011). Thus, the Yugoslavian case constitutes a gendercide. Young and middle-aged men were targeted because of their potential to be combatants. When Serb forces ethnically cleansed a desired territory, they rounded up residents, separating them by sex, sending away women, children, and the elderly to other territories, and then executing the "fighting age" men (Jones, 2006, 323). Forced conscription also is considered violence against men, as men can be physically abused and demasculinized when avoiding it (Carpenter, 2006). Milićević (2006) describes the reluctance of some Serbian men to fight, explaining that the "lack of enthusiasm for war participation would be interpreted as a lack of masculinity" (280). Seven hundred thousand men avoided conscription during the Yugoslav conflicts. As refugees, war dodgers were met with little sympathy, as avoiding conscription is typically not an acceptable reason for seeking asylum in another country (Carpenter, 2006).

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Approximately 8,000 men were raped during the Yugoslav conflicts (Norredam et al., 2005), and many experienced sexual violence, including beating of the genitals, objects inserted into their rectums, and psychosexual threats about losing fertility (Loncar, Henigsberg, & Hrabac, 2010). For entertainment, camp guards made men perform sexual acts on each other. These atrocities are impossible to fully document because many men died and were disposed of after sexual abuse, and officials have yet to collect much data from men survivors (Carpenter, 2006). Estimates of sexual assaults of women in Bosnia and Croatia range from 10,000 to 60,000 (Sharlach, 2000). Rapes and murders occurred in special camps and detention centers but also in villages as troops entered them. Though no side in this "civil war" is entirely innocent of violence, "independent observers agree… Serbs bear responsibility for the overwhelming preponderance of rape and other war crimes … [mostly against] Muslims [in Bosnia] but also Croats" (Kressel, 2002, 15).

Photos from a torture camp called Omarska outside Prijedor, Bosnia reveal prisoners who were "half-starved" and "semi-naked" (Omarska: A vision of hell 2001, np). Approximately 6,000 Bosnian and Croat prisoners were held at the camp, with "most prisoners …[being] male, [though] several dozen women were kept at Omarska and were forced to mop floors littered with hair and teeth, and stained with blood" (Omarska: A vision of hell 2001, np). The women were raped frequently while the men were killed. Humiliation of intellectual and professional women was purposeful at Omarska, as they were raped by and forced to clean and take orders from men that they had known in their professional capacities.

Furthermore, Serb forces forcefully impregnated women. Serb graffiti stated the intent of forced impregnation: "We're going to rape your women, and they will give birth to Serbian children" (Sharlach, 2000, 98). To ensure rapes resulted in pregnancy, forces held women captive long enough that abortion would not be option for them (Daniel-Wrabetz, 2007). Perhaps 35,000 women became pregnant as a result (Daniel-Wrabetz).

Post-Conflict Challenges and Solutions

Given the multiple challenges men and women faced during the conflict, their post-conflict struggles are numerous. Many men are dead, but the ones who survived suffer mental and physical repercussions of abuse, such as nightmares, headaches, and sexual dysfunction (Loncar et al., 2010), and they are plagued with humiliation because they were not able to protect their families or even protect themselves.

Women who were raped face shame and rejection from their families and husbands. The mental health ramifications for women are nearly unspeakable: "Massive bodily and mental injuries, the loss of any self control and continual mortal dread determined their realities for days, weeks, and months" (Grandits,

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1999, 40). One woman, for example, "suffers insomnia, takes tranquillizers and sometimes cannot do basic work at home" (Skjelsbœk, 2006, 389). Some women require gynecological surgery due to violent rape. Women who are widows or single, cannot see themselves marrying (again) or having children due to sexual trauma and fear. Some women cannot speak about what they have gone through—even to someone they trust like their own mothers (Skjelsbœk).

Solutions for victims have been less than perfect. Many women feel betrayed by the international community that did not rush to help them during the conflict and since has not provided the social services needed for recovery (Grandits, 1999). The media, too, have disappointed women in that their rapes have been sensationalized and their private identities have been disclosed. Men survivors as well do not receive proper social services, as they might not come forward for help or health and social workers may not consider them possible victims. To counter this situation, advocates for men suggest greater awareness among health professionals of men's experiences (Norredam, Crosby, Munarriz, Piwowarczyk, & Grodin, 2005).

To discuss their pain, women have organized women's groups. In the documentary, *Calling the Ghosts—A Story About Rape, War and Women* (1996), women name their experiences, some reject the identity of "victim" for "survivor," and they memorialize their friends and families who died during the conflicts. Women have also teamed with lawyers and mental health professionals to establish women's centers to treat rape survivors (Wallis, 1995, np). The director of one center said, "the first thing a traumatized woman needs to do is to tell her story…For many women, the usual support systems have broken down" (Wallis, np). As of 2012, women's centers continue to function in Bosnia, for example, teaching weaving to women as a form of therapy and income (BOSFAM, 2012).

Graveyard at the Srebrenica/Potočari memorial center in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Photo courtesy of Mazbln

Nations, 2012, np). The World Health Organization defined rape in 2002 as "physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration—even if slight—of the vulva or anus, using a penis, other body parts or an object" (WHO, 2012, np). These definitions refer to rapes of women *or* men.

Rape has been used as a weapon of war many times in the past century. In the systematic "rape of Nanking" in 1937, Japanese soldiers killed 300,000 Chinese, and at least 20,000 women and girls were raped, including infants, the elderly, and the infirmed. During the battle for Bangladeshi independence in 1971 from Pakistan (at that time West Pakistan), a staggering 200,000 women are estimated to have been raped. Some of these women died from the physical consequences of gang rape, and some later committed suicide (Sharlach, 2000). In the Rwandan genocide in 1994, rape was used in a widespread manner, and rape has been used in ongoing conflicts in Darfur and the Congo since 2000. One estimate puts the number of rapes in 2011 in the Congo alone at 400,000.

The words of the women who have experienced rape speak volumes to how devastating rape can be. A Ugandan refugee, raped during the Ugandan civil war (1980s–present), explains how women with children are vulnerable to wartime rape.

> I couldn't run because I have two children. I stayed in the house with them. After a while someone pushed the door open and flashed a torch at me. I realized he was a soldier. He threatened me with death if I made an alarm or noise. He then draped me aside from the sleeping children and raped me inside my own house. I was gang-raped by four soldiers who took their turn, one after another. In all I was raped eight times that same night so I almost became unconscious without ability or energy to walk (Turshen, 2000, 803).

Sometimes rape is referred to as **genocidal rape**, in that the rape is not just a sexual act, but also has genocidal intentions or after effects. Rwanda is a paradigmatic example of genocidal rape. Between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide (out of a total population of eight million people), with two-thirds of Tutsi women who were raped testing positive for HIV. As Chris McGreal poignantly states "…soon there will be tens of thousands of children who have lost their fathers to the machete and their mothers to AIDS" (2001, np). Furthermore, following the genocide, some women were questioned with the "rape card," namely their fellow residents wondered if they had managed to spare their lives by sleeping with attackers, i.e., facilitating rape instead of immediate death (Sharlach, 2000).

Sexualized torture—short of the legal definition of rape—is similarly dehumanizing. This can happen against women and men, but has been found to be an action often used against men. For instance, women and men suffered torture in the targeting of genital areas and nipples, during the Argentine Dirty War (1976–1983), through the *picana*, an electric cattle prod. Eric Stenner Carlson researches beating of the male genitals. He stresses that anal rape is not the only form of assault on men and that whether or not men become sterile or have sexual dysfunction because of a beating, "a crime is a crime, and a victim is a victim" (2006, 18). Similarly, forced nakedness may be considered as a form of sexual torture, as it is discriminatory and coercive (Oosterhoff, Zwanikken, & Ketting, 2004).

Why Use Rape and Sexualized Torture as a Weapon During Conflicts?

Motives for why sexual violence and rape are used during war fall into the categories of circumstantial factors leading to anomie, threatening masculinity, threatening communities, constructing male identity, rape as a strategic weapon, and the difficulty in prosecuting rape (Office on the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2012).

As citizens of war torn countries become victims of violence, the society as a whole loses order and social norms disintegrate, leading to **anomie**, or the lack of usual social and ethical standards of a group. Anomie is compounded by poverty, malnutrition, and the availability of weapons. Furthermore, the breakdown of social order leads to an environment conducive to sexual violence as anomie breaks down social standards (Card, 1996).

Rape also occurs in conflict as a way to threaten masculinity. Historically, women have been seen as the possessions of men, without agency. This view of women persists in many countries, particularly in rural areas. When women are viewed as property of a male relative and they are raped, the rape is viewed not as much as an attack against the woman, but as "property damage" against the man to whom she "belongs" (Sharlach, 2000, 90). Thus, the woman not only loses agency through the rape but also in the aftermath of rape when violations against her become less important than the rape's effect on the men. In this way, rape is a tool for men to attack other men. Rape threatens to emasculate the man because he is unable to protect his woman (Goldstein, 2003).

For years to come, the rape may challenge what it means to be a morally upright family. Where women's chastity is linked to a family's honor, rape can become a collectively experienced form of family shame (Sharlach, 2000). Nationalism in an ethnic community is sometimes tied to the purity of women. Women are viewed as a symbol of a nation because they ensure its continuity through reproduction. When women are violated, a nation and ethnicity are violated as well and the continuity of the group is put in danger. The ethnic group/society is also demoralized when men are raped, for homosexuality may be a taboo and rape of men by men is seen as such.

Rape is also used as a tool to construct the male identity during times of combat (Goldstein, 2003). For example, in Rwanda, Hutu masculinity was compromised before the genocide, as Hutu men often were unemployed and felt unsuccessful. Tutsi women were seen as elites and more successful than Hutu men; thus, some Hutu men sought superiority by raping Tutsi women (Jones, 2002). In some societies, male combatants believe that raping women will make them invincible, and raping certain categories of women, like pregnant women, is thought to lead to more strength in battle (Sow, 2009). Motives of power and intimidation over another individual are often more compelling than sexual motives, for wartime rapes target old and young, attractive and unattractive women alike (Kressel, 2002). Combatants also use rape, particularly gang rape, to create a sense of male unity and cohesion among forces. This violence, for the purposes of forging a "brotherhood," removes women's agency, treating them as a shell for the benefit of male wartime behavior.

Rape is also a strategic, military tactic during wartime (Card, 1996). Enloe (2000) argues that militarized rape is different than circumstantial rape because it is conducted in a context of institutional policies and decisions. Military commanders promote its use as a battle tactic and they compel individual soldiers to use rape. Rape can effectively send a threatening message to one's opponent, thus rape becomes political as it achieves a political goal. In many societies, after a woman is raped and her virginity compromised, she is no longer "suitable" marriage material. As mentioned above, this can lead to an unraveling of families and the social fabric of a community (Card, 1996). Thus, war rapes have a strategic political impact beyond the woman who has been violated. Bosnian women were strategically raped and impregnated as a part of ethnic cleansing, and state-backed Pakistani troops also used rape as a strategic attack against Bangladeshi women in 1971. Rape also instills fear in a society, and the threat of rape can diminish a population's resistance.

Furthermore, rape is used strategically to inflict economic violence. If women are cast out of families or communities after a rape, they lose their livelihoods by being cut off from sources of income. After a rape, rapists sometimes commit economic violence against women by stealing their material possessions and seizing control of their labor, thus allowing the rapist to gain assets needed during wartime. Again, this plays into the idea of women being constructed as property. They can be stolen and used, and their property can be transferred to their rapist (Turshen, 2000).

Rape and sexual torture also are strategic because they are difficult to prove in court, and most soldiers do not get prosecuted for these charges (Sharlach, 2000). When someone is killed in war, her/his corpse may exist and serve as forensic evidence in a trial. Physical evidence of rape, or, for instance, trauma to the male genitals, may be unavailable when trials take place, oftentimes many years later (Carlson, 2006). Thus, deterrents to rape in violent contexts are minimal, and few are held responsible for rape and torture in comparison to how often they occur.

International Responses to Rape: Regaining Agency?

Two trials display the international community's response to rape, one from the ICTR (Rwanda) and one from the ICTY (Yugoslavia). The Akayesu case from the Rwanda tribunal was the first recognition under international law of rape as a form of genocide. Jean-Paul Akayesu was the mayor of Taba, Rwanda. Though initially protecting Tutsis from the Interahamwe (Hutu) militia, Akayesu later acquiesced to the militia and facilitated genocide by exposing safe havens and encouraging people in the town to participate in killings and rapes. Activists fighting for legal recognition of genocidal rape lobbied the ICTR to include the Taba rapes as part of Akayesu's trial. The tribunal found Akayesu guilty of many genocidal acts, including rape and he was sentenced to life in prison in 1998. Although the Akayesu case is a "jurisprudential pioneer," the ICTR has not been widely successful in convicting other suspected rapists since 1998 (Van Schaack, 2008, 29). As of 2008, four

individuals in Rwanda, including Akayesu have been convicted of sexual crimes, including rape. This number pales in comparison to the estimated 250,000–500,000 rapes during the genocide.

Second, the Foca case centers on the town of Foca, Bosnia that experienced the deaths or refugee exit of close to 20,000 non-Serbs during the early 1990s. In this trial three men were accused of imprisoning, torturing, and raping Muslim women and girls in 1992, though the ICTY tribunal initially had wanted to try around 25 men for similar crimes but could not due to lack of resources (Kuo, 2002). One man raped a 12-year-old girl, sold her for 100 Euros to a Montenegrin soldier, and she was never seen again. According to the US State Department, "this case is the first before an international tribunal to focus entirely on crimes of sexual violence and to enter a conviction for enslavement as a crime against humanity" (US State Department, 2001, np). A 28-year sentence was given to a commander, and a 20-year sentence was given to the man who had sold the above-mentioned 12-year-old. The third man received a 12-year sentence. The ruling was handed down in 2001, almost 10 years after the crimes were committed.

While these cases were pioneers in prosecuting rape, rape was not officially acknowledged by the international community as a weapon used in war until June 19, 2008 when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1820 declaring that "women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group." Although the resolution called for an "immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians," it remains to be seen if it will result in more international prosecutions of wartime rapists.

Survivors of rape deserve the utmost justice, but tribunals are not the only and perhaps best remedy for them. The tribunal process as it pertains to gender crimes may be critiqued for several reasons. First, rape and gendered torture are hard to prove. Second, perpetrators are not likely to be tried at all or in a timely manner. Tribunals cost a lot of money in comparison to the number of criminals eventually convicted and they linger for many years after an atrocity (for example the ICTY and ICTR were still hearing cases as of 2012, and in 2010–2011, the ICTY budgetary costs were over $300,000,000). Third, though some women desire to publicly state atrocities and seek closure, trials may rob survivors of their agency once again as "'revealing is not healing,' and the performative aspects of the courtroom may not be therapeutically in the survivors' best interest" (Mertus, 2004 113). The legal setting prioritizes perpetrators' narratives, because the trial is about whether the perpetrator is guilty. Thus, the survivor will not be able to give a therapeutic retelling of events, as the court is not interested in the complex impact violence has had on her life. Though defense lawyers cannot directly accuse survivors of being complicit in rape, they tend to portray women who testify as weak and non-credible witnesses. Moreover, psychologists have found retelling one's story of violence from genocide can induce fear and post-traumatic stress (Brounéus, 2010). Women then lose agency as they are discredited, re-traumatized, and cut off in the expression of their story.

What should international agencies, politicians, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals do in response to gendered political violence? Some women want to take part in gatherings of women, whether formally or informally organized, as a way to regain agency after mass rape. One Yugoslavian woman pursues healing, by getting "together [and talking] with other women from her village who were in the concentration camp with her" (Skjelsbœk, 2006, 388). On the other hand, some women do not speak to friends, their mothers, or husbands about their experiences (Skjelsbœk). Other women's post-traumatic stress disallows them from leaving their homes and functioning socially on a day-to-day basis.

Women also call for better social services for survivors. In conflict-torn countries, strong social service institutions may be lacking; however, survivors often need counseling, physical therapy, surgeries, and/or prescription medicine. Making sure health networks are adequate to meet this demand is a pressing policy concern for post-conflict societies and the international community. Social service providers, in order to satisfactorily respond to refugees, must be trained to understand how diverse gender norms impact various women and men. For instance, counselors might not suspect that men are also victims of gender violence and they might underestimate the great stigma of rape in a woman's home culture (Oosterhoff et al., 2004).

Some NGOs go beyond basic health care and seek to enhance women's wellness and mental health. An interesting example of this is Project Air in Rwanda and Eastern Congo that facilitates yoga classes for sexual violence survivors. Through yoga, "… something inside…[the women] began to stir, to shift. This was something below the level of thought, below the level of memory, below the level of conscious feeling even, but when it was sparked, it was as if… women became able to feel again and so love again the life that was in them" (The Story of Project Air, nd). Finally, the political rehabilitation of women in the aftermath of conflict involves reestablishing women's standing in their communities because community status is the first instance of women's citizenship. In order to reestablish citizenship, post-conflict policy should focus on the promotion of women's rights and the reform of outdated and discriminatory laws (Turshen, 2000).

Terrorism's Victimization of Women

Terrorism, like rape, can be used strategically to remove agency and victimize women. Moreover, terrorism's victimization is wrought with gender dynamics. Given that the fight against terrorism is perceived as a war, it is logical to expect that more men than women are victims of terrorist violence. Men make up the majority of fighters in terrorist organizations and men predominate in militaries fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. A way to gauge the gendering of terrorism's victims is to look at the sex identity of victims killed by terrorist organizations. This data is hard to come by worldwide, but the Basque Country in Spain provides an interesting gender analysis.

Case Study: Genocide and Use of Rape as a Weapon in Darfur

"I was sleeping when the attack on Disa started…They took dozens of other girls…. During the day we were beaten and they were telling us: 'You, the black women, we will exterminate you, you have no god.' At night we were raped several times…" –as told by Darfuri refugee (Amnesty International, 2004, 1).

A Darfi woman in an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) refugee camp in South Darfur. Photo courtesy of USAID

Introduction and Background to the Case

Darfur, in western Sudan, has been embroiled in conflict since a famine in the 1980s. Fighting intensified in the early 2000s when two Darfuri rebel movements (the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement) began armed conflict against the Sudanese government that was unable and unwilling to protect farmers and sedentary people from government-supported attacks by nomads. The Arab-controlled government responded to the rebels by arming Arab militias, called Janjaweed (also spelled Janjawid or Janjawiid), and having them attack villages throughout Darfur (United Human Rights Council, 2012). The targets of attacks are ethnic black Africans, mainly farmers, of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups. Arab villages have not been attacked.

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When the Janjaweed attack, they kill men, rape women, and displace villagers from their homes, burning homes and either burning or looting crops and cattle (Amnesty International, 2004). The genocide has claimed over 400,000 lives and over 2.5 million people have been displaced. In June 2005, the ICC launched investigations into human rights violations in Darfur. The ICC indicted former Sudanese Interior Minister Ahmad Harun and Janjaweed militia leader Ali Kushayb in 2007. In March 2009, the ICC indicted the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, for mass killing, rape, and pillages against Sudanese civilians (United Human Rights Watch, 2012). Many Western nations supported the ICC's actions, but China, Russia, and many African nations strongly criticized it. In March 2012, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein, Sudanese Minister of Defense. Sudan has not surrendered any of these suspects. The ICC also indicted Darfuri rebel leaders Bahr Idriss Abu Garda (United Resistance Front), Abdallah Banda (Justice and Equality Movement), and Salah Jerbo (Sudanese Liberation Army); all voluntarily appeared before the court. Attempts at peace have not been successful. Peace agreements were signed in 2006 and 2010, but all rebel groups did not support them. The Doha Peace Agreement was negotiated in 2011, but again, not all rebel groups chose to accept the agreement.

Rape as a Weapon of War in Darfur

Rape is being used as a weapon of war in the Darfur conflict (Reeves, 2012). Some estimates suggest 40% of Darfuri women have been raped. Other reports suggest that 100% of Darfuri women and girls are subject to gender-based abuse (Robertson, 2008). Girls as young as eight have been raped, and gang rape is widespread. In many instances women who resisted rape have been killed. Often displaced women and girls are raped when they walk to outer areas of refugee camps to collect firewood. A study found that a "majority (82%) were raped while they were pursuing their ordinary daily activities. Only 4% of women reported that the rape occurred during active conflict, while they were fleeing their home village" (Doctors Without Borders, 2005, 3).

In several ways, the Sudanese government is using rape as a political weapon in Darfur. First, rape is used being used to impregnate women with babies who are not ethnically African in an attempt to ethnically cleanse Africans from Sudan (Reeves, 2007). Women with "rape babies" are ostracized and the child born is considered an "enemy child." Women who are married are rejected by their husbands after the rape and often feel compelled

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to abandon the baby conceived during the rape (Amnesty International, 2004). Women impregnated during rape are at higher risk of death during childbirth as medical care in the refugee camps is poor, and there are increased levels of HIV/AIDS among the Darfur female population as a result of rape (Amnesty International, 2004; Genocide Intervention, 2012).

Second, rape is being used to ostracize women so they cannot begin families, and to damage women's bodies so that they cannot have children (Genocide Intervention, 2012; Reeves, 2007). Raped women often are left with scars to mark them as raped and tainted, thus further destroying the social fabric of the region (Reeves). Due to the social stigma of rape, women suffer economic effects after the rape. In Darfur, a husband can disown his wife if rape occurs, and an unmarried woman can be considered "damaged goods" and not marriageable and be thrown out of her family (Genocide Intervention, 2012). Because many women, especially married ones, cannot talk about rape due to social stigma, many of them remain silent or leave their families due to shame. These women become economically vulnerable because they have no source of income, as most women in the region are economically dependent on families until marriage and husbands afterwards (Amnesty International, 2004).

Rape is also being used to instill fear in the civilian population, so that land and agricultural goods can be captured. Finally, the government uses rape to demoralize and emasculate the male Darfuri population (Reeves, 2007).

Conclusion

Rape is an unabated weapon of war in Sudan. Sudan's neighbor, The Democratic Republic of Congo, suffering a similar conflict over 15 years, estimates the number of women raped there at 400,000. It is reasonable to believe that if violence continues in Darfur, we could see similar numbers. In the face of these atrocities, what can be done?

The ICC is working to convict Sudanese leaders of crimes of genocide, including rape. In addition, NGOs such as Amnesty International and Médecins Sans Frontières are trying to raise awareness. The Nobel Women's Initiative started a "Stop Rape in Conflict" campaign to raise awareness about rape as a wartime tactic. Moreover, several women's groups, many of them based in the United States and comprised of women who either fled Darfur or are of Darfuri origin, lobby the international community to intervene in Darfur. Without strong international support and the declaration of genocide in Darfur, however, many in the international community will sit by while atrocities continue.

In more than 40 years of ETA terrorism in Spain (Euskadi TaAskatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom), over 800 people have been killed. Government estimates of victims by sex show that men are 93% of ETA's mortal victims. Though most of ETA's victims are targeted for death as enemies of the group, 87% of women killed by ETA were indiscriminate deaths, meaning they were not targets but bystanders in a large attack on other people. More men have died because police, state security forces, and politicians are ETA targets. Women have gained political representation in Spanish political institutions since the 1990s, yet men still hold more of these targeted positions (Varona, 2009). The sex of targeted victims of terrorism is the same for the case of the Red Army Faction (Germany, 1970–1998); this Marxist group targeted businessmen and politicians, thus most of its victims were men. In the twenty-first century, terrorism by fundamentalist Islamic groups is more indiscriminate as, for example, a biological attack would hurt all citizens in the attack's vicinity and not just men politicians. In fact, in the late 1990s, Osama bin Laden declared deaths of American civilians as part of the global jihad, meaning that Al Qaeda sees all citizens—men or women—as fair targets of terrorism.

Even if women do not numerically exceed men as victims killed by terrorism, the atrocities of terrorism are often gendered in a way that views women as the innocent victims of terrorism. Take for example the story that opened this chapter. Though one of bin Laden's wives fought back against US troops in the Abbottabad raid, his wives and children were discussed in the year that followed as being caught up in terrorism, as innocents caught in the middle. A discourse surrounds terrorism—both on the side of the United States and the side of transnational terrorist networks—that women and children are not safe due to the actions involved in and the values embedded in the war on terror.

Western, developed countries and their media often express concerns about women during violent conflict. After September 11, 2001, when the United States invaded Afghanistan, the United States and its leaders expressed concern about the oppression of women in Afghanistan under the Taliban. In a radio address in November 2001, First Lady Laura Bush announced that the Bush administration was kicking off a "world-wide campaign to focus on the brutality against women and children by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and the regime it supports in Afghanistan, the Taliban" (quoted in Cooke, 2002, 469). Though packaged through the words of Laura Bush, feminist scholars saw the administration expressing a form of "masculinist protection." Male, American troops were going to save Afghani women who were the victims (Young, 2003). A more direct way to put it was that the war was partially a case of "white men saving brown women," thus serving as an insult to the Afghani women who rarely gained voice in the matter (Cooke 2002, 469; Spivak, 1988). Similarly, in 2012, President Obama came under attack for his policy of using drones to eliminate terrorists in countries such as Yemen and Pakistan. Administration officials expressed that they "count all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants…unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent" (Becker and Shane, 2012, np). The gender implication of this statement cuts two ways. First, it confirms the logic of gendercide: men are often targeted because of their age—they are threats even if we do not know their

intentions. However, we must presume that women in the targeted zones are considered as noncombatants, i.e., innocent victims of attacks. Although women are sometimes terrorists (see Chapter 3), we are left to think of them as helpless bystanders.

The terrorists who target the United States also think of women as victims who need to be protected. Victimization in their eyes comes from the ill effects of Western culture—sexualized and materialist—on Islamic society and women. The global jihad with its accompanying terrorism is meant to restore conservative Islamic values and sexual propriety.

Women as Targets of Terrorism

Acid terrorism is another way women are targeted as victims of terrorism. **Acid terrorism** is defined as assaults with acid meant to punish, kill, and/or disfigure victims. Men may use acid to terrorize women who do not accept their engagement proposals or women who are seeking an education. While some of these violent perpetrators are not terrorists in the sense of participating in a terrorist organization, they are practicing a new form of terrorism that must be analyzed by feminist scholars. It is terrorism in that it is political (not permitting women in the public sphere) and it is meant to terrorize a particular audience (women) and seek control over them.

Cambodian acid attack victim, 2007. Photo courtesy of Sand Paper

That said, terrorists in organizations also use acid attacks and other violent methods to punish women who transgress societal norms. This is the case with acid attacks against girls attending schools in Afghanistan. In Yemen, in 2012, terrorists in the Al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-Sharia attacked women with acid who they believe to be inappropriately dressed (Onassis, 2012). In Cambodia, victims of acid attacks are often the young mistresses of prominent men who are attacked by the wife of the man or family members who consider her a "whore."

Finally, transnational terrorists may victimize women as they take them as wives and start families outside of their home countries. Terrorists, who came from abroad to fight in the insurgency in Iraq, took local Iraqi women as wives in unofficial marriage ceremonies, often against the women's will (Al Arabiya, 2010). These women now have children deemed illegitimate in the eyes of Iraqi society and government, creating a social service problem for the women, as their children are not citizens. In this way, women are caught in the middle of terrorist actions.

Conclusions

This chapter focused on gendered violence and the victimization of women, yet it also demonstrated ways in which women are regaining agency after political violence. First, we examined genocide and gendercide, showing that genocides have occurred throughout history. The international community is often slow to recognize genocides and international courts have prosecuted a limited number of genocide cases. When genocides have a gendered component, they become gendercides. The former Yugoslavia provided an illustration of gendercide as well as wartime rape. We elaborated on rape as a weapon of war and as a political strategy through the case of Darfur. Finally, we focused on women who are viewed as targets of terrorism because of their sex.

The theme of women's agency was prominent in the chapter. In much of the discussion surrounding terrorism and violent conflict, women are viewed as victims and passive vessels without agency, often needing to be saved. Efforts to regain agency, however, are underway, including women organizing and advocating for themselves as well as local and international organizations working to improve women's lives. While women can regain agency, some women may never truly be "ok" given the nature of horrific crimes committed against them. Moreover, justice may not always come from a courtroom. This begs the question of what is "justice" for women who have been targets of state violence or terrorism?

Chapter 3
Women Engaged in Violent Political Activity

Introduction

> Baby-faced, she looks barely a teenager. But the pistol she is holding suggests the violent
> path she would choose: strapping on an explosive belt and blowing herself up in a subway
> station in Moscow during the morning rush-hour.
>
> *New York Times*, April 2, 2010

The *New York Times* describes Dzhanet Abdurakhmanova as young, 17 years old, but willing to kill. Abdurakhmanova was a Black Widow suicide bomber whose attack killed 40 people in March 2010. Why was she motivated to kill? The article explains that her husband was a Chechen insurgent killed by Russian troops in 2009. In what ways are Osama bin Laden's wives different than Dzhanet Abdurakhmanova? Like bin Laden's wives, we know very little about Abdurakhmanova except that she was married to a terrorist. Similar to bin Laden's wife, Amal Ahmed al-Sadah, who incurred a leg injury while fighting back during the Abbottabad raid, Abdurakhmanova was young, fought back, and sustained injuries—yet, in her case, it cost her life. These women are dissimilar, however, in that al-Sadah is not thought of as a terrorist, as she was defending life, whereas Abdurakhmanova indeed chose to kill by perpetrating a terrorist act. In this chapter, we discuss women involved in violent politics, including women who assist in violence from behind the scenes and those who act as violent participants.

We begin with a short review of women's participation in violent politics across history. We then discuss women in terrorist organizations, followed by discussions of women as suicide bombers and as genocidaires. The chapter closes by examining media reaction to violent women. Case studies focus on Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque Country, the transnational Al Qaeda network, and Black Widows in Chechnya.

Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between guerilla warfare, terrorism, and genocide (see Chapter 1). **Genocide** is the *intentional murder of people because of their group membership, where group membership can be ethnic, racial, political, religious, or economic.* **Guerilla warfare** can take place during genocide or may be divorced from genocide. It is defined as *a type of unconventional warfare in which smaller groups of irregular forces, often civilians, use mobile tactics such as ambushes and raids to combat larger, better trained, and regular forces* (Poloni-Staudinger, 2011). Terrorists are distinct from guerillas in that guerillas target regular military forces and terrorists typically target civilians or government officials. **Terrorism** is defined as a "political activity that relies on violence or [credible] threat of violence to achieve its ends" (Magstadt & Schotten, 1993, 586).

Women as Warriors, Guerillas, and Anarchists

Violent women are not a new phenomenon, as women have been involved in political violence since Biblical times (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2008). Jean Bethke Elshtain, in *Women and War*, call these women "the ferocious few," "who have *actually* fought" rather than served in "auxiliary services, support, [and] noncombat duties" (1987, 173). At many points in history, including the American Revolution, the American Civil War, and World War II (in Britain), women have dressed as men in order to fight in combat.

Women's LTTE brigade in Sri Lanka. Photo by Marietta Amarcord

Women in anarchist movements are forerunners to women in terrorist organizations. Anarchists were active in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, committing terrorism to pursue revolutionary change. For example, Russian anarchists wanted to end the autocratic regime of the czars. Women anarchists there were not motivated by feminism, yet gender relations framed their activism (Knight, 1979). Russian society at the time expected women to stay in the home. By joining anarchist groups, women rejected these gender expectations. Their activism, however, portrayed the female virtue of self-sacrifice, thereby confirming cultural expectations. Anarchists would receive a death sentence if caught. Thus, "the terrorist wing" of the anarchists required "the most crucial quality" of "selfless devotion—a trait that had been instilled in women as a traditional female virtue" (Knight, 143).

Women in guerilla movements also served as forerunners to women terrorists. Women guerillas in the twentieth century took on combat and support roles in cases throughout Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. In Cuba (1950s–1960s) and Uruguay (1970s), women comprised up to 25% of guerillas. Although women guerillas often support operations through food preparation, intimate partnerships with men fighters, and/or the storage and transport of weapons, they are known to alternate between supportive and combat roles and have held leadership positions in some groups (e.g., Argentine guerilla groups). Though some women seek gender empowerment through guerilla activity (e.g., in Mozambique, 1977–1992), guerilla activity did not lead to feminist emancipation in many cases, as women were expected to take up domestic responsibilities after fighting ceased (e.g., El Salvador after the civil war, 1979–1992).

Women in Terrorist Cells

In 1969, a 25-year-old woman hijacked a TWA flight out of Rome to Athens, and a year later she helped hijack an El Al flight from Amsterdam to New York in one of four simultaneous hijackings. This woman, Leila Khaled, became known as the "poster girl" of Palestinian militancy. Khaled was a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and is a member of the Palestinian National Council as of 2012. She captured the world's attention not only because the multiple hijackings appeared sophisticated, but because she was a young, beautiful *woman*.

The world continues to be mesmerized by women terrorists, and the majority of research on gender and terrorism details women as terrorists (rather than, for example, women as responders to terrorism) (e.g., Alison, 2009; Bloom, 2011). Some researchers investigate and describe why women—perceived as a fairly unified social group—commit acts of terror (Bloom, 2011; Cragin & Daly, 2009). Sjoberg, Cooke, and Neal (2011), representing another approach, critique the view that motivations are common to all (or most) women solely because of shared sex identity. They argue women experience varying gender relations and social structures worldwide; thus, motivations for terrorism will vary from woman to woman.

Leila Khaled with attorneys. Early 1970s

The history of women's participation in terrorism is well established, and scholars are certain women have been central to terrorist organizations and that their numbers and roles are growing (Talbot, 2001). Every terrorist organization in Western Europe, with the exception of the loyalists in Northern Ireland, has used women combatants (Talbot, 2004). Cunningham (2010) reports about one-third of terrorists in FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) are women, and 20% of Italian terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s were women. Terrorist organizations composed of large numbers of women also include the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) in Peru, and ETA in Spain and France. Growth in women's participation is especially evident in Islamic terrorism. Al Qaeda uses women in operations because of the shock value they bring, even as the network claims a lesser role in society and politics for women than men.

Women are in leadership positions in some terrorist groups. They have risen to leadership in groups as diverse as the German RAF (Red Army Faction), Shining Path (Peru), the IRA (Irish Republican Army), LTTE (Sri Lanka), and ETA (Spain and France). As of 2012, the leader in charge of ETA operations is a woman, Ixrate Sorzabal Diaz.

What Motivates Women to Terrorism?

What are women's motivations for joining terrorist groups? Abdurakhmanova discussed above was recruited to the Black Widows because she lost her

husband to Russian violence. Bloom argues "women across a number of conflicts and in several different terrorist groups tend to be motivated by [the four Rs]… revenge [for death of a family member], redemption [for past sins that have damaged their self image], relationship [with insurgents, such as a father or husband], and [desired] respect [from their community for their dedication to the cause]" (2011, 235). Gentry (2009) explains that motherhood motivates women terrorists, as terrorists are sometimes women who "did not or could not have children" (244) or are violent mothers who "can be a martyr after giving birth to martyrs" (244), calling this a type of "twisted maternalism" (Gentry, 242).

Women also have been motivated to join terrorist groups because of deep attachment to the ideological or cultural goals of the group, desire for emancipation, and security concerns and coercion (Cragin & Daly, 2009; Morgan, 2002). Like men, women are dedicated to the goals of terrorist groups. As Sjoberg (2009) states, women "participate in terrorism as terrorists…who happen to be women" (69). Many women are politically motivated to become terrorists as a way to end their own suffering and that of their people. Interviews with failed suicide bombers in Palestine reveal that women and men alike participate in violence "for revenge of the Jews" (Berko & Erez, 2005, 611). Sixta (2008) agrees, stating, the "new women" terrorists of today "are committed to public activism….[they] want social reform to preserve their own cultures and religions from the invading and increasingly intrusive Western culture" (262).

Women and men terrorists also share idiosyncratic reasons for violent participation. One Palestinian man, interviewed by Berko and Erez, decided to become a suicide bomber for the money. "In responding to why he needed the 100 shekels he received for agreeing to be a suicide bomber, the interviewee stated that if he were to feel hunger on his way to the suicide mission, he could go to a restaurant and eat. He also said that he used the money to buy a cooking pot for his mother" (2005, 613). A woman interviewee, who had been living in a refugee camp, had a similarly idiosyncratic explanation. She "relayed how she and her girlfriend…were preparing homework assignments at her home. They…felt that 'there was nothing to do' and looked for some excitement…and decided that they would volunteer to be terrorists" (Berko & Erez, 611).

Women may seek gender equality through their participation as terrorists. Georges-Abeyie (1983) argued that emancipation accompanies women's involvement in terrorist groups. For example, women like Tamil LTTE leader, Thamalini, have achieved respect through terrorist participation. Ulrike Meinhof, a terrorist from the German RAF, also claimed women's emancipation through terrorism. However, O'Connor (2010) argues that women's liberation does not motivate many terrorists, as only three terrorist groups—the German RAF, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Shining Path in Peru—were strongly committed to gender equality. Moreover, after a struggle is over, women can face trouble reintegrating into society as they are confronted with **patriarchy**, a social system in which men hold power over women and children (Morgan, 2002).

In some terrorist groups women face rape within the group and are motivated by personal security (Bloom, 2005; O'Connor, 2010). Becoming a terrorist shields them from society's ostracism and provides redemption. Alternatively, women may

be coerced into joining the group if they feel shame due to rape. In Sri Lanka, women who are raped cannot reenter society, so they join the Black Tigers, the suicide wing of the LTTE.

What Do Women Terrorists Do?

Women act as sympathizers, providing assistance and resources to others in the terrorist group (Griset & Mahan, 2003). They serve as lookouts, drivers, suppliers, spies, decoys, or messengers (Griset & Mahan). For example, IRA women in the 1970s and 1980s deceived British soldiers and lured them into traps, "by having the girls offer to take them to a party…" (Mitchell, 2000, 55).

Women also act as warriors, conducting hijackings or detonating bombs (Griset & Mahan, 2003). Finally, some women have held leadership roles, making decisions for the group and interpreting the group's ideological stance (Griset & Mahan). The case study below shows how ETA women participate in violent operations in support roles and as leaders.

Case Study: Women's Actions in ETA

ETA was established in 1959, but its first moment of public prominence occurred in 1970 at the Burgos military trial. Sixteen ETA members were tried for the assassination of a San Sebastián police inspector, Melitón Manzanas, in August of 1968. ETA chose Manzanas as its first assassination because of his reputation for torturing ETA detainees in Spanish prisons. Through the defendants' presentation of evidence against the Franco regime, the members of ETA "acquired human faces and names for scores of Basque and Spanish citizens watching and reading coverage of the trial" (Hamilton, 2007, 78).

Academics disagree about the importance attributed to the women defendants in the trial. Hamilton (2007) claims that the three women defendants (Arantza Arruti, Jone Dorronsoro, and Itziar Aizpurua) are largely overlooked in commentaries on the Burgos trial, and they predominantly appeared as "'pretty faces' in the courtroom, or are recorded as the wives of other defendants" (Hamilton, 82). Sullivan (1988), however, believed that Itziar Aizpurua was critical in setting the mood of the trial. Aizpurua "described how her political consciousness was awakened by observing both the hardship suffered by [non-Spanish] immigrants… and discrimination against the native [Basque] population by the refusal to allow children to speak *Euskera* (Basque) in school and by the authorities' prohibition of Basque cultural events" (1988, 96). One defendant was absolved of crime, but the other 15 ETA members faced long-term imprisonment and six men faced death sentences, though Franco later commuted the sentences.

Early in 1973, ETA began planning a kidnapping of the Spanish vice premier, Luis Carrero Blanco, in the hopes of forcing the Spanish government to release 150 Basque fighters from prison (Sullivan, 1988). After Carrero Blanco's promotion to prime minister and an increase in Spanish security forces in the Basque country, ETA decided to attempt an assassination rather than a kidnapping. In late 1973, ETA perpetrated several small-scale attacks to distract from the impending assassination attempt on Carrero Blanco. On 20 December 1973, ETA assassinated Carrero Blanco, using underground explosives to blow his car over a five-story high wall, instantly killing Carrero Blanco, his driver, and his bodyguard. A woman named Genoveve Forest Tarat helped orchestrate the attack, though most ETA women at this time performed logistical tasks, such as smuggling weapons or bomb-making materials (Cragin & Daly, 2009).

Following Franco's death in 1975 and the subsequent democratization of Spain, ETA increasingly used violence to seek an independent Basque state. Although three Basque provinces were granted regional political autonomy in 1979, ETA's violence increased. Political autonomy "was simply seen as a barrier to full independence from Spain" (MacDonald, 1991, 5). From 1978 to 1980, it is believed that ETA's actions claimed the lives of 234 people, with 1980 being the bloodiest year on record.

Although ETA traditionally had been a male-dominated organization reflecting the patriarchal nature of Basque society itself, after 1980 it became more responsive to women's issues, integrating women into the organization and incorporating issues of gender equality into its political platforms, in part because of women in leadership positions (MacDonald, 1991). In 1985, ETA formed a women's group, *Egizan* ("Act Woman"). Gonzalez-Perez (2008) argues, "the traditional stereotype of women as non-terrorist enabled them to become more effective than their male counterparts….As more women began participating on the same level as men…their male comrades began to change their own stereotypical views of women" (104).

Post (2005) explains that the typical pathway to involvement in national-separatist terrorism is through the family. Terrorists "are carrying on the mission of their parents and grandparents…they are loyal to families that are disloyal to the regime" (619–620). However, women's recruitment to ETA often occurred during their participation in Basque amnesty and prisoners' rights groups (discussed in Chapter 4) and after initial exposure to the violence of Spanish security forces (MacDonald, 1991). Women in amnesty groups witnessed violence against prisoners, and then responded with violent action.

With many women in support roles, the few ETA women engaging in violence gained notoriety. In 1994, France arrested Maria Idoia López Riaño, who had been linked by Spanish police to 23 killings. She is the most mythologized

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gunwoman for ETA and is now serving a 30-year jail sentence. López Riaño's sexuality became a large part of her myth. Stories suggest she would pick up young police officers in discotheques for one-night stands, only to kill other officers days later. The media portrayed her as having an extreme desire for violence, claiming that "during one attack in Madrid she was detailed to cover another commando member as he opened fire on a car full of army officers. She could not, however, resist spraying it with bullets first" (Tremlett, 2009, np).

Women became leaders of ETA for the first time in the group's history in 2000. From 2000 to 2004, María Soledad Iparraguirre Genetxea was a military leader of ETA, along with her partner Mikel Albizu (Cragin & Daly, 2009). Iparraguirre began her career in ETA as a teenager, working to conceal explosives, gradually scaling the organization through participation in assassinations and attacks with assault weapons (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008). In 2004, Iparraguirre and Albizu were arrested in France. The percentage of women arrested for their affiliation with ETA steadily increased during the 2000s. "In 2002, only 12% of ETA-affiliated prisoners were women. By 2009 that figure had risen to close to a quarter. If the latest arrests are any indicator, the proportion among recruits is nearer to half" (Tremlett, 2009, np). In the 2000s, ETA also placed women in high-ranking positions as leader of the strategic and logistical committee and as active service unit leaders (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008).

As of 2009, experts believe two women took over leadership of ETA, Iratxe Sorzabal and Izaskun Lesaka (Lesaca). Both have outstanding warrants for their arrest (Govan, 2010). Like many other women in ETA, Sorzabal began as a spokeswoman for prisoners' rights and later transitioned to violent activities. In addition to Sorzabal and Lesaka's leadership, two women are wanted for leaving bombs in women's lavatories in two restaurants and at a shopping center in Majorca in 2009. The locations of the bombs made the involvement of women critical (Rosario, 2009). In January 2011, ETA and the Spanish government entered into peace talks culminating with the declaration of a ceasefire by ETA on 20 October 2011. Though it is unclear what ETA's next move will be, women certainly will be central to the organization's structure.

Women in Islamic Terrorist Cells

Historically, women have been less involved in Islamic terrorist organizations and networks, such as Al Qaeda, than in other terrorist groups; however, Islam sets a precedent for women's involvement in jihad. *Jihad* is Arabic for what can be translated as "struggle" or "effort." The Quran calls for equality and equal jihad responsibility for men and women (Busool, 1995). Though jihad can mean "holy war," having military connotations, it also references an individual's personal struggle—the internal, spiritual struggle toward self-improvement, moral cleansing, and intellectualism. The Prophet Muhammad thought of the armed-struggle

version of holy war as "the little jihad" and the spiritual, individual version of holy war—the war within oneself—as "the great jihad" (Busool). The internal struggle has been considered more relevant to women. Ways in which women can personally struggle for their faith, specifically regarding terrorism, include giving birth to martyrs and raising male children for "the little jihad."

Women participating in Islamic terrorism do so through supportive and violent actions. Women cook for fighters and take care of their children, and women fighters are referred to as mujahidaat. Despite early historical examples of women fighters in Islam, "classical Islamic sources are fairly negative about the role of women in jihad," asserting women should be dedicated to their husbands and private responsibilities (Cook, 2005, 383). Contemporary Islamic sources are vague about women's place in jihad. Whereas women are considered potential fighters, social regulations make them less fit for combat, for to go on a jihad mission a woman "would have to dress in an immodest fashion" (Cook, 380). During a mission, a woman fighter would likely come in contact with men outside her family, which concerns some Islamic scholars.

Greater involvement of women in violence is evident in Palestine since the late 1980s and in Chechnya since the early 2000s. In the first intifada in Palestine (1987–1993), women played violent roles. The first Palestine woman suicide bomber was Wafa Idris. She was 28 years old when she completed her mission in 2002. In Chechnya, women also propagate suicide attacks, with the first woman bomber acting in 2000.

How have Islamic values evolved to allow for women's participation in the armed struggle of jihad? In Palestine, a change of heart in Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (1937–2004), an original leader of Hamas, marked a change in principles. Yassin originally believed that women should participate only in support roles, and he did not approve of the suicide mission of Wafa Idris. Later, he conceded that a woman could be martyr if she completes her mission in 24 h and is escorted by a chaperone. Hamas did not sponsor a woman bomber until 2004, but other Palestinian groups had done so already. Women's violent actions in Al Qaeda are growing as well. As discussed below, women participate in violent operations even though Al Qaeda's leadership originally denied that women were a part of the network.

Case Study: Women in Al Qaeda

The origins of Al Qaeda lie in the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989). Male fighters from Muslim countries, called mujahedeen, gathered in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Following the withdrawal of the USSR in 1989, Al Qaeda—a grouping of mujahedeen—turned its attention to eliminating secular, Arab governments, and then focused on combating the West, including the US, which was seen as supportive of secular Arab states. Al Qaeda's central command is located in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and its network of affiliates includes groups in the Maghreb, Iraq, Indonesia, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, and in Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda also maintains terrorist cells in other parts of the world, including Europe.

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Al Qaeda's social values regarding women are generally conservative, indicating that women should serve in the private, not public, sphere. However, gender values vary based on the location of the Al Qaeda affiliate, with some affiliate groups embedded in cultures where a strict physical separation and covering of women is preferred (e.g., Afghanistan under Taliban influence). In Iraq and the Maghreb women are less restricted in Al Qaeda operations.

Osama bin Laden, leader of Al Qaeda until his death in 2011, pronounced women's responsibility to encourage men fighters. In 1996, he stated:

> Our women had set a tremendous example of generosity in the cause of Allah; they motivated and encouraged their sons, brothers and husbands to fight—in the cause of Allah—in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya and in other countries… May Allah strengthen the belief…of our women in the way of generosity and sacrifice for the supremacy of the word of Allah…our women instigate their brothers to fight in the cause of Allah (bin Laden quoted in PBS, 1996, np).

Beyond instigating their male relatives toward jihad, women support Al Qaeda in terms of domestic responsibilities and financial management. In the early 2000s, an al Qaeda publication from Egypt "called for women to support the Mujahedeen in their missions, but only in terms of cooking for them, and providing material support" (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2010, np). Assistance from women in the domestic sphere includes helping men and families hide from authorities and live underground (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2010). Women are also fundraisers for Al Qaeda, with Haila Al-Qusayer, a Saudi, as a prime example. Al-Qusayer, married to an Al Qaeda leader and referred to as the "First Lady of Qaeda," was famous for "her fundraising skills." She collected "money from wealthy Saudis on the pretext of raising money for orphans and widows" (BBC Monitoring Middle East, np), but was arrested in 2010. In addition to sheltering and financing, Saudi officials believe women are active in "spreading extremist ideology" (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2010).

In recent years, Al Qaeda women have spread ideology via the Internet, often appearing under false names (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2010, np). Bint Najd, a Saudi woman, had an incredible online presence. Najd "was the media chief of Al-Qaeda in the [Saudi] Kingdom. She operated more than 800 online clubs and blogs to promote the extremist ideology…She uploaded the extremist web sites with audio and video recordings and official statements of Al-Qaeda" (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2010, np). Malika El Aroud, in Belgium, similarly encouraged men and women to be active in jihad. She describes her actions with the following statement: "It's not my role to set off bombs—that's ridiculous…I have a weapon. It's to write. It's to speak out. That's my jihad. You can do many things with words. Writing is also a bomb" (Sciolino & Mekhennet, 2008, np).

Despite these examples, a puzzle exists about women's participation in Al Qaeda, particularly in violent operations. Ayman Al Zawahiri, the number

one leader after the death of bin Laden, has flatly denied that women partici-
pate in Al Qaeda. In a 2008 audio recording, responding to questions posted
in an Al Qaeda online forum, Al Zawahiri said the "terrorist group does not
have women…A woman's role…is limited to caring for the homes and chil-
dren of Al Qaeda fighters" (TODAY, Singapore, 2008, np). Nevertheless,
statements by Al Zawahiri's wife, Omaima Hassan, contrast his claims. In
2009, Hassan said that jihad is difficult for women because they need a male
guardian in public, yet she mentioned that women could help "financially and
morally, by leaking information to the mujahedeen, and even becoming a
martyr" (Seib & Janbek, 2011, 85). In 2012, Hassan hinted at women's active
involvement in political change. Though she emphasized women's responsi-
bility to raise children for jihad, Hassan, as an Egyptian herself, congratulated
women for taking part in the Arab Spring.

Al Qaeda's practices appear to be shifting away from Al Zawahiri's per-
spective, given the actions of women suicide bombers in Iraq during the
2000s. The first woman suicide bomber for Al Qaeda in Iraq completed her
mission in 2003, killing three coalition soldiers at a US checkpoint. In 2006,
Muriel Degauque, a Belgian woman who converted to Islam, traveled to Iraq
to be suicide bomber and "rammed an explosives-filled vehicle into an
American military patrol…wounding one American soldier" (Von Knop,
2007, 403). In the first half of 2008, women carried out 11 of 20 suicide
bombings in Iraq (Rubin, 2008). Al Qaeda in Iraq openly acknowledges its
use of women in violent operations, and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb also sends
women on bombing missions (Bloom, 2011). Therefore, Al Qaeda women
engage in a variety of actions related to terrorism, and thus have agency, even
if Al Qaeda's central command denies or downplays women's contributions.

Women as Suicide Bombers

I am proud to be the first female HAMAS martyr. I have two children and love them very
much. But my love to see God was stronger than my love for my children, and I'm sure that
God will take care of them if I become a martyr (Hamas operative Reem Rayishi quoted in
al-Muslimah 2004, qtd. in Ali, 2005).

Suicide bombing is a violent, politically motivated attack carried out in a deliberate
state of awareness by a person who blows himself or herself up together with a
chosen target. It is a subset of terrorism, and all suicide campaigns coexist with
regular insurgent tactics. Sana Mehaydali, a Lebanese and PPS (secular pro-Syrian
Lebanese organization) operative, was the first modern woman suicide bomber.
In 1985, at 17 years old, she blew herself up near vehicles carrying Israeli soldiers
in Lebanon (Bloom, 2005).

A poster of a woman jihadist who carried out a suicide bombing in a shopping mall in 2003. The bombing killed three Israelis and injured many more. From the Israeli Defense Force

Women have been suicide bombers in 8 out of the 17 groups using the tactic since the 1980s (Bloom, 2007). Terrorists use suicide bombings when other terrorist or military tactics fail and/or when they are in competition with other groups for popular or financial support (Ali, 2005; Bloom, 2007). Suicide terrorism is usually chosen as a tactic after other strategies have failed for an insurgent group struggling against an established and more powerful state and/or when a stalemate between the group and state exists. When groups are engaged in competition with each other, as with the different groups in Palestine, they also use suicide bombings as a sort of "one upsmanship."

Suicide bombings procure domestic and international audiences. Domestically, the bomber's aim is to physically destroy a target, but the attack also constitutes a psychological weapon. The targets are not only those killed, but also those made to witness the killing. Suicide terrorists want to portray themselves as fanatical and irrational because their victimized audience will then feel like nothing can be done to stop terrorism. Since the image of a woman bomber so greatly clashes with the image of a peaceful life-giving woman, the psychological impact of a woman bomber is greater than that of a man bomber. Internationally, the suicide bomber's aim is to attract donors and supporters for the group (Bloom, 2005). In terms of transnational terrorism, the international audience also can become direct targets and/or psychologically victimized.

A group's use of suicide terrorism only proliferates when a population supports its goals and is receptive to terrorists targeting civilians. For example, when ETA bombed a Barcelona market in 1987, its popularity decreased due to the lack of Basque support for civilian casualties. Why does the general population either

support or reject the use of suicide bombing? In countries where the state forcefully responds to terrorism—like in Chechnya or Palestine—greater public support of suicide terrorism exists because the public is more desperate and feels recourse is limited (Wyne, 2005). The state's heavy-handedness also serves to radicalize more terrorists. The PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party), seeking an independent Kurdistan from Turkey, is illustrative. In the 1970s, the Turkish government harshly treated the PKK and the surrounding Kurdish population, raiding villages and jailing suspected sympathizers. During this time, public support for suicide terror existed. However, as Turkey tried to garner the European Union's favor, the government began to loosen restrictions on the Kurdish population and negotiated with the PKK. As a result, the PKK lost public support for the use of suicide terrorism and discontinued it (Wyne).

What Motivates Women Suicide Bombers?

Women suicide bombers are motivated by many of the same factors as men. Conventional wisdom states that suicide bombers are poor, with little opportunity, possessing of personality disorders, and/or motivated by financial incentives. Most bombers, however, are not undereducated religious zealots. In fact, some suicide bombers, like the LTTE in Sri Lanka, engage in suicide terrorism for secular reasons. Most suicide bombers worldwide come from middle and upper class backgrounds and are more educated than not. They do tend to be younger, and many have suffered humiliation at the hands of their enemies and lack outlets to express rage and frustration (see Victoroff, 2005). Moreover, individuals who have been raised in war torn situations oftentimes become less sensitive to violence and feel despondent about their own lives, pushing them toward radicalization and terrorism.

Why Do Groups Use (Women) Suicide Bombers?

Terrorist groups find suicide attacks advantageous because they are low cost, capable of signaling the groups' complete dedication to a cause, and a way to legitimize the group. With the attack's perpetrator dead, police cannot interrogate her/him. The negative costs of attack (deaths of civilians) are mitigated by the perceived brutality of the state that so horrendously treats its victims that they have no other way to channel grievances than through this ultimate sacrifice.

Women as bombers help to achieve these goals because women are not thought to be violent, thus their attacks are surprising and able to psychologically impact the victimized audience. Groups also may use women for suicide missions to shame men into greater participation. If it appears the group *needs* women for missions, men may be compelled to come forward as active fighters. Finally, organizations may see women as "throw away artillery…because of their lesser military value" (Sixta, 2008, 268).

Case Study: The Black Widows of Chechnya

Chechnya is a federal state located in the southeastern part of Russia, distinct in language, religion, and ethnicity from Russia. Chechens are Muslim, while the majority of Russians are Orthodox Christians. In 1990 Chechnya declared itself an independent republic, attempting to secede from the USSR (Tishkov, 2004). The Soviets opposed this move, as has Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s, the region has been embroiled in nearly constant conflict, leading to economic hardship and the emigration of many Chechens from the region (Tishkov).

The first Chechen War took place between 1994 and 1996, during which Chechen guerillas fought against Russian forces trying to regain control of the region. After Chechen terrorists stormed and held a hospital in the Russian city of Budyonnovsk, the conflict ended in a ceasefire and peace agreement (Tishkov, 2004). However, violence continued mainly in the form of targeted car bombings and kidnappings. Full-fledged fighting resumed in 1999 under the Second Chechen War (Tishkov). After 1999, Chechen terrorist groups escalated violence and conducted most of their well-known operations.

Since 2000, "Chechen militant involvement has been identified in approximately thirty terrorist acts in the Russian Federation, leading Vladamir Putin to refer to the Republic as the 'epicenter of the global war on terror'" (Banner, 2009, 80). More importantly, "these attacks…garnered worldwide attention because more than 40 percent of suicide attacks featured groups of women as perpetrators" (Banner, 80), with the women involved in attacks wearing black robes and full face veils. These women were dubbed "Black Widows" because of their dress and because they were related to men killed by Russian forces (Banner, 81). Western media portrayed Chechen women "as a 'striking cult of vengeance' that set a new standard for would—be 'heroines of jihad'" (Banner, 81). Two of their more notorious attacks include the Dubrovka Theater and the Beslan School.

On October 22, 2002, women veiled in black and donning suicide belts entered the Dubrovka Theater demanding an end to Russian occupation of Chechnya. Threatening to kill all the hostages in 1 week, rebels used video messages to denounce the Russian occupation and to negotiate the release of hostages. Despite initial fears on the part of Russian intelligence, only two of the hostages were killed before Special Forces stormed the theater on October 26; however, Special Forces used an opium-based gas in the theater and 113 of the hostages were killed by the gas—not by actions taken by the rebels. The dead bodies of the Chechen rebels "were shown on worldwide television. Still photos of the women with bombs still attached to their inert torsos were the most dramatic, their heads leaning back or hanging down, loose-jawed, faces framed by black veils" (Nivat, 2005, 414).

The Black Widows returned in 2004 with what was dubbed the Beslan school siege. On September 1, 2004, 30 militants invaded Middle School No. 1 in

(continued)

Beslan, Ossetia, taking students and teachers hostage in the gymnasium. The women militants wore suicide belts and carried rifles, prompting shock that *women* would endanger the lives of children. With about 1,000 hostages, the rebels again demanded Russian forces be removed from Chechnya, as well as the release of 24 militants who had been taken into Russian custody in 2004. After 3 days, two explosions went off. A bloody battle commenced, and by the end of the siege, more than 335 hostages died with over 700 injured (Staff, 2004).

According to their families and friends, the Black Widows only are able to defend themselves and their culture by using their bodies as bombs (Banner, 2009, 6). They are in despair. A friend of one of the Dubrovka Theater bombers, stated:

> Our only desire is to be able to live in peace, to wear a scarf if we want, to study whatever we want, including the Koran, and to perpetuate our families. But here, it is impossible… we take things into our own hands… we are not afraid anymore. We've already died (Nivat, 2005, 417).

Despair alone did not motivate the Black Widows, for their experiences and culture also determine their decisions. By living in a patriarchal society wherein they are valued less than men and their bodily integrity is at risk, especially with the loss of male relative who is a "protector," they chose suicide as a mode of agency (Banner, 2009). Under the Russian government's repression, they saw their only method of protest to be suicide bombings (Banner). By shattering social norms, these women garnered more media attention than a man in the same instance.

Women as Genocidaires

On June 24, 2011 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, former Rwandan Minister for Women's Empowerment, of genocide for her role in ordering rape and killing during the Rwandan genocide. Nyiramasuhuko became the first woman convicted of genocide. We shift the focus here from women victimized by genocide, as in Chapter 2, to women who perpetrate genocide.

Women typically take a less direct role in killing and more of a supporting role in genocides. Genocidal women are often cast as slightly removed from violence and perform more "feminine" tasks (Jones, 2010). For example, in the Rwandan genocide, Hutu women denounced Tutsis or turned them over to the killers, and women supported men who carried out the killing, by preparing meals, running errands, and bringing provisions to roadblocks (Hogg, 2010). They also "looted the corpses afterward" (Jones, 2010, 481). Similarly, women during the Holocaust in Nazi Germany brought meals and other supplies to men involved in the mass murdering of Jews at concentration camps or in forests (Kershner, 2010). Therefore,

support roles carried out by women during genocide are similar to those carried out by women guerillas and terrorists.

History also shows "the direct involvement of women" in violence, "joining men in attacking and pillaging refugee convoys (as Turkish women did in the Armenian genocide); and actively involving themselves in…concentration-camp atrocities under the Nazis" (Jones, 2010, 481). When women directly participate in genocide, they "have often been regarded as 'evil' or 'non-women'" (Hogg, 2010, 71), or, as "monsters" (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007). The "evil woman theory" purports that "'real women' do not commit crimes" and those who do or are "even worse than the male offenders" (Hogg, 2010, 100).

Why do women participate in genocide? Referencing Rwanda, Hogg (2010) identifies two reasons why ordinary women were complicit in the genocide. First, women were scared. They report that they were "forced" by the killers to disclose the hiding places of victims and were afraid that if they did not comply, they or their families would be killed. The second reason is the "the effect of …hate propaganda and the 'trumping' of ethnicity over gender" (Hogg, 86). Hutu women were incited, mainly through the radio, into believing that Tutsis *needed* to be killed. Men *and* women radio personalities and leaders instigated the propaganda.

Some women participate in genocide to prove their commitment to the cause. A famous story to emerge from the Holocaust was that of Ms. Petri, who was married to an SS officer. Stories of Ms. Petri focus on her marriage and her status as a mother. She murdered six Jewish children, ages 6–12. "She came across them while out riding in her carriage. She was the mother of two young children, and was 25 at the time. Near naked, the Jewish children had apparently escaped from a railroad car bound for the Sobibor camp. She took them home, fed them, then led them into the woods and shot them one by one" (Kershner, 2010, 1). The idea of Ms. Petri killing these children when she herself was a mother clashes with the ideal of the peaceful mother, yet she was motivated because of her belief in the Nazi cause.

A final reason why women participate in genocide relates to "interfemale rivalries" (Jones, 2010, 482). Adam Jones explains that in Rwanda, "Hutu women had long been depicted as less attractive and desirable than their Tutsi counterparts. Many Hutu women accordingly took pleasure in Tutsi women's 'comeuppance,' and proved more than willing to assist in inflicting it" (Jones, 482). With the exception of this final reason, men and women tend to participate in genocide for similar reasons—out of fear and incitement and/or to prove loyalty.

Media Reaction to Violent Women

Media responds to violence perpetrated by women with surprise, sympathy, and/or emphasis on motherhood, ruthlessness, sexuality, and/or appearance. Attacks by women draw greater media attention than attacks by men because they seem surprising due to a perception that women are not violent (Ali, 2005). The **CNN effect/ CNN factor** refers to a media effect that amplifies the impact of a terrorist attack,

occurring when attacks by female fighters are perceived of as "more deadly" than those conducted by male fighters. Media often replay coverage of attacks by women, thereby amplifying the attacks' impact.

Public response to terrorism by women may be more sympathetic, because women make terrorist acts look like they were caused for love of a man or country (Nacos, 2007). Media often assume that men have manipulated women terrorists, thus evoking sympathy. The media also portray women terrorists as mentally inept, coerced into action through a relationship with a man (especially regarding Islamic women), or as brainwashed victims (Sternadori, 2007; Talbot, 2001). As such, O'Connor (2010) explains that operations carried out by women make the terrorist organization seem less "evil."

Media often portray women acting violently as mothers, monsters, or whores (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007). One popular media narrative is that of a failed mother and/or one who cannot bear children (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2008). This type of reporting took place regarding Ulrike Meinhof, cofounder of the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany (1970–1988), also called the Red Army Faction. Ulrike Meinhof, who had two young children, eventually left her children to their father because of her involvement with the group. The first woman suicide bomber from Palestine, Wafa Idris, also received coverage as a failed mother, considering that prior to her attack her marriage had failed due to fertility problems. According to Alison (2009), motherhood is invoked when discussing women terrorists because of the incongruence regarding an individual who can give life and also take it away. Thus, "it is assumed that women and mothers don't hurt others, don't loot or steal, and certainly do not kill" (Brown, 2012, np).

At times, women terrorists have been portrayed as *more* violent, ruthless, and uncompromising than their men counterparts (Galvin, 1983). Media coverage pointing to an "attack bitch" seeking revenge is not uncommon (Sternadori, 2007). For example, Chechen women terrorists are described as bent on revenge, blood thirstily avenging the loss of a loved one. The "attack bitch" metaphor also can be attached to women politicians when they behave assertively (see Chapter 5).

Media also reference violent women's sexuality. Regarding suicide bombers, Sternadori explains that women may be seen as the "sexy babe" or as sexual objects for men as the media focus on the women's attractiveness or paints them as sexually motivated (Sternadori, 2007). Coverage often mentions "how they were dressed, as well as their body language or facial expressions" (Sternadori, 17). Leila Khaled, the Palestinian terrorist introduced above, received such coverage. In the 1960s, she was described as a "girl terrorist" and a "deadly beauty" (The Guardian, 2001).

Conclusions

This chapter focused on women engaged in violence as terrorists and genocidaires. While some scholars believe women's motivations for violent action are different from those of men, most evidence suggests that women and men are similarly

motivated to violent actions. Women in most cases herein did not express feminism as a cause for terrorist participation. Nevertheless, the media often react to violent women differently than they do to violent men. Differences also exist in *how* women act violently, with women less likely than men to take leadership roles; however, women are rising to key leadership positions in many terrorist organizations and increasingly participating in suicide terrorism.

Violent women are often mothers and wives, and although this clashes with our stereotype of "the peaceful woman" or maternal life-giving behavior, they have agency as terrorists and genocidaires. Oftentimes, women act violently because their voices are not heard in any other way. Consequently, we must problematize this agency. Is it possible for women to be agentic in ways other than terrorism, in a world where women's participation as terrorists sometimes outpaces their participation in parliaments (see Chapter 5)?

Chapter 4
Women in Social Movement Groups as Related to Terrorism

Introduction

Terrorism is no laughing matter; however, social movement groups often make a spectacle of serious issues in order to draw the public's attention to them. Take for example women in Code Pink who wear feather boas, Statue of Liberty crowns, and clothing in "the hue of Barbie dolls" to protest for peace in the world today (Copeland, 2007, np). "They've dressed in pink surgical scrubs to hand out 'prescriptions for peace,' and in pink slips to call for the president's ouster" (Copeland, np). Their name plays on the homeland security color-coded threat levels of yellow, orange, and red. They "wage peace" by challenging counterterrorism policies associated with the war on terror, such as the use of drones, and by urging the impeachment of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama (Code Pink, 2012).

In this chapter, we discuss groups like Code Pink, that seek to end violence surrounding terrorism, but also groups of women who support alleged terrorists. Our goal is to capture the wide array of women organized in social movements as activists addressing the politics of terrorism and/or counterterrorism. What are these activists' motivations, goals, and tactics? How does gender influence their activism?

Code Pink demonstration in front of the White House on July 4, 2006.
Photo by Ben Schumin

Background to Women Organized in Social Groups

Kriesi (1992) defines **social movements** as "an organized, sustained, self-conscious challenge to existing authorities on behalf of constituencies whose goals are not taken into account by these authorities" (22). The claims of women activists typically do not make front-page news regarding terrorism; rather, they are marginalized. Thus, women use social movement activity to influence authorities and the general public.

We distinguish between women's movements and "women in movements." **Women's movements** are groups with central goals pertaining to "women's gendered experiences, women's issues, and women's leadership and decision making" (Beckwith, 1996, 1038). **Women in movements** refers to activism by women in movements not primarily focused on women's issues and experiences. For example, we discuss women activists in terrorism survivor groups. Though these women express gendered claims, they are not in a "women's movement" because gender issues do not guide the groups' actions and men may lead the groups (Beckwith, 2000, 437).

The definition of a women's movement may be applied to feminist, antifeminist, and nonfeminist movements (Beckwith, 2000). Whereas *feminist* **women's movements** challenge "political, social and other power arrangements of domination and subordination on the basis of gender" (Beckwith, 437), *antifeminist* **women's movements** "protect women's socially ascribed gender roles" in the private sphere (Alvarez, 1990, 24). *Nonfeminist* **women's movements**, unlike antifeminists, accept women's entry into the public sphere, yet do not actively seek changes in gender relations. In fact, nonfeminist groups reproduce gender relations as they often uphold feminine, wifely, and maternal ideals (see Ortbals, 2010). Nonfeminists respond to issues important to women and families "like

education, childcare, [and] family violence" (Matland & Montgomery, 2003, 61). In this chapter, nonfeminists are mobilized as mothers as a way to end terrorist violence in their communities or to seek better treatment for their children who are alleged terrorists.

Five kinds of social groups, grouped into two camps, are discussed here. First, we discuss women in groups who practice maternal politics by seeking goals related to their own children or to mothering their communities. Most of these groups are nonfeminist, but some advocate for gender equality. Four groups fit under this umbrella: prisoners' rights groups, victims/survivors' groups, peace groups, and counterideological groups. Groups that critique terrorism, security, and violence from a feminist perspective constitute a second category. Though peace groups can be nonfeminist and maternalist, feminist groups also pursue peace through a framework that challenges gender relations and sees peace as possible if patriarchy is dismantled. We ask how each group acts to support or counter terrorism and how gender motivates them and frames their action. We divide the chapter into maternal activism and feminist activism, but we acknowledge that groups often function somewhere between these two camps.

Maternal Politics in Social Movement Groups: Advocating for Family and Peace

Being a mother is one of the most acceptable identities for women in international politics (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007). Motherhood is key to nationalism because women bear and raise the generations of a nation. Moreover, women are viewed as less violent than men and more capable of facilitating peace in the international system because they are attributed maternal characteristics like care and gentleness (Åhäll, 2012).

Three reasons demonstrated by three very different women's groups—Latina janitors in Los Angeles, Chilean Leftists, and Nicaraguan antirevolutionaries—illustrate why women incorporate maternal identity into social movement action. First, women use maternal politics because the maternal identity ties to their everyday experiences and those of their children. In the case of union politics in Los Angeles in the 1990s, Latina janitors participated in protests because they wanted to better their children's lives. One woman protested for employment benefits because, "women take the children to the doctor, and they see how much it costs. And that's why we are fighting for health insurance" (Cranford, 2007, 375). Similarly, in the 1980s, Rightist, antirevolutionary women in Nicaragua protested against poor prison conditions experienced by their relatives in jails run by the governing Sandinistas (Bayard de Volo, 2004). During the right-wing Augusto Pinochet dictatorship in the 1980s, Chilean women joined organizations for families of the politically repressed, imprisoned, and executed. By pointing out the ill effects of state terrorism on their family members, these women added a motherhood emphasis to the larger pro-democracy movement in Chile (Valenzuela, 1998).

Second, social groups practice maternal politics because framing protest as an extension of motherhood is strategic. Rita Noonan, speaking of Chile in the 1980s, explains that motherhood is a safe identity to activate—even to speak out against state terror—because motherhood implies care for one's children, which is not overtly suspect in the eyes of authoritarian regimes (1995).

Third, other actors (the state or NGOs) mobilize politically inactive women through compelling maternal discourses, thus convincing them to politically support a cause. During the 1980s in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas of the ruling, leftist regime organized mothers' groups and used pressure from mothers to conscript young men into the regime's revolutionary cause (Bayard de Volo, 2004). Thus, rather than women organizing themselves from the grassroots, other actors—whether social groups or governments—may mobilize women by way of maternal identity.

Prisoners' Rights and Victims' Rights Groups

Using this framework, we can ask why women in groups addressing terrorism use maternal politics. Our first examples are of prisoners' rights groups and survivors/victims' groups from the Basque Country, situated between France and Spain. Women in these groups act based on the first above-mentioned reason: maternal politics ties to their personal experiences with terrorism and/or those of their children.

Prisoners' rights groups argue for the repatriation of their sons and daughters back to the Basque homeland from prisons around Spain and France, for the Spanish and French states purposely place prisoners far from their homeland as a way to stymie terrorism communications and actions. These prisoners mainly are accused of being ETA operatives and/or having participated in the outlawed political party of Batasuna, and they are in jail for violent and nonviolent activities. The prisoners' rights groups invoke the language of motherhood when seeking the return of their children. In January of 2012, at a prisoner's rights march in Bilbao, Spain, Consu Mayo the mother of Gorka Mayo, detained for participating in Batasuna, stated "my son … does not have blood on his hands. For a year, he has been detained without trial. I am here to advocate for his rights" (Mora, 2012, np). Consu Mayo participates in a group called Exterat. Women in groups like Exterat often brandish flags with the outline of the Basque country stating "euskal presoak, euskal herrira," meaning "Basque prisoners in the Basque country," and they argue that their children should be returned to their families (even if not released from prison), by being incarcerated in their home communities.

Victims' rights groups in the Basque country also invoke motherhood. They argue for the state to crack down on ETA because they have lost husbands, children, or parents to terrorist violence. For example, women in the Association for the Victims of Terrorism (AVT) argue against amnesty for ETA prisoners and advocate for pensions, housing, and health benefits for survivors or families of victims. More men than women have died as a result of ETA violence (see Chapter 2); thus

Signs flown throughout the Basque country calling for the repatriation of Basque prisoners. From ukberri.net

many family members of victims are women. The story of Ana María Vidal-Abarca is illustrative. ETA killed her husband, who was in law enforcement in the Basque Country, in 1980. She and her four daughters relocated to Madrid, she met other women whose husbands had been killed or injured, and together they began AVT. She explains, "I had been to so many funerals…I had seen so many widows…I thought I had to do something" (Calderín, 2012). Many widows had young children, but struggled because they did not have employment opportunities or support from government. In part because of Vidal-Abarca's activism, the Spanish government passed a law in 2011 guaranteeing compensation from the state for victims and families affected by terrorism.

Similarly, women in organizations in Mexico organize for victims' rights, though they face a different kind of terrorism and violence—**narcoterrorism**, defined as "the use of extreme force and violence by producers and distributors of narcotics against a government or population, intended to coerce that body to modify its behavior in their favor" (Dyson, 2012, 31). Dangers associated with narcoterrorism include assassinations and kidnappings, and, as of 2012 over 40,000 people are dead and 10,000 more have disappeared since the Mexican government began a war on drugs in 2006.

Women's activism related to narcoterrorism manifests in peace marches and in an NGO called Justice for our Daughters (*Justicia para Nuestras Hijas*), created in 2002, for the purpose of questioning feminicides in the Mexican towns bordering the United States (particularly Ciudad Juarez and areas in Chihuahua State). As discussed in Chapter 2, feminicide is the targeting killing of women or girls. Some feminicide deaths are directly related to the drug trade, but others constitute a form of gender violence, becoming permissible given the state's inability to control narcoterrorism. According to Justice for our Daughters, "Mexico's 98 percent impunity rate for all crimes, corruption within various levels of government, and desperation among the population…has created a carte blanche for any type of gender violence

to occur" (Justicia para Nuestras Hijas, 2012, np). Dr. Cynthia Bejarano, a criminal justice professor at New Mexico State University, concurs: "People are willing to commit crimes against women—whether that's sexual assault, rape, murder—right now is the time to do it because you can get away with it" (Frandino, 2011, np). Describing themselves as "poor women…[who] have suffered…the pain and anguish of losing a daughter," they state "WE WANT JUSTICE, FOR OUR DAUGHTERS, FOR THE MISSING, FOR THE DEAD, WE DEMAND JUSTICE" (Justicia para Nuestras Hijas, 2012, np).

Chapter 2 discussed the struggle survivors of genocide face. Some women seek social connections to heal, cope, and seek justice; and many do so, by joining women's groups and participating in community activities. These groups are sometimes feminist and other times nonfeminist. A good example of a nonfeminist group is Project Air, run by the WE-ACT organization, which set up yoga classes for survivors of genocide in Rwanda. A feminist example is the Women's Court Initiative in the former Yugoslavia, discussed in the second half of this chapter.

Peace Advocates

Motherhood is also used in Mexico to seek peace and better public policies. For example, women from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador, with children who "disappeared" while attempting to migrate to the United States across the Mexican border, marched to Mexico City in "caravans" to seek information from the Mexican government. The goals of the peace caravan of 2012, the third of its kind, were "to build bridges between victims of the war on drugs and those who have suffered from the structural violence of the state…" (Pastrana, 2011, np).

The caravans are not solely made up of women; however, the fight against narcoterrorism and state violence is gendered in that the 2012 caravan took place on Mother's Day. One woman protester, speaking of disappeared family members, claimed that Mexican mothers have "nothing to celebrate…as families, we want to take this occasion to tell society not to forget that in Mexico there is [a] home with a plate and a empty seat" (Paterson, 2012, np). Another woman added, "Our pain and our struggle for our missing sons and daughters are heightened when we see that part of society is indifferent, when we see a government that also contains corrupt authorities who are in league with criminal elements" (Pastrana, np).

Sri Lankan women have fought political violence through a feminist framework (Hoole, 2007), but they also have used a nonfeminist framework of motherhood to seek peace and information about the deaths of their children (de Alwis, 2009). As Chapter 3 noted, women have been active participants in the Sri Lankan civil war and terrorism in Sri Lanka since the 1970s. Motherhood politics is perceived as a safe way to pursue peace, and one of the most well-known women's groups from the time of the civil war is called the Mothers' Front. The group began in 1984 as a way for Tamil women to speak out against state violence against Tamil youth. A founder

of the Front sought answers in her son's death after he was taken from her home, and likely received them because she was affluent, as other poorer women never got answers. She stated, "I am the luckiest mother in Sri Lanka… I got my son's body back. There are thousands of mothers who never get their children's bodies back" (Coll, 1991, np). Because of their "'traditional' family values," these mothers captured "an important space for protest when feminist and human rights activists who were critical of … violence were being killed with impunity" (de Alwis, 2009, 84).

Mothers in Counterideological Groups

Aman-o-Nisa: Pakistan Women's Coalition Against Extremism is a women's group focusing on mothers and sons as a way to stymie terrorism. Aman-o-Nisa advocates **counterideological work**, defined as challenging terrorist propaganda by "presenting alternatives to terrorist ideology" (Hassan, 2006, 535). This group has worked with Secretary Hillary Clinton at the U.S. State Department and has received support from the US Institute for Peace. The organization wants to eradicate extremism in Pakistan by working with mothers who can influence Pakistani children away from radicalism (Aman-o-Nisa, 2011). Aman-o-Nisa practices maternal politics, while also promoting women's rights and women's participation in counterterrorism. The group is made up of professional women who promote women in higher government and societal posts.

Aman-o-Nisa's grassroots efforts include education curriculum for youth stressing democracy and tolerance and programs for extremist youth that offer alternative interpretations of Islamic principles. Women in the organization consult with former, radical extremists to identify the Quran verses used to radicalize youth, and they teach alternative perspectives, from moderate scholars, about those verses. The group emphasizes the special qualities of women who promote peace. A recent conference of the group concluded, "transformation of attitudes needs to start from within the home and communities. As mothers and teachers, women hold enormous sway in these arenas and can largely influence attitudinal and behavioral shifts in Pakistan's next generation" (Hunt Alternative Funds, 2012, np). A group leader, Mossarat Qadeem, further explains the role of mothers: "In Pashtun society, a woman…is very well-respected…the sons—they do listen to the mothers. … once a mother is convinced, I think, you convince the whole family, the whole community then" (Qadeem qtd. in National Public Radio, 2012).

Pursuing peace, however, is not without consequences as Aman-o-Nisa acknowledges that "if a woman goes out and starts getting involved in such [counter-ideology] activities, she is definitely going to be at risk" (Weingarten, 2012, np). Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE), an initiative of Women Without Borders, highlighted in the case study at the end of the chapter, similarly emphasizes women's importance in combating extremism in Pakistan. The immediate case study that follows reviews the maternal politics of *Las Madres* in Argentina.

Case Study: Maternal Politics and the Madres of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina

In Argentina, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, radical Leftists launched terrorist attacks against symbols of capitalism, including bankers, whom they kidnapped or assassinated. Right-wing extremists formed militias and enacted terror in response. When President Juan Perón died in 1974, the ideological terror escalated, creating a cycle of violence between the police and terrorists, which prompted the military to take over the government in a coup. A junta of three military commanders ruled the country between 1976 and 1983. The military waged the Dirty War during this time, committing atrocities to root out Leftist extremists and anyone tangentially associated with them.

Between 9,000 and 30,000 people "were disappeared" and/or killed during the Dirty War. Victims were typically young people from the working class. Prisoners were tortured by electrocution and sexual abuse, and people were killed in heinous ways, including death flights over the Atlantic, during which prisoners would be drugged and dropped alive to drown in the ocean. The disappeared, known as the *desaparecidos*, mostly were not heard from again, leaving families with no information of their deaths or ability to bury their remains. More men than women were disappeared during the Dirty War; however, some women prisoners gave birth in jail, were later killed, and military families adopted their children.

Women largely were not represented in politics and economics at this point in Argentine history. Many women were housewives, and the country's culture reflected *machismo* and *marianismo*. **Machismo** is exaggerated masculinity and indicates male dominance in society and politics, whereas **marianismo** reflects the adoration of the religious mother Mary and conveys the expectation that women's life pursuits are sacrifice and motherhood. The Madres of the Plaza de Mayo reflect these expectations, as their reason for mobilization was to find their disappeared sons and daughters. The women became activists as they sought information about the disappeared from authorities, and they turned to one another as they began to recognize their common plight *vis-à-vis* the authorities who would not provide information. The Madres began meeting in churches, and eventually moved their protest to the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires in 1977, gathering in a large circle in the plaza located in front of the Argentine Presidential Palace, *Casa Rosada* (Bouvard, 1994). The mothers were mostly from the working class, were middle aged, and had minimal education. One mother explained,

> [E]ach of us Mothers is born again in the circle….One Mother leaves her apron in the kitchen, another her sewing machine, yet another her typewriter. We have to be present at three-thirty in the afternoon…Not one Mother fails…What mysterious hand convokes us? The puzzle of our children's fate, which didn't stop us from going on…the son's photograph on the night table; every Thursday it would point the way—'Today is the circle, Mom:—to the Plaza!' (Mellibovsky, 1997, 82–83).

(Continued)

At the plaza, women wore white scarves embroidered with the names of their children. Their maternal politics caught worldwide attention and hastened democracies like the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States to put pressure on the Argentine government (Bouvard, 1994); however, even as mothers, the women were harassed by police officers and sometimes arrested, and one of their founders, Azucena Villaflor De Vicente, was disappeared in 1977. The mothers empowered themselves through camaraderie (Bosco, 2006). One madre stated,

> My first time in the circle I was very scared…and deeply moved…Once we were in the Plaza, the fact of being arm in arm, or of walking together compelled us to return… we could talk [to each other] about our concerns without any problem, without fear, and the person by our side listened very, attentively (Mellibovsky, 1997, 84–85).

The women protested by walking peacefully around the Plaza de Mayo, every Thursday, continuing to this day.

By demanding information about their children from Argentine officials, thus garnering international attention, the mothers helped to facilitate the return of democracy in Argentina in 1983. They have since won the 1999 Prize for Peace Education from the United Nations. Moreover, they have inspired many women activists worldwide—as their repertoire of maternal politics and peaceful demonstrations translates into other contexts in which women also confront state terrorism or warfare that endanger their families.

Madres with Argentine President Néstor Kirchner. From www. presidencia.gov.ar

The Madres splintered in 1986, and some of the mothers since have become controversial. One group of mothers desired information about the remains of relatives, and these Madres approved of exhumations by the then democratic

(Continued)

government (*Madres Línea-Fundadora*). Other mothers refuse exhumation and closure, insisting that their loved ones deserve justice not burial as dead persons (*Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo*) (Pauchulo, 2008). This second group, led by Hebe Bonafini, has expanded its activism to include support for the poor and against neoliberalism (Borland, 2006). These mothers are connected to the international left (e.g., Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez), thus prompting some to accuse the Mothers of supporting terrorists. The other group of Madres (*Madres Línea-Fundadora*), for example, harshly criticized Hebe Bonafini for speaking out in favor of ETA in Spain (Europa Press-Servicio National, 2000). Though Bonafini advocates for those who have little power in the international system, like those in ETA seeking a homeland, her views are distinct from the Madres' original goal of searching for disappeared sons and daughters.

Feminist Politics in Social Movement Groups: Challenging Patriarchy and Violence

Feminist peace activists also use maternal discourses at times, thereby making it difficult to classify groups responding to terrorism and violence. Our focus in this section, however, is squarely on women's groups that question patriarchy and believe gender equality and women's participation in international affairs is necessary to change the international system predicated on war.

Should women influence international affairs because they are naturally more peaceful than men? According to these activists, yes and no. Women peace activists who were social reformers in the United States in the 1800s tied the eradication of war violence to other social ills they believed threatened society, such as liquor. They favored peace "as childbearers…[with] a special affinity for preserving life" (Ziegler, 1990, 72), but they also saw themselves as "social housekeepers" who could clean up the ills of the "public world" (di Leonardo, 1985, 602). When women in the United States obtained suffrage, some activists believed women soon would occupy the reins of government, consequently changing institutions and culture, and making peace a reality (Alonso, 1993). Women invoked motherhood and women's special penchant for peace to provide "acceptable cover for their highly political work" (Alonso, 11); however, by entering the public sphere, they also wanted to change the status quo, altering gender relations and building new institutions and traditions (Ziegler, 1990).

Second wave feminism in the 1960s and 1970s moved women's culture and traditions in a new direction. Instead of focusing on occupying existing institutions, activists sought out all-women spaces in the form of peace camps situated near US

Women at Greenham Common, December 1982. Photo by Ceridwen (www.geograph.org.uk)

military bases and/or nuclear arsenals. By physically occupying spaces near the "real" spaces of power, peace camps served as nonviolent, visual reminders that women were fighting against the Cold War, nuclear weapons, and proliferation. Women lived at the camps (with famous ones in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia) for prolonged periods, slept and washed their clothes there, and created posters and art as a way to communicate with the media. The camps valued creativity and fomented a "feminist cultural renaissance" (Murray, 2010, 4). Moreover, camps included the participation of lesbian activists at a time when lesbianism was stigmatized in many advanced democracies (Murray). One famous example of a peace camp existed in Greenham, UK. The Greenham Common camp began at noon on December 12, 1982 when 30,000 women held hands around the six-mile perimeter fence of a US Air Force base to protest the UK government's decision to site American cruise missiles there. Women stayed at the camp for 19 years.

What is the logic of feminist peace activism today? First, many scholars and activists reject the older movement's pacifist link to maternity, considering it **essentialism**, the idea that "human behavior is 'natural,' predetermined by genetic, biological, or psychological mechanisms and thus not subject to change" (Vance, 2006, 29). Thus, they reject the idea that all women are born with a tendency toward peace. As Cynthia Cockburn argues, "to expect women to be naturally unaggressive

is a recipe for disappointment," for many women wholeheartedly rally around troops and war efforts (Cockburn, 2003, np). If women's biology does not unite them in the fight for peace, another "bridge" is necessary, argued to be a *feminism* based on gender experiences shared by women (though these experiences also vary among women). Women share a number of gendered experiences, including primary responsibility for caregiving (motherhood, but also eldercare), gender discrimination and division in economic life, and sexualized violence; and, women are present in combat contexts even as they are absent in military decision-making (Cockburn). These gendered experiences may make women question why countries spend substantial public funds on defense rather than domestic policies that impact women's caregiving responsibilities (Alonso, 1993). Women also may question why their bodies are front and center in war—through rape as a weapon and prostitution associated with military encampments—yet they have little say in how/whether those wars are fought (di Leonardo, 1985).

What can be done to remedy these realities relates back to the ideas of early women activists: more women need to be in prominent roles in society and politics—as politicians or as participants in social activism—in order for policy priorities to change. Also, women must point out that the violence of war is connected to other kinds of violence, whether colonialism, racism, and/or gender violence. Cockburn (2003) argues that the US war on terror creates a new sort of colonialism and racism, as the United States and her allies occupy areas of the world and discriminatorily label "others" as bad, such as "Muslims" and "terrorists." Moreover, gender violence is linked to terrorist violence, as seen with the case of Justice for Our Daughters. Although narcoterrorism is not responsible for every feminicide death near Juarez, the context of permissive violence brought on by Mexico's drug war leads to violence against women. Alonso concurs, explaining that military training often utilizes misogynist and homophobic language, violently expressing the desire to "fuck" an enemy or calling young men "fags" and "girls" if they fail to perform at a certain standard. As violence against "others" pervades a culture, according to feminists, "the result is an easy swing to domestic violence, date rape, and child abuse" (Alonso, 1993, 10). Women in Black and Code Pink provide examples of how groups graft feminist principles with pacifist goals. These groups address terrorism by challenging the "war on terrorism."

Women in Black

Women in Black began in Israel in 1988 to address the occupation of Israel in the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. Though the group found inspiration in Argentina's Madres, as Women in Black hold silent, nonviolent vigils, they are also adamantly feminist. Women in Black find inspiration in feminist peace camps, and their website states "we have a feminist understanding: that male violence against women in domestic life and in the community, in times of peace and in times of war, are interrelated. Violence is a means of controlling women" (Women in Black, 2012a, np).

Inauguration Day Vigil, Oakland, January 20, 2005 (photo by Eva). Reprinted with permission from Bay Area Women in Black (www.bayareawomeninblack.org)

From Israel, Women in Black expanded to Europe—particularly Italy, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia—and later to India, Philippines, the UK, and the United States. Groups are now in over 30 countries. The groups' actions are always nonviolent, but they are direct and assertive. Groups hold vigils against militarism at military bases, "refusing to comply with orders" (Women in Black, 2012a, np). Their placards displayed at vigils, say, for example, "no war in my name" and "how many dead children?" Three examples of Women in Black's activities offer a sampling of their tactics and beliefs. First, Women in Black in the Bay Area (San Francisco, California) held weekly, Saturday vigils in 2007 to protest the US military's role in Iraq, potential US conflicts with Iran, and the occupation of Palestine. They stated,

> JOIN US as we use the powerful presence of our vigil to bring attention to the costs, political, economic and moral, of these two occupations [Iraq and Palestine] that increasingly resemble each other… [we] must counter those who use name-calling and heated rhetoric (Bay Area Women in Black, 2007).

Second, Women in Black in Belgrade, Serbia, active since the early 1990s, have raised awareness about the atrocities committed by their own government during the Yugoslav conflicts (see Chapter 2). They also support Bosnian women by attending commemorations of massacres. At a ceremony commemorating Srebrenica, a Serb woman conveyed her unity with all victims of terrorism, including Bosnians, by stating, "My nationality is—woman…Sept. 11 and July 11 (date of the Srebrenica massacre) are linked because those were attacks against civilians, those were terrorist acts" (Associated Press Newswires, 11 September 2002). Women in Black in Belgrade, along with other women's groups, set up the Women's Court Initiative in the former Yugoslavia. Because many rapists in wars and genocides are never

punished (see Chapter 2), the women, in public proceedings of a "women's court," will "testify about their experience during and after war, and their vision for addressing gender and structural violence and individual and community healing" (Global Fund for Women, 2011, np). Women in Black are not well received in Serbia, for they have been "beaten and even tear gassed" during their protests (Bzganovic, 2012, np).

Third, Women in Black in London have held vigils to recognize the rape of women and the proliferation of small arms in the Democratic Republic of Congo. They called on the UK government to "implement the UK laws on arms brokering and strengthen the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports…[and] demand women have seats at the peace negotiation tables…[and] support local women's and peace organizations" (Women in Black, 2012b, np).

Code Pink

Code Pink, the vibrant and riotous group discussed in this chapter's introduction, holds goals similar to Women in Black. They reject militarism, particularly in Iraq and in Palestine, are committed to nonviolence, and work across borders to pursue peace for all women. Code Pink began in 2002 to stand up to President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq and to make fun of the homeland security color-coded alert system. They joked, "President Bush was telling us all to be afraid: **CODE ORANGE!** Duct tape your windows shut! **CODE YELLOW!** Saran-wrap everything in your freezer! We decided we needed to open a space for women to respond with love, humor and spirit: we decided that America needed **CODEPINK**" (Code Pink, 2012, np).

Code Pink's actions, unlike those of Women in Black, are not vigil-like. In fact, Code Pink women often scream at current and former politicians, whom they believe are war criminals and responsible for deaths and torture. They also choose the bright and feminine color of pink to frame their activism. Code Pink does not directly answer the "feminist question" on its website, though scholars believe that they are feminist, because they are "a women-led organization that seeks to empower women politically, creating space for women to speak out for justice and peace in their communities, the media and the halls of Congress" (Code Pink, 2012, np). Kutz-Flamenbaum calls Code Pink a "feminist performance activist group" (2007, 99) that uses carnivalesque activities to "draw attention to the differential impact of war on women, challenge gender norms by explicitly and implicitly critiquing the relationship between militarism and patriarchy, and attract media attention" (2007, 90). As such, Code Pink stresses the connection between military spending and policies such as "education, health care, veteran's benefits and social services," which they would prefer the US government to prioritize over military spending (Code Pink, 2012).

Analysis of Women in Black and Code Pink

Both Women in Black and Code Pink respond to terrorism by rejecting the war on terror. Rather than focusing on the violence of terrorists themselves, the groups argue against the United States' and its coalition partners' assertive response to countries/regions where terrorism emerges. Women in Black consider the Iraq War to be an invasion, and they wish for discontinuation of militarism in the Middle East.

Though September 11, 2001 happened more than a decade ago, Code Pink argues that the United States is still spending money and perpetuating violence—such as drone attacks—in the name of fighting terrorism. Though drone attacks took out top leaders of Al Qaeda in 2012, a Code Pink activist has stated, "We apologize to the people of Pakistan for the strikes that have killed so many civilians. The CIA needs to be held accountable for their strikes" (Yusufzai, 2012, np).

It should be noted that Code Pink is criticized for its nonconventional position on terrorism policies. In 2011 conservative, US talk show host Glenn Beck critiqued Code Pink, citing the group's 2009 trip to Gaza, during which activists met with women's groups and Hamas representatives. He stated, "Can you imagine a terrorist organization—can you imagine if any of us were cozy with Hamas…I thought Code Pink was anti-war, anti-violence. What are they doing with terrorists like Hamas?" (Beck qtd. in O'Donnell, 2011).

Case Study: Women Without Borders

Women Without Borders (*Frauen Ohne Grenzen*) is a feminist organization headquartered in Vienna, Austria, founded in 2002. Its mission is to "encourage women to take the lead in their personal and public lives" and to "invest in women from all over the world as they strive toward inclusion and participation in all levels of the decision-making process" (Women Without Borders, 2012, np). Focusing on core beliefs of advancement, equality and participation, Women Without Borders carries out projects that give women space in the public arena to "raise their voices and state their concerns, to actively participate in social, political and economic activities at all levels, and to empower women to achieve positive change" (Personal Communication, 2012). This group particularly focuses on the intersections between maternal and feminist politics and peace.

In 2008, Women Without Borders launched a global campaign aimed at targeting terrorism called Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE). SAVE is the first women's counterterrorism platform and brings together women from several walks of life—victims and survivors of terrorist attacks, activists, educators, policymakers, and peace-building experts from around the world "to create a new sisterhood and contribute to a safer and more secure world" (Women Without Borders, 2012, np). By setting forth a feminist

(Continued)

agenda, SAVE explicitly strives to make women realize their agency and responsibility in countering violent extremism, while welcoming and relying on the support of male allies (Personal Communication, 2012). SAVE has projects to combat extremism in India, Israel and Palestine, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Yemen, and Indonesia, and a key step in the initiation and continued success of SAVE's projects is the building of relationships with established nongovernmental organizations in the target countries (Personal Communication, 2012). Focusing on all forms of violent extremism, SAVE's platform argues "women must be included as sought-after contributors in the security arena" so that "politicians and journalists can find alternate, oft-neglected viewpoints on conflicts, negotiations, and bases of popular support by turning to these women's networks" (Women Without Borders, 2012, np).

In an interview conducted for this book, Elaine Hargrove of Women Without Borders was asked about the primary cause of violent extremism. She stated, "I believe that a sense of isolation and despair, disillusionment with mainstream society and politics, at times economic distress, and a search for identity are key contributing factors to radicalization and extremism." She went on to explain,

> women have a key role to play in finding and implementing new, alternative approaches to ending violent extremism. Their voices, experiences, and ideas have been utterly neglected to date, but their close proximity to potentially vulnerable youth through their roles as the main caretaker in most societies provides them with a unique point of view that can lead to vital insights into how to steer youth away from violence (Elaine Hargrove, 2012).

Women, then, are key to ending violence and shedding light on violent extremism. As Hargrove states,

> …the single most important thing women can do to end violence is to provide alternative narratives, paths, activities, and perceived outcomes to their children, other youths, and community members… as one of our interview partners in Northern Ireland pointed out, women tend to think more long-term than men: "how will this affect my children? How will this affect my grandchildren?" …however, women's voices remain sidelined and their priorities neglected. If women are therefore empowered, self-confident, and respected enough to challenge dominant thought processes and responses to events, they can contribute significantly to ending violence by offering to their family and community members more peaceful ways of resolving conflict (Elaine Hargrove, 2012).

Conclusions

This chapter focused on the relationship between social groups and political violence, and particularly terrorism. Women mobilize in groups to advocate for victims

of terrorism and for alleged terrorists. Women also mobilize in groups to advocate for peace through maternalist politics. These groups are mostly nonfeminist, yet sometimes they also champion women's rights. Women in groups draw upon their private lives and identities as mothers as an inspiration for protest. Moreover, women are fighting for peace through feminist women's movements. Feminist groups, like Women Without Borders/SAVE, Code Pink, and Women in Black, argue that unless patriarchy is dismantled and women are present in politics, violence will continue.

Thus, women are acting with agency in social groups and are present in politics surrounding terrorism. While these examples of women's agency may be considered more constructive than the agency of women terrorists (see Chapter 3), all activists in groups do not meet with success. Sometimes women's foray into the politics of political violence is met with negative reactions and even threats to their safety and lives. Feminist activism is also a prominent theme in the chapter. However, because feminist peace activists do not support status quo counterterrorism measures, they may be seen as terrorist sympathizers. The motherhood theme also is prevalent here. Women express that they are motivated for peace as mothers. Feminist groups, however, often challenge maternal politics, insisting instead that women should seek peace based upon shared gendered experiences.

Chapter 5
Terrorism and Women Political Elites

Introduction

> … [T]he Women's Peace Party (1915), consisted largely of suffragists who stressed that the elimination of war was not possible unless women not only had the right to vote but also made up half of every nation's governing body (Alonso, 1993, 12).

Nearly one hundred years ago the Women's Peace Party advocated for women in power positions as a way to stop political violence, yet women are not even close to half of politicians in most countries' governing bodies. As of 2012, women on average are 20% of legislators worldwide, and only two countries—Rwanda and Andorra—have women as 50% of their legislators (Interparliamentary Union, 2012). Furthermore, women do not make up top leadership positions related to foreign policy (Goldstein, 2001). Thus, women often have better representation in terrorist groups, than in parliaments. As discussed in Chapter 3, many terrorist groups include 20% women in their ranks or more.

This chapter focuses on women political elites acting in the realm of terrorism policymaking. We examine to what extent women are present in policy positions in which they can influence terrorism, if/how they experience or respond to terrorism in gendered ways, and how the media reacts to their responses. The chapter mainly draws on examples from the Basque region and the United States.

Throughout the chapter, we use the terminology of framing and frames. **Framing** refers to how elites or the media construct and present reality. **Frames** present "little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin, 1980, 6), and they articulate how reality is defined and interpreted by various actors and institutions (Benford, 1997). We are interested in how women elites frame their own identities and actions *vis à vis* terrorism and how elites are framed by the media when they respond to terrorism concerns.

Descriptive Representation of Women Elites in Terrorism Policymaking

Gender and terrorism research typically investigates women as targets of violent activity (see Chapter 2) or as perpetrators of violence (see Chapter 3). Few scholars examine how terrorism affects women political leaders. To explore this question, we must ask to what extent women are present in leadership positions related to terrorism. Put another way, what is the descriptive representation of women in these positions? **Descriptive representation** of women means the absolute numbers of women in government, and it is often stated as the percent of political leaders who are women. As mentioned in this chapter's introduction, the descriptive representation of women in legislatures worldwide is 20%.

Women typically do not occupy governmental positions with authority over terrorism policymaking, or, in other words, they are not usually descriptively represented in the positions of head of state or head of government or as ministers of defense, state, or interior. **Head of state** refers to the chief public representative of a country. The **head of government** is a country's political leader, in charge of running the country and policymaking. In the United States and most of Latin America, the president is both head of state and head of government, while other countries have prime ministers who are head of government and presidents (or monarchs) who are head of state. Situated under the head of government in the executive is the cabinet. The cabinet (or ministry) portfolios most associated with combating terrorism are defense, state, or interior. **A defense department or ministry** would manage the military as related to terrorism, and a **state department** would be responsible for diplomacy and foreign policy related to terrorism. **Interior ministries** deal with policing and immigration as related to terrorism (and can be called a ministry of home affairs). In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is roughly similar to interior ministries in other countries.

Women's sparse presence in the above-mentioned positions is a puzzle, because women's descriptive representation has been increasing in other political positions over time. Many political parties and/or governments have adopted **gender quotas**, which mandate the proportion of women who must be candidates on election lists or ballots. As a result of quotas, women's representation in legislatures has increased. While 20% of legislators worldwide are women as of 2012, women were only 11.7% of legislators in 1997 (Interparliamentary Union, 2012). Some countries mandate **parity**, namely equal, 50/50 representation of women. Heads of governments also may choose to appoint half women and half men to cabinets, resulting in more women in the executive. According to Krook and O'Brian, "in recent years countries with more than 40% women [in cabinets] have grown more diverse to include Chile, Spain, France, Switzerland, Nicaragua, South Africa, Burundi, and Germany" (2011, 9).

Nevertheless, women are rarely in the positions of President, Prime Minister, or in the various ministries impacting terrorism. In fact, "women [executive] leaders in certain regions [of the world] are largely limited to relatives of former executives

or opposition leaders" (Jalalzai, 2010, 136). Why is this the case? Women, if viewed as part of a family or connected to men, might be acceptable as leaders, but they are not seen as independent agents in politics. Moreover, some believe women do not have the toughness and leadership skills associated with being the head of government or head of state. Elite political positions are gendered in a masculine way, "leading to assumptions of men's superiority at handling military conflicts" (Jalalzai, 139). Chapter 6 elaborates on how gender expectations about leaders influence citizens' voting behavior. Thus, while women in chief executive positions are increasing (about 100 women have occupied head of government positions over the last 50 years), complete equity with men has not transpired.

Research on women cabinet ministers tells a similar story. First, though women are more common in cabinets today, they do not have parity representation in most cabinets worldwide (Krook & O'Brien, 2011). Second, women tend to lead ministries or departments that are feminine (i.e., family, culture, education, and social services), rather than masculine (i.e., defense, economic, finance, security, and agriculture) (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2009; Krook & O'Brien, 2011). Because women often are viewed as compassionate or as mothers, they are considered fit to oversee ministries related to family and social services. Considering that terrorism policymaking generally comes from "masculine" ministries, women often lack the opportunity to engage in this policy area. The presence of women in the military also is less than desirable. Women are "unseen," constrained, and/or not equal to men in the military (Cockburn, 2003), though women have long been present in military life, as wives, camp followers, and laundresses (Enloe, 2000). When women occupy high positions in the military, they face expectations of **hegemonic masculinity**, meaning that they are expected to convey aggression and independence rather than feminine traits (Connell, 1995).

Therefore, though the descriptive representation of women has increased over time, especially in legislatures, women do not have an equal presence in terrorism policymaking. The two tables presented below demonstrate this conclusion in numerical terms. Table 5.1 shows the women who have been in positions of head of government, minister of defense, or minister of interior since 1970. We can see that not only have women occupied very few positions, most of their positions have been held since 1980, and many women advance through positions, meaning that they might hold positions of defense, then interior, and then head of government; yet, this also means fewer women overall have their chance at governing.

Table 5.2 references the authors' research into the Basque case, and suggests several conclusions. First, women are significantly represented in the regional, legislative sphere, and they are moderately represented in the national, legislative sphere. This is likely due to quotas in France and Spain, which have seen greater implementation and/or success at the subnational level. Second, Table 5.2 shows that women in Spain and the Spanish Basque Country are slightly more represented in security and terrorism areas than their French counterparts. This dovetails with findings presented later in this chapter: several Spanish elites believe that women's positions related to terrorism are increasing, whereas some French elites discuss the sexism they experience in "masculine" policy areas. Thus, we are reminded that

Table 5.1 Presence of women as political executives and ministers of portfolios related to terrorism

	Head of government	Defense minister	Interior minister[a]
Europe			
Austria			Liese Prokop (2004–2006) Maria Fekter (July 1, 2008–2011)
Belgium			Annemie Turtelboom (July 17, 2009–2011)
Bosnia	Biljana Plavšić (November 18, 1990–April 1992) Tatjana Ljujić Mijatović (2002–2006) (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Borjana Krišto (February 22, 2007–2012)	(Acting minister, then Deputy minister) Marina Pendeš (2007–2012)	
Bulgaria	Reneta Indzhova, Bulgaria Interim Prime Minister (1994–1995)		
Croatia	Jadranka Kosor (July 6, 2009–2011)	Dr. Zeljka Antunovic (July 30, 2002–December 23, 2003) Vlasta Parkanová (January 9, 2007–May 8, 2009)	Đurđa Adleši (January 12, 2008–2011)
Czech Republic			
Denmark		Gitte Lillelund Bech (February 23, 2010–2011)	Nathalie Lind (1973–1975; 1978–1979) Britta Caroc Schall Holberg (1982–1986) (Minister of Interior) Birte Weiss (1993–1997); (Minister of Justice and Police) Pia Gjellerup (1993) Karen Jespersen (2000–2001) Lene Espersen (2001–2008) Karen Ellemann (2009–2010)
Estonia			Lagle Parek (1992–November 27, 1993)
Finland	Anneli Jäätteenmäki (April 17, 2003–June 24, 2003), Mari Kiviniemi (June 22, 2010–2011)	Elisabeth Rehn (1990–1995) Anneli Kariina Taina (April 13, 1995–April 15, 1999)	Kaisa Raatikainen (1984–1987) Anne Holmlund (April 19, 2007–present)
France	Edith Cresson (May 15, 1991–April 2, 1992)	Michèle Alliot-Marie (May 7, 2002–May 18, 2007)	Marie-Josée Roig (November 29, 2004–May 31, 2005) Michèle Alliot-Marie (May 18, 2007–June 23, 2009)
Germany	Angela Merkel (November 22, 2005–2012)		
Greece			Vasso Papandreou (February 19, 1999–March 20, 2000; April 13, 2000–October 24, 2001)

Country		
Hungary		Dr. Mónika Lamperth (May 27, 2002–June 9, 2006)
Iceland	Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir (February 1, 2009–2012)	
Ireland	Mary Robinson (December 3, 1990–September 12, 1997) Mary McAleese (November 11, 1997–2011)	
Italy		Rosa Russo Iervolino (October 21, 1998–December 22, 1999)
Latvia	Solvita bolti a (2005–2006) Linda M miece (January 5, 2006–April 7, 2006)	Linda M miece (2009–2011)
Lithuania	Kasimiera Prunskien (March 17, 1990–Januray 10, 1991) Irena Degutienė (May 3, 1999–May 18, 1999; October 27, 1999–November 3, 1999)	Rasa Juknevi ienė (December 9, 2008–2012)
Macedonia (Republic of)	Radmila Sekerinska (May 12, 2004–June 2, 2004; November 18, 2004–December 17, 2004)	Dosta Dimovska (1999–2001) Gordana Jankulovska (2006–2012)
Moldova	Zinaida Grecianîi (March 31, 2008–November 14, 2009)	
Netherlands		Ien Dales (1989–1994) Guusje ter Horst (February 22, 2007–February 23, 2010)
Norway	Gro Harlem Brundtland (February 4, 1981–October 14, 1981; May 9, 1986–October 16, 1989; November 3, 1990–October 25, 1996) Anne Enger Lahnstein (August 31, 1998–September 23, 1998)	Eldbjørg Løwer (1999–2000) Kristin Krohn Devold (2001–2005) Anne-Grethe Strøm-Erichsen (2005–2009) Grete Faremo (October 20, 2009–2011) Inger Louise Valle (1973–1979) Mona Scobie Røkke (1981–1985) Wenche Frogn Sellæg (1985–1986) Helen Bøsterud (1986–1989) Else Bugge Fougner (1989) Kari Gjesteby (1990–1992) Grete Faremo (1992–1996) Anne Holt (1996–1997) Gerd-Liv Valla (1997) Aud Inger Aure (1997–1999) Hanne Harlem (2000–2001) Grete Faremo (2011–2012)
Poland	Hanna Suchocka (July 11, 1992–October 25, 1993)	
Portugal	Dr. Maria de Lourdes Ruivo da Silva Pintasilgo (August 1, 1979–Januay 3, 1980)	

Table 5.1 (continued)

	Head of government	Defense minister	Interior minister[a]
San Marino	Antonella Mularoni (December 3, 2008–2012)		Clara Boscagli (1976–1978) Francesca Michelotti (2000–2002) Emma Rossi (2002) Valeria Ciavatta (July 27, 2006–2012)
Slovenia		Ljubica Jeluši (2008–2012)	Katarina Kresal (November 21, 2008–2011)
Spain		Carme Chacón Piqueras (April 2008–2011)	
Sweden		Lena Hjelm-Walén (September 30, 2002–October 22, 2002) Leni Björklund (November 4, 2002–October 6, 2006)	
Switzerland	Ruth Dreifuss (January 1, 1999–December 31, 1999) Micheline Calmy-Rey (January 1, 2007–December 31, 2007 and January 1, 2011–December 31, 2011) Doris Leuthard (January 1, 2010–December 31, 2010) Eveline Widmer-Schlump (January 1, 2012–December 31, 2012)		Elisabeth Kopp (October 21, 1984–January 12, 1989) Ruth Dreifuss (March 10, 1993–December 31, 2002) Micheline Calmy-Rey (January 1, 2003–2011) Doris Leuthard (August 1, 2006–October 31, 2010) Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf (January 1, 2008–2012)
Turkey	Tansu Çiller (June 25, 1993–March 7, 1996)		Meral Ak ener (1996–1997)
Ukraine	Yuliya Tymoshenko (January 24, 2005–September 8, 2005; December 18, 2007–March 11, 2010)		
United Kingdom	Margaret Thatcher (May 4, 1979 –November 28, 1990)		(Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety) Hazel Blaers (2003–2006) (Home Secretary) Jacqui Smith (June 28, 2007–June 5, 2009) Theresa May (May 11, 2010–present) (Attorney General for England and Wales) Patricia Scotland, Baroness Scotland of Asthal (June 28, 2007–May 11, 2010)
North America			
Canada	A. Kim Campbell (June 25, 1993–November 4, 1993)	(Associate Minister) Mary Collins (1989–1993) A. Kim Campbell (January 4, 1993–June 24, 2003) (Associate Minister) Albina Guarnieri (2003–2004)	

Country			
United States		(Secretary of the Air Force) Sheila E. Widnall (August 6, 1993–October 31, 1997) (Acting Navy Secretary) Susan Morissey Livingstone (July 26, 2001–February 7, 2003)	(Secretary of Homeland Security) Janet Napolitano (January 21, 2009–2012) (National Security Advisor) Condoleeza Rice (2001–2005) (Department of Justice, Attorney General) Janet Reno (March 12, 1993–January 20, 2001)
Oceana			
Australia	Julia Gillard (June 24, 2010–2012)		
New Zealand	Jenny Shipley (December 8, 1997–December 10, 1999) Helen Clark (December 10, 1999–November 19, 2008)	(Associate Minister) Annette King (2005–2007) (Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control) Georgina te Heuheu (November 19, 2008–2011) (Associate Minister) Heather Roy (November 2008–August 2010)	Margaret Austin (1989–1990) Annette King (October 19, 2005–November 19, 2008) (Minister of Police) Judith Collins (November 19, 2008–2011)
Latin America			
Argentina*	Isabel Martínez de Perón (July 1, 1974–March 24, 1976) Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (December 10, 2007–2012)	Nilda Garré (November 28, 2005–2010)	Nilda Garré (December 15, 2010–2012)
Brazil*			(Ministry of Justice): Ivete Lund Viegas (October 4, 2002–December 7, 2002)
Chile	Michelle Bachelet Jeria (March 11, 2006–March 11, 2010)	Michelle Bachelet Jeria (January 7, 2002–October 1, 2004) Vivianne Blanlot Soza (March 11, 2006–March 27, 2007)	Adriana Delpiano Puelma (May 9, 2005–May 24, 2005)
Costa Rica	Laura Chinchilla Miranda (May 8, 2010–2012)		Laura Chinchilla Miranda (1996–1998), Janina del Vecchio Ugalde (June 2008–May 2010)
Nicaragua*	Violeta Barrios Torres de Chamorro (April 25, 1990–January 10, 1997)	Violeta Barrios Torres de Chamorro (April 25, 1990–January 10, 1997) Cristian Matus Rodríguez (2000) Ruth Tapia Roa (2007)	Ana Isabel Morales Mazín (2007–2012)
Uruguay		Azucena Berrutti (March 2005–March 2008)	Daisy Tourné (March 8, 2007–June 5, 2009)

Table 5.1 (continued)

	Head of government	Defense minister	Interior minister[a]
Middle East			
Israel	Golda Meir (March 17, 1969–April 10, 1974)		
Asia			
Bangladesh*	Khaleda Zia (March 20, 1991–March 20, 1996; September 1, 2001–October 29, 2006); Hasina Wajed (June 23, 1996–July 15, 2001; January 6, 2009–2012)	Khaleda Zia (1991–1996; 2001–2006) Hasina Wajed (1996 –2001)	Sahara Khatun (February 2009–2012)
India*	Indira Gandhi (January 24, 1966–March 24, 1977; January 14, 1980–October 31, 1984)	Indira Gandhi (1975–1977)	
Japan		Yuriko Koike (July 4, 2007–August 27, 2007)	(Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) Chikage Oogi (January 6, 2001–September 22, 2003)
Philippines*	Corazon Aquino (February 25, 1986–June 30, 1992), Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (January 20, 2001–June 30, 2010)		
South Korea		(Acting) Chang Sang (July 11, 2002–July 31, 2002); Han Myung-sook (April 19, 2006–March 7, 2007)	
Caribbean			
Jamaica	Portia Simpson-Miller (March 30, 2006–November 11, 2007)		
Africa			
Senegal*	Mame Madior Boye (March 3, 2001–November 4, 2002)	Mame Madior Boye (2002)	
South Africa*		Lindiwe Nonceba Sisulu (May 10, 2009–2012)	Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula (2004–2009)
			Dr. Nkosazana C. Dlamini-Zuma (May 10, 2009–2012)

NB: These are countries considered full democracies (score of 10) and democracies (score of 6–9) in the *Global Report 2009* by the *Centers for Systemic Peace and Global Policy*. Democracies (6–9) are denoted by an (*)

[a]Represents departments of interior, internal security, justice, policing, and home affairs

Table 5.2 Presence of women in politics in France, Spain, and the Basque regions

	France	Spain
National level		
Percent women in National Legislature and Executive	26.9 as of 2012 (National Assembly) 22.2 as of 2012 (Senate) 49.0 as of 2012 (Government/ Cabinet)	36.0 as of 2011 (Congress of Deputies) 33.5 as of 2011 (Senate) 30.8 as of 2011 (Executive Cabinet)
Evidence of women in National Interior/ Defense Ministry or Prime Minister	Edith Cresson (Prime Minister, 1991–1992) Michele Alliot-Marie (Interior Minister, 2007–2009; Defense Minister, 2002-2007)	Carme Chacón (Defense Minister, 2008–2011) No Woman Interior Minister or Prime Minister in Spain's history (but Doña Pilar Gallego Berruezo is sub-secretary of Interior as of 2011) Doña Sonia Ramos Pineiro (Director of General Support to Victims of Terrorism in the Interior Ministry as of 2012)
Regional level		
Percent women in Regional Legislature and Executive	47.0 (Aquitaine as of 2011)[a]	45.3 as of 2009 (Basque Parliament) 50.0 as of 2009 (Executive Cabinet of Basque Government)
Evidence of women in Regional Interior Ministry	No regional ministries[a] Little evidence of women in such portfolios at regional or local level	No women as regional Interior Minister in Basque Country's history Notable positions held by women related to Interior/Police (2009--): Nelida Santos Diaz (Deputy Interior Minister of Administration and Services) Maixabel Lasa Iturrioz (Director of the Department of Assistance to Victims of Terrorism of the Basque Government in Interior Ministry) Joana Madrigal Jiménez (President of the Parliamentary Commission on Institutions, Interior, and Justice)

Adapted from Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011

[a]Representation of regional ministries in France does not exist due to the unitary structure of the state

women in different contexts experience the impacts of terrorism and political violence in distinct ways. Third, the data show that women elites are not equally represented in terrorism policymaking compared to men, even in countries like France and Spain, where there are gender quotas and cultural claims of gender equality.

Substantive Representation of Women Elites in Terrorism Policymaking

Though women are not often found in governmental positions with authority over terrorism policymaking, Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary of State in the United States (2005–2009) and National Security Advisor (2001–2005), is a prominent

exception. At a 2011 public forum on the campus of Pepperdine University, the former Secretary of State was asked if her identity as a woman influenced her work in foreign policy. As a professor and social scientist by trade, she creatively declined to say, explaining that she was only one "case" as a woman, and without having experienced being a cabinet secretary as a man, she did not have enough cases to properly analyze and compare experiences. On the other hand, she later mentioned her collaborative work on foreign policy with women cabinet ministers and secretaries from other countries, and how together they advocated for women worldwide. Would Secretary Rice believe that women elites act differently than men elites responding to terrorism? Was she expressing that women elites have a particular "woman's perspective" on world affairs or was she implying that her experiences should not be thought of as any different than a man's experiences?

Questions like these point to the idea of substantive representation. Whereas descriptive representation refers to the raw number or percentage of women in politics, **substantive representation** refers to how a representative acts on behalf of his/her constituency. Scholars debate whether and how women politicians act as representatives "for women" as a particular constituency, and they consider the substantive representation of women to consist of women politicians speaking out and voting for women's issues. **Women's issues** mean issues related to women's lives, such as women's health, the gendered division of labor (women's double duty of work within and outside the home), and women's responsibilities in the private sphere (pertaining to children, family, and community) (Celis, 2009). Because all women do not have the same preferences about what it means to improve women's lives, "women representing women" is not as straightforward as it sounds. Moreover, scholarship is unclear about whether women elites have a specific "women's perspective" on military, security, and terrorism policy (see Chapter 6 about whether women as constituents have a "women's perspective" on terrorism). Although peace advocates view women as agents for peace in a violent world (see Chapter 4), Goldstein indicates that many women elites in the United States do not think they act differently than men as related to foreign policy. He states,

> A 1993 study of foreign policy insiders found that … nearly 90% of men and women at both [the] State and Defense [Departments], excluding career women at Defense who split evenly, thought that having more women in the Department would not affect foreign policy or process. Overall, little evidence shows that women foreign policy insiders hold a 'women's perspective' on international issues or the policy process (Goldstein, 2001, 124, citing study by McGlen and Sarkees 1993)

Nevertheless, one could still argue that women elites experience and respond to terrorism in a way unique to women. Studies of American politics have shown that as women candidates and politicians represent "women's issues," or "caring areas" related to education, health and welfare, they are *less likely* to focus on policies surrounding terrorism and security (Kahn, 1996). Women politicians often emphasize "'female' issues, such as education and health policy, while men are more likely to stress their commitment to 'male' issues, such as the economy and defense policy" (Kahn, 35). Alternatively, women may also be called to act in ways that bolster what the public and media often consider as their weak points, namely personality traits stereotyped as

male like competence (Kahn) or policy interests stereotyped as male such as national security (Swers, 2007). Most men politicians, on the other hand, would be less likely to experience criticism *as men* for "weak points" related to masculine policy areas.

Women politicians are sometimes torn between appearing competent or tough regarding terror and representing so-called women's issues. For instance, in Northern Ireland, Besançon (2002) found in an interview with a political elite that the politician thought she should say that disarmament was the most salient issue, even though she did not really think it was the most important issue and saw issues of education, health, and employment as more important.

Women politicians also are put in a bind because the public associates maternal traits and care work with women, regardless of whether or not they have children (Monopoli, 2009), and this association results in the expectation that women politicians will work in caring policy areas and will shy away from violent policy areas, like terrorism. According to Monopoli (2009) "… to bear a child is a biological form of maternalism associated with all women, whether individual candidates wish to affirm this identity or not" (160). However, when women are associated with maternalism they are thought to be "weaker" on terrorism and unviable as political candidates, instead of as candidates with unique, maternal perspectives on violence.

Examining what women elites have to say about their own experiences in the areas of security and terrorism is an appropriate way to elaborate the above-mentioned trends. Do women elites think they act in a distinct way, possibly to represent women in their response to terrorism? We discuss this inquiry by summarizing interviews with women elites from the Basque region.

Basque Women Elites Framing their Experiences with Terrorism

We use frames to describe how women elites articulate their gender realities (Benford, 1997). Recall from the introduction that framing is a way individuals and institutions articulate, "what exists." Framing can also be thought of as a way of "**doing gender**," meaning how individuals discuss perceived gender differences and similarities, thereby constituting gender relations through social interactions (Deutsch, 2007; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Social interactions yield various **gender frames**, or social interpretations of gender.

Women elites may frame their actions in *feminist* and/or traditional *feminine* ways. When an individual uses a **feminist gender frame**, she emphasizes the rights of women, their political agency, and women's emancipation from male-dominated societies (Baldez, 2003). When an individual uses a **feminine gender frame**, she accentuates women's private lives, in particular their housewife and mother identities, as well as women's appearances and so-called feminine traits, such as gentleness or emotionalism (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007; Sylvester & Parashar, 2009). Feminine framing also suggests that women are invisible or lack agency in politics (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007). Women elites use six main frames, which can be found in Table 5.2.

The first three are feminine frames, the next two are feminist frames, and the last one is a frame claiming feminine attributes as a way to express women's agency.

Without essentializing women elites, two conclusions about the experiences of women can be made. First and foremost, many women we interviewed feel equal to men as responders to terrorism, expressing what we call a feminist frame of equality. Though descriptive representation of women in terrorism policymaking is low, the women who are present claim to make a difference in policymaking. However, some women report sexism in politics, indicating that hegemonic masculinity in this policy area requires women to express themselves in relation to what masculinity has dictated as appropriate.

Table 5.3 Feminine frames and feminist frames

Name of frame	Description of frame	Supporting sources
Private life frame	*Feminizes women elites* by focusing on their family and home life. This frame is used when an elite invokes her status as a wife or mother	Sreberny and Van Zoonen (2000), Baird (2005), Noonan (1995)
Cover girl frame	*Feminizes women elites* by emphasizing their physical appearance. Women elites articulate this frame if they assert that feminine looks are essential to political success	Baird (2005)
"Attack bitch" frame	*Masculinizes women elites* by attributing exaggerated toughness and strength to them, presuming the *feminized* inferiority of others. A politician uses this frame to bolster her perceived weak points, i.e., lack of toughness, strength, and fortitude	Nacos (2005), Pantti (2011), Gidengil and Everitt (2003)
Equality frame	*Asserts feminism*, for women elites to be equal to men in terms of participation, agency, and competence in policymaking. Women elites may assert competence and agency in order to emphasize equality relative to men	McCammon et al. (2007), Baldez (2003)
Transformative change frame	*Asserts feminism*, for women elites to dismantle patriarchal structures that maintain masculine power and to empower women in politics. Women elites articulate this frame when they express that their leadership can transform gender relations	Lombardo and Meier (2009), Deutsch (2007)
Relational frame	*Flips feminine ideals to assert women's agency* through women's special way of governing. This frame stresses women's relationship skills and their ability to understand policy issues and constituent concerns in an interconnected, distinctly responsive way	Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger (2011)

Adapted from Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger (2011)

Case Study: Elite Framing in the Basque Regions of France and Spain

In a previous paper (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011), we presented data from 14 interviews conducted with local political elites in the Basque regions of Spain and France. The interviews, from 2011, were anonymous; thus the women did not frame their experiences as a way to impress the media or constituents. The women invoked frames presented in Table 5.3. Below is a summary of the paper's results:

- **Private Lives Frame**: This frame was present in interviews, as many women elites talked about balancing work and family (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011). According to one respondent, "as with every woman who works outside the home, women who are dedicated to politics suffer, especially the difficulties of reconciling work and family life" (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger). Because of assassination threats, some women elites in Spain conveyed that they fear for their children's lives. Elites also used the private roles frame to explain why women are more likely to work on "caring" policy areas and are less likely to work in portfolios dealing with security. The caring areas dovetail more closely with their other responsibilities inside and outside the home.
- **The Cover Girl Frame was not invoked** (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011).
- **"Attack Bitch" Frame**: Though women elites typically stressed equality (see below), some mentioned sexism in politics as leading to a need to act like men in order to succeed in terrorism policymaking. One typical response sums it up. "In order to be accepted in politics, you have to act like a man. You have to talk loudly and be bold. You can't be too 'feminine'. In order to succeed, I have to take on more male characteristics because of the sexism" (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011).
- **Equality Frame**: Together with the private roles frame, the interviewees used this frame the most. Women used it when first discussing their role in terrorism policymaking (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011). Women stressed that they fight for democracy and stand up to terrorism in no way different than men politicians. This is likely due to the institutional norm of gender equity discussed above (through quotas in both countries) and due to norms of liberty, fraternity, *and equality* in France (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger). While women espoused the equality frame, some acknowledged sexism in politics and stated the need to act like men (see "attack bitch" frame).
- **Transformational Change Frame**: While no women talked explicitly about dismantling patriarchal structures, some Spanish women predicted change in gender relations over time, claiming women eventually would be prominent in terrorism policymaking (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011).

(Continued)

- **Relational Frame**: Women in France and Spain expressed that they have a unique way to govern that influences terrorism policymaking. A French elite stated, "I think women who are involved in politics, particularly at the local level, see things differently than men. They focus more on the relationships in the community." Another French elite said, "all policy areas are connected. That is why education is as important as fighting terrorism and improving our environment. You have to look at the big picture. Women do this more than men" (Ortbals & Poloni-Staudinger, 2011).

Second, and in contrast, some women describe experiences with terrorism through the use of feminine frames. Some women explain how terrorism influences their families and private lives, and others believe a "woman's perspective" would help to educate citizens about values other than violence. Thus, women elites have experiences and/or perspectives that differ from men elites. Not all women elites claim this unique position related to terrorism, but those who do, believe feminine traits are helpful in curtailing terrorism. In the next section we ask a similar question: do the media use feminine or feminist frames to discuss women political elites?

Women Elites' Representation in the Media

Feminist scholars have long studied media representations of women, suggesting women candidates and politicians receive less media coverage than men (Aday & Devitt, 2001; Heldman, Carroll & Olson, 2000), but are more likely to receive coverage about their maternal and/or marital status (Pantti, 2011). Gaye Tuchman in 1978 labeled the media's condemnation, trivialization, and exclusion of women as "symbolic annihilation," arguing, however, that as society changed so too would representations of women elites in the media (Pantti). The 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing rearticulated this goal, and delegates to the conference urged the media to promote a less stereotyped image of women in the media and to increase representation of women in the media. Delegates advocated for change because the media too often sees women politicians as less professional or serious than their male counterparts (Van Dijck, 2002, 2).

Research about American politics suggests women receive less coverage in the media than men (Aday & Devitt, 2001; Heldman et al., 2000), "even if journalists rarely employ simple, crude gender stereotypes typical of earlier decades covering female and male politicians" (Pantti, 2011, np). The sexism that remains is subtle, based upon the gendering of the individual. "Media images still reflect stereotypical reflections of gender roles. A male politician is first and foremost perceived as a politician. A female politician however is first and

foremost seen as a woman, a wife and a mother. Her profession is rarely separated from her gender" (Van Dijck, 2002, 2).

The media also use women elites to report on "soft" issues (such as education and culture), while using men to report on "hard" issues (such as economics and foreign policy) (Pantti, 2011). Thus, even when media recognize women's agency in politics, they convey that women's actions do not stray from the "acceptable" areas for women's participation.

In the case studies below, we examine these trends. Do the media use blatant stereotypes to discuss women who are responding to terrorism? Or, do the media suggest that women are more representative of so-called feminine traits? The first case looks at Spanish and French elites in the policy areas of terrorism and security, and the second case reviews the media's portrayal of Hillary Clinton as a policy-maker in the United States. Whereas the French and Spanish data do not show the media's utilization of overt feminine or feminist framing, the Hillary Clinton case demonstrates the media's use of feminine frames.

Media Framing: French and Spanish Elites

The following case study reports the degree to which women are gendered in the national media of France and Spain, the two countries facing terrorism in the Basque region (see Chapters 3 and 4). While the Basque data earlier in this chapter show how *local* women elites frame *their own actions* related to terrorism policy-making, the following data concern the *media's framing* of *women elites at the national level* in France and Spain. The frames discussed in Table 5.3 help gauge how the media present women elites, through the use of feminine frames (stereotypical understandings of feminine gender) or feminist frames (women as equal and transformative).

Case Study: Media Framing of Elites in France and Spain

We **content analyzed** articles about women who are national-level politicians. Content analysis is quantitative analysis of written work, and, in this case, we analyzed news articles in which women elites and terrorism were discussed in the same story. The news stories we evaluated, 212 in all, included coverage of the following women: Carme Chacón (Defense Minister of Spain, 2008–2011), Edith Cresson (Prime Minister of France, 1991–1992), and Michele Alliot-Marie (Defense Minister of France, 2002–2007, and Interior Minister of France, 2007–2009). We coded the articles to see the degree to which feminine and/or feminist frames were present in the media reporting.

We found the media specifically addressed the women elites' sex only about 1% of the time. In addition, the articles mentioned women's appearance only

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(Continued)

about 2% of the time. When appearance was mentioned, it was not done in a way as to invoke the cover girl frame, yet was a brief commentary on the color of a blouse or cut of hair. We found limited discussion of the women in terms of their family status, with their family being discussed in less than 2% of the articles. This negates the idea that the media use the *private lives frame* to discuss women politicians. We find slightly higher levels of gender words being used in the articles (female, gender, woman, mother), yet this only occurs in 4.5% of the articles. Thus, the media did not overtly frame women politicians in a gendered way. However, we found subtle indications of gendering. In 9% of the articles, women were ascribed personality traits that are considered traditionally "feminine" such as innocent, compassionate, and caring. On the other hand, traits considered traditionally "masculine" such as steeliness, resolve, and assertiveness were ascribed to women in less than 2% of the articles. The majority of the articles did not discuss personality traits at all.

Women's actions surrounding terrorism were judged in only 2% of the articles. That is, the majority of the articles report facts without making a judgment on the women's job performance. In addition, about 14% of the articles provide a biography of the woman politician. Of those bios, about half indicate that the woman had achieved a "first," i.e., the first woman as Minister of Defense. Thus, while overt gendering in terms of job performance does not occur in the articles, the media treats women's entry into male-dominated positions as something that needs to be explicitly addressed. These bios are more likely to be reported earlier in a woman's career than later.

Media Framing: Hillary Clinton and the Bin Laden Raid

Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, was present in the White House Situation Room during the capture and death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011. **The Situation Room**, a conference room for discussing American security and intelligence matters, is historically a male domain in US politics (Goldstein, 2001), and Clinton's actions in this room came under question for gendered reasons. A photographer took a picture of policy leaders watching the bin Laden raid in Abbottabad from the room, and Clinton appeared with her hand over her mouth, leading the media to misconstrue what she called a cough for a woman's display of emotionalism. While we did not find evidence of feminine framing of national level elites in Spain and France, this case study shows how the media genders women and men leaders.

The iconic Situation Room photo. From www.whitehouse.gov

Case Study: The Gendering of the Bin Laden Raid

How did the media interpret Hillary Clinton's expression in the Situation Room photo? We evaluate the media's response by content analyzing 5 days of news articles, from May 2 to May 6, 2011. The 37 articles analyzed were identified by using the combined search terms "Hillary Clinton," "bin Laden," and "photo."

Conversations about the "Hillary photo" began on May 2, after the White House released photos from the raid the day before. On May 5, Clinton was interviewed and she stated her perceived gasp of anxiety was in fact a spring-time cough. However, coverage purporting Hillary's anxiety and/or shock continued into May 6. The media described the reaction and emotion of all officials in the Situation Room, as a group, in 23 of the articles (62%), and in about half of those articles (12) the officials are described as being anxious or tense (i.e., about a quarter of all articles label *everyone* in the room as tense).

Given that we searched for Clinton's name, her expression and/or actions in the photo are mentioned in almost every article (32 of 37). Feminine media framing is evidenced by the fact that emotions are attributed to Clinton in 16 articles (about half) and that her emotions are varied in many more ways than the emotions of men (see Table 5.4). She is described as anxious, worried, in shock, in horror, and in dread. Some articles make sweeping assumptions that all emotion and humanity in the room can be summed up by the expression on Clinton's face. Several times the "men" in the room are described as

(Continued)

expressionless, even though the group as a whole is thought to be tense. Whereas Obama has "steely eyes" with a serious expression, Clinton is "wide-eyed" and her eyes "tell the entire story." She is described as one of two women in the room, but her clothing and looks largely are not discussed. These data demonstrate that a woman in the Situation Room is framed as rare, and though Clinton's greater sense of emotion does not fit this expressionless, masculine space, she is applauded for bringing humanity to the space.

The other woman in the room is Audrey Tomason, Director for Counterterrorism. Blogs have described her as a "mystery woman" because the public and media could not quickly identify her policy position. The news articles in our analysis refer to her as a brunette, "the lowest-level official in the picture," and as a woman peeking out or popping up from behind the men. One article, without knowledge of her identity, stated that she could be a spy and that this photo might have leaked her identity. This article was entitled, "Riddle of Raid Snap 'Spy' Girl" (The Sun, 2011). Another article coyly asked, "who is that woman getting to peek in there and share this moment in history?" (*WWD*, 4 May 2011). The same question was not asked of lower-ranking men who are also difficult to identify in the photo. Tomason's framing by the media is more feminine than Clinton's framing. Whereas Clinton shows many emotions, Tomason is seen as small, barely able to peer over men, and she is a "girl," whose youth is observed.

Given the media's tendency not to quote women, who gets quoted in these articles is noteworthy. Hillary Clinton was not quoted until May 5, when she clarified that she was coughing. In these articles, the media cited her as saying she had "no idea" what the policymakers were doing at the time of the photo and that the raid constituted "38 intense minutes." Clinton made these comments at a policy address in Rome, at which she discussed US–Pakistani relations. However, only three articles mention her policy statements at this crucial moment for American foreign policy. Most articles after May 5 focused on her disputed cough and her "no idea" comment. Alternatively, in the immediate days after the raid, the media often quoted Leon Panetta (Director of CIA at the time, not in photo) and John Brennan (Obama's Counterterrorism Chief), and also provided quotations from David Cameron (British Prime Minister) and the White House photographer for George W. Bush (also a man).

Media surrounding the photo also suggests the framing of masculinity. At times, the articles refer to men as expressionless. Nevertheless, Table 5.4 shows that Brennan is considered gruff and President Obama is thought of as intense. In the 20 articles mentioning President Obama, his physical presence and position in the photo were critiqued in contrast to other men in the room. Though media typically comment on the looks and apparel of women politicians, it is interesting that the media judged President Obama for his casual attire

(Continued)

(tieless and wearing a windbreaker, for he had arrived to the room after golfing that Sunday). As the photo shows, Obama is over to one side of the room. The media framed this positioning as "hunched over in the corner" in contrast to being at the center of the action and in the largest leather chair in the room. Obama without stiff, dress clothes or military uniform and without the largest chair, therefore, did not display the hegemonic masculinity many expect of the country's top leader. Thus, President Obama's so-called "diminutive" presence in the room challenged masculine stereotypes associated with fighting terrorism (Brooks & Collins, 2011).

Therefore, data show the feminine framing of Hillary Clinton during the bin Laden raid. Hillary Clinton and Audrey Tomason were trivialized by the media. By focusing on emotion, Clinton's femininity was emphasized but also applauded as a window into the emotions of otherwise expressionless men. With only three articles attributing policymaking statements to Clinton, the media did not use feminist frames of equality and transformation to describe her. Tomason was trivialized by her physical positioning behind men and was referred to as a "girl," thus she too was not attributed agency. Though the media does not *always* frame women according to traditional femininity, women in policy positions related to terrorism still surprise the media and are the minority within masculine spaces.

Table 5.4 Media representations of gender in the White House Situation Room

Leader (policy position)	No. of articles in which discussed	Action/trait discussed (no. of stories in which mentioned)
Hillary Clinton (Secretary of State)	32	Physical traits: hand (clamped) over mouth (31); eyes telling a story (1); eyes staring ahead/watching (4); one of two women in room (2); general sense of expression, emotion, humanity on face (5)
		Clothing: tweed jacket (1)
		Emotions: anger (1); anxiety/tension (8); concerned (1); disbelief (1); dread (1); horror (1) shock/surprise (5); stricken (1); worried (1)
		Positioning in room: NA
Barack Obama (President)	20	Physical traits: grave/frowning face (5); posture is huddled/hunched/slumped over (10); shoulders raised (1); eyes staring intently/intense gaze (9); hand/fist to mouth (1); general sense of expression, emotion, humanity on face (1)
		Clothing: casual clothing (4)
		Emotions: anxiety/tension (3); concerned (4); stoic (1)
		Positioning in room: In the corner/to the side (10); sitting in small chair (3)

Table 5.4   (continued)

Leader (policy position)	No. of articles in which discussed	Action/trait discussed (no. of stories in which mentioned)
Joe Biden (vice president)	7	Physical traits: broadly filled out and sitting up (1); no expression on face (1) Clothing: casual clothing (1) Emotions: nervous (1); relaxed (3) Positioning in room: flanking Obama (1)
Robert Gates (Secretary of Defense)	4	Physical traits: unruffled (1); arms folded (1); No expression on face (1) Clothing: NA Emotions: NA Positioning in room: standing in back (1)
John Brennan (Counterterrorism advisor to the President)	4	Physical traits: NA Clothing: NA Emotions: gruff (2); anxiety/tension (1) Positioning in room: standing in back (1)
Audrey Tomason (Director for Counterterrorism)	3	Physical traits: Brunette (1); one of two women in room (1) Clothing: NA Emotions: NA Positioning in room: peeking over men's shoulders (2)

Note: The content analysis included 37 articles. *NA* = not available, as this particular action/trait was not mentioned by the media for the given policy leader

Conclusions

As stated in the beginning of the chapter, women political elites responding to terrorism constitute a new area of study. As such, the jury is still out regarding the nature of their policy responses and the media's framing of them. Descriptive representation in these policy areas is clearer: women do not tend to be elite leaders regarding terrorism. Substantively, some elites claim to have a woman's perspective on terrorism and peace, yet research is unclear about whether or not there is a substantive difference in how women react as policymakers to terrorism. Women elites themselves use both feminine and feminist frames to discuss their experiences with terrorism, and evidence of gendering in the media is mixed. We did not find significant gendering in the case of France and Spain, yet the case of Hilary Clinton did show gendering.

The motherhood theme was present in this chapter, with many elites occupying "feminine" portfolios because of their status as wives and mothers and due to media framing predicated on this role, which is attributed to *all women*. Women in positions to influence terrorism policymaking have agency, and they sometimes express a unique ability to fight terrorism from the perspective of feminist and relational frames. That is, some women elites argue for transformation in gender relations and some believe women can facilitate better solutions to terrorism because they are more relationship oriented than men. However, in a world where fewer women occupy positions of government power than terrorist organizations, we argue for increased representation of women in "masculine" policy areas.

Chapter 6
Terrorism and the Public: Gender, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior

Introduction

In early 2004, it looked as if the political Right in Spain, the Popular Party (PP), was poised to win national reelection, with public opinion polls showing a six-point margin over the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE). Prime Minister José María Aznar, leader of the PP, was in part popular with voters because he cracked down on ETA and banned its political party wing, Batasuna. Everything changed 3 days before the election on March 11 when the country was turned on its head by the largest terrorist attack on Spanish soil, the Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people and wounded 1,800. Public opinion, influenced by the attack, quickly turned as the Spanish public rallied behind PSOE leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who had run on a platform to remove Spanish troops from Iraq. While Prime Minister Aznar originally blamed the attack on ETA, it actually had been the work of Al Qaeda affiliates who stated they targeted Spain because of its involvement in the Iraq War. The Spanish public, already in favor of troop removal, threw support behind the candidate who had promised to remove Spanish troops from Iraq if elected. The Socialists handily won the election with a five-point win over the PP, marking an 11-point swing in 3 days.

Though the Spanish 2004 election illustrates the link between terrorism, public opinion, and voting behavior, few scholars study terrorism's effect on voting behavior. The existing scholarship focuses on the opinions of society at large (Kibris, 2010; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009), and mostly does not pay attention to terrorism's influence on women's public opinion and the voting behavior of women. Public opinion not only intersects with terrorism to influence voting, but it also plays a role in supporting terrorism. According to Afzal (2012), the importance of public support for terrorism and militant groups cannot be understated because these groups must have support to operate and survive.

This chapter has two goals. First, it explores the relationship between public opinion and terrorism, including support and nonsupport for terrorism. It also explores how public opinion is (or is not) gendered. Do women provide a different type of terrorist support than men? Do terrorists who are mothers lend legitimacy to terrorist acts, or can mothers influence terrorism with counterideological work (see Chapter 4)? Second, the chapter explores to what extent the relationship between voting behavior and terrorism is gendered. Will the public support a woman candidate during times of high terrorist threat or will the maternal identity of women candidates render them less acceptable? Moreover, do men and women display similar opinions about the threat of terrorism? The chapter closes by describing counterterrorism policies aimed at using women's opinions and influence to stymie the growth of terrorism support.

Key terms in this chapter require definitions. **Voting behavior** refers to voting patterns. Analysis of these patterns gauges why people vote as they do and how they arrive at the decisions they make. **Public opinion** refers to the aggregated opinions and beliefs held by a population. While most research about terrorism emanates from the political science subfield of **international relations**, which studies relationships between countries or between countries and non-state actors, most studies on the relationship between *terrorism and voting behavior* are conducted by **Americanists**, or those who study American politics. To a lesser extent, **comparativists**, or those who compare political phenomena across countries, study this topic. Most scholarship about *public opinion and support/nonsupport for terrorism* emanates from the comparative and international relations subfields.

Public Opinion and Terrorism

Favorable public opinion from the population for which terrorists groups claim to fight is key to the survival of terrorist groups (i.e., the Palestinian people for Hamas, Muslims all over the world for Al Qaeda, or the Basque people for ETA) (Criado, 2011). Supporters constitute recruits and informants for the terrorist group (Gupta, 2008) and mobilizing them is a key terrorist activity (Bloom, 2004; Criado, 2011).

Conventional wisdom in American policy circles surmises poverty is a root cause of terrorism support, yet scholarship challenges this idea. In a study comparing Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and Israeli Jewish terrorists, Krueger (2007) finds that poverty and lack of education do not explain support for terrorism. Similar findings emerge out of Pakistan (Fair, 2008; Shapiro & Fair, 2010). In fact, the very poor are less likely to support suicide attacks or attacks against civilians than other people (Fair & Shepherd, 2006).

Buena de Mesquita (2007) examined the determinants of public support for terrorism across several Muslim countries and did not find a relationship between support for terrorism and the economy, an individual's education level, and her/his support for democracy, meaning these variables did not influence whether or not someone would support terrorism. Instead, he found support for terrorism was

positively correlated with anti-Americanism (meaning those with anti-American feelings were more likely to support terrorism) and positively correlated with the belief that Islam should play a larger role in politics. Furthermore, those who thought the United States was a threat to Islam and those who thought free expression should be promoted were more likely to support terrorism. Other studies demonstrate that young people, computer users, those who believe Islam is under threat, and those who want religious leaders to play a larger role in politics are more likely to support suicide bombing and other attacks against civilians (Fair & Shepherd, 2006).

Support for terrorism varies by country. To assess public support for terrorism, a Pew survey asked individuals in Muslim countries the following question over several years:

> Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

Table 6.1 shows the survey's results. Percent support represents those individuals who answer terrorism is "often" or "sometimes" justified.

Table 6.1 Support for terrorism by country and year

Country	Year	Percent support
Bangladesh	Spring 2007	20
Bangladesh	Summer 2002	44
Egypt	Spring 2011	28
Egypt	Spring 2010	20
Egypt	Spring 2009	15
Egypt	Spring 2008	13
Egypt	Spring 2007	8
Egypt	Spring 2006	28
Indonesia	Spring 2011	10
Indonesia	Spring 2010	15
Indonesia	Spring 2009	13
Indonesia	Spring 2008	11
Indonesia	Spring 2007	10
Indonesia	Spring 2006	10
Indonesia	Spring 2005	15
Indonesia	Summer 2002	26
Jordan	Spring 2011	13
Jordan	Spring 2010	20
Jordan	Spring 2009	12
Jordan	Spring 2008	25
Jordan	Spring 2007	23
Jordan	Spring 2006	29
Jordan	Spring 2005	57

Table 6.1 (continued)

Country	Year	Percent support
Jordan	Summer 2002	43
Lebanon	Spring 2011	35
Lebanon	Spring 2010	39
Lebanon	Spring 2009	38
Lebanon	Spring 2008	32
Lebanon	Spring 2007	34
Lebanon	Spring 2005	39
Lebanon	Summer 2002	74
Pakistan	Spring 2011	4
Pakistan	Spring 2010	8
Pakistan	Spring 2009	5
Pakistan	Spring 2008	5
Pakistan	Spring 2007	9
Pakistan	Spring 2006	14
Pakistan	Spring 2005	25
Pakistan	Spring 2004	41
Pakistan	Summer 2002	33
Palestine	Spring 2011	68
Palestine	Spring 2009	68
Palestine	Spring 2007	70
Turkey	Spring 2011	7
Turkey	Spring 2010	6
Turkey	Spring 2009	4
Turkey	Spring 2008	3
Turkey	Spring 2007	16
Turkey	Spring 2006	17
Turkey	Spring 2005	14
Turkey	Spring 2004	15
Turkey	Summer 2002	13

Data from http://www.pew.org

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the point that support for terrorism is not homogenous across countries. In Egypt (Fig. 6.1), support for terrorism has increased over time, but support has decreased in Pakistan (Fig. 6.2).

Sex, Gender, and Support for Terrorism

While public opinion agencies like Pew have gauged individuals' support for terrorism, fewer studies examine whether support varies by sex and/or if sex intersects with other variables (socioeconomics, age, ethnicity, etc.) to impact terrorism support, and these studies yield mixed results. In the 2002 Pew data discussed above, Fair and Shepherd (2006) find that women are more likely than men to support

Fig. 6.1 From: http://www.pew.org. Percent of respondents saying terrorism "often justified"

Fig. 6.2 From: http://www.pew.org. Percent of respondents saying terrorism "often justified"

suicide attacks and attacks against civilians; however, Buena de Mesquita, using the same data, found no relationship between sex and support for terrorism. A Pew study using 2006 data found some evidence that women from Muslim countries are less likely to support terrorism than men, with 39% of women saying suicide bombings in Iraq were justified compared to 45% of men (Wike & Samaranayake, 2006). Moreover, 44% of women said they supported terrorism in general, compared with 49% of men (Wike & Samaranayake).

Afzal (2012) examines the relationship between women and support for terrorism in Pakistan. She finds that as women become more educated, they are less likely to support militancy and terrorism relative to similarly educated men; whereas uneducated women are more likely to support militancy and terrorism relative to uneducated men. Afzal posits reasons for this finding. First, more educated mothers are more likely to send their daughters to school and pass along antiterrorist opinions to them. Second, households with more educated mothers tend to be more liberal, and less likely to support terrorism. Finally, educated men are more likely than educated women to have attended **madrassas**, Islamic seminaries, where they may have received pro-terrorism messages. Thus, education and gender intersect to impact public opinion.

Countries sometimes use gendered counterterrorism strategies to influence the public opinion of women (see end of this chapter). Similar to the counterideological work discussed in Chapter 4, the United Kingdom adopted a program, called *Prevent*, to stop the radicalization of women in the UK and their membership in terrorist groups. The program uses an explicit strategy of "engaging women, women's organization and/or issues in preventative [antiterrorism] issues," because women are presumed to be key to changing public opinion, as they help to build resilient communities and provide mainstream voices to challenge ideology (Women Preventing Violent Extremism, 3). Mothers are particularly important to this program, because "they have a unique viewpoint on the challenges faced by the communities they live in—whether that is the threat of violent extremism, anti-social behavior, or young people feeling isolated and disengaged…" (Women Preventing Violent Extremism, 6).

Voting Behavior and Terrorism

Approaches to Voting Behavior

Political scientists draw upon different approaches when explaining voting behavior. **Structural approaches to voting behavior**, also sometimes called **sociological approaches** or the **Columbia model**, focus on the relationship between individual and social structure by placing the decision to vote in a social context and relating it to individuals' social status (Bartels, 2010). Thus, structuralists look to variables such as social class, language, religion, and sex to explain voting behavior. A structuralist may argue women are more likely to vote based upon security concerns because they are more fearful. In fact, a major finding out of the 9/11 Commission Report is structuralist. The Commission argues "poor education [in Pakistan] is a particular concern" for Islamist recruitment (9/11 Commission Report, 2004 in Afzdal, 2012, 3). **Ecological approaches**, sometimes referred to **as aggregate statistical approaches**, relate voting behavior to a geographical area. For example, the Basque population may be more likely to have a more favorable opinion of ETA

than populations in other Spanish regions. **Social psychological approaches**, also called the **Michigan model**, suggest that people vote based on psychological predispositions or attitudes and/or party identification (Bartels, 2010). These scholars may argue that individuals who are more nationalist in party identification will be more likely to support ETA terrorism. Finally, **rational choice approaches**, also called **economic approaches**, explain voting behavior as the outcome of cost and benefit analyses on the part of the voter, through which the voter attempts to maximize a "payoff" (Bartels). If, for example, a voter values security as most important in her voting calculus, she will choose the candidate who maximizes the payoff, i.e., the candidate who she believes best addresses security issues.

Studies on Terrorism, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior

In Chapter 1, a defining characteristic of terrorism was its psychological effect beyond the actual victims of a terrorist attack (Sharvit, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Gurevich, 2010). Public opinion polls directly after attacks (e.g., September 11th in the United States or May 11th in Spain) demonstrate a disproportionate number of people who believe they are at risk of being affected by a terrorist attack. Given that terrorists seek broader impacts from an attack, terrorism is bound to influence voting publics in democracies (Sharvit et al.). In fact, scholars note terrorism is more effective in democratic regimes because these regimes' responsiveness to voters makes them more vulnerable to terrorist demands (Criado, 2011). Such effects are even more likely given the media's vast coverage of terror attacks (Sharvit et al.). The above-mentioned Spanish election of 2004 highlights this effect. What do we know, however, about how terrorism influences voting behavior? Do sociological, social psychological, ecological, or rational models explain voting behavior related to terrorism?

The rational choice interpretation of voting behavior helps to explain voting behavior in Turkey and Spain, as voters have prioritized security and voted for parties they thought maximized their security. In Turkey voters change their voting behavior, blaming the incumbent government, during times of increased casualties from PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) attacks (Kibris, 2010). A similar pattern exists in Spain (Lago & Montero, 2006). After 11 March 2004, voters were not motivated out of fear to vote for the incumbent party that had been tough on terror, rather they blamed the incumbent party for failure to circumvent a terrorist attack. In order to maximize security, voters changed their voting behavior and elected the Socialist Party, which got Spain out of Iraq and presumably out of the ire of Al Qaeda (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009).

Evidence from Israel demonstrates the ecological explanation of voting behavior, specifically that regional differences are noticeable between Israeli voters. Just after a terrorist attack, voters in areas recently targeted by terrorism turn to right-wing candidates; however, voters turn to left-wing candidates in areas not proximal to the attack (Berrebi & Klor, 2008). Thus, voters with heightened sense of fear

(those in the attack zone) believe that right-wing candidates are more likely to offer protection as they tend to be more retaliatory toward terrorists. Those with a lesser sense of fear (outside of the attack zone) feel that the Right's retaliation might provoke attacks in their own region, thus they prefer the Left.

The ecological and rational models are both applicable to American elections after 11 September 2001, (see Abramowitz, 2004). The states in the United States most influenced by the September 11 attacks (New York, Connecticut and Washington, DC) historically vote Democratic in national elections. However, more of these states' voters were likely to vote for George W. Bush, a Republican, in 2004 than they had been in 2000. The fact that Bush did better than expected in the three states most affected by September 11th suggests that the Republican strategy of emphasizing terrorism's continuing threat and the President's strong leadership regarding terrorism were somewhat effective (Abramowitz). As in Israel, geography mattered to voting behavior. Moreover, voters likely made decisions based on which candidate would maximize security (but different than Turkey or Spain, the incumbent was perceived by some as the best choice for security). In all of these studies, however, *neither sex nor gender is considered as an explanatory variable*.

Sex, Gender, and Voting Behavior

Although no prominent studies examine the effects of sex on voting behavior as related to terrorism, three areas of research relate to sex, gender, terrorism, and voting behavior. One area examines how voters' gender assumptions influence whether they deem women candidates and policymakers as acceptable. A second area focuses on voting preferences of men and women relative to terrorism, and the development of a "security mom" voter. A third area discusses women as fearful of terrorism, with men and women reacting and voting differently because of fear.

Rosenwasser et al. investigated the link between the candidate preferences of American voters and the voters' perceived feelings of safety, finding that voters felt safer with male candidates (Rosenwasser et al., 1987). In experiments, respondents evaluated hypothetical presidential candidates who displayed "masculine" traits and/or were men as being more competent on presidential tasks such as security. Conversely, candidates who displayed "feminine" traits and/or women candidates were rated higher on tasks such as solving problems in the educational system. Men, regardless of gender traits, were perceived as being more likely to win a presidential election, and "masculine" tasks, like defense, were evaluated as being more important than "feminine" presidential tasks, like social services (Rosenwasser et al.). In experimental work, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) posit that people experience heightened thoughts about death during security crises, which causes them to prefer leaders who appear capable of providing protection and leadership. Given the framing of women politicians as "weaker" than men or "bitchy" if they are assertive (Chapter 5), support for women as presidential candidates in the United States decreased after 2011, i.e., during a time of increased perceived threat, with male

citizens decreasing support more than female citizens (Lawless, 2004). Since 2001, citizens' preference for masculine traits in leaders has increased because citizens deem men more competent regarding national and military crises, specifically crises stemming from September 11th such as terrorism (Lawless). Because of gender stereotyping, support for a qualified woman presidential candidate dropped lower than it had been in decades and lower than support for a man with the same qualifications (Lawless). Therefore, when "masculine" issues like security dominate the political agenda, public opinion, and possibly voting behavior, is worse for women candidates in American electoral politics.

Research about the creation of the "security mom" in the United States (Grewel, 2006) similarly examines public reaction to perceived terrorist threats and its influence on women's voting behavior. Until the 1970s women in the United States voted more conservatively than men. With the sexual revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, a different gender gap emerged, with women voting in large blocks for more liberal candidates (Grounds, 2008). Some political commentators believe a shift in women's voting behavior toward a more conservative, security oriented voter occurred due to September 11, with women becoming "security moms" who felt their families could also become victims of terrorism. In the national election of 2004 in the United States, the "security mom" voter entered the national media landscape. In fact, after the September 11th attacks, women became much more concerned with security issues (43%) than men (11%) (before September 11th it was the opposite with men more concerned) (Grounds).

The "manifesto" of the security mom, written by conservative syndicated columnist Michelle Malkin, appeared in *USA Today* in August 2004. The manifesto conveys that Malkin owns a gun, votes, is married, and has two children. She writes: "Nothing matters to me right now other than the safety of my home and the survival of my homeland…" (Malkin, 2004, np). Since 9/11, she monitored everyone around her:

> I have studied the faces on the FBI's most-wanted-terrorists list. When I ride the train, I watch for suspicious packages in empty seats. When I am on the highways, I pay attention to larger trucks and tankers. I make my husband take his cell phone with him everywhere …We have educated our 4-year-old daughter about Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. She knows there are bad men in the world trying to kill Americans everywhere. This isn't living in fear. This is living with reality. We drive defensively. Now, we must live defensively too (Malkin, 2004).

This shift toward "security moms" suggested a major change in voting behavior because American women seemed less engaged with abortion, health care, and education–mainstays of female voting for 30 years– and more focused on security and families. In fact, in the 2004 national election, women indicated that their top concerns were the war in Iraq and terrorism (Grounds, 2008). This change was short-lived, for polling during the 2012 election suggests that terrorism and security are becoming less important to American women relative to other issues.

Some scholars dispute the security mom argument. Kaufman (2006) debunks the "security mom" theory, by showing that mothers with children at home were no more likely to vote for Bush in 2004 (49%) than in 2000 (50%). Instead Kaufman argues that the 2004 election was influenced by the intersection of race,

Table 6.2 Priorities of women and men in the 2012 US election

Women more likely to prioritize education, birth control

% of voters saying each is "very important" to vote	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	M–W diff.
Education	72	65	79	W+14
Birth control	34	27	40	W+13
Health care	74	69	80	W+11
Abortion	39	34	44	W+10
Environment	51	46	55	W+9
Medicare	66	61	70	W+9
Gun control	47	44	50	W+6
Gay marriage	28	26	31	W+5
Jobs	84	82	86	W+4
Economy	86	85	88	W+3
Terrorism	59	57	60	W+3
Afghanistan	46	44	47	W+3
Foreign policy	52	51	52	W+1
Immigration	42	42	42	0
Taxes	61	62	60	M+2
Iran	47	49	46	M+3
Budget deficit	74	77	72	M+5
Energy	61	66	58	M+8

PEW Research Center Apr. 4-15, 2012 Q8

Based on registered voters

From: http://www.pewresearch.org

sex, and region. Southern White women moved to the Republican Party in much higher proportions in 2004 because the national Democratic candidate that year was not Southern as in the past decade, thus causing a gender gap in voting (Kaufmann, 2006). Disputing the security mom argument, one also could argue that women have a more complex notion of security than men, one that "includes healthcare security, retirement security, and economic security" (Goodman, 2004, np). Goodman argues that women should not be essentialized as mothers solely concerned for the safety of children, but should be seen as political actors with broad definitions of security, based on the idea that human security and health are necessary for all women.

Furthermore, polling data from 2012 demonstrate that terrorism is not the foremost issue of concern to American women (Pew Research Center, 2012). Although 60% of women said that terrorism was an important election issue, compared to 57% of men, women place more importance on the economy, education, or health care (see Table 6.2). These findings parallel the claims of peace groups in Chapter 4, namely that women (as a whole) want to spend more public money on domestic policies than on war. Clements (2012) finds a discernible difference by sex in support for war across European countries as well, with women's support for the Iraq War, on average, being 10% points less than men, and women's support for the war in Afghanistan being 9% points less than men.

A third area of research discusses whether women react differently to the fear inspired by terrorism, thus leading them to vote differently than men. Women's voting behavior possibly differs from men's voting behavior as related to terrorism because women and men have different perceptions of fear as it relates to crimes involving victimization. A study from the United States found that women are more fearful, engage in more avoidance behaviors (such as not going to crowded locations or avoiding flying), and are more likely to seek information in response to terrorism-related incidents. In part, this may be because women are nearly twice as fearful than men of crime (Ferraro, 1995). Results out of Israel suggest gender differences in perceived vulnerability to terror are partially due to women's higher sense of threat and lower self-efficacy (Solomon et al. 2005). In fact, while fears of terrorism have decreased over time among the American public (with 59% and 36% of the public being very or somewhat worried, respectively in 2001 and 2011), fear remains higher among women than men (Nellis, 2009). This finding holds across geographic regions in the United States and from urban to rural areas (May, Herbert, Cline, & Nellis, 2011).

Why, though, are women more fearful than men of terrorism? Women might be more fearful of terrorism than men because they are socialized to feel more vulnerable in society (Nellis, 2009). In addition, women may be fearful of all crimes, including terrorism, because they feel physically vulnerable. Women's generally smaller physical stature increases their fear of rape and violence, which "shadows" their fear of all other crimes (May et al., 2011).

Case Study: Political Parties Supporting Terrorism?
Terrorism, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior

Political parties in democracies typically are seen as reacting against terrorism; however, some terrorist groups have political parties attached to them. Two of the best-known political parties attached to terrorist groups are Batasuna/Bildu with ETA and Sinn Fein with the Irish Republican Army. For terrorists, using political violence typically supersedes any electoral strategy; but ETA and the IRA's terrorist acts are sometimes undertaken with electoral strategy in mind (Criado, 2011). In fact, the ETA symbol of the snake (for politics) wrapped around the axe (for armed struggle) symbolizes this dual mission, and the ETA motto, *Bietan jarrai*, meaning "keep up on both," reinforces the use of armed struggle *and* politics.

If a terrorist group uses violence to force a government into negotiation, it is using violence to influence public opinion, for public reaction to terrorist attacks is one way terrorists can pressure a government (Criado, 2011). In democratic societies, terrorist organizations have three constituencies—the government they want to force into concessions, the public at large, and the

(Continued)

micro-public from whom the attached political party draws support (Criado). The terrorist organization does not want to turn the micro-public against the party, as this would contradict the organization's political goals. For instance, ETA does not want to conduct attacks that upset the micro-public favoring nationalist ideology. This is why groups like ETA and IRA engage in targeted killings, which often leads to more men being assassinated due to their positions as police officers, bodyguards, and politicians. The micro-public in addition to the public at large has turned against groups like ETA and the IRA when they have engaged in bombings of markets or public areas where women and children are killed. However, in the Basque region, public opinion itself is not determined by one's sex, with males and females equally likely to support ETA (Criado).

Why it Matters: Public Opinion, Voting Behavior, and Counterterrorism

The ways in which terrorism influences public opinion and voting behavior have important policy implications related to counterterrorism, particularly regarding what sort of counterterrorism policies publics are willing to support. In some countries, but not others, citizens are willing to curtail their own freedoms (i.e., surveillance, incommunicado detention, etc.) in the name of counterterrorism. In the United States, the public is supportive of terrorism being treated as a military issue; while in Europe, the public considers counterterrorism to be a policing issue. Gender plays a direct role in counterterrorism policies. UN Resolution 1325 calls for a gendered perspective on conflict and post-conflict situations, with the direct result of women becoming involved in peace-building, peace-keeping, and counterterrorism campaigns and policies.

Gendering counterterrorism also means focusing on women as terrorists. The *Prevent* strategy, discussed above, is based on the idea that a gendered approach to counterterrorism is necessary, but also assumes that women, as caregivers, are more likely to convey peaceful messages to their communities. Byrd and Decker (2008) argue that critically evaluating the relationship between women's opinions and counterterrorism strategies is necessary for any well-developed counterterrorism policy. They write,

> Since women in most societies are traditionally responsible for passing on the cultural expectations of their communities to their children, women become vehicles for transmitting norms of violence, radicalism, and martyrdom….As first caregivers and teachers, women serve as a key node for influencing and spreading cultural traits to the next generation. Historically military conflicts needed women's support for sustainability, and today that phenomenon applies to terrorists/terrorism…. (99).

Conclusions

This chapter focused on terrorism, public opinion, voting behavior, and gender, and it looked at public opinion in support of terrorism and the relationship between public opinion and voting behavior as related to terrorism. We found that support for terrorism varies across countries and by the education and location of individuals. Evidence suggests that terrorism influences public opinion, which in turn influences voting behavior. The relationship between gender and voting behavior is twofold. First, voters may shy away from women candidates if they value security and associate it with "masculine" traits. Second, women and men may react differently to security concerns, with women feeling more fearful than men. Although some scholars suggest fears about security influence women's voting behavior as related to terrorism, the relationship between sex and voting behavior is actually more complex, with the sex of voters intersecting with other identities (motherhood, region, race) to influence voting patterns. Finally, counterterrorism strategies pay

attention to how the public opinion of women can influence an entire community's feelings about terrorism.

We conclude that there is a paucity of research related to gender, public opinion, and terrorism. Although women may be agentic in formulating opinions and influencing their communities, they are mostly absent in the research. A focus on motherhood is present in the security mom narrative, though some scholars reject this narrative. Finally, shared gendered experiences cause women to fear crime in general, and terrorism in particular. This conclusion is not meant to essentialize women but to reveal how women may be socialized to fear terrorism.

Chapter 7
Conclusions

Summarizing the Findings

The story of the Abbottabad raid opened our gaze to the variety of ways in which political violence intersects with gender. Through Amal Ahmed al-Sadah's story we see how women have been viewed as victims, responders, and violent agents in a world wrought with terror. To this end, this book explored a gendered interpretation of political violence, describing the ways in which women are present (and/or perceived as absent) in contexts involving political violence, and analyzing what gender assumptions, identities, and frames women face, express, and act upon regarding political violence. Each chapter discussed different groups of women.

Chapter 2 detailed women as victims of violence, yet emphasized how women regain agency after violence occurs. The chapter examined the concepts of genocide and gendercide and discussed women as terrorism's victims. Chapter 2 covered rape in wartime, by which women's bodies have been used as battlefields; however, with gendercide, we pointed out men typically are killed more so than women, and they too become victims of sexualized violence.

Chapter 3 explored women as agents, as perpetrators of political violence. Women's participation as terrorists, guerillas, and genocidaires showed the "dark" side of women's agency. Chapter 3 found that women act in "supportive" or "feminine" capacities related to political violence *and* as active fighters. In some groups, like ETA, women have advanced to leadership positions. Chapter 3 also found that women are increasingly active in Islamic-based terrorism.

Chapter 4 discussed the relationship between social groups and political violence, examining the agency of women advocating for peace, terrorism's victims, and alleged terrorists/prisoners' rights. We found that women acting in movements are both feminists and nonfeminists, and motherhood is often a unifying theme of their action. Other women espousing feminism argue that patriarchy needs to be dismantled if violent extremism is to end.

Chapter 5 examined women political elites who respond to terrorism. We found some women elites claim to respond to terrorism in ways different than men, but they also claim that they are equal to men and have agency. Nevertheless, descriptively, they are absent from many of the positions with the potential to influence terrorism policymaking. Furthermore, the media sometimes, but not always, use feminine frames to describe women elites responding to terrorism. Women elites themselves describe their own agency in feminist and feminine ways.

Finally, Chapter 6 examined the intersection of terrorism, public opinion, and voting behavior as related to gender. We found support for terrorism varies by sex, education, and location. Moreover, voters' gender expectations about security can cause them to prefer men to women as political candidates, as voters believe men will keep them safe. Though the extant literature is sparse, some studies suggest women are more fearful of terrorism than men, which may cause them to prioritize security when voting. That said, other studies are doubtful of the existence of the "security mom."

Revisiting the Book's Themes

In Chapter 1, we stated the five themes that guide the book.

- First, we investigate the presence or absence of women in violent politics and we discuss whether women have agency in the contexts surrounding violent politics.
- Second, we show how women's private lives as related to family and motherhood involve and position women in terrorism and genocide contexts.
- Third, we explain how political actors, the media, and women themselves, claim that women possess special maternal and peaceful qualities *because they are women*.
- Fourth, we report how women influence violent politics through the framework of feminist activism.
- Fifth, we describe differences among women and between contexts in order to convey the varied landscape of political violence and terrorism in today's world.

Table 7.1 explores these themes by chapter, showing how the themes emerged in relation to women as victims/survivors of violence, as perpetrators of violence, as activists and political elites responding to violence, and as part of the mass public with opinions about violence.

Table 7.1 Presence of themes expressed in each chapter

	Theme 1: women's agency	Theme 2: motherhood/private life	Theme 3: motherhood/peace	Theme 4: feminist activism	Theme 5: variations and reactions
Chapter 2: women as victims of violence	While women often are marked as "victims," some women reclaim agency and seek justice in post-conflict contexts	Not as prominent, but women are targets because they sustain the nation through motherhood and caregiving, and they can give birth to "enemies" through forced pregnancy	Not as prominent	Some women reclaim agency through feminist activism	Some women will never find justice and closure, but other women reject the label "victim" and seek empowerment
Chapter 3: women as perpetrators of violence	Women have agency, but they are perpetrating violence. Given the structure of society and government, violence may be the only form of agency they can pursue	Women acting violently clashes with motherhood stereotypes. However, violent women often are portrayed as mothers or wives	Gender stereotypes consider women to be peaceful, but their participation in political violence challenges stereotypes	Some women seek and find gender empowerment through participation in terrorist organizations. However, most women in violent groups do not have feminist motivations and they take on feminine, supportive tasks	Women, like men, have a variety of reasons for violent participation, some of them political and some of them idiosyncratic. Women terrorists may be thought of as perpetrators who simply happen to be women, but media often portray women as sexualized and/or bloodthirsty, thus overhyping their actions because they challenge gender stereotypes
Chapter 4: women in social movements	Women demonstrate agency by participation in social groups. They do so by either advocating for peace, on behalf of alleged terrorists, and/or as victims of genocide or terrorism	Women often act on issues regarding their private lives, and they draw upon maternal identity when advancing social and political claims. Motherhood mobilizes women activists and provides them with legitimacy	Women are essentialized as peaceful because they are life and caregivers. Women pursue peace through feminist and nonfeminist movements. Counterideological groups seek women's participation to encourage peaceful solutions	Some groups claim a feminist agenda, arguing that a feminist agenda, not women essentialized as peaceful, unites women	Some women activists are in direct conflict with each other (e.g., prisoners' rights and victims' groups). Some women are seen as terrorist collaborators when they challenge the state, and some women are endangered by their social activism

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

	Theme 1: women's agency	Theme 2: motherhood/private life	Theme 3: motherhood/peace	Theme 4: feminist activism	Theme 5: variations and reactions
Chapter 5: women as political elites	Few women are acting in high-level positions to influence terrorism policymaking. Women elites who are present in relevant policy areas have agency and consider themselves equal to men, but the media may overlook their agency	Women's positions in private life parlay into the policy positions they occupy. Terrorism is a "masculine" policy area that does not coincide with women's private responsibilities and presumed aptitude in "feminine" policy areas. Women elites sometimes think their families are at risk of terrorist violence	Women may be more inclined to craft peaceful policies because of concern for their children and families. Some women claim to be more relational, thus able to pass on tolerance to children	Women elites use feminist frames to stress their equality in fighting terrorism. Some elites also anticipate transformational change, especially in the presence of women in terrorism leadership	The media sometimes uses feminine frames to describe women and other times they do not. Women elites describe their actions with feminine and feminist frames
Chapter 6: women, public opinion and voting behavior	Women have agency as voters who make decisions based on security concerns, yet women politicians are perceived as absent in terrorism policymaking when voters consider them ill-fit to protect their countries. Moreover, the lack of research about how gender, public opinion, and voting behavior intersect means that women's agency as voters is unseen	Some researchers support and others reject the idea of the "security mom" voter. Women's voting patterns likely are influenced by motherhood, but intersectionality indicates a more complex picture	Counterterrorism arguments (UN 1325) are based in part on the idea that women are inclined toward peace and averting terrorism, thus women's opinions about terrorism appear essential to counterterrorism measures	Not as prominent	Men and women react differently to threats, but these reactions, and hence, their public opinion and voting behavior, also intersect with other identities

Future Research

The scholarly study of women and political violence is ripe for research. The majority of scholarship thus far relates to topics discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively—women as victims or as perpetrators of violence. These essential topics will continue to be studied; however, a significant opportunity for research about the topics in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 exists (social movements, political elites, public opinion, and voting behavior), as these topics are grossly under researched. Future research in these areas is vitally important. Women are active in social movements, and overlooking them means scholarship neglects ways women are agentic as related to terrorism and political violence. Moreover, as gender quotas worldwide promote women's descriptive representation, we need to know if and how women are influencing terrorism policymaking. Are women occupying all types of policy positions, including those related to combating political violence, or are they only found in areas designated as "women's areas"? Finally, voting preferences and behavior influence who is elected and what policy positions are supported. Gender expectations influence women politicians' chances for election, and they are a basis for the formulation of counterterrorism policies. Thus, the future of research is bright as scholars open their gaze to the full-spectrum of relationships between gender, political violence, and terrorism.

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