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

THE WINDSOR DYNASTY 1910 TO THE PRESENT

'Long to Reign Over Us'?

Edited by
Matthew Glencross
Judith Rowbotham
and Michael D. Kandiah

Palgrave Studies in Modern Monarchy

Aim of the Series

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Matthew Glencross • Judith Rowbotham • Michael D. Kandiah
Editors

The Windsor Dynasty 1910 to the Present

‘Long to Reign Over Us’?

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macmillan

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London, UK — Matthew Glencross
Plymouth, UK — Judith Rowbotham
London, UK — Michael D. Kandiah
April 2016

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List of Abbreviations

BL	British Library
CAC	Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge
FO	Foreign Office
IWM	Imperial War Museum
NAA	National Archives, Australia
NAM	National Army Museum
NLS	National Library of Scotland
RA	Royal Archives, Windsor
TNA	The National Archives, Kew

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Matthew Glencross, Judith Rowbotham, and Michael D. Kandiah

Background

This volume fills in a gap in the current historiography of the twentieth century, promoting a better understanding of why the British monarchy, currently under the House of Windsor, has not only survived, but also flourished, at time when other monarchies, globally, have disappeared to be replaced by a variety of non-monarchical systems. Scholarship on monarchy in the modern era went through a period when it was regarded as being largely irrelevant to the concerns of modern historians, who have concentrated instead on the emergence of post-monarchical systems in Europe after 1918. This has meant that where monarchy has been addressed it has been seen as a background to the development of successor systems. Books in English on both monarchy as a modern form of government and on individual monarchs as political and diplomatic agents have been few and far between in the last half century of substantial historical writing. Recent

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exceptions have been Douglas-Home and Kelly's study of twentieth century monarchy and, focusing on the present reign, Philip Murphy's work on monarchy in Britain in the post-imperial era of the Commonwealth.[1] Otherwise, comments on the post-1914 British monarchy as a political force have generally been found in texts written by constitutional experts such as Vernon Bogdanor rather than by leading political historians.

There have been biographies, of course, often written by popular, rather than academic, historians—but biography has remained an area of academic historical writing that continues to be under-appreciated in terms of the contributions it can make to the understanding of the past, socio-economically and politically. Essentially, this is a product of the traditional Whig approach to history where there is a notion of an end-point which implicitly suggests that there will come a time when the monarchy will become totally irrelevant, and so be disposed of. In seeking to open the debate further, by challenging this underlying Whiggish certainty of the end of monarchy, the book seeks to test the potential for endurance of the monarchy within the British political system, and within the popular support offered to the institution by the population of the United Kingdom as a whole.

Methodological Approaches

Thus the starting point for the contributions to this volume has been a revisiting of the modern British monarchy inspired by a conviction that as a system and an aspect of the political state, monarchy has been undervalued by British scholarship since Walter Bagehot's work on the constitution. Bagehot's conclusions have been used as a way of writing off the monarchy as a serious player in Britain's political and diplomatic history.[2] Recent scholarship has, however, started a process of rehabilitation by using the approaches of socio-cultural history to provide insights into the importance and impact of monarchy in Britain. David Cannadine's work has already shown that, when it comes to

[1] Charles Douglas-Home and Saul Kelly (2000) *Dignified and Efficient: the British Monarchy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Claridge Press); Philip Murphy (2013) *Monarchy and the End of Empire: the House of Windsor, the British Government and the Postwar Commonwealth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[2] See Zara S. Steiner (1969) *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914* (London: Ashfield Press); George Monger (1963) *The End of Isolation. British Foreign Policy 1900–1907* (New York: Greenwood Press) in particular. Both these works are obviously influenced by Bagehot's argument and have been used to bolster the work of subsequent diplomatic historians of the period. Walter Bagehot (1883) *The English Constitution, and other essays* (London: D. Appleton).

domestic British politics in the nineteenth century, Bagehot's explanation of how monarchy works is practically flawed.[3] Vernon Bogdanor's work has also shown, through his study of domestic political history in the twentieth century that Bagehot's model does not work for that period either.[4] Looking more widely, this volume will also suggest where monarchy has continued to play a significant part in Britain's external relations—both with its former colonies and with other global powers. In other words, Bagehot's suggestion that the British monarchy has not had any political or socio-cultural relevance in modern history is not automatically sustainable.[5]

A better understanding of the significance of symbolism and how monarchy has epitomised that symbolism to reinforce national identity at individual state level has come from studies on European monarchies in the modern era, particularly the nineteenth century. Johannes Paulmann's work has been widely credited with prompting a rethinking of the importance of royal diplomacy and politics within European states, and is drawn on as a significant influence here.[6] As Karina Urbach points out, the association of a dynasty with a national identity was by no means straightforward or easy, given the essentially international nature of royal familial relations.[7] However, what this volume explores is how George V and his successors have managed to anglicise very successfully a dynasty which was, in the nineteenth century, still seen—both by its incumbents and by its critics at least—as being German as much as British, and part of a wider royal network.[8] The importance of ceremonial, and the symbolism derived from that, to underpin this link

[3] David Cannadine (2001) *Ornamentalism* (London: Penguin); David Cannadine (1983) 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition' c. 1820–1977' in E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[4] Vernon Bogdanor (1995) *The Monarchy and the Constitution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

[5] Antony Best (2008) 'The role of diplomatic practice and court protocol in Anglo-Japanese relations, 1867–1900' in Markus Mosslang and Torsten Riotte, eds *The Diplomats' World: The Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp231–53.

[6] Johannes Paulmann (2000) *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Regime und Erstem Welkreig*,(Paderborn: Schoningh Verlag).

[7] Karina Urbach, ed (2008) *Royal Kinship: Anglo-German Family Networks 1815–1918* (Munich: deGruyter).

[8] Here it is stressed that the term British is used deliberately—because the emphasis of the Windsor dynasty has been on a Greater Britain, with its interest in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland as well as England. This also has wider implications for the post-imperial Commonwealth, with the emphasis that when in Canada, for instance, members of the royal family depict themselves as Canadians, rather than Britons.

between British royalty and British national identity will be shown here to have been a crucial tool. Moreover it is one very consciously used by all the Windsors, from George V on.

This is not to argue that—as Paulmann also shows—nineteenth-century monarchs and their early twentieth-century successors were unaware of the value of ceremonial and its significance for 'Britishness' when performing their monarchical functions, both domestic and international.[9] In Britain, monarchic ceremonial was lower key in the last forty-odd years of Victoria's reign, because of her emphasis on her widowed status. But it would be a mistake to assume that it was not important to the way in which the monarchy was identified as being important to the British populace as a whole—the wild popular success of Victoria's Golden and Diamond Jubilees underlines this.[10] In terms of a revival and also a modernisation of monarchical ceremonial in Britain, it has tended to be Edward VII who has been credited with a re-inventing of royal pomp, especially in terms of state visits overseas, for instance.[11]

However, to emphasise this is to miss the point of the modern monarchical reality as created first by George V and subsequently nuanced and expanded by his successors. Up to the creation of the Windsor dynasty, the individual personality of the monarch was intrinsically intertwined with—and arguably the most prominent part of—the public face of monarchy. Within British history, however, the Crown had been gradually developing as a symbol with a life of its own outside that individual monarchical personality, thanks to the long evolution of constitutional monarchy.[12] The existence of the Crown as symbol was something which was consciously capitalised on by George V, who understood it differently to his father and grandmother—and his elder brother. Never expected to

[9] Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik*.

[10] G. King (2007) *Twilight of Splendor: The Court of Queen Victoria During Her Diamond Jubilee Year* (New York: John Wiley and Sons)—this volume, however, challenges King's conclusion that royal ceremonial was then in its twilight, in terms of public importance. See also Christopher Hibbert (2010) *Queen Victoria. A Personal History* (London: HarperCollins).

[11] Matthew Glencross (2015) *The State Visits of Edward VII: Reinventing Royal Diplomacy for the Twentieth Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan); see also Roderick McLean (2001) *Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe 1890–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[12] See Mike Ashley (1998) *British Monarchs, The Complete Genealogy, Gazetteer and Biographical Encyclopedia of the Kings and Queens of Britain* (London: Robinson) in particular, but also David Starkey (2010) *Crown and Country: A History of England Through the Monarchy* (London: HarperPress).

inherit the throne, George had instead been trained to consider himself as a servant of the Crown even though a royal himself. As a serving naval officer, he had become accustomed to a largely unquestioning loyalty to the symbol of the Crown, in a way that those brought up to inherit the throne would not have considered. He saw his duty to the Crown as being preeminent, and did not lose that perspective when he assumed the role of heir apparent. It shaped how he understood the monarchy as an institution, and how he modelled his behaviour when he became King. It also shaped how his successors were educated to consider their roles as heirs apparent—with an emphasis on duty to the Crown and all it stood for, rather than on the privileges of royalty. Essentially, there was a solemnity to George V's perspective on the monarchy: it was a serious commitment that he took seriously. It is an exploration of how this commitment to monarchy as a solemn dedication to duty, rather than an inherited privilege, has worked out in practice for the Windsors as a ruling dynasty, and how this has manifested itself in terms of relations between the Windsors and the British people that underpins the explorations in this volume.

Writing About Modern Monarchy: The Windsors as Case Study

Nobody questions the importance of a study of the Tudor monarchs, or various successors up to Queen Victoria, nor of their European counterparts.[13] Yet until recently, when the work of scholars like Johannes Paulmann, Frank Müller and Heidi Mehrkens has provided a more substantive appreciation of modern European monarchy, it was largely taken for granted that monarchies in the twentieth century rate discussion only as a factor leading to the rise of alternative systems of government.[14] Adam

[13] To name but a few, see Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik*; David Loades (2012) *The Tudors: the History of a Dynasty* (London: Bloomsbury); Allan Massie (2011) *The Royal Stuarts: a History of the Family that Shaped Britain* (New York: St Martin's Press); Jeremy Black (2004) *The Hanoverians: the History of a Dynasty* (New York: St Martin's Press); Sean McGlynn and Eleanor Woodacre, eds (2014) *The Image and Perception of Monarchy in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press); J. Shennan (2007) *The Bourbons: the History of a Dynasty* (London: Bloomsbury); D. J. Raleigh and A. A. Iskenderov, eds (1996) *The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs* (London: Routledge); A. Wheatcroft (1996) *The Hapsburgs: Embodying Europe* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books).

[14] See, for example, John Van der Kiste (2013) *Crowns in a Changing World: the British and European Monarchies 1901–1936* (Stroud: History Press).

Kozuchowski, for instance, seems puzzled by the inter-war (and more recent) nostalgia for the Hapsburg Empire in his study.[15] In contrast to the substantial studies by scholars working on British history up to the start of the twentieth century,[16] modern British monarchy as a significant practical element in modern British constitutional evolution has too rarely benefitted to date from any extensive scholarly consideration by historical scholarship. With exceptions such as the works of Douglas-Home and Kelly, and Murphy, the passing mentions in much contemporary history of the Windsors as a factor in Britain's socio-cultural and political evolution seems rooted in assumptions of monarchy's ornamentalism and practical irrelevance in the modern era.

This comparative neglect of monarchical studies as a part of twentieth-century-focused political, constitutional and cultural histories of Britain fits into the approach taken for much of the last half of the twentieth century to other European monarchies. Especially, the bulk of the work on the Russian and German monarchies during the early part of that century relates strongly to explorations of how and why the last incumbents of these thrones were that. In exploring why these monarchies ended, there has been an implication that it was not just the individual monarchs, but also the monarchical system, that had failed.[17] However, such assumptions about the inherent flaws of any monarchy as part of a modern political state system and its culture are now being revisited (if not always in English) by European scholarship. Revisiting the modern British monarchy thus forms part of that wider challenge. It is, however, a very 'British' challenge, because generalisations about the ways in which European monarchies have

[15] Adam Kozuchowski (2013) *The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary: the Image of the Hapsburg Monarchy in Interwar Europe* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press).

[16] Consider, for example, Kevin Sharpe (2013) *Reading Authority and Representing Rule in Early Modern England* (London: Bloomsbury); Hannah Smith (2006) *Georgian Monarchy: Politics and Culture 1714–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); James H Burns (1996) *The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early Modern Scotland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press); John McDiarmid, ed (2007) *The Monarchical Republic of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson* (Aldershot: Ashgate). Douglas-Home and Kelly, *Dignified and Efficient*; Murphy, *Monarchy and End of Empire* remain notable modern exceptions.

[17] See, for instance, Kozuchowski, *Afterlife of Austria-Hungary*; also Sebastian Balfour (1997) *The End of the Spanish Empire 1898–1923* (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Catrine Clay (2006) *King, Kaiser, Tsar, Three royal cousins who led the world to war,* (London: John Murray); John Rohl (2004) *Wilhelm II. The Kaiser's personal monarchy, 1888–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

evolved and operated cannot be readily used to interpret and understand the English/British monarchy. For instance, working with parliaments that had active and substantial powers was no new thing for British monarchs even by the nineteenth century: yet it was a challenge that the restored French monarchy failed to respond to effectively as the events of 1830, 1848 and finally 1870–1871 underline.[18] Other European royal families into the twentieth centuries have subsequently faced the challenge of working with a 'modern' democratic system that could give a voice to 'the people', as works on the newly-unified Germany from 1871 underline.[19]

By contrast, English, and later British, monarchs had, from the time of Magna Carta, to face significant challenges that altered the relationship between rulers and subjects in ways that were unfamiliar (and, as James I and George I certainly thought, unpalatable) to other European rulers. Increasingly, laying claim to the English throne for late medieval and early modern monarchs involved the consent of Parliament for successful succession to the throne.[20] The Civil War of 1642–1649 can be interpreted, amongst other things, as a conflict between King and Parliament which was only resolved with the consent of the latter to the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660—which in turn involved an acceptance by Charles II of the right of Parliament to have their advice followed by the monarch on certain key issues. The abdication of James II and succession of William and Mary in 1688, and the succession of the Hanoverian dynasty in 1714 under George I, further emphasise the extent to which British monarchs ruled with the consent of Parliament, and that that consent increasingly involved the active management of government by politicians, though still in the name of the monarchy.

The increasing involvement of elected politicians in the government of the realm has led many to assume that by the start of the twentieth century the monarchy had become an elaborate and expensive cloaking device for a form of constitutional democracy. This accounts for the wealth of work

[18] See, for instance, Julian Wright and H.S. Jones (2012) *Pluralism and the Idea of the Republic in France* (London: Palgrave Macmillan) pp70–2.

[19] Matthew Seligmann and Roderick McLean (2000) *Germany from Reich to Republic 1871–1918* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

[20] Henry VII's claim to the throne by inheritance was not substantial; there were other more direct heirs. Prior to his marriage to Elizabeth, by then accepted as the heiress of the House of York, Parliament had already confirmed his possession of the throne and his right to pass it on to his heirs. See William Blackstone, ed. Samuel Warren (1837) *Select Extracts from Blackwell's Commentaries* (London: A Maxwell) p121.

that was published in the 1980s and 1990s which predicted, as an inevitable outcome, the imminent death of the British monarchy as an 'absurd anachronism' which had outlived its purpose.[21] Antony Taylor, in 1999, pointed to what he hoped would prove to be a terminal state of 'disillusionment with the throne', with the 'fairy-tale of the British monarchy's relationship with the public' having ended.[22] The resultant debate over the House of Windsor would, he and a number of other commentators anticipated, promote the end of the monarchical system and its replacement by a 'grown-up' political system in the shape of a republic. This was why he felt the need to write a serious scholarly text on the history of the anti-monarchist movement in Britain, and why he collaborated with other studies on that topic, presaging their use by a burgeoning republican movement in Britain.[23] In 2016, when this Introduction was finalised, the republican movement in Britain is still a real factor in the nation's politics, as it has been since the 1790s, but their hopes of an imminent end to the monarchical system have lost a substantial amount of their sparkle.

What is needed, then, is critical work which tests such assumptions by locating monarchy in the context of a developing British political system and explores its contributions and the relative success and failure of these from that perspective. This volume is part of a new scholarly interest in the study of the modern British royal family, and its political, constitutional and cultural significance, both within the United Kingdom and as part of how the United Kingdom is understood internationally. A key element in the enquiries shaping this volume is the question of how, and why, the Windsor dynasty has survived a number of challenges and currently seems set to continue doing so, thus distancing the 'end' of monarchy. In embarking on such enquiries, one of its core strengths has been that a number of the contributors have looked to the Royal Archives as an important resource for extra information and consequent insights; something which has not always been of interest, or available, to scholars touching on the monarchy in the modern age.

[21] Stephen Haseler (1993) *The End of the House of Windsor* (London: I. B. Tauris), back-cover paragraph.

[22] Antony Taylor (1999) *Down with the Crown: British Anti-Monarchism and Debates about Royalty Since 1790* (London: Reaktion Books) p1.

[23] Ibid.; see also Haseler, *End of the House of Windsor*; Edgar Wilson (1987) *The Myth of the British Monarchy* (London: Pluto Press); David Nash and Antony Taylor, eds (2000) *Republicanism in Victorian Britain* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing).

In the early part of the twenty-first century, the British monarchy as an institution is once again very popular in the mass media, even if some individual members are regularly held up to criticism. By contrast, the reputation of elected (and appointed) politicians has plummeted, thanks to the on-going resonance of episodes such as the MPs' (and peers') expenses scandal of 2009–2012, with others coming to prominence as this volume is completed in 2016.[24] Individual politicians are also regularly lambasted, especially in the tabloid press. A revealing illumination on the reasons for the popularity of the monarchy is provided by examination of the grounds on which individual royals (and politicians) are criticised. In both, perceptions of inappropriate extravagance allied to a supposed failure to perform allotted duties properly are a frequent theme. However, the issue of abuse of power is a criticism currently largely associated with politicians. The monarch is, by contrast with her politicians, substantially understood as an unthreatening and stabilising influence. Such swings of the public pendulum of perception of monarchy suggest a kind of see-saw balance, where the popularity of the monarchy as institution (and individual members of the royal family) is balanced against the popular perceptions of politicians (both elected and appointed to the Lords).[25] It could yet swing against the monarchy as institution as a result of factors which it is impossible to predict but which could include a more enduringly popular political class.

Certainly there are still some commentators who insist that the Windsor dynasty will not long survive the death of the present monarch, especially if a supposedly 'unpopular' Prince Charles succeeds her.[26] As already indicated, much of the scholarship of the last forty years on contemporary Britain has been informed by the assumption that the British monarchy is an arcane phenomenon, useful for tourists: a governing system that will not (indeed should not) survive. As a kind of curiosity, therefore, it has been readily overlooked as a potentially flourishing system by scholarship

[24] See, for instance, the examination of this episode in the collection edited by Jennifer Van Heerde-Hudson, ed (2014) *The Political Costs of the 2009 MPs Expenses Scandal* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

[25] The flourishing of anti-monarchical sentiment in the late 1990s, for instance, could potentially be linked to the popularity of New Labour and Prime Minister Tony Blair, managing to make the monarchy seem 'stuffy' and outdated by contrast. See Jim McGuigan (2010) *Cultural Analysis* (London: Sage) p31.

[26] Christopher Lee, 'Why Prince George Will Never Be King', *New Statesman*, 20 October 2013; 'Royal Family will NOT last another 100 years, claims Princess Diana's Brother', *Daily Express*, 20 January 2015.

on the contemporary history of British political systems and their impact. Yet to date, the Windsor dynasty has survived more challenges and change than any other dynasty that has inhabited the English, and later British, throne. If it has not emerged unscathed, one of the purposes of this volume is to assess how far the various suggestions of its imminent demise are imminent, or exaggerated.

In a modern democratic age, when the emphasis is on the power wielded by elected politicians (prime ministers, presidents etc.), a constitutional monarchy such as that represented by the Windsors can seem both powerless and irrelevant. From that perspective, any survey of the House of Windsor and the monarchy would need to be written from the perspective of monarchy in decline. Yet is decline inevitable? It has to be accepted that, in relative terms, given the powers possessed by their royal predecessors even during the eighteenth century, the direct power wielded by the Windsor monarchs is slight. What of its indirect power and influence, including the potential of the royal prerogative? What this volume reveals, however, is how complicated the nature of the political system is within the modern British state, and how intrinsic to that complexity the monarchy, in the hands of the Windsor dynasty, has been during the last century.

Consequently, this volume explores the extent to which, amongst other things, flexibility or adaptability in the face of change has been one of key characteristics of the Windsor dynasty. Certainly that factor is ongoing within the royal family, on the basis of current media discussions of the intentions of the Prince of Wales to change the shape of the British royal family once again when he succeeds to the throne. In the last three years, the willingness to change has already been observed with the alteration to the rules governing the royal succession: had Prince George of Cambridge been a girl instead, then, as the oldest child, a first-born daughter would have become heir apparent, even if brothers had been born subsequently.[27]

As part of the processes of change and continuity, the Windsors are not without their own internal traditions. The very fact that the eldest child of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge was given the name of George harks back, for his parents, to his great-grandfather and great-great-grandfather: both viewed as model upholders of the Windsor ideal. Yet for historians and other interested commentators, what is of at least equal interest is that the previous royal Georges had been far from ideal, including a previous Prince George

[27] This was achieved under the Succession to the Crown Act 2013, which was also endorsed across the Commonwealth in those states which still retain the monarch as head of state.

of Cambridge.[28] George IV, in particular, had been far from a model King.[29] But, this return to the name of George suggests that the Windsors of the twenty-first century consciously view themselves as a separate dynasty to the Hanoverian one to which these previous Georges belonged. As Cannadine has pointed out, traditions do not have to have thousand-year heritages: they can be established with an imagined pedigree very rapidly, when occasion demands.[30] While borrowing heavily from earlier traditions, this volume explores how the Windsors re-invented the purpose and popular cultural understandings of monarchical traditions such as the title of Prince of Wales.

There are also questions to be raised about the wider significance of the current British monarchical model, especially in terms of modern international relations and the British participation in modern diplomacy. Some modern presidents are, on closer examination, simply elected politicians as in the case of the leaders of Germany; others have the appearance of being more like elected monarchs, as in the case of the US and French Presidents.[31] Many have chosen to surround themselves with various forms of pomp and state. The power of a monarch in a constitutional state can, as in the case of Japan, be essentially ceremonial now.[32] Alternatively, that

[28] Prince George of Cambridge, first cousin to Queen Victoria, and 2nd Duke of Cambridge, was rejected by Victoria as a potential husband because of his scandalous life style, which he crowned by 'marrying' (in contravention of the Royal Marriages Act 1772, so it was not legal) an actress, Sarah Fairbrother, known for playing breeches roles on stage. Interestingly, the marriage did not (see Chapter 7) have a morganatic status, and there is no contemporary indication that this Prince George ever sought it for his wife.

[29] Matthew Glencross, 'What's in a Name? Naming Baby Cambridge', *History & Policy*, 10 June 2013, http://www.historyandpolicy.org/opinion-articles/articles/whats-in-a-name-naming-baby-cambridge, accessed 1 March 2016. The choice of Charlotte for their second child has also a resonance, if with the Georges of an older tradition. Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, of course, was the much-loved wife of George III, another Princess Charlotte, the eldest daughter of George III became a much-loved Princess Royal, and Princess Charlotte of Wales was, until her death in childbirth, heir apparent to her father, the later George IV. Even if not a Windsor name, it is a name linked to royal women who have been beloved and popular.

[30] See Cannadine, 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual'.

[31] See, for instance, W. Heun (2011) *The Constitution of Germany: a Contextual Analysis*, (Hart); M. Fausold and A Shank, eds (1991) *The Constitution and the American Presidency* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press); David Marrani (2013) *Dynamics in the French Constitution: Decoding French Republican Ideas* (Abingdon: Routledge).

[32] Kenneth Ruoff (2011) *The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy 1945–1995* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

power may still have real substance, if behind the scenes, as is the case—or so some of the contributors to this volume argue—for the Windsors.

Structuring the Volume

The volume is divided into three parts to reflect different aspects of the Windsor experience. The first contains only one chapter—but it is the crucial scene setting chapter for the whole volume and so warrants singling out in this way. It underpins and frames the considerations of the approaches taken in the two subsequent parts. The emphasis in this first part relates to its focus is on the reasons why—as well as how—the monarchy changed under George V. Part II explores how the Code of the Windsors, as laid down by George was used as the foundation for the business of modern monarchy and also how it has also been built on and sustained over the twentieth century by his descendants in relation to various institutions. It concludes by considering how the public has reacted to this apparent solidity and stability and the inflections which have been added to it over time. Following on from the longer term perspectives offered in Part II, the third part comprises a series of detailed snapshot case studies at different points in time to illuminate various important aspects of the workings of the Windsor dynasty over time, and that thinking about both accessibility and duty.

Creating the Windsor Brand

Crucially, Glencross's chapter insists that the thinking behind the change of name for the dynasty pre-dates the supposedly forced changes to the dynastic profile made during the emergency conditions created by the Great War (Chapter 2). It is not portrayed as something which was an emergency response to the unhappy events affecting other European monarchies at the time. Instead, it is here identified as a development that was based on a previous, pro-active consideration by George himself of what monarchy should be in a modern era. If it is no longer to be identified as being the reaction to a crisis, as is argued here, then much is explained about the assurance George V showed in managing the scale and detail of the restructuring of his family and its wider royal links, to make it quintessentially British, and about its longer-term success.

His father and predecessor, Edward VII, undoubtedly saw himself as the saviour and moderniser of the British monarchy, bringing it out of the

'doldrums' of the Victorian low levels of public engagement in the period after the Prince Consort's death. He had certainly appreciated the messages about the public enthusiasm for monarchy displayed both in association with his mother's two jubilees but also the reaction to her initiatives in reviewing troops and visiting the wounded during the Boer War, at the end of her life. Building on this, he created a public profile for his reign that emphasised his majesterial presence for his subjects. Photographs of him undertaking public duties were regularly included in the media and the day, as well as reporting of his busy schedule of public engagements so long as his health permitted.[33] Yet not for nothing has Edward VII been described as the last of the Victorians—he was more a reviver of old traditions, though he learned (largely thanks to other monarchs like the Kaiser) to present them in a more modern way. His importance in the history of the British monarchy is that he reminded the British public of many of those lapsed traditions which provided George with a foundational list from which he could operate when modernising the monarchy.

What this core chapter argues is that when George V came to the throne in 1910, there was an immediate and perceptible change—something taken up by the first chapter in Part II, on coronations. The survival of the Windsor dynasty after 1918 is thus shown as depending on an ongoing re-imagining of the British monarchy, to make it fit for purpose in a changing, post-war world in an exercise in reinvention which predated the Great War. A discussion of how it has demonstrated that fitness for purpose, and where it has been less successful, provides the basis for the succeeding chapters. One key difference in terms of George's attitude towards his role as monarch was that, as the chapter in Part 1 underlines, this successor to Edward VII did not identify himself as a member of the Trade Union of Kings, that royal network which had been so important to the previous dynasty. Instead, the quintessentially British King identified himself not only with British interests but also with the idea of the royal family being a British 'firm'.

That conceptualisation of monarchy re-invents the point of occupying the throne, to make it a 'job', rather than a privilege conferred solely by birth. Certainly, as subsequent chapters underline, that idea of the royal firm, and doing a 'good job' of being royal has become ever more important to the success of the Windsor dynasty. Where members of the modern royal family are not seen as being sufficiently 'hard working' in their job, and so not justifying

[33] See Glencross, *Edward VII;* Kinley Robey (1975) *The King, The Press and the People. A Study of Edward VII* (London: Barrie and Jenkins).

their 'pay' (in terms of respect and loyalty as well as the issue of royal funding), the public response has been hostile in a way that has been unprecedented. Royals have (witness the cartoons and satires focusing on the sons of George III) often been criticised on the basis of their characters historically.[34] Victoria certainly deserves credit for restoring a respectability to the monarchy that had disappeared with the declining health of George III and the emphasis on the far from respectable behaviour of his sons. Interestingly, in what might be seen as a harbinger of modern monarchy, she promoted a version of herself as what Matthew Dennison describes as 'the acme of ordinariness', while still enjoying her 'riches and grandeur'.[35] That version of Victoria certainly caught the public imagination, and her personal character became core to the eulogies she received, and the popular enthusiasm which was demonstrated during her Jubilees, ultimately overriding any criticism of her failure to perform her royal role during her long widowhood. As this underlines, neither she nor her son expected to be assessed by their subjects as sovereigns on the basis of 'job performance': this is a post-1910 reality.

Establishing the Brand

The emphasis in this part is on explorations of the role of ceremonial and symbolism and how these have been used by the Windsors to evoke a popular response. Also, it explores how, in turn, ceremonial and symbolism has been changed to reflect perceived shifts in public moods and expectations of the monarchy within Britain. The first two chapters, on Windsor coronations and funerals, focus on the headline ceremonial occasions marking individual monarchs and their reigns to reflect how coronations and investitures, along with funerals and memorials, have been used to establish the public profile in particular. State and ceremonial events featuring the royal family are now key brand markers, and it is for this reason that it was felt that a single chapter exploring this aspect could not bring out the important nuances that distinguish how the Windsor dynasty has consciously crafted these for public consumption. They have invoked tradition, and the appeal of ritual and ceremonial—but combined that with what Paul

[34] A Gestrich and M Schaich, eds (2015) *The Hanoverian Succession: Dynastic Politics and Monarchical Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

[35] Matthew Dennison (2013) *Queen Victoria: A Life of Contradictions* (London: HarperCollins), piii.

Readman has identified with a modern appetite for public pageantry that directly includes the audiences for such state events.[36]

Today's general perception is that one of the major appeals of the modern royal family is for tourists, especially foreign tourists, who can view a series of lavish monarchical spectacles. However, what these chapters underline is that there are serious political dimensions to coronations. It is not simply a form of celebrating a form of the modern celebrity culture: there are substantial implications for a public understanding of the role and importance of the monarchy which are conveyed by coronations, and in turn underlined by the retrospective of funerals. These key symbolic events have acquired an even deeper public dimension thanks to the decisions taken by the Windsors over the twentieth century to make use of the technology of an evolving mass media to enhance the depth of their impact, especially in association with such set piece events.

Returning to Chapter 3, the point it makes is that, despite the plethora of public souvenirs created as memorabilia for them, coronations and investitures have traditionally been performances associated powerfully with the political establishment of the nation. The nuances in these elaborate ceremonials originally had more to do with establishing the right of the monarch to exercise power and authority, with the sacerdotal elements in the coronation ceremony giving divine force to that right. But as the coronation ceremony was modernised during the emergence of a constitutional monarchical system, there has always been a delicate balance to be observed between rival political factions within the country's political establishment. This is visible through the careful negotiations to highlight the capabilities of the faction or party in charge of the executive while not excluding the oppositional elements in Parliament.

Issues such as the cost of coronations have long been a matter of parliamentary debate: those of the predecessors to the Windsors were always hotly debated in both Houses. George IV was determined to have an expensive event at all costs, and had sufficient power (or capitalised on the relief of politicians that the complexities of the Regency were at an end) to steam-roller that through. William IV's coronation was a lower-key affair, however, partly

[36] Paul Readman (2005) 'The Place of the Past in English Culture c.1890–1914', *Past and Present* 186(1)147–200; Vera Nunning, Jan Rupp and Gregor Ahn, eds (2014) *Rituals and Narrative: Theoretical Explorations and Historical Case Studies* (Berlin: transcript Verlag).

in response to William's own tastes and partly because there was a lack of enthusiasm, in the midst of the debate over parliamentary reform, for indulging in extravagant royal display. When it came to Victoria's coronation, the Whig government under Lord Melbourne decided to capitalise on popular enthusiasm for the new, young Queen by spending more money and attention on the public procession to the Abbey than on the ceremony within. As a result, they were widely criticised by both the Tories and the Radicals.

As Kandiah, Rowbotham and Staerck's Chapter 3 underlines, however, Edward VII's coronation showed the beginnings of a new, and more sophisticated, political ascendancy in shaping these events At a time when Britain's international reputation was at a low ebb thanks to the recent Boer War, the government of the day saw the 1902 coronation as a way of demonstrating to a wider world that Britain still possessed diplomatic power and authority and was prepared to use them internationally.[37] George V's coronation followed along similar lines in terms of its planning, but the imperial dimension was then a priority, accounting for the government's acquiescence in George's insistence that the event be followed up by the Delhi Durbar. Interestingly, however, as Chapter 3 underlines, what absorbed George quite as much was the planning of the Investiture as Prince of Wales of his heir. This was to be an essentially British affair: for the first time in modern British history, the ritual surrounding the awarding of the title of Prince of Wales was to be performed in public, and in Wales. While this suggests that George had his own ideas about the point and purpose of royal events, this was always within constitutional limits. George was, as was noted after his death, the model of a constitutional monarch and thus, though he himself was eager for this, he would not have carried it through without the consent and involvement of his ministers.

As this retrospective element explored in Rowbotham's Chapter 4 suggests, the emphasis in royal funerals began to echo that displayed in the non-royal state funerals of leading politicians (especially prime ministers). These latter had provided media opportunities to reflect on how well they had done the jobs they had been elected to do. Being born to rule, figures like Queen Victoria and King Edward VII had instead enjoyed post-mortem reflections largely on how they had demonstrated their capacity

[37] Only representatives of foreign powers, and not actual heads of state or fellow monarchs attended coronations: the monarchs there were all heads of dependant (or colonial) states. Ian Dunlop (2004) *Edward VII and the Entente Cordiale* (London: Constable) pp191–2.

to fill the throne in terms of their ability to wield power and authority. Strikingly, the Windsor version of the royal family has been subjected to post-mortem scrutiny that considers how well they have done the 'job' of being royal. George V was crucial here, in that he valued the office he was called on, by birth, to fill. However, he also believed, very profoundly, that it was an office where it was not sufficient simply to occupy it—as he understood too many of his predecessors in Britain and his European counterparts had and still did.[38]

The conclusions drawn from Rowbotham's chapter suggest that modern monarchs, and their supporting royal family members, have had to earn the loyalty of their subjects by their conduct, rather than being awarded it as of right. Where they have failed to fulfil such public expectations, as in the reaction of the royal family, led by the Queen, to the sudden death of Diana, Princess of Wales, the sense of public let-down has been immense.[39] It also helps to explain why the previously popular Edward VIII was let go by his subjects with such apparent readiness. His failure to demonstrate a commitment to his office and 'doing the job' required by it, above and beyond his private desires, was at odds with the expectations of the British people, and the colonial subjects of the King, that George V had established. The strength of public reaction in terms of the welcome given to the dutiful George VI and his wife, and the criticism of the Queen in particular in 1997, is a measure of how successfully George V had established the public's right to deliver criticism of royal performance on the job.

These chapters on coronations and funerals do indirectly address the relationship between the Crown and the Established Church, but it has not been felt important to include a chapter specifically on that. One reason is that there has not, to date, been a discernible change distinguishing the Windsor relationship with the Anglican Church except through the nuances of change to the state occasions discussed in the first two chapters to this part. Change, under future monarchs, may come especially should there be a disestablishment of the Church of England, but currently such

[38] See Chapter 2.

[39] The personal relationship between Charles and Diana may have broken down, but even after their divorce she was still perceived as doing a royal 'job' in terms of her public impact, and doing so very well. A widespread perception of the failure of the royal family to appreciate Diana's 'work' was at the heart of the powerful popular reaction, we would argue. See Chapter 6.

a major constitutional change seems distant. Like Queen Victoria, and his father, George V was a devout Anglican in his religious attitudes. His son and grand-daughter have also taken their religion very seriously, and very personally. Such personal belief has both strengthened them and justified them in their monarchical roles. Yet, that is not—in and of itself—new. Indeed arguably, the sacerdotal nature of the British monarchy, thanks to the unchanged sacral core of the coronation ceremony, can make the Windsor monarchy at the start of the twenty-first century seem outdated, rather than modern. Monarchs with a less sacramental core to their rule have felt it feasible for them to abdicate in favour of their next heirs, as has happened most recently in Spain and the Netherlands. Elizabeth II has made it plain that she sees her monarchical role as a job for life.[40]

However, though the relationship between monarchs and the army in particular during conflict is touched on elsewhere in the book, it has been felt important to include in this part Beckett's Chapter 5, exploring the relationship between the monarch and the armed services in more depth. When it comes to public pageantry, the military has always had a prominent role in advertising the power and authority of monarchy. But, with the delegation of much of that everyday power and authority over the armed forces to elected politicians, the modern monarchy has had to re-invent a relationship between the monarch and those taking oaths of allegiance to the Crown in the name of an individual monarch. As Beckett demonstrates, the close association between the armed forces and the Crown was of long standing, and even though kings were no longer permitted physically to lead troops into battle, the legacy of royal leadership endured. His thought-provoking chapter on the Windsors and the British Army amplifies and expands on theme of constitutionalism and the royal relationship with the Army touched on by Glencross. Tellingly, the creator of the Windsor dynasty had been a serving naval officer, and so—like army officers—had learned to regard the Crown as the highest authority in the land. This helps to explain what Beckett demonstrates in detail, the continuing stress placed by the Windsor dynasty on sustaining that association—because it promoted the idea of loyalty being to the symbol of monarchy rather than the person actually on the throne.

[40] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2661447/King-Spain-s-day-throne-Juan-Carlos-eve-abdication-Spain-rushes-Charles-Diana-style-chintzy-memorabilia.html accessed 13 November 2015. Japanese emperor Akihito has recently sought to change the constitutional base for that monarchy. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37007106asia-37007106, accessed 14 August 2016.

This can all be contextualised, in summarising these two first parts, by considering the ways in which male heirs, and not just minor members of the Windsor dynasty, have been expected to undergo periods of serious commitment to military service. This does provide a contrast with the attitude of Albert and Victoria, as it was not something Albert wished (and Victoria followed his thinking) for the heir apparent. Thus while, as Prince of Wales, Edward VII did have a brief military career of sorts, his Army service was never taken seriously by either his parents or himself (he never cared to learn to drill properly!). This is not to say that Edward VII did not value his relations with his armed forces, and he certainly worked to keep up good relations with key members of both the Army and Navy. Equally, the naval training Edward preferred for his own eldest son was superficial, ending when, at 19, the Duke of Clarence was sent to Cambridge before a brief stint in the Army which entailed no active military duties.

But in an imitation of the patterns followed by his own younger brothers, Edward VII's younger son, George, joined the Navy on the same basis as ordinary naval officers from good social backgrounds, to be educated academically and militarily entirely by the Royal Navy. Since then, one of the characteristics of the Windsors has been that they have encouraged—almost expected—that those males in direct line of succession will have an active military experience. This military option has certainly continued to provide an occupation for minor members of the royal family, but more importantly, it has been seen as a positive thing in terms of positive public attitudes towards Windsor heirs.

The importance of cultivating such positive perceptions is also considered in the concluding chapter of Part II, through Mortimore's study of the profile of the royal family as seen through opinion polls. These have been an increasing factor in modern political life, and have been held to reveal how the population as a whole perceives various institutions and figures. It is hardly surprising, then, that the royal family has featured regularly in these surveys—and it can be argued, as this volume does overall, that the Windsors have actually made themselves susceptible to them in a way that has been unique to this dynasty. They have been consciously consulted and drawn on to justify change within the dynasty in terms of how members of the royal family are presented to the public, in terms of the wider symbolism associated with their actions and characters.

One of the most significant aspects of Mortimore's Chapter 6 is his assessment of the extent to which opinion polls on the monarchy are conceived and implemented within a framework that takes it for granted that being a

monarch, or a royal, is essentially about doing a job. The questions asked concentrate on issues such as 'value for money', a calculation particularly focusing on anyone enjoying an allowance under the Civil List. This accompanies features which have, over the Windsor dynasty period, increasingly appeared in the media informing readers and viewers about how busy individual royals have been over an identified period in doing their 'job'. The issue of how many public engagements (and how much actual hard work is involved in carrying them out) individual members of the Windsor 'firm' have undertaken is a core factor in assessing that value for money. 'Hard-working' royals like the Princess Royal, with her world-wide commitments, can expect to find favourable comparisons being made of them, while others are held to be making a less useful contribution to the public well-being.

Linked to this, as all these chapters reveal, there has been a conscious invocation by the Windsors of a consistent emphasis on the symbol of the Crown, rather than on a showcasing of their individual personalities. This contribution on the perspectives on the Windsors given by opinion polls helps to illuminate the various impetuses for change that have come from presumed popular responses to the royal family that have marked evolutions in the self-imposed rules that the Windsors have worked by since George V's time. Arguably, for instance, the choice of the name for the eldest child of the current heir apparent, George (and despite the unfortunate echo with a previous, undesirable Prince George of Cambridge), shows just how important the legacy of that name is to the current royal family. There has, after all, been regular speculation that the Prince of Wales might choose to reign as George (already one of his four names), even though this has been denied by Clarence House. In effect, George seems to have become 'the' spiritual name of the dynasty at the start of the twenty-first century; something that Victoria had hoped for, but failed to achieve, with the name of her husband, Albert.[41]

She had hoped that all future Kings would take the name Albert, and so represent what he stood for, as her husband and father of her children, to the monarchy and the nation. It was a very eclectic and informed vision that Albert had had of monarchy, one focused on diplomacy and negotiation, and a monarchical network based on close family ties. Albert's eldest son had deliberately rejected Albert as his regnal name, because of what the name represented both personally and in terms of the broader message that the name would convey to the nation and empire. Instead, he chose Edward,

[41] Hibbert, *Queen Victoria*, p150.

partly because of the echoes it had with past successful monarchs and partly because it was accepted as a very 'English' name.[42] George has now accepted as become a very British (English) name, but until the twentieth century it has not represented anything particularly positive for the monarchy (the first four incumbents had all had reputational problems). After the reigns of George V and George VI, what George now represents for the Windsors is a spirit that is very different to that represented by Albert. It is, for a start, something more popularly accessible, and linked to duty done to the nation, at all costs. The current monarch, Elizabeth II, is widely accepted as encapsulating that spirit—raising speculation that a future preferred regnal name for any Windsor Queen would be Elizabeth, establishing that name as having the same echoes that George does for the dynasty.

Marketing the Windsor Brand

The demonstration of visible and measurable diligence and devotion to the monarchical ideal (and to becoming the ideal monarch) as the distinctive thrust in the marketing of the Windsor brand is at the heart of the first substantial case study, which sets the tone for this part. The focus in Blackburn's Chapter 7 is on Edward VIII and his abdication, and how Edward as a man was seen by both his advisers and the public as failing to relate properly to the symbolic role of monarchy and to the concept of doing 'the job' it entailed. Blackburn points out that, like his father George V, Edward had evolved his own vision of a modernising monarchy during his apprenticeship as heir to the throne. However, Edward's idea of how to modernise his role involved a substantial rejection of many of the public ceremonials (with all that implied for a continuation of royal traditions) that George V had felt it important to preserve within the Windsor dynasty. Edward saw them instead as outdated and rather embarrassing: he openly mocked his father's obsession with punctuality, with ceremonial and formality. For Edward VIII, his model was his grandfather, not his father. In his own memoir, he eulogises the 'fun' dimension to Edward VII's kingship, regretting the seriousness with which his father approached his occupation of the throne.[43] What, as this chapter underlines, Edward

[42] Simon Heffer (1998) *Power and Place: The Political Consequences of Edward VII* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson) p98.

[43] Duke of Windsor (1999) *A King's Story: The Memoirs of HRH the Duke of Windsor KG* (London: Prion Books, originally published 1951) pp44–50. He stresses the dullness and boringness of growing up in York Cottage, as opposed to the pleasures of his grandfather's house at Sandringham.

failed to appreciate was that while this might have been his personal perspective, it was not necessarily one shared by the majority of his advisers and politicians, let alone by his subjects. He had no comprehension of his father's longer, essentially dynastic vision for the future of the monarchy and the extent to which this had been accepted by politicians by the end of that reign. Instead, Edward concentrated on what he believed he, himself, would bring to it—thinking in terms of personal lustre, not of personal service and duty. In this he did a disservice to his grandfather's comprehension of monarchy as well as his father's understanding of the role: because for all the hedonism that his grandson remembered him as displaying, Edward VII took his duties (witness his approach to royal diplomacy) very seriously indeed once he had become King.[44]

Edward VIII had a high opinion of himself, and of his capacity to be an effective King. As Jones's Chapter 8 also mentions, the future Edward VIII had been bored with the restrictions placed on him by his father and the British government during the Great War. Lord Esher's Diary regularly reflected upon the tensions between George V and his eldest son because of the latter's emphasis on what he, personally, desired. He regularly used his position as Prince of Wales to achieve his own goals in relation to the nature of his involvement with the war: an interesting contrast to his father's submission to the duties expected of him as a junior naval officer, and his resistance of any temptation to use his royal status to get any favours for himself. Edward VIII saw no reason to refrain from using his position, because he believed that by achieving what he wanted, he would be more effective as heir, and later, as King. This is particularly apparent in Blackburn's discussion of the public appeal that Edward VIII had wanted to make: the terminology he used in his projected speech to his subjects underlines how limited his comprehension was of the service to country and level of personal sacrifice involved in that which was inherent to the Windsor model established by his father—something he was later to demonstrate also in his memoir.[45]

Yet what Blackburn's chapter also underlines—and explains the choice of the explicit dynastic reference in the title awarded to Edward VIII after his abdication—is that Edward VIII was Windsor enough to believe that it

[44] Ibid., p46, where the Duke of Windsor recounts the overseas state visits of his grandfather in terms that demonstrate he understood them as 'sojourns', or holiday jaunts, rather than as matters of state. The Duke fails to mention, for instance, the Entente Cordiale as part of the trip to Paris.

[45] Ibid.

was essential for the monarch to take the advice of his ministers. Chapter 7 reveals that Edward VIII had wanted, personally, to appeal to his subjects for their support but that when this was vetoed by his government, he refused to cause a constitutional crisis by insisting on so doing. Instead, he avoided such a crisis by accepting the interpretation of Baldwin and his advisers that his only choice lay between renunciation of either the throne or Wallis Simpson. It is probably that in yielding up his throne in accordance with the presentation of his situation created by his ministers, he qualified himself for a title that signalled his continuing inclusion in the Windsor family.[46]

The conclusions reached by Blackburn are contextualised and explored further by the second case study in the part. This examines the ways in which George V took advantage of the first opportunity to signal widely to his subjects that he perceived his role as King differently to his predecessors during the First World War, and how he passed on that expectation to his heir. In Chapter 8, Heather Jones locates George V's practices as monarch during the First World War, at a time when he was working out details of the Windsor code in reaction to the realities of war, and in context with the fate of other European monarchies at the time. Picking up on the issues of symbolism and their material manifestation as well as the points made by Beckett in relation to the armed services, she examines the ways in which the British royal family related to the British and colonial populations during the experience of a war with global dimensions. The focus is on the development of a cultural comprehension of the nature of monarchy as something encapsulated not so much by the personality of the ruler as by the display of necessary royal characteristics such as duty and visible diligence in carrying out royal duties. One striking thing in the reportage in the British press between 1914 and 1918 was the emphasis placed on what the royal family were doing in relation to the war effort: this chapter explores the practical impacts of their visible diligence in performing their duty.

[46] There were other choices of royal dukedoms that could have been made for him, including Duke of Sussex, but the creation of such a significant nomenclature for the new royal duke suggests a desire to en-title him in a way that was inclusive. It should be remembered that this reflected the situation in 1936. It was only after the creation and confirmation of the title that doubts began to arise about his capacity to be an asset to the country, as a result of his subsequent behaviour and the popular belief amongst many politicians at least that he was a threat to national interests because of his apparent sympathy with the Nazis, for instance.

Also touched on was the increasing use of mass-produced and affordable souvenirs (china, tins and other ephemera, especially print) as lasting celebratory tokens of royal interest in national emergencies such as the Great War. This tapped into a well-established consumer culture, and saw the royal family making a sophisticated use of this culture to convey the extent of involvement by the Windsor dynasty in those serving in its name. Royal memorabilia also showcased the leadership of the sovereign in promoting the 'best of British', as the continuing interest of the Windsors in patronising both craftsmanship and its mass dissemination on appropriate occasions. It helps, for instance, to explain royal patronage for the Lutyens-designed Queen Mary's Dolls' House in the 1920s, which both promoted British craft skills, and was a showcase of modern British living techniques. Both at the time and subsequently, putting it on public display ensured it has constituted a sustained popular dimension to a consciousness of the royal family in between the high-profile events.[47]

Chapter 9, the third case study, moves the focus to a post-Second World War incident, which both reveals how public expectation of royal observance of duty as a characteristic of modern monarchy had evolved and how the aura of the Crown could extend beyond the figure of the monarch. For political and diplomatic reasons, the British government had thought it expedient to invite Marshal Tito, newly-elected President of Yugoslavia, on a visit to Britain in 1953. The invitation had more to do with international developments including the illness and death of Stalin and developments in the Cold War than with purely domestic British concerns, including the impending coronation of the new monarch, Elizabeth II, the grand-daughter of George V. But—in a move which indicates how conscious British politicians now were of the value of the symbol of the Crown abroad as well as within Britain—this meant a series of manoeuvres which enabled Tito's visit as a guest of the government to acquire the key trappings of a state visit while also demonstrating that the royal consort was prepared to undertake supporting duties when called on so to do.

[47] A Benson and F Morley (1924) *Everybody's Book of the Queen's Dolls' House* (London: *Daily Telegraph*); with views of it also available online: https://www.royalcollection.org.uk/visit/windsorcastle/what-to-see-and-do/queen-marys-dolls-house, accessed 10 August 2016.

On his arrival, the monarch's consort, the Duke of Edinburgh—a man closely related to the former Yugoslav royal family—was deputed to greet him, alongside Winston Churchill. Later, the Queen also entertained him to a lunch at Buckingham Palace, and agreed to an official photograph of the pair of them. This chapter illuminates the political usefulness of the Crown as a symbol, at home and abroad, as well as the firm commitment to duty of the Windsors—a commitment which extended beyond the person of the monarch. Though not yet a Prince of the United Kingdom (this came in 1957), the Duke of Edinburgh was seen by politicians eager to please Tito as a positive asset in their event planning, partly because of his close personal connections with Yugoslavia. He was able to symbolise a welcome to Tito that included a significant gesture from the Crown, despite Tito's association with the ending of monarchy in Yugoslavia and the deposition of Peter II. It was, in fact, an ideal 'job' for Peter's cousin, the former Prince Philip of Greece, to undertake.

What this chapter also reveals, especially when considered alongside Beckett's Chapter 5, is that the kinds of jobs appropriate for royals to undertake has become an increasingly challenging one. The constraints of being royal in a democratic framework have never been easy to negotiate in practice, and this holds true today, especially for those who have looked beyond the usual roles associated with royalty. As well as for her charity work, the Princess Royal has won plaudits for her sportsmanship, representing her country in international events in a way that is generally felt to have added lustre to the reputation of the United Kingdom. Her daughter, Zara Tindall, has also won praise on similar grounds, but concerns have been expressed that she has capitalised on the interest in her royal associations to win lucrative sponsorship deals. But this contrasts interestingly with the criticisms that have, over the years, been made of the Earl of Wessex.[48] This underlines how difficult it is for any member of the royal family who has not got either a military outlook or a sporting talent on which to capitalise to flourish as an amateur. Prince Charles's determination to slim down the active constituent members of the royal family needs to be seen in that practical light: both as preserving the reputation of the royal 'firm' and enabling a more flexible career choice for those falling outside the remit, without public criticism.

[48] Recently, for example, see 'Queen pays Edward and Sophie ¼ million to quit jobs', *Daily Mail*, 20 May 2011.

Chapter 9 works in a comparative sense, as well as highlighting the challenges faced by the Crown. The tensions between political expediency and the national interest are often rooted in the different perspectives of professional politicians and diplomats and public opinion, as shaped and expressed by the media and opinion polls. The Windsors have been, in many ways, in the firing line when it comes to making decisions which have involved something that might not have been a risk in the days of the 'Trade Union of Kings' but was less easily dealt with by them as a royal 'firm'. Few things underline this better than the history of Anglo-Japanese relations.

In 1910, George V had inherited a *rapprochement* between Britain and Japan, which was renewed and extended in 1911. In the aftermath of the First World War, and in the face of hostility from Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada, as well as from the USA, British politicians and diplomats came to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance no longer had sufficient value for the United Kingdom. Practically ended in 1921, it was officially terminated in 1923 when it came up for renewal. From the point of view of the Crown, the Anglo-Japanese relationship had, up to that time, been expressed substantially via court relationships. This had been for practical reasons, in that Japan's political system was also rooted in monarchy.

When it was felt to be expedient, in the post-1945 era, to repair relations between the two states the immediate question for politicians was whether, and how, the 'royal' card could be played effectively by Britain. Initially at least, the close association between the Crown and the armed forces made any suggestion of a *rapprochement* between the Japanese ruling house and British royal family actually offensive to both ordinary servicemen and women and the higher levels of the military echelon. For British politicians used to invoking the monarchy effectively—as they had done with Tito in 1953—to be faced with difficulties in using it was contrary to the long-established ideas imparted by the ways in which the Windsors had carried out their duties during the post-1910 period. British politicians were thus somewhat at a loss in both 1953, when Crown Prince Akihito visited the UK, and during the unpopular state visit of Emperor Hirohito in 1971. But the practical input of the Windsors themselves in resolving these challenges is also revealed by the way in which the Queen carried out a successful state visit to Japan in 1975. What is also plain is that the Windsors were able to achieve this partly because they were accustomed to fulfilling the requirements of their royal jobs, regardless of personal feelings.

Conclusion

This is a volume which has laid out the basis—and need—for further study and consideration of the modern British monarchy, and the extent to which the Windsor dynasty has had a significant impact on modern British life. George V's intention was that it should, in practice, be the 'last' dynasty—that no matter the potential for any future marriages affecting the family name, the Windsor label would be retained for the monarchy and the immediate heirs. As historians such as Cannadine have illustrated, the conversion of the monarchy into a symbol has moved it above the party politics encapsulated in the current political system in Westminster. The name Windsor has placed the monarchy as an element in the British political system that is apart from the fluctuations of easy political change; something achieved by providing a quintessentially British and stable label for the royal family. It is one that links the family both to a royal ruling past and all the tradition of loyalty that involves but also—by removing from the dynasty the direct associations with other foreign royal families—makes the British royal family more local and 'everyday' in a very British way. As George V said, at the time of his Jubilee, he felt himself to be just an ordinary sort of chap, and so he had wanted an ordinary-sounding sort of name for his family. But he also wanted to do a good job. That carefully expressed principle of royals being public servants has acted as a lasting quality mark for the Windsor dynasty.

This volume is not a hagiographic survey of a century of the Windsors as a ruling family in Britain. If the emphasis has been on the extent to which they have succeeded in remaining at the core of British national life, cultural as well as political, it is because of a historical reality that they have demonstrably learned the lessons of their mistakes to a very considerable extent. There is clearly a conscious understanding within the modern royal family—one that has been there since the reign of George V—that they have to justify their existence publicly if they are to remain on the throne. If Britain is to choose to remain a monarchy, the Windsors cannot rely on unthinking popular support or sycophancy to keep the monarchy in place; of this, they are well aware. If history teaches us nothing else, it is that when regimes become over-confident of their long-term stability that they become vulnerable.

The Windsors were reminded of this reality by the critical coverage surrounding the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. However, as post-1997 management of events like Windsor royal Jubilees (which deserve

a volume in their own right) underline, lessons were learned. Thus while there can be no absolute guarantee that the Windsor dynasty will be a permanent feature of the British landscape, the surveys undertaken in this volume suggest that it is likely to be one of the most enduring, and possibly endearing, of the dynasties to have occupied the British throne.

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PART I

Setting the Scene

CHAPTER 2

George V and the New Royal House

Matthew Glencross

Background

If anyone picks up a copy of the type of general guide to British monarchy which is usually found in tourist attractions (including Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle), two things are very noticeable about their structure and organisation. The first is largely unremarkable, and even predictably narrative, in a chronological sense. Each monarch has two to three pages devoted to them, pages which are largely biographical in style but peppered with anecdotal facts intended to interest and inform the reader, such as what Elizabeth I used to create her white face makeup. The second is, however, far more interesting to the academic historian, and noticing it greatly informs the spirit of this chapter. The usual organisation of these books is to classify the monarchs under the labels of their respective dynastic house, such as Plantagenet and Tudor. Normally, this is accompanied by a few comments on the dynasty along with the date range for it on the introduction page.

What is intriguing about this approach to organisation of the facts is that in almost all examples, in the pages after Edward VII the reader sees a concluding section with a title along the lines of 'The House of Windsor

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1910–Present', with George V as first monarch discussed. The key reason for this is likely to be simply a desire for 'neatness' in terms of the book organisation, as it would look awkward either to omit the first seven years of George V's reign, or to have it under a different heading for those years.[1] However, it has forced this author to consider the extent to which George V's changes to the monarchy, those which characterise the House of Windsor, actually are traceable back to his accession in 1910, rather than being (as is usually assumed) something forced on the King by the exigencies of war and revolution. An exploration of the genesis of the many changes to the style and justification of monarchy, both official and unofficial (things that are now seen as characteristic trademarks of the modern Windsor dynasty) provides the core of this chapter. It is contextualised by the author's previous research into state symbolism, particularly in the reign of Edward VII, which highlights the need to see the accession of George V in 1910 as a defining moment in the history of the modern British monarchy.

Learning How to be King

Unlike his father, George V was not brought up to think of himself as heir (or heir apparent) to the throne. That role was allocated to his elder brother, Albert Victor, popularly known as Eddy. Given the title of Duke of Clarence, Eddy had received a version of the training that his father had received at the hands of *his* father, Prince Albert.[2] Aged 12, George had been enrolled as a naval cadet, along with his older brother, but George was taught to think of this as his future career, and not just a part of his education, which was how Prince Albert Victor viewed his naval years. George, in the aftermath of his brother's death, when he became heir apparent, consciously evolved plans for how differently he would undertake the task of kingship. To understand his thinking about the approach he intended to take, one must look to his life preparation for the role (or the lack of it) and consider how different it was from the traditional training provided for heirs to thrones. For a start, George was an adult when he began his training to be heir, while it was usual for such training to start in childhood.

[1] Richard Cavendish (2007) *Kings and Queens: The Concise Guide* (London: David and Charles), Plantagenet Fry (2014) *Kings and Queen of England and Scotland* (London: DK).

[2] The boys received much of their early education together, because of their closeness in age. Neither excelled intellectually, but Albert Victor, on leaving the Navy, crammed and then attended Trinity College, Cambridge.

By the nineteenth century, the training of European royal heirs was arguably more complicated that it had ever been. There was a consciously felt necessity for young Princes (occasionally Princesses) to understand both the importance of maintaining the ancient royal traditions that underpinned the thrones they were destined to inherit, and of keeping abreast of the increasingly modern state and governmental mechanisms that complicated the role they would one day have to assume.[3] At one level, British heirs were no exception to this. George's father, the future Edward VII, had an intense tutoring regime from infancy which had been carefully devised by his father Prince Albert, himself a European royal steeped in those continental traditions.[4] Interestingly, though, this future British King was given only limited military training as compared to that provided for his younger brothers.[5] After all, British monarchs and heirs were debarred, by law, from participating actively in combat and that, combined with his own inclinations, helps to explain why Albert so clearly prioritised a university dimension to the training for his eldest son. But broadly speaking, the personal education that the later Edward VII received was not significantly different to that of his European counterparts, even if the nature of the British constitutional monarchy meant that he had to view his future royal powers slightly differently.

Albert's grandson, George, largely escaped the intense tutoring provided for an heir to the throne. His father, keenly aware of the negatives to his own strict upbringing, had wanted to ensure that his sons, even the heir apparent, enjoyed their childhoods. The best way to achieve something approaching a 'normal' upper-class childhood, the Prince of Wales felt, was to remove his sons from the court as much as possible while they were growing up. To do this acceptably, both his sons were sent to naval college.[6] Inevitably, George did initially receive some training of the kind intended for an heir, because he shared his older brother's lessons. But as the younger son of the heir to the throne, with a robustly healthy grandmother on that throne, George was considered a minor member of the

[3] For those interested in the training of royal Princes I can recommend the 'Heirs to the Throne' project led by Frank Muller and Heidi Mehrkens, particularly the first edited collection from the project, F. Muller and H. Mehrkens, eds (2015) *Sons and Heirs: Succession and Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

[4] Christopher Hibbert (2007) *Edward VII: The Last Victorian King* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp19–39.

[5] Ibid., pp23; 28–9; 39–49.

[6] Kenneth Rose (1983) *King George V* (London: Phoenix Press), Ch. 1.

royal family at a time when questions were being asked about the expense of the royal family. He was consequently encouraged to look forward to a naval career without any expectation of having a royal role.

It was focusing on his future as being that of a career naval officer, serving the Crown, that led George to understand monarchy and its role in a different way to his predecessors. Aboard ship, George (and his royal elder brother) received exactly the same treatment as any other cadet.[7] This included the 'honour' fights for tuck money, for which the younger Prince George was often a target due to his royal status and small size.[8] Aside from the obviously humility this installed into the young Princes it would also create in them a sense of camaraderie with their fellow cadets as well as the importance of 'mucking-in'. However, the most important lesson that George took from his naval days was about service, or more importantly the institution he was serving: his grandmother's Navy, which would in due time become that of his father and later his brother. But the emphasis was on his service to them, not his personal relationship with them. Whilst most royal Princes learn of the Crown as something that they would someday inherit, George learned about it as something one served for the good of the British Empire.

As a serving naval cadet and officer, he had to accustom himself to spending most of his life away from his family, especially after Eddy departed to continue his formal preparations to take on the throne. This was a sacrifice for him, but one he dutifully accustomed himself to, even though he had powerful family affections and good memories of his home life. George would write to his mother, wistfully inquiring who was staying in his 'sweet little room' whilst he was away with his ship.[9] Whilst the homesickness displayed in his letters sometimes borders on the heartbreaking, reading them induces a sense of admiration for a young man who understands that he must accept such sacrifices and do his duty in the place allotted to him. As the letters underline, there was, in his mind, already no question of duty being shirked so that

[7] They were however given their own shared cabin. A full account of life on their ship can be found in Albert Victor and George Wales (1886) *The Cruise of HMS Bacchante 1879–1882* (London: Macmillan).

[8] Catrine Clay (2006) *King Kaiser Tsar: Three Royal Cousins Who Led the World to War* (London: John Murray), p71.

[9] Georgina Battiscombe (1969) *Queen Alexandra* (London: Constable), p143.

he could come home for the holidays.[10] What is also striking is that he expected no special treatment on account of his royal status: no other midshipman would have expected to be relieved of duties to spend a holiday at home, and neither did George. He was not 'playing' at being a sailor, it was to be his lifelong career, and he took it seriously, including all that that entailed in terms of service to his sovereign, and lack of royal privilege in the life. It was an irrelevance to his daily duty that the Queen in whose service he had enlisted was also his loved 'grandmama'. It was his sense of duty, and not of privilege, that would one day become a cornerstone of the Windsor house.[11]

The decision that George was to grow to adulthood without a sense of royal privilege in his daily life had another very important consequence for the modern monarchy. His absence from family and public events where he could have had interactions with other royal relations, adults and children, meant that he grew up without a sense of being part of an extended and cosmopolitan royal family. This meant that, outside his immediate family, by the time he was an adult George felt little affinity with various other royals to whom he was related, whether based in Britain or on the continent. Further, he barely spoke German and had only limited French, so he could not converse easily with them unless they spoke English fluently. This was so unusual for modern European royals of any status that it was actually commented on, later, by the British Consul-General in Berlin: 'Royal George cannot speak a solitary word of German, and his French is atrocious.'[12] George therefore did not, unlike his father and grandmother, have a real sense, one that transcended national boundaries, of being part of an extended royal family scattered across the continent.[13] Hence, the idea of claiming membership of a Europe-centred 'Trade Union of Kings', something so central to his father's thinking, had little real influence on George, whose thinking was much more local.[14] His formative years had

[10] By the time this letter was written, Albert Victor had left the Navy to focus on his royal training, and so George was left alone, with no distraction from a focus on his duties to a naval career. There was no longer any reflected privilege that might have affected his daily life while his older brother was with him in the Navy, and nothing to remind him in that daily routine that he had been born into a royal family.

[11] Charles Douglas-Home and Saul Kelly (2001) *Dignified and Efficient. The British Monarchy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Claridge Press), Conclusion.

[12] Rose, *George V*, p16.

[13] His closeness to Nicholas II had much to do with Cousin Nicky's ease in speaking English. Dominic Lieven (1994) *Nicholas II Emperor of all the Russias* (London: BCA), p34.

[14] Rose, *George V*, pp162–3.

been spent with British boys from a range of mainly middle-class and gentry backgrounds. He had a strong sense of affinity with the young men who saw themselves as Britons, and this shaped his own sense of 'Britishness' and his royal responsibilities to his subjects in very practical ways when he came to the throne.

This is not to suggest that Edward VII's loyalty to Britain was in any way less than that of his son: merely to point out that George saw Britain in a different way, one that did not involve thinking of the British throne primarily as part of a network of European thrones where the survival of the monarchy relied on the survival of fellow monarchs as well. Edward's sense of duty included an unquestioning belief that fellow monarchs should help each other maintain their Crowns where possible and provide them with refuge if they were not able to do so, following in the footsteps of his mother and great-uncle George IV.[15] For George V, the need to question the impact on Britain of any decision he made in relation to his fellow monarchs was a conscious thing, not guided by a well-developed instinct.

The unexpected death of his elder brother in 1892 meant George found himself heir apparent and, as a young man substantially past the years of formal education, needing to learn lessons never previously considered relevant to him. By 1892, those lessons had moved on from what had been considered valuable in the late 1860s when Albert Victor and George were first learning together. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the symbolic importance of the Crown increased, particularly in the context of the British Empire.[16] As underlined by the success of the Golden Jubilee, the symbolic dimension to the imperial Crown was recognised as having the power to draw a huge population together, in a unity of loyalty. Prince George had become accustomed to paying homage to that symbol as a Royal Naval officer primarily, rather than as a Prince of the Realm. Taking part as a naval officer in the various ceremonials surrounding the Golden Jubilee had let him see how participating in public displays, focused on the symbol of the Crown, had the power to enhance an existing sense of unity even more strongly.[17] This learning process was

[15] Chrisopher Hibbert (1988) *George IV* (London: Penguin).

[16] David Cannadine (1983) 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition" c. 1820–1977', in E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 138.

[17] David Cannadine (2004) 'From Biography to History: writing the modern British Monarchy', *Historical Research, 77*(197), p308.

to turn out to be crucial to George's development of the Windsor style for the monarchy. A conscious sense of the symbolic significance attached to the modern monarchy was then enhanced by the adult training he was to undergo when he did become heir apparent. As a result, when George V came to the throne he understood, better and more viscerally than any of his predecessors, how crucial it was that his subjects saw their monarch in person as much as possible.

New Approaches to Coronations

Thus, in 1910, George actively intended to create a monarchy that was seen as being quintessentially British in the eyes of his subjects. As King, he also wanted to stress publicly his consciousness that monarchy was not a birthright but rather an inherited duty to one's country. This was best achieved through stage-managing the Crown's symbolism, through public displays that the people could participate in to demonstrate that they shared, and rallied around, that representative symbol of Britishness.[18] This explains why one of his earliest strategies to reinforce how the British monarchy related to the British people involved the perception of his heir. The ancient title of Prince of Wales was to be invested with a modern and national symbolism, as will be explored in more detail in Chapter **3**. It was a significant move as it emphasised the association between Wales and the rest of Britain at a time when Welsh national feeling was emerging as a cultural factor.[19] Equally, George felt that he needed to take the symbol of the British Crown and make it more relevant to his wide-flung imperial domains. This explains why he felt it so important to appear as a visible symbol to his millions of Indian subjects. Both his grandmother and father had declined to attend their Indian coronations. No-one had expected Victoria to travel, but it had caused much disappointment in India when Edward VII sent his brother Arthur to represent him in the Indian celebrations.[20]

[18] Ibid.

[19] John Ellis (2008) *Investiture: Royal Ceremony and National Identity in Wales, 1911–1969* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press).

[20] Edward had simply held a low-key and little-reported ceremony in Whitehall, in the Durbar Court.

George felt it was his duty, both to the institution of monarchy and to his Indian subjects, to be part of a ceremonial that symbolised his crowning as Emperor in the sight of the Indian people. This unprecedented departure from the usual expectations of what a British monarch would undertake in terms of public ceremonial actually alarmed his politicians. He was, for instance, warned that the prolonged absence from Britain that the trip to India would require could send a message to his subjects at home that the system of governance could still work in the monarch's absence, which could be deleterious to the future of the Crown. It was certainly planned to be the longest absence of a British monarch from the mainland UK since George II led British and Hanoverian troops during the War of Austrian Succession. More, it would occur at a time when, thanks to the examples of successful republics set by the USA and France, the issue of republicanism was a topic for discussion throughout Europe, including Britain.

There were, by now, well organised mechanisms of state in Britain that could replace the monarch in his absence and, arguably, enhance the republican cause still further.[21] But the King was adamant that the benefits of travelling and visibly participating in ceremonials in the imperial 'jewel in the crown' outweighed any risks. He is quoted as saying to Lord Esher, one of his leading courtiers, that he 'means to do for the Empire what King Edward had done for the peace of Europe'.[22] This further underlines the extent to which, from the start, George was distancing himself from active participation in the 'Trade Union of Kings'. His emphasis on visiting India before any European kingdoms testified that he saw his priorities as lying within his own realms, rather than in the cultivation of British interests in Europe.[23]

George's intention was that India would see itself, and be seen, as part of a single imperial entity owing allegiance to the symbol of the Crown, rather than to any individual incumbent of the throne. It was a modernisation of the ways in which monarchs related to their overseas colonies, and while George VI did not undertake a similar Durbar, the argument could

[21] The Cabinet remained unhappy with the situation right up until the King's departure, Rose, *George V*, p132.

[22] Lord Esher (1938) *Journals and Letters of Viscount Esher*, 3 vols (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson) 3, 1910–1913, p17.

[23] Matthew Glencross (2015) *The State Visits of Edward VII: Reinventing Royal Diplomacy for the Twentieth Century* (London: PalgraveMacmillan).

be made that there was no need for it. The point had been made in 1911. And it had been made not just for India, but also for the rest of the colonies making up the British Empire. If India was the jewel or centrepiece of the Empire, then messages conveyed through royal actions there were understood elsewhere. The Durbar was as much a statement about the future of the monarchy as symbol as it was about displaying George as Emperor of India. George V's later initiative to modernise further the imperial entity, via the Statute of Westminster 1931 (which transformed the Commonwealth into separate nations, all united under the symbol of the British Crown) was possible only because of the idea already conveyed to the Commonwealth by the Durbar.[24] The Statute also removed the need for further expensive symbolic gestures. George VI could simply continue to uphold the precedent set by his father, to the effect that the Crown was a symbol. More, it was one of duty, not privilege: a duty to promote and safeguard the interests of his subjects. When he visited the USA in 1939, George VI did so via Canada and took care that the point was understood that he was entering America as King of Canada, rather than as King of the United Kingdom.[25] George V's imperial legacy has largely proved positive, and the British Crown has, in terms of the Commonwealth, consequently been seen as acting as a uniting factor in the latter part of the twentieth century. The present Queen, like her grandfather and father, continues to use her role as a symbol of the British state to sustain friendly relations between the members of that Commonwealth, and to represent the Commonwealth's interests globally.[26]

A King's Duty: George V at War

During the First World War, George V advanced previous royal tradition in terms of relations with both the media and the armed forces in ways that left an enduring legacy for the House of Windsor. Since British Kings had ceased to lead their troops into battle in person, the relationship

[24] Bernard Porter (1996) *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850–1995* (London: Longman), pp172–5.

[25] There was always tension and nervousness in Canada over its relations with its, at times, overmighty neighbour. Kenneth Bourne (1969) *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815–1908* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

[26] Philip Murphy (2015) *Monarchy and the End of Empire: The House of Windsor, The British Government and the post-war Commonwealth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

between monarchs and the armed services had generally become more distant.[27] From the start of his reign, however, George V had seen his relationship with his Army and Navy through a much more personal lens when it came to displaying the symbolism of the Crown. Even though not active military leaders since 1742, British monarchs had continued to utilise military imagery. Victoria had enjoyed being the titular head of her armed forces, and her interest in her soldiers and sailors demonstrated itself in her involvement in the development of military honours such as the Victoria Cross.[28]

Coming to the throne in his forties, George V was very active from the start in engaging with his armed forces, practically as well as symbolically. He maintained relationships with the men he had served with, and invited some of them to court, which ensured that he had a good knowledge of what was going on in his Navy and Army from sources besides his political advisers. Thus with the outbreak of war in August 1914, George felt that his duty to his armed forces had to be more than distantly symbolic. His grandmother had reviewed troops before they had set off to fight in her name, had visited the wounded, and decorated deserving soldiers and sailors. But while intending to do all of this, George V was also determined to be more actively involved in supporting his Navy and his Army, at least partly because it was something he felt himself genuinely qualified to do, thanks to his earlier naval career. So far as the King was concerned, the hardships of conflict were not something to be shouldered by those serving in his name without his direct involvement.

He was determined, from the start, that as much as his royal duties would permit, he would share their burden. This feeling also spread to the families

[27] The last monarch to lead his troops in battle was George II, at the Battle of Dettingen in 1743. Subsequently, the British Parliament had passed a provision banning the monarch and the direct heirs to the throne from adventuring their person in conflict. An exception to this was provided by William IV, the 'Sailor King', who became heir apparent on the death of his brother's daughter, the Princess Charlotte. He had had a naval career and had advanced (though not on the basis of skill and prowess) to the rank of Lord Admiral. However, by the time William came to the throne just short of his 65th birthday, he was already an old man, in poor health, and one who—like his great-great nephew—had not been trained for the throne but who (unlike George V) made no attempt to train for the position he would assume in the twelve years when he was heir apparent. He maintained his old friendships, with figures like Admiral Codrington, but otherwise made no attempt to intervene in matters military.

[28] Byron Farwell (1985) *Queen Victoria's Little Wars* (London: Norton) makes this point very cogently.

of those on the front line, and to his subjects in general. The advice he had been given by his politicians in the lead-up to war was that, whether the war was swiftly over or not, the country as a whole would suffer hardship, and he believed that the royal family should be seen to be sharing that suffering.[29] His feeling manifested itself in his famous, but heart-felt, message to his troops, 'Although I cannot share your hardships, my heart is with you every day.'[30] These were not idle words on the part of the King. He expressed his desire to spend time with the troops almost as soon as the war commenced—not simply reviewing them but going to visit them in their barracks to see the details of their preparations for active duty.

Educated in the constitutional propriety of his role and its limitations when it came to policy, George made no substantive attempt to influence the decisions made by his politicians over the conduct of the war, though it is true that some generals and admirals could expect to find a sympathetic ear in their King.[31] However, this was essentially over their grievances with the government when it came to, for instance, details of conditions on the frontline. In practice, rather than urging on policy change, the King used such information to help shape his visits.

On an almost daily basis, as the media coverage of the royal family's involvement in the war effort underlines, George was promoting his vision of the ethos of the monarchy as a national and an imperial symbol; one which could unite men from across the Empire, and also their families. But he was also conscious that if George the King became too visibly involved in the actual conduct of the war, then George—the man—would once again be the focus for attention, and the monarchical symbol would became a less effective tool to unify the nation. He could not afford for the Crown to become tainted by association with policy leading to any failure of arms. All his efforts, therefore, were directed towards the symbolic dimension to the involvement of the Crown in national hardship and suffering and attempts to share these. This helps to explain why George V escaped most of the contemporary (and subsequent) criticisms for bloodbaths like the Somme or Gallipoli. George effectively conveyed the message that the monarchy was not just above everyday politics, it was above those shaping military decisions as well.[32]

[29] Newspaper reportage made this plain from the start, see for example 'Five Months' Supply of Breadstuffs', *The Times*, 8 August 1914.

[30] Rose, *George V*, p176.

[31] On this point, see also Chapter 5.

[32] Rose, *George V,* pp179–84.

George focused on being understood as a King dedicated to the experiences of his men on active service, at sea and on land: he portrayed himself as the active element in the God, King and Country that they were fighting for. This was why he made several visits to the frontline in France (it would not have been practical for him to go to sea, or to travel to any other theatre of war). There, he spent his time not with the generals, but in the trenches, talking to his troops. The amount of time he spent walking around in France amongst his men, comprising troops from across the Empire, was absolutely unprecedented. He and the Queen had already, in the first four years of the reign, made themselves more visible than their two predecessors had done, through their so-called 'state visits' to British cities, from Nottingham to Liverpool. Widely reported, the royal presence was already becoming more than distant glimpses of a royal on a distant balcony or in a coach. But the King's trips to the Front took the idea of a royal 'walkabout' and royal closeness to their subjects in new directions, because these trips were so very deliberately used and reported. The use of an official royal photographer (instead of leaving the reportage to the whim and enthusiasm of local and national newspapers and their reporters) was crucial: it ensured that the images that were reported in the national and the imperial media showcased the King meeting ordinary soldiers, not generals. The psychological impact of such images was immense, and left the troops (and their families) in no doubt that they were fighting for a King who genuinely cared about them.

Today we are used to the idea of the royal walkabout, seeing royals visiting places and having a go at everyday things, but George's initiative, from 1910 onwards, constitutes the birth of the modern royal walkabout. Whilst Queen Victoria and Edward VII had made visits to towns and cities and to various factories and galleries throughout their reigns, these visits had a very different tone to that of the visits made by George, including those when he was accompanied by his Queen. Edward's visits, for instance, had always promoted the sense of occasion and were reported as such, but they did not involve any engagement with figures who were not prominent citizens. He could actually get annoyed if the 'general public' intruded itself too much on his notice unexpectedly.[33] George's style provides an interesting contrast. He was interested in engaging not simply with the prominent citizens but also with the more humble, and his

[33] Frederick Ponsonby (1951) *Recollections of Three Reigns* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode), p22.

engagement with those he met was much less planned and managed than had been usual for his father and grandmother. At the first public appearance of the King and Queen in 1910 after Edward VII's funeral *The Times* commented on the way they moved 'freely, almost familiarly' amongst the cheering throngs, adding that 'the most striking feature' was the 'absence of formality and ceremonial'.[34] The 'ordinary' dimension to these pre-war royal visits carried over into the wartime engagement of the King with his people, and actually became their distinguishing feature. Nor was this accidental: it was a deliberate choice on the part of George, as is underlined in his wartime comment, made through Clive Wigram, his Assistant Private Secretary, that he did not want to put any burden on headquarters staff but instead 'to motor out every day to see what is to be seen of troops on the march, billets, etc'.[35] Modern consumers of royal news are accustomed to reportage of the Prince of Wales playing a traditional game with Brewery Staff or Prince Harry 'mucking-in' with workers at a factory.[36] In 1914 these kind of relatively informal 'personal' walkabouts were genuinely revolutionary.

What made this style of royal walkabout successful was, to an extent, rooted in George's own ability to converse with 'the common man'—a talent honed during his years in the Navy, when talking to his men on board ship was an essential skill for any ambitious naval officer. But what was also crucial was his consciously cultivated relationship with the media. Previously the British monarchy had always kept the press at a distance, even when they had made use of them. Edward VII had thought of them as an annoyance throughout his reign, even during his state visits—despite the fact that the success of the latter was largely dependent on their reportage.[37] By contrast, George—who had himself been a consumer of news about his own family through the medium of the press—understood that the press merely needed to be used effectively. This did not mean harnessing the media in a controlling manner, as the Kaiser used the German press. Instead, the key was to develop a spirit of cooperation that acknowledged royal reportage was core to what should be a mutually beneficial relationship between the royal family and the media.

[34] 'The King and Queen. Visit to the London Hospital', *The Times*, 1 August 1910.

[35] Royal Archives (henceforth RA) PS/PSO/GV/PS/WAR/QQ06/4503, Wigram to General Peyton, 28 July 1916.

[36] http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/news-and-diary/hrh-visits-wychwood-brewery-oxfordshire, accessed 12 October 2015.

[37] Glencross, *The State Visits of Edward VII*.

During the war, he made a point of meeting regularly with war correspondents, to ensure the reportage of positive messages about the royal family's engagement with the armed services. This prepared the way for their willingness to use official photographs covering his activities on the frontline. This was an initiative which George himself had decided on, intended to make sure that the most supportive images of him engaging with his men were the ones which appeared in the media. Press coverage was consequently a prime concern when planning a new visit, where the King could be seen to be doing his duty to his people.[38] True, it meant that many of the famous pictures of the King were staged, but this was primarily because of the need for military secrecy and security, as well as the logistical requirements of a camera crew recording operations in the frontline trench.

Nor did he confine himself to the British press. He was determined to make himself widely accessible, to enable the widest possible positive reportage:

> His Majesty last year was graciously pleased to receive the British and Allied correspondents together, and if it should be found possible to repeat the procedure I feel sure it would cause a deep gratification to the press. The correspondents this year have been increased by adding neutrals to the British and Allied but there is only one or two of the latter present here. May I ask you if you will be good enough to put this suggestion forward in case it should be found possible to give effect to it.[39]

In 1914–1918, for people across the Empire to see pictures of the King 'mucking-in' with his men would have been particularly striking. It may have been war propaganda, but it also represents a conscious effort by George to illustrate the changes he was making to the monarchy. Further confirmation of George's determination to be more than a 'stay at home' monarch comes with his behaviour at the end of the war. He was determined not to wait for Sir Douglas Haig to return to London to receive his congratulations. Instead, he insisted on travelling to France to congratulate him personally in the field, even though doing this involved a confrontation with his Prime Minister. Lloyd-George felt the trip was unnecessary but George overrode

[38] RA PS/PSO/GV/WAR/QQ19/07110/1, Wigram to Major E. G. Thompson, 26 July 1918.

[39] RA PS/PSO/GV/WAR/QQ19/07110/4, Earl of Onslow to Major E. G. Thompson, 6 August 1918, Reception of newspaper correspondents; and photographs of visit Earl of Onslow to Major Thompson, 6 August 1918.

him. By not waiting to receive Haig in London, as his father would have done, he again emphasised his active involvement with his subjects' war effort. The obvious comparison that can be made is with his son, George VI, who made extensive tours of the bombed-out streets of London in the 1940s and to the frontline in theatres such as France.[40]

The House of Windsor

It was during the First World War that George re-labelled, formally and publicly, the British royal house as the House of Windsor. Given the remit of this volume, it might be thought that this episode would be the centrepiece of the chapter on the promoter of this new identity. It is not, being only one symbol of the substantial changes that George V had already introduced to the way that the royal family interacted with their subjects and revolutionised the way in which they were seen and understood publicly. In building a new style of monarchy, George V did not factor a name-change into his plans until events during the war suggested that, for short-term reasons in 1917, it became an act that could have a useful resonance. In 1914, at the outbreak of the war with Germany, George was already convinced of the Britishness of his immediate family, and saw this as being demonstrated to the British and imperial public through their high-profile leadership of the war effort, both in terms of active military service and at home. While not unaware of the German origins of his family, for him this was a distant historical memory and not something he thought of first in relation to his own immediate family, despite his wife's more immediate antecedents in Germany. Thus, Kenneth Rose was right to interpret the change of name as essentially a 'theatrical gesture'.[41]

In this sense, therefore, it would not be unfair to label his name-changing actions as mere war propaganda, and certainly there were those at the time who doubted its value. Lord Rosebery warned that its only result would be ridicule, a reflection which was particularly provoked by the Kaiser's famous Merry Wives of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha comment.[42] But the action to change the name of his house, and to force those of his relations with German titles to renounce them in favour of British ones, was a minor episode in

[40] Douglas-Home and Kelly, *Dignified and Efficient*, p147.
[41] Rose, *George V*, p174
[42] Ibid.

his strategy to construct a new monarchy for Britain. That name change, then, ended up being part of George's long-term strategy to differentiate the British monarchy from other royal houses, especially the continental European ones. He had long disliked what he saw as the extravagant flabbiness of foreign courts, and his naval training had given him a distaste for what he would dub 'layabouts', those without a useful role and function, and sense of responsibility to those whom they were set in authority over. From the start, George was determined to establish new regulations and restrictions for wider members of his own family, to rein in any sense of such extravagance being associated with the British royal family.

Changes to the structure and function of the royal family, to make it more recognisably British, were happening even before 1914, as George had signalled when he passed on the title of Prince of Wales to his son and heir in a public investiture in Wales. What the war did, in essence, was act as a catalyst. It was the excuse and the opportunity for George to break publicly the links with German royal titles within his family. Importantly, his 'good riddance' deed included all foreign titles borne by members of the British royal family.[43] His relations resident in his kingdom were given the option of staying British and accepting Anglicised versions of their titles (usually without royal rank being attached) regardless of the country of origin, or of departing. As part of that, George himself rejected the German dynastic names associated with his family, and replaced both Hanover and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha with something that he believed was a quintessentially British label for his House: Windsor. He also signalled a determination to make sure that the Britishness of the royal family in succeeding generations, regardless of accidents of marriage and inheritance by junior branches, remained. As part of the decree establishing the name change, it was also decreed that the House name for any future monarchs would remain Windsor.[44]

The episode should be understood as reaffirming the King's mastery of royal symbolism, distancing the institution from the birth origins of any holder by a labelling reaffirming its Britishness. Of at least equal importance was the decision taken by George V to increase the chances of his successors being of predominantly British descent. The key reason that

[43] This is a reference to the caption for a famous *Punch* cartoon at the time, showing the King vigorously sweeping 'made in Germany' coronets onto a dust-pile. See 'A Good Riddance', *Punch*, 27 July 1917.

[44] Douglas-Home and Kelly, *Dignified and Efficient,* p187.

the British royal family was so infused with foreign, particularly German, blood was the long expectation that royals would marry only other royals, which meant looking abroad. Germany had been the provider of many eligible spouses substantially because of the accompanying need for British royals to marry Protestants after the Act of Settlement 1701.[45] While there was no constitutional bar to marriage between a member of the royal family and someone British-born (effectively, a commoner, even if possessing aristocratic rank), the Royal Marriages Act 1772 had had the effect of further encouraging the habit of British Princes and Princesses marrying into foreign royal families. The intent of the Act was to prevent members of the British royal family marrying unsuitably, and so they were required, under the terms of the Act, to gain the consent of the ruling monarch to any proposed marriage.[46] Of Victoria's children, only her fourth daughter, Princess Louise, had chosen not to marry into a foreign royal family, becoming in 1871 Marchioness of Lorne (later Duchess of Argyll).[47] George himself had been encouraged by his family to look for a suitable bride only amongst his royal relations, with the choice falling on Princess Mary (May) of Teck.

However, at the same Privy Council that the House of Windsor was formally declared as being the royal dynasty in Britain, George also announced that he and the Queen had, for some time, agreed to consent to *any* of their children, including his heir, marrying into British families; something that, he commented in his diary, marked 'a historical occasion'.[48] This removal of the expectation for the next King to marry a foreign Princess was particularly telling, especially given George's insistence that he and Mary had come to this decision previously, implying that it may have pre-dated the war.[49]

[45] This debarred Roman Catholics, or those married to Roman Catholics, from the line of succession to the Crown, and remains in force in 2016.

[46] Any marriage undertaken by a descendant of George II without royal consent was null and void, legally, and continued to be so until recent constitutional changes in 2011. The Perth Agreement 2011 restricts the provision of the Act to the first six individuals in line of succession.

[47] Though the marriage itself turned out to be less than happy in the longer term, there was considerable public enthusiasm in Britain at the time for Princess Louise's choice. The 'love match' that led a 'Princess of the Blood Royal to wed a commoner' had 'aroused the enthusiasm of the country', see 'Marriage of Princess Louise', *Morning Post*, 22 March 1871.

[48] Rose, *George* V, p309.

[49] This seems probable. After all, the Prince of Wales was 20 in 1914, and so his future choices of bride must already have been in the minds of his parents.

The End of the Trade Union of Kings

Arguably the most important aspect of the Royal Titles Act 1917, in terms of its significance for the establishment of the new 'Windsor' style of monarchy was that it signalled the effective resignation by George V from the Trade Union of Kings, that concept so valued by his father. One of the most famous incidents of George V's reign was his apparent refusal to allow his cousin the Tsar to settle in Britain after the loss of the Russian throne. George's actions are popularly accepted as leading to the Tsar and his entire family being executed by the Bolsheviks.[50] This incident is regularly presented as one involving a family betrayal between two men who were both cousins and friends. However, this chapter choses to focus on it in the context of what it affirms about George's determination to uphold the British character of his House. To that end, he had already, in 1915, struck seven cousins from the Garter Roll, because of their service with the German and Austrian armies. Subsequently, the Royal Titles Deprivation Act 1917 enabled him to remove British peerages from his cousins Charles, Duke of Albany and Ernst Augustus, Duke of Cumberland (along with his son, the Duke of Brunswick) who were serving in the German forces.

As this signals, George had a very different attitude to what his father, Edward VII, had labelled the 'Trade Union of Kings'. The long-established royal network across Europe had been underpinned by an implicit commitment to the maintenance of royal status as something different and above the duty of a monarch to his country. This commitment, which had existed over many centuries, included as one of its prime rules an expectation of assistance being offered to fellow monarchs at times of crisis, even where that might complicate a nation's foreign policy. In recent centuries, thanks to its relative political stability, England/Britain had been, in practice, one the most active members of the royal network, in terms of offering refuge and safe havens to deposed monarchs, their families and followers. The Bourbons from France, and Napoleon III, had all retreated to a dignified exile in Britain, as, more recently, had Manuel II of Portugal. Therefore, even disregarding their family relationship, it could have been anticipated that the Tsar would seek refuge in Britain. This expectation was also held by the Kaiser, who (as a conscious member of the 'trade union') felt it natural to offer free and safe passage to

[50] Although the logistical issues of removing the Tsar from Ekaterinburg have led some to suggest that rescuing the Tsar would have been a costly and possibly an impossible venture had George agreed.

Nicholas and his family through Germany on their way to Britain.[51] Indeed, Wilhelm himself was to benefit from this established expectation of the behaviour of monarchs to other monarchs, regardless of enemy status, when he was received in the neutral Netherlands by Queen Wilhelmina, who subsequently refused to rescind her protection.[52]

By contrast, George's first conscious priority was to his country, in whose Navy he had himself served. Consequently, he did not feel automatically obliged to offer refuge to anyone without considering the wider issues and implications for Britain of that offering. George had effectively resigned his membership of the 'trade union' when he began to reconstruct the royal house in the British Windsor image, and reject both foreign titles and foreign holders of British titles. Therefore, when the matter of asylum for the Tsar and his family came up, the Palace did not just accept that an automatic invitation could be issued. The Palace did not block the invitation but *did* ask for it to be delayed so that its implications could be properly considered. It was during this period of consideration that the Tsar and his family were murdered. It must remain a subject for debate whether George had delayed the invitation as a means of refusing refuge, or whether he had simply expected usual conventions to be followed and that, after a delay, the Tsar and his family would be allowed to go into exile, and probably (if eventually) in Britain.[53] But, in terms of this chapter's arguments, George's intentions and Nicholas's unhappy fate are secondary to the way that the episode underlines George's strategy of modernising the British monarchy in ways that emphasised its core Britishness.

Ever aware of symbols, the King was fully conscious that Nicholas was viewed within Britain as bloody tyrant. He vividly remembered how, less than ten years previously, there had been considerable outrage in Britain when Edward VII had announced a state visit to Britain by the Tsar.

[51] It is argued it is in this light, not as an attempt by Wilhelm II to avoid any potential blame for the Tsar's death, that his offer needs to be understood. Clay, *King, Kaiser, Tsar*, p345.

[52] Matthew S. Seligmann and Roderick R. McLean (2000) *Germany from Reich to Republic, 1871–*1918 (Basingstoke: Macmillan), p172.

[53] Modern portrayals of George such as in the BBC drama *The Lost Prince* have taken the former view, or portrayed George as not understanding that by delaying the invitation he was inadvertently signing Nicholas's death warrant. However, the Romanov family still put the blame fully on George himself as was reflected in 1998 when the family were buried in St Petersburg and the Queen, as the direct descendant of George V, was pointedly not invited. Ann Morrow (2006) *Cousins Divided, George V and Nicholas II* (London: Sutton), p233.

Petitions from the trade unions, amongst others, had been received by Buckingham Palace protesting at the invitation and requesting its withdrawal. The objections had been so strong that it had been agreed that the traditional venues for state visits of London and Windsor had to be avoided, and the Isle of Wight substituted instead.[54] So in 1917, George first thoughts were directed to the potential for an extreme destabilising effect on Britain, at a time when, he felt, the unquestioned loyalty of subjects to the Crown, if not always to the policies of the government, was of the utmost importance if victory in the war was to be achieved.

The appearance of turning his cousin away and leaving him to his fate was something that pained George for the rest of his life. It certainly shocked other European royals that he failed in what they thought should be his prime duty. But George's decision to ask for time for consideration was made on the basis of prioritising assessments of what was best for his country at a time of war, rather than simply responding to an older tradition of duty to fellow royals, who might happen to be relations. For George to have behaved differently would have been to undermine the impact of his achievements in creating a new symbolism for the British royal family, one which focused inwards on Britain and its Empire first and foremost and not on rescuing even dearly loved royal relations at the expense of that duty.

Conclusion: Family Life in the New Royal House

In what may seem to be an irony after this discussion of events in 1917, George put family at the heart of his new royal house. But, his idea of 'family' was focused on what we now think of as the 'nuclear' family: those closest to him—his wife and their children, essentially. He was a rather boring *paterfamilias*, as a result, but in that he saw himself as being like the majority of his male subjects. It was vital to this master of the royal symbol that he was, at heart, an ordinary British man and was understood as such by his people. At his own Silver Jubilee he confirmed his own sense of this by commenting that when it came to the demonstrations of adulation for him from his subjects, 'I cannot understand it, after all I am only a very ordinary sort of fellow.'[55] When H.G. Wells famously sneered at the 'alien and uninspiring court' residing at Windsor, what made George angry was

[54] Glencross, *State Visits of Edward VII*, Ch. 7.

[55] David Sinclair (1988) *Two Georges: Making of the Modern Monarchy* (London, Hodder and Stoughton), p1.

not the accusation that he was an uninspiring figure but the implication that he was not British. His apparent response was to the effect that 'I may be uninspiring, but I'll be damned if I'm an alien.'[56] What is telling, in terms of his reinvention of the monarchy, is that his greatest asset in this process was how genuinely ordinary he actually was. As a young naval officer, he had disliked his father's 'fast' set at court. Later, when he became the heir, George had only attended his father's lavish parties when he absolutely had to as a matter of duty. Nor had he identified with the ostentatious style of living enjoyed by his European royal cousins. When deputising for his father in Berlin or on the Isle of Wight, and meeting with his German and Russian cousins, George had always been taken aback by the lavishness of their lifestyles and the extravagance of their courts.[57] The various cousins had, in turn, mocked 'steadfast Georgy'.[58]

Traditionally, monarchies globally, not just in Europe, had always used extravagance and lavish displays of pomp and ceremony as a measure of their power, as when Henry VIII met Francis I on the Field of Cloth of Gold. By contrast, a lesson that George had derived from his days in the Navy was that the success of the British Empire was instead due to the strong, simple family unit that he believed was at the core of the British character. He had realised that for many of his fellow sailors and their families, it was the image of Victoria as the matriarch of her nation that had won their loyalty and love. George's conscious decision from the start of his reign to promote a public image of himself as an ordinary family man, just like any other in his Empire, was a direct break with the tradition of royal difference, but it was well-suited to what were to become the hallmarks of modern monarchy as the century developed.

George V understood from the first that the model provided by the British royal family could be a very valuable propaganda tool in his reinvention of the monarchy. It is particularly from 1910 on that images of the royal family doing 'ordinary' things, such as reading the newspaper or having tea on the garden, began to proliferate in newspapers and periodicals. George was consistent in impressing his ideal of an 'ordinary' if royal family upon his children, discouraging any notion

[56] Rose, *George V*, p174.

[57] What drew him, also, to 'Cousin Nicky' was the latter's preference for an unpretentious and simple 'British' style of home comfort, when he was away from lavish court ceremonial. Lieven, *Nicholas II,* p59.

[58] 'Steadfast Georgy' was a common family nickname for George V, especially amongst his cousins. See, for instance, Clay, *King, Kaiser, Tsar*.

that they were special as individual personalities. He strove to curb any extravagant excesses for them as well as for himself. While this message met with limited success in terms of the lifestyle choices of his elder son, the future Edward VIII, it had an enduring impact on his younger son, the future George VI and subsequently, on his granddaughter Elizabeth II. George V certainly saw his second son as a better torch-bearer for his ideals. On the throne, George VI was keen to promote this image of royal 'ordinariness', and encouraged portraits and pictures of himself, the Queen and their two daughters taking tea, in very 'everyday' surroundings. The enduring trope of George's royal 'ordinariness' as a core element in the symbolism used by the royal family is evidenced in the early twenty-first century, with the British public being treated to insights into the 'ordinary' royal home with titbits like the fact that the present Queen is apparently a fan of *Eastenders* and a user of Tupperware. Reporting of Sandringham Christmas festivities are still characterised by their lack of extravagance, with information about presents received by the family including Prince Harry's gift to the Queen of a shower cap.[59] Following the example set by George V, the Windsors have subsequently taken pains to characterise the dynasty as being an ordinary family with everyday interests, while having an extra and special duty to the nation. It has led to accusations of them being 'boring'. George himself had to weather such a comment from his Prime Minister Asquith. But the image of steadfast British family life has been one that has created a deal of respect for royal family, particularly at times of national hardship.

An official portrait in the National Portrait Gallery from 1913 provides further powerful confirmation of George's conscious intention to send a very different message out to his subjects about the kind of monarchy he represented. In the portrait, he and Mary were shown only with their immediate heir, the Prince of Wales, and their daughter Mary, and not with any wider members of the family or their courtiers. The four were positioned around a sofa, and the darkened rooms of Buckingham Palace (complete with the symbolism of grand piano and state dining table) are in the distance, visible only as part of a darkened background. The main lighting for the portrait is daylight, entering through a window and projected directly on the royal family. The imagery suggests an ordinary group of people who, despite the lavish

[59] http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/08/14/prince-harry-s-christmas-presents-to-the-queen-confirm-he-s-a-ruddy-scamp_n_7353386.html, accessed 26 October 2015.

palatial background, choose to show themselves as occupying the space closest to one another. It is also striking that while the King is dressed formally and standing in a traditional pose, he is relating to his family in their much more informal pose on and around the sofa. The Queen is also dressed formally, with a tiara and jewels, but otherwise simply. The message of this portrait would appear to be that the family is both royal, and ordinary. Equally, while the trappings of royal state are visible, the lavish excess associated with the reign of Edward VII has been switched off (like the chandeliers). Instead the King and his family enjoy the natural light from the sun.[60]

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PART II

Establishing the Windsor Brand

CHAPTER 3

The Ultimate Windsor Ceremonials: Coronations and Investitures

Michael D. Kandiah, Judith Rowbotham, and Gillian Staerck

Introduction

Four coronations of British monarchs were carried through during the twentieth century, with a fifth planned but abandoned on the abdication of Edward VIII. They were major, and expensive, state occasions with a high public profile that were also quintessentially British and imperial events. Representatives of foreign powers were present. However the only royals present at these events were those who still enjoyed that distinction as a 'gift' of the British Empire and its ruler, in that they were tributary to British power and authority through a colonial or quasi-colonial status of some form.[1] As well as

[1] Traditionally, there could, at a coronation, be no presence of rulers of *equal* standing to prevent any suggestion that either they were there to pay fealty (swear loyalty) to the British monarch, or that the British monarch was paying fealty to them.

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coronations, there have been two investitures of heirs to the throne with the dignity and title of Prince of Wales, and four Jubilees since 1910—three celebrating the same monarch, Elizabeth II. All of these were also lavish public state events. The Jubilees followed the patterns inaugurated for Queen Victoria, but turning the investiture of the heir to the throne with the title of Prince of Wales into a public occasion, and one firmly linked with the Principality, was an innovation promoted by George V. In many ways, what these two investitures do is signal how different the purpose and message of the more traditional coronations had become, from the time of George V onwards. This chapter explores the extent to which, under the cloak of continuity via the supposedly time-honoured ceremonial of the coronation, the Windsor dynasty has effectively re-invented the purpose of monarchy, using the messages sent out via such public state occasions to signal this to their subjects.

English—later British—coronations have certainly always been public events.[2] Originally, they constituted lavishly staged ceremonials whose main purpose was to contextualise the public avowals of loyalty and promises of service made to their consecrated monarch by the leading (in terms of their financial and power resources) men of the state. In response to such promises of fealty, the monarch promised to maintain and safeguard the laws and customs passed by his (or her) predecessors and to guarantee the spiritual freedom of the Church.[3] Core to coronations for over a thousand years has been the sacerdotal element within the coronation event, which consecrated and so set apart an anointed ruler from ordinary secular men and women. This was, traditionally, part of the process of monarchy which helped to secure the throne for a new incumbent on the throne by institutionalising the concept of secular sovereignty and authority within the framework of Christianity.

This served two key purposes: it enhanced the monarch's personal authority by endowing it with religious significance. Any *lèse majesté* against an anointed, consecrated ruler thus violated not only the dignity of the individual incumbent of the throne but also offended God's dignity

[2] It should be noted, however, that the key moment of the coronation, the anointing of the monarch by the Archbishop of Canterbury, is still shielded from view. For the longer history of the ceremony, see Roy Strong (2005) *Coronation. A History of Kingship and the British Monarchy* (London: Harper Press).

[3] The *Liber Regalis* has (in some version or other) been at the core of English (later British) coronation rituals since the eight century, probably, and lays down the basic text of various coronation oaths and promises. See Joseph Strutt and J. R. Planché (1842) *The Regal and Ecclesiastical Antiquities of England* (London: Bohn).

and authority. In the more consciously religious and deferential but also politically turbulent mediaeval period, this was a great asset to any monarch. Secondly, it enlisted the power of the Church on the side of the monarch, since the local highest officials of the Christian Church were a core part of the process of king-making, and publicly endorsing that the monarch had authority 'by the Grace of God'.[4]

Over time, the relationship of the English monarchy with the Christian church changed, especially as a result of the Reformation and the later Anglican Settlement under Elizabeth I. This saw the emergence of a national Established Church, formally part of the secular political hierarchy as well having an ecclesiastical hierarchy headed by the monarch as Supreme Governor. On the surface, this centralised both spiritual and secular authority in the monarch: the reality was more complex.[5] For a range of complicated reasons, shaped by events from the Civil War and Restoration to the establishment of the principle of Protestant succession and the arrival of the Hanoverian dynasty, the reality over the period from the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century was one of diminishing political power exercised by the sovereign. Instead, politicians—both hereditary peers and elected Members of Parliament—exercised authority in the *name* of an individual monarch.

The development of a constitutional monarchy had an impact on the contextualising realities of the choices to be made when organising the coronations of the Hanoverian monarchs, from George I to Queen Victoria and (though not strictly a Hanoverian), Edward VII. The religious and sacerdotal dimension to the coronation service was retained but was differently understood. This was important, because the monarchy now needed to be presented as being quintessentially British, in line with the emergence of that national identity which had coalesced during the eighteenth century and been refined during the wars with France between 1793 and 1815.[6] The Protestant cover over the coronation rites was sufficiently strong, and by the nineteenth century, sufficiently different from the coronation

[4] See, for example, Joseph Canning (2005) *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300–1450* (Abingdon: Routledge), especially pp54–8. The endorsement of the Church could, of course, prove problematic when or if the Church turned against the ruler they had endowed with authority by the grace of God, as figures including Henry II and King John discovered, but usually the interests of both sides were mutually supportive.

[5] For the complexities of monarchy and power in the early modern period, especially the transitional Tudor period, see Alice Hunt (2008) *The Drama of Coronation: Medieval Ceremony in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[6] For a more detailed discussion, see Linda Colley (2006) *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

rituals in place elsewhere in Europe, to make its retention important to the national perception of the legitimacy of a new incumbent on the throne. However, in the new conceptualisation of monarchy that emerged particularly post-1714 (i.e., from the accession of George I, the first Hanoverian), monarchy was also being re-imagined as an institution that was, in its daily practices, there to be shaped and guided by political advice.

Political Dimensions to Coronations

Coronations have always been political acts: essentially a presentation by a ruler to the political elite of a state and, simultaneously, a ritualised demonstration that that ruler possessed the authority to exercise political leadership.[7] In a constitutional monarchy such as had developed in the United Kingdom by the twentieth century, however, there had been a shift in the political realities. Symbolically, the supreme authority of a monarch was confirmed but practically, when it came to everyday political management of the country, it was politicians, especially elected ones, who had the authority of the leadership role, even if it was still in the name of the monarch. Thus, coronations became events over which politicians could have a significant say in shaping, in terms of the some of the details of how such an event should be arranged and how much it should cost the nation. It was part of an exercise to demonstrate that a new reign would be marked by political unity, under the skilled political leadership of the government of the day. If the religious dimensions of the coronation service were still within the remit of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Lords Spiritual, it should be remembered that they, too, were politicians, possessing and exercising political power by virtue of their membership of the House of Lords.

During the transition to modern constitutional monarchy under the House of Hanover, the first four Georges had actively involved themselves in negotiations with their politicians, and so with the political factions of their reigns. Victoria's reign, however, signalled the real move away by monarchs from involvement in what might be called, in

[7] Andrew Spencer (2015) 'The Coronation Oath in English Politics 1272–1399' in B. Thompson and J. Watts (eds) *Political Society in Later Medieval England* (Woodbridge: Boydell), 38–54, p39.

the modern era, party politics.[8] However, if monarchs sought to stand aloof from party politics, this has not meant that politicians have not been prepared to make political capital out of the monarchy, for their parties as well as themselves, when opportunity has offered.[9] From Victoria's reign on, in the context of an expanding mass electorate, the importance of public spectacle as a political asset became enhanced. This was thanks to the opportunities offered by easier mass transport such as railways, and even more by mass communication in the shape of newspapers initially, followed by photography (still and then moving). Thus Victoria's Jubilees in 1887 and 1897 were staged as major public events in order to allow a public, patriotic effusion of loyalty and affection for the monarch, which also benefited party politicians.

The coronation of Victoria's heir, Edward VII, was another major event in which politicians could take a hand. Fortunately, the new King's ideas of enjoyment associated with his position included lavish displays which could easily be tailored by astute political advisers to the nation's tastes and political ideas about what were the nation's needs. Consequently, Edward VII had happily collaborated with his politicians in making his coronation a spectacular event.[10] He himself had the view that 'Monarchy is strengthened and its popularity increased by a certain amount of ceremonial magnificence'.[11] It went well with his personal inclination for getting 'the most out of life'. The resultant coronation in 1902 was something which, again according to *The Times*, constituted 'a noble, an unforgettable sight', both within the Abbey and in the streets outside it; one that both reaffirmed

[8] This is not to say that she did not have political favourites, but this was more to do with personalities than substantial political meddling, certainly when it came to domestic politics (she was more active—if not always successfully so—in interfering with foreign policy issues). See, for instance, Frank Hardie (1963) *The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861–1901* (London: Routledge). Roy Strong antedates the withdrawal of the monarch from party politics to the reign of George III, and certainly (thanks to his illness, and especially after the débâcle over North America) he was not actively involved in partisan politics in the latter part of his reign, but his heir's continuing involvement, along with the activities of his younger son, rather challenges that conclusion. See Strong, *Coronation*, pp361–2.

[9] Most recently, it could be argued, Tony Blair did so very successfully for New Labour and himself in 1997, with the aftermath of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, whom he dubbed 'the people's princess', taking advantage of a mood of resentment against the monarchy. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3qinDH_3HE, accessed 24 January 2016.

[10] Strong, *Coronation*, pp446; 458; Wilentz, *Rites of Power*, pp222–3.

[11] 'King Edward', *The Times*, 7 May 1910.

the 'supremacy' of the nation, and signalled to the world that it was an Empire at peace.[12]

A staged filmed version of Edward VII's coronation was directed by the noted early French film director, Georges Méliès, and was first shown on the day of the actual coronation to considerable public interest. Edward found out about this film and, after watching it, wrote to the film-makers to say that he was delighted with the product: '*C'est splendid! Mais quel merveilleux appareil que le cinéma. … Ça, c'est réellement fantastique!*'.[13] Edward clearly recognised the power and potential of new and developing media, something which his successors would similarly comprehend and would utilise.

Crowning George V

From the start, the coronation of George V was conceptualised by both the King and his politicians as an event which would have a populist appeal on a domestic rather than an international stage. This perspective on the domestic significance of the coronation was crucial to the decision to stage also a formal investiture of the Prince of Wales in the same year.[14] It was a strategy which certainly fitted with the King's own perspective on what the coronation should be but quite as significantly, it chimed well with the political perspectives of the leading Liberal politicians at the time, keen to build up their credentials after the constitutional crisis precipitated by the House of Lords' rejection of the Liberal's 'People's Budget' of 1909. This acrimonious crisis was rumoured to have affected the health of Edward VII, possibly even contributing to his death. It had remained an issue which George V had to contend with upon his accession, triggering two general elections in 1910, neither of which broke the political deadlock in the country. Consequently, by the time of the coronation in 1911, the governing Liberal Party and the King were both keen to promote the profile of the coronation, and present it as a patriotic event, one which 'stirs that special love of country' for which the British were noted.[15] The event would help steady and unite the country after two years of political turmoil.

[12] Ibid.

[13] See Elizabeth Ezra (2000) *George Méliès* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p66.

[14] Domestic, here, includes the imperial dimension—it was to appeal to Britain and the 'Greater' British family of the Empire.

[15] 'The Investiture of the Prince of Wales', *The Times*, 12 June 1911.

Along with news of the details of the coronation, the British media also trumpeted the fact that there was to be a 'real Investiture' of the new Prince of Wales. Again there was a domestic and an imperial political dimension to this decision and the active political support given to it by the Liberals. It helped that by July 1911, *The Times* pointed out, Prince Edward would be 17, and so an adult capable of demonstrating his own commitment, both to his position as Prince of Wales and to the concept of the monarchy he would inherit. Consequently, the investiture process would become 'a very impressive reality', one that would appeal not just to Wales but to the whole Empire by demonstrating 'the meaning, the continuity of the British monarchy' to the peoples under George V's rule.[16]

The enthusiasm which greeted the news that there was to be an investiture as well as a coronation in 1911 was a good indicator of the popular British appetite for such royal occasions. The event was to be both extensive and lavish, a highlight of coronation year, but also part of a series of events showcasing the monarchy that would be staged from May to October across the country in 1911. The culmination of the coronation year would be the Delhi Durbar, to be held in India in December, and would—for the first time—be attended by the sovereign in person, all of which was trumpeted as being accessible to the peoples of the Empire thanks to increasing media technology. There was formal co-operation between the Palace and film-makers, leading to the filming of the coronation procession and of the investiture in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Delhi Durbar was also filmed. All of these were to be shown in cinemas in Britain and around the Empire.

The media rose to the occasion, and reported the events, from anticipation to retrospectives, lavishly. *The Times* gleefully announced in October 1910 that there were plans to celebrate the coronation with an exhibition at White City which was 'designed to show the power and resources of the empire'.[17] If it was to be 'magnificent', it was also to be 'popular', showcasing the 'typical features' of each of the various countries 'living under the British flag'.[18] Not only was it to repeat the Great Exhibition of 1851 in its magnificence, it was also to be even more inclusive, with the holding of sporting events involving participants from across the United Kingdom and the Empire, in the associated stadium at White City.[19]

[16] Ibid.

[17] 'A Coronation Exhibition', *The Times*, 3 October 1910.

[18] 'Preparations are Now on Foot for the Great Coronation Exhibition', *Illustrated London News*, 26 November 1910.

[19] 'The Coronation Exhibition', *The Times*, 14 November 1910.

It was all to amount to an 'Imperial "stock-taking" at the commencement of the new reign', which would lead to an 'increase in the goodwill amongst the various peoples and races of which the British Empire is composed', an expanded form of civic pride.[20] Within this extensive media reportage—national, imperial and local—which took care to include the vast numbers of people choosing to attend (and pay for) coronation-linked events, politicians and prominent dignitaries sought to ensure their names were associated prominently with these stirring occasions. Coronation events—from the nation-wide chain of coronation bonfires to the fête at Grimsby given to 23,000 children by Sir George Doughty MP to the nation-wide chain of coronation bonfires—gave ideal opportunities for enthusiastically patriotic politicians to demonstrate their efficiency and their dedication to the cause of the nation and the Empire's health and happiness.[21] Over half of the members of the Grand Council organising the Exhibition were 'members of both Houses of Parliament', for a start. The mutual support and involvement of the royal family in the enterprise was assured also by the involvement of the King's brother-in-law, the Duke of Teck, as Honorary President of the organising committee.[22]

Austerity Windsor Coronations

If the coronation of George V set the tone for the subsequent media-friendly coverage of planning and delivery of the coronations to follow, it also set the tone for the publicity surrounding the political involvement in such events. One thing that the 1911 coronation established was that, in the context of a mass electorate, it served politicians to be associated with the successful organisation of a well-publicised coronation event. Such things reinforced not only their own individual reputations but also those of their parties, both locally and nationally. Equally, however, politicians were eager to ensure that, in any media coverage, the tone of the public celebrations associated with a coronation was adjudged by the mass media

[20] 'The Coronation Exhibition at White City', Letter to the Editor, *Sunday Times*, 19 March 1911. It was also mentioned, of course, that it was good business too, both within the Empire and as a way of promoting Empire goods to a wider world.

[21] 'Fete', *Grimsby Daily Telegraph*, 23 June 1911; 'Coronation Bonfires', *The Times*, 23 June 1911. This was not confined to the UK, similar involvement in the arrangement of loyal events was a feature of Dominion coronation coverage.

[22] 'Personal', *Sunday Times*, 12 February 1911.

to be in tune with the popular mood of the day. What this meant for the coronation planning for Edward VIII and George VI was that it reflected a distinct sense amongst politicians and other leading figures of the day that 1937 was a time for economy, not extravagance. In the interests of both the monarchy itself and the reputations of politicians responsible for managing the budget for it, this had to be reflected in the coronation.

Thus, when a Coronation Committee to plan for Edward VIII's coronation was set up by the Privy Council, the chairing fell to Ramsay MacDonald (then still Lord President of the Council). Few would know better than this veteran Labour politician and former Prime Minister that if the worst of the Great Depression was now past, unemployment was still high and the extent and robustness of economic recovery was by no means obvious, especially in the old industrial heartlands of the nation. Fortunately the sense of austerity and restraint being voiced by the Committee chimed with the new King's personal views. Intent on cutting back on formal royal expenditure generally, Edward VIII was also reluctant to participate in any lavish coronation.[23] Consequently planning pressed ahead for a shortened and simplified event for 1937.[24] What is telling is the muted nature of press coverage of the plans from the start. It reflected an apparent popular feeling that, while the coronation was to be welcomed, there was no clamour for accompanying lavish events to mark the occasion, locally or nationally. There was a discernible sense that rather than feastings and parties, things which marked an investment in the nation's future were the most appropriate and needed. Thus amongst the most discussed plans was the one to plant native trees to commemorate the coronation, with a resultant appeal for sites.[25]

With an apparent political and popular agreement that the coronation planned from the last half of 1936 for Edward VIII was not to be marked by mass public events in London apart from a coronation procession, the basis for the plans was unoriginal. Essentially the plans were a reduced version of those made for 1911, economising both on expenditure and effort. Britain and its Empire were still to be showcased in 1937 to promote imperial recovery from the global depression, but in a serious and business-like way, rather

[23] Michael Bloch (2012) *The Reign and Abdication of Edward VIII* (London: Hachette).

[24] This included shortening the ceremony, including cutting back on the musical interludes. See Matthias Range (2012) *Music and Ceremonials at British Coronations: from James 1 to Elizabeth II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p16.

[25] See, for instance, 'Ceremonial Tree Planting', *The Times*, 1 October 1936.

than through a series of exhibitions and events linked to the coronation. Instead, there was to be an Imperial Conference that year between 14 May and 24 June, taking advantage of the presence in London for the coronation of Dominion politicians and other leading imperial figures. It is a measure of the reduction in scale of the planning that there was even a suggestion from the General Purposes Committee, in October 1936, that instead of municipal corporations using the occasion to promote publicly their own virtues and advantages through the means of individual loyal addresses to the King, there should instead be a single loyal address on behalf of them all.[26] Locally, regular events to mark Empire Day (24 May) were to be used also to mark the coronation. Both before and after Edward VIII's abdication, while souvenirs were to be made (demand for pottery products was anticipated as being between 4 and 5 million items across the Empire), the emphasis in the press coverage was on the fact that this would promote jobs in 60 or 70 firms.[27]

That the nation needed strategies which were calming and reassuring following the abdication of Edward VIII was well understood by the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. He was happy to be identified as the politician who had skilfully contained the crisis—as the 'man who saved the monarchy'.[28] Continuity was key here: if the individual had changed, the monarchy as institution had not—or that was the message which needed to be sent. Thus, the coronation plans for the new King substantially picked up on those already in place for his brother (easily done, as it had been the new George VI, rather than Edward VIII, who had actually been the regular attender of the planning committee).[29] If there was some change in the detail of the plans, there was none in their tone. More than his brother, George VI shared George V's appreciation of the importance of publicly viewed ritual and ceremonial. Hence, he accepted his mother's advice. The Queen Dowager, Mary, felt strongly that several of the traditional and visible accompaniments that had characterised his father's coronation but had been rejected by her elder son should be re-incorporated into the event. This included lengthening of the outside ceremonial element to include the return from the Abbey to the Palace and a state banquet. Most significant of all, perhaps, was the innovation that she proposed; that as Queen Dowager, she be present and

[26] 'Single Loyal Address', *The Times*, 25 October 1936.

[27] 'Coronation Pottery', *The Times*, 16 January 1937.

[28] See D. R. Thorpe (2011) *Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan* (London: Pimlico), p128.

[29] Bloch, *Edward VIII*.

part of the coronation procession to emphasise the continuity.[30] But this expansion in detail was still limited. Economy was still the order of the day, and a demonstrable need to be seen to be keeping expenditure under as much control as possible by all public figures involved.[31]

Embracing developing media technology provided opportunities to make George VI's coronation more striking, allowing it to reach a wider audience than ever before. As with the two previous coronations, the newspapers all planned lavish souvenir editions, many with colour photographs.[32] As expected by now, the coronation procession was recorded on film, but the coronation service itself was, innovatively, broadcast over the wireless. The BBC also used a mobile van to capture and transmitted clips of the coronation procession to a tiny number of UK television viewers—the world's first outside broadcast.[33] The BBC's focus, though, was the King's broadcast, on the evening of Coronation Day, to his people—preceded by a 40-minute programme 'The Empire's Homage' where the political leaders of the various dominions and colonies would be heard around the Empire.[34] As *The Times* commented, the 'splendid symbolism' of this 'elaborate ritual of personal and national dedication' gained a 'new significance' as a result of its broadcast to 'countless millions at home and abroad'.[35] For the first time as part of a coronation event, a King could 'speak heart-to-heart' to his people to invoke their loyalty.[36]

[30] Anne Edwards (2014) *Matriarch: Queen Mary and the House of Windsor* (Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield), Ch. 29.

[31] This dimension also needs to be taken into account in the one area where George VI abandoned an element in the coronation plans made by his brother, Edward VIII. The latter had announced a re-run of his father's Delhi Durbar, George VI did not carry through those plans, considering them untimely for a variety of reasons including the cost to India. See *Hansard*, Commons, 2 February 1937, cols. 8–9; 27 October 1937, col. 133.

[32] See, for instance, 'The King', *The Times*, 8 April 1937.

[33] See Thomas Hajkowski (2010) *The BBC and National Identity in Britain 1922–1953* (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Churchmen had real concerns that the service would be listened to in 'inappropriate places' (like pubs). Many churches bought or borrowed wirelesses for the occasion, to ensure congregations listened in reverence in appropriate locations. See 'Preparation in the Churches', *The Times*, 10 May 1937. The coronation procession was also recorded by Pathé News and screened in cinemas.

[34] 'The King to His People', *The Times*, 5 April 1937. Also see Jeffrey Richards (2001) *Imperialism and Music: Britain 1876–1953* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp111–16.

[35] 'King George Crowned at Westminster', *The Times*, 14 May 1937.

[36] 'Coronation Plans', *The Times*, 16 January 1937.

The Escape from Austerity

The accession of the young Elizabeth II to the throne had a popular appeal based in the hope that there would be dawning of a new 'Elizabethan age'. This would capture both the greatness of an earlier age but it also promised a move away from the austerity that had marked the years immediately following the Second World War.[37] Additionally, Elizabeth's accession at such a young age reminded the media of the parallels with the young Victoria. This was used as an opportunity for the media to reassure 'her' (but in reality, the wider nation) that the 'traditional observances' that had already begun to surround her were not 'lifeless forms'. They were ones that were intended to 'remind her of the wealth of devotion' that supported 'the historic idea that she now embodies', a process which would culminate in her coronation.[38] The Coronation Commission, whose titular chair was the Queen's husband, the Duke of Edinburgh, met first on 17 May 1952, to begin planning a coronation for June 1953 that would use all the available pomp and ceremony to celebrate not just a new reign but also the hopes of a new, post-war nation. If the Empire was diminishing (India already gone), the United Kingdom still remained to be celebrated, as were familial links with its imperial past through the newly-created Commonwealth and its nations, who were represented and commemorated at all stages of the coronation and its preparation.[39]

It was plain from the first formal proclamation of the coronation date that this was to be no austere event, even if any endorsement of things that could be considered as extravagance for its own sake was still to be avoided by sensible politicians.[40] As with the coronation of 1902 it was important in 1953 to use this coronation to declare to the world that the nation still possessed Great Power status.[41] But for politicians, the coronations of both 1937 and 1953 were much more complex and problematic to nego-

[37] Kenneth O. Morgan (2001) *Britain Since 1945: The People's Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p126.

[38] 'The New Reign', *The Times*, 9 February 1952.

[39] See Richards, *Imperialism and Music*, pp117–21.

[40] 'Her Majesty's Pleasure touching the Coronation', *The Times*, 8 June 1952; 'Queen's Coronation', *Daily Mail*, 8 June 1952.

[41] For more on this point, see David Cannadine (1979) 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the Invention of Tradition, c.1820–1977' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p146.

tiate than the coronation of 1911 had been. There were the feelings and expectations of a mass electorate to take account of in all three. However, when making arrangements for the presentation of a coronation and its portents for the future of the United Kingdom in the post-Second World War world, the politicians had to walk a delicate tightrope between providing what could be seen as a well-managed and efficiently delivered event that was an appropriate national showcase to the world and indulging in inappropriate expenditure that could alienate their electoral support. This was well-understood by the politician most involved with the coronation arrangements, Lord Woolton. He had been a successful Liverpool businessman before becoming involved with politics and was now a very successful and popular Conservative Party Chairman. He moved from the position of Lord President of the Council to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster during the coronation preparations, a move which required that he take more interest in the affairs of the new Queen.

Of course the precedent for the coronation service to be broadcast over the radio had been set at the coronation of her father, George VI.[42] This time, a carefully-shaped television broadcast of the service from inside Westminster Abbey was added, to accompany traditional filming of the procession to and from the Abbey, an innovation sparking considerable discussion and debate.[43] Initially, Woolton was concerned that 'torture of the excessive lighting' required for filming indoors would unduly strain the Queen personally. She told him that she, too, was worried because 'she thought it would be awful if a considerable number of people were lying fainting on the floor because of the heat.'[44] The Coronation Committee subsequently suggested that television cameras should not be allowed to film and broadcast the coronation event inside the Abbey. Churchill, however, saw the coronation as a significant opportunity to connect politically with an electorate which had returned the Conservatives to power by providing them with the majority of the seats in the House of Commons, but not the majority of votes. Accordingly, he sought to overrule the committee.[45] A perceptive politician

[42] Strong, *Coronation*, p. 434.

[43] 'Queen to Broadcast on Coronation Day', *The Times*, 9 August 1952.

[44] Woolton Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Woolton Diary, 11 March 1953.

[45] Jennifer Clark (2015) 'Queen for a Day: Gender, Representation, and Materiality in Elizabeth II's Televised Coronation', *Journal of e-Media Studies*, 4(1), p10, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bec9/81af8dcb5d16dff2711cabd2529c1e78d1b0.pdf, accessed 30 March 2016.

himself, on listening to Churchill's points Woolton came to realise that televising the coronation itself might also further his own political ends. He had been keen to break the BBC's broadcasting monopoly and, at that time, he was deeply involved in the preparation for the establishment of independent television. If the coronation could raise the profile of this new medium, then commercial television would have an assured audience. Indeed after the coronation the numbers of television sets purchased did go up, in time for the first broadcast of Independent Television in 1955.[46]

One further innovation aimed to make the coronation a more 'inclusive' event was the production of two full colour films, *A Queen is Crowned* and *Elizabeth is Queen*, which were shown in cinemas worldwide.[47] This was part of a wider move to use the coronation to change the mood of the country, and to reaffirm the continuity of certain core values at a time of considerable change, most noticeably in terms of the Empire. Sir Gerald Barry, who had been the Director General of the 1951 Festival of Britain celebrations, suggested that, though it was still an austere time, the opportunity should be taken to usher in change and that there should be 'as much fun and spectacle as possible'. A particular focus should be on young people and their enjoyment, and also on promoting a 'strong civic sense' which could celebrate the past of communities as a way of establishing a responsibility for the future.[48] Elaborate efforts were consequently made to ensure that the coronation would be remembered by the nation's youth, including the issuing to schoolchildren of a coronation souvenir book, which carefully explained the meanings of the rituals which were central to the coronation and their implications in terms of how monarchy had remained relevant to the British identity.[49]

The print media, especially titles such as *The Times*, then still traditionally the paper which most closely mirrored official government policy in its

[46] See TNA PRO/CAB129/50/C(52)99; D. R. Thorpe (1989) *Selwyn Lloyd* (London: Cape), pp116–137; Anthony Seldon (1981) *Churchill's Indian Summer: The Conservative Government, 1951–55* (London: Hodder and Stoughton), pp140–6; M. D. Kandiah (1995) 'Television enters British politics: the Conservative Party's Central Office and political broadcasting, 1945–55', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 15(2), 265–84.

[47] James Chapman (2015) 'Cinema, monarchy and the making of heritage' in Claire Monk and Amy Sergeant, eds *British Historical Cinema* (London: Routledge), pp82–7.

[48] 'Royal Festival Year', *Sunday Times*, 29 June 1952.

[49] See Hector Bolitho *et al* (1953) *The Coronation Book of Queen Elizabeth II* (London: Odhams Press); for details of other efforts to make the coronation memorable to the young see, for instance, Strong, *Coronation*, pxxxv.

perspective and editorials on events, assisted as a two-way channel of communication. It both transmitted the official line of thinking on these coronations and how they should be most appropriately planned and carried out, and the reactions of the public (through both letters and reports of the level and nature of public engagement with coronation events). It is likely that the next coronation will need to take even more careful account of both popular expectations and the party political realities for the government of the day, in the context of events that are shaping the anticipated future of the United Kingdom (including attitudes towards the Commonwealth) at the time. But it would be a mistake not to expect that there will not be significant input from the individual who next occupies the throne.

Coronations and the Concept of Service in the Coronation Service

As retrospective media comment on Elizabeth II's coronation underlined, a key aspect of the coronation of a monarch, encapsulated in the religious service and its rituals, was the dedication of the monarch to their task for the remainder of their lives.[50] This has been understood, within the context of constitutional monarchy, as being largely symbolic. But this is a very superficial perspective on the monarchy and on the power of individual monarchs to shape how their occupancy of the throne will be understood. In other words, even in the modern era, Windsor monarchs have not been merely cyphers. To think so ignores the enduring cultural power of monarchy as a modern as well as a traditional institution. What has kept it a significant political factor, and one that even republican-inclined prime ministers or opposition leaders have been unable to ignore, has been its substantial popularity as a symbol of the 'best' of the nation. So long as it has been managed by the monarch and key individual members of the royal family (including the heir) in ways that encourage the majority of the monarch's subjects to regard it as a positive national asset, so long monarchy remains an asset which is likely to endure.

Starting with George V, even before the dynastic change of name, the spirit in which the three crowned Windsor monarchs took up their task of occupying the throne has been communicated through the coronation

[50] 'The Queen Crowned at Westminster', *The Times*, 3 June 1953.

service. Shaping the way in which the coronation ritual was to be understood was the emphasis on a reconceptualisation of monarchy as being a job, carried out by 'The Firm'.[51] The job was a lifetime of service to the nation. This contrasts interestingly with the traditional coronation perspectives, where the emphasis was essentially on the offering of homage to the monarch, as in the coronation of Edward VII in 1902. That aspect had been particularly important and timely in that year, given both domestic unrest and the recent damage done to Britain's reputation by the Boer War. The attendance of colonial rulers and the emphasis on the presence of troops whose uniforms and physical experience underlined that they had been recruited from across the Empire were intended to present the nation and its Empire as one where the homage of its subjects, including the colonial ones, was given freely and willingly to the new King.[52]

However, as the emphasis on the popular dimension to George V's coronation underlines, by 1910, the balance of expectation had already begun to change, even before the official change to the name of the dynasty. The emphasis at Windsor coronations has become more upon the service offered to the nation *by* the monarch rather than homage and service offered *to* the monarch. Implicitly, the equation had become that homage given by subjects had to be earned. Homage, then, became something that was delivered because deserved. It was not automatic, generated by reverence for the intrinsic office but offered out of respect for the way in which the 'job' of being royal was done by individuals to warrant a continuity reverence for the institution they symbolised.

Reflecting on George V's coronation, the Bishop of Durham had commented that the 'glory' of the coronation had been the emphasis on service as its theme, where 'the present of a Bible to the King' was a 'key' element, emphasising that its theme of service and sacrifice was the most valuable part of the dedication of the new monarch.[53] George V's son, in his New Year message to the nation in 1937 shortly after his accession, picked up on the same emphasis as he looked forward to his reign. For him, the forthcoming coronation was to represent the 'investing of our King with his high office as a trust from God' and as a symbol of the

[51] 'The Firm' is the informal name by which the royal family refers to itself.

[52] 'King Edward', *The Times*, 7 May 1910.

[53] Handley Moule (1924) *Letters and Poems of Bishop Moule: Selections from the Spiritual Letters and Poems of Handley Carr Glyn Moule, Bishop of Durham (1901–1920)* (London: Marshall Brothers).

re-dedication of the nation as a whole to God's service.[54] This continuity of emphasis might have been something simply created by the context in which George VI had come to the throne, after the abdication of his brother who had refused the sacrifice required of him in the service of his people. As part of reaffirming the position of monarchy, George VI certainly needed to emphasise his sense of personal dedication to the task in front of him: that unlike his brother, he would not 'let the side down'. In this message, he was certainly aided by his Archbishop of Canterbury. Back in 1911, Lang had been invited personally by George V to deliver a sermon at the coronation. Lang had then insisted that 'The King is set to be the leader of his people in the service of God and man … He is the servant of the people. To be among them as he that serves … this is indeed a Kingly life.'[55] Like his father, George VI valued and listened to Lang. The latter's interpretation of a King being a public servant supported in that service to the nation by the help of God was one which chimed with the new King's understanding of the monarchical role.[56]

Equally, reflecting on Elizabeth II's coronation, John Hall, Dean of Westminster, commented that it represented 'a setting apart for service after the pattern of Jesus Christ'.[57] This emphasis on the self-sacrificing dimension to the service required of an effective modern monarch has certainly underpinned the attitude of the present Queen to her role. The book published by the Bible Society to mark her ninetieth birthday also underlines her belief that she is a public servant.[58] Tellingly, most popular criticism of monarchs and individual members of the royal family in the last century (certainly that voiced through the mass media) has also been couched in terms of a popular expectation of high levels of service; with consequent disappointment and disapproval when these are estimated not to have been met. Most recently, in 2016, there has again been criticism of William, Duke of Cambridge and heir apparent after his father, for failing to undertake a sufficiently high level of public engagements and so being 'lazy' in his role as public servant.[59]

[54] 'Confidence and Hope', *The Times*, 2 January 1937.

[55] *The Times*, 23 June 1911.

[56] In this, he was very different to his brother, Edward VIII. See Chapter 7.

[57] John Hall (2012) *Elizabeth II and Her Church: Royal Services at Westminster Abbey* (London: A and C Black), p2.

[58] *The Servant Queen and the King She Serves* (London: Bible Society, 2016).

[59] 'Prince William blasted for laziness', *Daily Express*, 24 April 2015; 'Revealed: Part-timer William', *Daily Mail*, 22 February 2016.

Investitures: An Affirmation of Continuity

As this indicates, the emphasis on being seen to be 'hard-working' in their service to the nation applies not solely to the monarchy but also to the wider royal family (certainly those in receipt of a 'salary' in the shape of income from the Sovereign Support Grant, the successor to the Civil List). The expectation unsurprisingly falls particularly heavily on those in direct line of succession. A new monarch on the British throne has meant also the elevation to second in line of an heir apparent (or in the case of a lack of a direct male succession, heir presumptive).[60] When male, the option has regularly been taken to invest the next-in-line with the title of Prince of Wales. However, any investiture following the awarding of the title had been a formality rather than a public occasion for centuries. The announcement of its award and any subsequent investiture was held away from any public gaze apart from that of the royal court.[61] As late as 1901, it was something that still received relatively minimal press coverage with no expectation of any extraordinary ceremonial occasion to mark either award or investiture.[62] There was a passing mention that in Caernarfon, the mayor hoped for some 'official festivities' to be held locally to mark the awarding of the title, but there seems to have been no expectation that this would involve the presence of the new holder of the title.[63]

By the accession of George V, there was a different mood, both amongst the King's ministers and in Wales itself. In July 1910, it was reported that there was a widespread popular feeling in Wales that, should the new King award his eldest son the usual title of Prince of Wales, this should be marked by public ceremonial. Also, that that ceremonial should take place in Wales, not England. There seems to have been a general agreement from leading Welsh figures of the popular need for there to be a proper

[60] Up to the recent changes in the rules of succession in 2013, which would have permitted gender-neutral succession to the throne on an age hierarchy only, where a female was next in line she remained (as did the present Queen) heir presumptive rather than heir apparent, in that were a male heir to have been born, she would have been superseded.

[61] John S Ellis (2008) *Investiture: Royal Ceremony and National Identity in Wales, 1911–1969* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press), p15.

[62] George V himself had been awarded the title ten months after his father's accession, with minimum fuss and public ceremony, see 'Court Circular. Prince of Wales: The Title Conferred', *The Times*, 9 November 1901. The Welsh spelling, Caernarfon, has been preferred except in quotations and titles.

[63] 'Prince of Wales', *Carnarvon and Denbigh Herald*, 16 November 1901.

marking of the creation of a new Prince of Wales. The media showcased this with its discussions of the feeling that there had to be more than the issuing of a ceremonial set of 'figures of speech', as used in previous occasions, as when Princes of Wales like the month-old infant who was to become Edward VII had apparently been invested by 'girding him with a sword, by putting a coronet on his head and a gold ring on his finger, and by delivering a gold rod into his hand'.[64]

The tone of subsequent reportage indicates the widespread confidence that the King would consent, given that the key question in the media concerned where the investiture would take place. On 8 September, it was formally announced that the investiture would take place at Caernarfon, in July 1911. While there was plainly a contingent political motive behind the choice in 1911, the official justification of the choice of Caernarfon over Cardiff, encapsulated in the Court Circular announcement, was that, since the investiture was designed as 'a tribute to Welsh sentiment', then Caernarfon had 'peculiar claims' over any other location.[65] Further official coverage identified Caernarfon as the obvious choice because the Castle there was Crown property on the one hand, and was also the 'least ruinous' of the feudal castles in public hands. On the other, its scenic landscape endowed it with a natural magnificence that was suitable for such a royal occasion.[66]

The formal announcement of the occasion in *The Times* carried overtones of the old appeal to fealty and doing homage which were less visible in the various media statements about the coronation itself, but were clearly intended for consumption in Wales at a time when Welsh national feeling was a matter of concern for the government, given the problems that the Irish nationalists were causing. Its peroration concluded with the hope that the 'revival of an ancient rite' would 'bring all Welshmen to feel the greatness and the Imperial significance of what some of their leaders disparagingly call the "English connexion"'.[67]

This emphasis on providing a practical demonstration of the importance of the connection between Wales and the wider kingdom was further underlined by tracing the evolution of the details of the ceremonial for the event. Initially, the task of investing the Prince with his title was rumoured

[64] Ibid.
[65] 'Court Circular: The Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 10 September 1910.
[66] 'The Investiture of the Prince of Wales', *The Times*, 9 September 1910.
[67] Ibid.

as having been deputed to the Queen. This left the King's actual presence in Wales for the event open to doubt, and this suggestion of a delegation of the ceremonial task by the King did not go down well in Wales itself.[68] Consequently, though the Queen continued to be mentioned in connection with the investiture, when details began to be formally announced in the spring of 1911, it was made plain publicly that the task of organising the ceremonial for the investiture was now being handled directly by the Lord Chamberlain, and that the King, while accompanied by the Queen, would be performing the actual ritual task himself.[69]

Once again, it is plain that the King was working with his ministers when agreeing to the investiture and its details. It was under its Political Notes heading, rather than Court-related columns, that *The Times* first revealed that an 'influential committee' had been set up to petition the King to consent to a 'ceremonial investiture' of the Prince of Wales. Lloyd George was identified as one member, along with the Bishop of St Asaph, plus Lords Tredegar, Cawdor and Plymouth (not the Liberal politician's usual allies and surprising ones given the scorn he had poured over the members of the peerage during the constitutional crisis only a few months before). What they all shared was an interest in using Welsh national feeling for their own interests, while ostensibly working to put together this 'petition from the people of Wales'.[70] A level of political investment by the British government in those parts of Wales identified as most susceptible to nationalism had been going on for some time. Lloyd George, as a long-serving Chancellor of the Exchequer, also felt it important to be a good constituency MP.[71] It has been observed that, 'The investiture was part of the Liberal attempt to reconstruct the nature of British national identity' in a time of political flux.[72] The £7000 restoration of Caernarfon Castle, commenced under the supervision of the Office of Works in 1905, was one instance of this targeted investment (Lloyd George was also Constable of the Castle).[73] Certainly several of the newspapers of the day commented

[68] 'Personal Politics and National Sentiment', *Penny Illustrated Paper*, 17 September 1910.

[69] See John S. Ellis (1998) 'Reconciling the Celt: British National Identity, Empire, and the 1911 Investiture of the Prince of Wales', *Journal of British Studies*, 37(4), 391–418, see especially p392; John S. Ellis (1996)'The Prince and the Dragon', *Welsh History Review*, 18(2), 272–94.

[70] 'Political Notes', *The Times*, 29 July 1910.

[71] Roy Hattersley (2010) *David Lloyd George: the Great Outsider* (London: Hachette).

[72] Ellis, 'Reconciling the Celt', p4. See also Ellis, *Investiture*, p15.

[73] 'Court Circular: The Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 10 September 1910.

upon the choice as amounting to the 'last word in personal influence that has astonished the Welsh people and the English nation since the accession of Mr Lloyd George to the Great Seal'.[74] But there was a clear appeal made by him, and other leading figures in Wales, to the whole principality: Lloyd George insisted the Committee wanted 'democracy' and the involvement of 'all classes', because otherwise it could not be a 'national festival'.[75]

Interestingly, unlike the coronation, where the cost was to be covered by the public purse, the investiture would, it was announced in March 1911, be paid for substantially out of a national appeal for funds to 'defray the cost of the ceremony' and to cover the cost of the Insignia 'which will be a present to the Prince of Wales from the people of Wales'.[76] It was estimated that a total of £5000 would be needed to ensure that the promise of 'national recognition' made by Edward I could be 'redeemed by George V'.[77] The Committee made the appeal 'in the full assurance' that a 'generous response' from the Principality would be forthcoming to mark 'the nation's appreciation of the honour done to it' (especially as Lloyd George had already donated £50, and the Marquess of Bute, a significant Welsh as well as Scottish grandee, 150 guineas [£157 10s]).[78] That appeal was sufficiently successful to enable an elaborate programme, including the construction of an investiture platform within the castle and the preparation of a 'high oak platform' at Queen Eleanor's Gateway, so that the new Prince could 'present himself to the view of his Welsh subjects'.[79] The media concluded, after the event, that it was an innovation that showed how traditional institutions could be refreshed and made popular.[80]

Elizabeth II continued the innovation, when she announced in 1958 that she had created her son and heir, Charles, as Prince of Wales with immediate effect, adding that 'when he is grown up, I will present him to you at

[74] 'Personal Politics and National Sentiment', *Penny Illustrated Paper*, 17 September 1910.

[75] 'The Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 14 April 1911.

[76] Court Circular: The Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 11 September 1910. After his abdication, the Duke of Windsor carried his insignia with him into exile. Only after his death did they return to the possession of the royal family.

[77] 'The Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 8 April 1911.

[78] Ibid.

[79] As a further gesture, he would also be tutored (by Lloyd George) to give a speech in Welsh. 'The Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 3 April 1911; 'Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 6 April 1911.

[80] 'The Investiture of the Prince of Wales', *The Times*, 14 July 1911. See also 'Investiture of the Prince', *Daily Mail*, 14 July 1911.

Caernarvon'; a message reported as being received at the time with 'great joy' in Wales.[81] The investiture was finally fixed for 1 July 1969, by which time Charles would have been able to signal his investment in Wales after studying Welsh history and language at the University of Wales' College at Aberystwyth.[82] This time, the investiture plans were not well-received by increasingly militant hard-core Welsh nationalists, and there were real concerns for the physical safety of the Prince. In a sign of the ongoing international belief in the importance of the British monarchy, the Soviet KGB began plotting what they called 'Operation Edding', hoping to foment nationalist discontent in the Principality. A bridge near Caernarfon would be blown up and a story would be planted (with the recently-elected Plaid Cymru MP, Gwynfor Evans) that this had been done by 'British organs of power' to discredit those in Wales who wanted emancipation from Westminster. It was, however, abandoned because of fears of discovery.[83]

The reality that most people in the Principality were apparently not hostile to the planned event, both at the time and subsequently, does not obscure the accompanying debate over why a national Labour government, headed by Harold Wilson, should have endorsed the idea of an investiture. This is a key question, especially as this time (unlike the event in 1911) the event was to be funded by the public purse, at an anticipated cost of £500,000 (later scaled back).[84] There was no constitutional necessity for formal investiture, and the event was publicised as occurring when it did simply because Prince Charles would come of age in November 1969. What Wilson could have been sure of was that the lack of an imminent jubilee or other royal anniversary would focus critical attention on the ceremony. Was it a 'farce' and an excuse for wasting tax-payers money on 'needless pageantry? Or instead a shrewd move which could promote tourism in Wales, with all the benefits for the local economy, while confirming the importance of Wales within the United Kingdom?[85] It has

[81] 'Prince Charles Created Prince of Wales'; 'Joy in Wales', *The Times*, 28 July 1958.

[82] 'Investiture of Prince Fixed', *The Times*, 14 November 1967.

[83] Susan Kennedy *et al* (2015) *Queen Elizabeth II and the Royal Family* (London: Penguin Random House), p171; see also Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin (2015) *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Penguin), p491.

[84] 'Prince's £41,000 Investiture', *The Times*, 28 March 1968, announcing the preliminary investment included in Government Estimates, which included £24,000 to the Welsh Tourist Board for its preparations, identified as an indication that 'the Government hopes to make the ceremony a big tourist attraction'.

[85] Compare, for instance, 'Royal Opportunity', *The Times*, 1 March 1969; 'Investiture a "farce",' *The Times*, 25 March 1969. For a detailed analysis on the politics of the investiture, see Ellis, 'Reconciling the Celt'; Ellis, *Investiture*.

been convincingly argued that Labour's keenness to promote the investiture was underpinned by the challenge of growing Welsh nationalism to the party's electoral support in the Principality. Labour leaders like George Thomas, the Secretary of State for Wales, hoped that promotion of the dual identity of Wales—as being both a distinct nationality while being part of the United Kingdom—might be able to shore up electoral support for Labour.[86]

A ceremony of 'formidable pomp' was being evolved for the investiture, starting with a radio interview for the Prince on 1 March, to mark St David's Day and the beginnings of the series of events that were to include his term at Aberystwyth, six hours of television coverage of the ceremony by the BBC, and culminate in his post-investiture progress in Wales itself.[87] But for all the traditional ceremonial supported by the politicians, the Prince (and the Queen) were both also very determined that the event should have a modern dimension to it, including being seen to be cost-conscious.[88] As the Prince said in one interview, 'enough money' should be spent, to make it 'dignified, colourful and worthy of Britain', but also to show that the modern monarchy was more '"with it" than of old'.[89] It was envisaged by Lord Snowdon, the Queen's brother-in-law, as an occasion not just for those there in person but also for millions of television viewers.[90] Even the coronet was trumpeted as being produced by modern methods combined with traditional craftsmanship, and with

[86] See Howard Hodgson (2007) *Charles—The Man Who Will Be King* (London: John Blake), Ch. 2; Paul Ward (2002) 'All that is solid melts into air? Britishness in the twentieth century' in E. S. Smith ed *Aspects of Culture*, (Coruña: University of A Coruña), http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/7714/, accessed 30 March 2016.

[87] 'Formidable Pomp for the Prince's Investiture', *The Times*, 14 February 1969; see also, for the television coverage, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cn7-MsaDq_s, accessed 2 January 2016.

[88] The very chairs designed by Snowdon on which the notables sat were sold off afterwards, to help recoup the cost to the taxpayer—but also to give people a 'stake' in the event. They still regularly turn up in auction sales and on eBay. For the return of one to Wales, see http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/prince-wales-historic-investiture-chair-7005124, accessed 30 March 2016. This was not an entire innovation. From Edward VII's coronation in 1902, guests had been encouraged to purchase the chairs on which they sat as souvenirs, but this was more overtly to keep costs down. See http://www.lukehoney.co.uk/blogs/inspiration/79955524-game-of-thrones-british-coronation-furniture, accessed 20 August 2016.

[89] 'You've got to be with it to be a monarch today', *The Times*, 6 June 1969.

[90] See Interview with Lord Snowdon, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cn7-MsaDq_s, accessed 2 January 2016.

'economy' always in mind to keep its cost down.[91] Snowdon later recalled that when the Queen placed the coronet on the Prince's head, she had to 'stifle a giggle' because she thought that 'it extinguished Prince Charles like a candlesnuffer.'[92]

Despite this brief, unobserved moment, from the perspective of the monarch and her heir the concept of service was central to the events of 1969. It was clearly felt to be important to show that the Prince was receiving appropriate 'job training' for being the next monarch. In one interview, he said he felt he had been 'trained' to be heir apparent, and had 'this feeling of duty' as a result; and that the motto '*Ich Dien*' was very important to his thinking.[93] This probably helps to explain the absence of the Duke of Windsor from the ceremony, though as a former Prince of Wales, he had offered to attend. He would have served as a potential reminder that investiture and promises did not necessarily transmit into the lifetime of service and self-sacrificing dedication to royal duty that the Queen and the newly-invested Prince wished to signal in association with the occasion.

Conclusion

Reflecting on the birthday celebrations of the Queen Mother as she turned 100, William Rees Mogg commented that 'historical compromise' was at the heart of the survival of the modern monarchy.[94] This chapter has sought to explore the messages sent by the phenomenon of the coronation and its modifications under the guidance of the Windsor monarchs, allied to those sent by the new 'habit' of formally investing the heir apparent as Prince of Wales in Wales itself. However, this in

[91] 'A "sputnik" coronet for the Prince', *The Times*, 25 June 1969. Also see Deborah Fisher (2010) *Royal Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press), pp107–8.

[92] Lord Snowdon's comments made to Robert Lacy. See Robert Lacey (2003) 'Made for the Media: The Twentieth Century Investitures of the Princes of Wales', *The Court Historian*, 8(3), p38.

[93] See 'You've got to be with it to be a monarch today', *The Times*, 6 June 1969; also Interview with the Prince of Wales, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cn7-MsaDq_s, accessed 2 January 2016.

[94] 'Survival: the First Law of the Windsors', *The Times*, 24 July 2000.

itself is insufficient to explain the survival of the Windsor dynasty and the British monarchy. The emphasis evolved by George V on service to the nation, to the people of the nation and by extension to the Empire (later, the Commonwealth), has enabled a very flexible presentation of the place of the monarch within the constitution and the daily political life of the country and the constituent parts of its former Empire. It has been a consistent message, but importantly, it is also one which has been supported by most members of the political classes. This has been essentially because both in the short term (the coronations themselves) and in the longer term (the emphasis on continuity and consistency affirmed by them) they have served the individual and party purposes of such politicians.

This in turn has given opportunities to different occupants of the throne to play a part in adapting and redefining key aspects of coronations and their messages to fit with their understanding of the times. The current incumbent, Elizabeth II, has certainly shown real skill in redefining that concept of service within her own reign, while maintaining an essential air of continuity and consistency in her attitude towards her role as monarch. Coronations have therefore been used by both monarchs and politicians to establish the basis of service, and also to make the monarch of the day seem relevant to the necessities and agendas of that day. Currently, and largely behind the scenes, with the Queen having achieved her ninetieth birthday in 2016, tentative thinking is going on in a muted key in terms of planning for the next coronation. It will continue to be an interesting challenge for those involved in such thinking to judge how to reflect the understanding, provided by both politicians and new monarch, of what is required to promote the ability of the next monarch to remain relevant and useful.

Part of this will undoubtedly involve consideration of the impact of a new dimension to the media presentation of the event, in the shape of a substantially uncensored and largely unmanageable input to the public messages that will be sent by the social media of the day. Could the majesty of the event be damaged by the temptation to take, and disseminate, potentially embarrassing or informal incidents in such public ceremonials? This is clearly a new dimension of which the Windsors, and politicians, will have to take account when planning major ceremonial celebrations like coronations and investitures. Consequently, any future

scholarship on this aspect of monarchy will also have to include that dimension in order for the public phenomenon of coronations, and their long-term impact, to be understood.

Additionally, it is important to remember that, over the course of the twentieth century 'through royal celebrations, the British nation … [has been] imagined and unified'.[95] This point was made by the historian of Wales, John Ellis, but it is also echoing the work of Hobsbawm, Cannadine and others (including, most recently, Glencross) who have examined the place of traditions—genuinely long-standing or recently invented—in Britain. Coronations and investitures have always to be seen in their contemporary context, especially taking account of the complexities and nuances of the society, politics and culture of their time. By their very nature, these were political events, and so the political actions and motives of the various actors therein must be acknowledged and understood.

What is apparent is that despite the growing importance of elected politicians as public figures in relation to the national self-presentation, the ceremonies headlining the monarchy as aspects of the national identity have not been seen by the majority of politicians and people as constituting empty gestures. As media observation also underlines, they have consistently been believed by both the country's political elites and the individual monarchs to have been invaluable in binding together the nation.[96] If each has had different reasons and motivations, they have both been keen to cooperate with the other in the visible staging and public promotion of these events.[97] That is likely to continue.

[95] Ellis, 'Reconciling the Celt', p392. See also Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds (1983) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) especially Cannadine's contribution; Colley, *Britons*; Matthew Glencross (2015) *The State Visits of Edward VII: Reinventing Royal Diplomacy for the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

[96] Possibly with one exception in the shape of Edward VIII, who abdicated prior to his coronation of course.

[97] See Philip Williamson (2007) 'The Monarchy and Public Values, 1900–1953', in Andrzej Olechnowicz ed *The Monarchy and the British Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 223–57, p235.

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CHAPTER 4

The Windsors and Ceremonial Events: State Occasions for the National Family

Judith Rowbotham

Introduction

State occasions are events which are, or become, well-entrenched in public expectation as relating to incidents or individuals which reflect the public profile of a state's public identity. As such, they have been used by a ruling dynasty to mark out their importance to the well-being and stability of a state. The increase in opportunities of reportage that have characterised the modern nation-state has encouraged a proliferation of such occasions across the lifetime of a monarch. Coronations and more recently, the supporting events of investitures and jubilees, where ceremonial and ritual provide the most obvious state occasions used to remind the public of the role of the royal family in the life of the nation. Yet other state occasions have also played a significant affirming role, emphasising the links between a ruling royal dynasty and the wider state. The emphasis, in terms of their management, has required a modernisation of some aspects while preserving an appearance of some kind of traditional ceremonial as the justification for such events.

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Few have been as skilful at managing state occasions in the twentieth century as the Windsors, and yet their management of such occasions has not always worked positively for them, as the royal, or state, funerals underline. They provide the obvious contrast to (indeed, the usual preliminary to) coronations, but do so in ways that provide an opportunity to reflect on the successes or failures of other state occasions such as the ruling dynasty. The opportunities provided by marriages and christenings should not be ignored in terms of the role they play in confirming the success of the royal family in keeping themselves at the heart of the nation's values and self-identity.

The *Longue Durée* of State Funerals

The theory surrounding late medieval and early modern funerals related to a reality that often, succession to a throne could be challenged. Any funeral is an occasion used to reaffirm a breach in the fabric of a family and the contextualising community: but the 'family' of a monarch has long been regarded as comprising much more than the immediate royal family—it is the 'family' of subjects that feels a loss, in theory. Thus, the damage to the life of the nation as the community affected by the death of a monarch had to be reaffirmed by a royal funeral that related to the wider issues raised by this loss. The funeral was there to mark the smooth succession of the rightful heir to the dignities and power of the deceased sovereign, informing the nation that political stability was assured by this transition. The work of many early modern historians has been based in an assumption that the public spectacle of the ceremonials and rituals surrounding royal funerals was part of the structure of power that was underpinned and assured by such public performances.[1]

However, in British history, the evolution of a constitutional monarchy, and the eradication of any doubt over succession to the throne by the start of the nineteenth century meant that for Britons, a royal funeral no longer had quite the resonance of reassurance that had once been so central to such events. The lack of personal popularity of the first two Hanoverian monarchs, George I and George II, meant that there was little concern that the former died (suddenly) in Hanover and was buried there, with no major ceremonial

[1] See, for instance, Edward Muir (2005) *Ritual in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Elizabeth Tingle and Jonathan Willis, eds (2015) *Dying, Death, Burial and Commemoration in Reformation Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

to mark the event in Britain. George II was buried in Westminster Abbey, at night and with due torch-lit magnificence but without much in the way of public ceremonial.[2] However, as one nineteenth-century historical retrospective by J. R. Miller noted, the emphasis in 1760 was on the public joy demonstrated over the accession of his grandson, George III. According to Miller, 'all manner of men vied' to show their approval that the throne was now filled by a man 'born and bred amongst them' and who was properly acquainted with their 'language and manners'.[3]

On his death in 1820, George III had lain in state at Windsor. While numbers of spectators were admitted to the spectacle before his interment in St George's Chapel there, it was again an evening event. The service was substantially attended by members of the court and political elite, and crowds did reportedly line the streets to witness the funeral procession as these dignitaries plus representative bands of soldier made their way to the Castle.[4] But this was before the days of mass media, and so it was not a national event in any real sense, unlike the subsequent coronation of his son, George IV. According to Taylor, London did mark the occasion by regular tolling of bells and the holding of special services in the capital's various churches, which were substantially attended. But there was no note of any organisation by the royal court of this form of public tribute, and an implicit suggestion that when and where it happened, it had more to do with the spontaneous initiatives of local clergymen and dignitaries.[5] A decade later, the funeral of George IV and seven years after that, the funeral of William IV, were equally conducted with pomp and ceremony but, as the night timings of these events again underlined, they were semi-private state occasions. There was no real emphasis on the public meaning of these occasions. However, despite their magnificence and a degree of public interest (mainly in and around London), along with the tokens of court and ecclesiastical mourning, they were not events that were part of the national calendar and did not prompt a spirit of national grief.

[2] Horace Walpole had a 'curiosity' to see the event, and so attended it, commenting on the lavish ceremonial accompanying the event. See *The Yale Edition of the Correspondence of Horace Walpole*, ed W.S. Lewis, http://www.library.yale.edu/walpole/collections/digital_collection_corr.html, accessed 1 October 2015.

[3] J. R. Miller (1836) *A History of Great Britain from the Death of George II to the Coronation of George IV* (Philadelphia: McCarty and Davis), p12.

[4] Joseph Taylor (1820) *Relics of Royalty* (London: William Newman and Co), pp179–84.

[5] Ibid., pp194–7.

Changing the Remit: State Funerals for Commoners

A signal of the change to come in terms of how royal funerals were to be marked in the twentieth century came with the death of Queen Victoria. By then, British understanding of state funerals had shifted—they were, for a start, no longer solely reserved for the deaths of sovereigns. State-funded funerals of notable individuals had been a feature of the British experience from the seventeenth century on: Admiral Robert Blake had been the first to receive a state funeral during the Interregnum. He was, in this way, recognised by Cromwell and his Council of State for his achievements at sea (generally recognised as establishing the basis for British naval supremacy in the coming centuries) by being given a public or state funeral and interred in Westminster Abbey. Though Charles II later had his body exhumed and dumped in St Margaret's churchyard nearby, it had created a precedent.

Essentially, it became possible after that to envisage a state funeral being ordered for any prominent commoner who had provided an extraordinary service to the state, to mark appreciation for that service and (to an extent at least) to encourage similar zeal in others. Thus in 1778 on the death of William Pitt the Elder, the 'Great Commoner'—though he was by then Earl of Chatham—the House of Commons ordered a state funeral for this veteran politician and stalwart of the political system. After lying in state for two days in the Painted Chamber in the Palace of Westminster (the room where reportedly Edward the Confessor had died) he was interred in Westminster Abbey. Tellingly, it was clearly conceived of as a public event that would attract spectators to witness the event. The timing for the funeral saw it starting at 2 pm in the afternoon, instead of being a night-time ceremony as had become usual for royal state funerals. Pitt the Elder's obsequies amounted to a full ceremonial funeral accomplished with much of the public pomp and ritual that still marked the ceremonial surrounding royal funerals of the day, but with the addition of public demonstrations of popular grief. The daylight funeral procession included prominent political figures including the Marquis of Rockingham and three (non-royal) dukes—though several members of the House of Lords refused to attend.[6] The only royal presence, however,

[6] John Almon (1810) *Anecdotes of the Life of the Right Hon William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, 3 vols (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme) III, pp324–8.

was provided by George III's out-of-favour younger brother, the Duke of Gloucester and Edinburgh along with his wife, formerly the Dowager Countess Waldegrave.[7]

Pitt the Younger was another popular politician and war leader awarded a state funeral on his death in 1806. Like his father, he had lain in state in the Painted Chamber, where it was viewed by 'great crowds', before his body was taken in solemn funeral procession to Westminster Abbey for a lavish ceremonial service, attended by three royal dukes as well as most prominent members of both houses, led by his brother, the Earl of Chatham as Chief Mourner.[8] But these men were politicians, and related to powerful aristocratic families. The state funeral awarded to the great naval hero Admiral Lord Nelson opened up a new dimension to public memorialisation of those who had rendered extraordinary service to the state. That event was on an unprecedentedly lavish and grandiose scale; something thought appropriate as a response to intense public grief. This was understood by contemporaries as amounting to a public demand that the death of nation's hero be properly commemorated, even at great cost to the public purse.

After being returned to Britain, his plain wooden coffin was placed within an elaborately-decorated outer casket, and then lay in state for three days in the Painted Hall at Greenwich. His coffin was then transferred upriver to Westminster as part of a large flotilla, in one of the royal barges made for Charles II, lying in state for a further night in the Admiralty. Subsequently, an enormously long funeral procession set out for St Pauls, through streets packed with spectators, taking so long to get there that it was beginning to get dark when the coffin itself arrived. If the service itself was not as elaborate as some, it was still graced by the presence of the Prince of Wales and his brothers, the Dukes of York and Cambridge, further underlining the state dimension to that event.[9]

This huge public spectacle undoubtedly set the model used for the even more extraordinary state funeral arranged for the Duke of Wellington in 1852, also interred in St Pauls, next to Nelson. This time, for the first

[7] Ibid., p328. The Duke's marriage had taken place in secret, in 1766, and his choice of a commoner who was also the illegitimate daughter of Sir Robert Walpole had been one of the reasons for the later Royal Marriages Act 1772.

[8] 'Public Funeral of the Late Rt Hon. William Pitt', *Gentleman's Magazine*, March 1806.

[9] John Fairburn (1806) *Fairburn's Edition of the Funeral of Admiral Lord Nelson* (London: John Fairburn). Later that year, Charles Fox was also awarded a state funeral, if not so lavish as that awarded to either Pitt or Nelson.

time, the British royal family took a lead in organising the event. While the substantial expressions of national grief and Wellington's symbolic importance as national hero and great statesman were held to warrant a state funeral, the direct involvement of the Crown was unprecedented.[10] However Victoria and Albert wanted personally to underline the extent to which Wellington had become the ultimate servant of the Crown, and to reward him properly in a way that both showcased the national virtues he epitomised and the royal appreciation of these.[11] It was, therefore, deliberately conceived of as an event of great symbolic pageantry, intended to sum up in this symbol of British heroics, who had been the nation's political leader after his glorious military victories, the greatest virtues and a royal appreciation of these. At Victoria's command, the British Army was instructed to observe a period of mourning as long as that usually associated with the death of a royal.[12] With his experience of organising the Great Exhibition behind him, Prince Albert spent two months planning what was an even more extraordinary public spectacle than Nelson's funeral had been. With the details finally in place, Wellington's coffin first lay open to public viewing at Walmer Castle, before being transferred to the Royal Hospital at Chelsea. There it lay in state for two days in the Great Hall (visited by an estimated 260,000 with a lead being taken by Victoria and Albert) before a transfer overnight to Horse Guards.[13] On the morning of 18 November, the elaborate procession set out along a two-mile route for St Pauls, meandering past Buckingham Palace en route and down streets packed with thousands of spectators, displaying—in an orderly fashion—their grief.[14] The magnificently gaudy funeral car cost £11,000 and cost to the Crown of the whole event was £80,000.[15]

[10] It is plain in the early comments that it was expected this would be organised by prominent political figures, especially those in the Lords. See 'Duke of Wellington', *The Times*, 21 September 1852.

[11] 'Funeral of the Duke of Wellington', *The Times*, 23 October 1852.

[12] John Wolffe (2000) *Great Deaths: Grieving, Religion, and Nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[13] Ibid.

[14] The event was widely covered in the press, see for instance'The Funeral of the Duke of Wellington', *The Times*, 19 November 1852; 'London', *The Times*, 19 November 1852.

[15] Wolffe, *Great Deaths*; David Cannadine (1981) 'War and Death, Grief and Mourning in Modern Britain' in Joachim Whaley, ed *Mirrors of Mortality: Studies in the Social History of Death* (London: Europa) 187–242.

The Funerals of Victoria and Edward

The funeral of the Prince Consort in 1862 was an elaborate one, accomplished in the context of national mourning, but the event itself was private.[16] There was no lying in state, and the funeral took place in St George's Chapel at Windsor before his final interment at Frogmore, though throughout the land there were, spontaneously, services held to mark the occasion and sympathy with their bereaved monarch.[17] By the time that Victoria herself was dying, however, the reality was that even when not state occasions, royal funerals were again acquiring a substantial public dimension. The private funeral in 1884 in St George's Chapel, Windsor, of her son Prince Leopold, the Duke of Albany, had been widely and sympathetically reported (and the University Boat Race was postponed).[18] Eight years later, though, the funeral of the Duke of Clarence, Victoria's heir presumptive, in 1892 became a major national event.[19] The intention of the royal family had been to continue its habit of private funerals at Windsor. So no public lying in state was arranged and even though he would pass through London on his journey from Sandringham (where he had died) to Windsor, no funeral procession was arranged. But it was agreed, under public pressure, that Prince Eddy would have a military funeral. Thus something of a mix of an event was evolved: one not strictly a state funeral, but not entirely a private funeral either. The press including *The Times* insisted on describing it as a state occasion however.[20] The point made by the media was that the 'family' of the nation mourned with the Queen and Prince of Wales, and also felt personally bereaved by

[16] 'By the express desire of His Royal Highness the funeral was of the plainest and most private character' as the press commented sympathetically, see for instance 'The Funeral of His Late Royal Highness the Prince Consort', *The Times*, 24 December 1861.

[17] The French commentator Edmond About was quoted in the British press as reflecting that the Queen's simple appeal for a 'decent mourning' to be observed by her subjects demonstrated the strength of the monarchy at that point. See 'Edmond About on Prince Albert's Death and England's Mourning', *Birmingham Post*, 24 December 1861.

[18] 'The Death of the Duke of Albany. Arrival of His Body. Funeral', *Reynolds News*, 6 April 1884. *Reynolds News* was still a radical newspaper, and it is a measure of the level of public sympathy that it reported the funeral so extensively in its pages.

[19] It drew comparisons with the death in 1817 of Princess Charlotte, heir apparent to the throne of England; but the emphasis in 1892 was on the fact that unlike in 1817, there was no alarm over the quality of the succession. See 'The Late Duke of Clarence', *The Times*, 19 January 1892.

[20] 'Funeral of the Duke of Clarence', *The Times*, 21 January 1892.

the loss of the heir presumptive, because 'the monarchy was the embodiment of national life'. Necessarily, therefore, the mourning of the royal family was shared by the wider national, and indeed imperial, family.[21]

Such feelings were visibly manifested with the death of Queen Victoria. By the time it occurred, it had already been much anticipated and discussed.[22] But the scale of reaction was extravagant, both in the media world and in terms of the reports of public reactions, with witness reports of people weeping on the streets from London to Kingstown, Jamaica, and Calcutta.[23] The global impact of her death is comprehensible: she was, after all, not only the symbolic mother of the nation and her millions of imperial subjects, but also the grandmother of Europe thanks to the marriages of her children and grandchildren. Spontaneous memorial services were held around the country, even before the formal funeral arrangements were announced.[24] But unlike the arrangements she oversaw for her husband and children, she had had no intention of settling for a private and plain funeral herself. It was her wish that 'her funeral should be marked by every circumstance of public ceremonial, to the end that those who had been her subjects might look upon the scene in common grief, and might remember it to the end of their days'.[25] But there was a mixed message. She lay in state at Osborne and Windsor only, and her funeral being still held at Windsor before her interment at Frogmore, it thus preserved something of the private character traditional to previous Hanoverian royal funerals.

Things were very different for the funeral of Edward VII. That event not only stands still as the largest gathering of European royals of the modern era, in keeping with Edward's presentation of himself as a key member of the 'Trade Union of Kings'.[26] It was also a major state occasion, with a return to the older tradition of a public lying-in-state for the departed monarch. Overall, it was the 'grandest state pageant in which he

[21] Ibid.

[22] 'Court Circular'; 'The Last Hours at Osborne', *The Times*, 23 January 1901.

[23] See Tony Rennell (2014) *The Last Days of Glory: the death of Queen Victoria* (New York: St Martin's Press).

[24] 'Memorial Services', *The Times*, 29 January 1901.

[25] 'Funeral of the Queen', *The Times*, 4 February 1901. Its recording on film was also part of that intention: see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9yiG3EUz_A, accessed 1 October 2015.

[26] See Matthew Glencross (2015) *The State Visits of Edward VII* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

was to take part', with over a quarter of a million travelling to view his coffin as it lay in Westminster Hall.[27] The London streets were packed with awed mourners as the great funeral procession moved from Westminster to Paddington Station, on its journey to Windsor. Comparing it to the funeral of Victoria in 1901, *The Times* reflected that the spectacle of Edward VII's funeral was 'far more' impressive as 'No King ever started on his last journey with such an escort'.[28]

Royal Deaths and the New Dynasty

When Queen Alexandra died in November 1925, there was a new dimension to the funeral arrangements. Like her eldest son, Alexandra died at Sandringham and was buried in Windsor: but in line with state funerals for great men, for the first time in centuries the key part of this royal funeral was performed in public, in Westminster Abbey. While the public lying-in-state of her husband was not imitated, there was an acknowledgement by George V that a public element needed to be incorporated into the obsequies of the 'beloved Queen Mother' of the nation, to enable them to say farewell in a way that reinforced the modern spirit of royal family's identification with the whole population.[29] Two years previously, the funeral at Windsor of Alexandra's sister-in-law, Princess Christian, had, more traditionally, been a lavish but relatively low-key affair in terms of newspaper coverage. But a memorial service at Westminster Abbey two days after the funeral, on 15 June, was unprecedentedly advertised as having part of the Abbey being 'open to the public without ticket'.[30]

[27] See for example 'When the Day of Toil is done: the lying-in-state', *Illustrated London News*, 21 May 1910; see also Sean Wilentz (1999) *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics Since the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), pp221–2.

[28] 'The Pageant of Yesterday', *The Times*, 21 May 1910.

[29] 'Alexandra the Loved', *The Times*, 28 November 1925.

[30] 'Princess Christian's Funeral', *The Times*, 14 June 1923; 'The Funeral of Princess Christian: The Cortege at St George's Chapel', *Illustrated London News*, 23 June 1923. Interestingly, *The Times* had earlier noted that while a special train would be leaving Paddington for Windsor for those attending the funeral, they would be expected to buy tickets. See 'Princess Christian's Funeral', *The Times*, 12 June 1923. It seems that the costs of such special trains for previous royal funerals had been underwritten, presumably either by the royal family or the railway company, but in a sign of changing times, the great and good attending the funeral were no longer transported free. Noted for her charitable works with the poor, and also for her patronage of nursing and needlework, she was originally Princess Christian of Schleswig-Holstein after her marriage, but from 1917, the territoriality of her title was resigned.

The arrangements for funeral of George V, on 28 January 1936, and the reportage of these underlined the new tone that has since characterised the royal funerals of the Windsor dynasty. The emphasis has consistently been on the British (or rather, in days when the two terms were seen as substantially interchangeable, English) character of the deceased. When Princess Christian died, it provided an opportunity for a wide range of media reflections on this quintessentially British Princess. She might have married a German Prince and her surviving son might have served in the German army (though he had never actually fought against his mother's country), but she had lived all her life in Britain, and shown herself to be a tireless and devoted worker in the interests of her fellow countrymen and women. It was this which was the focus of comment: her sustained interest in nursing and support for nurse registration (in the face of opposition from Florence Nightingale) was one of the first things noted in the press.[31]

Her death also prompted a related reflection on how fortunate Britain was to have its royal family. The way that, despite their sorrow, members of the family had kept their public commitments so as not to disappoint people had 'brought into clearer relief all that we owe to the KING and QUEEN and to all the members of the royal family for their unwearied response to the call of duty'. Readers were reminded that the only reward for this (and the only valued by them) was the 'affection and loyalty and sense of kinship they inspire wherever they go amongst their own people'.[32] In a column simply titled 'Alexandra', *The Times* referred to her life of 'love and service' and described her as the 'Nation's Friend' because she had been so much more than 'an exquisitely graceful and dignified figure in the splendid pageant of court'.[33] The emphasis was on how she had 'done her duty', in a selfless and loving way, and so won the hearts of the nation as the Queen Mother, again emphasising the kinship between royals and subjects, in terms of character and approach to life and its duties.

In 1936, in its appreciation of the late King, *The Times* reflected that 'As Sovereign he has founded no legend such as flourishes more sturdily with every new document from QUEEN VICTORIA's long life. It was not his to exert KING EDWARD's influence on foreign peoples and on the course of international diplomacy'.[34] But, more importantly, under

[31] 'Nurses' Princess', *The Times*, 10 June 1923.
[32] 'Royal Workers', *Sunday Times*, 17 June 1923.
[33] 'Alexandra', *The Times*, 21 November 1925.
[34] 'George V', *The Times*, 21 January 1936.

his leadership, 'the human bond between CROWN and people has been wrought afresh', not because of any trait of personality or demonstration of the 'outward brilliance that may captivate popular favour for a time'. What, 'less precariously', sustained this new bond was that the King (and Queen) had provided an 'unstudied example of good citizenship at its highest and simplest'. This was important because 'the CROWN at all times is the single institution that liberates and harmonises the diversities of our State', amounting to a bond 'in equal and inseparable shares' of policy and affection, expressed (unlike his predecessors) in 'the bond of homely things and homely standards prized in common by the King and innumerable households throughout the Empire'.[35] As part of that, it noted with approval that there was 'nothing cosmopolitan in his tastes', they were quintessentially English. He had won the hearts and the loyalty of his people because he was a monarch who had 'loved and lived for' his country.[36] Furthering this point, the *Illustrated London News* described the late King as 'A Patriotic Ruler and a Public Servant', and stressed that his view of his monarchical role as being that of a 'public servant' had corrected the 'confusions and corruptions that have made modern government so insecure' elsewhere in the post-1918 world.[37]

Mourning George V

According to *The Listener*, he was 'simultaneously the most democratic as well as amongst the most imperial and royal of our monarchs' and it was 'Through him' that the British had become 'a more united nation than at any time in our history'.[38] It recalled that the King himself had been conscious of this, in his message of thanks to the nation and the Empire for the Silver Jubilee of the previous year, when he had insisted that it was 'the personal link between me and my people which I value more than I can say'.[39] It was a theme echoed again by *The Times* when, in its editorial upon the lying-in-state in Westminster Hall, it pointed out that for all the pageantry surrounding this, the trust of the nation had lain in the

[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] 'George V: "A Patriotic Ruler and a Public Servant"', *Illustrated London News*, 25 January 1936.
[38] 'Our Loss', *The Listener*, 22 January 1936.
[39] Ibid.

fact that he was a man who was personally happiest in being 'in his own place amongst his own people', living a simple country life.[40] It drew a contrast with Versailles and the 'pinchbeck rusticities of the Petit Trianon' to reveal the 'gulf between two conceptions of kingship'. One 'affirms the unlikeness of Royalty to the rest of humanity: the other affirms its likeness'. George encapsulated a conceptualisation of monarchy that built up a 'towering ideal of service' by drawing on the 'common shared pleasures, occupations and interests of life'.[41]

As the British and colonial press reported the tributes to George V that poured in from other countries after his death, and as it was announced that 'Many Royal personages from abroad' would attend the state funeral on 28 January, the emphasis remained not upon ceremonial and pageantry, but on 'King George the Man'.[42] It was stressed that for those of his subjects who met him personally, 'directly he started talking', it was as if they had known him all their lives and that his interest was never feigned: 'he really wanted to know' about those he met. The King, it was insisted, had been proud of only two things: 'of the antiquity of his Kingly office and of his birthright as an Englishman'.[43] This personal simplicity was something which could also, the British press proudly emphasised, teach lessons to 'republican plutocrats and millionaires', and to be a real model for 'democratic idealists'.[44] As part of that, the day of the funeral was not proclaimed a day of public mourning so that the consequent closure of businesses (including the Stock Exchange) would not cause any hardship. Despite this, it was spontaneously observed as such a day by many firms and institutions.[45]

It was, in terms of detail, the most visibly reported funeral, from the photographs of what was now called his 'lying-in-state' in Sandringham parish church, with a guard of honour mounted by workers from the estate, and with his 'neighbours' filing past the 'simple coffin', to the more elaborate arrangements at Windsor.[46] In between Sandringham and Windsor, his body had (like that of his father) lain in Westminster Hall for his people to pay their last homage. Readers were told that they would

[40] 'The Squire and the King', Editorial, *The Times*, 24 January 1936.

[41] Ibid.

[42] 'Kings at the Funeral'; 'King George the Man', *The Times*, 23 January 1936.

[43] 'King George the Man', *The Times*, 23 January 1936.

[44] 'George V: "A Patriotic Ruler and a Public Servant"', *Illustrated London News*, 25 January 1936.

[45] 'Order of the Royal Funeral', *The Times*, 25 January 1936.

[46] 'The Lying-in-state at Sandringham', *The Times*, 23 January 1936.

find the scene 'symbolic both of the glory which he earned as King and the affection which he inspired as man'.[47] The accessibility of the organisation surrounding the arrival of the King's body in his capital was also emphasised: 'Not yet had the full pomp and state of Empire claimed him'. Setting a lead, the royal mourners had arrived 'on foot, bare-headed and in plain clothes'.[48] Thousands filed by to pay their respects, and the public accessibility theme continued with arrangements for a Memorial Service at Westminster Abbey which would be held simultaneously with the funeral in Windsor, at 3 pm on 28 January. That service, apart from a small number of reserved seats for peers and their families, would be 'open to the public without tickets'.[49]

Around the country, it was announced that 'in large towns and small, in villages and isolated parishes, arrangement have been made for memorial services to be held for King George', many of which were non-denominational to bring whole communities together in the 'Nation's Mourning'. What also helped this heightened level of participation was the broadcast of the funeral service, and the filming by Pathé News—for later screening in cinemas around the Empire—of the King's funeral: *The Times* pointed out that 'most centres of any size' had made arrangements for a collective listening to the public broadcasting of the service from St George's Chapel.[50] Instead of the usual day of public mourning for deceased sovereigns, (to avoid damaging the nation's precarious economy unnecessarily), a voluntary two minute silence at 1.30 pm had been suggested. It was announced that 'practically everywhere', this would be 'reverently observed', including in the Sheffield steelworks, which would otherwise continue to work.[51]

Sixteen Years On: Mourning Another King

The newspapers were less important than the wireless in spreading news of the death of George VI, on 5 February 1952, but they still provide a point of useful reference for the extent and tone of popular mourning for

[47] 'At Westminster Hall', *The Times*, 24 January 1936.

[48] 'The Squire and the King', Editorial, *The Times*, 24 January 1936.

[49] 'Order of the Royal Funeral', *The Times*, 25 January 1936.

[50] 'Nation's Mourning', *The Times*, 28 January 1936.

[51] Ibid. Employment exchanges were to be open until 11 a.m. for vacancies, but would continue to pay out to those due to receive benefits on Tuesday. The unemployed (apart from dock workers) were also to be spared from signing on or claiming that day without penalty.

the King.[52] What struck many, for instance, was the radio broadcast tribute by Winston Churchill to the late King, later picked up in most national newspapers in Britain and around the Commonwealth and Empire. Its emphasis (in an echo of the eulogies to his father) was on how the King had been 'greatly loved by all his peoples' and 'respected as a man and a prince' because he understood he was 'a ruler and a servant of the vast spheres and communities for which he had responsibility'.[53] Though it was known the King was in poor health, his sudden death in his sleep was not publicly anticipated in the way that his father's death had been, and was more of a shock to public sensibility, especially since the new Queen was herself out of the country on a state visit, representing her father. But what was, by then, not surprising were the arrangements for his funeral, starting with a lying-in-state in Sandringham, where his estate workers, tenants and neighbours would come to pay their respects over the weekend. On 11 February, his coffin would be transferred to London. There, after a solemn procession through the streets, would come George VI's public lying-in-state in Westminster Hall for three days, until his final journey to Windsor. *The Times* referred to the 'tender associations' the Hall now had in the minds of the British people, after the lying-in-state of George V, which would now be further reinforced.[54]

Again, the emphasis in the reportage was on the 'simple state' at Sandringham, where the local community, often in their working clothes, filed past to pay their respects to the man who had been their neighbour. Even in London, for all the 'stately splendour' of the lying-in-state in Westminster Hall, 'multitudes of people will think of the King as the head of a united family', and express 'the sympathy of ordinary people with the family he has left behind'.[55] That family, it was noted, was extended to include the Empire and newly-created Commonwealth very visibly. For the first time, in the service that accompanied the arrival of the coffin at Westminster Hall, all Commonwealth ministers present in London were there (or represented by a delegate); and the flags of all colonies and Dominions were also ranked around the Hall, emphasising popular

[52] See, for instance, 'The Nation Mourns', *The Guardian*, 7 February 1952.

[53] Winston Churchill (1952) *King George VI. The Prime Minister's Broadcast, Thursday 7 February 1952* (London: The Times Publishing Company), p1.

[54] 'Coffin Taken to Church'; 'Westminster Hall Preparations', *The Times*, 9 February 1952.

[55] 'Today's Procession', *The Times*, 11 February 1952.

consciousness of 'the links of kinship and friendship binding together the Commonwealth and Empire'.[56]

George VI's funeral was broadcast by the BBC, both on radio and television.[57] These services also broadcast the news of how the huge crowds of people waited in long queues to pay respect and homage to George VI, many of them also remembering doing the same for his father, sixteen years previously.[58] Interestingly enough, it is through the criticisms of the BBC's programming (including its news coverage) for the period between the announcement of the King's death and the funeral, that a glimpse of another change appears. At this stage, one possibly more to do with attitudes of educated men and women such as those found in the BBC than in the wider national community. Monsignor Heenan, in a sermon on the 'sincere and simple man' who had been genuinely loved by his people, commented that the BBC had not 'used its monopoly judiciously during this time of national trial'. He reflected on the absence of a Christian dimension to the messages of grief being purveyed in the media, pointing out that to Christians it was 'not a tragedy when a great and good man had been called by God to his eternal reward'.[59] By contrast, a shared Christian tone to the reportage of 1936 had been evident: a national sense of reverence based in shared religious values had manifested itself publicly.[60]

Interestingly, Heenan also criticised the fact that 'It had wrapped the nation in organised gloom for more than a week', adding that 'The death of a constitutional monarch need not paralyse the legitimate relaxation of the whole nation for so long'. Showing that he understood the Windsor concept of monarchy better than the BBC, the Monsignor insisted that the 'memory of our gracious King' was not 'well served' by either 'the melodrama of prolonged silences' on the day of his death or the 'sombre and mirthless programmes' that had succeeded them.[61] Equally, some public criticism was also voiced of the organisation of events by the Palace.

[56] 'Lying-in-State of the King', *The Times*, 12 February 1952.

[57] Pathé News also filmed the procession from Westminster Hall to Paddington for cinemas around the Empire and Commonwealth, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oh0JJcf4z6A, accessed 5 October 2015.

[58] See 'The Majesty of Kingship', *The Times*, 14 February 2015. See also 'George VI's Death: Your Memories', BBC News, 6 February 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1802708.stm, accessed 20 October 2015.

[59] 'B.B.C. Programmes Criticised' *The Times*, 15 February 1952.

[60] It is, of course, accepted that not all shared privately in those religious values.

[61] 'B.B.C. Programmes Criticised' *The Times*, 15 February 1952.

The two minute silence introduced for the funeral of George V was kept for the funeral of George VI, but this time it was not voluntary but was issued via the Court Circular as a 'request' by the Queen to the nation that it be observed at 2 p.m. on 15 February, the time the funeral service in Windsor would begin.[62]

Coupled as this was by an announcement that all people were 'expected' to wear mourning, it created some hostility at the apparent readiness of 'high officials' acting in the name of the Queen to issue instructions with a 'note of command' instead of leaving such decisions up to 'private and spontaneous decision'.[63] As *The Times* went on to comment, the fashions in mourning had changed.[64] It was no longer usual, even for family mourning, to wear black, or even sombre colours. It had been noted in earlier reportage that many of the crowds queuing for the lying-in-state in Westminster Hall (in excess of 300,000) were dressed in bright colours, and that men were often bare-headed. Both of these would have been unthinkable in 1936. *The Times* warned that in a transitional society such as existed in Britain at the start of the 1950s, one 'uncertain about its own conventions', it was a challenge for 'ceremony to remain in touch with sentiment'. It was no longer felt necessary to manifest sentiment in dress or via black armbands but the genuineness of the sentiments of popular affection for the late King, and the sense of being part of a national (and imperial) 'family' should not be doubted.[65]

It is fair to say that the next royal state funeral after that of George VI, that of his much-loved wife, Elizabeth, was much more skilfully handled by the Palace, if not by the BBC initially. In the aftermath of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, there had been an unprecedented level of public criticism of the monarch and the House of Windsor in

[62] It was also, in line with older traditions, a day of public mourning there not being the fears for the nation's economy expressed by the politicians. However, the timing of the funeral for a Friday was almost certainly to lessen any impact. It is worth noting that, in anticipation of the death of the current monarch, Elizabeth II, some articles have already been written on the impact on the nation's economy of the state funeral arrangements including the likely day of public mourning. See Rob Price, 'The death of Queen Elizabeth will be the most disruptive event in Britain for the last 70 years', *Business Insider*, at http://uk.businessinsider.com/what-happens-when-queen-elizabeth-ii-dies-2015-3, accessed 20 October 2015. It has to be said, however, the article does rather exaggerate the impact on the life of the nation in 1952.

[63] 'Epilogue', *The Times*, 16 February 1952.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

general. Julie Burchill had commented that, as the 'People's Princess, not the Windsors', she had shown up 'the House of Windsor's total lack of rapport with, and affection for, its people'; a 'dumb, numb dinosaur', it was now completely out of touch with modern realities.[66] In the days after Diana's death with all the accompanying images of a grief-struck nation, the Queen's emphasis on supporting her bereaved grandsons, and not her bereaved subjects, was widely perceived as something that could result in the ending of the House of Windsor's tenure of the throne. Yet, once alerted to the danger, the Queen and Prince of Wales ensured that Diana was accorded a public funeral that trod a careful balance between being a public state funeral and a royal (not state) funeral. The question asked was whether the gestures made to her by the Windsors were sufficient, and many thought they were not.[67]

It was out of a consequent assurance of diminishing interest in the Windsors in mind that coverage of the Queen Mother's death and funeral was initially down-played by the BBC, most famously with the announcement of her death by a newsreader wearing a burgundy, not a black, tie.[68] Yet in fact the levels of public grief were once again high. The Queen Mother's lying-in-state in Westminster Hall saw queues of people wanting to pay their respects that eventually could only be managed by removing opening hours for the Hall.[69] Equally, great wisdom was shown in the decision to hold the funeral itself in Westminster Abbey, with a private family interment in Windsor afterwards. It made the fully-televised service visible in an unprecedented way for a royal funeral, as well as providing an opportunity for spectators to feel involved in a way that the televised funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales, had shown was valued. It would undoubtedly have been easier in 2002 anyway to have transported the Queen Mother's coffin to Windsor by road rather than rail: but it also gave an opportunity for around a million to line the roads on the route she travelled for her

[66] Julie Burchill, 'The People's Destroyer', *The Guardian*, 2 September 1997.

[67] It does still remain a question regularly asked by the media, at least, if Diana's 'rejection' by Prince Charles disqualifies him from taking his legally rightful place in the royal succession. See Chapter 6.

[68] 'Red faces in BBC newsrooms as corporation is caught on the hop', *Daily Telegraph*, 1 April 1997; 'Sissons defends corporation's coverage and lack of a black tie', *Daily Telegraph*, 3 April 2002.

[69] See, for example, the BBC report from 6 April 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1913120.stm, accessed 27 January 2016.

last journey to Windsor, demonstrating the high level of public sorrow and interest in an event which undoubtedly marked the ending of an era.[70]

Memorialising the Windsors

The habit of memorialisation is not new, and has often been used to mark events that are held to represent the ends of eras. Deaths of sovereigns provide an obvious marker in this respect, but the time of Queen Victoria had seen the beginnings of an alteration in how the British perceived the process of public commemoration after death The vast number of what have been called 'Victoria's Little Wars' meant that substantial numbers of men, often young, died in conflicts around the British Empire.[71] This promoted a will to produce tangible objects to remember with admiration and respect the individual dead associated with war in the shape of monuments not just to military leaders (the traditional response) but also to the wider sacrifice made by those who died '*pro patria*'. It was the Boer War which produced most in the way of such tangible general memorials, and which also signalled the end to a valorisation simply of leaders via posthumous statuary and similar expressions.[72] But by the time of Victoria, British monarchs were no longer warriors in any real sense and so no such valorisation was considered.[73]

However, there was one other feature of Victorian memorialisation that had a real resonance for modern monarchy: the valorisation of the civilian who, by dedication to the interests of his or her fellow countrymen (and women) had improved their lives by their efforts. The concept of the 'everyday' hero (or heroine) began to appear in biographical collections, aimed especially at the young—because it was argued that by presenting them with

[70] For more details of the BBC's television coverage, see that from 10 April 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/obituaries/queen_mother/funeral_procession/procession.stm, accessed 27 January 2016.

[71] Byron Farwell (1985) *Queen Victoria's Little Wars* (London: Norton); Matthew Dennison (2011) *Queen Victoria: a Life of Contradictions* (New York: St Martin's Press).

[72] See, for instance, Peter Donaldson (2013) *Remembering the South African War: Britain and the Memory of the Anglo-Boer War from 1899 to the Present* (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press).

[73] While a statue of George IV, in Roman dress and on horseback, is part of the furniture of Trafalgar Square, an inscription had to be added later in the century because no one knew who the statue represented. See http://www.royal.gov.uk/HistoryoftheMonarchy/The%20House%20of%20Windsor%20from%201952/QueenElizabethTheQueenMother/MemorialProject/TheProject/FamousRoyalmemorials.aspx, accessed 20 August 2015.

such models, they were improving the national future, as well as their own.[74] Such literary efforts were also matched by a proliferation of tangible memorials, often erected as a result of public subscription as a way of expressing gratitude and admiration. Increasingly, these took the shape of 'useful' objects, from a drinking trough to a hospital bed, so that the exemplary work of the individuals memorialised in this way could be continued into the future—inspiring others to act likewise.[75] Even though the most universally famous memorial to Queen Victoria remains the Victoria Memorial outside Buckingham Palace, posthumous tributes to her life already included a will to name projects already under construction in her name, in the shape of hospitals and nurses homes around Britain and the empire.

Equally, the memorials that were encouraged to Edward VII were largely popular in their focus—parks, philanthropic funds for purposes such as training of nurses—rather than memorial in a statuary sense. Thus it cannot be claimed that George V, as part of his establishing of a Windsor 'brand' of monarchy, created a new style of memorialisation for monarchy. He did, however, undoubtedly promote that aspect. Planning for the Edward VII Memorial Park in Shadwell started in 1911.[76] When it finally opened in 1922, the dedication ran 'In grateful memory of Edward VII' (though there is no record of any direct input to the area either by him or his successor), along with the announcement that the park was 'dedicated to the use and enjoyment of the people of East London for ever'. George V and Queen Mary were at the opening of what has proved to be a popular local amenity ever since. Thus the Windsor dynasty has tapped into, and expanded on, public memorialisation of the individual monarchs by promoting community projects and assets in their name.

'Invited' to the Party

Another way in which the 'family' life of the nation and that of the Windsors has been enhanced by a will on the part of the royal family to share its occasions with the wider public has been by a new emphasis on the public

[74] Judith Rowbotham (2000) 'All our past proclaims our future': popular biography and masculine identity during the Golden Age, 1850–1870' in Ian Inkster, Jeff Hill, Colin Griffin and Judith Rowbotham, eds *The Golden Age: Essays in British Economic and Social History 1850–1870* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

[75] See John Price (2014) *Everyday Heroism: Victorian Constructions of the Heroic Civilian* (London: Bloomsbury).

[76] 'Edward VII Memorial', *East London Observer*, 23 December 1911.

dimension to royal marriages and christenings. Such events had always been of public interest but the idea that royal marriages in particular should be opened to a form of public participation by being staged at venues and in ways that enabled a direct view of them by the general public was new. The first time this happened was with the wedding of the highly-popular Princess Patricia of Connaught, who married the commoner, Commander the Honourable Alexander Ramsay in 1919. For the first time in centuries, a royal wedding took place in Westminster Abbey instead of in one of the private chapels attached to one of the royal palaces. More, the whole occasion was shared with the world as a result of the wedding being filmed by Pathé News.[77] All of this gives the sense of the British people (and the Commonwealth) being 'invited' to such events. Most recently, the christening of Princess Charlotte of Cambridge was widely publicised. Even though the service itself was not filmed by the media, the arrival (on foot) of the proud parents and the charming elder brother (Prince George of Cambridge) was lavishly reported, with newspapers issuing souvenir supplements, for instance.[78]

Conclusion

What this chapter has shown is how—consciously, and for the most part successfully—the Windsor dynasty has modernised older traditions associated with retrospective state occasions. They have done so through a careful rethinking of the messages that these occasions were intended to send to their key audiences—the British people, at home and abroad (in the shape of the colonial, and later Commonwealth, members of the family). The national family has been invited to share the sorrow of the Windsors over the death of key royal figures in a way that has been intended to emphasise that it was a shared grief at the loss of a family member. The emphasis has been on mourning *with* and not *for* the royal family. Equally, with events such as royal weddings and christenings, the emphasis has been on rejoicing *with* and not just *for* the royal family. At times, the British media refers to the 'bicycling monarchies' (by which they mean the monarchies of Scandinavia, Denmark and the Netherlands) by way of drawing comparisons—implicitly

[77] See http://www.britishpathe.com/video/wedding-of-princess-patricia-to-sir-a-ramsay-1919, accessed 10 August 2016.

[78] 'Princess Charlotte christening: everything you need to know', *Daily Telegraph*, 5 July 2015.

negative—with the British royal family.[79] Such monarchies are supposedly more down-to-earth, and more unfussy than the British royals. Yet as this chapter—along with others—has underlined, the British balance has put a great emphasis on incorporating that dimension into their approach to the job of monarchy. The sacerdotal nature of the monarchy, incorporating a sacred dimension as well as the secular aspects, ensures that the Windsor emphasis on the ceremonial and ritual symbolism remains important. It has also, thanks to the high level of public involvement that is possible because of modern media technology, developed that dimension in a way that has helped to re-invent the monarchy's popularity. It is a matter of popular pride, also, that the British do the ceremonial and pageantry surrounding state occasions involving monarchy so well.[80] It has become a part of British distinctiveness, reinforcing national identity, and indirectly therefore, place of the Windsor dynasty in the estimation of the nation.

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[79] Andrew Brown 'Sweden's cycling royals do it better', *Independent*, 23 October 2011.

[80] Damian Thompson, 'We British are the Masters of Ceremony', *Daily Telegraph*, 10 May 2013, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/damianthompson/100216223/we-british-are-the-masters-of-ceremony/ accessed 9 October 2015.

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CHAPTER 5

Royalty and the Army in the Twentieth Century

Ian F. W. Beckett

Introduction

Famously, it was Walter Bagehot's contention in *The English Constitution*, published in 1867, that a constitutional monarch enjoyed but three rights: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn. As has been pointed out, however, neither Queen Victoria nor King Edward VII subscribed to Bagehot, other than in the most general terms. Indeed, Edward was anxious to extend his exercise of the royal prerogative in certain areas and remained something of a bulwark against democratisation of the political system. Consequently, it was only during the reign of King George V, who had been instructed as an adult in Bagehot's theories by Professor J. R. Tanner in 1894, that Bagehot's constitutional vision was fully realised.[1]

One significant remaining part of the royal prerogative was the monarch's role as titular Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, not least the right to be consulted on appointments. Just as executive government was

[1] Simon Heffer (1998) *Power and Place: The Political Consequences of King Edward VII* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson), pp86–97.

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carried on in the monarch's name, so honours and appointments were also made in the monarch's name, though generally bestowed upon the advice of ministers. With regard to the Army, the Secretary of State for War, to whom the officer Commanding-in-Chief, as the service's professional head, had been formally subordinated since 1870, represented the monarch. In fact, a kind of duality had survived until 1895, but the professional appointment of Commander-in-Chief was abolished in 1904. Thereafter the Chief of the General (Imperial from 1909) Staff acted as *primus inter pares* among his professional colleagues.

The role as titular Commander-in-Chief, however, was of immense importance for monarchy and armed forces alike. For most soldiers, the Crown represented a higher form of authority than that of government. By posing, first and foremost, as servants of the Crown, soldiers could distance themselves from what was perceived as the squalid nature of politics. Potentially, indeed, the Army could play off the royal prerogative against parliamentary authority. Thus, in any conflict that emerged between British soldiers and politicians over the direction of strategic and military policy, there was a considerable danger that the monarch could be drawn into a damaging confrontation with government. George V and, to a lesser extent, George VI were so drawn into the Army's politics, and there have been some occasions on which the views of Her Majesty the Queen and the Prince of Wales on military affairs have become known publicly. In any case, there has always been a close connection of Army and Crown through the personal military service of members of the royal family and also through continual contact with officers, not least the Household Division, as Colonels in Chief of regiments. In looking at the relationship of Crown and Army, it will be necessary, first, to examine the conventional and practical links, before, secondly, turning to the more political aspects of the relationship.

The Crown and the Military Dimension

First, then, the practical links between Crown and Army, located within the wider context of Crown and the armed services. What has apparently dominated the Windsor experience until recently has been experience with the Royal Navy. Neither George V nor George VI had initially being expected to be King: both were adults prior to their elevation in the line of succession, and with service experience in the Navy. George V had been a serious and committed naval officer before he became heir apparent in

1892, on the death of his older brother: it was only at that stage that his active service and career progression ceased. George VI, as Duke of York, was heir presumptive as the Prince of Wales remained unmarried, as even when the latter ascended the throne as Edward VIII (there was always the hope, if not expectation, that his elder brother would marry and produce his own heirs).[2] Though George VI did not maintain his service career after 1919, it was a formative experience. When simply Prince Albert, and a naval officer, and though often ill during the Great War, he gained conflict experience. He was, for instance, present at the Battle of Jutland in a turret of the cruiser, HMS *Collingwood*, which engaged German cruisers. He later was seconded to the newly-formed RAF, learning to fly before gaining his father's consent to abandoning a service career, substantially on health grounds.[3] The Duke of Edinburgh, and Princes Charles and Andrew also all served in the Royal Navy rather than the Army, the Duke of Edinburgh seeing active service during the Second World War, and the Duke of York in the Falklands War.

But, as the career experiences of the current heir apparent, the Duke of Cambridge, and his brother, Prince Harry, remind us, there is an even more sustained royal link with the Army, which the Windsors have also sustained. The Duke of Edinburgh was made a Field Marshal in 1953, and the Prince of Wales in 2012. Reflecting back on the links with the Army, George V's father, Edward VII, served briefly with the Grenadier Guards in 1861 before being elevated to Field Marshal in 1875. But his younger brother, Prince Arthur, Duke of Connaught was commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1868, and followed a serious military career. Apart from holding significant command appointments, Prince Arthur also commanded the Guards Brigade in action at Tel-el-Kebir in September 1882. The wish of Queen Victoria was that Connaught should succeed her cousin, George, Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief, but this was thwarted by her government. Politicians also baulked from giving Connaught the Indian command when Lord Roberts retired from it in 1893. Instead, Connaught was installed as Inspector General in 1904, his promotion to Field Marshal having taken effect in 1902.

[2] There was also, of course, no automatic expectation that the Duke of York would outlive, and so succeed to, a childless Edward VIII: it was the abdication, not death, of his predecessor which elevated George VI to the throne.

[3] Denis Judd (2012) *George VI* (London: I B Tauris).

It is clear that Edward VII saw his brother as a useful means of exercising influence within the Army directly, for the Inspector General enjoyed effective control over military patronage through the simultaneous presidency of the Army Appointments Board.[4] The King, therefore, was irritated when Connaught concluded that his subsequent appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean command in 1907 was of little military value. Edward warned Connaught that he could neither remain President of the Selection Board nor continue his military career if he resigned. Nonetheless, the Duke did so retire in July 1909, subsequently becoming Governor General of Canada in 1911.[5] He continued in that role until 1916, when he was succeeded by the Duke of Devonshire as Governor General. On the outbreak of war, he had resumed his Field Marshal's uniform and (to the annoyance of local Canadian politicians) taken to visiting Canadian troops before they left for Europe—a strategy in line with traditional royal responsibilities. On his return to Britain, he had placed himself at the disposal of his nephew, the King.

Connaught's great-nephew, the later Edward VIII, was commissioned from the Oxford University Officer Training Corps into the Grenadier Guards in 1914. First attached to the staff of I Corps in May 1915, Edward managed to visit the Guards Division from time to time in the front line and was then attached to that division's staff in September 1915. Subsequently he joined the staff of XIV Corps in Italy, before joining the staff of the Canadian Corps in May 1918, and spending some time in France with the Australian Corps after the Armistice. Naturally enough, the presence of the Prince of Wales in the war zone was a potential risk that exercised his superiors. Commanding I Corps, Sir Hubert Gough found the Prince 'always pleasant, frank and simple, and he never failed to take as much violent exercise as he could cram into the day in the intervals of his office work. He was always up early, had a cold bath and went out for a ride, usually without stirrups.' However, Gough 'had the greatest difficulty in trying to keep him out of the front line trenches, and I am quite sure that, in spite of my efforts to do so, often failed'. Having suggested that the Prince return to France from Italy in the autumn of 1918 as success seemed near, the Commander-

[4] Ian F. W. Beckett (2002) 'Selection by Disparagement: Lord Esher, the General Staff and the Politics of Command, 1904–14' in David French and Brian Holden Reid, eds *The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890–1939* (London: Frank Cass), pp41–56.

[5] Noble Frankland (1993) *Witness of a Century: The Life and Times of Prince Arthur Duke of Connaught, 1850–1942* (London: Shepheard-Walwyn), pp246; 254–6.

in-Chief of the BEF, Sir Douglas Haig found Edward 'a good sporting lad, natural and sincere, but rather faddy over his diet. Eats no breakfast, but has jam in large quantities with "morning tea".'[6]

Edward VIII had assumed the rank of Field Marshal on his accession to the throne but his position as Duke of Windsor caused some difficulties during the Second World War. In 1939 the Duke requested that the Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha, find him a post. Hore-Belisha considered the Duke might be added to the British Military Mission in France but only if he was prepared to step down to Major General from the rank of Field Marshal, which he had retained. The Duke did not seem that willing to do so, and also suggested that he should be reinstated as Honorary Colonel of the Welsh Guards. The CIGS, General Sir Edmund Ironside, initially objected, both on the grounds that the Duke could not be trusted not to divulge military plans to the Duchess, and also because he was clearly reluctant to accept subordination to the Head of Mission. The Duke was duly appointed to the Mission but General Lord Gort commanding the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) refused to allow the Duke to visit British sectors of the front. Following the fall of France the Duke and Duchess fled first to Spain and then Portugal, and he was then given the appointment of Governor of the Bahamas in August 1940.[7]

George V's third son, Prince Henry, Duke of Gloucester, was commissioned into the Rifle Brigade in 1919 and saw service in France and the Middle East during the Second World War. Technically, he retired as a Major General in 1937, but secured appointment as Chief Liaison Officer on the staff of the BEF in September 1939. It was generally acknowledged that Henry was no intellectual, the Duke of Windsor referring to him as the 'unknown soldier'. Prince Henry seems to have been treated with some discourtesy by Gort and his staff, Henry later complaining to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir Alan Brooke, in March 1941. Gort having complained, in turn, back in 1940 that Prince Henry got on his nerves, Brooke had found a place for him on the staff

[6] Frances Donaldson (1974) *Edward VII* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), pp49–55; Hubert Gough (1931) *The Fifth Army* (London: Hodder and Stoughton), pp93–4; Gary Sheffield and John Bourne, eds (2005) *Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 1914–18* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), pp462–3; 474.

[7] R. J. Minney (1960) *The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha* (London: Collins), pp236–39; T. A. Heathcote (1999) *The British Field Marshals, 1736–1997: A Biographical Dictionary* (Barnsley: Leo Cooper), pp110–11.

of 4th Division in II Corps. Henry was promoted to Lieutenant General in September 1941 but then reverted to the rank of Colonel in order to act as second in command of 20th Armoured Brigade, where he was not a success. Supported by the King, Henry pestered Brooke for another role in August 1942, perhaps in the War Office. Brooke prevaricated for, 'From what I had seen of him in France I knew that he would not have stood the pace, and that used as a personal assistant he would have acted as a permanent drag, which could not be countenanced. Fortunately he did not press the matter!' In the event, Henry became Governor General of Australia in November 1943, being elevated to Field Marshal in 1955. Famously, criticism of Churchill's government during the crucial censure debate in the House of Commons in June 1942 following the fall of Tobruk was deflected by an eruption of laughter when the proposer of the motion, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, suggested that Prince Henry be appointed Commander-in-Chief.[8]

The fourth son, George, Duke of Kent was a Commodore in the RAF when killed in a flying accident in 1942. His son, the present Duke of Kent, however, was commissioned into the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards in 1955, retiring as Lieutenant Colonel in 1976. He was reappointed to the supernumerary list as Major General in 1983, and promoted Field Marshal in 1993. His younger brother, Prince Michael of Kent, was commissioned into the 11th Hussars in 1963, retiring as a Major in 1983. Most recently, Princes William and Harry were both commissioned in the Blues and Royals in 2006, the latter undertaking two tours of duty in Afghanistan. It should also be recalled that Her Majesty the Queen was commissioned in the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) in February 1945 as junior commander, though she was also simultaneously Colonel-in-Chief of the Grenadier Guards. In terms of Colonels-in-Chief, and excluding Commonwealth and Territorial units, the Queen is Colonel-in-Chief or Royal Colonel of 16 regiments or corps; the Prince of Wales of eight; the Duke of York, of five; the Duke of Edinburgh and the Princess Royal, of four each; and the Dukes of Kent and Gloucester, the Duchess of Gloucester, and the Countess of Wessex, of one each. While the Queen remains Colonel-in-Chief, Prince William became Colonel of the Irish Guards in 2011.

[8] Sarah Bradford (1989) *King George VI* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), pp346–8; Alex Danchev and Dan Todman, eds (2001) *War Diaries, 1939–45: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), pp315; 321; 384–5.

Crown Engagement with the Army

Such honorary colonelcies in chief and colonelcies have always been taken extremely seriously. Edward VIII held 32 such appointments in the British Army, 13 in the Indian Army, 12 in other dominion or colonial forces in addition to that of the Royal Marines and being Captain General of the Honourable Artillery Company. Upon assuming the throne, it was suggested that George VI assume seven new appointments in the British Army in addition to the five he already held. Other members of the royal family including Queen Elizabeth, the Dukes of Kent and Gloucester, Princesses Marina and Beatrice, and the Earl of Harewood held 18 more honorary appointments, while 12 appointments previously held by the Duke of Windsor were in abeyance.[9]

George VI maintained a close interest in his regiments and corps. In the case of the East Yorkshire Regiment, for example, George was routinely notified of changes in command of battalions; of changes of station; of regimental duties such as the 2nd Battalion's apparent success in capturing a notorious Arab bandit, 'Sheikh Fahman', in Palestine in December 1937; and of unit reductions such as that of the 7th Battalion in August 1944. Indeed, as a procedural point, there was some discussion in March 1939 as to whether or not the King should be informed of the proposed change in command in the 1st Battalion in particular and in the regiment's battalions in general in his capacity as Colonel in Chief before he had approved the proposed commanding officer as King.[10] The King was also always notified of any changes affecting the Guards and Household Cavalry, extending to formal approval for Guards bands to perform overseas. In April 1939, for example, the King expressed his doubts as to advisability of the band of the Scots Guards touring South Africa like 'a theatrical touring company' under the auspices of African Theatres Ltd, following its approved appearance at the Cape Town centenary celebrations. Rather more significantly, that same month the King approved the deployment of the Welsh Guards to Gibraltar amid fears that it might be attacked by Italian troops now

[9] Royal Archives (henceforth RA) PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/0003/1/004; ibid., 00031/B/01, Agenda for meeting with Wigram, 22 February 1937; ibid., 00031/B/03.

[10] RA PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/01575/31, Anderson to Hardinge, 7 August 1944; ibid., 01575/51, Margesson to Hardinge, 16 January 1941; ibid., 01283/027 Clarke to Miéville, 5 December 1937; ibid., 01575/70, Hardinge to Brownrigg, 9 March 1939; ibid., 01575/71, Brownrigg to Hardinge, 10 March 1929.

released from assisting the Nationalist forces following Franco's victory in the Spanish Civil War.[11]

Naturally enough, national ceremonial reinforces the link between Crown and Army, be it coronations, jubilees, Royal weddings, state occasions, or the annual Trooping of the Colour on the monarch's official birthday, a ceremony dating back at least to 1748. Monarchs have routinely presented new Colours to regiments. Queen Victoria distributed 123,000 Christmas chocolate boxes to troops in South Africa in December 1899, and Queen Mary presented 355,000 Christmas boxes to troops in December 1914.[12] Members of the royal family also routinely visit troops, including in theatre. George V made six trips to the Western Front during the Great War. George VI visited the British Expeditionary Force in France in December 1939. He also, in 1943, visited troops in North Africa and Malta in June, and the following year, 1944, went to Normandy in June, to Italy in July, and to the Low Countries in October 1944. He also tried twice to persuade Churchill to allow him to visit troops in India, but this was rejected on political grounds given the growing agitation for independence. On his visit to Italy, the King observed Indian troops in action both from an observation post but also from the bath in his caravan while the band of the Grenadier Guards played outside. Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese, whom the King knighted during the visit, wrote, 'He was thrilled. Few Kings in these days can have watched a battle from his bath to the strains of martial music by his own guards.' The recently promoted Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander believed the Italian trip particularly important, telling the King, 'he was particularly glad I had come out just at this moment as the troops rather feared that their campaign had been put in the shade by the Press ever since the landing in Normandy'.[13]

Prince Charles was in Afghanistan in March 2010. According to his official website, he 'is a strong supporter of the Armed Services and sees this as one of the most important parts of his role as Heir to The Throne',

[11] RA PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/00649/34, Hardinge to Roseway, 26 April 1939; ibid., 01283/043, Hore-Belisha to Hardinge, 18 April 1939; ibid., 01283/045, Hardinge to Hore-Belisha, 19 April 1939.

[12] See also Chapters 2 and 8 for more detail on this aspect.

[13] Rowland Ryder (1987) *Oliver Leese* (London: Hamish Hamilton), pp180–1; John Wheeler-Bennett (1958) *King George VI: His Life and Reign* (London: Macmillan), pp566–70; 612–14; Bradford, *George VI*, pp358–65.

his relationship being based on promoting the role of the Forces within national life, through operational visits and ceremonial duties. His focus in this context is on the professionalism and excellence of training as well as supporting the welfare of service personnel and their families; and 'helping to maintain the history and heritage of the Services through regimental links'.[14]

Naturally, information would be imparted to monarchs and members of the royal family on such visits, but there have always been regular communications between the Crown and the Army. Lord Esher, for example, sent Edward VII daily reports on the deliberations of the Elgin Commission after the South African War. Prime Minister Asquith once complained that George V needed 'a really good *civilian* among his Secretaries, instead of always drawing them from his (mostly less) instructed soldiers'.[15] Perhaps naturally enough, members of the Royal Household were frequently former servicemen. Arthur Bigge, Queen Victoria's Private Secretary from 1895 to 1901, had been an officer in the Royal Artillery until appointed to Victoria's household in 1880. When Edward VII became King, Bigge was appointed Private Secretary to the Duke of York, later George V, in 1901. He continued in George's service when he became King, and was elevated to the peerage as Lord Stamfordham in 1911. Upon the retirement of Lord Knollys (also a soldier), who had been Private Secretary to Edward VII and then to his son, Stamfordham became principal Private Secretary, and remained in that role to George V until 1931. His assistant, Clive Wigram, was an officer in the 18th Bengal Lancers when he joined the then Prince of Wales's staff in 1905. Both Stamfordham and Wigram nominally remained on the army active list after joining the royal household and both continued to correspond with old military friends. George VI's Private Secretary from 1936 to 1943, Major Alexander Hardinge, had won the MC with the Grenadier Guards in the Great War, while his successor, Captain Sir Alan Lascelles, had served with the Bedfordshire Yeomanry. Hardinge was an old friend of Lord Gort and corresponded with him regularly while Gort commanded the BEF in 1939–1940. Both Michael Adeane and Sir Martin Charteris, successively Private Secretaries to the Queen from 1953 to 1977

[14] http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/personalprofiles/theprinceofwales/atwork/supportingthequeen/armedservices/index.html, accessed 20 December 2012.

[15] Michael and Eleanor Brook, eds (1982) *H.H. Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p432.

reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Sir Robin Janvrin, Private Secretary from 1999 to 2007 had served in the Royal Navy.

The Crown in Direct Communication

George V also directly solicited reports from a number of officers. Those from whom letters were received in response to specific royal invitations to correspond, either directly or through Stamfordham and Wigram, included, in 1914, Field Marshal Sir John French, commanding the BEF; Haig, then commanding I Corps, and Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, commanding II Corps. In 1917 invitations were extended to General Sir Hubert Gough, commanding Fifth Army; and Lieutenant General the Earl of Cavan, commanding XIV Corps, although Cavan had earlier sent reports relating to the Guards Brigade and the Guards Division. In the case of Haig and Smith-Dorrien, the King also received their daily journals in batches.[16]

The King had known Smith-Dorrien for many years, and had asked for similar regular reports when Smith-Dorrien held Southern Command in 1911. Haig was also well known to the King, although Haig had enjoyed a closer relationship with Edward VII, having married a lady-in-waiting to Queen Alexandra. George V had also become well acquainted with Sir William Robertson when the latter was assistant quartermaster-general at Aldershot in 1907, and Robertson was to be a regular wartime correspondent. Some correspondents received game from the Sandringham estate during the war. The King also took a special interest in the 4th (Guards) Brigade, the later Guards Division, and the Household regiments serving with 7th Cavalry Brigade. Much of the correspondence reaching the King and his Secretaries emanated from the Western Front, but they were also informed of events elsewhere, particularly at the Dardanelles. Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) correspondents included General Sir Ian Hamilton; Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, commanding the Anzac Corps and an old friend of Wigram, who continued to correspond throughout the war; and Major General Alexander Godley, commanding the New Zealand Division. Elsewhere in the Middle East, correspondents included General Sir Edmund Allenby, commanding in Palestine from 1917 to 1919; Brigadier General Gilbert Clayton, head

[16] Ian F. W. Beckett (2000) 'King George V and his Generals', in Matthew Hughes and Matthew Seligmann, eds *Leadership in Conflict, 1914–18* (Barnsley: Leo Cooper), pp247–64.

of the Military Intelligence Department in Cairo, who forwarded several of the reports of T. E. Lawrence; and General Sir John Nixon, commanding in Mesopotamia from 1915 to 1916 and another of Wigram's Indian Army friends. In addition to correspondents, the King regularly saw officers while they were on leave in London.

During the Second World War, George VI saw Alan Brooke regularly, often keeping him for over an hour.[17] Montgomery also often communicated with the King, sending him operational reports on the Guards, while the King also received Ultra intelligence.[18] George VI sent many messages of congratulations direct to field commanders during the Second World War. In June 1941, for example, he softened Wavell's dismissal from the Middle East Command by offering his thanks for his efforts: 'Though for a long time handicapped by inferiority in numbers and equipment, and in spite of the strain of conducting campaigns in several theatres at once, you have won great and historic victories for the arms of the British Empire.'[19] The King also sent a special separate message to the Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, Eisenhower, in May 1943 when it was acknowledged by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, that the latter had erred in asking the King initially to send a message to troops in the theatre that had not been routed through Eisenhower: it was necessary 'in view of the great importance of keeping things sweet'.[20] Otherwise, the King does not appear to have had as much military correspondence with subordinate commanders either directly or through his Private Secretaries as had his father, possibly because he had not such an extensive personal acquaintance with military figures, having left military service in 1919.

Adorning the Relationship

One last aspect that needs to be mentioned is that monarchs seem to have a particular fascination with the minutiae of uniforms and distinctions. This was certainly true of Queen Victoria and George, Duke of Cambridge. But Edward VII also took special interest in the Guards' dress

[17] Later Viscount Alanbrooke, from 1945.

[18] Danchev and Todman, *War Diaries*, pp95; 115; 130; 149; 206; 239; 275; 315; 385; 455; 504; 512–13; 615; 672; Bradford, *George VI*, pp305; 352; 364.

[19] RA PS/PSO/GVI/C/138/08, George VI to Wavell, 24 June 1941.

[20] RA PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/05123/086, Churchill to Hardinge, 28 March 1943.

and accoutrements. In 1905 he also took exception to the removal of the red puggaree worn by the Duke of Cornwall's Light infantry, a distinction relating to the role of the 46th Foot at Brandywine during the American War of Independence. The Director of Supplies and Clothing argued that this was only reiterating a decision previously taken by the Duke of Cambridge in 1880 but Edward insisted on its reinstatement in February 1906.[21]

Meeting George VI on one occasion in February 1945 Alan Brooke found the King 'thrilled about the new medal ribbon he has been devising, and had an envelope full of them in his pocket'. Similarly, back in October 1944, the King had told the Adjutant General that that 'all questions relating to uniform must come before me before any alterations to it are discussed, let alone settled'. He wanted a dark blue and not khaki uniform adopted for ceremonial so that the Army would be 'popular & for soldiers to have a uniform which they will be proud of'. The Household Division, however, should revert to the pre-war full dress.

The King had also questioned Montgomery's wearing of a black Royal Armoured Corps beret, which he said was 'a flagrant departure from the orthodox uniform of a general'. Montgomery had suggested to the King's Private Secretary, Sir Alan Lascelles, that the beret was 'worth three divisions' in moral terms as a sign of recognition among the troops. Subsequently, in February 1944, by which time the beret was now apparently worth 'at least an Army Corps', Montgomery was able to persuade the King to permit it.[22] George VI had readily acquiesced in the decision to mount guard at Horse Guards in Whitehall dismounted and in service dress in March 1939, but he directed that full dress was be resumed in April 1949. In 1938 he had indicated his dislike of a new badge for National Defence companies. He again indicated his disapproval of a new collar badge for other ranks of the South Lancashire Regiment in December 1950 and of officers of the Royal Tank Regiment wearing cavalry-style cross belts in No 1. Dress in February 1951. He also suggested the band

[21] Sidney Lee (1927) *King Edward VII: A Biography* 2 vols. (London: Macmillan) II, pp208–10.

[22] Danchev and Todman, *War Diaries*, p663; John Wheeler-Bennett (1958) *King George VI: His Life and Reign* (London: Macmillan), p617; Stephen Brooks, ed (2008), *Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy* (Stroud: History Press for Army Records Society), pp42; 325.

of the Life Guards wear white rather than red plumes in March 1951.[23] According to Jonathan Dimbleby's biography of Prince Charles, he, too, is a 'meticulous student of military procedure and discipline'.[24]

The Crown and Army 'Politics'

Turning to the more politicised role of the monarchy with respect to the Army, Queen Victoria had never made any secret of her view that the Army was decidedly 'not the property of Parliament'. As already indicated, she had pressed strongly for Connaught to succeed Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief.[25] Moreover, the architect of the changes in War Office administration effected in 1904, Lord Esher, contemplated Edward VII becoming a much more active, Commander-in-Chief. Edward himself ominously declared to Field Marshal Lord Roberts in February 1904 that a Commander-in-Chief other than the monarch was only needed 'when the Sovereign happens to be a Queen'. As suggested earlier, the new post of Inspector-General of the Forces, was vested in Connaught: Field Marshal Lord Grenfell had turned it down as he would not act as 'a d—d Royal warming pan'.[26]

Edward VII, who had a keen interest in military affairs, had been a key supporter of the Esher Committee and exercised an influence not only over those initially appointed to the new Army Council in 1904 but also their successors. To the intense irritation of the Secretary of State for War, Hugh Arnold-Forster, the King communicated regularly with Esher with regard to army affairs. Arnold-Forster testily wrote to the King's Private Secretary, that if it was the King who wished to inform the War Office of his wishes, he would not, as Esher was doing, do so 'through 'the channel

[23] RA PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/03639/2, Hardinge to Athlone, 2 February 1939; ibid., 03639/4, Adeane to Abel Smith, 26 March 1949; ibid., 02825/5, Hardinge to Hore-Belisha, 22 February 1938; ibid., 00651/09, Strachey to Lascelles, 5 December 1950; ibid., 00595/D/382, Lascelles to Montgomery, 20 February 1951; ibid., 01853/5, Adeane to St. George, 29 March 1951.

[24] Jonathan Dimbleby (1994) *The Prince of Wales* (London: Little, Brown), p515.

[25] British Library, Lansdowne Mss, L(5)42, Bigge to Lansdowne, 26 August 1895; Frank Hardie (1938) *The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861–1901* 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp178–82.

[26] Beckett, 'Selection by Disparagement', p47; Hew Strachan (1997) *The Politics of the British Army* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp68–9.

of an unauthorised person communicating with my Private Secretary'.[27] In turn, the King complained that he had not been properly consulted on the issue of decentralisation of district command and staff duties, making 'voluminous' comments on the draft Army Order. Being presented in July 1905 with a further Army Order on the subject, almost as a *fait accompli*, particularly irked him. Knollys informed the Prime Minister 'that it will be impossible in future for His Majesty to give his assent to proposals of this degree of importance at such very short notice, practically of a few minutes only'.[28] He was equally critical of other aspects of Arnold-Forster's reform plans. He regarded the launching of the *Army Journal*, which the Army Council had endorsed, as a grave error, in that it allowed serving officers to express their views in public: 'I will neither sanction nor support it in any way, and this should be clearly understood, so I wash my hands of the whole matter. The AC can now act as they please, but they will (at least I hope so) regret having started it. I hope that it may be of short duration!'[29]

Arnold-Forster's Liberal successor, Haldane, was careful to cultivate the King's support. Accordingly, Edward embraced the creation of the Territorial Force, summoning Lords Lieutenant to urge them to support the scheme in October 1907. He presented Colours to 108 new units in a spectacular ceremony at Windsor in June 1909, as well as presiding over reviews of Territorials in West and East Lancashire in July. He even suggested that no one should be appointed a Deputy Lieutenant unless they had served for at least ten years in the armed forces or on a County Territorial Association.[30]

George V was readier to accept perceived constitutional proprieties reflecting his comparative lack of interest in politics. In public, he was a model of scrupulous rectitude, whatever his personal views. In private, however, his language could have 'about it the tang and exuberance of the salt sea waves', and he was conservative by nature. Thus, while prepared to accept 'the larger transformations', George V acted to preserve

[27] Ian F. W. Beckett (1981) 'H. O. Arnold-Forster and the Volunteers', in Ian F. W. Beckett and John Gooch, eds *Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, 1846–1970* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 47–68, p55.

[28] Ibid. See also Christopher Hibbert (2007) *Edward VII, the Last Victorian King* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) p208.

[29] Lee, *Edward VII*, pp200–02; 207; 210–14.

[30] Ibid., pp501–9.

the royal prerogative where smaller encroachments 'appeared to him to detract from the repute of the Crown', such as ecclesiastical appointments, and the conferment of honours and appointments.[31]

Even before the Great War, the dangers of the Army involving the monarchy in political affairs were fully demonstrated by the Curragh incident in March 1914. Through a series of misunderstandings, officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh camp near Dublin, and many other officers serving in and beyond Ireland, threatened to resign if called upon to coerce Ulster into accepting the imposition of Irish Home Rule.[32] It was an unauthorised use of the King's name in orders from the War Office that did much to induce obedience, since it was suggested that he had personally approved what were perceived to be highly distasteful orders. Major General Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding the 5th Division, shouldered the blame for spreading this mistaken impression through the Irish Command but, in fact, it was the wholly bogus fabrication of the GOC in Dublin, General Sir Arthur Paget. The King was perturbed by events of which he had not known in advance and secured a pledge from Asquith that no military movements would be ordered in Ulster without him being consulted.[33] In terms of the damage done to civil–military relations and its continuing repercussions well into July 1914, the Curragh affair was the worst possible basis from which to embark upon a major war. Moreover, the contest between the soldiers and the politicians for the control of strategic policy exacerbated mutual hostility. Sir William Robertson, CIGS between December 1915 and February 1918, was not beyond veiled hints at the benefits of military dictatorship. Such talk alarmed the King's Assistant Private Secretary, Clive Wigram, when it was suggested that the King should turn out the politicians and instal a military government. As Wigram wrote to Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson on one occasion, 'The people, the press and Parliament would not for one moment stand such an unconstitutional act, and it is asking for disaster.'[34]

[31] Harold Nicholson (1952) *King George V: His Life and Times* (London: Constable and Co), pp249–50; 510–11.

[32] Ian F. W. Beckett, ed (1986) *The Army and the Curragh Incident, 1914* (London: Bodley Head), pp57–64 in particular.

[33] Ibid., pp15; 25; 88; 106; 132–5; 154–5; 226–7; 317–8; 323; 326; Richard Holmes (1981) *The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French* (London: Leo Cooper) p184.

[34] David Woodward, ed (1989) *The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, CIGS, 1915–18* (London: Bodley Head for Army Records Society), pp40–1; 315 n.23; National Army Museum (hereafter NAM) Rawlinson Mss, 5201-22-73, Wigram to Rawlinson, 18 April 1918.

Wigram also believed that it was the long-term intention of David Lloyd George, who became Prime Minister in December 1916, to destroy the monarchy. Thus, Lloyd George's attempt to subordinate Haig to the French general, Robert Nivelle, in February 1917 was portrayed as weakening the Army in order, in turn, to undermine the monarchy. Characterised by Lord Beaverbrook as the 'keeper of the Palace gates', Haig was urged not to resign, lest Lloyd George appeal to the country and 'possibly come back as a Dictator'. The King concurred with Wigram's analysis and believed that his own position 'would then be very difficult. He would be blamed for causing a General Election which would cost the country a million, and stop munitions work etc.'[35]

It is clear, however, that soldiers such as Haig and Robertson made maximum use of their ability to communicate either directly with the King, or through Stamfordham and Wigram. Haig and Robertson most certainly consciously undermined Sir John French's position as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force. French did not help his own position by attempting to discredit the Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, over the so-called shells scandal in May 1915, the King being a personal friend and firm supporter of Kitchener.[36] The dispute between French and Haig over the deployment of the reserves at Loos in September 1915 brought the issue of French's future to a head, especially as Haig ensured that documents contradicting French's official despatch reached the King through Lady Haig and Stamfordham. In October, while Robertson, bolstered by Haig, impressed this lack of confidence in French on Stamfordham in London, the King was visiting the Western Front. During his tour, George V took further soundings on French. Absent in London for a crucial two days, French tried to restrict the royal visit, but the King's blunt reply to such attempts was that French could 'go to hell'.[37] Much to Haig's chagrin, the King fractured his pelvis

[35] National Library of Scotland (hereafter NLS) Haig Mss, Ms 3155, Haig, Diary, 9 and 11 March 1917; Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge (hereafter CAC) Rawlinson Mss, RAWL 1/7, Rawlinson diary, 12 March 1917; David Woodward (1983) *Lloyd George and the Generals* (Newark: University of Delaware Press), p150; Gerard De Groot (1988) *Douglas Haig, 1861–1928* (London: Unwin Hyman), pp308–9; Robert Blake, ed (1952) *The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914–19* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), p209; Lord Beaverbrook (1956) *Men and Power, 1917–18* (London, Hutchinson), p165.

[36] See Peter Fraser (1983) 'The British "Shells Scandal" of 1915' *Canadian Journal of History*, 18(1) 69–86.

[37] Kenneth Rose (1983) *King George V* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) pp192–3.

in falling from a horse lent him by Haig on 28 October 1915 and had consequently to curtail his visit. The message from the Army, however, had already struck home. The King wrote to Stamfordham three days before his accident, 'I find that several of the most important Generals have entirely lost confidence in the C.in.C. and they assured me that it was universal & that he must go, otherwise we shall never win this war. This has been my opinion for some time.'[38]

Upon his return to England, the King played a pivotal role in pressing Asquith and Kitchener to remove French. French resigned on 6 December 1915 and Haig formally succeeded to the command of the British Expeditionary Force on 19 December.[39] Esher, indeed, was despatched as a special emissary to ease French out of his command. Equally, through Stamfordham, the King pressed upon Asquith the need to reorganise the War Office in the absence of Kitchener, who had gone to assess the situation at Gallipoli. Robertson had long advocated restoring the primacy of the General Staff, submitting to Stamfordham in June 1915 a suggested outline of a new War Council. Kitchener, whom the King still supported, remained Secretary of State but, on 23 December 1915, Robertson became CIGS and sole military adviser to the War Council. Meeting the Secretary to the War Council, Colonel Maurice Hankey, on 14 December 1915, the King 'told me all about the forthcoming changes, Haig for French in France and Robertson as Chief of State, and rather hinted that he had done the whole thing'.[40] Thereafter, Haig was careful to continue to cultivate the King. In particular, Haig was assiduous in discussing appointments and dismissals, especially as the King regarded himself as the proper authority to deal with injustices to officers.

In many respects, the events of December 1915 represented the apogee of the King's real influence over military affairs. The King regarded the renewed grip of the soldiers upon the formulation of strategy as quite proper since they were the military experts. It posed, however, an increasing threat to his own position when his concern to retain Haig and Robertson clashed with the determination of Lloyd George to remove them. The King's support was certainly one of a number

[38] RA PS/PSO/GV/C/Q./2522/3/182 and 185, Robertson to Wigram, 19 June and 13 July 1915; Nicholson, *George V*, p267.

[39] Ian F. W. Beckett (2014) *The Great War* (Abingdon: Routledge) p156.

[40] CAC Hankey Mss, HNKY I/1, Hankey, Diary, 14 December 1915.

of potential advantages favouring Haig and Robertson against Lloyd George, who became Secretary of State for War on Kitchener's death in June 1916 and, subsequently, of course, Prime Minister. Yet, while Lloyd George could not find a realistic alternative to Haig as Commander-in-Chief in France and Flanders, he derived considerable leverage from the difficulty of his opponents in finding any realistic alternative to himself as Prime Minister. In real terms, therefore, there were distinct limitations as to how far the King could support his generals.[41]

Lloyd George's manoeuvres to place Haig under French command at the Calais Conference in February 1917, for example, directly challenged the King's prerogative in subordinating his Army to a foreign power without his consent. Fearing that, if Haig resigned, Lloyd George might call an election with potentially dangerous consequences for the monarchy, the King was insistent that there should be no resignation. He promised also to support Haig 'through thick and thin'. Such declarations did not necessarily offer much real protection should Lloyd George choose to press the issue. On this occasion, however, Lloyd George backed down.[42] By contrast, the King was unable to save Robertson as CIGS in February 1918. With Robertson's resignation, the King complained that he received far less information from the War Office and there was clearly deep suspicion of Robertson's successor, Henry Wilson. In November 1918 the King sent his personal congratulations to Haig on the achievement of victory, but, when Haig wished to publish the telegram, publication was denied in case Lloyd George regarded it as unconstitutional.[43]

Following the war, George V continued to make his views on military affairs known albeit in the knowledge that he would have to acquiesce in the decisions of ministers. He had little eagerness with regard to the mechanisation of the cavalry. Thus, the decision to convert two cavalry regiments to armoured cars in March 1928 was regarded as inevitable but, as Stamfordham put it to the Secretary of State for War, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, 'I am sure you will not be surprised if I say that it is one which does not arouse any enthusiasm in His Majesty!' The subsequent notification that it would be two regiments of which the Prince of Wales

[41] Beckett, 'George V and his Generals'.

[42] RA PS/PSO/GV/C/Q/832/130, Haig to King, 28 February 1917; ibid., 832/134, Stamfordham to Haig, 5 March 1917; Blake, *Private Papers*, p. 209.

[43] NAM, Rawlinson Mss, 5201-33-73, Wigram to Rawlinson 18 April, 13 May and 4 September 1918; Blake, *Private Papers*, pp293; 343–4.

and the Duke of York were respectively Colonels-in-Chief, the 11th Hussars and 12th Royal Lancers, converted was 'without exaggeration, a shock to His Majesty' but it was acknowledged that the King could only abide by the decision of his ministers.[44]

George VI was inclined to do little more than approving his ministers' decisions although he did seek an interview with the Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha, over the latter's desire to merge the Royal Military College and Royal Military Academy in February 1939 before approving it.[45] He had been more assertive when the Honorary Colonel of the King's Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC), Sir John Davidson, appealed to him as Colonel-in-Chief in April 1938 over Hore-Belisha's attempt to rationalise recruitment through discontinuing the privileges of the KRRC, to reject recruits on their arrival at the depot. Davidson argued that as the KRRC was now an integral part of a mechanised brigade, it required the very best men. Since it appeared that the right of rejection was rarely exercised, the King felt it a pity to discontinue it. Hore-Belisha countered that the others affected—the Rifle Brigade, the Royal Army Service Corps and the Royal Corps of Signals—had all agreed to drop the privilege, and it would be anomalous to leave the KRRC as the only unit outside the Guards and Household Cavalry able to complicate the recruitment process by remaining with the privilege. Davidson then discovered that the Rifle Brigade had not actually agreed to the change but the papers had been submitted to Malcolm Murray, the Comptroller of the Duke of Connaught, who was its Colonel-in-Chief so that the latter would be prepared if the matter came before him. Hardinge, therefore, was surprised that the Rifle Brigade had agreed to its removal and felt it was now too late 'to take up the cudgels' on its behalf. The King then insisted that the KRRC retain the privilege.[46]

[44] RA PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/01153/04, Stamfordham to Worthington-Evans, 3 March 1928; ibid., 01153/07, Stamfordham to Worthington-Evans, 7 March 1928.

[45] RA PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/03651/01, Hore-Belisha to Hardinge, 2 February 1939; ibid., 03651/02, Hardinge to Hore-Belisha, 3 February 1939; ibid., 03651/03, Note by Hardinge, 6 February 1939.

[46] RA PS/PSO/GVI/PS/ARMY/01139/30, Davidson to Hardinge, 28 April 1938; ibid., 01139/31, Hardinge to Davidson, 2 May 1938; ibid., 01139/33, Hardinge to Hore-Belisha, 9 May 1938; 01139/36, Hore-Belisha to Hardinge, 20 June 1938; ibid., 01133/38, Davidson to Hardinge, 28 June 1938; ibid., 01139/40, Davidson to Hardinge, 4 July 1938; ibid., 01139/41, Hardinge to Davidson, 6 July 1938; ibid., 01139/42, Hardinge to Hore-Belisha, 6 July 1938.

By contrast with George V's experience in the Great War, however, there was only one real episode during the Second World War suggesting any significant Royal intervention. Historians have disagreed on the issue of the resignation of Leslie Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State in January 1940. Andrew Roberts has argued that George VI 'actively conspired to bring down the War Secretary'. Sarah Bradford, on the other hand, has seen the King's role within the parameters of his constitutional rights to advice, counsel and warn. Robert Rhodes James has considered the King's role minimal and that he did no more than alert the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, to the Army's feelings.[47]

Never very popular with the soldiers, Hore-Belisha, who was Jewish, believed as a result of a visit to France in November 1939 that the British Expeditionary Force was not doing as much as the French to construct pill-boxes on its sector of the front. Gort took considerable exception to this. Prince Henry may well have discussed the Army's discomfiture with the King when back in London in mid-November. Gort's Chief of Staff, Major General Henry Pownall, most certainly did so with Hardinge and the King when visiting London ostensibly to arrange for the King's visit to France. Pownall also spoke to Sir James Grigg, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the War Office; Sir Horace Wilson, the head of the Civil Service; and Sir Maurice Hankey, the former Cabinet Secretary, now a member of the War Cabinet. Having visited France himself on 30 November to ascertain the situation, the CIGS, General Sir Edmond Ironside, spoke to the King on 3 December. According to Ironside, George was angered by what he had heard 'and distressed by the offence evidently given to his army in the field'. Ironside had also warned Hore-Belisha that the King had approved Gort's appointment and he 'must not be monkeyed about'. Accompanied by Prince Henry and Hardinge, the King then visited France on 4 December. Having spoken to Hardinge, Pownall noted in his diary:

> Both the King and Hardinge are under no illusions about Hore-Belisha and realise that he must go. We did not fail to keep them fully informed of all the details of H-B's recent disgraceful behaviour, and there's no doubt we have the Palace on our side against him. The King, when I sat next to him at

[47] Andrew Roberts (1994) *Eminent Churchillians* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), p27; Bradford, *George VI*, p305; Robert Rhodes James (1999) *A Spirit Undaunted: The Political Role of George VI* (London: Abacus), p179.

> dinner, went so far as to ask me who, in my view, should replace H-B at the War Office. I told him M[alcolm] Macdonald & he seemed to like the idea.[48]

The King saw Neville Chamberlain on his return, suggesting he speak to Ironside, and mentioned that

> Gort, his Staff & the Generals were upset by H-B's remarks, which they knew to be most unfair. I said Heads of Depts did not usually run their own Dept. The PM told me he hoped to go to France himself next Friday & that he would have a talk to Gort on this matter, and also that he would go to Paris and hold a meeting of the Supreme War Council on Monday 18th Dec.[49]

Chamberlain duly went to France on 15 December to confer with Gort. Subsequently, Chamberlain decided to move Hore-Belisha to the Ministry of Information but was then warned by the Foreign Secretary, Halifax, that a Jew would be unsuitable. Hore-Belisha then turned down a non-Cabinet post at the Board of Trade and resigned on 5 January 1940. According to the Conservative MP, 'Chips' Channon, rumours circulated that the King had been primarily responsible. Chamberlain also told Hardinge he 'wants Your Majesty to know that H-B is saying your attitude towards him has changed and that you were anxious for his removal. That is only what one would expect of him.'[50] The King, however, was not told of the precise circumstances of Hore-Belisha's removal.[51] Clearly, the King's unhappiness with Hore-Belisha was a significant factor in the affair but it obviously was not his decision to remove him from the War Office. There is little indication of any other major intervention though, in 1946, Montgomery was unable as CIGS to cut the Guards Brigade in the same proportion as the rest of the infantry when they appealed to the King.[52]

[48] Brian Bond, ed (1973) *Chief of Staff: the Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall*, 2 vols, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books).

[49] Charles Hardinge of Penshurst (1947) *Old Diplomacy* (London: Jonathan Cape).

[50] Charles Douglas-Home and Saul Kelly (2000) *Dignified and Efficient: The British Monarchy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Claridge Press).

[51] Bradford, *George VI*, pp305–8; Rhodes James, *Spirit Undaunted*, pp179–84; Robert Rhodes James (2000) *Chips: The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon* (London: Orion) p229; J. R. Colville (1972) *Man of Valour: Field Marshal; Lord Gort VC* (London: Collins), pp161–5; Minney, *Private Papers of Hore-Belisha*, pp266; 281; Brian Bond (1981) 'Leslie Hore-Belisha at the War Office', in Beckett and Gooch, eds *Politicians and Defence*, pp110–53.

[52] Strachan, *Politics of British Army*, p71.

As might be supposed, rather less is known of Her Majesty the Queen's interaction with the Army in times of civil–military tensions. In a speech at a gathering of regimental colonels in November 1956, she praised the regimental system, saying 'There is no first among the regiments and corps of my Army and there is no last; all are bound in the same spirit of brotherhood and proud service to sovereign and country and each regards itself—with every reason—as second to none.'[53] It has been suggested that this was a pre-emptive strike orchestrated by the Army against the cuts intended by Duncan Sandys. In 1991, too, after Field Marshal Sir John Chapple had communicated the extent of the reductions planned under the government's 'Options for Change' policy, it became known that the Queen was unhappy.[54] The opposition of the Prince of Wales to the amalgamation of four regiments of which he was Colonel-in-Chief was also made known, Charles's letter to the Colonel of the Cheshire Regiment becoming public in October 1991.[55] In a speech at the Mansion House after a parade marking the end of the First Gulf War, Charles also spoke up for the regimental system, having earlier remarked remarked to a friend, 'it is a tragedy to do away with the best things'.[56] Charles also wrote to the new Minister of Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, to try and save the Army's bands, urging other members of the royal family to do likewise.

The recent publication of Prince Charles's letters, including those to the then Labour Minister of Defence, Geoff 'Buff' Hoon, along with Jonathan Dimbleby's authorised biography has provided further evidence of the Prince's deep interest in, and concern for, the Army. The Prince has clearly made his views known on a number of occasions, supporting disabled servicemen, protesting at medals for Falklands War casualties being sent to families in jiffy bags, raising the need for better accommodation for troops in the Gulf in 1990, and so on.[57] He has also been a fierce defender of the Army's honour. In 1980, for example, the Mayor of Bridgend made the error of protesting that the Welsh Guards had marched through the town

[53] 'The Queen Dines with the Army', *The Times*, 28 November 1958.

[54] See, for instance, 'Royal Cavalry to be Axed in Defence Cuts', *Sunday Times*, 7 July 1991; 'Royal Family's distress', *The Times*, 14 October 1991.

[55] Ibid.

[56] David French (2005) *Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British People, 1870–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p2; Strachan, *Politics of British Army*, pp72; 214–15; 270; Dimbleby, *Prince of Wales*, pp515; 520; 523.

[57] Dimbleby, *Prince of Wales*, pp515–19.

without saluting the war memorial. This elicited a reply from Prince Charles that there was no such regulation, and did not constitute disrespect:

> The final thing I would like to say is that I strongly recommend you check your facts more carefully before you make unfair complaints about a regiment, which on the whole, takes enormous trouble to conduct their business in the most correct manner possible and which also takes great pride in its long and close association with the principality. I also take great pride in my regiment and in its ties with Wales and I must admit I find it extremely difficult to understand your particular attitude in this whole business.[58]

Other than Dimbleby's revelations, it is also known that, as Colonel of the Welsh Guards, the Prince raised the issue of there being too few black soldiers in the Household Division in 1986, supporting the first black recruit to the Grenadier Guards in 1987 although the man in question then left the Army in 1990.[59]

Conclusion

What then can be said in conclusion? Writing in 1997, Hew Strachan drew attention to the view of Peter Dietz, a retired brigadier, to the effect that as the institution of monarchy was being undermined by media attention, the Army might ultimately find its traditionally close association with the Crown counter-productive.[60] That appears far less likely now for times have moved on. Although media focus on the monarchy has hardly diminished, the military service of Princes William and Harry has often acted as a counterbalance to any more critical publicity given the royal family's other activities. While the political influence of both Crown and Army diminished throughout the twentieth century, the special relationship endures to the benefit of both institutions.

[58] Ibid.
[59] *The Times*, 16 June 1986; 4 May 1987; 16 May 1988; 10 April 1996.
[60] Strachan, *Politics of the Army*, p62.

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CHAPTER 6

Measuring British Public Opinion on the Monarchy and the Royal Family

Roger Mortimore

Introduction

Britain's monarchy has outlived the age when unelected autocracy was normal in the Western world. In the democratic age, forms of government are generally subject to popular consent; in many other countries monarchies have been replaced by elected heads of state. What the public think about the monarchy is therefore a key aspect in understanding both its history and its future. The monarchy's survival has been, and will be, ultimately dependent on the public's respect and belief that there is a value in its existence. In fact, the public seem to have consistently supported it, often greatly valued and cherished it, and the monarchy has not merely survived but flourished.

Yet until a very recent period, this has amounted to no more than a generally held belief: direct measurements of opinion have been rare. Britain has had no referendum on the monarchy, nor a general election in which it was an issue between the major parties; nor, until the 1990s, did it have even semi-regular opinion polls to test whether the people wished to retain the monarchy or would prefer a republic. The reason is perhaps understandable: the broad majority of support was so obvious that there was

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felt to be little value in measuring it. The opposing minority perhaps saw nothing to be gained by testing their strength. But the result is a frustrating paucity of solid evidence about what ordinary Britons thought about the institution and the royal family until a comparatively recent date.

The systematic measurement of public opinion, even on attitudes to politicians and political parties, had to wait until barely eighty years ago.[1] British governments have depended for their legitimacy on some form of popular election since at least the eighteenth century. For the more subtle nuances of what the public thought, and why those who had the franchise voted as they did, however, reliance remained on impressionistic sources. Public opinion was broadly held to be what the politicians and, later, the editors and cartoonists said it was, occasionally modified by the dissenting voice of mass public demonstration in one form or another. But this monopoly was definitively broken by the invention in 1935 by George Gallup and others of the modern public opinion poll. This device for assessing opinion quickly spread from its American roots to Britain and many other countries, even if it was a little slower here than in the USA to gain a sure foothold in the thinking of the powerful.[2] The popularity of leading political figures and the public's approval or otherwise of the government's record have been regularly measured since the late 1930s, and opinion polls have been for decades part of the common currency of political debate.

Despite the widespread use of opinion polls to measure attitudes on political and many other matters, royal issues were very late in coming under their spotlight. Occasional questions on peripheral matters were fielded, but the first-ever question to test support for retaining the monarchy and for its abolition seems not to have been asked until 1966. Regular polls had to wait until the royal family began to be an obsession of the tabloid press in the 1980s; extraordinarily, the oldest continuing trend series on the straight-choice, monarchy-or-republic, question began only in 1993. For the modern student, this is very frustrating. It not only leaves many fascinating historical questions about public opinion towards the royal family unanswered, but limits the value of the more voluminous

[1] For the best discussion of public opinion in the pre-polling age, see Walter Lippmann (1922) *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company).

[2] Robert M. Worcester, ed (1983) *Political Opinion Polling: An International Review* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan); Robert M. Worcester (1991) *British Public Opinion: A Guide to the History an Methodology of Political Opinion Polling* (Oxford: Blackwell). See also Laura Dumond Beers (2006) 'Whose opinion? Changing attitudes towards opinion polling in British politics, 1937–1964', *Twentieth Century British History*, 17(2) 177–205.

recent research because its findings cannot be put into any sort of historical context. Before the 1980s there were only a few sporadic measures on a variety of subjects, and there is little that can now be used as a yardstick to gain deeper understanding of current public attitudes.

Of some trends, we can be tolerably certain. It seems certain that public favourability towards the royal family and confidence in the survival of the monarchy fell sharply in the 1990s, but in the first decade-and-a-half of the twenty-first century both have risen again. It also seems clear that despite these substantial shifts in mood, over the same period the public's support in principle for the continuance of the monarchy itself was quite undented. But can we judge the real significance of these movements in opinion on the one hand and rock-steady stability on the other without knowing what the comparable figures would have been from polls in the 1950s or the 1970s—or, for that matter (if polls had only existed) the 1850s and 1870s?

Nevertheless, the findings of the polls help us understand the ebb and flow of public sentiment, even if we are sometimes constrained by lack of data. We can explore, too, where support was strongest and weakest, and the reasons for it, and we are also able to consider attitudes to particular aspects of the royal role, to the royal family's behaviour in both their public and private lives, and to some of the individuals themselves. All these matters have, on occasion, been tested by polling. With what we know from this evidence about the present and recent past we can also speculate about the future. We deal with some of these subjects in this chapter.

However, for the polls to function as reliable historical evidence they must be read critically. The message of the polls cannot be fully separated from the news agenda of the media at any particular period. News values influence the prominence with which issues are covered and frequently frame the terms in which they are discussed. The media also commission most British opinion polls, to assist their reporting. The very existence of those polls is usually thus a part of that agenda. They are rarely independent of it, even though the polls themselves attempt to measure impartially and with objectivity. When there are no polls, it is because the media has seen no use for them. At high points and low points, the evidence on public opinion has been collected assiduously, but of the periods of humdrum routine, when the Palace was 'not news', far less is known.

Nor must we forget that polls do not necessarily function only as passive observers: they are also events in themselves, serving as a vehicle for the expression of opinion as well as its measurement. During periods

of generally hostile news coverage, as in the early 1990s, the reportage becomes part of the chain of events, and this is as true of the polls as of the journalism. Moreover, wise decision-makers react to polls, which can provide essential information to aid management of public opinion, just as companies conduct research to guide their marketing and political parties use private polls to inform their election strategies. It is known that Buckingham Palace has commissioned public opinion research.[3] Tony Blair, who with his team played a pivotal role in shaping royal reaction in the days following the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, was noted for his assiduous attention to polling throughout his political career.[4]

Finally, we should remember that the public themselves pay attention to public opinion and can be influenced by it. In the case of elections, it is often suggested that the voters notice what the opinion polls are saying about the likely outcome, and that sometimes this affects their voting behaviour. As far as support for the monarchy is concerned, the process may be different: it seems probable that far fewer pay much attention to opinion poll findings on royal issues than on elections. But this does not prevent people from reacting to the state of public opinion as they perceive it from other sources, perhaps in particular from the content and tone of media coverage. During the 1990s the evidence suggests that supporters of the monarchy may have tended to greatly underestimate how widely their views were shared, and as a result became despondent and pessimistic about the future of the institution. More recently, with the Queen's Jubilees, the Duke of Cambridge's marriage and a new generation of eventual heirs to the throne, the pendulum has swung sharply in the opposite direction.

The Early History of Royal Polling

In the first decades in which opinion polls were conducted in Britain, the questions very rarely touched on royal issues or personalities. It does not seem that the lack of polling stemmed entirely, as is sometimes supposed, from either the pollsters or the public viewing such issues as taboo and so making such polls impractical—they were a perfectly practical proposition,

[3] J. F. O. McAllister 'A Woman's Work Is Never Done', *Time Magazine*, 9 April 2006; Robert Lacey (2003) *Monarch: The Life and Reign of Elizabeth II* (New York: Free Press), pp386–7.

[4] See Alastair Campbell (2007) *The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries* (London: Arrow), pp230–47.

but nobody commissioned them. Britain's first polling company, the British Institute of Public Opinion (usually known as 'Gallup' after its American parent) was set up at the start of 1937. As early as June of that year, it had asked its first royalty-related question (on whether the Duke and Duchess of Windsor should be invited to return to England to live). There is no indication that the public felt offended to be asked or inhibited to answer (the tiny proportion of those polled who failed to answer the question was fully in line with the numbers reacting in the same way to questions on other subjects).[5] Certainly it was not felt to have caused any insuperable problems, since it was repeated in the November poll.[6]

Probably the explanation for the sparsity of royal polling after this rests not with the pollsters but with their press clients. In June 1937, Gallup still had to find a press sponsor who would commission and publish its polls, and was polling primarily so as to have wares with which to interest potential media partners.[7] No doubt in such circumstances it made sense to cover as wide a range of subject matter as possible, if only to demonstrate what could be achieved. But when Gallup eventually found publications interested in paying for polls—first the magazine *Cavalcade*, then the *News Chronicle* newspaper—their editors were more interested in other subjects.[8] Probably, as the editors of a later compilation of Gallup data explained, 'survey questions were seldom asked about the monarchy as an institution and about the Royal Family as part of that institution. Both seemed too stable and secure to warrant detailed enquiry.'[9] But possibly also there was some reluctance to commission polls that seemed to question the existence of the monarchy because such things were 'not done'.

Nevertheless, royal topics were not entirely ignored over the succeeding decades. While there seems to have been no formal polling on the popularity of George VI, or of support for the monarchy during his reign,

[5] Only 4 % had no opinion or declined to answer; of those expressing a view, 61 % said they thought that the Duke and Duchess should be invited to return, and 39 % that they should not. See George H. Gallup, ed (1976) *The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, Great Britain, 1937–1975*, 2 vols (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), I, p2.

[6] Gallup, *Great Britain,* I, p3.

[7] Mark Roodhouse (2013) '"Fish-and-chip intelligence": Henry Durant and the British Institute of Public Opinion, 1936–63', *Twentieth Century British History*, 24(2), 224–48, p241; Anthony King and Robert Wybrow, eds (2001) *British Political Opinion 1937–2000: The Gallup Polls* (London: Politico).

[8] Roodhouse, 'Fish-and-chip intelligence', p241; King and Wybrow, *British Political Opinion*.

[9] King and Wybrow, *British Political Opinion*, p296.

government researchers exploring morale on the Home Front during the Second World War made occasional mention of public reactions to news about the King and Queen in their reports. Notably, the Ministry of Information's network of public opinion monitors were clearly asked to gauge reactions to the King's Empire Day broadcast on 24 May 1940 (in which he spoke of Hitler's intention to conquer the world). Although their reports were impressionistic rather than a quantitative measurement, their unanimity that the speech was well received is convincing. It was also variously described as 'moving', a 'grand effort' and 'just what was wanted', although the Ministry's summary also opined that it had 'a steadying but not deep effect' and noted that 'most frequent comments were on the improvement in His Majesty's delivery'.[10] Other topics were covered sporadically when normal polling resumed after the war, and these occasionally included controversial ones such as the cost of the future Queen's wedding in 1947 and reactions to the possibility that Princess Margaret might marry Group Captain Townsend in the 1950s.[11]

Monarchy or Republic?

However, it seems not to have been until 1966 that any client took the plunge by commissioning a poll directly measuring support for the monarchy. This was the BBC, perhaps surprisingly in view of the Corporation's generally ultra-cautious approach to Royal issues at the time.[12] It was commissioned for a *Panorama* programme to mark Prince Charles's eighteenth birthday, and the poll found that 'about a sixth of the British people think they would like to see the monarchy abolished'.[13] Three Gallup polls in the early and mid-1970s (Table 6.1) showed support for the status quo significantly higher than this, although they may have tilted the balance in the monarchy's favour by stating the alternative as 'a President, as they have in America and some European countries' at a period when the

[10] Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang, eds (2011) *Listening to Britain: Home Intelligence Reports on Britain's Finest Hour—May to September 1940* (London: Vintage), pp31–6.

[11] Gallup, *Great Britain,* I, pp165; 349.

[12] See Ben Pimlott (1998) 'Monarchy and the Message', in Jean Seaton, ed *Politics and the Media: Harlots and Prerogatives at the Turn of the Millennium* (Chichester: Wiley) 99–107, pp99–101.

[13] Jeremy Murray-Brown, ed (1969) *The Monarchy and Its Future* (London: Allen and Unwin), Introduction, pvii; Henry Luce III (1969) 'Monarchy: the Vital Strand', in Murray-Brown, ed *The Monarchy and Its Future*, p130. *Panorama* at that point was the BBC's flagship documentary series, known for its hard-hitting stories.

Table 6.1 Monarch or president? Q. Do you think we should continue having a King or Queen as head of state, or would you prefer a President, as they have in America and some European countries?

	King/Queen	*President*	*Don't know*
	%	*%*	*%*
January 1972	80	12	8
2–7 May 1973	80	11	9
11–16 February 1976	85	8	8

Source: Data reported in *Gallup Political Index*, Report no. 154 (May 1973), 90; Report no. 187 (February 1976), 16

public standing of the American presidency in Britain cannot have been at its highest. A British Social Attitudes survey in 1983 put support for abolishing the monarchy at just 3 %, but used a question wording (see below) that probably elicited lower support for abolition than a straight-choice question would have done.[14]

Not until 1993 did MORI for the first time ask 'Would you favour Britain becoming a republic or remaining a monarchy?'. The same question has been repeated in MORI (now Ipsos MORI) polls on many occasions since then; the results are shown in Table 6.2.

MORI's founder, Sir Robert Worcester, has described polling on this question as 'the most stable measure in British polling'.[15] The findings of the first MORI poll almost exactly replicated those of Gallup's *Panorama* poll a quarter of a century earlier. With the sole exception of one poll in 2005, every poll in the series after that until 2011 found support for the monarchy within three percentage points of 72 %.

Popular myth notwithstanding, this was even true in the traumatic week that followed the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. Then, 52 % said that they disapproved of the way that the royal family had handled the situation since Diana's death, while 66 % thought that Prince Charles should not be allowed to become King if he were to marry Camilla Parker Bowles.[16] However 73 % still said they favoured Britain remaining a monarchy with

[14] http://www.bsa-data.natcen.ac.uk/?_ga=1.6275763.1068730213.1415366354, accessed 23 October 2015.

[15] McAllister, 'A Woman's Work Is Never Done'.

[16] Poll for ABC: MORI interviewed 1063 GB adults aged 18+ by telephone on 4–5 September 1997, https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2116, accessed 14 November 2014.

Table 6.2 Monarchy or republic? Q. Would you favour Britain becoming a republic or remaining a monarchy?

	Republic	*Monarchy*	*Would not vote*	*Don't know*
	%	%	%	%
22–26 April 1993	18	69	n/a	14
7–12 January 1994	17	73	n/a	10
28–29 December 1994	20	71	n/a	9
6–7 September 1997	18	73	n/a	9
5–8 March 1998	19	74	n/a	7
18–20 August 1998	16	75	n/a	9
23–24 October 1998	16	74	n/a	10
5–6 November 1998	18	73	n/a	9
15–16 June 1999	16	74	n/a	10
8–10 November 1999[a]	16	74	2	8
8–9 June 2000[a]	19	74	2	8
13–15 December 2000	21	72	n/a	6
29 December 2000	15	73	n/a	12
5–6 April 2001[a]	20	71	n/a	9
10–12 April 2001[a]	19	70	3	8
14–16 December 2001[a]	21	70	4	5
1–3 February 2002	19	71	n/a	10
24–26 May 2002[a]	19	74	3	4
23–25 April 2004[b]	20	71	2	4
7–9 April 2005	22	65	n/a	13
20–22 April 2006	18	72	n/a	10
15–17 April 2011	18	75	n/a	7
12–14 May 2012	13	80	n/a	7
9–11 June 2012	15	77	n/a	8
10–13 November 2012	16	79	n/a	5
13–15 July 2013	17	77	n/a	6

Source: Ipsos MORI (http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=122&view=wide, accessed 28 October 2015)

Base: c. 600–1000 British adults in each poll

[a]Question wording 'If there were a referendum on the issue …'

[b]Question wording: 'Do you favour Britain electing its Head of State or do you favour Britain retaining the monarchy?'

18 % preferring a republic.[17] Yet other polls in 2012 and 2013 all found support for the monarchy marginally higher than this.

Other poll series have also found differences in the level of outright opposition to the monarchy, almost certainly reflecting differences in question wording. The British Social Attitudes survey asks 'Q. How important or unimportant do you think it is for Britain to continue to have a monarchy: very important, quite important, not very important, not at all important, or, do you think the monarchy should be abolished?'. After its initial measurement in 1983, the question was not repeated until 1994, but ran most years after that until 2012. It has always, except in 1983, found the number advocating abolition to be between 5 % and 11 %.[18] ICM's series, since 1997, has asked 'Do you think Britain would be better off or worse off without a Royal Family?' and has found bigger fluctuations, varying between a low of 18 % and a high of 38 % saying the country would be better off.[19] However, these have focused on the royal family rather than the monarchy as an institution, and not offering a 'would make no difference' option has probably acted to increase this figure.

Members of the Royal Family

Polling on royal issues has not, of course, been confined to testing support for the survival of the monarchy. Another frequently-researched topic has been attitudes towards individual members of the royal family. The Queen herself has been covered, especially with broadly phrased questions touching on satisfaction with or approval of her performance of her role, on which she invariably receives ratings that politicians can only dream of. In August 2012, a YouGov poll found that the vast majority of the public (84 %) had a 'positive opinion' rather than a negative one of the Queen.[20] In November of the same year, 90 % told Ipsos MORI they were satisfied with the way the Queen was doing her job as monarch. Even at the end of 1997, months after the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, 72 % were satisfied with her

[17] Poll for the *Sun*: MORI interviewed 602 GB adults aged 18+ by telephone on 6–7 September 1997, https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2189, accessed 14 November 2014.

[18] http://www.bsa-data.natcen.ac.uk/?_ga=1.6275763.1068730213.1415366354, accessed 23 October 2015.

[19] http://www.icmresearch.com/voting/monarchy-section, accessed 23 October 2015.

[20] Poll for the *Sunday Times*: YouGov interviewed 1731 GB adults aged 18+ online on 23–24 August 2012, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/sdx6k0u8c5/YG-Archives-Pol-ST-results-24-260812.pdf, accessed 9 January 2015.

performance.[21] By way of comparison, the highest-ever equivalent rating for a Prime Minister in Ipsos MORI's monthly polls dating back to 1977 is 75 %, and the long-term average is 39 %.[22]

Nevertheless, the Queen has usually not emerged as the single most popular member of the royal family in polls, that distinction being most often reserved for one of the younger generations. Asked in 1984 to say which members of the royal family they liked the most, the public put Prince Charles at the head of the list with 50 %, just ahead of the Queen (46 %) and Princess Diana (45 %). In September 2014, 20 % told YouGov that Prince Harry was their 'favourite member' of the royal family, with the Queen on 17 % and Prince William 10 %, although 32 % said they had no favourite.[23] But in January 1994, the Queen (44 %), Queen Mother (45 %) and Princess of Wales (47 %) scored almost equally as 'most liked'.[24] For most of the 1980s and 1990s, of course, the pivotal figure was the Princess of Wales. As the breakdown of her marriage began to leak into the public domain, there was something of a polarisation of opinions between her supporters and those of her husband, which is still to some extent reflected in attitudes to Prince Charles and to the Duchess of Cornwall almost two decades after Diana's death.

Numerous factors no doubt influence these preferences. Age is certainly one, with the youngest royals being most popular with the younger members of the public. The Queen had twice as many adherents among those aged 60+ (28 %) as did Prince Harry (14 %) in YouGov's 2014 poll. Gender has been another, with men being more likely to take Charles's side and women that of Diana. In February 1996, men thought, by 45 % to 37 %, that Prince Charles would on balance make a good King when he came to the throne in the future. Women split 42 % to 37 % in favour of his being a bad King; similarly only 44 % of men but 50 % of women were dissatisfied with the way he was doing his job as Prince of Wales.[25]

More detailed polling in 1984 revealed the virtues that each of the leading members of the royal family was perceived as possessing. Charles

[21] https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=124&view=wide, accessed 22 October 2015.

[22] https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/88/Political-Monitor-Satisfaction-Ratings-1997Present.aspx, accessed 22 October 2015.

[23] Poll for *Newsweek*: YouGov interviewed 2099 GB adults aged 18+ online on 8–9 September 2014.

[24] MORI, *British Public Opinion* newsletter, 17(1) (January-February 1994), 10. Poll for *Today* newspaper: MORI interviewed 1007 GB adults aged 18+ face-to-face on 7–12 January 1994.

[25] Poll for the *Independent on Sunday:* MORI interviewed 1165 GB adults aged 18+ face-to-face on 7–9 February 1996.

and Diana scored equally, well ahead of the others, in being seen as having the most pleasant personality. Charles was also considered to have the 'best' sense of humour and to be 'best' at handling the media. However, the Queen scored heavily as the most hard-working. Of the others, the Duke of Edinburgh was rated as most outspoken while Prince Andrew was thought to be the one who enjoyed himself the most and Princess Anne, the one most unfairly treated by the media.

Diana stood out, however, as the 'most glamorous', easily topping a list of male and female celebrities. She was picked as one of the two or three most highly rated by 56 %. Princess Michael of Kent came second with 27 %, and both outscored newsreader Selina Scott and soap stars Victoria Principal and Joan Collins, among others.[26] All these women of course, but above all Diana, were darlings of the popular press, guaranteed to sell newspapers and magazines if they appeared in headlines or a front page photograph. One tabloid editor of the period is reported as instructing one of his staff 'Give me a Sunday for Monday splash on the royals. Don't worry if it's not true—so long as there's not too much fuss about it afterwards'.[27]

Diana clearly provoked strong feelings, and the apparent siege mentality of some of her supporters has extended not only to hostility towards Prince Charles but to embracing the wilder conspiracy theories around her death. In September 2013, a YouGov poll reported that 38 % of the public believed that 'on the evidence made available so far', her death was not an accident. In later questions in the same poll, 8 % thought it was 'definitely true' and 25 % 'probably true' that she was assassinated, 25 % that it was definitely or probably true that MI6 was involved in her death and 16 % that it was definitely or probably true that the SAS was involved.[28]

[26] MORI, *British Public Opinion* newsletter, 6(5) (May 1984), 6. Poll for the *Daily Star*: MORI interviewed 1077 GB adults aged 18+ face-to-face on 24 April 1984.

[27] Kelvin McKenzie while editor of the *Sun*, according to Chippindale and Horrie. See Peter Chippindale and Chris Horrie (1999) *Stick It up Your Punter! The Uncut Story of the Sun Newspaper* (London: Faber and Faber), p127.

[28] Poll for the *Daily Express*:: YouGov interviewed 1615 GB adults aged 18+ online on 8–9 September 2013, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/09/17/38-brits-princess-dianas-death-was-not-accident/, accessed 26 November 2014. YouGov's finding was certainly not a freak result, though finding more conspiracy theorists than are usually picked up in polls not conducted online. In 2008, using a differently worded question and polling by telephone, Ipsos MORI found 24 % thought 'Princess Diana's death was the result of a conspiracy', while 64 % thought it was an accident and 12 % that neither was true or didn't know. But the same poll found many of the public equally credulous in other respects, with 30 % believing that 'evidence of UFO landings are being hidden from the public'. (Poll for the BBC: Ipsos MORI interviewed 1070 UK adults aged 16+ by telephone on 3–6 January 2008, https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/150/BBC-Survey-on-Trust-Issues.aspx, accessed 26 November 2014.).

Nevertheless, the public standing of Prince Charles has steadily recovered since the 1990s, although fewer have supported Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall. Even by June 1999, 65 % felt that Prince Charles 'has the affection of the public' and 69 % that he 'has the respect of the public'; but only 12 % and 15 % respectively said the same of Camilla Parker Bowles, although 57 % said they approved of the way she had behaved since the death of Diana.[29] In June 2012, 78 % were satisfied with the way Prince Charles was doing his job, although 36 % were still saying that he should give up his right to be the next monarch in favour of Prince William.[30] A couple of months later, YouGov reported that the public had a positive rather than a negative opinion of Prince Charles by a two-to-one majority, 64 % to 32 %, while in Camilla's case opinions were more evenly split, 48 % being positive and 43 % negative; women's opinions were now a little *more* positive than men's in both cases.[31]

Opinions, Attitudes and Values

But we should be wary of taking findings too literally, or assuming that they represent fixed opinions among the public. Some recent polling on attitudes to the Duchess of Cornwall demonstrates the effect which question wording can have on the findings, suggesting that attitudes are by no means entrenched and can be dramatically influenced by context and phrasing—influences which can as well be invoked by media coverage as by a pollster's question. In October 2014, a YouGov poll found that 'Thinking about if Prince Charles becomes king', 17 % of the public thought that his wife should become Queen, 46 % that she should 'have the title of Princess Consort' and 27 % that she should not have any title at all.[32] These findings

[29] Poll for the *Sun*: MORI interviewed 806 GB adults aged 18+ by telephone on 15–16 June 1999.

[30] Poll for the (London) *Evening Standard*: Ipsos MORI interviewed 1016 GB adults aged 18+ by telephone on 9–11 June 2012, https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2977/Satisfaction-with-the-Queen-at-record-high.aspx, accessed 22 October 2015.

[31] Poll for the *Sunday Times*: YouGov interviewed 1731 GB adults aged 18+ online on 23–24 August 2012, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/sdx6k0u8c5/YG-Archives-Pol-ST-results-24-260812.pdf, accessed 23 October 2015.

[32] YouGov interviewed 1883 GB adults aged 18+ online on 29–30 October 2014, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/cxcx0hk2zv/Internal_Results_141030_Royals_Website.pdf, accessed 28 October 2015.

were well in line with other polls on the same topic over several years, by YouGov and other companies.

But when YouGov asked the same question but in a different form, in June 2014, they got entirely different results. The wording used was 'In the UK, when a king is crowned his wife typically becomes queen consort. Thinking about if Prince Charles becomes king, which of the following comes closest to your view of his wife Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall?'. YouGov found 53 % saying that 'She should become queen consort, as is traditional for a reigning king's wife in the UK', while only 32 % preferred the alternative that 'She should be given a lesser title, out of sensitivity to Diana, Princess of Wales'. Only 14 % didn't know.[33] What is unclear is how far this apparent tripling of support for 'Queen Camilla' arose from a rejection of the linking of the issue to Diana, and being replaced by an emphasis on the concept on her becoming Queen as being normal practice, or some other related factor. Nevertheless, this is plainly one area in which opinions are considerably more fluid than is sometimes supposed. Polls can measure attitudes if they exist. But if they do not exist, what is uncovered may reflect only lightly-held opinions of the moment, which may nevertheless be mistaken for something more deeply felt.

The contrast between the mutability of these opinions and the stolid stability of support for the monarchy probably reflects a qualitative difference in the way these views are held. Sir Robert Worcester has drawn a distinction between three levels of views—opinions, attitudes and values.[34] For him, opinions are 'low salience, little thought about reactions to pollsters' questions about issues of the day, not very important to the respondent, not vital to their well-being or that of their family, unlikely to have been the topic of discussion or debate' in which they have participated. These are easily affected by political comment and attention by the media and are easily manipulated by question wording. Attitudes, by contrast, 'derive … from a deeper level of consciousness, are held with some conviction, and are likely to have been held for some time'. They may well be evidence-based, formed after deliberation, and if they change

[33] YouGov interviewed 667 GB adults aged 18+ online on 9 June 2014, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/y77stv13r3/YG-Archive-140609-Camilla.pdf, accessed 28 October 2015.

[34] Robert M. Worcester (1997) 'Why do we do what we do?', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 9(1), 2–16.

it may be because circumstances have changed, or because new evidence has overturned the basis of previous attitudes.

The most stable of the three types of perspective on individuals, institutions and events are values. Values, Worcester argues, tend to be 'learned parentally in many cases, and formed early in life and not likely to change, only harden as we grow older'. Values are not based on evidence or rational deliberation, and so are not normally susceptible to being changed by debate, persuasion or propaganda. This makes values, both in the individual case and in the aggregate, much less volatile than opinions or attitudes. The extraordinary stability displayed by the poll numbers suggests that the views of most Britons on the continuance of the monarchy constitute a value in this sense. In effect, almost everybody knows which side they are on, and neither events nor rhetoric will change that. Nevertheless, the stability of values should not be confused with their intensity. Where (and when) an individual's values conflict, that individual will be forced to choose between those conflicting values. Values may be maintained and yet not a driver of behaviour if other conflicting values have a more powerful effect.

No doubt many factors contribute to the resolution of such conflicts; one that is certainly likely to do so is a perception that one's values are, or are not, shared by other people. The influence of the perceived public mood on individuals' opinions is most clearly demonstrated in a phenomenon called a 'spiral of silence' (in which those who believe their opinions are unpopular become inhibited from expressing them, thereby further strengthening the impression that these are indeed minority opinions and creating a vicious circle).[35] The converse is equally true: popular and widely-held opinions feed on themselves to become stronger and push their opponents towards their own spiral of silence. Belief in the future survival of the monarchy may therefore be as important an indicator of the real depth of its support as the numbers who would prefer a republic.

During the 1990s, though public support for the monarchy remained stable, people's confidence in its long term future plummeted (see Table 6.3). At the start of the 1990s, more than two-thirds of the public expected the monarchy to survive for at least another half century; but doubts set

[35] See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1984) *The Spiral of Silence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Table 6.3 Does the monarchy have a future. Q. Looking to the future, do you think Britain will or will not have a monarchy in 50 years?

	Will	*Will not*	*Don't know*
	%	%	%
January 1990	69	11	20
February 1991	55	21	23
May 1992	46	30	24
December 1992	36	42	22
7–9 February 1996	33	43	24
13–16 December 1996	33	48	19
7–10 August 1997	35	48	17
4–5 September 1997	30	45	25
18–20 August 1998	32	44	24
5–6 November 1998	33	42	25
8–10 November 1999	29	45	26
29–30 June 2000	38	43	19
13–15 December 2000	35	43	22
5–6 April 2001	32	46	22
4–6 January 2002	39	43	18
24–26 May 2002	44	33	23
20–22 April 2006	41	40	19
15–17 April 2011	56	32	12
10–13 November 2012	60	27	14

Source: Ipsos MORI (https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=114&view=wide, accessed 23 October 2015)

Base: c. 600–2000 British adults in each poll

in quickly with the events of that troubled decade. By the time of the December 1992 surveys, at the end of the Queen's identified *annus horribilis* and just after the Windsor Castle fire, the doubters had a plurality for the first time. The 1990s ended with those predicting the monarchy's demise outnumbering those expecting its survival by three-to-two. However, the majority of these doomsayers were pessimistic supporters of the monarchy rather than optimistic opponents.

In the new millennium, there has been a substantial swing back, but one that has gone only part of the way towards reversing the loss of confidence that took place after 1990. Before that, just one in ten doubted the monarchy's medium-term survival. In November 2012, those doubts were held by two-and-a-half times as many. It is probably impossible in the foreseeable future that the survival of the monarchy

will ever again routinely be taken for granted by the vast majority of the public (including by a majority even of those who wished for its demise). Consequently, the future of the monarchy will always now be a live question. If, as seems probable, this mood of optimism or pessimism has the power to influence the extent to which people will adhere to their pro-Royal values when these conflict with their other values, the susceptibility of public confidence in the monarchy's future to fluctuation in the face of adverse events suggests a potential weakness in public support that is not revealed by the very stable continuance of support for the monarchy itself.

The Influence of the Fourth Estate

Media coverage, of course, plays a huge role in informing and probably in influencing the public's attitudes towards the royal family, their perceptions of other people's opinions and their expectations of its future. Nevertheless, polls consistently find widespread opposition to the extent of coverage, and the degree to which it is seen to be intrusive. In 1955, when Gallup polled twice on the relationship between Princess Margaret and Group Captain Townsend, they also asked about the press coverage of the issue and found that fully 40 % of the public thought that newspapers 'should not write about these things'.[36] In December 1979, 63 % said they thought that the media paid too much attention to the royal family. That figure was 61 % in April 1984, 67 % in February 1987 and 65 % in January 1990.[37] And in September 2012, after a French magazine published long-lens topless photographs of the Duchess of Cambridge, 57 % of the public said that the Press 'report too much of the royal family's lives and don't give them enough privacy'.[38] In this particular case, 82 % felt that it was wrong to publish the photographs.

Many of these responses reflect a public hostility to the media, and especially to the tabloid press, which is far more intense and widespread than any opposition to the monarchy has been. These attitudes are quite distinct to Britain. A European Commission survey in 2007 found that

[36] Gallup, *Great Britain,* I p349.

[37] MORI, *British Public Opinion,* (February 1990), Newsletter, 12(1), p7.

[38] YouGov interviewed 1731 GB adults aged 18+ online on 16–17 September 2012, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/rdmh413l0z/Kate%20Results%20120917.pdf, accessed 28 October 2015.

just 18 % of Britons said that they 'tended to trust' the Press. The lowest level found in any other EU-15 country was 35 % in Sweden while the EU-15 average was 46 %.[39] But distrust of the press's trustworthiness does not prevent the public buying the newspapers or absorbing many of the messages that they convey.

The press has often led the attack on the royal family (if rarely openly on the monarchy itself). It has found popular support when it frames its criticisms in terms of weak areas of the royal family's image. One recurring theme has been that the monarchy costs too much. This seems to have struck chords in public opinion even at periods when overall criticism of the royal family was muted. Probably much of the reaction is of a knee-jerk nature, and perhaps exaggerated by social desirability bias in the polling answers. It must be recognised that there is a tendency of some survey respondents to avoid answers they think might make other people, particularly the interviewer, view them less favourably. People are generally reluctant to approve lavish public spending of any description, and the royal family is by no means the only institution which poll respondents can be persuaded to describe as being too expensive. Nevertheless, the sentiment is real, and is one upon which the press has frequently picked.

Even in 1947, as preparations were made for the then-Princess Elizabeth's wedding against a background of public shortages and tightening austerity in government policies, Gallup found a sizeable number of critics, although they were only a minority: 29 % said they thought arrangements for the wedding were too elaborate, although 13 % felt they were too simple and 50 % 'about right'.[40] In November 2010, notwithstanding the apparently overwhelming popularity of the Westminster Abbey ceremony when it took place the following Spring, only 33 % said that they felt that the recently-engaged Prince William and Catherine Middleton should have 'a large state wedding similar to that of Charles and Diana's'. Fully 50 % thought they should have a more modest wedding.[41]

[39] European Commission *Eurobarometer 67: Public Opinion in the European Union* (Spring 2007), 57, https://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.htm, accessed 23 October 2015. The EU-15 are the countries that were members of the EU before May 2004.

[40] Gallup, *Great Britain,* I p165.

[41] Poll for the *Sunday Times*: YouGov interviewed 1967 GB adults aged 18+ online on 18–19 November 2010, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2010/11/30/modernising-monarchy/, accessed 26 November 2014.

More generally, polls have consistently found that the public at best evenly divided on the cost of the royal family. As early as 1972 an NOP poll found as many agreeing as disagreeing that 'The Royal Family should not receive as much money as it does'. By the middle of the '*annus horribilis*' of 1992, three-quarters of the public were prepared to oppose the current level of royal funding. More recent polls at less fraught times have not been quite so negative. Yet even in an otherwise entirely positive Ipsos MORI poll towards the end of 2012, the Diamond Jubilee year, more than half were still critical of this aspect of Britain's Royal arrangements (see Table 6.4).

Such criticism could also be personalised, apparently with success. In December 1966, public attacks on Prince Charles were still a rarity. On being informed that he 'has just reached the age of 18 and becomes entitled to an income of about £30,000 a year', half the public (51 %) said they disapproved of his getting it.[42]

It is difficult to believe that many Britons in 1966 were losing sleep over Prince Charles's allowance unless reminded about it, but one of a number of damaging stories running at the same time, had more resonance. This was around the arguments over the Queen's tax arrangements at the start of the 1990s. In January 1990, 75 % agreed that 'The Queen should pay poll tax like everyone else'. This is a slightly paradoxical finding, perhaps, since at that period one would have been pushed to find a third of that

Table 6.4 Cost of the monarchy. Q. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 'The Royal Family should not receive as much money as it does'

	Agree	*Disagree*	*Don't know*
	%	*%*	*%*
June 1972 (NOP)	48	48	4
January 1990 (MORI)	50	44	6
February 1991 (MORI)	64	28	8
May 1992 (MORI)	76	18	6
29–30 June 2000 (MORI)	64	29	7
10–13 November 2012 (Ipsos MORI)	52	47	6

Source: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=110&view=wide, accessed 26 September 2014

[42] Gallup *The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls*, II, p900.

number who would agree that anybody at all should pay the poll tax. It serves as a reminder, perhaps, that opinion polls usually elicit general indications of emotion rather than literal answers to the questions asked. In the same poll, 74 % agreed that the Queen should pay income tax, and that figure remained at 73 % a year later.[43]

It is presumably the resentment engendered by this issue, and perhaps in particular the perception that the Queen was being unfairly privileged, which is reflected in the sharp rise over the 1990–1992 period in the numbers feeling the royal family should not receive as much money as it did. It also presumably accounts for a willingness to agree to even more sweeping statements. In the January 1990 poll, 42 % said they thought that 'It is unfair that the Queen and the Royal Family have so much wealth when there are other people in Britain without enough to live on'.[44] In the same poll, 24 % agreed that 'The Royal Family is an expensive luxury the country cannot afford'. The latter figure had risen to 42 % by the following February, seemingly sitting oddly with only 14 % saying that Britain would be better off if the monarchy were abolished. However, once again the question wording should probably not be interpreted entirely literally. In the same poll a very similar number, 41 %, disagreed with the statement that 'Britain gets good value for money from the money it spends on the Royal Family'.[45] This may be a more accurate expression of their real feelings. It may also be, of course, that many draw a distinction between the cost of the monarchy as institution and the cost of the royal family as individuals.

Either way, these feelings remained active throughout the 1990s, even when the tax issue had been resolved and most of the negative coverage of royal issues was not cost-related. MORI found agreement that 'The Royal Family is an expensive luxury the country cannot afford' was still at 42 % in 1996, and 40 % in June 2000.[46] By the time of the Jubilee in 2012, things were a little better. The YouGov finding was that 27 % thought the money

[43] MORI, *British Public Opinion* (February 1990), Newsletter 13(1), pp7–9. Poll for the *Sunday Times*: MORI interviewed 1075 GB adults aged 18+ face-to-face on 6–8 January 1990.

[44] The poll showed that 53 % opted for the alternative statement that 'The Queen and the Royal Family are figureheads of the nation and our ambassadors abroad, and it is only right that they should have as much wealth as they do'; 6 % didn't know.

[45] MORI, *British Public Opinion* (March 1991), Newsletter 14(2), p6. Poll for the *Daily Mail*: MORI interviewed 629 GB adults aged 18+ by telephone on 12–13 February 1991.

[46] https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=117&view=wide, accessed 6 January 2015.

the royal family receives from the civil list represented bad value for money for the role they play, while 64 % thought them good value for money.[47] In 2013, ComRes found a less positive response when the relevant sums of money were mentioned. Told that 'The Royal Family receives £36.1 m a year from the taxpayer-funded Sovereign Grant', 43 % said they felt this was good value for money, but 40 % that it was not, with 17 % being don't knows.[48] Similarly, in January 2012 a ComRes poll found 77 % agreeing 'It would be wrong for the taxpayer to be required to contribute towards the cost of a new royal yacht'.[49] Cost clearly remains a vulnerable issue for the royal family, one around which resentment might be fomented, even when overall support for the monarchy seems to be at its highest and most solid level for years.

Conclusion

The advent of regular opinion polling has given us a perspective on the monarchy and royal family under Elizabeth II that was not available in any previous reign. Public opinion has always been of interest and often of immense importance, but in the past its measurement has been essentially a judgement call. For example, the likely public reaction if the King married a divorcée was a crucial factor in the Abdication crisis, but the King and the Prime Minister differed in their perceptions of what that reaction was likely to be.

Today, polls allow public opinion to be measured systematically and objectively. But it must be realised also that the interpretation of and reaction to public opinion via these polls still calls for good judgement. Is it more relevant to know that most of the public support the continuance of the monarchy or that most think it costs too much? Should the emphasis be on the apparent reality that the majority are satisfied with the way Prince

[47] Poll for the *Sun*, conducted 27–28 May 2012: YouGov interviewed 1743 GB adults aged 18+ online, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/bds05na0fe/YG-Archives-Pol-Sun-JubileeRoyalFamily-300512.pdf, accessed 9 January 2015.

[48] *Sunday Telegraph*, 27 July 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/10206708/Confidence-in-British-monarchy-at-all-time-high-poll-shows.html, accessed 6 January 2015.

[49] ComRes interviewed 2050 GB adults online on 18–19 January 2012, https://www.comres.co.uk/polls/independent-on-sundaysunday-mirror-political-poll-4/, accessed 28 October 2015.

Charles is doing his job or that a large minority say they think he should give up his right to the throne in favour of Prince William?

The monarchy has undergone some dramatic 'modernisations' in recent years, and it is plain that many of these have represented concessions to the force of public opinion as articulated by the media. These include the Queen paying tax, the opening of Buckingham Palace to the public, the decommissioning of the Royal Yacht without a replacement, and—most memorably, if perhaps most trivially—changes in protocol after the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, such as flying a flag at half-mast over the Palace. The polls, undoubtedly, have contributed to the force with which the Press has been able to convey its criticisms, and perhaps have given the appearance of substance to some fairly ephemeral reactions to topical news stories. Yet the underlying depth of feeling is real enough. The crowds turned out in London to express their joy at the Queen's Jubilees, but also huge crowds turned out spontaneously to express their grief at Diana's death. These are testament to that feeling.

To understand an institution like the British monarchy and its relationship with the public, more precise knowledge such as that offered by the polls is always welcome. But when so old an institution is in question, an understanding based only on the last forty or fifty years will always feel potentially inadequate. The greatest frustration in studying the polls comes from knowing what a recent innovation they are.

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PART III

Marketing the Windsor Brand

CHAPTER 7

The Abdication of Edward VIII: Legal and Constitutional Perspectives

Robert Blackburn

On 11 December 1936, Edward VIII formally abdicated his position as Monarch of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Defender of the Faith, and Emperor of India. He did so acting upon the constitutional advice, in other words political instruction, of the Prime Minister of the day, Stanley Baldwin. He had reigned on the throne for just 326 days. The ostensible reason for his departure was the King's unflinching wish and intention to marry the woman he loved, Mrs Wallis Simpson, an American by birth who was already married as well as being a divorcee from a earlier marriage, which was a proposition unacceptable to the British Cabinet as well as to the governments of the overseas Dominions where King Edward also reigned as monarch. The monarchy has faced a number of sensational and traumatic episodes in its modern history, but none so large in political, legal and constitutional terms as the Royal Abdication of 1936. The event stunned the nation, particularly as the British press coverage of the crisis was concentrated into just nine days of high drama. When the Prime Minister read out the King's Message to the House of Commons on 10 December that Edward was renouncing the throne, MPs were numbed into silence, causing an adjournment moved by the Leader of the Opposition to allow parliamentarians time to

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absorb the emotional and political impact of what had just been said and its consequences.[1]

King Edward was immediately replaced by the next in line of succession to the throne, his younger brother Prince Albert the Duke of York, who took his father's name as monarch, becoming George VI. The ex-King the next day left the country, never to return to live as he had hoped, and was re-titled His Royal Highness Prince Edward by Royal Proclamation on 15 December, then the Duke of Windsor by Letters Patent on 8 March the following year. Following a harrowing four months waiting for Mrs Simpson's divorce decree nisi to be made absolute, on 3 June 1937 Edward[2] and Wallis were married in France at the Château de Candé, near Tours, in the company of just nineteen friends, but no member of the royal family. They spent much of the next ten years travelling, Edward becoming Governor of the Bahamas during the Second World War, then setting up a permanent residence in Paris granted to them by the French government adjacent to the Bois de Boulogne. Edward died on 28 May 1972, twenty years after his brother George VI, who was succeeded by the present Queen, Elizabeth II, in 1952. His wife Wallis, the Duchess of Windsor who was never accorded the title of Her Royal Highness to the enormous hurt and anger of Edward, survived until 24 April 1986. Edward and Wallis now lie buried together behind the Royal Mausoleum at Frogmore House, close to Windsor Castle.

The romanticism and tragedy in this story, of 'the King who gave up his Throne for the woman he loved', together with the many conspiracy theories it has spawned, has generated a steady flow of historical books and films ever since, including an official biography of King Edward written by the historian Philip Ziegler published in 1990.[3] However, remarkably little research and analysis has been carried out on the legal and constitutional aspects of the abdication, even though these were fundamental to its causes, the manner in which it was negotiated, and its implementation. Some key assertions of law or convention buttressing the government's position were made by the Prime Minister throughout the crisis, which

[1] *Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2186.

[2] Edward VIII is referred to in this article as 'the King' for events occurring during his reign, rather than his post-abdication title of Duke of Windsor; or alternately as 'Edward', rather than David which was the name his family and friends called him. His full names were Edward Albert Christian George Andrew Patrick David.

[3] Philip Zeigler (1990) *King Edward VIII: The Official Biography* (London: Harper). See also Frances Donaldson (1974) *Edward VIII: The Road to Abdication* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson); Susan Williams (2003) *The People's King: The True Story of the Abdication* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

were almost universally accepted, then and subsequently, but in the writer's view were in fact highly questionable. Propositions of law and convention were prepared by government lawyers to support ministerial decisions that had been taken as a matter of policy and to exert control over the King. Statements about the law, the constitution and the monarchy were put forward as the grounds for the abdication, when the reality was the reverse—ministers' versions of the law and convention were shaped by their views on whether Edward's personality and private life rendered him suitable to remain on the throne. The abdication is unique for what it has to tell us about the nature of our constitutional law as it has operated, and continues to do so, at the highest echelons of the British political system.

The Constitutional Requirements of a King

No one can understand the abdication crisis from a legal and constitutional perspective unless the nature and role of the monarchy as it had come to exist by 1936 is appreciated. For it was the government's judgement of the personal incompatibility of Edward with the expectations and role of a modern-day monarch that led directly to his departure. Indeed constitutionally the abdication crisis should be seen as the most significant event in the history of the modern monarchy, for it settled without doubt and made clear that a monarch's role had become that of total personal subordination to the advice of ministers on all matters, even those relating to his or her private life. What a monarch's role was, or rather how it was perceived by the establishment, led directly to Edward's demise from the throne, as well as ruthlessly compounding itself as the model to be followed to the present day.

Whoever is monarch stands in possession of a formidable array of legal powers over the workings of government known as the Royal Prerogative, which have existed since time immemorial as part of the common law, in other words not having originated from parliamentary legislation, though Acts of Parliament have progressively regulated the Prerogative in modern times in a number of ways, not least over the meeting and termination of Parliament itself.[4] Much of the work of Cabinet and government ministers is conducted under the authority of the Prerogative, in foreign affairs such as treaty making and decisions on entering into armed conflict,

[4]For the constitutional law and history, see Robert Blackburn (1990) *The Meeting of Parliament: A Study of the Law and Practice Relating to the Frequency and Duration of the United Kingdom Parliament* (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Co). The most recent regulation has been the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.

and domestically on matters of national security as well as in the appointment of ministers and many other public appointments including life peers in the House of Lords, and making numerous legislative orders and proclamations through the Privy Council. In addition to being the head of state (a prime minister's position is head of government), the monarch is the Supreme Governor of the Church of England, and head and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He or she is also head of state in many other countries belonging to the former British Empire, in 1936 the Dominions as they were called, today the fifteen Commonwealth Realms, of which major countries were and are Canada and Australia.[5] By virtue of a monarch's position, he or she is clearly in a position of considerable potential influence in what they say or do in political life. Constitutionally, therefore, the basic dogma of monarchy by the turn of the twentieth century, if not earlier, had firmly become one of ministerial responsibility for all that the monarch says or does, with almost all Prerogative executive powers being exercised by ministers in the name of the Crown, and those that only a monarch can exercise personally[6] being circumscribed either by established convention or upon the 'advice', in other words instruction, of the prime minister. The 1936 abdication showed that the constitutional extent of prime ministerial advice and responsibility even extended to a monarch's acquiescence in his removal from the throne itself.

The decorative and cypher function of the modern monarchy, devoid of direct governmental function, led to its creation of a new public image and activities for its role and purpose in public affairs, almost as if to justify the continuing existence of the institution at all. The achievement of Edward's grandfather, Edward VII (1901–1910), had been to restore ceremony and grandeur to the Crown, generating much popular interest and support, where Queen Victoria had been a dour and largely absent presence for much of her long reign. Then, more significant for Edward, was the emergence of monarchy as a reassuring pedestal for family values in the reign of his father George V (1910–1936), a period that encompassed the devastating effects of the First World War that left barely a family in the country untouched by tragedy or death. George V became Father of his People and together with his wife Queen Mary and sons and daughters

[5]See Sir William Dale (1983), *The Modern Commonweath* (Oxford: Butterworths Law).

[6]Notably prime ministerial appointment, Royal Assent to legislation, and the summoning of Parliament. Robert Blackburn (2004) 'Monarchy and the Personal Prerogatives', *Public Law*, 546–63.

were projected into the public imagination as the epitome of wholesome values, family prayers, and a powerful sense of public duty and moral rectitude.

Edward VIII had been a hugely popular heir apparent and Prince of Wales since 1910, a Prince Charming with great personal style, attractiveness and sense of fashion. Where his father disliked foreign travel, the Prince on his behalf travelled the Empire and the globe to great acclaim. He was the most photographed celebrity of his day, famous for his tailored clothes and cigarette in hand, and for being the height of chic. During the First World War he had boosted the troops' morale, and on his tours of Britain showed compassion and care for the social conditions of the working class.[7] However, suspicions about the suitability of Edward becoming monarch had been expressed privately within the corridors of power for several years before he ascended the throne. Latterly his performance in carrying out his duties as Prince of Wales was becoming erratic, causing concern among those he worked with. The recently published diaries of Sir Alan Lascelles for example, who in 1929 resigned as Edward's Assistant Private Secretary (later becoming Private Secretary to George VI and Elizabeth II), describe his deep disapproval of the Prince's poor conduct in his public activities, and what he regarded as the loose morals of the Prince's private life and social company he was keeping.[8] It was this last consideration, the manner of his private life and affairs with married women, culminating in his liaison with the married and previously divorced Mrs Simpson that provoked most concern within the establishment.

In giving his account to the House of Commons of his discussions with the King leading to Edward's renunciation of the throne, Baldwin set out his view on the role and status of the modern monarchy and why for him the abdication of King Edward VIII had become a necessity for its preservation.

> The British Monarchy is a unique institution. The Crown in this country through the centuries has been deprived of many of its prerogatives, but today, while that is true, it stands for far more than it ever had done in its

[7]As King visiting the poverty of mining communities in South Wales he uttered the now famous words, 'Something must be done to meet the situation in South Wales and I will do all I can to assist you', *Daily Herald*, 20 November 1936.

[8]Alan Lascelles (1989) *In Royal Service: the Letters and Journals of Sir Alan Lascelles 1920–1936* (1989), ed Duff Hart-Davis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson); Alan Lascelles (2006) *King's Counsellor: Abdication and War, the Diaries of Sir Alan Lascelles*, ed Duff Hart-Davis (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson), especially pp104–13.

> history. The importance of its integrity is, beyond all question, far greater than it has ever been, being as it is not only the last link of Empire that is left, but the guarantee in this country so long as it exists in that integrity … This feeling largely depends on the respect that has grown up in the last three generations for the Monarchy, it might not take so long, in the face of the kind of criticisms to which it has been exposed, to lose that power far more rapidly than it was built up, and once lost I doubt if anything could restore it.[9]

In terms of the national interest therefore, for Baldwin and the establishment it was the survival of the monarchy itself and the position and authority of Great Britain abroad that was at stake. To his and the Cabinet's mind, the King had stepped outside the public role expected of him through his stated intention of marrying Wallis Simpson whom they regarded as morally unsuitable to be the King' wife. For them, such a union would debase Edward's position as monarch and bring the institution of monarchy and the country it represented into disrepute.

Ministerial Advice and Responsibility for a King

The formulation of the constitutional advice that Edward should abdicate took place over a series of meetings between the King and Prime Minister between Tuesday 20 October and Tuesday 8 December, culminating in a formal exchange of letters on 9 and 10 December.

The subject of Edward's relationship with Mrs Simpson was first broached by Baldwin at a meeting he initiated with the King at Fort Belvedere, the King's preferred home of residence in Windsor Great Park, on 18 October 1936. The background to him doing so was the growing publicity of Edward and Wallis's relationship in the American and European press since the previous July, though not in Britain and across the Empire where there was a self-imposed prohibition on the subject.[10] Nonetheless, when Baldwin returned to work after an absence due to illness over the summer, he found a large quantity of correspondence from Britons living abroad, especially from Canada where American newspapers

[9] *Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2179.

[10] On the conduct of the press see Lord Beaverbrook (1966) *The Abdication of King Edward VIII* ed A. J. P. Taylor (London: Hamish Hamilton).

are imported and widely read.[11] By the time of their meeting, two particular events had been exciting ever greater press interest, the first being the King's summer holiday cruise on the *Nahlin* yacht along the Adriatic and Dalmatian coasts with Wallis and a few personal friends, during which time press reporters followed the cruise and photographs were taken of Edward and Wallis together and widely published, including one of Wallis fondly touching the King's arm. Second, Wallis had now petitioned her husband Ernest for divorce, and this was set down for trial at Ipswich Assizes on 27 October. The royal romance in the foreign press was now being fuelled with speculation that the King and Wallis were planning to get married. At this initial meeting, Baldwin mentioned to Edward his anxieties about the negative effects of continued press reporting on the King's relationship with Mrs Simpson, and the damage he believed this would bring to the monarchy. As later recounted to the House of Commons, Baldwin pressed him for no kind of answer, but simply asked him to consider and reflect on what he had said.[12] A week later, Wallis's divorce decree nisi was granted in undefended proceedings, unleashing a fresh torrent of overseas press speculation on a marriage between the King and Wallis.

The next meeting between King and Prime Minister took place on Monday 16 November at Buckingham Palace, this time convened by Edward in response to a letter he had received from his Private Secretary, Major Alexander Hardinge, which—to use his own words—had left him 'shocked and angry'.[13] Hardinge wrote that the full force of public opinion would shortly be brought to bear on the King's relationship with Mrs Simpson, as the silence of the British press on the matter was bound end shortly; that senior members of the Cabinet were now meeting to discuss the matter; and that if the King did not distance himself from

[11]The Prime Minister of Canada was visiting the UK between 16 and 31 October, enabling him to brief Baldwin on the press and public opinion in his country and America. Meanwhile Baldwin was receiving 'a vast volume of correspondence … all expressing perturbation and uneasiness' at the news being reported abroad. *Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2177.

[12]*Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2180. According to Edward's memoirs, during the meeting Baldwin suggested the King prevail upon Wallis to withdraw her divorce case. This was immediately rejected by Edward, saying, 'I have no right to interfere with the affairs of an individual. It would be wrong were I to attempt to influence Mrs. Simpson just because she happens to be a friend of the King's', Duke of Windsor (1951) *A King's Story* (London: Cassell) p318.

[13]See Windsor, *King's Story*, p327.

Mrs Simpson the government might well resign and cause a general election to be held, in which the King's personal affairs would be the chief issue.[14] The King therefore wanted to know from the Prime Minister what his and the Cabinet's views were and whether it was true that they believed a constitutional crisis was developing over his relationship with Wallis. In Baldwin's words, as later expressed in the House of Commons,

> I told him I did not think that a particular marriage was one that would receive the approbation of the country. That marriage would have involved the lady becoming Queen. I did tell His Majesty once that I might be a remnant of the old Victorians, but that my worst enemy would not say of me that I did not know what the reaction of the English people would be to any particular course of action … I pointed out to him that the position of the King' wife was different from the position of the wife of any other citizen in the country; it was part of the price which the King has to pay. His wife becomes Queen; the Queen becomes the Queen of the country; and, therefore, in the choice of a Queen the voice of the people must be heard.[15]

It was then that the King told the Prime Minister that he intended to marry Wallis Simpson, and would not be deflected from his determination to do so. He was if necessary 'prepared to go'.[16]

Two weeks later on 1 December, with the British press bursting to report on the royal romance, it took a speech by an Anglican Bishop, Dr. A. W. F. Blunt, at a diocesan conference in Bradford, in which he queried the King's commitment to his religious duties, as the excuse to open the floodgates. Within forty-eight hours the national newspapers were running a commentary on the speech, exposing the King's relationship with Mrs Simpson, unleashing a storm of controversy over the whole affair together with its constitutional implications upon the unsuspecting people of Great Britain and the Empire.

[14]For the full text of the letter, see Hardinge Papers, Cambridge University Library; Helen Hardinge (1967) *Loyal to Three Kings* (London: William Kimber) p117; Duchess of Windsor, *The Heart Has its Reasons* (London: Chivers) pp244–5.

[15] *Hansard* Commons, 10 December 1936, cols.2180–2181.

[16]Windsor, *King's Story*, p332; *Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2181.

The King's Own Legal and Constitutional Advisers

If Baldwin as Prime Minister was the King's official constitutional adviser of state, Alexander Hardinge as the King's Private Secretary and chief official in the Royal Household was formally responsible for assisting and representing Edward in all his public affairs, including relations with the government.[17] Edward had never had a good working relationship with Hardinge, who had not been his first choice as Private Secretary and was appointed largely because he had been Assistant Private Secretary to Edward's father, George V. However, after taking great exception to the tone and manner of delivery of Hardinge's letter of 13 November, and the fact it showed Hardinge had been liaising with ministers on the subject without his consent,[18] the King broke off all dealings with him completely. The only point of contact he retained in the Royal Household was Major Ulrick Alexander, the 'Keeper of the Privy Purse', whose work was limited to domestic and financial affairs in the Royal Household but during the crisis served as a point of contact on Palace matters. All this meant that during the last four weeks of his reign, Edward was virtually isolated from any institutional or official form of support or assistance independent of the government.

Throughout the crisis, the King sought support from a handful of informal advisers on matters of constitutional law and political strategy.[19] All of these were professionals in their field of work rather than genuine close friends, of whom Edward had remarkably few. By this time, he was becoming increasingly estranged from his mother, brothers and sisters, all of whom would normally be a natural source for advice and help, since all thought his affair with Wallis unwise and inappropriate and that he should detach himself from her immediately. Chief among his legal advisers was Walter Monckton, a senior barrister and King's Counsel, and a long-standing acquaintance of Edward, being Attorney General to the Duchy of Cornwall (which had been in Edward's possession since his father came to the throne in 1910). From 13 November onwards after breaking off relations with his Private Secretary Hardinge, it was to Monckton that Edward turned to advise him on all legal and constitutional matters arising

[17]On the office of Private Secretary see Vernon Bogdanor (1995) *Monarchy and the Constitution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Ch.8. On Edward VIII's Royal Household appointments, see Windsor, *A King's Story* pp304–05.

[18]See Windsor, *King's Story*, p327.

[19]The role and support of Winston Churchill is considered below.

in the crisis, and for handling his negotiations with No. 10 Downing Street.[20] The lawyer George Allen was the King's Solicitor on his personal affairs, and played a subordinate role to Monckton during the crisis.[21]

Confronting the King on behalf of the government was its chief legal adviser within the Cabinet, Sir John Simon, Home Secretary and a former Attorney General. The Lord Chancellor at the time was Lord Hailsham, but since July that year and throughout the crisis was absent due to a gall bladder illness, leaving Simon in overall charge of advising on matters of constitutional law. Meanwhile the chief government official at 10 Downing Street was Sir Horace Wilson, a Permanent Secretary and later head of the Civil Service, who had been seconded to provide special support and assistance to the Prime Minister. It was Simon and Wilson who between them arranged for Special Branch to follow and compile a dossier on Wallis Simpson, and to arrange for all the King's telephone conversations to be intercepted by MI5 at the General Post Office during the last week of the crisis. The secret bugging of the King's telephone was outrageous in constitutional terms, though contrary to most people's expectations was not actually illegal,[22] and was only disclosed in 2003 by release of government documents at the National Archives.[23] These actions by the government show the degree and extent of their hostility to Wallis Simpson, treating her as a risk to national security, not to mention the ruthlessness of their attitude towards the King himself.

It is unclear whether Edward was aware of just how embedded Monckton was in the personal network of Whitehall and Westminster. Many of the political elite had been at Harrow, his old school, including Hardinge and Stanley Baldwin himself.[24] This social bond and familiarity

[20]Windsor, *King's Story*, p329.

[21]Co-founder of the firm Allen and Overy, a large legal practice still in existence today. Following the abdication, Allen became Edward's primary legal representative in dealings with the British government, on matters including the ex-King's exile, financial settlement, and title for Wallis after their marriage.

[22]See *Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner* [1979] Ch 344.

[23]A note from the Home Office to the GPO's head Sir Thomas Gardiner dated 5th December 1936 marked 'most secret', reads, 'The home secretary asks me to confirm the information conveyed to you orally, with his authority, by Sir Horace Wilson that you will arrange for the interception of telephone communications between Fort Belvedere and Buckingham Palace on the one hand and the Continent of Europe on the other': TNA CAB 301(101).

[24] Monkton Papers, Dep. Monkton Trustees file 22, f.279.

cut both ways in terms of his motivation, and raises questions about in whose best interests he was acting, and whom he most wished not to upset. No one in Whitehall, Downing Street or the Palace took any exception to him taking on this de facto role as Edward's legal representative, and indeed his involvement was welcomed. He was charming and liked by all, and served as a confidante and friend to Edward though always addressed him in highly formal terms. However, as discussed below, on certain key legal and strategic issues, he failed to give any penetrating legal advice or negotiate the grounds upon which Edward could remain on the throne, where necessary by challenging the shallow nature of some of the government's propositions of constitutional law governing the King's situation. Monckton's reputation was strongest as a conciliator, and in his service for the King both in practice and effect, he behaved more as a go-between rather than a legal adviser and strategist for the King remaining on the throne.[25] Every day he dutifully liaised with Whitehall and the Palace and conveyed Edward's suggestions and attempts at compromise to keep him on the throne to Downing Street, and when each was rejected he consoled the King as the prospect of abdication moved ever closer. He provided emotional support for the King by his constant presence, staying with him at Fort Belvedere each night between 3 and 11 December, then accompanying him to Portsmouth on the evening of 12 December to wave him off when Edward took a boat across the Channel at the start of his exile. In Monckton's own account of the crisis, he said, 'I became the channel between the Prime Minister and the King and I tried so far as I could to prevent the acerbities which might so easily have arisen in a situation of such delicacy and world-wide importance'.[26] Significantly the following year he received a knighthood from George VI. Though spoken of in glowing terms at the time by Edward, in later life he allegedly told a friend that Monckton had received 'a GCVO for selling me down the river'.[27]

[25]The view of Sir Brian MacKenna, a colleague of Monckton and High Court judge, was that, 'Walter was not a great or original lawyer, nor one who could himself generate a way of looking at a question', cited, Lord Birkenhead (1969) *Walter Monckton*: *The Life of Viscount Monckton of Brenchley* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) p73; Ch.8 generally.

[26]Monckton Papers, f.289, p11 in his account.

[27]Churchill Archives Centre (henceforth CAC), Brendon Papers, interview with Kenneth de Courcy. Subsequently Monckton became an MP in 1951 and served in Cabinet (as Minister for Labour, Defence, then Postmaster General) until 1957 when he was awarded an hereditary peerage, becoming Viscount Monckton of Brenchley.

The Royal Title of Queen: Ministerial Rejection of a Morganatic Solution

The pivotal legal issue in the abdication crisis was the government's assertion that Mrs Simpson would necessarily become 'Queen' if and when she married the King. This was a proposition held out by the government as an absolute and unquestionable fact of 'law'. Their dogmatic assumption of this position meant that they could then utterly reject the serious proposal for compromise and resolution that came from the King as a means of keeping him on the throne, which was a 'morganatic' marriage. The substance of this proposal was simply that Wallis would not take the title of 'Queen' on their marriage, but would remain either a commoner or take the title of Duchess instead.

The political case for the proposal was that it would soften opposition to the marriage and questions about her fitness for the role of consort to the monarch, or indeed absolve her for having any public role to perform at all. Furthermore, if they were married before the coronation took place, there would be no expectation or necessity for her to be crowned alongside Edward at the coronation ceremony, thus resolving the ecclesiastical problems of the Church about her being a divorcee. There were actual precedents among the European aristocracy for such a practice, where marriages were contracted with spouses of a lower social order.[28] The suggestion originated from the press magnate and supporter of the King, Esmond Harmsworth,[29] and after having reservations on grounds of it being unworthy of Wallis, Edward decided to support the plan as a means of resolving his growing impasse with the government, and Harmsworth was delegated to go to Downing Street to put the proposal to the Prime Minister and his advisers. On 2 December, Harmsworth briefed London journalists about the proposal, which was then given prominence and widely discussed in the national newspapers.

Downing Street acted swiftly to dampen and close down any feasibility of the proposal as a way out of the crisis. In his first dramatic speech on the King's matter to the House of Commons on Friday 4 December, the Prime Minister simply read out a statement that had been carefully

[28]The best-known instance being the marriage of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria to Sophie Chotek in 1900.

[29]Windsor, *King's Story*, p342. Harmsworth was Chairman of Associated Newspapers and publisher of the *Daily Mail*.

prepared for him by his acting chief legal adviser, Sir John Simon. It robustly rejected the King's proposal, asserting that anyone marrying the King as a matter of law had to be called a 'Queen' whether they liked it or not, and only an Act of Parliament could change this situation which he and his government were not prepared to introduce.

> In view of widely circulated suggestions as to certain possibilities in the event of the King's marriage, I think it would be advisable for me to make a statement. Suggestions have appeared in certain organs of the Press yesterday and again today that if the King decided to marry, his wife need not become Queen. These ideas are without any Constitutional foundation. There is no such thing as what is called a morganatic marriage known to our law … The King himself requires no consent from any other authority to make his marriage legal, but, as I have said, the lady whom he marries, by the fact of her marriage to the King, necessarily becomes Queen. She herself, therefore, enjoys all the status, rights and privileges which, both by positive law and by custom, attach to that position, and with which we are familiar in the cases of Her Late Majesty Queen Alexandra and of Her Majesty Queen Mary, and her children would be in the direct line of succession to the Throne. The only possible way in which this result could be avoided would be by legislation dealing with a particular case. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to introduce such legislation … I have felt it right to make this statement before the House adjourns today in order to remove a widespread misunderstanding. At this moment I have no other statement to make.[30]

The manner and strategy behind this speech was fundamental to the government's position. It was presented as an authoritative statement of constitutional law by the Prime Minister for public and press consumption, decreeing that the wife of a King must always be Queen under the terms of an established and inflexible diktat of the English common law. Despite its tenuous basis in law, it succeeded in fooling almost everyone at the time, and indeed subsequently in all the historical accounts of the abdication, that it was a settled and rigid dogma of the law. Tactically too, by asserting and gaining acceptance of the view that legislation would be required, the Prime Minister stole the initiative away from the King on the proposal, because according to the government's doctrine the King could not unilaterally proceed to a

[30] *Hansard*, Commons, 4 December 1936, cols.1611–12. Edward later commented that, 'He undertook in a few shrewdly chosen words to demolish for Parliament's benefit the case for the middle way—the morganatic marriage', Windsor, *King's Story*, pp377–8.

morganatic arrangement by a simple Proclamation under the legal authority of the Royal Prerogative; he had to rely on asking and obtaining the agreement of the government to present legislation to Parliament for an alternative title for his wife, which it then declared its unwillingness to do.

However, government ministers, and even the law officers, are not courts of law and have no basis or status in law whatsoever for making unilateral decrees or pronouncements on matters of legal principle by way of a statement to Parliament. The King was urgently in need of expert professional advice on questions of constitutional law together with a negotiating strategy if he was to remain on the throne and choose his own wife. On the central legal point as to whether it was indeed a legal imperative that Wallis must adopt the title of 'Queen' if and when the King might marry her, Monckton was completely defeatist from the outset. He failed to query the point at all and simply reiterated the government's stance on the matter, as formulated by Sir John Simon, which suggests he had had earlier discussions on the subject arising during his regular private meetings with Baldwin at the House of Commons. In his account of the crisis, Monckton says, 'It was plain from the first that such a plan could only be made effective by legislation'.[31] This was all he could provide in response to the King's request for an expert opinion, their exchange later described by Edward as follows:

> Walter Monckton, whom I had asked to look into the legal precedents, advised me that even in the unlikely event of the Cabinet's approving a morganatic marriage, special legislation would be required and the prospects of such a Bill's ever passing Parliament were dubious.[32]

A thorough legal analysis of the situation should have explored the nature of the Royal Prerogative and the legal basis of titles and privileges attaching to royal wives from Henry VIII onwards. It needed to be understood then, as now, that the Royal Prerogative is a network of common law principles combining differing elements. It comprises firstly, a common law legislative power under which new regulations are made by Royal Proclamation, Letters Patent or Order in Council;[33] secondly, it comprises

[31]Monckton Papers, f.290, p12 in his account.

[32]Windsor, *King's Story*, p342.

[33]Thus the Crown is an extra-parliamentary legislature, though its working and measures are subject always to the primacy of an Act of Parliament: for the classic exposition of parliamentary sovereignty see A. V. Dicey (1885) *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (London: Macmillan). Orders in Council in modern times may also, and regularly are, made under statutory authority conferred by Acts of Parliament on specific subject-matter.

the common law rules and regulations themselves that have been made by way of Prerogative orders, subject always to further modification by later Prerogative order; and thirdly, it comprises a number of common law Prerogative rights and privileges, including ones that attach to positions in the royal hierarchy, the possession and operation of which may be either mandatory or optional at the discretion of the holder. Working alongside these common law powers, rules and privileges that fall under the authority of the Royal Prerogative are the evolving conventions of a social or political nature that regulate and update their exercise and application in the real world, including on matters of ceremony, titles and honours. The exercise of a Prerogative power to appoint a prime minister to chair Cabinet proceedings (the Cabinet itself being a committee of the Privy Council established under the Royal Prerogative) is a primary example of such a practice or convention, since there is no Act of Parliament providing for the office of prime minister or the terms upon which a prime minister is appointed and holds office.[34] Furthermore, the ceremonial status and precedence of a prime minister at state occasions was, and is, given legal recognition under the authority of a common law Prerogative order made by Edward VII in 1905.[35] If the Prerogative can determine the existence and ceremonial details of our head of government, one would expect it to have the capacity to determine the name and title of the monarch's own spouse.

The title attaching to the wife of a King is conceptually distinct and of a separate legal nature from that of the monarch himself. Whereas a King is irrevocably possessed of the position of monarch similar to the holder of a hereditary peerage,[36] the spouse of a King has none of the incidents of the King himself, and such privileges accorded her endure only for as long as she remains the King's wife. As a matter of settled judicial opinion, the wife of a King has no legal right to participate in the coronation of her husband or be crowned, which is a matter to be decided on by the new King himself.[37] Such prerogatives and privileges as have customarily been said to attach to a Queen Consort are all of a redundant or archaic nature today,[38] and almost certainly apply to the wife of the King in any event,

[34]Generally see J. P. Mackintosh (1977) *The British Cabinet* (London: Stevens and Son).

[35]Royal Warrant dated 4 December 1905, *London Gazette* 5 December 1905.

[36]Today a hereditary peerage may be disclaimed under the terms of the Peerage Act 1963.

[37]*Queen Caroline's Claim to be Crowned* (1821) 1 State Trials NS 949.

[38]Mackay of Clashfern (2008) *Halsbury's Laws of England* , Vol. 29: *Crown and Crown Proceedings*, (London: Butterworth) para.31.

whatever her title may be. Thus in the few statutory references to a King's wife, the term 'Queen' is not always employed. In the Treason Act 1351, for example, under which the offence of treason is committed where a person 'doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the King, or our lady his Queen', there is an alternative statutory text in existence where the term 'wife' is used instead of 'Queen'.[39] During the reign of Edward VIII itself, the government was preparing a Regency Bill to provide for situations of incapacity, in response to the awkwardness earlier in the decade when George V had on occasion been so ill he could not conduct routine royal duties, that expressly provided that it was the 'wife' of the reigning King who along with the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice and Speaker of the House of Commons who would certify a King's incapacity prior to a statutory regent being appointed.[40] The fact is that at common law, the wife of a King remains a private citizen,[41] and in the modern era naming the King's wife as 'Queen Consort' was, and is, more of a social convention than a principle of our evolving and unwritten common law. Furthermore, even if it were thought that a King's wife possessed a customary right to the title of Queen, it does not automatically follow that she is compelled to adopt it as a matter of law, and it would be of no legal consequence whether she did so or not.

Certainly legislation by Act of Parliament can always be employed to regulate royal titles, as on all matters, and had in fact been used by Henry VIII in 1539 to settle matters of precedence at state ceremonies (for bishops, the royal office-holders of state, and seniority of the nobility), including that only his children could sit next to him on either side of the Cloth of Estate in the House of Lords.[42] However this does not mean that Parliament has an exclusive jurisdiction over the matter or affect the Crown's well-established position since time immemorial as the fount of all honour and dignity with the inherent power to grant titles.[43] If King Henry's 1539 regulation had not been for amending ceremonies in Parliament and seeking to communicate the new situation directly to the aristocracy in the House of Lords, it would almost certainly have taken

[39] *Halsbury's Statutes* (1985–1992) 4th edn (London: Butterworths); Treason Act 1351.
[40] Regency Act 1937, section 2(1).
[41] See *Halsbury's Laws of England* Vol. 29: *Crown and Crown Proceedings*, para.31.
[42] House of Lords Precedence Act 1539.
[43] See *Prince's Case* (1606) 8 Co. Rep. 1a at 18b; Sir Edward Coke (1644) *Institutes of the Laws of England*, Part 4, pp361; 363; *Halsbury's Laws of England* (2014) 5th edn, Vol.20, *Constitutional and Administrative Law*, para.567.

the form of a Royal Proclamation under King's Prerogative. Thus when it came to determining royal titles for his ex-wives, Henry simply proclaimed the title of 'Princess Dowager of Wales' for Katherine of Aragon after their divorce in 1533, and the title of the 'King's Sister' for Anne of Cleves after their divorce in 1540. There was, and remains today, a strong case that any alteration in the customary title of the wife of the King falls within the competence of the Royal Prerogative and if Baldwin had chosen to support the King in his marriage and retention of the throne, the government could have adopted this position.

However Monckton not only failed to make the case that the King's wife could be called an alternative suitable title to that of 'Queen' under the authority of the Royal Prerogative rather than an Act of Parliament, but displayed no awareness of this as an issue at all. Furthermore, as the King's lawyer he could have powerfully taken the initiative away from the government by advising the King to insist upon the question of whether an Act of Parliament was necessary to alter the title of the King's wife being referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for an independent ruling, if ministers would not accept that it was a matter that could be settled under the Royal Prerogative. There was a strong precedent for this, as the judges in the Privy Council had earlier settled a dispute concerning the wife of George IV, ruling that she had no right to attend or be crowned alongside the King that overrode his Prerogative authority to decide the matter.[44] All these legal arguments Walter Monkton could and should have made on the King's behalf, but failed to do so because of his apparently limited knowledge and understanding of constitutional law, and also because he lacked the necessary appetite for making a legal challenge to the government. He failed to provide the King with any cogent legal and constitutional grounds to keep Edward on the throne, or how to use arguments of constitutional law to compel ministers to postpone their decision until the following year, by which time public opinion might well have moved in the King's direction, a factor which explained the government's great rush towards abdication in the nine days of public crisis. No wonder then, that the government's manipulation of the vagueries of constitutional law as an instrument for implementing its policy decision that

[44]The same procedure was subsequently been given statutory form by Sect. 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833, under which a monarch has power to refer any matter to the Judiciary Committee for 'consideration and report'.

the King could not remain on the throne and marry Mrs Simpson proved so successful, leading inexorably to the abdication.

The final legal debacle came when Monckton suddenly raised the possibility of a Private Bill to make the Simpsons' divorce absolute, which would remove the risk of the Simpsons' divorce being refused and the King having abdicated for nothing. He put forward this proposal at a lunch he was hosting at the Windham club on Saturday 5 December with Sir Horace Wilson, Thomas Dugdale (Baldwin's Parliamentary Private Secretary), and George Allen.[45] This Bill, he suggested, could be introduced alongside and at the same time as the legislation giving effect to the abdication. The King was very excited by this idea,[46] and asked Monckton to put it before the Prime Minister. However, although initially Wilson and Baldwin warmed to the suggestion, which from their point of view had the advantage of facilitating Edward's departure, still being fearful he might not go quietly, the proposal came far too late. Monckton could have strengthened the case for insisting on a Bill of this nature by emphasising that there were established precedents for such legislation prior to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 when Private Divorce Acts had been the standard method for effecting a divorce, several of which took place each year.[47] To be successful, this proposal should have been made as a bargaining tool in the negotiations in November when the issue of the future marriage and prospect of Abdication was first discussed. By the time it was mentioned by Monckton and then considered by the Cabinet on Sunday 6 December, ministers had already adopted an entrenched and uncompromising attitude towards the King, and they immediately rejected such a Bill outright, Neville Chamberlain simply telling Monckton that it 'would affront the moral sense of the Nation'.[48]

[45]Monckton Papers, f.294, p15 in his account.

[46]Edward later said, 'Gratefully I grasped Walter's proposal—it was a lifeline thrown across a crevasse', Windsor, *A King's Story* p387; also generally Ch.XXVI ('The Fate of the Two Bills').

[47]Between 1800 and 1857 there were 193 divorces by private Acts of Parliament, an average of over three a year: generally see Sybil Wolfram (1985) 'Divorce in England 1700–1857', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 5(2) pp155–86.

[48]Monckton papers, f.295, p17 in his account.

Edward VIII's Political Entrapment

If the need for an Act of Parliament to implement a morganatic solution was the legal hurdle presented to the King in opposition to its success, the related need for the formal approval of the British Cabinet and all the governments of the Dominions to the idea of the King's wife taking a title other than Queen was the constitutional hurdle that Baldwin carefully constructed. Both politically and constitutionally, the most significant meeting between the King and Prime Minister took place on Wednesday 25 November at Buckingham Palace.

This meeting had been asked for by Edward as a follow-up to Esmond Harmsworth's visit to Downing Street the previous Monday to present the case for a morganatic compromise. When the King asked the Prime Minister for his view on the matter, Baldwin responded he had no considered opinion at that time but proceeded to ask whether the King would like him to 'examine it formally'. When Edward naturally agreed that he would, believing this was already being done, Baldwin went on to say,

> It would mean my putting that formally before the whole Cabinet and communicating with the Prime Ministers of all the Dominions, and was that his wish?[49]

When Edward agreed that it was, this now ensnared him in an elaborate and comprehensive form of 'constitutional advice' that the King had expressly submitted himself to, whether or not it was actually required as a matter of constitutional theory.[50] Indeed, this acquiescence could be regarded as the constitutional act that most effectively terminated his prospects for remaining on the throne and marrying Wallis. As he later reflected in his memoirs, 'As the door closed behind him [Baldwin] I realised that with that simple request I had gone a long way towards sealing my own fate. For in asking the Prime Minister to find out the sentiments of the British and Dominion governments, I had automatically bound myself to submit unquestioningly to their "advice"'.[51] The whole constitutional machinery of Britain and the Empire would now come down to bear on the King's

[49]Windsor, *King's Story*, p343.
[50]Ibid. On the ambit of ministerial responsibility for the monarchy see further below.
[51]Ibid.

tenure of the throne, if he wished to proceed with his intention to marry Mrs Wallis Simpson. Two days later the matter was discussed at Cabinet, which settled its robust opposition to the morganatic proposal.

The contents of the telegrams sent out by Baldwin to the Dominion Prime Ministers were prepared over the next twenty-four hours in successive drafts and discussed at two meetings by a small group of ministers and senior civil servants presided over by Sir John Simon and Sir Horace Wilson. The final version signed off by the Prime Minister and despatched from the Dominion Office on 28 November set out the morganatic proposal with the covering comment that, 'I feel convinced that neither the Parliament nor the great majority of the public in all parties here should or would accept such a plan, any more than they would accept the proposal that Mrs Simpson should become Queen'.[52] After summarising his three meetings with the King on the crisis, the Prime Minister then said,

> I do not think there is any possibility of dissuading His Majesty from this marriage, if the decree nisi is made absolute and such a course therefore does not seem to be one of the practicable alternatives before us …
>
> It would be very helpful to me in my consideration of the question if as soon as possible I could have your personal view and what in your opinion would be view of the public opinion in your Dominion regarding three following possibilities: (i) marriage of Mrs Simpson, she to become Queen; (ii) King's marriage to Mrs Simpson without his abdication but on basis that she should not become Queen and accompanied by necessary legislation; (iii) a voluntary abdication in favour of Duke of York.

The view of the British Prime Minister and Cabinet was therefore made clear, though ministers then and after claimed they had been scrupulously impartial. The Dominions' responses were duly supportive, with the Australian Prime Minister later replying to say, 'There would be outspoken hostility to His Majesty's proposed wife becoming Queen, while any proposal that she should become Consort and not Queen … would not be approved by my Government'.[53]

[52]TNA CAB 21/4100/2.
[53]Quoted in Ziegler, *Edward VIII* pp305–6 (RA KEVIII Ab. Box 1/19).

The Prime Minister went to meet the King on the evening of Wednesday 2 December to communicate the collective ministerial advice he had gleaned from his discussions in Cabinet and with Prime Ministers from the Dominions. The conclusions of his consultations, he told the King, were that the morganatic proposal was 'impracticable' and that the Cabinet had reached 'a formal decision' on the matter. 'The inquiries had gone far enough', he said, 'to show that neither in the Dominions nor here would there be any prospect of such legislation being accepted.'[54] In consequence, Baldwin advised the King that he must now make a decision between two options, being to renounce Mrs. Simpson and remain on the throne, or proceed with his intention to marry her and abdicate.

Public Opinion: Ministerial Rejection of a Public Statement by the King

An important part of the Prime Minister's political strategy, as the momentum towards abdication accelerated in the days following the press exposure on 2 December, was to control and deaden as much as possible parliamentary and public debate and discussion of the King's position. In the House of Commons, the government kept an iron grip over the timetable and procedures under which the King's matter was mentioned down to the actual Message of the King that he would abdicate on 10 December. The statements made by Baldwin on the 3, 4 and 7 November allowed no discussion on the first two occasions, and only six very brief interventions on the third, the chief of which was by Winston Churchill who was howled down by Baldwin's supporters when arguing that the King should be allowed time for consideration.[55]

Dealing with public opinion and the press was a more difficult exercise for the government. The chief method employed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet was insisting there must be a swift closure of the issue, forcing him into an immediate decision on the options presented to him, and taking advantage of the King's physical and mental utter exhaustion that virtually all the contemporary accounts refer to. He had two blackouts during a dinner with Winston Churchill on 4 December,[56] and his financial

[54] *Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2182. The statement was qualified by the exception of the formal exchange of letters on 9 December: see below.

[55] See further below.

[56] TNA PREM 1/448, Churchill to Baldwin, Letter, 5 December 1936.

adviser Sir Edward Peacock reported that the King was 'dead beat' and 'seemed completely done'.[57]

The partisanship of the press was finely balanced between newspapers with establishment links notably *The Times* under the editorship of Geoffrey Dawson which reported and followed the government line, and others expressing loyalty to the King notably the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Mirror* owned by Lord Rothermere (and his son Esmond Harmsworth) and the *Daily Express*, *Sunday Express* and *London Evening News* owned by Lord Beaverbrook. Baldwin maintained he knew what ordinary people thought on the matter,[58] but the opinions that influenced him most significantly in his calculations beyond those expressed in Cabinet were those of the royal establishment as represented by its matriarch Queen Mary, widow of George V, and the Church establishment as represented by Cosmo Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, both of whom Baldwin met privately on regular occasions throughout the crisis and were equally horrified by the prospect of Edward marrying Mrs. Simpson.[59] What was lacking in public discussion in the rush towards abdication was a simple humanity to provide a sense of proportion.

It was in this context, in response to the breaking news in the press of his relationship with Mrs. Simpson, that the King formed the idea of making a public statement by way of a BBC radio broadcast direct to the people of Great Britain and the Empire. He wanted to give his own version of events and a personal explanation of his situation, expressing his natural desire to marry the woman he loved, then go abroad for a short period to allow public opinion to settle on the matter and determine what he should do. The proposal was strengthened in Edward's mind by the precedent of his father, George V, making annual Christmas broadcasts to the Empire since 1932 and he himself having made a successful BBC broadcast on St David's Day in March that year. In his memoirs, Edward commented, 'The more I thought about the idea the more a broadcast appealed to me as the only possible way in which I might be able to mobilize the support of the entire Commonwealth. I therefore resolved to raise the question

[57]Monckton Papers, file 22, f.267. Monckton in his own account said the King was 'even more tired than I had thought and seemed worn out', but made little of this in his negotiations with Downing Street.

[58]A view expressed to Edward at their meeting of 16 November 1936, Windsor, *King's Story*, pp330–1.

[59]See James Pope-Hennessy (1959) *Queen Mary 1867–1953* (London: Allen and Unwin); Robert Beaken (2012) *Cosmo Lang: Archbishop in War and Crisis* (London: I.B. Tauris).

with the Prime Minister'.[60] This he proceeded to do at their meeting on 3 December, where Baldwin later recounted that the King had been 'frantically keen' on the idea.[61] The Prime Minister departed to immediately consult his officials and ministerial colleagues on the proposal and decide how to respond, while Edward set about preparing a final draft of the speech, aided by Monckton and George Allen. Had this been broadcast it would have had an explosive effect on public opinion and British politics, almost certainly moving attitudes in support of the King's position.[62]

Baldwin, Simon and Horace Wilson were deeply alarmed at this idea of the King making a direct appeal to the people. It would have undermined their control of the situation, and added a new dimension to the consultations being carried out, exciting both public and parliamentary opinion. Communicating with and charming ordinary people was Edward's forte, and ministers were highly sensitive to the King's huge popularity from his years as Prince, as well as being aware that popular opinion across the country was more on the King's side than they would admit. Any unilateral action by Edward, if the BBC Director General Sir John (later Lord) Reith supported it, would have been viewed by the Cabinet as a challenge to their authority and therefore to their minds deeply unconstitutional. Wilson immediately contacted Reith at the BBC and told him that under no circumstances could he allow the King to make the proposed broadcast. Wilson wrote that, 'He is to take no action of any kind without direct authorisation' from 10 Downing Street.[63]

A legal opinion on the matter was swiftly sought from Sir John Simon. Within twenty-four hours Baldwin returned to see the King to formally state that he and his government 'could not advise' the broadcast suggested, providing him a written *precis* of the Cabinet discussion on the matter prepared by Simon. This robustly stated that the King could make no public statement except on the advice of his ministers; that the King is bound to accept their advice; that they have already tendered advice in the matter at issue; and that to broadcast his views would in effect be an attempt to reach and possibly divide the people over the heads of his constitutional advisers.[64]

[60]Windsor, *King's Story*, p357.

[61]Quoted in Ziegler, *Edward VIII*, p316.

[62]The text of this draft broadcast, which in the event was stopped by the Prime Minister from being made, is among Walter Monckton's private papers released to the Bodleian Library in 2000: Monckton Papers, DMT 14, fols.52–4; now also available in The National Archives, TNA CAB 21/4100/2. See also Windsor, *King's Story*, p361.

[63]TNA PREM 1/451 (2003 release).

[64]This summary is taken from Windsor, *King's Story*, pp378–9.

To more firmly bolster the rejection, it was stated to Edward that a broadcast by him against ministerial advice was 'legally' impossible.[65] This was a deliberate misuse of constitutional law terminology from Sir John Simon as the matter was clearly one of convention, not law, if indeed it could be said to be a rule of any substance at all in the unprecedented circumstances of an abdication. Nonetheless the King bowed to this rejection, and the suggested broadcast was dropped. A week later on the evening of 11 December, he would be permitted to make a very different kind of broadcast, one following his abdication from the throne having already taken place, in which he was able to explain to the world that he had found it impossible to continue as King 'without the help and support of the woman I love.'[66]

The King's Negation of Constitutional Conflict

The final submission of formal constitutional advice by the Prime Minister, and its acceptance by the King, came in an exchange of letters on Wednesday 9 December. The first, from Baldwin to Edward, was in the form of a Minute of the Cabinet meeting in the morning, offering a Prayer that the King's intention was not irrevocable, thus avoiding the wording of blunt instruction to abdicate if he continued to maintain his wish to marry Mrs. Simpson.[67] The predictable response from Edward was simply to state,

> The King has received the Prime Minister's letter of the 9th December, 1936, informing him of the views of the Cabinet. His Majesty has given the matter his further consideration, but regrets that he is unable to alter his decision.[68]

This letter for the Prime Minister was signed together with a second document given to him for signature, one giving his formal approval to the necessary legislation to remove him from the throne entitled His Majesty's

[65]According to Thomas Dugdale, Baldwin's Parliamentary Private Secretary. See Nancy Dugdale 'An Abdication Diary', Review, *The Observer*, 7 December 1986, p22.

[66]For reasons of length and the broadcast being well known, it is not reproduced or extracted here: for its text see Windsor, *King's Story*, pp413–14. An audio recording is at www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/307221/today-in-media-history-radio-stations-broadcast-the-1936-abdication-speech-of-king-edward-viii.

[67]For the text of the letter see *Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2185.

[68]Windsor, *King's Story*, p403; *Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2185.

Declaration of Abdication Bill.[69] Edward's memoirs state that this document was a second 'letter' for the Prime Minister, by which he was referring to the Letters Patent signed by a monarch authorising the Royal Assent to be pronounced in the House of Lords once the Bill had completed all its parliamentary stages.[70] This was therefore a unique constitutional moment, securing the Royal Assent to legislation that would remove the reigning monarch from the throne, signed and authorised by the monarch even before the Bill itself had been introduced and given its First Reading in Parliament. It provided the legal guarantee for ministers that there could be no turning back or second thoughts by the King from then onwards.

For Baldwin, the King's restraint and consistent acquiescence in all the pieces of 'advice' tendered came as an enormous relief. For the prospect of the King challenging his advice, or ignoring it altogether thereby leaving the government in a quandary over whether to resign or not, would almost certainly have brought an ignominious end to his long political career. He told the House of Commons when speaking after the King's Message on 10 December, 'I honour and respect him for the way in which he behaved';[71] and later on to one of his biographers, 'Whoever writes about the Abdication must give the King his due. He could not have behaved better than he did'.[72]

At no time did King Edward challenge the advice and options offered to him by the Prime Minister, either in its conclusions or the quality of its rationale and opinion. He acted scrupulously on ministerial advice at all times. In his later memoirs, Edward described his understanding of the constitutional obligation and conventions upon him in the following way,

> In theory the Prime Minister had no power to prevent my marriage. He could only proffer 'advice' as to what, in the Government's opinion, constituted a proper course for the King. Now the word 'advice', like other terms in the constitutional vocabulary, has a special meaning when used in relation to the Sovereign. Whenever the Prime Minister 'advises' the King he is using a respectful form of words to express the will and decision of the Government. The King is virtually bound to accept such 'advice'. Furthermore, he cannot seek 'advice' elsewhere.[73]

[69]HC Bill 48 (1936–1937).
[70]Windsor, *King's Story*, pp403–4.
[71]*Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2183.
[72]G. M. Young (1952) *Stanley Baldwin* (London: Hart-Davies) p241.
[73]Windsor, *King's Story*, p343.

He explained his acquiescence in ministerial advice in terms of protecting and safeguarding the institutions and conventions of monarchy, and the irreparable damage that he believed a struggle between King and ministers would cause the Crown and its prospects for survival. He later wrote that he 'put out of mind all thoughts of challenging the Prime Minister'; because,

> By making a stand for myself I should have left the scars of a civil war. A civil war is the worst of all wars. Its passions soar highest, its hatreds last longest. And a civil war is not less a war when it is fought in words and not in blood.'[74]

Edward's own understanding of the constitutional position that limited his freedom of action was of vital significance. As illustrated above, he believed that a monarch should always act exclusively upon the advice of his Prime Minister and government of the day, and should not without the Prime Minister's consent seek the advice of other Parliamentarians. The rationale behind this view was that if a monarch chose to prefer and act upon the alternative advice of other politicians contrary to that of the Prime Minister, it would cause the resignation (and therefore effectively dismissal) of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the appointment in their place of those from whom the monarch had received the alternative advice he preferred.[75] In practice the last occasion for a monarch's dismissal of a government had been a hundred years before in 1834, when William IV called upon Lord Melbourne to resign and appointed Sir Robert Peel in his place.[76]

However there were certainly constitutional ideas still in circulation at that time that the King retained a residual power to reject prime ministerial advice and dismiss the government in extreme circumstances, if he preferred the advice of alternative advisers whom he could appoint and were willing to accept office as Prime Minister and members of the government responsible to Parliament. This issue had arisen during the reign of Edward's father, George V, over the issue of Irish Home Rule

[74]Ibid., p385.

[75]See Geoffrey Marshall (1984) *Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Responsibility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Robert Blackburn (1985) 'The Queen and Ministerial Responsibility', *Public Law*, pp361–8; Sir Ivor Jennings (1936) *Cabinet Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), especially chs XII; XIII.

[76]An earlier dismissal had been of the Fox-North ministry by George III, replacing it by William Pitt as Prime Minister, in 1783.

and the Government of Ireland Bill. The prominent constitutional lawyer, Professor A. V. Dicey had said,

> I entirely agree that the King can do nothing except on the advice of Ministers. I totally disagree with the doctrine drawn from this principle that he can never dismiss Ministers in order that he may ascertain the will of the nation. Of course, the incoming ministers must, like Sir Robert Peel, accept responsibility for the change of Ministry. No one need be ashamed of following the principle set by Pitt and Peel.[77]

George V and the Prime Minister at that time, Herbert Asquith, exchanged correspondence on the subject, both agreeing that the power of dismissal existed in theory. However, Asquith warned the King that in practice the exercise of this power would be 'a constitutional catastrophe which it is the duty of every wise statesman to do the utmost in his power to avert … it is no exaggeration to say that the Crown would become the football of contending factions'.[78] George V reserved his position and right on the matter, and in 1931 was to play an independent role in re-appointing Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister of a minority Labour administration, as Prime Minister of a National Government with the Conservatives, an intervention that caused outrage in the Labour Party and led to the expulsion of MacDonald from the party.[79]

Edward's compliance with formal constitutional procedures during the critical weeks of November and December extended to him requesting and receiving the Prime Minister's agreement to him meeting and taking advice from other senior politicians at Westminster. Edward made three such requests to the Prime Minister, initially to see Duff Cooper and Samuel Hoare, both members of the Cabinet, then on 4 December Winston Churchill who at that time was on the backbenches, having earlier served in several Cabinet positions.[80] Churchill, a romantic in his view of

[77]Edward Marjoriebanks and Ian Colvin (1934) *The Life of Lord Carson,* 2 vols (London; Gollancz), II, p240.

[78]Memorandum reproduced, J. A. Spender and C. Asquith (1932) *Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith,* 2 vols (London: Hutchinson) II, pp30–1.

[79]MacDonald was expelled from the Labour Party in consequence: see Reginald Bassett (1958) *1931: Political Crisis* (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Company).

[80]These included as Home Secretary 1910–1911; First Lord of the Admiralty 1911–1915; Secretary of State for War, and for Air, 1919–1921; and Chancellor the Exchequer 1924–1929. Baldwin subsequently regretted allowing Edward to consult Churchill: see G. M. Young (1952) *Stanley Baldwin* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis) p242.

the Crown and its place in the English constitution, thought it unimaginable for a King to abdicate, or be forced by any government to do so. On taking up the King's cause with alacrity, he declared in a written statement to the press on 5 December that the government had no constitutional right to advise an abdication from the throne: 'No such advice has ever before been tendered to a Sovereign in Parliamentary times … No Ministry has the authority to advise the abdication of the Sovereign.' Above all, he advised the King that a decision on the matter should not be rushed upon him by the Prime Minister, and he should insist on being allowed more time to consider the matter. Churchill wrote to Baldwin to say,

> We are in presence of a wish expressed by the Sovereign to perform an act which in no circumstances can be accomplished for nearly five months, and may conceivably for various reasons never be accomplished at all. That, on such a hypothetical and suppositious basis the supreme sacrifice of abdication and potential exile of the Sovereign should be demanded, finds no support whatever in the British constitution.[81]

This advice to the King was potentially lethal to Baldwin's position, and Baldwin knew it. It directly challenged the government's case that the subject matter, namely the question of who a monarch might marry and remain on the throne, fell within the constitutional scope of ministerial responsibility for the Crown. If this view became widely accepted then it would give the King a legitimate ground for rejecting the two options being presented to the King to Baldwin, namely marriage to Mrs. Simpson or abdication. Even if that was not accepted, there was clearly a case, and considerable public support, for not pushing the King to make a hasty decision on the matter, given its level of importance to the country as a whole. Indeed, allowing more time had the advantages of enabling public and parliamentary opinion to consider the nature of the constitutional problem, then settle and be taken into account (whereas the rush of events effectively excluded this), and there was the outside possibility of the prospect of Edward and Wallis's marriage collapsing altogether. Here again, this would challenge the advice being proffered to the King by his Prime Minister, which was that there was an urgent need to reach a decision on the matter straightaway.

[81]Quoted, Windsor, *King's Story*, pp390–1.

Churchill's support for the King's position was high profile, as he was a famous political character, and a forceful and able advocate. He raised the issue on three occasions in the House of Commons, the first two times urging that 'no irrevocable step will be taken before a statement is made to the House'.[82] In his advice to the King and his statement to the press, Churchill clearly implied that the King could and should reject Baldwin's advice for an immediate decision on a choice between his marriage to Mrs. Simpson or abdicate, and if ministers did not like this, 'they are of course free to resign'. At the start of the final week of the crisis, it was reckoned that there were at least 70 MPs who supported Churchill's view of the situation, and would back him as their leader if a 'King's Party' were formed to fight for Edward and keep him on the throne. For a few days, given the substantial support for the King in the press and demonstrations of loyalty being expressed for him in the streets of London, this seemed a very real possibility.

What then might have been the course of events if the King had simply rejected Baldwin's 'advice' at their meeting of 4 December that he had to either renounce his relationship with Mrs. Simpson or abdicate, and that a decision by him had to be taken immediately? The key factor would have been whether the Baldwin Cabinet felt sufficiently strongly about the issue that they would resign office rather than accept Wallis Simpson as the King's wife. It is most likely that in a constitutional stand off on the subject, Baldwin would have backed down or taken the occasion to resign office which he was intending to do very shortly anyway (and did the following spring). This would have been a token gesture to retain Conservative dignity, with Neville Chamberlain or possibly Lord Halifax assuming office as premier. However if the Cabinet resigned altogether, a general election would have been inevitable under the party composition of the Commons (386 Conservatives, 154 Labour, and 54 Liberals and Liberal Nationals), assuming the bulk of the Conservative Party supported Baldwin's stand on the King's matter. Baldwin would therefore have gone back to the King to request a dissolution of Parliament, which conceivably Edward might have rejected and decided to appoint an alternative Prime Minister for an interim period, either Clement Attlee as Leader of the Opposition or Churchill as leader of a 'King's Party'. Baldwin had shrewdly met with Clement Attlee as well as the Liberal leader Sir Archibald Sinclair in early

[82] *Hansard*, Commons 3 December 1936, cols.1440–1; 4 December 1936, cols.1529–30.

December, and secured a promise from them not to participate in the formation of a new government were he to resign and Edward inviting either of them to serve as Prime Minister.[83] If a 'King's Party' had been formed however, electioneering would have commenced almost immediately in an attempt to secure a stable majority in the Commons to support a government serving under Edward VIII. If the 'King's Party' was then heavily defeated, this might well have led to the abolition of the monarchy; but if it had been successful, the eventual war-time coalition under Churchill might have already been in place to fight the Second World War.

However, the political context in which Churchill sought to champion the King was becoming untenable to his own position at Westminster. Parliamentary opinion became polarised between two opposites, with ranks closing behind the government as generally happens in time of acute national crisis. In the hysteria of the moment, rational discourse had become impossible. This meant that when Churchill rose to speak in response to a Private Notice Question on the 'Constitutional Position' on Monday 7 December, urging that the King be allowed more time, he was simply yelled at and shouted down.

> Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he could give us an assurance that no irrevocable step—[HON. MEMBERS: 'No.']—that no irrevocable step will be taken before the House has received a full statement, not only upon the personal but upon the constitutional issues involved? May I ask him to bear in mind that these issues are not merely personal to the present occupant of the Throne, but that they affect the entire Constitution? [HON. MEMBERS: 'Speech,' and 'Sit down.'] If the House resists my claim it will only add the more importance to any words that I might want to use. May I say that the right hon. Gentleman has spoken of rumours? If he were able to give an assurance that the House would have the constitutional issue laid before it, then this anxiety would not persist.
>
> Mr. SPEAKER: Will the right hon. Gentleman confine what he has to say to a simple question?
>
> Mr. CHURCHILL: I am grateful for what the right hon. Gentleman has said, but I ask that there should be an assurance that no irrevocable decision will be taken until at least a statement has been made to Parliament of the constitutional issues involved, and of the procedure involved in such an event—[HON. MEMBERS: Order.][84]

[83] *A King's Story*, p382.
[84] *Hansard*, Commons, 7 December 1936, cols.1643–4.

In his defence of the King, Churchill was in a precarious opposition to the cross-party consensus against the King, sensitised no doubt by an underlying sense of guilt for the disloyalty of which they could easily be accused, but encouraged by Churchill being an easy target for ridicule as a flamboyant, egotistical character, then out of favour with mainstream political opinion for his vocal opposition to government policy on appeasement with Germany. Realising he had misjudged the strength of feeling in the House of Commons in favour of Baldwin's handling of the King, together with realisation he was risking his own credibility and standing in the House, Churchill chose a tactical withdrawal.[85] Like Lord Beaverbrook, he also came to accept that no progress on the King's behalf was realistic anymore, since Edward himself seemed unwilling, or perhaps too physically and emotionally exhausted, to confront the Cabinet. As Beaverbrook put it, 'Our cock would be alright if only he would fight, but at the moment he will not even crow'.[86]

On the morning of 10 December Edward signed the further documentation that had been prepared in advance by Sir John Simon to accompany his removal from the throne, being an 'Instrument of Abdication' witnessed by his three brothers, and a 'Message' in the nature of a public declaration that he was renouncing the throne, to be read out in Parliament. That afternoon, the House of Commons met to receive the King's Message and to hear in response the Prime Minister's speech and version of events leading to it.[87] The following day the His Majesty's Declaration of Abdication Bill was rushed through all its parliamentary stages in each House within a matter of hours, coming into effect immediately.[88]

[85]Roy Jenkins (2001) *Churchill* (London: Macmillan) p503.

[86]As spoken to Sir Henry Channon, see Robert Rhodes James, ed (1967) *Chips: The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) p92.

[87]*Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, cols.2175–97.

[88]*Hansard*, Commons, 11 December 1936, col.2223. The Act of the UK Parliament took direct effect in most parts of the Empire but subsequent national legislation was required in some of the Dominions, including Canada, South Africa and Ireland. The approval of the Dominions to any UK changes in the law of succession to the Crown was a constitutional requirement under a convention declared in the preamble of the Statute of Westminster 1931 and was deemed to have been given through the consultations over the morganatic proposal.

Final Reflections

This chapter has addressed the legal and constitutional issues arising in the abdication crisis, and makes no judgement or analysis of the personal suitability of Edward to be King, on which arguments will forever continue on the quality of his character, political views, and aptitude for the work involved. One observation might be made, however, which is that it is within the essence of monarchy, namely its occupancy by accident of birth rather than selection on merit, that on each new accession to the throne the Prime Minister and Cabinet must respond to the new personality who will be head of state and they have a choice to make, between managing and accommodating the character and behaviour traits of the new monarch, or else rejecting that person altogether as unsuitable which ministers so painfully decided was necessary in 1936.

Some of the issues confronting Edward in 1936 have returned in very recent times, but have led to different outcomes, especially in matters concerning the present heir to the throne, Prince Charles, over his public role, his two marriages, and a royal title for the Prince's second wife if and when he becomes King. Clearly attitudes to towards royal divorce and a monarch's capacity to marry a divorcee have changed since 1936, with the Prince's divorce in 1996 from the late Diana, Princess of Wales, and his remarriage in 2005 to the divorcee Mrs Camilla Parker Bowles, now Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Cornwall. The government's insistence in 1936 that the wife of a King must always be called 'Queen' is to be contrasted with the government's position in 2005 that if and when the Prince succeeds to the throne, the Duchess of Cornwall will be known as 'The Princess Consort'.[89] This gives the lie to Baldwin's statement that this question was ever a matter of constitutional or legal compulsion.

Virtually all the legal and constitutional statements given by ministers during the abdication crisis were in essence policy decisions taken on political and personal grounds, then justified by legal and constitutional

[89]See *Announcement of the Marriage of HRH The Prince of Wales and Mrs Camilla Parker Bowles,* Clarence House, 10 February 2005: 'It is intended that Mrs Parker Bowles should use the title HRH The Princess Consort when The Prince of Wales accedes to The Throne'. A review and final judgement on the matter will no doubt be taken at the time of Charles's accession, influenced by public opinion. Meanwhile the Duchess has eschewed using the title of 'Princess of Wales' out of respect for the memory of Princess Diana who died in 1997.

arguments some of which were questionable at best, or duplicitous and misleading at worst. Their objectives were to compromise the King and banish him from the political and social life of Britain. Their actions towards Edward as an ex-King after 11 December 1936, by keeping him in exile and refusing him a return to his homeland to live (secured by the terms his financial settlement with his brother, the new King, George VI), by removing from his wife the new Duchess of Windsor her right under pre-existing law to the title of Royal Highness,[90] and even by the restrictions imposed on media reporting of Edward's life so as to banish him from people's minds, were brutal and unforgiving.[91] In retrospect, if not at the time, the establishment's treatment of him, especially considering his acquiescence in ministerial advice at all times, can be regarded as mean, ungenerous, and in some respects even absurd.[92]

In his speech to the House of Commons on 10 December, Baldwin said that Edward VIII's decision to abdicate the throne had little to do with himself or the government, and that it was almost entirely a matter resolved and decided by the King himself. He presented his own conduct and words throughout his meetings and discussions with the King in terms of being his 'friend' ('I wanted to talk it over with him as a friend to see if I could help him in this matter').[93] He said 'the only formal decision of any kind' communicated to the King, in other words formal constitutional advice given to Edward, was that the government refused to introduce the legislation the King had asked for which would declare that a future wife of his

[90]Her honorary right to the title as the wife of Edward was removed by Letters Patent of King George VI dated 27 May 1937, duplicitously conferring the title of Royal Highness upon Edward when in fact he already possessed the title under Letters Patent of 5 February 1864 (conferring the title on all children of a monarch), then adding the real purpose of the document which was to state that the title did not extend to his wife or children. It was Sir John Simon who designed this scheme to draw a line between the Duchess and the Royal Family, to the everlasting hurt and anger of Edward.

[91]The British film industry banned movie coverage of the Edward and Wallis's marriage from being shown in cinemas around the country to comply with the government's direction that undue publicity should not be given to the wedding.

[92]These were the words used by Lord Devlin to describe the government's refusal to admit the title of Royal Highness to the Duchess of Windsor, as Wallis became. Michael Bloch (1988) *The Secret File of the Duke of Windsor* (London: HarperCollins) p76.

[93]*Hansard*, Commons, 10 December 1936, col.2179.

need not necessarily be called a 'Queen'. In fact, his parliamentary account of events was a distortion of what had happened, designed to deflect any critical objection being taken to the legal and constitutional reasons given for Edward being driven from the throne. The truth was, and is, that on a series of core issues that might have saved the King, most of which Baldwin failed to mention altogether in his speech, he had robustly rejected the King's wishes, supported by elaborate arguments prepared by a few select colleagues in government notably Sir John Simon and Sir Horace Wilson.

The constitutional advice given to Edward VIII had included a battery of directions and refusals: that he should terminate his friendship with Mrs Simpson on grounds of adverse public opinion and disrespect it might bring to the monarchy; that he could not make a BBC broadcast to the nation setting out his own view of his personal situation in response to the press publicity on the news breaking on 3 December; that the government would not support legislation to make Mrs Simpson's divorce absolute in the manner of private divorce Bills in the past; and that as the King was still insisting on his wish to marry Mrs Simpson, despite her not being free till the following May and the King being utterly exhausted and in no fit state to decide anything, Edward must abdicate the throne immediately. Whether these communications were delivered to Edward in a formal manner or as a verbal exchange between Prime Minister and King was of no consequence in terms of their content, substance and intended effect. The constitutional advice given to the King throughout the abdication crisis was in essence a political conspiracy to remove him from the throne. A conflict of social *mores* may have been the issue and actual reason for the conspiracy, but it was the politics in the conspiracy that drove him out of office. Baldwin performed his role in this assassination with an ostensibly calm and reassuring efficiency; an iron fist in a velvet glove, and the swan-song of his own political career.[94]

[94]Baldwin resigned office in May the following year, having served as Prime Minister 1923–1924, 1924–1929, 1935–1937.

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CHAPTER 8

The Nature of Kingship in First World War Britain

Heather Jones

The role of monarchy in Britain during the Great War has been largely ignored by the new wave of cultural historiography of the conflict.[1] Yet, the British royal family was central to both the practical mobilisation of the war effort and the cultural belief systems that underpinned contemporary British mentalities. This chapter will explore the ways in which kingship was understood during the war, both by members of the British royal family and British society more generally, by examining the role of George V. It will attempt to apply the kind of cultural history analysis of leadership mythologies that historians have provided for other

[1] Leading examples of the most insightful recent historiography include: Adrian Gregory (2008) *The Last Great War. British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Jay Winter, ed (2014) *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Another excellent study is Catriona Pennell (2012) *A Kingdom United? Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) which briefly assesses the crowds who gather at Buckingham Palace.

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late-nineteenth-century and First World War figures—however different their politics to that of George V—to the British King.[2]

Three key aspects of the war will be the focus here, in order to explore in depth the ways in which kingship was understood during the conflict. First, the mobilisation period in 1914 when the cultural attitudes towards kingship in British society proved instrumental in engaging the population with the entry into war; second, the role of the King in bolstering troops' morale during the conflict; and finally, the way in which cultural understandings of kingship were used to cope with the period of mass mourning and commemoration that followed the war.[3]

The Mobilisation Period

One of the most important phrases in Britain at the outbreak of the First World War was the term 'King and Country'. Indeed, it was such a ubiquitous wording at the time that it has not been subject to any detailed historical analysis. However, the term was central to British wartime recruitment and mobilisation, and to understanding how men were culturally invoked into volunteering for war. 'For King and Country' was a key imperative expression—used to trigger a cultural duty reflex across the United Kingdom and not a bland, empty rhetorical expression in 1914—as it would later become. It carried real weight at the outbreak of the war—there was a sense of obligation to serve monarch and country within the honour cultures of Edwardian society that the term reveals. As Ute Frevert has argued, the European states that entered the war in 1914, were honour culture societies, with codes and behaviours predicated upon ideas of status, respectability and reputation that were based upon highly gendered notions of individual and societal 'honour'.[4]

[2] For such new approaches to the history of leaders as mythologised symbolic figures, see Anna von der Goltz (2009) *Hindenburg. Power, Myth and the Rise of the Nazis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Robert Gerwarth (2005) *The Bismarck Myth. Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Lucy Riall (2007) *Garibaldi. Invention of a Hero* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

[3] I am grateful to Alex Mayhew for his assistance in bringing some source material used in this chapter to my attention.

[4] Ute Frevert (2007) 'Honor, Gender, and Power: The Politics of Satisfaction in Pre-War Europe,' in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson, eds *An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914*, (Oxford: Berghahn Books) 233–55. On the cultural codes of bourgeois respectability see: James Connolly (2013) 'Mauvais Conduite: Complicity and Respectability in the Occupied Nord, 1914–1918' *First World War Studies*, 4(1), 7–21.

Clearly the term 'King and Country' provides a key insight into the culture of 1914 with the idea of a dual and intermeshed loyalty system as central to personal identity: duty is owed to *both* the monarch and to the *Patrie*. If the term is analysed in more detail, it is clear that 'country' is the more ambiguous aspect—George V ruled over four separate home nations, England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales and 'country' was suitably open to allow the term to invoke loyalty across all of these territories.[5] Yet the fact that the term always invoked the two elements—King *and* Country—also implies to some degree that the two coexisted symbiotically; that you could not have one without the other in the symbolic universe of British statehood in 1914. They were, if not one and the same, a perpetual intertwined and coalescing double act, which behoved citizen-subjects to defend them.

This helps to explain why large crowds gathered at Buckingham Palace from the evening of 2 August onwards, as George V reported in his diary. On 2 August a crowd of '6000' gathered and when the royal couple appeared on the balcony gave them a 'great ovation'.[6] On 3 August the crowds were 'very large' and the King wrote in his Diary that 'we were forced too [sic] go and show ourselves on the balcony three different times at 8.15, 9.0 and 9.45. Tremendous cheering.'[7] This process, of spontaneous crowds gathering and the royal family being called for and having to go out onto the balcony continued each night from 3 August until Sunday 9 August when a crowd of '50,000' gathered.[8] It appears the public sought to see the King, indeed needed to see him—as part of coming to terms with the realisation that the country was going to war. This was partly about reassurance—the King was a point of stability in an uncertain week—but also about checking that the monarch endorsed the war, and that the duty reflex of serving King and Country was thereby correctly to be invoked. It was perhaps also subconsciously about invoking an older historic tradition whereby British monarchs 'sent' their people into battle. The sheer scale of the crowds and the way they took the royals by surprise and demanded them—rather than the other way around—suggests British popular culture still had a deep kingship mechanism when it came to going to war.

The popularity of the term 'for King and Country' also highlighted the weak status of the term 'state' in popular British cultural symbolism. Indeed

[5] On cultural mobilisation in all four see: Pennell, *A Kingdom United?*
[6] Royal Archives (henceforth RA), GEO/PRIV/DIARY/1914, 2 August.
[7] RA, GEO/PRIV/DIARY/1914, 3 August.
[8] RA, GEO/PRIV/DIARY/1914, 9 August.

the expression 'King and Country' can in many ways be seen as a substitute for that of 'state'. After all, King and state were united entities: the King as head of state both *represented* the state and *embodied* its continuity through the monarchy. The medieval idea of the King's two bodies—identified by Kantorowicz—applied here.[9] The term 'King and Country' was thus a synonym for the invisible UK 'state' which, as a monarchy, effectively existed through this bifurcated and intertwined loyalty system of monarch and *Patrie*. Referencing the King obviated the need to mention the state. Yet this was not the only reason why 'King and Country' substituted for 'state'. The term had a powerful resonance and it evoked older and ongoing honour cultures in a way that made it highly effective in a British setting.

In the United Kingdom, comprising four nations in that union, and without a written constitution, the idea of statehood, can be argued to have been very abstract and problematic. The state was consequently a vague concept for most people in their daily life—its physical and symbolic embodiments as expressed in the term 'King and Country' were thus far more concrete and sacralised in the First World War era. Identity in 1914 was essentially built around loyalty to 'King and Country' or, in its broader, more global, variant, to 'King and Empire'. These phrases substituted for state in popular language. Individuals were referred to as subjects of the King before they were described as state citizens in any European sense.

The above understandings of kingship were very evident in the way the language of monarchy was used during this period; for example, it infused British military discourse. The terms 'soldiers of the King' and 'the King's uniform' were common and conveyed a whole range of meanings that contemporaries understood; here clearly we need to consider these as some of the 'unspoken assumptions' of British society in 1914 *pace* James Joll.[10] Those commissioned as officers in the pre-war British Army received a certificate that was infused with an older language on the sacred bond between monarch and subject. For example, the certificate sent to Stanley Steadman read 'To Our Trusty and Well-beloved Stanley Joseph Steadman Greeting: We reposing especial Trust and Confidence in your Loyalty, Courage and good Conduct do

[9] Ernst Kantorowicz (1998) *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

[10] James Joll (1968) *1914. The Unspoken Assumptions* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).

by these Presents Constitute and Appoint you to be an Officer in Our Land Forces from the Sixteenth day of July 1913.'[11] The certificate carried a facsimile of the royal signature and was sealed with the royal seal. The bond elucidated here was explicitly not between officer and state, but between officer and monarch. Arthur Osborn of 1st Birmingham Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment referred in a 1914 letter to the future 'success of the "Birmingham Boys" as soldiers of the King'.[12] Most famously, Kitchener's note of guidance to British troops in 1914, which was to be kept in each soldier's active service pay book, stated: 'You are ordered abroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common Enemy. … Do your duty bravely. Fear God. Honour the King.'[13] Such language also formed the bedrock of Sir Douglas Haig's belief system at war. This is clearly illustrated in a letter from Haig to the King where Haig was protesting against a plan to put the British Army under overall French command: 'At this great crisis in our history my sole object is to serve my King and Country wherever I can be of most use, and with full confidence I leave myself in Your Majesty's hands to decide what is best for me to do at this juncture.'[14] This was not purely rhetorical: Haig had a profound respect for the idea of kingship. The notion of serving 'King and Country' was one of the moral principles that drove him.

Nowhere was this kingship discourse more evident than in recruitment. That the term 'King and Country' invoked a cultural imperative to serve is evident in the way that it was commonly used in conjunction with recruiting publicity. As a recruitment poster for the Royal Fusiliers (London Regiment Battalions) put it:

> You don't want to see that day [of compulsion] come—nor do we. But there is only one way to prevent it and that is for you, and all of us who are young and healthy, to cheerfully don the King's uniform, and play a manly part by doing a man's work in defence of all an Englishman holds dear—his King, Home and Country.[15]

[11] The National Army Museum (henceforth NAM) 2002-02-516-5, 9 July 1913.

[12] Imperial War Museum (henceforth IWM) 90/17/1 Arthur Guy Osborn, 1st Birmingham Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Letter, 10 October 1914.

[13] Lord Kitchener's Guidance to British Troops, August 1914, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/kitchener1914.htm, accessed: 7 December 2015.

14 RA PS/PSO/GV/C/Q/832/130, Sir Douglas Haig to King George V, 27 February 1917.

[15] The Liddle Collection, Alfred Edward Burdfield, Liddle/WW1/GS/0222 (2/3 Battalion Royal Fusiliers).

The phrase 'King and Country' also appeared in numerous music hall recruiting songs. Paul Rubens wrote the famous 1914 song 'Your King and Country Want You' which was published by Chappell music at the outbreak of the war as a 'Women's Recruiting Song' intended to be used to encourage men to volunteer, with the famous lines 'Oh! We don't want to lose you but we think you ought to go; For your King and Country both need you so.' The song raised half a million for the Queen Mary Work for Women Fund and was recorded by some six different artists in 1914 alone. The same year, Lawrence Wright Music published 'Your King and Country Need You' with words by Paul Pelham and music by W. H. Wallis and Fred Elton:

> Have you seen the Royal Proclamation?
> Caused by War's alarms,
> Words addressed to all the population,
> Calling us to arms!
> …
> a great and glorious thing,
> To know the answer to the call,
> Is each one ready, great or small,
> So Britain's Sons will one and all,
> Now sing 'God Save The King'!

Yet another popular 1914 song by Huntley Trevor and Henry Pether was also entitled 'Your King and Country Need You'. That these were all 1914 recruiting songs highlights the importance of the phrase as one that could persuade men to volunteer to fight. It was so popular in 1914 that when the journal of the Women's Social and Political Union, in a radical political patriotic turn, changed its name to *Britannia* after the outbreak of war, it added the dedication 'For King and Country'.[16]

In fact, so popular was the term that it could be depicted visually without explanation as in the recruiting poster shown in Fig. 8.1. Indeed, in 1915, such rhetoric had powerful enough implications for the Prime Minister to admonish Admiral Fisher upon his resignation with a note that began 'In the King's name I order you to remain at

[16] Galit Haddah (2015) 'La Guerre de 1914–1918, matrice du pacifisme féminin au XXe siècle' in Nicolas Beaupré, Heather Jones and Anne Rasmussen, eds *Dans la Guerre 1914–1918: Accepter, Endurer, Refuser* (Paris: Belles Lettres).



Fig. 8.1 Great War recruiting poster

your post.'[17] The monarch was still a sacralised figure during the Great War, as Supreme Governor of the Church of England but also as a focus for older forms of folk loyalties and belief systems, particularly in rural England and among the aristocracy. In this culture, the words 'God Save the King' in the Anthem when sung 1914–1918 were not merely melody but prayer; kingship had a culturally spiritual role in the Britain of the Great War, as evidenced by the King's role in calling highly popular National Days of Prayer during the conflict.[18] In sum, kingship discourse infused British society at war.

[17] Kenneth Rose (1983) *King George V* (London: Phoenix Press) p188.

[18] Philip Williamson (2013) 'National Days of Prayer. The Churches, the State and Public Worship in Britain, 1899–1957,' *English Historical Review,* 128(531), 323–66.

Monarchy and Troop Morale

Of course, kingship was not merely a language discourse. During the war it was also very visibly present in tangible cultural practices in Britain such as the honour system—perhaps the most concrete embodiment of 1914–1918 honour culture. Such honour practices had an influence upon wartime morale, even if the extent of their impact remains difficult to assess. This becomes all the more evident when one considers the role that the honour system played during the war: the King personally conferred with his own hands 50,000 awards for gallantry.[19] Medals were the most visible form of honour practice during the conflict: they were metonyms for actions in the field, for a range of strenuous physical endeavours and for lauded characteristics such as bravery, courage or self-sacrifice. Through awarding the medal, the monarch not only honoured the individual man but also symbolically sacralised the talisman he handed over. The medal as talisman that the man would wear represented the brave deed. Some of the King's divinely ordained 'honour' was, through awarding medals, incorporated onto the attire of his subject. Personally pinning on medals was thus a powerfully intimate act of transfer of the King's honour to be incorporated into the subject who had performed particularly important acts of gallantry. Medals thus represented both the old and the new in the First World War. On the one hand, medals for acts of extreme gallantry harked back to an older era when the monarch—not the state—rewarded the individual for deeds in time of war. It related to a romanticised ideal of combat which ill matched the realities of trench warfare. On the other hand, medals became mass produced and ubiquitous as the conflict developed until ultimately every man who served received a medal after the war to commemorate the fact. This was a thoroughly modern democratic development of the older idea of medals as an honorific exchange but it was also one which saw medals provided with far less ceremonial, and even sent out by post.

The King also carried out numerous troop inspections which were intended to reinforce the symbolic honour-based relationship between sovereign and military subject. He made 450 visits to troops in Britain, during the whole war according to his biographer Kenneth Rose.[20] Indeed, due to the King's frequent visits to Aldershot to inspect troops

[19] Rose, *George V*, p179.
[20] Ibid.

about to leave home shores, being inspected by the monarch became a sign to troops that they were imminently due to leave for the war. It is difficult to assess how ordinary soldiers responded to the King's inspections. However, on 25 September 1914 George V recorded a positive reception from troops at Aldershot in his diary:

> Went for ride and saw a great many of the troops drilling, there are over 60,000 here now. Rode by the long valley and on coming home all the Highland Brigade who are camped outside here gave me a great ovation.[21]

The King's inspections and awards were not limited to the home front. George V made six visits to the troops in the field during the conflict—once in 1914, 1915, 1916 and 1917 and twice in 1918, as well as a further visit which followed on immediately after the Armistice in 1918. The King's first visit to France in late 1914 was focused on seeing as many of the troops as possible; indeed the *Daily Mail* claimed that 'During the King's visit to his army in the field his Majesty was able to see practically all the troops except those actually in the trenches.'[22]

The reference to the Army as 'his army in the field' is significant, again highlighting how the language of kingship infused a contemporary understanding of the war effort in 1914. George V also believed that on his 1914 visit he had managed to see 'all the troops out here in the last three days except those actually in the trenches'.[23] Seeing each man mattered to George V as it encapsulated that personal bond of feudal loyalty between the individual and his monarch that was the cultural basis on which military service operated. By his presence in France, the King reinforced this principle, thereby strengthening his Army. Within the lexicon of Great War honour culture, the King's visits represented an exchange. By his presence in France, he honoured those risking their lives in his name; they, in turn, honoured him by their sacrifices. As one soldier, H. G. Gilliland, described it: 'A holder of the King's Commission must carry out the spirit in which that commission is given—the path of duty, even unto death, in whatever circumstances that path may lie … it is the duty of each able-bodied officer and man to carry out the offensive spirit in every way possible.'[24]

[21] RA GEO/PRIV/DIARY/1914, 25 September.
[22] 'The King's Return', *Daily Mail*, 7 December 1914.
[23] RA GEO/PRIV/DIARY/1914, 3 December.
[24] H. G. Gilliland, 'My German prisoners', quoted in A. L. Vischer (1919) *The Barbed Wire Disease. A Psychological Study of the Prisoner of War* (London: Bale and Danielsson) p18.

The King's own desire to visit his troops thus stemmed from this honour-based understanding of kingship in wartime. He felt a sense of personal responsibility for the men. George had an ingrained understanding that a King's duty was to be as present with his troops as possible and included watching over his soldiers' welfare. There may also have been a desire to contrast his pared-down constitutional monarchy rule with that of his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm—widely viewed as the cause of the war. With a warmongering monarch being blamed for the conflict, the idea of hereditary rule itself risked being discredited completely. George V was acutely aware of the need to present a more redemptive, alternative image of monarchy to the British troops. In planning the 1914 visit, Clive Wigram, the King's Assistant Private Secretary, wrote of how 'The King would probably only come over with two or three of his Household and not in any way ape the German Emperor with a full Military Staff and large Escort.'[25]

If George V understood kingship in wartime as comprising a symbiotic relationship between the monarch and his soldiers, whereby each honoured the other, others around him saw his visits to the troops in more political terms—as a way of promoting the monarchy and of giving the troops a boost. There was a general belief at GHQ in 1914 when the first visit was being planned that seeing the King would boost morale:

> The difficulty, and what I suppose his Majesty most wants, is to arrange for seeing troops; but I think we can get those not actually engaged assembled by Brigades near their own Hd Quarters. I am sure that a sight of the King and a few words from him will do a world of good and will delight the troops (Sir John has visited a good many lately and from all accounts his visits are much appreciated) much more will those of the king.[26]

The verdict on the King's visits to troops varied. Colonel Stewart Cleeve was very impressed by George V's interest and questions put to him about technical gun settings.[27] Writing of the monarch's visit in late 1914, Wigram stated: 'The visit I think was a great success and everybody seemed delighted to see His Majesty.'[28] Sir Douglas Haig also believed

[25] RA PS/PSO/GV/PS/WAR/QQ7/4745, Wigram to Lambton, 5 November 1914.

[26] RA PS/PSO/GV/PS/WAR/QQ7/4745, Lambton GHQ to Wigram 26 November 1914.

[27] IWM 7310, Oral history account of Colonel Stewart Montagu Cleeve, interviewed 1983, reel 8, describing George V's visit in August 1918.

[28] RA PS/PSO/GV/PS/WAR/QQ7/4745, Clive Wigram to Colonel Sir Harry Legge, 9 December 1914.

that the 1916 visit had had a very positive effect, although this has to be seen in light of Haig's ingrained monarchism and his continually sycophantic behaviour towards George V:

> I beg leave to express my very grateful thanks for Your Majesty's kindness in writing to me so soon after returning to England and I cannot adequately explain what a real pleasure it has been to every one of us to see Your Majesty moving about amongst the troops. The universal wish is that 'the King should come and see us oftener!'[29]

Haig was also enthusiastic about the King's April 1918 visit, which came at a moment of major crisis for the British forces, dramatically pushed back following the start of the Ludendorff Offensive on 21 March:

> The coming of Your Majesty amongst his troops at this critical time has been immensely appreciated by us all and it has shown to all ranks the very keen interest which the King personally takes in the work of his soldiers in the field. After what Your Majesty saw of the Army in France last week, I feel sure that no assurance of mine is needed to prove that the troops, in spite of fierce fighting for so many days, still preserve their courage unabated, their determination unshaken and their confidence in final victory undiminished.[30]

In contrast to this enthusiasm, Raymond Asquith wrote from France, where he was serving with the Grenadier Guards that: 'The King came to see us this morning, looking as glum and dyspeptic as ever.'[31] However for others, the visits do seem to have boosted morale—Major General V. G. Tofts wrote:

> I remember one day in France when we had come out of the front line after a rather bad spell with very many casualties and we were reviewed by King George V with General Haig and several other Generals. We were thrilled to see the King but as regards all the Generals and the staff all we could think about was how clean and smart they looked.[32]

George V himself recorded a positive response in his diary on his first visit to France in December 1914. He wrote of how, driving to Estaires,

[29] RA PS/PSO/GV/C/Q/832/124, Douglas Haig to King George V, 20 August 1916.
[30] RA PS/PSO/GV/C/Q/832/139, Haig to King George V, 2 April 1918.
[31] Rose, *George V*, p169.
[32] IWM, Memoir, [Con shelf], Major General V. G. Tofts, 2–8 Battalions Manchester Regiment, p14.

he was cheered by troops suffering badly from the cold for which their uniforms were inadequate: 'roads lined by troops who were all in reserve, they cheered as we passed. Saw some men dressed in clothing to prevent frost bite consisting of fur skins for the body and sacks filled with straw for the legs.'[33]

For other soldiers, the importance of the King is revealed simply in the fact that they remarked upon any monarchical engagement with them. In 1918, H. T. Madders noted that 'Our Div. has been complimented by the King and are having a few days rest; thoughts of the Home Fires', suggesting the psychological connection between the idea of home and the familiar image of the King.[34] Lance-Corporal K. M. Gaunt noted on 25 December 1914: 'We have received a very nice card from the king and also a card, cigarettes and tobacco in a beautiful box from Princess Mary, which I must try and keep.'[35] Like medals, the Princess Mary Gift boxes were metonymic honour exchanges between royals and subjects. Kingship was more than a discourse for wartime Britain. It was also based upon practical symbolic actions that represented exchanges of honour between individuals and the monarchy and which appear to have helped sustain troops' sense of self-worth—and hence their morale.

George V and Commemoration

The discourse of kingship was also fundamental to the culture of post-war commemoration that emerged as a result of the conflict. If, in 1914, the idea of kingship—as a metonym for the state—had led men to go to war, then it followed that the men who had died in this cause should be honoured by the monarch. Likewise the term 'For King and Country' continued to be important in the immediate post-war years—reflecting its ubiquity in 1914 as part of the call to men to fight and its power as the term that had invoked a complex and compelling duty mechanism upon men in British society to volunteer. However by 1918 the term also had another function when it appeared on war memorials. There, it conveyed honour upon the dead. This was similar to the way that the term '*mort pour la patrie*', an officially awarded title in the French context, appeared

[33] RA GEO/PRIV/DIARY/1914, 1 December.

[34] IWM 01/21/1, H. T. Madders, 2/1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, Diary, 3 April 1918.

[35] IWM 75/78/1, L/Cpl later 2/Lt K.M. Gaunt, 1/16 Battalion London Regiment and 4 Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

on war graves to conveyed the honour of that state upon the fallen.[36] The more informally-applied phrase 'For King and Country' lauded the self-discipline of the British dead, their ready response to the duty imperative when called upon, amounting to their fulfilment of their manly 'honour.' It was far from an empty platitude on war memorials. It was meant as a comforting recognition of the *success* of the dead in meeting the demands of honour placed upon them, including their duty to their King. Even if honour culture can be claimed to have been badly damaged and undermined by the war, in the immediate post-war years it still carried weight. In other words, mentioning the King in this way on memorials sacralised the dead with some of the sacredness of the monarchy.

Victory was similarly infused with the idea of unity between monarch and people. As Jon Lawrence has noted, the *Daily Mail* reported how the King and Queen toured the working-class parts of London in the days after the Armistice. The language of the report suggests again the ideal of symbiosis between monarchy and subjects—a kind of re-enactment of the public at the gates of Buckingham Palace in 1914 when war was declared, except this time, in a symbolic demonstration of how the war had changed Britain, the monarch went out to the people, in poorer socio-economic areas:

> The climax of the revelry … was the passing of the King and Queen through the streets. Without escort save for two mounted policemen they drove through the delirious people—the King and Queen who, when thrones are falling like autumn leaves, can ride with only the escort of the people's love.[37]

A similar process was in evidence during the Victory Parade in London on 19 July 1919 when *The Times* reported 'thousands of people cheering and dancing around an open carriage in their anxiety to show their loyalty and devotion to their Sovereign'.[38] The victory procession included a march past the King who took the salute from those passing the royal stand at Buckingham Palace—a location *The Times* claimed where 'throughout

[36] In France, the phrase (translation: died for one's country) also came with generous state welfare benefits for the bereaved families of those granted it the appellation.

[37] *Daily Mail*, 12 November 1918, cited in Jon Lawrence (2007) 'Public Space, Political Space' in Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, eds *Capital Cities at War*, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2, 280–312, pp308–9.

[38] *The Times*, 21 July 1919.

the war in every moment of victory the people of London have flocked instinctively to make the King a sharer in their joy'.[39] It also described war-maimed men singing the National Anthem before the King as

> the noblest tribute king ever had from free people. It expressed all that the Royal House of England has meant to the soldiers of England throughout the past years; but much more than that it was the tribute of men, approved in the fires of war, to a man whom their hearts acclaimed.[40]

Again here the core relationship of the soldier was displayed as being to the monarch. Yet, in keeping with the increasing post-war lauding of democracy, it was now also described as a relationship of equals: man to man. The whole of the Victory Parade, which incorporated delegations from Britain's Allies including those from republican states, carried out a march past and saluted the British monarch, Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch and John Pershing among them.

What *The Times*'s pro-monarchist reporting masked of course was the general anxiety amongst the British establishment about increasing radical left anti-monarchical attitudes in some quarters of British society following the Bolshevik revolution.[41] Yet the symbolic involvement of the King and the royal family in marking the end of the war and honouring the dead was genuinely popular and appreciated; republicanism held very little sway overall in post-war Britain. In December 1920, news that Buckingham Palace was to host a garden party for VC holders to which the next of kin of fallen VCs were also invited, led to a series of letters from members of the public who had lost immediate family in the war, requesting an invitation. This included many whose dead relative had not been awarded that high honour.[42] One typical example from Mrs F. Spain, a Royal Navy widow, requested permission to bring her son: 'We have not [sic] an invitation of any kind since my poor Husband has been dead so for my little son sake [sic] I should be glad to come and bring him with me.'[43]

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Frank Prochaska (1999) 'George V and Republicanism 1917–1919,' *Twentieth Century British History*, 10(1), 27–51.

[42] The National Archives (henceforth TNA) ADM 116/1683, VC's Garden Party at Buckingham Palace 1 January 1914–31 December 1920.

[43] TNA ADM 116/1683, Mrs F. Spain to Admiralty, 20 June 1920.

Mrs E. G. Sandford wrote in response to 'His Majesty the King's gracious invitation' of how she was 'deeply touched by His Majesty's expression in this, of remembrance of those who have gone'.[44]

Perhaps the most important example of the sacralisation of the monarchy, and this being used to sanctify rituals around the war dead, was the burial of the Unknown Soldier in November 1920. George V, initially reluctant about the idea, donated an antique sword that he himself had selected from his private collection which was placed upon the soldier's coffin—a gesture that captured the public's imagination.[45] The tombstone recorded that:

> thus are commemorated the many multitudes who during the great war of 1914–1918 gave the most that man can give life itself for God for King and Country for loved ones, home and empire, for the sacred cause of justice and the freedom of the world. They buried him among the Kings because he had done good towards God and toward his House.[46]

Note the hierarchical order of causes for which the individual had died—first God, then King, with the rest following after. The King played a major role in the burial ceremony: unveiling the Cenotaph, laying a wreath upon the Unknown Soldier's coffin, scattering earth upon the coffin of the Unknown Soldier in the grave in Westminster Abbey.[47] The burial of the Unknown Soldier was a novel act—it fits with Eric Hobsbawm's arguments that many 'ancient' traditions are of recent invention.[48] Yet it was given much of its 'sacral' dimension by the participation and veneration of the sacred monarch—who, as Supreme Governor of the Church of England, had a particularly important national spiritual role.

Such usage of kingship to sacralise commemoration in the wake of the war was to become commonplace as an aspect of the everyday functioning of the institution within the community. Innumerable monuments were

[44] TNA ADM 116/1683, Mrs E. G. Salford to Admiralty, 16 June 1920.

[45] Stefan Goebel (2007) *The Great War and Medieval Memory. War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp86–7.

[46] Laura Wittman (2011) *The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Modern Mourning and the Reinvention of the Mystical Body* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) p327.

[47] Juliet Nicolson (2009) *The Great Silence. 1918–1920, Living in the Shadow of the Great War* (London: Grove Press) pp340–3.

[48] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds (1983) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

engraved with the phrase 'For King and Country'. For example, the tribute to Scottish women's war service on the Scottish National War Memorial proclaimed: 'whether their fame centuries long should ring, they cared not overmuch, but cared greatly to serve God and the King.'[49] Another example was the memorial placed in Tullow Church of Ireland, Dublin, to Geoffrey Hamilton who 'gave his life for his King and Country at the battle of Ginchy'.[50] Some memorials incorporated monarchy in more subtle ways: Lutyens placed a crown above the arches of his famous monument to the British and Empire dead and missing of the Somme at Thiepval. What is clearly still operating here is a form of what Norbert Elias has identified for older societies as the 'kingship mechanism'. Elias invented the term to define the informal power wielded by monarchs in court societies. After 1918, memory cultures in the wake of the war based around informal communities of bereavement projected the King, through his displays of sympathy for the war dead, into their shared web of grief, thereby sacralising it through the monarch's association with the spiritual.[51]

This sacralisation function of the monarchy also meant that members of the royal family were often chosen to unveil war memorials. George V, and the Prince of Wales, carried out innumerable such acts in the interwar period. Informal monarchical power thus remained in inter-war Britain, taking a new form—that of helping society deal with mass bereavement. Kingship was now about channelling public mourning in democratic ways—honouring the lowliest of soldiers as highly as a fallen general. Other aspects of kingly wartime leadership, such as George V's political influence in the selection of generals during the conflict, were now overshadowed by this kingship function of honouring the war dead and bereaved.[52]

The idea that the British and Empire war dead had sacrificed themselves for the King remained highly significant in terms of how the monarchy saw itself in the inter-war period. There was a clear sense of burden: the duty

[49] Website of the Scottish National War Memorial, http://www.snwm.org/gallery/bronze-metal/ accessed 20 December 2015.

[50] See the excellent Irish war memorial website: http://www.irishwarmemorials.ie/Memorials-Detail?memoId=84 accessed 20 December 2015.

[51] On Elias's definition see Jan Rüger (2009) *The Great Naval Game. Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p188.

[52] Ian F. W. Beckett (2000) 'George V and his Generals' in Matthew Hughes and Matthew Seligmann, eds *Leadership in Conflict: 1914–1918* (London: Pen and Sword).

to live up to the extent of the sacrifice that the people—and in particular the troops—had made in the conflict. This helps to explain some of the context of the fierce reaction to Edward VIII's decision when he rejected the Crown in order to pursue personal happiness with Wallis Simpson. Queen Mary informed him: 'It seemed inconceivable to those who had made such sacrifices during the war that you as their king refused a lesser sacrifice.'[53] For Edward VIII himself, however, a recollection of the war sacrifices led him to emphasise a duty of the monarchy to do all it could to preserve peace in Europe.[54] In 1935, when still Prince of Wales, he was to support a proposed visit by British Legion war veterans to Germany in the name of peace and reconciliation with the former enemy.[55] It is argued here that his experience of serving on the Western Front had greatly disillusioned him with regard to ideals of duty and sacrifice, and indeed, kingship itself. For example, in 1917, the Prince of Wales had returned to his base, only to be told off by his commanding officer for 'not reading the papers & taking no interest in World politics!! Of course he is right really & I dont [*sic*] attempt to be P of W or prepare for being so, but how I hate all that sort of thing & how unsuited I am for the job!!'[56] The enormous demands on, and new risks to, the monarchy's future stability, that had faced his father as a King during the First World War (a conflict that had toppled multiple European dynasties) may well have been intimidating for Edward VIII. It could well have been a factor in why, as Prince of Wales in the early 1930s, he had done all he could to improve relations with Germany to avoid another conflagration in the future.

Conclusion

It is useful to here draw some conclusions regarding the ways in which the idea of kingship changed in Britain during and after the First World War. At the outset of the conflict, kingship was part of a broader honour culture that infused contemporary beliefs and mentalities in much of

[53] Queen Mary to the Duke of Windsor, July 1938. Cited in 'King George and Queen Mary: The Royals who Rescued the Monarchy,' episode 2, BBC2, aired 4 January 2012.

[54] I have written on this elsewhere: see Heather Jones (2015) 'A Prince in the Trenches? Edward VIII and the First World War' in Heidi Merkhens and Frank Lorenz Müller, eds *Sons and Heirs: Succession and Political Culture in 19th Century Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan) pp229–46.

[55] Ibid., p243.

[56] RA EDW/PRIV/DIARY/1917, 3 June.

British society. However it has been argued here that by the end of the war, the high casualty rates, wartime shortages and the sheer duration of the violence had undermined this. The discourse of kingship had changed from one based on tropes borrowed from medieval pageantry, unquestioning martial loyalty and lingering, stiff Victorian class hierarchies. It had become one that emphasised kingship as service, thrift and humility, and the King as an ordinary man, a humane, if still sacralised, figure, eager to share in his people's suffering.

This was, in part, of course a shift designed to clearly differentiate the British monarch—despite his German ancestry—from the Kaiser and his sons, who were known for their love of luxury in wartime (see Chapter 2). Any discussion of how kingship changed in Britain during the First World War has to acknowledge the fact that the British press's denigration of the Kaiser's rule challenged the idea of hereditary monarchy in Europe altogether. The British press argued that the Kaiser was personally responsible for the outbreak of war. He became a barbaric cartoon villain and the personification of evil. In essence it revived an older discourse of the tyrannical King with its echoes of the English Civil War depiction of Charles I.[57] This was a dangerous media climate for the British royal family, particularly given their German connections. Hence the constant emphasis as the war went on upon George V as a 'democratic' modest King.[58]

In terms of the three elements of kingship assessed in this chapter—mobilisation, morale and commemoration—the conflict brought significant challenges and some important changes. With regard to mobilisation, by the end of the conflagration, gone was the unquestioning idea of a duty imperative to go to war to preserve one's masculine honour. The fact that by 1916 conscription was required highlighted this shift. With conscription came a change in the role of the King in relation to his Army. This was no longer an army of volunteers or professional regulars who had chosen to serve. Now the *state* was very clearly imposing military service; it could

[57] On the image of the Kaiser in Britain see: The German Historical Institute (2012) *Many Faces of the Kaiser: Wilhelm II's Public Image in Britain and Germany* (London: The German Historical Institute); Lothar Reinermann (2008) 'Fleet Street and the Kaiser: British Public Opinion and Wilhelm II' *German History*, 26(4), 469–85; Lothar Reinermann (2001) *Der Kaiser in England: Wilhelm II und sein Bild in der britischen Öffentlichkeit* (Paderborn: F Schöningh); J. Rebentisch (2000) *Die vielen Gesichter des Kaisers. Wilhelm II. in der deutschen und britischen Karikatur* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot).

[58] Jones, 'A Prince in the Trenches'.

no longer be portrayed as springing predominantly from a cultural sense of duty to 'King and Country'. In other words, the state was interposing itself (if still in the King's name) into what had been seen as a direct honour relationship between military and monarch. Even if many soldiers had always, pre-1914, enlisted for financial reasons, this image of an honourable relationship had still mattered.

George V tried to resist this change as much as possible. He sought to sustain the sense of a unique bond between the monarch and the ordinary soldier and officer as a direct affective connection and one which bypassed the complex faceless bureaucracy and institutional structures of the state, despite the vast expansion of the Army and the introduction of conscription. His tireless inspection of troops bound for overseas before they left the United Kingdom, his constant awarding of medals to individuals, his visits to France where he sought to be seen and indeed meet as much of the Army as possible face to face, highlight this. Likewise, the fact that the King sent a letter to each returning British prisoner-of-war upon their repatriation after the conflict ended, similarly testifies to George V's desire to preserve kingship in military culture as a personal bond.

By emphasising the personal, the individual and symbolic interaction between monarch and subject, the King's efforts had the corollary of making the monarchy appear approachable and human, at a moment in history when industrial warfare had made battle faceless, mechanical and anonymous. As a result, kingship here functioned particularly well in British war culture precisely because the King resisted modernising the monarch–subject relationship with his troops. It offered an antidote to the modern terrors of Great War anonymity. The King's visits, praise and awarding of medals do appear to have boosted morale as indeed did the war service of other members of the royal family. This was especially the case regarding the Prince of Wales at the front and Prince Albert (later George VI) in the Navy, because of the real risks they took and the perception that this showed the royal family sharing in the nation's sacrifices by offering its sons to the war.[59]

With regard to commemoration, kingship became a social mechanism for dealing with mass national bereavement, an innovation that again the British monarchy adapted to relatively sensitively. Importantly, a powerful discourse of kingship remained in Britain after the war: the ongoing popularity of the

[59] Ibid.

term 'For King and Country' on war memorials in the immediate aftermath testifies to this. It would not be until the literature of disenchantment period after 1929 that the high rhetoric of patriotism would be radically challenged, and with it, some of the language of monarchism, including this phrase. But from 1917 on, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution and the strains of the Great War, kingship was no longer a cultural code that could be taken for granted in British society in the way that it once had been. It was, between the wars, undergoing dramatic changes in meaning. Loyalty now had to be earned, not assumed. The monarchy recognised this. George V had been quick to reposition the King in wartime not as a warrior but as an ascetic. His giving up alcohol and his request to be accommodated as modestly as possible during his visits to France were designed to convey the message that he was deliberately seeking out hardship, as a way of physically conveying that the King wished to share his people's suffering.

However limited his gestures may appear today, in the context of European monarchy at the time they were greatly appreciated in a Britain (and, more widely, a Europe) where enormous hereditary privilege among elites was still the norm. By rejecting alcohol and luxury and travelling simply, George V was invoking older religious languages about mortification of the flesh. In terms of the symbolism of the King's body as both a physical and a national entity, this had powerful overtones to a public literate in the words of the King James version of the Bible. The King's physical body doing penance as a way of keeping faith with the symbolic national body, that of King and people, which was in crisis, signified an almost puritan, spiritual gesture by the King that suggested a supplication of God for victory in return, something George V also did through declaring and regularly attending National Days of Prayer during the war.[60]

For George V, his gestures of minor sacrifice in this way honoured the soldiers' far greater sacrifice in battle. It was the demonstration of community implied by this that was the really radical aspect here and which was understood as such by the British public—by sharing in the public wartime sacrifice the King made common cause with his people—and sacrificing *together* was a form of spiritually communing, a fact not lost on a still largely theologically literate Anglican population and their King. Sacrifice was projected as a spectrum that connected all quarters

[60] On George V and religious supplication through national days of prayer during the war see Williamson, 'National Days of Prayer.'

of society; it made a monarch metaphorically one with his people. It also evoked imitation of Christ, the original divine sacrifice and spiritual King in Christian theology, a theology George V as Supreme Governor of the Church of England was pledged to uphold. In navigating new First World War languages of mass sacrifice and substituting them for older pre-1914 honour discourses, George V helped steer the British monarchy through the crisis years of the First World War. Here, ultimately, kingship as discourse and practice successfully reinvented itself in Britain during the 1914–1918 conflict around ideas of service and national unity in ways that still shape the modern British monarchy.

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CHAPTER 9

The Duke and the Dictator: The Royal Role in Marshal Tito's Visit to Britain, March 1953

Andrew Harrison

In the months leading up to the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, Winston Churchill's Conservative government was busy preparing to welcome a controversial visitor to London: the communist dictator of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito. Tito would become the first communist leader to visit a Western nation when he arrived in March 1953 against a backdrop of Cold War friction. The visit held risks for Tito himself, as he had not left the relative security of his nation since the Soviet Union expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform in disgrace five years earlier.

Tito's foreign policy in the post-war years had made him a dangerous rival to his wartime allies in the West. Internationally, Tito was seen as second in command to Joseph Stalin with Belgrade firmly part of the communist bloc. The United States had two planes shot down over Yugoslavia in 1946 and British-backed government troops were under attack from Tito-supported communist rebels in the Greek Civil War. The Yugoslavs also laid claim to the port of Trieste and surrounding area, rivalling similar claims from Italy, a member of NATO and key British ally.

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In Moscow, Stalin had his own anxieties about Yugoslavia's antagonistic foreign policy. Tensions were high in Europe, with the Kremlin's interests clashing with those of London and Washington, particularly over the future of Berlin. At the time, the West interpreted Stalin's policy of installing puppet leaders across Eastern Europe as an aggressive attempt to dominate that part of the continent. Scholars now largely agree the Soviet leader's main priority was to stabilise control over 'buffer states' as a defensive measure. Tito's independent foreign policy conflicted with Stalin's aims, and his patience was finally exhausted in June 1948. The Kremlin feared Tito was inciting the West too much with his public rhetoric and collaboration with the Greek communists despite Stalin telling him to withdraw. Stalin hoped to scare Tito into repenting but the tactic failed. Instead, fearing his nation would become dangerously isolated, Tito turned to the West.

Despite an initial reluctance to believe Yugoslavia really had been excluded from the communist bloc, Tito soon found governments in London, Washington and Paris receptive to his calls for assistance. Britain's Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was key in formulating a Western policy to 'keep Tito afloat'. Economic and military aid packages were drawn up and a trade agreement was signed between Britain and Yugoslavia in February 1950. A change of government at Westminster in October 1951 did not curtail the policy. Indeed, Britain was prepared to lead the Western diplomatic rapprochement with the Yugoslavs. The Conservative Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, visited Belgrade in September 1952 and six months later Tito became the first communist leader to be welcomed to the West.

Foreign Office protocol meant Eden had extended an invitation for Tito to pay a return visit during his stay in Belgrade. The Yugoslav leader's acceptance caused something of a panic in King Charles Street with officials conscious that the new Queen was yet to receive any foreign visitors.[1] Nevertheless, Prime Minister Winston Churchill intervened to insist Tito, whom he had met in Naples in August 1944, must come. However, the status of his visit and whether it was possible to receive Tito before Elizabeth's coronation led to lengthy debate. Officially, Tito came as a private guest of the government yet he was afforded plenty of the ceremo-

[1] The National Archives (henceforth TNA) PREM11/578, FO telegram to Belgrade, no.658, 20 September 1952.

nial traditions of a full state visit during his five-day stay. The first person to shake Tito's hand as he disembarked at Westminster Embankment was His Royal Highness, the Duke of Edinburgh.[2] Admittedly, the Duke was not head of state and in reality held no official role in British public life. However, he was a senior royal by birth and his prominent presence in Tito's welcome party alongside Churchill and Eden made a statement as to the importance the government was prepared to place on the visit. Tito had requested the Duke welcome him to Britain on behalf of the Queen, and, for his part, the Corfu-born Duke whose family had fled Greece in 1922 was equally keen to meet Tito.[3]

Status of the Visit

Tito's 1953 visit has been misinterpreted as a full state occasion by some scholars. Perhaps understandably so given the ceremony afforded the Yugoslav leader. The prominent issue here is the fact a rewriting of the Yugoslav constitution, between Tito being invited and his scheduled arrival, meant he would be head of state and head of government, during his stay. This caused difficulties for Churchill's government, magnified by the fact Britain's monarch was yet to be crowned and yet to have received any foreign guests. George VI died on 6 February 1952 but Elizabeth II was not crowned until 2 June 1953. Protocol would not have allowed Tito to be officially received before more traditional friends of Britain.

Erik Goldstein's pamphlet *The Politics of the State Visit* offers a framework for the analysis of state and non-state visits.[4] This pamphlet carries authority as, following its publication in 1997, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office distributed it to employees to act as unofficial guidelines when organising state visits. Goldstein describes the elements of past state visits and argues certain events should occur based on precedent. As Britain has an uncodified constitution, there are no officially published guidelines on state visits or on entertaining foreign dignitaries. Instead tradition and precedent are cited. Useful diplomatic consequences of this include the prospect of ambiguity and rules being bent or stretched for political or pragmatic purposes.

[2] The Duke of Edinburgh was granted the title 'Prince' of the UK in February 1957 after renouncing his titles in Greece and Denmark.

[3] TNA FO371/107832, Cheetham, Minute, 17 January 1953.

[4] E. Goldstein (1997) *The Politics of the State Visit* (Diplomatic Studies Programme).

The Crown and the Communist

Hosting a prominent communist in London months before the coronation of Elizabeth II seemed improbable to many Whitehall officials in September 1952. Indeed, Communism had been viewed as the real threat to British values before the Second World War, especially in establishment circles. For his part, Eden had initially seen his visit to Yugoslavia as the chance for a holiday before the summer ended rather than an important diplomatic mission.[5] The Foreign Office saw Eden's visit as a useful propaganda tool to use against Stalin, as it was hoped personal contact with Tito would consolidate Yugoslavia's separation from the Kremlin and glean some understanding of Moscow's inner workings.[6]

Nevertheless, concerned conversations rumbled on into the early months of 1953 following Tito's keen acceptance of an invitation to make a return visit. It had taken Churchill's personal intervention to ensure Eden's invitation was more than just a polite gesture. For those in favour of the visit, the positive reasons were clear. For example, it was thought that exposing Yugoslavia's leaders to democratic government would hopefully reduce the more non-liberal elements of the communist regime. In doing so this would also show Soviet satellite states there was an alternative to rule from Moscow while remaining communist. Also, a British strategic and defence priority focused on the Balkans and the east Mediterranean, with interests in Greece, and the Suez Canal offering a route to the empire beyond. The region was NATO's weakest frontier, and a friendly Yugoslavia could act as a buffer. Economically, Yugoslavia offered new markets to aid an ailing British economy struggling to cope with the demands of maintaining a worldwide empire after the exertion of all-out modern warfare. However, the balancing act was to ensure welcoming Tito did not come at the cost of upsetting more traditional allies. If nothing else, there was a strict hierarchy of which heads of state should be received first by a new monarch and the communist leader of Yugoslavia was not among them.

It was eventually agreed in January 1953 that Tito's visit would be described as 'private' but 'official' despite some in Belgrade objecting to the use of 'private'. As a result, compromises were offered to the Yugoslavs and elements more associated with a full state visit were included. These

[5] TNA FO371/102179, Eden to Churchill, Note,14 July 1952.
[6] TNA FO371/102179, Belgrade to FO, Telegram, 25 July 1952.

compromises were mainly symbolic to appease Tito's considerable ego and keep the visit on track. The very visible involvement of the Duke of Edinburgh, and subsequently the Queen, are examples of the British government's pragmatism.

Tito's Arrival

This intentional blurring of the state or non-state line is evident in the reception awaiting Tito as he emerged through the particularly thick fog at Westminster Pier aboard London Port Authority barge, *The Nora*, on the afternoon of 16 March. He had sailed from Yugoslavia to Greenwich Pier aboard his Yugoslav Navy yacht JRM *Galeb* (Seagull) before heading up the Thames in the smaller vessel to meet his official welcome party. Goldstein argues that the arrival ceremony for a visitor 'often conveys a signal of the host state's attitude' to its guest.[7] Therefore, the presence of the Duke of Edinburgh sent mixed messages as it had been announced that Tito was officially coming as a guest of the government, not the monarch. However, the Duke held no official role although his presence as a senior royal would have certainly impressed Tito. This was what the British government hoped to achieve.

Tito had personally requested the Duke welcome him on behalf of the Queen in January. Reportedly, Tito had said he 'trusted whoever came … as the Representative of the Queen should be a member of the Royal Family, and he suggested it should be the Duke of Edinburgh'.[8] Tito, who was considering flying to London at this point, also said he 'would understand' if Churchill was unable to come to the airport to meet him, although he found the usual reasons given due to the 79-year-old Prime Minister's age and workload, 'unconvincing'.[9] It seems Tito, himself aged 60, preferred to push the British to ensure a royal welcome rather than being met by the elected leader of the country's government. This illustrates Tito's attempts to be seen as above politics and very much aware of the propaganda value of being met by a senior royal. From the British perspective, it gave an insight into how Tito could be flattered and the potential for using this to their own ends. The irony was Tito's attempts to

[7] Goldstein, *State*, p7.
[8] TNA FO371/107832, Cheetham, Report, 12 January 1953.
[9] TNA FO371/107832, Cheetham to Mallet, 12 January 1953.

style himself as a friend of royals came despite him ousting the monarchy from his own country at the end of the Second World War.

The Duke's presence at the official reception does suggest the British wanted Tito's visit to be seen as something more than a regular private visit to meet members of the government. Some Foreign Office civil servants had doubted whether Buckingham Palace would allow the Duke to meet Tito if he came as head of state, due to a queue of royalty ahead of the communist dictator. The answer came, however, that the Duke 'would rather like to do so, as he is interested in Marshal Tito'.[10] The Queen's Private Secretary, Sir Alan Lascelles, said the Duke would be 'pleased to meet Tito at the airport' and further that the Queen would be 'glad to receive him before the luncheon party which she gives for him at Buckingham Palace'.[11]

One month before his scheduled arrival Tito had informed London he hoped to move his visit forward a fortnight from the agreed 23–28 March in an attempt to scupper any potential assassination plots. Despite many arrangements already being in place, including dates for lunch at Buckingham Palace and meetings with the Prime Minister, the British government offered to move the dates by one week, which Tito accepted. On 7 February, Lascelles wrote to inform the Foreign Office that the Duke would also postpone an arranged visit to West Germany in order to meet Tito as he arrived on British soil.[12] This again shows how keen the British government was to ensure Tito visited, even to the point of reworking the calendars of the monarch and senior government ministers at short notice.

The Queen approved a request for a Royal Navy Guard of Honour to be assembled to greet Tito on his arrival at Westminster Pier. Instructions for the guard and band stated the Duke was receiving Tito 'on behalf of the Queen' and that six bars of the National Anthem would be played for the Duke and then the Yugoslav national anthem for Tito.[13] Regrettably, Belgrade provided a score of their anthem suited to a symphony orchestra. In an upbeat letter to the Admiralty, however, Foreign Office official J. Oliver Wright mused: 'Doubtless the Marines will be able to make

[10] TNA FO371/107832, Cheetham, Minute, 17 January 1953.
[11] TNA FO371/107832, W&S Department, Minute, 20 January 1953.
[12] TNA FO371/107832, Lascelles to Shuckburg, Letter, 7 February 1953.
[13] TNA FO371/107832, Instructions for Guard and Band at Westminster Pier, 9 March 1953.

something of it.'[14] The status of Tito's visit was carefully explained to the Admiralty as: 'Strictly speaking a private one since no State visits can take place before the coronation. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the visit and all possible courtesies will be offered.'[15]

One of these courtesies was luncheon at Buckingham Palace. In planning for Tito's first meeting with the Queen, the Foreign Office informed Lascelles that it was believed Tito would like the affair to involve a larger party, including the Foreign Secretary and Ambassador, and that he would almost certainly wear his uniform as often as he could. Lascelles replied that the Duke of Edinburgh would 'certainly put on uniform if that was thought to be helpful'. Lascelles also reiterated that the Duke was happy to meet Tito at the airport as he was 'interested' in the Yugoslav.[16]

The pragmatism in Whitehall and the awareness of the importance of the symbolic is clear from a Foreign Office minute which concluded that: 'These two favourable points should perhaps make it easier for us to be firm with the [Y]ugoslavs about their other demands.'[17] The main Yugoslav demand was a public acknowledgement by the British government to recognise Tito's visit more prominently as 'official' rather than the less appealing 'private'. That would not be possible due to protocol, but the British could highlight the symbolism attached to Tito dining with the Queen to the Yugoslavs. Whether or not the Duke of Edinburgh wore military uniform was not an issue for the British. It was, however, an opportunity to flatter Tito as it was well-known that he enjoyed wearing his uniform and it was thought he would enjoy being with the Duke wearing his too. However, Tito surprised everyone by announcing he actually did not want to wear his uniform while dining with the Queen and only military personnel within his party would be dressed this way. The British may have been relaxed about the Duke being in uniform with Tito but it was concluded that formal speeches at the luncheon would be out of place. It was also decided that toasts should be limited to 'The Queen' and 'The President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia'.[18] The

[14] TNA FO371/107833, Wright to Allingham, Admiralty, Letter, 6 March 1953.
[15] TNA FO371/107832, Cheetham to Secretary of the Admiralty, Letter, 16 February 1953.
[16] TNA FO371/107832, Shuckburg, Minute, 17 January 1953.
[17] Ibid.
[18] TNA FO371/107833, Wright, Minute, 26 February 1953.

Queen specifically asked for no exchange of gifts either; something certainly associated with a full state visit.

On arrival at Buckingham Palace, Tito was allowed 15 minutes conversation with the Queen before moving to the dining room to sit with the other guests. Tito was granted this despite Lascelles' firm assertion in January that he was invited to lunch, not an audience. However, a press announcement provided by the Foreign Office in the week before Tito's arrival reported he would indeed be 'received in audience by the Queen'.[19] The Yugoslavs had wanted Tito's reception and luncheon to be separated, allowing for a representative of the Queen, probably the Duke of Edinburgh, to make a return call. This was rejected out of hand as a departure from the normal etiquette. However, Lascelles wrote to the Foreign Office Press Secretary on 13 March to advise that 'the Queen has agreed to be photographed with Marshal Tito. Her Majesty would like this done in the Picture Gallery immediately after luncheon'.[20]

So while Tito did not get his return visit, he did get the opportunity to be photographed with the Queen: arguably a far more important piece of propaganda to be distributed back home through the state-owned press. For the British, the Duke making a return visit would have been far more symbolically important than a photograph. Newsreels had already captured pictures of the Duke shaking hands with Tito as he arrived and inspected the Guard of Honour and it was already known to the country that he would be lunching at Buckingham Palace. The British Embassy in Belgrade also hoped to use Tito's visit for their own propaganda purposes. In organising photography and filming, British Ambassador Sir Ivo Mallet and his staff were keen to portray Tito as 'a small Marshal in a big pond' with plenty of shots of him with leading British personalities and famous London landmarks.[21]

It is rare that these sorts of diplomatic visits lead directly to political or economic agreements between nations. The visit was about laying foundations for the strengthening of relations between Britain and Yugoslavia and if that meant the flattering of Tito's ego then so be it. This symbolism meant more to the Yugoslavs than it did to the British but a need for careful awareness of certain traditions remained vital. For example, an early draft the visit schedule drawn up by Foreign Office officials included taking

[19] TNA PREM11/578, Press announcement, 11 March 1953.
[20] TNA FO953/1457, Lescelles to FO, Memorandum, 13 March 1953.
[21] TNA FO953/10457, Lloyd to Crighton, Telegram, 28 February.

in Windsor Castle and Hampton Court Palace, arguably both traditional highlights of a state visit. This significance was not lost on Churchill and his joint Principal Private Secretary John Colville. Enquiries had not been made with Buckingham Palace as to whether Tito would be welcomed at Windsor and Colville registered his, and the Prime Minister's, surprise to the Foreign Office.[22] The Palace also responded with surprise after receiving the draft. In a consequent minute to the Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary William Strang, a defensive Assistant Private Secretary Frederick Leishman said: 'We had sent [Lascelles] the draft for his own advance information and had no intention of seeming to be making firm arrangements without proper authority.'[23] Strang was subsequently despatched to Buckingham Palace to seek the Queen's belated permission to include invitations to Windsor and Hampton Court in Tito's schedule.

Not everyone in Whitehall was concerned with upsetting the Palace, however. Eden's Principal Private Secretary, Evelyn Shuckburg, wrote of Lascelles: 'It seems to me he's being very touchy. We are keeping the closest touch with him all the time about this visit.'[24] Nevertheless, after being officially approached, the Queen thought it 'an admirable idea' that Tito should go to both places and approved the suggestion.[25] The visits proved brief to say the least. Tito spent fifteen minutes at Hampton Court and received a 55-minute tour of Windsor before taking his leave. The importance of a quick photo opportunity outweighed everything else. Likewise, the Royal Box at the Royal Opera House was made available for an evening at the ballet although Foreign Office official Nicholas Cheetham wrote: 'You can't see anything from it but it is highly dignified and there is a nice ante-room for drinks and supper.'[26]

Official But Private

The Yugoslavs finally accepted the status of Tito's visit following lengthy discussions with British Ambassador Mallet. From Tito's point of view, an audience with the Queen and meetings with the British leaders could be used to benefit his international legitimacy and personally boost his

[22] TNA PREM11/578, Colville to Leishman, Note, 25 February 1953.
[23] TNA FO371/107833, Leishman to Strang, Minute, 25 February 1953.
[24] TNA FO371/107833, Shuckburg, Minute, 25 February 1953.
[25] TNA FO371/107833, Lascelles to Strang, Letter, 27 February 1953.
[26] TNA FO371/107832, Cheetham, Minute, 23 January 1953.

confidence on the world stage. From Britain's point of view, the government could allow Tito to feel he was on a state visit while highlighting the reasons why he was not to any country potentially irked that a communist dictator had seemingly jumped the queue. There was no harm in bending the unwritten rules every now and again to meet political aims.

British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, John Selwyn-Lloyd, tried to explain the complicated situation to Yugoslav Ambassador Vlatko Velebit in February 1953. Selwyn-Lloyd said: 'As far as the Marshal's position as Head of the State was concerned, there were only two categories—State and private. Tito's visit could not be a State one, since the Queen was not crowned, and was therefore in this respect a private one.' However, the Yugoslavs should not lose heart, as: 'In his capacity as Head of the Government, Tito's visit was an official one and regarded as such by Her Majesty's Government.' In a Minute to Foreign Office colleagues, Selwyn-Lloyd confirmed, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, that: 'Dr Velebit said my explanation was perfectly clear and that he quite understood the position.'[27] On reading Selwyn-Lloyd's Minute an exasperated Eden used his distinctive red pen to describe the Yugoslavs' 'prickly' attitude towards the status of Tito's visit as 'cheeky'.[28]

The main concern of how Tito's visit would be construed by Britain's allies is shown in a confidential Foreign Office intelligence report distributed to Her Majesty's Government representatives around the world on New Year's Eve, 1952. Again it was emphasised that Tito's visit would be 'private and informal' due to the constitutional difficulties in both countries.[29] Similarly in correspondence with the military, extra care was given to explain why Tito's visit was categorised as private despite the very public ceremonial gestures being afforded the Yugoslav dictator. A Commonwealth Office telegram to the High Commissions in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) explained that although Tito's visit was not a state one, it was still being afforded a great deal of importance.[30]

The Foreign Office did not expect Tito to bring his wife Jovanka to London. The presence of Madame Broz would certainly push things far closer to a state occasion. There had been no mention of Tito's wife

[27] TNA FO371/107833, Selwyn-Lloyd, Minute, 24 February 1953.

[28] TNA FO371/107833, Eden, Minute, 25 February 1953.

[29] TNA PREM11/578, Foreign Office Intelligence Report, 31 December 1952.

[30] TNA FO371/107834, Commonwealth Office telegram to High Commissions, Telegram, 6 March 1953.

accompanying him until a telegram arrived from Mallet in December. The Ambassador reported that Jovanka Broz had told his own wife that she hoped to accompany Tito although no invitation had yet been extended. On receiving the telegram, a clearly panicked Eden wrote at the bottom of the page in red ink: 'Help! What do we say? Yes, I suppose?'[31] In an attempt to avoid more protocol issues, the Foreign Office and Prime Minister's Office decided to tell Mallet to inform Tito that Madame Broz would be welcome. But, with the loaded caveat, that 'the presence of ladies in the party might unduly complicate a programme which was intended to be practical and official rather than purely social and formal'.[32]

Nevertheless, the response came that Madame Broz intended to travel and as a result, for fear of offending Tito, the Foreign Office asked Buckingham Palace whether the Queen would receive her in audience and invite her to lunch too. Churchill regarded the suggestion of Madame Broz receiving an audience with the Queen as 'quite inappropriate'.[33] In the meantime, Lascelles had told the Foreign Office he personally believed the Queen 'could not possibly refuse to entertain Madame Tito as well as the Marshal himself'.[34] However, it seems the continued, and almost certainly intentional, delay of an official invitation led Madame Broz to read between the lines and save face by announcing she would be unable to make the trip after all.

Security Concerns

The involvement of leading personalities, notably the Duke of Edinburgh, and the possibility of an attempt on Tito's life led to much tighter security than was usual for private visits. A vague US intelligence report handed to the Foreign Office in December identified a Soviet-inspired Croat group who apparently hoped to murder Tito in London, although further investigation found no real evidence of this being the case.

Scotland Yard was faced with several more security concerns as Tito's visit approached. Police Commissioner Sir Harold Scott said assassination attempts were the main worry, but also 'unpleasant incidents such as demonstrations and leaflet throwing', especially from Britain's Roman Catholic

[31] TNA FO371/102184, Belgrade to FO, Telegram, 1 December 1952.
[32] TNA PREM11/573, Shuckburgh to Colville, Letter, 8 December 1952.
[33] TNA PREM11/578, Colville to Shuckburgh, Letter, 13 December 1952.
[34] TNA FO371/102184, Leishman, Minute, 16 December 1952.

community, were an issue.[35] The outrage from British Roman Catholics had been unforeseen by Churchill and had its roots in Tito's imprisonment of the Archbishop of Zagreb, Aloysius Stepinac, and others on charges of supporting the fascist Ustaše regime during the Nazi occupation.

An important figure in calming the situation, in Britain at least, was the President of the Catholic Union, Bernard Marmaduke Fitzalan-Howard, 16th Duke of Norfolk. Norfolk also held the position of Earl Marshal and was therefore making preparations for the coronation. Despite it being a busy time he agreed to work with the government to convince Catholic Union members the best way of getting a message to Tito would be a written Memorial outlining their grievances rather than public protests and demonstrations. In the meantime Mallet was instructed to reassure the Yugoslavs that all political parties, the press and the majority of the British public wanted Tito to visit. Nevertheless, while Churchill had agreed that Tito would be allowed to lay a wreath at the Cenotaph in Whitehall, the Prime Minister decreed 'in no circumstances' should he be permitted to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Westminster Abbey due to fears over further offending Catholics, or other groups who thought Tito guilty of religious persecution. Should Tito protest at being denied this opportunity usually afforded to visiting heads of state, the government had a ready-made excuse in that Westminster Abbey was closed and being prepared for the forthcoming coronation.[36]

As well as the US report, British intelligence had identified anti-Tito groups in Germany, France and Argentina with the capacity and inclination to 'do something' while Tito was in London. Home Secretary David Maxwell Fyfe had surmised: 'I cannot rule out the possibility that an attempt will be made on Marshal Tito's life; and I cannot give a guarantee that an attempt, if made, will be frustrated.' Indeed, Churchill did not think it advisable for the Duke of Edinburgh to share a car into London with Tito should he arrive by air. Proposed measures included a 'strong motorcycle escort whenever [Tito] travels by car'. Crucially, Maxwell-Fyfe accepted that extra measures may lead to 'public comment on our taking more obvious care of him than of our

[35] TNA FO371/102184, Harrison, record of conversation with the Police Commissioner, 11 December 1952.

[36] TNA PREM11/578, FO to HMG Representatives around the world, Report, 3 March 1953.

own visiting royalty but I do not think that need cause any embarrassment'.[37] Tito was also given residence at White Lodge in Richmond Park, rather than his country's Embassy, on Kensington Gore, as would usually be the case for guests of the government. Advanced enquiries to use the Duke of Wellington's ancestral home of Apsley House, Number One London, had also been made before Churchill settled on the west of London Georgian mansion with all its royal connections. It seems the negative diplomatic consequences of Tito's possible assassination in London outweighed the potential perception that the communist dictator was more important than visiting monarchs. The power vacuum Tito's death would have left in Belgrade would have thrown the region into chaos and been a major blow to Britain's strategic foreign and defence policy in the eastern Mediterranean. In the end, the only security concern during Tito's arrival was a magnesium flare set off in the welcome party's vicinity by right wing extremists but which failed to disrupt any of the ceremonial events.

The View from Belgrade

Tito's visit to Britain received a great deal of positive coverage in the Yugoslav press, and news that Tito would be received by the Duke of Edinburgh, as well as Churchill, made front page headlines. Supportive press coverage in Greek, French and West German publications was also reported with pride in Yugoslavia, especially the *Neue Zeitung's* assurances that Tito was very popular in Britain.[38] During Tito's time in Britain the first two or three pages of the leading Yugoslav newspapers were 'almost exclusively devoted' to the visit. An edition of *Politika* printed a photograph of Tito with the Queen on the front page below the banner headline: 'The President of the Republic has lunch with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.' *Borba*, the official Yugoslav communist party newspaper, understandably made less of the royal factor but was still equally as enthusiastic about Tito's visit to a leading Western nation.[39] The general theme was of the 'war hero' Tito meeting Churchill, 'one of the most prominent leaders of the anti-fascist coalition', on cordial terms.[40] As all these newspapers were state-controlled to some

[37] TNA PREM11/578, Maxwell Fyfe to Eden, 28 October 1952.
[38] TNA FO371/107835, Wilson to FO, Telegram, 14 March 1953.
[39] TNA FO371/107835, Wilson to FO, Telegram, 21 March 1953.

extent, one can see their positive coverage as reflecting the general mood of the party hierarchy regarding Tito's visit. They also used the event as 'proof' of their country's apparent high standing in world affairs.

The Yugoslav leader was sailing to Britain looking forward to lunching with the Queen and Churchill as a power struggle erupted in the Kremlin following the death of Stalin. On a personal level Tito could present himself as the leading communist in the world, standing above the political struggles and personality clashes being played out in the Soviet bloc. He was Tito, leader of the politically independent Yugoslavia: free from the chains of Moscow and showing the world that being the leader of a communist country did not automatically mean subservience to the Russians. This, of course, was also good news for the West.

Press reports in the Soviet bloc were less than complementary of Tito's visit to Britain and his meetings with European royalty, reflecting Yugoslavia's icy relations with her neighbours. The Bulgarian press in particular printed several political cartoons mocking Tito for going 'cap in hand' to the West and taking money to become their 'Balkan watchdog'. Another showed a grovelling Tito kissing the left foot of the Queen 'in accordance with [his] left principles'.[41] It was clear his visit to Britain would antagonise the Soviet bloc but Tito was unconcerned as his aims were to ensure Yugoslavia was not left in isolation between East and West without financial or military support.

Diplomatic Leadership

Tito's visit illustrated that Britain was still an important international hub for Western diplomacy, and its allies were on the whole supportive. The US President, the French government and West German leaders were all curious to know more about Tito's ideas and foreign policy aims. They all made a point of asking the Foreign Office how the visit went and congratulated Britain on its success.[42] However, the public welcoming of Tito could have potentially led to difficulties in Anglo-Italian relations due to the ongoing dispute over Trieste. Positive support from the US and France

[40] K. Spehnjak (2005) 'Josip Broz Tito's Visit to Great Britain in 1953', *Review of Croatian History*, 1(1) 273–94.

[41] TNA FO371/107835, British Legation, Sofia to FO, 19 and 26 March 1953.

[42] TNA FO371/107838, Roberts to Strang, Memorandum, 2 April 1953.

made matters easier. In a letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 19 March, Churchill admitted Tito was 'full of commonsense' when it came to East–West relations and he understood that Stalin's death was not automatically going to make the world a safer place. Eisenhower agreed and complimented Churchill on his overtures to Tito. He wrote: 'I am much interested in what you say about Tito. I am glad that you and Anthony [Eden] have been urging him to improve his relations with some of his neighbours.'[43] Despite the Duke of Edinburgh postponing a visit to West Germany in order to meet Tito, Bonn was informed that Tito's visit was 'primarily a goodwill visit in return for Mr Eden's visit to Belgrade'.[44] The West Germans were content. The French were also happy that Tito's visit to Britain had been a 'complete success'.[45]

Britain's relationship with Italy proved strong enough to withstand Tito's *rapprochement*. Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi was a long-time vocal opponent of Yugoslav claims on Trieste and the Foreign Office noticed his attitude harden towards Tito during the early months of 1953. Tito's imminent visit to London was one of the reasons for this hardening, no doubt underlined by the upcoming elections in Italy. However, relations with De Gasperi were secure. In a public statement on 9 March he spoke of his country being 'bound by ties of alliance and friendship' to Britain. De Gasperi saw positives in Tito visiting London despite Yugoslavia's 'unfounded attacks' on Italy's foreign policy, he said: 'Perhaps he will learn to know us better than he appears … to know us now.'[46] Eden was quick to hold a meeting with the Italian Ambassador in London, Manlio Brosio, on the day Tito set sail for home. The Foreign Secretary informed Brosio that no decisions had been made on Trieste although the subject was discussed. Eden also told Brosio that Tito was keen to talk with Rome, and that an improved relationship between Italy and Yugoslavia was in the interests of the West.[47]

[43] P. G. Boyle, ed (1990) *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), p33.

[44] TNA FO371/107838, Robert to Strang, Memorandum, 2 April, 1953.

[45] TNA FO371/107838, Record of conversations between Secretary of State and the French and American Ambassadors, 21 March 1953.

[46] TNA FO371/107369, Wright, Minute, 13 March 1953.

[47] TNA FO371/107369, FO to Rome, Telegram, 24 March 1953.

However, there was the potential for dissent in Western Europe from Franco's Spain. Discussions were held as to whether Tito's yacht should dock at either Malta or Gibraltar on her voyage to London. Malta was ruled out due to fears Tito's presence would antagonise the Catholic population to a scale which would need government attention. However, any 'hostile and sarcastic comment' in Spain should Tito dock in Gibraltar during the time of a Spanish-backed strike was not seen as a problem. Foreign Office opinions on the subject included the comment: 'Perhaps we don't mind this' and 'I don't think [it] will do us much harm.'[48]

A key aim of the Foreign Office in inviting Tito to London was to build confidence and friendship between governments. It would be easier to resolve disputes more amicably and without misunderstandings should both sides be able to speak frankly and openly with one another. The British also saw closer relations with Tito as a chance to learn more about the inner workings of Stalin's Soviet Union. The Red Tsar's death just before Tito's arrival scuppered this and Tito was not particularly useful in offering an insider's view on what would happen next due to his country being cut off diplomatically from the rest of the eastern bloc.

Between East and West

The presence of the Duke of Edinburgh at Tito's arrival and his luncheon with the Queen undoubtedly impressed the Yugoslavs and perhaps soothed concerns that the visit was being described as 'private'. For Tito, he could tell stories of his lunching with the Queen and her family. Indeed, during a dinner with a group of Croatian teachers in his home village of Kumrovec in December 1953, Tito recalled how much he enjoyed meeting members of the British royal family: 'But particularly Princess Margaret, who had delighted him with her charm and her informal manners.'[49] Tito was aware of what he needed to do to be seen as a world statesman and he was pragmatic enough not to let his communist beliefs get in the way.

Tito made speeches at the port of Split and then in Belgrade upon his return. In both he spoke with remarkable enthusiasm of his visit to Britain and the 'allied reception' he received. However, he emphasised

[48] TNA FO371/107833, Cheetham, Minute; Harrison, Minute, 23 February 1953.
[49] J. Ridley (1994) *Tito: A Biography* (London: Constable), p323.

and re-emphasised that 'neither he nor his Socialist principles had been corrupted by his reception with the Queen and by members of the Conservative Government'. Tito stressed the 'genuine warmth' he felt between Yugoslavia and Britain and highlighted his confidence that both nations would stand side by side in the face of aggression.[50] This was undoubtedly a veiled message to the Cominform states.

Tito could use his visit to help portray Yugoslavia as a fully accepted, independent member of the international community. As a leading nation in the Western world, Britain's outstretched arm was seized with great vigour by the leader of a relatively inexperienced government without many friends. Tito took the opportunity and used it to his full advantage. He subsequently made a tour of other nations to increase his personal profile on the world stage. The Non-Aligned Movement was established in Belgrade in 1961 and became the perfect vehicle for Tito's vision of a Yugoslavia uncommitted to, but on receptive terms with, both East and West.

In an interview with *Borba* in August 1953, Tito reiterated there would be no return to pre-1948 relations with the Soviet Union or of Yugoslavia rejoining Cominform.[51] However, he had no interest in joining NATO either. Tito's London visit had built his personal confidence and he was fully committed to seeing what he could gain from relationships with individual countries rather than commit to either dominant Cold War bloc. The major concession he did win was Churchill's admission that the Western Powers would in future view any outside intervention into Yugoslavia's territory as a global issue rather than a regional conflict.

Anglo-Yugoslav Relations

Tito's visit to London was a significant step in consolidating friendly Anglo-Yugoslav relations. Although the visit did not tie Tito to the West diplomatically, it did help improve cooperation. The later disgraced Milovan Djilas attended the Queen's Coronation on behalf of Yugoslavia on 2 June 1953 and in 1966 a symbolic Cultural Convention was signed between both nations. November 1971 saw Tito return to Britain as a guest of the monarchy on his way home from a visit to North America, where he had met with

[50] TNA FO371/107835, Mallet to FO, Telegram, 2 April 1953.
[51] TNA FO371/107827, Belgrade to FO, Telegram, 13 August 1953.

President Richard Nixon. The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh visited Belgrade, Dubrovnik and Zagreb as Tito's guests in October 1972 and the 86-year-old Yugoslav leader again called for lunch at Buckingham Palace in the spring of 1978 after visiting President Jimmy Carter.

This relationship with Tito had ramifications for Peter II, the deposed King of Yugoslavia. George V, Elizabeth II's grandfather, was Peter's godfather and the pair were both great-great grandchildren of Queen Victoria. However, by the 1940s the families were not close. Churchill and his wartime Cabinet had initially supported the Yugoslav monarchy and the Četnik forces during the Second World War, and 17-year-old Peter moved his government-in-exile to London in June 1941. Churchill's friendship with Peter grew but events in Yugoslavia called for pragmatism from Western leaders. Tito's position as leader of the Yugoslav partisans soon became too dominant for the West to deny, and Britain consequently began backing the Communist forces to defeat the Nazis. A slighted King Peter was forced to accept he would not be returning home as head of the Yugoslav state but kept in touch with Churchill through letters while living in various Parisian hotels into the 1950s.[52] Indeed, by this time Churchill considered the Cambridge graduate a personal friend.

Despite numerous attempts, Peter had failed to secure any meetings with the Queen during his post-war visits to Britain. Churchill also slowly cut off personal contact with him as relations with Tito's government developed. Ironically, during their penultimate meeting in March 1952, Peter asked Churchill whether he should publicly support Tito to help 'maintain the independence and integrity' of his country. The Prime Minister replied that: 'In the right place and at the right time he saw nothing but advantage in King Peter's doing so.'[53] In the context of post-Second World War Anglo-Yugoslav relations, it seems Peter could be tolerated to some degree until an opportunity arose to advance relations with Tito. Then he became a potential embarrassment and was once again cast aside. This thought process is clearly shown in a Foreign Office briefing report on Tito's visit which included 'the Yugoslav Royal Family' among the topics of conversation to avoid during formal and informal talks with the President and his entourage.[54]

[52] TNA PREM11/580, King Peter, correspondence.
[53] TNA PREM11/580, Colville to Shuckburgh, Letter, 13 March 1952.
[54] TNA FO371/107835, Briefing, prepared for the visit of Tito, March 1953.

Conclusion

Tito's visit was a significant event in the early years of the Cold War and gave credence to those promoting policies of peaceful coexistence. No communist leader had ever visited a Western country and Tito had not left Yugoslavia since his split from Moscow in June 1948. Britain led the Western world in reaching out publicly and welcoming Tito as their guest with the monarchy a very visible and active part of this gesture. Symbolically, this went much further than financial or military aid, or trade agreements, as it was a palpable sign of two ideologically opposed nations working together. The visit was filmed for newsreels and was reported around the world. The Duke of Edinburgh welcoming Tito ashore at Westminster Pier formed a central part of a Pathé film recording of the visit and the Queen was happy to be photographed with Tito for distribution to the press.

For Tito's visit to take place and be a success, both sides had to desire its occurrence. Churchill and Tito were two pragmatists who saw advantages in the improvement of Anglo-Yugoslav relations. The visit was an important part of wider foreign policy aims for both men. Churchill knew the involvement of the royals would be useful in flattering Tito's ego as long as protocol was not compromised too much. However, for the Yugoslavs, royal involvement lifted the perceived importance and propaganda value of Tito's visit immeasurably. The Duke of Edinburgh's insistence that he wanted to meet Tito also went a long way in framing the symbolism of the visit. Some in the British government would have preferred no royal presence, or a lesser royal if absolutely necessary.[55] But the Duke's firm insistence, even changing his own plans when the dates of Tito's visit were altered at late notice, ensured both a public awareness of royal involvement and clear engagement from Buckingham Palace.

Cultural, or 'soft' diplomacy, is vital in building relationships to a point where differences can be bridged and agreements reached successfully and peacefully, as the royal family understood very well. The importance of gestures and symbolism cannot be overestimated in creating an atmosphere where negotiations can reach positive conclusions. The purpose of Tito's visit was not to hold official talks to sign agreements or pacts or

[55] One option was the Queen's uncle, Prince Henry, Duke of Gloucester.

financial deals yet it was hugely significant in the uncertain times of this early Cold War period. Churchill's Iron Curtain had been drawn across the continent and there were real fears for the future, especially in Europe and most prominently over the potential flashpoint of Berlin.

East–West relations were very strained, with war continuing in Korea and Commonwealth forces locked in a guerrilla battle in Malaya. For Britain to be seen welcoming the communist Tito, and the communist Tito to be seen lunching with the British royal family, would have been unthinkable—and unpalatable—for many. But it happened. It is another example of a war-weary Britain still being a leading and skilled force in international diplomacy because it possessed the asset of a royal family which was prepared to engage with soft diplomacy when required by the elected government. Britain was also the first Western nation to recognise the People's Republic of China, in January 1950. Of course, there was an element of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend', in relation to Stalin and the Soviet Union, and Western nations were already bankrolling Tito's regime behind the scenes, but it was the British who seized the initiative to reach out publicly. Suspicions of US foreign policy remained despite Washington pouring millions of dollars into Belgrade to help prop up Tito's government. Surprised Foreign Office officials were forced to ridicule Ambassador Velebit's query as to whether the US government were behind an uprising in East Berlin in June 1953, for example.[56] The pragmatic Tito could not afford to turn down Britain's overtures.

In the context of the time, Tito's visit was a vital element in improving and strengthening Anglo-Yugoslav relations to a point of solidity and thereby ensuring stability in the Balkan region.[57] In essence, the role of the Duke of Edinburgh, and subsequently the Queen, helped smooth the way for a successful visit. Their role was purely symbolic but arguably more important to Tito than to the British. From the British perspective, involving the royals could have led to potential difficulties in their relationship with more established allies. However, perhaps the biggest potential problem here was the fact Tito was coming at all. Once it became clear Britain had broad support in reaching out publicly to Tito, the next issue regarding the status of the visit had to be addressed.

[56] TNA FO371/107827, Dixon, report on conversation with Yugoslav Ambassador, 19 June 1953.

[57] The Trieste situation erupted in the autumn of 1953 but this did not lead to a total breakdown in relations.

Ultimately the real winner from the visit as a whole was Tito himself. He secured new friends in the West and could later approach *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union on his own terms. A guarantee of Western military support in the face of Soviet bloc aggression was secured as a direct result of his visit to Britain. And, on the wider world stage, Tito soon consolidated himself as an independent leader of a non-aligned European nation.

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CHAPTER 10

'We Cannot Pretend That the Past Did Not Exist': The Windsor Dynasty and Japan, 1941–1971

Antony Best

Introduction

The role that the royal family has played is vital in coming to an understanding of many facets of modern British history, be they domestic or imperial. However, the constitutional limitations on the monarchy's activities mean that there are certain areas of government activity where historians have paid relatively little attention, and this notably relates to the Court's influence. One of the most notable omissions is in the field of foreign policy. Stretching back to the period of George V, the orthodox view has been that the British monarchy's role in influencing foreign relations has been peripheral, and even in regard to Edward VII the attempts to assert that his personal diplomacy was important have traditionally been met with scepticism.[1] Accordingly, little work has been done on British

[1] A new perspective on this is, however, opening up. See Matthew Glencross (2015) *The State Visits of Edward VII: Reinventing Royal Diplomacy for the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

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royal diplomacy and what has emerged has largely been limited to the most prominent state visits, such as that to the United States in 1939.

To ignore the role of the monarchy in foreign policy is always a mistake. One important aspect of diplomacy is to indicate goodwill. In this regard, heads of state, no matter whether they are monarchs or presidents, have an important role to play in communicating favour through activities such as engaging in, and hosting, state visits, the bestowal of gifts and chivalric decorations and the exchange of letters of congratulations or sympathy. What is more, both foreign ministries and the offices of the heads of state spend an inordinate amount of time in fine-tuning protocol in the knowledge that any mistakes could be interpreted by the recipients of such favours as a deliberate slight. In other words, this area of activity, what might look like arcane ephemera, is, in fact, a matter of great seriousness. Arguably, this symbolic diplomacy is of even greater significance when a state has a monarchical system of government. Royalty is, of course, suffused with concerns about ceremony and precedence and has an emotional, historical and spiritual link with the nation that supersedes that of most presidencies. Thus, in the British case to look at the list of countries that Elizabeth II has visited and when those visits took place gives an interesting insight into the government's foreign policy priorities and how it interacts with its international peers.

In order to demonstrate the role that monarchy plays in foreign policy, this chapter focuses on one of the most difficult but important royal relationships of the post-war period, namely that with Japan. In the present day this relationship is largely unburdened with complications; for example, in the summer of 2012, Emperor Akihito and Empress Mitsuko came on a private visit to Britain to celebrate the Queen's Diamond Jubilee. It was not their presence that provoked criticism in the British press, however, but rather that of the attendance of the Bahraini royal family. However, for the first 30 years of the post-war period, the issue of how to handle Anglo-Japanese royal relations was fraught with difficulty as the exigencies of the Cold War clashed with the bitter memory of the Pacific conflict between 1941 and 1945.

The Anglo-Japanese Background

It is important to begin any study of the role of royal diplomacy in post-war Anglo-Japanese relations by noting that the ties between the two courts had played an important role in the first third of the century. Indeed, it would not be wide of the mark to describe the treaty relations that existed

between these countries from 1902 to 1923 as 'a royal alliance'. Reciprocal visits by Princes from both nations and the bestowing of decorations and other tokens of respect were liberally used to inculcate trust and a spirit of cooperation in this period.[2] This was necessary, in part, to overcome the racial, cultural and religious divide that separated the two allies. Above all else, the degree to which the Japanese were treated with special favour can be seen in the fact that, despite Japan's not being a Christian country, the Order of the Garter was bestowed on the Emperor. This first took place in 1906 with its award to the Meiji Emperor in 1906. Then, in 1912, it was awarded to his son, the Emperor Taisho, on his accession to the throne. Moreover, despite the very great distance that separated the two countries, there were reciprocal visits by their respective heirs to the throne, with Crown Prince Hirohito going to Britain in 1921 and the Prince of Wales visiting Japan in 1922.[3]

Even after the end of the formal Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in 1902, the intensity of contact in court relations continued, maintaining an informal alliance. In the mid-1920s Hirohito's younger brother, Prince Chichibu, studied at Oxford University. This can be seen as one part of a larger attempt by the Japanese court to learn how the British system of constitutional monarchy worked.[4] When, in 1926, Hirohito ascended to the throne, there was a debate about whether he should be honoured in the same way as his father and grandfather before him by making him a Stranger Knight of the Order of the Garter. Following the end of the alliance, it appears that Lord Curzon in 1923 had recommended to the King that Britain should return to the tradition of only bestowing the decoration on Christian monarchs.[5] However, to have followed this line in the late 1920s risked offending

[2] For the royal ties in these years, see Michio Yoshimura (2000) 'Nichi-Ei kyūtei kōryu shi no ichimen: sono seijiteki seikaku to hiseijiteki seikaku'[One Face of Anglo-Japanese Imperial Court Relations: Their Political and Non-Political Character] in Yoichi Kibata, I.H. Nish, Chihiro Hosoya and Takahiko Tanaka, eds *Nichi-Ei kōryu shi, vol.1, Seiji-Gaikō* [The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: Politics and Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press); Naotake Kimizuka (2004) *Joō heika no buru ribon: gata kunshō to igirisu gaikō* [Her Majesty's Blue Ribbon: The Order of the Garter and British Diplomacy] (Tokyo: NHK Shuppansha); Antony Best (2007) 'A Royal Alliance: Court Diplomacy and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1900–41' in H. Cortazzi, ed *Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits*, VI (Folkestone: Global Oriental) pp63–70.

[3] See Best, 'A Royal Alliance'.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

Japan at a time when its assistance was needed to deal with the contemporary political chaos in China. Thus in 1929 Prince Henry, the Duke of Gloucester, led a Garter Mission to Japan. In the following year, Hirohito's brother, Prince Takamatsu, paid a reciprocal visit to London.[6] In an interesting sidelight on the role of royal diplomacy, the ever-parsimonious Treasury complained about the costs attached to this episode. The Foreign Office response was:

> The Japanese have in the last two years expressed a great desire for our co-operation, and it is not always easy to respond since our interests are not always identical, so that courtesy is valuable to fill any gap.[7]

In other words, *politesse* mattered.

Even in the troubled 1930s the royal relationship continued to act as a useful, if intermittent, channel for communication. This is most noticeable in regard to the coronation of George VI in 1937. The Japanese government and court took advantage of this occasion to signal to Britain that it was willing to move towards a *rapprochement*. In this regard it decided to send the British-educated Prince Chichibu as the Emperor's representative. The British, meanwhile, sought to make their own use of this opportunity by ensuring that the Prince was, as the brother of an Emperor, given precedence over all other foreign guests at the coronation, much to the fury of the Dutch government. If the Sino-Japanese War had not broken out two months after the coronation, it is possible that this royal signalling might have prefigured a more substantial move towards some kind of reconciliation. As it was, though, it acted as a useful channel for vague indications of favour that did not commit either side to anything substantial and which, if unsuccessful, could merely be explained as exercises in courtesy.[8] In addition, it is worth noting that the royal family itself appears to have looked on Japan with some degree of favour. In 1921 and 1925 George V wrote warmly in his diary about the visits of the

[6] Neither were lavishly reported, but did receive some media attention. See 'Garter Mission to Japan', *The Times*, 3 May 1929; 4 May 1929; 'Court's Return to Town', *The Times*, 4 May 1930.

[7] TNA FO372/2685 T5475/972/379, Warner to Treasury, 30 May 1930. Royal relations in the inter-war period are covered in Antony Best, "'Our Respective Empires Should Stand Together": The Royal Dimension in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941' *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 2005, 16(2) 259–79.

[8] Best, "'Our Respective Empires"'.

Japanese Princes. In 1932, at the height of the Shanghai crisis, he wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, offering to use his personal influence with the Emperor to work for peace. Both the King and the Prince of Wales, in 1934, indicated their approval of the idea of a Federation of British Industry mission visiting Japan and Manchukuo.[9]

The royal relationship had thus proved to be an important means through which the two countries had interacted up to the end of the inter-war period. In particular, it appears that Japan treasured this link, for the fact that one of Europe's oldest and most prestigious royal families was willing to engage in a relationship of equals with its own court was a sign that the Japanese had been accepted as important players in international society. As such, it communicated a more far more welcome message than that which emanated from the United States, Australia and New Zealand, states which had Japanese immigration to their countries.

The Challenge of the Second World War to Anglo-Japanese Royal Relations

The question, eventually, for a post-1945 era was whether the royal relationship between Japan and Britain would once again be able to play a useful role, and most importantly whether it might, within the context of the Cold War, provide a means by which British influence could be exerted on the Japanese elite to keep their country aligned with the 'free world'. The latter goal, one should note was a very real concern for the Foreign Office during the 1950s and early 1960s. There was a real fear that Japan might be tempted to move towards neutralism or even be forced by its need to trade with China into the communist orbit.[10] Thus any means to indicate to Japan that it was perceived and welcomed as member of the free world alliance had to be taken.

[9] Ibid.

[10] See Antony Best (2014) '"A Cardinal Point of our World Strategy": The Foreign Office and the Normalization of Relations with Japan, 1952–63' in Effie Pedaliu and John Young, eds *British Foreign Policy from Churchill to Cameron, 1945–2011* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Reconstructing Relations

The problem in this sphere was, however, clear. Japan's war record meant that any policy of reconciliation would be difficult to sell to the British public, which naturally bitterly resented the way in which Japanese troops had abused the prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Southeast Asia. In this environment, there were clear difficulties in seeking a rapid revival of royal ties, for the popularity of the British monarchy might well be dented if its actions offended public sentiment. Moreover, there was, of course, the fact that the ties between the royal family and the armed services were particularly close and extensive. Prince Philip had, for example, served in the Royal Navy during the war and his uncle, Lord Mountbatten, had been in charge of Southeast Asian Command (SEAC). Yet, at the same time, it was readily apparent that this was a problem that would have to be addressed at some point. Once diplomatic relations were restored, as they were in 1952 following the end of the Allied occupation of Japan, protocol dictated that royal relations would have to be resumed in some form or another, despite the understandable sense of distaste.

It is also important to note here that the British government, even before the Japanese surrender and despite Australian pressure, remained steadfast in its support for Japan's monarchical institution and the continuation of Hirohito's reign as Emperor. Thus in December 1945 when one MP (none other than the later Prime Minister, James Callaghan) had put down a parliamentary question on whether the Emperor should be indicted for war crimes, the Foreign Office persuaded him to withdraw on the basis that:

> The Emperor is the greatest asset we hold in the control of Japan. … If we were to indict the Emperor we should immediately be faced with 70,000,000 hostile instead of cooperative Japanese. The task of controlling Japan would become not merely immeasurably more difficult, it would be impossible.[11]

The Foreign Office was, however, not convinced that the American-dominated occupation authority sufficiently understood how the institution could contribute to future stability and believed that more

[11] TNA FO371/46431 F11833/4/23, de la Mere (Far East Department), Minute, 5 December 1945.

could be done in terms of training the court in the ways of constitutional monarchy. Accordingly, the Liaison Mission in Tokyo in 1948 argued that it should act to enhance the role of the court and improve British influence by taking advantage of the royal connection.

Its initial campaign focused on the idea of providing a British tutor for Crown Prince Akihito to educate him in his constitutional responsibilities.[12] This might appear at first glance as a fairly minor initiative, but the head of the British Liaison Office in Tokyo, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, was convinced that the appointee's influence 'would be far wider than this'. He believed that the latter would be placed in frequent contact with the Emperor and be consulted on various constitutional issues, thus allowing the British to outflank the Americans.[13] The only problem with this cunning plan was that any such appointment had to be approved by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, who was far too wily to fall for such a ruse. Indeed, Gascoigne's eventual reward for his plotting was to receive, after two years of careful setting the scene, a severe ear-bashing from the general for his impertinence.[14]

With that avenue blocked, the diplomats within the Foreign Office turned instead to the potential benefits that might arise from the Japanese court's plan to send its grand-master of ceremonies, Yasumasa Matsudaira, to visit Britain and other European monarchical countries in January 1952 to inspect how they managed their constitutional duties.[15] Accordingly, arrangements were made for Matsudaira to meet with representatives both from the Foreign Office and Buckingham Palace and for his being allowed to witness the new Austrian Ambassador presenting his credentials to George VI.[16]

On the eve of the Japanese peace treaty coming into effect the Ambassador-designate, Sir Esler Dening, reiterated to his superiors in London the significance of monarchical ties and argued that Britain should try to take advantage of Japan's long-standing admiration for

[12] TNA FO371/69820 F4930/44/23, Gascoigne (Tokyo) to Dening (Foreign Office), 15 March 1948 no.PA10/13/48.

[13] TNA FO371/76257 F4637/1942/23, Gascoigne to Scarlett (Far East Department), 11 March 1949 no.PA19/38/49.

[14] TNA FO371/84046 FJ1941/3, Gascoigne to Dening, 20 February 1950 no. PA11/13/50; FJ1941/8 Gascoigne to Dening, 31 May 1950 no.PA48/13/50.

[15] TNA FO371/99530 FJ1941/1, de le Mare (Tokyo) to Scott, 24 December 1951 no.278/21/51.

[16] TNA FO371/99530 FJ1941/18, Eden to Dening, 15 February 1952 no.77.

British institutions, including the monarchy, in order to improve its standing in Tokyo.[17] Around this time a new opportunity emerged to explore this possibility when the King succumbed to lung cancer, thus bringing Elizabeth II to the throne. This naturally meant that a coronation, with all of its pomp and glory, was imminent and raised the immediate prospect of a senior member of the Japanese ruling house attending to represent the Emperor. In October 1952 Dening subsequently reported that Crown Prince Akihito would represent his father at the ceremony.[18] This raised a number of interesting questions and disturbing scenarios, for, while on the one hand, it was felt that giving a generous reception to the Prince would help Anglo-Japanese relations, it was clear on the other that there were some areas of protocol that could prove difficult to finesse.

The protocol problem focused on the fact that following the formal outbreak of the Pacific War the King had, following precedent, revoked the decorations of all Japanese nationals. This included most significantly the deletion of Hirohito's name from the Garter list and the removal of his banner from Saint George's Chapel in Windsor.[19] This raised difficulties on a number of accounts. First of all, the fact that the Japanese court had decided to send their heir to the throne to Britain would normally have led the British Crown to mark the Prince's majority by bestowing a decoration upon him. But could this be done if there was an embargo on decorations? In addition, another aspect of the problem was what should be done if members of Akihito's suite wore British decorations to which they were no longer entitled. Moreover, behind these immediate concerns lurked the most awkward issue of all, what if the Crown Prince should remark on the absence of his father's banner at Windsor Castle? In the name of good relations and improved royal ties, the diplomats decided to take the bull by the horns. In November 1952 the Protocol Department tentatively proposed that the Japanese suite should be told unofficially that there would be no objection to them wearing their decorations and that a similar message should be communicated in a low-key manner to the Emperor in relation to the Garter.[20] While this proposal might have made eminent

[17] TNA FO371/FJ1051/16, Dening (Tokyo) to Eden, 24 March 1952 no.83.

[18] TNA FO371/99533 FJ1945/1, Dening to Eden, 11 October 1952 tel.1720.

[19] RA PS/PSO/GVI/C/130/40, Hardinge, Memorandum, 23 December 1941.

[20] TNA FO372/7133 TD10051/2, 'Treatment of Foreign Nationals (particularly ex-enemies) in regard to British Honours at the Queen's Coronation', Protocol Department Memorandum, 3 November 1952.

sense at the diplomatic level, it was, to put it mildly, insanely naïve in terms of British politics. When he saw this file, the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden violently dissented, noting, 'I think all this is going a good deal too fast … I feel pretty sure that any preliminary guidance would become known & be ill received & the Emperor's Garter restoration resented. Cabinet would have to see.'[21]

Eden, of course, was first and foremost a politician, and his reaction shows that he all too clearly believed that British opinion was not ready for a rapid *rapprochement* with Japan. Indeed, at around this time in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to London, Shunichi Matsumoto, he carefully observed that both governments 'must accept the fact that … progress was likely to be slow. Memories of the prisoner-of war camps were still at the bottom of most of the ill feeling towards Japan in this country.'[22]

Prince Akihito's subsequent visit to Britain in 1953 showed that Eden's caution was entirely justified. At the formal level events ran fairly smoothly. Most notably the Prince's presence in Britain was marked by a very successful lunch at Downing Street. During this, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a speech on the important role of the monarchy in British political life and how he hoped for better Anglo-Japanese relations in the future.[23] If the political elite proved to be forgiving, there was evidence of discontent among public opinion, however. The Foreign Office, for example, received a swathe of letters hostile to the Prince's visit; unfortunately this correspondence was subsequently destroyed and is not available at The National Archives.[24] Meanwhile, in the national press the *Daily Express* decided to run a readers' forum on the advisability of asking a Japanese royal representative to attend the coronation ceremony. It subsequently announced that seventy out of the hundred letters received had been opposed to the idea.[25] Further problems emerged when a visit by the Prince to Newcastle had to be cancelled after local former prisoners-of-war had protested about a municipal function due to be held in his honour. Akihito's reception in Cambridge was also reduced, to a

[21] TNA FO372/7133 TD10051/2, Eden, Minute, undated [November 1952].

[22] TNA FO371/105374 FJ1051/4, Eden to Dening, 30 January 1953 no.43.

[23] TNA PREM11/468, Sansom to Yoshida, draft letter, n.d. [April 1953].

[24] This is evident from the Foreign Office index for 1953 which lists this material under the file reference.

[25] National Archives of Australia, Canberra (henceforth NAA) A1838 3103/11/51 PART 1, *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney) 28 April 1953.

university event only. The Cambridgeshire regiment had been present at Singapore in 1942 and it was believed that a civic ceremony would invite criticism.[26] Press coverage and one parliamentary question then focused on the unhappy story of how the parents of one deceased soldier had been denied seats to view the coronation procession while inside Westminster Abbey the representatives of the country whose troops had tortured him to death sat in comfort.[27]

The visit therefore confirmed the degree to which there were limits to the public's tolerance of relations with Japan and the diplomats in the Foreign Office duly learned from this sobering experience.[28] For example, it is notable that in December 1953 Whitehall's Honours Committee decided that it was too early for the reinstatement of Japanese into Britain's Orders of Chivalry, which included, of course the matter of restoring Hirohito to the Knights of the Garter.[29] Subsequently, it appears that in 1954, when a decision was made in 1954 to confer the Garter on (Christian) Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, there was a broader discussion of who should receive this honour. The outcome was a reconfirmation of the line originally taken by Lords Rosebery and Salisbury in 1895, that Britain's highest honour should only be given to Christian monarchs, thus excluding Japan from the list of future recipients.[30] The royal route to the restoration of better ties was thus, for the moment, firmly in abeyance.

[26] 'Change of Plan', *The Times*, 1 May 1953; Churchill Archive Centre Cambridge (henceforth CAC) Hankey Papers, Cambridge, HNKY21/7, Hankey to Piggott, 13 March 1953.

[27] *Hansard*, , Commons, 5th series, 516, vol.516, 9 June 1953, col.12.

[28] For a post-facto review of the Prince's visit, see TNA FCO21/923 FEJ26/4, Pilcher (Tokyo) to Morgan (Far East Department), 21 January 1971 no.26/3.

[29] TNA FO371/110527 FJ1944/1, Jelpke (Department), Minute, 17 July 1954.

[30] The Foreign Office file from 1954 on the Order of the Garter, FO372/7226, is closed for 100 years on the grounds that 'after careful consideration, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has decided that release of this information could have an adverse effect on the UK's relations with Japan, Iran and also Islamic countries. The public interest in maintaining good relations with these countries and protecting British interests (particularly current foreign policy) outweighs the public interest in releasing a full historical record at this current time.' See TNA to the author, 2 December 2008. However, the essence of what was decided can be seen in TNA FO371/133598 FJ1051/51, Dalton (J desk), Note, 17 November 1958.

Post 1950s Realities

For the rest of the 1950s royal relations were left in the doldrums, but they revived a little in 1961 when the Queen's young cousin, Princess Alexandra, was chosen to represent the Crown at the ceremony to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the University of Hong Kong. This led to a suggestion by the Foreign Office at a meeting of the Cabinet Office's Royal Visits Committee that she might extend her period in East Asia to incorporate an official visit to Japan.[31] The planning behind this trip is impossible to follow for the relevant document has been retained under the surely misnamed Freedom of Information Act.[32] This lack of candour probably arises from the one controversy surrounding this visit, which was that Emperor Hirohito appeared at the state banquet held for the Princess wearing the insignia of the Order of the Garter, which he was, at least, theoretically, not allowed to wear. It transpires, though, that in a clear sign of a thaw in relations, it was indicated to him beforehand by the British Ambassador that, although he had not formally been returned to the fold, the Queen would not protest if he wore his Garter insignia on royal occasions involving Britain.[33]

In retrospect, the visit was judged a success, for, as the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Harold Caccia, noted, it meant that a great step had been taken in bringing 'our relations with Japan as nearly as possible back to normal'.[34] It also provided the opportunity for a reciprocal visit, which was made in 1962 by Princess Chichibu. She was chosen deliberately by the Japanese government. Her late husband had been pro-British, while she was the daughter of Matsudaira Tsuneo, the former Ambassador to London, and had been born in Britain. She was also renowned for her Anglophile sentiments.[35] From this point on activity in the royal sphere began to gather momentum. In 1965 Princess Alexandra made a second visit to Japan to attend a British trade fair in

[31] TNA CAB130/165, Royal Visits Overseas and Visits by Foreign Heads of State Committee, 3rd meeting, 4 November 1960.

[32] The closed file is FO371/158539. This episode is referred to in Hugo Vickers (1994) *Royal Orders: The Honours and the Honoured* (London: Bextree) p49.

[33] TNA FCO21/923 FEJ26/4, Mayall (Protocol Dept) to Pilcher, 5 May 1971.

[34] TNA FO371/165031 FJ1942/2, Caccia to Adeane, 15 February 1962.

[35] 'Princess Chichibu in London', *The Times*, 24 July 1962.

Tokyo and the following year Prince and Princess Hitachi came to Britain. The Foreign Office marked the latter event by noting its pleasure that this visit, which was covered slightly but sympathetically by the press, 'confirmed that Anglo-Japanese relations have moved away from the post-war period when bitter memories prevented all but the most formal contacts'.[36]

The degree of progress that had been made, however, only helped to raise an ever bigger issue—when would one of the two monarchs visit the other's country? That the Japanese themselves were probably thinking along these lines became apparent in June 1965 when two Foreign Ministry officials speculated with some British Embassy staff in Tokyo about the prospect of the Diet changing the law to allow the Emperor to travel overseas.[37] Accordingly, when he returned on home leave in the spring of 1966, the Ambassador, Sir Francis Rundall, duly raised the issue of mutual full-scale state visits with the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Paul Gore-Booth.[38]

Rundall's suggestion came at the right time, for by 1966 the Queen had engaged in state visits to virtually every country considered to be, at that point, in friendly relations with Britain. This included her having officially visited the two other main defeated nations of the Second World War, Germany (in the form of the Federal Republic) and Italy.[39] The Royal Visits Committee (RVC) was therefore keen to recommend pastures new and to take on what the Foreign Office referred to as 'difficult' countries including Japan and the Soviet Union.[40] It should be noted that the latter was, of course, not only communist, but also had murdered Nicholas II, the Queen's first cousin, thrice-removed, which only goes to show the company that Japan was perceived as keeping. At the RVC's meeting on 17 May 1966 there was agreement in principle that Japan was a suitable destination, but it was felt that further time was needed to consider two potential problems. These were the public reaction in the light of the prisoner-of-war issue

[36] TNA FO372/8012 TS1231/59, Mayall (Far East Department) to Rundall (Tokyo), 3 December 1965.

[37] TNA FO262/2139, Ellingworth (Tokyo Embassy), Minute 26 June 1965.

[38] TNA FO371/187138 FJ1941/1, Wright, Minute, 28 April 1966.

[39] For the reciprocal visits with the Federal Republic of Germany see, Anthony Glees (2002) 'The British-German State Visits of 1958 and 1965: From Occupation to Normalization' in J. Noakes, P Wende and J. Wright, eds *Britain and Germany in Europe 1949–1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 279–305. I would like to thank Piers Ludlow for bringing this essay to my attention.

[40] TNA CAB134/2462 RV(66)1, 'State Visits', FO Memorandum, 9 May 1966.

and the difficulty that, as the Japanese law stood, there was no prospect of Hirohito's being able to return the Queen's visit.[41]

Subsequently Gore-Booth consulted the Queen, who expressed her agreement in principle to reciprocal visits, although she stressed that if the Emperor came to Britain it might be better for him to arrive in Windsor in order 'to avoid the possibility of any untoward happening during a carriage drive in London'.[42] With the Queen's approval now registered it was possible for the Japanese to be informed of the British decision; this was done when Rundall returned to his post in August.[43] Soon after that a further Foreign Office Memorandum raised the possibility of a visit by the Emperor in 1968 and in October that year Arthur de la Mere, the Head of the Far Eastern Department, was stirred enough by the excitement to record his view that, 'I think that in the present circumstances a visit to Japan would probably have a greater and better effect than a visit to any other foreign country.'[44] Great wheels were thus in motion.[45]

Reciprocal Royal Visiting

It is worth pausing here to reflect on why this idea of reciprocal royal visits was considered so important by the British government. After all by this point the political relationship between the two countries had clearly markedly improved from its sad condition in the early 1950s. Indeed, from 1963 an arrangement had been established for twice-annual meetings to take place between the two countries' respective Foreign Ministers to discuss issues of mutual interest. The fact of the matter, however, was that although relations had improved, they were still relatively distant. An acknowledgement of this problem can be seen in a Memorandum on Anglo-Japanese relations that was drawn up at the Tokyo Embassy in September 1967. This chapter noted the remarkable growth of Japan's economic strength, which meant that it was now one of the leading industrial powers in the world, but it also observed that Britain seemed to possess little influence with the Japanese and that it had fallen behind

[41] TNA CAB134/2462 RV(66), 1st Meeting, 17 May 1966.

[42] TNA FO372/8184, Gore-Booth (PUS FO) to Adeane (BP), 20 May 1966.

[43] TNA FO371/187138 FJ1941/5, Rundall (Tokyo) to de la Mere (Far East Department), 1 September 1966.

[44] TNA FO371/187138 FJ1941/6, de la Mere, Minute, 14 October 1966.

[45] TNA FO372/8184, Gore-Booth (PUS FO) to Adeane (BP), 20 May 1966; CAB165/215, Reid Minute, 17 October 1966.

the United States, France and West Germany in this respect.[46] In such circumstances the royal card was an obvious one to play, for, as the British Ambassador to Japan, Sir John Pilcher, noted in 1970, 'This is our one special rapport with the world's third industrial power …'.[47] In addition, it was important to take advantage of this tool in a world in which, as Sir Denis Greenhill, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, noted, state visits were increasingly being used by all states 'as a weapon of diplomacy'.[48] However, agreeing that a visit might very well assist Britain in re-establishing some kind of special relationship with Japan was one thing, putting it into practice was another.

In addition, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), as it became in 1967, decided that the problem of reciprocity should not be allowed to stand in the way. Indeed, there was some concern that of the two visits, Hirohito's arrival in Britain would prove the more difficult, for 'the Emperor in this country could be a focus for all the latent anti-Japanese feeling among ex-POWs and other persons who may still want to hold him responsible for the start of the Pacific War'.[49] Talk turned therefore to the possibility of just the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh visiting Japan sometime in the next few years.[50]

Britain's slow, medium-term approach was knocked out of kilter in November 1970 when the Japanese side suddenly announced, without any prior warning, that the Emperor wished to visit Britain in the early autumn of 1971. This was not exactly welcome news, for royal visits take time to plan and in any case the Queen was usually at Balmoral at the time of year suggested. However, with the initiative having been made it could clearly not be turned down. Thus, when writing to gain the Queen's approval, Greenhill emphasised that the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 'considers it so important to take up this rather remarkable Japanese self-invitation'.[51] The Queen immediately agreed,

[46] TNA FO262/2512, 'Anglo-Japanese Relations', British Embassy, Tokyo, note, September 1967.

[47] TNA FCO57/187 TXV1/306/1, Pilcher (Tokyo) to Stewart, 5 May 1970 tel.410.

[48] TNA CAB165/901, Greenhill (PUS FCO) to Trend (Cab Office) 21 June 1971.

[49] TNA FCO57/79 TP51/27, Bolland, Minute, 21 July 1967.

[50] TNA CAB134/3189 RV(68), 1st meeting, 27 March 1968.

[51] TNA PREM15/504, Greenhill (PUS FCO) to Adeane (BP), 20 November 1970.

and accordingly the great Whitehall machine began to bestir itself in order to do justice to its esteemed visitor.

Two problems soon emerged. First, there was the question of what to do about the Order of the Garter. Initially Buckingham Palace wished to maintain the status quo from 1961; that the Emperor would be allowed to wear his insignia, but would not be fully restored to the Order. The FCO felt that this was unsustainable. Greenhill noted to the Queen's Private Secretary, Adeane, on 10 February 1971 that full restoration had to take place as 'Such a gesture would allow the State Visit to take place in the happiest possible atmosphere and Sir Alec Douglas-Home is convinced that the long-term political advantages to British interests would be very great indeed.'[52] This request duly received royal approval.

The other deeply problematical issue was what the Queen should say in her speech at the state banquet for the Emperor. Clearly there was no wish to offend the Japanese. The visit was designed to improve relations and to provide, in particular, a boost to Britain's commercial ties with Japan, but at the same time the domestic audience had to be considered. The speech went through two drafts. The first was by the FCO and, in the great tradition of that august institution, it was most notable for its lamentable, mealy-mouthed blandness. While it did acknowledge the past, it was content to emphasise only the positive, focusing on how technology transfer from Britain had helped Japan in the late-nineteenth century and how the close relations between the two countries had culminated in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[53] The Foreign Office thus displayed an unbecoming adherence to the words 'don't mention the war' a good five years before *Fawlty Towers* contributed that famous phrase to the canon of English quotations. Luckily for the prestige of the monarchy, the Duke of Edinburgh proved to be a far more astute judge of what had to be said. He redrafted the speech and inserted its most important passage:

> We cannot pretend that the past did not exist. We cannot pretend that the relations between our two peoples have always been peaceful and friendly. However, it is precisely this experience which should make us all the more determined never to let it happen again.[54]

[52] TNA, FCO73/133, Greenhill Papers, Greenhill to Adeane, 10 February 1971.

[53] TNA FCO21/924 FEJ26/4, part B, Elizabeth II's speech first draft (not attributed) n.d. [September 1971].

[54] TNA FCO21/925 FEJ26/4, part C, Elizabeth II's speech second draft with amendments by the Duke of Edinburgh, n.d. [September 1971].

These were dignified words, which quite rightly acknowledged the recent past, but used it as a basis to look towards the future.

In adding this passage, the Duke was, of course, showing an entirely appropriate awareness that this visit could not but be controversial, for it was in the Emperor's name that so many war crimes had been committed. The government was, however, reasonably hopeful that the Emperor would not receive an overtly hostile reception. To a large degree this was due to the responsible attitude taken by the various POW organisations. In April 1971 the President of their umbrella organisation, the National Federation of Far Eastern Prisoners-of-War Clubs and Associations, informed the head of the FCO's Asian Department that out of loyalty to the Queen they would not create any embarrassment and that they intended to consult with the editors of the leading newspapers to reinforce this message.[55] In this regard, it was also reassuring that the announcement in May that the Garter would be restored to the Emperor only generated a few letters of protest.[56]

The scene was therefore set for a visit which it was hoped would turn a new page in Anglo-Japanese relations. The Emperor's arrival took place on 5 October, he having stopped briefly beforehand in France to renew his acquaintance with the Duke of Windsor. That meeting had gone well, but as soon as he stepped on British soil a series of minor incidents helped to cast a pall over proceedings. First of all, during the carriage procession along the Mall a young man hurled his coat at the Emperor. Then at the state banquet in the evening there was one noticeable absentee, Lord Mountbatten. The latter's official spokesman claimed that Mountbatten was otherwise engaged, for he was committed to attend functions elsewhere in the country, but people could not help but to suspect that there were ulterior motives.[57] Further difficulties arose on 7 October when a tree that the Emperor had planted at Kew Gardens was hacked down. The sign left beside it said simply, 'They did not die in vain.'[58] On the same day a man, whose father had died on the Burma Railway, shouted within earshot of the Emperor, 'fascist, fascist, fascist, murdering bastard,' at him.[59]

[55] TNA FCO21/923 FEJ26/4, part A, Morgan (Asian Dept) to Pilcher 16 April 1971.

[56] TNA FCO21/923 FEJ26/4, part A, Morgan to Tomlinson (Parliamentary Office), 21 May 1971.

[57] 'Man Hurls Coat at Emperor Hirohito's Coach', *The Times*, 6 October 1971.

[58] *The Times*, 8 October 1971.

[59] Ibid.

In addition, it became clear that the press and the public more generally were not enamoured with the Emperor. For example, in the 6 October edition of the *Daily Express* the journalist Derek Mark referred to the 'wave of nausea' he experienced when the Emperor placed a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Westminster Abbey.[60] A shift in mood was evident, according to the Australian High Commission in London, and an even darker shift in mood followed after 7 October when Mountbatten held a private meeting with the Emperor.[61] Following this, the tone of press comment became more cutting. For example, an editorial in the *Spectator* opined, that, 'There is something essentially squalid about the visit of the Emperor Hirohito to this country … The Emperor is a despicable man, who used to preside over a despicable regime.'[62] It did not, of course, help, as an Australian Memorandum observed, that the Emperor did not make 'any expression of regret for Japan's deeds in the war, something the British appear to have expected him to mention'.[63] According to the FCO's Information Department, the editorials in the British press were unfavourable to the Emperor in a ratio of three to one, although one cannot but feel that this was an underestimate.[64]

In retrospect the government tried to put a positive spin on events, with Douglas-Home noting in his briefing for the Cabinet a 'certain coolness, but perhaps a good thing that they should realise that it will take some time to work themselves back into favour with Europe.'[65] This though hardly chimed with the desire that Britain had had to use the visit as a springboard to closer commercial ties with Japan. The Second Secretary at the Australian High Commission, R.C.B. Brown, was typically more frank. He observed to Canberra that as a public relations exercise the visit 'was not a complete success'. In addition, he revealed that the Desk Officer for Japan at the FCO had told him that, 'the Royal Family had also

[60] Derek Marks, 'This Painful Charade', *Daily Express*, 6 October 1971.

[61] NAA A1838 3103/11/51, PART 4 Brown to DFA, 15 October 1971 no.646.

[62] Editorial, *The Spectator*, 9 October 1971. See also Editorial, *Guardian*, 8 October 1971.

[63] NAA A1838 3103/1/3/1, PART 2 'Japanese Emperor's Visit to Europe', PIB Memorandum 29 October 1971.

[64] TNA FCO26/644, 'Japanese State Visit' Walker, Note, 19 October 1971.

[65] TNA FCO21/925 FEJ26/4, part C, Douglas Home briefing for Cabinet, 11 October 1971.

had some misgivings about inviting Hirohito'.[66] The British government, however, could at least take some comfort that the visit to London went well in contrast to the Emperor's arrival in the Hague where the windscreen of his car was broken and some householders flew flags at half mast, or to his presence in Bonn, where the day before his arrival a crowd of 300 left-wing demonstrators took up a chant of 'HiroHitler' before being dispersed by water-cannon.[67]

The unpleasant side of the Emperor's visit became a cause for reflection on both sides, for it was clear that, while the ice had been broken in terms of restoring Anglo-Japanese relations, it was still important not to go too fast. On the Japanese side, fear of further incidents led to some misgivings about the Crown Prince and Princess's forthcoming visit to Australia and New Zealand, although this eventually went ahead in 1973 without any complications.[68] Within Whitehall and Buckingham Palace, the main effect was a feeling that there should be no rush to get the Queen to Japan, for what 'would be an unpopular visit anyway'.[69] In the end, though, this was too pessimistic a reading of events. The Queen did eventually visit Japan in 1975 and on whole her sojourn proved to be a great success. She was greeted warmly by the Japanese Emperor and his family, and by the people. Additionally, the British press, in contrast to 1971, failed to display any resentment.[70] In his report back to the FCO after the visit had concluded, the Ambassador, Sir Fred Warner, related his feeling that, 'The effect on what the Japanese think about Britain has been of the greatest importance. For several weeks the Japanese found Britain constantly on their minds.' In addition, he observed interestingly that, 'I don't set much store by the argument used by the British press that the visit laid the ghost of the war for ever because the ghost does not often stalk here in Japan.'[71] With this visit, then, it could be said that at long last Anglo-Japanese relations had returned to something approaching normality.

[66] NAA A1838 3103/11/51, PART 4, Brown (HC London) to DFA, 15 October 1971 no.646.

[67] 'Windscreen of Emperor Hirohito's Car Broken', *The Times*, 9 October 1971; '"Hirohitler" Chant in Bonn Drowned by Waterhoses', *The Times*, 13 October 1975.

[68] NAA A1838 1516/1/479, PART 1, Lewis (Australian Embassy, Tokyo) to DFA, 24 July 1972.

[69] TNA FCO57/427 TXR22/5B, Curlemin (P & C Department), Minute, 22 November 1972.

[70] 'Tokyo Gives the Queen Big Welcome', *The Times*, 8 May 1975.

[71] TNA FCO21/1448, Warner to Callaghan, 12 June 1975, no.26/10.

Conclusion

The evolution of royal ties between Britain and Japan in the post-war period thus provides us with a useful means of comprehending the way in which the overall political relationship developed during these years and understanding the obstacles that existed to improving the connections between these potential Cold War allies. Much of the work that constitutes diplomatic history concerns itself with the minutiae of negotiations on specific international issues which can lead to the bigger picture of how countries perceive each other being obscured. The study of royal relationships and the symbolism involved in diplomatic protocol is important precisely because, while, of course, it involves its own rarefied details, its whole purpose is to signal respect and, as such, by its very nature it does communicate the broader realities of how two countries interact. In this case, the problems surrounding Prince Akihito's visit to Britain in 1953 are a telling comment on the degree to which the recent world conflagration continued to impinge on public thought and that the Foreign Office's desire to improve relations with Japan for Cold War reasons was dangerously premature. Indeed, such was the power of these memories that even in 1971 the visit of Emperor Hirohito turned out to be a difficult event.

In addition, the history of this period as seen through the eyes of the royal link is significant because of the light it sheds on the position of the monarchy in relation to British diplomacy. The obvious factor to stress here, as can be seen from the discussions from 1966 onwards about a royal visit to Japan, is that in a world in which British power was in relative decline, the monarchy's role was if anything increasing in its importance. As travel became ever easier and the number of countries in the world proliferated, state visits were ever more common, and there could be no more unique an occasion than one that involved the last remaining Great Power monarchy in Europe with all of the pomp and circumstance that such an institution suggested. The British monarchy was an extremely useful asset to possess and allowed a country that was struggling to adapt to the modern world to continue to carry a high public profile.

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CHAPTER 11

Epilogue: The Rise of 'The Queen'

Matthew Glencross, Judith Rowbotham, and Michael D. Kandiah

It is one of history's ironies that despite the efforts made by George V and his descendants to push forward the symbolic qualities of the monarchy at the expense of the individual, the presence of Elizabeth II has increasingly shone through and personalised an apparently monolithic institution. After a reign of over 60 years it is impossible for many to imagine a monarchy without her now matriarchal presence as Queen. She has been the one constant in British and world affairs for the majority of the twentieth century, with a reign spanning depressions and booms, meeting world figures such as Kennedy and De Gaulle as well as cultural icons such as the Beatles.[1] Now

[1] Matthew Glencross, Interview, Australian Broadcasting Company, 9 September 2015; http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2015/s4308723.htm, accessed 10 August 2016.

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the longest-serving British monarch, her Prime Ministers are mainly now coming from the ranks of those born after she came to the throne, rather than during her predecessor's reign.[2]

Her reign, and consequently, the personal association of the monarchy with her, has become so era defining that there are some who have suggested that the institution's continuation after her death is unimaginable. This line is particularly taken by many supporters of republican movements in Commonwealth countries retaining the Queen as head of state. Republican politicians in Australia, for instance, are on record as stating that, after previous defeats in popular referenda, they will not seek to put the question again until after her death.[3] It is a testament to her influence throughout the world that she is forever associated with her title without any further qualification. Around the globe, the phrase 'the Queen' can refer to only one person: Elizabeth II, Queen of the United Kingdom.

This therefore begs the question, have we come full circle to the pre-George V era when the personality of the monarch was paramount to the success of the institution? And if so, what does it mean for the long-term future of the Windsor dynasty? The Queen herself is clearly very conscious of being part of a tradition associated with that dynastic name: not only in her determination to preserve the name for her direct heirs. Whenever she appears in public in full state, she wears as emblems the representations of her father and her grandfather, two of her Windsor predecessors. Interestingly, she has never made any similar public acknowledgement of her uncle, the Duke of Windsor as one of the Windsor monarchs.[4] It suggests that for her, the right to be considered as such is something to be earned, and that she

[2] Judith Rowbotham, 'Sure-footed Queen steps into history in the role she modernised', *Western Morning News*, 8 September 2015. See http://www.westernmorningnews.co.uk/Comment-Sure-footed-Queen-steps-history-role/story-27759073-detail/story.html, accessed 6 November 2015.

[3] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/11879475/Australian-PM-Malcolm-Turnbull-says-no-push-for-republic-until-Queens-reign-ends.html, accessed 4 December 2015. Most recently, a majority of Australian political leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to a republican future by signing a declaration to that effect drawn up by the Australian Republican Movement, but they still insist it must have popular support. See http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jan/25/state-and-territory-leaders-unite-to-call-for-republic, accessed 27 January 2016.

[4] This is not to suggest she did not accept he was one of her predecessors on the throne. A clear acknowledgement of this is provided by the nature of his funeral. While not formally a public state funeral as had become usual for prominent Windsor funerals it still featured the ceremonial aspects of one, including the attendance of politicians and world leaders, and the reading out of his styles and titles, including his being 'sometime the most high, most mighty and most excellent monarch Edward VIII'.

does not see her uncle as qualifying—but very possibly more because of his post-abdication choices and lifestyle than the abdication itself.[5]

The question of personality versus duty, which also bears on this, has been raised regularly in the media in association with her heir, the Prince of Wales. Some commentators regularly express concerns about whether he will be able to imitate his mother's famous impartiality and avoid inhabiting his role as King without personalising it in a way that threatens the constitutional impartiality associated with the modern British monarchy.[6] While Charles is the first heir not to have met and been influenced personally by George V, it does not mean that he has not been influenced by the vision of the founder of the Windsor dynasty, through his grandmother and mother if nothing else.[7] Time alone will tell how he addresses the job of occupying the throne.

We believe that one of the key things that this volume has revealed is the extent to which the Windsors, above all the present incumbent of the throne, see being royal as being a job that they do, day by day, year round.[8] More significantly, that this is also how the public now views the Crown's role within the British political system. That aspect has been plain through the recent reportage assessing the Queen's reign as she has become the longest-reigning British monarch. The questions asked at the

[5] A further example of this is possibly provided by the Queen's refusal of the Duke of Windsor's request to attend the investiture of Prince Charles as Prince of Wales: one apparently phrased in terms of family, and not monarchy. The claim was that he would not wish his uncle there, rather than that it could be problematic to have a predecessor as both monarch and Prince of Wales present. Philip Ziegler (2012) *King Edward VIII* (London: Harper Press) p555.

[6] This is not new: similar questions were raised about Edward VII when Prince of Wales, but while a rumbustious personality, his behaviour as King was constitutionally correct and by his death, he had completely overcome any concerns about his suitability for his role. See Matthew Glencross, 'Edward VII, A Role Model for Charles?' http://www.historyandpolicy.org/opinion-articles/articles/edward-vii-a-role-model-for-charles, accessed 4 December 2015.

[7] In early childhood, he spent much time with his grandparents. Though his memories of George VI will be slight, we would suggest that they will have been kept alive by the Queen Mother during her long life.

[8] Even Edward VIII so described the role ('the biggest job in the world'), in a letter written in September 1919 during his tour of Canada, and recently rediscovered and put up for auction. See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3345399/How-Edward-VIII-wrote-couldn-t-king-Letter-reveals-monarch-expressed-doubts-taking-biggest-job-world-17-years-crowned.html, accessed 7 December 2015.

beginning of this volume do, consequently, still remain: what is the future of that job? Is the Crown likely to be made redundant in the near future?

In response to these questions, we would make the point that in many ways Elizabeth II has been no different to her father and grandfather in her job approach. She has, in terms of her public presence and the access given to her private personality, deliberately kept to her Windsor-inspired constitutional duty of remaining aloof from political controversies. However she has reminded her subjects and the world in general of her presence in the ways in which she has consistently made herself visually accessible from the start of her reign in relation to its key events. Media reaction has established these, on the whole, as amounting to positive statements of monarchy in the modern age. With one major exception, in relation to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, and a few other minor issues over her reign that have had a less lasting public impact, she has consequently been seen to be doing the job, by using her presence as symbol of the nation to highlight issues of national importance. And as already pointed out, she has regularly done so in ways that carry a constant reminder of the Windsor trademark via the brooches over her left breast when in full state dress.

This being said, over the last thirty years or more, British society—like so many others around the world—has found itself challenged by an obsession with the personal in the shape of the modern celebrity culture. This puts a focus on searching out the face behind the public image of many of our world leaders, which can then be purveyed to a wider world via various forms of social media. It is now not uncommon for politicians to use their 'personal' lives alongside their public credentials to 'appeal' to the public, from images of Tony Blair's guitar playing to Vladimir Putin's bare-chested enthusiasm for martial arts. It is not easy to manage a celebrity profile, however, especially in the days of instant and widely accessible social media. Old standards of *politesse* have gone, and no one now asks if it is permitted to take a photograph or publicise a gaffe committed by a celebrity. Despite their best precautions, the unintentional slips in their private lives made by such world figures can leak out to be broadcast throughout Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat and the rest, then remaining as an indelible part of their public profile along with their planned and intended public exposure. The Queen and other members of the royal family now also count as celebrities, with all the vulnerability that brings. Thus despite Elizabeth II's dedication to Windsor ideals, she and her family increasingly face challenges that had no equivalent in the reigns of George V or George VI.

It justifies a level of scrutiny unthinkable in earlier periods. On the one hand, the media constantly questions what kind of person is Elizabeth II? Articles are regularly published in serious and tabloid newspapers claiming knowledge about what her personal interests and private tastes are, and suggesting what her thoughts are on particular issues. This presents the Queen and her advisers with a challenge. How can the monarch negotiate the demand for information that is intrinsic now to someone possessed of 'celebrity' status, where denial is considered a challenge to the public's 'right to know', while avoiding divulging too many of her personal opinions and thoughts in order to avoid a breach of what she sees as her constitutional obligations.[9] It is frequently mentioned (with enjoyment) by onlookers that the Queen has the capacity to deliver a cold stare capable of disconcerting receivers and depressing pretensions to familiarity.[10] But that aloof stare can also be mentioned with disapproval. What this highlights is that on the one hand, if she appears too remote it can create an impression of coldness which departs from the pattern of the 'personal engagement with the people' style of monarchy that was one key element in her grandfather's 'Windsor' philosophy. On the other, she is well aware that she cannot afford to share publicly, as Victoria felt able to do, opinions on her Prime Ministers or world figures she encounters while doing her job. As one recent *Daily Mail* article described it, this is the modern 'royal paradox'; because we 'want our monarchs to be just like us but also completely different from us'.[11] Overall, despite an amount of media irritation over its failure to crack her careful balancing act, recent polling suggests that the Queen continues to display an overall ability to hold the line between these differing expectations of her.[12]

One question which has not been explored thoroughly in this volume is one touched on by some contemporary historians like Peter Hennessey, in

[9] Consider, for example, the recent furore over claims that she backs an exit from the EU, 'Revealed: Queen backs Brexit', *The Sun*, 8 March 2016; 'Buckingham Palace makes official complaint', *Daily Telegraph*, 9 March 2016; 'Brexit: the Queen is a powerful asset but she is being exploited', *Guardian*, 12 March 2016.

[10] Robert Hardman, 'From the unwelcome visitor at the Palace to the joy of losing herself in the crowd', *Daily Mail*, 25 September 2011.

[11] Ibid.

[12] https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2977/Satisfaction-with-the-Queen-at-record-high.aspx, accessed 4 December 2015.

raising the issue of the Royal Prerogative.[13] Throughout the history of the Windsor monarchs, Prime Ministers have generally commented, and not always favourably, on their relations with individual monarchs even while valuing the institution. Interestingly, the present incumbent has increasingly received glowing tributes from her Prime Ministers about the value of the advice received from the Queen. But what this also indicates is that, under the Windsors, the extent of the residual power of the Royal Prerogative has never been tested in the courts (where the question would have to be ultimately decided).[14] Thus it is only when, and if, this question arises in the courts that it will be possible to write a substantial contribution on this, which goes beyond theoretical speculation and guesswork.[15]

Equally, the current constitutional interpretations of the Bagehotian mantra about the monarch's right to be consulted, to advise and to warn has been extended to include the right to be informed. More it has been formalised in ways that experts like Dicey and Bagehot would not have predicted.[16] Now, aspects of the operation of the Royal Prerogative have even been written down and incorporated into *The Cabinet Manual*.[17] Windsor monarchs, including the present Queen, have shown no willingness to diminish their current level of potential power. One thing that the Queen has firmly refused to yield to the Commons is the right to declare war, for instance.[18] Also, as has recently been revealed in the media, ministers and civil servants have to consult both the Queen and her heir 'in greater detail and over more areas of legislation than was previously understood'.[19]

[13] Peter Hennessey and Caroline Anstey (1992) 'Jewel in the constitution? The Queen, Parliament and the Royal Prerogative', University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics, 8.

[14] There is a belief by many royal biographers, for instance, that George V did use the Royal Prerogative to deny refuge to the Tsar in 1918, but this incident does remain ambiguous as there is no known record of how far Lloyd George and the government sought to push the issue with the King, or whether they were in fact relieved at the King's decision, seeing it as fitting that he be the one to make it.

[15] We are particularly indebted to Andrew Blick for his insights in this area of the Royal Prerogative, See his forthcoming chapter, Andrew Blick (2016) *The Codes of the Constitution* (Oxford: Hart), chapter on 'Historic Origins of Codification'.

[16] See Peter Raina, ed (2009) *A. V. Dicey: General Characteristics of English Constitutionalism* (Oxford: Peter Lang).

[17] *The Cabinet Manual*, October 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60641/cabinet-manual.pdf, accessed 4 April 2016.

[18] This was recently confirmed over the declaration of war on Iraq in 2003; see 'Mystery Lifted on Queen's power', *Guardian*, 21 October 2003.

[19] 'Secret papers show extent of senior royals' veto over bills', *Guardian*, 15 January 2013.

However, a check on the power of the monarchy is undoubtedly the need for individual monarchs to conduct themselves in line with public expectations of what they will, and will not do. Blackburn's chapter on Edward VIII underlines this. Also, as Roger Mortimore has commented in papers presenting the results of his work on the apparently positive overall approval levels of the monarchy as an institution, only time and any future challenges along the lines of those posed by royal reactions to Diana, Princess of Wales and her death, can test the enduring depth of that approval, with all the implications that could have for the survival of the institution.

In reflecting on this potential for disaster for the monarchy, what this volume suggests is that a key factor in the success of the Windsor monarchy from 1910 has been its ability to adapt itself to what the people want its monarchy to be at various points in time. This involves maintaining and evolving traditions and rituals that are core to British identity, such as the State Opening of Parliament, and also keeping up to date with new trends such as Twitter.[20] Much, then, must depend on the willingness of individuals in line to the throne to respond to such demands of their subjects. To date, they seem to have responded positively. Even the traditions started by the Windsors have evolved during their dynasty in order to keep them relevant. To take an obvious example, George V's first Christmas Speech featured a Kipling ode to the newly-created Commonwealth. Following in her grandfather's tradition of delivering a broadcast Christmas Speech, Elizabeth II has used this medium to deliver an annual personal message to her people. This highlights issues that she has identified as being important to them as well as to her personally. Yet Elizabeth II, the doyenne of the Windsors, has her critics in terms of how she has performed as monarch. David Starkey recently reflected on the current Queen that no one could really remember anything reign-defining said by Elizabeth II, in contrast to a number of her predecessors including the first Elizabeth.[21]

Despite how these words were taken by the majority of the media, we would argue that this volume suggests that this comment should be understood not as a criticism of her reign but rather, as a statement about her style of queenship. Her long reign makes it tempting to compare her

[20] https://blog.twitter.com/en-gb/2014/queen-elizabeth-ii-sends-her-first-tweet, accessed 4 December 2015.

[21] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/the-queen-has-done-and-said-nothing-that-anybody-will-remember-says-david-starkey-10480125.html, accessed 4 December 2015.

to her to other era-defining Queens such as Elizabeth I or Victoria. In this comparison it is true that she has not had her own, 'frail body of a weak, feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king,' moment. But—what significant speeches made by either George V or George VI have entered popular memory (apart, perhaps, from the possibly apocryphal 'Bugger Bognor' comment of the former)? In the twentieth century, when the Windsor dynasty was established, it has been the visual impact of monarchy rather than words that has been its most powerful asset in terms of impressing itself on the public memory and affection. Her concern in this age of visual communications has been to be more a pictorial symbol rather than one having to make her enduring symbolic mark through her words. Images of the Queen have certainly proved to be iconic and, we believe, will be accepted by historians as reign-defining.

In this connection, it is important to understand that although the Windsors are a dynasty, Elizabeth II has occupied the throne longer than the other Windsors put together. Thus any enduring development and continuing success for the dynasty in the years after her eventual demise will depend a great deal not just on her interpretation of what it means to be Windsor and but also on the reactions of her successors to that legacy. She herself has certainly not left the legacy untouched, and has even, to an extent, modified the Windsor dynastic name. It has been widely known that Prince Philip was hurt and offended that the name of the ruling house did not become, in 1952, Mountbatten—his adopted British surname. At the time, the Queen accepted Churchill's advice (which will almost certainly have been endorsed by the two Queens Dowager then still alive—Mary and Elizabeth the Queen Mother) that the name Windsor had to be kept, in line with George V's decision to make that the perpetual designation for his royal descendants.[22]

However, by the time of the birth of her third child, she sought the advice of her constitutional experts on making a modification for descendants from her marriage to Philip Mountbatten. The agreed compromise was that the official designation would remain the House and Family of Windsor for the royal family *en masse*, but that the descendants of those of her children who were not in close succession to the throne (her 'de-royalised' descendants) would adopt for themselves the surname Mountbatten-Windsor.[23] This also shows another aspect of the modernisation of the

[22] Sally Bedell Smith, 'Love and Majesty', *Vanity Fair*, January 2012.
[23] Ibid.Notes

monarchy—the idea of a surname had never been a royal concern in previous centuries. George V, along with Lord Stamfordham, had had to work out what 'surname' his descendants not in the immediate line of succession might adopt.[24] Reflecting back on Glencross's chapter, Edward VII had even been referred to (entirely inaccurately) in some history books as a Plantagenet, rather than as of the House of Saxe-Coburg Gotha. But for the modern royal family, the use of a surname relating to the Royal House from which they were derived was going to be an important one if they were to be able to appear sufficiently British and part of the national family.

Thus while honouring her grandfather's heritage, Elizabeth II has also felt able to modernise it herself. It is only after the reigns of her successors, likely to be Charles and William, that we shall truly be able to assess whether Elizabeth II's role has been essentially predominantly a continuation of her grandfather's Windsor ideal or the start of a new chapter for the monarchy, even if under the same label. It seems likely, though, that the Windsor trademark will remain the identifying one for future British monarchs. Monarchy may not last forever in the British system. However, thanks to the flexibility and capacity institutionalised within the mechanisms of the British monarchy as a result of George V's vision in establishing the concept of the Windsor dynasty, it seems highly possible that it will be a case of 'long to reign over us'—at least from the perspective of 2016, when this volume was completed.

[24] Kenneth Rose (1983) *King George V* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson) p174.

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Note: Page numbers with "n" denote foot notes.

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