Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968

PHILIP MUEHLENBECK



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

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Acknowledgments

Most historians spend the better part of a decade researching and writing their dissertation, and then (if they are lucky) further adapting the dissertation into a manuscript for publication. After investing so much time and energy into that first book it is a daunting task to try to conceive a follow up project. When my first book was released exactly three years before the writing of this forward, I had no idea that my next project would be an exploration of Czechoslovakia's relations with Africa. At that time, despite having just finished a book on United States policy toward Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, I had very little knowledge of the role that Czechoslovakia played on the continent during those years. United States government documents available at National Archives II or the Kennedy and Eisenhower presidential libraries rarely make reference to Czechoslovak involvement in Africa—and when they do it is only in passing. Instead, Czechoslovak actions in Africa are simply labeled "Soviet Bloc activity" or mischaracterized as "Soviet." Likewise, outside of a journal article from 1963, I am unaware of any English language source which spends more than a paragraph on Czechoslovakia's role in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, I had no understanding of how involved Czechoslovakia was with Africa or how interesting Prague's relations with the continent were. When I initially began to examine Czechoslovak sources my original intention was to use this research as a small part of a larger study on Cold War era competition for African civilian aviation markets. However, once I started to delve into this Czech language research it did not take long for me to realize that I had stumbled upon a gold mine of archival material which had the potential to change the way scholars think of the Cold War in Africa—and that the story of Czechoslovakia's involvement in Africa deserved a full length manuscript in its own right.

I am most indebted to two individuals without whom this project would never have been possible. A quick glance through my reference notes makes clear the intellectual debt that this project owes to Czech scholar Petr Zidek. Zidek has published three encyclopedic type reference books on Czechoslovak involvement with sub-Saharan Africa, Francophone Africa, and the Middle East. These books provided me not only with a rough outline of Czechoslovak involvement in Africa during

the 1950s and 1960s, but just as importantly pointed me in the right direction toward finding relevant archival material for this project. Jan Koura, a historian at Charles University in Prague, then served as my contact with the National Archives of the Czech Republic and the Archive of the Czech Foreign Ministry and provided me with copies of nearly 1,800 pages of Czechoslovak government documents from these archives.

I would also like to thank archivists on three continents for their assistance in helping me research for this project. In Europe, I appreciate the staffs at the Archives of the Czech Foreign Ministry and the National Archives of the Czech Republic—both in Prague—as well at the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew for their assistance in locating relevant files. In Africa, I would like to recognize the hard work of archivists at the National Archives of South Africa in Pretoria and the Public Records and Archives Administration of Ghana in Accra. In the United States, I benefitted from the assistance of archivists at: National Archives II in College Park, Maryland; the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas; the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts (I am particularly indebted to Stephen Plotkin and the JFK Library Foundation for awarding me a Kennedy Library Research Grant in the Fall of 2012), the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, and the Liberian Collections at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana. I am also appreciative of the staff at Gelman Library at The George Washington University who assisted me in tracking down copies of obscure Czech language books from across the United States.

Special thanks goes to Andy DeRoche, Alessandro Iandolo, Lise Namikas, Joe Parrott, and Rob Rakove, colleagues and friends, each of whom read parts of the manuscript and provided me with invaluable suggestions for revisions or new lines of research to pursue. I also benefitted from the intellectual insights of Rob Waters who assisted me in developing the broad scope of this book while graciously providing me with copies of documents from the Ghanaian archives. Heather Dublinske read the entire manuscript, improving it with her editorial pen, but more importantly motivating me by her constant eagerness to read the next chapter and just as importantly providing the inspiration of the book's cover art. Without her encouragement this project may have taken me another decade to complete.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family: Greg and Lisa Muehlenbeck; Andrea, Garrett, and Brendan Klisz; Heather and Ryleigh Dublinske, and Teddy Muehlenbeck for making my life away from academia so fulfilling. I love you all.

Abbreviations

AMVZ	Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí [Archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
ANC	African National Congress
ČSA	Czechoslovak State Airlines
ČSSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
DDEL	Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
FLN	National Liberation Front (Algeria)
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GPRA	Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria
GRAE	Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile
HTS	Main Technical Administration
JFKL	John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
KANU	Kenyan African National Union
Kčs	Czechoslovak korunas (currency)
KSČ	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
LOC	Library of Congress
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MZO	Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade
MZV	Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NA-A UV KSČ	Národní archiv, Archiv Ústředního výboru KSČ [National Archives of the Czech Republic, Records of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]
NARA	National Archives II (of the United States)
NASA	National Archives of South Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Democratic Party (of Southern Rhodesia)
NSC	National Security Council (of the United States)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PRAAD	Public Records and Archives Administration Department of Ghana
PRO	National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly known as the British Public Record Office)

StB	Czechoslovak State Security
UN	United Nations
UNIP	United National Independence Party (of Northern Rhodesia)
UPC	Union of Peoples of Cameroon
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VRP	Volta River Project
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZB	Zbrojovka Brno

Introduction

In the April 1963 issue of *World Politics*, Curt F. Beck, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, told readers about communist Czechoslovakia's deep involvement with the newly decolonized continent of Africa:

> The water is safe to drink in Alexandria and Cairo, Egypt, thanks to a water filter station established by Czechoslovak engineers. A shoe factory in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is being built by Czech technicians. Across the frontier, in Somalia, Czechs are building a technical institute to teach some young Somalis the techniques necessary to staff modern factories. Across the continent in Conakry, Guinea, airport inscriptions are in Czech as well as in French and English to accommodate the many Czechs arriving on the direct Prague-to-Conakry airline. In the smaller villages of Ghana special trucks are delivering Czech beer to the local inhabitants. In Mali journalists are being trained by Czechs in the establishment of their own press agency. And in Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia, there are numerous Africans among the more than 2,000 students from Africa, Asia, and Latin America enrolled at Czech state expense in institutions of higher learning. To say that Africa has assumed a role of real importance for the Czechs is an understatement.[1]

What is most noteworthy about Beck's article is that it was the first—and until this book, only—scholarly account of Czechoslovakia's involvement with Africa published in English. The purpose of this present book is not only to update Beck's 50-year-old article with research based on archival material from the Czechoslovak and US governments, which was unavailable at the time, but also to challenge Beck's assertion that "One must make clear at the start that in her African policy Czechoslovakia fulfills a task that she has been given by the Soviet Union."[2]

Since the end of the Cold War and subsequent opening of government archives in Eastern and Central Europe, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and other scholars have been able to obtain important documents from the other side of the Iron Curtain which have reshaped our understanding of the foreign policies of Soviet bloc countries as well as the internal dynamics of the relationships between

Moscow and its junior allies.[3] In an article in *Diplomatic History* at the turn of the century, Tony Smith developed the idea of "pericentrism" in which he argued that junior allies on the periphery of the Cold War often pulled the super powers into new areas of conflict.[4] Following along these lines, scholars such as Hope Harrison and Piero Gleijeses published groundbreaking studies based on archival materials from East Germany and Cuba which demonstrated that these two junior allies had pulled the Soviet Union into the building of the Berlin Wall and proxy wars in Angola and Ethiopia.[5]

I do not make quite as ambitious of a claim in this book. Prague did not pull Moscow into Africa. It was the Soviet Union, in 1955, under Nikita Khrushchev, which made the decision to expand Soviet bloc foreign relations into the so-called Third World of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.[6] What I do argue is that, contrary to the accounts of current historiography, the US government at the time, and Professor Beck in 1963, Czechoslovakia had significantly more autonomy from the Soviet Union in conducting its foreign relations with Africa than has previously been presumed. The US government viewed the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) as "the most firm parrot of the Soviet line."[7] US officials did not even contemplate the possibility that Czechoslovakia might have had an independent foreign policy in Africa. State Department analysts never made a stand-alone examination of Czechoslovakia's Africa policy, instead lumping Prague's activities with those of the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the United States was oblivious as to the level of involvement that the ČSSR had with Africa.[8]

In reality, Czechoslovak involvement in Africa occurred before it was a Soviet satellite, and even pre-dated World War II. Therefore, it is difficult to sustain an argument that communist Czechoslovakia only became involved with Africa at the behest of Moscow, when Prague had already developed ties to nearly every region of the continent before Czechoslovakia became communist, and at a time when the Soviet Union completely ignored Africa (and before most of Africa became self-governing, for that matter). Moreover, at the beginning of 1960, while the Soviet Union only had formal diplomatic relations with two states in sub-Saharan Africa (Guinea and Ghana), Czechoslovakia had already established relations with five (Guinea, Ghana, Congo, Ethiopia, and South Africa)—and Prague would continue to have more embassies in Africa than Moscow during the period covered in this study.

Prague pursued its Africa policy for four distinct reasons. The most important reason was economics. Africa had played an important role in Czechoslovakia's economy since the 1920s. At that time, as a newly created state, Czechoslovakia needed to develop trading partners as markets for its manufactured products and as a source for raw materials in order

to grow its export-oriented economy. Czechoslovakia's main exports to Africa were small arms (mostly pistols, semi-automatic assault rifles, and hunting rifles), airplanes and other aviation-related equipment, automobiles, trucks, mining equipment, pharmaceuticals, glassware, textiles, shoes, miscellaneous smaller consumer goods, and its famous beer. By the late 1950s, Africa's potential importance to the Czechoslovak economy was intensified by the fact that its currency, the koruna, much like the Soviet ruble, was worthless on the international market. Exports to other states within the Soviet bloc were either bartered for or traded for currency that also held no value outside of the communist world. Prague badly needed hard, internationally convertible cash with which to buy products from outside of the Soviet bloc, and exporting manufactured products to Africa provided this. Such trade arrangements also allowed Czechoslovakia to import African products, such as tropical fruits and raw materials, at reduced cost.

Its alliance with Moscow was a second reason that Prague became so heavily involved with Africa. From 1948 to 1968 Czechoslovakia was one of the most steadfastly loyal satellites of the Soviet Union. It relished the opportunity to turn its past experience with Africa into an asset for Soviet foreign policy in the Cold War. Prague did not need to be cajoled by Moscow into increasing its involvement in Africa because it was eager to do so. In terms of its involvement in Africa, Prague did not sit back and wait for marching orders from the Kremlin. Instead, it proactively sought opportunities to expand its influence, and by extension, the influence of international communism, throughout the continent.

Thirdly, relations with Africa brought the Czechoslovak state a fair amount of prestige and respect within the international community, and particularly within the developing world. Nearly every month a visiting dignitary from Africa visited Prague to thank Czechoslovakia for its friendship with his country. This helped the communist regime build both domestic and international legitimacy. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) took satisfaction in informing its citizens that non-communist countries were calling upon its assistance and had chosen aid from Czechoslovakia, rather than Western countries, as proof that the communist system in Czechoslovakia was respected abroad. It proudly publicized the fact that thousands of Africans were now learning to speak the Czech language—previously one of the least-spoken languages in the world. In short, Czechoslovakia's involvement with Africa allowed it to play an important role in international affairs and strengthened the KSČ's domestic legitimacy.

Finally, many Czechoslovak authorities involved with African policy genuinely believed in the moral correctness of what they were doing in Africa. In their minds, they were helping oppressed Africans free themselves

from colonial rule and capitalist exploitation from the West. Many had no doubt in the virtue of communism vis-à-vis capitalism and its neocolonial cousin. As Foreign Minister Václav David stated in April 1961, "The basic problem of newly independent states in Africa is to eliminate the remnants of economic and political domination of colonialism, to strengthen their national independence and sovereignty. Czechoslovakia sees its main task as rendering all-round assistance to the African nations in their effort to achieve this aim."[9] Ideology aside, Czechoslovakia also pursued numerous humanitarian efforts across the continent such as providing clean drinking water, education, and medical services. In fact, from 1955–66, it may have supplied the greatest amount of per capita foreign assistance in the world.[10]

Czechoslovakia was uniquely positioned among the states of the Soviet bloc to shoulder the burden of expanding communist influence in Africa. It, alone among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, could draw upon a long tradition of its nationals exploring the interior of the continent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as significant diplomatic and economic relations with Africa prior to the Second World War. Just as importantly, Czechoslovakia, by far the most industrialized country in the Soviet bloc, had the prerequisite skills and experience to assist newly independent African states establish industrial factories, airlines, and hospitals, as well as train engineering and manufacturing technicians and aviation and medical personnel. Furthermore, as a smaller state, Czechoslovakia often enjoyed more favorable conditions in Africa than did the Soviet Union, which was suspected by many Africans of having hegemonic intentions. For this reason, Prague was able to establish certain relationships in Africa that Moscow could not. Viewing Prague as one of its most trusted allies, Moscow astutely understood that it could draw upon the Czechoslovaks' contacts and experience with Africa, and therefore, entrusted its junior ally with the task of spearheading the communist cause on the African continent.

One should not confuse this to mean that Prague's foreign policy toward Africa in the 1960s was as independent as Cuba's was in the 1970s.[11] I was unable to find a single instance in which Czechoslovakia directly opposed the Kremlin's wishes in conducting its relations with Africa. Moreover, Prague frequently consulted with Moscow prior to making major policy decisions or launching new initiatives on the continent.[12] There were, however, also many occasions when the Czechoslovaks acted on their own, and then informed Moscow of their actions after the fact. Far from being the puppet that Beck's quote would suggest, Moscow gave Czechoslovakia a fair amount of independence in this endeavor, and in some instances, Prague drove communist policy in Africa. The Kremlin seemingly approved of this arrangement because it

was confident in Prague's loyalty to the Soviet bloc and was willing to defer to Czechoslovakia's expertise in African matters of lesser importance to Moscow. However, on issues of greater significance to the Soviet Union, such as relations with Ghana or the Congo crisis, Moscow took greater involvement, and Prague followed its lead.

Organization of Study

This work is not intended to be a comprehensive history of Czechoslovakia's bilateral relations with any given country. Rather, its goal is to demonstrate the breadth and diversity of Prague's relations with Africa from 1945–68 by summarizing its relations with a wide spectrum of African states. The book is organized into three roughly chronological chapters on Czechoslovakia's relations with various African countries separated by two thematic chapters.

The introduction provides contextual background information on the evolution of communist Czechoslovakia's pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation; the shift in Soviet foreign policy that made Africa a priority for the Soviet bloc; and an overview of the Czechoslovak institutions involved with African policy. Chapter 1 covers Czechoslovakia's relations with conservative African states from 1945–62. States covered in this chapter are Ethiopia, Egypt, Morocco, Somalia, Nigeria, the Belgian Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Tanganyika (Tanzania), Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa.

Chapter 2 details Czechoslovakia's relations with the radical states from 1957–62. Included in this chapter are case studies of Prague's relations with Guinea, Ghana, Mali and post-independence Congo. Some readers will question Egypt being included with the conservative, rather than radical, states. This was done partially because relations with Egypt began much earlier than Czechoslovakia's involvement with the other radical states, and therefore, the Egyptian case study fits better within the narrative of chapter 1. More importantly, however, is the fact that although most contemporary historians would likely group Nasser's Egypt as having been a "radical" state, Czechoslovak officials at the time viewed his regime as rather conservative and as a result made a much less concerted effort to form relations with Cairo than it did Conakry, Accra, Bamako or Stanleyville.

The third chapter examines Czechoslovakia's arms exports to the continent, with particular attention being given to the notorious arms deal with Egypt in 1955, military aid given to both the aforementioned radical states and national liberation movements (such as the FLN in Algeria, UPC in Cameroon, PAIGC in Guinea-Bisssau, FNLA and MPLA in Angola, ANC in South Africa, and ZAPU in Rhodesia), and Prague's involvement

in the Nigerian Civil War. Chapter 4 discusses Czechoslovak aviation assistance to Africa, both the extensive development of Czechoslovak State Airlines routes to Africa and Prague's assistance in the development of national airlines in the radical states. The final chapter details 1962–68, when Czechoslovak involvement in Africa was in decline in nearly every country on the continent as a result of failed economic projects, the fall of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union (which resulted in a change in Soviet foreign policy toward Africa), and the overthrow of Prague's key allies on the continent in Ghana, Mali, Congo, Kenya, and Algeria. This study ends with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring. After the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Prague's involvement with Africa was greatly reduced and mostly limited to providing arms for the Soviet side in the proxy wars in Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s.

Czechoslovakia's pro-Soviet Orientation

High above the northern banks of the Vlatva River, sits the picturesque Letná Park, where in 1955, after more than five and a half years of construction, the KSČ unveiled a massive 50-foot granite statue of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. The world's tallest statue of Stalin stood on a pedestal overlooking the historic city center of Prague enjoying arguably one of the world's most beautiful views—the Gothic, Baroque, and Renaissance architecture of the "golden city of spires." With its placement in Letná Park, the Stalin statue had symbolic meaning as well: the Soviet leader and his country stood watching over its communist junior ally.

The statue was also emblematic of Czechoslovakia's pro-Soviet orientation, which was uniquely different from the other Soviet satellite states in Eastern and Central Europe. Unlike the majority of other ethnic groups in what would become the Soviet bloc, Czechs and Slovaks had not had historical animosity against Russia or Russians. In the nineteenth century, the Czechs and Slovaks had responded to Austro-Hungarian hegemony with the idea of pan-Slavism and looked upon Russia as a potential protector.[13] Most Czechoslovaks were also grateful to the Soviet Union for having liberated them from Nazi occupation in 1945. Most could not understand why the advancing US army stopped its advance in Plzeň, forcing the people of Prague, who had rose up against the German occupation, to wait for help from the Soviet Red Army to arrive. They remembered how in 1938 both France and Great Britain had abandoned them to the clutches of Hitler in the Munich Agreement—preferring to sacrifice Czechoslovak autonomy to risking war with the Nazi war machine. Moreover, after the Nazis occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939, the Bank of England transferred over 23 metric tons of gold which the Czechoslovak

state held in reserve in the bank to the Germans, who then used it to fund their war effort.[14] After the war, the Americans, British, and French gained control of Nazi gold reserves but refused to return any of it to the new Czechoslovak government.[15] In the face of such recent history of bad experiences with the United States, France, Great Britain, Austria, Hungary, and Germany, it seemed natural for Czechoslovaks to view the Soviet Union as their best choice for a post-war alliance to preserve their future security.

Prague's *decision* to gravitate into the Soviet orbit was also practical, given the fact that the Red Army occupied the region and thus held predominant military influence. I have emphasized the word "decision," because it is also important to note that to a greater degree than the other states of Eastern and Central Europe, Czechoslovakia itself opted to join the Soviet bloc. This is not to say that Moscow did not try to coerce the Czechoslovak leadership into the decision, but the fact that a democratic post-war government led by President Edvard Beneš and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk chose to ally with the Soviet Union, as opposed to the other states who were forced into the alliance by the Soviet occupation of their countries and Moscow's imposition of communist party rule, is an important distinction to make in understanding the relationship between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and the subsequent trust that Moscow would give to Prague in allowing it autonomy in its African policy. In fact, unlike most of the Soviet bloc states, no Soviet troops were stationed in Czechoslovakia until 1968, after the Red Army invaded following the Prague Spring. Czechoslovakia's autonomy was owed in part to the fact that Moscow hoped to use the country, with its location bordering Western Europe and its democratic tradition, as a showcase to make communism and alliance with the Soviet Union appear attractive to the people of Western Europe.[16]

When the KSČ eventually took full control of the country in February 1948, that, too, served to further strengthen ties between Moscow and Prague. The top KSČ party leaders—its chairman, Klement Gottwald, and its general secretary, Rudolf Slánský—had both been closely connected to the Communist International (Comintern), lived in the Soviet Union during the war, and were strongly pro-Soviet. The KSČ knew that it could not have come to power without Moscow's support, and therefore held a natural allegiance to the Soviet Union, encapsulated by the motto, "*Se Sovětským svazem na věčné časy!*" (With the Soviet Union forever!) Furthermore, Antonín Novotný, the general secretary of the KSČ from 1953–68, was able to consolidate his absolute control over the leadership of the country by outflanking President Antonín Zápotocký and Prime Minister Viliam Široký through backing from Moscow. In 1957, Novotný took over the presidency of Czechoslovakia, while continuing

to be general secretary of the communist party, which essentially made him the unquestioned dictator of Czechoslovakia during the period of its intensive relations with Africa. Because of Moscow's role in his rise to power, Novotný would remain staunchly loyal to the Soviet Union throughout the period of his rule.

In the early 1950s, the KSČ leadership had opportunities to demonstrate its fidelity to the Soviet Union through political show trials, which purged party members who were allegedly disloyal to Moscow (the most famous being against Slánský in 1952).[17] Czechoslovakia also became a founding member of Soviet-sponsored organizations such as the economic organization, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), and the military alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Prague further proved its devotion to Moscow in 1956, when it supported the Soviet Union after two of its satellite states, Hungary and Poland, sought to take advantage of the Khrushchev Thaw to attempt to gain some autonomy from Moscow, prompting Soviet President Kliment Voroshilov to declare, "The Czechoslovak Communist Party members are the best, the closest, and the dearest friends of . . . the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."[18] Similarly, French diplomat Claude Bréart de Boisanger remarked in May 1957, "I've always thought that the Czechoslovak government is more pro-Soviet than the Soviets."[19]

In recognition of this loyalty, in July 1960 Czechoslovakia became only the second state in the Soviet bloc (after the Soviet Union) to be promoted from a "people's democracy" to a socialist republic. Renamed the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR), this honor indicated that the Kremlin viewed the KSČ as having elevated the country along the road of becoming a full-fledged communist society as defined by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. De Boisanger's comment that Czechoslovakia was more pro-Soviet than the Soviet Union may hold some truth, as the country was slow to accept Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, and the statue of Stalin atop of the hill in Letná Park was not dismantled until 1962.

Soviet Foreign Policy Responds to the Winds of Change

Under Stalin the Soviet Union showed little interest in the Third World, and even less interest in Africa. The one partial exception was Libya, where, seeking a warm-water port on the Mediterranean, Moscow sought joint governance of the country during the Potsdam conference at the conclusion of World War II. Failing in this endeavor, Stalin—distrusting the "bourgeois nationalism" of African elites—would again ignore the continent for the next decade. At the time of Stalin's death in March 1953, Moscow did not operate a single embassy on the African continent.

By January 1955, Nikita Khrushchev had consolidated his hold on power in the Kremlin to become Stalin's uncontested successor and began to chart a new course for Soviet foreign policy. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev recognized the power of Third World nationalism and attempted to court it to Moscow's side in the Cold War. Four events that year would combine to change Moscow's outlook toward Africa: the Bandung conference, reconciliation with Yugoslavia, the East-West Geneva summit, and the infamous arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt.

In April, representatives from 29 Asian and African states met in Bandung, Indonesia. This marked the first time independent Afro-Asian states had met to coordinate a common strategy to fight colonialism and counteract Cold War military alliances. Moscow adroitly tried to align itself with the sentiments of Bandung and co-opt its message to enhance the Soviet position in the Third World. As a result of Bandung, Moscow now understood that Third World nationalism was anti-imperialist, rather than a preserve of imperialism, as Stalin had believed, and henceforth, it began to try to court leaders of the conference, such as Sukarno of Indonesia and Nasser of Egypt.

The gradual process of reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia, following Stalin's death, culminated in the signing of the Belgrade Declaration in June, which acknowledged that there could be separate paths to socialism. Prior to this, the Soviet Union had been dogmatic in requiring its allies to rigidly follow their model of building communism. The Belgrade Declaration, however, indicated that the Soviet Union would now be more flexible in allowing their allies to pursue a separate roadmap, toward constructing a socialist society, and this change in mindset would allow Moscow to accept as allies so-called revolutionary democratic states such as Indonesia and Cuba, or in Africa, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.

Khrushchev also sought a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States and other Western powers in order to reduce international tensions. This led to a four power summit—the Geneva conference—in July. As a result of the "spirit of Geneva" both the United States and Soviet Union mutually agreed that neither state could win a nuclear war. This change in the dynamics of the superpower relationship convinced Moscow that it could now attempt to expand its political influence in sub-Saharan Africa without risking nuclear war with the United States. Peaceful coexistence meant that competition with the United States could move away from the military field (where the Soviet Union was clearly in an inferior position compared to the United States) to the economic sphere, where the Kremlin leadership believed that the Soviet socialist economic model would prove to have more appeal to Africans than Western capitalism.

Finally, with the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal in September, the Soviet Union initiated relations with an African state for the first time (the Soviets partially negotiated the deal). After the arms deal relations between Moscow and Cairo would rapidly develop, spurred on by the Soviet Union's agreement to help fund the Aswan Dam after the United States and British pulled their funding for the project (in response to the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal and Egypt's recognition of communist China). Coming at the expense of American and British influence in the region, the Soviet Union's expanding relations with Egypt gave Moscow its first geostrategic ally in Africa and was a Cold War victory for Moscow, which increased its desire to expand its influence beyond the Sahara Desert.

In the final months of 1955, Khrushchev would kick-start his outreach to the Third World by embarking on a highly-publicized trip to India, Burma and Afghanistan. The Soviet premier's trip to Asia also signaled the start of an ambitious new African policy. In 1956, the Soviet Union recognized the independence of Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan, and unsuccessfully attempted to initiate diplomatic relations with Liberia.[20] It developed relations with Ghana and Guinea within the next two years as well. Along with Mali, these three West African states would be key to Khrushchev's plan to export socialism as a development model. According to historian Alessandro Iandolo, "West Africa in the mid-1950s acquired a disproportionate importance in Soviet thinking about the third world, in spite of the small size of the countries in the region and their lack of relevant strategic or economic resources."[21] The new Soviet policy toward Africa (and the Third World more broadly) emphasized supporting national liberation movements in order to take advantage of decolonization, to make it the Achilles heel of the West. On January 6, 1961, Khrushchev made a speech in which he said it was the "historical mission" of world communism to assist "wars of national liberation" in an attempt to end colonialism:[22] "A remarkable phenomenon of our time is the awakening of the peoples of Africa . . . Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be unfortunate if they did not take advantage of new opportunities and did not look for new methods and forms that would best achieve the ends in view."[23]

Czechoslovakia would stand ready to help the Soviet Union implement this new strategy.

Czechoslovak Institutions Involved with African Policy

The KSČ dominated all aspects of Czechoslovak state and society, and foreign policy was no exception. Organizationally, Czechoslovakia

followed the Soviet model of governance, in which the central committee of the KSČ-directed party and government activities in between party congresses. In terms of conducting foreign policy, there were four particularly important parts of the central committee: the general secretary, the politburo, the secretariat, and the international department.

The general secretary of the KSČ was the key figure in the communist power apparatus. Antonín Novotný held the position for the majority of the time covered in this study (1953–68). Novotný exercised control over foreign policy in a number of important ways. Most importantly, as head of both the party and the state, Novotný had the most direct contact with African heads of state, as well as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Additionally, he chaired the meetings of the politburo, largely determining their agendas, and played a large role in selecting who served in the top positions in the politburo, secretariat, international department, and the relevant ministries. Although Novotný took an active role in politburo discussions regarding Africa policy, met with visiting African heads of state, and himself made state visits to Ethiopia and Egypt, it is difficult to ascertain how involved or interested he was in the development of Czechoslovakia's African policies.

The politburo (referred to as the "presidium" from 1954–62) of the KSČ was the most important body in the governance of Czechoslovakia's political decision-making. Politburo members were elected by the central committee and constituted the top echelon of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The politburo only discussed and voted on major foreign policy decisions or initiatives, such as whether or not to continue to maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa, and therefore did not have much involvement with the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.

The secretariat was the key administrative body of the KSČ. Its members were also formally elected by the central committee of the party. Its foreign policy responsibilities included administrative personnel tasks such as the appointment of ambassadors and embassy staff and approving visas for Czechoslovak journalists or technicians who were employed abroad.

The international department was the fourth segment of the communist party with significant involvement in foreign affairs. The international department oversaw relations with the communist or "revolutionary democratic" parties in foreign countries, as well as with the international organizations based in Czechoslovakia, and managed the visits of foreign dignitaries and foreign students. The international department was also given the assignment of making sure that the more pragmatic reports from the ministries of foreign affairs or foreign trade were infused with sufficient ideological content before being forwarded to the politburo for consideration.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZV)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZV) experienced a high level of turnover following the communist coup of 1948. Most experienced Czechoslovak diplomats went into exile, and a great many of those who opted to stay in their positions were within a year or two fired from the MZV if they were not deemed loyal enough to the communist cause. The continuity of the ministry was further shaken by the Stalinist purges of the late 1940s/early 1950s, of which the first foreign minister of communist Czechoslovakia, Vladimir Clementis (1948–50), among others, was a victim. From 1948–54, the MZV, generally speaking, was quite ineffective and incompetent. Its employees were chosen strictly by their loyalty to the party, and few had the requisite skill set (or even desire) to be professional diplomats. This did not, however, greatly hamper Czechoslovak foreign relations, since during this period, the country had an insular foreign policy as a result of slavishly following the Stalinist line emanating from Moscow. Change in the MZV stemmed from the Khrushchev Thaw and a desire for Czechoslovakia to pursue a more activist foreign policy, particularly in Africa. An October 1956 report and meeting of the politburo discussed past deficiencies of the MZV and ways to improve its operations and professionalism. The report produced for this meeting also emphasized the importance for Prague of renewing its relations with the developing world as a result of decolonization.[24]

Václav David, foreign minister from January 1953-April 1968, was the head of the MZV for the majority of the period covered in this study. David, with a background as a payroll clerk, and without the ability to speak a Western language, was an unorthodox choice to be foreign minister. According to Czech historian Jan Zidek, he lasted in his position at the MZV for so long for three reasons: his close friendship with Novotný, his loyalty to the Soviet Union, and his unaggressive and unambitious personality—which allowed him to avoid making enemies within the KSČ leadership.[25]

Organizationally, until the end of 1959, African policy was dealt with by the Afro-Asian department at MZV. In November 1959, a separate African department, named the "tenth territorial division" was created to exclusively cover relations with the states of sub-Saharan Africa. The countries of North Africa (minus Algeria) were assigned to be part of the ninth territorial division, which covered the Near East, while Algeria remained part of the fourth territorial division, which was in charge of France. The impetus for creating a separate department devoted to Africa was intensifying relations with Guinea and Mali and the pending independence of soon-to-be-decolonized Francophone Africa.

At the time of the creation of the tenth territorial division, Prague had embassies in Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well

as consulates in South Africa and Congo. Within a few years, the number of Czechoslovak embassies in Africa had more than doubled by the opening of missions in Algeria, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Togo. Like the United States under the Eisenhower administration, Czechoslovakia also accredited its ambassador in these countries to other less important neighboring countries as well. For example, Prague's ambassador to Guinea, Milos Votja, operated out of the embassy in Conakry but was also accredited as ambassador to Sierra Leone, where the Czechoslovaks did not operate an embassy.

Ministry of Foreign Trade (MZO)

In communist Czechoslovakia, all large businesses were nationalized, and foreign trade was monopolized by the state. The MZO, therefore, played a large role in Prague's relations with Africa, as it handled all export-import agreements and was tasked with finding suitable markets for Czechoslovak manufactured goods. Czechoslovakia's main export to Africa was small arms, and therefore, the unit of the MZO involved with weapons, *hlavní technická spravá* (main technical administration, or HTS), which is discussed in greater depth in chapter 3, probably had the most direct involvement with Africa. Another important arm of the MZO was the company Technoexport, which was founded in 1953 and specialized in the sale of complete industrial projects and installations abroad and promoted the acceptance of Czechoslovak manufactured goods in developing countries.

Ministry of National Defense

The ministry of national defense was headed by Bohumír Lomský from 1956–68. Lomský fought alongside the Soviet Red Army as a member of the Czechoslovak Infantry Brigade during World War II, and at the conclusion of the war, studied and graduated from the KJ Voroshilov Military Academy in Moscow. Under Lomský, the ministry of national defense played an important role in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy toward Africa. The weapons which were sent as military aid to Africa, although negotiated by HTS, typically came from the stocks of the ministry of national defense. More importantly, officers from the ministry of national defense were assigned to train African soldiers and liberation fighters in how to operate Czechoslovak weaponry. Such training was conducted both in Czechoslovakia and Africa and was intensified in 1962 by the opening of a department within the Antonín Zápotocký Military Academy of Technology that specialized in providing such training to foreign students.[26]

Czechoslovak State Security (StB)

Státní bezpečnost (State security or StB) was a unit of the ministry of the interior that functioned as Czechoslovak intelligence and played an important role in the conduct of Prague's foreign relations. Following the KSČ's seizure of power in February 1948, Soviet advisors helped organize the structure of the StB, and intimate relations between the Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence services would persist throughout the Cold War. By the mid-1950s the StB's reach covered nearly the entire world. In some countries, an estimated 70–80 percent of Czechoslovak embassy employees were covert StB agents, and all foreign ministry employees (including the ambassador) were subordinate to the StB chief of station. In 1950, the StB employed approximately 100 agents. This had increased to 360 in 1953, 520 in 1957, 930 in 1961 and 1,236 by 1968. By 1968, the StB operated 41 outposts in 39 African countries.[27]

Meeting in Prague in July 1960, Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior Rudolf Barák and Soviet KGB Chairman Alexander Shelepin signed an agreement in which the intelligence services of the two countries vowed to coordinate their activities throughout the world. In Africa, joint cooperation focused on Egypt, Guinea, Mali, the Congo, Ghana, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Zanzibar.[28] The StB's three primary responsibilities on the continent were reducing the influence of the Western powers (through subversion or propaganda), training and coordinating with the intelligence services of radical states such as Guinea and Mali, and assisting national liberation movements. StB activities in Africa included organizing preparation for a coup against the pro-Western Ghanaian military government and planning a rescue operation for Antoine Gizenga in the Congo. Additionally, from 1959 to 1968, Czechoslovak intelligence organized 31 courses to train African intelligence personnel from radical states or national liberation movements. The students in these courses came from 11 different countries. Their training consisted of state security techniques, military or guerilla training, organized political work, and communist ideological indoctrination. Additionally, 13 Czechoslovak intelligence experts served in Africa as permanent consultants to the security services of Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, and PAIGC (the national liberation movement from Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde).[29]

Other State and Transnational Institutions

An assortment of other state institutions played significant roles in Czechoslovakia's relations with Africa. The Czechoslovak state airline, *České Slovenské aerolinie* (ČSA), serviced one of the most extensive route maps in Africa and also assisted several African countries in establishing their own national airline. Over two thousand African students studied,

free of charge, at the University of the 17th of November in Prague. The *Česká tisková kancelář* (Czechoslovak News Agency or ČTK) operated an international school of journalism that trained photographers, editors, and journalists from Africa in the art of state propaganda through media. Similarly, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia (SBCS) created an international banking school where foreign students (a disproportionate amount of which were from Africa) were trained to become workers in the financial sector of developing countries.[30] On the other side of academia, an African studies program was developed at Charles University to train Czechoslovaks about African languages and culture, and the Research Institute for Foreign Trade (VUZO) was founded to study the economic challenges of recently decolonized and developing countries.

Finally, many international communist organizations were headquartered in Prague. These included the International Union of Students, the International Organization of Journalists, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the World Trade Federation. Through these organizations, the Soviet bloc provided moral and material assistance to nationalist organizations in Africa.

At the outset of the 1960s, in an attempt to attain middle power status, Czechoslovakia sought to develop both economic and diplomatic relations with nearly every independent state on the African continent. During this period, Czechoslovakia operated more embassies in Africa than did the Soviet Union. It developed close economic, cultural, and political ties to many African states, which led to the opening of Czech cultural centers, Czech movie weeks, and the study of the Czech language throughout Africa. Over two thousand African students studied at Czechoslovak universities free of charge. Prague gave significant amounts of military aid to newly established national armies of independent African states, as well as to national liberation movements still fighting against European colonialism—and even influenced the fashion choices of Africa's most famous revolutionary. It assisted African countries to develop their own national airlines. The amount of Czechoslovak trade with, and humanitarian assistance to, Africa was significant. From 1954–68, Czechoslovakia dedicated a greater percentage of its GDP to bilateral economic assistance to Africa than did the United States and devoted more than double of its GDP to Africa than did the Soviet Union.[31] Czechoslovakia's involvement in Africa was massive in scale, when its small population and size of its national economy is considered. Prague's per capita involvement in Africa during these years was likely unsurpassed by any other state. This book tells the untold story of Czechoslovakia's intense involvement with Africa during the years 1945–68.

CHAPTER 1

Relations with Conservative African States (1945–62)

Soon after the Czechoslovak state was created from the ashes of World War I, its leaders understood that because it was a small, democratic state surrounded by larger, undemocratic, and potentially hostile neighbors (Germany, the Soviet Union, and the remnants of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire), it could not stand isolated in the international system, and instead must develop relationships outside of Central Europe in order to ensure its security. Establishing diplomatic missions abroad in support of the state's political and economic interests was therefore viewed as vitally important. By the mid-1920s, the Czechoslovak diplomatic network had become one of the largest in the world—and was much more extensive than nearly any other state of comparable size.[1] Czechoslovak diplomatic and consular missions were established, not only in Europe and North America, but also in countries such as India, China, Japan, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

The first Czechoslovak consulate in Africa was established in Alexandria, Egypt in 1920. It was followed by the opening of Prague's first embassy on the continent in Cairo in 1923 and the establishment of additional consulates in Algiers and Tunis in 1925. Czechoslovakia's first diplomatic outpost in sub-Saharan Africa was opened in Cape Town, South Africa in 1926. Thereafter, a number of honorary consul offices were opened in the cities of Dakar (1927), Bulawayo (1927), Durban (1928), East London (1928), Leopoldville (1929), Johannesburg (1930), Port Elisabeth (1930), and Mobassa (1937).[2]

As a newly independent state, interwar Czechoslovakia needed to develop trading partners as markets for its manufactured products and as a source of raw materials in order to grow its export-oriented industrialized economy. One of the places Czechoslovakia looked was south, to Africa, where Ethiopia, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, British East Africa, and the Belgian Congo all became significant trading partners.

The expansion of trade to Africa was no easy matter for Czechoslovakia, given that African markets were closely guarded by the colonial powers. Although trade with Africa accounted for a relatively low percentage of Czechoslovakia's economy (4.9% of imports and 3.9% of exports in 1937), the relative importance of the continent to its economy was much higher for Czechoslovakia than it was for the United States or Soviet Union.[3] In fact, it is doubtful that any non-African state, other than, of course, the main colonial powers (the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal) had as much economic involvement with Africa during the interwar years as did Czechoslovakia.

However, following Czechoslovakia's occupation by Nazi Germany in March 1939, the majority of the Czechoslovak diplomatic offices around the world, including those in Africa, ceased to operate. But a few, including the embassy in Cairo and consulates in Casablanca and Cape Town, continued functioning for the Germans. During World War II, the only remaining representative in Africa for the London-based Czechoslovak exile government was the honorary consulate in Kenya (which was based in Mombasa at the outset of the war, but moved its operations to Nairobi in 1942).[4]

At the conclusion of World War II, the newly reconstituted Czechoslovak government began the process of reinstituting relations with Ethiopia, Egypt, and South Africa immediately. Initially, the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia had little effect on its relations with Africa as inertia kept Prague's diplomatic, counselor, and economic relations intact. At this point, 85 percent of all Soviet bloc exports to Africa were from Czechoslovakia.[5] However, once the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) began to consolidate its control over the country, it began to strictly follow Moscow's Stalinist line of insular foreign relations. By 1950, all of the Czechoslovak honorary consulate generals in Africa, and most of its formal ones, ceased operations. In some cases, this was at the order of the host government, which opposed the new communist government in Prague. One such example was the consulate general in Algiers where after the death of the Czechoslovak representative the French colonial authorities refused to accredit a replacement.[6] In other cases, such as the Belgian Congo, Czechoslovak diplomatic outposts were made ineffective by communist party purges, which replaced quality diplomats with more loyal party members who lacked the professional and linguistic skills necessary to be effective representatives in sub-Saharan Africa.[7] Trade between Czechoslovakia and Africa also experienced a sharp decline at the outset of the 1950s, largely as a result of an April 1949 law instituted by the communists, which nationalized Czechoslovak industries and gave the government a monopoly over foreign trade.

In the mid-1950s, following Nikita Khrushchev's policies of de-Stalinization and outreach toward the Third World, Czechoslovakia again reversed course and revived its interests in the African continent. Prague did so for four primary reasons, most importantly, the restoration of economic opportunities; secondly, it gave the KSČ an opportunity to demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow by being an asset to Soviet foreign policy on the continent; thirdly, it enhanced the communist regime's legitimacy both at home and abroad; and finally, many within the Czechoslovak government honestly believed in the virtue of helping oppressed Africans free themselves from colonial rule and capitalist exploitation. Therefore, in the mid-1950s building upon its historic ties and with the blessing of its patron in Moscow, the Czechoslovak communist state set out to develop diplomatic and economic relations with nearly every country on the African continent.

Relations with Ethiopia

The earliest recorded history of Czech interaction with Ethiopia occurred in the eighteenth century when the Czech-born Franciscan missionary, Jakub Římař, travelled through the country on his way from Egypt to the Somali coast. A second Czech Franciscan missionary, Václav Prutký, lived at the Ethiopian Imperial Court between 1751–53 and described his travels through the country in a book he published in Latin, titled, *Descriptioa Ethiopiae*.[8] Prutký is also reputed to have been the first person to compile a written vocabulary of the Amharic language.[9]

Ethiopia would later become the first state in sub-Saharan Africa with which Czechoslovakia developed intensive relations. Informal relations began shortly after the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic in October 1918. In the early 1920s, Czechoslovakia began to export textiles, glassware, furniture, porcelain, and sugar to Ethiopia. Bilateral contacts were also strengthened by Czech national Rudolf Klíma, who became an advisor to Zewditu I, the Empress of Ethiopia, from 1920–25, serving first as director of construction projects in the Ethiopian capital, and later as the imperial trustee at the imperial coffee plantations in Siddam.[10]

From 1926–39, the French embassy in Addis Ababa represented Czechoslovak commercial interests and provided Czechoslovak passport services within the Ethiopian capital. France also played an important role in getting Ethiopia an exemption from League of Nations arms prohibitions which applied to the rest of the African continent, and as a result, Czechoslovakia joined Belgium and Switzerland in selling Addis Ababa weapons in the mid-1920s.[11] Economic and diplomatic relations between the two League of Nations member states continued to intensify, and culminated in the signing of a Czechoslovak-Ethiopian bilateral

trade agreement in Paris in December 1934—the first such agreement between Prague and an African state.[12] The agreement called for the establishment of formal diplomatic missions on the level of embassies but was never ratified due to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and the outbreak of the Second Italo-Ethiopia War (1935–36).

In his role as president of the League of Nations assembly, Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš lent moral support to Addis Ababa after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, but Czechoslovakia stopped arms deliveries to Ethiopia in deference to a British and French sponsored embargo. Nevertheless, Czechoslovak arms would still find their way to Ethiopia using Chile as an intermediary, and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie would later write Beneš:

> We cannot forget that your Excellency was one of the sympathizers of Ethiopia at the time when she was without arms and attacked by fascist Italy. Although it was politically very difficult for those countries friendly to us to provide Ethiopia with war materials, Czechoslovakia ignored those difficulties and stretched out her hands to supply these materials to the oppressed party. The accusations put forward by the aggressor did not move Czechoslovakia an inch.[13]

Despite this, formal relations between Prague and Addis Ababa ground to a halt between the years 1938–44 as a result of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia and Nazi Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Diplomatic relations were restored in June 1944, when Selassie accepted the credentials of the Czechoslovak ambassador to Egypt, Jaroslav Šejnoha. Shortly after the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia began to aggressively market its industrial products to Ethiopia, and in the late 1940s, Czech arms manufacturer Povážské strojirny opened an ammunition factory in the country, with the Czechoslovak government providing technicians to run the factory until Ethiopians could be trained to take their place.[14] Following the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, relations between Prague and Addis Ababa momentarily cooled at Selassie's behest. But this did not last long, as the Ethiopian emperor soon decided to pursue a foreign policy designed to lessen the influence of Great Britain over his country. In June of that year, after being rebuffed in his attempt to procure weapons from either Washington or London (the US attitude toward providing Ethiopia arms is summed up by a later comment from US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson that he "personally favored providing the Ethiopians only with spears"), Selassie turned to the new communist regime in Prague, which agreed to sell Ethiopia not only small arms and ammunition, but also 20 AH-IV-Hb tanks.[15] Czechoslovakia was then welcomed back into

the country alongside a multitude of other foreign aid donors— ranging from the United States, France, and Canada to Sweden and the Soviet Union.[16] By 1953, the volume of Czechoslovak exports to Ethiopia had reached 897,000 Kčs (Czechoslovak korunas), and was projected to more than double to 2.2 million Kčs the following year. As a result, relations with Ethiopia were listed among the top non-European priorities for Czechoslovak foreign policy.[17]

In January 1955, Czechoslovakia opened a legation in Addis Ababa, and Ethiopia reciprocated by accrediting its ambassador to the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia in 1957. In 1958, Emperor Selassie began planning for an extensive around-the-world trip to take place the following year, and expressed to the Czechoslovakian charge d'affaires his desire to visit Prague. Czechoslovak authorities were eager to extend such an invitation, believing that a visit from the Ethiopian emperor would bring significant political and economic benefits, not only to Czechoslovakia, but to the entire Soviet bloc.[18] The objective of Selassie's 1959 world tour was to secure aid to finance Ethiopia's forthcoming five-year economic plan, and in addition to Czechoslovakia, it included stops in Egypt, the Soviet Union, Belgium, France, Portugal, West Germany, and Yugoslavia.[19] Selassie's visit to Czechoslovakia took place from July 13–17, 1959. In addition to receiving an honorary degree from Prague's prestigious Charles University and making a visit to the thermal spa town of Karlovy Vary, Selassie's Czechoslovak guests offered his nation a long-term loan worth 25–30 million Kčs, 10–15 scholarships for Ethiopian students to study at Czechoslovak universities, and 25–30 internships for Ethiopians to receive industrial training in Czechoslovakia. Additionally, the two states agreed to upgrade their counsel general offices to full embassies. In December, another agreement provided Ethiopia with £3.5 million in loans for the purchase of machinery to operate shoe, pharmaceutical, and tannery factories. These agreements were highly significant for the Czechoslovak government because it was the first time that the communist government in Prague had signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with a country outside of the communist bloc.[20]

On the basis of their Treaty on Friendship and Co-Operation and the Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Technical Co-Operation signed in 1959, Czechoslovakia held a major industrial exhibition in Addis Ababa in November 1960, after which bilateral relations between the two countries developed rapidly in the early 1960s. Czechoslovakia sent hundreds of experts to assist Ethiopia in the fields of agriculture, forestry, food (mainly butchers and beer brewers), tanning and leather, geology, energy, medicine (physicians and other medical personnel were sent to hospitals all across the country), and education (lecturers were sent to the University of Addis Ababa).[21] The most prominent projects

included the creation of a large scale experimental farm and oil extraction plant in Ciaffa, the establishment of eight fully equipped hospitals in the country, and the construction of factories to produce tires and shoes in Addis Ababa.[22]

Symbolic verification of good Czechoslovak-Ethiopia relations was the reciprocal state visit by the Czechoslovak President and General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Antonín Novotný, to Ethiopia in November 1966.[23] In a toast in honor of Novotný during this visit, Haile Selassie spoke of the longstanding warm relations between the two states and remembered gratefully:

> During the dark hours Czechoslovakia was among the very few countries that courageously raised its voice in denouncing the invasion of our country by the fascist aggressor. In doing so, Czechoslovakia gave us support not only in upholding our rightful cause at the League of Nations but has also supported us with the much needed arms and ammunitions for the defence of our beloved country against the invader. In the early part of the post-war period, when we commenced to reorganize our Armed Forces, it was from Czechoslovakia that we were able to purchase modern weapons to equip our army. In view of this, can one expect greater friendship? All these manifest the prevalence of a long and profound friendship between our two countries.[24]

It is notable that unlike his counterparts in the Soviet Union or United States, Novotný visited sub-Saharan Africa and chose Ethiopia as his destination. He did so because of a combination of factors: the historical relations between Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia, Selassie's personal prestige on the world stage, and the fact that the Organization of African Unity was based in Addis Ababa.

Relations with Egypt

Only two years after the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic, Prague opened its first consulate in Africa or the Middle East in Alexandria in 1920. Its central task was to develop trade relations with Egypt and protect the interests of Czechoslovak citizens living in the region. Prague opened a second diplomatic office in the country in Cairo in 1921, and when Egypt received its independence from the United Kingdom in January 1922, Czechoslovakia recognized its sovereignty, and formal diplomatic relations were established between the two countries later in the year. Relations between Prague and Cairo were broken during World War II, and then later strained by Czechoslovakia's support for Israel and the Egyptian government's anti-communism, so, by the early 1950s, relations between Czechoslovakia and Egypt were almost nonexistent.

This dynamic would change when, in July 1952, King Farouk, Egypt's pro-Western leader, was deposed by a group of army officers calling themselves the Free Officers Movement. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, an energetic and passionate nationalist, quickly assumed the reins of power in Egypt. Initially, Nasser's rise to power did not look promising for the Soviet bloc, as he arrested a group of Egyptian communists after accusing them of preparing a coup against his regime. The United States, under president Dwight D. Eisenhower, was also making a concerted effort to court the new Egyptian regime. After entering office in 1953, Eisenhower initially promised to make "firm commitments" to Egypt in order to help fill the void created by the British departure.[25] The previous year, Nasser had given the American ambassador in Cairo his personal assurance that if Washington supplied military arms to Egypt, the weapons would be used only in self-defense. Furthermore, Nasser stressed the high level of prestige that such a deal would generate for the United States in the Middle East.[26] Yet the Eisenhower administration never sent military aid, partly because of an emotional telephone call from Winston Churchill. The British prime minister reportedly said to the general-turned-president, "My dear friend, surely you are not going to start your term in the White House by supplying arms to Egypt which may well be turned against your former comrades who fought under your command in the great battle for the liberation of Europe."[27] Eisenhower took Churchill's call to heart and shelved plans to provision Cairo, which would later provide the opening that Czechoslovakia needed to gain influence inside the ancient country.

Yet the Eisenhower administration still believed that Egypt was potentially important enough to US foreign policy that it was the destination of John Foster Dulles's first trip abroad as US secretary of state. Upon arriving in Cairo, Dulles presented General Mohamed Neguib, the head of the Egyptian revolutionary government, with a leather case containing two silver-plated .38 Colt revolvers (the only two weapons that the administration ever gave Egypt).[28] Dulles later engaged Gamal Abdel Nasser in a debate over whether or not Egypt should join a military pact directed against the Soviet Union. Nasser argued that Egypt's greatest enemy was Great Britain, its historical occupier, and told Dulles that as a nationalist, he could not afford to forget that fact.

> They [the Egyptian people] will lose faith in me and other people will rise from the underground and win the confidence of the people. If I stop leading my people as a nationalist, then the Communists are going to lead them. They would use my partnership in pacts with you to say that I am a stooge.
>
> How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding a knife a thousand miles away?[29]

Dulles returned to Washington, having concluded that the United States could not rely upon Egypt as the key country in building its defense alliance in the Middle East, and as a result he shifted focus to develop a so-called northern tier approach, in which the Muslim countries stretching from Turkey through Iraq and Iran to Pakistan would create a defense perimeter against possible communist bloc encroachments toward the Persian Gulf. Along with Great Britain, these countries formed the Baghdad Pact military alliance—which Nasser viewed as being more directed at him than at the spread of communism.[30] The Egyptian leader made a public denunciation of the alliance while attending the conference of non-aligned African and Asian political leaders, which took place in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955.[31] With the West refusing to provide him weapons and seemingly forming an alliance directed against him, Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc.[32] In September 1955, the diplomatic world was shocked by the announcement that Egypt had accepted an agreement to purchase large quantities of military equipment from Czechoslovakia (discussed in detail in chapter 3).

Because the Eisenhower administration had demanded that all of its allies be anti-Soviet, Washington was furious that Nasser had welcomed Soviet bloc influence into his country. In a comment certain to make its way back to Nasser (since the two nonaligned leaders had a close relationship), Dulles told the Yugoslavian President Tito that the Soviet decision (Washington viewed Prague as merely a proxy for Moscow) to provide arms to Nasser was "as irresponsible as giving a lethal weapon to children to play with."[33] Egypt's recognition of the People's Republic of China in May 1956 further convinced Eisenhower and Dulles that Cairo had joined the communist camp.[34] The Eisenhower administration was determined to avoid the impression that countries that played both sides of the Cold War got better treatment than those who were staunchly anticommunist. Citing the acceptance of Czechoslovak arms, recognition of communist China, and continued hostility toward Israel, Dulles informed the Egyptian ambassador that the United States had decided to cancel both its funding of Nasser's cherished Aswan Dam project as well as its PL-480 food shipments.[35] The secretary of state explained, "We do not want to give such aid if it merely supports governments which are subservient or sympathetic to international communism."[36]

The United States government's knee-jerk reaction to the Czechoslovak arms deal, as well as its unwillingness to accept Cold War neutrality, created additional opportunity for Moscow to sway Nasser closer to the Soviet camp. It also dramatically changed the course of events in the Middle East. One week later, an alienated Nasser retaliated against the news that Washington was pulling funding for Aswan by nationalizing the Suez Canal. In response to Nasser's nationalization

of the canal, the British, French, and Israelis launched a joint invasion of Egypt, with the unstated goal of overthrowing the Egyptian president.[37] Eisenhower was both surprised and infuriated by the actions of his so-called allies and opposed the intervention. Washington then teamed with the Soviet Union to introduce a United Nations resolution demanding the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egypt. But for Western prestige in the region, the damage had already been done. The combination of the Czechoslovak arms deal, the Suez crisis, and the US refusal to fund the Aswan project opened the door for the Soviet bloc to gain a further foothold in Egypt.[38] Khrushchev came to Nasser's rescue by agreeing to build the dam and providing additional military and diplomatic support, making Egypt the focal point of his efforts to build bridges to the Third World.[39] Thereafter, the Soviet bloc became the chief supplier of aid and arms to Egypt during the late 1950s.

In terms of its influence in Cairo, Prague benefitted greatly from these turn of events. Although the ministry of foreign affairs expressly prohibited Czechoslovak military personnel (who were inside the country teaching the Egyptians how to use their new weapons) from fighting alongside the Egyptians during the Suez crisis, Prague publicly supported Cairo's sovereign right to nationalize the canal, and it was Czechoslovak arms that allowed Egypt to hold its own against its aggressors until Soviet and American political pressure could ultimately save the day for Nasser. As a result, Cairo agreed to upgrade its diplomatic relationship with Prague to the ambassadorial level and to an expanded economic and military relationship. By 1958, Czechoslovakia was receiving 9 percent of Egypt's exports (mostly cotton).[40]

Czechoslovakia was particularly active in building complete industrial factories in Egypt, including two power plants, cement mills, a sugar mill, a metal-rolling mill, and separate factories that built ceramics and porcelain, children's toys, bicycles, plywood, and footwear. Textile machinery, diesel equipment, locomotives, freight cars, tractors, trucks, machine tools, spinning machines for fabrics, and drinking-water filter stations were also supplied. In order to implement all of this technical aid, a large number of Egyptian engineers and industrial technicians were brought to Prague for training, and Czechoslovakia built a technical institute in Cairo, so such training could be conducted within Egypt as well. A Czechoslovak cultural center was also opened in Cairo, and a team of archeologists, with a specially equipped boat, were sent to help preserve the ancient monuments in the areas that were to be flooded by the creation of the Aswan Dam. In November 1957, ČSA, the Czechoslovak national airline, would begin direct service between Prague and Cairo. Of special importance to Nasser, Czechoslovakia provided Egypt with

several medium-wave transmitters, so he could disseminate propaganda throughout the region with his "Voice of the Arabs" radio station.[41]

Czechoslovakia would also continue to be a major arms supplier for Egypt for the next decade, yet one gets the sense from Czechoslovak archival materials that Prague saw relations with Egypt primarily in economic, not political terms, and was not as enthusiastic about relations with Nasser's regime as were the Soviets. The KSČ viewed Nasser's internal policies with trepidation. Reports from Czechoslovak journalists who had visited Egypt described huge discrepancies in living standards among the population, and viewed Egypt's leadership as bourgeoisie capitalists. This, combined with the fact that Nasser had outlawed the Egyptian Communist Party, convinced Prague to maintain its distance from the Egyptian leader. When, in October 1958, Egyptian Minister of the Interior Zakaria Muhieddin suggested that Nasser be invited to visit Prague, the KSČ voted against issuing the invitation.[42]

Relations with Morocco

On the opposite end of North Africa, Czechoslovakia formally recognized Rabat's independence and requested the establishment of formal diplomatic relations soon after France relinquished its protectorate over Morocco in the spring of 1956. Although Morocco delayed responding to the Czechoslovak proposal while it decided the position it would take toward the communist world, it did receive a Czechoslovak trade delegation, headed by explorer and Africanist Jan Kořinek, who had previously mediated the opening of diplomatic and business relations between the two states during 1930–38.[43] As a result of Kořinek's efforts in the 1930s, Czechoslovakia opened a consulate in Casablanca in 1936, and Morocco had become Czechoslovakia's most important trading partner in Francophone Africa (by 1937, the value of this trade reached 33.5 million Kčs in exports and 12.1 million Kčs in imports) and remained so for the majority of the period covered by this study (with the exception of 1959–61, when it was briefly surpassed by Guinea).[44] Czechoslovakia's main exports to Morocco were engineering equipment (particularly for use in mining), consumer goods, and sugar, and the primary imports were phosphates, ore (iron, manganese, lead), and limes.[45] But after Nazi Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia, the consulate in Casablanca became a diplomatic outpost for the Third Reich in 1940, and trade between the two countries slowed to a trickle until Morocco's independence.

The success of Kořinek's 1956 trip led to Czechoslovak products being exhibited at Casablanca's Exposition Fair in 1957. According to Czechoslovakia's deputy foreign minister of trade, Jaroslav Kohout, the

exhibit made a favorable impression on Morocco's Crown Prince Hassan and his younger brother, Moulay Abdallah, who voiced an interest in visiting Prague to possibly buy Czechoslovak vehicles and aircraft for their country.[46] The goodwill created for Czechoslovakia at this fair was short lived, as only a month later, Františka Vlčka, an agent for the StB operating in Morocco under the cover of working for the Czechoslovak trade mission, was arrested for attempting to recruit a Moroccan intelligence officer. After holding Vlčka in jail six weeks on bribery charges, he was expelled from the country. While the incident significantly dampened diplomatic relations between Prague and Rabat, it did little to impair their burgeoning economic relations. Six months after the Vlčka incident, a far-reaching trade agreement was signed between the two countries, and in 1958, their level of trade would be almost 2.5 times more than it had been at Morocco's independence two years earlier.[47]

Prague tried to further strengthen Czechoslovak-Moroccan relations by using the general secretary of the Moroccan Communist Party (PCM), Ali Yata, as an intermediary to Crown Prince Hassan. Hassan occupied the position of Moroccan defense minister, and in comparison to his father, King Mohammed V, he was considered to hold anti-imperialist views and be more sympathetic to the Eastern bloc. Following up on the impressions formed during the Casablanca Exposition Fair, KSČ party leader Jiří Hendrych met with Yata and enlisted him in an attempt to convince Hassan to visit Prague to consider buying Czechoslovak weaponry to rearm the 30,000 man Moroccan army.[48] While the documentary record makes it unclear whether Hassan actually visited Prague, Yata's efforts did lead to Morocco's purchase of Czechoslovak arms; Hassan's consent for Morocco to serve as a conduit for funneling Czechoslovak military aid to the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) rebels in Algeria; and Rabat's decision to establish formal diplomatic relations with Prague in August 1959.[49]

Closer relations between Prague and Rabat was part of a gradual shift in Moroccan foreign policy toward Cold War non-alignment by distancing itself from the United States and France and improving relations with the Soviet bloc and progressive African and Arab states. Morocco established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1958, and Moscow provided large amounts of military aid to Rabat, including jet fighters in early 1961. In 1962, Morocco signed aviation agreements with both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, while making a formal request for the United States to evacuate its WWII era military base in the country prior to the contracted December 31, 1963 date for doing so. Of even greater concern for the United States, Moscow and Rabat entered into negotiations to construct a naval submarine base on the Moroccan coast.[50] In the political realm, King Muhammad V initiated a summit meeting of

progressive African states, which met in Casablanca in January 1961 to discuss issues of common concern such as the conflicts in Congo and Algeria. As a result of this meeting, the Casablanca Group was formed, consisting of Morocco, the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. While Morocco still hosted US military bases on its territory, and its economy remained open to Western private capital, this shift in Moroccan foreign policy created favorable conditions for further improvement in Czechoslovak-Moroccan bilateral relations.

Czechoslovakia used these favorable conditions to strengthen its economic position inside Morocco. In 1960, two Moroccan foreign ministers (the minister of education and the minister of culture) visited Czechoslovakia, which was followed by the first high-level ministerial delegation from Czechoslovakia, led by Frantisek Krajčír, which visited Morocco in the spring of 1961 to sign bilateral economic, scientific, technical, and aviation agreements. When Mohammad V died unexpectedly in March 1961, Hassan was elevated to king. Given Hassan's previous anti-imperialist reputation and role in expanding relations between the two countries, his ascendency to the throne seemed to portend even closer relations between Rabat and Prague. Indeed, this was exactly the analysis of the ČSSR embassy in Rabat, but the new king instead reoriented Moroccan foreign policy back toward the West, and in the process, strained relations with Czechoslovakia.[51]

Relations with Somalia

Czechoslovakia's intimate relations with Ethiopia did not prevent it from also establishing relations with its archenemy, Somalia. Somalia gained its independence in July 1960 through the merger of Italian and British Somaliland. Given the fact that Somalia was among the least developed countries on the African continent, with an economy almost exclusively agricultural in nature, relations with Mogadishu was not a high priority for Prague. Despite this, Czechoslovakia sent a delegation to Somalia's independence ceremonies and sought to initiate diplomatic relations. At first, Somalia rejected the Czechoslovak offer, citing a lack of resources and trained diplomats. Yet Prague remained persistent, and Somalia agreed to establish diplomatic relations in September 1960, after which Czechoslovakia opened an embassy in Mogadishu on Christmas Day 1960.[52]

With Czechoslovakia's economic opportunities in the country negligible, educational assistance became the basis of its relationship with Somalia. In December 1960, Somalia's minister of education, Garad Ali Garad Jama, visited Prague and signed several education agreements with the Czechoslovak government. Czechoslovakia agreed to send experts

to help in the development of the new country's education curriculum. Prague also agreed to build in Somalia a technical institute, complete with dormitories for both students and teachers, and to give the Somali government 2 million Kčs in free assistance to help fund the project. In addition to this, Prague gave 40 Somali students scholarships to receive technical training in Czechoslovakia.[53]

Czechoslovak-Somali bilateral relations would be expanded the following year, when Somali Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke visited Prague in June 1961. The Czechoslovaks viewed the visit as an opportunity to strengthen the position of Prime Minister Shermarke, who they viewed as a progressive interested in developing ties with the Soviet bloc. At the meeting between Shermarke and Novotný, the Somalis asked for assistance in industrializing their country and forming a national army and police force. Novotný expressed a willingness to help, but their meeting became contentious when the Czechoslovaks indicated they would provide a loan to the Somali government in order to cover the salaries and living expenses of their technicians whom they would send to Somalia, while Somalia instead wanted to use the loan to cover their own budget shortfalls. The archival records do not indicate how this dispute was resolved, but Shermarke's visit to Prague ended with the signing of agreements in the scientific, cultural, and economic fields, and the gift of a Czechoslovak-built Zetor Super tractor for Somalia. In a follow up to Shermarke's visit, a Czechoslovak delegation visited Mogadishu two weeks later and agreed to provide Somalia a loan of £1.5 million (approximately 30 million Kčs) to help carry out its industrialization program.[54]

Relations with Nigeria

Czechoslovakia's first contacts with Nigeria took place prior to World War II, when the Czech shoe company, Bata, formed the subsidiary, Czechoslovak-Nigerian Export-Import Company (CNEICO), as a conduit for its purchase of Nigerian rubber for the soles of its shoes. Bata, although largely unknown in the United States, is a very successful shoe company (it, for example, holds the Guinness Book of World Records distinction for being the world's largest shoe retailer and manufacturer and founded one of the world's largest shoe museums in Toronto, Canada) which was founded by Tomáš Bat'a in the Czech city of Zlín in 1894. Bat'a perfected the process of mass producing cheap footwear, earning him the sobriquet of the "Henry Ford of Eastern Europe." The company's product quickly spread across Europe. At the end of the nineteenth century, British manufacturers sent representatives to colonial Africa to survey the scene and determine which markets there might be for European

products on the continent. One of the delegation's observations was that since few people wore shoes in Africa, there was no market for European footwear. Bata's representative saw things differently, however. Rather than being discouraged by the rarity of footwear in Africa, he saw a huge opportunity of an unfilled market. By 1929, Bata was the world's leading footwear exporter, and on the eve of World War II, the company had over 100,000 employees, and its shoes were being sold all over the world, but especially in Africa. The company set up several factories on the continent, as its inexpensive footwear was perfect for the African market, and Bata soon became known as the "shoes of Africa" and was perhaps the most recognizable brand name of any product in Africa.

Following the initial economic penetration into Nigeria via Bata, Czechoslovakia attempted to enter into formal diplomatic relations with the then-British colony in the mid-1950s. However, after the Suez crisis, with relations between Czechoslovakia and Great Britain tense, Prague decided to postpone negotiations. When it tried to renew the discussions in 1958, the British government strongly rejected the offer. Even after Nigeria received its formal independence in January 1960, Lagos continued to refuse contact with Prague.[55]

It would again be Bata which would provide Czechoslovakia its opening to Nigeria. Shortly after independence, the Nigerian politician and former accountant for the Bata operations in Nigeria, Festus Okotie-Eboh, became minister of finance. In the late 1950s, his relationship to Bata eventually led him to move to Czechoslovakia, where he studied to become a podiatrist. As a result, Okotie-Eboh held pro-Czechoslovak sympathies, and in June 1961, he led a Nigerian delegation to Prague in order to discuss the possibility of closer relations between the two states. As a result of Okotie-Ehoh's visit, formal diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Nigeria were established later that year. However, because of Nigeria's pro-British orientation, Czechoslovak-Nigerian relations remained minimal until the Biafra war (discussed in chapter 3).[56]

Relations with the Belgian Congo

Diplomatic relations between Prague and the Belgian Congo began with the opening of a Czechoslovak honorary counsel in Leopoldville in 1929, which was upgraded to full counsel general in 1936, and operated until the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Following the war, Prague reopened its consulate in Leopoldville in February 1948, but prior to Congo's independence, both economic and political relations were minimal. Czechoslovakia's early diplomatic involvement with the Belgian Congo is of interest mostly as a case study of how the communist party purges in Czechoslovakia impacted Prague's ability to conduct its diplomacy abroad in the early 1950s.

When Zbynek Roušar arrived in Leopoldville, the capital of the Belgian Congo, in 1948, to reopen the Czechoslovak consulate there, he faced difficult conditions. A makeshift consulate had been set up in rented rooms in a hotel, and he operated without a telephone, automobile, or even basic office supplies. Nevertheless, within a year of his arrival, Roušar was successful in expanding the scope of Czechoslovak foreign policy in central Africa by becoming accredited to the colonies of Ruanda-Urundi, French Equatorial Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, Gambia, and the Gold Coast.[57]

But soon Roušar came into constant conflict with Vladislav Roubal, one of his subordinates at the consulate. In the atmosphere of the purges taking place back home, their dispute took on political overtones. The ministry of foreign affairs personnel files of the two men contain numerous documents about their disputes.[58] Roubal denounced Roušar as being disloyal to the state on at least two separate occasions. For his part, Roušar sent a letter to Prague, dated April 21, 1949, in which he accused Roubal of attempting to have contact with Hubert Ripka. Ripka was a former correspondent for the Czech newspaper *Lidové Noviny* and advisor to former Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš, who had served as the secretary of state in the ministry of foreign affairs for the Czechoslovak government-in-exile during the war, and as the minister for foreign trade in the postwar government. After the communist coup, Ripka went into exile and was a noted opponent of the communist regime. Apparently, the MZV took Roušar's accusations seriously, because only nine days later, Roubal was ordered to return to Prague. Roubal disobeyed this order and stayed in the Congo with his family for over a year. When he finally returned to Prague in November 1950, he was arrested and sentenced to 11 years in prison. In October 1951, he was shot while trying to escape from the Jáchymov prison camp. Roušar would eventually suffer a similar fate. He was recalled to Prague in March 1951 and fired from the MZV eight months later. In January 1955, Roušar was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison as part of the purge trail against Ctibor Novak, a Czech general who was convicted and executed on charges of being a spy for "imperialist powers."[59] While there is no way of knowing whether Roubal or Roušar were actually disloyal to the state or innocent victims of the purge, their stories illustrate the instabilities that the purge caused for the implementation of Czechoslovak foreign policy.

Relations with Liberia and Sierra Leone

As a member of the League of Nations, and one of only three independent states in Africa prior to World War II (along with Ethiopia and South Africa), Czechoslovakia was keen to establish relations with Liberia in the interwar wars. But Monrovia was not receptive to Prague's advancements

and rejected its attempts to initiate diplomatic relations in 1934 and a trade agreement in 1938.[60]

Liberia was founded by the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1816 as a colony in West Africa where freed ex-slaves from the United States could be repatriated to their native continent and escape from the limitations on freedom they faced in the United States. After President Abraham Lincoln extended diplomatic recognition to Liberia in 1862, the United States became one of Liberia's closest allies, highlighted by the intimate friendship between the two countries during World War II, when the United States built a large international airfield in the country in 1942, and President Franklin Roosevelt visited in 1943. Therefore, by the time William V.S. Tubman was elected to his first of seven terms as president of Liberia in 1944, his country already had a long history of close relations with the United States (10 of Liberia's first 16 presidents had been born in the United States).[61] With such an American-centric foreign policy orientation, it is not altogether surprising that Monrovia rejected Prague's early blandishments.

Relations between Washington and Monrovia cooled considerably during the early 1950s. By 1952, Washington told Liberia that Roberts Field (the airfield built by the United States in 1942) was no longer beneficial to the United States, and Monrovia would have to maintain the facility itself, even though it could not afford to do so and did not have trained air traffic controllers (Washington would later reverse course on this decision). US aid to Monrovia was also meager, with Liberia never getting more than $2.4 million in American aid for any year between 1953 and 1957.[62]

Liberian annoyance with its alliance with the United States gave the Soviet bloc an opening to gain a foothold in the country. The Soviet Union took the first crack at it when it sent a delegation to Tubman's inauguration ceremonies in January 1956. This marked the first time that an official Soviet delegation had visited sub-Saharan Africa as well as Moscow's first attempt to establish diplomatic relations with an African state.[63] Although the Liberians strung along the Soviets with the prospect of an exchange of embassies for some time, it appears that this was all a ruse to grab the attention of the United States, in order to convince Washington to stop neglecting Liberia.[64] Tubman told the American ambassador that the Soviets had offered him large amounts of technical, as well as economic, assistance (when in reality, the Soviets had not offered him anything), but he assured Washington's envoy that he would not befriend Moscow, because he feared Soviet influence, not only in his country, but also throughout West Africa. He added that even if Moscow offered him $100 million, he would not accept their aid.[65] This was quite a statement of loyalty to the United States, given the fact that

Washington only gave Monrovia $2.4 million in aid that year.[66] In order to further substantiate his loyalties, Tubman sent a letter to the White House, telling US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “This is intended to assure you that the Liberian Government and people are not vacillating nor mercenary, and that the century old friendship” between the United States and Liberia would continue.[67]

While the Soviet initiative of 1956 failed, Czechoslovakia did become the first (and until the 1970s, the only) country in the Soviet bloc to establish economic relations with Liberia, although this was minimal—amounting to only 500,000 Kčs of exported consumer goods per year. Prague also made its own attempt to form relations with Monrovia when it sent a delegation to Tubman’s inauguration in January 1960.[68] Once again, the Liberians strung along their communist suitor by feigning an interest in relations and suggesting that Tubman might even make a state visit to Prague (four years earlier, the Liberians had inferred that he might visit Moscow). But again, formal diplomatic relations never resulted from these preliminary negotiations, because the Liberians had no intention of opening to the Soviet bloc.

The Czechoslovaks had learned their lesson from these experiences. When Prague received an invitation to send representations to Tubman’s next inauguration four years later, the presidium decided to send a delegation, because “in view of us being interested in expanding trade with Liberia it would not be correct to reject the invitation,” but, it added, “the Liberian government, which follows an explicitly pro-Western, especially pro-American policy is not interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia,” and therefore, the head of the delegation, the Czechoslovak ambassador to Guinea, Milos Votja, was instructed to not even raise the matter with Liberian government officials.[69] Diplomatic relations were not established between Liberia and the Soviet bloc until after Tubman’s death 1971.

Neighboring Sierra Leone has a history similar to Liberia, as it too was originally founded as a colony for freed slaves. In Sierra Leone’s case, it was established by the British in 1792 as a home for free slaves from Canada, the United Kingdom, and those freed by the British Royal Navy’s attempts to combat the slave trade off the coast of West Africa. Unlike Liberia, however, the government of Sierra Leone was willing to initiate formal diplomatic relations with the communist world. Moscow and Prague both recognized Sierra Leone’s independence in April 1961 and established diplomatic relations with Freetown in early 1962.

Despite this, ČSSR officials regarded Milton Margai’s regime as overly pro-British. Since Sierra Leone kept its distance from the Soviet bloc, it thus held for Czechoslovakia purely economic interest. The export of consumer goods to the country generated 3–4 million Kčs of revenue

per year, but given its small size and political orientation Prague did not view relations with Sierra Leone as holding much potential.[70] Liberia and Sierra Leone represent the conservative, Anglo-American-oriented African states, which were wary of the Soviet Union and communism, yet perhaps feeling less threatened by a smaller communist state, were willing to form an economic relationship with Czechoslovakia.

Relations with Francophone Africa

During World War I, the nucleus of the exile Czechoslovak movement seeking autonomy for Czechs and Slovaks from Austria-Hungary was based in Paris. In the interwar period, France was Prague's most valuable international ally and the guarantor of the inviolability of Czechoslovakia's borders. An alliance with Paris was important for Prague, due to its vulnerable location between the potentially hostile powers of Germany and the Soviet Union. Cultural ties between the two countries would also flourish during this period. Bilateral relations would later sour over France's (along with Great Britain's) abandonment of Czechoslovakia at the Munich Conference of September 1938. Prague felt betrayed by Paris' decision to sacrifice its country to Hitler in order to avoid a wider war with Nazi Germany. After the war, relations with France were restored, but the new Czechoslovak president, Edvard Beneš, oriented Prague's foreign policy closer to Moscow, feeling that the Czechoslovaks could no longer trust or rely upon a French government that had not only turned its back on them at the outset of World War II, but then themselves became quickly routed by the Nazi war machine.

After the KSČ's takeover of power in 1948, it moved to eradicate almost all connections with Western countries, and especially with France, which among the Western powers previously had the most cultural influence inside Czechoslovakia. The KSČ leadership viewed ongoing cultural relations with France as an attempt by Paris to drive a wedge between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In March 1951, Czechoslovakia's alliance with France was officially dissolved. In April, the Paris-based cultural organization, the French Institute, was forced to close its offices in Prague, Brno, and Bratislava. In June, the same fate met the French consulates in Prague and Bratislava, and the offices of the French news agency, Agence France-Presse. Soon, the Stalinist onslaught against France included the banning or restriction of French cultural products within Czechoslovakia (books, films, etc.) and formal accusations that French diplomats had been spying for the West. Czechoslovak animosity toward France reached the point that it was last country in the Soviet bloc (September 1964) to resume cultural relations with Paris following the Khrushchev thaw.[71]

By the late 1950s, the enmity between Prague and Paris would spread to sub-Saharan Africa, where Czechoslovakia was working hard to establish its influence, and France was trying desperately to retain its predominance. In Africa, France, along with Great Britain, had been one of the major colonial powers. Once Charles de Gaulle returned to power in Paris, following the founding of the French Fifth Republic in 1958, he envisioned Africa as the key to both extricating Paris from its colonial war in Algeria and maintaining French prestige by transforming the image of France within the Third World from that of an imperial oppressor to its great champion. De Gaulle's first step in this effort was to offer France's colonies in sub-Saharan Africa a referendum on whether to remain part of the French Fifth Republic or receive immediate independence from Paris. Guinea was the only French colony to reject de Gaulle's offer and vote "non" to the referendum, thus gaining its independence on September 29, 1958.[72] As a result of Guinea's decision, de Gaulle immediately ended all assistance to Conakry, which forced Guinea to seek aid from the Soviet bloc—giving Prague its first opening in Francophone Africa (discussed in greater detail in chapter 2).

The development of relations between Guinea and the Soviet bloc, Czechoslovak weapons shipments to Algerian rebels (discussed in chapter 3), Czechoslovakia's relative economic prosperity and desire to export its manufactured products to Africa, and the general deterioration of East-West Cold War relations following the crises over Hungary and the Suez Canal, combined to cause considerable consternation in Paris. De Gaulle realized that only through continued relations with Africa could France retain any semblance of being a world power.[73] Paris viewed Czechoslovakia's new African policy as a threat to the continuance of French influence over Francophone Africa. It feared that Czechoslovak offers of aid could weaken is economic influence in the region, or even worse, Czechoslovak arms could help opposition groups overthrow the conservative governments of Africa that retained their allegiance to Paris. As a result, French authorities and intelligence services closely monitored Czechoslovakia's ties with Africa.[74] In fact, since France was more interested in preserving its economic, military, and cultural influence over Africa than in fighting the Cold War against communism, it opposed the more active efforts of the United States and Czechoslovakia to increase their influence in Africa than it did the encroachment of the Soviet Union, which was more passive toward Francophone Africa, due to Khrushchev's efforts to reach a *modus vivendi* with de Gaulle.[75] For its part, Prague sent official missions to attend the independence ceremonies of nearly every country in Francophone Africa, and attempted to form diplomatic and economic relations with the newly independent states. In order to counter this perceived Czechoslovak offensive in Africa, when

France gave its remaining African colonies their independence in 1960, it pressured them to refuse Prague's (as well as Moscow's) offers to establish diplomatic relations, and nearly all complied with Paris's wishes.[76]

Senegal, by virtue of having the only legal communist party in Africa, was a country which Prague initially believed that it may be able to make inroads into. The African Independence Party (*Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* or PAI) was a communist political party founded in Thiès, Senegal in 1957. It developed branches in other West African countries, which were all banned by the respective local governments, leaving the branch in Senegal as the only legal communist party in the region during the late 1950s. One of the leaders of PAI, Majhemout Diop, worked in the mid-1950s for the International Association of Students in Bucharest, Romania, but apparently had no contact with either Moscow or Prague at that time.

In January 1959, the French colonies of Senegal and French Sudan (modern day Mali) merged to form the Mali Federation, which became an independent state in June 1960. At that time, Czechoslovakia viewed the PAI as "the only progressive force" in the newly independent state, but viewed its influence within the country as minimal.[77] On August 1, 1960, the government of the Mali Federation accused the PAI of encouraging unrest during local elections and banned the organization—forcing it to go underground. Only weeks afterwards, the federation itself was dissolved and became two separate independent states—Senegal and Mali. The Malians blamed Paris for the breakup of the short-lived Mali Federation, and thereafter became a bitter enemy of France and Senegal, while aligning themselves with the "radical" states of Guinea and Ghana. The PAI then opened offices in Conakry and Bamako and served as a Senegalese opposition movement in exile.

For its part, Czechoslovak analysts viewed the breakup of the Mali Federation as a French-inspired separatist coup, designed to prevent progressive African socialist leaders like the Malian politician, Modibo Keïta, from power.[78] Prague then recognized Keïta's government in Mali in September, and Bamako quickly formed close relations with Czechoslovakia and the rest of the Soviet bloc (discussed in chapter 2). Czechoslovak recognition of Senegal would be delayed until November, but Prague was still eager to form both economic and strategic relations with Dakar. Economically, Senegal had the second-strongest economy in Francophone Africa (behind the Ivory Coast), and therefore, the Czechoslovaks viewed it as a potential export market for their manufactured goods. Strategically, the Dakar airport was the most important air traffic hub of West Africa, and Prague hoped to reach an aviation agreement with the Senegalese government that would allow the Czechoslovak airline *České aerolinie* (ČSA) to use it for refuelling, in order to link

Czechoslovakia with its new regional allies: Guinea, Mali, and Ghana. However, to Prague's dismay, Dakar did not even respond to its offer to establish reciprocal diplomatic relations.[79]

Yet Prague did not give up so easily. It made the pragmatic decision to keep its contacts with PAI minimal and discreet, while it continued to seek diplomatic and economic relations with Senegal. In 1961, several Czechoslovak delegations would visit Senegal. After one such visit, Ján Šebík, chairman of the Africa-Czechoslovakia group in the national assembly, reported that "political power in the country [Senegal] is in the hands of [French] collaborators. In the state administration the French are in every important position."[80] In June 1962, Mamadou Dia, Senegal's leftist prime minister, made a trip to the Soviet bloc, visiting the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Dia confirmed to Czechoslovak authorities that the majority of his government was under the influence of French anti-communist propaganda and knew very little about Czechoslovakia.[81] The aviation agreement between the two countries was signed during Dia's visit, but the prime minister was not authorized to agree to any other diplomatic or economic agreement. Six months later, in December 1962, Dia attempted an unsuccessful coup against the regime of Senegalese president Léopold Senghor—largely because of opposition to Senghor's support of the United States during the Cuban missile crisis, as well as his refusal to form relations with the Soviet bloc.[82] After this, there was no diplomatic contact between Czechoslovakia and Senegal until December 1967, and formal diplomatic relations did not begin until 1970.

In response to Senegal's unwillingness to develop relations, the ČSSR ramped up its aid to PAI. In the early 1960s, while Prague was still hopeful of opening relations with Dakar, its support for the PAI was extremely limited. Historians Jan Zidek and Karel Sieber could find no record of Czechoslovakia providing any financial or material support to the PAI until the mid-1960s. Prior to that, Prague's support was confined to consultations and scholarships for two PAI members to study at Czechoslovak universities.[83] But after it became clear that Senghor was going to continue to ignore Czechoslovakia's advancements, PAI was allowed to establish its headquarters in Prague, and the ČSSR government supported the party through a monthly stipend.[84]

The Ivory Coast, under the leadership of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, was the state in Francophone Africa that was the most loyal to Paris, and as a result, the most hostile to the Soviet bloc. Houphouët-Boigny had ironically begun his political career as a communist, but after a falling out with the French Communist Party in 1950, he became staunchly anti-communist. He served in the French National Assembly from 1946 to 1959, and then as a cabinet member during the 1950s, which cemented

his lifelong allegiance to France. Even after Ghana and Guinea had kickstarted the wave of African independence by proclaiming sovereignty from their former colonial masters, Houphouët-Boigny remained hostile to the idea of the Ivory Coast breaking away from Paris. He became the leading advocate for continued French influence in West Africa, and in 1958, lobbied strongly for Africans to vote in favor of de Gaulle's referendum. Following independence in 1960, Houphouët-Boigny promoted Western capitalist development in the Ivory Coast and fought to preserve French influence in his country, prompting African socialists and Soviet commentators to label him as a "black capitalist," a "troubadour of neocolonialism," and "an African [only] by the color of his skin."[85] Czechoslovakia's embassy in Ghana agreed, labeling Houphouët-Boigny France's biggest "neo-colonial puppet on the African continent."[86]

Despite this, because Ivory Coast was the most economically promising of the former French colonies in Africa, Czechoslovakia had a strong interest in developing relations with Abidjan, but Houphouët-Boigny resolutely refused. The only official contact between the two states in the period covered in this study was the Czechoslovak delegation, which visited Ivory Coast in 1961 to attend the celebrations for the first anniversary of Ivorian independence. Houphouët-Boigny's cold shoulder prompted Czechoslovakia to half-heartedly support the Ivorian opposition movement, *Comite national pour la liberation de la Cote d'voire*, but this backing was limited, as Prague preferred to hold out hope of forming lucrative business relations with Houphouët-Boigny's regime. It would have to wait a long time, as formal diplomatic relations between the two countries would not be established until August 1984.[87]

Other than Guinea, Niger was the only other state in Francophone Africa in which a significant number of voters opposed remaining part of the French Republic during the 1958 referendum. In Niger, while 76 percent of votes received were in in favor of remaining under Paris' domain, only 36.6 percent of eligible voters went to the ballot box.[88] Anti-French sentiment in the colony was led by the majority leader of the national assembly, Djibo Bakary, the head of the Nigerien Democratic Union (UDN), more commonly known as Sawaba. But Sawaba was banned in 1959, and when Niger received its independence in August 1960, it was under the rule of Bakary's cousin, Hamani Diori, leader of the pro-French Nigerien Progressive Party (PPN). Czechoslovakia attempted to initiate diplomatic relations with Niger at that time, but Diori was wary of relations with the Soviet bloc and declined Prague's advances. Nonetheless, Prague persisted in trying to establish relations with Niamey, and in 1961 sent a medical mission to help fight against a meningitis outbreak in the country. Afterwards, a Nigerien goodwill mission visited Czechoslovakia in late 1961, which led to the two

countries signing a trade agreement in January 1962—making Niger the first country from the pro-French African and Malagasy Union to enter into formal economic relations with Czechoslovakia.[89]

Despite this, since the early 1960s, Czechoslovakia maintained substantial relations with Sawaba, which since being outlawed had moved across the border to set up an office in Mali. Bakary visited Prague in March 1961, after which Czechoslovak officials convinced Moscow, which previously had reservations about backing Sawaba, to support his opposition movement.[90] Although Niger was a poor country, its uranium deposits and location next to Ivory Coast and Nigeria made it an appealing target for Soviet bloc subversion. Before long, Sawaba was receiving support from a Who's Who of the socialist world: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Algeria, Morocco, Ghana, and Mali. Eventually, the Sino-Soviet split would erode the unity of Sawaba's supporters, as the Soviet bloc distanced itself from the movement as China's ties to Sawaba increased. In 1963, Sawaba unsuccessfully tried to assassinate Diori, which was followed by a failed invasion of the country in 1964.[91] Sawaba's attempts to overthrow his regime made Diori even more opposed to international communism, and as such, diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Niger would not occur until 1975, after Diori had been ousted in a coup.

Besides the radical states of Guinea and Mali, Dahomey (modern-day Benin) was the state in Francophone Africa in which Czechoslovakia made the greatest inroads into during the early 1960s. What set Dahomey apart from the other former French colonies were the personal contacts that its prime minister, Sourou-Migan Apithy, had established with Czechoslovak officials from having attended numerous receptions at the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris during the late 1950s. Despite the fact that Czechoslovak officials considered Apithy solidly pro-French and not among the more progressive leaders of Africa, Prague built upon these contacts by recognizing Dahomey's independence in July 1960 and sending a goodwill mission to the Dahomian capital of Porto-Novo in December of that year.[92]

In June 1962, Apithy, now in his capacity as vice president, led a reciprocating goodwill mission to Czechoslovakia to propose the opening of formal diplomatic relations between Prague and Porto-Novo. With diplomatic relations commenced, agreements on trade and scientific cooperation followed in the spring of 1963. Relations progressed enough that Dahomey's president, Hubert Maga, had scheduled to make a state visit to Prague—which would have made him the first head of state from the African and Malagasy Union to visit Czechoslovakia—but before this could happen, Maga was overthrown by a military coup in October

1963.[93] The Czechoslovak embassy in Ghana interpreted the coup as the French government using the Dahomian military to overthrow Maga for having opened relations with Prague in order to replace him with a more pliant puppet.[94] The coup effectively killed Prague's attempts to penetrate into France's "chasse gardée" (private hunting ground) in Francophone Africa.

The other countries in Francophone Africa—Cameroon, Congo-Brazaville, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Upper Volta—all refused both diplomatic and economic relations with Czechoslovakia, despite Prague's attempts to form them. The final six of those states would not open relations with Czechoslovakia until the 1970s. It was difficult for Prague to compete against Paris's influence in post-colonial Africa. Other than the newly designed national flags replacing the French tricolor on governmental flagpoles, little else changed within the first decade of independence in most of Francophone Africa. France retained, and in many African countries actually increased, its political, economic, educational, and cultural influences. Former French colonial governors usually stayed on, becoming the French ambassadors to the newly independent countries (or, in a few cases, even being appointed as ambassadors to France from the ex-colony), and thousands of French colonial servants remained as advisors, technicians, and teachers—oftentimes continuing to be paid by Paris, rather than by the African government for which they now worked.[95] In fact, in the immediate years after 1960, the French population in Africa actually grew.[96] For the first few years after independence in much of Francophone Africa, French advisors controlled the newly independent governments to the extent that they prepared all governmental paperwork while African cabinet members did little more than sign off on agreements that had previously been negotiated by the French. Despite this, Czechoslovakia made a concerted, but in the end failed, effort to establish relations with every former French colony in Africa—regardless of their political or economic orientation. Ironically, Czechoslovakia only supported opposition movements inside those African countries that rejected Prague's offers to establish diplomatic relations, and therefore, France's policy of pressuring its former colonies to ignore Czechoslovakia's advancements only served to weaken those countries' internal stability.

Relations with British East Africa

Because the colonies of British East Africa did not obtain their independence until the early 1960s (Tanganyika, 1961; Uganda 1962; Kenya 1963), Czechoslovakia's economic relations with the region was initially

limited, but this did not prevent Prague from developing substantial contacts with the nationalist movements in each colony prior to independence. But unlike the rest of "conservative" Africa, where economic relations were paramount in Prague's relationships, in British East Africa, Czechoslovakia focused more on developing political relations with the future leaders of the soon-to-be independent states.

Tanganyika was slated to become the first colony in British East Africa to gain its independence at the end of 1961. Representatives of the colony's dominant nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), themselves sought out contact with Prague when they visited the Czechoslovak embassy in London in the summer of 1961 and indicated their desire to not only establish relations with Czechoslovakia, but for the leader of their party, Julius Nyerere, to visit Prague. Czechoslovakia was eager to develop relations with TANU because it believed that a Czechoslovak presence in post-independent Dar es Salaam would be an ideal location from which to maintain contact with the liberation movements in neighboring Congo and Portuguese Mozambique. Prague then sent a delegation to attend Tanganyika's independence celebrations in December 1961, and opened up a consulate in the Tanganyikan capital shortly thereafter. However, because of Nyerere's sincere desire to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy, Tangyanika did not reciprocate by posting a diplomatic representative in Prague, as Nyerere maintained that his country would only operate three foreign missions (in London, Delhi, and at the United Nations in New York).[97]

In Uganda, Czechoslovak representatives established close contact with both Milton Obote's Ugandan People's Congress (UPC) and Benedicto Kiwankuka's Catholic Democratic Party in the late 1950s. Both visited Czechoslovakia prior to independence (Kiwankuka in 1960 and Obote in 1961) and were given small amounts of funding to assist their parties in preparing for elections.[98] After the UPC won the 1962 election, Obote visited the Czechoslovak embassy in London, prior to Uganda's formal independence, to discuss the possibility of forming trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation agreements with the ČSSR. The Ugandan prime minister-designate also proposed sending a group of print journalists, photo-journalists, and radio and television reporters to Prague for training.[99]

Such requests made Czechoslovak officials optimistic that Uganda would seek close relations with the Soviet bloc after independence, an impression that was given further legitimacy during Uganda's independence celebrations in September 1962, from which the head of the ČSSR delegation, Jozef Valo, reported that Obote gave him "extraordinary attention" and gave Czechoslovak representatives precedence over all other government delegations at the ceremonies, while stressing the role that

Prague's support had played in the UPC's electoral victory.[100] Originally, Czechoslovakia had planned to wait until all three East African colonies had gained independence in order to send an ambassador accredited to Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika. But after Obote's blandishments on Independence Day, and in response to his personal request for Prague to send an ambassador to Kampala as soon as possible, so he could receive advice on developing his newly independent country, the ministry of foreign affairs advised sending an ambassador to Uganda immediately, in order to not only strengthen relations with Obote's regime, but also to expand interaction with the neighboring states of Rwanda and Burundi, and increase contact with Kenya's nationalist leaders.[101] However, the politburo demurred on this suggestion, most likely for a combination of reasons, including the high cost of establishing embassies in each state in East Africa, Uganda's lack of geopolitical value to Czechoslovak foreign policy, and the fact that Uganda's former colonial power, the United Kingdom, continued to have paramount influence in the country—especially over the military. Instead, it was decided that Prague's charge d'affairs in Dar es Salaam, František Vomáčka, would also be accredited to Uganda. Nonetheless, Czechoslovak-Ugandan relations remained strong throughout the rest of the 1960s.[102]

Kenya was the colony that Czechoslovak officials believed held the most promise in British East Africa for orienting its foreign policies toward the Soviet bloc. This was largely because, like their counterparts in the West, Eastern bloc observers mistakenly viewed the Mau Mau uprising as communist-inspired. Prague, therefore, made an intensive effort to establish relations with Jomo Kenyatta's Kenyan African National Union (KANU), and in particular with the party's left wing, which was led by KANU's Vice President Oginga Odinga.

Odinga first visited Prague in 1960, where he was promised financial and material assistance for KANU's office in Cairo. A follow up visit by the head of KANU's Cairo office, Odhiambo Okello, resulted in the Czechoslovak government granting 14 scholarships for Kenyan students, selected by KANU, to study in Czechoslovakia. After Czechoslovak officials met with Odinga at Tanganyika's independence celebrations in December 1961, KANU was awarded more scholarships for the training of two personal bodyguards for Kenyatta and Odinga, and 20 officials who would be trained to become the nucleus of Kenya's ministries of interior and defense after independence.[103]

During the negotiations in London between British and KANU officials on setting a date for Kenyan independence in the spring of 1962, KANU representatives visited the Czechoslovak embassy and requested funding to purchase a printing press, and aid to help fund its office in London. Czechoslovak officials were reluctant to buy KANU a printing

press, suggesting instead that they themselves set up a press in Dar es Salaam that could then be used to publish materials for all of the national liberation movements it was supporting in eastern and southern Africa. The ministry of foreign affairs did, however, decide that because of the "urgency and importance of assisting the Kenyan party KANU" that additional funding, originally earmarked for the nationalist groups in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Zanzibar, be redirected to KANU.[104]

In July 1962, Odinga and Okello again stopped in Prague, on their way to attend the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace conference in Moscow. They again urged Prague to give KANU more financial assistance for the upcoming elections, which would decide the makeup of Kenya's first independent government. Odinga alleged that both the United States and United Kingdom were infusing large amounts of money into Kenya in an attempt to influence the elections and said that KANU had to rely on the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to offset Western attempts to buy the election. He even went as far as to compare the situation in his country to the Congo, where he said support from the socialist camp came too late to save Lumumba's party. As a result, the ČSSR leadership gave Odinga some small additional funding and a commitment that the Czechoslovak Press Agency (ČTK) would train six Kenyan editors to help KANU's campaign efforts.[105] While Czechoslovakia had minimal economic relations with Kenya through 1962 (total exports to Kenya in 1960–62 totaled only 4.4 million Kčs), it hoped that its political contacts with Oginga Odinga and Odhiambo Okello would allow Prague to have influence in Kenya after its independence.[106]

Relations with South Africa

As was generally the case elsewhere in Africa, Prague's relations with South Africa was determined by trade, which during the late 1950s and early 1960s provided Czechoslovakia with about 30 million Kčs annually.[107] The difference, of course, was that because of the government's apartheid racial policies, South Africa was a pariah state with which no other state in the Soviet bloc or sub-Saharan Africa maintained diplomatic relations. Ironically, the fact that few other states had relations with South Africa was considered a positive by the Czechoslovak government, as it allowed Prague greater trade opportunities and made their diplomatic representation in the country more valuable for the Soviet bloc.

Czechoslovakia opened its first consulate in sub-Saharan Africa in Cape Town in 1926. Its purpose was primarily to serve the small community of Czechs and Slovaks who had immigrated to southern Africa,

as well as to support Czech companies Škoda (auto manufacturer) and Bata (shoe manufacturer), which had both entered the South African and Rhodesian markets. The consulate fell into the hands of the Nazis when Germany took over Czechoslovakia in 1939. Because the South African government, although constitutionally obliged to support the British war effort against Germany, had neutral and even pro-German sympathies, the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile was not allowed to reestablish representation in Cape Town until December 1941, after the pro-British faction of the South African government, led by Jan Smuts, overcame the pro-German element, led by J.B.M. Hertzog, and officially declared war against Nazi Germany that proceeding September.

When Czechoslovakia became communist in 1948, the South African government—in order to demonstrate its anti-communist position to its Western allies—ceased relations with Prague on any practical level, but did allow Czechoslovakia to keep one administrative officer in Cape Town in order to continue skeletal operations of its consulate. After the Soviet Union and Poland closed their diplomatic offices in South Africa in 1956, and Yugoslavia left shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak consulate in South Africa remained in the late 1950s as the only communist diplomatic outpost south of the Congo.[108]

While diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and South Africa remained minimal, by 1960, both states realized that the continued Czechoslovak presence in Cape Town was mutually beneficial to both sides. It allowed, for example, Prague to be valuable ally to Moscow by negotiating with the South African government permission for the Soviet ship, *Kooperacija*, to dock at a South African port and take on provisions before continuing on to the Soviet research base in Antarctica. Conversely, after the international outrage following the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, in which nearly 300 black demonstrators protesting apartheid pass laws were either killed or injured by aggressive South African police, South African officials were able to ask their Western counterparts how they could consider disrupting diplomatic relations with Pretoria over the incident, when not even communist Czechoslovakia had done so.[109]

Between 1949 and 1960, Czechoslovak exports to South Africa increased fourfold. With Czechoslovak companies Skolexport (glass), Centrotex (fabrics), and others bringing back to Czechoslovakia over 30 million Kčs in profits from South Africa per year, South Africa was one of Prague's most important trading partners outside of Eastern Europe. South Africa held a significant place in the Czechoslovak economy, because being outside of the Soviet bloc, it provided much needed hard currency for Czechoslovakia. As a result, Czechoslovakia began to seek opportunities to expand trade with South Africa during a time

when the international community was becoming increasingly vocal in its condemnation of apartheid at international venues such as the United Nations, and many states were ending or dramatically curtailing their relations with Pretoria.[110]

In January 1961, Foreign Minister Václav David informed the KSČ's political bureau that South African authorities had requested an urgent reply regarding whether Czechoslovakia intended to maintain its consulate in South Africa, as well as whether it would accept the visit of a South African trade delegation to Prague. The politburo determined that maintaining its diplomatic representation in South Africa was advantageous for not only Czechoslovakia, but for the entire Soviet bloc, and voted to assure South Africa that it would continue to operate the consulate. It decided, however, to delay responding to Pretoria about the possibility of a South African trade mission visiting the ČSSR. While Prague did not want to completely close the door on the possibility, it judged that given the current international furor over apartheid, the time was not ripe to so openly demonstrate its relations with a state that was increasingly becoming an international outcast.[111]

Pressure on Czechoslovakia to close its consulate in South Africa (which by this point had been relocated to Johannesburg) continued to mount through 1961–62. In November 1962, United Nations Resolution 1761 was passed by a vote of 67–17. It declared that South African apartheid "seriously endanger[ed] international peace and security," and called for all states to break their economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties with South Africa.[112]

Yet, in a memorandum, international department officer Josef Antoš continued to argue in favor of ignoring such pressure and maintaining the consulate in Johannesburg, or at the very least trade with South Africa, noting that every time Prague had consulted with Moscow on the matter, "our Soviet friends" urged Czechoslovakia to maintain its relationship with South Africa.[113]

Because their movements were constantly monitored by the South African police, Czechoslovak diplomats working in Johannesburg found it very difficult to meet with officials from either of South Africa's leading national liberation movements, the South African Communist Party (SACP) or the African National Congress (ANC)—both of which were banned by the apartheid government. However, on one occasion in 1962, Tomáŝ Lahoda, from the Czechoslovak counsulate, was able to meet clandestinely with Joe Slovo, the general secretary of SACP, and two members of the ANC. Slovo and his colleagues implored Lahoda for Czechoslovakia to adhere to United Nations sanctions and close its diplomatic office in South Africa. In response, Lahoda purportedly told Slovo that his request was "blind and dogmatic," because the Czechoslovak

general consul was the communist world's only source for unfiltered information about events in country.[114]

SACP did not rely solely on its limited contact with Tomáŝ Lahoda to voice its displeasure with Czechoslovakian policy toward South Africa, but also made its opinion known in meetings with KSČ officials in Prague. Other communist parties from both sides of the Iron Curtain urged Czechoslovakia to end its involvement with the apartheid regime as well. In a meeting with officials from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), Antonín Novotný disingenuously told CPGB General Secretary John Gollan that the ČSSR maintained its relations with the South African government because SACP did not officially oppose it.[115]

Eventually, Czechoslovakia's view of maintaining relations with South Africa began to change. Once harassed by South African intelligence, Czechoslovak diplomats were now treated with unexpected friendliness, which did not sit well with officials in Prague. Additionally, in mid-1963, SACP officials sent the KSČ a stern letter warning that dire consequences would result in the KSČ-SACP relationship if Czechoslovakia continued its relations with the apartheid government.[116] This initiated an intense policy debate between the ministries of foreign affairs, and foreign trade, and the international department. Minister of Foreign Affairs David advocated for reducing the staff size of the consulate from three to two people; the ministry of trade wanted to see no changes made, and the international department wanted a complete break in relations with apartheid South Africa. Asked to weigh in on the debate, officials in Moscow stated that they themselves had no problem with the existence of the Czechoslovak consulate general in Johannesburg, but told Prague that the opinion of their South African comrades in SACP should be taken into account.[117]

In the end, a compromise was reached. The Czechoslovak consulate in Johannesburg would be closed, but trade with South Africa would continue. It was agreed that the ČSSR's level of trade with South Africa should be frozen (it should not increase, nor in the short-term would it decrease). In an attempt to not endanger trade with South Africa, Prague would tell Pretoria that it was closing its consulate as part of wider austerity measures and was not a sign of an end of their relationship. Czechoslovakia would also refrain from selling weapons, ammunition, or airplanes to South Africa (including hunting and sporting weapons). Finally, Czechoslovak exports would gradually be moved into other markets, after which trade with South Africa would be dramatically reduced.[118]

Czechoslovakia's consulate in Johannesburg was therefore closed, but trade continued relatively unaffected for the next year. Then, in May 1964, an article appeared in the Algerian press exposing the extent of

Czechoslovakia's economic relations with South Africa and harshly criticizing it. Publication of the article was embarrassing to the KSČ, especially since it came at a time of waning Czechoslovak influence on the continent (covered in chapter 5). As a result, in July 1964, the ministry of foreign trade was ordered to no longer trade with South Africa. Current contacts were to be concluded by the end of 1965, and thereafter, only the delivery of spare parts "considered necessary to maintain the operation of machines and thus maintain a good reputation of Czechoslovak products" would be permitted.[119]

Prague's decision to end its diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa undoubtedly hurt Czechoslovakia more than it did South Africa. Czechoslovakia was giving up 30 million Kčs per year in much-needed, internationally convertible cash, while South Africa's exports to Czechoslovakia amounted to only 0.3 percent of its overall trade.[120] Moscow had little influence over the ČSSR decision to end its lucrative economic relations with South Africa. Instead, the decision was the result of rising international pressure to isolate the apartheid regime, particularly from the so-called radical African states, and from national liberation movements like SACP and ANC. The next chapter details Prague's blossoming relations with the continent's "radical" countries, and national liberation movements from 1958–62.

CHAPTER 2

Relations with Radical African States (1957–62)

The first wave of independence in sub-Saharan Africa had begun on March 6, 1957, when Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana away from its colonial past and to independence. In the late 1950s, Nkrumah seemed to be the embodiment of everything pan-African. The inscription on a statue of him in front of the Parliament building in Accra read, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you. We prefer self government with danger to servitude in tranquility. Our task is not done and our safety not assured until the last vestiges of colonialism have been swept from Africa."[1]

Nkrumah thought of himself as a great pan-Africanist leader and dreamed of one day leading a united Africa.[2] The fact that he was the first black African to lead his nation from colonization to self-government earned him tremendous respect throughout sub-Saharan Africa, as well as from the wider world. The Ghanaian leader was keenly aware that the eyes of the world were on him and his country, and that to some degree Ghana's performance as an independent state would either speed up or stunt the rate of independence elsewhere on the continent:

> How we conduct ourselves when we become independent will affect not only Ghana but the whole of Africa. We have a duty not only to this country but to the peoples everywhere in Africa who are striving toward independence. If we can make a success of our independence, we shall have made an incalculable contribution towards freedom and progress throughout Africa.[3]

Due to his personal prestige and popularity, both sides of the Iron Curtain saw Nkrumah as a potential mouthpiece to spread their ideology throughout the continent, and each therefore took great effort to court the Ghanaian leader.

This chapter discusses the years 1957–62, when Czechoslovakia's policies toward Africa began to shift from being primarily focused on economic relationships with the conservative states discussed in chapter 1 to more intensive relations with the so-called radical leaders, embodied by Nkrumah. This new focus in Czechoslovakia's approach toward Africa was a result of the combination of increased Soviet interest in the continent (a byproduct of the Khrushchev Thaw) and the rise to power of pan-African nationalist leaders such as Nkrumah in Ghana, Sékou Touré in Guinea, Modibo Keïta in Mali, and Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, who seemed more ideologically compatible with the Soviet bloc. In response to these two changes, Prague's involvement in Africa would expand during these years, from being based primarily on mutually beneficial economic relations with the conservative states, to helping the radical states consolidate their political and economic independence through generous aid.

Relations with Ghana from 1957–60

When Ghana first gained its independence in March 1957, it showed little inclination to form close relations with the Soviet bloc. This was despite of the fact that the Ghanaians felt slighted by Washington when US Vice President Richard Nixon presented to Ghana, as an independence present, only one fellowship for a Ghanaian student to study in the United States. Ghanaian authorities responded by seating the American vice president in the back of the hall at the formal independence dinner. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union also both sent delegations to Ghana's independence ceremonies, but while Nkrumah greeted both groups cordially and agreed to mutual cooperation and diplomatic relations in principal, he became evasive when the Czechoslovaks raised the possibility of a formal exchange of ambassadors, citing a lack of both resources and qualified Ghanaian diplomats as reasons for delaying such actions at the time.[4]

Part of the explanation for Nkrumah's reluctance to move quickly to embrace the Soviet bloc is that Ghana's economy (particularly its cocoa trade), military, and communications networks all remained tightly connected to the United Kingdom, its former metropole, with many British expatriates continuing to serve in key positions in the Ghanaian government. Because of this, Nkrumah was hesitant to sever ties with the West in the early years of Ghanaian independence.[5] However, the main reason that Nkrumah remained aloof from the Soviet bloc for the first few years after Ghana's independence was his desire to secure Western financing for his dream to build the Volta River Project (VRP). The VRP had initially been conceived by Sir Albert Kitson for the British

colonial administration in 1915 but never came to fruition because Great Britain, while financing and then recovering from two world wars, was forced to shelve large public works projects for its colonies. By the late 1950s, with the price of cocoa (Ghana's dominant export crop) in a tail-spin, Nkrumah rekindled the idea of the project as a way to wean Ghana's economy away from its dependence on world cocoa prices.[6] Nkrumah, like Nasser, believed that the hydroelectric dam and lake that would be created by the VRP would diversify the Ghanaian economy by modernizing agriculture (through the use of irrigation), creating a fishing industry, and generating enough power to support the entire country. The Ghanaian president envisioned the VRP not merely as a way to electrify the country, but as Ghana's best hope for achieving the grand economic and industrial goals he had set for the new state.

While studying in the United States in the 1930s, Nkrumah was inspired by the hydroelectric dams that were constructed in the New Deal.[7] Further bolstering Nkrumah's determination to complete the VRP was a World Bank report that forecast a fourfold increase in demand for aluminum by 1970.[8] This convinced Nkrumah's economic advisers that an aluminum smelter powered by the dam could process the country's abundant bauxite reserves and provide Ghana with a lucrative manufactured export. For these reasons, following Ghana's independence in 1957, Nkrumah's first goal was to secure funding for the VRP, which he described as "my baby and my ambition."[9]

Initially, Nkrumah had taken an overtly pro-British orientation, hoping that London would fund the VRP—which explains why he decided to keep his distance from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. But shortly after Ghana's independence, London informed Accra that it could not afford to help finance the VRP alone. Nkrumah was devastated. His personal prestige had become intimately intertwined with the VRP. Without the project, he feared that his vision of leading Africa to a prosperous future would be dashed. James Moxon, Nkrumah's spokesman for the project, remembers, "He [Nkrumah] was almost in despair, he was depressed. All those involved in it were shattered when we discovered that the Project was on the shelf. But Nkrumah was not a man to allow depression to take over."[10] An unexpected twist of fate soon brightened the prospects for the project.

Komla Gbedemah, the Ghanaian finance minister, was in the United States trying to mobilize interest for the VRP, when he stopped for a glass of orange juice at a Howard Johnson's in Dover, Delaware. The waitress at the restaurant informed Gbedemah that because of his skin color, he could not have his drink in the restaurant. The following day in New York, Gbedemah released a press statement about the incident, which became front-page news around the world. Thoroughly embarrassed by

the coverage this story was receiving in the international press, particularly following the crisis caused by efforts to integrate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, the previous month, US President Dwight Eisenhower personally called Gbedemah and invited him to breakfast at the White House.[11] The Ghanaian finance minister seized upon the unique opportunity of an audience with the American president to discuss Ghana's difficulty in financing the Volta River Project, and Eisenhower expressed a willingness to consider helping Ghana finance the project.

Nkrumah quickly took advantage of Gbedemah's meeting with the American president to write a letter to Eisenhower, officially requesting help in building the dam. Nkrumah told Eisenhower that the VRP's "successful implementation would, I am sure, do most to preserve and strengthen the political independence of this country." Continuing to play the Cold War card, Nkrumah added, "if the Government of the United States could provide the stimulus and drive which could bring the scheme to life, I venture to suggest that such actions would demonstrate to the world most convincingly and dramatically the general policies [of the United States] towards the Continent [of Africa]."[12] Eisenhower responded by sending Nkrumah an invitation for a White House visit. In his memoirs, James Moxon wrote that Nkrumah said Eisenhower's perceived interest in the VRP had "given us all fresh heart."[13] It also meant that the shrewd Ghanaian leader understood that he needed to maintain distance from the Soviet bloc until he had closed the deal on US financing for the VRP.

When Nkrumah arrived in Washington in July 1958, American representatives laid out the red carpet for the Ghanaian leader. In reporting on Nkrumah's visit, *Time* magazine wrote, "Seldom was a guest from a small country more welcome."[14] A briefing paper prepared for Eisenhower prior to Nkrumah's arrival stated that "Ghana's policies and institutions are still in a formative state, and their future character can be affected substantially by the attitude and actions of the United States."[15] From Washington's perspective, the meeting was an opportunity to enlist Nkrumah as its point man for Western interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet despite its desire to court Nkrumah, the White House was unwilling to make any economic commitments to their Ghanaian guests, promising only to fully consider participation in the VRP after receiving more extensive studies of the project. Instead, Eisenhower advised Nkrumah that the best way of financing the VRP would be to solicit American private industry. He offered his services in forming a consortium of American aluminum companies to fund the project.

Eisenhower contacted Edgar Kaiser, the head of one of the largest aluminum corporations in the world. At the president's request, Kaiser

agreed to fly to Ghana with a group of engineers to survey the VRP. Kaiser's report suggested that moving the site of the dam from Ajena to Akosombo, which would result in significantly lower costs, while generating much more power. Kaiser's assessment reduced the estimated cost of the project by 30 percent and immediately made it a more viable proposition. Kaiser wanted to go ahead with the project, but the World Bank made it clear that it would not participate without an unconditional endorsement from the White House. In August 1960, Eisenhower sent a letter to Nkrumah confirming that the United States would contribute $30 million toward the VRP.[16] Although Czechoslovakia had opened an embassy in Accra in November 1959 (three months after the Soviets had done so), the fact that the United States was key to Ghana's efforts to finance the VRP made Nkrumah continue to approach relations with the Soviet bloc with caution. The Ghanaian leader knew that Nasser's acceptance of arms from Czechoslovakia had resulted in the Eisenhower administration rescinding its commitment to fund Egypt's Aswan Dam, and he was careful to ensure that the same fate did not befall the VRP. It would take an issue of even greater significance for Nkrumah—the Congo crisis—for the Ghanaian leader to begin moving closer to Czechoslovakia and the rest of the Soviet bloc.

Relations with Guinea

While Ghana was maintaining a safe distance in its relations with the Soviet bloc, Prague would have better success in Guinea. In 1953, trade union leader Sékou Touré established himself as a folk hero throughout French West Africa after he organized a two-month strike in Conakry that resulted in a 20 percent wage increase for Guinea's lowest-paid public-sector workers, the first major concessions for the workers of French Africa. Two years prior, Touré's trade union activities had taken him to Berlin, Warsaw, and Prague, leading the American consulate general in Dakar to report to the State Department that Touré was an "African communist leader."[17] While the 1953 strike garnered him acclaim in Guinea, in Washington it only served to further convince the incoming Eisenhower administration that Touré was a communist, while it alerted officials in Prague and Moscow that he could potentially become a useful ally in the future.

In the Soviet bloc, Touré had the reputation of being a Marxist-inspired revolutionary. After being expelled from his lycée for having participated in a strike at the young age of 15, Touré studied the ideology of Marxist-Leninism under the guidance of French communists and was an active member in Guinea's first Marxist-Leninist study group, which was established in Conakry in 1944. In 1949, he took a job in the French

colonial treasury office, after which he became a local union organizer. He would later collaborate with the French General Confederation of Labor, as well as the World Federation of Trade Unions' General Council, and in the process, became the leading figure in the Guinean trade union movement. This displeased French colonial authorities, who then attempted to transfer him to Niger in order to put a damper on his union activities. Instead, Touré quit the French civil service and founded the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG) as the local offshoot of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA). It was around this time that he gained his first sustained exposure to Czechoslovakia, when he traveled to Europe and studied at the Institute of Economic Studies in Prague. Upon his return from Europe, he quickly built the PDG into a well-organized mass party, which led him to being elected as the mayor of Conakry in 1955 at the age of only 33.[18]

Guinea became independent on October 2, 1958, after being the only French colony to reject Charles de Gaulle's offer of increased autonomy within a French union of African states. Touré rejected the French referendum because it did not contain a provision to allow African states to opt for independence at a future time. Touré's position was heavily influenced by pressure from younger more radical elements of the PDG not to sell out to de Gaulle.[19] Under the leadership of Touré, the majority of Guineans voted against ratifying the constitution of the Fifth French Republic, and instead insisted upon complete and immediate independence from French rule. Touré triumphantly explained, "We prefer poverty in *liberty* to riches in slavery."[20]

The next day, de Gaulle angrily responded by cutting off all economic and technical assistance to Conakry. He announced, "Guinea can no longer nominally receive any aid from the French state either for administration or for funds for equipment."[21] Subsequently, nearly all French technicians and civic officials left Guinea, paralyzing a country whose population was only 5 percent literate and had only six university graduates. The French vindictively launched a scorched earth policy to punish Guinea for having left the French Empire. The police force destroyed its barracks. Departing colonial officials stripped their offices of all administrative records, as well as anything else potentially useful to the Guineans, including telephones and telephone wires, typewriters, maps, light bulbs, and medical supplies. Anything that could not be carried back to France was either burned or sunk in the ocean. In addition, the scholarships of Guinean students studying in France were revoked.[22] The French withdrew from Guinea so precipitously that an American reporter from the *Chicago Daily News* traveling from Liberia to Guinea was stranded at a bridge on the border for two weeks, unable to enter the country because the French border guards had locked the gates to the bridge and taken all of the keys.[23]

Guinea was left with no banking institution, no currency of its own, and no domestic capital accumulation. The prompt and complete French exodus had left Guinea ill prepared for independence. A desperate Touré turned to the United States for economic aid. On October 2, 1958, Touré sent a telegram to President Eisenhower, seeking to establish diplomatic relations between his newly independent state and the United States. A week later Touré sent a special emissary to meet with Donald Dumont, the US consul general stationed in Dakar, Senegal. Touré's representative explained to Dumont that Guinea placed great economic and political importance on relations with both the United States and United Kingdom, and assured him, "It is to Guinea's interest to remain with the Western bloc," and that Touré was not a communist and was not going to "sell out his country to the USSR."[24] Out of deference to its European ally, the Eisenhower administration did not even respond to Guinea's advancements.[25] This left Touré little choice but to turn to the Soviet bloc for assistance.

Within a week of Guinea's independence, Touré's regime was diplomatically recognized by both Moscow and Prague, while continuing to be ignored by Washington and Paris. Six weeks later, a Czechoslovak delegation, led by deputy foreign minister for trade Jaroslav Kohout, visited Conakry from November 17–21, becoming the first formal contact between Touré's newly independent government and the Soviet bloc. Kohout met with all of the key members of Touré's cabinet, and concluded agreements to establish economic and cultural relations between Czechoslovakia and Guinea. Kohout also gave Touré assurances that Prague would provide his country with weapons with which to establish its military. The following month, a Czechoslovak military expert visited Conakry to assess Guinea's military needs, and the Czechoslovak politburo voted to open an embassy in the Guinean capital.[26]

Two weeks after the visit of the Czechoslovak delegation, Moscow sent Peter Gerasimov, the counselor of the Soviet embassy in Egypt, to Conakry in early December to discuss the prospects of establishing relations between the Soviet Union and Guinea. Ismaël Touré, the minister of public works and half-brother of Sékou Touré, told Gerasimov that formal relations between Conakry and Moscow should be delayed until after Guinea exchanged ambassadors with at least one Western country, so France or the United States did not accuse it of joining the socialist camp.[27] The Guineans seemed less willing to establish close diplomatic relations with the communist superpower than they had been with its junior ally in Prague. As a result, while Prague had a diplomatic representative in the Guinean capital in January, and formally opened its embassy in Conakry in March 1959, Moscow would not open its embassy until a month later. Ecstatic about the opportunity to increase its Third World image and to get a foothold into sub-Saharan Africa, Moscow and Prague

would both provide Touré with extensive programs of technical and economic assistance. The other Eastern European states quickly followed their lead, and by 1960, even Mongolia had an embassy in Conakry. Trade agreements between COMECON (an economic consortium of Soviet bloc states) and Guinea quickly followed, with Conakry sending coffee and bauxite to Eastern Europe in exchange for manufactured consumer and industrial goods.

Despite having refused to assist Guinea, the Eisenhower administration became upset by the fact that Touré had accepted aid from the Soviet bloc. On October 13, Touré again wrote Eisenhower, requesting Washington's recognition of his government. The Guinean president stated that it was in the best interest of his country to remain aligned with the West, and emphasized how America's recognition of Guinea would contribute to that possibility.[28] Three and a half months later, the State Department's African Bureau recommended establishing an embassy in Conakry "as soon as possible." Again, his policy determined by the European Bureau, Eisenhower followed de Gaulle's advice ("Touré has made [his] bed, let him lie in it") and ignored the Guinean's plea for initiating a relationship between the two countries.[29]

Touré's personal envoy to Washington, Diallo Telli, was also continually rebuffed in his efforts to contact the Eisenhower administration. The State Department repeatedly cited "deference to French sensibilities" as the rationale for its decisions to deny diplomatic recognition to Guinea, refuse Conakry's admission to the United Nations, deny economic assistance, and delay sending an ambassador to Conakry. After France finally gave its blessing, the Eisenhower administration nominated John H. Morrow as the first US ambassador to Guinea on May 28, 1959, a full eight months after Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had recognized the West African state.[30]

Morrow later wrote in his memoirs that while being briefed at the State Department for his post in Conakry, he found it "difficult to ascertain the current United States policy in Africa in general, and in Guinea in particular."[31] Washington seemingly had little interest in cultivating relations with a nation it had labeled as being communist, and which it perceived had little strategic significance. Upon arriving in Conakry, however, Morrow quickly "reached the conclusion that this fearless, tough-minded African leader [Touré] was a fervent African nationalist" who would not allow Moscow or any other power to dictate his policies.[32] Despite Morrow's opinion, and the fact that Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Satterthwaite had found "an exceptionally cordial atmosphere toward [the] US" during his June 1959 visit to Guinea, Eisenhower had already decided not to invest much effort in courting the "communist" Touré.[33]

For his part, Touré was initially optimistic that Washington would help ease African countries away from dependence on their European metropoles. He believed that the United States was "better situated than most Western powers to adopt correct policies towards Africa because it has no colonies and it has a colonial past."[34] His early optimism soon dimmed. After Touré had spent months personally badgering the American ambassador for an English-language program, the State Department responded by sending only one teacher to a country of 2.5 million people.[35] A general consensus was formed in Conakry that the United States was not interested in assisting the economic and political development of sub-Saharan Africa.[36]

Washington's reluctance to embrace Touré's regime provided the opening that the Soviet bloc needed to gain influence in the West African country. It is noteworthy that Prague was the destination of Guinea's first official delegation sent abroad after independence. The delegation, led by Minister of Economic Affairs and Planning Louis Lansana Beavogui and Minister of Interior and Security Fodéba Keïta, visited Czechoslovakia in February 1959. These meetings led to an expansion of the economic and technical aid commitments that Czechoslovakia had given Guinea three months earlier.[37]

The following month, Czechoslovakia sent its first arms shipment to Guinea (discussed in greater detail in the next chapter), and the two countries established formal cooperation between their military and security forces. As part of this collaboration, five intelligence agents from the Czechoslovak ministry of the interior were sent to Guinea in June to help establish Guinean counterintelligence capabilities. The Czechoslovak experts helped their Guinean counterparts remove the phone taps and other listening devices that French intelligence had planted within Guinean government ministry buildings, established secure radio communications between all segments of the Guinean army and security forces, and helped establish control posts to secure and regulate Guinea's state borders. From September 1959 to April 1960, 15 Guineans were trained in security and intelligence matters in Czechoslovakia. Later, Czechoslovak instructors would train over 700 Guinean security personnel at a school in Kankan and provided weapons, uniforms, motorcycles, and two armored cars to the security apparatus of Touré's regime from 1959–64. Perhaps most importantly, at the end of 1959, Czechoslovak intelligence advisors helped foil an alleged attempt by the French intelligence agency, *Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage* (SDECE), to overthrow President Touré.[38]

Deputy Interior Minister Karel Klima accompanied the first Czechoslovak arms shipment to Conakry in March, and thereafter stayed in Guinea two months, overseeing an exhibit of Czechoslovak

goods. When he returned to Prague in May, he brought back a letter from Touré to Czechoslovak President Antonín Novotný that requested that Czechoslovakia send to Guinea a large number of experts in the fields of agriculture, transportation, communications, energy, medicine, geology, and other fields.[39] On May 7, 1959, the KSČ's politburo voted to meet all of Touré's requests, which initiated an intensive relationship between the two countries that included Prague giving Conakry a loan of roughly $5.5 million to purchase Czechoslovak trucks, rail cars, aircraft, and diesel generators.[40]

In August 1959, six months after the first Guinean emissaries had visited Prague, Touré sent an official Guinean delegation to the Soviet Union for the first time. The group was led by the chairman of the Guinean National Assembly, Saifoulaye Diallo and Ismaël Touré. The Guineans were seemingly impressed, both by the red carpet treatment that they received in Moscow and by the industrial and agricultural achievements they witnessed in the Soviet Union, and expressed their intention to build a socialist society in their own country. Economic and technical agreements signed between the two states during the trip included a credit of 140 million rubles to construct a radio station in Conakry, to purchase trucks and other agricultural machinery from the USSR in order to develop a state-run rice farm, and to pay for the expenses of Soviet technicians who would be sent to Guinea to assist in these and other projects.[41] The Soviets were eager to provide aid to Guinea in order to transform it into a showpiece to demonstrate to the world that the Soviet socialist economic model for modernization could be exported to the developing world.[42]

In September, the Guineans again turned to Czechoslovakia with a request for Prague to assist them in their pursuit of monetary reform, by printing banknotes and minting coins for the newly formed Guinean treasury. The KSČ politburo approved this request, and also sent a delegation to Conakry to attend the meeting of the Fifth Congress of the PDG later that month.[43] By the fall of 1959, it had become clear that by refusing to cooperate with Guinea, the United States and France had pushed Conakry toward the Soviet bloc. While the West gave it a cold shoulder, Guinea had concluded loan, line of credit, and trade agreements with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and communist China, which resulted in technical and economic assistance that included construction of a shoe factory, sawmill, a cannery, a refrigeration plant, a hospital, a polytechnic college, and a hotel.[44] Approximately 150 technicians from the Soviet bloc were now working inside Guinea, having replaced the departing French officials. With roughly a third of Guinea's foreign trade being directed toward Eastern

Europe, and more than 75 percent of the Guinean budget being funded by the communist world, the Soviet bloc had firmly entrenched itself inside the country, and Czechoslovakia was leading the way.[45]

In order to try to counteract this "rapidly developing Communist influence in Guinea," Secretary of State Christian Herter sent President Eisenhower a memorandum suggesting that he issue an invitation for Sékou Touré to visit the United States.[46] In spite of the growing hostility between the Eisenhower administration and Touré, the latter was invited to make an official state visit to the United States. When Touré arrived in Washington, DC on October 26, 1959, he was greeted at the airport by Herter and Vice President Richard Nixon, who escorted their guest to Blair House along a parade route lined by more than 250,000 people who hoped to catch a glimpse of the man who had defied Charles de Gaulle.[47]

The next morning, the two presidents and a handful of their advisors met at the White House. Their meeting was cordial but unproductive. Touré told Eisenhower how abrupt French withdrawal from Guinea had crippled his country. The Guinean president justified his acceptance of Soviet bloc aid by saying that under the dire conditions Guinea faced at its independence, he would have "accepted help from the devil." He noted that Soviet and Czechoslovak aid was given to Conakry, "without their [Guinea's] having made a request for them of any kind either orally or in writing," whereas Washington neglected to make even a symbolic gesture of support to Guinea. Touré explained that Guinea was still in a precarious position both economically and educationally, but he did not request aid from his American host. Eisenhower offered 150 scholarships for Guinean students to study in the United States and an English-language training program, but he otherwise avoided discussing economic assistance.[48]

Eisenhower did not impress Touré. The Guineans were offended that Eisenhower had not welcomed their delegation at the airport, despite having done so for both Soviet Premier Khrushchev and President Adolfo Lopez Mateos of Mexico; they were told he was ill. The Guineans did not imagine their lukewarm reception: in fact, the Eisenhower administration purposely downplayed its welcome of its Guinean guest, and prior to Touré's arrival, had confided to South African diplomats its concern that the Guinean president would not be happy with the lack of red-carpet treatment he would be receiving in Washington.[49]

Particularly frustrating for the Guinean leader was the fact that the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs, which Eisenhower allowed to determine US-Guinean relations, had routinely declined Ambassador Morrow's requests for aid for Guinea.[50] Touré later made a

somewhat veiled criticism of the Eisenhower administration's policy of granting aid:

> Nations that really wish to aid Guinea or any other developing people don't have to wait to be solicited. We are certainly not going to disguise ourselves as beggars to explain our indigence which everybody knows, which everybody can appreciate, and which each one can, loyally and in strict respect of our sovereignty, bring remedy.[51]

On the heels of his disappointing October visit to the United States, Touré would head directly to Europe to make state visits to the United Kingdom, West Germany, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia in November and December. The Guinean leader felt better received in the two communist capitals, but the concrete results of both stops were similar to his visit to the United States.

The Guinean leader visited the Soviet Union from November 19–27, making him the first head of state from sub-Saharan Africa to visit the USSR. Touré made a good impression on his hosts, which prompted the Kremlin to decide that it would provide the necessary aid to turn Guinea into its first strategic ally south of the Sahara.[52] The Guineans went directly to Prague from the Soviet Union, and stayed in Czechoslovakia from November 27 to December 1. Czechoslovak authorities were less enthused with Touré's visit than their Soviet counterparts had been. They felt that his speeches were not sufficiently radical enough, and clearly saw the pains that the young Guinean leader took to present his country's foreign policy as neutral and non-aligned. While Touré's trip to Eastern Europe seemed to increase the sense of enthusiasm Moscow had for his regime, in Prague, it lessened expectations for the future of Soviet bloc influence in Conakry.[53] In the long run, Prague's view turned out to be more perceptive.

Despite this, in March 1960, Czechoslovak-Guinean relations were further strengthened by the opening of a large Czechoslovak industrial and cultural exhibition in Conakry, Prague's agreement to aid in the development of Air Guinée (discussed in greater detail in chapter 4), and Czechoslovakia's delivery to Guinea of its newly printed currency. Once its new banknotes and coins had arrived from Czechoslovakia, Guinea publicly announced that it was leaving the French-led CFA franc zone and launching its own currency—the syli. The syli took its name from the Susu word for "elephant," which was the symbol of Touré's political party, the PDG. The Guinean government paired the change in currency with increased "customs vigilance" along the country's borders, in order to try to stem the flight of foreign capital from Guinea. In an attempt to curb this, the Guinean government expelled all foreigners caught trading

in a currency other than the syli. The French interpreted the move away from their backed currency as indicating that Guinea not only wished "to rupture all ties with France and to attempt to dismember our whole economic [position] in Africa," but also that Guinea's foreign policy had demonstrated that it held a preference for the Soviet bloc.[54]

Another crisis in Guinea's relations with the West would occur only a few days later, when the official news service of the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) announced that it would soon be exchanging ambassadors with Guinea. This caused great concern within the capitals of Paris, Washington, and Bonn because of the precedent it would set for other African countries to recognize the Soviet-backed East German regime.[55] In order to avoid a break in relations with the United States and West Germany, Touré quickly assured both countries that Guinea had in fact not agreed to formal diplomatic relations with the GDR, and would not be exchanging ambassadors. The East Germans would continue to be represented in Conakry by a trade commission, not an embassy, until September 1970. Guinea did, however, become the first non-communist state to formally recognize Ho Chi Minh's regime in North Vietnam.[56]

Building upon Touré's fond memories of being a student in Prague and his inclination to distance his regime from France or either of the superpowers, whom he feared might try to impose hegemonic influence over his country, relations between Czechoslovakia and Guinea continued to blossom into 1961. In January, after the two countries signed another trade agreement, Czechoslovakia announced that Guinea had become the biggest customer of its state export organization.[57] Czechoslovakia opened a school of journalism in Conakry and provided automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, agricultural equipment, medical supplies, a radio station, shoes, sugar, paper, textiles, office supplies, and equipment for the construction of industrial plants. In the cultural sphere, Czechoslovakia helped Guinea establish its first national museum, and provided equipment and training to allow the Guineans to shoot their first full-length film.[58]

Conakry also became the center of Czechoslovakia's massive propaganda efforts on the African continent. As an indication of the scale of Czechoslovakia's propaganda efforts in Africa, Prague reportedly distributed over 11 million pieces of print propaganda from Conakry to the rest of the continent in the first half of 1960 alone.[59] Despite this, Czechoslovak print propaganda was constrained in Africa by the fact that the majority of its population remained illiterate, and most African states—even those who formed close political relations with Prague—jealously reserved the domain of print propaganda to themselves. Likely more effective was Czechoslovakia's transmission of radio broadcasts

to Africa in the English, French, Arabic, and Swahili languages, focusing coverage mostly on Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanganyika, and Kenya.[60]

The goal of Czechoslovak propaganda in Africa was primarily to extol the virtues of the communist model of government (particularly its free education and health care), and secondarily to denigrate the exploitive nature of European colonialism and American led neo-colonialism. Racial discrimination in Western Europe, and especially within the United States, was another topic commonly covered in Czechoslovak propaganda. Soviet bloc propaganda in Africa had a few common basic themes. First, colonialism was considered a uniformly negative factor in Africa's development, during which the continent was economically exploited by the Western powers. Communist propaganda claimed that the main impetus for the decolonization movement was the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War II, both of which reputedly caused a crisis in the colonial system. In its material support of national liberation movements and political support for decolonization and opposition to racism in international venues such as the United Nations, the Soviet bloc was portrayed as Africa's only true friend in the international system.

Czechoslovakia also attempted to appeal to Africans by contrasting its history with those of the great powers (including even the Soviet Union). Czechoslovak propaganda frequently played up the fact that it had never colonized, or even bullied or threatened, other countries or peoples. On the contrary, Czechoslovakia presented itself as having a history similar to the African colonial experience, after having been harshly occupied by foreign powers such as Austria-Hungry and Nazi Germany. As a result, Czechoslovak authorities claimed that their approach toward newly independent countries was strikingly different from the larger powers because theirs was based on mutually beneficial relationships, rather than on lopsided exploitation.[61]

Czechoslovak propaganda also differentiated between Soviet bloc aid—which was purported to be humanitarian in nature, without political strings attached, and focused on improving the living conditions for Africans through industrializing their societies—with aid from the West, which was portrayed as being designed to create a relationship of dependency on Western donors that would reduce Africa to little more than a source of raw materials. Furthermore, Western aid was said to be given only to those states which relegated their foreign policies to the wishes of the United States. Finally, the United States was painted as a power-hungry, war-mongering state, whose rhetorical support for decolonization was disingenuous. The Americans, Czechoslovak propaganda contended, merely intended to substitute European colonialism with

their own neo-colonialism, the end result of which would be trading economic and political exploitation by Europeans for that of the Americans.[62]

By the opening months of 1961, it appeared to many that the rift between Conakry and the West was beyond repair, and that Guinea had moved squarely within the camp of the Soviet bloc. At this point, with Guinea's foreign policies consistently in opposition to those of the United States and France, and Touré's paranoia of becoming little more than a satellite of the Soviet Union, relations between Conakry and Prague were at their apex (at this time, even Touré's personal photographer was a Czech), and Czechoslovakia may have been in a more favorable position than any other foreign power in Guinea.[63]

Czechoslovakia and the Congo Crisis

In January 1959, anti-Belgian riots erupted in the Belgian Congo after colonial police broke up a meeting in Leopoldville of the *Alliance des Bakongo* (ABAKO) political party, which demanded independence for the Congo. Dozens of Congolese were killed in subsequent clashes with the colonial authorities. As unrest and the independence movement in the Congo continued to intensify, the Soviet Union took interest in the colony as a possible place for it to break out of its Guinean bridgehead and expand its influence throughout sub-Saharan Africa. However, Moscow had no diplomatic or economic relations with the Congo, which limited its possibilities for making contacts with the Congolese nationalist movements. Because Czechoslovakia was the only communist country to have diplomatic representation in the Congo from January 1948 until July 1960, again, it was in a perfect position to assist its superpower ally.[64]

Following the January riots, Joseph Kasavubu's ABAKO party sought to make contact with both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. It sent a letter to Khrushchev via the Soviet embassy in Brussels and made personal representations at the Czechoslovak consulate in Leopoldville. The Czechoslovaks were cautious in their relations with ABAKO and skeptical of the movement's nationalist credentials, believed that they were possibly being baited by the Belgian colonial authorities, who intensely monitored the activities of the Czechoslovak consul.[65] Perhaps due to the advice of their junior allies, Moscow also decided not to respond to ABAKO's letter, disregarding the advice from its embassy in Brussels, which reported that ABAKO was "the most influential political organization" and "the avowed leader of the national liberation movement in the Congo."[66] Later in the year, Prague did relent and agree to a request to provide ten ABAKO members military training in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak consulate provided the ABAKO members with Guinean passports, and planned to include them in courses organized for

Guinean officers. However, once in Czechoslovakia, they revealed that they were not really interested in military training, but rather intended to establish a Congolese exile government in Prague, which the KSČ refused to allow.[67]

Moscow and Prague were also both initially reluctant to develop close relations with Patrice Lumumba and his *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) party. Although Czechoslovak diplomats held meetings with him in Leopoldville and Brussels, while Soviet officials met with him in Conakry and Brussels, neither were overly impressed. From Brussels, the Soviet embassy reported that Lumumba's MNC was "more moderate" than Kasavubu's ABAKO, and the Czechoslovak embassy reported rumors that Lumumba had "been bought by the Americans."[68] This uncertainty about Lumumba demonstrates historian Lise Namikas's point about the "irony of US fears that he was a Communist disguised in nationalist clothes and could be unduly influenced by the Communists."[69]

In January 1960, Belgium announced that it would grant Congo its independence in six months. The abrupt and precipitous Belgian exodus from the Congo would create the prerequisite conditions to make it the site of the African continent's first Cold War crisis. In February 1960, State Department officials met to discuss the US approach to Congo's approaching independence. The US ambassador to Belgium, William Burden, advised that Washington needed to "avoid a repetition of the Guinean experience, when the Soviet Bloc moved into a vacuum after the French left," because the Congo was a "potentially explosive situation" that required "unusual attention."[70]

The United States, Belgium, and Great Britain all had significant economic interest in the Congo, but even more important was the country's potential strategic value. Encompassing more territory than Western Europe, Africa's third most populous country was plush with natural resources. In 1959, 69 percent of the world's industrial diamonds, 49 percent of its cobalt, 9 percent of its copper, and 6.5 percent of its tin originated in the Congo. Perhaps more important were the country's uranium deposits—from which the uranium in the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagaskai was mined. The United States also received approximately 75 percent of its cobalt and half of its tantalum—minerals important for the nuclear and aerospace industries—from the Congo.[71]

The Czechoslovak and Soviet attitude toward Lumumba became warmer in June 1960, after the MNC won the most votes in Congo's first parliamentary elections. After its electoral success, the MNC formed a coalition with ABAKO, which allowed Lumumba to become prime minister and Kasavubu president. Moscow and Prague both sent delegations to Congo's independence celebrations; each held meetings with Lumumba and Kasavubu, who agreed to upgrade Prague's consulate to an

embassy and allow Moscow to establish its own embassy in Leopoldville. The possibility of extensive economic and technical assistance for the Congo from the Soviet bloc was also discussed. Agreements for cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Congo in the fields of culture, education, and technical aid were also agreed upon.

But Lumumba's prime ministership would be rocky from independence onwards. His emotional and controversial Independence Day speech on June 30, 1960 was highly critical of the Congo's Belgian colonial past, and promised to "show the world what the black man can do when he is allowed to work in freedom, and we shall make the Congo the focal point of all Africa."[72] The Belgians felt humiliated by Lumumba's speech, while the Americans thought that the Congolese prime minister's oratory demonstrated "personal instability," "erracticism," and "inexperience—qualities which might make the Congo more vulnerable to instability and Soviet penetration."[73] Both expressed trepidation over rumors that the Congolese prime minister was inviting a Czechoslovak military mission to run the Congolese army.[74]

Almost immediately after independence, civil disorder broke out in the country, when the Congolese military mutinied, demanding higher salaries and the Africanization of their officer corps (which remained exclusively Belgian). The ensuing chaos would ultimately serve to push Lumumba, Nkrumah, and Touré all closer to the Soviet bloc, while fraying their relations with the United States. On July 11, Belgium sent its troops back into Congo, ostensibly to protect its nationals from the violence that broke out following the army's mutiny, but in reality, it was in support of the mineral rich province of Katanga's announcement that it was succeeding from the Congo to become a separate country.

Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah was determined to defeat the Belgian-sponsored Katangan secessionist movement.[75] He issued a joint statement with Lumumba, declaring that if Belgium did not get its troops out of Katanga, Ghana would send troops to aid the central government, even if this meant that "Ghana and Congo would have to fight alone against Belgium."[76] Therefore, Nkrumah was relieved a few days later, when the United Nations General Assembly voted to send a peacekeeping contingent to the Congo, and he quickly responded to the UN appeal for assistance by agreeing to dispatch Ghanaian troops to Leopoldville. Still, Nkrumah hoped to have the Congo crisis resolved by Africans, without outside interference, so as to keep the Cold War out of Africa.[77] Speaking to the Ghanaian National Assembly, Nkrumah summed up his view of the Congo crisis:

> This is a turning point in the history of Africa. If we allow the independence of the Congo to be compromised in any way by the imperialist and capitalist forces, we shall expose the sovereignty and independence

> of all Africa to grave risk. The struggle of the Congo is therefore our struggle. It is incumbent on us to take our stand by our brothers in the Congo in the full knowledge that only Africa can fight for its destiny. In this struggle we shall not reject the assistance and support of our friends, but we will yield to no enemy, however strong.[78]

Nonetheless, reality soon dictated that Nkrumah call upon the assistance of the world powers to facilitate the transport of Ghanaian troops to the Congo. Despite the fact that American, British, and Egyptian planes also took part in the airlift, and Nkrumah had sent Eisenhower a letter thanking him for US participation in the operation, the American president was nonetheless upset that Nkrumah had accepted Moscow's offer to use Soviet Ilyushin civil aircraft in the endeavor.[79] While the Soviet Union contributed 26 airplanes and 6 helicopters to the Congo (along with 5 planes to transport Ghanaian troops and 2 to ferry Guinean troops), this was small in comparison to the United States, which had used nearly 100 aircraft to help support the UN mission in the Congo.[80] Czechoslovakia only sent one flight full of food and medical supplies to the Congo before deeming the flight too expensive, after which Prague began to ship its aid via the sea.[81]

While the Soviet bloc sought to expand its political influence inside the strategic central African country, the United States overestimated both their desire and capacity to intervene militarily. Despite Lumumba's request that they do so, neither the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia sent much, if any, military aid to his regime. In fact, Moscow had told Prague that it should provide Lumumba with the maximum amount of human and material assistance possible, with the exception of arms.[82] Instead, Soviet and Czechoslovak aid was limited to food, medicine, trucks, and logistical aviation assistance to help transport Ghanaian and Guinean troops to the Congo to participate in the UN operation. With limited naval and airlift capabilities, neither country had the ability to send their military forces into the heart of Africa.

The fact that Washington became irked over Nkrumah's use of Soviet aid further accentuated the fact that the Congo policies of Washington and Accra were increasingly at odds. The source of the friction between the White House and Flagstaff House, Nkrumah's residence and office, centered on Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Among African nationalist leaders, Kwame Nkrumah was Lumumba's most passionate supporter. Nkrumah seemingly envisioned Lumumba's plight as being closely linked with his own for good reason, because the two had signed a secret agreement to unite to form the nucleus of Union of African States.[83] In Lumumba, Nkrumah saw a flicker of hope that his pan-Africanist dream of a United States of Africa might someday be realized.

Eisenhower, however, was willing to support just about any Congolese leader *other* than Lumumba. Eisenhower's distrust stemmed from the Congolese prime minister's acceptance of Soviet aid, which Lumumba requested to quell the rebellion in Katanga after the United Nations had proved unwilling to expand its mandate to prevent the breakaway province's secession.[84] Washington viewed the crisis in the Congo as the first time that Moscow had militarily intervened far from its own borders, and was concerned about setting a dangerous precedent if this were to remain unchecked.[85]

Seeking to curtail Soviet bloc infiltration of Africa, Washington became obsessed with ousting Lumumba. CIA Director Allen Dulles sent a telegram to his operatives in Congo, saying, "We wish to give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility [of] resuming governmental position or if he fails in Leopoldville, setting himself up in Stanleyville or elsewhere." Removing Lumumba from power was "an urgent and prime objective . . . this should be a high priority of our covert action."[86] Dulles also warned the National Security Council that Lumumba was "a Castro or worse . . . We [the CIA] believe that he is in the pay of the Soviets either directly or through the UAR."[87] Before long, the agency was pursuing numerous plots to assassinate the Congolese prime minister, and the CIA station in Leopoldville was authorized to spend up to $100,000 to accomplish this.[88]

The scholar Richard D. Mahoney believes "there also may have been a racial factor in the decision to kill him."[89] During Lumumba's visit to still segregated Washington in the summer of 1960 (Eisenhower himself had purposely avoided Lumumba by leaving for a golf trip to Rhode Island), the Congolese nationalist had apparently requested the sexual favor of *une blanche blonde* (a blonde white woman), as well as a handgun with which to protect himself on the mean streets of the American capital.[90] Denied these requests by his American guests, the Congolese prime minister was reportedly "offended and noted that France and some other European nations were more hospitable."[91] Another rumor is that the FBI searched Lumumba's Blair House guest room after his departure and detected that he had been smoking marijuana during his stay. The American intelligence community concluded that this was yet more proof that Lumumba was a communist. Whatever the reason for his dislike of Lumumba, President Eisenhower, a personal friend of King Baudouin I of Belgium (who had felt personally insulted by Lumumba's speech at Congo's independence festivities), had been hostile to Congolese nationalism since its independence from Belgian rule, and he said privately that he hoped "Lumumba would fall into a river full of crocodiles."[92]

The Eisenhower administration had actually considered prohibiting Lumumba from visiting the United States when he first expressed an interest in doing so. After the State Department grudgingly realized that

it did not have a viable cover story with which to publicly rationalize denying the Congolese prime minister a visa, the White House decided instead to try to arrange for Lumumba to stay in the United States for as long as possible. Secretary of State Christian Herter explained this reversal of strategy to the NSC by hypothesizing that if Lumumba "stayed away from the Congo long enough, he would find that he had no government when he returned [home]."[93]

Soon after Lumumba's visit, CIA Director Allen Dulles initiated plans to assassinate him. Ironically, on the same day as this authorization, Lumumba told his countrymen in a radio address, "We know that the US understands us and we are pleased to see the US position in bringing about international peace…If the Congolese place their confidence in the US, which is a good friend, they will find themselves rewarded."[94] History would show that certain Congolese (most notably Joseph Mobutu) would indeed be rewarded by the United States, for their part in disposing of Lumumba.

By the end of the summer, African leaders were growing impatient over the fact that the UN had still not expelled Belgian troops from the Congo or put down the Katangan succession. In August, Sékou Touré wrote to Eisenhower, appealing personally to him to take vigorous action in implementing a UN Security Council Resolution calling for the immediate removal of all Belgian troops from the Congo. The Guinean nationalist asked Eisenhower to consider his letter "to be a cry of alarm from Africa, humiliated and under attack by its enemies." Touré added that with its "determining" role in world affairs, a supportive United States could rectify the situation in only a few hours, thereby benefiting "the African peoples and the entire world."[95] A week later, the White House countered with a courteous but aloof response. For Touré, it must have been painfully clear that he could not expect Eisenhower's support, either in the Congo or in the development of his own nation, and as a result, he turned increasingly toward the Soviet bloc.[96]

President Eisenhower laid the blame for the turmoil in the Congo on Moscow, stating that the United States deplored the "unilateral action of the Soviet Union in supplying aircraft and other equipment for military purposes to the Congo, thereby aggravating an already serious situation which finds Africans killing other Africans."[97] The UN operation in the Congo, the American president claimed was "threatened by the Soviet action, which seems to be motivated entirely by the Soviet Union's political designs in Africa."[98] Eisenhower pleaded for Moscow to join the United States in supporting UN efforts in Congo, rather than acting unilaterally.

In September, political events in the Congo changed drastically after President Kasavubu, assured of American, Belgian, and UN support,

announced that he was dismissing Prime Minister Lumumba from office. Lumumba responded later that night by announcing that he was instead discharging Kasavubu from the presidency, prompting the country to descend into a state of chaos. The previous month, the province of South Kasai had followed Katanga's example and announced its own secession from the central government of Congo; the struggle between the factions of Lumumba and Kasavubu meant that four competing governments now claimed legitimacy in various regions of the country. On the same day that Kasavubu and Lumumba mutually dismissed each other, a 23-person Czechoslovak delegation arrived in Leopoldville. Lumumba and his deputy, Antoine Gizenga, led a group of ten high-level Congolese government functionaries who met with the Czechoslovak delegation to get advice on responding to Kasuvubu's challenge, reorganizing the Congolese economy along socialist lines, and restructuring the Congolese state security apparatus in order to better protect Lumumba and rid it of Belgian influence.[99]

The next day, Lumumba and Kasavubu each ordered Joseph Mobutu, the head of the Congolese army, to arrest the other. But by this point, the so-called Binza Group, led by the troika of Mobutu, head of the security services Victor Nendaka, and Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, had already established close ties with the United States, and Mobutu told CIA agent Larry Devlin of his concern that "the Soviets are pouring into the country," and the Congolese "didn't fight for independence to have another country to recolonize" them.[100] On September 14, 1960, after consulting with Devlin, Mobutu essentially seized power for himself in a CIA-endorsed coup, and placed Lumumba under house arrest, while leaving Kasavubu as a figurehead president.

Mobutu then announced that Congo was severing diplomatic relations with both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and gave their nationals 48 hours to evacuate their embassies and leave the country. Three hours before the deadline was set to expire, members of the Czechoslovak embassy staff were escorted by Mobutu's troops at gunpoint to the Leopoldville airport and sent back to Prague. After the expulsion of Czechoslovak diplomatic personnel, it became a high priority for the StB to infiltrate intelligence assets back inside the country. In November, they were successful in getting a group of agents into the country as part of a delegation from the International Red Cross, and in January 1961, a group of StB agents working as journalists were able to reach Stanleyville, where Lumumba's supporters were attempting to regroup, by way of jeep from Juba in southern Sudan.[101] With no representatives from the Soviet Union, Ghana, Guinea, or Egypt in Stanleyville at this time, the StB agents who were able to keep in radio contact with the Czechoslovak embassy in Cairo were the only source of

contact between the Lumumbists and the outside world.[102] Nonetheless, the closing of its embassy in Leopoldville virtually eliminated Prague's ability to influence the rapidly changing situation in the Congo.

Khrushchev learned about Mobutu's coup and the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the Congo while crossing the Atlantic Ocean abroad the *Baltika*, three days out from New York, where he was headed to attend the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The UN meeting was attended by many heads of state from around the world, who discussed the Congo crisis. Although many Afro-Asian states were dissatisfied with the UN's handling of the crisis, most supported both the United States and the United Nations in the debates at the expense of the Soviet bloc. Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, however, all harshly criticized the actions of both the United States and United Nations. The Congo crisis was beginning to move Africa's radical states closer to the Soviet bloc.

In the fall of 1960, as the crisis in the Congo was intensifying, relations between Ghana and the United States were growing strained, and the Eisenhower administration began to reconsider its commitment to funding the VRP. Stemming from this disagreement over the Congo, US-Ghanaian relations had deteriorated so badly that when Nkrumah came to the United States to address the United Nations in September 1960, neither Eisenhower nor Secretary of State Herter received him at the airport.[103] When Nkrumah and Eisenhower eventually met on September 22, it was a disaster. Eisenhower repeatedly deflected Nkrumah's attempts to discuss the Congo, preferring instead to reminisce about his military accomplishments during World War II.[104] According to Ghana's ambassador to the United States, W. M. Q. Halm, Nkrumah was "heartily dissatisfied" with this encounter.[105] The Ghanaian president left the meeting upset that Eisenhower did not share his belief in the urgency of the situation in the Congo.

Citing China's opening of an embassy in Accra, Ghana's purchase of Soviet airplanes, and Nkrumah's speech before the UN General Assembly criticizing Western policy toward the Congo, Secretary of State Herter announced that Nkrumah "had marked himself as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc."[106] The *California Eagle* labeled Herter's comments as evidence of the Eisenhower's administration's failure to understand African nationalism, and representative of "the paternalistic attitude of white America when it deals with peoples of African descent."[107] US-Ghanaian relations became so strained after Nkrumah's address to the UN General Assembly that Nkrumah refused to meet with the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and he instead left to spend the weekend at the Soviet estate on Long Island.[108] Despite the claim of the US ambassador in Accra, Wilson C. Flake—"Ghana

is not Communist and I detect no desire here that it become so"—the Eisenhower administration no longer viewed Ghana as nonaligned, and it labeled Nkrumah a communist.[109] Eisenhower decided to suspend the $30 million he had committed to the VRP.

Guinean President Touré was also outraged by the role the Eisenhower administration played in granting a seat in the UN General Assembly to the Congolese delegation that supported Kasavubu's faction. Like Nkrumah, Touré was a fervent supporter of Lumumba and believed that his group was the legitimate leadership of the central government of the Democratic Republic of Congo.[110] Touré angrily cabled President Eisenhower and lambasted Washington's "partisan position" toward the Congo. He implored Eisenhower to

> cease supporting the position of the enemies of the African emancipation, who are employing every possible means against the legitimate Government of the Congo to attack the unity and territorial integrity of the Congolese nation. If the United States maintains its present position the government of Guinea will refuse to take any part in the conciliation commission and will take any position in African affairs consistent with Congolese interests.[111]

Eisenhower broadcast his reply to Touré's charges on the front pages of American newspapers. He asserted that the United States supported the creation of an independent Congo and respected its territorial integrity. The American president further claimed that the United States supported both African freedom and the emancipation of all peoples of the world, and that Touré had a "serious misunderstanding" of US policy toward the Congo.[112] The Guinean president told the American ambassador in Conakry that he was "very unhappy" with the tone and public nature of Eisenhower's response.[113]

The Eisenhower administration's handling of the Congo crisis had served to push Nkrumah and Touré closer to the Soviet bloc, but both men were hopeful that Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, would realign US policy toward the Congo to meet the views of African nationalism. A few days after Kennedy's inauguration, Nkrumah sent a 2,000 word letter to Kennedy, indicating that he had no intention of troubling the new American president "with complaints or with criticism of a past administration for whose actions you were nowhere responsible."[114] Nonetheless, he pressed JFK to act to secure Patrice Lumumba's release from prison and to halt the Belgian military intervention in the Congo.[115] Nkrumah complained about the degrading conditions in which Lumumba was being jailed and stressed that the Congolese prime minister's life was in jeopardy.[116] He pointed out that "time is running

short. I am absolutely certain that if you were personally to intervene to secure the release of Mr. Lumumba, this would in fact be significant." Playing on Kennedy's desire to be respected throughout the Third World, he added, "Even in the most unlikely event of your intervention being unsuccessful, it would clearly demonstrate to the world the position of the US in this matter."[117] Further stroking Kennedy, Nkrumah conveyed his confidence that the president would approach "the question of the Congo with the same courage and realism" that he had displayed in his stand on Algeria.[118]

> The reputation of the US could be irretrievably damaged if it sits by and watches the crumpling up of democracy in Africa by one of your close military allies—Belgium—in flagrant disregard of the unanimous opinion and sentiment of all those African people who are free to express their views.[119]

So desirous was Nkrumah of repairing US-Ghanaian relations and building a personal relationship with Kennedy that the Ghanaian government reneged on a secret agreement made with Moscow the previous year to act as a conduit of Soviet aid to Lumumba's regime.[120]

As a candidate in the summer of 1960, Kennedy had indeed considered openly backing Lumumba. He decided to solicit the opinion of Averill Harriman as to whether he should break with the Eisenhower administration's policy. At Kennedy's direction, the former governor of New York flew to Brazzaville and held an hour-and-a-half meeting with Lumumba. He returned reporting that the Congolese leader, while not a communist, believed that he could receive aid from Moscow without jeopardizing Congolese sovereignty. Harriman advised that since there was little that the United States could do unilaterally, Kennedy should support the UN peacekeeping efforts but not openly identify himself with Lumumba or any other Congolese leader. Kennedy accepted Harriman's advice.[121]

Kennedy's response to Nkrumah after taking office reflected this decision. Voicing his concerns about the United States taking unilateral action to release Lumumba, he deferred resolution of the crisis to the United Nations. He did, however, explain to Nkrumah the "Kennedy Plan," his new policy toward the Congo, which encouraged the broadening of the United Nations mandate in the Congo to allow Africans and Asians to take the lead in resolving the crisis.[122] Kennedy's reply so disappointed Nkrumah that he later claimed never to have received it.[123]

What neither man knew was that President Eisenhower had already signed Lumumba's death warrant, and the Congolese prime minister had been killed 48 hours before Kennedy took the presidential oath.[124] On

January 17, 1961, in the face of advancing troops loyal to Lumumba, the forces of Joseph Mobutu took Lumumba and two of his associates from their prison cell and flew them on a Belgian plane to Elizabethville in the rebel province of Katanga. Lumumba was so brutally beaten during the flight that the crew who witnessed the attack became physically sick and shut themselves into the forward cabin. Lumumba and his followers were killed shortly after the plane arrived in Elizabethville.[125]

Katangan authorities did not announce Lumumba's death until February 13. The cover story given was that Lumumba, having escaped from detention, was killed by heroic civilians trying to prevent his escape. There was not an ounce of even superficial remorse in the announcement made by Katangan authorities to the press, which in part read:

> Nor do we wish to be subjected to any pressure to charge those Katangans with murder, for though they may have acted somewhat precipitately (particularly excusably so, in that they believed the fugitives to be armed), we cannot blame them for having rid Katanga, the Congo, Africa and the world of a problem which some people have exaggerated out of all proportion, and which therefore threatened to poison human lives all over the world. That village will receive the reward of 400,000 francs promised by the Council of Ministers . . . I should be lying if I were to say I was sorry that Lumumba is dead. You know my feelings: he was a common law criminal. . . . I realize of course that the UN will say the whole thing was a plot, and that we killed him ourselves. That is only to be expected. . . . I will speak frankly as I always do. We shall be accused of having killed them, and my answer will be: 'Prove it.' . . . Even had we executed them (which is being said everywhere, but nowhere proved), I would categorically deny that the UN has any right to make judgment in the case.[126]

In Guinea, in the aftermath of Lumumba's murder, Sékou Touré gave a speech in which he suggested that the newly elected US president, John F. Kennedy, was responsible for "this crime against the African people."[127] The US ambassador to Guinea, John Morrow, reported from Conakry that after Lumumba's death, Touré "went off like a skyrocket. He worked himself and the Guinean population into a state of dramatic emotionalism during which he made statements and took steps from which he will now find it impossible to retreat."[128] Touré was clearly shocked and disappointed that this had seemingly happened under Kennedy's watch, the man in whose election he had placed so much hope. He wrote Kennedy, stating that this "unspeakable crime destroys hope African nationalism had placed in your Government. . . . Africa which had placed hope in your election expects from you concrete acts to shed light on this assassination and repair grave errors committed in Congo."[129]

A similar scenario played out in Accra, where the news greatly disturbed Nkrumah, who began to fear that he would be the next victim of what he considered a plot of "Western neocolonialism."[130] In an emotional radio broadcast to the Ghanaian people, he blamed Lumumba's death on UN incompetence, and he accused the United States and Western Europe of being culpable. Nkrumah publicly labeled Kennedy "a murderer." An angry crowd invaded the US embassy grounds in Accra and damaged the chancery.[131] The Ghanaian press hinted at a racial motivation behind Lumumba's murder, featuring old photographs of blacks lynched in the United States.[132] For more than two weeks, Ghana's *Evening News* devoted several pages of tributes to Lumumba on a nearly daily basis. An orator along Ring Road, one of Accra's main thoroughfares, preached to passerby:

> Men and women of Africa and the world! America has now clearly taken a stand against Lumumba, against Africa, against parliamentary democracy in the young republic of the Congo, and against everything that is right and decent in human relations in the Congo. America appears to have emerged concertedly as the big apologist of colonialism—in fact, much more than that—the big Godfather of the colony-owning imperialists.[133]

When the news originally broke, Accra hurriedly extended an invitation to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, then on an official visit to Guinea, to fly to Accra to discuss the situation in the Congo. A joint press release by Nkrumah and Brezhnev stated their "similarity of points of view . . . on the most important problems of international policy."[134] On February 15, many African nations, along with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the People's Republic of China, recognized Lumumba's protégé, Antoine Gizenga, and his Stanleyville faction as the legitimate government of the Congo. Large-scale protests against Lumumba's murder were held across the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union received further good publicity by announcing that it would rename the University of Friendship of Peoples in Moscow as Patrice Lumumba University.[135] Before his departure, Brezhnev confirmed Moscow's intention to build a dam at Bui on the Black Volta River and invited Nkrumah to visit the Soviet Union and meet with Khrushchev.

As the Soviet bloc strengthened its relations with Accra, US-Ghanaian relations reached an all-time low. Throughout Africa, it was commonly believed the Central Intelligence Agency was behind Lumumba's murder. Nkrumah called the US ambassador in Accra to condemn American policy and criticize Kennedy personally.[136] A letter that Nkrumah sent to Kennedy a week later bluntly accused the American president of bad faith in dealing with the Congo.[137]

Relations with Ghana from 1960–62

The crisis in the Congo served to change Ghana's attitude toward the Soviet bloc from a cold shoulder to a warm embrace.[138] During festivities to celebrate Ghana's transition to becoming a republic in the summer of 1960, Nkrumah told the Czechoslovak delegation of his interest in expanding relations between the two countries and in visiting Prague.[139] Relations were further solidified when Nkrumah met with Novotný at the UN General Assembly session in September, where the two discussed coordination of their Congo policies and an increase in economic relations.[140] Two months later, a Czechoslovak delegation visited Accra to conclude agreements on long-term trade arrangements, scientific and technical cooperation, and education and cultural relations.[141]

Relations between Ghana and Czechoslovakia exponentially grew in early 1961, when Prague began to sell arms to Accra (discussed in the next chapter) and extended to the Ghanaian government a £5 million loan to help finance the Czechoslovak construction of a sugar mill, two shoe factories, a ceramic plant, tanning and plywood factories, a 200 bed hospital, and for the purchase of equipment for four hydroelectric power plants. Ghana's shift toward the East culminated in Nkrumah leading a 60-person delegation on an 8-week trip of the communist world with stops in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and communist China, followed by a vacation at Khrushchev's dacha in the Crimea. At almost every stop, Nkrumah made statements that raised eyebrows in the West. Most notably he called for diplomatic recognition of China and a unified Germany, and claimed that without the anti-imperialism of the Soviet Union, Africa would "have suffered a most cruel and brutal suppression."[142] Nkrumah had been impressed with the speed at which the Soviets had industrialized Russia, and thus believed Ghana could learn much from studying Soviet bloc industrial techniques.

Nkrumah's visit to Czechoslovakia took place from July 31–August 3, 1961. In a meeting with Novotný, Nkrumah requested that the £5 million loan that Czechoslovakia had previously extended to his country be increased to £25 million. In the end, Prague agreed only to double Czechoslovakia's loan to Ghana to £10 million (approximately 203 million Kčs) but the Czechoslovaks did agree to Nkrumah's request to help finance and build in Ghana a guerrilla training center in order to facilitate Nkrumah's support for national liberation movements from across Africa.[143] Also agreed upon was expanded education ties to allow 50 Ghanaian students to study free of charge at Czechoslovak universities, while 15 Czechoslovak specialists and teachers were sent to Ghana to assist in the development of the Ghanaian education system.[144] Agreements were also reached to fundamentally change the structure of bilateral

trade between the two countries. Up until this point, Czechoslovakia had exported to Ghana only consumer goods, while cacao beans (via the United Kingdom) were the only thing imported from Ghana. After Nkrumah's visit, Czechoslovakia would send industrial engineering goods and machinery to Ghana, while receiving back lumber and industrial diamonds. As a result, mutual trade between the two countries increased from 20.4 million Kčs in 1960 to 100.2 Kčs in 1963.[145]

Czechoslovak-Ghanaian bilateral relations would be further strengthened by a series of failed assassination attempts against Nkrumah. After one such attempt, in September 1961, the Ghanaian press accused America and Great Britain of being involved in the incident. As a result, Ghana severed its intelligence relationship with the British, and some of Nkrumah's more Western-leaning cabinet members (especially those who were British expatriates) were relieved of their duties.[146] After another attempt on his life, when a grenade was thrown at him in Kulungugu in August 1962, Nkrumah accused the CIA of having played a role. Obsessed with the role of the CIA in Ghana (which was exacerbated by the Soviet KGB feeding him false information about Western plots against him), he began handing out a book called *The Inside Story*, written by a former CIA agent, Andrew Tully, to all of his visitors. Moreover, Accra's newspaper, *The Evening News*, began making frequent attacks on the United States and accused the Peace Corps of being a front for the CIA.[147] In January 1963, Nkrumah had grown highly agitated over mounting domestic problems and continuous attempts on his life. He became so paranoid of assassination attempts that at a children's party he fell flat on his face when a bird alighted over his head in a tree. When one of his own security guards carried out his normal drill, Nkrumah ran off, saying, "You have come to kill me!"[148] He went as far as to ask for the withdrawal of two members of the American embassy staff in Accra whom he alleged were involved with those conspiring against him. Reacting to Nkrumah's request, President Kennedy asked, "What is this guy—some kind of a nut?"[149]

Nkrumah asked Czechoslovakia to fill the void created by Ghana's ending of its intelligence relationship with the United Kingdom. In the fall of 1962, Czechoslovak experts were sent to Accra to help reorganize Ghanaian counterintelligence and assist in an investigation of the Kulungugu incident. Czechoslovak investigators sent fragments from the grenade to Prague for forensic analysis at a StB laboratory, only to embarrassingly discover that the grenade was of Czechoslovak production. Prague speculated that the grenade was likely part of a consignment of weapons delivered to the Cameroonian resistance organization, Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), in 1959.[150] While the discovery demonstrated the ubiquitous presence of Czechoslovak weapons in

Africa, Czechoslovak involvement in the inquiry also indicated a level of trust that Nkrumah now put in his relations with Prague.[151]

Relations with Mali

When the ill-fated Mali Federation between Senegal and the French Sudan (modern day Mali) was dissolved in August 1960, it created an opportunity for the Soviet bloc to gain influence in another West African state. The Malians blamed the French for the breakup of the short-lived federation, and thereafter began referring to the leaders of Francophone Africa who maintained close relations with Paris as "stooges."[152] A US State Department report concluded that "Mali's leadership regards France as its main potential enemy and suspects the French of stirring up the nomadic Saharan tribes against it.... France's influence will inevitably decline, at Malian initiative if not at French."[153]

With the French presence radically diminished in both Guinea and Mali, one might have expected that Paris would have supported the United States in its effort to fill the void as a means of preventing the two countries from turning toward the Soviet bloc. Indeed, this was the mind-set in Washington, as the State Department warned, "If in consequence [of France's declining influence] the Soviet Bloc becomes the predominant supplier of outside help, all of the disturbing elements in Mali's policies will be hardened and strengthened."[154] The report therefore advocated an increased US presence in Mali, adding that "the Mali Government will reduce the French influence... regardless of our attitude."[155]

Yet the French tried to disrupt American activities in Mali and Guinea in much the same way they did in the states where they continued to enjoy their favored status. According to Stephen Low, who served as the US attaché in Dakar and was charged with staying in contact with the labor movements in both Mali and Guinea, the worse US relations with Guinea and Mali were, the happier the French became.[156] French efforts to sabotage relations between the United States and Guinea were highlighted by clandestine efforts to organize a boycott of a US-sponsored technology fair in Conakry (and then falsely claiming that they had not been invited to attend), and the French news organization Agence France Presse's attempt to float a factitious story that claimed that Touré was sponsoring a resolution at the Organization of African Unity critical of US race relations.[157] In Mali, French anti-American efforts included misleading the Malians into thinking that the Americans were being kept apprised on negotiations to build the Sotuba hydropower station, when the French had deliberately failed to consult with the United States. The Malian ambassador to France was reportedly "astonished" when

he learned that the French had concluded a unilateral agreement with his government to finance the power station, without having given the United States an opportunity to participate in the project.[158]

In addition to Paris's clandestine anti-American efforts, the French relied on two lines of argumentation to limit American involvement in Francophone Africa. The first was an attempt to convince Washington that an expanded American presence on the continent would in turn arouse the Soviet bloc's interest and increase its presence on the continent. African states, in accordance to their preference for Cold War nonalignment, would in turn be obliged to open relations with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the other Eastern European states. Thus, according to Paris, if Washington stayed out of Africa, and left responsibility for its well-being in the hands of the French, the Russians and Czechoslovaks would not be interested in Africa.[159] The second line of reasoning used by the French was the claim that they were the experts on Africa, and therefore, they understood much better than Americans the long-term consequences of their actions in Africa.[160] In their rush to aid Africa, the United States would inevitably make rookie mistakes that the French, by virtue of their experience on the continent, had already learned to avoid.

Such arguments found a receptive ear in the Eisenhower administration, whose fiscal conservatism and disinterest in Africa made it inclined to delegate France and the United Kingdom the responsibility of upholding the Western cause in Africa. The Eisenhower administration was pleased that Paris was willing to take the primary responsibility for keeping Francophone Africa out of the Soviet sphere, and therefore happily agreed that Africa should remain squarely within Paris's sphere of influence—an arrangement that the political scientist Peter Schraeder has referred to as the "French Monroe Doctrine." Under this division of labor, Africa was the "responsibility" of France and the United Kingdom in the same way that the United States took responsibility for Latin America. For their part, the French were delighted with such an arrangement, because they considered their former African colonies as their own "*chasse gardée*" (private hunting ground), which they wanted off-limits to other great powers—regardless of whether they were allies (United States and United Kingdom) or enemies (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and China).[161] Under Eisenhower, Washington's policy toward Francophone Africa was so hands-off that of the 12 African states that received their independence from France in 1960, only one received economic aid (Mauritania received $100,000 worth of Food for Peace aid).[162]

Czechoslovakia was well positioned to take advantage of the fact that the Malian government was looking for non-French alternative sources of aid, and the United States was not interested in meeting its needs. Since

1958, Czechoslovak diplomats in Paris had been cultivating relationships with African political figures who later become key leaders in independent Mali. In the late 1950s, Modibo Keïta (president), Madeira Keïta (minister of the interior), Hamacire N'Dour (minister of commerce), and Abdoulaye Maïga (Malian ambassador to the United States) were all frequent dinner guests at the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris. Even prior to independence, Maïga made a goodwill visit to Prague in February 1960.[163] Only two weeks after the dissolution of the Mali Federation, Keïta appeared at the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris, appealing for not only aid from Czechoslovakia, but also for Prague to mediate on Mali's behalf with the other states of the Soviet bloc. The Malian in particular sought military aid, and indicated that Conakry had already agreed to allow Czechoslovakia to transport it through Guinea.[164]

The two countries thereafter moved quickly to establish an intense relationship. A week after Keïta's visit to the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris, a Malian delegation, led by Minister of Public Works Ousmane Ba, travelled to Czechoslovakia to formally discuss economic, technical, and military cooperation between the two states.[165] A week later, a Czechoslovak delegation went to Moscow to discuss the possibility of providing aid to Mali with their Soviet colleagues.[166] A group of Czechoslovak officials was in Mali the following week, after Moscow consented to Prague's lobbying for the Soviet bloc to initiate economic and military aid to Bamako. Deputy Interior Minister Karel Klima, the head of the delegation, reported back to Prague that, like Guinea, Mali had the potential to be a worthy ally for Czechoslovakia in sub-Saharan Africa, and his government should provide a maximum amount of scientific, technical, aviation, medical, cultural, educational, military, and intelligence assistance in order to support the Malian government in its attempt to break its bonds with France and adopt a "progressive" foreign policy orientation.[167] This does not mean to imply that the Soviet Union decided to give aid to Mali solely, or even primarily, because of Czechoslovak lobbying. Obviously, Moscow had its own African policy and was not taking orders from Prague. It does, however, demonstrate that Czechoslovakia also had its own independent African policy and was not simply following the Kremlin's lead, either.

In the first week of November, agreements between the governments of Czechoslovakia and Mali were signed in Prague, which laid the basis for the intimate relationship between the two countries over the next two years. Among other things, Czechoslovakia agreed to provide 40 university scholarships for Malian students to study in the ČSSR; a line of credit to Bamako for the purchase of equipment for a textile factory, a hospital, and a scientific laboratory; armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, and military training for the creation of Mali's army; 5 airplanes, training

for Malian pilots and mechanics, and the services of Czechoslovak aviation personnel until the Malians had been trained; assistance establishing Mali's own press agency and journalism school; and increased economic and cultural relationships.[168] In return, Mali agreed to export peanuts to Czechoslovakia. These were the first government contracts that Mali consummated with another state since the dissolution of the Mali Federation. Only two months after Keïta's plea for assistance in Paris, Czechoslovakia had become Mali's greatest patron.[169]

In November 1960, Czechoslovakia sent intelligence advisers and interpreters to Mali to help build Malian counterintelligence capabilities. Cooperation between the two states increased once Mamadou Diakité became minister for defense and security and sought to replace old pro-French colonial era security officials with younger agents trained by Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks thereafter created several different courses on topics such as surveillance, counterintelligence, and encryption communication, which they conducted in both Mali and Czechoslovakia. Outside of the training courses, several Czechoslovak StB agents were also posted in Bamako to operate cipher and telephone monitoring equipment. According to an intelligence report from October 1961, this intelligence relationship between Prague and Bamako was particularly successful in strengthening relations between the two countries.[170]

In 1961, economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Mali continued to expand and reached the point that Czechoslovak experts drafted and supervised Mali's five-year economic plan.[171] In response to a personal letter from Keïta to Novotný in April 1961, Prague agreed to print 59.1 million banknotes and mint 70 million coins in order to allow Mali to introduce its own currency—the Malian franc—so that Bamako could free itself from French monetary control.[172] Finally, in June, Czechoslovakia agreed to loan Mali $10 million (approximately 72 million Kčs) to purchase Czechoslovak textiles, sugar, and a cigarette factory.[173]

By the middle of 1961, Mali appeared to be a solid ally for Prague and the Soviet bloc. It had adopted a semi-socialist economy and aggressively sought to reduce the remnants of French colonial influence from Malian society. Bamako also joined the Ghana-Guinea Union, which was then renamed the Union of African States. The Union of African States was intended to promote political and economic cooperation amongst the three states along a socialist and Pan-African path. The union served to reinforce the fact that the three states, while still proclaiming Cold War neutrality, had in fact moved into the Soviet sphere of influence. In the realm of foreign policy, Mali, like the Soviet bloc, recognized the government-in-exile of the Algerian National Liberation Front (GPRA) and Gizenga's Congo-Stanleyville regime as the legitimate governments of

Algeria and Congo. This led US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams to note, "'Anti-colonial' sentiments—and a demagogic desire to place the greatest distance between themselves and the French—have led the Malians to vote more often with the [Soviet] Bloc in the UN than any other African country."[174]

The apex of the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Mali occurred with Modibo Keïta's trip to Prague from May 31–June 6, 1962. The importance of this occasion for the KSČ is illustrated by the fact that the politburo met four separate times to discuss different aspects of Keïta's visit.[175] In a meeting with Novotný at Prague Castle, the Malian president attempted to impress upon his Czechoslovak host his socialist credentials by proclaiming that the Malian people had chosen the "path of building socialism." Later in the trip, Keïta mentioned that many Malian leaders had received a good political education from an alliance with the Communist Party of France in the 1950s.[176] Although no substantial agreements came out of Keïta's time in Czechoslovakia, it symbolically demonstrated the close relationship that Prague and Bamako had developed over the previous two years.

Relations with Congo-Stanleyville

As Lumumba's supporters began to reorganize in Stanleyville, the capital of Orientale province, under the leadership of his deputy, Antoine Gizenga, Pierre Mulele, former minister of education in the Lumumba government, reached out to Soviet bloc embassies in Cairo for aid. Because the Congo now had two competing governments claiming legitimacy—Kasavubu and Mobutu in Leopoldville and Gizenga in Stanleyville (in addition to the still-rebellious provinces of Katanga and South Kasai)—recognition of and support for Gizenga's regime was a delicate matter. As a result, in early January 1961 Prague sent a delegation to the Soviet Union for consultations. In Moscow, the Czechoslovaks learned that the Soviets intended to provide Gizenga with arms for 5,000 men, airplanes, cars, food, medication, a radio transmitter, and $500,000 cash. Moscow intended to transport most assistance through Sudan, but the more sensitive military equipment through Egypt. The Soviets stressed to their Czechoslovak comrades that it was important to get arms to Gizenga's regime as soon as possible, and urged them to explore as many potential routes to reach Stanleyville as they could find.[177] Two weeks later, on January 24, the KSČ politburo voted to donate, at no cost to the Stanleyville government, small arms for 2,500 men, four airplanes, 60 tons of food and pharmaceuticals and £25,000 cash.[178] Diplomats were to be sent to Stanleyville to open a Czechoslovak embassy and the

state airline, *České aerolinie* (ČSA), was urged to establish a regularly scheduled Prague to Stanleyville flight as soon as possible.[179]

After Lumumba's assassination, Gizenga sent telegrams to Novotný, Khrushchev, and other world leaders informing them that his government would declare war on Belgium within 48 hours and asked for a commitment of support within 24 hours.[180] This was apparently an empty threat, as Gizenga never formally declared war, and it does not appear that Prague ever formally responded to his telegram. However, Mulele visited Prague from March 5–14, 1961 to sign trade agreements between Czechoslovakia and the government in Stanleyville and to negotiate ČSA's assistance in helping develop a Congolese national airline.[181] Mulele did not make a favorable impression on Czechoslovak authorities. Mulele had been known to Czechoslovakia since 1956, when he befriended Joseph Virius, the Czechoslovak consul in Leopoldville, and became one of the students in a communist study group organized by Virius.[182] After becoming reacquainted with Mulele in meetings in Cairo and Prague in early 1961, Czechoslovak officials decided that they did not trust him. Richard Dvořák, the Czechoslovak ambassador to the Soviet Union, told Soviet officials that "Mulele lives in easy circumstances [in Cairo] and is surrounded by the company of very dubious persons. Agents of intelligence services of the imperialist states may be among them."[183] As a result, Dvořák informed his Soviet counterpart that Czechoslovakia would not be handing over the £25,000 in cash that it had earmarked for the Stanleyville government to Mulele, as the Soviets had suggested they do, and would instead seek an alternative channel to funnel its aid to the Gizenga regime.[184]

Despite the aviation agreement signed between Mulele and Czechoslovak officials, Soviet bloc countries soon found it very difficult to get to Stanleyville. After Lumumba's assassination, it became dangerous for any white person to stay in Stanleyville without being mistaken for a Belgian, so in February, the Czechoslovak journalist/StB agents left the city. The government in Leopoldville, along with their regional African allies, and the United Nations, then set up a blockade of Oriental province in order to prevent Gizenga's regime from receiving outside aid. The Soviet and Czechoslovak governments needed transit overflight rights from the Sudanese government in order to fly supplies from Europe to Stanleyville. Washington, however, successfully exerted pressure on Khartoum to deny the Soviet bloc such rights in order to "prevent Sudan from becoming a gateway for Communist supply to virtual satellite regime in Congo."[185] Khartoum relented to US pressure and even refused to allow humanitarian aid from the Soviet Red Cross from crossing into Congo via Sudan.

Czechoslovakia failed in its attempt to establish a Prague to Stanleyville airline route via Cairo and Khartoum, as Egypt and Sudan both refused

to allow Czechoslovak planes to overfly their territory. Prague then sought to use Ghana as a proxy for sending aid to Stanleyville and sent ten tons of small arms and ammunition to Accra with the intention that Ghana would then transport them to Stanleyville under the Ghanaian flag.[186] Nkrumah wrote to Sudanese President Ibrahim Abboud urging him "to secure refueling and staging rights in Khartoum for Ghana Government planes proceeding to the Congo from Accra," but his appeal was also rejected.[187]

Moscow faced similar difficulties. When Soviet officials asked Gamal Nasser how the Soviet Union might be able to deliver aid to Stanleyville, the Egyptian president suggested that the Soviets parachute supplies into the city without obtaining advance permission from Sudan to overfly its airspace.[188] Mulele, meanwhile, suggested that the Soviets put Congolese markings on their planes in order to overfly African countries enroute to Stanleyville.[189] But Moscow was not willing to suffer the international consequences that might arise from violating the sovereignty of other African states or disobeying UN directives in this manner.

Besides this seemingly insurmountable logistical hurdle, Soviet and Czechoslovak efforts to aid Ginzenga's government became hampered by the fact that some of his key African allies, such as Nkrumah in Ghana and Nasser in Egypt, turned their backs on Ginzenga's movement in an effort to establish positive relations with the new Kennedy administration in the United States. The so-called Casablanca powers (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and Egypt) were initially united in their support of Gizenga and opposition to Kasavubu, but could not agree on the best way to respond to the Congo crisis. In early 1961, Nasser, Touré, and Keïta were ready to withdraw their troops from the UN forces and put them at the disposal of Gizenga, but Nkrumah squashed this idea.[190] Nkrumah's attitude toward the Gizenga regime cooled largely out of deference to his attempt to improve relations with the United States. John F. Kennedy was making a concerted effort to court the Ghanaian leader by giving him the honor of being the first foreign head of state to receive a state visit during his presidency and dangled the prospect of unfreezing US funding for his much cherished Volta River Project.[191] Similarly, Nasser decided to lessen his support for Gizenga so as to not spoil the opportunity for better relations with the United States that Kennedy's election provided.[192]

Prague had not yet given up hope on the Gizenga regime, and continually tried to infiltrate aid to and make contact with Stanleyville. Finally, in June 1961, two StB agents reached Stanleyville after taking 18 days to travel on a circuitous route through Italy, France, and Uganda with fake Austrian passports. They became the first intelligence personnel from the Soviet bloc to reach Stanleyville after the blockade, and they were able to establish direct radio contact with the outside world.[193] The

next month, Sudan finally began granting transit visas for diplomats destined for Stanleyville, which allowed the ČSSR to establish an embassy in Gizenga's capital.

The Czechoslovaks again became the focus of Soviet bloc activity in Congo, as the Soviet Union did not have an embassy in Stanleyville.[194] Despite this, with his support within Africa dwindling, and the Soviet bloc unable to send him aid, Gizenga had little choice but to accept an offer, sponsored by the United States, to join a unified coalition government. In August 1961, Cyrille Adoula became prime minister of Congo, and Gizenga was appointed to the position of vice prime minister.

The Soviet bloc was disappointed that Gizenga had announced that his government no longer existed, and Czechoslovakia was therefore forced to move its diplomatic representatives to Leopoldville. Discouraged by the political leanings of the Adoula regime, Prague shifted its focus to trying to develop commercial relations with the Congo. But this was unsuccessful, as Czechoslovakia's volume of trade steadily declined from 1960 onwards.[195]

Meanwhile, Gizenga stayed in Stanleyville for months, refusing to go to Leopoldville. Eventually, in January 1962, the Congolese Chamber of Deputies voted that he needed to return to the capital. Gizenga initially refused, and fighting broke out between his forces and troops of the central government. When the UN threatened to intervene against Gizenga, he surrendered and was put under house arrest in Leopoldville before being imprisoned from January 1962 to July 1964.

By 1962, the Congolese government began criticizing the fact that Czechoslovakia had previously provided (limited) military aid to the Stanleyville regime, and relations between Prague and Leopoldville became so contentious (particularly after the Congolese had arrested Czechoslovak diplomats seemingly for no reason) that Czechoslovakia withdrew its diplomats from the Congo. In late 1964, the StB developed a plan, codenamed Operation Gold, to rescue Gizenga from house arrest and transport him across the border to Brazzaville, but the operation was called off in January 1965 because it was deemed too risky and could have put Gizenga's life in jeopardy.[196] After this, Czechoslovak involvement in Congo became practically nonexistent for the remainder of the time covered in this study. Prague neither aided the Simba rebellion nor initially sought relations with Mobutu's regime after his second coup in 1965.[197]

The success that Czechoslovakia had in establishing close relations with Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and the Lumumbists in the Congo during the late 1950s and into the early 1960s stemmed from three sources. The first was the active engagement of Czechoslovak and Soviet authorities, who saw in decolonization an opportunity to forge relations with new

strategic allies south of the Sahara. Prague, in particular, attempted to form both economic and diplomatic relations with nearly every state in Africa, but the radical states were much more receptive to Czechoslovak offers and therefore received greater attention. Second, the failure of the Western countries to recognize and support Guinean independence, back the democratically elected government of the Congo in its effort to maintain its territorial integrity, or side with Mali after the breakup of the Mali Federation, served to push the radical states toward the Soviet bloc, which unlike the West was willing to align its foreign policy alongside those of the radical states. Finally, the Western powers thought poor African states should focus their energy and resources on economic development and were reluctant to provide aid for purposes they felt were unnecessary and wasteful prestige projects. Conversely, leaders such as Nkrumah, Touré, and Keïta believed that the only way they could achieve the autonomous middle power status they craved was through the development of independent military and aviation capabilities. The next two chapters will show how Prague stepped into the void created by Western unwillingness to provide such aid to satisfy African desires to express their newfound sovereignty through the development of their own militaries and national airlines.

CHAPTER 3

Czechoslovak Arms Exports to Africa (1954–68)

Czechoslovakia had long been one of the world's leading exporters of weapons to the developing world. Through the sale of arms, Czechoslovakia was able to make a profit through the disposal of obsolete weapons, stimulate its industrial economy, and form closer political relations with the states that purchased its arms. Arms exports and military training were a gateway to increased influence in Third World states because they created a technical dependence on Czechoslovakia for training, spare parts, and ammunition. Military assistance was also often a precursor to greater trade relationships with recipient states. Therefore, Czechoslovak military aid played a significant role in the overall growth of Soviet bloc influence in Africa during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

As early as the 1920s, Czechoslovakia was an aggressive exporter of arms. Two companies, Zbrojovka Brno (ZB) and Škoda, were the principal exporters. Founded in 1918, Zbrojovka Brno was a semi-national enterprise which was three-fourths owned by the Czechoslovak state. In addition to heavy machine guns, light machine guns, submachine guns, and rifles, ZB also produced automobiles, tractors, telegraph and telephone equipment, typewriters, bicycles, aircraft and motorcycle engines, and machine tools. By the end of the 1920s, it was one of the world's largest producers of rifles.[1] Škoda was founded in Plzeň in 1859 by the Czech noble Waldstein family and was purchased by Emil Škoda in 1869. Škoda quickly became the leading industrial enterprise in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and exported all over the world. It produced artillery mountain guns, tanks (including the Panzer 35(t) and 38(t) used by Nazi Germany), anti-tank guns, and machine guns. After World War I, Škoda was transformed from being exclusively an arms manufacturer to become one of the world's largest diversified industrial companies. Škoda produced automobiles, locomotives, trolley buses, aircrafts, ships, steam turbines, machine tools, and eventually even nuclear reactors.[2]

The production and export activities of the two companies were coordinated and non-competitive. Škoda held a 20 percent share of ZB's stocks and its representatives served on Zbrojovka's administrative council and executive board. Moreover, the two companies had agreed to pursue different production niches: Škoda made heavy weapons, while ZB produced infantry arms. Taking advantage of the interwar restrictions on German rearmament, the two companies were so successful that by 1935, Czechoslovakia became the world's top exporter of arms, controlling 21.1 percent of the world's weapons and 24.5 percent of its munitions market.[3] After Nazi Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939, it became a hub of military production for the Third Reich producing aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, and other armaments. Toward the war's end, the Škoda plant in Plzeň alone produced 30 percent of all arms supplies for the Nazi army.[4]

Prior to World War II, the main foreign customers of the Czechoslovak arms industry were the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Germany.[5] Czechoslovakia also attempted to sell its weapons in Africa at this time, but this was not an easy task, given that most of the continent was still colonized by the European powers. Ethiopia was the only country in Africa in which Czechoslovakia found a market for its arms prior to 1955. The first arms deliveries from Czechoslovakia to Ethiopia occurred in 1928 after Zbrojovka Brno terminated its cartel agreement with the Belgian armament company Herstal.[6] Czechoslovak weapons would prove significant in Ethiopia's efforts to defend itself against Italian aggression at the outset of World War II.[7] After the war, Ethiopia would again become the first African country to which communist Czechoslovakia sold arms. Beginning in 1954, the Czechoslovak government sold Ethiopia small arms and tanks, and Czechoslovak arms manufacturer Povážské strojirny opened an ammunition factory in the country.

In the early years after World War II, the Czechoslovak armament industry sputtered, as it lacked the necessary domestic raw materials for production. The Soviet Union was also initially reluctant to support a revitalization of Czechoslovak arms production, arguing that Czech factories were too far west and hence vulnerable to attack in the event of a war with the United States and its allies in Western Europe. Moscow suggested that Czechoslovakia should completely abandon its arms industry and instead rely upon Soviet built weapons. Czechoslovakia rejected this advice and rebuilt its arms industry, before long producing weapons for the entire Soviet bloc.[8]

After the KSČ came to power in February 1948, both Zbrojovka Brno and Škoda were nationalized, as the entire Czechoslovak economy came under government control. Under the communists, the process of exporting Czechoslovak weapons was initially cumbersome. First, an

interested buyer would have to negotiate terms directly with the factory. Once terms were agreed upon, the contract would be forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MZO) for review. If approved by the MZO, then the Soviet Union would be consulted to get its blessing for the deal. If Moscow sanctioned the deal, then the KSČ politburo would vote whether or not to officially approve the transaction.[9] This difficult and slow-moving process, together with the fact that the world had become polarized into two distinct blocs with the onset of the Cold War (which eliminated certain potential markets for Czechoslovak arms such as Latin America), combined to dramatically reduce the number of Czechoslovak arms exported in the early 1950s, despite the fact that production had increased by 453 percent from 1950 to 1953.[10]

This unwieldy procedure would be changed through the creation of the Main Technical Administration (HTS) in October 1951. A subunit of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the HTS was empowered to negotiate the export of weapons and ammunition to foreign countries, which effectively combined the first two steps of the previous process in one office. As the monopoly exporter of Czechoslovak weapons, the HTS played a significant role in expanding Prague's influence in Africa. It also operated with a substantial amount of autonomy, as its actions were completely separate from the rest of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and only marginally guided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The HTS also operated a front company, Omnipol, which was tasked with managing the sale of sporting and hunting weapons, as well as any arms sale that might potentially be embarrassing to the Czechoslovak state. Omnipol was presented publically as a separate and independent firm, but in reality, it was located in the same building and had the same director as the HTS.[11] A United Press International exposé later wrote of Omnipol:

> Whether you're plotting a revolution, a coup d'etat or a big game safari, Czechoslovakia is the best place in the world to buy arms—over or under the counter.
>
> Spies, dealers, collectors, mercenaries, intriguers or just plain governments in need of modern arms do their shopping at the state-owned Omnipol trading corporation in Prague.
>
> Omnipol offers a vast selection of guns from the huge Brno arms complex—Skorpion machine pistols, Model 58 carbines, one-man rockets, not to mention a wide range of pistols and ammunition.
>
> If you're really serious, Omnipol can also provide armored personnel carriers, tanks, fighter jets and heavy artillery pieces, from the Skoda works at Plzen . . .
>
> Hungry for foreign currency, Czechoslovakia asks few questions of buyers.[12]

Communist Czechoslovakia's first significant arms deal was with Israel. Between 1948 and 1949, Czechoslovakia exported tens of thousands of firearms (infantry rifles, machine guns, and pistols), ammunition, mortars, howitzers, hand grenades, Spitfire military aircraft and other military material to the Zionist state. This infusion of Czechoslovak weapons was an important factor in Israel's successful defense of its state from attacks from its Arab neighbors during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Just as important was fact that Prague held up a scheduled delivery of arms to Syria, which helped tip the scales of the conflict in Israel's favor.[13] "One must remember that it was rifles from Czechoslovakia that gave the Israeli army its decisive victory over the Arabs in 1948," one Israeli soldier later remembered. "They were the only weapons we had. We got down on our knees and kissed those Czech weapons when they arrived."[14]

While the communist regime had halted the sale of military weapons to Western countries, it had initially remained benevolent toward the sale of sporting and hunting weapons. As a result, in 1952 the main export markets for Czechoslovak sporting and hunting weapons were France (3.9 million Kčs), Brazil (3.8 million Kčs), and South Africa (3.7 million Kčs). This changed in April 1953, when the KSČ politburo passed a resolution banning the export of all military weapons or ammunition, including sporting and hunting weapons and aircraft to capitalist countries. This change in policy would adversely impact Czechoslovakia's economy (particularly its efforts to obtain convertible foreign currency) to the point that exceptions were granted to sell weapons to Guatemala in 1953, Afghanistan and Ethiopia in 1954 and Egypt, Syria, and Mexico in 1955. A new resolution was then approved by the KSČ politburo in August 1955 that allowed for the resumption of arms sales outside of the Soviet bloc.[15] Under the terms of this policy, sporting and hunting weapons no longer required approval from the politburo to be sold, but modern military weapons, which could potentially find their way into the arsenals of Western militaries, still required politburo authorization.

The Czechoslovak arms deal with Guatemala, consummated in 1953 and delivered in May 1954, is noteworthy because of the role it may have played in prompting the CIA overthrow of the regime of Jacobo Árbenz Guzman the following month. Prague had sold Guatemala outdated World War II model weapons at Árbenz's request after the United States announced an arms embargo against Guatemala. Washington considered the Czechoslovak arms deal to be proof of Árbenz's ties to the Soviet Union, which in its view constituted a communist threat to the Panama Canal and the Western Hemisphere more broadly. In response, the Eisenhower administration ordered the CIA to initiate Operation PBSUCCESS, a coup d'état against Árbenz.[16] Árbenz was forced to resign and go into exile, while Czechoslovakia offered asylum to some of his supporters.[17]

The 1955 Czechoslovak-Egyptian Arms Deal

Without a doubt, the most contentious issue in the historiography of Czechoslovakia's relations with Africa is the arms deal it concluded with Egypt in September 1955. In fact, most historians paint the transaction as being between the Soviet Union and Egypt, with Prague simply serving as a Soviet surrogate. For example, Rami Ginat refers to it as the "so-called Czech-Egyptian arms deal," Uri Ra'anan used quotation marks to sarcastically question how "Czech" the deal was, and Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali barely mention Czechoslovak involvement at all.[18] Such accounts, based exclusively on American, British, Israeli, and to a lesser extent Soviet archival materials and newspaper accounts, fail to accurately portray the true nature of Czechoslovakia's sale of weapons to Egypt.

Most narratives of the 1955 Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal neglect to mention that Prague had actually sold 368 million Kčs worth of small arms to Egypt during the years 1946–47—more than a year *before* Czechoslovakia had become a communist state.[19] Moreover, as has already been established, Czechoslovakia had long been one of the world's largest exporters of arms, even prior to the Second World War. Therefore, the portrayal of Czechoslovakia as nothing more than a Soviet proxy in the 1955 arms deal ignores the reality of the matter.

For its part, Egypt had initially preferred to procure arms from the West, but both the Americans and British made joining an anti-Soviet defense pact a perquisite for providing Cairo with weapons.[20] The Egyptian public was in sharp opposition to such a military alliance, however, so Cairo felt that it could not accept such terms. As a result, beginning in 1951, the Egyptian government would make multiple attempts to buy weapons from both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. With Stalin's cautious approach toward the Third World, the Soviet Union showed no inclination to provide Egypt with arms at the time. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, was seemingly more willing. On October 24, 1951, Prague signed a commercial agreement with Cairo, in which it agreed to sell about 600 million Egyptian pounds worth of arms and ammunition in exchange for Egyptian cotton.[21] Czechoslovakia would, however, delay shipment of the weapons multiple times, and by the end of 1954, the arms had still not been delivered.[22] The reasons for the delay appear to have been due partially to Czechoslovak reluctance to send weapons to a non-communist state, but mostly because Egypt continued to hold out hope that it could instead procure weapons from the West. According to historian Guy Laron, "until March-April 1955 [Egyptian President Gamal Abdel] Nasser believed that an arms deal with the US was feasible. Yet at the same time he was trying to develop a 'Plan B,' or fallback position, in case negotiations with Washington were to fail."[23]

In February 1955, two events occurred which seem to have pushed Nasser into fully activating the notorious 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia. The first was the signing of the Baghdad Pact, which Nasser viewed as an Anglo-American attempt to weaken his leadership position in the Arab world. The second was an Israeli raid on an Egyptian military base in Gaza that killed 34 Egyptian soldiers. The raid was a humiliating blow for Cairo and resulted in Egypt increasing both its support for Palestinian militants within Israel and its desire to improve its conventional military capacity.[24] Nasser would later tell Western diplomats that the Israeli attack on Gaza was his main motivation for concluding the September 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Some historians—most notably Ra'anan—in an attempt to disprove Nasser's claim, cite the fact that arms negotiations between Egypt and Czechoslovakia pre-dated the Israeli raid on Gaza.[25] In reality, while there were preliminary negotiations between the two sides since 1951, the talks had been stalled for four years. Yet only a few weeks after the Israeli raid, the Egyptian Deputy War Minister Hassan Ragab approached Jaroslav Kohout, Czechoslovakia's deputy minister for foreign commerce, about the possibility of Egypt buying planes, tanks, and guns from Czechoslovakia.[26] The only things that had changed in early 1955 to increase Egyptian eagerness to consummate the deal were the Baghdad Pact—which deflated Nasser's faith that he would receive weapons from the West—and Israel's attack on Gaza—which demonstrated the inferiority of Egypt's military vis-à-vis Israel. There is therefore no reason not to believe the Egyptian leader's claims that it was Israel's attack that prompted him to consummate Egypt's notorious arms deal with Czechoslovakia.

After the Bandung Conference in April, Nasser met with the Soviet ambassador to Egypt, Daniel Solod, to express his desire to buy weapons from the Soviet bloc and to request that negotiations for such a deal take place in Prague. The Soviets approved of such a deal and left it to Egypt and Czechoslovakia to work out the details.[27] An Egyptian delegation arrived in Prague on August 20 to negotiate the terms of the agreement. On September 12, 1956, a contract was signed in which Czechoslovakia agreed to sell to Egypt 86 MiG-15 fighter jets, 25 Jak-11 trainer aircraft, 47 IL-28 bomber aircraft, 20 IL-14 cargo transport aircraft, 220 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, 200 T-34 tanks, 50 122 mm artillery guns, 80 122 mm caliber howitzer cannons, 50 SU-100 self-propelled anti-tank guns, 24 130 mm rocket launchers, 50 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, 120 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, four P-8 radar stations, 12 torpedo boats, a transport ship, four naval minesweepers, 100,000 anti-personnel landmines, 92 carriers and towing vehicles, and 1,000 tons of nitric acid, among other things. Egypt agreed to pay £45.7 million (approximately 921 million Kčs) for these weapons. Four days later, an agreement was

consummated between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, in which Moscow agreed to help finance the deal for Cairo. Egypt was to pay 25 percent of the total by the end of March 1956, with the rest financed through a 30-year loan at 2 percent interest. Eighty percent of the amount was to be paid to Czechoslovakia in goods (mostly Egyptian cotton) and the remaining 20 percent in hard currency.[28]

Nasser publicly announced Egypt's massive purchase of Czechoslovak arms on September 27, and the first shipment of weapons arrived in Alexandria ten days later.[29] In explaining his decision to buy arms from the communist world, the Egyptian leader emphasized three points. First, he said he had tried to purchase weapons from the West, but the United States and Great Britain had both required Egypt to join a military alliance before they would agree to do so. Second, he underscored that the agreement was with Czechoslovakia, not the Soviet Union. Third, he made clear that the deal was purely commercial, did not imply political overtones, and did not mean Egypt was moving into the Soviet camp in the Cold War.[30]

Nonetheless, Egypt's arms deal with Prague was not without political, and even personal, risk for Nasser. Less than a year earlier, the United States had overthrown Guatemala's Jacobo Árbenz Guzman after his regime had purchased arms from Czechoslovakia. Once the news of Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia became public, Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian ambassador to the United States who was in Cairo for consultations at the time, stormed into Nasser's office, exclaiming, "Guatemala, Mr. President! Guatemala!" But a defiant Nasser reportedly responded, "To hell with Guatemala."[31] Although the United States would not attempt to overthrow Nasser, the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal did lead to the United States canceling both its funding of the Aswan Dam project as well as its PL-480 food shipments to Egypt.

In 1956, three more arms agreements were signed between Egypt and the Soviet bloc. The first, between Egypt and several Soviet bloc countries, was agreed to in April for 569.5 million Kčs, in which the Czechoslovak share was 303.9 million Kčs. A second bilateral agreement for 36.1 million Kčs was signed between Egypt and the Soviet Union in August. In October, Czechoslovakia agreed to a bilateral agreement with Egypt in the amount of 62 million Kčs.[32]After the Suez Crisis in the previous fall, in January 1957, Czechoslovakia agreed to its fifth bilateral arms deal with Egypt, valued at 1.282 billion Kčs, in which dozens of fighter jets, tanks, rockets, missiles, and artillery pieces were sold.[33] Prague questioned Cairo's ability to pay for all of these arms deliveries and voiced an unwillingness to take an economic loss on the transactions, but the Soviet Union again agreed to help Egypt finance the deals and sent Czechoslovakia 100,000 tons of grain as partial compensation for the

arms Prague sent Egypt.[34] As a result of these deals, in 1955–56 Egypt was the second leading importer of arms in the Third World (behind only China) with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union supplying over 85 percent of the Egyptian total (between 1954–68 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia combined to account for 96 percent of Egypt's military imports).[35] Furthermore, in 1956, Egypt would serve as an intermediary in facilitating arms deals between Czechoslovakia and Syria, Yemen, and Jordan.

In December 1955, Egyptian soldiers began coming to the Czechoslovak city of Brno to attend five-week courses in tank and artillery combat at the Antonín Zápotocký Military Academy of Technology. Perhaps more significant was Czechoslovakia's role in helping to found Egypt's first military college, the Military Technical College (MTC), in Cairo in 1958. The MTC provided training not only to Egyptian military officers but also to enrolled students from all across the Arab world. Czechoslovak military experts (teaching with the aid of Egyptian translators) exclusively staffed the college from 1958 until 1960, when Egyptian nationals also joined the faculty. Czechoslovak nationals continued to work at the college until 1978, when the faculty transitioned into becoming operated entirely by Egyptians.[36]

The history of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal is far more complex and nuanced than popular historiography would suggest. Far from being a straightforward bilateral agreement between Moscow and Cairo, in which Prague simply served as a tool used by the Soviet Union to implement the transaction, the deal was legitimately a commercial transaction between Czechoslovakia and Egypt. The Soviet Union did not initiate the arms dialogue as some have asserted.[37] Likewise, it is a myth that Egypt first inquired about buying arms from the Soviet bloc during a conversation between Nasser and Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai during the Bandung Conference in April 1955. While it was indeed the Egyptian government who first raised the issue, it did so much earlier than at Bandung. Egyptian representatives initiated conservations about the possible purchase of weapons from the Soviet bloc first in 1951, and then again in February 1955. Each time, Egypt first approached Czechoslovakia—not the Soviet Union.

In 1955, Egypt turned to Czechoslovakia for weapons for three reasons. First, the West had proven to be unwilling to sell Cairo weapons in the quantities and types it desired. Second, Prague had already agreed to sell Egypt weapons in both 1946 and 1951, so Cairo was a return customer. Finally, Cairo feared that purchasing weapons from the Soviet Union would result in the suspension of US and British aid, and hoped that another deal with Czechoslovakia would draw a less adverse reaction in the West.

Czechoslovakia agreed to sell weapons to Egypt on its own accord and for its own economic self-interest, and was not directed by Moscow to do so. In fact, Czechoslovakia had already concluded arms deals with the Egyptian government in both 1947 and 1951 without Soviet approval or involvement. Although the KSČ was happy to further Soviet foreign policy in this way, it agreed to sell weapons to Egypt for commercial, not political, reasons. This is where the Soviet Union's involvement came in. The Egyptian government only opened negotiations with Moscow because it believed that Czechoslovakia would be unwilling or unable to sell it weapons in the quantity and quality that it sought. As such, Egypt believed that the Soviets would have to supplement the agreement that it hoped to conclude with Czechoslovakia. Indeed, Prague would have been unwilling to agree to such a large arms deal with Egypt without Moscow underwriting the financing for such an agreement. Seeking to expand its influence in the Third World, Moscow saw increased ties to Egypt as a way to improve its position in both the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, and therefore, unlike Prague, it was willing to support arms sales to Egypt on political, rather than economic, grounds.[38]

Most histories of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal claim that the Soviet Union negotiated the sale with Egypt and then simply delegated Czechoslovakia to carry out the transaction. In order to explain why Moscow chose to facilitate the transaction through Prague, they cite the "spirit of Geneva"—claiming that in the wake of reduced tensions between the Cold War superpowers following their summit in Geneva, Switzerland in July 1955, the Soviet Union thought it best to present the sale as nothing more than a bilateral commercial transaction between Egypt and Czechoslovakia.[39] This interpretation, however, does not hold up to scrutiny because, as demonstrated above, communist Czechoslovakia was involved in arms negotiations with Egypt more than four years prior to the Geneva summit. Viewing the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal through a Soviet-centric lens has therefore led to considerable misinterpretations. Although it is accurate to state that the deal likely would not have occurred without Soviet financial and political backing, Moscow did not initiate or negotiate the deal, nor did it order Prague to sell weapons to Cairo, as has long been mistakenly believed.

The Curious Case of Czechoslovakia's Refusal to Sell Arms to Sudan

In February 1955, Otakar Taufer, an official in the Czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs, met with Soviet Ambassador Solod in Cairo during a layover stop on his way to Sudan. Taufer reported to Prague that Solod "was very interested" in his trip to Khartoum, which the Soviet

official considered "important not only in the economic sense but also in the political sense." Solod informed Taufer that since the Soviet Union had not yet established relations with officials from the soon-to-be-independent Sudanese government, "it would be very important if Czechoslovakia could be successful in doing so."[40] According to historian Guy Laron, Soviet documents show that Solod was "under strict orders from Moscow" to prod the Czechoslovaks about improving relations with Sudan.[41]

In September of that year, a Sudanese delegation visited Prague and requested a demonstration of Czechoslovak arms, expressing an interest in acquiring the arms as soon as possible. The Czechoslovaks viewed the possibility of selling weapons to Sudan, which was at the time still under British colonial rule, as a "very delicate" situation.[42] The Czechoslovak government was wary of selling weapons to Sudan because it viewed the regime as overly pro-British; thought that Nasser would oppose the move (as he had uneasy relations with Sudan); feared that such a transaction would expose Khartoum to the same sort of backlash from the United States that Egypt was facing; and was apprehensive about the prospect of the weapons being used by Sudan to create an anti-Egyptian bloc with Ethiopia, which would result in Prague being blamed for militarizing the region by arming both sides.

In an attempt to dissuade Sudan from seriously pursuing their weapons, the Czechoslovaks gave a half-hearted demonstration of their capabilities and only displayed infantry weapons and nothing more powerful. The Czechoslovaks did not raise the possibility of an arms deal in their subsequent meetings with Sudanese officials. After learning of the Sudanese inquiry, Solod broached the issue with Nasser, and then told Arnosta Karpíšek, the Czechoslovak ambassador in Cairo, that the Egyptian leader did not oppose Czechoslovakia selling weapons to Sudan because if Khartoum did not get weapons from Prague, then they would just get them from the West. Solod pressed his Czechoslovak counterpart to convince Prague to consummate an arms deal with Sudan so the Soviet bloc could expand its influence in the country. Despite this pressure from the Soviet Union, the KSČ decided not to change its position on selling weapons to Nasser's southern neighbor, and Khartoum instead received extensive military assistance from the British.[43]

A similar situation occurred in 1963, when Sudan approached Czechoslovakia about a potential arms deal for a second time. The Soviets again advised their junior ally that selling weapons to the regime in Khartoum "would be very useful in terms of socialist camp influence in Sudan."[44] Nonetheless, an arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Sudan failed to materialize once more. It is unclear why Czechoslovakia was still

uninterested in selling weapons to the Sudanese. What is clear, however, is that Moscow wanted Czechoslovakia to provide them with weapons, but the KSČ demurred, further demonstrating Prague's autonomy over its arms exports.

Decolonization and the Czechoslovak Arms Trade

By 1956, with decolonization resulting in the creation of dozens of new states, Soviet foreign policy reoriented toward establishing relations with these newly independent countries, and with its arms deal with Egypt setting the precedent, Czechoslovakia reestablished itself as a major arms exporter. By this point, Czechoslovakia had a large pool of weapons manufactured during its industrial surge from 1950–53. By selling these surplus weapons, as well as older obsolete ones, to recently decolonized countries, Czechoslovakia was able to obtain badly needed convertible foreign currency. For their part, Third World countries were eager to increase their prestige and power by building national armed forces. By obtaining Czechoslovak weapons, these Third World countries could follow Egypt's example in demonstrating autonomy from their former colonial power while still being able to plausibly claim that they had not joined the Soviet bloc—as an arms deal with the Soviet Union might have implied.

Czechoslovak and Soviet officials developed a joint approach, in which they agreed not to sell weapons to states that were members of US-sponsored military pacts, such as NATO, SEATO, the Rio Pact, or the Baghdad Pact. A pre-approved list of nations that could be sold weapons was created and included Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon (modern day Sri Lanka), and India in Asia. In 1960, this pre-approved list was adjusted to remove Burma, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, while adding Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, and Iraq.[45] Prague agreed to consult with Moscow before selling weapons to any state outside of this list. An even more significant change was that Czechoslovakia, in an effort to support Soviet foreign policy, agreed to begin providing military aid for political, rather than economic, purposes. As such, Czechoslovakia began supplying arms to the radical African states and various national liberation movements, either as a donation or under favorable long-term payment plans. In 1960, the Czechoslovak foreign trade minister reported to the politburo that the ČSSR had exported 1.1 billion Kčs of military aid in 1959 and projected that the figure would climb to 2.3 billion Kčs by 1965.[46]

Czechoslovakia and the Algerian War of Independence

From the beginning of the Algerian uprising against French colonial rule in 1954 until the summer of 1956, the Soviet bloc did not show much interest in becoming involved in the conflict. The Soviet bloc's lack of early interest in the Algerian revolution was seemingly due to a combination of the lingering effects of Stalin's distrust of national liberation movements, and the fact that both the French and Algerian communist parties did not initially support the uprising. Furthermore, the National Liberation Front (FLN), which initiated and controlled the insurrection, opposed the Algerian Communist Party (PCA).[47] Ultimately, the PCA dissolved itself and merged with the FLN in July 1956. However, this was not a merger on equal terms, as the FLN demanded that the PCA disband itself and that its members join the FLN as individuals, rather than as members of the PCA.[48] After this, the Soviet Union began to voice its support for the Algerian cause, although this was mainly for the purpose of propaganda against Western colonialism. Moscow believed that if France were forced to leave Algeria, the United States would fill the power vacuum to the USSR's detriment. For these reasons, in 1956–57, Soviet support for the Algerian rebels amounted to little more than words.

Moscow's backing of the FLN would grow in 1958 as a result of pressure from Egypt, international outrage at French bombing of a village in neighboring Tunisia in which women and children were killed, competition with communist China over leadership of international communism, and Paris's reconciliation and rapprochement with West Germany.[49] The Soviet Union began providing humanitarian aid to the FLN, celebrated "Algeria Day" on March 30, 1958, and criticized France for its "barbaric war" in which its soldiers committed "crimes against the Arab population."[50] On September 19, 1958, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA) in Cairo, Egypt, which was diplomatically recognized by 15 states including communist China, but not by Moscow or Prague, which continued to remain cautious about overtly supporting the FLN. Prague would not provide official diplomatic recognition to the GPRA until March 20, 1962, two-and-a-half years after its founding, two days after the signing of the Evian agreements, and one day after the Soviet Union did so.[51]

Throughout the duration of the Algerian War of Independence Prague's position toward the conflict did not deviate from that of Moscow. Czechoslovakia maintained political distance from the FLN, maintained relatively close relations with the Communist Party of Algeria, mimicked the Soviet attitude toward the war and the GPRA in the United Nations and elsewhere, and initiated humanitarian aid at the same time as the Soviet Union. Czechoslovak humanitarian aid for Algerian refugees was initially quite minimal and purely symbolic. Distributed mainly through

the Red Cross, it amounted to only 70,000 Kčs in 1957 and 250,000 Kčs in 1958, but as the Soviet bloc increased its support for the war, Czechoslovak humanitarian aid to Algerian refugees jumped to 36 million Kčs in 1959–60.[52] Similarly, the first official FLN delegation to visit Prague did not occur until the summer of 1960. And although Antonín Novotný met with a GPRA representative at the United Nations in September 1960, Czechoslovakia did not even grant de facto recognition of the GPRA until March 1961.

Czechoslovakia's arms exports to Algerian rebels followed the same general trend and were supplied indirectly and for cash. Prague even refused to provide weapons to the Algerian communists, suggesting instead that they could give them financial assistance that could then be used to buy weapons.[53] The first Czechoslovak weapons to reach Algerian rebels arrived circuitously from Egypt and Syria in 1955. After Czechoslovakia initiated large arms deals with both Cairo and Damascus in 1955, they were able to transfer not only weapons of Czechoslovak origin, but also some of their older stock of weapons to the FLN in Algeria.[54] The first direct sale of Czechoslovak arms to Algerian insurgents occurred in early 1957, in the wake of the Suez and Hungarian crises, and was partially a result of deteriorating East-West Cold War relations. In January, the HTS was approached by representatives of the Moroccan and Egyptian governments seeking to broker a deal to purchase Czechoslovak arms for the FLN. After consulting with the Soviet Union, the KSČ politburo approved such a deal in February, a contract was signed in April, and the first shipment of Czechoslovak weapons destined for the FLN arrived in Alexandria, Egypt late in the year. A second shipment containing 900 tons of weapons was sent to Casablanca, and in a pre-arranged ruse, was seized by the Moroccan police, who then distributed the weapons to Algerian rebels.[55]

In January 1958, the French navy seized a Yugoslav ship, the *Slovenija*, approximately 45 miles from the Algerian coast, which contained a shipment of 55 tons of weapons and 95 tons of ammunition from Czechoslovakia destined for the FLN. According to French estimates, the load would have outfitted 6,000 men for a period of 3 months.[56] In April 1959, French authorities detained another Yugoslav ship, the *Lidice*, and confiscated the load of Czechoslovak weapons that it was carrying to Morocco.

In commandeering the weapons aboard the *Lidice*, France was interfering in the bilateral commercial relations between Czechoslovakia and Morocco, which caused tremendous strain in French-Czechoslovak relations. The incident also created almost a state of psychosis for the French. Even before the two ship seizures, the French had accused Prague of supplying weapons to the Algerian rebels as early as March 1956.[57] After the seizure of the *Lidice*, the accusations intensified,

and the French made numerous spurious or exaggerated claims about Czechoslovak support for the Algerian rebels. For example, in 1960, the French government claimed that more than 3,000 wounded FLN soldiers were receiving medical treatment, and 300 Algerian students were studying in Czechoslovakia. In reality, Algerians receiving medical treatment or education in Czechoslovakia numbered only in the dozens.[58] By February 1962, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs would go so far as to claim that Czechoslovakia had done more than any other communist country to aid the Algerian rebellion.[59] It is not clear whether these French overestimations of Czechoslovak involvement with the Algerian rebellion were based on faulty intelligence or purposeful mischaracterizations, designed to paint the FLN with communist connections in order to turn Algeria into a Cold War issue, so as to retain US support for the French colonial war.

In early 1961, Czechoslovakia brokered its first arms deal directly with the FLN, which consisted of 200,000 grenades, 8,000 files, and more than 100 artillery pieces.[60] After the agreement was reached, the Czechoslovaks asked Moscow to approve the deal, seemingly only as a courtesy, because the Czechoslovak inquiry was made *after* the arms were already enroute to Alexandria (in any event, the Soviets sanctioned the deal). Previously, Prague had only sold small arms to the Algerians, but now mortar and cannons were consigned, and Algerians were brought to Czechoslovakia to receive military training for the first time.[61] Parallel to this, Czechoslovakia finally agreed to allow the FLN to open an information center in Prague and began supplying humanitarian aid directly to the GPRA. In the spring of 1961, Czechoslovakia donated an estimated 15 million Kčs worth of aid to the FLN: transport vehicles (20 trucks, 30 motorcycles, and 7 tractors), 30 tons of condensed milk, a 1,000 tons of sugar, 100,000 pairs of boots, and other miscellaneous clothing, food, and medical items.[62]

Despite the fact that Czechoslovak weapons had been instrumental in Algeria's war for independence, relations between Prague and Algiers were slow to blossom. The Czechoslovaks were displeased by the fact that the FLN had not allowed Algerian communists a role in the provisional government. Furthermore, at the outset of independence, a power struggle ensued between several different factions of the FLN, and the Czechoslovak leadership chose to cautiously await the outcome. As a consequence, in 1963, only one Algerian delegation visited the ČSSR, and Czechoslovakia exported merely 6.5 million Kčs worth of goods to Algeria with no imports.[63] After independence, Czechoslovakia's military relationship with Algeria consisted of little more than politically supporting Algiers in its 1963 border dispute with Morocco by refusing to sell Rabat weapons.

Military Aid to Guinea, Mali, and Ghana

As part of its intensification of relations with sub-Saharan Africa from late 1958 through 1962, Prague provided military aid to the radical states of Guinea, Mali, and Ghana. In becoming an arms supplier to the radical states, Czechoslovakia was able both to prove itself a valuable ally of the Soviet Union in strengthening Soviet bloc influence in West Africa, and to lay a foundation upon which greater economic relations between Prague and the radical states could be built.

A month after Guinea's independence, a Czechoslovak delegation arrived in Conakry to discuss, among other things, the military needs of the newly independent country. In February 1959, the KSČ politburo voted to supply to Guinea, as a gift, small arms and uniforms to equip a 6,000 man army.[64] The arms were sent to Guinea aboard the Polish ship, *Iczen*, and arrived in Conakry on March 17, 1959 along with an official diplomatic delegation led by Deputy Minister of Interior Karel Klima. Unlike its arms supplies to the FLN, Czechoslovakia would not endeavor to keep its arms deal with Guinea a secret, as the weapons were disembarked on March 20 as part of a public ceremony led by Guinean President Sékou Touré.[65] Included in the shipment were a number of older obsolete armored vehicles, tanks, motorcycles, and artillery pieces that Czechoslovakia gave to Guinea.[66] The US State Department described the Czechoslovak arms shipment as "the [Soviet] Bloc's most serious attempt to date to penetrate and influence political development in Black Africa."[67]

Czechoslovak military aid to Guinea was not restricted to the supply of arms. Under an agreement for security cooperation Czechoslovak experts went to Guinea to help organize the country's military and security forces and to train Guinean soldiers in how to use and maintain their new weapons. In mid-summer, the two countries signed a second military agreement during the Guinean secretary of defense's visit to Czechoslovakia from June 25–July 15, 1959. Under the terms of the agreement, 58 Guinean soldiers were to receive military training in Czechoslovakia on how to operate and maintain military aircraft and artillery armament. It was estimated that the training would cost 7 million Kčs, of which Czechoslovakia paid 1.3 million, with the remaining 5.7 million provided as a low-interest five-year loan to Guinea, payable beginning in October 1960.[68]

France found Czechoslovak weapon transfers to Guinea almost as unsettling as its provisions for Algeria's FLN for four reasons. First, in Paris's opinion the amount of arms Czechoslovakia sent to Conakry greatly exceeded Guinea's needs, which created the fear that some of the weapons might be diverted to anti-French movements in neighboring

colonies. Second, because the borders between Guinea and its neighbors was neither demarcated or guarded, Guinean arms smuggling into Senegal, French Sudan, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau would be nearly impossible to prevent. Third, the delivery of Czechoslovak weapons would make Guinea dependent on military instruction and training from the Soviet bloc, and would therefore be the precursor to even greater Soviet bloc influence in the country. Finally, since World War I, European states had agreed to make Africa a demilitarized zone. but Guinea's large influx of weapons could make its neighbors fear for their security and seek their own weapons, thus leading to a regional arms race.[69]

France immediately used its diplomatic channels to protest the transaction with the governments of Guinea, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (since the weapons were sent aboard a Polish ship) and considered seizing future shipments of Czechoslovak arms destined for Guinea in the same manner that it had the *Lidice*. Touré responded to Paris's remonstrations by informing the French ambassador that Guinea had not solicited the arms: "Prague had sent a 'gracious' gift, without political conditions; other countries had offered other types of equipment, notably agricultural, and Guinea would accept all contributions, irrespective of the source."[70] Moreover, Guinea had made at least two requests for arms from the United States prior to its deal with Czechoslovakia, but the United States ignored the requests out of deference to its French ally.

The matter of Czechoslovak arms deliveries to Guinea was on the agenda of the tripartite consultations on Africa between the United States, France, and Great Britain which took place in Washington from April 16–21, 1959. French officials labeled Czechoslovakia's arms shipment to Guinea "sinister" and tried to get its Anglo-American allies to agree to common action to establish a naval blockade of the Guinean coast in order to interdict future Czechoslovak arms shipments to Conakry. Playing the Cold War card, French officials tried to convince their counterparts that Touré was a communist. Although there was nothing in international law which would prevent Guinea from purchasing arms from any willing seller, Paris was hoping that the Western allies could create such a new norm. But neither of Paris's allies was enthusiastic about the prospect of taking such aggressive action, which they feared would only serve to push the Guineans (and possibly other African states as well) further into the Soviet sphere.[71] Paris was unwilling to act without the support of Washington and London, especially when future shipments were sent abroad Soviet ships, which the French were more reluctant to act against, and therefore, Czechoslovakia's military aid to Guinea continued unimpeded.[72]

Czechoslovak military aid to Mali resembled its military relationship with Guinea. After Malian President Modibo Keïta formally requested military aid from Czechoslovakia, Prague sent armored vehicles, artillery,

and small arms for 5,000 men to Bamako.[73] The small arms provided to Mali consisted of 3,000 pistols, 5,000 assault rifles, 323 machine guns, and 29 grenade launchers.[74] A close relationship was also established between the Czechoslovak and Malian intelligence services, which resulted in training courses being conducted both in Czechoslovakia and Mali, and Czechoslovak intelligence experts being assigned to work directly for the Malian ministry of the interior.

Czechoslovakia's military relationship with Ghana was slower to develop and did not become tangible until Prague agreed to sell small arms and ammunition to Ghana's police. In February 1961, it was agreed that Czechoslovakia would sell Ghana 3,000 9 mm caliber pistols, 500 9 mm caliber rifles, 5,000 RG-4 hand grenades and 300,000 rounds of ammunition for the price of 860,000 Kčs, to be paid in a freely convertible currency.[75] Just like in Guinea and Mali, close relations between the Czechoslovak and Ghanaian intelligence services would develop in the fall of 1962, when after a series of failed assassination attempts against President Nkrumah, the Czechoslovak StB was invited to help restructure the Ghanaian security apparatus.

When Nkrumah visited Prague in the summer of 1961, Czechoslovakia agreed to help him finance and build a guerrilla training center in Ghana. Opening in 1962, the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science, more commonly known as the Winneba Ideological Institute, was created to promote socialism and pan-Africanism within Ghana and to support the liberation of Africa from European colonialism. Africans from across the continent were brought to the center to receive both ideological and military training. In practice, however, Ghana trained insurgents to fight not only against European colonialism, but also against Nkrumah's regional foes, who rejected his ideas of pan-Africanism and were unwilling to relinquish their nation's sovereignty to a United States of Africa, which the Ghanaian aspired to create and lead.

In sponsoring subversive activities against his conservative neighbors in Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Togo, Nkrumah made many enemies for himself in West Africa. Czechoslovakia's relations with those states were also damaged because of its guilt by association, for funding Nkrumah's activities. In Togo, for example, Prague had established both diplomatic and economic relations in 1960, and Togolese students were given scholarships to study in Czechoslovakia. The expanding relationship between the two countries would, however, be reversed after an assassination attempt against Togolese Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio in May 1961. Olympio's would-be assassin used a Czechoslovak pistol and had allegedly received training in Ghana. In the next year and a half, relations between Ghana and Togo reached a boiling point, and there were several assassination attempts made against both Olympio and Nkrumah.

More Togolese insurgents armed with Czechoslovak weapons would be arrested, and finally, in January 1963, relations between Czechoslovakia and Togo became so strained that Prague closed its embassy in Lomé. In May 1963, Olympio was assassinated in the first coup d'état to occur in post-independence Africa (he died just outside the gate of the US embassy in Lomé). Much popular opinion in Africa blamed Nkrumah, but Ghana and Czechoslovakia both blamed French neo-imperialist interests. As a result of this chain of events, Czechoslovakia's relations with Togo became practically nonexistent. By the end of 1963, no more Togolese students studied in the ČSSR, and Czechoslovakia's exports to Togo shrank to the point of becoming the fewest of any country in the Soviet bloc.[76]

In the mid-1960s, Czechoslovakia also agreed to cooperate with Ghana in the field of arms and ammunition production. In March 1963, an agreement was signed in Accra in which Czechoslovakia agreed to build in Ghana a factory that would have the capacity to produce 18 million rounds of ammunition per year. The following year, Nkrumah requested that Czechoslovakia build a plant to produce small arms in Ghana. An agreement was reached in which Prague agreed to build a factory that could produce 10,000 weapons per year. However, Nkrumah would be overthrown in February 1966, before the project was completed.[77] After being ousted from power in Ghana, Nkrumah went into exile in Guinea, which precipitated another Czechoslovak arms shipment in support of his exile movement. In April 1966, Prague sent 200 rifles, 100 pistols, and 20 machine guns, along with ammunition and military medical supplies, to Conakry for the deposed Ghanaian leader's use.[78]

Military Aid to African National Liberation Movements

While states in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa were getting their independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were a few colonies in which the white minority governments held out against the "Wind of Change" that brought decolonization to the continent. Portugal would be the last European colonial power to preserve its rule in Africa. Lisbon's right-wing dictatorship maintained brutal control of its overseas provinces and resisted all attempts for African self-determination. Under the slogan, "*Angola e nossa. Angola e Portugal*" ("Angola is ours. Angola is Portugal.") the Portuguese vowed to never grant independence to their African colonies, which they considered to be part of Portugal proper. Elsewhere, large white settler communities in Rhodesia and South Africa also refused to accede political power to African nationalists. As a result, national liberation movements were created in each colony to fight against white minority rule. The African nationalists turned to the newly independent African countries and both Cold War blocs for support for

their cause. While the West was generally unsupportive and stood by their European colonial allies, the Soviet bloc—and Czechoslovakia, in particular—answered this call by providing substantial military and material support to the major liberation movement of each colony. Providing military aid to national liberation movements not only created positive goodwill in independent African states that almost uniformly opposed European colonialism, it was also an investment designed to gain influence with the possible future leaders of the colonies.

Throughout the 1960s, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which fought against Portuguese colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau, was the national liberation movement most consistently supported by Prague. PAIGC became Czechoslovakia's favored liberation movement for five reasons. First was the leadership of Amílcar Cabral. With a charismatic personality, immense intelligence, and a Marxist mindset, Cabral was a well-respected leader throughout Africa, and Moscow and Prague viewed him as an ideologically compatible ally. Second, the fact that the Soviet Union, Cuba, and communist China all enthusiastically supported PAIGC served to reinforce Czechoslovakia's backing for the movement. Third, Guinea-Bissau's location, north-west of Guinea-Conakry, made it logistically easy for Czechoslovakia, with the willing support of Sékou Touré's regime, to supply aid across the porous border. Fourth, from a military perspective, PAIGC was one of Africa's most effective liberation movements and was able to control a vast swath of territory in Portuguese Guinea. Finally, Cabral served as an agent for the Czechoslovak StB and provided Prague with a lot of valuable intelligence information.

The first contact between Czechoslovakia and PAIGC occurred in the fall of 1960 when Miroslav Alter, an StB agent based in Conakry, began regular meetings with Cabral.[79] A few months later, in March 1961, the first formal contact was made when Cabral and Aristides Maria Pereira visited Prague for meetings with the upper echelon of the Czechoslovak leadership. Cabral made a "very good impression" on Czechoslovak representatives who, after consultations with Moscow, agreed to supply PAIGC with light infantry weapons for 500 men, explosives and igniter components, a motorcycle, training for PAIGC soldiers in Czechoslovakia, a monthly stipend of 2,500 Kčs for PAIGC's office in Conakry, and equipment to facilitate radio communication between the movement's headquarters in Conakry and its operatives in Portuguese Guinea.[80] In December 1961, this initial consignment of weapons for PAICG arrived in Conakry—becoming the first weapons that the movement had obtained from a foreign source—and consisted of 1,561 pistols, 600 rifles, 30 light machine guns, 25 heavy machine guns, 2,000 hand grenades, 1,500 kg of explosives, 25 pairs of binoculars, and a Jawa motorcycle.[81]

In October 1963, Cabral, accompanied by his brother Luis, again visited Prague, requested additional aid, and asked that a Czechoslovak military advisor be sent to join PAIGC in battle. The politburo of the KSČ agreed to meet Cabral's needs "due to the fact that it [PAIGC] is a serious movement, which reaches concrete achievements in the fight against colonialism and due to good relations between PAIGC and Czechoslovakia."[82] In mid-1964, Prague sent the PAIGC 60 light machine guns, 25 heavy machine guns, 250 semi-automatic rifles, 3,000 hand grenades, 300 anti-tank land mines, 300 anti-personnel land mines, 200 shrapnel mines, 15 82mm mortars, 30 P-27 bazookas, 1,000 shells for the bazookas, 500 kg of explosives, and ammunition for all of the weapons. As requested by Cabral, a Czechoslovak expert in guerrilla combat and explosives joined PAIGC troops in Portuguese Guinea.[83] Czechoslovakia sent similar-sized weapons shipments to PAIGC in both 1965 and 1966, along with medicine, consumer goods, and school supplies for distribution in the PAIGC-controlled areas of Portuguese Guinea.[84] The closeness of the PAIGC- KSČ relationship led Cabral to publically thank the ČSSR for its "moral-political and material help" and to label the Czechoslovak people "loyal friends to our people and to all oppressed nations."[85] But the affinity Cabral had for Czechoslovakia went even further, as the African revolutionary adopted the distinctive Czech *zmijovka* hat as his signature look, popularizing it in West Africa in the process.[86]

Finally, it should be noted that Amílcar Cabral had a close relationship with the Czechoslovak StB in Conakry, serving as a clandestine intelligence asset for Czechoslovakia from 1961 until his assassination in 1973. Operating under the codename "Secretary" [*Sekretář*], Cabral held at least 73 meetings with his StB handlers, providing intelligence not only on the situation in Portuguese Guinea, but also about other African leaders and nationalist movements (including the Touré regime in Guinea-Conakry) as well as on the Non-Aligned Nations summit meeting in Belgrade.[87] Because of this relationship, Prague viewed Cabral as one of, if not their most, important ally in Africa, which in part explains the extensive amount of military aid that Czechoslovakia provided to PAIGC. Czechoslovakia's aid to the PAIGC was given without prior consultation with Moscow and occurred about four years before the Soviet Union began sending military aid to the movement.[88]

In the early 1960s, there were two primary liberation movements in Angola, the *Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola* (National Front for the Liberation of Angola or FNLA), which received aid from the United States during the Kennedy administration, and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPLA), which was the preferred Angolan movement of the Soviet bloc countries. Founded by Angolan exiles in December 1956, the

MPLA's first contact with the Czechoslovak government came in early 1961, when two MPLA representatives visited Prague from January 19–29 and again on February 7. The MPLA delegation made a good impression on their Czechoslovak interlocutors, who reported that they had a good understanding of Marxism-Leninism, appreciated the threat of Western neo-imperialism, and were interested in learning from Czechoslovakia's experience of building a socialist society.[89]

In February 1961, open rebellion broke out against Portuguese colonial rule in Angola. Lisbon blamed "Communist agitators" for instigating the attacks and alleged that the rebels were armed with Czechoslovak weapons.[90] In April, the matter came to the attention of the world with a United Nations resolution—put forward by African states and supported by the Soviet bloc—that called for Angolan self-determination. Ultimately, the resolution was defeated by Portugal's European allies. It was at this time that the KSČ politburo voted to initiate support for the MPLA. Czechoslovakia's initial aid to the MPLA consisted of a monthly stipend of 3,000 Kčs to support the operation of the MPLA's office in Conakry, 20 scholarships for Angolans to study at Czechoslovak universities, and training for MPLA cadres in the fields of security, military training, party propaganda, and foreign affairs. The KSČ leadership also decided "to inform the general [Czechoslovak] public through press, radio and television of the development of the national liberation movement in Angola and to allow publishing activity of the MPLA in Czechoslovakia."[91] As a result, in 1962, a brochure on the situation in Portugal's overseas territories was published in the Czech language.[92]

Military training for the MPLA began in November 1961 and was the first time that training for African liberation fighters had taken place in Czechoslovakia. The initial class was very small, consisting of only three MPLA cadres, and conducted in secrecy so as to not cause problems in Prague's bilateral relations with Portugal. The Angolans received guerrilla combat training and communist indoctrination in the course of their stay in Czechoslovakia.[93] Czechoslovakia was unable to supply weapons to the MPLA because the organization did not have a way to transport them from its exile headquarters in Guinea to the Angolan battlefront. The MPLA would move its headquarters to Leopoldville in mid-1962, but this did little to rectify the situation because the Congolese government supported the FNLA and prevented the Soviet bloc from shipping weapons to the MPLA. Prague did, however, assist the MPLA in other material ways. For example, after Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA, escaped from house arrest in Portugal and fled to Morocco, Czechoslovakia provided him a plane ticket to Conakry and then Leopoldville.[94]

Nonetheless, Czechoslovakia's support for the MPLA became increasingly lukewarm. Czechoslovak diplomats pushed Neto to expand the

MPLA's support base outside of the communist world and even agreed to postpone his planned visit to Prague so as to not jeopardize the MPLA's attempts to solicit support from the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. After African heads of state meeting at the founding gathering of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) voted to recognize the FNLA's Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (*Govêrno revolucionário de Angola no exílio* or GRAE) as the sole legitimate government of Angola, the Congolese government banned MPLA activities in Congo-Leopoldville in November 1963, forcing the movement to relocate its headquarters across the river in Congo-Brazzaville.

With the FNLA now enjoying nearly exclusive support from African governments, and with many MPLA followers deserting to the FNLA side—including the head of the MPLA's department of war, Armindo Freitas, who had been one of the three Angolans to receive military training in Czechoslovakia—Prague began to consider switching its allegiance from the MPLA to the FNLA. For its part, FNLA representatives began contacting Czechoslovak diplomats in Leopoldville with complaints that the Western powers were providing inadequate material to their movement and had aided Portugal by squashing the UN resolutions calling for Lisbon to grant Angola its self-determination.[95] During Kenya's independence ceremonies in December 1963, FNLA leader Holden Roberto told the Czechoslovak delegation that the support his movement had been receiving from both the West and other African states was insufficient. Roberto asked the Czechoslovak diplomats to transmit to Prague his official request for Czechoslovak weapons and training for his troops in the ČSSR.[96] The next month, the GRAE's foreign minister, Jonas Savimbi, met with the Czechoslovak ambassador to Egypt to again solicit military aid from Prague. Savimbi explained that the FNLA was turning to Czechoslovakia because unlike the West, it was serious in supporting African national liberation movements fight against colonialism.[97]

The KSČ leadership was cautious about initiating a relationship with Roberto and the FNLA. On the one hand, his movement had received backing from most independent African states, including pledges of military aid from Egypt, Algeria, and Ghana. On the other hand, while the FNLA had sought to initiate relations with Czechoslovakia and communist China, it was not contemplating breaking relations with its Western patrons and the Soviet Union remained firmly committed to the MPLA. The KSČ International Department determined that since the GRAE had the support of most African states, Czechoslovakia must consider doing the same.[98] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs opined: "The Soviet Union strongly supports the MPLA, represented by Dr. Agostinho Neto. That does not prevent us from maintaining contacts with the movement of Holden Roberto, GRAE."[99] It was decided to maintain contact with

the FNLA, but not to provide it with material support at this juncture. Financial assistance to the MPLA was also temporarily stopped until Prague could get a better feel for which movement to back. In the meantime, it worked to convince the FNLA to accept MPLA officials into leadership positions in the GRAE and sent aid to support Angolan refugees to the government of Congo-Leopoldville, rather than directly to either of Angola's competing nationalist movements.[100]

At the same time, Prague ignored an OAU resolution calling for all states to sever relations with Portugal as a means of pressuring Lisbon to grant independence to its African colonies. In August 1965, a member of the MPLA leadership visited the Czechoslovak embassy in Cairo seeking support from Prague to pressure Western, African, and Asian countries to cut their ties with Portugal. The Czechoslovak response was that while it would continue to provide the MPLA material support, as well as political backing in venues such as the United Nations, "business relations between Czechoslovakia and Portugal are growing and will continue."[101] Czechoslovakia considered Portugal an important export market for its consumer goods and was not willing to lose income from trade with Portugal to show solidarity with the MPLA.

In September 1964, Neto visited Prague, seeking the restoration of Czechoslovakia's aid to the MPLA. By this time, Prague had already lost confidence in the FNLA, due to its unwillingness to engage the Portuguese in combat, a split in the party which led to Savimbi forming his own national liberation movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* or UNITA), and Roberto's failures as a leader. After consultation with the Soviet Union, Algeria, and Ghana, in January 1965, Prague decided to restore financial support for the MPLA and end its relationship with the FNLA.[102]

With relations restored, Czechoslovakia sent clothes, shoes, medicine, and guerrilla combat manuals to MPLA soldiers through Brazzaville. A small number of MPLA combatants, including Henrique "Commandante Iko" Teles Carreira, who later became independent Angola's first minister of defense, received military and intelligence training in Czechoslovakia. But under an agreement with Moscow, Czechoslovakia would not provide weapons to the MPLA because the Soviets wanted to control the flow of weapons themselves.[103]

To the east of Angola sat the British-controlled Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Prague placed significant strategic interest in Rhodesia because of its natural resources (especially copper), its geographic location, from which aid could be sent to the national liberation movements in neighboring Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa, and the prospects of expanded trade, which already exceeded 60 million Kčs by the

early 1960s.[104] While Czechoslovakia opened a trade office in Salisbury and sought to increase economic relations with Rhodesia's white minority government, it also supported national liberation movements in both Northern Rhodesia (modern day Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe). As such, Prague partially justified its diplomatic post in Salisbury as a way to improve its intelligence capabilities in the region and maintain contact with the national liberation movements.

Czechoslovakia's first contact with the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the national liberation movement of Northern Rhodesia, took place in December 1960 when UNIP leader Simon Kapwepwe initiated contact with the Czechoslovak embassy in Cairo. Its initial interactions with the Southern Rhodesian liberation movement, the National Democratic Party (NDP) occurred around the same time in both London and Cairo.[105] Prague would be the first destination in the communist world that representatives of both organizations visited. In April 1961, NDP representatives Morton Malianga and Jason Moyo visited Prague and received aid in the form of a camera, tape recorder, transistor radios, typewriters, a box of jewelry (which was intended to be sold for cash), and 2,000 anti-colonial brochures that had been printed in Czechoslovakia at the behest of the NDP.[106] After failed negotiations at the Northern Rhodesian constitutional conference in London, several UNIP delegations visited Prague in 1961 and discussed the possibility of Czechoslovak support for an armed uprising against Rhodesia's white-minority government. In response, the MVZ authorized providing the liberation movements of Northern and Southern Rhodesia 1.1 million Kčs in aid, of which 1 million Kčs would fund a one-year training course for Rhodesian liberation fighters in Czechoslovakia.[107]

Relations between Czechoslovakia and the UNIP would intensify after Zambia's independence in October 1964. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were quickly established, and Prague opened an embassy in Lusaka in mid-1965. Moscow realized the special relationship that Czechoslovakia had with the Rhodesian liberation movements—not only had both movements approached Czechoslovakia before any other communist country, but Prague was also the only capital in the Soviet bloc to which Zambia sent a trade delegation upon its independence—and encouraged its junior ally to continue to strengthen these relationships.[108]

Czechoslovakia's advantageous position in Zambia was based on the fact that Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda wished to remain neutral in the Cold War.[109] Kaunda proclaimed that Zambia "shall not have Moscow and Washington or London and Peking, fighting in Lusaka."[110] As a result, Kaunda preferred relations with smaller countries such as Czechoslovakia and Israel. In early 1966, in response to Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral

Declaration of Independence (UDI), Lusaka turned to Prague with a request for military aid.[111] Despite British attempts to prevent a military relationship between Czechoslovakia and Zambia, the two governments reached an agreement in which Czechoslovakia trained Zambian military officers in the ČSSR and helped arm and train the UNIP Youth Wing as a civilian militia that would be activated in the event of a foreign invasion of Zambia.[112] The HTS also entered into negotiations with Kaunda's government to build explosives and weapons factories in Zambia, but it is not clear from available documentation whether such plants were ever built.[113] Finally, from the mid-1960s onwards, Zambia served as a logistical hub from which Czechoslovakia and the rest of the Soviet bloc was able to transmit aid to the neighboring liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique.

Meanwhile, in Southern Rhodesia, the NDP, which had been renamed the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) split into two competing movements in 1963—ZAPU, which continued to be led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which was headed by Ndabaningi Sithole. Initially, Czechoslovakia opted to maintain contact with both movements, but by early 1965 threw its support exclusively to ZAPU because it felt that ZANU was favored by the United States and lacked the ability to organize an effective national liberation struggle in Rhodesia.[114] During 1964–65, various ZAPU representatives requested weapons from Czechoslovakia. Prague agreed to supply weapons in principal, so long as either Tanzania or Zambia consented to serve as transit countries for Czechoslovak weapon shipments, but it was confused by ZAPU's inconsistent appeals, and was not sure whether or not Dar es Salaam or Lusaka had agreed to serve as a conduit. The amount of arms requested by various ZAPU representatives fluctuated greatly, from ZAPU Vice Chairman James Chikerema requesting 100 weapons in May 1965 to ZAPU General Secretary George Nyandoro seeking 20,000 weapons.[115] And despite ZAPU's claims to the contrary, Czechoslovak diplomats in Dar es Salaam learned that neither Tanzania nor Zambia had agreed to allow Czechoslovak weapons to transit through their territory.[116] The situation would change as a result of Southern Rhodesia's UDI, which was harshly condemned by Czechoslovakia as well as by Tanzania and Zambia, and it made all three states more inclined to provide ZAPU with military assistance. On October 26, 1965 (two weeks before the formal announcement of UDI), the KSČ politburo voted to provide ZAPU with 500 rifles, 320 machine guns, 200 pistols, 1,000 grenades, a ton of TNT, and ammunition, detonators and incendiary cord.[117] Czechoslovakia would continue to provide diplomatic and limited military support for ZAPU up through Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Prague's decision to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with the government of South Africa caused it to keep its contacts with South Africa's leading national liberation movements, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African National Congress (ANC), to a minimum and out of the public view during the first third of the 1960s. When, for example, a seven-person ANC delegation visited Prague in May 1962, the KSČ politburo adopted a resolution that ordered that the visit "be strictly kept from the Czechoslovak and foreign public."[118] Similarly, two ANC combatants of Indian origin who received military training in Czechoslovakia beginning in February 1963 were given fake Tanzanian passports in an effort to keep their true nationality a secret.[119]

However, immediately after the closing of the Czechoslovak consulate in Johannesburg in July 1963, the politburo began considering the types of military aid that it could provide *Umkhonto we Sizwe* ("Spear of the Nation"), the military organization co-founded by the ANC and SACP. Czechoslovak authorities opened discussions with ANC agents in both London and Moscow in order to ascertain the type of support that Prague could lend their movement. ANC representatives requested machine guns, pistols, rifles, three tons of plastic explosives with detonators, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles, telescopes, radios, and military training for 10–15 South Africans.[120] The ANC representatives suggested that the explosives be smuggled into South Africa, hidden inside children's toys shipped through a legitimate business in Western Europe, but Czechoslovak officials rejected this risky idea.[121] Prague agreed to meet most of the ANC's other requests, but, like the Soviet Union, gave much less military assistance to the ANC as compared to other African nationalist movements.[122]

The radical Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC) was the one national liberation movement in sub-Saharan Africa that Czechoslovakia supported militarily, vis-à-vis an independent majority-ruled African government. The UPC was founded in 1948 and led a revolt against French colonial rule in May 1955. The revolt was brutally suppressed, and the French banned the UPC, forcing its leaders to go into exile. Czechoslovakia had contact with the UPC prior to Cameroon's independence, first through its consulate in Leopoldville, Congo, and later through its embassy in Cairo, Egypt. In early 1959, the UPC moved its headquarters from Cairo to Conakry, where it continued to maintain close contact with the Czechoslovak embassy in Guinea. In addition to these connections, the UPC's leader, Félix Moumié, visited Prague in October 1958 and December 1959. During his 1959 visit, Moumié criticized the lack of support his organization had received from the Soviet Union and was promised by Czechoslovak authorities that Prague would send weapons to Guinea as a gift for the UPC.[123]

Partly in response to the UPC-led uprising, France sped up the process of decolonization to grant Cameroon its independence on January 1, 1960, under the rule of a moderate pro-French president, Ahmadou Ahidjo. Although Cameroon was now independent, the UPC considered Ahidjo a French puppet and continued its rebellion. Czechoslovakia recognized the new state, sent a delegation to Cameroon's independence ceremonies, and sought to establish diplomatic relations with the Ahidjo regime. Ahidjo, however, was evasive about committing to diplomatic relations, and instead criticized the fact that the UPC "terrorists" were armed with Czechoslovak weapons.[124] In March, Ahidjo labeled Czechoslovakia as the UPC's primary foreign backer in a public speech.[125] The following fall, in a meeting at the United Nations, Cameroonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles Okala chastised Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Vaclav David over the fact that the UPC was receiving financial support from Prague and using Czechoslovak arms in an attempt to overthrow his government. David disingenuously denied the accusation that Czechoslovakia was assisting the UPC and suggested that the Czechoslovak-made weapons used by the UPC had likely reached Cameroon via the government in Guinea-Conakry.[126]

Paris actively supported the Ahidjo regime against the UPC by keeping its military forces in the country until 1964 and assassinating Moumié by poisoning him with thallium in Geneva in October 1960.[127] Following his death, UPC representatives visited the Czechoslovak embassy in Conakry in February 1961 to request an increase in military aid. In August, the KSČ politburo voted to supply the UPC with over 2,000 weapons and corresponding ammunition at no cost.[128] Yet by the end of 1962—with Prague growing disenchanted with supporting radical African states, the UPC losing many of its international allies, including Guinea, Ghana, and the Soviet Union, the Ahidjo regime finally showing a willingness to normalize relations with the ČSSR, and a UPC representative having been caught embezzling money from the Czechoslovak StB—it drastically reduced its support for the Cameroonian opposition movement. In November 1962, the politburo passed a resolution to approach future involvement with the UPC with "extreme caution" and limit involvement to only minimal financial assistance.[129] Nonetheless, the Cameroonian government remained wary of relations with Czechoslovakia, and formal diplomatic relations would not be established until 1990.

Military Aid to Conservative African States

In 1963, in the midst of a severe economic recession and growing disenchantment about its relationships with the radical states (discussed in chapter 5), Czechoslovakia reoriented its approach to supplying military

assistance to Africa. Prague drastically reduced its uneconomical practice of providing arms to friendly states as gifts or under arrangements for the recipient to pay in the future. Instead, it began looking for commercial partners who were willing (and perhaps more importantly, able) to purchase Czechoslovak weapons up front, in cash, in order to provide Czechoslovakia with badly needed foreign exchange. As a result of this policy change, Prague's military ties with Guinea, Ghana, and Mali were reduced, while new relationships with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Morocco were initiated.

Upon independence in December 1963, Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta announced that his government wanted all British troops to depart the country by December 1964. Building upon the relationship that Vice President Oginga Odinga had formed with Czechoslovakia prior to independence, Prague was asked to assist in the task of reorientating the Kenyan Army, which KANU party leaders felt had been brainwashed by previous British training. Shortly before independence, Kenyan authorities concluded an agreement for the Czechoslovak government to train a new officer corps and security apparatus personnel that would replace the British expatriates. Under the agreement, the ČSSR agreed to pay the transportation and tuition costs for Kenya to send to Czechoslovakia 20 of its Army officers for a one year course and 30 of its security personnel for six months of training.[130] In the end 21 Kenyan Army officers studied in the ČSSR: 9 received infantry training, 6 focused on tank combat, and the other 6 were enrolled in an artillery course. Even prior to this arrangement, the previous summer, an agreement had been brokered by the Egyptian government for 6 Kenyans from KANU's office in Cairo to receive military training for a year at the Antonín Zápotocký Military Academy of Technology.[131]

The Kenyan government also requested from Czechoslovakia modern military armament to outfit a 1,000 man army. The Kenyan defense minister, Njoroge Mungai, led a delegation to Prague to review a demonstration of Czechoslovak weapons which included machine guns, aircraft, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and mortars. As a result of this visit, Czechoslovakia sold to Kenya 500 pistols with 50,000 rounds of ammunition and 500 submachine guns with 100,000 rounds of ammunition. Later in the year, Czechoslovakia sold the Kenyan security forces a fully equipped darkroom, surveillance cameras, and 50 pistols with ammunition, while 20 submachine guns were delivered to Odinga's personal security detail.[132]

A similar situation occurred in neighboring Uganda, where the government of Milton Obote was also seeking to reduce the influence of British and Israeli instructors within its military. The first Ugandan inquiry about the possibility of receiving Czechoslovak military training

and weapons appears to have been in March 1964. Prague responded favorably to the request, and within months, the first ten Ugandan officers arrived in Czechoslovakia for a six-month training course.[133] Despite viewing Uganda as pro-Western, Prague would develop an extensive military relationship with Kampala on a commercial, rather than ideological, basis, becoming Uganda's main supplier of arms from 1966–68.[134]

In April 1965, a Czechoslovak delegation went to Kampala to meet with Ugandan Defence Minister Felix Onama, and after a month of negotiations, concluded a contract in which Czechoslovakia would partner to help build Uganda's air force—the Ugandan People's Defence Force Air Wing. Under the terms of the deal, Uganda would send 10 pilots and 18 aviation mechanics to Czechoslovakia to learn how to operate, maintain and repair the Czechoslovak manufactured aircraft L-29 Delfin, while Prague would send 12 aviation experts to serve directly in Uganda. By the fall of 1967, 9 Ugandan pilots had successfully completed training in aerial navigation, aerial reconnaissance, aerial shooting, artillery fire, and bombing, and Czechoslovakia delivered to Uganda 3 L-29s in exchange for about 8.8 million Kčs in foreign exchange. Unfortunately, the potential financial profit from such transactions was hampered by the fact that the Soviet Union agreed to supply Uganda with Czechoslovak-made anti-aircraft systems and MiG fighter jets as gifts, while constructing a military airport at Gulu through a long-term loan.[135] As is to be expected, when possible, the Ugandans preferred to build their aviation infrastructure through Soviet gifts, as opposed to Czechoslovak commercial transactions.

Czechoslovakia also sold additional miscellaneous military equipment to Uganda, the most famous of which was 12 OT-64 SKOT amphibious armored personnel carriers. In 1968, Uganda became the first country outside of the Soviet bloc to obtain them. They quickly became a favorite of Ugandan Army General Idi Amin, who was known to travel in them as often as possible. Interestingly, Uganda would partially pay for its 1968 order of OT-64s, missiles, ammunition, and spare parts for the L-29s by preparing the largest transport of captured animals in the country's history. Czechoslovakia would use the exotic animals for both its zoos and scientific research.[136]

Like its two East African neighbors, Tanzania also took advantage of Czechoslovakia's new mindset on military exports and entered into an arms agreement with Prague. In October 1964, Czechoslovakia agreed to sell Tanzania 360 heavy machine guns and 30 light machine guns as a "first step towards closer cooperation."[137] At that time, 5 Tanzanian counterintelligence agents came to Czechoslovakia for a 6-month training course and were given a pistol upon the completion of their studies. In 1965, an additional 15 Tanzanians completed the course and were

likewise given pistols with ammunition as graduation presents. As a gift to the Tanzanian state, Czechoslovakia also provided 12 pistols, a hunting rifle, ammunition, and surveillance cameras, which were earmarked for the "female police of Tanzania."[138]

Besides the potential for commercial profit, Czechoslovakia had additional ulterior motives to initiating a military relationship with Tanzania. The first was to offset the growing influence of communist China and West Germany within the country. Beijing had a close relationship with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party, which had overthrown the sultan of Zanzibar in January 1964 and unified the island with mainland Tanganyika to form Tanzania. Following unification, the United States, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain and other outside powers became anxious over the level of influence that communist China might develop over the country. Similarly, Czechoslovak analysts watched with consternation as West Germany sought to increase its influence in the former German colony, fearing that Bonn would turn it into a "scarecrow of West German imperialism."[139] Prague viewed its military relationship with Dar es Salaam as a way to potentially "paralyze the dangerous Chinese [and West German] growing influence."[140]

Dar es Salaam was also home to the exile headquarters for several African national liberation movements from Angola, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Mozambique. Establishing a military relationship with Tanzania therefore provided Czechoslovakia the logistical opportunity and political cover necessary to send material and military assistance to the MPLA, ZAPU, and ANC. It also allowed Prague to establish for the first time relations with the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Mozambique Liberation Front or FRELIMO). In October 1964, FRELIMO's president, Eduardo Mondlane, visited Prague to discuss the possibility of his organization receiving military aid from Czechoslovakia. A follow-up meeting took place in Dar es Salaam the following month. In June 1965, Prague decided to provide FRELIMO with one million Kčs in military aid, and1,100 machine guns, 200 pistols, 1,000 hand grenades, a ton of explosives, ammunition, and Czechoslovak military advisors were sent to FRELIMO via Tanzania.[141] The KSČ approved this aid, despite Soviet concerns that Mondlane was pro-American (he had lived in the United States for 12 years where he taught history and sociology at Syracuse University and had married an American), partially because Mondlane had stroked the egos of the KSČ party leadership by publicly referring to Czechoslovakia as a "military giant."[142]

After Algerian President Ben Bella was ousted in a military coup d'état in June 1965, relations between Prague and Algiers soured and Czechoslovakia reconsidered its previous policy of refraining from selling Morocco weapons that it had followed since the 1963 Sand War border

dispute between Algeria and Morocco. In May 1967, the Moroccan minister of defense approached Czechoslovak authorities with a request to purchase 100 T-54 tanks (with corresponding spare parts and ammunition), six 85 mm anti-aircraft systems with radar and spare parts, and 30 fully equipped artillery batteries.[143] The following month, the KSČ's politburo voted to sell Rabat the requested items for the amount of $18 million (roughly 129 million Kčs), with $12 million to be paid upfront, and the remaining $6 million to be paid with 4 percent interest in 7 annual installments from 1968 to 1974.[144] In September, this agreement was expanded to $22.4 million as Czechoslovakia agreed to sell Morocco an additional 29 T-54 tanks. However, Prague denied Rabat's request for the tanks to be equipped with high tech night vision firing capability because Moscow opposed proliferating this technology outside of the Soviet bloc.[145] Along with the sale of weapons, Czechoslovakia agreed to provide Morocco with extensive technical assistance and military training. From 1968–70, approximately 100 Moroccan soldiers would travel to Brno, Czechoslovakia to be trained to operate the T-54 tanks and other purchased military hardware. These arms deals significantly improved Czechoslovakia's chronic trade imbalance with Morocco.

Czechoslovakia and the Nigerian Civil War

Nigeria gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 as an artificially created nation-state with a population of over 45 million people and over 300 different ethnic groups. There were three primary ethnic groupings, each concentrated in a different region of the country. The predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani constituted about 65 percent of the population in Northern Nigeria. In contrast, the Yoruba, who made up about 75 percent of the population in the southwest, and the Igbo, who comprised about 65 percent of the population in the southeast, were largely Christian. Yorubaland was primarily Protestant and Igboland predominantly Catholic. The 1963 Nigerian census showed that Nigeria's population was 47 percent Muslim, 35 percent Christian, and 18 percent followers of traditional African beliefs.[146]

The 1963 census would indirectly pave the way for civil war in the country after its results showed a population of 23.25 million in southern Nigeria, compared to only 22.01 million in Northern Nigeria, which led southerners to demand a reapportionment of legislative seats to reflect this. Instead, Nigeria's Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Muslim from Northern Nigeria, rejected the results of the census and demanded a recount that raised the population of Northern Nigeria to 31 million—effectively allowing the region to retain its predominant

political position in the country and leading to further tensions between Nigeria's various regionally based ethnic groups.[147]

In January 1966, Balewa was overthrown by a group of junior Army officers citing alleged electoral fraud by his government. Because many northerners (including Balewa) were killed in the coup, many speculated that the real purpose of the coup was to empower the Igbo to the detriment of the Hausa-Fulani. The coup plotters themselves were quickly arrested, but the military took political control of the country with an Igbo, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, becoming president. In July, a countercoup led by northern soldiers took place and resulted in Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a northern Christian, being chosen as a compromise candidate to be the new head of state. Ethnic tensions stemming from the coup and countercoup increased, culminating in pogroms in the summer of 1966 in which thousands of Christian Igbo living in the predominantly Muslim north were killed. The ethnic violence prompted many other Igbos, fearing for their safety, to migrate to Eastern Nigeria.

As early as October 1966, the Czechoslovak embassy in Lagos reported to Prague about the possibility of Eastern Nigeria seceding from the federal government.[148] Vítězslav Wagner, the Czechoslovak ambassador, travelled to all four of Nigeria's provinces in order to get a feel for the situation on the ground.[149] During his visit to Eastern Nigeria in February 1967, Wagner met with General C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the region, for more than five hours. Ojukwu informed him that, given the situation in the country, the eastern province had no choice but to secede from the federal government. Ojukwu compared his region's forthcoming secession to Czechoslovakia gaining its independence from the Austria-Hungarian Empire, and told Wagner that after its independence, Eastern Nigeria would like to establish diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia.[150] Ojukwu sought to acquire printing presses and weapons from Czechoslovakia and hoped that the ČSSR would agree to print the banknotes for the new state, establish a press office in its capital, and construct a sugar refinery and textile and paper factories to assist in the development of its economy.[151]

Wagner reported to Prague that Ojukwu was clearly in control in the east and had the authority to speak on behalf of the region. In the ambassador's opinion, an independent Eastern Nigeria would present more favorable economic opportunities for Czechoslovakia than the current "stagnant Federation." He advised that if Prague recognized the new regime at the time of its declared independence, it would enjoy a favorable position in the new country.[152] Czechoslovak officials in Prague preferred to approach the issue with caution. Wagner was informed that he should not discus Czechoslovakia's position on the prospect of secession until after a formal declaration of independence was declared and Prague had

consulted with Moscow. In the event that secession took place, Prague agreed in principal to supply arms to Eastern Nigeria, so long as the transaction occurred through a third-party intermediary in order to provide the ČSSR with political cover.[153]

Ojukwu was aware of Czechoslovakia's position as the foremost supplier of arms to the Third World and likely believed that Prague's support could potentially be a decisive factor in the success or failure of Eastern Nigeria's secession. As a result, at least three delegations from Biafra (as Eastern Nigeria would rename itself) visited Prague between April–June 1967. During these meetings (one of which the Igbo author Chinua Achebe participated in via telephone from London), Biafran representatives sought Czechoslovakia's political recognition and support, military aid, and telephone and telegraph assistance to allow Biafra to communicate with the outside world independent of the infrastructure of the Nigerian government.[154] At the same time, the Nigerian federal government initiated its own diplomatic offensive when Gowon sent a letter to Antonín Novotný informing the Czechoslovak president that his government would consider any foreign state's diplomatic recognition of Biafra to be an unfriendly act of interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria.[155] Czechoslovakia was sympathetic to the Biafran cause, but remained hesitant to support the nascent nation out of fear of retribution from the Nigerian federal government.

When Biafra announced its secession from Nigeria on May 30, 1967, and civil war broke out in July, Prague had still not decided upon its position toward the Nigerian Civil War (also known as the Nigerian-Biafran War). In July, after both Washington and London refused to sell Lagos the weapons it felt it needed to quell the rebellion, Moscow agreed to sell the federal government of Nigeria weapons.[156] In August, a Dutch arms leader, Animo A. G., approached the Czechoslovak government about purchasing weapons for the Gowon regime. Requested were mortars, bazookas, bombs, missiles, and six L-29 Delfin aircrafts, along with Czechoslovak aviation experts to train Nigerian pilots on the L-29s. Czechoslovak officials worried that the Dutch company might divert some of the Czechoslovak weapons to Biafra, which would result in criticism that Prague was selling weapons to both sides in the conflict and encouraging a civil war in Nigeria.[157] Nonetheless, Czechoslovakia eventually approved the deal and became the first state to provide the Nigerian federal government with weapons after the start of the Biafran succession, sending eight L-29s, 2,670 bombs, 2,600 rockets, and a few hundred crates of AK-47 automatic rifles to Gowon's government through Omnipol via the Dutch intermediary.[158]

For Prague, this was a strictly commercial transaction, as it still leaned toward supporting Biafra politically. In internal position papers, the

federal Nigerian government was referred to as "feudal and Muslim," while Biafra was characterized as "relatively more progressive."[159] More significantly, during a meeting in Moscow in August, Czechoslovak officials tried to convince their Soviet colleagues to support Biafra. After an official from the African department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified a representative from the Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow that the Soviet Union had also agreed to a one-time delivery of military equipment to the Nigerian government, the Czechoslovak diplomat suggested that the Soviet bloc instead support Biafra, noting that none of the states that had recognized the new state had suffered consequences. This idea was rejected by the Soviets, who justified their support of Gowon's government by noting that Nigeria's labor unions, as well as the communist Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria, favored preserving Nigeria's territorial unity and supported the Soviet arms deal with Lagos.[160] In the end, Biafra was only recognized by the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Tanzania, Zambia, and Haiti, although it also received support (without formal diplomatic recognition) from France, China, Portugal, Israel, Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Vatican. The federal government of Nigeria, meanwhile, was supported by the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, Algeria, Chad, Niger, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and the Soviet Union. Prague, albeit somewhat reluctantly, followed Moscow's lead in supporting the Gowon government.

Czechoslovakia's enthusiasm for supporting Lagos increased in August after the Biafran Air Force attacked the federal government's airbase in Kaduna, during which a West German adviser was killed. Ironically, the attack was conducted by a lone B-26 bomber piloted by an elderly Czech mercenary named Jean Zumbach, who went by the nickname "Kamikaze Braun" and had served in the British Royal Air Force during World War II.[161] The following day, the rest of the West German advisers left Nigeria, and Czechoslovakia, seeing an opportunity to increase its influence over the Nigerian Air Force and the federal government more broadly, quickly sent 18 aviation advisers to fill the void. About a week after the Kaduna raid, the Nigerian Air Force received its first two L-29s, which were flown directly from Czechoslovakia to Nigeria (the other six aircraft were dismantled and sent to Nigeria via sea transport). The Czechoslovak L-29s were originally intended to serve primarily as training aircraft for inexperienced Nigerian pilots until they were ready to move up to flying Soviet MiG fighter planes. However, because Biafra's rag-tag air force consisted of only four planes (two of which were transport planes hijacked from Nigerian Airways and Ghana Airways), the L-29s were able to operate inside Biafra with impunity, and were used extensively by the Nigerian Air Force to bomb the secessionist province.[162]

Soon, the Nigerian Civil War led to unexpected bad press for the Czechoslovak government, when rumors of Prague's arms deal with the

Nigerian government reached Biafra's supporters. Czechoslovakia was harshly criticized in Eastern Nigeria for its perceived duplicity. For example, on August 12, 1967, the prominent Nigerian author Wole Soyinka came to the Czechoslovak embassy in Lagos to denounce Prague's arms deal with the Gowon regime.[163] The situation worsened after the Nigerian government began using the Czechoslovak L-29s to bomb urban centers in Eastern Nigeria, which resulted in the death of thousands of Biafran civilians. According to the memoirs of one survivor, "Markets, schools, churches, hospitals, refugee camps—wherever the pilots could discern any large concentration of people—were the target for the Federal military aircraft."[164] During a demonstration in Enugu to protest such bombings women and children carried banners asking, "Czechoslovak comrades, why do you want to kill our children?" Biafran radio accused both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union of betraying the Biafran revolution and the principle of Marxist-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.[165] Soon, such accusations reached the international press which condemned Czechoslovakia for providing arms to both sides of the conflict.[166] When Ambassador Wagner met with Gowon to voice concern over how Czechoslovak planes were being used by his air force against Biafra, the Nigerian head of state brushed aside the complaint, instead accusing Prague of supplying weapons to the Biafran rebels.[167]

After Alexander Dubček replaced Antonín Novotný as general secretary of the KSČ in January 1968 (discussed in more detail in chapter 5), Czechoslovakia's foreign policy became increasingly pro-Biafra. The day after Dubček came to power, Radio Prague offered the Nigerian rebels moral support by characterizing the conflict as Biafra fighting for "self-determination and survival of a nation," and comparing its plight to Czechoslovakia's historical fight against Austro-Hungarian domination. A few months later, Radio Prague praised Tanzania for granting Biafra diplomatic recognition, labeling the move one of the most progressive steps ever taken by an African government.[168] Coming during the period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia at the outset of the Prague Spring, which included reduced censorship of the press, articles even appeared in Czechoslovak newspapers criticizing its government's earlier decision to supply arms to Nigeria's federal government.[169] Responding to such negative public opinion (both at home and abroad), the reformist government of Dubček announced in April 1968 that Czechoslovakia would terminate its shipment of military aid to Gowon's government.[170]

In May, Omnipol strongly lobbied for permission to sell four more L-29s to Nigeria "for training purposes only"—suggesting that they could be routed through another country such as Egypt in order to avoid public scrutiny of the transaction—but this proposal was rejected by the Dubček regime.[171] Rather than continuing to supply military aid to Lagos, Czechoslovakia's new government instead sent humanitarian aid,

including food and medical supplies, to Biafra.[172] In an official statement, the Dubček government announced that the assistance had been largely donated by the public because "our young people feel we have a debt to repay for the mistaken policy of last year," when Czechoslovakia had sent military aid to the Gowon government.[173] Dubček's decision to end Czechoslovakia's supply of weapons to the Nigerian government marked one of the few instances during the Cold War when a Warsaw Pact member differed publicly with the Soviet Union's military assistance policy, and has led some scholars to speculate that it was a contributing factor to the Warsaw Pact's decision to invade Czechoslovakia in August 1968.[174]

After the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia overturned the Prague Spring reform movement, Dubček was forced to step down from power in April 1969. The process of reassessing and scaling back Czechoslovakia's arms exports to the Third World, which Dubček had initiated, was paused. Dubček's successors restored Czechoslovakia's supply of military aid to Nigeria and began referring to reports of mass murder of Biafra civilians by the Nigerian government as "propaganda" of the Ojukwu regime.[175] Yet, Soviet and Czechoslovak military support for the federal government of Nigeria failed to sway that state's Cold War orientation toward the Soviet bloc. Instead, Lagos continued to maintain pragmatic relations with both the East and the West. This was, in part, because of the fact that the Nigerian government never shook its belief that Prague had supplied weapons to Biafra despite Czechoslovakia's repeated claims to the contrary. The Czechoslovak ambassador to Nigeria, Vítězslav Wagner, for example, attempted to persuade officials at the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that because Czechoslovakia was a prominent producer of weapons, its products could naturally be found all over the world. "Like the producer of matches is not responsible for fires caused by its products, Czechoslovakia cannot be blamed for the possible existence of weapons of Czech production on the side of Biafra," Wagner argued.[176] Prague's claims that the Czechoslovak arms used by Biafra were purchased through the black market, rather than directly from Czechoslovakia, appears to be legitimate, as no documents have surfaced which would indicate that the ČSSR sold weapons directly to the rebels in Eastern Nigeria.

According to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Czechoslovakia was the world's fourth leading exporter of arms during the years 1950–61 and ranked fifth during the period from 1954–68.[177] In 1954–68, 53.5 percent of Czechoslovak military aid exported outside of the Soviet bloc was sent to Africa ($249 million out of a total of $465 million).[178] Additionally, Czechoslovakia exported to the Soviet Union more than $8.5 billion worth of arms during this period, and many of these weapons likely found their way to Africa as

well.[179] Yet these statistics fail to give a full picture of Czechoslovak arms transfers to Africa at this time, for they only capture the transfer of major conventional weapons (such as aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks, missiles, etc.) to other sovereign states (thus not including aid sent to national liberation movements), which was mostly the domain of the superpowers. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, specialized in the export of small arms and light weapons, which are not included in SIPRI's statistics because they are deemed impossible to accurately track. As Natalia Telepneva perceptively noted in her study of Soviet bloc aid to the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa: "The Czechoslovakian commitment to the movements was actually much greater than that of the Soviets, especially given the size of and financial means available to the [ČSSR]."[180] Although after 1968 Czechoslovakia's arms exports to Africa decreased dramatically and consisted of little more than aid given to the pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia in the late 1970s, from 1954–68, Czechoslovakia was a major, perhaps even the leading, exporter of small arms to Africa. When the West refused to do so, Czechoslovakia was willing to provide military assistance to countries such as Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda and increased its political influence in those countries as a result.

CHAPTER 4

Czechoslovak Aviation Assistance to Africa (1960–68)

After World War II, the airplane served to dramatically shrink the world, enabling states to expand their diplomatic relations and trade with distant countries. This was especially true for a small landlocked country like Czechoslovakia. Under the motto, "Air is our sea," Czechoslovak leaders sought to make their country a transportation center by turning Prague into an aviation hub. As one Czechoslovak diplomat put it in the early 1950s, Czechoslovakia was "a small state," which could "feed its population only through extensive trade with other countries," and that trade could only be conducted through the air.[1] The Czechoslovak government understood that it needed its own civil aviation capabilities so it would not have to be dependent on foreign airlines to transport its goods and diplomatic delegations. Prague was therefore sympathetic when, during the late 1950s, newly independent African states similarly sought their own national airlines.

For Africa, in particular, the airplane had the potential to revolutionize transportation, politics, and economics. A continent four times the size of the continental United States, Africa's formidable geographic obstacles, such as deserts, rivers, rain forests, and mountains, made it challenging and costly to build railways or a continental road system. To put this into perspective, in 1960, there was approximately 15,000 miles of railways serving Africa's nearly 12 million square miles, while in Great Britain there was over 45,000 miles of railways in only 89,000 square miles of land. Similarly, whereas Britain had 2 miles of road for every square mile of its area, in Africa, the ratio was 2 miles of road for every 200 square miles of land.[2] Furthermore, as most African railways and roads were built by the colonial powers, they were designed to connect the interior of the country with the coast in order to send raw materials back to Europe, rather than connecting African countries and capitals with each other. Besides leaving Africa with a paltry rail and road system, colonialism also left the newly independent African states with an aviation infrastructure

that was geared toward the metropoles, with nearly all air routes running north-south from Europe to Africa and back. For example, if an African wanted to travel from Nigeria to Kenya, they would have to connect in Europe, since there were no routes running from west to east across the continent.

After decolonization, the newly independent states of Africa ambitiously sought to assert their independence through the air by breaking these imperial patterns of transportation through the establishment of their own national airlines. Many African leaders believed that by creating "flag carriers" the national flags emblazoned on their aircraft would represent national technological, economic, and political prowess.[3] Historian Jeffrey Engel has argued,

> Leaders of the developing world . . . saw aircraft as potential symbols of their authority at home and their legitimacy abroad . . . aircraft brought instant respectability. It is little exaggeration to say that countries established during this period required three things before they could claim true sovereignty: an army, a flag, and an airline . . . Airpower meant independence.[4]

The United States and its European allies viewed the idea of independent African airlines as both a waste of Africa's limited financial resources and an economic challenge to their own airlines, which, in the absence of local African competition, had a monopoly over air services throughout the continent. Therefore, just as had been the case in their efforts to build national armies, African states found that the Western powers were not very interested in helping them develop their own airlines. Both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia stood ready to take advantage of Western indifference to provide the technical expertise needed to assist African states get their airlines off the ground. Civil aviation assistance, therefore, became another vitally important component of Czechoslovakia's Africa policy.

Early Czechoslovak Aviation History

Czechoslovakia had a long history in aviation, dating back to 1784, when Tadeas Hanka flew the first hot air balloon in the Czech lands, only a year after the Montgolfier brothers had performed the world's first manned flight in a balloon the previous year in France. Likewise, shortly after the Wright brothers first flight in 1903, and the first international flight (across the English Channel) by Louis Bleriot in 1909, Jan Kašpar, the earliest known Czech pilot, made his first flight in April 1910. That same year, the first Czech aviation club was formed in Plzeň.[5]

Almost immediately after its creation in 1918, Czechoslovakia became one of the world's leading aircraft manufacturers and had a significant influence on European aviation. The first mass produced aircraft of

entirely Czechoslovak design was the Letov Šm1 (1920). In 1929, Czech Technical University in Prague began offering aviation engineering curriculum, likely becoming the first institution in Central Europe to do so.[6] During the 1920s and 1930s, Czech aviation companies Letov, Aero Vodochody, Avia, Praga, Tatra, Zlin, and Benes-Mraz manufactured the entire spectrum of aircraft produced during this era, from small monoplanes to fighters, bombers, and large transport planes—and widely exported them throughout Europe. Czechoslovak pilots also dominated international aviation contests by breaking several speed records and winning multiple aerobatics competitions—including both the silver and bronze medals when airplane aerobatics was included as an event in the 1936 Olympics (had there been a team event, Czechoslovakia would have won gold, as it had three pilots finish in the top eight).

After the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939, all Czechoslovak aircraft were absorbed into the Luftwaffe, and the Czechoslovak aviation industry was diverted toward supplying the German war effort. The Nazis forced their own designs on the Czechoslovak manufacturers, but it also exposed them to the latest technologies of the time. This experience and gained knowledge were applied to the revitalized Czechoslovak aviation industry following the war. In 1948, Czechoslovakia was the only country willing to provide the nascent Israeli state with aircraft and training for Israeli pilots. Czechoslovakia sold the Israeli air force 25 Avia S-199s and 62 Spitfires (British-manufactured planes that had previously been acquired by the Czechoslovak state). According to some sources, these planes were decisive in allowing Israel to win the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. As one aviation historian put it, "If it hadn't been for Avias, there would be no Israel."[7]

Once Czechoslovakia became a communist country, its aviation industry was nationalized, and most of the smaller Czech companies were consolidated into three main companies: Aero Vodochody, Let Kunovice, and Avia. During the Stalin era, the Soviet Union discouraged Czechoslovakia from continuing its own aviation industry and persuaded the Czechoslovaks to instead build Soviet designs. As a result, Avia began producing B-228s, B-33s, and Av-14s (licensed copies of the Soviet Ilyushin Il-28, Il-10, and Il-14 respectively), while Let Kunovice built the C-11 (Czechoslovak version of the Soviet Yak-11), and Aero Vodochody produced MiG fighter jets.[8] By the early 1960s, Czechoslovakia returned to producing aircraft of its own design, and just like its previous experience with German domination of its aviation industry, Czechoslovak engineers had benefitted from becoming familiar with the technology behind Soviet planes.

The Czechoslovak aviation industry then focused its efforts into two major production areas: mid-sized commuter airliners and military fighter jet trainers—both of which it would successfully export to Africa. The

Aero 45 (and its successor the Aero 145) and the Let L-200 Morava were small "air taxis," which typically fit between 5 and 15 passengers. These aircraft required minimal maintenance and were considered to be some of the best in the world, performing in extreme climatic conditions such as deserts or tundra. As such, they found customers on every continent but Antarctica. These aircraft were particularly adept for use in Africa, where they were utilized as air ambulances or to transport government VIPs throughout the country. These aircraft were exported to Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and Tunisia.[9] Another plane Czechoslovakia widely exported to Africa was the Avia Av-14, which could be used either as a military cargo plane or as a commercial transport plane that carried between 24 and 40 passengers. The Avia Av-14 was used by Czechoslovak State Airlines (ČSA); it also was sold to both Air Guineé and Air Mali.

The quality of Czechoslovak aviation engineering would be validated in 1961, when the Aero L-29 Delfin edged out its Soviet and Polish competitors to win a design contest to become the new jet trainer for the entire Warsaw Pact. The L-29 Delfin became regarded as the best jet trainer in the world, and a total of 3,665 (1,943 by Aero Vodochody and 1,722 by Let Kunovice) were produced between 1963–74, making Czechoslovakia the world's top producer of jet trainers.[10] L-29 Delfins would be exported to Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, and later to Angola, and are still in use by the militaries of Angola, Guinea, and Mali.

Civil Aviation in the Early Cold War

The question of national air space first arose in international relations in 1870, when balloons were used for aerial reconnaissance and bombing during the Franco-Prussian War. After that war, opinion was divided as to whether airspace should be treated like the high seas, free for the use of all, or whether a nation should be able to control who used the air above its territory. State sovereignty over airspace was established in the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Air Navigation of 1919. This convention gave states the sovereign right to deny overflight rights to other states. The delegates also created the International Commission on Air Navigation (ICAN) as a forum to discuss the rules for allowing foreign aircraft to use sovereign airspace.[11]

Although Czechoslovakia signed the agreement, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union did. Soon the governments of both Czechoslovakia and the United States began to independently sign bilateral agreements with other nations. These agreements allowed US and Czechoslovak airliners to land in foreign countries to refuel or unload and

board passengers. Reciprocity in these agreements meant those nations with which Washington and Prague signed agreements could do the same.

During World War II, the immense destructive capability of airpower became abundantly clear, causing world leaders to think more seriously about the international security of aviation. After the war, delegates from 52 states met in Chicago in November and December 1944 in order to found the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations organization created to coordinate and regulate international air travel. The Convention on International Civil Aviation was signed there, establishing international rules governing airspace, aircraft registration, and other aviation guidelines. The treaty perceptively stated that "the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security."[12] While the United States and Czechoslovakia both signed, the Soviet Union did not.

The Soviet Union refused to be party to the Chicago Conference because Stalin wanted absolute control over who entered, left, and influenced his country.[13] Just as importantly, the Soviets did not want to grant other states overflight rights through their territory, fearing that doing so would help facilitate foreign espionage. The Soviet rejection of the "open skies" arrangement proposed by the United States made the Cold War colder, and ensured that the large stretch of territory in between Western Europe and Japan "would remain a blank space on the new air maps of the world."[14]

Postwar America had the materiel and manpower to mount an ambitious international civil aviation system throughout the world and did so with great success. In June 1945, the US Civil Aeronautics Board granted permission to three airlines—American Export Airlines, Pan American, and Transcontinental & Western Airlines (TWA)—to operate transatlantic service. Before long, Pan American (or Pan Am) and TWA were two of the world's leaders in international air travel, while the American companies Boeing, Douglas, and Convair set the standard of excellence in aircraft construction.

At this time, the Soviet Union had relatively little capability in the field of international civil aviation and was preoccupied with the task of establishing its own domestic civil aviation network. Although there were 150 airfields across the Soviet Union by 1940, most were unpaved, navigation aids were undeveloped, and maintaining scheduled routes was difficult.[15] In the immediate postwar years, most Soviet aircraft either were made in America or were Soviet-constructed copies of American designs. Gradually, the USSR established its own domestic air network and jet

aircraft of its own design, but by the mid-1950s, the only international destinations serviced by Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline, were Berlin, Prague, and Stockholm.

With Aeroflot's international service practically nonexistent, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations gave little thought to the question of Soviet penetration into the international civil aviation market. Two factors contributed to drastically change this situation by 1961. The first was the development of the Tupolev-104 (Tu-104), which in 1956 became the second civil jet airliner in the world. The Aeroflot Tu-104 shocked Western observers when it arrived at London's Heathrow Airport, carrying Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin for a state visit, because it was the first jet airliner to land at the airport. The Tu-104, with a range of approximately 1,650 miles, allowed Aeroflot to expand its foreign service to most major Western European cities starting in 1958. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets designed the Tu-114, with a range of about 6,000 miles. The largest and fastest civil aircraft of its era, the Tu-114 brought Khrushchev to the United States in 1959.[16] The second factor was Khrushchev's ascension to power in the Kremlin and the foreign policy changes that accompanied his "wars of national liberation" speech in January 1961. With Moscow expressing interest in cultivating relations with the developing nations of the world, and the Tu-104 and Tu-114 giving it the capability to expand Aeroflot's flight routes, it was only a matter of time before the Soviet bloc would attempt to expand its air service to Africa.

Czechoslovak State Airline (ČSA)

In early 1923, two segments of the Czechoslovak government—the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Public Works—were tasked with jointly building the country's military and civil air capabilities. Half a year later, in October 1923—on the fifth anniversary of Czechoslovakia's foundation—Czechoslovak State Airlines (ČSA) was created. Twenty-three days later, the airline's first flight took place from Prague to Bratislava. The airline's initial fleet consisted of four Aero Ae-10s known as the "air limousine" which was the first Czechoslovak commercial aircraft.

Initially, ČSA only operated domestic flights, until 1930, when it began operating a route to Zagreb, Yugoslavia. The airline's route map thereafter expanded by adding regularly scheduled flights to Cluj and Bucharest (1933), Moscow and Kiev (1935), Trieste and Venice (1937), and Brussels, Paris, Strasbourg, and Rome (1938). The flight to Moscow made ČSA the first foreign airline allowed to fly into the Soviet Union.[17] However, the airline was abruptly forced to close down in 1939 after Nazi Germany occupied Czechoslovakia, and most of its planes were transferred into the fleet of the German carrier, Lufthansa.

In September 1945, following Nazi Germany's defeat, ČSA was reconstituted, nationalized, and made the sole airline in the Czechoslovak Republic. Since the airline no longer had any aircraft, it was forced to buy several C-47/DC-3 military cargo planes from the United States Air Force, which engineers from Avia and Aero then reconfigured into commercial passenger planes. The revitalized airline then set out to aggressively rebuild its international route map adding flights to Zurich, Amsterdam, Belgrade, Copenhagen, London, Paris, Stockholm, and Warsaw in 1946; Ankara, Athens, Cairo, Istanbul, and Rome in 1947; and Beirut, Berlin, Gothenburg, Haifa, Helsinki, Milan, Nice, Nicosia, Tel Aviv, Trieste, and Venice in 1948.[18]

ČSA's operations initially suffered significant setbacks when the KSČ took over full control of Czechoslovakia. As Stalinist isolationist measures were adopted, the airline had far fewer passengers on its international flights, since Czechoslovak citizens faced travel restrictions, and Prague became a less desirable tourist attraction for foreigners. The airline also lost many pilots, either because they quit and emigrated, or because they were fired from their jobs because their loyalty to the state was questioned (this was especially common for the many who had fought with the British Royal Air Force during World War II). Included in the number of lost pilots were three ČSA aviators who pulled off history's first triple hijacking in March 1950 when they diverted their planes to the American Air Force base in Erding, Germany and sought asylum (about two-thirds of the passengers returned to Czechoslovakia, while the rest stayed in the West).[19] The loss of both pilots and passengers resulted in a 40 percent reduction in the number of ČSA's international routes in 1949.[20]

In the early 1950s, ČSA's operations were further effected by the impact of an embargo that Western countries imposed on Czechoslovakia following the communist coup. In 1950, ČSA was prohibited from flying over West Germany, despite Czechoslovakia's status as an ICAO member. In 1951, the airlines from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands terminated their flights to Prague. Such restrictions had reduced ČSA's international routes to only the Soviet bloc and the capitals of Scandinavia (Copenhagen, Helsinki, and Stockholm). Perhaps an even greater consequence of the embargo was the fact that ČSA could no longer acquire spare parts for its fleet of American manufactured DC3s. The embargo thus forced Czechoslovakia to begin buying its aircraft exclusively from the Soviet Union.[21]

By 1956, the constraints imposed on Czechoslovak foreign policy by Stalin were replaced by Khrushchev's encouragement to Soviet bloc states to expand their relations with the developing world. As a result, ČSA once again set about aggressively building its international route map. The airline reestablished most of its European routes, but more importantly, it became the second airliner in the world to regularly operate jet planes

when it received 3 70 seat Tu-104As from the Soviet Union. To utilise them,, in 1957 ČSA made its Prague-Moscow route the world's first jet-only connection.[22] The introduction of Tu-104s, Iluyshin Il-18s, and the Czechoslovak-produced (but Soviet-designed) Avia Av-14s into ČSA's fleet allowed the airline to expand its destinations outside of Europe. In August 1958, ČSA opened its first route to Africa when it began flying to Cairo, Egypt, and the next year, it extended this route all the way to Bombay (present day Mumbai), India.[23]

Beginning in 1960, both Czechoslovak State Airlines and Aeroflot began expanding their flight routes into Africa. In most cases, it was ČSA that led the way, partially because as a signatory of the Chicago Convention, Czechoslovakia did not face as many impediments to developing new aviation routes as the Soviets did. In July 1960, ČSA used Il-18s to open the first regularly scheduled flight from the Soviet bloc to sub-Saharan Africa on a route of Prague-Zurich-Rabat-Dakar-Conakry. In February 1961, this flight was extended to Bamako, Mali and later to Lagos, Nigeria. By 1967, the two major Soviet bloc airlines serviced 11 African cities, 7 of which were added to ČSA's routes before Aeroflot's. Algiers, Bamako, Cairo, Conakry, Rabat, and Tunis were serviced by both airlines while ČSA additionally flew to Dakar, Freetown, and Lagos, and Aeroflot included Accra and Khartoum amongst its destinations.[24] By the late 1960s, ČSA flew to more than 50 international and 15 domestic destinations, including Havana—its first transatlantic route—which it started flying to in February 1962, a year before Aeroflot did. Prague's Ruzyně International Airport was becoming an international crossroads.

The Soviet bloc's civil aviation policies had been guided less by commercial considerations than by the desire to extend its political influence in the developing world. Doing so increased opportunities for intelligence activities, provided a relatively safe method to transport sensitive shipments, such as weapons, and assured continuing influence in a country by creating a dependency on Soviet bloc training, supplies, parts, and service. Perhaps most important, the establishment of air routes and airport infrastructure in Africa would allow for improved Soviet and Czechoslovak access to increasingly distant parts of the globe in times of political or military crisis. The Soviet bloc thus instituted scheduled routes for Aeroflot and ČSA, sold aeronautical equipment, provided technical assistance to African nations and African airlines, constructed airports, and maintained operations in several African countries.

Aviation Assistance to Ghana

Ghana Airways was created in July 1958 as a joint partnership between the Ghanaian government (60% ownership) and the British Overseas

Airways Corporation (BOAC) (40% ownership). BOAC personnel operated the airline while Ghanaians were training to eventually replace them. Despite this arrangement, Nkrumah demanded that Ghana Airways "should be truly Ghanaian both in form and outlook," ordering that the planes should be painted in the national colors of Ghana and include only Ghanaian, and no British, advertisements onboard.[25] For its first two years of operation, Ghana Airways' fleet consisted of exclusively British and American aircraft: four Douglas DC-3s, two de Havilland Herons, two Bristol Britannia 102s, and a Boeing 377 Stratocrusier. Facing domestic criticism that his regime was overly pro-Western, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah signed an aviation agreement with the Soviet Union and purchased six Ilyushin Il-18s in August 1960. In November, Moscow also sent Ghana Airways an Antonov A-12. In early 1961, Ghana Airways bought out BOAC's shares, so the airline became fully government-owned, and ordered two more Soviet Il-18s, three British Vickers VC-10s, and two American Boeing 707s.[26] As a result, in the early 1960s Ghana Airways was the only airline in the world to have British, American, and Soviet aircraft in its fleet of planes.[27] Despite the fact that the airline had twice as many Western planes and pilots as it had Soviet ones, the United States was worried about the introduction of Soviet influence into Ghanaian civil aviation.

Nkrumah viewed Ghana Airways as a symbol of Ghana's statehood and an instrument of national prestige, rather than as a commercial endeavor.[28] As such, Nkrumah sought to have the Ghanaian flag (which was painted on the tail of Ghana Airways planes) fly to as many destinations as possible. The airline ran an extensive route system within Africa from Accra to Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Asmara, Bamako, Bathurst, Cairo, Conakry, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Freetown, Kano, Khartoum, Kumasi, Lagos, Leopoldville, Monrovia, Mopti, Nairobi, Ouagadougou, Takoradi, Tamale, Rabat, and Segu. Longer-range international destinations included Beirut, London, Rome, and Zurich. Ghana Airways also periodically made grandiose claims of soon initiating service to distant locations such as New York, Moscow, Prague, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Sydney.[29]

Although Ghana Airways had never made any secret that prestige came before economic considerations in its operations, by mid-1961, it was reeling after reporting a loss of nearly £485,000 in the previous fiscal year.[30] The airline's financial bottom line was hurt by the fact that Nkrumah often used it for personal purposes, such as flying his dog to Switzerland.[31] Particularly burdensome for the airline were the eight Soviet Il-18s, which had cost Ghana £14.3 million, yet had many service problems and only averaged a total of 36 service hours per week.[32] The Il-18s were primarily used on Ghana Airways unprofitable flights to either Khartoum or Cairo/Beirut. The Khartoum route, for example, carried

only 12 paying passengers in its first three months of operation.[33] Typical of the Nkrumah regime, rather than admitting it had made a mistake by buying so many planes and initiating unprofitable routes, Ghana instead scapegoated the Soviet planes as being the reason for Ghana Airway's financial troubles. In order to help Accra reduce its losses from its airline, Moscow offered to reduce the salaries of Soviet technicians employed by Ghana Airways by half. At the time, the Soviet Union had 110 pilots, maintenance engineers, and interpreters servicing Ghana Airways' 9 Soviet built aircraft.[34] Instead, Ghana Airways grounded its Il-18s and turned to British and American-made aircraft, sending most of the Soviet technicians back to the USSR in the process. In a seemingly corresponding move, Ghana Airways purged itself of many of the Ghanaian pilots and aircraft maintenance engineers who had been trained in the Soviet Union (the pilots were grounded because they all supposedly had sickle cell anemia).[35] In September 1963, four of the Il-18s were returned to the Soviet Union, and by 1967, the remaining five Soviet aircraft were retired from service by Ghana Airways.[36]

Czechoslovakia's involvement in Ghanaian aviation was limited only to training a handful of Ghanaians to pilot MiG fighter jets in Czechoslovakia (the Soviet bloc never actually sold any MiGs to Ghana).[37] While the Soviet bloc's first attempt to penetrate African civil aviation, handled almost exclusively by the Soviet Union, had ended in failure in Ghana, the communists would find more success in Guinea and Mali, when Czechoslovakia took the lead in the process.

Aviation Assistance to Guinea

As decolonization began to reach Francophone West Africa the two main French air carriers, Air France and Union Aéromaritime de Transport, conceived an idea to form a consortium airline, which they would jointly own with the governments of soon-to-be-independent French West Africa. The idea came to fruition in September 1960 when the airline Air Afrique was formed to create a network of internal air services within Francophone Africa as well as to connect the region with international air services to Europe. However, the former French colonies of Guinea and Mali, both of which harbored anti-French feelings, opted not to join the consortium and instead chose to follow Ghana's lead in establishing their own independent national airlines.

In February 1960, the Guinean government approached American embassy officials in Conakry and made clear their interest in negotiating an air agreement with Pan American Airways (Pan Am). Pan Am was uninterested in such an opportunity, however, so the following month, the Touré regime turned instead to the Soviet bloc.[38] Less than a month

later, in March 1960, Czechoslovakia signed a contract to provide Guinea with six transport aircraft (four Avia Av-14s and two Aero-145s), while the Soviet Union reached agreements to provide additional aviation assistance, including lengthening the runways at Conakry's airport so it could handle jet traffic.[39] ČSA inaugurated regular flights between Prague and Conakry (twice per week via Rabat and Dakar) in July and delivered the Avia Av-14s in October.[40] With this aid in hand, the Guinean government formed Compagnie Nationale Air Guinée on December 31, 1960.

Air Guinée began service in early 1961 with domestic routes connecting Conakry with Boké and Kankan. It has frequently been misreported that the airline initiated its operations with Soviet Il-14s operated by Soviet flight crews. In fact, Air Guinée was operated by Czechoslovak pilots and technicians using Avia Av-14s (which was the Czechoslovak version of the Soviet Il-14), which Guinea had leased from the ČSSR.[41] Several dozen Czechoslovak aviation personnel worked for Air Guinée from 1961–65, including four flight crews who operated the Avia Av-14s, other pilots who flew the Aero-145s, and ten plane mechanics.[42] This explains why all signage in Conakry's airport was in the French, English, and Czech languages—and not in Russian—although eventually Soviet planes and flight crews would join their Czechoslovak comrades in the service of Air Guinée. In 1961, Air Guinée inaugurated international service to Bamako, Mali, and over the next few years, added service to Dakar, Senegal; Freetown, Sierra Leone; Monrovia, Liberia; Lagos, Nigeria; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; and Accra, Ghana. The airline also planned to operate flights to Paris and onward to Moscow, but this never materialized since Guinea was unable to reach a traffic rights agreement with the French government.[43]

A rift in Czechoslovak-Guinean civil aviation relations occurred in October 1961, when one of the Czechoslovak operating crews working for Air Guinée, citing bad weather, refused to fly Guinean government officials to Abidjan and Accra for meetings with delegations in the Ivory Coast and Ghana. In response, Guinea cancelled the flight crew's contracts and expelled them from the country. An internal Czechoslovak report found that the pilot was "completely correct" to not fly in the elements that day, viewing the situation as resulting from a personal dispute between the Czech pilot and the director of Air Guinée; nonetheless, it served to fray relations between Prague and Conakry.[44] The Soviet bloc position in Guinea was more seriously hurt when the Soviet ambassador, Daniel Solod, was declared persona non grata and expelled from the county in December 1961 (discussed in greater detail in chapter 5).

After the Solod affair, Guinea sought to lessen its civil aviation dependency on the Soviet bloc, and in December 1962, Air Guinée signed an agreement with US-based Alaska Airlines. The terms of the agreement

called for Alaska Airlines to provide Guinea with two Douglas DC-4s and two Lockheed AL-60s, with operating crews to replace the Czechoslovak and Soviet planes and pilots, and a training program for Guinean pilots in Seattle.[45] The American planes arrived in Guinea in April 1962, but only two weeks later, on the second scheduled flight operated by Air Alaska, one of the planes crash-landed when its landing gear malfunctioned. No one was injured in the crash, but the Guinean government immediately lost all faith in Air Alaska's reliability. William Attwood, the US ambassador to Guinea, later wrote that Russian and Czechoslovak onlookers smiled, "as a Guinean fork-lift operator had to haul the plane away, carelessly crushing its nose in the process."[46] The next day, Air Guinée switched back to using Czechoslovak and Soviet planes and flight crews. The Guinean government refused to continue its contract with Air Alaska, and eventually, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) paid the airline $700,000 for the planes, which Guinea kept.[47]

By mid-1963, Air Guinée's fleet consisted of 23 aircraft: six Avia AV-14s and one Aero-145 from Czechoslovakia; three IL-18s, five Yakovlev Yak-18s, three Antonov An-2s, and one Mil Mi-14 helicopter from the Soviet Union; two Lockheed AL-60s and one Douglas DC-4 from the United States; and one French Jodel.[48] According to US intelligence, there were 173 Soviet bloc civil aviation personnel working in Guinea at this time. All aspects of Air Guinée's operations were handled by Czechoslovak or Soviet technicians, with the exception of two Egyptian flight crews, and the flight attendants and desk clerks, who were native Guineans, trained by Canada. The Conakry airport was operated by Czechoslovak aviation personnel, who also made frequent trips to other Guinean airports for training purposes.[49]

Aviation Assistance to Mali

Given the great distances involved and the difficult landscape in Mali (which is roughly twice the size of Texas, 65% desert, and also includes rugged hills), President Modibo Keïta viewed establishing Mali's transportation infrastructure as the "very pillar of our economy."[50] Mali's topography would make building a vast railroad or highway network an expensive and time-consuming project, so the Malian government instead sought to develop a national airline that would be able to connect the distant parts of the country more easily and quickly. With this in mind, Société Nationale Air Mali, more commonly known as Air Mali, was established by the Malian government in October 1960.

Consistent with other areas of assistance, Czechoslovakia was the first to offer to help build Air Mali. During the visit of Minister of State Jean-Marie Koné (the second-ranking official in the Malian government) to

Prague in November 1960, Czechoslovak officials promised to provide an unspecified number of transport planes to Air Mali and signed an agreement to train 11 pilots and 21 mechanics for the airline.[51] Thereafter, the British government donated 3 DC-3 aircraft, which had previously been used by British European Airways (BEA), to Air Mali, but it did not offer any personnel to operate the planes out of deference to France, Mali's former colonizer.[52]

In January 1961, Mali requested American assistance in developing its aviation infrastructure, but the request was rejected by USAID officials without an appraisal by competent aviation specialists to determine either the feasibility of the proposal or the political significance of establishing a US aviation presence in the country. State Department officials did approach Pan Am on behalf of the Malians about the possibility of adding a route to Bamako and helping to establish a Malian flagship airline, but the company was uninterested in expanding its operations in this direction. Taking advantage of the lack of American interest, within weeks, ČSA established a Prague-Conakry-Bamako route.[53] In February 1961, the KSČ politburo also voted to send Mali five Aero-145 aircraft, flight crews to operate not only these Czechoslovak planes but also the three British ones, and eight technical experts to run airport operations in Bamako and Gao.[54] The two governments agreed that the planes would be sold to Mali for 7 million Kcs (a 14% discount), and the training of Malian aviation personnel provided for 11 million Kcs (a 20% discount), to be paid by Mali in five installments of deliveries of peanuts.[55]

In March, the Soviet Union joined Czechoslovakia to help Mali establish a national airline by signing a contract with Air Mali to sell Ilyushin-18, Ilyushin-14, and Antonov An-2 planes to the airline—delivering a total of ten aircraft in 1961.[56] Air Mali began domestic service in 1961 and joined the International Air Transport Association in July. One hundred Malians went to Prague, and another 65 went to the USSR, for pilot and maintenance training, while Czechoslovak, Soviet, and Ghanaian technicians agreed to maintain and operate Air Mali in the meantime.[57] With the arrival of two Soviet Il-18s in August, the airline was able to begin international service, to destinations such as Casablanca, Paris, and Marseille, by using Soviet flight crews. Soon thereafter, Air Mali used three Avia Av-14s and the three DC-3s operated by Czechoslovak crews to start regional routes to Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Congo-Brazzaville, and Cameroon. The smaller planes, five Czechoslovak Aero-145s and two Soviet Antonov An-2s, were used as flight trainers and for domestic flights, and were operated respectively by Czechoslovak and Soviet pilots.[58]

In the summer of 1961, the United States had become worried about the level of Soviet bloc domination of Malian civil aviation, and Secretary

of State Dean Rusk sent a telegram to the American embassies in both Bamako and Paris, stating that he was,

> gravely concerned at [the] possibility...GOM [government of Mali] intends to allow [the] Soviets [to] use air base [in] Bamako as [its] central maintenance center for serving bloc aircraft operating [in] Ghana-Guinea-Mali. If true, [this] would enhance USSR capability [to] provide large scale air transport for troops [to] these countries to Congo or other African hot spots. Also provides [the] Soviets embryonic air base facilities. While GOM probably envisages only civil aviation operation, it lacks [the] technical ability for adequate control [of] activity [of] Soviet personnel, many of whom will doubtless be military.[59]

In an effort to prevent this, Washington pressured France to try to maintain control of the military airbase that it had built outside of Bamako during the colonial era.[60] This failed due to the anti-French sentiment in Mali at the time, and in July 1961, the Malian government agreed to let the Soviets use the former French airfield as the regional maintenance center for Soviet bloc aircraft operating in West Africa.

By fall, the State Department concluded:

> The most conspicuous example of the bloc's success in penetrating civil aviation development with the use of its civil aviation is Mali, where all aspects of civil aviation—air fields, towers and airport operations, and maps—except for the Bamako international airport are operated by the Czechs and Soviets. Fears have recently been expressed that Czechoslovakia might further its influence in Mali, as well as Africa, should it succeed in obtaining permission to operate a civil aviation school in Bamako for the training of technicians from nearby African countries. Soviet civil aviation personnel in Mali during the last half of 1961 numbered 122. No information available on the number of Czechs.[61]

In an attempt to weaken the Soviet bloc's grip on civil aviation in Mali, the United States belatedly offered to sell Bamako two cargo planes, as well as to initiate a training program for Malian pilots, but the Keïta regime, apparently satisfied with its arrangement with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, declined both offers.[62]

US officials told their British counterparts that the Soviet bloc provided equipment and training for Air Mali in order to cultivate the image of a "disinterested power" giving "selfless aid" without ulterior motives.[63] By signing reciprocal agreements that allowed Air Mali to fly to Moscow and Prague, just as Aeroflot and ČSA flew to Bamako, the Soviet bloc, in the opinion of the State Department, was trying to demonstrate "its

respect for Mali's sovereignty and technical achievement as a new world state."[64] Czechoslovakia garnered further goodwill in 1963 when ČSA began operating charter flights to carry Malian and Mauritanian passengers to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia so that they could embark on the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.[65]

During his visit to Prague in May 1962, Keïta asked Czechoslovak President Antonín Novotný for the ČSSR's assistance in helping to expand Mali's military air force, which to this point consisted of only one MH 1521 Broussard (a reconnaissance aircraft) and two C-47 transport planes left by the French, but no fighter planes. Novotný responded that Czechoslovakia had previously helped build the national air forces for the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Syria, and Indonesia through "both illegal and legal" means and would be glad to provide fighter pilot training to Malians as well.[66] Later that year, the Malian air force received five L-200 Morava aircraft from Czechoslovakia and four Antonov An-2 Colt transports and four Mi-4 light helicopters from the Soviet Union.[67] In the mid-1960s, the Soviets added five MiG-17F fighters and one MiG-15UTI fighter trainer, and both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union provided military flight training to teach Malians to pilot these planes.

US Response to Soviet Bloc Penetration of African Civil Aviation

Throughout 1962, a major focus of the US State Department had been to limit and, where possible, scale back Soviet bloc civil air service to Africa. The US government feared that regular flight schedules of Aeroflot and ČSA to Africa would serve to spread Soviet bloc influence and subversive activity. Officials in Washington were afraid of the possibility that the typically half-empty flights from Eastern Europe to Africa would serve as the perfect conduit for Soviet bloc propaganda materials and small arms to African rebels. More important, the only way for Soviet bloc planes to reach South America, the Caribbean, or the Eastern United States would be for them to land and refuel on the western coast of Africa.[68] For these reasons, precluding Moscow and Prague from obtaining civil aviation landing rights in West Africa became an important national security consideration for the United States.[69]

The Kennedy administration took this issue very seriously and established the Inter-Agency Committee for International Aviation Policy (IACIAP), which consisted of representatives principally from the Department of State, Civil Aeronautics Board, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The interagency group was given a high profile, with an office on the seventh floor of the State Department, and it was chaired by W. Averell Harriman, the former governor of New York and

United States ambassador to the Soviet Union and United Kingdom. Betty Crites Dillon, an air transport examiner at the Civil Aeronautics Board with responsibility for Africa, the Middle East, and the Soviet bloc, was tasked with writing an IACIAP study to develop recommendations for a US civil aviation policy for Africa.[70]

Dillon's report, completed in September 1961, argued that in the newly independent countries of Africa,

> the vested interests of European airlines coupled with an aggressive Soviet aviation policy which includes equipment, technical and managerial assistance, as well as operation of airports and aviation facilities, and extensive route exchanges, lend some urgency to a need for early consideration of long-range economic planning with respect to the future of United States scheduled services to, through, and within Africa.[71]

The report also lamented missed opportunities in African civil aviation that the Soviet bloc had taken advantage of as a result of the United States being uninterested in helping establish Ghana Airways, Air Guineé, and Air Mali.

Clearly, the American political system was hampering the United States in its competition with the Soviet bloc for influence in African civil aviation. While the communist states could easily direct Aeroflot or ČSA to initiate operations in these various African states, Washington could not force Pan Am or TWA to launch routes that were likely to be unprofitable. As one State Department report concluded, "It is immaterial to the Soviets that an airline venture be non-profitable so long as it meets a political or clandestine objective."[72] To counter this, Dillon's report suggested that Washington underwrite such endeavors to minimize the potential financial risk to Pan Am and others. The study also advocated for an American airline to implement a direct east-west route across the African continent from Lagos to Nairobi, because passengers seeking to travel between East and West Africa had to make a connection either in Europe or Ethiopia. Additionally, it recommended avoiding repeating past mistakes by taking an active role in assisting in the foundation of Air Afrique, rather than leaving the opportunity open to the Soviet bloc. Finally, the report suggested that civil air attachés be assigned to most US embassies in Africa to better assess the aviation needs of each nation. The report was routed through all of the relevant agencies in Washington—State, Defense, CIA, FAA, and the White House—and in a rare occurrence, was approved without change throughout the US government.[73]

In early 1962, the Dillon report recommendations began to be implemented. The State Department attempted to convince Pan Am to expand its scheduled services to Africa out of deference to national interests. Pan

Am demurred, on the grounds that doing so was not only economically unviable, but could also potentially alienate African states, many of whom were attempting to establish their own national carriers. Pan Am instead suggested seeking cooperative arrangements between itself and the new African national airlines as the best means for offsetting Soviet bloc influence.[74] While Pan Am slowly pursued opportunities to collaborate with the new African airlines, Moscow and Prague moved aggressively to expand their presence in African civil aviation. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had begun efforts to obtain air transport rights on the continent, and by early 1962, had concluded comprehensive agreements with Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and Guinea, and had approached Libya, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan as well.

From 1961–62, Sudan was the center of the Cold War competition for influence over African civil aviation. Because of its large size and geographical location, Sudan was in a position to either facilitate or block Soviet bloc air routes to much of the African continent. Both sides of the Iron Curtain realized that the lack of Soviet bloc air traffic rights through Sudan prevented the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia from projecting their power in the Congo crisis of 1960.[75] Afterwards, Moscow and Prague redoubled their efforts to reach civil aviation agreements with Khartoum, while Washington worked hard to prevent this.

In 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised President Kennedy to delay a planned White House meeting with President Ahamadou Ahidjo of Cameron and to invite instead Sudanese President Ibrahim Abboud to Washington. Rusk argued:

> My recommendation at this time is based primarily on the crucial importance to the success of the UN operation in the Congo, and to our own policy objectives in that area, of the Sudan's continuing its policy of denying permission to the Soviet Bloc, the UAR, or other countries, for the transit of supplies across its territory to the Congo except under UN auspices. There is no question that the Sudan's persistence, under the most extreme pressure, in maintaining this policy has substantially reduced the dimensions of the Congo as a cold war battleground and greatly assisted in preventing the establishment of a Soviet beachhead in the Congo. The problem is to assure as far as possible that the Sudan will continue to maintain this position.[76]

Rusk informed Kennedy that Abboud would be traveling to the Soviet Union in the summer and would receive red carpet treatment in Moscow. In the secretary of state's opinion, if the United States did not reciprocate, Sudan would likely accede to signing an aviation agreement with the Soviet bloc.

Abboud visited the Soviet Union in July and was reportedly impressed with his visit. James Moose, Jr., the US ambassador to Sudan, recommended that during his visit to Washington, the United States should offer Abboud either to construct a road from Khartoum to Port Said, or two jet aircraft in order to offset the positive impression made upon him in Moscow. At the time, Sudan Airways did not own any aircraft capable of long-range international travel, and as such, Sudanese government delegations were forced to rely upon foreign commercial airliners to transport them.[77] An additional dilemma arose from the fact that the Soviets had sent an Ilyushin Il-18 to fly Abboud to his meeting with Khrushchev at the Kremlin, which put pressure on the United States to provide the Sudanese leader with the same courtesy for his trip to Washington. While the United States Air Force was willing to meet this request, it expressed concern that doing so would lead to expectations that they would provide such service for all foreign heads of state who visited the United States, which would be a costly commitment.[78] Moreover, the Air Force suggested using a turboprop military transport Lockheed Constellation to carry Abboud to the United States, which Kennedy's National Security Council staff found ill advised:

> While this would at minimum meet our political needs, there is no question but that an executive jet would be preferable in order to prevent unfavorable comparison being drawn between the Ilyushin 18 which the Soviets sent to Khartoum for Abboud's Moscow visit. It seems to me that at a time when the technical proficiency of the US versus the USSR is at issue among the underveloped countries, we would be ill-advised in the jet age to send other than a jet aircraft.[79]

The National Security staff wanted Abboud to be transported in a Boeing VC-137, which was an executive jet used by the US Air Force to transport VIP delegations, but the Air Force again raised concerns about this:

> There are a limited number of VC-137s and the President should understand that once he starts this, using the long-range jets, he will have to continue with VC-137s. Otherwise, if we send a C-121 or DC-6 for some Heads of State and a VC-137 for others, there will be hurt feelings and implications of one Head of State being more important than another…We could adopt a policy of always sending only DC-6 or C-121 type aircraft but I hear that the Russians would outshine us on every occasion and I don't believe the President would want to do it this way.[80]

In the end, the VC-137 was used to transport Abboud from Khartoum to Washington. The planning for this meeting, and the fact that it even

occurred in the first place, testifies to the importance that the United States now placed on competing with the Soviet bloc in the sphere of African civil aviation.[81]

Flirtation between Sudan and the Soviet Union continued into the spring of 1962. While the United States hoped to preclude all Soviet bloc flights to or through Sudan, it was particularly worried about the prospect of the Soviet bloc obtaining landing rights in Juba or elsewhere in southern Sudan, from which the communists would be able to reach the Congo's Orientale province and help revive the Lumumbist revolt.[82] In April, Sudanese officials informed the US embassy that they had "committed themselves too deeply" in negotiations with the Soviets to pull out at this point—unless, of course, the United States could give them two Boeing 720Bs and a road between Khartoum to Port Said as incentive to do so. The State Department seemed willing to meet Sudan's demands but understood that doing so could cause problems in its "special relationship" with the United Kingdom, which might look unfavorably upon the introduction of American aviation competition in the country.[83]

In its attempt to keep the Soviet bloc from receiving civil aviation rights in Sudan, in particular, and Africa more generally, the United States hoped to coordinate its policy with the United Kingdom. In a memorandum to the British Foreign Office, the United States Department of State summed up its perception of the problem:

> The USSR acquires prestige, importance, and respectability as a world power. Regular air service from Moscow and Prague is a useful implement in the operation of technical and economic aid programs, the exchange of cultural and governmental delegations, and the establishment of a Soviet presence in countries where the Soviet Union has previously been only a name. It is also a secure channel for subversive activity including the transport of propaganda material, personnel, and small arms. This is of particular importance in some African countries where even small quantities of modern weapons can have great impact and where logistic barriers have prevented dissident groups from receiving Soviet support. In negotiating agreements which encourage flights to Moscow by African airlines, and by providing aircraft equipment, and training to some countries, the USSR deftly exploits—and identifies itself with—the intense desire to assert their sovereignty. On balance, and partially because of special conditions in Africa, civil aviation would appear to be unusually effective in advancing Soviet objectives on that continent.[84]

London, however, did not share Washington's concern over the level of danger that could stem from the Soviet bloc's acquisition of African civil aviation rights. Nor did British diplomats think that the United States

could be successful in convincing African states of this either. As one Foreign Office official put it,

> I am doubtful if representations on the lines proposed by the Americans would be successful. I would expect the newly independent African states to say that if Western airlines fly to them they see no reason why the Russians should not do so. There are no bye-rounds in the cold war; we have to take on Russian competition where we find it. The history of the Russian aircraft in Ghana suggests that Aeroflot's appearance is not always to the Russian advantage. We heard recently from Sir I. Scott that the Americans overplayed their hand over this question in the Sudan and are temporarily unpopular as a consequence.[85]

In fact, the British were more concerned about Sudan Airways possibly buying American aircraft than they were about Khartoum granting the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia traffic rights in the country. For Whitehall the greatest threat to continued British influence in African civil aviation came from the West, not from the East.[86] Sir Ian Scott, the British ambassador to Khartoum noted,

> Apart from the advantage to the British aircraft industry of Sudan's 'staying British' rather than going to the Americans for jets, there is quite a serious risk, if Sudan were to buy Boeing 720's that Lufthansa (who are about to operate these aircraft through Khartoum) would move in with technical and other assistance, which could seriously undermine the [British Overseas Airways] Corporation's position there.[87]

For this reason, Washington deferred to the British and did not offer Sudan aircrafts as Ambassador Moose had recommended—instead the British sold Sudan Airways two of its infamous De Havilland Comet 4Cs, so the airline would "stay British." Sudan remained opened to the highest bidder between the Soviet Union and the United States.

As rumors of a pending Soviet-Sudanese aviation agreement began to circulate, the American chargé d'affaires called upon Ahmed Hohamed Kheir, the Sudanese foreign minister, to inquire whether the local press reports were accurate. Kheir chastised the American diplomat for dealing with him as if he were a reporter, and treating him "as you would deal with the Laotian foreign minister." Kheir told the American that the article only pertained to Soviet, not Sudanese, intentions, and sarcastically asked why the chargé d'affaires put any credence in a Sudanese newspaper report when it was "[you] Americans who represent [your]selves as [the] authority on this [Soviet intentions], not [the] Sudanese."[88] Shortly thereafter Kheir told US officials that although Sudan was pro-Western and anti-communist, in order to maintain a public façade of neutrality, it had decided to sign an air agreement with the Soviet Union. The

Soviet-Sudanese aviation agreement was signed in Khartoum on April 23. A week later, on May 2, Czechoslovakia surprised State Department officials by concluding an aviation agreement with Senegal that Prague planned to use as a refueling stop for ČSA flights to Guinea, Mali, and Ghana. The Czechoslovak-Senegalese agreement caused even greater consternation in Washington than had the Soviet-Sudanese agreement, as it allowed the Soviet bloc an opening into the Dakar airport—the westernmost airport on the African continent, from which flights to South America could be initiated.

This was of such concern in Washington that a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) Standing Group was held at the White House in May 1962 to address the problem. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee warned of the urgent need to prevent further Soviet bloc penetration into civil aviation in Africa, while David Bell, director of the Bureau of the Budget, questioned the cost of doing so. At the end of the meeting, McGhee had convinced National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Bell, and the others assembled not only of the importance of US action but also that through the manpower and ground equipment of the FAA, the training capabilities of USAID, and Department of Defense surplus aircraft, ample resources were available to allow Washington to make a greater effort in assisting African states in the development of their aviation capabilities.[89]

McGhee, a former US ambassador to Turkey and assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs in the Truman administration, devoted a great deal of his energies over the next two years to this matter. A week after the White House meeting, he outlined the potential ramifications that Soviet bloc involvement in African civil aviation could have elsewhere. "The recent Soviet activity in negotiating civil air agreements with African Governments, including some on the West Coast, suggests that Moscow is interested not merely in developing air routes in Africa but in laying the basis for one or more trans-Atlantic air routes to Latin America."[90] McGhee continued:

> This Government began to devote urgent and organized attention to some Soviet aviation activities in Africa only after the bear's nose was well into the tent. Since Soviet or Bloc air links to Latin America, in addition to the existing one with Cuba, would greatly increase Soviet potential for mischief through transportation of persons both ways and the introduction of agents, propaganda, etc.... Brazil appears to be both the most accessible and vulnerable country.[91]

The possibility that access to refueling and maintenance facilities in West Africa would allow the Soviets to extend their civil aviation activities into the Western hemisphere thus caused American authorities to treat this issue with great urgency.

McGhee asked the State Department's African Bureau to make recommendations regarding the short- and long-term objectives of US civil aviation policy in Africa and how the US might curtail Soviet bloc involvement. The resulting report concluded that Washington's short-term objective should be to "preclude where feasible or limit to the maximum extent possible further Soviet civil air penetration" in Africa. Recommendations included assisting African countries in supervising Soviet bloc air operations in their countries; assisting African national and regional airlines in developing financially viable alternatives to Aeroflot or ČSA routes; increasing pressure on African states to refuse overflight rights to Soviet bloc airlines; attempting to "educate" Africans "regarding the dangers of Soviet air penetration"; and assisting Pan Am in establishing management contracts with African airlines.[92] While the Soviets and Czechoslovaks had made significant inroads into African civil aviation, the report contended, the West was still "in the saddle" in the superpower contest over African commercial aviation.[93] The superiority of American aircraft in comparison to those from the Soviet bloc; French involvement in the establishment of Air Afrique; and the African preference for regional African airlines as well as a preference for Pan Am and TWA over Aeroflot and ČSA were listed as assets to American efforts. The African desire to remain neutral in the Cold War (and thus offer the Soviet bloc the same opportunities and rights as the West), the Soviet bloc's lack of a colonial past, and its technical prowess and determination to broaden the scope of its civil aviation activities were listed as factors complicating American efforts to limit communist influence at African airfields.[94]

In the summer of 1962, the American effort to curb Soviet bloc influence in African aviation was codified in the creation of Project Eagle. The project's planning document stated that its goal was to ensure that the "independent nations in Africa [are] properly oriented toward Free World ideals of Democracy and Liberty" by assisting African nations in developing their own civil, commercial, and military aviation programs, including the training of Africans in air traffic control and the maintenance and operation of aviation technology. Noting that no single department within the American government was prepared to meet this challenge alone, it called for collaboration across the entire government, as well as with Washington's European allies.[95] In overly dramatic fashion, the authors of Project Eagle's planning document laid out the importance of the initiative:

> The implications of this action are quite apparent and are ominous. Should the airways system of Africa or major segments of it fall into the hands of Communist countries or their agents then all air travel—and as we have already seen since there is little other internal transport—and with a major portion of the economic activity of that continent would

> come under the complete and continual cognizance, and control if desired, of the Soviet Government . . . And it [Project Eagle] is impelled by a deep sense of urgency from the realization that if we delay action or stand aside in this crucial period, we shall miss this opportunity which most certainly will not knock as clearly again . . . With this project underway our goals and our achievements are limitless. With the wealth and the people of Africa working together for the Free World we shall have added a tremendous force on the side of free men. This plan can succeed without communes and coercion, without subversion and civil strife. It is the American way and our best chance of real lasting achievement.[96]

In September 1962, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that the Soviet bloc had provided over $78 million in civil aviation assistance to developing world countries, approximately $47 million in deliveries of aircraft and equipment, $31 million in the construction of civil aviation facilities, and an unknown amount for the training of civil aviation personnel and for the direct operation of African and Asian airlines (pilots, mechanics, and air traffic controllers).[97] A State Department position paper on "Soviet Bloc Air Penetration of Underdeveloped Areas: Africa and Latin America" noted that the Soviet bloc was establishing permanent transportation and communication networks in Africa and acknowledged that "had they had such a network two years ago, it might not have been so easy to eliminate them from the Congo." Although the US still hoped to be able to roll back the communist presence at African airports, the focus was now on preventing them from expanding their network to the Western Hemisphere: "Although we have been unable to keep the Soviets out of Africa, we want to make every effort to keep them out of South America."[98]

African Civil Aviation and the Cuban Missile Crisis

During the first few weeks of October 1962, while Soviet military engineers worked to make secret Soviet nuclear missile launchers operational in Cuba, George McGhee drafted yet another policy paper on US civil aviation objectives for Africa. No one knew that a week later, these two activities would collide.[99] While the discovery of missiles in Cuba by reconnaissance photographs taken by a U-2 spy plane is well known, Moscow's attempt to use its ties to African civil aviation to make a breakthrough in the superpower standoff is not.[100]

In typical Cold War fashion, both Moscow and Washington went to extremes to avoid direct conflict with each other during the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviets, not wanting to challenge the US naval quarantine

of Cuba out of fear that doing so would lead to World War III, instead devised a plan to replicate the Americans' Berlin airlift of 1948–49. Of course a USSR-to-Cuba airlift would be much more complicated than the American West Germany-to-West Berlin operation had been, primarily because direct flights from the Soviet Union to Cuba would not be possible. Aeroflot had previously operated periodic direct flights from Murmansk to Havana using the Tu-114, but it required refueling if the plane was more than half full of passengers; there was no way for a direct flight to carry nuclear warheads or other heavy military supplies. The Tu-114 would require at least one refueling stop, while the shorter range Il-18 would have to refuel twice during a trip from the Soviet Union to Cuba. Therefore, the Soviets would be forced to find a country that would allow them to land and refuel before continuing to the Caribbean.

At the outset of the crisis, there were four air channels linking Eastern Europe to Cuba: KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) flights from Moscow to Havana via Amsterdam and Curaçao; Aeroflot flights over the North Atlantic via the United Kingdom (Prestwick, Scotland) and Canada (Gander, Newfoundland); Aeroflot flights over the South Atlantic via the Mediterranean, Africa, and Latin America; and ČSA and Cubana (the Cuban national airline) flights from Prague via Ireland (Shannon) and Canada (Gander or Goose Bay, Labrador). On October 23, KLM announced the suspension of its service to Havana for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. Soon thereafter Pan American, Iberian, and Mexican Airlines (all of which operated regional flights to Cuba) followed suit. The governments of the United Kingdom and Canada likewise announced that they would no longer permit Aeroflot or Soviet military aircraft use of their territory to travel to Cuba. This left ČSA as Cuba's only foreign air connection to the outside world from the end of October until late December 1962.[101] The ČSA and Cubana Airlines flights via the North Atlantic were the most effective and legally secure routes because Czechoslovakia and Cuba were both members of the ICAO, as well as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and they had signed full air agreements with the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Canada. These agreements legally prevented London, Dublin, and Ottawa from denying landing and overflight rights to Czechoslovak and Cuban aircraft, as they had done to Soviet planes. In fact, a ČSA plane had flown from Goose Bay, Canada, to Havana on October 24, a few hours after President Kennedy had announced the US quarantine of Cuba.[102] Furthermore, the previous month ČSA had flown Soviet technicians to Havana, claiming they were economic and agricultural experts. The British accepted this explanation at face value, while the Canadians were skeptical but allowed the passengers to continue to Cuba anyway. The United States believed those passengers were nuclear missile technicians and sought desperately to stop

more from being ferried to Cuba aboard ČSA flights.[103] In an attempt to prevent this, under provisions of the ICAO Convention, Canada and the United Kingdom announced that they would inspect all subsequent Czechoslovak and Cuban aircraft destined for Cuba to ensure that they were not carrying military supplies. This meant that the combination of fuel mileage, geography, and political considerations would dictate routing any USSR-Cuba airlift through West Africa.

US officials worried that a Soviet airlift would transport military supplies and cargo, such as spare parts for missile systems, jet aircraft, and radar and communications equipment, military personnel and technicians needed for the maintenance of the newly constructed military installations, and nuclear warheads for missiles or nuclear bombs for Soviet aircraft already on the island. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that on only four Tu-114 flights to Cuba per month, the Soviets could ship as much as "135,000 pounds (more than 60 tons) of high-priority cargo or more than 800 personnel or a mix of both."[104] Before long, Washington received reports of a Soviet plan to airlift additional nuclear warheads to Cuba via flights originating in the Black Sea, with likely refueling stops in Sudan and West Africa; the flight path would continue across the South Atlantic Ocean to Recife, Brazil, then up through the Caribbean Sea to Cuba. American officials hurriedly tried to initiate a diplomatic interdiction effort to prevent more warheads from being flown into Cuba.[105] Building from Project Eagle, a two-track approach would be taken to defuse the Soviet airlift. First, West African states would be lobbied to deny Soviet aircraft permission to refuel in their countries. Second, the landlocked African states between Sudan and West Africa would be asked to deny Moscow overflight rights in the event that the former approach failed.[106] The State Department was not overly optimistic that these diplomatic initiatives would be successful, predicting that African states "because of neutralism, non-alignment, and nationalism might be hesitant if not definitely opposed to a policy of outright refusal of Soviet requests for transit rights . . . It is not certain that all of these countries will be able to maintain their positions in the face of strong Soviet pressure."[107]

In the early morning of October 23, only hours after Kennedy's quarantine speech, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a priority circular telegram to American embassies in Africa and Europe to apprise them of the situation and instruct them to seek meetings at the highest level possible with their host governments to enlist their support in preventing additional Soviet military equipment from reaching Cuba. Rusk stated that Washington considered the Soviet nuclear buildup in Cuba to be jeopardizing not only the United States, but also world peace, and he told his ambassadors to "emphasize in your discussions [with foreign heads of

state] that government has before it [the] critical opportunity [to] take decisive action for preservation of peace as well as [a] positive demonstration [of] it[s] friendship for [the] US."

"Needless to say," Rusk continued, "[each] government should be made aware [of the] deadly serious nature [of] this demarche."[108] The American representatives in Africa were authorized to offer their host nations tangible incentives in the event that moral appeals fell short.[109]

In the fall of 1962 only five countries in West Africa—Liberia, Senegal, Morocco, Ghana, and Guinea—had airstrips long enough to handle jet traffic, so if Washington could convince these nations to deny landing permission to the Soviets, Moscow's airlift would be grounded. A secondary track was to obtain agreements from Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Algeria, and both Congos to deny Moscow overflight rights. In the event that one of the five West African states granted the Soviets refueling privileges, the airlift could still potentially be prevented by blocking the Soviet flight path with a combination of denials for overflight rights from these secondary nations.

That evening Rusk held a briefing on the American quarantine of Cuba for African ambassadors accredited to Washington. The secretary of state went into considerable detail, using slides to indicate the extent of the Soviet missile construction on the island. Rusk described the potential routes of a Soviet airlift to Cuba and implored the ambassadors to make sure their countries did their part to prevent this from happening. Over the next several days, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams followed up individually with each African ambassador to discuss in greater detail the specifics of how each of their countries could assist Washington in this matter.[110] The American embassy in Paris also pressed France to use its influence on its former colonies—especially Senegal and Niger—to convince them to not allow the Soviets to use their airport facilities.

The initial African responses emanating from the United Nations were a mixed bag. African representatives in New York wanted more proof of the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba and suggested that a team of UN inspectors be sent to the Caribbean to verify Washington's claims. The United States was also criticized for initiating its quarantine of Cuba prior to presenting its case before the UN. The African bloc at the UN also proposed that the United States withdraw its nuclear missiles that surrounded the Soviet Union in return for the Soviets withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Finally, it was suggested that Washington and Moscow pledge to limit their confrontation in the Caribbean to a "shooting," rather than nuclear, war.[111]

Getting Liberia's acquiescence to block Soviet flights was not a problem, given the historical relations between that nation and the United

States, the American role in operating Roberts Field, and the fact that Monrovia did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The same held for the solidly pro-Western governments of Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Upper Volta, and both Congos—all of them promptly indicated that they would deny any Soviet request for overflight permission. But the other four nations with jet traffic–equipped airports were all non-aligned, and their agreement was much less assured.

Without a doubt, the West African state that Washington feared was most likely to consent to Moscow's request was Guinea. Not only was Conakry's international airport ran almost exclusively by Czechoslovaks, but the Soviets had finished lengthening Conakry's airstrips to accommodate jet traffic only months before the Cuban missile crisis, and in mid-July, the USSR had made a Tu-114 test flight in the Moscow-Conakry-Havana route. At that time, Moscow announced it would begin regular service along this route beginning October 5, using Conakry as a refueling stop for commercial Aeroflot flights destined for Cuba, Brazil, and Ghana.[112] However, implementation of this route was delayed when Washington advised Conakry that it would not allow Soviet planes to be refueled via the kerosene tankers provided to Guinea through USAID, necessitating Soviet provision of aviation fuel tankers in Conakry. Nonetheless, American policymakers worried that Conakry would not be in a position to refuse Moscow access to the airport that it had just finished building.

Fortunately for the United States, the Guinean president, Sékou Touré, had just returned from a White House visit, and the American president had made an indelibly positive impression on his Guinean guest. Touré's state visit proved to occur at a propitious time—only a week before the Cuban missile crisis flared up. Flush with goodwill, President Touré personally rejected the Soviet request to refuel aircraft in Conakry before American Ambassador William Attwood even tried to intervene.[113]

There were also serious concerns in Washington about whether Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah could be convinced to support the American position during the Cuban missile crisis. Initially, Nkrumah was critical of the US action of quarantining Cuba, suggesting instead that a UN inspection team be dispatched to confirm the presence of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons. Ambassador Stevenson reported from the United Nations that Ghanaian officials in New York "believed both US and USSR rascals in [the] Cuban situation."[114] The Ghanaian president also pointed out the fact that the United States had its own missiles bordering the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the government-controlled Ghanaian press concluded that the US quarantine was "just an excuse for a second attempt at destroying Cuba after the abject failure of the first [at the Bay of Pigs]."[115]

Nkrumah's stance changed dramatically after a meeting with the American ambassador, William Mahoney, during which he saw pictures of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. According to Mahoney, the photographs "really shook the old boy."[116] Nkrumah agreed immediately to prohibit the Soviets from using Ghana as a refueling stop for a USSR-Sudan-Ghana-Brazil-Cuba airlift. Additionally, he changed his mind and supported the American quarantine, telling Mahoney, "At last you are acting as a great nation."[117]

Nkrumah seethed with anger as he told the American ambassador that, by denying the existence of the missiles, Moscow had double-crossed not only Cuba, but also the entire nonaligned world.[118] In the presence of Mahoney, Nkrumah immediately telephoned Radio Ghana to express his displeasure with the commentary it had been running that was critical of America's Cuban policy, and he ordered the cancellation of any other such disparaging broadcasts.[119] This was a significant political victory for the Kennedy administration, especially because Ghana had signed another aviation assistance agreement with Moscow only three months earlier.[120]

There was also serious concern as to whether Senegal would allow the Soviets to refuel in Dakar. Senegal would have been a particularly desirable refueling stop for Moscow because of its relative proximity to Recife, Brazil. This would allow Tu-114s and Il-18s to cross the Atlantic. Furthermore, after the United States had successfully defused the earlier Moscow-Conakry-Havana Aeroflot route, Senegal agreed to allow such flights to be routed through Dakar.[121] In order to prevent a repeat performance during the Cuban missile crisis, American officials arranged to urgently deliver a letter from President Kennedy to Senegalese President Léopold Senghor. Senghor was awakened and came out of his bedroom in a dressing gown to receive the letter that asked that he deny landing permission to any Soviet aircraft flying en route to Cuba.[122] Later that morning, the Senegalese cabinet met to confer on the matter. Luckily for Washington, although Senegal had signed a bilateral air transport agreement with Czechoslovakia, it had not signed one with the Soviet Union, and the Senegalese therefore felt no obligation to extend such rights to Moscow. Because the Senegalese-Czechoslovak agreement called for only the allowance of a Prague to Dakar flight, and not onward traffic rights, it was decided that the Czechoslovaks could be denied the ability to act as a Soviet proxy in the airlift without violating the agreement between the two countries.

President Senghor, recognizing the importance of this issue to Washington, acceded to the request in a conversation with American Ambassador Phil Kaiser, who based his entire argument on Senghor's personal relationship with Kennedy.[123] In order to maintain the appearance of

Cold War neutrality, the Senegalese foreign minister announced that his government would prevent Dakar's airport from being used for military purposes, by either side, for the duration of the crisis. Such an announcement was, of course, directed at Moscow because Washington had no need to use Senegal's facilities.[124] Senghor's decision was so unpopular with some in his government that it contributed to an attempted coup against him two months later by the country's radical socialist and Soviet bloc-leaning prime minister, Mamadou Dia. The coup failed, but it underscored the risks Senghor, Touré, and Nkrumah took by supporting the United States.

By this point, nearly every African state had responded positively to Washington's demarche, with the significant exception of Morocco, whose response was still pending. This created the possibility that all of Washington's hard work throughout the rest of the continent would be for naught, as a flight pattern through Belgrade (Yugoslavia) and Rabat would eliminate the need to fly over the territory of any other African state. As with Ghana and Guinea, there was considerable reason for Washington to worry that the Moroccan government might not take its side. Morocco began receiving Soviet jet fighters in early 1961, and thereafter received additional Soviet military aid. In March 1962, Rabat signed a civil aviation air-transport agreement with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Moroccan king had made a formal request for the United States to evacuate its World War II–era military base in the country before the contracted December 31, 1963 date for doing so. Of even greater worry for Washington was a story that ran in *US News & World Report* only a few weeks before the Cuban missile crisis entitled, "New Threat-Red Bases in Morocco," which detailed how Soviet military personnel would soon replace the departing American troops on the military base. The story additionally reported that the Soviet Union had recently shipped more arms to Morocco and that the two countries were negotiating to construct a naval submarine base on the Moroccan coast.[125]

Convincing Rabat to deny the Soviets refueling permission would therefore seem to be a daunting task, made even more difficult by the fact that both King Hassan II and his foreign minister, Ahmed Balafrej, were traveling outside the capital when Kennedy made his quarantine speech and were inaccessible to American diplomats. In the absence of the king and foreign minister, Moroccan officials seemed unable to take decisive action. Meanwhile, State Department officials received intelligence reports that a Soviet plane was on its way to Morocco and continuing on to Cuba. American diplomats were frantic, with George McGhee exhorting, "This is very vital; one [Soviet plane making its way to Cuba] would be all that would be necessary" to dramatically change the flow of developments in the Caribbean.[126]

Ambassador John H. Ferguson cabled from Rabat, reporting that the opposition elements in Morocco were against the US quarantine and supported the Soviet position on Cuba. Ferguson believed that King Hassan II would be under considerable domestic pressure to side with Moscow during the crisis, and he suggested that a personal letter from President Kennedy could help to resolve the overflight dilemma.[127] The panic turned out to be unwarranted because King Hassan II returned to Rabat on October 27, and the personal letter from President Kennedy, as well as appeals from Ambassador Ferguson, persuaded the king to accede to Washington's request.[128] The planned Soviet airlift to Cuba had been effectively grounded before it could even lift off.

After the crisis in the Caribbean, the Kennedy administration sustained its policy of trying to enhance its civil aviation partnerships on the continent. It also continued to exert diplomatic pressure on African nations to discourage them from entering into civil aviation agreements with the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Washington sought to reward those African states that had sided with the United States during the crisis by increasing US aid to all of the key African states, except Ghana, in 1963.[129] This increase is even more noteworthy given that US foreign aid as a whole was reduced by $147.6 million from the previous year and aid to sub-Saharan Africa was slashed by $55.1 million.[130]

The Cuban missile crisis also left the United States in a quandary over whether to implement bilateral aviation agreements with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Washington had initialed an agreement with Moscow in August 1961, but it had still not been put into effect by the fall of 1962. Czechoslovakia, meanwhile, should have automatically been granted aviation rights in the United States by virtue of being an adherent to the Chicago Convention, but it had not yet sought such rights. Following the Cuban missile crisis, the United States understood that it would have a hard time continuing to pressure other states not to sign aviation agreements with Moscow and Prague if Washington itself consummated agreements with the communist countries; therefore, no such reciprocal agreements were enacted.[131] This decision, combined with the continued economic embargo against the ČSSR, prompted a frustrated Václav David to ask Dean Rusk why the US government was depriving its citizens of the best (Czech) beer in the world.[132]

Just like it had in the Congo two years prior, Moscow realized that its lack of air traffic rights in Africa had seriously handicapped Soviet bloc foreign policy for a second time. As a result, the Soviets redoubled their efforts to expand their foothold in the African civil aviation market. The combination of the renewed Soviet effort, along with the fact that it was politically untenable for nonaligned African nations to continue a policy of denying air service with the Soviet bloc while accepting service with

the West, ensured that the American advantage in African civil aviation would be short-lived. In December, Moscow had established a connection between the Soviet Union and Cuba on a Moscow-Belgrade-Rabat-Cape Verde-Barbados-Cuba route by placing some of its aircraft under Cuban registry in order to avoid the problem of Soviet nonadherence to the Chicago Convention.[133] By 1963, Guinea relented and allowed a Moscow-Conakry-Havana route, and the Soviets reconfigured their Tu-114 by reducing seating from 170 to 60 and adding 15 extra fuel tanks in order to allow for the possibility of nonstop flights between Murmansk and Havana on a flight pattern that went over the North Pole and down through the Atlantic Ocean between Iceland and Greenland. The reduced seating made the flight both expensive and dangerous—covering 5,800 nautical miles for a plane with a maximum range of 6,000 miles—but it eliminated Soviet dependency on African airports.[134]

Czechoslovakia's Disengagement from African Civil Aviation

Although Czechoslovakia finally signed an aviation agreement with Sudan in 1963, for the most part, its involvement in African civil aviation went into decline following the Cuban missile crisis. As Czechoslovakia's contract to provide civil aviation assistance to Guinea neared its expiration, Mamadou Cisse, the director of Air Guinée, sought to negotiate a contract extension. Negotiations continued through 1964 and into early 1965, but ended in failure, mainly because of Guinea's inability to live up to its financial obligations in other areas of Czechoslovak-Guinean bilateral relations. The last member of the Czechoslovak aviation mission to Guinea returned to Prague in July 1965 (the Soviets had left in 1963).[135] The Czechoslovak departure forced Air Guinée to temporarily suspend its services until the Guineans turned to the United States to replace Czechoslovak assistance for a second time and entered into a short-lived contract with Pan Am. Following Pan Am's departure, the Soviets would return to provide aviation assistance to Air Guinée in 1966–67. In 1970, ČSA ended its own route to Conakry. During this time, an Air Guinée flight from Conakry to Prague was forced to divert to Morocco due to bad weather and ended up crashing into a building while trying to land in Casablanca.[136] The crash was emblematic of the decline of Air Guinée's fortunes, which continually went downhill after Czechoslovakia ended its relationship with the airline. After limping along with a combination of Soviet, French, and American assistance for the next 37 years, the airline was finally dissolved in 2002.

Because the Czechoslovak Aero-145s performed well in Mali's desert conditions, the Malian government purchased three more in September

1965.[137] However, within a few years, political relations between Mali and the Soviet bloc became frayed (discussed in chapter 5) and Air Mali—disgruntled with the bigger Soviet turboprop planes which it found expensive to operate and maintain—started replacing them in its fleet with American built Boeing 727s. By the end of 1967, the last remaining Czechoslovak pilots, mechanics, and other aviation specialists left Mali.[138] Thereafter, although the Soviets remained in the dominant position of providing aid to the Malian air force (probably because the United States was not willing to do so), the United States and France took over predominant positions within Malian civil aviation, and Czechoslovakia's involvement in Malian aviation ended.

The amount of effort and resources that Czechoslovakia invested in African civil aviation, both to build ČSA's routes in Africa and to assist in the development of the national airlines of Guinea and Mali, is a good indicator of the level of interest Prague had in the continent. In the long run, however, undertaking to support the uneconomic civil aviation programs of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali only saddled the Soviet bloc with a heavy financial burden, and boomeranged when the African states became disillusioned with their unprofitable airlines and placed the blame on their Soviet and Czechoslovak benefactors. The Cuban missile crisis not only largely ended the Cold War competition for African civil aviation, but can also be seen as one of the pivotal chapters of the Soviet bloc's disengagement from Africa.

CHAPTER 5

The Decline of Czechoslovak Influence in Africa (1962–68)

Czechoslovakia's attempt to build intensive relations with the African continent, which continually intensified during the years 1955–61, began to decline in 1962. The reasons that Czechoslovakia's influence in Africa began to wane were many. An economic crisis in the ČSSR prompted officials to reexamine Czechoslovak foreign policy and especially its economic assistance expenditures to Africa. At the same time, African students returned from studying in the ČSSR disenchanted with their firsthand experience with communist society, while African governments became frustrated with the levels and types of aid they were receiving from the Soviet bloc, which was not meeting their expectations of significantly improving their economies or the living standards of their people. John F. Kennedy's election as president of the United States also played a significant role. Under his leadership, the United States dramatically increased its interest in Africa, which provided the Soviets and Czechoslovaks greater competition for influence on the continent. Likewise, a change in leadership in Moscow from Nikita Khrushchev to Leonid Brezhnev meant that while the United States was increasing its interest in Africa, the Soviet Union's was waning. By the middle of the decade, a series of coup d'états overthrew most of Czechoslovakia's closest African allies and replaced them with pro-Western governments which served to further weaken the ČSSR's influence on the continent. The final death blow for Czechoslovakia's African policy would prove to be the Prague Spring reform movement, which toppled from power the KSČ party leaders who had been responsible for implementing Czechoslovakia's involvement with Africa.

The American Offensive in Guinea

1961 began in a favorable manner for Soviet bloc influence in Guinea. In early February, Leonid Brezhnev, the head of the Supreme Soviet and

an increasingly important figure in the Kremlin power structure, visited Conakry and presented Sékou Touré with the Soviet version of the Nobel Prize, the Lenin Peace Prize (Fidel Castro was the other recipient that year). Touré publicly pronounced that his country and the Soviet Union held identical views on international affairs, prompting US Ambassador John Morrow to report back to Washington that "Guinea is now more firmly in the [Soviet] Bloc camp than it ever has been before."[1] After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Guinean leader affirmed to Fidel Castro on behalf of the Guinean people, "our complete solidarity and our total support for the cause of your revolution, which symbolizes the struggle for liberty of all dominated peoples."[2]

In the wake of news of Patrice Lumumba's assassination in the Congo, Touré blamed the United States for "this crime against the African people."[3] The official state-run Guinean press, Agence Guineenne de Presse, also voiced its displeasure at the new American government by writing that the honeymoon between the new Kennedy administration (which had been in office for only one month) and African nationalism was over, and the "new administration has dropped its mask... There is decidedly nothing new under the Yankee sky." The article continued by chastising the United States for pursing a policy of force and reaction that sought to resolve international crises "by menace and intimidation."[4] A few days later, another article, titled "The Syndicate of Assassins," went even further, telling its readers that political assassination was a Western concept foreign to Africa, speculating that the United States might be on the verge of launching World War III on the continent.[5]

The opinion in Washington was that the Kennedy administration should write off Guinea as being hopelessly lost to the Soviet orbit. It was widely believed that Moscow and Prague were building up Guinea as their "African Cuba" to serve as a beachhead to spread communist influence and subversion throughout the continent. Yet despite the extremely harsh accusations hurled at both his administration and him personally, President Kennedy was intrigued with the challenge of dislodging Soviet bloc influence from Guinea. Kennedy believed that Touré valued his reputation as an African nationalist too much to become a Soviet puppet.[6] Furthermore, Sékou Touré was a popular figure throughout Africa for standing up to de Gaulle, and he was not a man to write off if the United States wanted to achieve influence on the continent. With this in mind, the new American president decided to try to mend the rift in US-Guinean relations.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk promptly told the Guinean ambassador that Kennedy was "deeply disappointed" at what he felt was an "unwarranted and unjustified attack upon him from a national leader with whom he has hoped to have friendly relations," adding that during its one month

in power, the administration had supported the federal government of the Congo both morally and in the United Nations.[7] Kennedy also sent William Attwood as his new ambassador, with instructions to determine whether the Guinean president was an African nationalist or a communist ideologue.

Years later, Attwood reflected on the situation:

> The attitude of the State Department was to not do a thing—Guinea was beyond the pale; the French didn't want us to [do] anything; therefore we should take our cue from the French. Others, including the President, were against letting this place turn into an African cub . . . Our idea was to see what we could do. If these people were indeed neutralists, we might bring them around, give them a little aid, and show them that cooperating with the West would benefit them more than becoming a Soviet dependency. Never mind what the French thought.[8]

Attwood departed for Conakry intent on testing a theory that he shared with the new American president—that Third World leaders, "no matter how radical their rhetoric, would rather work with us [the United States] than the Soviets provided we dealt with them sympathetically and showed some understanding of their problems."[9] Attwood's first priority was to win Touré's confidence. He decided to take a low-key approach and to spend a lot of time simply listening to Touré's grievances in an attempt to show his sincerity and lack of a predetermined agenda. Attwood informed Touré that the new administration supported African neutrality, and unlike the Eisenhower administration, it would not have a problem with Guinea's relationship with the Soviet bloc, so long as he did not take orders from the Kremlin. He further pleased the Guineans by assuring them that Washington's policies toward Africa would no longer be decided by its European allies, citing the administration's recent vote against Portugal in support of Angolan self-determination as an example.[10]

Attwood wrote to Washington that Touré viewed the strained state of US-Guinean relations as a result of the Eisenhower administration's neglect of his country. Touré complained that Eisenhower had been the first head of state invited to visit independent Guinea, and this invitation had gone unanswered. Furthermore, with Paris and Washington ignoring his plight, Guinea was forced to turn to the Soviet bloc for assistance, which later became a reason for US reluctance to aid his country. Touré pressed upon Attwood the fact that Guinea's neutralism was sincere, and he would accept aid from anyone who was willing to help his country, adding that Guinea was "so poor [that it] cannot be concerned [with] ideology only action."[11] Attwood reported that Touré appreciated the changes that the Kennedy administration had made in its attitude toward

Africa and its readiness to make policy changes toward the continent. The Guinean president was ready to cooperate but felt that the ball was now in Washington's court.[12] The American ambassador saw the situation as "decidedly optimistic."[13]

A few days later, Kennedy met with the Guinea's new ambassador to the United States, Dr. Seydou Conte, when he presented his diplomatic credentials. After Kennedy reassured his guest that he was determined to change Washington's responsiveness to Guinea's needs, Conte responded that the Guinean government was well aware of Kennedy's personal interest in Africa and stated that he was confident that his administration would "take a broad view of African problems and work for their rightful decision."[14]

Kennedy then requested that Attwood return to Washington so they could compare notes on their respective meetings. Attwood concluded that Touré valued his reputation as a pan-Africanist leader "too much to tarnish it by becoming a Soviet stooge . . . and he had courage and integrity."[15] He spoke of the Guinean president's vision of African unity and the continent's role as a buffer between East and West. He quoted Touré as having said that the Guinea "revolution" had rejected atheism, class struggle, and the idea of an elite and all-powerful party, and therefore could never become communist.[16] Additionally, he inferred that Guinea was becoming disillusioned with the aid that it was receiving from the Soviet bloc, making "the time . . . ripe for an American initiative" to sway Conakry away from the Soviet sphere.[17] Attwood suggested that the United States initiate sending modest aid to Guinea as an act of good faith in support of African nonalignment. This proposal was strengthened after Attorney General Robert Kennedy returned from the Ivory Coast, where President Felix Houphouët-Boigny had counseled that Touré was not a communist but rather a well-respected African nationalist.[18] President Hastings Banda of Nyasaland (modern-day Malawi) had also told the American president that Touré was an "African individualist."[19]

Disregarding French President Charles de Gaulle's opinion that Sékou Touré was a communist who had renounced French aid in favor of Soviet and Czechoslovak friendship, Kennedy approved an aid program for Conakry and hammered out the details during his meeting with Attwood.[20] It was agreed that Guinea would be offered the construction of a dam on the Konkouré River that was capable of providing power for light industry, staffing for an English-language teacher program, food aid, a training program for Guinean administrative and technical personnel involved in industry and government, and a Peace Corps contingent.[21]

Touré gratefully and cheerfully accepted Washington's offer. Meanwhile, President Kennedy met with Ambassador Conte for the second time in two weeks to emphasize his immense interest in Guinea and

its development. Kennedy told the Guinean ambassador that he realized Conakry wished to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy, but he hoped that Touré would always remember their friendly Disneyland meeting and never forget that the United States was a country that wished to maintain friendly relations with Guinea.[22] The Soviets and Czechoslovaks now faced stiff competition for influence in Guinea.

Czechoslovakia's Declining Influence in Guinea

The first signs of tensions in Czechoslovak-Guinean relations would surface in 1960 and culminate in December 1961 with an open break between the Touré regime and the Soviet bloc. Initially, strains in the Czechoslovak-Guinean relationship were exclusively related to economics. On one hand, Guinea was growing frustrated by what it viewed as the unreliability of Czechoslovak tractors, trucks, and railway freight cars, which were sent without spare parts or mechanics to provide maintenance. This was a common occurrence with the vehicles Czechoslovakia sent to Africa. For example, of the 12 OT-64 SKOT armored personnel carriers later sold to Uganda, 5 were immobile within months as a result of a lack of spare parts for repairs. The busses that Czechoslovakia had sent to Guinea, for example, struggled on Guinea's dirt roads and were built without air conditioning—making them quite uncomfortable to ride in Guinea's tropical climate.[23] When combined with the infamous shipment of snowplows that the Soviet Union had sent to Guinea (which never left the airport, instead rusting in a corner of its grounds), the Guineans had good reason to criticize Soviet bloc mechanical assistance for being of lesser quality than what they were used to receiving from France.[24] Prague, on the other hand, was disenchanted with the amount of Czechoslovak exports that the Guinean economy was able to absorb and the growing imbalance of trade between the two states.

In March 1961, Touré abruptly announced that Guinea was again switching to a new currency, printed and minted in the United Kingdom, which would replace the bills and coins produced in Czechoslovakia. Publicly, the Guineans claimed that the measure was taken in order get their financial house in order prior to applying for membership in the International Monetary Fund. Left unstated was the fact that the Touré regime had no idea how many Czech printed sylis were in circulation and suspected Czechoslovakia of smuggling currency into the country for its embassy's use—a situation that Touré understandably felt was an affront to Guinean sovereignty, as well as its honor and prestige.[25] These developments occurred alongside consistently pessimistic reports from

Czechoslovak officials stationed in Conakry about the nature of the Touré regime and the increasingly successful attempts of the United States to expand its influence in the country vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.[26]

Guinea's Cold War orientation shifted further toward the West when, in December 1961, Touré declared Daniel Solod, the Soviet ambassador, persona non grata and declined future aid from Moscow after Solod was implicated in an attempt to intervene in Guinean domestic politics. Touré told Attwood that Solod was caught red-handed fraternizing with Guinean students and organizing Marxist "study groups," which Touré felt was an attempt to build a cadre of Soviet-minded dissidents.[27] Publicly, Touré said that these "study groups" were part of "a Marxist-Leninist group, based in Moscow, Paris, and Dakar, whose Machiavellian plan was to unleash a Marxist revolution in Guinea."[28]

After reviewing Soviet documents, historian Sergey Mazov concludes that the Solod affair was either a misunderstanding or an incident manufactured by the Guinean government as a pretext to shift relations away from the Soviet bloc and toward Washington.[29] Likewise, there is nothing in the Czechoslovak archives to suggest that either Moscow or Prague had thoughts of trying to overthrow Touré. In all likelihood, the incident stemmed from a combination of factors. The Guinean economy was struggling, and Touré was dissatisfied with the direction of economic relations with the Soviet bloc. At the same time, he probably genuinely feared the potential organized subversion against his regime by the Soviet bloc states. The Solod affair allowed Touré to pin the blame for Guinea's sluggish economy on the Soviet bloc (thus deflecting domestic criticism of his own leadership), while simultaneously providing him a way to demonstrate to the United States that he was serious about reestablishing political and economic ties to the West. This incident caused the Soviet bloc to reassess its perception of Sékou Touré as a reliable ally and created what Mazov terms the "Guinean syndrome"—which caused the Soviet Union to "adopt a more pragmatic policy toward 'progressive' African countries and be less inclined to invest heavily when there were dubious prospects for receiving both economic and political dividends."[30]

Prague also became victim of the Guinean syndrome. In April 1962, the KSČ politburo adopted a resolution altering Czechoslovakia's policy toward Guinea. The revised policy called for examining relations with Guinea more objectively on economic, rather than political, grounds. It was agreed that net loss on trade with Guinea for 1962 was not to exceed 7 million Kčs, and the KSČ leadership voted to reject Czechoslovak participation in a joint Soviet-Guinean proposal to build an aluminum smelter and hydroelectric plant on the Konkouré River.[31] In June, Touré complained to a visiting Czechoslovak trade delegation that Prague's attitude toward his country had cooled considerably in recent months. The

delegation returned home, reporting that the Guinean president was jealous of Czechoslovakia's expanding relations with Mali and Ghana.[32]

Touré Visits the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis

With Touré now distancing himself from the Soviet bloc, Kennedy invited the Guinean president on an official state visit to Washington. A Bureau of Intelligence report informed Kennedy of something that he already knew—Touré was one of the most influential men on the African continent, and Guinea itself occupied "a symbolic importance out of all proportion to its size."[33] The American president was determined to take all measures to assure leaving a favorable impression with his important guest. Touré arrived in Washington on October 10, 1962, and became the last head of state personally greeted by Kennedy at the Washington National Airport. During their one-hour discussion, Touré spoke of his difficulties with the Soviet bloc, and his country's need for practical agricultural and economic assistance. President Kennedy assured Touré of his willingness to be helpful in any way he could, and the two men agreed that a free, stable, and unified Africa was in the best interest of both countries.[34] Following their formal meeting, Kennedy took Touré upstairs to the residential quarters of the White House, where he was introduced to Jacqueline and Caroline Kennedy and offered a glass of sherry. This unusual gesture made a dramatic impact on Touré because he was more impressed by being received by the president's family than he was by the ceremonial honor guards in Moscow or Prague.[35] It was a short but successful visit. William Attwood wrote of the encounter, "Touré was captivated by the Kennedy charm—a blend of attentiveness, humor, frankness, and easy grace—and thereafter regarded him as a friend he could confide in."[36]

Touré's state visit to the United States proved to occur at a propitious time, two weeks before the Cuban missile crisis flared up. Without a doubt, the state that Washington feared was most likely to consent to Moscow's request was Guinea. Fortunately for the United States, flush with goodwill from his recent visit with Kennedy, Touré personally rejected the Soviet request to refuel their aircraft in Conakry before Attwood even raised Washington's objection.[37] JFK's courting of Sékou Touré thereby paid immediate and tangible benefits to the United States.

The second half of 1963 marked the high point of US-Guinean relations. In May 1963, Touré affirmed to Ambassador Attwood that "the Guinean people now regard America as their best friend."[38] By October, Moscow was so out of favor in Guinea that members of the Soviet embassy began to initiate probing conversations with American diplomats in an

attempt to ascertain Touré's intentions.[39] For Khrushchev, Touré's refusal to allow Soviet planes to use Conakry airport during the Cuban missile crisis was the final straw, and in 1963, Moscow decided to stop aid to Guinea.[40]

From 1958 through 1961, Czechoslovakia invested more resources in Guinea on a per capita basis than any other Soviet bloc state, despite having reservations about the economic feasibility of doing so. Its investments in Guinea were jeopardized by the fact that Guinea was gradually shifting its allegiance from East to West. As a result, from 1962 onward, Prague's relations with Guinea were principally concentrated on the question of repayment of the loans that it had extended to Conakry. Czechoslovak exports to Guinea steadily declined from 29.4 million Kčs in 1963, to 14 million Kčs in 1964, and a mere 9.4 million Kčs in 1965.[41] In 1962, there were 91 Czechoslovak technicians stationed in Guinea (excluding diplomatic and intelligence personnel). Most of these individuals worked either for Air Guinée or in the medical profession. This figure fell to 58 in 1963, 38 in 1964, and after the expiration of a contract between Czechoslovakia and Air Guinée, to only 14 by 1966.[42] Relations deteriorated to the point that Guinea closed its embassy in Prague in late 1964. The relationship between the Soviet bloc and Guinea was dependent on Soviet and Czechoslovak willingness to expend considerable resources in pursuit of political goals, but once Touré had turned toward the United States, both Moscow and Prague decided that the economic cost of aiding Conakry was no longer worth the minimal returns.

Stagnation of Relations with Mali

From the fall of 1960 until the summer of 1962, Czechoslovakia was arguably Mali's closest international ally. The Czechoslovak government had provided Mali with a large amount of military, security, medical, aviation, education, and economic assistance. Some of this aid was given free of charge, and the rest was funded through a 72 million Kčs loan that Prague extended to the Malian government. In return, Mali sent Czechoslovakia 20,000 tons of peanuts—almost half of the amount that it exported—making the ČSSR Mali's number one trading partner.[43] However, by mid-1962, both sides began to sour on this relationship.

Malian interest in maintaining such close relations with Czechoslovakia lessened as a result of a combination of improved relations with the United States and frustration with the realization that Soviet bloc aid was not as altruistic as Bamako had originally believed. Improvement in US-Malian relations began after the conclusion of the Belgrade Non-Aligned Nations summit during the first week of September 1961. The conference attendees sent delegations to inform the leaders of the Soviet Union and the

United States of the meeting's proceedings. India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah were selected to deliver the message to Khrushchev, while Mali's Modibo Keïta and Indonesia's Sukarno were picked to visit Kennedy. After the formal meeting between the three heads of state, Kennedy invited Keïta to return for an informal one-on-one meeting the following day. Kennedy was eager to meet with the Malian leader, not only in order to improve relations between the United States and Mali, but also because Krishna Menon, India's ambassador to the United Nations, had recently told US officials that Keïta was one of the few participants of the Belgrade conference who "made sense," and as such, Kennedy should take the opportunity to get to know him, since Keïta's "influence in Africa could be constructive."[44]

By all accounts, the meeting between Kennedy and Keïta was a success.[45] Keïta recalled "with some emotion" how his country was in a dire predicament following the dissolution of the Mali Federation. He recalled how the Eisenhower administration was initially unwilling to aid his country, and when it did eventually offer aid, it was slow to be delivered. This, he explained, was why Mali was so dependent on aid from the Soviet bloc—his country had first requested assistance from the West, but aid from the East was sent more quickly and in greater volume. He assured Kennedy that the discrepancy in aid received was not indicative of any particular sympathy for communist states vis-à-vis the West. "When one's country faces serious problems, one has no choice but to accept the readiest available means of coping with them" the Malian president perceptively noted, adding, "Mali is not for the East or the West but will remain absolutely faithful to its policy of nonalignment." The two leaders also had a frank conversation about the complexity of decolonization—and how Kennedy and his administration opposed colonialism but were in an uncomfortable bind because of their close relations with the European colonial powers. The conversation allowed the two men to gain a greater understanding of the goals and challenges that each faced in navigating their countries through the complex and intertwining worlds of decolonization and the Cold War.[46]

After Guinea's gravitation back to the Western orbit—following the expulsion of Soviet ambassador Solod—Kennedy administration officials hoped that Guinea's rapidly improving relations with Washington would rub off on its northern neighbor, Mali. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams noted that "Mali seems to be the only country . . . [in Africa] where the communist bloc has so far penetrated seriously."[47] After visiting the country, Williams concluded that "although Mali officials are inclined philosophically more to the East because they see the East as more anti-colonial . . . I believe that they are more attached to the society of the West. I am convinced that Mali is not lost to the

Free World."[48] The Malian government's frequent criticism of Western colonialism, and tacit US support for the wars in Algeria and Angola, Washington's opposition to communist China's inclusion in the United Nations, and US aggression toward the Castro government in Cuba, all led many to question Williams' assessment. While over half of Mali's exports were directed toward the Soviet bloc, and Soviet and Czech economic aid was approximately five times larger than what it received from the West, the Kennedy administration was not willing to write off Mali as a lost cause to communism as the Eisenhower administration had previously done with Guinea. Instead, it perceptively viewed Keïta's government as an intensely nationalist pan-African state that rejected Soviet Marxism in favor of pursuing socialist economic ideas modified to suit African circumstances.[49] The Kennedy administration believed it could replicate the success it had experienced in Guinea, if rather than overreacting to Mali's seeming tilt toward the Soviet bloc by cutting the country's aid package, it instead stayed the course, showed interest in helping Mali modernize its economy, and waited for the communists to wear out their welcome in Bamako.

The Kennedy administration instituted gradual increases in US aid to Mali, but this was never a large part of the strategy to gain influence in the country. In fact, the administration was cognizant of limiting economic aid to Bamako in order to avoid creating the impression that it was merely greasing the squeaky wheel in the Cold War. Combined economic and military aid to Mali during the Kennedy presidency never surpassed $4 million in any fiscal year.[50] The State Department believed that Mali's "ideological outlook combined with a badly distorted image of the US" was the root cause of the country's lurch toward the East, and as a result, the United States focused its efforts in Mali on cultural exchanges consisting mainly of training programs and offering Malian students scholarships to attend universities in the United States.[51] Kennedy and his advisors realized that it was unrealistic to try to preclude Soviet bloc influence in the country; they understood that it would be counterproductive if it appeared that their actions in Mali stemmed from such an objective.

The Kennedy administration pursued two programs in particular that played important roles in increasing US influence in Mali. The first was a US Agency for International Development (USAID) program to improve the quality of Mali's livestock industry.[52] The Kennedy State Department realized that conditions in Mali were such that it was unlikely to ever fully industrialize, and therefore, aid aimed at its traditional trade in live animals to the coastal areas of Africa would not only be more likely to have a greater long-term impact than Soviet bloc industrial aid, but would also help integrate the Malian economy with Western-leaning countries, such as the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Senegal, and away from the

Soviet bloc. The second program was for the famous 101st Airborne Division of the US Army to train a battalion of Malian parachute troops. The Malian government was concerned about the ability of its military to control the vast, sparsely settled territory and uncontrolled nomadic populations of the Sahara Desert. Since Keïta suspected the French of supporting the nomadic tribes against him, he was unwilling to turn to the French for this sort of assistance. However, neither the Soviet Union nor Czechoslovakia had planes capable of delivering parachute troops and were therefore unable to satisfy this Malian request. By offering to fill the void and supply the training, the United States was able to prevent a communist monopoly on military assistance to Mali and gain a foothold into a favored program of the president.[53]

Such American efforts were effective, and by mid-February 1963, Keïta called the ambassadors from Eastern Europe into his office to complain that the scope and conditions of aid from the Soviet bloc was inferior to that from the West, in both quality and in economic efficiency. He also complained that the salaries Mali was asked to pay Czechoslovak technicians were much higher than those paid to Chinese experts (who worked for local salaries).[54] After this, relations between Mali and Czechoslovakia steadily declined, and in November 1963, Bamako announced that it was closing its embassy in Czechoslovakia for economic reasons. Before leaving Prague, Aboulaye Maïga, the departing Malian ambassador, complained to his French counterpart that the majority of Czechoslovak aid programs to his country were either not met or were impaired in their implementation.[55]

From the mid-1960s onward, economic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Mali reached a freezing point. In 1965, the politburo classified the status of the relationship as one of "stagnation, even a touch of mortification."[56] Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had both overestimated the economic possibilities of building relations with Keïta's regime and had literally nothing but peanuts to show for their efforts to court Mali to their side of the Cold War. The largest project that Prague had initiated in Mali, a project to build a textile factory, had gone bankrupt and was abandoned in September 1964. By mid-1965, Mali had only paid back 4.2 million of the 72 million Kčs loan it had taken from Czechoslovakia. Disappointed by the lack of economic and political return on their Malian investments, the Soviet bloc dramatically reduced its aid programs to Bamako. In August 1965, the KSČ politburo passed a resolution to stop additional aid to Mali until it began to repay its loans from Czechoslovakia.[57]

In the early 1960s, there were several dozen Czechoslovak experts working in Mali, but by the end of 1967, this had been reduced to only 11.[58] The number of Malians studying in Czechoslovakia had fell from

a high of 86 in 1962 to 5 by 1969. In 1961, the turnover of trade had been nearly 40 million Kčs, but by 1968, it had fallen below 2 million Kčs. In 1967, Mali abandoned its Czechoslovak printed currency and rejoined the Franc zone. At the end of the 1960s, Mali had only paid back 64 percent of the loan that Czechoslovakia had given it at the start of the decade.[59] Relations between Czechoslovakia and Mali had deteriorated nearly as quickly as they had formed and had sunk so low that when Modibo Keïta was overthrown in a military coup in November 1968, Czechoslovakia barely noticed. With Keïta now replaced by a pro-Western military regime, Czechoslovakia closed its embassy in Bamako in October 1969.[60]

African Students in Czechoslovakia

Although some Africans, such as Guinea's future president, Sékou Touré, and Nigeria's future minister of finance, Festus Okotie-Eboh, had attended university in Czechoslovakia earlier, large numbers of Africans did not begin studying in the country until 1956. By 1960, four times more Africans attended university in Czechoslovakia than did in the Soviet Union (285 Africans studied in Czechoslovakia compared to 72 in the Soviet Union).[61] On a per capita basis, Czechoslovakia hosted considerably more African students than either of the Cold War superpowers in the early 1960s. Whereas in Czechoslovakia there was approximately one African student for every 7,500 Czechoslovak citizens, there was only one African student per 92,000 Americans in the United States, and one African student per every 415,000 Soviets in the Soviet Union.[62]

In May 1961, the Czechoslovak KSČ voted to establish a special university in Prague for students from the Third World, at which all African students in the city were concentrated. Like Friendship University (later renamed Patrice Lumumba University) in Moscow, and Karl Marx University in Leipzig, East Germany, the University of 17th of November (named after the date on which the Nazis forced the closure of Czechoslovak universities in 1939) in Prague offered round trip airfare, free room and board and tuition, and a subsidy for food to developing world students in the hope that after graduation, they would return to their home countries to become the professional class of their newly independent country, while espousing the virtues of a communist society and alliance with the Soviet bloc.

The University of 17th of November opened with an enrollment of 1,000 students in 1961 and had 4,000 students by 1965—roughly half of which were Africans.[63] Students enrolled at the university studied the Czech language, international relations, economics, economic management and planning, public administration, sociology, the history of

non-European cultures, and education planning. Depending on the student's interest, they could also study natural and technical sciences, engineering, medicine, or agriculture. Africans typically came to the University of 17th of November in one of three ways. Most were selected because their home country had signed educational assistance agreements with Czechoslovakia under which the Czechoslovak government agreed to provide a set number of scholarships. By these means students from Mali, Guinea, Sudan, and Somalia alone made up approximately 40 percent of the Africans studying in the ČSSR. A second source of Africans studying in Czechoslovakia were young members of African national liberation movements that were supported by the Czechoslovak government. Students from Algeria, Angola, South Africa, and Northern and Southern Rhodesia came to Prague through this method. Finally, a third group had begun their studies in the West but were disenchanted there and ended up transferring to the University of 17th of November through the help of local communists in Western Europe. The Czechoslovak government estimated that 60 percent of the African students enrolled at the University of the 17th of November were from the "sub-national bourgeoisie" class (what we might refer to as the middle class), 23 percent were from the laboring class, and only 17 percent were from affluent bourgeoisie or ruling class families (which included family members of both Sékou Touré and Haile Selassie).[64]

English and French were the languages of instruction, and much of the Czechoslovak faculty was engaged in research on technical assistance to developing countries. One significant difference between the University of 17th of November and Lumumba University was that a substantial number of Czechoslovaks who were destined for careers as technical experts, translators, or diplomats in the developing world attended the university as classmates of the foreign students from Africa and Asia.[65]

In order to improve the image of African students studying in Czechoslovakia and propagandize to the Czechoslovak public the purported success of the University of 17th of November, in 1963 the KSČ published a book entitled *Od Limpopa k Vltavě* (*From Limpopo to the Vltava*, a reference to the Limpopo River which runs through South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique and the Vltava River which runs through Prague). The book told the stories of 12 Africans who had gone to university in Prague. It opens with the author telling the reader about a conversation he overheard between two Africans in London. Since one was from Francophone Africa and the other from Anglophone Africa, they conversed in Czech—their only common language, since both had attended university in Prague. Like all communist publications, the book gives a highly idealized account of the 12 Africans' time in Czechoslovakia, without any reference to racist incidents or any

other negative experiences the students may have had. According to the book, all of the students returned to their home countries with positive impressions of communism and to become productive members of society—with the exception of one, who returned to his native Congo only to become a victim of Belgian and Katangan atrocities.[66]

The reality for African students in the ČSSR was quite different. Few in the closed and isolated Czechoslovak society of the late 1950s and 1960s had much interaction with foreigners, particularly those with darker skin, and racist incidents were commonplace for Africans studying in Prague. Studying the Czech language only made matters worse, as the more the African students learned Czech, the more they began to understand the insults hurled at them. Samson Mazerah, a Kenyan who studied at the University of 17th of November, said that Africans studying in Czechoslovakia were treated "as less than human beings" and were often beaten by police "for no apparent reason." Mazerah returned to Kenya before completing his studies because he found it impossible to interact with the racism of Czechoslovak citizens.[67]

The most serious incident involved Frank Chibeza, a Zambian student who in February 1964 fell off a train en route from Prague to Poděbrady and was seriously injured. Chibeza's Zambian classmates claimed that he was thrown from the train by a racist attacker. Czechoslovak authorities, however, claimed that Chibeza had been in the hospital receiving treatment for "nervous disorders" prior to the incident, but "arbitrarily left"—so they blamed the incident on Chibeza's own mental illness. When Chibeza regained consciousness the following month, he, too, reported being the victim of racial violence, but this was again dismissed by Czechoslovak investigators. The Zambian students then asked to be provided air transportation back to their home country, claiming that the Czechoslovak state had failed to provide them with adequate protection against such racist attacks, but Czechoslovak authorities denied this request. The situation began to take on Cold War ramifications when the Zambian students then turned to the British embassy in Prague for help in returning to Zambia. In the end, the Zambian Ministry of Education paid for five of its nationals to return home from Prague after quitting their studies in Czechoslovakia, but the racial overtones of the incident created stress in Czechoslovak-Zambian bilateral relations.[68]

The Czechoslovak government attempted to downplay or ignore African students' complaints of racist episodes as isolated incidents caused by a small minority of hooligans within Czechoslovak society. This briefly changed in the spring of 1968 when the overall loosening of political restrictions during the Prague Spring led to the issue being publically discussed within Czechoslovak media, but this proved to be short lived.[69] Like the Zambian students, Mazerah and others found it difficult to

return to their home countries. "If you tell [Czechoslovak authorities] you want to leave because you cannot stand the treatment they will not let you leave," he later complained.[70]

In addition to racial tensions, animosity toward African students also stemmed from the fact that they generally received larger housing accommodations and greater meat allotments than their Czechoslovak classmates. The provision of stipends in the form of "tuzex vouchers" meant that foreign students also had more spending money, which afforded them the ability to purchase luxury foreign goods unobtainable for ordinary Czechoslovaks.[71] These factors contributed to their relative popularity with Czechoslovak girls, which in turn fueled additional resentment toward the African students. According to Ludovic Chancel, the French ambassador to Czechoslovakia, possession of tuzex vouchers made African students the "prey of young [Czechoslovak] beauties" and the target of violently jealous Czechoslovak men.[72] Incidents of Czechoslovaks violently attacking African students in Prague were frequent enough that they became the subject of Associated Press reports and necessitated editorials in the state-run press demanding that such behavior toward foreign students cease.[73] Additionally, many Czechoslovaks had resentment against African students because they blamed their own worsening living standards, once the highest in the Soviet bloc, on the fact that their government was spending so much money on foreign assistance programs.

African students came into conflict not only with the local population, but also with the communist government. After being taught the art of mass demonstration by their Czechoslovak hosts, African students frequently organized their own protests in Prague. In some instances they protested the policies of Western governments outside of their embassies, in which case the demonstrations were compatible with Czechoslovak foreign policy, even if the KSČ was wary of its lack of control over the students' actions. In other cases, however, they protested against the conditions of communist society itself: poor living conditions, restrictions on travel and freedom of speech, and racist incidents. By voicing their displeasure with the communist status quo (something which few Czechoslovak or Soviet citizens dared to do) African students in the Soviet bloc became what historian Maxim Matusevich referred to as the "de facto conduits of dissent. They had more freedom of expression and travel (and quite often more money) than their hosts, and many of them arrived from postcolonial settings reverberating with spirited political debates."[74] This caused the KSČ leadership to fear that African students were, in effect, importing dissent into Czechoslovak society.

As evidenced by the case of Frank Chibeza, the presence of African students in Czechoslovakia would also periodically complicate Prague's bilateral relations with various African states. In the wake of the Solod

affair, for example, Guinean authorities requested that the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany arrest several dozen Guinean students studying in their countries and repatriate them back to Guinea for interrogation. Although the communist countries initially refused, they later complied after the Guinean government threatened to sever cultural ties and withdraw all Guinean students from the Soviet bloc.[75] Czechoslovak authorities also faced the dilemma of how to deal with Nigerian students during the Biafran War. In 1967, 26 of the 40 Nigerian students enrolled at the University of 17th of November were from Eastern Nigeria, supported their region's bid for independence from the federal government, and demanded to be allowed to create their own Biafran student association. Several incidents of violence occurred between Nigerian students who supported the federal government and those who backed Biafra's independence. The Czechoslovak government did its best to curtail the activism of Biafra's supporters in order to not impair the bilateral relations between Prague and Lagos, but this proved difficult during the days of the Prague Spring.[76]

A great many, quite possibly the majority, of African students who studied in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc left Eastern Europe disenchanted with their firsthand experience with communist society. Madhi Ismael, a Somali student who was expelled from the University of 17th of November and thereafter accepted a scholarship to finish his studies in West Germany, told the German media: "After studying economics and political planning for four years, I came to realize that communism has no place in Africa. In Somali[a] [*sic*] we fought the British and French imperialists but now I have learned that the Communists are the greatest imperialists. They are the worst." Ismael told reporters that after completing his education in West Germany, he planned to return to Somalia "to become an anti-Communist politician."[77] William Attwood, the American ambassador to Guinea, later recalled that the African students "hated the cold dark winters, missed their families, resented the political indoctrination and police surveillance, complained about wasting a year learning a useless Slavic language, got into trouble over girls and accused their hosts of being racists."[78] According to Attwood, each week three or four African students studying in Czechoslovakia came to the American embassy in Prague asking about the possibility of obtaining scholarships to finish their studies in the West.[79] In an open letter published in the magazine *Forum zahraničníh studentů* [*Foreign Student Forum*], Meer Hassan Allyho, a Malian student who studied in Prague, stated that the "large majority" of Africans who studied in Czechoslovakia left the country disillusioned by their time behind the Iron Curtain, adding "we can safely say with conviction that we gained a lot, because we saw Marxism in practice."[80] Abdoulaye Maïga, the Malian ambassador to Czechoslovakia, corroborated this by telling Czechoslovak authorities that an estimated

80–90 percent of Malian students who studied in Prague returned home with “anti-communist” mindsets.[81]

Ethiopian national Makonnen Fantaw said of his time studying in Czechoslovakia, “Altogether, we Africans were not exactly popular. On the streets parents would warn their children not to come near us.” He complained about African students being forced into mandatory labor assignments in a factory or on a farm in between semesters, as well as being required to participate in compulsory demonstrations in support of communist foreign policy; “We demonstrated so often that I can’t remember all of the causes.” Fantaw, who was in Prague to study to became a veterinarian, said that he eventually had to quit his studies in Czechoslovakia because even his veterinary textbooks spent more time discussing Marxist-Leninist theory than veterinary medicine. “All I wanted was to become a veterinarian; I decided to leave at the first opportunity.”[82]

Matusevich has noted that as a propaganda weapon African students in the Soviet bloc “often jammed and even backfired.”[83] This became well understood by Czechoslovak authorities. In July 1965, Deputy Foreign Minister Ján Pudlák told the foreign affairs committee of the Czechoslovak national assembly of the “bitter irony” that King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, after sending his first three sons to study respectively in Moscow, Beijing, and Prague, had sent the fourth to university in Paris in order to ensure that that at least one became a socialist.[84] A Ministry of Foreign Affairs report from 1965 stated that the political effect of having African students study in Czechoslovakia had not met expectations. According to the report, African students who came to Prague lost contact with political developments in Africa and got too accustomed to the “easy life” in Eastern Europe, so, as a consequence, they lost their motivation for studying or returning to Africa to lead socialist revolutions in their homeland. The report viewed the policy of hosting African students as a political liability, since the influx of African students in Prague led to conflicts between them and Czechoslovak citizens, and tensions between Czechoslovakia and African governments.[85] From the mid-1960s onward, the number of African students studying at the University of 17th of November began to decline, dipping below 500 by 1967.[86] The effectiveness of providing free scholarships to students from the Third World was debated during the Prague Spring reform movement of 1968 and again further curtailed. Finally, the University of 17th of November closed for good in 1974.

Czechoslovakia’s “Inverted Economic Miracle” and Africa Policy

From the end of World War II until 1960, the Czechoslovak economy grew at an impressive rate of an average of 8 percent per year, and its

annual industrial output increased fourfold.[87] Such growth resulted in substantial increases in the living standards of the population and gave Prague the means to pursue its policy of increasing its influence in Africa through its foreign aid programs and the expansion of its diplomatic network. However, beginning in 1960, the Czechoslovak economy started to diminish in its levels of efficiency. Greater decline took place in 1961 and 1962, and by 1963, the Czechoslovak economy was experiencing a negative growth rate of 3 percent, leading to what economists have labeled an "inverted economic miracle."[88]

The reasons for Czechoslovakia's economic stagnation were many, but the most prominent causes were the structural inefficiency of the Soviet-style command economy, poor weather conditions adversely effecting agricultural production, a dramatic decrease in trade with China as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, and the growing gap between Czechoslovakia's industrial output and its relative lack of domestic raw materials.[89] Prague's exit from the China market was particularly significant because it left Czechoslovakia with a large stock of highly specialized industrial equipment that was of no interest to other countries, since it was too sophisticated for African markets and too primitive for Western ones.

The factor which ultimately had the greatest impact on Prague's Africa policy was the raw material trade barrier and its impact on Czechoslovakia's foreign trade balance. With its industrial production greatly exceeding its own natural resources, Czechoslovakia became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union to supply it with raw materials. From 1951–55, for example, Czechoslovakia received 99.5 percent of its aluminum, 83 percent of its crude oil, 82 percent of its copper, 77 percent of its iron ore, and many other resources from the Soviet Union.[90] But as Moscow's own aid programs to the developing world expanded in the late 1950s, it became progressively less willing to supply such materials to Czechoslovakia, instead preferring to use the materials for its own growing industrial economy, or to provide them to the recently decolonized states whom the Soviets were trying to court to their side of the Cold War. This was most vividly demonstrated by the fact that Moscow sold its oil to Prague for twice the price that it charged many other states.[91] This, in turn, forced Czechoslovakia to import raw materials from the West, which adversely impacted its trade balance, since Western Europe was uninterested in trading for the substandard products manufactured in Czechoslovakia. This perfect storm of factors, therefore, squeezed the Czechoslovak economy on all sides.

At the same time that Czechoslovakia's economy was in such dire straits at home, the ČSSR government began to realize that many of the economic projects it had launched in Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in Africa had been near complete failures. One such project that came under the scrutiny of the KSČ party leadership was a large

experimental farm in Ciaffa, Ethiopia, in which Czechoslovak agricultural experts were working to introduce soybeans and other Czechoslovak crops to Ethiopia while teaching so-called progressive agricultural techniques to their Ethiopian counterparts. Operating the farm had led to considerable financial losses for Prague, so in March 1962, the politburo voted to discontinue the project. However, because the farm lay on land owned by Emperor Selassie's son, Crown Prince Asfaw Wossen Taffari, and was a pet project of the prince, closing it proved to be a complicated political situation, and as such, Czechoslovakia continued to fund the project until the late 1960s.[92] In neighboring Somalia, the economic situation in Czechoslovakia also forced a reassessment of Prague's plans to provide agricultural and educational aid to that country. "Eventually we came to the conclusion that our economic situation was not so rosy, so we could not afford to build schools in Somalia, and the project was abolished" remembered Jan Ledl, the Czechoslovak ambassador in Mogadishu at the time.[93]

Creating additional economic problems for Prague was the fact that few, if any, of the African countries Czechoslovakia had extended lines of credit to were paying back their loans. By August 1962, African governments owed Czechoslovakia 531 million Kčs in outstanding loans.[94] The net result was that Czechoslovakia's African policies were becoming a significant economic drain on the country at the precise time that its own economy was in turmoil. Because of this, Prague began to dramatically scale back its aid programs to Africa and switched the emphasis of its Africa policy from providing subsidized aid to ideologically compatible allies (such as Guinea, Mali, and Ghana) to seeking business relationships with African states that could pay for Czechoslovak products in cash, and hence help reduce the ČSSR's trade deficit.

Czechoslovakia's declining interest in Africa and shifting focus away from prioritizing relations with radical states, and toward building relationships with more conservative states is well demonstrated by its involvement with Congo-Brazzaville (also known as the Republic of the Congo). In August 1963, the overtly pro-French regime of Fulbert Youlou, the first ruler of independent Congo-Brazzaville, was ousted from power by a popular uprising led by labor movements. Alphonse Massamba-Débat replaced Youlou, and like Touré, Nkrumah, and Keïta, embraced "scientific socialism" as his country's constitutional ideology. Massamba-Débat forced France to close its military base and remove its troops from Congo-Brazzaville, while welcoming relations with communist states.

Prague established both diplomatic and economic relations with the Massamba-Débat government, but in comparison to its earlier efforts to establish close relations with Guinea, Mali, and Ghana, its efforts to befriend Congo-Brazzaville were decidedly lukewarm. When a Congolese

ministerial delegation visited Prague in March 1964 to request financial aid and weapons to equip a 2,000-man army, the Czechoslovaks immediately ruled out financial assistance and were evasive about the possibility of providing Brazzaville with weapons.[95] Similarly, although Prague opened a diplomatic outpost in Brazzaville, it took more than 19 months after Massamba-Débat came to power to do so, and it assigned only one diplomat to the office.[96]

By the end of 1964, analysts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered Congo-Brazzaville to be one of the most advanced socialist governments in sub-Saharan Africa.[97] Yet, unlike a few years earlier, when Czechoslovakia eagerly provided Guinea, Mali, and Ghana with substantial free or discounted economic and military assistance, Prague was reluctant to do so for Congo-Brazzaville. As a result of the Guinean syndrome and its stagnating economy, Prague was now viewing its potential relationships in Africa through an economic lens that made Congo-Leopoldville much more appealing than Congo-Brazzaville. The central reason behind the ČSSR's careful approach toward the new regime in Brazzaville was the fear that warmly embracing the Massamba-Débat regime would adversely impact Prague's efforts to normalize relations with Mobutu's government across the border in Congo-Leopoldville, which held much greater economic promise.[98] This was quite a turnaround from only a few years earlier, when Czechoslovakia stood ready to supply weapons to the Stanleyville rebels in their fight against the central government in Congo-Leopoldville.

Impact of Khrushchev's Fall from Power in the Soviet Union

In October 1964, Nikita Khrushchev's 11-year rule over the Soviet Union came to an end when he was stripped of his positions within both the communist party and the Soviet state and forced into retirement. Although the reasons for Khrushchev's dismissal included failures in the realm of foreign affairs, they were primarily domestic in nature, and his policies toward Africa were not a significant factor in his downfall.[99] Nonetheless, Khrushchev's replacement by Leonid Brezhnev did have important ramifications for Soviet African policy and caused ripple effects in Prague's policy toward the continent.

Even prior to Khrushchev's ouster, Soviet failures in Congo and Guinea had prompted the Kremlin to reassess and scale back its commitments to Africa. Under Khrushchev's leadership, the Soviet Union had sought to take advantage of decolonization to increase its influence in Africa, primarily in order to export its socialist development model to states like Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Moscow intended to use the West

African states as models to convince the rest of the Third World that Soviet aid could help modernize postcolonial states more quickly and efficiently than could the continuation of neo-colonial relationships with the West.

This strategy was partially successful in the 1950s when, under Eisenhower, the United States was not overly interested in expending much effort or resources to counter Soviet efforts in Guinea. However, by 1961, Kennedy had replaced Eisenhower as president and believed that the Cold War could be won or lost in Africa.[100] Moscow found it much more difficult to have success competing against the activist Kennedy administration—which had distanced itself from the African policies of its NATO allies—than it did against the indifferent Eisenhower administration, which had allowed the United States to remain shackled with the stigma of alliances with the European colonial powers.

Furthermore, the American response to the Congo crisis showed Moscow that its attempts to further its influence in Africa would run the risk of military confrontation with the West. This was a risk that Khrushchev was not willing to take, particularly because the Congo crisis had exposed the logistical limitations of the Soviet military and its relative inferiority compared to the United States, which unlike the USSR, had demonstrated an ability to project its military power to the heart of Africa. Combined with the rising costs of competing against the Kennedy administration's ambitious outreach to Africa, failure in the Congo caused the Soviet Union to reassess its Africa policy and begin a gradual disengagement from the continent between 1961 and 1964.[101] American interest, or the lack thereof, in Africa directly correlated to "emboldening or restraining Soviet actions" on the continent.[102]

As a result, the Soviet Union had already began to decrease the amount of resources that it allocated to Africa, even prior to Khrushchev's removal from power. However, the Soviet leader had invested a fair amount of his personal prestige into the policy of engagement with Africa and was not about to completely abandon the project. This would change under the new leadership in the Soviet Union, which was more pragmatic and had less faith in the value of courting African allies, which they felt "swallowed" Soviet aid without offering anything positive in return.[103] Brezhnev felt that the cost of continuing the policy of engagement with Africa had risen too high, in both economic and political terms, and viewed disentanglement from the continent as preferable to the Soviet Union continuing to take an economic loss by aiding fledgling African states.

After Khrushchev's removal from power, Soviet policy toward Africa was guided by commercial, rather than by ideological, interests.[104] Czechoslovak policy toward the continent likewise made the same sort of shift. The Czechoslovaks had always been attracted to Africa,

more for economic than ideological reasons. In 1958, Prague altered its approach toward Africa, not only to align it with Khrushchev's new approach toward the continent, but also because it hoped that following Moscow's lead would open up new avenues of trade. When the Soviet Union reoriented its policy toward Africa in 1964, the Czechoslovaks, reeling from the effects of their economic recession, were eager to follow suit. Nonetheless, Novotný, who had vacationed with Khrushchev at a Slovak spa only two weeks before, was upset that he had not been tipped off in advance about the Soviet leader's dismissal and sent a telegram to the Kremlin voicing Czechoslovakia's displeasure with Khrushchev's removal.[105] Brezhnev did not appreciate Novotný's terse telegram and would remember it three years later when the Czechoslovak leader sought his Soviet counterpart's support to retain his own power.

The African Socialists Fall from Power

Many of the Soviet bloc's closest African allies would not remain in power much longer than Khrushchev. By 1962, both Moscow and Prague had come to the realization that African efforts to build Soviet-style communist states were an illusion. Far from being genuine believers in Marxism, they began to view their African allies as opportunistic nationalists who had eagerly accepted generous Soviet and Czechoslovak aid, but were now not repaying their loans. In response, Moscow and Prague both dramatically scaled back their assistance to countries like Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, and declined to offer new socialist regimes in Algeria and Congo-Brazzaville the same sort of aid packages. Moscow and Prague would both retain relations, albeit reduced, with their initial African allies for political reasons, and in the hope that they could still recoup some of their earlier investments in those countries.

Although Czechoslovakia never formed the type of close relations with the Ben Bella regime in Algeria, as it did with Guinea, Ghana, or Mali (largely for the same reasons that relations were slow to develop with Congo-Brazzaville), the two countries did establish cordial relations after Algeria gained its independence in 1962. Czechoslovak attitudes toward Algiers would be tested in the fall of 1963 when a border war broke out between Algeria and Morocco. The war stemmed from the fact that the border between the two states had never been officially demarcated and contained significant mineral resources (especially iron and manganese). The war pitted Czechoslovakia's number one trading partner in Africa (Morocco) against one of the leading states in the socialist and Third World nationalist camp (Algeria), and hence put Prague's economic and political interests in direct conflict. While the Soviet Union and the rest of its allies supported Algeria without reservation—Cuba even sent troops to

fight alongside the Algerians—Prague took a more balanced approach.[106] Although Czechoslovakia refused to sell arms to Morocco during the war, it lent Rabat support behind the scenes, and unlike the rest of the Soviet bloc, refused to publicly support Algeria.[107] The so-called Sand War, from October to -November 1963, is therefore revealing, in that it suggests that in its African policy, Czechoslovakia emphasized economic considerations over political ones, as well as demonstrating that Prague was allowed some autonomy to deviate from the Soviet line, so long as it did not do so publicly.

As a result of the fact that trade between Czechoslovakia and Algeria was negligible, Prague was not overly upset when, in June 1965, Ben Bella was ousted in a military coup led by Houari Boumédiènne. In fact, despite the seeming ideological compatibility between their regimes, Czechoslovakia did not even warn Ben Bella of the pending coup, even though its intelligence agents in Algiers had sent Prague a detailed report on preparations for Ben Bella's overthrow earlier in the summer.[108] If anything, Czechoslovakia seemed relieved to see Ben Bella fall from power, as it freed the KSČ leadership to expand its relations with Morocco, and by 1967 Prague entered into a major arms deal with Rabat.

In Kenya, Prague's previous efforts to establish relations with prominent KANU politicians like Oginga Odinga seemed to pay dividends when the colony achieved its independence in December 1963. At that time, the Kenyan government invited Czechoslovak economists to present an economic development plan to Nairobi as an alternative to the advice they were receiving from British and American advisors.[109] While the Kenyan government kept its distance from the Soviet Union, it sought both economic and military assistance from Czechoslovakia, apparently calculating that this would draw less adverse reactions from the West. However, it soon became clear that the Kenyan government was split into two factions, led respectively by President Jomo Kenyatta, who favored alignment with the West, and Vice President Odinga, who preferred turning to the East.

In his autobiography, Odinga says that he was not a communist and did not advocate for Kenya to be solely aligned with the communist bloc. Rather, he wished Kenya to pursue a truly non-aligned foreign policy. Since Kenyatta leaned heavily toward the West, he felt the need to lobby for greater relations with the East in order to balance things out.[110] This led to Odinga making multiple visits to the communist bloc, beginning in 1960.[111] Nonetheless, the perception that Odinga was left wing and Kenyatta right wing, added to the fact that the vice president was ethnically Luo and the president Kikuyu, split KANU support along not only political, but also ethnic, lines. This political and ethnic divide led to a situation where most of the Kenyans who went to the United States and

United Kingdom for university or military training were Kikuyu, while most of those who received such training in the Eastern bloc were Luo.

Before long, the rivalry between Kenyatta and Odinga led to Prague entering into several agreements directly with Odinga that circumvented the Kenyan government, and in effect, served to help finance a shadow government run by the Kenyan vice president. For example, Czechoslovakia armed Odinga's personal security detail and gave money to the Kenyan vice president to finance the revolutionary Stanleyville government's diplomatic outpost in Nairobi after Kenyatta refused to provide the Congolese financial assistance.[112] In October 1964, a group of Kenyans returned from military training in Czechoslovakia with cases of weapons that were delivered directly to Odinga's office at the Home Affairs Ministry.[113] The next month, rumors, fed by Western intelligence, began to circulate that Odinga had procured the Czechoslovak weapons with the intention of overthrowing Kenyatta.[114] Odinga denied these accusations and later claimed that he and Kenyatta had jointly ordered the weapons from Prague in order to equip the Kenyan security forces independently of the United Kingdom.[115]

In December 1964, Odinga and other radicals within KANU, with direct funding from the Soviet Union and East Germany, created the Lumumba Institute to train party cadres, which served to further exacerbate the tensions between the supporters of Kenyatta and Odinga.[116] Kenyatta eventually became convinced that Odinga was planning a coup against him, which led to the vice president's gradual reduction in influence throughout the early months of 1965, his removal as vice president in May 1965, and his resignation from KANU to form an opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), in the spring of 1966. This rift between Kenyatta and Odinga split KANU in two, alienated the Luo from Kenyatta's government, and created tensions between the Luo and Kikuyu communities which continue to this day.[117]

Czechoslovakia's influence in Kenya deteriorated alongside Odinga's declining political fortunes. Prague continued to maintain relations with Odinga's opposition movement, but this ultimately greatly damaged its bilateral relations with Kenyatta's government when three Czechoslovak diplomats were expelled from the country in 1966, after making multiple trips to Odinga's Luo political stronghold in the Lake Victoria area. Thereafter, the 30 members of the Kenyan security forces who had received training in Czechoslovakia were fired from their jobs, and many of the Kenyan military officers who had received training at the Antonín Zápotocký Military Academy of Technology, derisively nicknamed "Odinga's boys," also had their careers ruined.[118] With Odinga's downfall, Kenya thus became a country with unfulfilled hopes of becoming an ally of Czechoslovakia.

To a greater degree than in Guinea and Mali, Soviet bloc relations with Ghana remained comparatively positive through early 1966. This was primarily because US efforts to build relations with Nkrumah were less successful than with Touré and Keïta, and because, unlike with Guinea and Mali, Soviet bloc economic relations with Ghana remained profitable. Yet, from 1962 onwards, internal opposition toward Nkrumah grew, and there were several failed attempts on his life. The Ghanaian leader became paranoid that the CIA was behind the assassination attempts, which served to keep him closer to the Soviet bloc and, in particular, to Czechoslovakia, which was providing assistance to the Ghanaian security services.

In February 1966, Nkrumah flew to Hanoi to present his peace plan for the Vietnam War. Three days after his departure, elements of Ghana's armed forces, with the cooperation of the National Police, staged a well-organized coup d'état, which removed Nkrumah from power. He owed his downfall partly to his own faults—he had built a cult of personality around himself, imprisoned political opponents indefinitely without trial, sponsored subversive activities against his conservative neighbors in Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Togo, and sacrificed many of Ghana's resources in pursuit of his pan-Africanist dreams. But his demise was also partly a byproduct of his strained relations with the United States, which deteriorated considerably after Kennedy's death. It now appears probable that the CIA, if not actively involved in planning the coup, at the very least had knowledge of the plan and failed to warn Nkrumah.

After being offered sanctuary by his friend, Sékou Touré, Nkrumah lived in exile in Conakry, where he was given the largely ceremonial title of vice president of Guinea. Czechoslovakia responded to Nkrumah's downfall with a dual policy. On the one hand, it attempted to continue normal diplomatic and economic relations with the new regime in Accra (and was the first state in the Soviet bloc to diplomatically recognize the military government), while on the other, it plotted subversion to return Nkrumah to power. Prague, apparently without consulting Moscow, sent weapons to Nkrumah in Conakry and helped to organize a countercoup in Ghana through a Ghanaian intelligence asset codenamed "Magnifying Glass" [*Lupou*].[119]

Magnifying Glass was Kofi Batsa, a Ghanaian journalist and communist who since his mid-20s had been involved with crypto-communist organizations such as the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Council of Peace, and others. Because of his involvement with these organizations, Batsa made frequent trips to the Soviet bloc, and especially to Prague, where most of these groups were headquartered.[120] In 1960, Batsa was expelled from Nkrumah's political party, the Convention People's Party, because of his leftist political views.[121] Soon thereafter, he was hired by Czechoslovak

Radio as its foreign editor of broadcasts to Africa, and he became an agent for Czechoslovak intelligence.[122] Batsa would eventually return to Ghana and began working as a journalist, when, in 1962, one of his articles was noticed by Nkrumah, who then hired him as the ideological editor of his new state-run publication, *The Spark*. Batsa was also appointed as the head of the press department of Ghana's Bureau of African Affairs. These positions allowed Batsa to use his front as a journalist to serve as Nkrumah's liaison to many leaders of national liberation and opposition movements throughout Africa. In 1963, Nkrumah appointed him as the Ghanaian ambassador to Iraq, but this was short lived as diplomatic relations with Iraq were severed following the Ba'ath Party's coup in November of that year. Batsa would visit Prague many times in his new official capacities, and in the process, he further strengthened his clandestine relationship with Czechoslovakia.[123]

At the time of the coup against Nkrumah, Batsa was one of the Ghanaian president's most trusted advisors and so he sought refuge in the Soviet embassy in Accra. The Soviets harbored him for two days before asking him to leave their compound. He then surrendered to the police and spent the next 17 months in jail.[124] In September 1967, a few weeks after his release from detention, Batsa initiated contact with an StB intelligence agent in Accra to inform the Czechoslovaks of his plans for a countercoup. The ČSSR decided to support Batsa's efforts, even though officials in Prague were skeptical of its prospects for success. From September 1967 to January 1968 Batsa met five times with Czechoslovak agents in Accra to further plan the coup and determine the type and amount of weapons and other assistance that he needed from Prague. Once a coherent strategy had been decided upon, a Czechoslovak delegation travelled to Moscow in February to discuss the coup preparations with their KGB counterparts. The Soviets approved the plan and promised to provide further organizational assistance and funding.[125] The coup attempt never took place, however. In August 1968, Batsa was arrested on suspicion of organizing a coup, and although he was eventually released a few weeks later for lack of evidence, the harsh interrogation was apparently enough to convince him to abandon his plans.[126]

Inertia initially kept the level of trade between Czechoslovakia and Ghana on the rise during the period of military rule (1966–69), increasing from a total turnover of 100.2 million Kčs in 1963 to a peak of 267.8 million Kčs in 1969. But trade between the two countries significantly decreased under the later civilian government of the Second Republic (1969–72), falling to only 29.9 million Kčs by 1972. Like Guinea and Mali, the Ghanaian government also failed to pay back the loans that Prague had given the Nkrumah regime in the early 1960s. By

1974, Ghana's outstanding debt to Czechoslovakia stood at more than 317 million Kčs.[127]

In 1968, Mali's Modibo Keïta and Congo-Brazzaville's Alphonse Massamba-Débat were also overthrown, leaving Guinea's Sékou Touré and Tanzania's Julius Nyerere as the only remaining prominent African heads of state who still espoused "scientific socialism." By this point, however, Czechoslovakia's relations with both states were insignificant. The Czechoslovak-Guinean relationship had greatly soured as a result of the Guinean Syndrome and Prague viewed Nyerere as overly pro-British and pro-Chinese. With Ben Bella, Odinga, Nkrumah, Keïta, and Massamba-Débat all losing power, Czechoslovakia no longer had any ideologically compatible allies on the African continent—only business partners.

The Prague Spring and Its Effect on Czechoslovakia's African Policy

The gradual process of Czechoslovakia's shift away from relations with ideologically compatible regimes and toward conservative states that offered better economic returns began in 1962, intensified in 1963, and was complete by 1966.[128] By then, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali had been replaced by Morocco, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Uganda as Prague's most favored African allies. This shift in focus was evident by the state visit of Ugandan President Milton Obote in July 1965, as well as by the fact that Antonín Novotný, who rarely traveled outside of Eastern Europe, visited both Ethiopia and Egypt in November 1966.

1966 would also mark the first signs of change in Czechoslovak society that would ultimately culminate in the Prague Spring. All of the political, ideological, and especially economic problems facing the country began to escalate at this time. Complaints against the Novotný regime were strongest from students, intellectuals, Slovaks, and the rural population. Eventually, reformers gained power within the KSČ, and in an attempt to placate such public discontent, they dismissed Antonín Novotný as general secretary and replaced him with Alexander Dubček in January 1968. The reasons for Novotný's fall from power were many, but the most prominent factors were his cult of personality, the struggling Czechoslovak economy, the rise of Slovak nationalism, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that he had lost the backing of Soviet leaders, which emboldened his local rivals to depose him.[129] Two months after losing his position atop the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Novotný resigned as the president of the ČSSR in a statement where he cited the "strengthening of the international status" of Czechoslovakia as one of his greatest accomplishments.[130] But the foreign policy that Novotný had been proud

of was one of the things that the reformers criticized about his tenure, and in April, Václav David, who had been Czechoslovakia's foreign minister since January 1953, was replaced by Jiří Hájek.

Under Dubček, the new Czechoslovak government embarked on a program of reform called "socialism with a human face," which was designed to grant additional rights to Czechoslovak citizens through increased democratization, liberalization of restrictions on speech, travel, and the media, and decentralization of the economy. Some anticipated that hardliners within the Czechoslovak military would intervene to reverse these liberal reforms and oust Dubček, but Bohumír Lomský, the minister of defense, rejected this possibility by ironically stating, "I defend the principle that the army may not be used. We are not somewhere in Africa."[131] Nonetheless, the Dubček government's reforms were viewed with suspicion by the ČSSR's communist neighbors who feared that they could spill over Czechoslovakia's borders and create a demand for similar change elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. In March 1968, the leader of East Germany, Walter Ulbricht, was the first to label the reforms in Czechoslovakia counterrevolutionary. Soon thereafter, the communist party heads in Poland, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union itself became convinced of the necessity of putting an end to the Prague Spring.[132]

Despite Dubček's assurances to his communist counterparts that Czechoslovakia would not leave the Warsaw Pact and that they had nothing to fear from his regime's reforms, on the evening of August 20–21, 1968, over 200,000 troops and 2,000 tanks from the armies of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary invaded the ČSSR. Dubček was arrested and sent to Moscow for "consultations," after which the ČSSR's leadership signed what was known as the Moscow Protocol, promising to roll back its reforms and return Czechoslovakia to the type of communism practiced in the rest of the Soviet bloc. Dubček was allowed to return to Prague and resume his position as first secretary of the KSČ, but Soviet troops continued to occupy Czechoslovakia.

African leaders reacted with dismay at the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[133] Mali's Modibo Keïta was the only African head of state who publicly supported the invasion. Africa's most vocal critics of the Red Army's actions were Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. In Dar es Salaam, the developments of the Prague Spring featured prominently on the pages of Tanzanian newspapers. After the Soviet invasion, the Tanzanian government supported a protest demonstration of over 2,000 people which was led by two members of the Tanzanian cabinet and ended with damage to the Soviet embassy. According to historian George Roberts: "seen from Dar es Salaam events in Czechoslovakia were not about East versus West or communism versus capitalism, but issues of large powers versus small states" and severed as

a warning that if Moscow could treat its Czechoslovak 'friends' in such a way that states such as Tanzania needed to be wary of relying too heavily on Soviet friendship.[134] Ultimately Tanzania severed relations with Czechoslovakia until December 1971.[135]

In Lusaka, Kaunda summoned the ambassadors of both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to his office, where he expressed support to the latter and demanded an explanation from the former. Kuanda labeled the Soviet Union an imperialist state, compared the Soviet occupiers to South African racists, and said that he could not understand how such aggression could occur in the mid-twenteith century. Similarly, Zambian Foreign Minister Reuben Kamanga described the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia as a "treacherous sin" and publically compared Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia to United States policy in Vietnam.[136]

Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubček remained in power in a country occupied by Soviet troops. The catalyst for changing that status quo was the Czechoslovak national hockey team twice defeating the vaunted Soviet team at the world championships in Stockholm in March 1969 (where they had been moved from Prague because of the military occupation of Czechoslovakia). Ironically, in the early 1950s, Czechoslovak hockey players had tutored the embryonic Soviet hockey program in much the same way that Czechoslovak Africanists had their Soviet counterparts.[137] The Soviets were quick learners, however, and became a dominant force in international ice hockey, winning seven consecutive world championships from 1963–71. Beating the seemingly invincible Soviet team in Stockholm led to over half a million Czechoslovaks spontaneously taking to the streets to celebrate the victories in nationalistic and anti-Soviet outbursts against their occupiers. The Warsaw Pact invasion had changed Czechoslovak society from one that was largely Russophile to one in which all things Russian and Soviet were now viewed with contempt.[138]

Czechoslovak exhilaration with the hockey results was short-lived, however. Moscow used the anti-Soviet hockey riots as a pretext to finish what it had started the previous August. Within a few weeks of the riots, the Soviet Union started its "normalization" process for Czechoslovakia. Dubček and the other liberal reformers were removed from power and a pro-Soviet communist hardliner, Gustáv Husák, was named the new first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. In the process, Czechoslovakia lost most of its autonomy in not only domestic affairs but also in international relations.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 had a substantial and immediate impact on the ČSSR's involvement with Africa. Up until this point, Czechoslovakia had been viewed by many African leaders as a different kind of outside power—one without a colonial past, with

a shared history of itself being occupied and exploited, and apparently without hegemonic goals on the continent. Following its occupation by the Soviet Union, however, the new Czechoslovak regime, now perceived as a puppet of Moscow, had little credibility on the African continent.

On the flipside, relations between Czechoslovakia and Africa had already been on a downward trend since 1962, and the governments of both Alexander Dubček and Gustáv Husák showed scant interest in continuing Czechoslovakia's ambitious African policy. The new leaders of the post-Prague Spring ČSSR viewed relations with Africa as little more than an economic burden on their struggling economy and chose to greatly reduce Prague's involvement on the continent and to defer guidance in its African policies to Moscow. At the end of 1968, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed closing the Czechoslovak embassies in Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, and Somalia, arguing that there existed little chance of broadening trade or economic cooperation or to consolidate political influence in those countries.[139] All three embassies were closed the following year, and several other Czechoslovak embassies in Africa would be closed throughout the 1970s.

Moreover, Moscow no longer entrusted Czechoslovakia to be its leading junior ally in Africa. As a result, the role of the Soviet Union's junior ally on the continent was passed to East Germany, which was eager to take that position.[140] The German Democratic Republic (GDR), more commonly known as East Germany, had long sought diplomatic relations with Third World states worldwide, including those in Africa.[141] However, under the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany threatened to sever economic and diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the GDR; in this manner, it was able to coerce every state in Africa to refuse the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR. This changed in 1969, when as a result of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* policy, Bonn granted the GDR de facto recognition and abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine. Soon after, East Germany established formal diplomatic relations with Sudan in June 1969, and by February 1973, the GDR had been formally recognized by an additional 21 African states.[142]

This change in East Germany's ability to develop relations with Africa came at an opportune time for the Soviet Union. Just when Moscow lost faith in Czechoslovakia being a faithful and reliable ally in Africa, the GDR was now able to fill the ČSSR's shoes. From the mid-1950s until 1968, the ČSSR's per capita involvement in Africa was greater than even the Soviet Union's, but by the 1970s, when Moscow increased its involvement in the Third World and began to more heavily involve its allies in the process, Czechoslovakia was conspicuously uninvolved. In 1968, Czechoslovakia provided 27.9 percent of the total economic

assistance that the Soviet bloc sent to Africa (which was second only to the Soviet Union's 51.4%), compared to only 1.1 percent contributed by East Germany.[143] Likewise, in 1960, 10.4 percent of Czechoslovakia's total trade was directed toward developing states, while only 4.3 percent of the GDR's was.[144] But these figures would move in opposite directions throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1960 and 1983, East Germany's trade with the developing world increased by 1092 percent.[145] Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia's level of trade with the developing world continually declined, and by 1987, had shrunk to only 5.2 percent of its overall trade—second lowest among Soviet bloc states.[146] During the 1970s and 1980s, Czechoslovakia's involvement with Africa would be reduced to little more than providing weapons to the Soviet Union's African allies, such as the MPLA in Angola and the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Once the most active communist country in Africa, in the aftermath of the Prague Spring, Czechoslovakia lagged behind the Soviet Union, East Germany, Romania, and even Bulgaria in its involvement with the continent.

Conclusion

Gustáv Husák would remain in power in Czechoslovakia until December 1989, when the so-called Velvet Revolution forced the KSČ to surrender its power and dismantle its single-party state. In June 1990, the first free and democratic elections since 1946 took place in Czechoslovakia. Dissident playwright Václav Havel was elected president, and Alexander Dubček, the beleaguered reformer of the Prague Spring, was elected speaker of the federal parliament. On January 1, 1993, the country split into two through the so-called Velvet Divorce when the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic were simultaneously and peacefully founded, and as a result, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist.

Today, the Czech Republic's relations with Africa are only a fraction of what they were from 1955–68. After closing its embassy in Angola in March 2010, and its embassies in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya in January 2011, Prague currently only operates ten diplomatic missions on the African continent. Ghana is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa in which it has continuously operated an embassy from 1961 until the present. To put Prague's diplomatic representation in Africa into perspective, the five European countries with populations most comparable to the Czech Republic's (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, and Portugal) all have more diplomatic missions in Africa than Prague, averaging 19.8 to the Czech Republic's 10.[1] Whereas the Czechoslovak government awarded scholarships for approximately 2,000 African students to study in its universities in 1965, the government of the Czech Republic provided only 14 scholarships to African students in 2010.[2] In the 1960s, Czechoslovak State Airlines (ČSA) serviced regularly scheduled flights to 9 African cities. As of February 2014, the airline no longer flies to any destination in Africa. In 2012, the Czech Republic's largest trading partner in Africa was South Africa, which ranked only as Prague's 38th largest trading partner. Today, only two states in Africa (South Africa and Egypt) rank among the Czech Republic's top 60 foreign trading partners.[3] A 38-page report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZV) of the Czech Republic, which lays out the country's development aid strategy for the years 2010–17, barely even mentions Africa. Ethiopia was the only African country among the group of "priority countries" identified in the report.[4]

The situation is comparable in the Slovak Republic, where trade with Africa amounts to only 0.4 percent of the country's imports and 0.4 percent of its exports. South Africa and Morocco are Slovakia's largest trading partners in Africa, but neither country ranks among Bratislava's top 35 trading partners.[5] Like Prague, Bratislava lags behind comparably sized European countries in its diplomatic representation in Africa, having only six diplomatic outposts on the continent, in comparison to an average of 13.8 for its cohort countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Serbia).[6]

In the twenty-first century, it is rare to read anything about connections between the former Czechoslovakia and Africa. The only international news stories connecting the two in recent years have been when microphones caught Czech Prime Minister Jiří Rusnok commenting that he was "dreading" going to Nelson Mandela's funeral because the trip to South Africa would ruin his social plans for dinner with friends, and a story about the treatment of a Ghanaian student who, after exhibiting symptoms of a slight cold upon arriving at Prague's international airport, had a black plastic bag placed over his head as the Czech police whisked him away to the hospital on suspicion that the Ghanaian had Ebola.[7] Neither of these stories paints the picture of contemporary Czech society or leaders having much understanding or respect for Africa.

Given these episodic examples and statistics, it is easy to forget (and, indeed, nearly the entire academic community has) that 60 years ago Czechoslovakia was one of the most active foreign powers in Africa. In the early years of post-colonial Africa, assistance to the newly independent countries was not the private domain of the former colonial powers or the Cold War superpowers. Czechoslovakia, a tiny Central European country of less than 15 million people, helped several African countries gain a degree of autonomy from the colonial and Cold War powers, by assisting their development of their own national airlines and currencies, equipping their national armies, educating their students, and establishing their own national museums and press agencies.

Czechoslovakia was the first communist state to arrive on the continent and to influence important African states from Ethiopia to Guinea, advancing the cause of communism in Africa, often in advance of the Soviet Union's own agenda. Czechoslovakia provided such assistance, not because it was directed to do so by Moscow, but because it saw Africa as a place where it could create a niche for its foreign policy and expand its economy through international trade. It is hoped that through this book's exploration of the forgotten past of Czechoslovak engagement with Africa, Czechs, Slovaks, and Africans can regain their common history, which has long been buried in obscurity, while scholars gain a fuller understanding of how the Cold War played out in Africa.

Notes

Introduction

1. C.F. Beck (1963) "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa, 1955–1962" *World Politics* 15 (3), p. 403.
2. Beck, "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa," p. 403.
3. To cite only a few examples, see H. M. Harrison (2003) *Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); P. Gleijeses (2002) *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press); W. G. Gray (2003) *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press); C. Stanciu (2013) "A Rebirth of Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of Communist Romania between Subordination and Autonomy, 1948–1962" *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 24 (2), pp. 253–72; and L. Watts, "Divided Loyalties within the Bloc: Romanian Objection to Soviet Informal Controls, 1963–1964" *Cold War International History Project*, e-Dossier No. 42.
4. T. Smith (2000) "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War" *Diplomatic History* 24 (4), pp. 567–91.
5. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall*, and Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions.*
6. A. Fursenko and T. Naftali (2006) *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton).
7. Memorandum of Conversation between US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Václav David, March 22, 1962. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey* (1994) (Washington, DC: US Department of State), p. 19.
8. For example State Department folders dedicated to Czechoslovakia's foreign relations and trade with Africa and Asia each contain one document pertaining to Czechoslovakia's involvement with Asia and not a single document related to Africa. See General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Records Relating to Czechoslovakia, 1958–1963, Box 1, Folder "Foreign Relations—African-Asian Bloc"

and Folder "Foreign Trade—African-Asian Bloc," Record Group 59, NARA. Additionally, there is not a single mention of Africa or any African country in the National Security Files or President's Office Files pertaining to Czechoslovakia at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.

9. David quoted in Beck, "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa," pp. 404–5.
10. J. M. Michal (1968) "Czechoslovakia's Foreign Trade" *Slavic Review* 27 (2), p. 216.
11. For a study of Cuba's foreign policy towards Africa in the 1970s see Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions.*
12. Czechoslovak and Soviet officials consulted with each other on African matters at all levels of government and in many venues. For example policy was coordinated and intelligence shared in African capital cities, the capitals of the metropoles, and in both Moscow and Prague.
13. Z. Krystufek (1981) *The Soviet Regime in Czechoslovakia* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs), pp. 9–10.
14. A. Lebor (2013) "Never Mind The Czech Gold The Nazis Stole…" *The Telegraph*, July 31, 2013.
15. Ambassador Peter S. Bridges, oral history interview, October 24, 2003, Frontline Diplomacy.
16. A. M. Filitov (1996) "Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions during World War II" in F. Gori and S. Pons (eds.) *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53* (New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 9.
17. For a fascinating examination of the Slánský trial see I. Lukes, "Rudolf Slansky: His Trials and Trial" *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper No. 50.
18. Voroshilov quoted in T. Szulc (1971) *Czechoslovakia Since World War II* (New York: The Viking Press), pp. 154–55. The Khrushchev thaw was the period from the mid-1950s to early 1960s when repression and censorship in the Soviet bloc was curtailed due to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization. In terms of foreign relations this introduced the policy of peaceful coexistence with other nations and the reopening of relations with the United States and Western Europe.
19. de Boisanger quoted in P. Zidek (2006) *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968* [*Czechoslovakia and French Africa, 1948–1968*] (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri), pp. 148–50.
20. For a discussion of Soviet attempts to initiate relations with Liberia see S. Mazov (2010) *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964* (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press), Chapter one.
21. A. Iandolo (2011) "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64" (Ph.D. diss, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford), p. 93.

22. Decolonization had increased the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Peking was challenging Moscow's leadership in the international communist movement and was criticizing the Kremlin's seemingly unenthusiastic support for Third World nationalism. Part of Khrushchev's rationale for making this speech was in response to this criticism. See Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 305.
23. For a translation and State Department reaction to Khrushchev's speech, see "Report on Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties," State Department translation of speech given by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev on January 6, 1961, in General Records of the Department of State, Box 65, "Records of State Dean Rusk, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1961–1968," Folder "DR—Personal Papers," Record Group 59, NARA.
24. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 28–9.
25. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 29.
26. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 36–7.
27. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 24–5.
28. N. Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961–1975" (Ph.D. dissertation, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014), p. 37 and P. Žázek, "Czechoslovak and Soviet State Security Against the West Before 1968" (Paper presented at the Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New Approaches in Graduate Studies conference, European Studies Centre, St. Antony's College Oxford, May 25, 2002), p. 2.
29. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 26–8.
30. The school operated from 1961–69 and taught a total of 288 students from 29 countries. Nearly half of the students (137) enrolled in the program were from Africa (mostly from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali). See Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 42–3.
31. Data analysis by author. From 1954–68 the United States gave $31.725 billion in bilateral economic assistance to Africa, compared to the Soviet Union spending $5.585 billion and Czechoslovakia $1.129 billion. This equates to Czechoslovakia devoting 0.1090% of its GDP to Africa in comparison to the United States spending 0.0949% and the Soviet Union spending 0.0417%. For data on Czechoslovak and Soviet economic aid to Africa, see C. Stevens (1976) *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (London: Macmillan), p. 69. For data on United States economic aid to Africa see US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] Database, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/ date accessed February 14, 2014. For data on each country's GDP during the years 1954–68 see The Maddison Project: Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison (home page), date accessed February 14, 2014.

1 Relations with Conservative African States (1945–62)

1. The population of Czechoslovakia was estimated to be approximately 13.5 million in the country's first census in 1921.
2. P. Zidek (2006) *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968* [*Czechoslovakia and French Africa, 1948–1968*] (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri), p. 18.
3. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 17–18.
4. History of Czechoslovak Diplomatic and Consular Presence in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe (1927–92) on the website for the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Harare, http://www.mzv.cz/harare/ (home page), date accessed February 2013.
5. R. Bass and E. Bass (1963) "Eastern Europe" in Z. Brzezinski (ed.) *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), p. 92.
6. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 19.
7. P. Zidek and K. Sieber (2007) *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948–1989* [*Czechoslovakia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1948–1989*] (Prague: Ústavmezinárodníchvztahů), p. 127.
8. J. H. Arrowsmith-Brown (2011) *Prutky's Travels to Ethiopia and Other Countries* (London: Ashgate).
9. J. Zahorik (2006) "African Studies in the Czech Republic—from the early Czech-African contacts until the 21st century" *Afrikanistik Online*, February 4, 2013. Prutký's dictionary of the Amharic language, *Vocabularium linguae Gallicae, Arabicae et Abyssiniacae* was never published.
10. "Historical Contacts" on the website for the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Addis Ababa, http://www.mzv.cz/addisababa/en/ (home page), date accessed February 7, 2013.
11. H. G. Marcus (1994) *A History of Ethiopia* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 123.
12. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 55.
13. Letter from Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie to Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, August 10, 1942, quoted in J. Chmiel (1992) "The Czechoslovak Armaments Industry and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict" *Asian and African Studies* 2, p. 171. Czechoslovakia sent arms to Hamburg, Germany to a Chilean owned company who then shipped the arms onwards to Ethiopia. See Chmiel, "The Czechoslovak Armaments Industry and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict," pp. 180–1.
14. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, p. 161.
15. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, May 12, 1959. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 217, ar. j. 295, b. 9. Also see A. K. McVety (2012) *Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 82.

16. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, p. 161 and H. G. Marcus (1983) *The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941–1974* (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc.), p. 53. For Wilson's spears comment see Memorandum of the 304th Meeting of the National Security Council, November 15, 1956. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, National Security Council Series, Box No. 8, Folder "304th Meeting of NSC, November 15, 1956," DDEL.
17. Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, July 26, 1954. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 6, ar. j. 8, b. 7.
18. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 56.
19. McVety, *Enlightened Aid*, p. 145.
20. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 57.
21. "Historical Contacts" on the website for the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Addis Ababa, http://www.mzv.cz/addisababa/en/ (home page), date accessed February 7, 2013.
22. W. Shurtleff and A. Aoyagi (2009) *History of Soybeans and Soyfoods in Africa* (Lafayette, CA: Soyinfo Center), p. 274 and "Historical Contacts" on the website for the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Addis Ababa, http://www.mzv.cz/addisababa/en/ (home page), date accessed February 7, 2013.
23. Report on Antonín Novotný's trip to Ethiopia and Sudan, November 29–December 20, 1966. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 19, ar. j. 19, b. 16.
24. Speech by Emperor Haile Selassie at banquet in Honor of President Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia, November 15, 1966, http://www.himchurch.org (home page), date accessed February 7, 2013.
25. Telegram from Department of State to US Embassy in Cairo, July 15, 1953, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Volume IX, The Near and Middle East* (1986) (Washington DC: US State Department), pp. 2121–2.
26. M. H. Heikal (1973) *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday), p. 37.
27. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill quoted in D. D. Eisenhower (1965) *Waging Peace: 1956–1961* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday), p. 34.
28. P. E. Muehlenbeck (2012) *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 10.
29. Gamal Abdel Nasser quoted in Heikal, *Cairo Documents*, p. 41.
30. S. Yaqub (2004) *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).

31. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 11.
32. From the viewpoint of the Kremlin, the formation of the Baghdad Pact created "a new mutuality of interests" with Nasser, because Moscow needed to find a new regional ally to offset the creation of this anti-Soviet military bloc. See A. Fursenko and T. Naftali (2006) *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton), p. 64.
33. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 12.
34. According to Fursenko and Naftali, Nasser recognized communist China "in an attempt to increase pressure on the West to come up with a plan to finance the [Aswan] dam that he could accept." See Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 84. Although surely his desire to be amongst the foremost leaders of the nonaligned world must have been another, possibly more important, factor in Nasser's decision making.
35. Public Law 480 (PL-480) allowed the US government to sell surplus American grain at a low cost to developing countries.
36. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles quoted in R. D. Mahoney (1983) *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 18.
37. Each of these countries had additional reasons (besides the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal) to be upset with Nasser. British banking and business interests held about a 45 percent stake in the canal. The British also saw Nasser as a fascist comparable to Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler and did not want to repeat their mistake of "appeasing" another leader with a perceived expansionist mind-set. Israelis were displeased with Egypt for having allowed Palestinian nationalists refuge inside their country from which they frequently launched commando raids inside Israel. Finally, the French were upset with Nasser for having supported insurgents in Algeria. See D. Yergin (1991) *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster), Chapter 24. For an account that the primary goal of the Suez intervention was to eliminate Nasser, see Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, pp. 94, 109–110.
38. Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 140.
39. Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 86.
40. P. Zidek (2002) "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962" [Export of arms from Czechoslovakia to third world countries in the years 1948–1962] *Historie a vojenství* 3, p. 524.
41. C. F. Beck (1963) "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa, 1955–1962" *World Politics* 15 (3), pp. 407–409.
42. P. Zidek and K. Sieber (2009) *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989* [*Czechoslovakia and the Middle East 1948–1989*] (Prague: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů), pp. 68–9.

43. For accounts of Kořinek's time in Morocco see J. Kořinek (1959) *Maroko Křížem Krážem* [*Crisscross across Morocco*] (Prague: Orbis); J. Kořinek (1946) *Fez, klenot islamu* [*Fez, the Jewel of Islam*] (Prague: Česka grafická unie); and J. Kořinek (1941) *Maghreb el Aksa: nejzápadnější Orient* [*Maghreb el Aqsa: The westernmost Orient*] (Prague: nádkl. České Grafické Unie).
44. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 18.
45. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 91.
46. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 91.
47. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 92.
48. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, October 4, 1957. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 154, ar. j. 203, b. 13.
49. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 93.
50. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 220.
51. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 94.
52. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 194.
53. Beck, "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa" p. 411 and Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 194.
54. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 1, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 317, ar. j. 402, b. 8. and Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 195–6.
55. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 164.
56. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 165.
57. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 127.
58. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel files for Vladislav Roubal and Zbynek Roušar. AMZV, f. Persomllni spisy, Roubal Vladislav, cj. 9taj.1949 and AMZV, f. Personalnf spisy, Rousar Zbynek, cj. 71/duv/48.
59. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 127.
60. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 139.
61. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 142.
62. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 30.
63. S. Mazov (2010) *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964* (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press), pp. 34–42.
64. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 30.
65. Memorandum of conversation between Liberian President William V. Tubman and American Ambassador to Liberia Jones, January 5, 1956. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. XVIII, Africa* (1989) (Washington, DC: US Department of State), pp. 391–2. For documents discussing repeated Liberian rejections of Soviet overtures, see "Political relations between Liberia and Soviet Union, 1956," and "Attitude of Liberia towards communism and

Soviet Union, 1957" in Records of the Foreign Office, 371/119452 and 371/125724, PRO.

66. US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] Database, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/, date accessed July 7, 2010. Data analysis by author.
67. Telegram from Liberian President William V. Tubman to President Dwight Eisenhower, January 9, 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. XVIII, Africa*, pp. 393–4.
68. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, January 5, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 244, ar. j. 325, b. 7.
69. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 5, 1963. NA-UV KSC. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 39, ar. j. 44, b. 5.
70. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 192–3.
71. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 148–50.
72. The best account of Guinea's decision to reject the 1958 referendum is E. Schmidt (2007) *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946–1958* (Athens: University of Ohio Press).
73. G. Lusignan (1969) *French-Speaking Africa since Independence* (New York: Praeger), p. 35.
74. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 161.
75. W. Taubman (2003) *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), pp. 452–53. To see a quote regarding how the French preferred a "Soviet Guinea" to an "Americanized Guinea" see W. Attwood (1967) *The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Harper & Row), p. 130.
76. For a discussion of French opposition to increased US involvement in Francophone Africa see Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, Chapter 8.
77. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, June 7, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 261, ar. j. 346, b. 8.
78. Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 11, 1960. AMZV, GS-T 1955–1964, k. 1, ob. 10.
79. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 189.
80. Reports from Czechoslovak Embassy in Conakry, Guinea to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. AMZV, TO-T Senegal, 1960–1964, k.1., ob. 8, ej. 0248.572/61–10.
81. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 189–90.
82. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, pp. 218–9.
83. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 190.
84. By 1966 PAI needed a new host country from which to base its operations after being kicked out of Algeria (where it had previously moved its headquarters) following the coup against the regime of Ben Bella. Czechoslovakia was chosen partly because of PAI's historical ties to

the ČSSR, the fact that three of its leading figures already lived there, and because ČSA's extensive air network made Prague a convenient travel hub for the party. See Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 190.

85. Quotes from R. Legvold (1970) *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 102–3.
86. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 186.
87. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 186–7.
88. K. Van Walraven (2009) "Decolonization by Referendum: The Anomaly of Niger and the Fall of Sawaba, 1958–1959" *Journal of African History* 50, pp. 269–92.
89. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 163.
90. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 164.
91. K. Van Walraven (2003) "Sawaba's Rebellion in Niger (1964–1965): Narrative and Meaning." in J. Abbink, M. de Bruijn, and K. Van Walraven (eds.) *Rethinking Resistance Revolt and Violence in African History* (Boston, MA: Brill).
92. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 50.
93. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 50–1.
94. Report from Czechoslovak Embassy in Accra, Ghana to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. November 11, 1963. AMZV, TO-T Dahome 1960–1964, k. I, ob. 3, cj. 031.080/63, Akkra, 8. 11. 1963.
95. A. Andereggen (1994) *France's Relationship with Subsaharan Africa* (Westport, CT: Praeger), p. 61; F. T. McNamara (1989) *France in Black Africa* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), p. 92.
96. McNamara, *France in Black Africa*, p. 217.
97. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 106.
98. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 212–13.
99. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 213.
100. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 13, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 369, ar. j. 463, b. 14.
101. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 13, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 369, ar. j. 463, b. 14.
102. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 213–14.
103. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, March 13, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 341, ar. j. 432, b. 7.
104. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 117–18.
105. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, July 24, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 358, ar. j. 448, b. 25.
106. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 12, 1963. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 40, ar. j. 45, b. 9.

107. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 100.
108. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 100.
109. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 100.
110. For the best account of international opposition to apartheid at the United Nations during this time, see R. Irwin (2012) *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press).
111. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, January 31, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 294, ar. j. 377, b. 22.
112. Irwin, *Gordian Knot*, p. 56.
113. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 101.
114. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 101.
115. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 102.
116. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 102.
117. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 103.
118. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 101–2.
119. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 104–5.
120. United Nations Historical Data on International Merchandise Trade Statistics, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/historical_data.htm, date accessed February 8, 2013.

2 Relations with Radical African States (1957–62)

1. Quoted in T. P. Melady (1961) *Profiles of African Leaders* (New York: Macmillan), p. 133.
2. For more detailed biographic information on Kwame Nkrumah, see D. Rooney (1988) *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's); B. Davidson (1973) *Black Star: A View of the Life and Time of Kwame Nkrumah* (London: Allen Lane); and K. Nkrumah (1957) *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: T. Nelson).
3. Nkrumah quoted in Melady, *Profiles of African Leaders*, p. 135.
4. P. Zidek and K. Sieber (2007) *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948–1989* [*Czechoslovakia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1948–1989*] (Prague: Ústavmezinárodníchvztahů), p. 69.
5. A. Iandolo (2011) "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64" (PhD dissertation, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford), pp. 8–9 and 109–12.
6. A good indication of how important cocoa was to West Africa's economy (especially Ghana's) is a review of the weekly periodical *West Africa*. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, articles discussing the productivity of the upcoming cocoa crop and the fluctuation of the price of cocoa on the world market appeared in nearly every issue of *West Africa*. Sometimes two to four stories appeared per issue and often cocoa was the subject of front-page stories. For

examples of this, see *West Africa*, March 29, 1958; April 12, 1958; May 17, 1958; May 31, 1958; July 19, 1958; January 17, 1959; October 31, 1959; and November 7, 1959, to name just a few.

7. See the transcripts of the BBC documentary on Kwame Nkrumah transcribed and printed in *New African*, http://www.newafricanmagazine.com (home page), date accessed August 4, 2006.
8. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah*, p. 154.
9. Nkrumah quoted by E. Nwaubani (2001) *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950–1960* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press), p. 165.
10. BBC documentary transcripts.
11. For more on the Little Rock school crisis, see E. Huckaby (1980) *Crisis at Central High* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press) and R. F. Burk (1984) *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press).
12. Letter from Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah to President Eisenhower, November 12, 1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, International Series, Box No. 16, Folder "Ghana (6)," DDEL.
13. J. Moxon (1969) *Volta Man's Greatest Lake* (New York: Praeger), p. 88.
14. R. D. Mahoney (1983) *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 161.
15. Briefing memorandum for the official visit of the Prime Minister of Ghana, July 23–26, 1958, cited in Nwaubani, *United States and Decolonization*, p. 87.
16. Letter from President Dwight Eisenhower to President Kwame Nkrumah, August 7, 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa* (1992) (Washington, DC: US Department of State), pp. 657–8.
17. Telegram from American consulate general in Dakar to the State Department, March 7, 1951. See Nwaubani, *United States and Decolonization*, p. 221.
18. S. Mazov (2010) *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964* (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press), p. 58.
19. For a good account of the pressures that Touré felt from within his own party to reject the French referendum, see E. Schmidt (2007) *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946–1958* (Athens: University of Ohio Press).
20. Touré quoted in Melady, *Profiles of African Leaders*, p. 88.
21. De Gaulle quoted in Melady, *Profiles of African Leaders*, p. 88.
22. For a good account of the vindictiveness of the French exodus from Guinea, see Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea* and T.

Hayter (1965) "French Aid to Africa—Its Scope and Achievements" *International Affairs* 41 (2), p. 241. Paris even considered using force (a naval blockade was discussed) to prevent a shipment of Czechoslovak arms from reaching Conakry. See "Discussions between UK, US, and France on Guinea, 1959," Records of the Foreign Office, 371/138836, PRO.

23. Smith Hempstone Jr., oral history interview, May 6, 1998, Frontline Diplomacy.
24. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 60.
25. Charles de Gaulle had threatened to withdraw France from NATO if Washington aided Guinea.
26. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 75.
27. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 64–6.
28. Letter from Sékou Touré to President Dwight D. Eisenhower quoted in Nwaubani, *United States and Decolonization*, p. 213.
29. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph C. Satterthwaite to Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter, February 5, 1959, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of African Affairs, 1956–62, Folder "Conakry Guinea" Record Group 59, NARA. For de Gaulle's advice to the United States regarding Touré, see telegram from US Embassy in Paris to State Department, October 13, 1960, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
30. P. E. Muehlenbeck (2012) *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 26.
31. J. H. Morrow (1968) *First American Ambassador to Guinea* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), p. 23.
32. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, pp. 82, 198.
33. Satterthwaite quoted in Nwaubani, *United States and Decolonization*, p. 211.
34. Touré quoted in Nwaubani, *United States and Decolonization*, p. 229.
35. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, p. 74.
36. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, pp. 79–80.
37. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 75–6.
38. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 76–7.
39. Letter from Sékou Touré, President of Guinea to Antonín Novotný, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (letter undated in Czech translated copy, but from early April 1959). NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 217, ar. j. 294, b. 11.
40. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, May 7, 1959. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 217, ar. j. 294, b. 11.

41. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, pp. 69–70 and Iandolo, "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64," pp. 144–7.
42. Iandolo, "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64," pp. 114–48.
43. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 78–9.
44. C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin (2005) *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books), p. 6.
45. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 71 and Iandolo, "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64," p. 181.
46. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 69.
47. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, pp. 93–5. The turn-out to see Touré paled in comparison to the reported 1.6 million Chinese who lined the streets to greet the Guinean president when he visited China.
48. Memorandum of conversation between Guinean President Sékou Touré and President Dwight Eisenhower, October 27, 1959, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa*, pp. 698–702. Also see "US Economic Assistance Program in Guinea," October 4, 1962. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa* (1996) (Washington, DC: US Department of State).
49. Letter from South African Ambassador to the United States Wentzel C. Du Plessis to the South African Secretary of External Affairs, February 25, 1959, BTS, 1/33/8/3, volume 1, Folder: "United States of America, Policy in Africa, Volume 1," NASA.
50. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, pp. 24–5, 100.
51. Touré quoted in Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, pp. 99–100.
52. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, pp. 74–5.
53. Report on Sékou Touré's visit to Czechoslovakia submitted to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ [undated but December 1959]. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 234, ar. j. 324, b. 10 and Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 79.
54. M. Stewart MacDonald (2009) "The Challenge of Guinean Independence, 1958–1971" (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto), p. 112.
55. Under the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany proclaimed that it would break diplomatic and economic relations with any country which established diplomatic relations with East Germany. For a discussion of Guinea's relations with West and East Germanies during this period see W. G. Gray (2003) *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), pp. 108–13.
56. MacDonald, "The Challenge of Guinean Independence," pp. 112–13.

57. W. Attwood (1967) *The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Harper & Row), pp. 21–2.
58. C. F. Beck (1963) "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa, 1955–1962" *World Politics* 15 (3), p. 412.
59. Beck, "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa," p. 413.
60. P. Zidek (2006) *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968* [*Czechoslovakia and French Africa, 1948–1968*] (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri), pp. 65–7.
61. Examples of these themes can be seen in the several speeches that Czechoslovakia's ambassador to Nigeria made throughout the country in the spring of 1967. See Report from Czechoslovak ambassador to Nigeria Vítězslav Wagner on his tour of the country. April 29, 1967. AMZV, PZ, Lagos, 1967, cj. 023.463/67–10, Praha 20.5. 1967. e. 047/67—Wg/SI, cj. 023.463/67–10.
62. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 60–4.
63. While it is true that the Soviet Union gave more total aid to Guinea than did Czechoslovakia, Prague was Guinea's number two donor in this period. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were of course coordinating their policies in Guinea, but it seems from available documentation that the Guineans were more comfortable with the Czechoslovaks than they were the Soviets.
64. According to Lise Namikas, Belgium purposely kept communist representation in the Congo to only the Czechoslovak embassy "knowing that this would help keep US fears of communism at bay." See L. Namikas (2013) *Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965* (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press), p. 25.
65. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 128 and Comments of Thomas Kanza, "The Congo Crisis, 1960–1961: A Critical Oral History Conference" [transcript of conference]. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 23–24, 2004, p. 46.
66. Quoted in Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 83.
67. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 128–9.
68. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 8 and Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 129.
69. L. Namikas (2002) "Battleground Africa: The Cold War and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1965" (PhD dissertation, University of Southern California), p. 104. For more information on the Soviet Union's initial doubts about Lumumba see Namikas, *Battleground Africa* [book version], pp. 40–1, 151.
70. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa*, p. 262.
71. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 81.
72. Lumumba quoted by T. Kanza (1978) *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba: Conflict in the Congo* (London: Rex Collins), pp. 161–4.

73. S. R. Weissman (1974) *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960–1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 55.
74. M. G. Kalb (1982) *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa—From Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing), p. 6. Although Lumumba requested military aid from Prague, there is no evidence to suggest that he actually asked Czechoslovakia to take control of the Congolese army.
75. Backed by Belgium, the province of Katanga had declared its intention to succeed from Congo. The Congolese central government, however, fought to maintain the territorial integrity of the Congolese state.
76. Nkrumah and Lumumba joint communiqué quoted by J. Woronoff (1972) in *West African Wager: Houphouet versus Nkrumah* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow), p. 115.
77. K. Nkrumah (1961) *I Speak of Freedom* (London: Heinemann), p. 246.
78. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, p. 257.
79. See Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, International Series, Box No. 16, Folder, "Ghana (3)," DDEL.
80. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, pp. 97–8.
81. Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 19, 1960. Papers of Antonín Novotný, NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 028400, ar. j. 60, b. 10.
82. Handwritten notes from meeting between Czechoslovak and Soviet officials in Moscow, August 9, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 273, ar. j. 355, b. 22.
83. This secret agreement between Nkrumah and Lumumba was not made public until after a military coup had deposed Nkrumah from Ghana's presidency in 1966. See Kanza, *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba*, p. 252; Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 164.
84. As with Nkrumah, Lumumba only accepted the Soviet aid offer after being rebuffed by both the UN and Western European countries.
85. For an overview of the Soviet rationale for involvement in the Congo, see A. Fursenko and T. Naftali (2006) *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton), pp. 292–322.
86. Telegram from CIA Director Allen Dulles to Congo Station, September 24, 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa*, pp. 661–2 and Editorial note; Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 443.
87. Memorandum of discussion at the 452nd meeting of the NSC, July 21, 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa*, p. 339.
88. Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 315.
89. R. D. Mahoney (1999) Sons & Brothers: The Days of Jack and Bobby Kennedy (New York: Arcade Publishing), p. 67.

90. R. D. Mahoney (1999) *Sons & Brothers: The Days of Jack and Bobby Kennedy* (New York: Arcade Publishing), p. 67. Also see Robert T. Hennemeyer, oral history interview, February 15, 1988, Frontline Diplomacy; L. Devlin (2007) *Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67* (New York: Public Affairs), p. 63.
91. Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo*, p. 50.
92. Nwaubani, *United States and Decolonization*, p. 148.
93. 453rd meeting of the NSC, July 25, 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, NSC Series, Box No. 13, Folder "453rd Meeting of NSC, July 25, 1960," DDEL.
94. Lumumba quoted in Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 44.
95. Telegram from President Sékou Touré of Guinea to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 8, 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, International Series, Box No. 27, Folder "Guinea," DDEL.
96. Telegram from President Sékou Touré of Guinea to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 8, 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, International Series, Box No. 27, Folder "Guinea," DDEL.
97. Eisenhower quoted in Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, p. 78.
98. Eisenhower quoted in Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 113.
99. Handwritten notes from meeting between Czechoslovak and Soviet officials in Moscow, August 9, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 273, ar. j. 355, b. 22.
100. Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo*, pp. 76–80. Devlin, the CIA chief of station in Leopoldville had near daily consultations with the Binza Group during this time period.
101. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 132.
102. Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, p. 251 and Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, p. 139.
103. A. Schlesinger (1965) *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin), p. 570.
104. Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, September 22, 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, International Series, Box No. 16, Folder "Ghana (2)," DDEL.
105. Halm quoted in Nwaubani, *United States and Decolonization*, p. 157.
106. *New York Times*, September 24, 1960.
107. *California Eagle*, September 29, 1960, quoted in J. H. Meriwether (2002) *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935–1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), p. 199.
108. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 51.

109. Telegram from US Embassy in Accra to State Department, August 25, 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa*, pp. 658–60.
110. In fact it had been through the Soviet Embassy in Conakry that Lumumba first made contact with Soviet officials. See Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 297.
111. Telegram from President Sékou Touré of Guinea to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 20, 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–61, International Series, Box No. 27, Folder "Guinea," DDEL.
112. Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to President Sékou Touré of Guinea, November 25, 1960, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu, date accessed February 14, 2009.
113. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, p. 216.
114. Letter from Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah to President John F. Kennedy, January 23, 1961, President's Office Files, Box No. 117 "Countries," Folder "Ghana," JFKL.
115. After being dismissed from office by Joseph Kasavubu, Lumumba was under UN "protection" in Leopoldville (this protection really amounted to being under house arrest). When Lumumba attempted to sneak to Stanleyville to meet with his supporters, he was arrested by soldiers who were loyal to Colonel Joseph Mobutu who subsequently sent him to be held in Katanga.
116. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah*, p. 209.
117. Letter from Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah to President John F. Kennedy, January 23, 1961, President's Office Files, Box No. 117: "Countries," Folder "Ghana," JFKL. For more about Kennedy's desire to form relations with the leaders of the Third World see, Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans.*
118. For a discussion of Kennedy's 1957 speech on Algeria see Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, pp. 36–7.
119. Letter from Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah to President John F. Kennedy, January 23, 1961, President's Office Files, Box No. 117: "Countries," Folder "Ghana," JFKL.
120. S. Mazov (2007) "Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960–61) as Reflected in Russian Archives" *Cold War History* 7 (3), p. 431.
121. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 59.
122. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, February 2, 1961, President's Office Files, Box No. 117 "Countries," Folder "Ghana," JFKL; Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, February 1, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, The Congo Crisis* (1994) (Washington, DC: US Department of State), pp. 40–4.

123. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 165.
124. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 70. According to the historian Madeleine Kalb, "The order to assassinate him [Lumumba] was given by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at [an NSC] Meeting on August 18, 1960 in Washington." See Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, p. 50. The memorandum of discussion of the NSC meeting in question makes no reference to Eisenhower making such an order (see memorandum of discussion at the 456th meeting of the National Security Council, August 18, 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa*, pp. 421–4). However, Robert H. Johnson, who drafted the memorandum of the discussion of this meeting, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 18, 1975, that he recalled "President Eisenhower said something—I can no longer remember his words—that came across to me as an order for the assassination of Lumumba" (see the editor's notes in FRUS [cited above]). Furthermore, the report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that the "chain of events and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower." See Nwaubani, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa*, p. 291. Finally, Larry Devlin, the CIA station chief in Leopoldville, said that he was told that the order to kill Lumumba had come directly from Eisenhower. See Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo*, p. 95; Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, p. 318. John Stockwell, a CIA operative stationed in the Congo, wrote in his memoirs that the agency feared the new president would reverse Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba, and it thus moved quickly to eliminate him prior to Kennedy's inauguration. See J. Stockwell (1978) *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: W. W. Norton); J. M. Blum (1991) *Years of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961–1974* (New York: W. W. Norton), p. 23; J. Kwitny (1984) *Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World* (New York: Congdon & Weed, Distributed by St. Martin's), p. 69; Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo*, p. 129.
125. At this point, Mobutu had not yet changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko, and he still went by his birth name Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. Mobutu was on the CIA's payroll. However, this author has not seen any evidence linking Americans with the actual murder of Lumumba. Most likely both the Americans and Belgians set the stage for Lumumba's death and encouraged it but deferred the actual act of murder to their Congolese counterparts. For his part Larry Devlin, the CIA chief of station in Leopoldville at the time, claims in his memoirs to have been ordered by Washington to assassinate Lumumba but that his personal morals prevented him from carrying out this order. Instead Devlin claims that his "plan was to

stall" and that he "dragged" his feet in carrying out the mission. See Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo*, pp. 97, 260. Conversely the Belgian writer Ludo De Witte places blame for Lumumba's murder squarely on the shoulders of the Belgians and their Congolese and Katagan accomplices. According to De Witte, although the Americans had their own plans to assassinate the Congolese prime minister, as the events played out "the US and the CIA played no role in either the preparations to transfer Lumumba, the transfer itself, or the events in Katanga on 17 January and the following days." De Witte has also persuasively demonstrated that all involved (Congolese, Americans, Belgians) who knew that Lumumba was going to be delivered into the hands of Tshombe in Katanga realized that such a transfer was sure to end in Lumumba's death. See L. De Witte (2001) *The Assassination of Lumumba*, translated by Ann Wright and Renée Fenby (London: Verso), p. 78.

126. Text of Godefroid Munogo's statement to the press regarding the death of Patrice Lumumba, Elisabethville, Congo, February 13, 1961, reprinted in Kanza, *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba*, pp. 375–6.
127. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 568. Touré also sent an angry telegram to Kennedy accusing the United States of having had a hand in Lumumba's murder.
128. Ambassador John H. Morrow to State Department, February 23, 1961, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
129. Ambassador John H. Morrow to State Department, February 23, 1961, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
130. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 165.
131. T. Noer (1985) *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press), p. 263.
132. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 165. Outrage over Lumumba's death was not limited to Africa. Protests were held all over the world, including at the UN in New York and in London where a few thousand protestors lined Trafalgar Square to protest the actions of the "Belgian Fascists." See *West Africa*, February 25, 1961, p. 221.
133. *Evening News*, February 4, 1961, p. 7.
134. W. S. Thompson (1969) *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957–1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 166–7.

135. *Evening News*, February 25, 1961, p. 1.
136. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 165.
137. Telegram from US Embassy in Accra to State Department containing text of letter from Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah to President John F. Kennedy, Emtel 1015, February 23, 1960, National Security Files, Box No. 99 "Countries: Ghana," Folder "Ghana, General, 2/22/61–2/28/61," JFKL.
138. Another factor in the improvement of relations between Ghana and the Soviet bloc were increased trade and economic aid. See Iandolo, "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64," pp. 168–77.
139. Notes of meeting between Ghanaian Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and Czechoslovak delegation to Ghanaian independence festivities [undated]. Box No. 02/2, Folder 281, Document No. 364/21. NA-UV KSC.
140. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 1, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 281, ar. j. 364, b. 21.
141. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, January 10, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 291, ar. j. 374, b. 13.
142. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams to Undersecretary of State George Ball, September 12, 1961, General Records of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box "Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–1963," Folder "The President (Ghana)," Record Group 59, NARA.
143. Minutes of Meetings between General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Antonín Novotný and Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, July 31–August 3, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 316, ar. j. 401, b. 24 and Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 15, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 313, ar. j. 399, b. 22.
144. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, September 12, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 321, ar. j. 408, b. 21.
145. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 70.
146. Telegram from British Embassy in Accra to the Commonwealth Relations Office of Great Britain, September 23, 1961, Records of the Foreign Office, FO 371/154811, PRO.
147. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 91 and C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin (2006) *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World* (London: Penguin), pp. 434–8.
148. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah*, p. 228.
149. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, p. 186.
150. Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, March 16, 1963. Papers of Antonín Novotný, Folder 32. NA-UV KSC.

151. According to Alessandro Iandolo the Soviet Union only sent one lone agent from the KGB to assist the Ghanaian intelligence services at this time. It is not known whether the Soviets provided less assistance in this area at Ghanaian initiative or their own. It is possible that Nkrumah favored Czechoslovak assistance to help from the Soviets believing that he had less to fear from the growth of StB, as compared to KGB, influence in his country. See Iandolo, "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64," p. 250.
152. Report of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams on his third trip to Africa, September 19 to October 26, 1961, undated, National Security Files, Box No. 2, Folder "Africa, General, 11/61," JFKL.
153. State Department Report, "Guidelines of US Policy and Operations in Mali," July 18, 1961, National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 7/61," JFKL.
154. State Department Report, "Guidelines of US Policy and Operations in Mali," July 18, 1961, National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 7/61," JFKL.
155. State Department Report, "Guidelines of US Policy and Operations in Mali," July 18, 1961, National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 7/61," JFKL.
156. Stephen Low, oral history interview, December 5, 1997, Frontline Diplomacy.
157. W. Attwood (1987) *The Twilight Struggle: Tales of the Cold War* (New York: Harper & Row), p. 241.
158. Telegram from US Embassy in Bamako, Mali, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, March 14, 1962, National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, 11/61–5/62," JFKL.
159. For an example of the French using this line of thinking on the Americans, see the telegram from the US Embassy in Cotonou to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, April 27, 1962, National Security Files, Box No. 65A, Countries, "Dahomey," Folder "Dahomey, General, 4/62–5/62," JFKL.
160. Willard De Pree, oral history interview, February 16, 1994, Frontline Diplomacy.
161. P. J. Schraeder (2000) "Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining US-French Competition in Francophone Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (3), pp. 398–9.
162. US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] Database, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/, date accessed July 10, 2010. Data analysis by author.
163. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 142.
164. Report from Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris, France to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 4, 1960. AMZV, PZ, Pariz 1960, Politicka zprava e. 76, ej. 0264/60-SklBr.

165. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, September 13, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 276, ar. j. 35, b. 32.
166. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, September 20, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 277, ar. j. 359, b. 29. Also see Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 154.
167. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 15, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 283, ar. j. 366, b. 1.
168. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, January 17, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 292, ar. j. 375, b. 9.
169. While it is certainly debatable whether the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia was Mali's "greatest patron" I would argue that unlike in Guinea and Ghana, Czechoslovakia's involvement in Mali was likely more intensive than even the Soviet Union's given the fact that Czechoslovakia initiated the Soviet bloc relationship with Bamako and Soviet aid to Mali was significantly less than in either Guinea or Ghana.
170. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 143–4.
171. R. Bass and E. Bass (1963) "Eastern Europe" in Z. Brzezinski (ed.) *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), p. 99.
172. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 144–5.
173. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 1, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 358, ar. j. 449, b. 7.
174. G. Mennen Williams quoted in Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 218.
175. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 146.
176. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ on Modibo Keïta's visit to Czechoslovakia, June 12, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 353, ar. j. 443, b. 17.
177. Report on Consultations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia Regarding Assistance to the Congo, January 12, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 293, ar. j. 376, b. 9.
178. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, January 24, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 293, ar. j. 376, b. 9.
179. Report on the Possibility of Establishing an Air Link Between Prague and Stanleyville, January 23, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 293, ar. j. 376, b. 9. Also see Transcript of the talk between Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR A. A. Soblev and Richard Dvořák, Czechoslovak ambassador to the Soviet Union, February 6, 1961. Unofficial translation by Sergey Mazov in the Congo briefing book prepared for the Cold War International History Project Oral History Conference on the Congo, September 2004, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-congo-crisis-1960-1961, date accessed February 19, 2014.

180. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, February 28, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 297, ar. j. 381, b. 26.
181. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 113.
182. Comments of Cleophas Kamitatu, *The Congo Crisis, 1960–1961: A Critical Oral History Conference,* p. 34.
183. Transcript of the talk between Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR N. P. Firubin and Richard Dvořák, Czechoslovak ambassador to the Soviet Union, March 9, 1961. Unofficial translation by Sergey Mazov in the Congo briefing book prepared for the Cold War International History Project Oral History Conference on the Congo, September 2004, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-congo-crisis-1960-1961, date accessed February 19, 2014.
184. Transcript of the talk between Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR N. P. Firubin and Richard Dvořák, Czechoslovak ambassador to the Soviet Union, March 9, 1961. Unofficial translation by Sergey Mazov in the Congo briefing book prepared for the Cold War International History Project Oral History Conference on the Congo, September 2004, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-congo-crisis-1960-1961, date accessed February 19, 2014.
185. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 128.
186. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, February 28, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 297, ar. j. 381, b. 26.
187. K. Nkrumah (1967) *Challenge of the Congo: A Case Study of Foreign Pressures on an Independent State* (New York: International Publishers), p. 116.
188. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 161.
189. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, pp. 166–7.
190. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 161.
191. For a discussion of Kennedy's attempts to court Nkrumah, see Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, Chapter 4.
192. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 125 and A. Nutting (1972) *Nasser* (New York: E. P. Dutton), p. 291.
193. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, October 10, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 325, ar. j. 412, b. 23.
194. Comments of Thomas Kanza, *The Congo Crisis, 1960–1961: A Critical Oral History Conference*, p. 187.
195. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 136.
196. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 137.
197. In 1964 the Simbas, mostly former followers of Lumumba and Gizenga and led by Mulele, Gastion Soumialot, and Christophe Gbenye, began a rebellion against the Congolese central government in Orientale and Kivu provinces and received aid mostly from communist China and Cuba, with limited support from the Soviet Union and Tanzania. I have seen no evidence to indicate that Czechoslovakia aided the Simbas.

3 Czechoslovak Arms Exports to Africa (1954–68)

1. History of Zbrojovka Brno, http://www.zbrojovka-brno.cz (home page), date accessed March 15, 2013.
2. History of Škoda Brno, http://www.skoda.cz (home page), date accessed March 15, 2013.
3. J. Chmiel (1992) "The Czechoslovak Armaments Industry and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict" *Asian and African Studies* 2, p. 172.
4. "The History of the Czech Economy," http://www.czech.cz (home page), date accessed February 20, 2014.
5. C. F. Beck (1963) "Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa, 1955–1962" *World Politics* 15 (3), pp. 406–7.
6. The previous year the two companies had agreed to a cartel arrangement in an attempt to create a worldwide monopoly on the production of rifles and Ethiopia fell within Herstal's sphere of influence.
7. Chmiel, "The Czechoslovak Armaments Industry and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict," pp. 173–4.
8. C. Rice (1984) *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948–1983: Uncertain Alliance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 50 and 81.
9. P. Zidek (2002) "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962" [Export of arms from Czechoslovakia to third world countries in the years 1948–1962] *Historie a vojenství* 3, pp. 527–8.
10. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," p. 526. Also see Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army*, p. 82.
11. P. Zidek (2006) *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968* [*Czechoslovakia and French Africa, 1948–1968*] (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri), pp. 31–2.
12. "Czechoslovakia best spot for purchasing weapons" *Ottawa Citizen*, November 24, 1979, p. 91.
13. P. Zidek and K. Sieber (2009) *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989* [*Czechoslovakia and the Middle East 1948–1989*] (Prague: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů), p. 129.
14. "Czechoslovakia best spot for purchasing weapons" *Ottawa Citizen*, November 24, 1979, p. 91.
15. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," pp. 529–30.
16. N. Cullather (2006) *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala 1952–54* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) and R. H. Immerman (1983) *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press).
17. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," p. 536.

18. R. Ginat (1993) *The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945–1955* (London: Frank Cass), p. 209, U. Ra'anan (1969) *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), and A. Fursenko and T. Naftali (2006) *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W.W. Norton), Chapter 3.
19. G. Laron (2007) "Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal" *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper No. 55, p. 8.
20. Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," p. 4. The British had provided Egypt with a small amount of arms, but Nasser estimated this to only meet 1 percent of his army's needs. See Memorandum of a conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D. S. Solod and Egyptian Prime Minister G. Nasser, June 15, 1964 reproduced in Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," p. 46.
21. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," pp. 540–1 and G. Laron (2013) *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945–1956* (Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 29–31.
22. Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," p. 10.
23. Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," pp. 15–19.
24. B. Morris (1999) *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999* (New York: Vintage), p. 283 and Laron, *Origins of the Suez Crisis*, pp. 116–17.
25. Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World*.
26. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, p. 56 and Guy Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," p. 22.
27. Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," pp. 28 and 32.
28. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, October 10, 1955. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 66, ar. j. 82, b. 19. Also see Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," pp. 540–3 and Zidek and Sieber. *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, pp. 55–7.
29. M. H. Heikal (1973) *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationships with Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday), p. 52.
30. Ginat, *The Soviet Union and Egypt*, p. 218.
31. Nasser-Hussein exchange quoted in Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, p. 51.
32. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, p. 58.
33. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," pp. 544–5.

34. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, p. 58.
35. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, date accessed February 10, 2015.
36. Zidek and Sieber. *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, p. 68 and History of the Military Technical College, http://www.mtc.edu.eg (home page), date accessed March 25, 2013.
37. Mohrez Mahmoud El-Hussini, for example, claimed that that Moscow "motivated by certain ideological and strategic requirements, made the first move." According to him, the Soviet Union offered arms to Egypt as part of a long-term plan for gaining naval and air bases inside the country. See M. M. El-Hussini (1987) *Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1945–85* (New York: St. Martin's), pp. 55–64.
38. Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, Chapter 3.
39. For examples of this interpretation see Ginat, *The Soviet Union and Egypt*, p. 216 and Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, p. 59.
40. Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," pp. 17–18.
41. Laron, "Cutting the Gordian Knot," p. 18
42. Zidek and Sieber. *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, pp. 260–1.
43. Zidek and Sieber. *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, pp. 260–1. Czechoslovakia did not supply military assistance to Sudan until 1968, when it provided a limited amount of aid. See SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers, date accessed February 10, 2015.
44. Zidek and Sieber. *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, pp. 262–3.
45. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," pp. 533–5.
46. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," p. 533.
47. Ultimately the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) dissolved itself and merged with the FLN. However, this was not a merger on equal terms as the FLN demanded that the PCA disband itself and for its members to join the FLN as individuals rather than as members of the PCA. See I. M. Wall (1977) "The French Communists and the Algerian War" *Journal of Contemporary History* 12 (3), p. 526.
48. J. Ruedy (1992) *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 165.
49. France bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef on February 8, 1958.
50. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 72–3.
51. The Evian agreements ended the Algerian war for independence. France recognized Algeria's independence and Algeria guaranteed the French government continued industrial and commercial privileges

within Algeria. Religious freedom and property rights were also promised to French citizens who wished to stay in Algeria.

52. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 83–4.
53. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 12, 1957. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 157, ar. j. 209, b. 3.
54. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," pp. 551–2 and Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 78.
55. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, February 26, 1957. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 130, ar. j. 170, b. 15 and Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, [undated]. Papers of Antonín Novotný, Folder "Algeria," Document No. 6 M-00884–58. NA-UV KSC.
56. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 78.
57. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," p. 551.
58. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 157.
59. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 156.
60. M. Connelly (2002) *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 237.
61. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 82.
62. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 84–5.
63. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 87.
64. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, May 30, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 216, ar. j. 392, b. 19.
65. P. Zidek and K. Sieber (2007) *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948–1989* [*Czechoslovakia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1948–1989*] (Prague: Ústavmezinárodníchvztahů), p. 76.
66. S. Mazov (2010) *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964* (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press), p. 68.
67. State Department Report, "Czech Shipments of Arms to Guinea" March 30, 1959, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of African Affairs, 1956–62, Folder "Conakry Guinea" Record Group 59, NARA.
68. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 76–8.
69. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 161–2.
70. Touré's response was paraphrased in a telegram from the French embassy in Conakry to Paris and quoted in M. Stewart MacDonald (2009) "The Challenge of Guinean Independence, 1958–1971" (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto), p. 78.
71. See "Discussions between UK, US, and France on Guinea, 1959," Records of the Foreign Office, 371/138836, PRO. Also see

"Memorandum of Conversation: First Tripartite Talks on Africa" April 16, 1959. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIV, Africa* (1992) (Washington, DC: US Department of State), pp. 45–53.

72. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, pp. 162–3.
73. P. Zidek, "Vývoz zbrani z Československa do zemí třetího světa v letech 1948–1962," p. 562.
74. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 144.
75. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, March 21, 1961. Box No. 02/2, Folder 300, Document No. 384/23. NA-UV KSC.
76. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 211–12.
77. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 71–2.
78. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, March 15, 1966. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 136, ar. j. 144, b. 25.
79. Natalia Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961–1975" (PhD dissertation, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014), pp. 59–60.
80. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 1, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 317, ar. j. 402, b. 25.
81. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 95–6 and Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," p. 64.
82. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on Aid Given to the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde [undated, but 1964]. AMZV, A-2–2/929, cj. Sv-0066/03–64.
83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on Aid Given to the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde [undated, but 1964]. AMZV, A-2–2/929, cj. Sv-0066/03–64.
84. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 96–7 and A. J. Venter (2013) *Portugal's Guerrilla Wars in Africa: Lisbon's Three Wars in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, 1961–74* (West Midlands, UK: Helion & Company), p. 314.
85. For Cabral's quotes regarding Czechoslovakia see *Rudé Právo*, November 16, 1967 and June 6, 1966.
86. Natalia Telepneva quotes Soviet official Petr Yevsyukov as stating that Czechoslovakia gave "a whole batch" of such hats as a gift to the PAIGC. See Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," p. 93. Historian Jakub Benes speculates that Cabral was first introduced to the *zmijovka* during one of his several trips to Czechoslovakia. The hat was produced in the Bohemian city of Strakonice where large Czechoslovak munitions and handgun factories were also located. There is documentary evidence of Cabral having visited a school in nearby Švihov, but it is

unlikely that his trip to this part of Czechoslovakia was for the sole purpose of visiting a school. It seems more likely that he was being taken to Strakonice to tour the weapons factories and perhaps also visited the Fezko factory which manufactured the *zmijovka*. See J. Benes (2012) "The 'Soft Power' of Czechoslovak Communism Abroad: Zmijovky/Cabral Hats as Socialist Global Commodities in the Revolutionary Third World" (Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies 44th Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA). I would like to thank Dr. Benes for graciously providing me a copy of this paper.

87. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 95–6 and Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," pp. 86–91.
88. Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," pp. 87–91 & 113.
89. Zidek and Sieber, Českoslov*ensko a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 19 and Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," pp. 57–8.
90. Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," p. 64. I have seen no evidence that Czechoslovakia gave military aid to Angolan rebels as early as 1961. It is possible that Czechoslovak manufactured weapons found their way to Angola through an intermediary source, or that the Portuguese simply fabricated the allegation.
91. Report from Foreign Minister Václav David to General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Antonín Novotný, April 18, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 304, ar. j. 387, b. 32.
92. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 20.
93. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 20–1.
94. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 21 and Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," p. 77.
95. Telegram from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Leopoldville, Congo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 29, 1963. AMZV, PZ, Leopoldville. Mimoradna politicka zprava C. 9, c. 082/63, cj. 020.601/64–10.
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104. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 225.
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106. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on Assistance for the National Liberation Movements of Southern Rhodesia, April 21, 1961. AMZV, TO-T. Rhodesie, 1960–64, cj. 024.176/61–10 also see V. Shubin (2008) *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press), p. 151.
107. Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ [undated]. Papers of Antonín Novotný, Folder "Coordination of assistance from socialist countries to African liberation movements," Document No. 003 950/61. NA-UV KSC.
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109. See A. DeRoche (2007) "Non-alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia and the USA, 1964–1968" *Cold War History*, pp. 227–50.
110. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda quoted in C. Legum (1966) *Zambia, Independence and Beyond: The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons), p. 54.
111. On November 11, 1965 the administration of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front party opposed the transition to black majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, proclaimed Southern Rhodesia's independence from the United Kingdom.
112. Letter from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 29, 1966. AMZV, PZ, Lusaka, 1966, cj. SM-028.774/66 and Letter from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 19, 1966. AMZV, PZ, Lusaka, 1966, cj. SM-028.779/66.
113. Letter from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 23, 1968. AMZV, PZ, Lusaka, 1968, cj. 021.665/68–8.
114. Report on the Rhodesian Liberation Movements, October 26, 1965. KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 120, ar. j. 126, b. 12.
115. For Chikerema's request see telegram from Czechoslovak Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 10, 1965. AMZV, TO-T, Rhodesie, 1965–69, cj. 027.178/65–10. For Nyandoro's request see telegram from Czechoslovak Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 26, 1965. AMZV, TO-T, Rhodesie, 1965–69.
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117. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, October 26, 1965. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 120, ar. j. 126, b. 12.

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119. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 107.
120. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, July 16, 1963. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 28, ar. j. 29, b. 16.
121. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, July 16, 1963. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 28, ar. j. 29, b. 16.
122. For an account of Soviet assistance to the ANC see V. Shubin (2008) *ANC: A View From Moscow* (Sunnyside, South Africa: Jacana Media), especially Chapter 2.
123. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 112–13. Based on other documents it is clear that Czechoslovakia in fact did send weapons to the UPC in late 1959 or early 1960, but I have not seen any records which indicate the quantity or type of weapons sent at that time.
124. Letter from Foreign Minister Václav David to General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Antonín Novotný, January 30, 1960. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 248, ar. j. 331, b. 6.
125. Telegram from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Conakry, Guinea to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 20, 1960. AMZV, PZ, Konakry 1959–61, ob. 2, C. 4, cj. 055/60-Kp-Ha.
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127. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 112.
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129. Resolution the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 27, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 371, ar. j. 465, b. 13.
130. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, November 12, 1963. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 40, ar. j. 45, b. 9.
131. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 120.
132. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 120–1.
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141. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, June 29, 1965. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 111, ar. j. 115, b. 21.
142. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ [undated, but spring 1965]. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 111, ar. j. 115, b. 21. According to this document Mondlane had given an interview to a Tanzanian reporter in which he referred to Czechoslovakia as a military giant which provided substantial military aid to African liberation movements.
143. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 96.
144. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika*, p. 96.
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McGhee, May 17, 1962, "Program of Action to Counter Soviet Penetration in the Field of Civil Aviation in Africa," General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.

73. Report from the Civil Aeronautics Board, September 1, 1961, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA; Dillon, Frontline Diplomacy.
74. Letter from Russel B. Adams, Vice President of Pan American Airlines, to Philip H. Trezise, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, May 14, 1962, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.
75. S. Mazov (2007) "Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960–61) as Reflected in Russian Archives," *Cold War History* 7 (3), pp. 425–37.
76. Memorandum from United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President John F. Kennedy, April 10, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General 1961," JFKL.
77. Telegram from United States Ambassador to Sudan, James Moose, Jr. to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, August 17, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General 1961," JFKL.
78. Memorandum from Robert Komer of the National Security Staff to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, September 11, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General 1961," JFKL and Memorandum from United States Air Force Colonel Godfrey T. McHugh to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, September 23, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General 1961," JFKL.
79. Memorandum from L. D. Battle, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, September 21, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General 1961," JFKL.
80. Memorandum from United States Air Force Major General R. M. Montgomery to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, September 13, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General 1961," JFKL.
81. Telegram from United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk to United States Ambassador to Sudan James Moose, Jr., September 12, 1961.

National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General 1961," JFKL.

82. Letter from J. G. S. Beith at the British Embassy in Leopoldville, Congo to the North and East African Department of the British Foreign Office, June 8, 1962. Records of the Foreign Office, FO 371/165178, PRO.
83. Memorandum from Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Achilles to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee, May 10, 1962. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa* (1996) (Washington, DC: US Department of State), pp. 315–18.
84. State Department Memorandum on "Soviet Bloc Civil Air Expansion in Africa" sent to the government of the United Kingdom, May 18, 1962. Records of the Foreign Office, Folder "Expansion of civil aviation in Africa by Soviet Union 1962," FO 371/165223, PRO.
85. Minutes from a Meeting at the British Foreign Office, May 16, 1962. Records of the Foreign Office, FO 371/165178, PRO.
86. For more on the competition between the United States and the United Kingdom for aviation markets see Engel, *Cold War at 30,000 Feet.*
87. Letter from the British Ambassador to Sudan Sir Ian D. Scott to Sir Roger Stevens of the British Foreign Office, February 24, 1962. Records of the Foreign Office, Folder "Civil Aviation: Sudan 1962," FO 371/165191, PRO.
88. Telegram from United States Chargé d'affaires in Sudan McElhiney to United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, June 16, 1962. National Security Files, Box No. 160 "Countries: Sudan," Folder "Sudan, General, 6/62–8/63," JFKL.
89. Memorandum of conversation of civil aviation meeting held at the White House, May 14, 1962, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.
90. Letter from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee to Mr. Martin, May 21, 1962, "Re: Soviet Civil Aviation Penetration of Latin America," General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.
91. Letter from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee to Mr. Martin, May 21, 1962, "Re: Soviet Civil Aviation Penetration of Latin America," General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.

92. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee, May 17, 1962, "Program of Action to Counter Soviet Penetration in the Field of Civil Aviation in Africa," General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.
93. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee, May 17, 1962, "Program of Action to Counter Soviet Penetration in the Field of Civil Aviation in Africa," General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.
94. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee, May 17, 1962, "Program of Action to Counter Soviet Penetration in the Field of Civil Aviation in Africa," General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV-Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.
95. "Project Eagle: Development of Continental Africa," undated memorandum (presumably from June 1962), General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "B-3 Aviation (Second Folder)," Record Group 59, NARA.
96. "Project Eagle: Development of Continental Africa," undated memorandum (presumably from June 1962), General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "B-3 Aviation (Second Folder)," Record Group 59, NARA.
97. Letter from Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman to United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, September 17, 1962. Copy of letter sent to the government of the United Kingdom, May 18, 1962. Records of the Foreign Office, Folder "Expansion of civil aviation in Africa by Soviet Union 1962," FO 371/165223, PRO.
98. Position Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State, "Soviet Bloc Air Penetration of Underdeveloped Areas: Africa and Latin America" [dated but August or September 1962] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa* (1996) (Washington, DC: US Department of State), pp. 322–3.

99. Memorandum from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee to State Department African Bureau Office Directors, October 17, 1962, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Box "Records of the Political-Military Advisor, 1951–1963," Folder "AV—Civil Aviation, 1961–62," Record Group 59, NARA.
100. For a good account of the events of the Cuban missile crisis, see A. Fursenko and T. Naftali (1997) *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: W.W. Norton).
101. "Aeroflot Service to Cuba: Problems Arising from USSR Not Being a International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Signatory" [undated by early 1963] Records of the Board of Trade, Folder "Aeroflot Service to Cuba," BT 245/1242, PRO.
102. Research memorandum from Director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 16, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00778.
103. See the numerous documents in Records of the Foreign Office, Box No. 371/165223, PRO.
104. Research memorandum from Director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 26, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00778.
105. As early as October 17, Dean Rusk sent a circular telegram to the US embassies in Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Guinea, Morocco, and Senegal to urge host governments to deny overflight permission for Soviet flights to Cuba. See circular telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 17, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00499.
106. See Montcrieff J. Spear, oral history interview, April 6, 1993, Frontline Diplomacy; Michael B. Smith, oral history interview, August 25, 1993, Frontline Diplomacy.
107. Research memorandum from Director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 26, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00778.
108. Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Embassies in Africa and Europe, October 23, 1962, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Morocco, US Embassy, Rabat, Classified General Records, 1956–1963, Box No. 13, Folder "US-Cuba, 1962–1964," Record Group 84, NARA.
109. Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Embassies in Africa and Europe, October 23, 1962, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Morocco, US Embassy, Rabat, Classified General Records, 1956–63, Box No. 13, Folder

"US-Cuba, 1962–1964," Record Group 84, NARA. Because numerous documents between the State Department and African embassies from this period remain classified, it is impossible to determine exactly what the United States was willing to offer African states in return for their support on this issue.

110. Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Embassies in Africa and Europe, October 23, 1962, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Morocco, US Embassy, Rabat, Classified General Records, 1956–63, Box 13, Folder "US-Cuba, 1962–1964," Record Group 84, NARA.
111. Telegram from Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 23, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00663.
112. R. Legvold (1970) *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 157. Also see W. Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks*, p. 104.
113. Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 109. For a discussion of Sékou Touré's visit to the Kennedy White House see P. E. Muehlenbeck (2012) *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 67–9.
114. Telegram from Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 23, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00662.
115. See top secret CIA intelligence memorandum, October 24, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00687.
116. Letter from Ambassador William P. Mahoney Jr. to Special Assistant to the President Ralph Dungan, November 27, 1962, National Security Files, Box No. 384 "William H. Brubeck Series," Folder "Ghana: Background Papers for Kaiser Visit to Ghana, 1962," JFKL.
117. Nkrumah quoted by Mahoney in an interview with David Rooney. See D. Rooney (1988) *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's), p. 243.
118. Letter from Ambassador William P. Mahoney Jr. to Special Assistant to the President Ralph Dungan, November 27, 1962, National Security Files, Box No. 384 "William H. Brubeck Series," Folder "Ghana: Background Papers for Kaiser Visit to Ghana, 1962," JFKL.
119. Telegram from US Embassy in Accra to State Department, Emtel 691, October 24, 1962, National Security Files, Box No. 384 "William H. Brubeck Series," Folder "Ghana 9/62–11/62," JFKL.
120. R. D. Mahoney (1983) *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 181, 245.
121. Research memorandum from Director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman to Secretary

of State Dean Rusk, October 26, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00778.

122. Philip M. Kaiser, oral history interview, May 4, 2005, Frontline Diplomacy.
123. P. M. Kaiser (1992) *Journeying Far and Wide: A Political and Diplomatic Memoir* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons). Also see telegram from Ambassador Philip Kaiser (Dakar) to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 27, 1962. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Morocco, US Embassy, Rabat, Classified General Records, 1956–63, Box No. 13, Folder "US-Cuba, 1962–1964," Record Group 84; Kaiser, Frontline Diplomacy; and Stephen Low, oral history interview, December 5, 1997, Frontline Diplomacy.
124. Telegram from Ambassador Philip Kaiser (Dakar) to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 27, 1962, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Morocco, US Embassy, Rabat, Classified General Records, 1956–63, Box No. 13, Folder "US-Cuba,1962–1964," Record Group 84, NARA. Also see research memorandum from Director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 26, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00778.
125. "New Threat-Red Bases in Morocco," *US News & World Report*, September 17, 1962.
126. Transcript of telephone conversation between Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, October 27, 1962, General Records of the Department of State, Office of the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Office Files of the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee, 1961–63, Box No. 6, Folder "Telephone Conversations, October 20–October 31, 1962," Record Group 59, NARA; also see telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Embassy in Rabat, Morocco, October 27, 1962, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Morocco, US Embassy, Rabat, Classified General Records, 1956–63, Box No. 13, Folder "US-Cuba, 1962–1964," Record Group 84, NARA.
127. Telegram from Ambassador John Ferguson to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, October 24, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00684.
128. See telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Ambassador John Ferguson containing message from President John F. Kennedy to King Hassan II of Morocco, October 25, 1962, Digital NSA, Collection: Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, Item Number CU00732.

129. See US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] Database http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/, date accessed February 23, 2009. Data analysis by author.
130. See US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] Database http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/, date accessed February 23, 2009. Data analysis by author.
131. Report from Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs George C. McGhee, "Memorandum on Civil Aviation Policy toward Sino-Soviet Bloc" April 19, 1963. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Box No. 466, Folder "Civil Aviation 2," LOC and Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Sterling J. Cottrell to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, September 19, 1963. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Box No. 466, Folder "Civil Aviation 2," LOC.
132. Memorandum of Conversation between United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Czechoslovak Vaclav David at United Nations General Assembly Meeting, December 10, 1964. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe* (1996) (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), p. 155.
133. Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Embassy in Rabat, Morocco, December 20, 1962, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Morocco, US Embassy, Rabat, Classified General Records, 1956–63, Box No. 13, Folder "US-Cuba, 1962–1964," Record Group 84, NARA.
134. "Aeroflot Service to Cuba: Problems Arising from USSR Not Being a International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Signatory" [undated by early 1963] Records of the Board of Trade, Folder "Aeroflot Service to Cuba," BT 245/1242, PRO.
135. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 88.
136. Guttery, *Encyclopedia of African Airlines*, pp. 78–9.
137. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 145.
138. Report on Czechoslovak Technical Assistance to Mali from Czechoslovak Embassy in Bamako to Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 30, 1967. AMZV, TO-T Mali, 1965–69, k. 1. ob. 15, cj. 0140/67.

5 The Decline of Czechoslovak Influence in Africa (1962–68)

1. Telegram from Ambassador John Morrow to Department of State, February 13, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea-USSR. Relations," Record Group 84, NARA. Additionally, in

August 1960 Touré had allowed the Soviets to use Conakry as a staging ground and refueling stop in their airlift of weapons and ammunition to the Congolese. See A. Fursenko and T. Naftali (2006) *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W. W. Norton), p. 312.

2. Touré quoted in A. M. Schlesinger Jr. (1965) *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 568.
3. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 568. Touré also sent an angry telegram to Kennedy accusing the United States of having had a hand in Lumumba's murder.
4. *Agence Guineenne de Presse*, February 14, 1961, as translated by the US embassy in Conakry. See telegram from Ambassador John H. Morrow to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, February 14, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA; telegram from Ambassador John H. Morrow to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, February 24, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 1 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Congo-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
5. *Agence Guineenne de Presse*, February 14, 1961, as translated by the US embassy in Conakry. See telegram from Ambassador John H. Morrow to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, February 14, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA; telegram from Ambassador John H. Morrow to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, February 24, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 1 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Congo-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
6. W. Attwood (1987) *The Twilight Struggle: Tales of the Cold War* (New York: Harper & Row), p. 226.
7. Telegram from State Department to Ambassador John H. Morrow, February 25, 1961, containing a copy of a written statement given by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Guinean Ambassador Diallo, February 25, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 1 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Congo-United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
8. William Attwood, oral history interview, December 14, 1988, Frontline Diplomacy.
9. Attwood, *Twilight Struggle*, p. 226.

10. Attwood, *Twilight Struggle*, pp. 227–8; W. Attwood (1967) *The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Harper & Row), pp. 34–5.
11. Telegram from Ambassador William Attwood to Undersecretary of State George Ball, May 4, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea—United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
12. Telegram from Ambassador William Attwood to Undersecretary of State George Ball, May 6, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder " #320, Guinea—United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
13. Telegram from Ambassador William Attwood to Undersecretary of State George Ball, May 4, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea—United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
14. Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the US Embassies in Conakry, Paris, and London, May 12, 1961. Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box No. 2 "Guinea, Conakry Embassy, Classified General Records 1959–1961," Folder "#320, Guinea—United States Relations," Record Group 84, NARA.
15. Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 23.
16. Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 35.
17. Telegram from Ambassador William Attwood to Bali, May 12, 1961, cited in T. J. Noer (1989) "New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa," in T. G. Paterson (ed.) *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 279.
18. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 569.
19. Memorandum of conversation between President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Hastings K. Banda, President of Nyasaland, May 2, 1961. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa* (1996) (Washington, DC: US State Department), pp. 508–9.
20. Memorandum of conversation between President John F. Kennedy and President Charles de Gaulle of France, President's Office Files, Box No. 116a "Countries: France," Folder "JFK Visit to de Gaulle, 5/31–6/2/61," JFKL.
21. Paper authored by Ambassador William Attwood, "Suggested Approach to Touré," May 18, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 102 "Countries: Guinea," Folder "Guinea, 1/61–5/61," JFKL.
22. In 1959, during Sékou Touré's visit to the United States, then Senator Kennedy rented a helicopter to fly the Guinean president to newly opened Disneyland so that the two could have a meeting. For a discussion of this meeting see P. E. Muehlenbeck (2012) *Betting on the*

Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 27–8.

23. Ambassador John Howard Morrow, oral history interview, May 11, 1981, Frontline Diplomacy.
24. For the story of the Soviet snowplows sent to Guinea see Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 67.
25. P. Zidek and K. Sieber (2007) *Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948–1989* [*Czechoslovakia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1948–1989*] (Prague: Ústavmezinárodníchvztahů), pp. 82–3 and *Attwood, Reds and the Blacks*, p. 117.
26. As an example see report submitted to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, October 10, 1961. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 325, ar. j. 412, b. 7.
27. Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 63; Attwood, *Twilight Struggle*, p. 231.
28. Touré quoted in *West Africa*, December 30, 1961. Touré also accused the French ambassador of complicity in the plot for having allowed Guinean opposition elements to use the French diplomatic post in Conakry to communicate with "Guinean anti-party groups in Paris and Moscow."
29. S. Mazov (2010) *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956 –1964* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press), pp. 188–9.
30. Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, pp. 196–7.
31. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, April 10, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 346, ar. j. 436, b. 13.
32. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 1, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 358, ar. j. 449, b. 7.
33. Research Memorandum from Bureau of Intelligence and Research Director Roger Hilsmen to the Acting Secretary of State, October 5, 1962. General Records of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box No. 2: "Office of West African Affairs, Country Files 1951–1963, Guinea," Folder "History and Background," Record Group 59, NARA.
34. Memorandum of conversation between President John F. Kennedy and Guinean President Sékou Touré, October 10, 1962. General Records of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box No. 2: "Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–1963, Guinea," Folder "US Guinean Relations 16.1(6)," Record Group 59, NARA; Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 106.
35. Attwood, *Twilight Struggle*, pp. 324–5.
36. Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 107.
37. Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, p. 217 and Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 109.

38. Touré quoted by Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 129.
39. Memorandum of conversation between Vladimir Dubinin, First Secretary of the USSR Embassy in Guinea, and Donald E. Herdeck, Acting Deputy Chief of US Mission in Guinea, October 17, 1963. General Records of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box No. 2 "Office of West African Affairs: Country Files, 1951–1963," Folder "Political Affairs and Relations: Soviet Bloc-Guinean Relations," Record Group 59, NARA.
40. A. Iandolo (2011) "Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1957–64" (PhD dissertation, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford), p. 243 and Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War*, p. 196.
41. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 87.
42. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 88.
43. Report on Czechoslovakia's Relations with Mali submitted to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 24, 1965. NA-UV KSC. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 116, ar. j. 120, b. 9.
44. Telegram from Ambassador Martin in Geneva to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, September 7, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 8/61–9/61," JFKL.
45. R. B. Rakove (2012) *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 84 and Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Embassy in Bamako, Mali, September 14, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 8/61–9/61," JFKL. For a transcript of the meeting between Kennedy and Keita see Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy and Malian President Modibo Keita, September 13, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 8/61–9/61," JFKL.
46. Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy and Malian President Modibo Keita, September 13, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 8/61–9/61," JFKL.
47. Report of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams on his third trip to Africa September 29–October 26, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy, President's Office Files, Box No. 2A, Folder "Africa, General, 11/61," JFKL.
48. Report of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams on his third trip to Africa September 29–October 26, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy, President's Office Files, Box No. 2A, Folder "Africa, General, 11/61," JFKL.
49. Memorandum from State Department Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, July 7, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Folder "Mali, General,

7/61," JFKL and Memorandum from State Department Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, November 16, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Folder "Mali, General, 11/61–5/62," JFKL.

50. See US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] Database, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/, date accessed June 3, 2013.
51. State Department Report, "Guidelines of US Policy and Operations in Mali," July 18, 1961. National Security Files, Box No. 140A, Countries, "Mali," Folder "Mali, General, 7/61," JFKL.
52. The program aimed to improve the quality of the herds, increase the number of animals commercialized, and improve the methods of bringing Malian beef to coastal markets.
53. Phillip W. Pillsbury, Jr., oral history interview, February 28, 1994, Frontline Diplomacy and Robert V. Keeley, oral history interview, December 19, 1991, Frontline Diplomacy.
54. Report on Czechoslovakia's Relations with Mali submitted to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, March 26, 1963. NA-UV KSC. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 13, ar. j. 14, b. 7.
55. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 148.
56. Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, August 24, 1965. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/1, sv. 116, ar. j. 120, b. 9.
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61. For data on African students in Czechoslovakia see P. Zidek (2006) *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968* [*Czechoslovakia and French Africa, 1948–1968*] (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri), pp. 37–8. For data on African students in the Soviet Union see J. Hessler (2006) "Death of an African Student in Moscow" *Cahiers du monde russe* 1 (47), p. 35 and S. Guillory (2014) "Culture Clash in the Socialist Paradise: Soviet Patronage and African Students' Urbanity in the Soviet Union, 1960–1965" *Diplomatic History* 38 (2), pp. 272–3.
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63. The rest of the students were from Czechoslovakia, Asia, and the Middle East. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968*, p. 37.
64. Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968*, pp. 37–9.
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68. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 227.
69. For an example, see discussion of racism against African students in *Forum zahraničníh studentů* [*Foreign Student Forum*] in the last issue printed before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
70. “African Cites Discrimination by Czechs,” *The News and Courier*, May 23, 1965, p. 3-A.
71. *Tuzex* is a contraction of the Czech phrase tuzemský export [domestic export]. During the communist era in Czechoslovakia special shops existed which sold foreign (mainly Western) luxury goods which were unavailable at regular stores. In these stores the Czechoslovak koruna was not accepted and payment was required in either foreign hard currencies or tuzex vouchers.
72. Ludovic Chancel quoted in Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968*, p. 40.
73. “Czech Youths Vent Wrath on Africans,” *Eugene Register-Guard*, July 10, 1963, p. 7C.
74. M. Matusevich (2012) “Testing the Limits of Soviet Internationalism: African Students in the Soviet Union,” in P. E. Muehlenbeck (ed.) *Race, Ethnicity, and the Cold War: A Global Perspective* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press), p. 151.
75. Hessler, “Death of an African Student in Moscow,” p. 41.
76. Zidek and Sieber. *Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989*, pp. 166–7; 178–9.
77. “Reds Plan to Rule Africa In 20 Years, Student Says,” *Tuscaloosa News*, January 3, 1962, p. 5.
78. Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 103.
79. Attwood, *Reds and the Blacks*, p. 103.
80. Meer Hassan Allyho quoted in Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968*, p. 41.
81. Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 148 and Zidek, *Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948–1968*, p. 41.
82. “African Adventure in Czechoslovakia,” *Southeast Missourian* [translated from an article which was originally published in the Austrian newspaper *Arbeiter Zeitung*] April 23, 1963, p. 6.

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92. Report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the KSČ, March 20, 1962. NA-UV KSC, f. 02/2, sv. 342, ar. j. 433, b. 9 and Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 57.
93. Jan Ledl quoted in Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, p. 196.
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120. K. Batsa (1985) *The Spark: Times Behind Me: From Kwame Nkrumah to Hilla Limann* (London: Rex Collings), pp. 10–11.
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129. For an analysis of Novotný's fall from power see Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, Chapter XIV.
130. Antonín Novotný's statement to the Czechoslovak National Assembly upon his resignation as president of Czechoslovakia, March 22, 1968. Quoted in Szulc, *Czechoslovakia Since World War II*, p. 291.
131. Bohumír Lomský quoted in Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army*, p. 114.
132. G. Bischof, S. Karner, and P. Ruggenthaler (2010) *The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 5–6.
133. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Eduardo Mondlane of FRELIMO, Halie Selassie of Ethiopia, and Joseph Mobutu of Zaire are just some of the many African leaders who vocally condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The government of Mali and the leading national liberation movements of South Africa (SACP and ANC) were among the few Africans who supported the Soviet invasion. See J. M. Cabrita (2000) *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 127; R. G. Patman (1990) *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 92; B. Kasuka (2013) *Prominent African Leaders Since Independence* (Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press), p. 180; Zidek and Sieber, *Československo a subsaharská Afrika*, pp. 208 and 229–30; A. Ogunsanwo (1974) *China's Policy in Africa, 1958–71* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 217; and *African Communist* 36 (4) (1968), pp. 5–15.
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138. Tůma, "'They had no tanks this time and they got four goals,'" p. 15.
139. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on Relations with Africa, December 28, 1962. AMZV, GS-T 1965–1969, k. 38, ob. 7, cj. 011570/68.
140. Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army*, p. 191.
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142. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa*, pp. 72–3.
143. In 1968 the percentage of total Soviet bloc economic assistance to Africa provided by each country was: Soviet Union, 51.4 percent; Czechoslovakia, 27.9 percent; Romania, 6.3 percent; Hungary, 5.6 percent; Bulgaria, 4.9 percent;, Poland, 2.8 percent, and East Germany, 1.1 percent. See C. Stevens (1976) *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (London: Macmillan), p. 69.
144. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa*, pp. 44–5.
145. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa*, pp. 44–5.
146. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa*, pp. 44–5.

Conclusion

1. As of February 2014, the Czech Republic had 10 diplomatic missions in Africa (all embassies) in comparison to 27 for Belgium (22 embassies and 5 consulates); 24 for the Netherlands (22 embassies and 2 consulates); 21 for Portugal (17 embassies and 4 consulates); 16 for Greece (12 embassies and 4 consulates); and 11 for Austria (all embassies).
2. The distribution of the fourteen scholarships was: Ethiopia (9), Angola (2), Ghana (2), and Nigeria (1). See *Report on the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, 2010* (Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic).
3. See Data on External Trade of the Czech Republic, 2012. Czech Statistical Office, http://www.czso.cz (home page), date accessed February 18, 2014.
4. The other priority countries were Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Mongolia. See "The Development Strategy of the Czech Republic" (2009) (Prague: Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic), http://www.mzv.cz/file/762314/FINAL__Development_Cooperation_Strategy_2010_2017.pdf, date accessed February 17, 2014.

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6. As of February 2014, the Slovak Republic had 6 diplomatic missions in Africa (all embassies) in comparison to 20 for Norway (all embassies); 14 for Denmark (13 embassies and 1 consulate); 12 for Finland (all embassies); 11 for Ireland (10 embassies and 1 consulate); and 12 for Serbia (all embassies).
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