



Contributions to  
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT,  
PEACE ECONOMICS  
AND DEVELOPMENT

VOLUME 12A

# ADVANCES IN MILITARY SOCIOLOGY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHARLES C. MOSKOS, PART A



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ESSAYS IN HONOR OF  
CHARLES C. MOSKOS



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Emerald Group Publishing Limited  
Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK

First edition 2009

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**British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data**

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-84855-890-8

ISSN: 1572-8323 (Series)



Awarded in recognition of Emerald's production department's adherence to quality systems and processes when preparing scholarly journals for print



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## FOREWORD

This two-volume book was prepared in the memory of Charles C. Moskos, a distinguished military sociologist. He addressed the role of military and their families in international and domestic conflicts. Military is an important part of conflict and war, and its role has changed distinctly over the years due to development of technology and present day politico-social contexts. In recent years, there have been very few international conflicts. Most of the conflicts are domestic where countries or coalitions of countries are often involved to save their interest, combat terrorism, and keep world peace. A new form of war, namely asymmetric warfare, has developed. Traditional armies are not prepared for this. Peacekeeping and peacemaking by international organizations like United Nations have become the rule. The attitude of the soldiers themselves has also changed. They are questioning authority more. Protests over civilian casualty and torture are being raised. The establishment of the International Court of Justice has led to many controversies amongst nations. The role of military cannot be discussed at global levels exclusively. Regional war and the role of the military in Asia, for example, is a topic of its own. Women in military and wives of the military play important but sometimes difficult roles. The value of these two books lies in the contributions of scholars living in different countries with drastically different socioeconomic conditions to come up with a generalization sought by Charles C. Moskos.

Manas Chatterji  
*Series Editor*



# INTRODUCTION

## 1. FOREWORD

I first met Charles C. Moskos back in 1983, at the first international conference in which I had the fortune to participate, and, since my history of relations with him parallels those of many colleagues and friends who study the military and who, like me, remember him, it seems worthwhile to introduce these studies in his honour with a personal recollection.

I met him, as I said, and naturally I began to examine his well-known institution/occupation model (see Moskos, 1977, 1986). The study led me to formulate a few criticisms on this theory and, on a more general plane, to write an article on interpretive models of the military profession. I sent it to the editorial office of *Armed Forces and Society*, which used, as is customary, the peer-reviewing procedure, and among the reviewers there was Charlie Moskos. What struck me about his review was that, despite the fact that my article was rather critical regarding his I/O model, his evaluation was positive, asking me only for a few methodological clarifications.<sup>1</sup>

It was one of the characteristic sides of his nature and his personality as a scholar. What interested him was the value of the research, coherence, and clarity; being contradicted did not concern him in the least. A friendship was born then, an exchange that he immediately gave concreteness to by sending me a copy of his book *Peace Soldier* (Moskos, 1976), a book that for me was a model for later field researches. The rest of the story is that of many of his friends and collaborators: over 20 years of meetings, collaborations, and exchanges of studies and researches.

Moved, like everyone, by his recent and sudden passing, I felt it was my duty to dedicate the next (with respect to his death) international study conference of RC01 to his memory and, with the unanimous approval of the entire Committee membership – or better, of all conference participants – to dedicate the publication of the conference's proceedings to Prof. Charlie C. Moskos and to name them after him.

The international study conference whose proceedings I am presenting here was held in Seoul, South Korea, from 14 to 17 July 2008. The choice of Seoul as venue for the meeting is important and significant. It fits in with the character of our Committee,<sup>2</sup> which aims to take in and link scholars from all parts of the world. For this purpose, it was considered appropriate to hold the meeting in a geographic region of steadily growing significance in which we had not yet held any of our previous meetings. Second, this choice allowed us to come into contact with different military and social realities from the already much-studied European and North American contexts.

Participation in the Seoul meeting was therefore an enrichment for all of us. Indeed, we had come to a country with an ancient history and civilization, characterized by a profound religious culture and spirituality, starting from the period named after the Three Kingdoms (from the first to the seventh centuries A.D.) and then through the long period of the Joseon dynasty (from 1392 to 1910), in an active relationship of cultural exchange with neighbouring China for a long historical period, and today also with the Western world.

We had come to a country that has succeeded in overcoming the hardships and the ruins of a disastrous civil war midway through the last century, a war that then unfortunately became internationalized owing to the bloc politics of the historical period, a country that still bears the deep wound of a split into two different states. A country that attempts today to overcome this division through dialogue, with various political tools, such as the so-called Sunshine Policy, according to an approach that appears very close to the conflict resolution processes that a sector of our Committee actively studies. Armed forces and conflict resolution are in fact two study themes that supplement each other: if on one hand the prevalent mission of national armed forces is today that of Peace Support Operations (PSOs), on the other it is equally true that the political action for the resolution of local conflicts more and more often requires an international police action – a constabulary function, *Janowitz (1960)* would have said – aimed at putting a stop to armed clashes and getting the parties into a dialogue.

We had come from various parts of the world (32 countries were represented at the conference) and this reflects that globalization that we put in the conference title. Scholars came from various disciplines of the social sciences, for that interdisciplinarity that we now all consider necessary for study of the armed forces and of conflict resolution.

Some statistical data can give a better idea of the participation at the conference.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. CONTENTS OF THE BOOK

With this 2-part volume I introduce the proceedings of the conference 'Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution in a Globalized World', held in Seoul. These proceedings include a selection of 46 of the 88 papers presented during the conference and can be considered ideally divided into three sections: a first, introductory section, a second devoted to more general thematic aspects and a third that goes into greater detail on various aspects, situations and geopolitical areas.

The introductory section of this volume includes a foreword by the editor of the *Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development* series, Manas Chatterji, this introduction, a remembrance of the person and the work of Charles C. Moskos by one of his closest collaborators, Laura Miller, an essay of a general nature by John Allen Williams and the report presented to the conference by Udi Lebel.

John Allen Williams' essay regards social studies of the military in general and basically applies the ancient Chinese proverb to the effect that those who perform administrative functions should find time for study and those who study should devote part of theirs to administering, or, to say it in Williams' words (see Chapter 2), 'Persons of action will be more effective if they are also reflective; persons of reflection can discover things worth acting upon'.

He highlights the rise (or the return?) of the figure of the soldier and scholar, that is, of the military professional who takes full advantage of his experience as a participant observer to contribute to the study of our research topic. This is an aspect that has seemed to me to be particularly significant for our subject matter. The military presents characteristics that are so unique and so poorly understood outside its sphere that the contribution of those who have accumulated years of experience in it seems particularly useful and meaningful.

Udi Lebel's chapter was included in this introductory part of the volume because, despite being a case study, its initial general part gives a good sketch of the new dimensions of the context in which the military and military policy must move today: a constant, diffuse interaction of the 'local' and the 'global'.

This new dimension also offers the chance to note the rapid change of politico-social contexts today: about a year before the Seoul conference we<sup>4</sup> chose the context of globalization to exchange views on the problems of conflict resolution and the armed forces. But just one year later, as the conference was opening, we had to come to terms with how the context was



already changed and that comparison now had to be made on the terrain of glocalization.<sup>5</sup> Lebel's report had the merit of moving in this dimension already, so I thought it would be suitable for inclusion in the introductory part precisely to underscore the rapidity and continuity of change of the context in which our actors find themselves operating.

The second section in this volume of these proceedings, devoted, as I said, to more general themes, starts out with a section, named Part I: Building and Sustaining Peace, that contains a number of contributions on conflict resolution theories. Since military activity increasingly takes place today with the declared objective of bringing (or restoring) peace to conflict situations, it seemed appropriate to begin the text of this work with the chapters devoted to the general study of conflict resolution.

The theme is treated by the various authors in a more far-reaching way than conflict resolution theory, however, because, as Dennis Smith observes in his contribution, which moves in an international, or rather global, dimension, 'It seems pretty clear that during the next decade or so there will be a shift towards a multi-polar global order with the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Japan and India all manoeuvring for position. This manoeuvring is bound to lead to many situations of conflict'.

The section is introduced by the essay by Bandana Purkayastha, who starts from recognition of the existence of a continuum of the phenomenon of violence, from the private to the public, from the particular to the general, from the primary, often family, group to wider groups, and this continuum of violence 'over a long period of time qualitatively and quantitatively negatively affected groups'. Therefore, 'thinking about peace in terms of human dignity and relationships' expands the parameters within which we have traditionally thought about conflict resolution. 'Peacekeeping operations and international humanitarian assistance are positive activities for resolving conflicts', Purkayastha says, but 'the issue discussed here is to conceptualize a long term peace that restores human dignity and lives of freedom to the largest number of individuals possible'.

The survey made in these chapters (B. Purkayastha, D. Smith, Lloyd Dumas and M. Mosser) on conflict resolution schemes serves as a good introduction to the theme of international operations, almost always multinational and today consisting chiefly of peacekeeping missions, with the seven chapters of the section named Part II "International Military Cooperation and Peacekeeping Operations" devoted to these themes.

Multinational missions are in fact the prevalent reality today. As Tibor Szvircsev Tresch observes in the introductory chapter of this Part II in this volume: 'In the face of new threats and declining budgets, armed forces have

been forced to engage in multicultural missions. Single states simply do not have the resources to engage in independent military action and, for reasons of political legitimacy, it has also become essential for the US to operate in coalitions’.

And these multinational missions are now almost always PSOs or, as many still generically refer to them, peacekeeping missions, but their nature is now different from those that we might term first-generation missions. Indeed, as Marian Kloczkowski observes: ‘Today objectives realized as part of peacekeeping missions definitely differ from those in years 70 and 80. When in the past they were mainly supervision or the separation of fighting sides, rarely requiring quasi-combat action and – in general – generated relatively small risk, with the appearance of the new type of conflicts and the new definition of presence of the West powers in developing countries the requirements towards soldiers participating in missions changed’.

Szvircev Tresch’s essay is followed by six case studies, four referring to peacekeeping experiences in various contexts and by various countries, namely: in Latin America by Marina Malamud Feinsilber, the Polish experiences by Marian Kloczkowski and others, the South Korean ones by Kyudok Hong and the Hungarian ones by Zoltan Laszlo. A further case study by Dimitrios Smokovitis deals with the Greek contribution to the Korean War (1950–1953), and finally Sandra Fernandes closes this section with a wide-ranging analysis on European involvement of Russia in order to face, in commonality of purpose with the EU, local crises with PSOs.<sup>6</sup>

But international operations today are coming up against a new form of war, asymmetric warfare, a fruit of glocalization that is still not well enough known. In it, more than in any other conflict manifestation, is a mingling and blending of local and global forms of (conflict-related) communication, in the instruments employed, the field affected and the objectives pursued. On asymmetric warfare, precisely because of its problematic nature and newness, the studies of eight different authors face off in Part III “Social, Professional and Political Aspects of Asymmetric Warfare”, authors who explore the various aspects, going so far as to call into doubt its very existence and newness in the essay of Antulio J. Echevarria.

After a short introduction to the treated theme by myself, the first chapter of the Part III, by Paul C. van Fenema, proposes to understand how asymmetric warfare influences value creation processes of expeditionary military networks. For this purpose the author, having pointed out that military forces must, in this context, come to grips with their task environment, performance, and main and supportive processes, ‘proposes a generic model linking these processes to value creation’, claiming that this

model 'may contribute to network theories exploring specific implications of different environmental properties for network operations and performance'.

The next essay, by Davids and Soeters, is a concrete case study, on the crossroad of management and social science in the military, that focuses on how the payment of salaries is organized within the Afghan 205th Corps. It is a study from which many concrete and significant assessments descend on the relationship between developed countries and developing countries in PSOs.

It is clear that in developing countries, managing and organizing activities is conducted in a very different way. The authors observe in this regard: 'Generally speaking, we are seeing friction between the legalistic-bureaucratic style of Western general and financial management and the pre-modern form of organisation that prevails in Afghanistan' and that the 'transnational model, dominated by the West, does not suffice for doing business in the so-called emerging markets'. Their conclusion, however, is not the traditional Western position according to which the developing countries must be 'educated' to the Western model, but that the 'strategies will have to be reinvented in order to respond to the local customs, possibilities and insights. The best of both cultures, that of the West and that of the developing countries, must be united and combined in order to achieve appropriate approaches'. This is one of those interesting aspects of glocalization that have emerged in the studies of the Seoul conference and in the debate that has followed it.

A theoretical frame for the operations of the strong side in asymmetric warfare, called counterinsurgency (COIN), is offered in the essay by Wilbur J. Scott, George R. Mastroianni and David R. McCone, who illustrate the whole historical excursus and the conceptual travail that took place in the United States, from the Vietnam experience to that of General Petraeus in Iraq. Examining military doctrinal publications and the work of social scientists, the authors point to the necessary change of mentality and approach with respect to conventional warfare, necessary because we are heading towards a future in which irregular rather than conventional warfare will be the norm. 'In such scenarios', claim the authors, 'the definition of and solution to security problems are at their core socio-political rather than military in nature'.

Iris Hoedemaekers and Joseph Soeters, in their chapter (another interesting case study), focus on the processes of communication during peace missions in far away countries, where local people in general do not master Western languages such as English and French. These authors state: 'Communication in peace operations is of great importance, it is at least as significant as gunfights'.

And it is important because of the necessity to both create support for the peace mission and collect information about imminent hostilities. Communication needs interpreters, but the interpreters' in-between position makes them strangers in their own country. Goffman's (1961) work on strategic interaction, the management of face and embarrassment as well as interaction rituals in general, constitutes the theoretical backbone of that study.

The chapter that follows, by Hermann Jung, deals with the preparation of soldiers in the new context of 'a world where asymmetry appears to be the only logical option for adversaries' of the developed countries. This preparation requires significant and innovative changes in training and education methods in order to enable personnel to cope with the complexity and unpredictability of asymmetric warfare. What appears to be needed is a new, alternative paradigm that gives commanders, especially, 'a new and better way of thinking and acting'; the rational-linear paradigm in fact appears to be superseded. Jung proposes a model founded on multi-dimensional thinking, suitable to 'make sense of the postmodern world in an almost circular, interconnected, interdependent way and, as a result, represents a more accurate understanding of the nature of complex human information processing'. A paradigm, as one can see, that is not far from the one proposed by Hoedemaekers and Soeters (see above).

The two contributions that follow instead show the critical side of contemporary social science in regard to the concept (or novelty) of asymmetric warfare, thus contributing to a comprehensive analysis of the topic.

Vladimir Rukavishnikov introduces the concept of *asymmetric answer* by the weak side in a conflict situation as cause of the type of war that is called asymmetric warfare and his chapter examines first and foremost the Soviet interpretation of the concept. According to this author, asymmetric conflict was used, especially by the Soviets, in the framework of a war of words between the United States and the USSR, destined for both internal and international public opinion. The rhetorical use of asymmetric war has continued, however, also in the political rhetoric of post-Soviet Russia, and Rukavishnikov offers us ample historical examples of this assumption. According to this author, therefore, the true asymmetric conflict is not the one between the religious and/or ethnic risings of developing countries and the Western world, but between the great powers, equipped with a different level of military power. He states that 'the greatest threat to the future comes not from Al Qaeda but from the most powerful states'.

Even more radical is the denial of the existence of a new form of struggle, asymmetric warfare, elaborated by Antulio J. Echevarria. Taking the

concept of symmetry (and asymmetry) to the extreme, he affirms that no conflict has existed in which the two parties were exactly of the same strength or weight, and therefore ‘the notion, or rather the presumption, that the belligerents in any war have been, or can ever be, symmetric in the first place – and that symmetry is less clever or desirable than asymmetry, particularly when it comes to strategy – is baseless’.

This third part closes this volume. Volume 12B opens with a section, named Part I, devoted to the recent and ongoing changes in the soldier’s trade, first and foremost the generalized passage from conscript armies to professional armies. The four chapters of this section deal with as many case studies, both national and regional.

The first, by Uros Svete and Ljubiča Jelusic, regards the Slovenian army in the dizzying process of change undergone in 15 years, from a territorial (reserve) army to a fighting army to an armed force completely based on compulsory military service to inclusion in NATO and, finally, passage to voluntary recruitment (professional armed forces).

The second essay, written by Yantislav Yanakiev, is aimed at investigating the organizational and cultural barriers present within the Bulgarian armed forces following the abolition of conscription. To do this, he bases himself on the comparative analysis of two representative sociological surveys carried out in the Bulgarian armed forces in June–July 2000 and October–November 2007.

Olli Harinen & Jukka Leskinen then present the case study of Finland, a country that, despite being a ‘Western type’ EU country in its general characteristics, is bucking the trend of the decline of mass armies of those countries by keeping its armed forces based on compulsory service.

The essay by Omar Gutierrez sets out from the framework proposed by Moskos (1994) in his book *The Postmodern Military*, where he argues the case of the United States as a paradigm of the changes of the military profession due to postmodernism in industrialized countries applies to the changes that have occurred or are in progress in the countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) where the process of democratization and the evolution of the military profession have led to greater elements of similarity with the postmodern context.

Part II that follows analyses, through three case studies, public opinion attitudes towards national security issues. This part opens with an essay by Marian Malesic and Vinko Vegic, devoted to Slovenia, where, as the authors declare: ‘We will attempt to check, based on secondary analysis of selected public opinion data obtained at the Defence Research Centre from 1991 to 2007, whether public opinion in Slovenia responds to security issues rationally

in the sense that security preferences of the public are realistic, have a purpose and are not coincidental'. The response is positive, but what interests us most here, and goes beyond the Slovenian case, is the theoretical investigation that the authors set out beforehand regarding the sense of studies on public opinion, put in doubt by various parties. Through an analysis of the literature on the subject, first, and then from analysis of the data of the case study, the authors arrive at the conclusion that 'public opinion viewed as a total is highly organized and responds to available information rationally'.

Yantislav Yanakiev succeeds, in his chapter in this section, in presenting us an interesting analysis of the perceptions of public opinion at European level with respect to defence and security issues under the threat of international terrorism after 11 September 2001. It is a secondary analysis, based mainly on Eurobarometer data, which substantially arrives at two conclusions: the first is an increase in the level of anxiety throughout European public opinion related to international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. The second is that the divergence in threat perception in the Western and Eastern parts of Europe in the first years following the end of the Cold War significantly diminished following 9/11 based on a common perception of the threats.

The chapter by Sabine Collmer deals with the development of public opinion in Germany on security and defence issues in the last few years. It strives to investigate long-lasting patterns of security-related public opinion which can be found among the German citizenry. Starting from the theoretical premise that the most persistent patterns in public opinion form on long-term traits and globally affecting developments, she notes from the empirical data of national researches that the change in the nature of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan has had a very strong impact on German public opinion. To date, however, this public impact has not been followed up by adequate public debate.

Part III "Women in the Military Profession and Military Families" of Volume 12B is devoted to women in conflicts and armed forces and to studies on soldiers' families – overall, the soft underbelly of the institution, as it were.

I chose to open this section with the study by Oluyemi Fayomi on women in conflict situations. The concrete examples that this author provides of the situation of women in the war in Darfur seemed suitable to me for outlining all the dramatic force and the importance of women in communities in general and in the military in particular in war situations.

Indeed, Fayomi writes that 'Rape and sexual violence continue at an alarming rate in the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Rapes and other forms of

sexual violence are being used as weapons of war in order to humiliate, punish, control, inflict fear and displace women and their communities. Rape also has serious economic and social consequences in Darfurian society by making the victims ineligible for marriage and ostracized by the community and the family members’.

All this happens, in Darfur as in numerous other war theatres, despite the 60-year history of the Geneva Convention of 1949, enriched by the Additional Protocol of 1977, which should guarantee the protection of women in armed conflicts.

Women in the armed forces are also vulnerable to discrimination, even in the developed Western countries. So claims Helena Carreiras in the second essay of this section, where she reports that ‘the integration of women into the Armed Forces of western democracies reveals a pattern of significant diversity: while some countries have integrated women, granting them real (and not only formal) access to a wide range of positions and occupations, other keep women in little more than symbolic spaces’. The study examines in particular, through empirical data, the effect of the organizational policies of the NATO countries on the effective integration of women within the various armed forces.

Greece, for instance (but it is not the only example), appears to be one of the countries where opening the military profession up to women has been the tardiest. In his essay on military women in Greece, L. Nicolau Smokovitis observes that ‘in a comparative sense, recruitment of women in the Greek military was delayed, while countries like the U.K., USA, Canada, Soviet Union, Israel, etc., accepted women in their military ranks almost after the end of W.W.II’. His essay, a classic case study, analyses the reasons of this late admission of women into the Greek military, as well as the social problems that such admission has involved and the attitudes of the political and military leadership towards these problems.

The essay by David R. McCone and Wilbur J. Scott is a case study as well and is devoted to gender integration in the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), where the admission of women began in 1976. The authors start from the field research carried out by the first scholars who dealt at the time with analysing the aspects and problems of gender integration, and then presenting the data of an autonomous research particularly centred on cadet perceptions of females at USAFA and on the effective integration at the present time.

Devoted prevalently to the ‘soft underbelly’ of the military, the case study presented by Manon Andres and René Moelker reports the data of a survey conducted on a sizeable sample of parents of Dutch soldiers engaged in a

high-risk deployment (Afghanistan). The authors point out that the research data show strong cohesion between the service members and their parents, cohesion that is significantly strengthened during the mission.

According to Marina Nuciari and Guido Sertorio, the authors of the next case study, ‘the Italian case can be defined by means of the image of the three-sided revolution: from draft to AVF, from national to international oriented military, from all-male to mixed military’. And indeed these changes were made in Italy very rapidly in the few years just before and after the turn of the millennium, overcoming a certain delay in comparison to the homologous countries. But this set of changes has brought to the fore a problem that was almost unknown before, that is, the involvement of a high number of families of soldiers deployed overseas for long periods, often in high-risk situations. The essay, based on research data, thus offers quite interesting perspectives on this topic.

As mentioned in the preceding section, the organization of the 2008 international study conference of RC01 in Seoul had the purpose of facilitating the attendance of Asian scholars in general and those of the Far East in particular, and the conference could therefore hardly fail to devote special attention to the military in the Asian context, and this is precisely the title of the final part of Volume 12B.

The *Military in the Asian Context* opens with the contribution of Riaz Ahmed Shaikh and is devoted to an overall analysis of the military on the Indian subcontinent. The antagonism between India and Pakistan has had a general geostrategic influence that has completely surpassed the borders of the region concerned. Shaikh’s analysis theorizes and provides an interpretation of the historical roots of the birth and success of Islamic jihad. Over time, Shaikh writes, the Pakistani fear of a conflict with its neighbour and adversary India led it to sacrifice internal social development in favour of a rearmament policy greater than its economic possibilities and consequently led the Pakistani military to assume an internal and external role that is absolutely incompatible with a democratic regime, destroying the centuries-old tradition inherited from the British Indian Army. The outbreak of the Russian–Afghan war broadly involved the Pakistani military and led to intense Islamization, both internal and forced on Pakistani society in general. The Afghan resistance against the Russians thus became part of a global jihad and, as Shaikh writes, ‘the Afghan war produced a new radical Islamic movement. Along with the Jihadi activities several young Muslims more joined madrasahs set up with funding from Saudi Arabia and some other Muslim countries. More than 100,000 foreign Muslim radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad. The decade



long conflict against communist Russia in Afghanistan gave Islamic extremists and jihadies a rallying point and training field. Young Muslims around the world flocked to Afghanistan to fight against a foreign invader'. The importance of the essay is represented by the fact that understanding this origin and this development of Islamic jihad means understanding the most recent aspects of asymmetric warfare.

Shaikh's essay is followed by a series of case studies centred on various countries of the Asian context, but significant also for their more general aspects referable to the application of the social sciences to our sector of study.

The first in order of placement is the essay by Leslie V. Advincula-Lopez, devoted to the study of the Philippine military academies as a means of social ascent. After pointing out, through empirical data, that 'the class profile of the cadets joining the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) have changed dramatically in the last 50 years', leading to recruitment increasingly centred on the lower class, Advincula-Lopez highlights how the military education process, through its system of instruction, its bureaucratic administration system, its regulated and strongly regimented daily activities, and its rites and tradition 'has provided an avenue for upward social mobility'.

This is an aspect common to many other national contexts, and the survey by Advincula-Lopez, which is also based on the theoretical frameworks of other authors (such as the Frenchman Pierre Bourdieu), acquires an interest and a valence that goes beyond the studied national context.

Janar Turtogtoh's essay helps us get to know the social and political reality of a country that has been little studied to date, at least in our sector of investigation, Mongolia. The country is also emblematic of the transition of the former Soviet republics towards autonomy, democracy and reaffirmation of their own national identities. Indeed, Turtogtoh writes that 'the post-communist period offered Mongolia a renewed position in international affairs, and the opportunity to reassert its once-disregarded Asian identity'. In the particular of the case study, the author focuses attention on the constitutional bases (new constitution of 1991) of the defence policy, as well as the internal organization of the Mongolian armed forces.

The essay by Yu-Wen Fan that follows is wide-ranging since, despite being titled and dedicated to the case study of Taiwan, it enables an acute analysis of the application of the theories of Charles Tilly (see [Tilly, 1992](#)) to Third World countries in general. Tilly's theory, as is well known and as Yu-Wen Fan reminds us, claims that continuous wars and preparation for wars motivated early European rulers to extract resources from their subject populations, thereby expanding states' infrastructure and establishing

mechanisms to enable negotiations with societies. The application of Tillian Theory to Third World countries explains the failure of many of them with two historical observations. The first is that without continuous international wars (as early modern Europe had), there would be no capable and effective states. The other element is that availability of foreign aid from the global powers during the Cold War era exempted Third World states from extracting resources from their societies. This general analysis applies poorly to the case study of Taiwan, however, because on the one hand, Yu-Wen Fan observes, 'Taiwan resembles early modern European state formation with high military expenditures and a huge standing army prepared for war. [omissis] In the Tillian model, this condition enhances state capacity. On the other hand, Taiwan was a huge US aid recipient in the Cold War, second only to South Korea. In the Tillian model, this degrades the state's effectiveness'. The author does not arrive at a conclusion but terminates by suggesting 'some analytical directions for future research to enhance our understanding of Taiwan's state-building trajectory in particular and of Third World states in general'.

Also the essay by Rebecca Schiff starts from a general theory on civil–military relations, the concordance theory (Schiff, 2008), which argues that three partners – the military, the political elites and the citizenry – should aim for a cooperative relationship and sees a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society. Applying this theory to India and Pakistan, Schiff points out how the existence, or lack, of a harmonious, collaborative civil–military relationship significantly influences also the foreign policy of the two countries. In the case in question, India displays an internal concordance that 'encourages partnerships among international political and corporate allies, Pakistan's continuous domestic discordance has resulted in recent difficult relations with the US, India and Afghanistan'.

Rosalie Arcala Hall then presents the case study of the Philippines, through a careful analysis of a local situation in a sample city for what concerns the role of soldiers and their relationship with the civilian authorities. In the study, the author states that 'a considerable gap exists between each force's understanding of its functions and what they actually do in relation to other state security forces'. In particular, the army is called to carry out principally non-combat tasks connected with COIN operations.

Applying the concordance theory already presented by Rebecca Schiff, Nilufer Narli presents the case study of Turkey, where the aspiration to integration of the country in the European Union has led to a rapid and far-reaching process of alignment of the Turkish military with the type of

civil–military relations and democratic control of the armed forces common to the EU countries.

The study presented by Narli has two particularly interesting aspects: one regards the analysis of the sectors where the alignment can be said to be achieved and of those where it must still be brought to completion; the other regards the historical survey of the relations between the Turkish military, civilian politics and society before and after the EU harmonization process.

In the framework of the military in the Asian context, particular attention was naturally devoted to the host country, South Korea, with four essays dedicated to it.

Doo-Seung Hong and Chon-Hwan Chong open this group by analysing the different perception of security issues among military professionals and civilians in South Korea.

The authors report that ‘traditional views on national security and international relations, which were based on national consensus in the past, have been replaced by a new conception of diversification, heterogeneity and even sharp opposition’. Getting down to a more detailed analysis of the opinions expressed by the two groups, and basing themselves on empirical research data, the authors point out however that not only differences, but also similarities of thought and perception exist, so that one can conclude that in South Korea, as in many countries, ‘civilian society and the military are ‘different, but not separate’.

Also Mahn-Geum Ohn’s essay is devoted to the host country and the author analyses the historical evolution of military professionalization of Korea, from a patron–client relations system of a parochial society to a modern, albeit recent, true professionalization. In the background, civil–military relations and their change aimed at a normalization of relations.

Byeong Jo Kim, too, examines in his chapter the existence of a civil–military gap in the perceptions or attitudes on security and defence issues. It is a study based on empirical data that divides the examined sample into different subgroups: COs and NCOs and ‘conscripted soldiers’ for the military, and for civilians, four subgroups divided by gender and age. The topic is an interesting one and the survey data, very detailed, lend themselves to comparison with the data of a recent international research (see [Caforio, 2007](#)) on the civil–military gap in 13 countries of the Western area conducted by members of RC01.

The analysis of civil–military relations in South Korea is completed by the essay of Il Joon Chung, who highlights how a dominance of national security concerns, consequent on the division of the country into two opposing states, formally still at war with each other, has profoundly

characterized the country's political development, 'reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, 'politics is the continuation of war by other means'', the author affirms.

The essay examines in particular the change and continuity of civil-military relations through the fluctuating dynamics of the democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea, to reach the conclusion that 'despite three terms of civilian presidency, civilian supremacy has not yet fully institutionalized'.

### 3. COLLABORATIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The compilation of this work is the result of an intense, step-by-step work of selection and refinement of the papers presented at the international conference in Seoul. A first phase was entrusted to the chairpersons of the conference panels (listed below), to whom go my appreciation and thanks for the work carried out. Each one selected the papers presented in his or her panel for publication in the proceedings. The individual paper givers were invited to review their papers, which were then, after interaction with the chairpersons, sent to me, whereupon I was able to begin my editing work on texts already selected and checked.

It was this intermediation activity by the chairpersons that made it possible to get an early start on the editing of this book and bring it rapidly to completion.

The chairpersons are (in alphabetical order): Helena Carreiras, Sabine Collmer, Christopher Dandeker, Rialize Ferreira, Hanggi Heiner, Mahn-Geum Ohn, Lindy Heinecken, Doo-Seung Hong, Ljubića Jelusic, Na-Young Lee, Marina Nuciari, Bandana Purkayastha, Joseph Soeters, Tibor Szvircev Tresch and myself.

The dispatch with which the editor of the *Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development* series, Prof. Manas Chatterji, accepted our proposal and took the necessary steps with the publisher did the rest, enabling such prompt publication of this voluminous work.

My thanks must necessarily go to the Korean organizers of the conference, Seoul National University, the Korean Military Academy and especially the Korean Sociological Association, who proved to be an excellent operational team, and also very helpful in co-funding the attendance of colleagues from less developed countries as well as some younger scholars. Special thanks go to the Korean Military Academy for hosting one of the sessions on the Korean military in transition.

## NOTES

1. The article was published in *Armed Forces and Society* (see Caforio, 1988).

2. Research Committee 01 'Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution' is 1 of the 52 Research Committees of the International Sociological Association (ISA). It was founded in 1964 and was initially called 'Armed Forces and Society'. It was renamed in 1980 and at the same time its programme was extended due to the fact that the field of conflict research was included. The objectives of the Research Committee are briefly described in the following five points:

- a. stimulating research on armed forces and conflict resolution;
- b. establishing and maintaining international contacts between scientists and research institutions;
- c. encouraging the exchange and discussion of relevant research findings;
- d. supporting academic research and the study of military-related social sciences;
- e. planning and holding research conferences.

3. Membership in the Research Committee is open to all scientists active in research and/or teaching in military-related social sciences and conflict resolution.

4. There were 137 participants from 32 countries from all continents, with 68 coming from all over the world, 54 Korean participants and 15 guests. The majority of them presented papers, and some even contributed two papers. There were 88 papers presented, including 40 papers by authors who were not RC01 members. The conference enjoyed strong qualitative support from the 15 Korean experts from different universities, who contributed to the conference and helped the foreign participants to understand better the history and the current defence efforts of South Korea.

5. The conference Program Committee comprised of Gerhard Kümmel, Ljubića Jelusic, Bandana Purkayastha, Doo-Seung Hong and myself.

6. The contribution of Dimitrios Smokovitis is of an essentially historical nature and is important in this context because it reports the situation and the atmosphere of the bloody war, with broad international involvement, that was fought in the early 1950s in the country that hosted the conference.

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Giuseppe Caforio  
*Editors*



# CHARLES C. MOSKOS (1934–2008)

Laura Miller

It is fitting that this collection of essays on military sociology is dedicated to the memory of Charles Moskos – “Charlie” to all who knew him. He knew many of these contributors both personally and professionally and given the opportunity, he would have come to know all of them. Throughout his career, he sought to understand sociological trends in the U.S. military and in other armed forces around the world and to foster a continuous exchange of knowledge among military sociologists.

Charlie’s exploration of military life began as an Army draftee in the Army Combat Engineers (1956–1958), which included service in Germany. Even then, as a young enlisted man, he was thinking sociologically about his environment, penning “Has the Army killed Jim Crow?” in 1957 for the *Negro History Bulletin*. His concern with racial integration in the military informed some of his most important work. Nearly 40 years later, he continued to explore military lessons for civilian society in *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (Moskos & Butler, 1997). Throughout his career, Charlie grappled with issues of social integration in the military and American society at large, including the roles of women and openly gay and lesbian personnel as well. He sought to foster a rigorous debate in those fields, and in that spirit welcomed disagreement even with his own conclusions and policy recommendations.

Charlie Moskos’s scholarship was extraordinarily broad, and many of the threads of inquiry he followed have been picked up in essays in this volume. Diversity and social integration issues in the armed forces continue to



interest scholars, and comparative cases can be illuminating. His more than 200 scholarly publications cover a wide spectrum of topics. These include soldiers' combat motivation, the morale and welfare of enlisted personnel, peacekeeping operations, national service, conscientious objection, the draft vs. the all volunteer force, public opinion and the military, military relations with the media and nongovernmental organizations, civil–military relations, institutional vs. occupational military models of military service, and international military cooperation.

Some highlights from Charlie's publications illustrate the ties between his body of work and the academic agenda represented in this collection of essays.

*Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force* (Moskos, 1976) is a classic case study about forces in Cyprus on which other sociological peacekeeping studies stand. The themes he explored – peacekeepers' attitudes toward their international partners and the tensions of assigning soldiers to perform peace missions – continued into his research on peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, and are today reflected in the scholarship presented in this book. The role of the military in meeting new security challenges continues to be among the most important issues confronting scholars and policy makers.

In 1977, Charlie first published in *Armed Forces & Society* what would become his greatest legacy for the field of military sociology: the notion that the armed forces were moving from an institutional organizational model to an occupational one (a concept known today as the I/O thesis). An institutional military, he described, is highly divergent from society and is legitimated in terms of values and norms – service and self-sacrifice for a greater good. Remuneration is low relative to civilian occupations, is based primarily on rank and seniority, and much of it comes in the form of benefits rather than salary. Military life in that model is all-encompassing and generally segregated from the civilian world. Troops' primary identities are as members of that institution.

An occupational-type military more closely resembles a marketplace economy, where people are competitively recruited and paid salaries and bonuses based on skills and manpower needs. An occupational military contains a greater division of labor with increasing specialization of skills. Members may work much like civilians by logging in a particular number of hours at the job, but then leave the work environment and their colleagues to live and socialize off-site. Members identify less with the organization as a whole, and more with others in their occupation, to include people outside of the organization. Moskos warned of the potential hazards of militaries

moving too far toward the occupational model: if members are highly specialized, serve primarily out of self-interest, and can be easily lured away by civilian competitors, the organization will lose its ability to retain the high ethical standards and commitment to self-sacrifice necessary to carry out its war-fighting missions responsibly and effectively. The I/O thesis has shaped analyses of military trends around the world, particularly as armed forces move away from conscription to volunteer forces and as militaries became increasingly sophisticated technologically.

Charlie's methodological preferences can be seen throughout this volume as well, as he was never content to write books based solely on library research. Across his career, he traveled to visit troops throughout the United States and the world, conducting field observations and interviewing and surveying from the most junior to the most senior military personnel. Moskos traveled to U.S. military operations in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and – at age 69 years – Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq. Within this collection, readers will also find scholars who place the experiences of the common soldier at the forefront, and consider the sociological implications of their perspectives on military effectiveness and on the broader objectives of military operations.

Charlie also believed in the value of edited collections such as this. By extending concepts across different contexts, the strengths and weaknesses of those concepts are revealed, and their elaboration can become more refined. His co-edited volume, *The Military – More Than Just a Job?* (Moskos & Wood, 1988), examined his I/O thesis in greater depth within the U.S. military and as manifested through other nations' militaries. In a similar fashion, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 1999) proposed the emergence of postmodern trends in the 1990s and then brought together international scholars to examine those trends in their home countries and the effect they had on relations between their militaries and their societies.

Charles Moskos was the world's most influential military sociologist of his era. Military and political leaders and scholars recognized the applicability of his work outside of the U.S. context, and appreciated his orientation toward the policy implications of his research. Charlie gave invited lectures at institutions in Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and the Soviet Union. He was proud that his writings had been translated into so many

languages: Albanian, Bulgarian, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Slovenian, Spanish, Thai, and Turkish.

Charlie's travels were not just for research; he reached out to bring as many international social and behavioral scientists who study the military in contact with one another as possible. He was able to accomplish this primarily in his role as the Chair and President of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, an international, interdisciplinary association of scholars, and through his affiliation with the International Sociological Association's Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. Many of the contributors to this volume are long-standing members of one or both of these associations, and their scholarship reflects cumulative discussions with member colleagues at conferences and meetings. Charlie would take particular interest in the increasing inclusion of our colleagues who study Asian militaries, because reaching out beyond Europe and North America is a shared goal of this academic community.

The substantive, theoretical, and methodological approaches of these essays demonstrate that the research agenda of Charlie Moskos will live on through many sociologists in countries across the globe. We are indebted to him for his leadership and his scholarship in this field, and we will remember him as we carry it forward.

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# SOLDIERS AND SCHOLARS IN A WORLD OF GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE

John Allen Williams

## 1. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

I would like to make three main points in this chapter. First, although the world is shrinking in some ways, it is not becoming homogeneous. Second, the profession of arms and the life of the mind are not incompatible, and sometimes coexist in the same individual. Third, challenges, old and new, require the closest possible cooperation among all elements of societies that wish to remain humane and uphold the values of human dignity and personal freedom.

## 2. A WORLD OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND HETEROGENEITY

The world remains a tightly knit system in which changes in one area have ripple effects that are both widespread and not completely predictable, as the economic and energy sectors are demonstrating only too well. Increasing interdependence should not be confused with increasing homogeneity, however. We are a world of many differences, which multiculturalists

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**  
**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 5–10**  
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**ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A006**

properly celebrate. It makes the world a more interesting place, and people have every right to honor their traditions. But not all differences are benign. Just as the Great War of 1914–1918 marked the end of the hopeful assumptions about the progress of rationality and the inevitability of human progress, the terrorist attacks show that more recent visions of a liberal international order based on individual freedom, religious tolerance, and material progress are not universal. Those of us who share these views need to be prudent about how we defend them, but there can be no compromise on humane principles.

Contradictory trends are evident with respect to global interdependence. On the one hand, the costs of *virtual* connections are dropping rapidly. Consider the cost and difficulty of making a telephone call even 50 years ago compared to the instantaneous communications made possible by the Internet. This is not an unalloyed blessing, however, as the Internet facilitates the construction of virtual communities of individuals estranged from their own societies and changes the socialization process in ways that are not completely understood. These “virtual communities” are quite real to those who dwell in them. There is no belief so bizarre or scheme so deranged that those who share or support it cannot find one another in cyberspace, share their real or imagined grievances, and plan assaults on their neighbors.

On the other hand, the costs of *physical* connections grow markedly when energy costs increase. This is true for both people and material. Indeed, the price of my own airline ticket from Chicago rose \$200 during two days in which I was making final arrangements to come here. The exploding economies of Asia will be hurt to the extent that increased transportation costs affect prices in distant markets and change the calculation of business deciding where to locate their factories.

My countrymen are often accused of lacking a sense of history, which we do at our peril. As a professor at a great Jesuit university, I recall the words of the wise preacher Ecclesiastes, who noted the same thing long ago: “What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun. Is there anything of which one can say, ‘Look! This is something new’? It was here already, long ago ....”<sup>1</sup>

Yet after the Cold War, some very intelligent people spoke of the “end of history” and others indulged in a decade-long vacation from reality and missed a very dangerous mutation in the nature of the threat faced by civilized societies. A combination of ahistoricism, politics, and wishful thinking obscured our realization that changed circumstances do not mean a changed human nature. However much we may will it

otherwise, conflict can be ameliorated and re-channeled, but we will never see the end of it.

For Americans, the attacks of September 11, 2001 seemed like Pearl Harbor, although many fewer died on December 7, 1941 and they were generally in the military. In retrospect, we should not have been so surprised. Now, as then, we underestimated our opponents and failed to anticipate their attack despite a number of warnings. Since 9/11, I have not had to convince my students that a large number of skilled and determined people are trying to kill as many of us as they can. People differ on the degree to which we may have contributed to the animus felt against us or whether different policies may have prevented the attack, but it was a clarifying moment nevertheless. Other atrocities in London, Madrid, Mumbai, and other places followed shortly – and they have not ended.

### **3. SOLDIERS AND SCHOLARS IN THE NEW ERA**

The new international challenges are complex and soldiers at all levels need to think reflectively if they are to deal with an ambiguous and evolving environment. Soldiers and scholars alike need to focus on “wars among the people” in addition to the old notions of state-centric warfare. Wars of the future will not necessarily be against other nation states, but against transnational organizations that may or may not be acting at the behest of a state. Future battlefields will not be simply military or even political, but economic and electronic as well. No future opponent will give the enemy’s homeland a free pass and let the battle be decided elsewhere.

Perhaps the soldier and the scholar can coexist in some degree in the same individual. Charles Moskos wrote about the emergence of the “soldier-scholar” to deal with the more complicated international environment after the Cold War (Moskos, 2000). To many, this sounds like a contradiction in terms. The stereotype of the soldier is of a person committed to a life of action, with little appetite for intellectual reflection. That of a scholar is of a person committed to a life of contemplation, unsullied by practical considerations – let alone action to deal with them. To some extent, these stereotypes are based on reality. We have all known examples of each extreme, but soldier-scholars such as Sam Sarkesian, H.R. McMaster, and David Petraeus show that contemplation and action can coexist in the same individual quite well. Persons of action will be more effective if they are also reflective; persons of reflection can discover things worth acting upon.

Morris Janowitz noted the tendency for military intellectuals to be scorned. He said in *The Professional Soldier* that “Both the Army and the Navy point with pride to a past succession of military thinkers and theoreticians. More often than not, these men were recognized for their achievements long after the fact.” (Janowitz, 1960/1971). In these times, however, the ability to reflect and not simply act is a crucial intellectual component of an effective soldier, whether officer or enlisted.

The need for soldiers and scholars to speak to one another is evident in contemporary military operations. Despite vocal protests from some academicians who regard any cooperation with the military as immoral, social scientists are embedded with military units in Iraq and Afghanistan in “Human Terrain Teams” to help the military understand the nature of conflict they are fighting. The military cannot tolerate the anti-intellectual culture suggested by its stereotype, and the lives of action and of contemplation must become more interdependent in the new era.

Unfortunately, many barriers to communication remain between the worlds of scholarship and the military. Problems of miscommunication and suspicion abound on both sides. It is difficult for some – especially in academia – to separate their feelings about wars in general or particular wars from their feelings about the military as an institution or about individuals serving in it. Fortunately, there has not been a recurrence of the contempt felt for soldiers returning to the United States after their service in Vietnam, but the possibility remains. For soldiers, there can be lingering resentments for being both misunderstood and inadequately appreciated by a society whose level of sacrifice has been very low so far.

#### **4. A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY**

September 11 provided a clear demonstration of the vulnerability of citizens of even the world’s most militarily and economically powerful state. Although often viewed as a global military hegemon, the United States was unable to protect its citizens from attack. The early U.S. response was military in character, and two governments were toppled in short order. Despite these early successes, continuing problems in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the limitations of a purely military response and the difficulty of reconstructing orderly societies in the wake of war.

In the short run, all elements of a nation must be engaged to confront current dangers. Recent history has shown that we should understand a conflict before fighting it, and the military cannot do this alone. On closer reflection, we may decide that a military response should not be the primary one. The military is a blunt instrument and should not be wielded carelessly. At the same time, military force will often be necessary, even if only as a backdrop to diplomacy.

In the long run, societies are ill-served by separation between militaries and the societies they protect. In the absence of large-scale conscription, there are fewer connections between military and society at all levels. Charles Moskos noted that “we must confront openly the question of how to revive citizenship in a technological and bureaucratic society” and wrote about the value of national service to achieve that goal (Moskos, 1988).

The worldwide movement away from conscription emphasizes economic motivations for service and lets societal elites avoid any personal connection with the military. In the United States, the involvement of the military reserve forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has increased civil–military linkages, but other useful institutions such as college Reserve Officer Training Corps programs continue to come under attack by those who view them as an inadmissible intrusion of the military upon the groves of academe.

One hopeful sign in the United States is an expansion of Defense Department-supported research to include social science and humanities work not directly related to weapon systems. As important, Defense Secretary Robert Gates – himself a former university president – expressed his support for traditional academic notions of openness and academic freedom.

Although the issues raised at this conference will not all be resolved, James Burk put forth some important considerations: this is a world of both interdependence and differences, some of which pose security challenges. We need to combine the talents of our best scholars (to understand the problems) and soldiers (to deal with them). The separation of the life of reflection and the life of action is a luxury that cannot continue. This relationship needs to be strengthened, and can sometimes coexist in individuals we have termed soldier-scholars. Only in this way can we protect societies dedicated to those humane principles that make them worthy of defense.

## 5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

One of my earliest childhood memories is sitting on the floor in my living room listening to radio reports of a horrible war in a far-away place called



Korea. I never dreamed that I would one day have the opportunity to visit a prosperous and democratic South Korea or that five and a half decades later the war would not be officially ended.

I frequently visit the Mall in Washington, DC. It is a hallowed ground for Americans, filled with museums and memorials to the fallen in the wars of my country. From the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, one can see the Washington Monument and the U.S. Capitol building. Less visible are memorials to those who fought in World War II, Vietnam, and Korea. Some 33,000 Americans died here, along with soldiers from many other countries represented here this morning – and, of course, untold numbers of Koreans from both sides of the 38th parallel.

A soldier-scholar known to many of us spent some time in 1952 and 1953 on an island off the west coast of Korea as a member of a U.S. Army Special Forces Group. He told me I needed to visit the Korean War Veterans Memorial, where I found a bouquet of flowers from the Embassy of South Korea. The most striking feature of that memorial for me is the 19 statues of ghostly soldiers walking through a field. Perhaps they represent the fallen.

I sometimes think of those soldiers as still on watch, but soldiers cannot be alone on the barricades. War in all its dimensions – its avoidance, initiation, conduct, and termination – cannot be the concern only of the military. It is the business of entire societies – civilian and military, soldiers and scholars, and soldier-scholars.

## NOTE

1. Ecclesiastes 1: 9-10, *Revised standard version*.

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# THE GLOCALIZATION OF BEREAVEMENT: BEREAVED FAMILIES, ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND THE HIERARCHY OF ISRAELI CASUALTIES

Udi Lebel

## ABSTRACT

*The paper examines two discourses of bereavement that crystallized simultaneously in Israel as the third millennium began. One is “the economic discourse of bereavement,” with which official organizations dealing with bereavement sought to “free themselves” from the state’s directives on entitlement to compensation. Army widows argued that compensation should not depend on their refraining from remarriage, while bereaved parents demanded it would not be contingent on a means test. They urge for liberation from “role demands” and for presenting entitlement to compensation as entitlement to personal rehabilitation, without using it to support pro-establishment behavior or unending interactions with establishment supervision. Those claims express the linkage of bereavement to globalization and individuation, and the desire to rebel against the republican equation conditioning entitlement to welfare on “proper” establishment-compliant behavior. A second discourse*

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**

**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 11–40**

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**ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A007**

*is the “hierarchy of bereavement discourse” – which was placed on the agenda together with the first one, and by the same organizations. Unlike the economic discourse, this one acted to replicate the monopoly held by families of IDF dead in the Israeli pantheon, with attempts to bring into it a group of families of civilian bereavement (families of terror victims). The discourse relies on purely republican underpinnings, complying with the spirit of the local–national period. Exploring the two discourses, that were promoted simultaneously by the same agents, assists an analysis of the Israeli discourse of bereavement that results in its definition as “glocal.” This transpires from a review of the literature showing that – even in the face of globalization processes – national–local foundations remained stable. The paper first engages with the concept of glocalization, the ethos of republican citizenship, and, as a facet of it, the identification of social policy as an agent of the social hierarchy, as well as changes in citizenship during globalization. The second section reviews the status of bereaved families, and the central discourses they have promoted in Israeli society. The third and major part contains an analysis of both discourses – the economic discourse of bereavement, and the hierarchy of bereavement discourse. Finally, we attempt to analyze and explain how apparently antithetical discourses took shape in tandem, drawing on the term “glocalism” and the impact of citizenship models.*

## **1. GLOCALIZATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL HIERARCHY**

“Glocalization” is a concept indicating the cultural merging of components of a national ethos with extra-national cultural components that have infiltrated the national space. It is a blending of cultures: the understanding that a zero-sum game does not occur between globalization and localization, and that a shared model of culture model is taking shape – known as “glocalization” (Shimshoni, 2006, p. 217). That culture maintains cross-fertilization between global and local, and has a range of types (Raz, 1999, p. 3). For example, it has been found that glocalization allows national goals to be promoted by ethno-national groups, via global practices (international communications, raising capital internationally, and others) (Kalekin-Fishman, 2006, p. 520). On occasion, it also enables nationalist values to merge with postmodern strategies of anti-establishment protest

(Kacowitz, 1999, p. 527). One of the fascinating issues that can be explored in studies of the glocalization culture is the status of core social-national values that acted as organizing values during the local, nation-building era. Under dominant national institutions, an ethos and public zeitgeist were molded. Inglehart (1991) notes that not only can concrete cultural agents promote the discourse in the public space, but alternative institutions can also gain a dominant position during shifts in the culture: this molds an alternative ethos (Helman & Pettersson, 1995, p. 297). Inglehart's most significant finding in that context, after examining 65 multinational companies that were exposed to processes of globalization and changing values, was that – despite the penetration of “new” postnational values into those conservative companies – their founding core values remained stable (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, pp. 19–51). This provides added evidence that it is not a question of replacement, and that the local and the global merge.

Inglehart's findings, chiefly based on consumerism and economic studies, match finding elicited by glocalization research on the perception of citizenship. In the face of globalization processes that arrived in the nation-state, that perception also remained grounded on a strong local core (Blank, 2003, pp. 83–111; Resnik, 2007, pp. 155–181). Exposure to globalization failed to shatter the foundations of national values. While the foundations became more polemical, displaying competing narratives and heterogeneous interpretations, their basic values remained the organizing, founding ones (Blank, 2006, pp. 263–281).

### *1.1. Republican Citizenship in the Glocalization Era*

Burke (1995, pp. 503–529) maintains that citizenship is an indication of an individual's place in society, the public discourse, and the political community. In the local era – whose zenith was the nation-building era – citizenship was grounded on participation in the military effort. Those serving in the army therefore received a preferred status, in recognition of their sacrifice for society (Tilly, 1997). Levy (1998, pp. 873–904) describes this as the implementing of the republican convertibility principle: conditioning and restricting entitlement to state-provided resources to individuals whose behavior reflects the ethos that the state views and signifies as desirable (Levy, 2003, pp. 71–96). It is a principle granting greater entitlement to resources for those social groups where participation in army service is higher (Levy, *ibid.*).

Participating in the military effort also became a mechanism for social mobility (Tilly, *ibid.*). Groups that produced the most combat soldiers converted soldiering into citizenship. They received greater legitimacy for assuming high-level positions in the political sphere, became prominent in the social discourse, and were rewarded with improved financial conditions and benefits in civilian life, as well as a higher ranking in the social hierarchy (Shafir & Peled, 2002). In other words, military service provided a trajectory toward effective political participation, and a way into the public discourse (Oldfield, 1990, pp. 1–11). “Civic virtue” is a republican virtue that allows citizens to enter the central discourse – as long as they promote general goals and set aside their private goals: they obtain a legitimate public position because of their military–societal service (Shafir & Peled, p. 16).

### *1.2. Citizenship and Globalization: An abandoning of the Republican Ethos?*

Significant evidence of the globalization process in Israel is the emergence of a civil society, after decades in which it did not exist in the national Israeli space (Ben-Eliezer, 1998b, pp. 370–396). For the first time, civil organizations began around a basis of identity, religion, ethnicity, gender, years lived in Israel, professional sector, or place of residence. Sectoral demands, that were described as “postnational,” were raised, from a perception of a global process that contradicted the local one (Warren, 2006, pp. 14–38). Groups that did not establish the legitimacy of their claims through their members’ national or military service started promoting private interests in the framework of what is termed “the politics of deprivation” (Savitch, 1975, pp. 5–36) and “victimology” (Cromer, 2005, pp. 235–245). Meanwhile, in wider society, fragmentation and individuation processes got underway; they consisted of “private discourses” where the individual, not society, was at the center (Rosolio, 2006, pp. 425–430). They contained non-profits and NGOs, private interest groups with no aspirations to shape the “common good,” but instead generate profits for their members and unravel the republican equation. It is not contingent on their contribution to society or the nation (Yishay, 1996, pp. 137–159), and the groups express objections to that contribution being a parameter for testing their entitlement to state support (Yishay, 1998).

Gusfield (1966, pp. 1–12) distinguishes between “class politics” and “status politics.” Groups active in class politics, he maintains, are accepted actors in “everyday politics,” where there are continuing efforts to empower

“private interests.” It is the politics of groups promoting material, financial, real-estate, or industrial interests. The public image of that politics is what Dalton and Weldon (2005, pp. 931–951) call “a necessary evil” – politics working to achieve the private interest, and to enforce it on the whole. It exploits manipulative skills, and misuses capital and the capital–government relationship in creating the status of groups and their accessibility to the political establishment and its elite. In tandem, it conserves social inequality through opportunistic considerations, and gains achievements though much of the public opposes it (Hirschman, Schumpeter, & Frank, 2002, pp. 46–61).

Status politics, in contrast, is what upholds symbolic discourse within public discourse. It is a discourse of values, objectives, and vision, but not a politics of the everyday, and it neither targets obtaining concrete profits in the short term, nor requires political coalitions. Instead, it engages in molding the discourse and in competing in imparting society with a value-based identity, whether that identity is secular, religious, collective or individualist, and peace-seeking or war-seeking. The harvest of that politics is garnered over the years. Its goals are long term. It has links with the sphere of education, art, culture, and literature (Gusfield, *ibid.*, pp. 13–23). Both its proponents and its opponents are viewed as intellectuals and visionaries, displaying sincerity and altruism. Accordingly, its actors gain excessive public esteem, since they are not involved in promoting their “own good” but the “public good,” to which they devote their lives and efforts (Clohesy, 2000, pp. 237–253). Because of this, the social legitimacy that their endeavors evoke tends to be higher (Sánchez, 2000, pp. 363–375). This is even more so when their objectives match what is signified in the republican culture as state goals, or when they match the values of that society’s dominant institutions (Hofstede, 2003, pp. 1–15). Whatever the case, they are signified as people working to shape what Rousseau termed “the general will” (Dent, 1988). Heading the social hierarchy in the localist era at national-building times were groups that believed in status politics, promoted collective values, and had the approval of the political and military establishments. Pizzorno (1987, pp. 27–63) held that absolutist politics prevailed in the first years of the nation-state, dictating the rules of behavior in all areas of social endeavors, and determining society’s traditional criteria. These, the author notes, launched ventures of military sacrifice and combat that “sanctify” the groups identified with them. And as Foucault (1975) maintained, most of all, the public gives credit not to members of the establishment, but to the “volunteers-entrepreneurs,” located “deep down” in the popular culture, who willingly, with no need for

enforcement police, chose with absolute loyalty criteria promoting general value in the public's name. Those "willing patriots" are public allies, signified as normative guides intended to set an example for all citizens. They possess "symbolic capital" not as a result of accumulated assets or political ploys, but because they match the central ideas signified in the national-republic ethos: ideas whose believers operate in the discourse of rights and equate the personal good with the general-national good (Gauthier, 2006).

At every period of shift, those responsible for the symbolic discourse and for status politics have different values – approved by the dominant institutions – but apparently they are always perceived as more moral actors who enjoy broad empathy in the public discourse. Studies by Kimmerling, Sears, and Wolpert elicit that, at any given period, both social collective ones and liberal-individualist social ones, the public distinguishes between interest groups working to promote a unique-private interest and those working to promote a "general" objective. The former are signified as vexatious interested parties, while the latter tend to obtain higher moral status, legitimacy, and broad social esteem (Kimmerling, 1995, p. 85; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Harris, 1980, pp. 670–684; Wolpert & Gimpel, 1988, pp. 241–262). Nevertheless, in the globalization era, as social fragmentation occurs, there are likely to be more and more social initiatives that dispense with the symbolic status discourse and focus on advancing the private interest, illustrating that discourse of that kind is becoming rarer (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, pp. 22–29).

## 2. BEREAVED FAMILIES IN ISRAEL

### *2.1. Families of Soldiers and War Casualties – Loyal to the Social Episteme*

In Israeli society, bereaved families – more so than families of combat soldiers – are identified as meriting public gratitude, since the fine education the families gave their sons was reflected in their definitively patriotic willingness to sacrifice themselves for national goals. Classed as "the family of bereavement," those families have become a political category (Soysal, 1997, pp. 509–527). Aspects of that category include affinities and ties encouraging the families to sense they have a common identity, and that they are entitled to obtain social power via over-proximity to decision-makers, to influence government, and to be liberally rewarded (Giddens, 1987, p. 201). The higher status of these categories in a "citizenship regime"

(Helman, 2001, pp. 295–318) was enabled, among others, by a policy where special benefits signified their higher rank in the stratified hierarchy (Rosenhek, 2007, p. 321). They were also signified as assuming the role of cultural agents, expected to teach the public about the inherent importance for the nation of military service, and to contribute to the legitimizing of security policy (Lebel & Ronel, 2005, pp. 383–405). As a result, they became “opinion-leaders” (Katz, 1995, pp. 93–108), because the discourse they promoted matched the republican–societal episteme (Foucault, 1991, pp. 85–103).

## *2.2. The Research Objective: Examining the Israeli Discourse of Bereavement – Between Localism and Globalization*

At the end of the last millennium, Israeli society was described as one whose identities had replaced the “discourse of duties” with a “discourse of rights” (Saguy, 2001, pp. 37–54). More and more individuals and social categories now adopted the perspective that Sandel (1984, pp. 81–96) defined as the “unencumbered self,” and Israel’s founding elite among them (Shafir & Peled, 2002). In the context of the army–society relationship, a notable example is the declining figures of conscription among young people from kibbutzim and the middle-class-secular-Ashkenazic group. Since the early 1990s, there has been a continuing decline in motivation to serve in the IDF (the Israeli army) (Peri, 2001, pp. 107–136). Groups that had historically acquired their social–civic status following their substantial contribution to the military effort had now stopped making that contribution (Levy, 2006, pp. 309–324). Israel’s long-standing elite was perceived as individualist, no longer focusing its efforts on contributing to society or to the nation as a whole. This had ramifications for its public image and perception as a “declining elite,” undeserving of its high social status (Nitzan & Bichler, 1997).

That situation also left traces on questions relating to the Israeli discourse of bereavement. For years, Israel’s bereaved families had acted as those responsible for imparting general values, shapers of the public-symbolic discourse who could promote collective values and influence the “general good.” As the twenty-first century began, they started organizing as a private interest group focused on particularist–personal interests. Among them were economic benefits unconnected to “the social good.” In tandem, families whose loved ones had been killed as civilians in terror attacks, not as IDF soldiers, launched a struggle to enter the national pantheon.



Using those two struggles, this paper explores whether changes in the bereavement discourse – that occurred at a time of culture shift when Israeli society became individualist and liberal, together with the decline in its militarist republican ethos – do indeed express the abandonment of the core collectivist-republican values. Or was it rather a “glocal” phenomenon demonstrating a change in the discourse alongside the conservation of the organizing values; in other words, did the transformation of bereaved families into private interest groups express willingness to give up the preferred status they acquired after their sons fell in war?

We attempt to answer those questions by examining the public discourse of bereaved parents as it unfolded on “front-stage” (Goffmann, 1959). Habermas describes the public discourse as an encounter between private individuals possessing social status, who are able to confront or side with the establishment, and who mold the public debate on everyday matters. They are capable of shaping “the consensus” regarding the establishment – a discourse that the government itself does much to shape, since it is what decides the legitimacy of the government’s leaders (Meehan, 2000, pp. 39–52; Lebel & Ronel, 2005, pp. 383–405).

It is noteworthy that, at the periods when the analyzed discourses rose to the surface, Israeli society faced existential challenges in security-military terms, which for a short time reinstalled the army at the center of the public discourse, allied with the tendency to support it. It occurred in 2000, when Israeli society underwent the Al-Aqsa intifada (Arian, 2002), and in 2006 when Israel fought the Second Lebanon War (Ben-Meir, 2007, pp. 84–100). The very existence of an economic-interest-based discourse of bereavement at those periods only intensified the decline of the collective-republican ethos of the bereavement discourse in particular, and of the social discourse in general, and challenged its significance across society.

### *2.3. The Israeli Bereavement Discourse: Symbolic Politics to Advance Collective Goals*

In Israel, 22,500 soldiers have fallen in the IDF, and the number of living bereaved parents is 12,500 (Knesset Archives, 2007). The number of IDF widows is 3,800 (*ibid.*). Both groups have a prominent public place in the media, acting as mediators who interpret and offer their opinions on ongoing security issues. Legitimizers of political perspectives or military initiatives, they hold a “golden share” awarding them proximity to Israel’s “kitchen cabinets” where political decisions are made (Lebel & Ronel, *ibid.*).

With their status, which no one disputes, the families held because of this fact that they were responsible for what Gusfield (1966) called “status politics.”

From the outset, the Israeli bereavement discourse was charged with hegemonic representations, as defined by Moscovici (1988, pp. 2–69). Bereaved families internalized the fact that they were public figures who had to comply with specific “role demands,” and that the military cemeteries were not sites for private communion, but arenas of public remembrance – the panopticon of Foucault (1980, pp. 147–165) – where “appropriate” behavior is required of them. This is following the design and influence of the dominant institution at that time – the Israeli army – which was structured in the public arena as not only responsible for implementing security policy, but also the pivotal shaper of perceptions of citizenship and the political culture (Ben-Eliezer, 1998a, 1998b).

In the framework of the “hegemonic bereavement discourse,” bereaved families always complied with the motif of “*the justice of the judgment*”: *the acknowledgement that the sacrifice had been necessary*. They spread the message that their son’s death in war was normative and unavoidable, a message widely reflected in Israeli literature of the period (Shaked, 1982, p. 197); they were loyal to the claim of the prime minister who informed them that their role was to “preserve that spirit (of their sons).” As well as mourning for their lost children, they would have to strongly believe in the justness of their sons’ chosen path, and be grateful for the noble role of their sons who made such a significant contribution to the motherland: “These people, the fate they have been awarded, may they bear it not only in pain and mourning [...] but also in awareness to the need for the sacrifice and appreciation for the great mission that their sacrifice casts on us all” (Sharett, 1954).

Those who opted for public activity did so in organizational frameworks that the establishment approved of, focusing on shaping the climate in terms of education, values, and society, as well as inculcating values and signifying them as social goals that society should adopt. Bereaved parents who worked “front-stage” took part in public endeavors in settlement and education, and called on the general public to join them. In particular, they were involved in the sphere of public memory, where they promoted many commemoration initiatives aimed at imparting a national-patriotic awareness, and in volunteering – where they became involved in supporting the well-being of serving and demobilized soldiers, and other bereaved families. Many of them became public figures who were frequently interviewed in the media, appeared in schools, wrote books that were published by state

publishing houses, and were also present at political platforms, state ceremonies, and public events – where they called on the next generation to follow in their son’s footsteps. Rivka Gruber, a mother who lost two sons in war, for example, became a speaker for bereaved families; her books and articles justified their death, and those of others (Lebel, 2007).

Three major enterprises are associated with the hegemonic bereavement discourse. The first is the establishing of Yad Labanim – an NGO set up as a voluntary organization of bereaved parents (1949). It was an interest group intended to mediate between bereaved parents and the establishment, to advance claims of the families for economic assistance, and to broaden the state’s activities for memorializing their sons. Governance, which benefits from an organization being created in civil society that does not act against the establishment, but works to boost the values it desires, recognized the organization as the official institution of bereaved parents. It had an acknowledged public status in matters pertaining to Israel’s commemoration and memory policy. It was decided that its operation would be mostly financed by the state, and that its heads would be involved – as representatives of the “family of bereavement” – in drawing up the benefits policy for families of the fallen. In terms of the public, then, its leaders were representatives of the bereaved parents and they had a moral-public position as the people who expressed the innermost thoughts of bereaved families (Ostfeld, 2000, pp. 217–219). Another venture was the founding of the “Public Council for the Memorialization of Soldiers” – an official council established by the Ministry of Defense (1951). Its role was “to advise and instruct the Ministry of Defense (MOD) about the ways and means appropriate for commemorating the memory of those who fell in IDF service” (*ibid.*, p. 220). Similar to the entities at the MOD responsible for intelligence, purchasing, strategy, and so on, this council was responsible in the state’s name for all commemoration policy; stipulating a national remembrance day and deciding on its nature, programs, and ceremonies; building and managing military cemeteries; literary and cultural commemoration activity that the MOD offered throughout the country – aimed at commemorating the dead and imparting their heritage; and holding memorial ceremonies in schools. Under the law, members of the council are members of bereaved families, funded by the Minister of Defense. It is not an interest group or an NGO, but a formal department at the MOD. Thus, the state granted bereaved parents the status and official task as shapers of Israel’s commemoration policy (*ibid.*, pp. 219–246).

A third initiative was the Memorial Day for Commemorating Fallen IDF Soldiers. It was declared after the first social struggle by bereaved parents in

Israel. In the state's first years, the day was marked voluntarily, by bereaved parents for the most part. It did not enter the Israeli calendar as a state day. At the state's offices and institutions, work proceeded as usual. Schools and other educational establishments that marked the day did so voluntarily. Bereaved parents who were members in Yad Labanim demanded that cultural institutions, cafés, restaurants, and theaters would be closed by law on that day and that state institutions would cease work and enable their employees to attend ceremonies. Their struggle only succeeded in 1963, when Memorial Day was stipulated as a state day of remembrance on which public ceremonies and state memorial services would be held in the presence of the prime minister, ministers, and the president. The parents' struggle for the "Memorial Day Law" was seen by the general public as a fight based on values, complying with the "spirit of the times" – seeking not only to remember their sons on a special day, but also to unite society as a whole around the memory of the fallen (*ibid.*, pp. 236–240).

Bereaved parents, not only their fallen sons, became a "symbolic type," viewed as entrusted with promoting national values, collective interests, and social ideals. Legitimization for that status derived from their having made the ultimate sacrifice for society. It signified them as altruists with social commitment, possessing epistemic authority in everything relating to molding Israeli society's character, in the same spirit of crystallizing ritual that began after WWI (Grathoff, 1970; Hendekman, 1991, pp. 205–225; Mosse, 1988). The way that society viewed them is expressed in the head of Manpower Division's proposal (1949) that the state reward bereaved parents' heroism by granting a *Bereaved Parents Medal* to families whose sons had died in the War of Independence (1947–1949), and future fatalities. A bronze medal would be awarded to families that had lost one son; for two sons – a silver award; and for families where three sons were killed – a gold medal. A certificate of consolation from the president, signed by the defense minister, would also be given to each family. The idea of the medals was rejected, but the diplomas are still sent to every family joining Israel's "family of bereavement" (IDF Archives, 1949).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the public discourse of bereavement changed and became a political discourse. Bereaved families began protesting against the establishment for flawed policies that had resulted in their sons' death (Lebel, 2006, pp. 439–461). This was a period when political parties became the dominant institutions in Israel. After years of single-party rule, Israel made the transition to multiparty rule; the immune status of the Israeli government crumbled, and social movements burst into the public space – sweeping the masses into political activity and organized protest.

The latter became part of the crystallizing political culture (Wolfsfeld, 1988). At that time, Israel was known as a “nation of parties” (Goldberg, 1992, p. 12), as a country “held captive by politicians” (Shapira, 1996), a society where most spheres of life – including the army – had undergone a politicization process. The outcome was that an assortment of protest movements and social movement started participating in the discourse over shaping Israel’s security policy (Helman, 1999, pp. 292–213).

The “political bereavement” model took shape as a result of all these events. Bereaved families headed the protest movements that consolidated after the Yom Kippur War (1973), with the intention of replacing the government, marked as guilty for the results of the failed war. This occurred again after the First Lebanon War (1981), when bereaved families raised the torch of protest against the government of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, achieving unprecedented public and media prominence. A significant achievement was made during the 1990s with the efforts of the “Four Mothers” movement, which was then working for the IDF’s evacuation from the security zone in Southern Lebanon. Headed by the mothers of soldiers and fallen soldiers, the Four Mothers movement projected the message that the significance attached to the death of their sons would be the fact that they were the last fatalities in Lebanon. And in fact after effective protest endeavors and “friendly” media coverage, it led the Israeli government to pull back its troops to the international demarcation line (2000) (Lemish & Barzel, 2000, pp. 147–169). In tandem, intensive activity by bereaved families whose sons had been killed in training accidents and flawed operations entered the public arena; their efforts focused on attempts to force the army to dismiss flawed commanders and to launch reforms in organizational management and culture (Doron & Lebel, 2004, pp. 201–220).

As far as attitudes to the bereaved parents were concerned, the public perceived that discourse – which began in the 1980s and 1990s, in which the politicization of bereavement and its linkage to promoting anti-establishment struggles began – as continuing the hegemonic bereavement model. They were not thought to be battling for private interests, interested in projecting discourse in which they promoted a cross-society nature, whether it concerned the worries about the army which should take better care of its soldiers’ lives, or about a responsible security policy that does not “sacrifice” its soldiers pointlessly. It was a symbolic discourse that highlighted national values and objectives – which justified the preferential status of the bereaved parents in the media agenda, and gave legitimacy to their social and media prominence.

And then, with the new millennium, a new discourse began, one that was promoted and adopted by bereaved families. It does not work for the general good of society, but – unprecedentedly – it promoted the private interests and objectives of a group of bereaved parents and widows. That was an era when the republican and collectivist ethos weakened in Israeli society, with a concomitant rise in a “discourse of rights” at the expense of a discourse of “obligations” (Meydani, 2007, pp. 277–299; Shalev, 2000, pp. 129–160). Several processes were getting underway then – privatization processes (Harris, Katz, Doron, & Woodlief, 1997, pp. 363–372), globalization (Ram, 2007), and multicultural politics flourished (Al-Haj, 2004, pp. 681–696), the victimological aspect intensified (Cromer, 2005, pp. 235–245), and the national ethos seemed to become postnational (Epstein, 2004, pp. 83–98). It was a period that also left its traces in the arena of Israeli bereavement and for the first time, the public became aware of what is called here the “economic discourse of bereavement.”

#### *2.4. The Economic Discourse of Bereavement: Bereaved Parents as a Private Interested Group*

For the first time, members of Israel’s family of bereavement were operating as an interest group with no aspirations of acting for the “general good,” but solely to improve the financial conditions they believed they were personally entitled to receive from the state. That discourse stressed the state’s commitment to bereaved parents, not its commitment to them in terms of values. Bereaved parents and widows now sought monetary compensation for their loss. In the hegemonic bereavement discourse, loss had been presented in the framework of an ideological discourse, as a normative sacrifice deriving from values and patriotism. But now it was presented in the framework of a “privatization discourse” and it therefore came with a price tag. It was reflected in demands by IDF widows and bereaved parents to change the benefits policy, which ensured the monetary compensation they merited from the government. Those benefiting from it were kept under the watchful eyes of the Defense Ministry, in a relationship of bureaucratic dependence. It was enabled by procedures and practices of monetary allocations, described below. This, many bereaved parents and widows believed, was what contributed to their being kept as conservers of the bereavement and sacrifice ethos. The economic discourse of bereavement undermined and rebelled against those republican conditions.

### 2.5. Bereaved Parents

The numerous laws that arrange the state's undertaking to provide economic support to the parents of fallen soldiers were designed as part of the personal social benefits policy, that looks at each family individually (and compensates it according to its economic needs), but not as part of a uniform, universal policy. This is known to contribute to the depoliticization of policy, and results in lowered social power for those helped by it (Fraser, 1993). Under the original legislation (1950), every bereaved family was entitled to compensation according to its income level, and families with the lowest incomes received more than those with the highest ones (Knesset Archives, 1950). This required families to be in constant contact with the Rehabilitation Division at the Defense Ministry, which has to constantly apply a "means test" to the bereaved parents. Its results had implications for the amount of compensation they would receive. Such constant, consecutive ties with a public institution have been shown, in a survey of cultural institutions, to create dependence that is not only functional, but also has an aspect of political socialization (March & Olsen, 2005, pp. 247–264; Rothstein & Stolle, 2002). Or, as bereaved parents describe it: "Because of the (security) institution, to which we had to report, on which we depended, we had to be in frequent and consecutive contact with so it would consent to give us the money we claimed, that it would recognize our various, changing requests – we depend on it and this of course causes some of us who would like to say something against it, or even protest its policy – to think twice" (Interview, 2007a, 2007b).

The decision that support of the fallen soldier's family depends on its economic status was made by David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister and defense minister. He objected when his advisors suggested paying all the bereaved families, and proposed to compensate only those where the fallen soldier was the family breadwinner: "I disagree with the idea that everyone must be paid. There are some young men whose families did not benefit from them ... and we must pay if there was some dependence" (Ben-Gurion, 1947). Over the years, compensation was subordinated to family and social criteria, with the emphasis that "proof is needed of the economic situation of the claimant [the parent] to receive this right" (Danziger, 1978, pp. 19–20). Since then, various tests have been implemented to examine entitlement. As early as the *shivah* (seven-day mourning period), bereaved parents are asked to fill out forms by the Defense Ministry representatives, intended to reflect their economic situation (the form's name is "Declaration of Income"), and it must be filled out, with a

declaration of one's income, assets, and so forth, yearly (Laron, *ibid.*, p. 32). The means test was institutionalized in the 1970s, and it was decided that each family would be compensated by the maximum pension (Amendment 11 to the Law) for those who were fully entitled and had no income – “minimum pension” to those with high incomes. It was a differential compensation that was not universally uniform (Gal, 1999, p. 15).

### *2.6. The Demand for Change: Bereaved Parents and The Rehabilitation Policy*

Since the early 1990s, bereaved families have demanded the cancellation of the means test and its replacement by uniform compensation – an amount equivalent to the average Israeli salary, to be granted to every bereaved family regardless of its socioeconomic situation. A transition of this kind – away from dependence on the security system which “grants a pension” and toward lawful entitlement to receive an income from it – is a change entailing not only budgets, but also a change in the definition of authorities of the Rehabilitation Division and its relationship with families. It requires reduced interaction with the division and less dependence on it (Laron, *ibid.*, pp. 31–34). A bereaved parent commented that the means test implies a “symbiotic relationship for the rest of your life with the Rehabilitation Division” (Laron, *ibid.*, p. 43). Under headings such as “Bereaved parents go to war for the pension” (Haaretz, 2000), the bereaved parents went into action and led the way for several draft bills to annul the means test (Knesset Proceedings, 2000a, 2000b).

In a public battle with an unprecedentedly broad scope, bereaved parents demanded an end to their eternal dependence on the Defense Ministry. Their claim was presented as the desire for “freedom” from the constraints such dependence placed on them. As a bereaved parent said: “They stop us going to the Knesset to demonstrations, prevent us from a sit-down in front of the Prime Minister’s office, they restrain us” (Meridor Commission, 2000). They explained that the justification for the economic battle focused on their personal well-being – a justification from the school of the hegemonic discourse of bereavement, which explained to the public the state’s commitment to the bereaved families. It was shown to be an empty myth, creating public dissonance. Exposing facts that contradict accepted beliefs and conceptions is a strategy likely to lead to subversive public behavior and public empathy toward those revealed as weak and disadvantaged (Eliade, 1965). The chairperson of the Yad Labanim organization



said: “The whole country is convinced that the bereaved families are excellently cared for by the state ... because what could be more natural than the state’s gratitude, appreciation and respect for a family whose son fell under its flag and on its mission?” (Ben-Shem, 2000a, 2000b).

The parents’ discourse (focused on private well-being) is imbued with and justified by the republican discourse. It is reflected, for example, in the words of a bereaved father who pondered: “When they conscript our sons, no one asks how much their parents earn. So after their death, they should not ask how much their parents earn” (Knesset Archives, 2007). Another father remarked: “We’re not complaining about the fact that our sons were killed. Absolutely not. Our sons fell for the sake of the country and for its security. But we are shouting ‘enough!’ We are shouting because instead of considering us the nation’s benefactors, assets to the national heritage and culture, we are relegated to the status of income support and welfare approach” (Laron, *ibid.*, p. 83). Parents began holding demonstrations across from the Knesset, and in 2002 a group started trying to persuade high-school students not to serve in the IDF because of the state’s refusal to cancel the means test. The chief-of-staff, Moshe Ya’alon, met with the parents and asked them not to send the letter, undertaking to try and help their claims (Haaretz, 2002). Later, the parents also petitioned the Supreme Court to enforce their demands on the state (Y-net, 2002a, 2002b).

Following the parent’s protests, the defense minister decided to set up a public commission of inquiry, and it recommended the revoking of the “means test” (Knesset Archives, 2007), a decision that was approved by the government and the Knesset. The prime minister declared that “from now on families of the fallen in the wars of Israel ... will receive equal compensation, reflecting the state’s attitude to the fact that the unbearably heavy price they paid – cannot be a function of economic situation. This is appropriate and this is what will be” (Haaretz, 2007).

The parents’ fight was not perceived as a given among many who wrote to the activist parents to withdraw their monetary claims that “damage the sons’ memories” (Interview, 2007a, 2007b). Others complained about the unfairness of the hysterical aspect of the “transaction” which originally had the qualities of republic convertibility, and pointed out to the parents that highlighting their rights while abandoning their duties has an adverse impacts on the social ethos that they themselves were bound by, and values to which they were committed. For example, an Israeli columnist described the bereaved parents’ campaign thus: “A few months ago, [bereaved parents] convened to demand that the state pay them a monthly salary equivalent to the average Israeli salary (around NIS 6000).

Journalists helped them with supportive articles, but it never crossed their mind that in doing so they are damaging the memory of the fallen, reducing their children to the level of mercenaries, and harming the honor of their memories as warriors who fell while serving the nation and the people ... the absence of elementary self-respect, a basic norm of human behavior, is the result of ignoring the shame. It is a major factor in the reprehensible cheapening by bereaved parents of the memory of the fallen” (Harel, 2000). The head of the Rehabilitation Division maintained that “the discourse of the bereaved has become the discourse of shekels” (Haaretz, 2000). But in the bereaved parents’ opinion, as their claims show, it was not a matter of emancipated, anti-hegemonic representations, aimed at ending their high ranking in Israel’s civil hierarchy. Quite the contrary. They believed that the justification for their efforts and the claims drew on the legitimacy of their preferred status, created according to the hegemonic model of bereavement. As Yad Labanim’s chairperson explained to the prime minister: “We, *who deserve special treatment*, in terms of “those whom the state wishes to reward,” are being thrown out into the yard ... we feel cheated by the state in whose name and for whose aims our sons fell” (Ben-Shem, 2000b, p. 60, emphasis added). This linkage between republican commitment to a discourse of financial rights was also adopted by the person who would eventually serve as defense minister, speaking in the Knesset about the issue the parents had raised: “How has it happened to us that we are unaware that the heroes, these symbols, feel humiliated to such an extent that no one listens to their outcry?” (Knesset Proceedings, 2000a, 2000b). Although he enabled the enhancing of the parents’ representations as people whose financial interests should be advanced, he based his statement on the hegemonic status that had been formed in the early years of statehood. The privatization discourse, then, relied on national-republic legitimization, and did not try to negate it.

### *2.7. Military Widows: The Struggle for Financial Rights and Social Status*

Since the drafting of Israel’s rehabilitation policy, IDF widows have been defined as entitled to a monthly budgetary pension – unless they remarry (Knesset Archives, 1950). Widows who wanted their entitlement from the Defense Ministry to continue refrained from founding a new family. That condition was described as leaving widows in their state role – carriers of the discourse of bereavement within the public discourse (Ben-Asher & Lebel, 2008) – at the expense of their personal rehabilitation and options

for creating a new relationship. In Israeli discourse, the wife of a fallen soldier is, like the wives of serving soldiers, “enlisted” to this role in the public arena; this is borne out by the titles of autobiographies by Lea Rabin, wife of Yitzhak Rabin, who served as chief-of-staff and prime minister: “*Always his Wife*” and “*Following his Path*.” When the state found widows who were cohabiting with a partner but had failed to declare it, their monthly pension was revoked. This logic was enforced by Israeli courts (Rulings, 2007), and their rulings relied on the Defense Ministry’s policy that “an IDF widow who remarries does indeed lose her rights” (Y-net, 2002a, 2002b).

In November 2006, a public committee was set up by the prime minister, defense minister, and the finance minister; it was intended to redefine the security budget, and to stipulate that the pension granted to widows living with a partner, without marrying him, would be ceased (Brodet Report, 2007, pp. 110–117). This set off an extensive public campaign by IDF widows, assisted by PR agencies, political lobbyists, and legal and media consultants (Interview, October 2008). As one aspect of the campaign, the general public was surprised by the large number of widows living with a partner, without marriage (Knesset Archives, 2002)<sup>1</sup>. The polemical discourse that resulted expressed a categorical objection to state intervention in the lives of an individual and demanded an end to rendering a pension conditional on the individual’s willingness to assume a national role. Moreover, the discourse made it clear that the value of personal rehabilitation outweighed any undertaking to that national role. In other words, failure to encourage a widow to remarry undermined her personal rehabilitation and it would be better to prefer the dictate of the “national pantheon” over individual rehabilitation. The origins of this approach are discussed in reviews of liberal claims for a state welfare policy that rehabilitates and empowers individuals, not society as a whole (Canterbery, 1979, pp. 1304–1307). It was also emphasized that the state’s commitment to “its victims” should be unconnected to their public–political behavior, that it was the state which had “taken away” their husbands and it, therefore, would compensate them financially. A compensation and benefits policy regarding personal needs should be created – coping with the trauma of a loss that does not end on remarriage.

Many Knesset members wondered about the willingness to compensate those who, while working for their personal rehabilitation, seemed to be abandoning their public position. In a Knesset debate on the widows’ claims, Member of Knesset (MK) Mussi Raz (Meretz) held, for example, that “the state gives funds so that the widow has a livelihood ... if she is

married, it begs the question what is the difference in economic terms between her and any other married woman?” (Knesset Archives, 2002). But the chairperson of the IDF Widows Organization pointed out: “It’s our role today as widows ... to explain to our friends, to the general public ... that we are being compensated for our loss. Our husband, our children’s father, was more than just a breadwinner. He was our whole world. Compensation is first and foremost the nation’s appreciation of our loss” (Shoham, 2008a, 2008b). This is to say that it is not compensation for performing a continuing role, but for the loss and assistance in dealing with the trauma. This argument is supported in the unilateral and individually focused republican text. As MK Yoel Hasson (Kadima) noted in a Knesset debate: “Over the years ... that state [Israel] said to those widows: if one day, after you rehabilitate yourself from the loss ... and would like to move ahead, for example, to remarry, that is the point when we’ll say: no further. We will no longer compensate you for the loss, we will no longer pay you a pension or allowance” (Knesset Archives, 2008). The political lobby that worked for the widows’ claim overcame its opponents and in July 2008, the Families of Fallen Soldiers Law was amended and the “revoking of pensions to remarried widows” was annulled (Knesset Archives, 2008).

Those discourses, which draw on what Gusfield (*ibid.*) called status politics, on the advancing of personal, not public interests, as Kimmerling (*ibid.*), Sears (*ibid.*), and Wolpert (*ibid.*) understand them, caused some sections of the public to see them as eroding the preferential symbolic status of bereaved parents in Israeli society, and also as contributing to the disintegration of the republican ethos. Bereaved parents had abandoned their social role as expressing and promoting “general values” and working to design the “common good.” To explore that issue, another discourse was needed, and it took shape among bereaved parents at that time, as they fought to preserve the Israeli hierarchy of bereavement.

### *2.8. Back to the Model of Hegemonic Bereavement: The Hierarchy of Israeli Casualties and the Struggle against Terror Families Inclusion in the Bereavement’s Pantheon*

Since the Israeli state was founded, 3,000 people have been murdered by terrorists (Haaretz, 18 October 2008). Neither they nor their families are part of the state’s “family of bereavement,” which receives support, rehabilitation, and great social esteem. Those whose offspring found their death like “the old Jews” from diaspora and Holocaust days, who did not

represent the “new Jews” who fell bearing arms, were not admitted to the national bereavement ethos (Lebel, 2005).

That group – which unlike groups that are carriers of the military bereavement discourse (families from the political founding elite and the “central stream” of Israeli society) (Levy, *ibid.*, pp. 309–324) – contains citizens from Israel’s middle-lower classes (Parhan, Pedhatur, & Perliger, 2005), including non-Jews (such as Arab citizens, tourists, and migrant workers) who have also been struck down by terror. Their inclusion in the “family of bereavement,” which charts the boundaries of Israeliness as policy-shapers perceive it, might result in a change in the Zionist ethos prevailing there.

As a result, the hegemonic bereavement model created the “hierarchy of Israeli bereavement” (Ben-David, 2006, pp. 79–98) in which a soldier’s death receives far more public attention than a civilian’s death, and where the families of IDF fallen are considered more deserving of esteem and social support than families of civilian bereavement (Avrami, Nuttman-Shwartz, & Lebel, 2007). While families of terror fatalities receive economic and psychological assistance toward their rehabilitation, it is not conducted by the Defense Ministry (which provides help through the Rehabilitation Division to families of IDF dead) but by the National Insurance Intuition (NII). Beyond economic–psychological support, victims of terror in Israel are not memorialized. The NII has no unit equivalent to the Unit for Commemorating Soldiers – a Defense Ministry department with multiple budgets for commemorating the IDF dead (Shamir, *ibid.*). And moreover, in contrast to the law requiring the state to keep accurate lists of the families of IDF fallen, there is no equivalent database for terror victims’ families – which rules out the option of turning them into an organized interest group (Yanai, 2007, pp. 35–53). As a consequence of all these, Israel’s Memorial Day (a day that after years of efforts by the families of IDF dead was legislated in the “Memorial Day Law”) is aimed at bringing together the general public with the IDF fallen. The Jewish calendar has no day of commemoration for civilian victims in the state of Israel. Over the years, families of terror victims have sporadically requested the Defense Ministry to make their loved ones part of state commemoration, but to no avail. In 1982, for example, MK Yair Tsaban (Mapam) set out his position that “a totally equal basis should not be granted to someone who died as the result of random chance, and someone dies in circumstance that resulted from a conscious act, volunteering and so forth. Making everyone equal ... is a very problematic matter” (Knesset Archives, 27 July 1982). Another MK, Benny Shalita (Likud), concurred, saying that “People who were killed

out of motivation to serve in the IDF, sometimes in an act of self-sacrifice, is something absolutely different” (*ibid.*).

### *2.9. Activity by Families of Terror Victims*

Over 1996, 228 soldiers were killed, of whom only 45 met their death in active service. In that year, 56 civilians were killed in terror attacks. It signaled the start of a period in which the Israeli public was exposed to suicide bombers and terror atrocities. The fact that *soldiers* killed in those terror attacks immediately became part of the commemorated, nurtured group, in contrast with society’s disregard of civilian fatalities, led the families of terror-attack victims to launch a public battle for entrance to the Israeli pantheon.

“Regrettably, some people claim sole possession of the anguish of bereavement” (Ma’ariv, 2000) declared Smadar Haran, whose husband and infant daughter were murdered in a terror attack in 1974, and who was among the heads of that group. “Until this very day, we victims of hostile acts have not received a place among the family of security bereavement of the state of Israel. We have no memorial site or central ceremony, and moreover, no binding regulations have been drafted governing our being named in state events on national memorial days. Unlike those killed in war, who are assisted by the defense ministry, civic agencies have failed to create tools and comprehensive response for the many difficulties – only some of which are mentioned here – faced by people affected by hostile acts” (*ibid.*).

### *2.10. The Position of the Families of IDF Fallen – The Discourse of Hegemonic Representations Redux*

Many bereaved families whose sons were killed while serving in the IDF, including many speakers who welcomed the “political bereavement discourse,” launched an organized struggle against their non-inclusion in Israeli state bereavement. In the framework of the political bereavement discourse and the economic discourse, claims were based on a polemical, liberal-individual discourse. And there, reliance on purely republican representations from the school of the “hegemonic bereavement discourse” made it clear that only they – who had chosen to sacrifice their sons for the nation’s sake – merited social esteem in the form of state commemoration.

The chairperson of Yad Labanim maintained that “people who rallied to the flag and in their death bequeathed us life should not be mixed up with people whom – with all the pain entailed – were walking along the street

when they met their death.” In a Knesset debate, the chairperson of the Organization of IDF Widows shouted at representatives of the Organization of Terror Victims: “The soldiers received emergency call-up notices knowing they might not return home. They set off to fight to defend our people and state. In terror acts ... innocent citizens were walking in Jerusalem or riding the number 18 bus along Dizengoff Street when a terrorist murdered them. How can you compare this with the heroism of soldiers in Israel’s wars? ... the war on Dizengoff Street versus the war on the battlefield? There’s no comparison.” Another representative, underscoring the proactive aspect of her husband’s death versus the passive aspect of terror victims’ death, asked: “How can you compare our dead with someone killed in a café?” (Ma’ariv, 5 May 2000).

The positions uttered in the Knesset did not match the existing ideological divides. MK Tamar Gojansky (Hadash) held that “There is a difference between a man who is a fighter and one who is a victim ... there is an educational message here: if you donned uniform, or not, you went in the name of the state and died, or by a twist of fate, you died? ... If we blur this, there is a certain damage to our perceptions.” MK Shaul Yahalom (Mafdal) concurred with her stance, declaring that “it’s hard to call three women sitting in Café Apropo warriors.” MK Yael Dayan stressed that the fact that “none of those killed in terror attacks had any intention of dying.” The philosopher Asa Kasher, a bereaved father and a prominent speaker on bereavement in Israeli society, joined the bereaved parents’ struggle against the families of terror victims; he also used republican terminology: “It is impossible to compare an individual who was a warrior to someone strolling the street who was blown up by an evil terrorist. The latter did not volunteer to risk his life, he did not volunteer for army service, nor did he devote all his time, energy and thought to defending the nation and its citizens. He is in a different framework, and should be treated differently” (Kedar, 2006).

### *2.11. The Results of the Struggle*

The intensifying of the terror attacks and the effective operations of the terror victims organizations, which won the support of Binyamin Netanyahu – who was prime minister in the late 1990s – resulted in the founding of the Maltz Commission, a special state panel to resolve policy on the matter. The committee’s decisions, which were ratified by the government (Maltz Commission Report, 2000, p. 93), defined civilian victims of terror as entitled to a state memorial ceremony on the annual Memorial Day for the fallen

of Israel's wars. They were also entitled to state commemoration activities for terror victims, including the establishing of a central memorial site. But the unending opposition of the army bereavement organizations to the phenomenon continued their exclusion from state sites.

In their struggle, the bereaved families worked in the framework of "Symbolic politics:, trying to mold the hierarchy of symbols and the social ethos" (Sperber, 1975). It seems that since the Yom Kippur war (1973) – when the political bereavement model began forming – there was no event that led to a unification of all components in the "family of bereavement" category, who are battling to preserve their preferential social status.

*2.12. Summary: On the Link between the Discourse of Rights and the Republican Discourse – The Glocalization of Bereavement*

Avinoam (2005, pp. 201–215) has found that the principal goal of the postcolonialist and postnational discourses in Israel, although they are both postnationalist, is to shape the social hierarchy in Israel. They are chiefly used by Palestinian citizens of Israel to improve their social status (Kochavi, 2006, p. 29): in other words, using global discourse to promote local interests. For a moment, it does appear that when bereaved families adopted the "economic bereavement discourse," they had, in the general public's eyes, become part of the "politics of deprivation" (Savitch, 1975, pp. 5–36). This is status politics, which the public considers to be far from value-based contexts, and certainly is not equated, in the Israeli experience, with bereaved families. It also seemed for a moment that the globalization process had left its imprint on bereaved families' status. They had "dared" to stand on the public stage, not to promote general values, but as private interest group, that like many others works to "squeeze" more funding from state coffers. It was viewed as a transition from the activity of a social category aimed at etching its sons' memory within the public consciousness to what a columnist defined as families who were "damaging the memory of the fallen, reducing their children to the level of mercenaries, and harming the honor of their memories as warriors who fell while serving the nation and the people ... the absence of self-respect ... the amazing disdain shown by some bereaved parents to the memory of the fallen" (Harel, 2000). But "rebellious" against the role allocated to the parents since the state of Israel's founding has other aspects that we have attempted to define in this paper:

- (a) *IDF widows*: The claims of IDF widows for monetary benefits even after they remarry may be considered as a transition from conditioned



remuneration as part of the discourse of obligations (in the framework of the republican equation that makes the allocation of remuneration conditional on the widow's remaining "mobilized" and permanently fixed in that status) to unconditional remuneration as part of the discourse of rights. Compensation is granted for the purposes of an individual's rehabilitation, not for "acquiring" a social agent. But from another aspect, we can view the widows' claims for continuing to receive monthly remuneration even after remarrying – as a demand to continue being considered widows. Because, until that struggle "from the moment they remarried they were erased from the list of widows" (Shoham, 2008a, 2008b). If they were not erased from the list, it would imply an intention to put the loss, the bereavement, and the belonging to the national ethos behind them, and to seek a new life. With their insistence on seeking a new life (marriage) without deleting the past, the desire for the loss to remain part of the identity – hers and of her new family – remains untouched. And from this perspective, one can also view a quasi-private struggle like this one not just as an individual economic claim, not only as a psychological conclusion affecting personal identity, but also as part of the aspiration to remain "signified," in order to preserve a higher social status in the public hierarchy. "*Always his Wife*" (Rabin, 1988) and "*Following his Path*" (Rabin, 1997) are the titles of two autobiographical books by Lea Rabin, wife of Yitzhak Rabin, a chief-of-staff and prime minister. She achieved her public status, as the contents of her books show, because of her marriage to the person that Israel considered as "Mr. Security." The identity that the wife received from her husband during his lifetime also gave her a partner who died in defense of the nation. Because of the unique status that the hierarchy of republican identities grants bereaved families, she refuses to let go of that social resource, even though – at the individual level – she has rehabilitated her life to the extent that she can find partnership and get married. From that perspective, it is not the privatization of bereavement as part of the globalization process – which was the case in the localization era – but a glocal combination: a move toward institutionalized couplehood, while using financial rights on the one hand, and insisting on continuing linkage to the national ethos, on the other.

- (b) *The bereaved parents*: These too on the face of it, in the framework of global processes, sought to promote the exploiting of narrow financial interests. They no longer promoted values but shaped the social benefits policy for their own good. But their struggle against bereaved families

of civilians illustrates a glocal process resembling that which occurred among widows. It was not a case of willingness to abandon the republican discourse that placed them at the top of the national hierarchy of identities. It in fact expresses the desire to maximize financial compensation for the sacrifice they made for the nation's sake. Alongside that though is the use of the "discourse of obligations" in order to remain monopolistically associated with the "family of bereavement" that is exclusively found in the national pantheon. Again, it is the glocalization of bereavement: capitalizing on rights while simultaneously preserving the republican hierarchy of identities.

We can return here to Inglehart's and Baker's (2000, pp. 19–51) findings on occurrences in a conservative society exposed to glocalization processes: "The influence of a traditional value system is unlikely to disappear, however a belief system exhibits remarkable durability and resilience ... Values can and do change but they also continue to reflect a society's cultural heritage."

This, then, is Israel's discourse of bereavement: budgetary demands, forming private interest groups, and promoting a global discourse, with the aim of preserving the local social hierarchy. It is the Israeli illustration of what we name – the glocalization of bereavement.

## NOTE

1. First reports of the numbers of widows living with a partner without marriage, or without declaring it, were presented by spokespersons of the Defense Ministry and the IDF Widows Organization at a meeting of the Knesset's Finance Committee. I note that the strategy of a movement that aims to perform a "social definition of the problem" is primarily to teach the public about the size of the population that needs the change in policy. This is achieved by showing that a great many people are in need of it (Luhmann, N. (1992). *The journalist's privilege: Conferring public attention*. In: E. Noelle-Neumann (Ed.), *The spiral of silence: Public opinion – Our social skin* (2nd ed., pp. 157–167). Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

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**PART I**  
**BUILDING AND SUSTAINING**  
**PEACE**





# MANY VIEWS ON PEACE

Bandana Purkayastha

## ABSTRACT

*This paper explores selected interdisciplinary literature on peace. It examines the notion of peace from several perspectives. First, it compares some theoretical discussions on peace, contrasting Tagore and Gandhi with the contemporary writings of Amrtya Sen and Lederach. Second, it examines notions of peace proposed by women's groups. Third, it examines notions of peace emanating from the efforts taken after prolonged conflicts, such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and humanitarian efforts. Fourth, it looks at peace through art. This paper compares the contributions of these approaches toward developing a multilevel, holistic concept of building and sustaining peace.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

On October 31, 2000, The Security Council of the United Nations adopted [Resolution 1325](#). The resolution recognized that “civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons ... and ... the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation.” [Resolution 1325](#) not only recognizes the significant ways in which women and children are affected by violent conflict,<sup>1</sup> but also reaffirms the role

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos  
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 43–57  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A008

played by women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and looks to include them “in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.” **Resolution 1325** brings two important *principles* to our attention: violence spans public and private spheres, and our current understanding of violent conflict and peace renders the full effects of violence and many victims invisible.

Just as many decades of women’s organizing led to the passage of **Resolution 1325**, the scholarly literature on violent conflict and conflict resolution continues to evolve to reflect new realities.<sup>2</sup> While the established scholarly trajectory on conflict resolution focuses on resolving episodic conflict, other studies have begun to focus on the costs of war and peace on different populations, including the effects on women and children. The assumptions, approaches, objectives, and focus of these studies are different, but, together, they have raised questions about the definition of violence and peace, and the arenas that should be considered when violent conflict and peace are discussed. This chapter builds on earlier discussions on building and sustaining peace by (a) describing a few formal efforts to build peace and (b) drawing on some recent work on human rights and peace studies to extend and deepen some theoretical discussions on peace.

## 2. VIOLENCE AND PEACE: DIFFERING IDEAS

A key focus of the armed conflict and conflict resolution literature has been on institutions of the nation-state. Much of this discussion has led to the proposition about democratic peace theory, that is, the idea that democracies rarely go to war with each other and they are more pacifist than other types of states (Elman, 1997). Yet, studies that tested this hypothesis show that there is nothing inherently pacifist about any form of government; the tendency toward war depends on the ideological inclination of the regime in power and their ability to gain support for wars and violent conflicts. Other strands of scholarship focus on what happens within nation-states. Gleditsch, Wallerstein, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002) presented a new database on “Armed Conflict 1946–2001,” showing that intra-state conflicts – that kill at least 25 people annually – remain a serious issue during the post-Cold War period. Importantly they have identified that intra-state conflict has become the dominant form after World War II. What is common to these scholarly discussions is the focus on the *public arena* of conflict and its resolution. Following this lead, many scholars focus on peace-building and peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world.

However, other scholars such as Keegan (1994) and Watkin (2004) point out that as the mass production of weapons increased dramatically, these increased the range and costs of ordinary people's warfare. The numbers of people around the world who are directly and indirectly affected by such armed conflicts have been growing rapidly. Reychler (2006) has argued that empirical studies typically examine the most visible forms of violence; less-visible forms that kill more slowly but inevitably are not measured. According to him, physical violence, structural violence, psychological violence, cultural violence, bad governance, organized crime, and extra-legal violence are all parts of this fabric of violence. Pandey (2006) has focused on the notion of routine violence by states, and pointed out that we often fail to "see" routine violence, if it is very large and organized, the technology sophisticated, and it is directed toward racialized/gendered victims; a global history of the 20th century shows that much of this violence has been normalized as a part of everyday life through ideologies of national security. The work of feminist scholars has added significantly to this discussion of exactly what constitutes violence and which groups are affected by it (see Purkayastha, 2008 for a review). The recognition of multiple forms of violence, including routine violence (institutionalized violence) and episodic violence (violence exemplified by armed conflict), is leading to the recognition of a continuum of violence and conflict. These scholars offer a definition of violence that creates "a situation in which the quantitative and qualitative life expectancies of a group or groups within a community, a state, a region, or the world are significantly lower than other groups" (Reychler, 2006, p. 2). As a consequence, discussions on peace, that are based on this expanded notion of violence, tend to recognize a multiplicity of ongoing efforts by institutions, groups, and individuals in violent conflict and in building and sustaining peace.

### **3. MANY ROADS TO PEACE**

In this section, I present two types of efforts to build peace after prolonged routine violence. Routine violence includes, but is not limited to, armed conflict within states; the assumption is that a continuum of violence over a long period of time qualitatively and quantitatively negatively affected groups. After the violence ended, these groups had their peaceful lives. The efforts at peace-building described in this chapter span public and private spheres, draw in institutions, groups, and individuals, and go beyond the idea of stopping and/or diffusing violence to resolve conflict. These efforts

address the longer term effects of routine violence. Such efforts offer a break with a violent past, and ways to establish “normal” lives. I use a well-known example, TRCs, and the less-known art initiatives, to discuss the ways in which peace is being built and sustained.

### *3.1. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions*

Since the later half of the 20th century, several countries, spanning almost every continent, have established TRCs. These commissions are testimony to the widespread violence of modern times; they also showcase efforts to build peace after prolonged conflicts.

The South African TRC is, perhaps, the best known of the TRCs and is credited with playing a role in South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1999). The long period of apartheid in South Africa, which was marked by brutal suppression and violence against non-Whites, was dismantled in the early 1990s. Following this, a key challenge was to create conditions that would allow the society to heal its wounds and move beyond the stasis of routine violence that had marked social life in the previous decades. The commission, through its three committees, provided a chance to publicly record the extent of human rights violations and crimes. At the individual level, victims were given a chance to speak out about harms done to them; perpetrators had a chance to answer, and, for some perpetrators, there was an opportunity to earn amnesty for their actions. Thus, the TRC provided a national platform to emphasize how routine violence killed, stifled, and injured people in public spaces and in the inner recesses of homes. It documented the direct and indirect harms suffered by those who had been stripped of power. The South African TRC was also remarkable because it provided a public space for women to talk about sexual violence against them, breaching the public–private divide that has for so long left their sufferings outside the discussions of restoring peace (Nairn, 2007). The TRC, by attempting to provide a space for diverse groups of people to speak, offered a chance to symbolically break with the past as a way of healing of the nation.

There are many debates about the success of this TRC (see Driver, 2005; Maitse, 2000; Minow, 1998; Nairn, 2007; Posel & Simpson, 2002; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000; Terreblanche, 2000). However, the two key principles of Resolution 1325 were in evidence during the proceeding of the South African TRC. The idea of linking individual healing with national healing recognized the need to breach the boundaries between private and public

spheres. The specific attempt to record women's experiences also brought into the public mind the sexual violence that women experience in times of prolonged violent conflict. Such sexual violence and ways of addressing the aftermath are rarely taken into account in formal plans for building and keeping peace.

TRCs, despite their shortcomings, uphold a key principle in building peace: they operate on the principle of restorative justice (Nairn, 2007). They recognize the harms that arise from prolonged violence. The idea is to provide victims with some material compensation—reparations – as well as promote national healing through public discussions of what had happened. The expectation is that victims will break out of their isolation as they see themselves as one of the many others who were harmed, and, ideally, be able to reconnect to a community in the process of healing. Restorative justice principles also raise the expectation that using moral condemnation rather than punitive actions has a more positive outcome over the long term. Unlike war crime tribunals which put a selected group on trial with the objective of punishing them, TRCs draw in an entire community in the process of condemnation and provide the perpetrator an opportunity to change. In addition, the public expectations of forgiveness are intended not only to arrest a trajectory of vengeance, but also to heal and return some degree of normalcy to the situation. Thus, these steps are intended to affect both the public and private spheres, drawing in people and groups who are visible as perpetrators of violence along with those whose sufferings have been made invisible during the time of violence.

### *3.2. Peace through Arts*

Paralleling the efforts of the TRCs, a number of organizations – public, private, grassroots, and others – have begun to use art as a way of healing individuals and societies after prolonged violence. Like the TRCs, the objective is to break from a past of routine violence. But the healing efforts through the arts go a step further: they attempt to rebuild broken communities by finding ways to reconstruct cultural symbols and practices that had been systematically suppressed in the earlier period. These efforts involve rebuilding community relationships in ways that uphold cultural values and visions along with efforts to harness the power of markets to mold cultural and economic independence objectives.

A significant example of this process of healing and restoring communities to a more peaceful state of being is exemplified by the efforts of

Australian aboriginal groups. These groups suffered from genocidal tactics that have been forced on indigenous people in different parts of the world – forced removal of children in order to “civilize” them, appropriation of indigenous settled lands, forced removals, and sexual and other types of everyday violence have decimated many indigenous communities. As recently as 1960, aboriginal children “not of full blood” were forcibly moved from their homes to fulfill a plan to “breed out” their aboriginal blood by mating them with Whites. Aboriginal children were kept in boarding schools whose objective was to wipe out their culture and language in order to assimilate them culturally into the mainstream. Australian aboriginal groups got the right to be Australian citizens in 1967, and partial rights to reclaim their lands by the 1990s. These changes, after centuries of routine violence, provided these indigenous groups an opportunity to recreate and heal their cultural communities. As they attempted to reclaim their civil rights and rebuild their communities, they were faced with a situation where very few ideological and material cultural symbols were available to reclaim their values, beliefs, histories, and heritages that form the building blocks of group identities. The aboriginal groups attempted to rebuild by restoring culture through the arts.

The first art co-operative was created in Papunya, in central Australia, in the 1970s. It began the long process of recreating traditional symbols and motifs in the arts, restoring the art of storytelling, and consequently, beginning the process of recording social mores and perspectives on lives, and re-igniting belief systems that uphold relationships between humans, environments, and dream-worlds. As elders began to “tell” their stories, and world views were expressed through creative processes, cultural memories began to be restored, re-inscribed, and transmitted as cultural symbols revived. Thus, the arts – the creative processes that express cultural visions and symbols – became part of the process of rebuilding communities that had been almost destroyed through earlier centuries of routine violence. Following Papunya, a series of other cultural community/art movements – for example, Pitjantjara, Ernabella, and Lajamanu – developed (McCulloch, 1999). While part of the focus of these movements is to record traditions, the movements also offer ways to synthesize aspects of community identities that would be lost with the realities of the contemporary context. Yuendumu art, for instance, developed a modern painting movement of women’s art, that adapted women’s designs for bodies to expressing similar concepts through paintings (McCulloch, 1999).

The revival of aboriginal art is now matched by a rapidly growing art market from the 1980s. Along with the aboriginal artist co-operatives, a

chain of dealers, agents, and galleries around the world profits from these arts. As Dussart (2007) has argued, the development and redeployment of identities through the arts involves a great deal of negotiation within and between groups since the outcome and directions of restoring culture are always contested. Nonetheless, like the TRCs, the art movements allow victims of violence to break with the past, to start a process of healing, and to move to a more peaceful future in ways that offer them economic opportunities and the communities tangible cultural records.

The impact of lost heritages has also been starkly highlighted through the efforts of the South African organization Ifa Lethu. During the apartheid era, much of the art by non-Whites was forbidden, particularly those that expressed yearning for freedom. Some of the “secret art” was taken outside the country by supportive individuals who wished to help the artists and preserve these cultural artifacts as a history of the time. At the end of apartheid, South Africa was faced with a near absence of any tangible cultural items by non-Whites from the apartheid era. This constituted a devastating loss of history and heritage. Ifa Lethu has worked to restore this art heritage ([www.ifa lethu.org.za](http://www.ifa lethu.org.za)). Australian diplomats who had helped protect apartheid era art donated the artwork back to free South Africa; these formed the basis of the foundation’s work (Offringa, 2007). According to Ifa Lethu, the act of bringing back this art constitutes a rebuilding of a history, a social memory of the apartheid. At the same time, the use of “struggle era” artists as educators to transfer their artistic skills, their extensive knowledge, and sense of history to a younger generation provides a way of reversing a trend of violently suppressing people. Equally important, like the Australian aboriginal art collectives, Ifa Lethu uses the market as a way to foster economic and social human rights along with their main objective of restoring cultural human rights. Thus, it has created a multipronged initiative through repatriation, educational outreach, development of skills among aspiring artists, and development of markets for cultural objects as a way to rebuild a society.

In sum, these government and non-government-sponsored efforts – TRCs and art initiatives – point to the complex impacts of violence as well as the creative processes that have been initiated, across political, economic, and cultural spheres, to remake worlds (Das, Kleinman, Lock, Ramphela, & Reynolds, 2001) in order to build more peaceful futures. While TRCs and war crime tribunals address recent violence, the restorative justice initiatives attempt to build broken relationships. Both these examples highlight the devastating effects of routine violence on communities whose cultural identities (and physical survival) have been in jeopardy. The loss of



established ways of life and heritages signals a deep level of harm and suffering. Instrumental ways of diffusing conflict would be insufficient to address the kinds of challenges these efforts highlight. Both the TRCs and the art initiatives assume people can heal and restore their identities and relationships, not simply through laws and commissions, but through touches of the web of community relationships. The use of multiple-level efforts that include symbolic and tangible actions appears to be crucial for building peace in ways that heal people and communities. The objectives are long term: to heal wounded communities and to build communities that offer people the restoration of human dignity and human relationships. The efforts exemplified by these two groups to build peaceful community uphold the principles – the need to recognize the public and private spheres, recognizing the harm women suffer – described by [Resolution 1325](#).

#### 4. THINKING ABOUT PEACE

Thinking about peace in terms of human dignity and relationships expands the parameters within which we have traditionally thought about conflict resolution. The efforts described above indicate some ways in which groups and communities have gone about the task of restoring peace; this section examines some scholarly approaches to thinking about peace. I have described an older strand of discussion on ways to address routine violence – for example, in Rabindranath Tagore and Mohandas Gandhi’s writing – elsewhere ([Purkayastha, 2002](#)); that strand focused on violence as colonial powers built the apparatus of nation-states in their colonies, creating stratas of power within nation-states, based on race, gender, religion, and class. The focus here is on two contemporary scholars, Amartya Sen and John Paul Lederach, whose work reflects some of these older discussions.

##### *4.1. Sen and Lederach<sup>3</sup>: Achieving Human Capabilities and building Voices*

A key principle underlying routine violence is the notion of security. National security – which most often ensures the security of the dominant majority – is the objective of many of the institutionalized forms of violence. [Resolution 1325](#) points to some shortcomings of the notion of national security: it ignores the harm done to individuals in the “private sphere,” especially women and children and marginalized groups. Thus, a conceptual problem that confronts scholars of peace is to incorporate the private and

public spheres in thinking about peace. While tasks of peacekeeping by troops under the UN aegis are recognized (e.g., Moser in this volume), as are humanitarian efforts (e.g., Smith in this volume), the issue discussed here is to conceptualize a long-term peace that restores human dignity and lives of freedom to the largest number of individuals possible.

A key challenge to this nexus of conflict and security has been made by Amartya Sen in his discussions on human capabilities, and the institutions that support and insure (or interrupt and obstruct) the ability of people to construct lives with human dignity. One strand of his argument focuses on identity and violence. He has denounced social violence that arises from attempts to impose homogenized identities on groups (Sen, 2006). While fundamentalist groups and ultra-nationalist groups attempt to hold people to singular identities through varied forms of violence – episodic and routine violence – Sen has argued that few women (or men) are solely Hindu, Muslim, Christians, Buddhist, Jews, Sikhs, or Jains; they are also parents, spouses, siblings, scientists, musicians, teachers, activists, students, migrants, and citizens, people with many cultural, social, economic, political, national affiliations, and interests. Suppression of these different identities in order to impose one – for instance, an individual’s national or religious identity – as the only salient identity excludes and distances all others who do not fit these exclusive identities. And, as the histories of the 20th and 21st centuries have shown, cultivating unidimensional identities is promoted on the basis of a great deal of force, coercion, and violence. (Cases of ethnic cleansing and “civilizational violence” are two recent examples of attempts to impose unidimensional identities.) The experience of the marginalized groups in South Africa and Australia reflects many of these points: the periods of violence are marked by large-scale, systematic attempts to impose a singular identity on a group of people. Sen has also criticized the growth and spending on arms and weaponry that are leading to devastating consequences – indirectly through spending diverted from social programs to buying costly, sophisticated weapons, and directly, through the vastly increased ability to kill and maim people through assault weapons – on vast sections of the globe (Sen, 2002).

Sen’s proposed solution focuses on the idea of human capabilities. The underlying premise is that building true human freedoms that are shaped out of care and compassion, recognize human dignity and diversity, and address the economic, social, and political underpinnings of a meaningful human life is possible if we examine and reject routine violence and concentrate on peace. Sen’s main work is reflected in his book *Development as Freedom* (1999). Sen has linked notions of security, human capabilities,

and human rights. As an economist, Sen has suggested ways of moving beyond the taken-for-granted narrow thinking about income poverty (and the idea that trickle-down development can lead to reduction of income poverty), to measuring poverty in terms of human capabilities, specifically focusing on the social structures that violate people's human right to longevity, quality of health, access to education and shelter, and social security. The conditions that promote such "unfreedoms" are expanded to include wars and conflicts, along with economic factors (Sen, 1999). The new holistic ways of assessing human conditions, as the sum of political, social, and economic factors, expand the idea of security from national security to human security, and shed light on the interconnected barriers that restrict human lives; violence of various types is identified as barriers to achieving full human capability. Thus, even though he does not write specifically on peace, we can use Sen's idea of freedom from violence as a way of thinking about a holistic notion of peace. Reychler's definition of violence which negatively affects human lives in quantitative and qualitative terms (that is quoted earlier in this chapter) comes close to Sen's thinking about development as freedom. Equally importantly, the lessons from the art movements in Australia and South Africa appear to reflect some of Sen's principles on developing holistic solutions to support human capabilities.

A similar idea is reflected in the work of Lederach (1997, 2006). In *The Moral Imagination*, Lederach asks "how do we transcend the cycle of violence that bewitch our human community while still living in them?" (2006, p. 5). He argues that transcending violence has to be forged through a capacity to generate, mobilize, and build moral imagination. "The moral imagination requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of relationships that includes our enemies; the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity that embraces complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity ..." (2006, p. 5). In his earlier work, *Building Peace*, as he discussed ways of reconciling divided societies, Lederach had proposed an action field drawn within a matrix that has time as the horizontal axis and levels of conflict as the vertical axis. He developed the idea of an action field that was designed to move from the issue at stake in the present to the vision of resolution in future, which extended the temporal limits of conflict resolution to a long-term vision of sustained resolution.

A more recent version of his ideas of building peace moves beyond instrumental ways of resolving conflicts to suggest that sustainable resolution has to take into histories, including silenced histories, into account (Lederach, 2006). Thus, Lederach describes an expanded model for understanding sustainable peace-building. It starts with a circle of recent events

(which are the most visible expression of political, military, social, or economic conflicts). This circle is part of a wider sphere of lived history (whose actual time range will vary by generation); this circle of lived history, in turn, is nested within “remembered history” or history kept alive through social memory. These social memories shape collective identities; they include moments which are *acknowledged* to have shaped and changed identity from then to now. (Newly mobilized ethnic identities have such beginning points as well, e.g., the Croats and Serbs, and Hutus and Tutsis became separate people relatively recently.) And finally, all these layers are nested within “the narrative,” the deepest memory of people and place, an expanded view of time and development of group identity over generations. Working with these nested spheres, Lederach argues, leads us to the conclusion that “the whole of peacebuilding could be summed up as finding and building voice” (2006, p. 169). He also points out that “the important process of professionalization of our fields ([can act as barriers], ... we cannot listen and provide support to others as they find their voices if we ourselves see this only as a technique or management process” (2006, p. 169). These arguments converge on the lessons offered by the TRCs and art initiatives; the need to “build voice,” that is, voices that reflect long-suppressed cultures and histories and social memories, becomes a key ingredient to building sustainable peace.

While a longer discussion is necessary to show the points of divergence and convergence of the arguments of these two scholars, I would argue that these theoretical discussions on security and capabilities and peace-building through building voice question the purpose of peace-building – whether it is to diffuse conflict, for how long and for whom, or whether it is to address harm and find ways to heal and rebuild former victims’ human capabilities – in ways that indicate a more holistic perspective on peace. Both these strands of discussion reflect some of the ideas reflected in the TRCs and art initiatives. Both these discussions move us from conceptualizing violence and peace beyond their time-delimited limited, public sphere effects. Both of these approaches make room for thinking about the less-visible victims of routine and episodic violence.

Just as there are many informal and formal groups involved in the process of building peace, Sen and Lederach are not alone in their theoretical discussions. For instance, building on his notion of fabric of violence, Reychler has argued that peace, like violence, is an outcome of complex forces, institutions, groups, and people, in all sectors and levels of societies, actively involved in peace-building. Supportive governments, more leaders committed to peace-building, improved mechanisms of communication,

negotiation, and consultation in all sectors and levels of society, and building peace-enhancing institutions are important factors for creating an integrative climate of peace. Similarly, building on Sen's work, Barnett (2008) links peace and development, emphasizing the need for freedom from direct violence, as well as economic opportunities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. And, over decades, feminist researchers from different parts of the world have pointed out the gendered dimensions of violence and peace; they have pointed to the ideological, interactional, and institutional processes that valorize force, might, and control, over care and compassion (John, 2006; Purkayastha, 2008). These researchers have looked to "women's ways" of organizing peaceful lives with support structures for care-work as a way to ensure peaceful conditions of life.

## 5. CONCLUSION

Resolutions at the UN, like Resolution 1325, are an outcome of significant organizing by groups whose experiences were not recognized by earlier attempts to conceptualize and act on violence and peace. I have argued elsewhere (Purkayastha, 2002, 2005, 2008) that there are many types of efforts to build peace around the world. Poor women's groups that fight for their economic and social human rights, but remain totally committed to non-violent ways of addressing conflict, are exemplars of such a process of building and sustaining peace. Women's groups who focus on the environment-human connections to uphold principles of healthy lives, women who intervene to stop or mitigate armed violence, those who challenge routine violence of authoritarian and democratic regimes, and the TRCs and art initiatives are all building a fabric of peace. Such a peace is predicated upon maintaining relationships between people rather than securing and emphasizing the boundaries of identities and territories defined by nationalisms. Care, compassion, and co-operation are the basic ingredients of building peaceful communities, institutions, and societies. Their efforts have begun to make us aware of the political and economic processes that *normalize* ongoing violence on the rationale of making nations and groups secure (see also Bruin & Salaff, 1982; Macy, 1985; Mason, 2005; Merry, 2006; Mohsin, 2004; Ruddick, 1985; Todeschini, 2001). The lessons from the two cases discussed here – the TRCs and art initiatives – show that peace-building cannot be left to sporadic efforts but it has to involve governments and NGOs, community groups, civil society

organizations, and entities. Similarly, the focus on Sen, Lederach, and others shows the ways in which conceptualizations of peace, peace-building, and sustenance are increasingly pointing to more complex paths to peace.

## NOTES

1. Since this chapter is based on the notion that violence exists as a continuum, from armed conflict to other less visible forms of violence, that kill and harm human being's capability to lead lives of human dignity, I will use the terms armed conflict, violent conflict, and violence throughout the chapter instead of confining my attention to armed conflict alone.

2. Critics charged that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) did not have sufficiently "deep" effects. For instance, focusing on individuals did not bridge the gap between individual and healing and its goal of national healing, since the TRC was not set up to dismantle structures of racism. Nor were the issues of economic inequality addressed. While sexual violence against women was recognized, the effort to help women heal was inadequate.

3. Amartya Sen is Lamont University Professor, and Professor of Economics and Philosophy, at Harvard University, and was until recently the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. He has served as President of the Econometric Society, the Indian Economic Association, the American Economic Association, and the International Economic Association. He was formerly Honorary President of OXFAM and is now its Honorary Advisor. Born in Santiniketan, India, Amartya Sen studied at Presidency College in Calcutta, India, and at Trinity College, Cambridge. He is an Indian citizen. He was Lamont University Professor at Harvard also earlier, from 1988 to 1998, and previous to that he was the Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford University, and a Fellow of All Souls College (he is now a Distinguished Fellow of All Souls). Prior to that, he was Professor of Economics at Delhi University and at the London School of Economics. Amartya Sen's books have been translated into more than 30 languages, and include *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (1970), *On Economic Inequality* (1973, 1997), *Poverty and Famines* (1981), *Choice, Welfare and Measurement* (1982), *Resources, Values and Development* (1984), *On Ethics and Economics* (1987), *The Standard of Living* (1987), *Inequality Reexamined* (1992), *Development as Freedom* (1999), *Rationality and Freedom* (2002), *The Argumentative Indian* (2005), and *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (2006), among others. Among the awards he has received are the "Bharat Ratna" (the highest honor awarded by the President of India), the Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize in Ethics, the Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Award, the Edinburgh Medal, the Brazilian Ordem do Merito Cientifico (Grã-Cruz), the Presidency of the Italian Republic Medal, the Eisenhower Medal, Honorary Companion of Honour (UK), The George C. Marshall Award, and the Nobel Prize in Economics.

John Paul Lederach is a Professor of International Peacebuilding at the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies, at Notre Dame University. Widely known for his pioneering work on conflict transformation, Lederach is involved in conciliation

work in Colombia, the Philippines, Nepal, and Tajikistan, plus countries in East and West Africa. He has helped design and conduct training programs in 25 countries across five continents. He is the author of *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of building Peace* (Oxford University Press, 2005), *The Journey toward Reconciliation* (Herald Press, 1999), *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (USIP, 1997), and *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures* (Syracuse University Press, 1995).

Both biographies were obtained from these scholars' websites.

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# CONFLICT, PEACEMAKING AND THE DYNAMICS OF HUMILIATION<sup>☆</sup>

Dennis Smith

## ABSTRACT

*This paper aims to do three things. The first is to present some core aspects of my approach to globalization, humiliation (or 'outrageous' displacement) and conflict. The second is to compare my own approach to displacement cycles and conflict with Randall Collins's approach to interaction ritual chains and violence. The third is to see if there is any prospect that a 'conversation' between the two approaches might advance our understanding of the triangular relationship between conflict, violence and humiliation. The essence of peacemaking is not the elimination of conflict but the eradication, to the greatest possible degree, of violence and humiliation.*

<sup>☆</sup> Revised version of a paper originally produced for Section 6/17-RC01 Interim Conference: Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution in a Globalized World (Seoul, Korea, 14–17 July 2008)

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**  
**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 59–69**  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A009


## 1. INTRODUCTION

It seems pretty clear that in the next decade or so, there will be a shift towards a multi-polar global order with the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Japan and India, all manoeuvring for position. This manoeuvring is bound to lead to many situations of conflict. At the same time, the very existence of disharmony between these global players will mean that they are less likely to band together to prevent conflict between less powerful players in the Middle East, Africa, Central and South-East Asia and Latin America.

Conflict is, not, in itself, harmful. It is a straightforward way of identifying disagreements and confronting the need to resolve them. However, some conflict is unacceptably harmful, both to individuals and to societies. I mean conflict that involves avoidable violence (in other words, illegitimate destructive force), or avoidable humiliation (in other words, illegitimate displacement), or both. It is important to try to think systematically about the relationships between conflict, violence and humiliation. This paper tries to contribute to that.

I want to do three things. The first is to present some core aspects of my approach to globalization, humiliation (or ‘outrageous’ displacement) and conflict. The second is to compare my own approach to displacement cycles and conflict with Randall Collins’s approach to interaction ritual chains and violence. The third is to see if there is any prospect that a ‘conversation’ between the two approaches might advance our understanding of the triangular relationship between conflict, violence and humiliation. The essence of peacemaking is not the elimination of conflict but the eradication, to the greatest possible degree, of violence and humiliation. Before doing any of that, I should try and clarify some of the terms being used (Fig. 1).

Destructive force is widespread. So is displacement, in other words, being moved out of, or denied entry to, the place where you used to be or want to be. We have to make a distinction between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’



*Fig. 1.* Violence, Humiliation and Conflict.

examples of destructive force and displacement. Views about what is legitimate may differ between the three possible interested parties: those who use destructive force or displace others, those who are damaged or displaced and third parties who stand at one remove from the action and the suffering but who have views about it and, quite possibly, a stake in the outcome (Fig. 2).

There will be differences among them both with respect to what the facts are and how those facts should be interpreted. Here is one view of how we should distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate acts in this context (Table 1).




Fig. 2. The Interested Parties.

**Table 1.** Force, Violence, Displacement and Humiliation.

	Force	Displacement
Legitimate	Policing or peace-keeping operations Acts sanctioned by 'rational authority' <sup>a</sup> (B. Moore) that use minimum necessary force and are likely to reduce future levels of violence and/or humiliation	Rehousing or industrial restructuring operations Acts sanctioned by 'rational authority' (B. Moore) that impose minimum unavoidable disruption and are likely to reduce future levels of violence and/or humiliation
Illegitimate <sup>b</sup>	Violence Acts that fail to meet these standards, and which violate the rights and/or dignity and/or honour of those acted upon	Humiliation Acts that fail to meet these standards, and which violate the rights and/or dignity and/or honour of those acted upon

<sup>a</sup>Authority is 'rational' when it can be convincingly shown that decisions are based upon the most effective use of available means to optimize the welfare of those citizens who are affected by the decisions (see Moore, 1972, pp. 52–56; Smith, 1982).

<sup>b</sup>Organized sport provides a rule-bound arena in which the rhetoric and emotions associated with both violence and humiliation are permitted on and around 'the field of honour'.

## **2. GLOBALIZATION, HUMILIATION/ DISPLACEMENT AND HONOUR/HUMAN RIGHTS**

In *Globalization: The Hidden Agenda* (Smith, 2006), I explore how the experience or threat of humiliation shapes the way actors in situations of conflict and would-be reconciliation behave:

- how they perceive their interests,
- how they deploy their resources and
- how they seek to protect and develop the capacities of their group and themselves.

The analysis interweaves a phenomenology of humiliation with analyses of globalization and modernity. Some key points of the analysis can be briefly summarized:

Humiliation means forced displacement that is seen as an infringement of legitimate expectations. In other words, the experience of being pushed out from or denied entry to the social position you feel you have a right to occupy.

An act of humiliation can be recognized by the anger and resentment it causes. This response says, inwardly at least: ‘How outrageous! How dare you? Don’t you know who we are?’.

### *2.1. The Dynamics of Humiliation*

Globalization, especially the reordering of power relations within and between societies, brings a great deal of displacement, much of which entails humiliation for those involved.

Humiliation plays different roles in the honour code (where it is seen as a central aspect of human relations) and the human rights code (where it is regarded as illegitimate).

Humiliation may take three main forms:

- conquest (reducing freedom),
- relegation (reducing status) and
- exclusion (denying membership/recognition).

Three main responses to these are:

- attempted escape,
- attempted rejection (resistance and/or revenge) and
- attempted acceptance.

There have been two long-term shifts with respect to humiliation/displacement:

- As human rights ideas become more widespread, people have become much more sensitive to the threat of exclusion humiliation, especially in the form of the denial of rights.
- Meanwhile, it has become increasingly difficult to escape humiliating relationships in an increasingly interdependent world. In previous centuries, a typical escape route was migration to ‘the colonies’ where a ‘promised land’ might be found. However, the ‘old world’ has re-established new and close links with the ex-colonies in America, Africa and Asia.

With escape effectively put off the agenda, those facing humiliation have little choice, either to accept or reject it. A common reaction is to put off this fundamental and difficult choice and instead fall into a condition of reluctant acquiescence, a kind of ‘holding’ pattern.

## *2.2. Globalization*

By this term, I mean not just the recent global advance of ‘liberated capitalism’, that is large business corporations operating with fewer controls within more societies than before, but a broader definition which emphasises the following:

- The increasing rapidity and density of communications and movement across the globe, creating the beginnings of a new global public sphere, and considerable cultural, political and personal turbulence for those involved, not least the creation of a widespread ‘cosmopolitan condition’ of rootlessness and dissatisfaction.
- The role of ‘global English’ as a lingua franca, complemented by global–regional, national and local languages which are also available for cultural and political activity at these sub-global levels.
- The movement towards creating global and global–regional political bodies (such as European Union) that exercise some discipline on national governments.
- The advance of the human rights code, mainly due to the rise to global power of the United States during the twentieth century, which has seriously undermined the imperial impulse. It must be added that

the imperial impulse to use violent means to create absolutist hierarchies that defy human rights in practice (whatever the ideology) is fighting a rearguard action. The collapse of the old European global empires during the twentieth century reduced the strength of politico-military controls on, and protection for, international trade and investment. An attempt by US government to continue this ‘imperial’ arrangement on a global scale is under way. We can assume that other potential global players – especially European Union, China, Russia, Japan, India – are watching the progress and outcomes of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to learn what the new limits and possibilities of post-imperial intervention are going to be in the next decade or so.

- The increase in the relative significance of the logic of the market as a way of managing social relationships that has occurred during the past half century, especially since 1989. ‘Liberated capitalism’ aligns itself with only a part of the human rights/citizenship agenda, that is the part supporting the free movement of capital and the sanctity of private property. It downplays the duty of care that the state/community should exercise towards all citizens.

### *2.3. The Regulation of Modernity*

There are two trends, competing with each other:

- The past 200 years have seen a steady advance of the influence of the human rights code. The guardians of the human rights code have been national states based upon the practice of citizenship.
- Now that the sovereignty and influence of many national governments have been undermined by globalization, this means that the human rights code is more weakly defended. People who feel belittled or degraded by others are more likely to act forcefully on their own account, often humiliating others on the way.

One consequence is a shift back towards the honour code: humiliate or be humiliated. Protection and strengthening of the human rights code requires that global–regional and global governance are both made more effective and authoritative.

### 3. THE DYNAMICS OF DISPLACEMENT

How do people deal with humiliating displacement? The initial response is resentful acquiescence (in a situation which they did not choose), but the gap between the expectation (how people think they should be treated) and practice (how they are actually treated) creates a degree of painful tension that is ‘unacceptable’ and requires action, either on the self/group or on the situation. This action may be concerned either with the structure of the situation, that is its ‘rules of engagement’, or with the relationship of the individual/group to that situation, that is whether they will choose to ‘engage’ within it or (if they can) withdraw and move elsewhere, away from their oppressors.

Crucial factors influencing the kinds of response that are possible are: the capacity of an individual/group to maintain a (covert?) distinction between an ‘inner’ identity and an ‘outer’ appearance; the capacity of the individual/group to carry out a self-critical reflexive dialogue within itself and the existence of social barriers (related to, e.g. language, status, ethnicity, gender, class) behind which to hide. The various forms of strategies of acquiescence all tend to lead towards more thoroughgoing and ‘committed’ strategies of rejection, escape or acceptance (see [Table 2](#)).

The responses of attempted escape, acceptance and rejection often lead towards displacement cycles; in other words, repeated episodes of further humiliation in which those who have been humiliated in the past sometimes engage in the humiliation of others (see [Tables 3–5](#)). The fear cycle flows from the escape response, the victimization cycle from the acceptance response and the revenge cycle from the rejection response.

**Table 2.** Forms of Acquiescence by Victims of Humiliation.

	Strategies	Tactics	Tendencies
Forms of acquiescence	Reversal	Defiant acceptance Politics of victimhood	→ Rejection
	Separation	Sabotage Inner withdrawal Denial	→ Escape
	Conformity	Self-abasement Elevation of master Stoicism	→ Acceptance
	Surrender	Self-abandonment	



When this cycle has been played out a few times, acceptance may be replaced by mere acquiescence, or it may turn into rejection.

These three displacement cycles (or humiliation cycles) may be interrupted by an emancipation cycle (Table 6) but in many cases this lapses into a distrust cycle (Table 7).

At this point, we can turn to Randall Collins's recent book entitled *Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory* (2008), building on an approach previously set out in *Interaction Ritual Chains* (2004). I am not going to attempt a full-scale critique of these very interesting books, but I will

**Table 3.** The Fear Cycle.

(i) Hurt withdrawal into treasured home/homeland	←	(iv) Embarrassing entanglements with outraged victims
↓		↑
(ii) Anxiety about threat of violation	→	(iii) Attack upon supposed source of real or imagined threat

Source: Smith (2006).

**Table 4.** The Victimization Cycle.

(i) Conquest or seduction creates relationship of high dependency/vulnerability for the weaker party	←	(iv) Outrage/despair by subordinate is met by renewal of seduction and/or repression and/or silent contempt
↓		↑
(ii) Dominant party manipulates shame, fear and desire to ensure obedience to its rules	→	(iii) Dominant party abuses and/or estranges subordinates and rapidly lowers trust level

Source: Smith (2006).

**Table 5.** The Revenge Cycle.

(i) X blames Y for a humiliating attack upon X, which X survives	←	(iv) The sequence from (i) to (iii) is repeated with X and Y reversed
↓		↑
(ii) X feels outrage against Y	→	(iii) X carries out a humiliating retaliatory attack upon Y

Source: Smith (2006).

**Table 6.** Emancipation Cycle.

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(i) Exhaustion leads to truce from either conflict or dialogue, and this permits reflection and the renewal of energy	←	(iv) Gradual transformation of attitudes, behaviour and structures, reducing levels of humiliation
↓		↑
(ii) Dialogue moves beyond stereotypical thinking	→	(iii) Jointly created meanings and intentions increase trust between dialogue partners

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Source: Smith (2006).

**Table 7.** Distrust Cycle.

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(i) Exhaustion leads to truce from either conflict or dialogue, permitting reflection and the renewal of energy	←	(iv) As the agenda moves beyond points of mutual pragmatic convenience, further bargaining arouses distrust, fear of deception, increased mutual antagonism and a renewal of hostilities
↓		↑
(ii) Dialogue fails to move beyond stereotypical thinking	→	(iii) Dialogue restricted to contingent areas of pragmatic mutual concern, for example, establishing the boundaries of aggression

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Source: Smith (2006).

notice some overlaps and similarities with the approach I have briefly sketched so far.

#### **4. INTERACTION RITUALS (AND VIOLENCE) AND DISPLACEMENT CYCLES (AND HUMILIATION)**

I shall radically oversimplify Collins’s argument in the following summary so as to get into its central points. Collins sees a world in which people seek out ‘interaction rituals’ (borrowing Goffman’s term) or situated encounters that provide and/or nurture emotional energy in those that join in. For example going to a sports game, attending a music concert or a ‘carousing’ event such as a wedding, or joining a riot. Being involved in such situations ‘gets people going’, partly through processes of bodily entrainment which put them ‘in tune’ with others, creating exciting feelings of solidarity.

Emotional energy is created or heightened in these situations, and may be renewed or ‘topped up’ by repeating such involvements. In such situations,

there is a strong possibility of observing or taking part in conflict, and/or exercising domination and mastery over others and/or joining others within a crowd or audience that is focusing on a shared object of attention (such as a fight), and/or becoming oneself the focus of attention by others.

The prospect of getting involved in face-to-face violent conflict generates a degree of confrontational tension in those involved. This creates discomfort and may be deeply inhibiting. This tension tends to keep violent encounters to a relatively small number and make many of them both brief and incompetent. However, violence may be encouraged and enabled by various factors such as a shift in power balances giving one side superiority, the presence of an audience or crowd, the existence of a set of rules of fair play, by cultivating an air of deliberate detachment, and by avoiding interpersonal contact with the victim when committing aggression.

I notice four similarities with the displacement cycles approach I set out earlier in the paper:

- In both approach, the main emphasis is placed upon the dynamics of situations and the relationships and interactions of actors within those situations.
- In both approaches, an important source of dynamism is the tension created within individuals and/or groups. In Collins's case, this is 'confrontational tension'. In my approach, it is the tension produced by being forced to acquiesce in something that is unacceptable, that is humiliation. In both approaches, dynamism comes from the spur to overcome, alleviate, escape or otherwise dissipate the tension.
- In both approaches, situations and the responses of those involved are affected by shared ideas of fairness and honour.
- Collins identifies micro-level interaction settings that can act as generators of confrontational tension and, in some cases, violence. In my approach, I have identified settings and conditions at the macro level that can act as generators of humiliation. These include the exercise of the imperial impulse (establishing autocratic hierarchies), the part played by the logic of the market (making many people losers in a game they did not ask to join) and the stresses caused by the cosmopolitan condition (especially in urban environments).

There are some possible points of further exploration. For example, perhaps Collins helps us to understand the conditions under people engage in acts of humiliation. Such as, for example the chance to enjoy the pleasure of total domination over another, or the opportunity to purge anxiety as in the case of what he calls 'forward panics' when sudden changes in the

disposition of crowds and police give one side or another a decisive if momentary advantage resulting in frenzied attacks on isolated individuals from the other side.

The inhibiting effects of confrontational tension may hold people back from violence, but it also encourages them to use great ingenuity when engaging in non-violent humiliation, for example in conversational exchanges that deal out exclusion and misrecognition, often taking the form of snobbish and insulting comments.

From the displacement/humiliation perspective, it is evident that although 'losers' may (to follow one aspect of Collins's argument) experience a decline in emotional energy, the 'unacceptable' humiliation of losing creates its own tensions, which often generate further dynamic emotional energy.

To pull some of these points together, although not all humiliation is violent (given the inhibitions on violent behaviour identified by Collins), it remains true that

- violence in the sense of illegitimate destructive force directed at property and person normally results in violation of rights and/or honour that will be perceived as humiliating and
- the humiliated condition generates emotional energy that may be expressed in, for example violent fear cycles and revenge cycles.

In effect, violence and humiliation can become part of mutually reinforcing cycles.

In conclusion, the practical object should not be to reduce conflict but to reduce violence and humiliation. It is important to advance our understanding further on this front because the degree and complexity of overt conflict within the global order is likely to increase significantly in the next quarter of a century.

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# TURNING ENEMIES INTO FRIENDS: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN BUILDING SECURITY AND SUSTAINING PEACE

Lloyd J. Dumas

## ABSTRACT

*There are two critical steps involved in reducing enmity between two nations and transforming their relationship into one of mutual accommodation and ultimately even friendship. The first step is finding a way to break through the wall of mutual hostility and suspicion. That depends primarily on communication. Since messages are more powerfully and credibly communicated when they are carried by behavior as well as words, the Graduated Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction (GRIT) strategy is offered as a possible path to achieving this breakthrough. The second step is creating and cementing friendship by building strong positive ties. That depends on creating a system of properly structured economic relationships.*

*There is a longstanding debate as to whether economic relationships build peace or provoke war. But it is not simply the existence or the extent of economic relationships that is key to their impact – it is the character of*

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**  
**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 71–92**  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A010

*these relationships. Economic relationships that are balanced and mutually beneficial create strong positive incentives to settle or manage conflicts short of violence while economic relationships that are unbalanced and exploitative produce hostility and create incentives for violent disruption.*

*If two nations that have long been enemies can begin to build peace, establishing a widening and deepening web of balanced, mutually beneficial economic relationships between them can support that peace-building process, strengthen it, and make it sustainable into the indefinite future. This paper defines and explores the aspects of balance that are most critical to creating peacebuilding economic relationships, as well as their connection to both economic development programs and environmental quality.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The title of this paper may seem more than a little naïve and idealistic, but it is neither. In the hard-nosed realities of this world, security is primarily a matter of relationships, not military power. That is easy enough to demonstrate. During the whole of the Cold War, the American military spent a great deal of time and trillions of dollars building weapons and structuring forces to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United States or its major allies with nuclear weapons. During much of that time, both France and Britain had a sufficient nuclear capability to deliver a devastating, perhaps terminal attack against the United States. Yet little or no time or resources were spent worrying about or preparing for the threat of a British or French attack. Why the difference? Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were hostile, while those between the United States and Britain or France were friendly. And when the Cold War ended and the relationship between Russia and the United States became much more cordial, very few Americans – in or out of the military – continued to fear a Russian nuclear strike. Yet the Russian military remained every bit as capable of destroying the United States as it had been during the Cold War. Furthermore, the United States, which has never been all that concerned about Israel's nuclear arsenal, went to war in Iraq citing fears that the Iraqis were trying to develop weapons of mass destruction and is today very worried about the possibility that Iran may be trying to build a nuclear arsenal. It is certainly true that security is primarily a matter of relationships.

As in the Korean peninsula, a military standoff can give the appearance of peace, but there is always an undercurrent of insecurity as long as the underlying relationship is hostile. Security cannot be complete until there is peace, and peace is more than just the absence of war. It is also the absence of imminent threat of deadly violence and war. Though Israel and its various enemies have fought a number of short wars over the past 60 years, for most of that time, they have not been actively engaged in warfare. But they have lived virtually all of that time in fear and under constant threat of the active eruption of violence and war. No sensible person would say that the Israelis and the people of the surrounding countries (most assuredly including the Palestinians) live in peace. And until the people of the Korean peninsula are able to put an end to the hostility between their two nations and therefore change the nature of their relationship, they will not truly be at peace and they will not be fully secure.

There are two critical steps in turning enemies into friends. The first is overcoming the enmity by finding a way to reduce mutual hostility and suspicion. That depends primarily on communication. Communication is critical to relationships, and messages are more powerfully and more credibly transmitted and received when they are carried by behavior as well as words. The second step is creating and cementing friendship by building strong positive ties. That depends on creating a system of relationships that provides balanced and mutually beneficial gains. We consider each of these steps in turn.

## **2. BREAKING DOWN HOSTILITY AND SUSPICION: A BRIEF PRIMER ON GRIT**

In 1962, Charles Osgood, professor of psychology at the University of Illinois and president of the American Psychological Association, published an intriguing book entitled *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Osgood, 1962). At the center of this book was a strategy for breaking down entrenched hostility in international relationships based on his work in the psychology of communications. He called this strategy GRIT, an acronym for Graduated Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction.<sup>1</sup> It is a flexible system of communication using words backed by actions, with the explicit purpose of reducing international tensions. Although Osgood originally developed the system to address the hostility between the



United States and U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, it is much more broadly applicable to situations of hostile two-party relationships.

The effectiveness of GRIT does not depend on any pre-existing agreement between the two sides. In fact, it is a strategy based on unilateral initiatives that either side can and should begin on its own without any pre-conditions. It is also non-competitive in the sense that it works even better if both sides decide to use it. GRIT is based on the understanding that when two parties have become hostile to each other, they both interpret each other's words and actions through the filter of that hostility. Each side comes to see the other as the "bad guy," out to deceive it and do it harm. No matter how conciliatory the intention, whatever words are said and whatever action is taken by one party are regarded with suspicion by the other. Once it has become entrenched, it is extremely difficult to break down this "bad guy" mentality. It requires dedication, patience, and persistence.

GRIT begins with the leader of one nation (call it "Country A"), making a public announcement, saying in effect, "There has been a state of hostility between our country and Country B for too long. We no longer consider this situation acceptable, and we are determined to improve it. As a result, we are going to begin a continuing series of action initiatives intended to reduce tensions between our two nations. We will announce each of these initiatives in advance, and invite Country B to reciprocate with whatever positive gesture it believes appropriate. If Country B will join us in this, we will soon put an end to the fear and suspicion that have kept us from working together. We cannot undo the past, but we are dedicated to creating a better future."

Given the hostile atmosphere, at least at first, this announcement will most likely be interpreted either as a propaganda ploy or as some kind of trick. That is to be expected. That is why it is so important to choose the unilateral initiatives carefully, to announce them in advance, and to carry them out as announced on time. What kind of initiatives should be undertaken? If the two nations are most concerned about preventing the outbreak of military conflict, the tension-reducing initiatives should certainly include some confidence-building measures in the military arena, such as increased notice of maneuvers or small but meaningful reductions in forward deployed troops. But they should not be restricted to military moves.

Instead, over the course of time, initiatives should include virtually all areas of current or potential interaction between the two countries – military, economic, environmental, cultural, and educational. For example, an educational initiative might include an invitation to host 1,000 high-school

students from their country to study for a semester in your country, or to send (and pay for) 1,000 high-school students from your country to study in their country, or both. A comparable cultural initiative might involve an invitation to the other country to send musicians or athletes to tour and perform in your country at your expense, or an offer to send musicians or athletes from your country to tour and perform in theirs. Environmental initiatives could include a commitment to reduce pollution from your country that may be creating a problem in theirs (such as acid rain) by a specified amount by a target date, or a commitment to clean up a river that both countries depend on for water or power. Unilateral economic initiatives might involve opening your markets to their products or offering to provide financing for a needed infrastructure project in their country. Medical exchanges or assistance, disaster assistance, and development aid are just a few of many other possibilities. The specific kinds of unilateral initiatives that make sense in any particular case depend on a host of economic, political, geographic, social, and cultural factors. But there are always some things that can be done.

Every initiative that is taken should be announced in advance, and carried out at the time and in the way that has been announced. Every announcement should also be accompanied by an invitation to the other country to reciprocate *without* specifying how. Doing what you said you would do, the way you said you would do it and when you said you would do it is important to the slow process of building confidence that you mean what you say and that you are serious about reducing tensions. Inviting reciprocation makes it clear that, even though the initiatives themselves are unilateral, you consider the other party a partner in this process. Leaving it up to them to choose the type and size of reciprocation they are ready to undertake makes it clear that you are not trying to trick or coerce them into doing what you want them to do. The GRIT process is about communication, and good communication requires not only that the transmitter send a clear message, but also that the recipient interprets it accurately.

The size of any particular initiative can be varied to reflect the extent to which they have reciprocated the previous initiative. If there is a generous reciprocal move, then the next announcement you make should take note of that fact, and explicitly state that their fulsome response is encouraging and allows you to specify a larger initiative as your next step. If their response is weak, it should be noted that you are pleased that they have positively reciprocated, a smaller next initiative should be announced and reciprocation should again be invited. If they do not respond at all, it is important to take note of that in your next announcement, but to make it clear that while you are disappointed, you remain determined to improve the relationship,

and announce (and carry out) another tension-reducing initiative, once more inviting reciprocation.

But what if they react in a negative way? For example, suppose you had carried out an initiative to unilaterally reduce forward deployed troops, and in response they had increased their own forward deployed troops. You should rebuild the strength of your forward deployed forces, while making an announcement to the effect that you are sorry the leaders of the other country have apparently misinterpreted your intentions, thinking that you have become either weak or less determined to defend yourself. Neither of those things is true. You remain every bit as determined to keep your nation secure, and will do what is needed to assure that security. But at the same time, you remain convinced that the best path for both your countries is to build a more positive relationship. And you announce and carry out a new initiative in any area of interaction, preferably non-military for now. Again, it is a matter of communication. By reacting to their move in this way, you send a message by your words and your actions that you have not gone “soft”; you are not giving in, but you are also not giving up your determination to improve the relationship. In fact, one of the most important reasons for taking initiatives in a variety of areas is that it gives you the flexibility to disabuse your adversaries of any idea that these initiatives are a sign of weakness by strongly confronting any attempt by them to take advantage in any one arena, while still allowing you to move the GRIT strategy forward elsewhere.

If the hostility is deep and longstanding, it may take quite a few initiatives and quite a long time to get the right message across, have it accepted by the other country, and convince them that both of you will gain a great deal from an improved relationship. There are, of course, no guarantees that GRIT will work. But if it does finally begin to work and the hostility becomes substantially diminished, it will then become far easier to replace GRIT's reciprocated unilateral initiatives with a bilateral process of negotiation and joint action that is faster and stronger, precisely because of the much improved relationship that GRIT has helped to create.

There is by now striking evidence from the real world of international relations that GRIT-like unilateral strategies can be effective. In the early 1960s, after years of frustration in trying to negotiate an atmospheric nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, U.S. President John F. Kennedy decided to give the idea of unilateral initiatives a try. On June 10, 1963, at the height of the Cold War and not long after the terrifying Cuban Missile Crisis, he announced the first initiative in what was to be an ongoing series: the United States would unilaterally stop testing nuclear weapons in

the atmosphere. He invited the Soviet Union to join the moratorium, saying that the United States would not test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere again unless another country did. The Soviet Union responded by unilaterally halting their tests, and within a few months, the elusive treaty was signed.<sup>2</sup> It is still in effect today. In 1977, convinced that an end to the decades-long hostility between his country and Israel would yield an enormous “peace dividend,” Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat made a speech to the Egyptian parliament in which he stated that he would unilaterally go anywhere, without pre-conditions, even to the capital of Israel itself to find a way to peace. The Israelis responded by inviting him to come to their country and speak to their parliament, the Knesset. Greeted warmly by thousands of Israelis when he arrived, Sadat’s speech to the Knesset created a new momentum for peace. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin then went to Egypt, where he too was greeted with great warmth and enthusiasm. Within a relatively short time the Camp David Accords were concluded (1978), and ultimately a peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel in Washington, DC on March 26, 1979 – a treaty that has remained resilient and vital for 30 years now, despite many deep disagreements between the two countries.<sup>3</sup>

It is not necessary to completely eliminate fear and suspicion between two countries before taking actions of a different sort to make the likelihood of armed conflict much more remote. Once the level of hostility has been reduced enough to allow it, it becomes possible to begin taking advantage of the power of properly structured economic relationships to draw nations closer together and strengthen the bonds between them.

### **3. USING ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO BUILD AND KEEP THE PEACE**

In the late 1970s, Kenneth Boulding, former President of the American Economics Association, put forth what he referred to as the “chalk theory” of war and peace (Boulding, 1978). A piece of chalk breaks when the strain applied to it is greater than its strength, that is, its ability to resist that strain. Similarly, war breaks out between nations when the strains between them exceed the ability of their relationship to withstand the strain. The key to establishing stable peace between them therefore lies in finding ways to reduce the strain on the relationship, increase the strength of the relationship, or better still both. The chalk theory is a useful mental frame of

reference, because it helps us to think about war in systemic probabilistic terms. Anything that increases strain or weakens resistance to that strain adds to the probability of war; anything that reduces strain or increases the ability of the system to withstand strain helps keep the peace. The boundary between the outbreak of war and the continuance of peace depends on many things.

In the midst of this complexity and uncertainty, maximizing the peacekeeping and peacebuilding potential of international economic relationships is part of the answer to establishing a durable peace. For international economic relationships to make their greatest contribution to peace, there must be a potent combination of economically based strain-mitigating and strength-enhancing strategies. That sounds more complicated than it actually is, at least in concept. It comes down to a handful of basic principles that define the character of peacekeeping economic relationships.<sup>4</sup> The first and by far the most important of these is that the relationships must be balanced and mutually beneficial.

### *3.1. Principle I: Establish Balanced Relationships*

There has been a longstanding debate in the political science literature between the “liberals” and the “realists” as to whether economic relationships create peace or provoke war. The “liberals” claim that higher levels of international economic activity help to keep the peace, and the “realists” claim that they create conflict and war. These opposing contentions seem utterly contradictory, but I believe they are both right. Higher levels of international economic activity can make war either more or less likely. What they actually do depends crucially on the nature of the activity, not just its extent. Unbalanced, exploitative relationships tend to increase the number and severity of conflicts; balanced, mutually beneficial relationships tend to reduce them.

A relationship is “balanced and mutually beneficial” if its benefits flow to every participant and there is a rough equivalence between everyone’s contribution to the relationship and the benefit they derive from the relationship.<sup>5</sup> It does not mean that all parties to the relationship benefit equally regardless of their contribution. A balance of benefit implies that those who participate are compensated for their participation in a way that truly reflects the value of their contribution rather than their differences in their bargaining power.<sup>6</sup> Unbalanced, exploitative relationships are thus those in which the flow of benefit is overwhelmingly in one direction, and does not correspond to relative contribution.

The enormous trade imbalance between the United States and China, for example, is not proof that the two nations have an unbalanced, exploitative economic relationship. The United States may be buying a much larger dollar value of goods from China than China is buying from the United States, but if the United States is paying China a price that reflects the true value of the goods it is purchasing, and China is paying the United States a price that reflects the true value of the goods it is purchasing, their trading relationship is balanced, mutually beneficial, and thus unlikely to provoke war. A fair trading price is the price that would be paid with open competition and no distortions arising from differences in economic or political power between the trading partners.<sup>7</sup>

There is some interesting evidence from the field of experimental economics that people intuitively understand the importance of treating others fairly in economic transactions, if only out of self-interest. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a one-time, two-person game in which one person, the Proposer, makes an offer to divide a sum of money (say \$100) provided by the Experimenter with another person, the Responder, in a specified proportion – say 60–40 or 90–10%. If the Responder accepts the offer, they divide the money the way the Proposer suggested; if the offer is not accepted, neither gets anything. After running this experiment many times in various countries under various conditions, the researchers noted that rather than trying to get a very lopsided deal, the majority of Proposers offered the Responders 40–50% of the sum of money, and about half of the Responders rejected any offer below 30% (Kapstein, 2006). Of course, we cannot be sure whether most Proposers made a relatively balanced offer out of a belief in the value of fairness or out of pure self-interest. But it is very clear that half the Responders preferred to walk away empty-handed rather than accept an offer they considered really unfair.

If any party to an unbalanced relationship is suffering a net loss, that party tends to feel ill used and hostile. But even if everyone is gaining something, the fact that the vast majority of benefit flows elsewhere is likely to create or aggravate antagonisms among those who receive less value than they contribute. There is certainly little or no incentive for them to work at resolving whatever conflicts might occur, economic or otherwise. If they come to see disruption of the relationship as key to rebalancing it or replacing it with a more beneficial relationship with a different partner, there will be an incentive to raise the intensity of those conflicts – in extreme cases, even to the point of war.

Balanced economic relationships have the opposite effect. Since everyone gains benefit at least equal to their contribution, out of pure self-interest no

one will want to see the relationship disrupted, let alone want to take deliberate action to disrupt it themselves. Furthermore, when gains are more equitably divided, the economic growth and development of all of the parties to the relationship is stimulated. Resources are more effectively used; producers become more productive; the size of the market grows. As a result, they have more to offer each other as time goes by, both as sources of products and as sources of profits.

Unbalanced, exploitative economic relationships are something like a zero-sum game, a game of redistribution (such as poker) where the gains of one party are achieved at the expense of another. But balanced, mutually beneficial relationships do not simply divide up a fixed pie of benefit; they help the pie to grow. Balanced relationships distribute the gains of the larger pie in a way that is more likely to create a “virtuous circle,” a positive feedback loop that keeps the pie growing. The advantages of balanced relationships tend to grow over time.

There is yet another way in which the peacekeeping potential of balanced relationships increases with the passage of time. When two nations are engaged in an expanding web of balanced, mutually beneficial economic interactions, more and more people in both countries have increasing and more regularized contact as a natural consequence of engaging in economic activity together. They will need to exchange e-mails, talk on the telephone, and even have face-to-face meetings simply to coordinate their activities. At first these contacts among people that have long been isolated from each other may be stilted, formal, and very much focused on the business at hand. But people are people, and eventually their ongoing social interactions will lead them to begin to know each other better. They will spend more time in each other’s country and almost inevitably become more familiar with each other’s life circumstances. These interactions will not always be positive. Sometimes they will not like each other. But more often than not, this increased contact will melt away the artificially turgid, stereotypical images they have had of each other and lead to a greater understanding and empathy. Some friendships will be made, and, even more important, much of the long-held enmity is likely to slowly disappear.

Even when gains are balanced, if the process involved in making key decisions relative to a relationship is unbalanced, those with less input and control in the decision process are likely to feel that they are unduly dependent on the good will of others. Believing that the terms of the relationship are subject to arbitrary, unilateral change creates insecurity and weakens commitment. When decision-making power is more equally shared, everyone involved has ownership in the relationship. It is their property, not

simply a gift someone has bestowed upon them and can just as easily withdraw. Every participant will therefore be motivated to take care of the relationship, to insure its continuation and success. This cannot help but strengthen the incentives of all participants to find peaceful ways of settling their conflicts with each other.

This idea may seem more at home in psychology or sociology, but it is actually a central tenet of free market economics as well.<sup>8</sup> It is the reason so much emphasis is placed on the institution of private property. Property is an asset that can provide continuing economic benefits. As a result, the private owners of property have a strong personal incentive to maximize the flow of those benefits by caring for it properly and using it efficiently – an incentive that works to the benefit of the society as a whole. Similarly, because a balanced economic relationship is an asset that can provide continuing economic benefits, each of the “owners” of the relationship also has a strong incentive to maximize the flow of benefits by caring for it properly. In either case, that incentive would be much weaker for any participant who did not have meaningful control over the asset and therefore had no way of influencing decisions that might reduce or completely halt the flow of benefits to them.

When decision power is balanced in a relationship, all participants have a greater sense of security because they know that they will be directly involved in any decision to change the rules or character of the relationship.<sup>9</sup> This will not necessarily prevent all changes that at least temporarily reduce their gains or increase their costs. But it will assure them that no changes will occur without their input, and perhaps (depending on the agreed decision rules) their consent. It is easier for anyone who has been a full partner in deciding to make a change to accept it without undue hostility, even if it hurts. Painful change that is coerced or imposed is an entirely different thing.

There are thus two aspects of balance in international economic relationships that are key: (1) balance of benefits and (2) balance of decision power. Balance of benefits is the most important to the power of international economic relationships to keep the peace. The lack of this kind of balance is virtually the definition of exploitation. But balance of decision power is also important, since it is what makes participants in these relationships see themselves as partners, rather than subordinates.

When economic relationships are balanced in both these senses, current gains and the prospect of still greater gains in the future create strong self-interested incentives to settle the conflicts that inevitably arise more peacefully.<sup>10</sup> As those conflicts are successfully resolved time after time,



the idea of allowing them to fester to the point of desperate confrontation comes to seem more and more absurd. The thought of brandishing the threat of war against valued economic partners slowly recedes, and war itself ultimately comes to be seen as unnecessary, undesirable, and inherently counterproductive.

### *3.2. The European Union*

The effectiveness of mutually beneficial, balanced economic relationships in keeping the peace is illustrated by the development and growth of today's European Union (EU). The EU began as the European Coal and Steel Community formed by six nations shortly after World War II (1952), with the deliberate purpose of trying to build economic bonds (especially between France and Germany) to make the outbreak of war among them less likely.<sup>11</sup> By the mid-1980s, the dozen nations that belonged to the EEC included Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. These nations had fought countless wars with each other over the centuries (including World Wars I and II), and were also major colonial powers that militarily dominated and exploited much of the rest of the world. Yet today, if you were to ask the leaders (or the citizens) of any of these countries the odds of their countries fighting a war with each other over the next 50 years, they would not even consider it a sensible question.

It is not as if these countries no longer have conflicts with each other. In fact, they have many, economic and otherwise, some of them very serious. In the last few years alone, there were major disagreements over the banning of British beef by other EU member states as a result of the outbreak of "mad cow" disease in Britain, ongoing squabbles over the adoption of the single European currency (the euro), and a sharp split over the 2003 war in Iraq (with the governments of Britain, the Netherlands, and Spain strongly in support and those of France, Germany, and Belgium strongly opposed).

But all the EU nations understand that the network of balanced, mutually beneficial economic relationships they have created gives them a strong stake in finding ways to manage, if not to resolve, the conflicts they have with each other. They simply have too much to lose to let their disagreements get out of control. So they debate, they argue, they shout. But they no longer threaten, or even think about threatening each other militarily, let alone actually going to war. With all of its problems, the EU is a clear piece of evidence that using properly structured international economic

relationships to build and keep the peace between former enemies is an eminently practical and achievable enterprise.

### *3.3. A Note on Principle II: Emphasize Development*

The poverty and frustration of so many of the world's people is a fertile breeding ground for violent conflict. There have been well more than 120 wars since the end of World War II, taking more than 20 million human lives. Nearly all of them have been fought in developing countries. People in desperate economic straits tend to reach for extreme solutions. They are much more easily manipulated by demagogues. Violent disruption is more threatening to people in good economic condition because they have a lot more to lose. Therefore, emphasizing inclusive and widespread development is important to inhibiting the outbreak of war.

There are many reasons why war erupts, and therefore few grounds for believing that, by itself, even a vast improvement in everyone's material well-being would put an end to war. But encouraging inclusive and widespread development is important to giving the largest possible part of the world's population a direct, obvious, and personal stake in avoiding disruptive explosions of violent conflict. Looked at through the perspective of Boulding's "chalk theory" of war and peace, development helps keep the peace by strengthening resistance to the outbreak of war, as well as reducing one source of strain that can directly or indirectly lead to war – the frustration and hostility of those who are economically deprived and politically marginalized.

### *3.4. A Note on Principle III: Minimize Ecological Stress*

There is no question that competition for depletable resources generates conflict. The desire to gain (and if possible monopolize) access to raw materials and fuels was one of the driving forces behind the colonization of much of the world by the more economically and militarily advanced nations in centuries past. This competition continues to bring nations, and sometimes sub-national groups, into conflicts of the most dangerous kind – those in which at least one party believes that the continued economic well-being, political sovereignty, or even survival of its people is at stake.

Furthermore, the air and the water do not recognize the artificial lines that we have drawn on the earth to separate ourselves from each other.

Environmental damage knows no national boundaries, and can also be an important source of international conflict. That is illustrated by both acute environmental disasters such as the nuclear power accident at Chernobyl and such chronic problems as acid rain. Trans-border pollution itself may not lead to war, but it has already generated considerable conflict and has the prospect of generating a great deal more. Every additional source of tension contributes to the strain on the international system and therefore to the likelihood that other sources of conflict will lead to the eruption of violence. Put simply, the greater the load on the camel's back, the more likely the next straw will break it.

Some have argued that the expansion of economic activity itself is inconsistent with maintaining environmental quality, that modern production techniques and consumption activities generate an unavoidable degree of ecological stress. There is an element of truth in this. Still, the levels of economic well-being to which the people of the more developed countries have become accustomed to can be maintained, improved, and extended to the people of the less developed nations without even generating current levels of environmental damage. Accomplishing this feat requires: (1) a great deal more attention than is currently being paid to the efficient use of natural resources; (2) the development and extensive use of pollution-abating technologies and procedures; and (3) a substantial shift toward qualitative rather than quantitative economic growth in the more developed countries.<sup>12</sup>

### *3.5. Pre-Conditions*

It is difficult, if not impossible, to begin the process of building a web of peacekeeping economic relationships between two deeply hostile countries until the tensions between them have been significantly reduced. In that sense, GRIT is one possible strategy for creating the necessary pre-conditions for the success of economic peacebuilding. But there should be no pre-conditions demanded of the opposing country before either engaging in GRIT or working to build up peacekeeping economic relationships. The point of using these strategies, especially in combination, is that they are designed to be proactive in turning those who seem to be enemies with whom no reasonable accommodation is possible first into partners willing to cooperate in peacefully managing, if not resolving, the conflicts that have kept the enmity alive, and perhaps ultimately into friends. It does not make sense to require your enemy to become more reasonable and acceptable – in short, less of an enemy – before you will be willing to put these strategies into action.

More than that, this kind of pre-condition – even if it is completely reasonable – can not only stall the peacebuilding process, but also undermine it. For example, early in the 2000s, the Israeli prime minister called for the Palestinians (and their allies) to cease all terrorist attacks on Israelis for number of weeks as a pre-condition for resuming the peace process. It did not seem an unreasonable demand. But in practice, what it actually did was to give the power to derail the peace process to anyone with a bomb – whether a Palestinian, an Israeli, or someone else. And that is exactly what happened. As a general rule, it is not a good idea to play into the hands of those who are most violently opposed to what you are trying to accomplish.

Pre-conditions can also be used as excuses for not taking action to build peace, while at the same time giving the appearance of being committed to the peacebuilding process. But it is important to remember that trust and friendship are intended *outcomes* of this process, not its required *inputs*. Pre-conditions only get in the way.

#### **4. ECONOMIC PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING: THE CASE OF KOREA**

I claim no special expertise in the politics, economics, or culture of Korea, all of which are very important here. It is not a simple matter to build balanced, sustainable, and efficient economic linkages that work to the mutual benefit of all parties involved, and not simply to the benefit of a small elite group within one or both countries. It requires considerable knowledge of how the economy, political system, social structure, and social norms of the countries involved operate in practice, not just in theory. When “outside experts” with very limited knowledge of the particulars of societies try to provide fully formed solutions, they often do more harm than good. That is one reason for the failure of so many well-intentioned development projects to date. It is also why so much of the advice given by Western experts to the formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union when they undertook their transition to market economies caused so much pain and accomplished so little. A more useful role for outside experts is to point out likely stumbling blocks, raise questions, and provide useful pieces of information as input for the countries involved to consider, while “inside experts” work out the design and implementation of programs for accomplishing the objectives at hand. In that spirit, I offer the following analysis.

There is a high probability that building a web of peacekeeping economic relationships between South Korea and North Korea will make a very positive contribution to creating real peace on the Korean peninsula. But this is a very difficult case in which to apply the principles of economic peacekeeping, especially the first and most important principle, “establish balanced relationships.” First, the vast difference in political systems, and, in particular, the highly authoritarian nature of the North Korean government, makes it potentially more difficult to come to the political accommodations necessary to move this process forward. It also complicates insuring that the broad mass of the people of North Korea will participate in the gains that the right kind of wider economic relations will produce. But once agreements can be reached, they may be able to be more quickly implemented. Second, the enormous difference in the level of economic development between the North and the South is in some ways a bigger problem. It is much easier to establish truly balanced, mutually beneficial relationships between countries at higher and more equal levels of development because they have more to offer each other. Finally, the United States is a major outside influence here, and U.S. policy has been especially counterproductive in recent years, making North Korea even more suspicious and fearful than it already was. This problem at least may be only temporary. The coming change of administrations in the United States creates the possibility that there may be a more helpful policy in place soon.

On the other hand, some progress has already been made in moving forward the process of building economic relations between the two Koreas. The first post-war inter-Korean trade in goods took place two decades ago, in November 1988. In 1990 and 1991, South Korea shipped rice, electronic goods, and appliances North, and North Korea shipped cement, coal, and works of art South. As soon as both Koreas were admitted to the UN in 1991, South Korean firms (including Hyundai and Samsung) accelerated their rate of importing iron and other metals (among other things) from North Korea, while exporting a range of electronic and other manufactured products to the North. They also began to explore the possibilities for moving beyond commodity trade and locating manufacturing and other business enterprises in the Democratic People’s Republic ([U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies, 2008](#)).

By 2006, the value of inter-Korean trade had risen to US\$1.35 billion, much of it related to processing or assembly work done by North Korean workers employed by South Korean firms operating in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), 6 miles North of the Demilitarized Zone

(although the bulk of South Korean exports to the North that year were still non-commercial). As of December 2007, some 65 South Korean firms were manufacturing goods in the KIC, employing close to 20,000 North Korean workers. The first products were shipped from Kaesong only four years ago (December 2004), but within another four years (2012) plans call for the KIC to be home to the operations of 250 firms, employing 350,000 workers (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2008).

The KIC is one of the two centerpieces of economic cooperation between the North and the South. The other is the Mt. Kungang tourism project in the Democratic People's Republic. Since 1998, when the Republic of Korea first began organizing tours to Mt. Kungang, more than a million travelers have made the trip (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, *ibid.*). But unfortunately, both the Mt. Kungang tourism project and the KIC are enclaves, located near the border and almost entirely disconnected from the rest of North Korea (Haggard & Noland, 2007). I do not know whether there was any real degree of balance in decision power in establishing either project, or whether the North is currently an active and equal partner in managing them and sharing in any economic return they might provide. If so, they would be useful examples of the kind of relationships that have economic peacekeeping potential. But the fact that they are enclaves makes them seem to be essentially South Korean projects done on North Korean soil in exchange for some form of payment to the North Korean government. If that is the case, they might still serve a useful door-opening function, but neither of them would be the kind of balanced, mutually beneficial economic relationships that are key to economic peacekeeping.

There has also been some progress in building economic relationships through joint infrastructure initiatives. Since the June 2000 summit, the North and South have reconnected roads crossing the Demilitarized Zone and their railroads on the east and west coasts. The east coast road was completed years ago and has been used by tourists traveling from the South to Mt. Kungang since 2003. In December 2007, freight began crossing the border by rail between Kaesong in the North and Munsan in the South. Much of this work has been funded by the South, and seems to have made the most progress where it most directly served as an adjunct to the other South Korean projects in the North (Op.cit., Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, p. 7). But since South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan would all benefit (in terms of reduced transportation costs) from a thoroughgoing rehabilitation of the North Korean rail

system, this seems like an area ripe for much greater and more widely supported joint economic cooperation between the North and South (Haggard & Noland, 2008). It offers a real opportunity for building peace through widened and deepened economic relationships. If designed, implemented, and operated with the peacekeeping principles in mind, these infrastructure projects could make a substantial contribution to creating a sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula.

Because energy issues have played an important role in the confrontation with North Korea over their nuclear programs, it would be particularly appropriate to try to create economic peacekeeping projects in this area of infrastructure development as well. Rather than fixating on nuclear power, it would be a good idea to focus on energy projects that are more ecologically benign and have much less risk of vertical or horizontal nuclear proliferation associated with them. Two broad possibilities that come easily to mind are the development of large- and small-scale renewable energy projects on the Korean peninsula and offshore, and investments in increasing energy efficiency. It should be relatively easy to conceive of projects in this arena of economic activity that would align well with all three peacekeeping economic principles.

It is also a good idea to consider establishing some programs that are more people-to-people oriented, such as direct farmer-to-farmer agricultural cooperation or doctor-to-doctor health initiatives. This bottom-up approach might make it easier to keep politicians and political agendas at a distance. It would allow the building of relationships among those who face common problems, though perhaps in a different form and certainly within a different context. People who struggle with the same challenges often have an easier time sharing experiences, understanding each other, and learning from each other. It will take some creativity to design and implement programs like this that take the form of balanced partnerships, and are not simply seen as charity. But if it can be done, it is likely to produce the benefits that are associated with economic peacekeeping.

It has taken determination, patience, and persistence to build up inter-Korean economic activity over the past decade or two. Those efforts have created a small but important base on which to construct a much stronger and better integrated web of economic relationships in the future. If careful attention is paid to the underlying principles of economic peacekeeping in building this web, it will tie the two Koreas together in ways that will enhance both security and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in the wider region.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The problem of maximizing security can be thought of as having the form of what mathematicians call a “constrained maximization” problem. In such a problem, the value of some specified “objective function” is maximized subject to an array of constraints on the variables included in the objective function. It is a basic tenet of constrained optimization theory that the value of the maximum can only be increased in one of the following two ways: (1) by loosening one or more of the binding constraints or (2) by redefining the objective function. In the case we have been discussing, the value of the objective function is the level of national and international security, and the variables contained in the objective function are all the factors that affect security (positively or negatively). The GRIT strategy amounts to a technique for improving the maximum by loosening the constraints imposed by ongoing hostility. Economic peacekeeping amounts to a strategy for redefining the objective (security) function, by adding new variables and perhaps also by changing the form of the function itself. In situations of ongoing hostility, either approach taken alone is helpful. Both taken together are much more powerful.

We know from mathematical optimization theory that as long as we fail to loosen the constraints and/or redefine the objective function, we simply have no hope of increasing the maximum. Therefore, if we insist on continuing to think about security primarily in narrow military-oriented terms, we will be stuck with the inadequate level of security we have and will be unable to achieve the higher level of security we want. Even if we are doing the best we can under existing circumstances, we will miss the chance to realize the enormous security gains that could be achieved by using GRIT and economic peacekeeping to change those circumstances for the better. We simply cannot allow ourselves to be trapped by the most important binding constraint of all – an unwillingness to think broadly and act boldly.

Neither the GRIT strategy nor economic peacekeeping can be guaranteed to work, but then no security strategy works all the time. Certainly strategies that rely primarily on the threat or use of military force to keep the peace have failed repeatedly, as is made clear enough by the long history of armed confrontations that have sooner or later erupted into war. But in the historical record we see clear evidence that GRIT-like strategies can break seemingly unbreakable deadlocks and in the daily operation of the EU we see evidence that economic peacekeeping is a practical and effective strategy for building security and keeping the peace.



Peace becomes possible when peace becomes practical. When it becomes clear that all of the parties involved can better achieve their objectives and address their needs through peaceful means, the prospects for lasting peace are strengthened. The widening zone of stable peace and economic prosperity in Europe that has resulted from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and its metamorphosis into the expanding EU of today is one clear example. There is every reason to believe that what the EU has accomplished can be accomplished elsewhere by similar means.

I have tried to present some strategic ideas that should be helpful guidelines in designing effective projects to build a sustainable peace, even in places like the Korea where the challenges are great. But the details of such projects should be worked out by those directly involved, not by outsiders. Koreans know the politics, economics, and especially the culture of Korea best. They have the insight and the talent needed, and they have the biggest stake in making the process work. Turning enemies into friends is not a simple process, but it is the key to real security and lasting peace. Where the stakes are as high as they are on the Korean peninsula, it will be well worth the effort.

## NOTES

1. Actually although he did call the strategy GRIT, Osgood's original name for it was Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction, which does not fit his acronym as well.

2. Kennedy's program of initiatives was not intended to be limited to the test ban. This was to be the beginning, not the end. For a much more detailed discussion, see Etzioni (1967).

3. Anwar al-Sadat, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/sadat.html> (accessed June 12, 2008).

4. I am currently working on the manuscript of a new book, tentatively titled, *The Peacekeeping Economy: Using Economic Relationships to build a More Peaceful, Prosperous, and Secure World*, which will include much more discussion and analysis of the principles of economic peacekeeping and how to implement them. For a brief discussion of several of the basic principles of an economic peacekeeping, see Dumas (2006). An earlier but somewhat more detailed discussion can be found in "Economics and Alternative Security: Toward a Peacekeeping International Economy", in Weston (1990).

5. This concept of balance and benefit is consistent with Aristotle's dictum that "the well-being of every polis depends on each of its elements rendering to others an amount equivalent to what it received from them", though in a very different context (see Aristotle, 1958).

6. The economic models of pure competition produce results that are in general more socially beneficial than those of monopoly mainly because power differentials unrelated to productivity are eliminated by the extreme assumptions of the purely competitive model. The intensity of competition in product and resources markets strips away any differential bargaining power that could lead to a lack of balance, in the sense I have defined it.

7. This concept of balance is a combination of fundamental ideas of equity and the economist's notion that allocative efficiency requires resources to be compensated in accordance with their productivity.

8. Although, truth be told, most economists do not seem to think of it that way. 9. The sole exception, of course, is that any party to a purely voluntary relationship, unconstrained by contractual requirements to the contrary, is free to end their participation without anyone else's consent.

10. The strength of that incentive depends on the salience of that relationship to the parties involved. Even if a relationship is balanced, if it is of little significance to either party, the incentive it creates to avoid conflict arising from other causes will be weak.

11. The formation of the ECSC was the result of a proposal by Robert Schuman, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. This proposal was based on provisions in the Marshall Plan, the American plan for the post-war economic reconstruction of Europe (Rittberger, 2001).

12. Further discussion and analysis of this approach in the context of the problem of climate change may be found in Dumas (2007), and are elaborated by other papers in the report by Dumas (2008).

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# THE MILITARY ROLE IN THE AMNESTY, RECONCILIATION, AND REINTEGRATION (AR2) PROCESS: AN EXPANDED FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

Michael W. Mosser

## ABSTRACT

*The amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration (AR2) process in a fractured and fragmented society may require assistance from the security sector to become fully operational. This article develops a framework for how such assistance may be implemented, based on current and developing US military operational doctrines and national security documents. It considers briefly the implementation of such principles via a discussion of the AR2 process in Northern Ireland.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In August 2007, the editors of *Military Review* asked the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) to develop a framework paper conceptualizing the

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos

Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 93–108

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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A011

military role in diminishing-conflict and post-conflict situations and locations (Mosser, 2007). The team of six Majors and one Ph.D. faculty member developed a process we termed “AR2”: the interrelated processes of amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration. Taken together, AR2 comprises a holistic and organic nexus that, in the absence of indigenous initiatives, is set in motion by the actions of a military “forcing function.” As the academic lead, I developed a framework attempting to explain the conditions under which AR2 might be needed and where it may arise, while the team of officers explored case studies of AR2 that differed widely in geographic scope and context, including Northern Ireland, South Africa, Rwanda, the Philippines, El Salvador, and the US Civil War.

This paper, actually more of a research note, is an extension of the original framework paper, re-presenting its arguments and expanding them in light of new Army doctrine which emphasizes the constructive role the military can play in fomenting positive change and rebuilding fractured societies. The primary question this paper seeks to raise is the following: how do we use the military instrument of national power to implement a policy of reconciliation while ensuring that the process by which such a policy occurs is not repressive? Showing examples from two case studies, the paper argues that in reality, using the military instrument of national power as a forcing function will succeed only when balanced among other elements of the process within the recipient society.

Before embarking on a discussion of the military and societal reconstruction, it is important to attempt to understand not just what we call AR2, but also its constituent elements. Crucially, AR2 is a *process* comprised of three distinct phases of societal reconstruction after civil war or other armed conflict: amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration into society (see Fig. 1). These three phases are themselves distinct processes and are not usually grouped together. Putting them together relationally, however, allows us to explore the dynamics of the interrelationships of societies in need of repair.




Fig. 1. The AR2 Process.

In each phase, the military can play a role, but how that role is played out depends a great deal on factors inherent to the situation on the ground as well as those politically back home.

### *1.1. Amnesty*

Of AR2's constituent elements, *amnesty* is both the most visible and the most problematic to define, and is usually found in the discussion of "national reconciliation." Generally centering on the UN and other international organizations as the prime movers in national reconciliation, the literature on national reconciliation tends to view amnesty in an instrumental light, as one step necessary to start a societal healing process (Amstutz, 2005; Freeman, 2006; Hazan, 2006; Philpott, 2006; United Nations, 2006; Dobbins, Jones, Crane & Cole DeGrasse, 2007). Amnesty, defined in the *Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military* (2001, 2002) as "an official pardon for people who have been convicted of political offenses," is generally held up as the absolute minimum that must be accomplished for any reconciliation to take place. It is important to note that amnesty is dependent in many ways on the cultural context in which it occurs, or whether it is called "amnesty" at all. By way of illustration, Bairstow (2008) argues that in the case of South Africa there were no convictions for political offenses. The amnesty was to encourage those accused of political crimes to come forth and put into the official record their testimony. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) realized that a non-retributive amnesty had to be in place in order to make the process of national reconciliation work. Whatever it is called, how amnesty is carried out, and to what extent it is "full" or "limited" are a matter of contention that depends a great deal on circumstances on the ground.<sup>1</sup> In the original article, I argued that some sort of societal or political dialog must take place, in most (but not all) cases leading to amnesty. Generally, this amnesty must be in place as a foundation before reconciliation or reintegration can take place.

Amnesty is a classic example of what might be called a "necessary but not sufficient" condition (Salmon, 1984). It is *necessary* in that without it none of the aggrieved parties are likely to put any effort into laying down arms or coming together in any way beyond the superficial. It is *insufficient* in that a declaration of amnesty is not enough to cement goodwill among the aggrieved parties. Indeed, without a clear roadmap toward the later two stages of the AR2 process in place at the time amnesty is granted, it may actually do

more harm than good to grant blanket amnesty to the aggrieved parties. Herrera and Nelson (2008) make this argument in the case of El Salvador, where granting of amnesty ended up “freezing” the conflict in place and in effect papered over the differences that led to the conflict in the first place.

Military actors play the most prominent role as a forcing function in the amnesty phase of AR2. Amnesty is a concrete mechanism through which the AR2 process begins. Thus, it is possible that in the transition from a conflict to a post-conflict situation, the military, acting either alone or in concert with an officially sanctioned political entity such as a transitional government or an international organization such as the United Nations, can grant amnesty in order to move the process along.

### *1.2. Reconciliation*

In contrast to amnesty, reconciliation is not a discrete step. Reconciliation is itself a process, and in many ways is not one that has any clear steps (unlike amnesty, where a formal declaration on the part of the government or other major party is often all that is required to “accomplish” that part of the process). In the AR2 schema, reconciliation can be considered both a sub-process of and a corollary to the overall framework.

Reconciliation is generally accomplished via formal juridical means or via civil society. In many respects, reconciliation is as much a perception issue among aggrieved parties as it is a practical issue of security sector reform (SSR). Some instances of reconciliation involve courts or tribunals where restitution to victims of violent action is granted (i.e., the Supreme Court cases in the Civil Rights era of the United States), whereas others involve a statesman with great standing (i.e., Nelson Mandela of South Africa) calling upon the perpetrators and victims of conflict to come together for the good of the nation.

In this step of the AR2 process, the role of the military as forcing function is limited. Military actors can move the process of reconciliation forward by serving to increase the security space in which political actors operate, but they cannot in and of themselves accomplish reconciliation. Much like reintegration into society (discussed below), reconciliation requires ideational change on the part of the parties involved in the conflict.

### *1.3. Reintegration*

“Reintegration” in the AR2 sense requires a wholesale reconnection of societal linkages broken during conflict. Thus, reintegration can be taken to

mean “reintegration back into a functioning society.” Every society is built on linkages; those linkages are normative and intersubjective in nature, meaning that the identities of members of a society – as well as the collective identity of the society itself – are mutually constituted. Social identities are the product of the network of interactions taking place within that society. In this sense, putting a society back together, or reintegrating it, is not as easy as merely bringing together one network of connections. Instead, to reintegrate society one must do a credible job of re-creating *all* networks of connections.

In terms of where it falls in the AR2 process, reintegration can be either ahead of or after reconciliation (see Fig. 1). Importantly, however, the society in question must be *integrated* before it can be *reintegrated*. Thus, as in the case of South Africa, the society divided by the policies of apartheid could not be reintegrated via traditional means – the society had to be re-imagined and recast as a pluralistic society (and thus integrated) before any progress could be made.

The use of the military element of national power to enforce reintegration is the most visible in the AR2 process, but its effects are solely means-based. As in the American South during the Civil Rights era, troops can be employed to force recalcitrant sectors of a society to come together, but the political leadership must have the strategic vision to know when the function of those troops serves more as a lightning rod focusing animus on the reintegrator than on the problems within the society itself. In other words, if the military instrument of national power is misused or used clumsily, the likelihood increases that the elements of society in conflict will instrumentally use a military “occupation” to serve their own ends.

#### *1.4. AR2: Putting the Pieces Together*

In the original article where I conceptualized the AR2 process, I argued that any comprehensive AR2 process requires full and wholesale incorporation *within a socio-cultural context* of three interrelated dimensions of a fractured polity: the political, economic, and security. Incomplete assimilation of these three areas will result in at best incomplete reconstruction of a fragmented polity, and at worst will sow the seeds for the future re-emergence of the conditions that led to the conflict in the first place. This multi-stage, multi-dimensional process is common to all projects of national reconciliation and reintegration into civil society of disaffected actors. The process as a whole,






Fig. 2. The AR2 Model.

depicted here by the Venn diagram of Fig. 2, can only be successful when constituent dimensions of a society are balanced.<sup>2</sup>

As I explained in the original AR2 article, the three dimensions of the AR2 model replicate the divisions found within any contemporary society. I define the political dimension as any political activity that takes place within formal governance structures at any level of a society; any action taken within these structures can be construed as “political.” Examples of political society can range from local PTAs to city councils to state/provincial or national government. Political society is therefore the exact opposite of civil society, which is generally defined in terms of voluntary associations, networks, or other non-political or non-governmental organizations (Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 2001). The economic dimension of a society is that in which economic activity takes place; I make no distinction between the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Finally, the security dimension of the society is one where issues facing society are best dealt with using the tools of the police, the judiciary, and/or military force (where appropriate, e.g., support to civil authorities in the case of national disasters).

Societies must also be reconciled and reintegrated on multiple levels. Primarily, we need to assess a society’s *receptiveness* to reconciliation. The level of receptiveness of a society for reconciliation (shown in Fig. 2 as the size of the “sweet spot” at the center of the political, economic, and security dimensions) varies, but it can be tested through metrics driven by and arising from the embedded dimensions. For example, we might call a society *politically* receptive to reconciliation and reintegration when it has put into

place some system of representative government, when it fairly and adequately represents all factions within it, and when it peacefully transitions from one government to the next, with a strong civic culture/civil society (Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980). By the same token, an *economically* receptive society could be one in which some attempt is made to address the income inequality gap, or a land reform process is put into place. Finally, a society receptive to reconciliation in the *security* dimension might be one where the police forces are seen as protectors rather than as predators, and where the military forces serve as guardians of representative government rather than as arbiters of justice. Increasing receptiveness in any dimension leads to the possibility of increased receptiveness in *all* dimensions.

Each of the three dimensions of a society undergoing the AR2 process has a key actor involved in balancing that dimension with the other two and expanding the AR2 “sweet spot” at the center. For the political and economic dimensions, there must be an apolitical and impartial actor – an *honest broker* – to prepare the ground politically for some sort of representative government and to increase the ability of the economy to adjust to the post-conflict environment. For the security dimension, the police, judiciary, and/or armed forces play the central role in maintaining order and administering justice. Ideally, this role would (and should) be played by internal security forces, but where that function is impossible (due to perceived or real difficulties in making the security sector apolitical and impartial) an outside actor must be willing to step in.

Each of the dimensions can also be weighted in terms of importance relative to the other two. Mapping the dimensions on a relative scale can give the analyst a better – though admittedly reductionist and simplified – picture of where to expend energy in the AR2 process. This becomes of paramount importance when attempting to discern the role of the military in fomenting change and pushing a society deeper into AR2. If, for example, the aggrieved parties of the society in question see the problem more in economic than in security terms, the military’s role as forcing function may well be to provide enough security to empower local economic actors to push through economic changes for the benefit of all. It is important to note, however, that such a mapping provides a condensed overview of the process; a case of national reconciliation may in later stages be weighted differently than when it began.

As Fig. 3 shows, the internal dimensions of the AR2 process, when modeled along three axes, give us a space on which we can place cases based on relative weighting of the dimensions within that particular country.




Fig. 3. AR2 Cases Plotted on Internal Dimensions.

Not surprisingly, most of the case studies are heavily weighted toward the security dimension, but one (El Salvador) was first and foremost an *economically* oriented conflict, and so appears as an outlier in the graph. Northern Ireland is represented twice on the graph, divided into two phases. Early on in the conflict, all sides presumed it to be a security matter. Only when the political dimension was given its due weight did the crisis resolve.

The military has been and continues to be the most visible element of US national power. As such, it has the greatest potential not just to make the headlines when it carries out kinetic operations in support of US policy and strategy, but also in terms of serving as a valuable actor in stability operations. As it operates around the world in prosecution of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the military by default becomes a major player not only in major combat operations (MCO) or counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, but also in promulgating conditions for a stable and viable post-conflict environment.

In the literature on post-conflict reconstruction, and especially SSR, the role of the military is traditionally viewed purely in terms of *internal* security, that is, the focus has generally been on what to do with the vestiges of the former regime’s military and security infrastructure (Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2006). Such a focus, while valuable, is limiting, and does not take into account the absolutely vital role an honest broker such as the US military can serve to shepherd through a conscientious, well-thought-out,

and universally applied program of AR2 within a country that is in desperate need of reconciliation.

Stability operations are becoming increasingly relevant to the US military and interagency. At every level, from Army to joint to Department of Defense (DoD), procedures for conducting stability operations are receiving increased scrutiny and re-evaluation. One of the most visible documents which highlights in no uncertain terms the key role stability operations are to play in future US military operations is DoD Directive 3000.05 ([United States Department of Defense, 2005](#)), especially paragraphs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.<sup>3</sup>

Stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction and development are inextricably linked, among both international organizations and US government departments and agencies. The Army's 2008 edition of its Field Manual for Operations (FM 3-0) speaks explicitly of the increasing relevance and pre-eminence of stability operations to current and future conflict: "Within the context of current operations worldwide, stability operations are often as important as – or more important than – offensive and defensive operations" ([US Army FM 3-0, 2008a, 2008b, p. vii](#)).

In this new way of thinking, stability operations become part of the process of a recipient country's internal development from conflict toward national reconciliation. Too often, however, statesmen, policymakers, or military executors of those policies fixate on that process, and fail to appreciate the intricacies of rebuilding a society in which groups may have been either disempowered for long periods of time or completely removed from any governing arrangements whatsoever. They see national reconciliation in linear and teleological terms, where a unified polity and society is the

end result of a process that builds on accomplishment of the preceding steps; overall success is determined more by the success of the process itself than by any substantive change for the better. A failure to recognize that national reconciliation is itself merely a part of a larger process – which I argue here must be preceded (or at least accompanied) by the two equally important steps of amnesty and reintegration – is a recipe for catastrophe. A secondary failure is the lack of understanding of the function that the military can play in helping to make that process work.

What role can (or should) the military play in setting itself up as the honest broker I see as so necessary to move a society forward toward national reconciliation? Is it even possible for a military, especially one that has most recently been the arbiter of force in regime change, to put itself in this position? I argue that not only is it possible, but it is also of vital importance that the military take on this role. Note that I use the phrase “honest broker” and not *neutral* referee or intermediary; this is a conscious choice of words that purposefully recognizes the facts on the ground in any post-conflict situation in which the military has been involved. Impartial does not mean neutral, and apolitical does not mean non-political. Rather, there is the expectation that the military will assist, where and when possible, in setting the boundary conditions to bring the warring factions together to undertake reconciliation. How it does so can be found in what US military doctrine calls “conflict termination” criteria. With whom it works, in the form of the multilateral global peace and security agencies such as the United Nations or regional security agencies like NATO or the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), also matters a great deal to the shape of the final AR2 process in that country.

In order for the military to serve as an honest broker and to serve at the same time as the “forcing function” in a society that needs to be reconciled, it is important to understand the standard operating procedures (SOPs) and criteria already in place by the military when dealing with transitional situations. These SOPs, grouped under the rubric of “conflict termination criteria,” are essential to establish a set of measurable benchmarks the military may use to determine when and how the US military chooses to end its participation in a conflict (Iklé, 1971; Sorfleet, 2001; Flavin, 2003). If developed correctly, I argue, *conflict termination criteria should also set forth the conditions under which the US military can push a society toward reconciliation*. Conflict termination criteria are developed in campaign planning, and well-defined conflict termination criteria are crucial in determining when and how a combat operation transitions to post-conflict peace or stability operation. US Joint doctrine recognizes this. Specifically,

Joint Publication 3-0, “*Joint Operations*,” in its section on “Termination of Operations” notes that “... military operations normally will continue after the conclusion of sustained combat operations” (US DoD, JP 3-0, p. xii). JP 5-0, “*Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*,” lists conflict termination among its “Fundamentals of Campaign Plans” and states that a good campaign plan “... serve[s] as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define[s] what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential post-hostilities activities” (US DoD, JP 5-0, p. 12). In other words, planning for the future state of the post-conflict society in question must be taken into account at the same time that military action is being planned (US DoD, JP 3-0, p. xii).

Developing clear and well-defined conflict termination criteria is best thought of as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a robust AR2 process, but the two are not mutually exclusive. While the AR2 process may take place in the semi-permissive environment immediately following MCO or during COIN operations, it must be planned *during* combat operations. In fact, conceptualizing the conditions under which a process of AR2 into a reconstructed society could be executed should constitute a key element of any conflict termination planning. AR2 needs to be nested within conflict termination, itself nested within campaign planning.

## 2. AR2: A VIGNETTE OF QUALIFIED SUCCESS

In the case studies that followed the AR2 framework piece, the team postulated a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for any complete AR2 process to take place:

- Primarily, the AR2 process must create a shared history that all parties must accept.
  - It may be that the “accepted” history will be a result of the AR2 process.
- The AR2 endstate must be envisioned during the planning process, as part of a post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization plan.
- Amnesty cannot be seen as a process unto itself, but rather must be considered as a beginning to a process which should end in national reconciliation. In addition, there are culturally different and distinct aspects of how that amnesty will be constructed and applied.
  - Any amnesty needs to be mutually recognized; in other words, all parties must be ready to accept it. Amnesty must be applied to and accepted by all parties to the conflict.

- In the reconciliation process, justice must be restorative, rather than retributive.
- Retributive (“victors”) justice serves only to sow the seeds for future protests or objections, whereas restorative justice takes into account the sentiments expressed by all parties (aggrieved or otherwise).
- A full and complete AR2 process must be mediated by a third party that is seen to be impartial, or some sort of *empowered* honest broker.
  - It may be possible to put a third party in charge as a facilitator, but care must be taken not to give too much (enforcer/bully) or too little power (monitor).
- Economic and political reconciliation needs to begin at the same time as the creation of a military security environment. Setting the long-term conditions for AR2 should ideally be done by civil, rather than military, means.
  - The sooner the process can be turned over to civil authorities (i.e., some normalization of society), the better.
  - The longer it takes to create a totally permissive environment, the less chance there is to stabilize society.

This last point creates a tentative answer to the question posed at the beginning of the paper: to be successful in helping to impel the AR2 process, *the military as an actor must recognize that the role it (and the state’s security apparatus in the form of police and paramilitary/expeditionary police) plays is only valuable if it occurs in a balanced, open, and professional way and works toward either creating or restoring a balance in a fractured/fragmented society.*

The qualified success in meeting these conditions can be seen in some limited form in vignettes from one of the AR2 case studies, Northern Ireland. In this case, the necessity of *balance* among the societal dimensions is highlighted, and the consequences of imbalance are shown in dramatic fashion. Northern Ireland met many of the conditions laid out above, and yet has its idiosyncrasies that make it distinct in the pantheon of AR2 cases. As such, this case serves at best as cautionary tales of what might be possible with AR2, rather than as “cookie cutter” templates on what to do to make AR2 a reality in any given situation.

### 2.1. Shared History?

One of the distinguishing features of the Northern Ireland conflict, and later the peace process that helped to end it, was the very fact that the combatants

had a shared history that in many ways divided them as much as united them. To put it another way, each side saw the other as “manipulating” history to serve its own ends, whereas their side had the only “true” history.

A shared history of conflict implies that the societal dimension encompasses the political, economic, and security dimensions. In his case study on AR2 in Northern Ireland, Clark (2008, p. 39) agrees, and notes that, “a study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland reveals that political developments give society goals to aim for by way of AR2.” It is important to note that within the surrounding societal dimension the importance of the political dimension transcended the other two, while the attempted solutions put in place by the authorities tended to place the security dimension at the fore. Northern Ireland’s “troubles” were primarily political.

## *2.2. Empowered Honest Broker?*

The difficulties in establishing an honest broker in the Northern Ireland peace process are well established. Parties internal to the conflict had too many vested interests (and were seen by the other side as “tainted”) to effectively attempt to broker any deal. Only when the process was internationalized through the intervention of the United States and the European Union (EU) was progress made.

Clark (2008, p. 41) notes:

The internationalization of the problem was the catalyst for real progress in AR2 .... The involvement of the United States, both as a nation and in the person of Senator George Mitchell, paved the way for political dialogue by opening lines of communication between the nationalist political parties and the UK government .... The EU supported AR2 on two inter-related levels, economic ... and political. Ultimately the EU, with its experience in creating federal institutions became one of the most influential brokers and was able to guide the peace process through the GFA and to deliver tangible economic and political development.

Neither the United States nor the EU met the technical definition of “honest” broker in the sense of having no stake in the outcome of the negotiations. The EU in particular, with both the United Kingdom and Ireland as member states, had a vested interest in getting the parties to come to some sort of arrangement that would bring the process to a successful conclusion. In addition, the US government had to walk a tightrope between its avowed refusal to negotiate with terrorists (much the same as the



position of the United Kingdom) and its recognition that Gerry Adams, as head of Sinn Fein, was central to any peace deal ever getting off the ground.

The success, then, of the honest broker(s) of the United States and the EU owed much to their status as *empowered* brokers. Both sides of the conflict saw the United States and EU as, if not entirely impartial, at least more willing to come to some sort of objective understanding of the situation, and accordingly gave these two brokers the power to bring the two sides together. Ultimately, as Clark notes, the honest brokers did not themselves force the two sides to an agreement, but rather set (and institutionalized) the conditions under which an agreement could be formed.

### *2.3. Economic and Political Reconciliation coupled to Security Environment?*

As noted earlier, in Northern Ireland, the AR2 process primarily focused on “politicizing security” instead of “securitizing politics.” To that end, once the antagonists (and, importantly, the military/security forcing function of British troops as well as the British government) brought into play the traditional political negotiation tools of meetings, timetables, and positive-sum negotiations (and dropped the long-standing refusal to negotiate with “terrorists”).

## **3. CONCLUSIONS**

It may be impossibly naïve to expect that in any fragmented or fractured society, especially one in which the scars of conflict are still raw, an external military actor could ever serve as an honest broker in bringing aggrieved parties together in a way that makes it possible to forestall or eliminate altogether future violence. Certainly it will require a fundamental shift in mindset not merely in the way military operations are planned and conducted, but also in the very way they are conceptualized. The traditional role of the US military, to defend the nation against foes and to fight the wars necessary in support of that mission, is now only one of the myriad missions. The nation’s security, it now seems clear, owes as much to the employment of *every* element of national power to establish and generate a peaceful and productive international security climate as it does to the military use of force.

## NOTES

1. There is some debate as to whether a general amnesty is required for reintegration or reconciliation. To square this circle, some have begun to make the distinction between national-level and local-level amnesty, or between “amnesty” and “immunity.”

2. Note that “balance” does not have to mean “equal.” An appropriate way to think of the system in which AR2 takes place is one of equilibrium, in which one or more of the separate dimensions may be larger (more important) than another but where the system itself is in balance. Each case had its own unique distribution of the dimensions laid out here as the general AR2 framework.

3. Note that while DoD Directive 3000.05 mandates that stability operations are to be given priority comparable to combat operations, the phrase immediately preceding it uses the word “shall,” implying not a direct task but rather one that should be accomplished at some future point in time.

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**PART II**  
**INTERNATIONAL MILITARY**  
**COOPERATION AND**  
**PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**



# CULTURAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES IN MILITARY MISSIONS: HOW OFFICERS VIEW MULTICULTURALITY IN ARMED FORCES

Tibor Szvircsev Tresch

## ABSTRACT

*Since the end of the Cold War, armed forces have been busier than ever before. This necessarily led to an increase in cooperation between national armed forces. It also produced cultural and political challenges, which influence both the success and the effectiveness of military operations abroad.*

*In this respect, the views of military personnel regarding the advantages and pitfalls in multinational missions may be of interest to us. In an attempt to provide answers to these questions, nine high-ranking officers from European countries were interviewed during a course at the NATO Defense College in Rome in late January 2007.*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos  
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 111–137  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A012

## 1. INTRODUCTION

KFOR was like a melting pot. Everybody got very fast involved in the job. It was very easy to work together because everybody wants to get richer from the experience from the others. (Officer at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 2007)

Since the end of the Cold War, armed forces across the world – especially in members and partner countries of NATO – have been busier than ever before. They have to cover the whole range of missions, from peacekeeping operations to combat missions. Thus, armed forces are deployed in missions to combat threats of a military and mostly a non-military transnational nature (Heinecken, 2007). These missions require more adaptive, flexible, and mobile forces capable of dealing with a broad range of tasks (Boëne, 2003). Moreover, national armed forces have to cooperate closely with the armed forces of other nations. Consequently, the *NATO Handbook* (2001) lists three main changes in NATO forces: first, a reduction in size and readiness, second, increasing flexibility and mobility, and third, multi-nationality.

Extensive scientific research has been conducted in this field. There are various evaluations of multicultural missions: on the one hand, this research deals with the advantages of diversity in missions, while on the other hand it reveals the pitfalls of such multicultural missions (Soeters, Tanerçan, Varoğlu, & Siğri, 2004; Soeters, Resteigne, Moelker, & Manigart, 2008; Elron, Shamir, & Ben-Ari, 1999; Soeters & van der Meulen, 2007). The views of military personnel directly involved in military missions may be of interest to us in this respect. As the first quotation above shows, officers mainly see the advantage of multinational cooperation. Moreover, they think that smooth cooperation is possible. That leads us to the following questions.

What opinions and perceptions do the military personnel directly involved have with regard to multinational forces? How do officers view multiculturalism? What do they perceive to be the main challenges? In an attempt to provide answers to these questions, nine high-ranking officers from European countries were interviewed during a course at the NATO Defense College in Rome in late January 2007. The interviewed officers had served in various military missions abroad, and had also worked at multinational headquarters (HQ) in different European countries.

To answer the research questions, Part 1 of this article provides a short overview of the emergence of multicultural forces, while Part 2 briefly clarifies the specification of military culture. Part 3 provides a theoretical explanation of multinationality. This conceptual analysis is followed by a

more thorough examination of the practical problems in missions abroad according to the statements of the officers in Part 4. Finally, the most significant challenges will be highlighted, while the findings will be seen in the light of previously published research.

## **2. THE EMERGENCE OF MULTICULTURAL FORCES**

Post-modern military organizations, unlike past military organizations, mainly focus on missions abroad. Today as in the future, we will see multinational intervention forces (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq) or permanent multinational corps such as the EUROCORPS, the EUROFOR, or NATO, acting as security organizations. This has led to a necessary increase in cooperation between national armed forces, linked on the one hand with the “specialization” of the various national European militaries, and on the other hand with deeper political and military integration in alliances and security frameworks. It has also resulted in the emergence of cultural and political challenges, and these are influencing both the success and the effectiveness of military operations abroad. In the past, military operations have been analyzed mainly from historical, organizational, and institutional perspectives. In recent years, there has also been a growing interest in culture-related factors and issues in multinational operations.

What were and what are however the main reasons for the existence of multinational forces? First, one has to mention the Cold War: in the context of confrontation between East and West, alliances were far more important and needed than before. Second, there are the UN missions conducted since 1948. In these missions, the different armed forces worked together and thus had the opportunity to share experiences. Last but not least, the end of the Cold War saw an increase in multinational forces accompanied by a downsizing of the armed forces, low military budgets, and new threats and combat missions.

However, although multinational military operations are not new per se, military multinationalism has acquired a new dimension since the end of the Cold War. Most importantly, the quality of cooperation has changed. In the past, cooperation took place at the level of chief of staff or HQ, while today national units are also being integrated into bi-national or multinational formations (Klein & Kümmel, 2000). The internationalization of personnel (e.g., in multinational HQ or in standing formations), and the multinational and multicultural character of military contingents during deployments have become principal features of current military activities. Since the end of the



Cold War, all European states have reduced their armed forces and now face the problem of reduced defense budgets. This in turn does not allow them to train and equip their troops to the level required for autonomous missions.

To conclude, the post-Cold War period has seen a significant increase in the number of military operations. Thus, UN, NATO, and other organizations were required to contribute forces to multinational coalitions in order to implement a variety of missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, antiterrorist actions, humanitarian aid, policing, and so forth. Since the first UN mission in 1948 in the Middle East (UNTSO), 61 missions have been carried out by the UN. Of these, 43 missions started after 1989. In June 2008, there were 119 troop-contributing nations with over 88,517 soldiers, military observers, and police in the field (United Nations, 2008). This is a clear indication of the need for closer cooperation among armed forces.

### 3. MILITARY CULTURE

Culture – whether its influence is apparent or subtle – can always be an issue when people from different countries are working together. Usually, culture refers to values, norms, or general human activities within one group. These norms and values differ from culture to culture and from nation to nation (Caforio, 2007). In this regard, when describing national cultures, common elements within each nation can be highlighted, but culture cannot be generalized to apply to every individual within a nation. Culture should rather be understood as a general criterion helping to analyze these societies. However, armed forces have a unique culture, which can be described as follows.

Military organizations are specialized in threatening opponents and exerting collective violence toward them. The use of focused violence calls for a high degree of coordination. Military organizational culture is based on a rigidly structured top to bottom leadership with a clear chain of command based on the principle of centralization. There is a clear primacy of the collective. Morale and cohesion are vital factors in combat motivation and are part of each soldier's education and training (Haltiner & Szvircsev Tresch, 2006).

Despite the fact that different military personnel represent different national military traditions, the military profession shows a vast array of commonalities. Military culture tends to be very similar all over the world, especially in Europe and within alliances like NATO. Consequently, military personnel from different nations can often cooperate in missions

without major difficulties (Soeters et al., 2008). Within NATO, for instance, there seems to exist a kind of supranational military culture which makes cooperation across boundaries possible (Soeters, Poponete, & Page, 2006). However, on the inside, the military is not homogeneous. From the macro to the micro level, armed forces themselves display a variety of subcultures (Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull, 2003). These subcultures are found in structural as well as geographical areas. There appear to be at least two different types of subcultures: horizontal among the services and vertical among the different categories of personnel, such as the classical vertical structure of officers, NCOs, and the rank and file. This may affect the cooperation within different national armed forces.

#### **4. MULTICULTURALISM AND MULTINATIONALITY IN THE MILITARY**

On the whole, two different types of multinationality can be observed, each with different prerequisites for the working process in multinational units: first, standing multinational corps in barracks in one of the participating countries. Two to four countries at most are involved in these standing formations. Examples are EUROFOR, permanently headquartered in Florence, or the 1st German–Netherlands Corps, based in Munster. These units have encountered some of the sociological problems typical of multinational military formations, such as language, different ranking systems, payment, and so on. However, smooth cooperation is possible in standing formations all in all.

Second, the form of multinational cooperation observed more frequently nowadays is based on ad hoc cooperation in military missions abroad, for example, in Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq. Here nations from more than 40 countries may be involved in one mission. This can cause misunderstandings and jeopardize the mission goals. In most cases, multinational forces are needed to intervene quickly and on an ad hoc basis in crisis situations which are ambiguous, dangerous, and complex. National militaries assigned to urgent missions often have no time for specific joint training with the other armed forces. Additionally, they are subjected to different Rules of Engagement (ROE) and different legal systems governing discipline and the use of violence (Elron et al., 1999).

Multinational armed forces normally consist of more than two nations. When cooperation is bi-national, many problems can arise. One party is

always dominant in military missions, leading to tensions and animosity. At Camp Julien in Afghanistan, for example, most of the friction that arose was between the large minority of Belgians and the dominating Canadians. In this case, there was moderate heterogeneity: two sizeable participating armed forces that formed two “blocs” and were continuously causing frustration among each other (Soeters et al., 2008).

However, the multinational approach is common. It is an example of high heterogeneity involving several countries and national contingents of roughly equal size, a condition which helps to optimize processes and outputs. With many armed forces of different cultures in the same mission, personal conversations about one’s own culture frequently take place and friendly comparisons are made. On the whole, it seems that officers are more than willing to engage in such multinational contacts. At the rank and file level, this readiness is less common (Van Ruiten, 2006; Elron, Halevy, Ari, & Shamir, 2003). In multinational missions, national units have to transfer a certain level of control to the other units, and consequently have less autonomy. People in general, and military personnel in particular, do not like to be dependent on other nations in situations that can be life-threatening and dangerous.

#### *4.1. Different Strategies: Assimilation, Integration, and Separation*

In multinational missions, there are three different strategies for the armed forces involved: assimilation, integration, and separation (Soeters et al., 2006). In general, the assimilation strategy tends to develop if one armed force clearly dominates the others. Normally, the larger party implicitly or explicitly expects this to take place. If the smaller parties agree, this strategy generally works quite well. However, this means that the smaller armed forces have to internalize the culture of the lead nation.

The integration strategy, on the other hand, tries to get people from different national armed forces to work and live together, which is done quite successfully in multinational HQ or in low-intensity operations. For this type of model, working and living conditions are shared, and the lines of command are multinational. One common language – normally English – is used and all members have to be sufficiently proficient (Moelker, Soeters, & vom Hagen, 2007). The prerequisite for this strategy is that the international staff involved should know the relevant procedures of their integrated unit.

If armed forces are not inclined to give up their own cultural practices, then a strategy of separation might be best. This approach can be strengthened by assigning each national contingent its own role and geographical area of responsibility within which it can act more or less independently. In this case, each national contingent commander has his own distinct authority based on national sensitivities. This strategy is appropriate for elite units who display strong internal cohesion, but are reluctant to be involved with other units in high-intensity conflicts. If the cultural differences among the armed forces are large, the separation strategy is preferable (Soeters et al., 2006).

The question of the right strategy is not just a scientific discussion, as the example of the Anglo-Dutch cooperation in Cyprus (UNFICYP) shows: “In the case of the Anglo-Dutch cooperation and after the fairly problematic experiences with the fully mixed Anglo-Dutch structure during the first two rotations, it was decided the Dutch company would be given its own subsector” (Soeters & Bos-Bakx, 2003, p. 292). This shift in the level of cooperation seemed to at least improve the Dutch contingent’s efficiency and certainly its motivation.

## 5. METHODOLOGY

In the end of January 2007, nine interviews with military personnel from European countries were conducted during a course at the NATO Defense College in Rome. The interviewees held ranks from Lt Col to Colonel (four Lt Cols and five Colonels). The interviews were carried out in English and were tape-recorded and transcribed. The interviews lasted between 40 min and 1 h. All interviewees were asked the same questions with a semi-standardized questionnaire. The questionnaire contained 18 questions regarding the interviewees’ personal experiences in missions. The questions covered a wide spectrum ranging from general questions about the nature of the operations, communication with other militaries, cultural diversity, and training to language aspects. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their experience. Senior member staff at the NDC helped to establish first contact with these interviewees.

The officers interviewed had previously served in various military missions, for instance, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon. Moreover, they had also worked in multinational HQ in different European countries. Normally, these officers had been deployed for six months. The missions they had participated in range from peacekeeping to combat

missions; thus, the whole range of military missions could be included in the research.

Most interviewees worked together with different national armies. Only one officer had contact with just one national army, that is, the US military. The individual levels of cooperation range from a day-to-day working basis to long planning phases in international HQ. In the mission, the other nations were usually European countries. However, in every mission, the US military was also strongly involved. Furthermore, the interviewees mentioned Australia and Japan as national military contributors in various missions. Cooperation took place at different levels. On the one hand, the officers interviewed worked with members from military HQ. On the other hand, they also worked with UN officials, local authorities, police men, and NGOs.

## **6. OFFICERS' VIEW OF MULTICULTURALISM IN ARMED FORCES: CRITICAL FACTORS IN MULTICULTURAL COOPERATION IN MILITARY MISSIONS**

### *6.1. Types of Mission and the Influence of Integration and Coordination*

But if you are going to have foreign soldiers under your command, I would be very demanding with respect to their training, mission, Rules of Engagements. (Officer at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 2007)

In standing formations, cultural differences are minimized with time and do not cause great concern in the armies involved, as the example of the 1st German–Netherlands Corps in Munster shows. In missions abroad, this well-rehearsed cooperation can change. Different factors are crucial for an effective mission abroad: first, the purpose of the mission must be described precisely. Second, the political goals should be understandable for all involved military personnel. Third, the ROE are essential in order to clarify the mission and the main steps to be taken in military missions, thus avoiding any kind of misunderstanding. Where forces operate alongside each other without a common set of ROE, real difficulties arise in implementing the mandate (Forster, 2006).

The missions are defined by the ROE. The question arises as to how the ROE can be maintained, because this has an impact on mission effectiveness. The opinion voiced by the interviewees was that for combat

missions, the contributing nations should send troops without caveats in their respective ROE. Naturally, each nation has a different risk threshold, as can be seen in Afghanistan. National caveats can give rise to the right of “opting out” of missions which a nation thinks endangers its forces. But if a multinational force is to function effectively, it must aspire to become a “risk community” (Coker, 2006, p. 17) in which national caveats can be translated over time into transnational ROE. However, nowadays the soldiers need all their abilities in order to successfully carry out their respective missions. They have to be able to fight, to secure the field, and also to provide humanitarian assistance/aid. Here, General Charles Chandler Krulak’s concept of “Three Block War” was stressed by the interviewees (Krulak, 1999). US Marine Corps General Krulak defined the “Three Block War” as a result of the new combat environment of the 1990s. This form of war occurs when a unit is engaged in moderate combat in one block, peacekeeping operations in a second block, and humanitarian relief in a third block. The notion of “blocks” stems from the idea that all three of these activities can occur in one city at the same time. The concept of the “Three Block War” is expected to be effected in multinational formations (Schwerzel, 2005). A distinction between tactical and routine operations was made by the interviewees: in a tactical operation, good equipment is needed and the soldiers should be capable of fighting in a more or less same kind, because tactical operations are closely linked with combat tasks (e.g., in Iraq). Routine operations are not so demanding regarding professionalization and technical standard of the various national units involved. Here, cultural differences do not have a strong impact on the mission.

Furthermore, there is a common understanding that the type of mission can influence the integration and coordination among national armies. High-intensity warfare or combat missions are more challenging. Soldiers are required to be able to do their job. As one interviewee explained, in the most extreme situation, it had happened that officers had been rejected for a mission because they lacked professional knowledge or language skills.

To sum up, routine missions have a low probability of involvement in combat; thus, cultural differences do not seem to be a big issue. In this case, conscripts can fulfill such missions, too. However, there is also a need for high readiness forces if the level of intensity in the theater is higher. In combat missions, it can be better to have professionals because due to intensive joint training, there will be more cohesion. In that sense, interconnection within the units is important.

### *6.2. Cultural Differences and their Influence on Coordination and Communication*

There are actually just a few problems coming from different coordination and communication styles. Most military personnel and civilian employees are quite used to working within NATO and to contributing to a military environment. But it seems that in the operational context, the working processes are a little slower, but not as slow as for this to affect the operation goals. In this sense, commanders have to be very specific about what they want to achieve. The lead nation system appears much simpler in comparison to multi- or bi-national armed forces. One cause of concern sometimes is the unresolved problem of interoperability. Therefore, a lot of training is required in multinational missions. The biggest problems for coordination and communication are national caveats. In certain operations some nations can do the task, others cannot. In practice, coordination and cooperation in the field will be practiced by those countries that are able to fulfill the job.

In missions, a set of standards and roles are required to minimize misunderstandings. An interviewed officer explained this in that way: *In Manas (International Airport in Kabul), every nation worked alongside each other. Everyone had their own operation room. Coordination between these detachments did almost not exist. Some coordination took place only on the higher level, but not on the basic level. If each nation has its coordination room, then it is really difficult: you can make mistakes. And the way information was brought to the upper level was by phone. Now we have five chains between the different levels and then we have the classical case that the story has been changed. We decided to make just one operational room and we put all personnel together. There was a lot of unwillingness because some nations realized that they would lose control over the operations. With enough pressure we were able to do this in a couple of weeks. Then the things worked well. We were able to coordinate among each other.* In this case, the involved officer adopted an integrative approach to improve daily work and the communication channels. One lesson learned from this example is that various roles/functions related to communication and coordination should be centralized and put under one command.

One interviewee stressed the urgency of interdependency. He compared that to the long working tradition within the Dutch, Norwegian, and Danish armed forces. He made the experience that if people are dependent on each other, they tend to have more respect, because they know each other better; they recognize that some will have better ways of fulfilling tasks. Seen from

his point of view, integration should be achieved in the earliest stage possible so that there is still time to discuss how to achieve the operation's goal.

### *6.3. Trust in the Foreign Militaries*

I give the people 100% trust capital at the beginning when I meet them the first time. But after that, the people have to prove worthy of this trust. You cannot give 50% trust, which is bullshit. Only 100% or zero trust is possible. (Officer at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 2007)

The trust in other militaries cannot be considered in a general way. Trust depends mostly on the personality of a person as the quotation above from one of the officers indicates. For this reason, it is important to communicate sufficiently with the foreign officers and the key point is therefore to trust in their capabilities and degree of professionalism. In a mission it can happen that sometimes one officer is being trusted, whereas mistrust is expressed toward another officer from the same nation. In a successful mission, the personal relationship should be good. The basis for this is mutual understanding. If people know each other, misunderstandings and lack of trust can be kept minimal.

Interesting is the assessment of cooperation and trust within high-risk situations. Some officers share the position that smooth cooperation and multicultural understanding are given in routine operation in daily work. But if the task involves war fighting, the officers would rather rely on their own units. This seems to be connected to the cohesion and the long common training experience in national units. According to results from a research by Segal and Tiggel about the Multinational Force and Observers stationed in the Sinai Desert in 1995, American peacekeepers had substantial reservations concerning trust toward military personnel from other countries. Most of the questioned soldiers did not consider foreign nationals to be trustworthy. A mere 17% of American peacekeepers regarded foreign soldiers as equally trustworthy as Americans (Segal & Tiggel, 1997). In the meantime, the level of trust has at least been increasing within European NATO forces.

### *6.4. Rotation Systems*

Multinational forces are temporary organizations. There is frequent rotation of military personnel. The rotation system can be seen under two different aspects. One is the duration of the units' deployment in the field which differs from nation to nation. The question is if there are problems



regarding different rotation systems for the cooperation among national armies. The second aspect is the rotation system related to the command of units in multinational armed forces.

Force rotation differs considerably from one nation to another. Most units serve for six months, some only for four months, and some specialists are sent to missions abroad for one year or longer. In view of the constant fluctuation of personnel, it is difficult to establish long-term cooperation in the theater. It was stated that, on a personal and organizational level, more time and prolonged contacts are necessary in order to become really familiar with one another and to appreciate soldiers of other nationalities. Without mutual understanding based on longstanding working relations, procedures that were previously developed are difficult to implement.

According to the interviewees, it seems useful to differentiate between the normal soldiers and their officers on the one hand and officers in HQ and with special tasks on the other hand. In this case, the rotation system is very significant and it matters greatly what type of tasks the soldiers and officers have been involved in. One interviewee pointed out that *in the CIMIC field you have to build up confidence and trust, without enough time you cannot work on the theatre.*

But boredom, at least at the rank and file level (e.g., guarding the compound), is one of the major problems in military missions. Within a 12–15-month tour of duty, such as the Americans have performed in Iraq, it is difficult to maintain motivation and the same level of performance at all times (Best, 2002). So, more flexible service durations in the field are necessary. It is considered a mistake by the interviewees if a country practices a specific rotation system. The latter should rather depend on what has to be done in the field.

Different rotation systems have an effect on operations, especially in an area like Bosnia. The interviewed officers mentioned the urgent issue of getting to know the personality of their working colleagues. According to their experiences, it takes one week to become familiar with the new contingents and working partners, and at least one or two weeks to be fully informed operationally about the job. Because normally there have been overlapping periods, no breakdowns were observed during the operation. *When a newcomer came I visited him/her in his/her compound and I was interested in how she/he lived. I didn't like to establish the first contact via phone. The first contact should be face to face interaction. It is easier to speak about problems.* This remark is a good example which shows that direct personal relationships are crucial for a good atmosphere within the unit, especially if there is a steady flow of personnel in the mission.

To sum up, the credo of the questioned persons was *to be as long as possible in the theatre* because in the end personal relationships are very important for achieving the mission objectives. This credo seems to apply only to highly qualified personnel. According to the statements of the officers, the rotation system should be divided in three ways:

1. Officers with a lot of contacts within the respective national armies and/or local authorities and UN authorities have to stay in the field for a long time. These officers become acquainted with their partners and their customs and they can build up good relationships. And they also know how to talk to the different groups (awareness of cultural aspects and ability to speak in the local language).
2. Personnel who works for intelligence. It is important to spend a lot of time in the same country if intelligence is to be successful. The argument for staying in the field longer is very similar to the first group. Intelligence officers have to depend on good relationships and trust if they like to gather high-quality information in the field. To the success of a mission, excellent intelligence is crucial.
3. For normal soldiers and officers who have just a few contacts among local people and other armed forces, deployment duration of six months is sufficient. In the opinion of the interviewees, it does not matter if a soldier who is guarding a camp leaves the country after six months. They also do not have to have the same level of understanding of the local culture as do officers with staff tasks.

The second aspect is the rotation of command within the various national units. For example, in a tri-national mission, the officers decided to rotate the commander of the detachment every three months with one of another nationality. All other pillars (defense, logistics, operations, and maintenance) in the detachment changed, too. These officers in charge made a plan for all the subordinates regardless of their nationality. If multinational integration works in this manner, the operation can be vulnerable: if one nation is not fulfilling its task, it may not be possible to fill the gap with other national contingents.

### *6.5. Reintegration of Military Personnel at Home*

The reintegration of military personnel at home should be taken into account. Most experts believe that it takes several months for soldiers to readjust to their home country. Four months is the typical readjustment

period after a non-traumatic deployment, while a much longer period is required to recover from a traumatic deployment (Thompson & Gignac, 2002). Especially family problems can arise during the soldiers' absence. Previous research results have been confirmed by the officers at the NATO Defense College. For example, of the officers and NCOs in the deployed unit of an interviewed officer, 40% are divorced. This is a general problem with missions abroad. As a rule, for each month military personnel are away from their families, one month is required to reintegrate with the family. Social problems occurred with people who have been in missions too long and were not able to readjust to civil life. For this reason, it is not allowed to go directly on the next mission in several countries today. Officers and soldiers are required to spend at least a certain amount of time at home.

#### *6.6. Competency of other Countries in Theater*

The interviewees were asked "Did you find that the militaries coming from other countries were competent?" In general, they judged the other national militaries to be competent and proficient. But they also mentioned slight differences among nations regarding the level of competence. Analyzing the answer, three frameworks can be distinguished. First, NATO versus non-NATO countries coming from Africa, Asia, and Arabic countries; second, North European countries versus South European countries; third, differences in the understanding of the wider security framework.

##### *6.6.1. NATO versus Non-NATO Countries from Africa, Asia, and Arabic Countries*

For non-NATO countries, social contacts at the beginning of a mission were viewed as very important. Generally with these armed forces, it is not possible at the beginning of a mission to immediately start issuing orders or start working without building personal relationships within the officers involved. Personnel coming from NATO member states are more focused on specific missions and do not require this socialization. They are used to right away go ahead with the main work at the beginning of a meeting or mission, so we can notice a more functional approach as compared to a more social approach with non-NATO countries from the South and Asia.

Another difference observed is the culture-related behavior with some nations involving the difficulty to say "No, I don't know that." They cannot

admit that they are missing some information or that they are missing the ability to do something. This can cause problems if the other nations are relying on their support. For this reason, the interviewees would be very careful in dealing with some nations with respect to how much they would rely and how they would formulate agreements with armed forces where that culture-based behavior existed, because agreements can be perceived differently. But in the end, if the commander in charge is aware of the culture-related divergences, tasks can be carried out in a proper way. Differences in time perceptions regarding appointments can also cause irritations. A Dutch officer explained this problematic situation as follows: *If I have a meeting I will be there on time. The same is true for e.g. Germans. The more the armed forces are coming from the South you cannot be sure that they will be on time at the meeting.*

#### 6.6.2. North European Countries versus South European Countries

Within a NATO deployment, all nations have to follow the same rules and the same training. They are subject to the Standardization Agreements of NATO (STANAG). In this case, the NATO military personnel speak the same operative and tactical language. But slight differences can also be observed among NATO member states. One point is language skills according to the interviewees. People from Northern Europe are more fluent in English. The Norwegians, the Dutch, and the Belgians, for example, speak perfect English. But military personnel from Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Turkey, especially on the non-commissioned officer and soldier levels, have had much more difficulty achieving the required language level. *So it is much harder to integrate them, then how you can work together if you don't speak a common language?* was a statement of an officer coming from the northern part of Europe.

According to the interviewees, all countries in the North have similar values, as do the South European countries. The latter believe that the Nordic countries have a more practical approach. Nordic countries, that is, their officers – in the opinion of officers from the South – carry out the tasks immediately. Military personnel from South European countries (e.g., Spain, France, and Italy) seem to have a more ideological approach. They discuss the different tasks more and rather follow the orders and do not react directly. They also orientate themselves more strongly toward the national guidance.

A further observation in the difference between Nordic and South European countries is that the personnel coming from Nordic countries seem more consensus oriented. Their discussions are a kind of collegial decision making. This is not the way in which the French work. The interviewee coming from France takes the opinion of his fellows into account, but the final decision is made by him. He argued that in some case he had not had the time to find a consensual solution and he had to take the responsibility for the decisions. All in all, these differences do not seem to interfere with smooth cooperation but they affect the mindset to some extent.

### *6.6.3. Understanding of the Broader Security Framework*

Some nations practice a robust interpretation of the ROE; others interpret them more tightly. ROE determine when, where, and how force shall be used. Some countries strongly believe that military means are the most important ones for the missions. Other countries share a broader approach which includes the whole framework of the security organizations in a society, like the police, the political parties, diplomacy, and so on. For example, the US military seems to focus strongly on military aspects. It has a tougher approach and it has a tendency to solve problems by fighting the enemy. On the other hand, there are nations like France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands which resort more to the cultural aspects in their work. This means they have also deepened working relations with other organizations like NGOs, the UN, and the local authorities. Negotiation under these circumstances is an important factor and crucial for the effectiveness of the mission. In the view of the questioned persons, this means that these officers have an integrated and extended approach regarding the mission.

## *6.7. Cultural Differences between US and European Armed Forces*

### *6.7.1. Use of Force*

The interpretation of the same event or situation often differs between nationalities. The mindset influences activity within the specific operational environment (war fighting/reconstruction, dangerous/more relaxing, etc.). In encounters among military personnel from different nations, debates arise on how to patrol, how to carry one's weapon, how to establish close

and positive contact with the local population, and how to communicate with the local authorities. Americans seem to be much tougher and more distant in their contacts with the local population than other forces in the field (Coker, 2006). This has also been observed by the questioned officers. They identified differences in the approach of the American and the European armed forces. According to them, US officers and soldiers thought to a greater extent that they were involved in a combat mission; the others (Europeans) viewed their assignment as a peacekeeping help for reconstruction mission. Maybe these notions have come from different experiences in the past, for example, the British and French military have a background in peace enforcement; the Americans seem to practice the approach “all or nothing.” They give the impression of not being able to use soft power. According to the interviewees, it may be very difficult for the US military to switch from war fighting to peacekeeping. It seems that they show a more aggressive behavior toward the local population. The locals feel like they had been overrun by the Americans.

Most European nations use a more humanitarian approach: *Help the people and improve the life situation*. Americans have a more combat-oriented view and stay under very strict combat rules, as one of the interviewees stated euphemistically: *Americans are very good at fighting wars but not good at winning peace*. In comparison to that, the European armed forces from the bigger states are able to fulfill both tasks; combat and peacekeeping missions were mentioned several times by the interviewees. Regarding the Scandinavian armies, an advantage is seen in the long tradition in classical peacekeeping missions, but on the other hand they are not so well trained and used to fighting in combat.

### 6.7.2. Other Differences

If a local person's car drove off the street into a tree, the Americans would drive back and report the issue. On the other hand the European nations, especially the Nordic countries would help, stop, assist, they might not solve the problem but would try to help. (Officer at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 2007)

This statement from one of the officers can be found in different variations in all interviews. It seems that the approach of the US armed forces and the approaches of European countries differ significantly, not just regarding the use of force. Another difference is the autonomy of decisions and actions by own initiative. It looks as if the American system impedes individual decisions. In the opinion of the interviewees, US military personnel are not so flexible. The perception is that the Americans are afraid

of making a mistake. A Scandinavian officer explained this as follows: *If I can do ten things and one was not so good, then I have done at least nine good things. But for the average American officer it is very important that he does not make a mistake. So he is focused so much on one thing that can be done wrong that he forgets the other nine good things. US officers like to go out of the office to say 'I have not made a mistake' and a Scandinavian would say 'I have done nine good things and one wrong.'* This cultural difference can cause problems in coordination and cooperation. Europeans miss the pragmatic approach with the Americans. One reason for this difference stems from the clear ranking system of the Americans. In North European countries, rank is not everything. It is rather experience, and (informal) influence which is important. Small armed forces are very dependent on individuals (on every soldier). The different importance given to rank is mentioned also by Klein and Kümmel (2000) regarding the Dutch military in comparison to the German and French non-commissioned officers. In another case, the liberal attitudes on the Dutch and also Danish side are confronted with the very pronounced hierarchy style in the armed forces of France and Spain. This is connected to superior-subordinate relations (Klein & Haltiner, 2005).

### 6.8. Hierarchy

Military organizations are structured in a similar way. One of the most striking features of any armed force is the strength of its hierarchical system. A hierarchical organization is crucial in ensuring that personnel act in an appropriate manner, even though parts of the armed forces have been destroyed by the enemy or are unable to fight. But levels of hierarchy in national armies differ in two ways. First, various ranking systems exist in armed forces around the world. In Europe or within NATO, it is obvious that national armed forces are more and more in line with NATO standards. In this respect, the structural problem seems to have been solved in recent years in Europe, as an interviewee stated. The cultural aspects of hierarchy are much more interesting. Some countries draw a clear distinction between ranks, not just in a structural sense but also in a psychological and social sense.

An issue that arises in many missions abroad are the differences in the power gap between the various levels of rank (Soeters et al., 2004). If, for example, a captain agrees to something but his major does not, then the former has to postpone his decision. This means that some countries rely on

an autocratic style of leadership, whereas in other armed forces there is far more emphasis on consultation and consensus. However, the authoritarian way in which orders are issued in some armies can appear strange in the eyes of more consensus-based armed forces, because in the former there is very little place for participative leadership style. Questioning the decision of superiors is considered impolite and something which destroys harmony. For mission effectiveness, it seems imperative to have the same or at least a similar concept of hierarchy, both structurally and culturally, within the respective national armed forces.

### *6.9. Language*

When the question of difficulties and challenges of multinational armed forces arises, it is often related to communication problems due to the existence of more than one language (Klein & Haltiner, 2005). Normally, there was one official language, for example, English, in order to guarantee an effective flow of communication within the mission. Also, military personnel should have basic knowledge of the local language. Lack of overall language preparation and specialized English language training is one of the most serious challenges to the individual integration of national soldiers into a multinational environment (Thomas, 2002, p. 163). Research indicates that conflicts rarely occur, but when they do, they are caused by misunderstandings and disagreements related to culture and language (Elron et al., 2003). There is an undeniable need for a common language among units deployed on missions, and deployed soldiers should be willing to learn languages. However, language in a multinational context is an instrument of individual power for those who are proficient in English, enabling them to dominate interaction and decisions (Abel, 2007). Additionally, problems can arise when native English speakers are using slang and idiomatic expressions and speak quickly. These results have been confirmed by the questioned officers. At the beginning of the missions, it was very difficult for non-native English speakers to understand the native speakers. In some cases, an adaptation took place and after a few weeks the language difficulties were solved. Soldiers (file and rank) sometimes had more difficulties with the language required. The main objective is mastering a common language. For that, a twofold approach is needed: native English speakers have to make an effort not to use acronyms in their speech or at least to allow for a warm-up time. On the other hand, non-native speakers have to improve their language skills.



Generally, when forces come under fire, proper communication is critical. In a combat situation, units are effective when they are able to communicate. Under strain, officers and soldiers tend to fall back on their native language. This hinders the success of missions in high-intensity environments.

#### *6.10. Previous Experience and Cross-Cultural Training*

General experience is always significant. Lessons learned in previous missions are part of the training period. If in a mission military personnel with a total different experience are involved, they may not be fitted to the ongoing mission. Regarding this point, an interviewee mentioned his experiences in the Bosnia conflict when he worked with officers who had former experiences in the Middle East. They were not able to adapt their experiences gained in the Middle East to the different situation in Bosnia. *They felt they had to tell us how to do the job in Bosnia based on their experience from UNIFIL.* This problem is not directly related to cultural differences because the officers came from the same nation as the interviewed officer but it shows a clear example of how learning effects in a former mission can affect a new mission. In the end, every mission has its own peculiarity and specific lessons learned in previous missions cannot be transferred one-to-one into a new mission.

Appropriate training and military skills are the basis for successful missions abroad. Special training is needed, particularly for multicultural force operations, because success normally comes to those who train together for a common mission. Today most countries feel that intercultural training is their own national business. With this pre-condition, a process of comprehensive training within armed forces is not likely to develop. Without mutual pre-deployment training, national contingents would better be deployed separately. But in the majority of cases, this is not possible for geographical and operational reasons.

Cross-cultural training differs among European countries. In some countries, a range of training courses exists, providing historical background information through hired University personnel or offering basic knowledge about the language of the theater, weapon handling, basic military skills, how do deal with the local population, and a few lessons about the challenges in the cooperation with other armed forces. In other countries, the battalion commander is responsible for the training of his unit. On the national level, he/she is given a sort of menu where she/he can choose from different training courses. At the end, she/he has to prove to

her/his commander if the troops are well prepared since this is her/his responsibility.

All in all, the interviewees shared the notion that cross-cultural training is still insufficient in most countries. In that respect, progress has been made in the last decade. Armed forces of various nations have established peace-keeping centers in which their military personnel destined for missions abroad receive multi- and cross-cultural training. Also, national military academies offer education and training courses for their own students as well as for foreign military personnel (Klein & Kümmel, 2000, p. 317).

#### *6.11. Mix of Formal and Informal Mechanisms for Integration*

You shift from professionals to brothers in arms! This is good for solidarity. (Officer at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 2007)

This evening provided a good opportunity to go behind the chain of command because the General also attended the Pizza night and so it was possible to speak to him in a frank and not so formal way in order to solve any problems. (Officer at the NATO Defense College, Rome, 2007)

On the operational level, formal lines are predominant in military operations. In some cases, the members of the units did so-called tactical exercises among officers: the underlying idea is to understand the command and control of the respective national armies. They also held formal symposiums for discussing problems in daily work. The formal meetings were generally more security related. On this level, informal integration mechanisms played a secondary role.

On the social level, informal integration mechanisms played an exceedingly important role, as the above quotations show. Social events seem to be an excellent way of bringing people together. Through these events, the military personnel can learn more about the culture of the other nations. The informal meetings are also very important for cohesion. Informal activities producing cohesion through eating, drinking, and sport competitions facilitate multinational military cooperation (Klein & Kümmel, 2000). They help in overcoming some cultural problems, but not all.

All interviewees agreed that formal and informal events must be mixed: the formal mechanisms are important for doing the job. Here it is important to include all nations. In missions abroad, the involved personnel also have to have a private life and not just mission life. With the mix of both events – formal and informal – the participants can establish new contacts in a very short time.

### 6.12. *How to Take Advantage of the Various Cultures in the Theater?*

The advantage of diversity is an increase in cognitive resources and task-relevant abilities and skills in the organizational structure of a multinational force, which can result in a higher level of creativity and improved quality of decisions (Elron et al., 1999). One officer pointed out clearly: *Sierra Leone is a country with a population that has an agricultural background. At first soldiers from Algeria were in direct contact with the local population. Due to the lack of agricultural knowledge on the part of the Algerians they did not understand local culture well. They have been replaced with soldiers from Bangladesh because in Bangladesh too, agriculture plays an important role. These soldiers had a better understanding and contact with the local population because they were similar with regard to the makeup of the economies in both countries.*

The advantage of multicultural forces lies in the fact that commanders can charge the different national armies with different tasks for which they are competent. It is also possible to make use of the geographical composition of the forces. A further advantage is the possibility to properly apply the different skills of the armed forces. That brings in more capabilities. Because every person from the various armed forces comes in with her or his own background, the quality of the mission can be improved. The commander in charge can make use of a large pool of different potentials and experiences. In a national mission, there are the specific national rules which can hinder bringing in different views and opinions. People from other nations feel free to make suggestions or to criticize. This allows for a broader view of the mission, not just the *own channel view*. Different national perceptions are very significant because various experiences come into contact. A further effect is the closer cooperation which soldiers from different countries have; they influence each other and broaden their mind. On the social-psychological level, working with other armed forces can strengthen the ability to interact in a multinational environment and to learn how to avoid offending people because their respective sensitivities stemming from their cultural backgrounds become clearer.

A further advantage of multinational cooperation has been seen for economical reasons. European states have significantly reduced the personnel of their armed forces and are aware that with the reduced defense budgets not all tasks of the military can be covered by one nation. It is the general opinion that within the framework of multinational cooperation, it should be possible to save money because different armed forces are able to concentrate on focal points and training capacities can be pooled. According to

Klein and Haltiner (2005, p. 409), it is thus possible to produce military goods in higher quantities with lower costs. This is possible with common armament and organizational policy which allows reducing national force reserves.

## 7. CONCLUSION

In the face of new threats and declining budgets, armed forces have been forced to engage in multicultural missions. Single states simply do not have the resources to engage in independent military action and, for reasons of political legitimacy, it has also become essential for the United States to operate within coalitions. Multinational missions have become a reality (King, 2007).

European armed forces and NATO in particular are more and more shifting from simple cooperation between purely national units to a mixture of soldiers from different countries within even the smallest units. In multinational missions, military personnel are confronted with various challenges, not only on an organizational, but on a cultural level as well.

The outcome of the interviews shows that cultural challenges within armed forces do not cause grave problems in a mission but can affect its effectiveness. The most problematic issue in daily life is related to language. One conclusion is that the most important aspect is language training for multinational forces. Usually, in contemporary military missions the lead language is English because the English-speaking armed forces are those which bear the most burdens in missions.

A second conclusion is that for more demanding missions, the lead nation approach seems to be the best solution. This means that most commands are in the hand of one nation (over 50%). The full multinational approach – meaning that every country holds no more than 5–10% of the commands – does not fit in high-intensity warfare. This is also a question of responsibility. One suggestion would be that a distinction between established multinational missions and ad hoc missions should be made (see Table 1). The interviewees prefer established cooperation for multinational cooperation, because in this case, some degree of familiarity is provided in having officers from different nations. In ad hoc missions, it would be better to rely on a strong lead nation system.

A further conclusion is that cultural challenges occur on the one hand between the different nations, and on the other hand between the different branches within (national) armed forces, for example, the Army, the Navy,

**Table 1.** Culture-Related Challenges in Multinational Cooperation.

Composition	Cooperation			
	Intensity of Conflict	Lead Nation Approach (> 50%)	Bi-National Approach	Multinational Approach (About 10%)
Standing formations	No intensity (Munster, Triest)	☺	☺	☺
Established cooperation	Low intensity	☺	☹	☺
	High intensity	☺	☹	☹
Ad hoc cooperation	Low intensity	☹	☹	☹
	High intensity	☹	☹	☹

(☺) No culture-based problems within the different national armed forces (smooth cooperation).

(☹) Some culture-based problems within the different national armed forces.

(☹) Noticeable culture-based problems within the different national armed forces (can hinder the missions' effectiveness).

and the Air Force. Also, Special Forces have a distinct military culture which is very hard to integrate into the whole framework of a mission.

Additionally, some nations are only working in a military context; they have no experiences in policing, or working with other agencies. This military approach is too limited to understand the whole operation and all parties involved in it. This can cause the authority to become too strong. Normally officers should be able to listen to the other parties involved like NGOs or the United Nations and to the other armed forces involved. Military officers should be able *to put on another hat* in order to understand all parties involved. Some countries – according to the interviewees – display a lack regarding this ability to adapt to different roles.

If armed forces want to prevent cultural problems, they have to integrate the respective armed forces. That will be harder at the beginning because obviously, they have to find a common way of conducting the tasks, and that takes time. But integration has its limits. Integration is successful when armed forces have close commonalities. Armed forces with cultural backgrounds that differ too strongly face more challenges in cooperation; sometimes the gap is so huge that it seems impossible to close it. On the other hand, common procedures hide many aspects of culture differences and with informal events military personnel have the opportunity of coming

together more closely. This is essential in order to avoid misunderstandings and offending people, because military personnel are more aware of the different cultures.

To sum up, every armed force has its own culture. But with appropriate pre-deployment training, officers and soldiers should make enough experiences to operate in an international environment. However, two clusters are worth to be mentioned. We can find differences between Nordic countries and countries from South Europe. The Nordic are more mission oriented and the Latin countries have a stronger need for cohesion and relationship at the beginning of the working process. Differences can be observed in English language skills too. A second observation concerns the respective approaches of the US military and European forces, which also have to do with the size of the armed forces.

Multicultural challenges can be analyzed under three main aspects: the type of cooperation, the composition of the forces involved, and the intensity of the conflict in the theater (see [Table 1](#)).

According to the interviewed officers and also based on evaluations in the literature, multinational cooperation in standing formations is not a problem. Multinational arrangements also seem to have proved adequate in low-intensity and in some circumstances in high-intensity operations in established cooperation frameworks. Common activities which normally take place in standing formations and in established cooperation have a positive influence on social interaction. They advance integration and multinational contacts, for example, eating and drinking together or sports competitions. The main multicultural challenges arise in high-intensity missions with ad hoc cooperation, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If we look at a mission more closely, we can identify at least three main approaches: lead nation approach, bi-national approach, and multinational approach ([Table 1](#)). Multinational/multicultural forces seem to be more successful in the lead nation and multinational framework. In the high-intensity phase, the lead nation principle plays a more important role. Furthermore, the outcome of the interviews clearly indicates that the lack of skills and training in multinational teamwork – as this is often the case in ad hoc cooperation – is a specific barrier to effective performance in coalition missions. Success normally comes to those who train together for a common mission. Specific pre-deployment “mission” training, cross-training, combined exercises, and seminars are key training factors in interoperability and success in missions.

Multicultural armed forces in challenging missions face a paradoxical situation ([King, 2007](#)). Multinational missions have become necessary

for strategic, political, and financial reasons, but multinationality based on ad hoc cooperation or on insufficient pre-arrangement in high-intensity conflicts can reduce operational success.

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# LATIN AMERICA IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: A SOCIOPOLITICAL OVERVIEW

Marina Malamud Feinsilber

## ABSTRACT

*A unique regional scenario marked by a low probability of interstate-armed conflicts and the commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a good framework for the success of measures like peaceful solutions to controversies, economic cooperation, foreign affairs agreements and mutual confidence measures in the defense arena. At the same time, it has also redefined Latin American military organizations. The strategic planning of the armed forces through the conflict hypothesis pattern has been replaced by the hypothesis of convergence. Therefore, the focus has gone from deterrence to the development of capacities, among which are the peacekeeping capacities that became a priority for many countries of the region. In this sense, the aim of the article is to analyze the participation of Latin America in peacekeeping operations, in order to propose as a final point an ideal type of a Latin American peacekeeper.*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos

Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 139–155

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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A013

## 1. FOREWORD

An important number of Latin American countries contribute actively in peacekeeping operations (PKO) and evidence their constant willingness to increase their participation. This is an ever-growing tendency that can be related to three main causes: to begin with, it seems to be a direct consequence of a peaceful scenario where political agreements and measures of mutual confidence prevail. Although peacekeeping is still taken by many of these countries as a secondary role by their regulatory schemes, peacekeeping can be seen as a reassignment of the military's missions, in a regional context where conventional wars with neighbors seem improbable. On the other hand, it has become a key initiative for their foreign policy and defense agenda, helping to strengthen the region's image among the international community. In this sense, the third cause is that it not only implies an international prestige, but is also supported by a high percentage of own public opinion. As a result, Latin American involvement in PKO constitutes a pragmatic measure to build an identity of international security cooperation and respect for human rights, domestically and around the globe.

At the same time, Latin America faces the critical problem of organized crime and other complex phenomena associated to violence. Then, there are two parallel positions regarding the incursion of the armed forces in the security arena: in the South Cone, there are still several regulations that separate national security from the national defense, whereas in Andean and Central American subregions, armed forces and police work in a combined way to palliate these problems. This has led to some divergences in the region regarding the strategic definitions of the functions, limits and social expectations on the armed forces regarding their role in national security. Nevertheless, at least a common tacit agreement, that is the importance of cooperation in PKO, emerges. Therefore, Latin American troops and military observers are deployed in 17 armed conflicts around the world, and the improvement of the contingents as for the training is already a tangible priority.

Hence, seven nations have recently signed an agreement to create the *Latin-American Association for Training Centers in Peacekeeping Operations* (ALCOPAZ). This association will foster the standardization of education procedures and facilitate a better coordination among peace institutions. On the other hand, permanent interactions between units and the political convergence among governments have facilitated bilateral agreements, like

the creation of the combined and joint *Southern Cross Brigade* between Argentina and Chile.

With a description of the current sociopolitical conditions in the region as a starting point, the objective is to analyze the action of Latin American countries toward PKO by describing some political parameters that have a bearing on the armed forces. Finally, an ideal type of a Latin American peacekeeper is proposed. The description will thus be structured to cover the following subjects: (1) an overview of the context of regional security to understand the Latin American sociopolitical scenario; (2) analysis of cooperation mechanisms and the type of contribution to peace missions; (3) key points of the Haiti case, the most relevant operation in strategic terms for the whole region; and (4) main features of the military professional committed to PKO.

## 2. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY CONTEXT

Latin America meets two exceptional conditions at world level: it is a peaceful zone with a low probability of interstate-armed conflict emergency and it is free of weapons of mass destruction. This unique scenario has progressively redefined the organization, mission and functions of these countries' military. It also has been the ideal framework for significant advances among states toward a peaceful solution of controversies and cooperation in economic, security and foreign affairs issues. What is more, the recently created UNASUR (*South American Nations Union*) is in the process of fully implementing a South American Defense Council.

On a different line, this context has ultimately been linked to a conceptual transformation of the defense paradigm in most Latin American nations, which affects the design of the armed forces. In this sense, *conflict hypotheses* take a second stand as the axis for the strategic planning of force organization, partially in favor of a *convergence hypothesis* among countries in the region. Thus, the conflict hypothesis linked to the deterrent paradigm associated to a large military structure with territorial deployment and little political margin for cooperation among neighbor countries in matters of foreign policy and defense is being replaced by the continuous fostering of an environment of peace in the region, which in turn causes force organization to focus instead on the *development of capacities*.

This circumstance, as already mentioned, is opposed to a security scenario marked by the dilemma of violence, drug traffic and organized crime as key security issues. In fact, Latin American cities are considered the most insecure in the world, due to the indexes of crime rate. Although representing 8% of the world population, the region registered 75% of the kidnappings happened in the world, only during the year 2003. In addition, according to the World Health Organization, the number of annual homicides with firearms in the region (between 73,000 and 90,000) is three times more than the world average. All these connote that insecurity is the second major concern for Latin Americans, after economic crises (Manrique, 2006).

Insecurity is however a particularly urgent issue in the Andean subregion and Central America: in the first case, the main problem is organized crime and its relationship with drug traffic. Colombia appears here as a key factor in the definition of the subregional security framework, marked by the problem of *narcoguerrillas* and armed insurgency. Although the Colombian case is unique in its characteristics of intrastate conflict, it is understood to have a spillover effect onto neighboring countries.

In Central America, the peculiar phenomenon of violence is related to juvenile gangs whose violence concentrates on urban delinquency, called *maras*. Gang members usually come from unstructured families where extreme poverty and social exclusion are endemic and these organizations constitute a method of omnipotence and group identification. Indeed, in the Central American isthmus there are between 70,000 and 100,000 members of these bands. In 2004, the rate of homicides was 46 out of 100,000 inhabitants in Honduras, 41 in El Salvador and 35 in Guatemala, above the 5.7 of the United States and almost 12 of Mexico. Moreover, the economic impact is also extremely high: according to the UNDP, the cost of the violence in El Salvador, only in 2003, was the equivalent of 11.5% of their GNP (Manrique, *ibid.*).

On the South Cone, on the other hand, as territorial focus of the defense prevails and there seem to be no imminent external threats in the short term, the military role toward peace operations has become a strategic priority for these states and a key role for the armed forces professionals. This implies a functional shift from the defense of the homeland to “Operations Other than War” (Moskos, 2000, p. 17). In the particular case of Brazil, partly due to its geopolitical border and the growing social polarization, it also stands out current land conflicts in rural areas such as the well-known *Movimento Sem Terra* and the concentrated urban criminal bands mainly in the marginal neighborhoods of the largest cities.

Whereas in other regions of the world the question of the security is focused in transnational threats or on domestic *fourth generation conflicts*, in Latin America, the national defense (in classic terms) is still preserved by a peaceful context. As a result, security is defined as a desirable condition of political stability and social coexistence, opposed by the persistence of unstabling factors like organized crime and different kinds of violence. This sociopolitical feature is gradually demarcating a “militarization of the security” in the region as the newest phenomenon, even in countries where the effective legislation still excludes any military involvement in these issues. What seemed politically incorrect and distant little time ago is being modified by default in an important number of Latin American countries.

For instance, for many years Brazil banned military participation against organized crime; however, the insecurity problem in cities like San Pablo or Rio de Janeiro concerning criminal organizations and drug traffic has pressed the president into deploying not only the police experts in facing situations of extreme violence, but also special forces of the Army and the Marine Infantry. In addition, the Parliament is currently discussing a reform of the regulatory scheme to allow the armed forces to act legally in national security. In Bolivia, the militarization is also reconfirmed as an axis of presidential policies. In this case, the armed forces are not used to combat insecurity like Brazil but are rather the government’s ideological *anti-imperialist* instrument to support diverse public policies fostered by the presidency.

At the same time, Peru, as well as Ecuador, has been using the military to prevent the action of autochthonous groups and face the regional environment. Although in these countries, the contra-insurgency is a police responsibility, the military participation is imposed with two aims: the preservation of the national territory, especially in the conflicting Amazon area, and dealing with the exogenous origin of the threat, in the specific case of the Colombian guerrilla (*FARC*) (Bartolomé, 2007).

In general, the Latin American diverse security context has heterogeneous and homogeneous elements at once. The specific political dilemmas of each country and subregions are delaying some convergences in security and defense definitions (which ultimately outline the role of the military). Hence, common to them all is the challenge of facing different forms of violence such as organized crime and its interrelations with other complex phenomena such as drug traffic.

Nevertheless, the relative regional stability, the commitment with non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the civil control of the defense

and security matters and the combined and joint permanent military exercises between Latin American countries, among other political measures, all help to blend a significant political homogeneity. Worth mentioning too is the trend toward the peaceful solutions of controversies, such as in the recent disagreement between Colombia and Ecuador, due to the intervention of Colombian forces into Ecuadorian territory in order to eliminate the guerrilla camp where the second commander of the FARC was supposedly operating.

This caused the Ecuadorian president's resistance, who exposed to the international community that this surprising measure of military incursion in the Ecuadorian territory was a violation of sovereignty. The tense relationship between both is not however an isolated concern but an inflexion point of a larger process: political disagreement between Colombia and Ecuador toward the guerilla development and action has indeed been a constant and reluctant issue in the last years. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that instead of beginning an armed conflict, a non-violent resolution of the problem was consented.

All the aforementioned factors converge into a favorable arena for cooperation and the complementation of some basic approaches as regards regional security. While an enhanced union is still pending, there is at least one common factor with high strategic importance and homogeneity among many Latin American countries: the contribution in PKO within the framework of the United Nations.

### **3. POLITICAL CONVERGENCE TOWARD PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

In pragmatic terms, although the armed forces are still considered primarily tied to the role of defending sovereignty from external threats, and their participation in this type of missions is regarded as subsidiary role, the increasing involvement of the Latin America in PKO demonstrates that it is nowadays felt as a specific priority with a marked tendency of increasing exponentially. Latin American countries contributing with troops and military observers evidence the incorporation of these missions as a key element of their international incidence, constituting a strategic defense and foreign policy objective. In addition, the favorable political scenario for regional cooperation has originated different initiatives of joint action by these countries.

One of them, for instance, is the creation of civilian–military centers for tactical and operational training. The first regional antecedent has been the Argentinean Joint Training Center (**CAECOPAZ**) created in 1995, formed for regional training of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru, plus representatives from Ecuador, Uruguay and Brazil. This Center still has a mobile training team, which provides specific advice to the School of Arms in Argentina and abroad on request by the United Nations (as, e.g., assistance to Paraguayan troops to their first military observers in Congo; **Campos & Isaac, 2006**).

By this same token, other centers were created later on with the purpose of promoting education for peace, with a cross-disciplinary approach for the joint training of military, civilian and police forces. Among them are: the Joint Center for Peace Operations (**CECOPAC**) in Chile, the National Support System to Peace Missions (**SINOMAPA**) in Uruguay, the Training Centre for Peace Operations (**CIOP**) in Brazil, the Joint Training Center for Peace Operations (**CECOPAZ**) in Peru and the Regional Training Unit for Peacekeeping Operations (**CREMOPAZ**) in Guatemala.

Due to the importance awarded in Latin America to the contribution to international security, two key regional initiatives have been started: a multilateral cooperation and mutual understanding agreement in academic and tactical training of contingents deployed in PKO; and a bilateral agreement of military cooperation through the creation of a joint brigade for peacekeeping missions under the framework of the UN.

The former initiative refers to the creation of an **ALCOPAZ** as an entity made up by government training centers of Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay. Some of its main objectives are the exchange of experiences, the development of training procedure standards, the creation of communication networks for the fluid contact among members and the purpose of getting to know each other and each one's various institutional perspectives.

The political aim of this association is to expand regional participation through joint training procedural standards for this type of missions and the coordinated work among the national centers. Hence, at the first meeting of **ALCOPAZ** in 2007, the Argentinean Defense Minister outlined that the purpose of the initiative was to promote staff efficiency and effectiveness in PKO, by implementing cooperation mechanisms for the consolidation of peace and international security from a purely Latin American perspective (**ALCOPAZ, 2007**).

The second important regional initiative is the creation of the joint *Southern Cross Brigade* between Argentina and Chile, originated in a 2+2



*annual consultation* (which consists of meetings between the ministers of defense and chancellors; United Nations, 2007). In 2006, both countries signed an understanding that gave rise to this joint military unit under a *Binational Peace Joint Chief of Staff* headed alternately by each country every year. This joint force started with a structure of 300 military members from both countries, and will be operative shortly, under the command of the UN according to the procedures of the *United Nations Stand-By Arrangement System* (UNASAS). The *Southern Cross* is at all times ready for any “due deployment”; in other words, in the event of crisis or emergency, the force shall within 30–90 days have to be available in the area, and stay there for a term of between 6 and 12 months.

Besides the significance of the agreement itself as a means of joint efforts and skills, the creation of the brigade implies an almost unprecedented advance in bilateral relationships: it was as far back as 190 years ago that both countries last joined their forces to defeat the Spanish Crown. On the other hand, in the recent history of bilateral relationships, there have been long pending disagreements over border issues. In fact, war almost broke out in 1978 between both over the sovereignty on three islets in the Beagle Channel and adjacent maritime area. This agreement on joint military actions in PKO has therefore contributed to most significantly improving the relationship between both countries on quite a different level as well.

Beyond particular initiatives of political convergence within Latin America in communication strengthening and performance improvements toward peacekeeping missions, the dramatic increase in participation percentages is clear when comparing the participation of each country of the region in the last five years separately. This is particularly noticeable in the cases of Peru, Chile and Brazil, with the exceptions of Honduras that kept the same number of military observers, and the cases of Ecuador and Guatemala, which in 2003 had still not lent any support to peacekeeping (Table 1).

Peru’s greater participation mainly responds to their objective of improving country image abroad. In this sense, their aim is “to integrate the armed forces to the international community by actively participating in PKO in the international context, without coercive force” with the understanding that operations involving armed forces should be in line with national interest (*Presentación de Perú en las Operaciones de Paz*, 2008).

As to Chile, increasing their participation in peacekeeping missions constitutes a long-term foreign policy and a defense objective. In that sense,

**Table 1.** Latin American Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations between 2003 and 2008<sup>a</sup>.

Country	Milob (2003) <sup>b</sup>	Troops (2003)	Total (2003)	Milob (2008)	Troops (2008)	Total (2008)	Difference (2008–2003)	%
Argentina	6	404	410	9	856	865	455	110
Bolivia	13	203	216	44	421	465	249	115
Brazil	12	59	71	49	1298	1347	1276	1797
Chile	10	0	10	7	502	509	499	4990
Ecuador	0	0	0	26	72	98	98	–
El Salvador	5	0	5	21	0	21	16	320
Guatemala	0	0	0	18	228	246	246	–
Honduras	12	0	12	12	0	12	0	0
Paraguay	22	0	22	38	34	72	50	227
Peru	2	0	2	29	212	241	239	11950
Uruguay	66	1539	1605	67	2531	2598	993	61

<sup>a</sup>Data taken from [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp) (May 2003/May 2008).

<sup>b</sup>Military observers.

Chile has pledged their contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and international security, provided these operations are also in line with their national interests. Along with their favorable disposition in this regard, Chile has also set limits for these types of operations: their “National Policies for Chile’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations” set forth that the country shall act on a command of the UN’s Security Council that may clearly define the extents and duration of these missions (Llenderozas, 2006).

Brazil, in turn, has decided to keep participating in peacekeeping missions to further enhancing their already growing international prestige. It has nevertheless been rather reluctant toward operations for the imposition of peace, tending rather to those aimed at peacekeeping as long as all parties involved agree and missions are established multilaterally. Brazil has also expressed their concern about involvement in the conflicting parties’ internal affairs, which Brazil claim is used by the main world powers to impose unilateral policies. In addition, it has stated that deeper motives such as underdevelopment and inequalities should come under closer focus in order to guarantee a lasting peace. Finally, Brazil prioritizes their participation in Latin America or in Portuguese-speaking countries, given that they privilege their involvement in areas deemed as high priority by their foreign policy (Llenderozas, *ibid.*).

Another outstanding feature of growing participation in peacekeeping missions is the case of Uruguay: although the percentage variation of the deployment is the lowest in the region, this country is the biggest contributor. From 1948 until the present time, it has deployed more than 15,000 troops and has already participated in all five continents. The participation index is mostly relevant because Uruguay has around 3,000,000 habitants. In fact, it should occupy the first position of contributors in the world, when considered the relationship between participant troops and population; in this case, the comparison indicates that 0.09% of the Uruguayan population has participated (Rosales, 2005).

At world level, if containing in regions the data of the number of troops and military observers deployed per country, provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Latin America appears as the second most important region in having increased peacekeeping troops' deployment throughout the world, second to Asia (which once more evidences Latin American commitment to peacekeeping when considered in extra-regional terms) (Table 2).

It is prominent that in the last five years almost all world regions have increased their participation in PKO, except for North America. Canada's and the United States' lower participation in military contingents can be associated to different political variables, although the prolonged intervention in Iraq seems in the short term to constitute their key strategic priority, so less military professionals are being deployed in other armed conflicts.

Last of all, the wide experience of some countries like Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, the incorporation of Guatemala and Ecuador and the significant increase in El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia's participations

**Table 2.** Comparison among Grand Total PKO Contributors per Region over the Last Five Years<sup>a</sup>.

Region	2003	2008	%
Grand total Africa	8786	17487	99.03
Grand total North America	234	90	-61.54
Grand total Latin America	2353	6130	160.52
Grand total Asia	12932	35944	177.95
Grand total Europe	4887	10469	114.22
Grand total Oceania	901	1140	26.53

<sup>a</sup>Data taken from [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp) (Total of troops and military observers per country 2003/2008).

have for the first time met the challenge of effectively participating in a political and security crisis in a country within their own region. Indeed so, according to DPKO data of May 2008, Latin American countries participating in the MINUSTAH operation have each deployed the biggest contingent ever in their record of peace operations. On top of this, these countries as well have to maintain and deepen their mutual points of political convergence, materialized by the bilateral and multilateral agreements recently signed.

#### **4. THE FIRST REGIONAL CASE: HAITI**

Haiti is perceived as a fragile state with urgent economic problems, characterized by a political uncertainty and social polarization. In 2004, after years of crisis, it was on the edge of a civil war in the main cities. With the threat of the armed invasion in the capital Port-au-Prince, the former president Aristide was forced to abandon the country. In consequence, the new political fissure allowed criminal bands to threaten national security.

It was in this context that United Nations constituted the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as the eighth mission achieved since 1993. The Security Council approved the mission in 2004, by the 1542 Resolution. Among the main objectives, it stands out the necessity to attend the interim government to reform the Haitian national police and to begin a disarmament process. For this matter, Chapter VII was applied; so the troops sent to the operation have the legitimate right of using the force as a defense mechanism against violent actors, to protect civilians as well as facilities (Stiftung, 2007).

At present, this country that does not possess armed forces is receiving a multilateral operation led by Brazil, with the particularity of being an “integrated mission”; in other words, its command is centered besides the establishment and maintenance of order, in the generation of a stable institutional development, with the final objective of the state reconstruction. One of the prominent initiatives was the UN technical support and planning of the 2006 elections when René Préval was elected as the new president of Haiti.

Since the assumption in the Haitian administration, the president showed the commitment of recreating the security sector, especially working in the reconstruction of the National Police, with the support of MINUSTAH. The reformation intends to duplicate the current police force to 14,000

**Table 3.** Latin American Troops and Military Observers deployed in Haiti (May 2008)<sup>a</sup>.

Contributor	Total No.
Argentina	560
Bolivia	218
Brazil	1208
Ecuador	67
Chile	503
Guatemala	119
Paraguay	31
Peru	209
Uruguay	1172
Grand total	4087

<sup>a</sup>Data taken from [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp).

agents for 2010 (a realistic figure for a country with a population of 9 million people). Currently, the police institution (PNH) counts with less than the third part of the Latin American average in police members. In this sense, the external support is high priority, since the staff is insufficient to maintain minimum conditions for all citizens' security.

The 9,055 military members deployed for MINUSTAH in 2008 came from 18 countries. At extra-regional level, the mission is composed of military from Canada, Croatia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, United States, Nepal, Pakistan, Jordan and France. From the region perspective, the strategic importance of this mission ended, at this point, in representing the most important operation for Latin Americans, which is evidenced in their political commitment (Table 3).

As a partial balance of the mission, four important results, at least, have been reached (*ibid.*): the support and security provision for presidential elections allowed restoring basic institutional conditions and at the same time helped political stability. In second place, the coordinated action among contributors allowed a better mutual knowledge; it enhanced military training under pragmatic conflict conditions; it permitted equipment revising, and the implementation of humanitarian actions. Therewith, a process of political integration was achieved as regards decisions, through the  $2 \times 9$  mechanism, by means of the meeting of the vice ministers of foreign affairs and defense of Latin American countries that participate in MINUSTAH.

The multinational force also achieved significant advances in the security field. Through disarmament plans, demobilization and reinstatement, Haitian government with the multilateral mission support has recovered part of the control in the most dangerous neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince like Bel Air, Cité Militaire and Cité Soleil, facing the scourge of the armed gangs and the urban violence actively. Moreover, there has been an advance in humanitarian matters and reconstruction, the execution of specific projects of streets recovery and routes, distribution of allowances, medications, school equipment and medical attendance. Control actions as well as civic and humanitarian help then allowed improving life conditions of the Haitians, recovering some of the stability and infrastructure.

However, there are still at least two relevant pending challenges in the security arena for the MINUSTAH: the first one is to maintain social peace and achieve the disarmament, and at the same time, to counteract the inefficient juridical and penitentiary system. The urban gangs continue operating, in many cases as an economic exit of the social exclusion and unemployment, establishing complex networks of organized crime. The question of the security is not, however, a failure of this mission in particular, but a structural problem (a non-minor fact is that Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America and has faced a long history of institutional uncertainty).

As a final point, the necessity of making decisions on the own reconstruction plan is imposed. Although foreign contingents have achieved respect from people, even in violent neighborhoods, and acceptance for their humanitarian help, ambiguity prevails and urges an efficient coordination of the 2 × 9 meetings and a clear political orientation among Latin American countries, the United Nations and domestic leaders. It is high priority then, in this point of the MINUSTAH, to plan and to execute concrete measures in the security arena, health and education, to avoid the mission to become a protectorate in the long term.

## **5. THE LATIN AMERICAN PEACEKEEPER**

PKO by military forces entail an important amount of skills that require not only technological, tactical and administrative expertise, but also deep understanding of world politics and societies, as well as the coordination of different and sometimes even opposite approaches among members, toward conflict resolution. Armed forces members must also be respectful of

international rights and should have an open attitude. Indeed, military participation in PKO involves a remarkable professional challenge related not only to the successful display of tactical warfare aptitudes regularly related to classic polemology, but also to the implementation of a peculiar type of military training and high qualifications regarding humanitarian values.

According to a CAECOPAZ professor's essay, peacekeepers are vested with special characteristics that to a certain extent place them within a distinctive culture. Therefore, it says that operational training should be supplemented with *UN aptitudes*. It is prioritized that an official that has been trained for the war should now avoid it. Therefore, a special training is essential, to allow professionals to operate in a conflict and also a post-conflict area, in a multinational and multidisciplinary environment, respectful of the different cultures, guided by the principles of UN and with a number of specific personality characteristics such as tolerance, flexibility, autonomy, initiative, patience and diplomacy (Campos & Isaac, op.cit.).

Under this perspective, the precise knowledge that should be provided not only to a peacekeeper, but also to any member of a mission should include conceptual aspects of UN and conflicts, administrative procedures, security, English, first aids, survival techniques, ethics, cultural and religious rules, International Rights of Armed Conflicts, civic–military coordination, gender and vulnerable groups, among other pertinent topics.

As long as the peacekeeper is linked in operations abroad with military members and civilians from other countries of the world, a wider cultural approach between units and professionals of different nations takes place, as they are sharing similar normative and values. The necessity to operate in different points of the globe using combined means, by reducing costs and rationalizing resources, favors this transnational integration.

Yet, social identifications tied to empathy and cultural proximity prevail. Therefore, in the formation of military multinational organizations, it is also important to keep in mind the compatibility of national cultures, just as Soeters (1997) outlines. In consequence, even without considering language problems, some national cultures working together work better than with others. This reveals that there is an ideal type of a peacekeeper shared by all the military of nations committed to peace processes, but at the same time, this definition has to be narrowed down to meet the specificity of each case in terms of training, values and military doctrines that are distinctive to each country or region.

In the first place, the common denominator of the military professional in the region is correlated to a specific pattern of a prevalent military

organization. Although it can be conceptually denominated as *plural* in Charles Moskos terms, the action of armed forces is permanently signed by values and norms, which shows a larger incidence of the *institutional* factor over the *occupational* one (Moskos, 1985, pp. 143–145).

Hence, whereas there is not a unique pattern for the entire Latin America, political priorities of States as regards force planning, the distribution of the defense expenditure, the regional security situation and the balance of some comparative experiences of the military action in peacekeeping missions, especially in the last years in Haiti, have conformed an ideal type of a *Latin American peacekeeper*, marked by the following characteristics:

1. *The L.A. peacekeeper lacks the technological advances present in other countries:* Due partly to a stable security scenario in classic terms and also to governmental measures against the political heritage of the last dictatorships in some Latin American countries, other priorities of the public agenda were imposed over the military organization; therefore, budgetary restrictions have had a bare on the development of some required capacities.
2. *The L.A. peacekeeper is less experienced in joint action:* Although specific reforms held by the defense ministries in the region have led to integrate each of the forces in military operations, this mechanism still needs to be fully achieved.
3. *The L.A. peacekeeper is strongly tied to the values, norms and doctrine of the organization:* As the military have maintained an *institutional* vision of the defense, armed forces professionals operate in accordance to their training, doctrine and values' structure.

Consequently, the Latin American professional committed with PKO faces the challenge to adjust to a peaceful regional strategic context in classic terms and a gradually more complex international security scenario in terms of new-armed conflicts and threats. Therefore, the search of permanent adaptation to the demands of new functions, conjugating the use of force and in specific occasions also diplomacy measures, modifies the planning, training and performance requiring a further integrated action.

The nature of conflicts is changing, and so is the conformation and function of the armed forces. Thus, Latin American peacekeeping contributors are successfully adapting to the new challenges of this world context. For instance, each government's political responsibility, each initiative of



cooperation agreements, each contingent training improvement and the integration among educational centers are proofs to these.

As a result, the transformation of the morphology of violence seems to challenge the capacity of states in facing its consequences, and at the same time the rising complexity of conflicts and sociopolitical problems that enhance them keeps pressing the international community to the search of palliatives. In times where looking for and finding new answers that may tend to a more peaceful world is imperative, it is relieving to know that many countries in Latin America are also making their effort to achieve it.

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# POLISH MILITARY FORCES IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: EXPERIENCES AFTER 2000

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## ABSTRACT

*The article is focused on three main issues. First, it presents a short overview of Polish armed forces' engagement in peacekeeping operations in Asia and Africa. This is followed by a discussion on the positive and negative outcomes and consequences of mission participation for the soldiers, with a special emphasis on their professional and interpersonal skills, intercultural experience and social relations. Finally, the chapter highlights the experience of the Polish army's peacekeeping missions as an important factor of change, which influences military institutions and its personnel in Poland. The participation in missions seems to be an important event in soldiers' professional career, seen as a kind of verification of previously learned skills and abilities. It might influence future career path, would be a reservoir for new practices and knowledge*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos

Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 157–171

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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A014

*for the military institutions, and might show their weak points. Presented data are based on official information of Ministry of National Defense of Poland as well as on surveys conducted in the years 2004, 2006 and 2008 on a random sample of around 500 Polish soldiers, each done in Military Office for Social Research, Poland.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, we are going to present outcomes of sociological research, considering the consequences of participation of Polish soldiers and Polish army as an institution in the peacekeeping missions and military operations other than war (MOOTW) during the last four – missions participants – years. The surveys were done in the years 2004 (Kloczkowski, Iwanek, Nowosielsi, & Wachowicz, 2004), 2006 (Kloczkowski et al., 2006) and 2008 (Kloczkowski, Weseliński, & Wachowicz, 2008) on the random samples of Polish soldiers and were focused on the motivation, evaluation, experiences and consequences of participation with a special emphasis on the impact of mission participation on the professional career of soldiers. Respondents were full professional soldiers – commissioned as well as non-commissioned. The number of filled-up questionnaires of each research exceeded 500. The respondents were recruited among the mission participants, except the 2008 research where the survey also covers non-participants from the same military units – the reason behind this was to compare the impact of participation in mission on attitudes, self-esteem and professional skills.

Polish army has a long history of participating in peacekeeping missions, stabilization operations and other types of MOOTW in Africa, Asia and Europe (for details, see Światkiewicz, 1975; Markowski, 1994; Kozerański, 2003).

Polish armed forces have participated in peacekeeping operations in Asia since 1952 and in Africa since 1968. In Asia, more than 50,000 Polish soldiers took part in 18 peacekeeping military operations – mainly in the Middle East area (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Israel – 30,000 soldiers; also Iraq – 16,000 soldiers) and in the Far East (Vietnam, Korea, Laos and Cambodia – 4,200 soldiers) as well as in Central Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Caucasus – 1,500 soldiers). In Africa, the nine peacekeeping operations engaged almost 1,000 Polish soldiers, mainly in Namibia, Congo and currently Chad.

In Europe, most Polish contingents of peacekeeping forces were deployed in Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia (FYROM), Albania and Kosovo, with total number exceeding 10,000 soldiers.

Today objectives realized as part of peacekeeping missions definitely differ from those in years 1970 and 1980. When in the past they were mainly supervision or the separation of fighting sides, rarely requiring quasi-combat action, and – in general – generated relatively small risk, with the appearance of the new type of conflicts and the new definition of presence of the Western powers in developing countries, the requirements towards soldiers participating in missions changed.

Present missions differ from the previous in two fundamental aspects: first, the warfare-like, risk-generating actions are playing a greater role (convoys, protective actions and different intervention of action quasi-military), and second, the significance of creating positive relations with the civilian population has considerably increased (distribution of the humanitarian aid and active involvement into processes of the self-organization of public life in the country of the mission).

Army that participates in missions is performing not only police tasks, but also typically military as well as political or educational tasks. In the past, peacekeeping forces functioned in the environment of local institutions and the formal organizations (most often states); today they are often the only efficient, formal institution that is present in the area of conflict, where the lack of clear rules is a rule – this was (and sometimes still is) a situation in Bosnia, Somali, Iraq or Afghanistan.

It seems that military practice in these cases has to be confronted with processes of the fundamental change of the self-organization of the contemporary society – the transition from formal, visible and hierarchical structures to networking, fluctuating and polycentral forms (passage which – paradoxically – is better visible in peripheral areas of contemporary world).

In our research, this shift is reflected in relations of Polish soldiers among whom a few reported a kind of shock when moved from the mission in the Middle East (Syria) to the reality of Afghanistan or Iraq.

## **2. THE POLISH SOLDIER IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS**

The tendencies that underline social structure of Polish troops in missions abroad could be described as follows. The social characteristics of Polish

soldiers who participate in military missions refer mainly to the categories of age and professional specialization. The average age of mission participants is lower than that in whole military (Ministry of National Defence of Poland – MON, 2007). Characteristic of peacekeeping military operations also requires a number of soldiers prepared for fulfilling specific tasks in the areas of logistic, medical care, communication, transportation, negotiation and intercultural relations, engineering, disarmament, etc. We are observing an increasing tendency for multiple participation in peacekeeping operations. Among the respondents of 2008 survey, more than half have at least one previous experience in peacekeeping service abroad, and there are a significant number of missions' participants who had serviced three turns and more. From the general perspective of the whole armed forces, it means an emergence of a new professional group with different experiences of service, commanding, etc., in extremely difficult conditions (Table 1).

However, the recruitment for peacekeeping missions in Polish army is not based on the voluntary enlistment; the reasons declared for and against participation are of crucial importance. Soldiers tend to participate mainly due to financial reasons (extra pay); also important are professional factors – expectations of gaining new experiences and (especially foreign language) skills. The most important factor that hinders participation is separation with family and its consequences. Another argument raised by the soldiers against the participation is that the army military personnel while on the mission may be omitted in the procedures of promotion in the country and the course of their career paths could be disrupted. In this context, the prevailing opinion that mission participation could be a simple gate to the promotion is true only for some cases – particularly in the case of senior officers at commanding positions.

General opinions on evaluation of particular aspects of preparation for peacekeeping missions were measured according to several dimensions.

**Table 1.** Participation in Missions (in %), 2008 Survey.

Number of Turns (Missions)	Iraq	Afghanistan	Balkans	Middle East	Other
1	50.6	7.8	19.1	6.6	0.8
2	8.6	1.6	1.9	1.2	
3	3.9	0.8	0.4		
4	5.1				
5 and more	1.1				
Total	69.3	10.2	21.4	7.8	0.8

Generally, due to results of 2008 survey, the highest positive marks were allocated to organizational, logistic and military aspects of preparation, like quality of individual military training before mission (74% of positive assessments), organization of transport and relocation (67%), organization of medical care (60%) and knowledge of procedures and regulations applied to the peacekeeping service (54%). The insufficient support was recognized in the areas of protection and care offered to soldiers' families in the country (pointed by 30%), foreign languages' training (28%) and psychological support and care (25%) offered to the soldiers participating in the mission. The preparation towards intercultural contacts with the local society in the country of mission was in majority seen as sufficient (38%: good and very good, 46%: adequate and 16%: insufficient).

The most popular and widely chosen reason – declared by almost half of the respondents – that influences the decision of participation in mission was the possibility of gaining extra salary. Other factors were of significantly lower importance – the will of checking one's skills in real, difficult situation and expected positive influence of mission experience on future career in military were mentioned by much less of the respondents.

### **3. THE REASONS OF THE CHOICE AND EXPECTATIONS**

The major reason behind the decision on mission participation was the possibility of gaining added income. The comparison of surveys conducted in the years 2004 and 2006 shows that motivation of mission participants was not changed significantly. Results show tendency for increasing importance of the belief that mission participation would help in professional career along with a slight decrease in financial motivation (Table 2).

In 2004, research respondents were additionally asked for assessment of each motive using a scale where 5 means 'very important' and 1 'not important at all'. Surprisingly, among very important factors besides financial benefits (average mark 3.92), respondents also pointed 'readiness to check oneself in difficult situation, extreme conditions' (3.97), 'need for self-development, gaining new skills' (3.82), 'feeling of participation in important, historical event' (3.25) and 'belief, that mission participation will help in professional career in military' (3.16).

Making decision to go on a mission certainly is not easy, with the family members and relatives playing an important role in the decision-making process. It is difficult to judge whether the failure to agree on the



**Table 2.** Most Important Motives Supporting Decision on Mission Participation.

	2004 (% of Respondents)	2006 (% of Respondents)
Financial motives (increased salary)	47	41
Belief that mission participation will help in professional career in military	9	20
Feeling of participation in important, historical event	7	4
Will of serving the nation (patriotic motivations)	2	–
Readiness to check oneself in difficult situations, extreme conditions	13	10
Adventure	1	6
Influence of friends, acquaintances	0	1
Need for self-development, gaining new skills	7	8
Other	6	9

departure could have consequences for the strength of support they gave to participants, but deciding against the family certainly caused disharmony in the minds of soldiers. This situation does not affect positively the perception of a sense of mission undertaken. Positive verification of this thesis is the situation when there was a favorable reaction and the family later welcomed the departure to the mission. The soldiers whose families proved their reluctance to leave on missions, more frequently than others, were dissatisfied with the stay on the mission abroad.

In the 2006 research, respondents were asked about their positive and negative expectations towards mission participation by using an open, possibly multiresponse question. In the result of categorization, we received the schedule shown in Table 3).

Mostly declared positive expectation might be described as cognitive. It is connected with increasing the level of professional abilities and skills and gaining new experiences. Second group of expectations consists of pragmatic prospects – financial benefits and positive impact on career course.

#### 4. SATISFACTION

Next issue deals with general opinion on experience of personal participation confronted with previous expectations and knowledge. Generally experience of mission participation was evaluated as positive. More than

**Table 3.** Expectations due to Mission Participation  
(in % of Responses), 2006 Survey.

	Respondents (%)
<i>Positive expectations</i>	
To acquire new experience (knowledge, skills)	39
Improving of the financial conditions, additional salary	15
Meet new people and their culture	13
Checking oneself in an extreme situation	10
Improving language skills	6
To have an interesting adventure	3
Other	9
<i>Negative expectations, concerns</i>	
Loss of life	43
Loss of health	32
Separation from family and its negative consequences	8
Concern about difficulties of tasks, demands and circumstances in the mission reality	4
Concern about stress caused by military action involvement	1
Lack of clear information on situation and mission reality	1
Other fears and concerns	10

80% of respondents in all three surveys declared their full (around 25%) or partial (around 55%) satisfaction from their personal activity and participation in the mission, whereas less than 14% expressed disappointment (Chart 1).

The share of definite positive assessments grows in the following years, from 22% in 2004 survey to almost 26% in 2008. The percentage of extremely disappointed and dissatisfied respondents declines in the same time. In opposition to the declared satisfaction from personal participation, the data on assessment of mission reality, environment and service conditions show much less optimism.

Data included in Table 4 show that the number of 'disappointed' prevails on those who were positively surprised by the reality (conditions and environment) of the mission. Simultaneously we can observe a tendency towards an increase in the percentage of satisfaction among respondents in the following years.

Among respondents of 2004 survey who declared disappointment and negative attitude towards mission reality, mentioned problems were connected with conditions of accommodation (30%), climate (19%), security




Chart 1. General Satisfaction of the Mission Deployment.

**Table 4.** Confrontation of Mission Reality with Previous Expectations.

	2004 Research (% of the Respondents)	2006 Research (% of the Respondents)	2008 Research (% of the Respondents)
Reality of the mission was much worse than expected	19	13	16
Reality of the mission was slightly worse than expected	31	24	25
Reality of the mission was no worse or better than expected	29	38	34
Reality of the mission was slightly better than expected	18	18	26
Reality of the mission was much better than expected	3	7	3

(15%) and organization of service and work in the mission (17%). In 2008, the frequency of complaints generally decreased and the structure of problems was changed. It includes weakness of arms and equipment (11%), poor conditions of accommodation and infrastructure (8%), the bigger-than-expected risk of loss of life and lack of security (7%).

Positive confrontation of expectations with the reality of the mission revealed that for the considerable part of respondents, the main positive output of mission participation is connected with gaining new skills and competencies. Upgradation of the skills takes place in the area of military dimension and less interpersonal skills (Table 5).

In the 2008 survey, there was possibility of measurement of mission participation impact on different areas of skills and competencies. The most important question concerned the changes in qualifications, influenced by the mission participation. Respondents were asked to report whether positive changes in several dimensions took place during their mission participation (participants) or during last year (non-participants). The idea was to gather opinion of soldiers, the mission participants, about what has changed in their knowledge and skills in the most recent period, and compare the results with the opinions of soldiers who have not been sent to the missions (they were asked about their experience of changes during last year, whereas participants were asked about the changes caused by mission participation). In both groups, the greatest change occurred in the sphere of military cooperation and knowledge in terms of resistance to stress and coping with difficult situations as well as the proper chain of command (Chart 2).

**Table 5.** Most Important Skills and Experiences gained during Service on the Mission, 2006 Survey.

Skills and Experiences gained during Service on the Mission	Respondents (%)
Gaining new military professional specializations	19.9
Language skills increment (English)	17.0
Real experience of the battlefield, field operations	14.6
Competencies in cooperation, team work	14.1
Being familiar with organizational culture (commandment, rules of action, etc.) in other armies	9.3
Stress resistance	7.7
Knowledge about and practice with new kinds of weapons	4.2
Ability in fields of information selection and quick decision-making	1.5




Chart 2. Percentage of Soldiers reporting Positive Changes in Several Dimensions during Last Year/due to Mission Participation (2008 Survey).

It is evident that the experience of mission participation is an influential and dynamizing factor of gaining new experiences and skills. The comparison between skills and abilities of ‘participants’ and ‘non-participants’ shows that mission participation gives a unique experience of effective acting in difficult situations, to cooperate, communicate and command in unsafe, unstable and non-predictable, risky circumstances.

Most of the surveyed soldiers believe that the gains from participation in missions outweigh the losses. Larger percentage of the positive assessment can be found in the group of participants of the mission – this is nothing surprising because in their consciousness there is ongoing process of cognitive dissonance reduction and rationalization of motives for participation in missions. Among the advantages mentioned most were financial benefit and to gain professional experience, including loss of all distortions in the functioning of the family (Table 6).

Another element of the balance of benefits and losses measured in the 2008 survey is opinion about changes in various aspects of professional and social situations of the respondents. Participants of the mission were asked to evaluate how the participation influenced their situation, and those who did not participate in missions were asked to assess the changes that occurred in their situation over the year before the survey was done (Table 7).

**Table 6.** Benefits and Losses of Mission Participation.

	Participants (%)	Non-participants (%)
<i>Benefits</i>		
Financial	36.2	48.6
Professional experience	35.2	30.0
English language improvement	8.7	1.4
New friends, colleagues	7.4	2.4
Verification of knowledge and skills	5.2	3.1
Coping with stress	2.7	1.0
Other	4.5	13.4
<i>Losses</i>		
Problems in family functioning	56.8	45.2
Career problems – omission in promotion	14.1	2.4
Mental, emotional problems	11.7	20.2
Health problems	9.7	21.2
Worse social relations (in military environment)	1.5	0.5
Other	6.3	10.6

Opinions of missions: ‘participants’ and ‘non-participants’. What kind of benefits/losses might be caused by mission participation? 2008 survey.

**Table 7.** Percentage of Positive and Negative Changes in Private and Professional Spheres (Differences between Participants and Non-Participants) 2008 Survey.

Dimensions of Professional and Social Life <sup>a</sup>	Participants		Non-Participants	
	Negative Changes	Positive Changes	Negative Changes	Positive Changes
Financial and salary	2.7	72.0	10.6	40.9
Prestige among friends (civilians)	3.1	68.9	5.6	41.5
Relations with colleagues in military	3.1	61.1	5.0	54.8
Prestige within the family	5.4	61.1	7.6	41.2
Relations with subordinates	0.8	47.9	9.3	33.2
Prestige in a professional environment (military)	3.9	52.5	10.3	32.9
Relations with superiors	10.5	44.0	15.6	39.9
The atmosphere in the working environment	8.6	40.5	21.6	37.5
Well-being	12.5	37.7	24.9	29.9
Compliance of duties with qualifications	10.9	38.5	22.9	31.9
The possibility of further professional training	12.8	33.1	25.9	31.9
Relations with children	16.3	23.3	7.6	23.3
The quantity of work, tasks	12.5	23.0	30.9	27.6
Job/position security	16.0	27.2	22.9	27.6
Relations within marriage	20.6	24.5	15.6	26.6
The possibility of promotion to higher position	18.3	20.2	32.1	15.0
Health conditions	25.7	12.8	19.3	21.3

<sup>a</sup>The column shows a list of the different dimensions of professional and social life. The respondents were asked to assess what kinds of changes (positive or negative) have occurred in these areas in their case – as a result of participation in the mission (participants) and during last year of service (non-participants).

In assessing the consequences of participation in missions in the 2008 survey, we have referred to the personal experiences of respondents, which have left an indelible footprint in their minds. Respondents who have participated in missions were asked to list the most memorized, both positive and negative events, feelings and the situations. The question was open, giving the possibility of unrestricted expression (Table 8).

The above data show that the most negative experiences are related to the experience of stress of battlefield – consciousness of casualties among colleagues and soldiers, tension and fear caused by hostile (mortar) fire and other risks and problems with efficient commanding and circulation of information in unpredictable, difficult situations. Other negative memories,

**Table 8.** Most Important Positive and Negative Memories, Reminiscences and Experiences from the Service in the Mission 2006 Survey.

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What are your most positive memories, reminiscences and experiences from the service in the mission (% of responses)?	
To meet different culture, different people	20.7
Helping others, 'smile of the children'	18.2
Atmosphere, social contacts, cooperation	18.2
Interaction with soldiers from other countries	17.4
Assistance from colleagues, brotherhood	15.7
Accommodation, living standards	6.6
Nature	3.3
What are your most negative memories, reminiscences and experiences from the service in the mission (% of responses)?	
The death of colleagues, soldiers	23.6
Problems with procedures (bad commanding)	20.1
Fear of death, fire of enemy (mortars') fire	18.8
Separation from family	6.3
Deficiencies in training, preparation	5.6
View of dead people, civilian victims	4.9
View of poverty and misery of civilians	3.5
Deficiencies in equipment and facilities	3.5
Deficiencies in the language preparation	2.1
Natural conditions, climate	0.7
Other	11.1

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for example, associated with separation from family and shortcomings in the supply or observed problems and casualties among the civilian population were not so significant in the memories of the mission participants.

The most positive memories affected the social dimension of experience participation in the mission. They include experience of contacts with representatives of other cultures, participation in humanitarian help deployed to the domestic population as well as the unique experience of social ties, a kind of brotherhood among the nascent soldiers in the face of threats, difficult challenges and not an easy service.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Social and geopolitical situation has allowed Poland to ensure that for a long period of time the Polish military units were not involved in the real



warfare or large-scale military operations.<sup>1</sup> Military missions and operations other than war outside the country carried out under the aegis of the United Nations were taken out by relatively small branches of the armed forces operating in relatively safe and organized environment, for example, the Middle East, and their mandate was not extended beyond stabilization. On the contrary, missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced a change in the mission conditions and made the baggage of soldiers' experience substantially different. The scale of the Polish involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised questions about the use of experiences of individual soldiers, commanders and subdivisions. First, it has become necessary to specify the impact of mission participation on self-esteem of soldiers.

The results of presented surveys confirm the argument that the participation in military missions (MOOTW) is an important element of the reorganization of the Polish army as an institution and a change in the mindset of soldiers. It is necessary to remember that situation of greater commitment due to mission participation is the factor that enhances institutional change and effects the improvement of regulations and procedures in the whole military.

A comparison of group of soldiers involved and participating in missions indicates that in all cases, the soldiers after missions often point to progress in their own skills and knowledge. The biggest differences can be noted in those dimensions which deal with the critical, dangerous and difficult situations. Professional soldiers, who have already participated in the missions outside the country, often report positive changes in qualifications (in terms of knowledge and professional, military skills). Even the least visible improvement – physical fitness – is dominated by soldiers from the missionary experience. The presented studies have shown that the participation in missions outside the country poses new structural military challenges. In many cases, we are dealing with the need to improve the procedures and solutions. According to the opinion of our respondents, special attention should be paid to the process of recruitment, selection and preparation for the mission. In the course of the mission itself, the inadequacy of information, system impediments to implementation of the tasks, has been particularly adversely assessed. Being on a mission involves increased stress and tension associated with it. This leads to interpersonal conflicts; hence, the emphasis should be placed on how to release tensions and conflicts.

Participation in missions is a critical element in the transformation of Polish army. It is a source of both internal and external legitimacy for the Poland's armed forces, which contributed to accelerating the process of professionalization. However, it carries the risk of new divisions (for those

who have participated and not participated in missions) and dominance in terms of needs and equipping of military units and structures involved in military missions. But from the long perspective, the involvement in operations of OTW type seems to bring more positive effects.

## NOTE

1. With one exception – in 1968 more than 20,000 of Polish troops had taken part in Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia.

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# SOUTH KOREAN EXPERIENCES IN PEACEKEEPING AND PLAN FOR THE FUTURE

Kyudok Hong

## ABSTRACT

*This study attempts to introduce South Korea's unique experiences of civic operations made in Iraq and Lebanon. Koreans approached it with extreme caution since they are seeing through two different lenses: "paying back syndrome" from the Korean War experiences is colliding with the "Vietnam syndrome" from the experiences of Vietnam War. Expanding its regional role through revitalizing PKOs is not an easy job for the ROK government despite the fact that President Lee has committed himself to increase its efforts since his campaign days. South Korea recently decided to send its KDX-II type destroyer to Somalia for joining the maritime peacekeeping while people in Korea strongly suspect that the Obama administration would soon request to send its troops to Afghanistan as a part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As the Korean society is getting democratized, progressive NGOs have been opposing the government decision to send forces to assist the U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how President Lee persuades people to bear the burden and endure sacrifices. At least, four problems need to be addressed for Korea to become a major troop-contributing country (TCC): first, Korea needs to enact laws to deal with*

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**

**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 173–187**

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**ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A016**

*South Korea's participation in the UN PKOs. Second, Korea needs to find a way to include civilian experts in future activities of UN PKOs. Third, it needs to increase the budget and size of standby forces. Lastly, it needs to educate people to understand why Korea has to contribute further to make a safer world. It remains to be seen whether South Korea will continue to focus on its stabilization and reconstruction efforts without sending its combat troops.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

South Korea's strong interests in the UN PKOs are somewhat unique and it is quite different from other troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Koreans approached the issue of sending troops to a third country through their own lenses of historical experiences. The Korean War and the Vietnam War have provided people with two different reactions: so-called "paying back syndrome" is still prevalent among majority of Koreans who believe that it is their moral duty to help those who are caught in the armed conflict. Being rescued by the 16 nations' timely military intervention when the UN General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution at the beginning of Korean War, they could hardly turn down the request of sending military forces for protecting people in danger, particularly when the UN is involved. The "Vietnam syndrome" is another important guideline for influencing the Korean minds. The reaction may not be identical among Koreans on what the Vietnam War is really meant by. For those of old generation, it was an opportunity for Korea to become a modernized country by gaining not only confidence, but also enormous economic benefits through financial assistance from the United States that lay the foundation for further industrialization. They see the convergence of interests with the United States by sending forces to assist the Johnson administration and its escalation drive strengthened their bargaining positions by making the United States dependent on the ROK contributions (Hong, 1991). On the other hand, there are those who see the decision to participate in the Vietnamese War as basically a wrong one made by the authoritarian leadership at the time. For those, Korea paid a high price by wasting 4,400 killed in action and numerous veterans are still suffering from various diseases and psychological wounds from the war. As the Korean society is getting democratized, new power elites in the Korean politics during the past 10 years tend to have a different understanding of Korean

modern history. Many of them were student activists and therefore had hard times during the authoritarian governments. They tend to believe that Korea's participation in the Vietnam War was a wrong decision and it was forced by the United States. Revisionism hit hard among the Korean intellectual society under the progressive governments during the past 10 years and the rising anti-Americanism checks every intention of the military to assist the American attempts to incorporate the ROK forces in their regional operations (Hong, 2007a).

The impact of society has grown up to constrain the desire of the military and Ministry of National Defense during the previous government. The progressive NGOs are attempting to influence the decision-making process in the area of national security and it is unprecedented in the modern history of Korea where security has long been regarded as a sacred area (Hong, 2005).

Against this backdrop, this article focuses on how the past experiences and domestic politics influence the way the Koreans operate the PKO activities in today's world. This study briefly introduces all the recent activities but focuses on their unique characteristics of civil operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Of course, the Korean unit stationed in Iraq does not belong to the UN PKO. However, it helps readers to understand how the Korean PKOs are managing their challenges.

## **2. BRIEF HISTORY OF KOREAN PARTICIPATION OF UN PKOS**

Due to serious tension between the East and West during the Cold War period, South Korea was able to join the UN only in 1991 as a full member. As the newly joined member state of the UN, South Korea began to express its strong wishes to participate in the activities of UN PKO. However, it approached with extreme caution. As the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar inquired of the possibility to sending troops for UN PKOs, the Roh Tae-woo government responded with a plan that it would send a battalion of infantry (540), medical unit (154), and observer unit (36). When the UN made an unofficial request that South Korea dispatch a medical team to Somalia (UNISOM I) in September 1992, it was not able to accept the request due to difficulties regarding necessary funds and lack of time for obtaining an approval from the Korean National Assembly. Later in that

year, South Korea was requested again to contribute troops and financial support to Somalia (UNOSOM II) by the United States as well as the UN Secretary General. South Korea decided to make a financial contribution of 2 million dollars since it could not send troops without having approval from National Assembly (Park, J.-Y., 2002).

In January 1993, Korea was again asked to send its troops to Somalia and finally dispatched a fact-finding mission to consult with the UN officials there. It initially considered sending a medical unit but finally decided to send engineering corps called “Evergreen Unit” consisting of 252 soldiers to UNOSOM II. It was the first operation after joining the UN in 1991 and lasted until March 1994. The reason the ROK sent its combat engineering unit to Somalia is that it can be more visible and earn trust and respect from the local people by engaging into civil operations. This was based on its own experiences from the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, the ROK dispatched a team of Tae Kwon Do (martial arts) instructors first to get public attention and sent “Dove Unit” composed of three engineering battalions to engage in civil operations to build roads, schools, and waterways for the benefits of local people.

In October 1995, Korea sent again engineering unit to Angola to join the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III). The unit was engaged in repairing roads, bridges, airfields, and civilian operations by providing a humanitarian assistance to local people. The mission continued until December 1996 and about 600 officers and soldiers were sent during the period.

South Korea sent its first medical unit to Western Sahara as a part of UN Mission for Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) in September 1994. The unit consisted of 27 officers and 14 soldiers and provided medical service to about 700 peacekeepers from various countries stationed there. The mission was continued until May 2006 and the rotation was made 23 times during the period.

In October 1994, Seoul began to send its military observers to several places including Georgia, Liberia, Burundi, Sudan, and Afghanistan. As a member of UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), three Korean officers were sent to Georgia for monitoring ceasefire and other duties. The mission is still continuing and the number has been increased to seven officers after October 2004.

Beginning in November 1994, South Korea sent nine officers to the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) as military observers. Major General Hwang Jin-ha was appointed for the first time as the chief military observer of the UNMOGIP.

The Kim Young-sam government decided to send six civilians as monitoring personnel for election in Cambodia at the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique, and Rwanda in 1994, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. It also sent two of police officers to Somalia in 1993.

Nevertheless, South Korea's contribution was limited during the early period mentioned above. It was only after 1999 that the Korean government found it necessary to increase its contribution to the UN PKO. President Kim Dae-jung strongly initiated at the APEC meeting that the Asian neighbors should not remain as by-standers for meditating East Timor crisis. President Kim Dae-jung decided to send its first infantry battalion to East Timor to join the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) (Park, 2002b). This was a landmark decision because it was the first time when the combat forces were sent to protect people who were suffering from domestic violence in the crisis after Vietnam. The rationale behind it was to assist the UN efforts to enhance its regional capacity in dealing with various challenges that cause human insecurities and it was a moral duty for Korea to participate in the activities as a member of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The "Evergreen Unit" was created out of the elite members of special force command and 419 officers and soldiers were dispatched to East Timor to conduct its first mission on October 20, 1999. They served until the end of 1999 before they transformed into a PKO as part of UNTAET under the mandate of new UN Security Council Resolution. About 3,200 officers and soldiers were sent to do PKO activities by October 2003.

South Korea also sent its troops as a part of multi-national forces to assist the U.S. efforts to stabilize the regional crisis. Small air force and naval contingents participated in the operation of "Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan. About 1,956 soldiers of Medical Unit and Engineering Unit were stationed in Afghanistan until the end of 2007.

In Iraq, however, Korean soldiers of Engineering Unit and Medical Unit participated in the Operation of "Iraq Freedom" for many years to assist the U.S. stabilization efforts there, stationing within the U.S. compound before they moved to Irbil, northern Iraq, where the majority of Kurdish people are now living.

In 2007, South Korea sent its infantry battalion to Lebanon after they decided to withdraw Medical and Engineering Units from Afghanistan in 2007. About 350 soldiers are stationed and they are engaged in various civilian operations there.

Currently, the total numbers of South Korean troops who are participating in either the UN PKOs or U.S.-led multi-national forces are 1,071 (391 for UN PKOs and 680 for MNFs). However, 520 soldiers of the



“Zaytun Unit” in northern Iraq and 130 soldiers of the “Daiman Unit” in Kuwait were withdrawn by the end of 2008 after four years’ services in the areas of stabilization and reconstruction. While the ranking of financial contribution is about 11th, the ranking of troop contribution is surprisingly low (39th among 119 states).

### **3. MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF KOREAN CIVIL OPERATIONS**

It is unique to recognize Korean ways to increase its capacity to carry out successful civil operations. Among them, several elements need to be addressed.

First, courteous manner is always emphasized. According to former commanders of the Korean forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, they trained their soldiers to respect elders and even teach how to get eye contacts appropriately with people. In order not to give an impression of the occupying forces, they try to be culturally sensitive and use various outreach programs to attract their interests.

Second, sports can be a tool to get closer to the people. Tae Kwon Do class has always been popular among people across the region since the Vietnam War. It easily overcomes the cultural and ethnic differences. Teaching Tae Kwon Do not only gives courage and confidence to the people of the war-tone society, but also provides them with a team spirit and discipline to control. Tae Kwon Do is usually taken as a regular course for local military academy and police academy and it strengthens the network between their officer corps and Korean masters. Moreover, the Korean unit educates local trainers and assists them financially with managing the cost of running Tae Kwon Do classes. In Iraq, for example, the Korean unit was operating 5 classes with 10 local trainers by the time of closing its mission. The Korean peacekeepers also arranged some prominent Tae Kwon Do leaders to visit Seoul to participate in the annual convention and international competition in Seoul by providing travel grants.

Third, teaching necessary skills for locals to improve their quality of life is emphasized. The Korean peacekeepers run technology education center to have local people equipped with basic technologies for improving their income and provide with a short-term “study in Korea” program for three months in order to give them an incentive. During 2007, a total of 197 Kurdish people went to Korea to learn more about their subject. In Lebanon, they opened a computer class at several public schools. In Iraq,

they maintained seven different technology education courses and it took two to three months to finish the coursework before getting certificate. The courses include bakery, heavy equipments, repairing electronics, computer, repairing generator, management of automobiles, and special vehicle driving. They also employ the outstanding graduates as a trainer to teach locals.

Fourth, providing tailor-made services to earn trust and respect is stressed. Operation “Green Angel” in Iraq and Operation “Peace Wave” in Lebanon are similar in their nature to mobilize local support for the Korean peacekeepers. They provide necessary services to local people by building schools, children’s parks, and whatever locals want to have in their communities. Fully utilizing their own experiences of running “New Township Movement” in 1970s to modernize the rural area, the Korean forces try to support local villages to increase their earnings by exploring their potential assets. The Korean peacekeepers were teaching various skills including beekeeping, alteration and tailor, live stocking, and growing vegetables in vinyl house based on Korea’s own experiences.

Fifth, medical support is a crucial part of humanitarian assistance. In Iraq, the Korean peacekeepers not only treated locals, but also trained the local doctors and nurses. About 120 local doctors and nurses have graduated from the special course provided by Korean medical unit. Before closing, they operated more than 1,488 patients including harelips and squint surgeries. They also sent those who need special medical care to Korea for an advanced surgery. After closing the mission, the Korean unit handed over all the equipment and facility to local government and the local doctors are now replacing the role played by the Korean peacekeepers.

Sixth, education service is also provided as a part of building long-lasting cultural relationship. They teach Kurdish language by opening the language class in northern Iraq. During four years of staying in the Kurdish land, about 8,000 people were attending the class to learn how to write and read their own alphabet. In 2007, the Korean peacekeepers built a modern-style library for locals. It definitely assisted Kurdish people to open their minds to seek cooperation with peacekeepers.

#### **4. MOMENTUM FINALLY ARRIVES FOR INCREASING ITS PEACEKEEPING FORCES BUT OBSTACLES STILL REMAIN**

It is fortunate that South Korean government committed itself to expand its contribution to peacekeeping operations and ODA as new President Lee

Myung-bak announced that he is going to use PKOs as major foreign policy tool to achieve the “global Korea” in which Korea can interact dynamically with global partners to make a safer world (Hong, 2008a).

However, no specific efforts have been made to deploy more peacekeepers abroad, to respond more quickly to crises, and to allocate additional resources to help carry out its core responsibilities due to squabbles of domestic politics. Unfortunately, Lee’s presidency has been crippled by street demonstrations against the purported mad cow dangers of imported U.S. beef. It is very important to investigate the case of South Korean progressive NGOs and their strong influence on the ROK–U.S. alliance. A coalition group of more than 24 progressive NGOs was hurriedly set up by those usual suspects. Among the prominent, Park Suk-woon and Pastor Han Sang-yol are key members of Solidarity of Unification (*Tongilyondae* in Korean) and they continued to obstruct the transfer of U.S. bases to Osan-Pyongtaik area, opposing signing of FTA with the United States, demanding an early transfer of OPCON to South Korea, and opposing the decision of dispatching troops to Iraq (Hong, 2007b).

Beef issue provided a momentum for those progressive NGOs, labor unions, and former Uri Party members to unite together to stage a coup against infantile conservative government. There is no way for the progressives to keep their interests without curtailing President Lee’s ambitious global agenda.

The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged how frustrated he was when the government failed to support his request for additional funds for pursuing an active public diplomacy program. At an interview with local reporters on July 5, 2008, he expressed his unusual tone of disappointment by saying that Korea’s contribution was too tiny and it needs to be expanded further in order to become a stakeholder of the international society.<sup>1</sup>

Despite such difficulties, President Lee made it clear that his government will increase its contributions to developing countries and seek a greater role in international peacekeeping and environmental protection efforts during his meeting with Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on July 4, 2008 (Korean Herald, 2008).

## **5. SOUTH KOREA SEEKS A NEW APPROACH WITHOUT HAVING A WELL-PREPARED ROADMAP**

South Korea’s priorities include the management of its relations with the United States, which has been backbone of the security and prosperity of

Korea. However, South Korea's partnership with the United States must continue to be expanded beyond bilateral security arrangements.

President Lee wants to foster a new partnership with the United States and therefore he agreed with President Bush at the Camp David to announce the Strategic Alliance for the 21st century. However, he has taken a cautious approach in the process of alliance consolidation. Lee committed himself to a "global Korea" but operationalizing this goal in the context of the alliance is likely to result in great political friction at home.

However, he needs to cooperate with the Obama administration that emphasizes global partnership in solving global challenges. Lee finds that peacekeeping and peace-building operations at the regional level are one of the areas where both can gain strategically from each other. His dilemma is whether he can carry out the initiative without provoking those critics at home who are concerned about potential dispatch of Korean troops to Afghanistan as a part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Lee government recently decided that it will dispatch KDX-II type destroyer to the Bay of Somalia to participate in the U.S. Operation of Enduring Freedom (Chang, 2008). Ocean peacekeeping is a new area for Korea. And the Lee government wishes that the decision would reduce the level of concerns by avoiding the chance of committing ground forces to Afghanistan. The Korean government is extremely careful to send its forces to join the United States in combating the terrorism since the previous government made a hard choice to withdraw its units from Afghanistan after Korean missionaries were abducted and murdered by the Taliban forces in 2007.

President Lee fully understands that there is a real need to translate Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles into East Asia as it observed serious human sufferings from the natural disasters of Myanmar and China (Axworthy, 2007). Although the ASEAN and ARF are beginning to embrace peacekeeping and peace-building, they are doing this in a limited and hesitant way (Lizee, 2007). South Korean strategists strongly urge President Lee to take a leadership role to deal with human security agenda in East Asia.

Korea's commitment to respond to humanitarian crises has been most recently on display in China. It decided to send its crises response unit to the site of earthquake-ridden place in China. A Korean gesture of goodwill attracted a wide range of support and helped direct the need for establishing a crisis response mechanism among the concerned parties in the region. The Korean Air Force also provided a disaster relief operation by dispatching three C-130s cargo planes, full of emergency items. It was the first time that

Korean military cargo planes were allowed to land on the Chinese soil and this positive response would certainly encourage Korean government to continue to participate in any future operation of similar sort if opportunities are given.

Koreans generally believe that building democracy is not exactly a science and can hardly be transferable from abroad (Zeller, 2003). Of course, there was a time when the culture of South Korea was incapable of sustaining democratic values. But today's Iraq and Afghanistan are different from Korea in the 1950s, given their ethnic and religious divisions and their lack of administrative structure. There is no blue print, magic formula, or mechanically transferable models for enhancing capacities of weak regimes like the al-Maliki government in Iraq and the Karzai government in Afghanistan. Many people in Korea think that success or failure at democracy depends less on the particulars of the country but more on the commitment of international society. But the distinction between domestic and international is less meaningful. A successful policy must consider closely the growing links between what occurs inside and outside the borders, on issues from immigration and human capital development to agriculture and national defense. South Korea lacks the capability to coordinate among the major players in politics that are involved with international issues, and fails to persuade those who monopolize media and Internet and utilize them as political instruments against the global Korea policy initiated by the current government.

In Korea, however, there are many people who want to be involved in humanitarian operations as volunteers. However, they need to be organized and better educated for enhancing its efficiency. The Korean government also needs to protect those civilian forces by providing better guidance and strengthening its regional networks. It is imperative for South Korea to prevent such unfortunate incidents of kidnapping and killing of Korean missionaries by the Taliban forces in Kabul and Afghanistan. The issue is that emerging and powerful NGOs in Korea have never fully exercised their capacity to coordinate to protect people's right comprehensively beyond the realm of national interest and patriotism (Hong, 2005).

## **6. NATIONALISM AND HISTORICAL SENSITIVITY STILL REMAIN AS KEY OBSTACLES**

There has never been a clear consensus about how much will be enough for Seoul's contribution to the international society. Moreover, people are still

heavily occupied with the threat from the North and hardly escapable from the emotional appeal that national unification must be obtained at any cost. The appeal for increasing ODA for poor people in developing world can easily be downgraded when it is interpreted as an indifference to the hardship and suffering of North Korean sisters and brothers living under the harsh rule of the Kim Jong-il regime or sabotaging the efforts to help North Korea.

Preparing for reconstructing North Korea can be an ideal goal for strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Korea. However, the pro-North Korean fundamentalists have condemned the people who call for trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and South Korea and brand them as internationalists to obstruct the inter-Korean efforts to heal the wounds of the Korean War by inviting foreign forces to intervene into domestic issue. Nevertheless, it is not always easy for South Koreans to overcome totally from the psychological wounds from the past. The false image of “the weak, helpless, suffering Korea” dies hard and the nationalist sentiments were relentlessly reproduced by the progressive teacher’s union members at every school. In the midst of the information age, it is important to note that Koreans are easily manipulated by propaganda through Internet and some media journals. It is very difficult to upgrade Korea’s image abroad if the country is still haunted by a memory of being abused by neighboring forces. Even in a full-blown liberal democracy like a modern Korea, nationalism would be a dangerous force to threaten its government. The negative consequences of nationalistic zeal are twofold: first, no one is eager to be soft on foreign powers. Second, people are encouraged to show their dissent by venting their frustrations and expressing their critical opinions in public. It is an irony because the progressive justifies their participation as an intellectual responsibility, while condoning their use of violence against the legal authority.

## **7. KOREAN MILITARY HAS OTHER PRIORITIES TO TAKE CARE OF THAN PEACEKEEPING**

The Lee government now seeks to expand its official development assistance to 0.2% of its gross national income by 2012 from current 0.1% and increase its participation of the PKO activities during his tenure.

On January 2008, the Presidential Transition Committee recommended the Ministry of National Defense to expand its PKO forces to the size of

5,000 soldiers and create a PKO center that can provide professional training for both civilian and military personnel. The transition team also planned to launch the “global leader program.” It was supposed to dispatch 20,000 young volunteers to virtually every corner of the world to assist local efforts to improve their living standard and promote the idea of sustainable development. Considering the fact that only 4,700 personnel were sent abroad by KOICA during the past 17 years, the new plan was ambitious enough to worry government officials who are supposed to be involved in the project. Ironically, the project was suspended when the idea of Reforming English Education System received harsh criticism from the media and public. The ruling Grand National Party also wanted to stop the project before ruining their chance at the coming general election in April.

The Korean military did not move fast enough to adopt the recommendation from the transition committee, either. The Ministry of National Defense has a big stake in revising the “Defense Reform 2020,” designed by the previous government in 2005. The Army needs to curtail its ground troops from 47 to 24 divisions according to the plan (Hong, 2008b). Under these critical circumstances, the PKO issue can hardly get appropriate attention. However, the slow face of reformulating PKOs may undermine Seoul’s voice in the United Nations and lose the momentum of the globalization drive of President Lee.

The National Assembly and NGOs will soon be engaging in the debate about making a new law in dealing with conditions of dispatching PKO units abroad. Korea is currently being requested by the United Nations to send PKO troops to Darfur, Sudan, and the Obama Administration also checked the possibility of having a Korean contribution to Afghanistan. Seoul needs to make it clear whether it can assist the new President of the United States when General David McKiernan demanded four additional brigades for stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan (DeYong, 2008). It would be very difficult for President Lee to dispatch its forces again to Afghanistan since it will definitely ignite serious domestic opposition against his government. On January 12, 2009, President Lee pronounced at the joint communiqué that it would find ways to contribute to ISAF jointly with Japan when he had a meeting with Prime Minister Aso Taro in Seoul.

Although President Lee repeatedly emphasized the need for increasing contributions to the UN PKOs, the prospect is not so promising considering the fact that the influence of progressive NGOs to the politics has been growing rapidly and the growing economic difficulty due to global financial crisis has reduced the chance of promoting its global agenda.

## 8. BUILDING PEACE FOR THE FUTURE

Despite unfavorable security and economic conditions, South Korea over the past half century achieved unprecedented economic growth so that it has become a nearly fully advanced country. Korea today is Asia's 3rd largest and the world's 13th largest economy. One of the key reasons behind the Republic of Korea's rapid growth stems from the support and assistance it received from the international community.

For nearly two decades, South Korea has participated in UN peacekeeping operations and is today the 10th largest contributor to the UN's PKO budget. South Korea also participates in the on-going war on terror and currently deploys contingents in Iraq and Lebanon as part of coalition's post-conflict operations. It is worth noting that the Lee government dispatched five women peacekeepers in Lebanon and they are doing a great job as civil operation officers. Insofar as future deployments are concerned, each case will be reviewed individually with due consideration of the need to consult fully with the National Assembly and civic groups, the impact it may have on South Korea's defense posture, contribution to regional and international security, the role of the UN Security Council in confirming peacekeeping operations, and the impact on the Korean-American alliance.

Building peace in the wake of war should be a very important goal for the Korean military for preparing for any future contingency. As observed in Afghanistan and Iraq, winning major battles is not sufficient for winning the peace. There are many demands that arise in the wake of conflict that are likely to involve military units as well as civilians. Currently, South Korea is not fully ready yet to handle post-conflict activities including transition to civil authorities, support of truce negotiations, civil affairs support to reestablish a civil government, psychological operations to foster continued peaceful relations, and continuing logistic support from engineering and transport units (Lacquement, 2005). It is a huge challenge for Army to upgrade its peacekeeping and peace-building capabilities.

However, the high command of the Korean military must understand that increasing international role for Korean armed forces through peacekeeping is necessary. It is high time for South Korea to start discussing with global partners on how to cooperate with them in enhancing its capabilities. There are many avenues for cooperation and there still are challenges for moving this idea forward. However, the time is right for Korea to take a leadership role in helping to galvanize international support. It is better for South Korea to increase its focus on the possible and the visible. As witnessed in the case of assisting China's Sichuan Province, joint disaster relief may be



the most visible thing that invites less controversy. Seoul also needs to initiate joint overseas PKO with Japan, Australia, and other global partners that may be interested in having joint operations with Korean forces.

## 9. CONCLUSION

There are at least three points that need to be addressed for enhancing its capacity.

First, there are no statutory provisions that specifically deal with South Korea's participation in the UN PKOs. Despite various efforts, South Korean law makers failed to make a separate law regarding dispatch of PKO troops abroad. What seems to be needed is the law that promotes not only the efficiency, but also the rapid deployment of modern type of peacekeeping. Thus far, focus has been to limit the presidential power in order to prevent potential misuse of its forces.

Second, since early 1990s, Korean cases in the UN PKOs illustrate that military personnel have played a dominant role. Thus far, there was no room for civilians to take a part in the military operations. However, in order to gain popular support and increase its efficiency, the ROK may need to change the policy to incorporate more civilian experts in peacekeeping operations. Until now, there was no system to coordinate between civilian groups and armed forces. Accordingly, military alone often confronted difficulties in the complex emergency situations. The priority is how to incorporate civilian experts to the peacekeeping operations in order to maximize productivity,

Third, the Korean government joined PKO Standby Arrangement System (UN SAS) only in 1995. Yet, the total number of participants is merely 800. The number has not been increased due to many reasons. It signifies the level of commitment from the political leadership. The functional capacities have not been upgraded, either. Korea needs to increase its capacity to give a meaningful contribution for making a secure world. As observed in the cases of Korean peacekeepers in both Iraq and Lebanon, civil operations can be the area where the government will continue to garner supports from home and abroad.

## NOTE

1. Secretary General Ban said that "Frankly I was shamed since Korea was not up to the expectation of the international society," *Joong-Ang Sunday*, July 6, 2008, <http://www.joins.comwww.joins.com> (accessed July 10, 2008).

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# HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCES FROM PEACEKEEPING IN AFGHANISTAN

Zoltan Laszlo Kiss

## ABSTRACT

*Hungary has been part of NATO's peacekeeping project in Afghanistan since 2003 and currently has more than 240 soldiers in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO's first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Hungary officially took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Baghlan Province from October 2006, and currently we have the 5th rotation of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan. The Hungarian unit serves in conjunction with representatives of several other nations.*

*Hungarian participation in NATO's UN-mandated peace support operation in Afghanistan has raised many questions not only in the field of operations, but also at home (mainly in the context of civil-military relations). Many of the Hungarian PRT-related challenges seem to be connected to the difficulties of proper management of civil-military interface, civil-military partnership and cooperation process, and financial backing of the mission.*

*Well-coordinated, multidimensional proactive and reactive responses to the conflict, and a comprehensive security sector transformation and reform can be vital to consolidate peaceful relations in Afghanistan; may help to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population; can help to establish security and provide improvement to Bahlan province; and might contribute to the success of the whole peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building process in Afghanistan.*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos

Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 189-224

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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A017

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Just a meaningful title of a short, recently published article: “Hungarian soldier killed in Afghanistan while trying to disarm roadside bomb.”<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, Hungary, as an active member of the international community, has been part of NATO’s peace support operation (PSO) in Afghanistan since 2003 and currently more than 240 soldiers serve in the *UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)*, NATO’s first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area.<sup>2</sup>

Hungary officially took over the *Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Baghlan Province* from October 1, 2006, and currently we have the 5th rotation of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan. The Hungarian unit serves in conjunction with representatives of several other nations for contributing to the success of peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building efforts of the multinational peace forces, and providing the local population with a stable and secure environment (Fig. 1).

In addition to the current Hungarian military presence in northern Afghanistan, Hungary has also committed itself to carry out a wide range of different crisis response activities on the field, aiming to establish and




Fig. 1. Participation of the Hungarian Military in Peace Support Operations. Source: Hungarian MoD’s Center for Operations, Budapest (February 15, 2008).

maintain security and peace in Afghanistan. For instance, since October 2008, Hungary has been assuming the role of a lead nation at Kabul International Airport; has been providing an operational mentoring and liaison team to the Dutch Sector in Uruzgan Province; and offering special forces personnel, without caveat, to the US forces.

We had to realize that the Hungarian participation in NATO's UN-mandated PSO in Afghanistan has raised many questions not only in the field of operations, but also at home (mainly in the context of *civil–military* relations). Many of the Hungarian PRT-related challenges seem to be connected to the difficulties of proper management of the *civil–military interface* and the dilemmas related to the *civil–military partnership and cooperation* process.

## **2. AIMS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

The central goal of our research was to find, investigate, compare, and analyze those factors from the point of view of military sociology that might favor or hinder contemporary and future activity of Hungarian soldiers participating in the multinational PSO in the *PRT in Afghanistan's Baghlan Province*.<sup>3</sup> On the basis of the above, later on we would like to propose measures that may strengthen the factors favorable for more effective, practice-oriented preparation and cohesive functioning of multinational peacekeeping forces during future PSOs, and diminish the effects of those factors that might cause difficulties during comprehensive process of cooperation between participating national military contingents.

We focused on specification of those trends and factors that have general applicability to the troops of the NATO- and EU-member Hungary, engaged with international PSO responsibilities. All through the analysis, we tried to keep the focus on the military dimension of multinational PSO in Afghanistan. Consequently, we concentrated on those macro-, mezzo- and micro-level factors (by taking into account their relative weight and dynamic interactions) that might have an effect on the efficiency of preparation for and successful execution of operations of multinational military forces assigned for PSOs. Moreover, we tried to provide a sociological analysis of some potentially neuralgic points of the internal dynamics of the functioning of multinational military forces before, during, and after various kinds of PSOs.

In the next few months, we are going to carry out a comparative empirical research with our Slovakian, Czech, and Polish colleagues to figure out what

are the sociological characters of the contemporary, new kind of “*peace soldiers*”<sup>4</sup> in the new NATO- and EU-member Visegrad four countries<sup>5</sup> – in the sense as *Charles Moscos* envisioned many years ago? Do they really form a “*new breed of international military peacekeeping professionals*”<sup>6</sup> How similar are they to soldiers from other NATO and EU countries?

What are the characteristic features of the contemporary *peacekeeping forces*,<sup>7</sup> and the *peacekeeping operations*,<sup>8</sup> carried out by them? How can we characterize the current *constabulary model*<sup>9</sup> and the transformation of the *organizational culture* of the contemporary military forces?

### 3. DILEMMAS RELATED TO PRTs IN AFGHANISTAN

#### 3.1. Troop contribution

NATO plays a key role in the international community’s contemporary engagement in Afghanistan. It should assist Afghan authorities by providing security and stability, and paving the way for reconstruction, effective governance, and development. The Alliance’s current engagement is three-folded, because:

- through *leadership of the ISAF*, it should assist the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising their authority and influence across the country, and create proper conditions for stabilization and reconstruction<sup>10</sup>;
- its *senior civilian representative* (currently Ambassador Fernando Gentilini of Italy), who *represents the political leadership of the Alliance* in Kabul officially and publicly, should take the responsibility for advancing the political–military aspects of the Alliance’s commitment to the country, work closely with ISAF, provide liaison with the Afghan government and other international organizations, and maintain contacts with neighboring countries<sup>11</sup>;
- within the framework of a substantial *program of cooperation with Afghanistan*, it should concentrate on *defence reform, defence institution building, and the military aspects of security sector reform (SSR)*.<sup>12</sup>

As of December 1, 2008 the ISAF mission involved approximately 51,350 people.<sup>13</sup> Individual contributions by each country changed rather frequently, because of the rotation of troops and various commitments from the different countries.<sup>14</sup> However, the main trend seems to be that *long-time NATO members with relatively larger militaries more likely and consistently provide the majority of troops*. As a result, in September 2008, top troop contributors were

the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and Italy (Table 1).

At the beginning of operations, we had to realize that the legacy of the past might cause difficulties during joint, multinational conflict resolution efforts. It is because in spite of the relatively active engagement in several previous PSOs, many troop contributing nations had *no separate doctrines for peacekeeping operations* for a relatively long time. The definitions of *peacekeeping* are still varying widely in the official national documents of the participating countries with regard to basis of *authorization, circumstances, the mission, organization, and components* of the national contingents deployed, and constrains on their operations. This might have been a source of some kind of *confusion, lack of clarity, and ambiguity* about the meaning of the concept and the harmonization of efforts in many cases.

### 3.2. Differing PRT Models for Adaptation

The ISAF adopted the general concept of *PRTs*, *originally* a concept of the *US Marine Corps' Combined Action Platoons of the Vietnam War*, as a method for expanding its presence in the country. Until now all together 25 PRTs came into life in Afghanistan (and another 25 in Iraq). "*PRTs have become an integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations; but they have also been criticized for their mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and differences in staffing and mission.*"<sup>15</sup>

This relatively new form of civil–military cooperation has got the *primary objective to strengthen the influence of the central government* (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, GIRA) *in the countryside*, and *improve the security situation* in the areas of operation by providing ground for "*jumpstart*" reconstructions. The small teams of civilian and military personnel should provide security for aid workers and help reconstruction work. As key component of a three-part strategy for Afghanistan, they should help the spread of stability across the country by supporting establishment and maintenance of *security, governance, and development*. According to the NATO's official approach, their main role is to *assist the local authorities in the reconstruction and maintenance of security* in the given areas.<sup>16</sup>



**Table 1.** Troop-Contribution Nations in the Current PSO in Afghanistan.

Troops Committed to NATO's ISAF by Country	
Troop-contribution nation	Number of troops (rounded) <sup>a</sup>
1. US	19,950
2. UK	8,745
3. Germany	3,600
4. France	2,785
5. Canada	2,750
6. Italy	2,350
7. The Netherlands	1,770
8. Poland	1,130
9. Australia	1,090
10. Turkey	860
11. Spain	780
12. Romania	740
13. Denmark	700
14. Bulgaria	460
15. Norway	455
16. Czech Republic	415
17. Belgium	400
18. Sweden	400
19. Croatia	300
20. Hungary	240
21. Lithuania	200
22. Slovakia	180
23. New Zealand	150
24. Albania	140
25. Macedonia	135
26. Greece	130
27. Estonia	130
28. Finland	80
29. Portugal	70
30. Slovenia	70
31. Latvia	70
32. Azerbaijan	45
33. Luxemburg	9
34. Iceland	8
35. Ireland	7
36. Ukraine	3
37. Austria	1
38. Georgia	1
ISAF total	51,350

Source: ISAF website. Available (online) at: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan\\_prt\\_rc.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.pdf)

<sup>a</sup>As of December 1, 2008. National contingent commands are included. See else: Troops committed to NATO's ISAF by country. In: Jason H. Cambell and Jeremy Shapiro (2008) Afghanistan Index. Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan (Figure 1.112) (December 16, 2008), p. 10. Available (online) at: <http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/~ /media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf>

The military has to provide security and force protection for the integrated team approaches, which can enable the civilian components<sup>17</sup> of the PRT, the representatives of the international organizations (IOs) and NGOs on the field to pursue their diplomatic or developmental objectives.<sup>18</sup>

The ISAF originally took over PRTs formerly under US command, beginning with the German PRT in Kunduz in December 2003. Since that time, all of the PRTs have transferred to ISAF command,<sup>19</sup> and then expanded to include the northern, western, southern, and eastern regions of Afghanistan.

The PRTs' objectives included the support to the central government to extend its authority, establish and maintain a more stable and secure environment, the support where appropriate the SSR initiatives; the facilitation of the *reconstruction efforts* and reinforce *national development priorities*; the efforts for creating goal-oriented unity amongst civil actors. According to the initial experiences NATO's aims of supporting the central government with provision of security and support to SSR succeed in general.<sup>20</sup>

PRTs exist in a *variety of working models* – the most influential seem to be the *United States, British, and German PRT models*. In the area of responsibility of ISAF's Regional Command North (RCN), mostly the German and British PRT working models seem to be the most influential.

Within the basic common NATO PRT structure, usually the national policies of the PRT lead nation govern the specific operations of all the PRTs: "With their mixed military–civilian composition, many PRTs reflect the 'whole of government approaches' of the major donor countries and represent increased internal coordination between the military, aid and diplomatic departments of their lead nation."<sup>21</sup> Differences in national goals, interests, and ambitions; strategic and military organizational culture; and the varying level of resources available also contribute to a situation in which there is no standard, unified PRT model (Table 2).

Certainly, the diversity of Afghanistan would make a standard, rigidly unified model impractical, since approaches must be tailored to various regions based on many factors (e.g., the level of security, the existing infrastructure, the degree of government control, the humanitarian situation, the local leaders, and local traditions, culture, etc.). Different teams have different concepts about the use and number of reconstruction projects in their operations. In addition, various guiding lines and mechanisms exist to coordinate the work of the PRTs with the Afghan government, foreign military, United Nations, IO, NGO representatives, and the local population (and its representatives).

**Table 2.** A Comparison of PRT Concepts.

		Comparison of PRT Concepts			
		US	UK	Germany	Hungary
Focus	Geo-strategic interests; maintaining of permanent bases; counter-insurgency; security; reconstruction; hearts and minds	PSO, local population as centre of gravity; obtaining a consensus between local stakeholders; facilitating and enabling of projects in terms of reconstruction	PSO, local population as centre of gravity; efforts to obtain consensus between local stakeholders; facilitating and enabling of provincial and CIMIC projects in terms of reconstruction	Time-limited support offer; creating a secure environment for civil reconstruction; force protection; Afghan ownership	PSO, local population as centre of gravity; efforts to obtain consensus between local stakeholders; facilitating and enabling of provincial and CIMIC projects in terms of reconstruction
Command and control	Command role clearly rests with the DoD	Multi-agency approach (MoD, DfID, FCO), military component decides in security issues	Inter-ministerial approach; civil-military double headed command (MoD and MoFA)	(Theoretically) inter-ministerial approach for reaching synergy by complementary share of work; military component decides in security issues	(Theoretically) inter-ministerial approach for reaching synergy by complementary share of work; military component decides in security issues
Method	CERP (DoD), QIP (USAID), force protection, PRTs as FSBs, combat operations, good governance, intelligence, SSR: training/setting up of ANA, ANP	Robust military diplomacy, discrete and demonstrative presence throughout MOTs, doing business in a low-key manner, networking, mediation, institution building, intelligence, SSR: DSR, counter-narcotics	Formula: stability = security × reconstruction, implementing security through patrolling, QIP, CIMIC, institution building, intelligence, SSR: setting up of ANP, DDR	Formula: stability = security × reconstruction, doing business in a low-key manner, by second-rank approach; networking, active involvement of available NGOs (e.g., Aga Khan Development Network) into reconstruction efforts, mediation, CIMIC, institution building; importance of public information officer (PIO), PSYOPS, and ISAF-delegated forward media team (FMT)	Formula: stability = security × reconstruction, doing business in a low-key manner, by second-rank approach; networking, active involvement of available NGOs (e.g., Aga Khan Development Network) into reconstruction efforts, mediation, CIMIC, institution building; importance of public information officer (PIO), PSYOPS, and ISAF-delegated forward media team (FMT)

Military role in reconstruction	High, direct military involvement with highway Kabul–Kandahar as state-of-the-art project in reconstruction	Low as DFID rules civilian efforts, identifying projects, involvement in the setting up of state institutions, proceeding with “Afghan time”	Medium: identifying projects, reconstruction through (military driven) CIMIC projects, coordination with civil PRT implementation partners	Medium: identifying projects, reconstruction through (military driven) CIMIC projects (special focus on education, health care and infrastructure), coordination with civil PRT implementation partners
Status and role of civilians	Specialists of DoS, USAID, USDA, etc., are integrated and subordinate to DoD (embedded civilians)	Joint command, operational autonomy of FCO and DFID (e.g., separate reporting system), DFID verifies and finances projects (project filter)	Civil–military double hated leadership through Foreign and Defence Ministries; MECD and MoI are subordinate to MoFA, implementation partners in charge for civilian ministries	Need for early implementation civilian experts from civilian ministries – since (currently) neither standing development advisor (DA), nor functional specialists (FS) on the field, who must have been delegated from civilian ministries
UN Cooperation with Limited	Active coordination with UNAMA, limited bureaucracy	Active coordination with UNAMA	Only wish for active coordination with UNAMA – since UNAMA is currently not present in Baghlan province	Only wish for active coordination with UNAMA – since UNAMA is currently not present in Baghlan province

*Sources:* Markus Gauster (2008) Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies: Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany). Occasional Papers Series, no. 16. (January 2008), pp. 56–57.  
 Col Tibor Rózsa and Maj Gábor Hangya (2008) Az újjáépítés és a biztonság katonai feladatai Baghlanban. A civil katonai kapcsolatok gyakorlata az MH PRT afganisztáni missziójában. (*Military tasks for Reconstruction and Security in Baghlan. The Practice of Civil–Military Relations in the HUN PRT Mission in Afghanistan*). Honvédségi Szemle, 2008. július, (62. évf., 1. sz.), pp. 26–29.

## 4. CHALLENGES FOR HUNGARIAN PRT IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE

### 4.1. Public Support at Home for the Hungarian Troop Contribution in Afghanistan

In spite of the typical rather passive communication strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the only mild interest of the journalists toward the issue, the Hungarian public seems to be rather supportive toward the national military contribution to NATO's peacekeeping project in Afghanistan.<sup>22</sup>

For the question of "Hungary took the responsibility for managing a PRT in Baghlan province of Afghanistan. Do you agree with this?" the responses were all together positive. This fact is even more convincing taking into consideration the fact that data collection happened just a few days after the loss of our second explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialist, who lost his life also because of a remote-controlled blast by an IED, while he was attempting to diffuse another improvised explosive device (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Hungary Took the Responsibility for Managing a PRT in Baghlan Province of Afghanistan. Do you agree with this decision? *Source:* Sonda Ipsos; civilian public opinion on Hungarian military and the peace support operation in Afghanistan (September 2008) ( $N = 3,000$ ).

#### 4.2. PRT Model Adapted

In the northern provinces of Afghanistan, ISAF's one of the main purposes is to preserve the status quo, and not to change it. North, Pashtun areas where they live are inevitably securitized to a degree, their presence being an obvious facilitating condition for otherwise rare attacks, which tend to happen in either the towns of Mazar-i-Sharif or Kunduz, or along the major road toward Kunduz, in the Baghlani Jadid area (not in the Tajiks and Uzbeks inhabited areas). PRTs' CIMIC approaches reflect this concerned view of Pashtun areas, and attempt to incorporate pro-activity in carrying out projects there to develop better relations. In Baghlan province, this is an imperative given how a local grievance of Pashtuns could be related to the trends that the old provincial capital Baghlan is losing its importance in comparison to the predominantly Tajik Pol-e-Khomri.

Since October 2006, the main tasks of the Hungarian PRT, in accordance with the ISAF Guidelines, have been:

- providing a *visible presence* in Baghlan province; monitor and assess the military, political, and civil situations
- *improving the security environment* for the Afghan people *through dialogue* with various level actors:
  - on *province level*: with governmental organizations (governor, representatives of ministries, police, and other security organizations; central offices of NGOs/humanitarian aid organizations, agencies; representatives of IOs, provincial "Shura" (committee of tribal elders, clerics, and administration officials set up to negotiate processes)
  - on *district level*: with district-level representatives of governmental organizations (district governors, police chiefs, district-level representative offices and project managers of NGOs, various district-level "shura")
  - establishment and maintenance of a (relatively) close and friendly relationship with the local population in the province
- assisting the international community with the process of *reform and strengthening of civil administration*; assist the governor of the province in the dissemination of its decisions and policies to the lower level leaders and to the communities; facilitate information sharing between the governor and civil agencies; organize and facilitate periodic principals' meetings to facilitate dialogue and liaison between the governor, regional leaders, and NGOs/IOs on the field

- supporting regional leaders and confidence building activities and mitigating likely areas of conflicts
- securing the security situation of the province with close cooperation with available Afghan security organizations
- providing information and intelligence to the appropriate organizations for the development of a common operational picture of the assigned AOO
- directing assistance to the civilian element of the PRT to be prepared to host, assist, escort, and defend international observers assisting in the development of civil structures
- supporting the development and reconstruction related efforts of the PRT Working Group (PRTWG, an operational forum where the government, donors, military forces, and other civilian and military actors can discuss the management of civil–military issues) and the NGO civil military group (NGO CMG, which allows for direct dialogue between national and international NGOs and the military forces).<sup>23</sup>

The Hungarian PRT also wanted to monitor, assess, advise, and support SSR activities in close coordination with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) – but unfortunately, *UNAMA is still not present* in Baghlan province! Another thing that also hinder the efforts of Hungarian PRT is the *weakness and corruptness of the provincial governmental organizations*.<sup>24</sup>

Since the Hungarian PRT is located in the area of responsibility of ISAF's RCN, where mostly the German and British PRT working models seem to be the most influential, and because of the special tasks assigned for the Hungarian PRT, the military leaders decided on to establish and maintain a unique PRT model, which is in between the British and German PRT models (Table 3).

The Hungarian PRT first tried to build on and continue the projects, started by its predecessor, the Dutch PRT. Furthermore, they launched many new projects as well. As a result, Hungarian PRT could succeed with a relatively large amount of projects (i.e., improved the infrastructure; participated in collection of small arms; offered industrial assistance, CIMIC projects, road construction; developed education; built schools and launched agricultural projects; provided water resources, etc.) – and participated in the security and defence sector reform (SSR, DSR) attempts.

Even if the Hungarian military started its operations in Baghlan with a relatively decent CIMIC budget, this does not mean that anything could happen because of bureaucratic reasons. As a result, waste of time was bad

**Table 3.** Two Distinct Types of Military Professionalism.

	Conventional (Warrior)	Peacekeeper
Military organization	State's instrument of partiality and coercive violence	Constabulary model of the military – by emphases on impartiality and noncoercion
End goal	Military victory	Resolving underlying conflict causes
Objective	Destruction of the enemy's will and ability to fight; annihilation of opposing armed elements	Defuse of conflict with a careful mix of firmness and negotiation with opposing armed elements
Enemy Identification	Identified Final loyalty to the nation-state	No identified enemy/impartial role Requires "inter- or transnationalist" identification (?)
Role	Adversary	Pacific (mostly)
Techniques applied	Forcible	Consent promoting (mostly)
Required attitudes	Willingness to employ that weaponry for patriotist/ chauvinistic purposes (aggressive, masculine)	Performance of mission in an impartial cause-maintain neutrality, impartiality, and toleration
Aim of military training	Preparation for war (high-intensity combat; combined arms warfare)	Maintain/improve their battle readiness, but meanwhile teach them necessary additional skills to make them <i>socially conscious</i> personnel with proficiency in noncoercive measures
Mean of military training	Drill <i>battle reflexes</i> , necessary for surviving and effective killing/ destruction on the modern battlefield	PSO-related constabulary skills; self-defense; flexibility and tact; sound judgment and diplomatic skills; reach reliance on persuasion, compromise, negotiation
Skills/expertise employed	Basic traditional (combat) military skills; expert command of lethal weaponry	Contact skills employed (arbitration, negotiation, go-between mediation, conciliation, problem solving, consultation)
Characteristic features	Discipline, to be fit for action, decisiveness, leadership, obedience, ability to undergo physical stress, patriotism, altruism	Determination, empathy, expertise, ability to easily make establish contact, cooperativeness, mental strength, general education, open mindedness, taking responsibility
Authority	(Heroic) leadership and command; <i>Leadership</i> arises out of personal qualities in the combat or field situation in the front echelon; <i>Command</i> – derives from rational ends-means calculation and predominates in the rear echelon	Predominantly command organization – command derives from rational ends-means calculation



*Table 3. (Continued)*

	Conventional (Warrior)	Peacekeeper
Leadership	Heroic leadership; authority based on traditional styles of domination	New managerial philosophy stressing persuasive incentives, personal manipulation, and consensus
Command structure	Highly centralized battle management; focused on maintenance and improvement of traditional military efficiency	Decentralized
Relative independence of lower level commanders	Narrowed	Broad
Interference of politically motivated compromises	Just at high (i.e., strategic) level (e.g., in alliances/coalitions) in the field (i.e., operational/tactical level) normally not allowed to interfere with combat efficiency	Strong political sensitivity even in the field level
Intelligence	Focus on the opponent's order of battle (use of high-tech fore reconnaissance)	<i>Human intelligence becomes far more important; great number of actors must be monitored, and their behavior analyzed</i>
Weaponry	Increasingly complex technical systems	Traditional, not too advanced level weaponry
Multinationality applied during unit building	Above brigade level (below brigade level: nationally homogenous units)	Integration of lower (i.e., company, even platoon) level national contingents
Priorities	Military necessities may take precedence over the needs of the civilian population in the combat zone	Political/civilian necessities may take precedence over military logic in the conflict zone
Use of force	Extensively, network-centric warfare	Principle of minimal force (applies in terms of duration, tactics and means); strict proportionality; effect-based operations (EBOs)
Civilian casualties	Accepted (however, aim of minimizing losses in human life)	Casualty awareness
Contact with civilians	No consistent interaction with civilians	Intense interaction with civilian population and close cooperation with civilian mission components (however, on paper usually exists a division of labor between military and civilian actors, but in reality, military must often take over many duties of civilian agencies) – source of later resentment in the military

Sources: Moskos (1976, pp. 10–11, 130–139, 165); Caforio and Nuciari (1994); Last (1997, p. 38); Röslı (2001).

to see. Furthermore, PRT leaders later on found difficult to apply for and get financing for projects from the Hungarian foreign ministry, because of various reasons.

#### 4.3. Applicability of the EBAO Approach

While Hungarian military planners of the out-of-area operation in Afghanistan tried to collect and analyze carefully every available information, we also took into consideration the analytical outcomes of the system of systems analysis, offered by EB-SAT (Fig. 3).

The special focus of our investigation, analysis, and evaluation were on the following main topics: initial system state of the field of future operations, essential elements/subsystems, system strengths and vulnerabilities, and key judgments.

##### 1. Initial situation:

- *Multiethnic society* – deep-rooted ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts
- *Socio-demographic* trends, health conditions of the population





Fig. 3. Focal Points of System of Systems Analysis – A Potential Tool for Supporting Contemporary Effect-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) in Afghanistan. *Source:* NATO ACT EBAO and system of systems analysis training course material (Norfolk, VA, USA, 2006; Budapest, Hungary, 2007).

- *Poverty* – geographical limitations for *social life* and development of *civilian society*
  - Importance of traditional values, *traditions*, beliefs in the basically agricultural society
  - *Public attitudes* toward occupying forces and institutions/representatives of the embryonic democracy
  - Increase in *drug producing and drug use*
  - *Massive corruption*
2. Vulnerabilities:
- *Tribal fractions, lack of unified national identity, and allegiance to the state* and its representatives in the multiethnic society
  - Competition and conflict between factions of *political elite and key power brokers*
  - Cultivation of opium regarded as a generally tolerated source of income for the population
  - Competition between groups interested in *drug producing*, and highly profitable *drug trafficking*
  - Drug traffickers and dealers depend on demands from *foreign markets*
  - Hidden threats against and intimidation of local population
  - *Lack of appropriate number of Afghan military and/or police personnel to fight against new threats* (e.g., infiltration of terrorists and guerilla warriors from the southern provinces; their attacks either by ambushes or IEDs, or kamikaze-actions against military posts)
3. Strengths:
- *Willingness* in some parts of the country to *support democratic transition*
  - *State/government structure* is developing
  - *Strong, cohesive communities*, structured paternal societies with their own tribal identity and special *conflict management* methods
  - *Religious leaders*, who offer and provide ultimate moral guidance (*moral leaders*) – *mosques* provide place for community members to come together
  - Powerful *regional players* in the cabinet (they are part of the process)
4. Weaknesses:
- *Multiethnic society* – tribal fractions; complex relations among ethnic groups, *lack of unified national identity, and allegiance to the state* and its representatives
  - *Weak, heavily drug-related economy, strong dependence of local communities on drug production for income (opium poppy cultivation countrywide)*

- *Corruption and organized crime*
- *Lack of social trust* in weak, underdeveloped government institutions/organizations, and the weak *security and defence system* is weak
- *Lack of legitimate governmental control* in large parts of the country, continued influence of Taliban, and the provincial and regional warlords
- Lawlessness, *lack of acceptance of state law; lack of security and democratic norms* – factional and regional violence, revival of Shariah Law
- Competition and conflict between factions of *political elite and key power brokers* threatens political stability and social peace
- Competition between groups interested in *drug producing*, and highly profitable *drug trafficking* (*the amount of opium* first continued to increase; the number of *growers was decreasing; farmers were getting less* for their crops; *prices* were now stable but *vary across regions*; and the fragmentation of the Afghan opium market continued to give rise to important regional price differences.<sup>25</sup>)
- *Education* – low literacy rates, accessibility is limited (e.g., for women in Taliban-ruled regions), limited infrastructure and resources
- *Public opinion* – distrust of occupying NATO forces (even their CIMIC activities) and distrust in official information (greater reliability on unofficial/mainly oral sources, that might be difficult to influence)
- *Anti-governmental and anti-Western propaganda*
- *Health care* – accessibility, availability is limited (lack of healthy workforce)
- *Social welfare* – limited, underdeveloped
- *Media* system restricted (availability, accessibility, variety of public/private broadcasting – difficulties in low tech, very centralized, censored information system; lack of knowledge on potential target audiences)
- *No standing Afghan military force from Afghan National Army* – and members of the *Afghan National Police are only a few*; and their personal equipment, training and readiness level is *very poor*.

In addition, we had to take into consideration the fact that one main road and one summer road, related to heroin and opium trafficking, goes across the province of Bahlan, the territory of responsibility of the Hungarian PRT – and we were suspecting and hunting for at least two hidden centers of drug-related laboratories in the province (Fig. 4).



*Fig. 4. Heroin and Opium Trafficking in Afghanistan. Note: The boundaries and names shown and designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Source: MCN–UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2005.*

Taken into consideration all the above, Hungarian military planners have decided on the following focus points of efforts and social subsystems to address in the Hungarian-controlled PRT in Bahlan province (Fig. 5):

According to the *key judgments*, based on the previous evaluations:

- *Security sector transformation and reform (SSR)* can be key to establish, maintain, and improve security in the “*calm, but not stable*” province<sup>26</sup> – and providing improvement to other areas (by taking into consideration the commonly agreed priorities in the *Provincial Development Plan, PDP*). That is why an assessment should be conducted on the effect of *incorporating tribal structures* and influences in a national security organisation;
- The dependence of a large part of the population on the *drug growing, trafficking, and trade* needs to be addressed in a way that supports the emergence of *alternative sources* of equal/better *income* (e.g., new crops) – while creating situation and values with comprehensive efforts that




Fig. 5. Social Subsystems and Actors to Address in Afghanistan’s Baghlan Province.

discourage drug-support activities (i.e., more effective reconnaissance and tougher control that might lead to the decrease of the flow of drug, social network to decrease drug addiction);

- *Education* for the population will be key to ensuring the continuation of an integrated and stable society. Increased literacy, education for *young generation and women* should be priorities;
- *PRTs* can play essential role not only in reconstruction of the ruined infrastructure, but also in *social reintegration* through *launching great projects!* Supporting the work of PRTs, including increased cooperation with IOs and NGOs, will address the short- and long-term needs of *refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)*, and the PRT-launched *(re)conversion projects* might help to reintegrate and keep under closer control former military personnel.

#### 4.4. The Vital Importance of the Success of Security Sector Transformation and Reform Attempts

How can outside actors (alliances, states) instill and entrench (Western, mostly Anglo-Saxon) liberal and democratic norms in war-torn and/or

collapsed states after, for example, devastating, controversial and contradictory international military interventions, where the political system can be characterized by authoritarian traditions, insecurities, and the society is opposing the “invaders,” and divided by centuries-old internal tensions and violence?

Nowadays many relevant forums and documents of United Nations, OSCE, NATO, and EU talks about the vital importance of launching and maintaining *security sector transformation and reform* in war-torn societies, as prerequisites for restoring and/or (re)creating essential institutions, which can later on help in stabilization, limiting corruption, promoting cooperation, developing legitimacy, and might return to normal life. It has happened in the case of Afghanistan as well. In fact, there are many different approaches toward the real meaning and elements of the “security sector,” and unfortunately does not exist a precise, commonly agreed and officially declared definition of “security sector”<sup>27</sup> yet.

In Bahlan Province, in the case of the Hungarian PRT, we would prefer to use the following broad definition: “*The security sector* is taken to mean all those *organizations which have authority to use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force*, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight.”<sup>28</sup> According to the comprehensive definition of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which incorporate both the key agencies and key functions, the following institutional and organizational elements (security sector actors) belong to the three main pillars of the “security family”:

- (a) *core security actors* (institutions and organizations with a mandate to wield the instruments of violence): armed forces; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); police forces (both national and local), together with border and coast guards, and customs services/authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias)
- (b) *justice and law enforcement institutions* (bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law): judicial and penal systems (ministry of justice; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems)<sup>29</sup>
- (c) *security management and oversight bodies* (bodies with a role in managing and monitoring the security sector by formulation,

implementation, and overseeing internal and external security policy); the executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

Certainly we should not forget the fact that in many countries, there might exist so-called “*non-statutory security forces*”<sup>30</sup> which might also play a role in the provision of security (or, alternatively, they might have a negative effect on the national security). Usually, the following kinds of security organizations can be characterized as “*non-statutory*”: private security companies/firms (private military companies (PMCs)),<sup>31</sup> private body-guard units, “private armies” of influential “warlords,” guerilla/liberation armies, political party militias, etc. The existence of such “non-statutory” security forces in Afghanistan can be altogether not a good sign at all, because of many reasons.<sup>32</sup>

The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been followed by a great need to engage in externally sponsored post-conflict nation building – of which SSR would be a centrally important component.<sup>33</sup> The main *objective of SSRs should be to establish and maintain efficient and effective security institutions, which are both able and willing to serve the broad security interests of their principal client, the State; and the civil society and citizens in a broad, but well-controlled, monitored, and managed “security architecture.”*<sup>34</sup>

It seems to be a critical step to strengthen the state’s capabilities to provide as effective, efficient, and accountable management of the broad national security, as it would be possible. In this case, the state can provide wide range of security-related services to its citizens and their groupings in a relatively “cost-efficient” and practice-oriented manner, if there are affordable, tightly connected security bodies capable to provide security for the state and its citizens under a really effective civilian oversight. Certainly, there might be different paths to achieve the same objectives. Appropriately tailored and delivered external support, based on previous experiences from around the world, can have a positive effect on the outcome of SSRs; however, the local approaches to improve security sector governance usually better fitted, if they are “home-grown.”<sup>35</sup>

The SSRs have a specific complexity in post-totalitarian countries, like Afghanistan, because these states had to carry out their SSRs and DSRs in



parallel with the overall implementation and consolidation of the required democratic structures and mechanisms in almost each social subsystem. But the absence of a holistic approach toward a broad strategic concept of security and security sector further complicated the SSRs and DSRs in many countries on the road of (forced) democratization. This fact calls attention to the urgent need for not only a common understanding and national level consensus on such a broad approach toward contemporary security challenges and security sector, but also a comprehensive approach of SSRs and DSRs in order to avoid societal, institutional and organizational tensions, instability and other challenges for SSG in the country.

Moreover, Afghanistan faces great challenges in its attempts to carry out general SSRs, professionalize its armed forces, and prepare them for various kinds of operations (with especial regard to counterterrorist operations). The success or failure of the above modernization attempts might be significantly influenced by several external and internal factors. These key factors include national *threat perceptions*; *international* pressure/aid and commitments, public *trust* in the international and national security institutions; domestic politics; economic constraints; public opinion<sup>36</sup> on the ongoing SSR (and, as its integral part: the *defence reform*); dominant attitudes of the civilian society and representatives of the armed forces on the *roles*; new missions and required functional and structural *features* of the future national armed forces. The potential differences in the *national strategic* and military cultures, the *adequacy of the professionalization model*,<sup>37</sup> and the *model for conflict resolution and PSOs*, adapted by the country, might also significantly influence the efficiency of the operation of national armed forces.

#### 4.5. *Adequacy of the Professionalization Model for the Military*

In such an operational environment, both the military personnel on the field and their political masters at home should face with the question of the adequacy of the former professionalization model, and the necessity of adaptation to the quickly changing operational environment – as Charles Moscos envisioned much earlier: “In contrast with standard armed forces, the *constabulary and peace soldier* are concerned with the *attainment of viable political compromises* rather than with the resolution of conflict through force. Where standard armed forces are typically dedicated to efficient achievement of *military victory without regard to nonmilitary considerations*, the constabulary and peace soldier are charged with *maintaining the peace even to the detriment of military considerations*.”<sup>38</sup>

As a result, on the basis of our experiences from the post-cold war era, we had to realize that Charles Moscos was right, when he said: “Contemporary standards of *military professionalism must undergo fundamental redefinition* to meet the requirements of the peacekeeping role .... Even more than standard armed forces, *peacekeeping forces* are not to be conceived as a static model but as a *dynamic process which engenders social organizational restructuring* in response to changing conditions.”<sup>39</sup>

#### 4.6. The Road to Madness

Planners of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan tried to collect and evaluate all the available information, and analyze all the possible factors that might be relevant in connection to the engagement of our personnel in Afghanistan (Table 4). One set of the information sources was related to the previous experiences of our “predecessors” in Baghlan province, members of the Dutch PRT. Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens from the Netherlands Defense Academy carried out a great job, when he tried to collect and analyze management-related experiences of the Dutch PRT in Baghlan. According to his conclusion: “... a lack of unambiguous and useful military guidelines regarding civil–military cooperation, the *military are often unaware of other actors operating in the area and their programs, cooperation is frequently supply-based* rather than demand-driven, and many *military personnel* involved in civil–military cooperation *have little experience with and training in the subject.*”<sup>40</sup>

In addition, human planners kept in mind the findings of Professor Vladimir Rukavishnikov and his colleagues regarding factors that can act as source of stress for military personnel serving abroad.<sup>41</sup>

## 5. CONCLUSION

There are many *factors* that might *favor activity* of soldiers participating in the multinational PSO in the *PRT*. These factors are mostly the *unity of purpose, consensus planning, simplicity, adaptive control, and transparency of operations.*<sup>42</sup> We can also evaluate as *positive signs* the following current advantages:

- the Hungarian military commander of the PRT has a more significant financial budget to maintain quick impact projects independently from the budget of the civilian component<sup>43</sup> *closer cooperation with Afghan*

**Table 4.** A Conceptual Framework for Post-Settlement Peace Building.

Dimensions	Time Frame of Measures Taken		
	<i>Interim/short-term</i> measures <sup>a</sup>	<i>Medium-term</i> measures <sup>b</sup>	<i>Long-term</i> measures <sup>c</sup>
<i>International</i> dimension <i>The military/security</i> dimension	Direct, culturally sensitive support for the peace process Disarmament and demobilization of factions, separation of army and police	Transference to local control avoiding undue interference and/or neglect Consolidation of new national army under civilian control; steps toward creation of integrated non-politicized national police; progress in protecting civilians from organized crime	Integration into cooperative and equitable regional and global structures Demilitarized politics, societal security, transformation of cultures of violence
<i>Political-constitutional</i> dimension	Manage problems of transitional government and constitutional reform	Overcome the challenge of the second election, peaceful transfer of power; settling disputes over land and other assets	Establish tradition of good governance including respect for democracy, human rights, and rule of law; development of civil society within genuine political community
<i>Economic/social</i> dimension	Assessing damage; planning reconstruction; starting to rehabilitate basic infrastructure humanitarian relief, essential services, communications	Resettling displaced persons/population; rehabilitation of demobilized soldiers; progress in rebuilding infrastructure, demining; reactivation of small hoarder agricultural sector; rehabilitation of export agriculture, key industries, and housing; revitalization of communities	Stable long-term macroeconomic policies and economic management; generating more employment; implementing environmental awareness and protection programs; locally sustainable community development; distributional justice
<i>Psycho-social</i> dimension	Establishing safety; overcoming initial distrust; communication and bereavement	Reestablishing personal and social morality; rebuilding trust and the capacity of trust; managing conflicting priorities of peace and justice	Healing psychological wounds; long-term reconciliation; reintegrating and restoring democratic discourse

Sources: Ball (1996, p. 616); Maynard (1997, p. 210); Ramsbotham (2000, p. 182).

<sup>a</sup>*Interim/short-term* measures: up to the first elections.

<sup>b</sup>*Medium-term* measures: through to the second election or to the next election where there is a peaceful change of government.

<sup>c</sup>*Long-term* measures: beyond medium-term measures.

*authorities* and political, functional, and religious leaders more practice-oriented preparation for PSO-related missions is made integral part of the overall training

- *closer cooperation and after all presence of representatives* of Hungarian ministries on the field initial steps toward gradual incorporation of lessons learned into the training doctrine of HDF<sup>44</sup>
- success of *rapid-effect projects*
- success of *popularizing campaigns*
- relatively *good reputation* among locals, rather *friendly behavior* of local population.<sup>45</sup>

On the other hand, we have to face with several *challenges*, which are related mainly to issues, like<sup>46</sup>:

- structural problems: difficulties with command, control, communication, information and intelligence (C4I2) systems, and logistics
- insufficiencies in personnel and training: distribution of the flag posts or key positions among the relatively small nations does not reflect to their contribution
- different interests behind, and emphases in PRT models
- to realize Hungarian contribution to new missions takes relatively long time
- the budget provides further estimates for new missions only in exceptional cases
- to fill up the positions with special language skills is extremely difficult
- lack of proper analysis and evaluation of information
- technical development
- harmonization of national doctrines.

The soldiers with experiences from the field highlighted some additional *shortfalls* in the interviews with them<sup>47</sup>:

- strategic airlift in order to provide proper logistic background and lack of appropriate intelligence capabilities<sup>48</sup>
- armored vehicles
- working conditions
- enlargement of security element
- the notion of “making peace while staying ready for war” is the challenge of military participation in POs
- appropriateness of the chosen tools and channels to transmit information (lack of knowledge about the harsh procedures for information exchange within the United Nations)

- language problems at the unit-commander level
- unique aspects of the mindsets of the national contingents
- bureaucratic protocol and communications procedures
- lack of a few special NATO guidelines with formalized interaction documents
- prospects for management of problems arising from conflicts among operational (in)compatibility, national cultures, national military cultures, traditions, and foreign language
- cooperation (military to military vs. CIMIC with IGOs, GOs, NGOs).

There are some special *CIMIC-related challenges* as well (mostly connected to the cooperation with the humanitarian community):

- cultural and organizational differences among cohabitants in the theater
- mandates – principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality
- asymmetrical capabilities/major gaps in CIMIC
- few formal relationships
- lack of awareness of each other
- competition for resources
- lack of information sharing
- no common, coherent planning
- lack of appropriate tools and methodology for information and knowledge management (IKM).

When Hungarian professional NCOs and COs and contracted soldiers were asked by a questionnaire closely after their return from the fourth Hungarian PRT deployment to Afghanistan (PRT-4), we got some additional feedback on the top of the above-mentioned issues (Fig. 6).<sup>49</sup>

1. Our respondents were satisfied with:
  - interpersonal relationship with comrades in arms
  - stationing (accommodation, living conditions in the camp/quarters, conditions for washing and getting themselves clean, and dining)
  - clarity of service requirements, demands and requirements of their superiors
  - preparedness of the trainers, who originally prepared them for the mission abroad.
2. The respondents were dissatisfied with their
  - salary
  - inappropriate personal and subunit level armament, weaponry, and other technical equipments
  - human resource management (too many tasks for too few people)




Fig. 6. Retrospectively How Do You Evaluate the Conditions in Your (Sub)Unit During the Mission in Afghanistan? *Source:* Gyula Gyimesi, Pál Dobai, and Veronika Karácsony (2008) Survey on mission-related experiences from Afghanistan, September 1–December 15, 2008 (research report) (Budapest, Strategic Defence Institute of MZNDU).

- the content of the training curriculum, preparation material, teaching/training methodology – and, as a result, they did not feel prepared and competent for managing every possible unwanted events (typical respondents mostly: older, more experienced military personnel in higher ranks)
- English language training (general and special)
- preparation for multicultury communication
- possibilities for planning their future in the armed forces after returning from the current mission
- lack of real intention and institutionalization in the Hungarian home military organization to collect foreign and Hungarian experiences and learn from the lessons of previous crisis response operations abroad (Fig. 7).




Fig. 7. What is Your Opinion about the Following ...? Source: Gyimesi, Dobai, and Karácsony (2008).

When our respondents retrospectively compared themselves to military personnel of other NATO nations and their equipment, we found signals that should be taken into consideration by our decision makers:

- We found some kind of uncertainty about life-saving appropriateness of weapons, equipment, logistics, and a kind of feeling of ineffectiveness of mission.
- Interestingly enough, many respondents might have felt some kind of *relative deprivation*, when they compared their salary to other NATO military (in cases of comparison the *perceived differences in wages, equipment, etc.*, among contingents might lead to *low self-estimation*).
- Another group of stressors were connected to the difficulties of getting adapted (to *another culture, people, customs, protocol, obstacles of multicultural communication*) (Fig. 8).

*Measures that may strengthen the factors favorable for more effective, practice-oriented preparation and cohesive functioning of multinational peacekeeping forces are as follows:*

- More financial and nonfinancial support for those personnel and their families, who sign up voluntarily for a mission abroad




Fig. 8. What is Your Opinion about the Following ...? Source: Gyimesi, Dobai, and Karácsony (2008).

- Review of the selection and preparation process of the future participants of operations, defining the criteria for acceptability – and have the best of the qualities selected, including compatibility with the elements of the system of the international contingent<sup>50</sup>
- Provide the best available, practice-oriented training and professional skills for future participants in their specified area (guarding, cargo transport, setting up durable communications, etc.). Possess essential peacekeeper qualities, the most important of which is neutrality
- Increased combat effectiveness in order to support PRTs in critical situations
- Build up and keep stronger moral stability to endure possible human and material losses
- More clearly defined command and control competencies
- Need for special focus on Afghan autonomy and responsibility (local ownership) after installation phase
- More authority and resources for civilian experts to assume command functions
- Trust building between civilian and military experts
- Improvement of the network between relevant actors
- Improvement of the communication and transportation facilities in the province



- Improvement of information gathering and analysis on local (e.g., power) – relevance of the EBAO and SoSA approach
- Constant internal and external reflection and feedback gathering on concepts, efficiency, and effectiveness of PRT activities to increase effectiveness
- Representatives of the lessons learned unit should interview those who returned from foreign services – and help them to return either to their original job or provide them other really demanding position, taking into consideration and providing some kind of advantages for them in case of their mobility in rank and position that they served abroad.

As far as I see it, well-coordinated *multidimensional responses to the conflict* (in which different actors and policy instruments work together more effectively) and a comprehensive *security sector transformation and reform* can be vital to consolidate peaceful relations. The above-mentioned preconditions may help to win the “*hearts and minds*” of the local population, establish security and provide improvement to other areas during the peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building process in Afghanistan.

## NOTES

1. Hungarian soldier killed in Afghanistan while trying to disarm roadside bomb. In: International Herald Tribune, The Associated Press (Tuesday, June 10, 2008) Available (online): <http://www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2008/06/10/europe/EU-GEN-Hungary-Afghanistan.php>

2. From the point of view of many legal experts, current mission in Afghanistan is neither a clear-mandated UN mission nor an integrated NATO mission, which results in many debates about the legacy of this PSO, and the NATO-led ISAF, the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) counterterrorism mission, and the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) involved in security sector transformation and reform projects. In spite of the fact that ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and nine UN Security Council Resolutions (namely UN SCR 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833) are related to the mission, ISAF is not a UN force, but a coalition of the willing of almost 40 nations throughout the world, which was deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. See more in ISAF mandate. Available (online) at: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html>

3. First we carried out a secondary data analysis and many interviews, and currently we are preparing an empirical (survey) research between professional and contracted soldiers in the Slovakian, Czech, and Polish military, who served and/or currently serve abroad in various PSOs – among them those military personnel (and their family members and commanders), who currently serve in Afghanistan.

In addition, we took into consideration the experiences of those 112 military personnel (professional officers, NCOs, and contracted soldiers in lower ranks), who recently returned from the 4th rotation of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan, and filled out the self-administered questionnaire of our colleagues (see Gyimesi, Dobai, & Karácsony, 2008).

4. According to Charles Moscos: “The peace soldier is, therefore, one who serves in a military capacity under a command authorized by an internationally accepted mandate and who adheres to impartiality while subscribing to the strictest standards of absolute minimal force functionally related to self-defense” (Moskos, 1976, p. 4). Furthermore: “The peace soldier is one who is able to subscribe to the precepts of absolute minimal force, a reliance on compromise and negotiation, and the recognition of the elusiveness of permanent political solutions” (Moskos, 1976, p. 137).

5. The so-called Visegrad four countries are Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.

6. See (Moskos, 1976, p. 11).

7. A peacekeeping force: “... military components from various nations, operating under the command of an impartial world body and committed to the absolute minimum use of force, which seek to reduce or prevent armed hostilities”(Moskos, 1976, p. 4).

8. As Charles Moscos argued: “The more generic term peacekeeping operations includes not only peacekeeping military forces but also such diverse and usually smaller peacekeeping enterprises as observer groups, truce commissions, investigatory missions, and the like” (Moskos, 1976, p. 4). On the issue of evolving doctrines for PSO from “consent” to “permissive environment,” see more in Henning A. Frantzen (2005), *NATO and Peace Support Operations, 1991–1999. Policies and Doctrines*. London; New York: Frank Cass.

9. The constabulary model of armed forces was first introduced by Morris Janowitz (1960) in his book on *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960, pp. 418–441. See also Janowitz (1968, pp. 15–38; 1974, pp. 471–508).

10. *Source*: NATO in Afghanistan. Available (online) at: <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html>

11. *Source*: NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. Available (online) at: [http://www.nato.int/issues/scr\\_afghanistan/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/scr_afghanistan/index.html)

12. NATO solidifies cooperation with Afghanistan. Available (online) at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0906a.htm>

13. *Source*: Troops committed to NATO’s ISAF by country. In: Jason H. Cambell and Jeremy Shapiro (2008). *Afghanistan index. Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-9/11 Afghanistan* (Figure 1.112) (December 16, 2008), p. 10. Available (online) at: <http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/~media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf>

14. Equipment and direct costs of ISAF are paid by troop contributing nations.

15. *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and recommendations*. Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, January 2008. Available (online) at: <http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2008/02/provincial-re-1.html>

16. *Source*: Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Available (online) at: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon\\_dev/prts.html](http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html)

17. The civilian components of contemporary PRTs in Afghanistan are commonly diplomats, government development agency staff, police advisors, counter-narcotics teams, judicial and criminal experts from donor governments, and liaison officers from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.

18. Stephan Klingebiel and Katia Roehder (2004). *Development–military interfaces: New challenges in crises and post-conflict situations*. Bonn: German Development Institute, p. 26. Available (online) at: <http://www.die-gdi.de>

19. Security Council Resolution 1510 of October 13, 2003 mandated the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul in the form of provincial reconstruction teams. *Source: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510* (2003). Available (online) at: <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>

20. NATO website. Available (online) at: [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan\\_stage3/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan_stage3/index.html)

21. ISAF Background. Available (online) at: [http://pom.peacebuild.ca/ISAF\\_PRTAfghanistan.shtml](http://pom.peacebuild.ca/ISAF_PRTAfghanistan.shtml)

22. At the beginning of September the Sonda Ipsos Research Institute carried out a public opinion poll on the attitudes of the civilian population on the Hungarian Military and the PSO in Afghanistan (with our involvement). The research was based on a questionnaire, and the sample (3,000 people) represented the whole Hungarian civilian population according to age, gender, educational background, and their living place.

23. Both the PRTWG and the NGO CMG are linked and report to the Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee, a high-level decision-making and consultative body that provides guidance to the management of provincial reconstruction teams and on how civilian and military actors interact within the framework of development and reconstruction.

24. Col Tibor Rózsa and Maj Gábor Hangya (2008). *Az újjáépítés és a biztonság katonai feladatai Baghlanban. A civil katonai kapcsolatok gyakorlata az MH PRT afganisztáni missziójában. (Military tasks for Reconstruction and Security in Baghlan. The Practice of Civil–Military Relations in the HUN PRT Mission in Afghanistan)*. Honvédségi Szemle, 2008. július, (62. évf., 1. sz.), pp.26–29.

25. *Sources: “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006,” “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007,” “Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey 2008,” Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008’*; Jason H. Cambell and Jeremy Shapiro (2008). *Afghanistan Index. Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan* (December 16, 2008), pp. 20–21. Available (online) at: <http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/~ /media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf>

26. Baghlan received a 4th grade on Markus Gauster’s “instability scale for PRTs,” according to the security situation in Autumn, 2007. On this scale: 1 meant “overall stability,” and 10 meant “open war”)” (Bamyan, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, Takhar provinces received the same grade in Gauster’s evaluation). See Markus Gauster (2008): *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies: Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany). Occasional Papers Series, No. 16. (January 2008) pp. 32–33.

27. Hendrickson Dylan and Karkoszka Andrzej (2002). *The challenges of security sector reform*. In: SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, disarmament and international security. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 175–201, esp. p. 179. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002). *Democratizing security*

to prevent conflict and build peace. In: Human Development Report 2002. Deepening democracy in a fragmented world. (2002) Oxford University Press: Oxford, Chapter 4. (pp. 85–100) Available also (online) at: <http://stone.undp.org/hdr/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/chapterfour.pdf>

28. Chalmers Malcolm (2000). Security sector reform in developing countries: An EU perspective. Joint report published by Saferworld and the Conflict Prevention Network (January 2000) Available (online) at: <http://www.saferworld.co.uk/pubsecu.htm>

29. See Hendrickson (1999, p. 29), Chalmers (2000, p. 1).

30. See Hendrickson (2002, p. 7, DFID).

31. On the detailed counter of pros and cons regarding potential advantages or disadvantages of using PMCs in international peace and security operations (see Kinsey, 2002, pp. 127–136; Lilly, 2002, pp. 139–144; Cilliers, 2002, pp. 145–151).

32. See Caparini, Marina (2003). Security sector reform and NATO and EU enlargement. In: SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, disarmament and international security. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 237–250, esp. p. 239.

33. Andrzej Karkoszka (2002, pp. 314–315) and other prominent staff members of the DCAF feel that the new researchers, engaged on the field of the SSR paradigm might produce a useful, practice-oriented “toolbox” that could be applied in a variety of regional political and geographic contexts and earmarked for specific national cases.

34. See Germann and Edmunds (2003, p. 6).

35. For this reason, national level decision makers should follow not only general principles, norms, standards, and guidelines of good governance, but should also take into consideration the relevant (e.g., geopolitical, foreign and internal political, sociopsychological, normative, institutional, societal, economic) contextual criteria and factors.

36. As many experts (Boëne, Bredow, & Dandeker, 2001; Shaw, 1991, pp. 184–190, 1996) have already highlighted, the public opinion and the media have become such factors that should be taken into serious consideration by the decision makers. It is, since public opinion and perceptions generally define acceptable limits within which the given political decision makers should resolve various political problems (Dalton, 1988, p. 2).

37. See Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2000).

38. See Moskos (1976, pp. 130–131).

39. See Moskos (1976, pp. 130–131).

40. Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens (2008). Managing civil–military cooperation. Experiences from the Dutch provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan. In: *Armed forces and society* (Vol. 34, no. 2), pp. 173–207. See also <http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/2/173>

41. Vladimir Rukavishnikov (2002). Stress factors, stress management and job satisfaction in MOOTW. In: Giuseppe Caforio (Ed.), *The flexible soldier*, Latina, pp. 107–127.

42. See more on the topic in: David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes (2005), *Command Arrangements for Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), pp. 27–29.

43. Results of the interview with Col Laszlo Szabo, former Commander of the 2nd rotation of HUN PRT in Baghlan.

44. From March 2009 a new Lessons Learned System will be launched in the Hungarian Military, which will work according to the requirements of NATO Bi-SC Directive 80-6 Lessons Learned. See Col (Eng.) Attila Süle and Maj (Eng.) Viktor Csabianszki (2008) A Magyar Honvédség tapasztalatfeldolgozó rendszeréről. In: Honvédségi Szemle, 2008. júl., pp. 16–18.

45. Results of the interview with Lt Col Gabor Boldizsar, Head of J9 in 5th rotation of HUN PRT in Baghlan.

46. Most of these dilemmas are not new, as we can see previous sources, like, for example, Andrei Demurenko (1997), Organizing the interaction of nations participating in a multi-national operation (CALL Publication no. 98-25), Frank Cass, London. Available also (online) at: <http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/nations.htm>

47. The list is based mostly on those interviews, which were carried out by professional military officers, who recently returned and currently MSc students at the MZNDU.

48. Results of the interview with Col Laszlo Szabo, former Commander of the 2nd rotation of HUN PRT in Baghlan.

49. Gyula Gyimesi, Pál Dobai, and Veronika Karácsony (2008) Survey on Mission-related Experiences from Afghanistan, September 1 and December 15, 2008. (Research Report) (Budapest, Strategic Defence Institute of MZNDU) Sample: Hungarian contracted soldiers and professional NCOs and COs, who returned from the fourth Hungarian PRT Deployment to Afghanistan (PRT-4) ( $N = 112$ ).

50. Andrei Demurenko (1997). Organizing the interaction of nations participating in a multi-national operation (CALL Publication no. 98-25). *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 10, (3), Frank Cass, London. Available also (online) at: <http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/nations.htm>

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# GREECE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE KOREAN WAR (1950–1955)

Dimitrios Smokovitis

## ABSTRACT

*Greece during and after World War II successively tried to rid itself from foreign (Italian and German) and communist influence. In its fight for independence, it was aided by the United Kingdom and the United States, but after World War II the communist threat, Greece being on the border to the communist sphere of influence, remained eminent. Therefore, Greece had to demonstrate solidarity and had to militarily participate in the alliance against communism around the world, that is, in North Korea. Greece formed a “Special Expeditionary Force” (GEF), involving ground and air forces. A special branch of high commanding officers, under a senior officer, was formed to play the role of liaison officer to the UN General Command Headquarters (GCHQs) for the Far East based in Tokyo-Japan. The Greek participation in the Korean War was highly recognized by the South Koreans as well as by the allied forces and the United Nations. Participating allies acknowledge and appreciate the valor, bravery, self-sacrifice, and resourcefulness of the Greek soldiers and officers.*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos  
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 225–232  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A015



## 1. INTRODUCTION

Greece entered the World War II on the side of the allies. After rolling back, deep into Albania, the invading Italian force (1940–1941), Greece successfully delayed the German offensive (April–May 1941). But, unable to fight two major powers (Germany and Italy) simultaneously, Greece fell under German occupation (1941–1944) (Clogg, 1994)

A few weeks after liberation (December 1944), the United National Greek Government faced the violent revolt of the pro-soviet armed communist resistance units in Athens. This provoked prompt British military intervention, which saved Greece from communist takeover. The Greek communists staged a second round of Civil War (1946–1949). On this occasion, it was the US intervention (Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan), which secured Greece's position in the Western block of democratic nations (Press and Information Ministry of Greece, 1947; Ulam, 1974).

## 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ten months after the internal upheaval, the Greek Ministry of National Defense, aiming at the substantial strengthening of the role of Greece as a factor of stability and peace in the sensitive area of South-East Europe, attempted to get the country to participate in international organizations as well as in varied and bilateral treaties. Taking into consideration the obligations and the rights, deriving from Greece's participation in these international organizations (e.g., the United Nations, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the European Community) and in texts of international conventions/contracts, the framework of its international presence is shaped.

The opportunity to demonstrate solidarity and to participate in the international community appeared in July 1950 when South Korea was suddenly attacked by communist forces from North Korea. This action drew an immediate reaction by the recently formed United Nations (Papyrus-Larousse Encyclopedia, 1966).

Right after the end of the World War II, Korea, a "victim" of Cold War era, was separated across the 38th parallel in the communist North and the democratic South. North Korea tried to impose a soviet-type regime in South Korea similar to its own. So, unexpectedly it attacked and invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was

occupied within four days. In answer to this hostile action, on June 29, 1950, the Security Council of the United Nations reacted immediately and decided to intervene. Greece, among 22 other nation-states responded to this resolution.

Greece, a full member of the United Nations, voted for this resolution to send a multinational force to drive back the invading North Koreans. It was obvious that Greece was going to take very seriously its role, not only as a member of the United Nations but also because of the obligations of mutual assistance. Not only had Greece received help from the United States only 10 month before, but also the future threat had not disappeared. The world had only just entered the Cold War era. And Greece might need support at a later moment in time.

### **3. THE GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (GEF) IS BORN**

Greece, in response to the call of the United Nations “in rescuing Korea and defending high human ideals,” assembled and sent to Korea the GEF in November 1950. In mid-November 1950, His Majesty King Paul presented the GEF its standard stating: “... I hand you today the Greek flag state assured that your fight under the U.N. will be for the defense of liberty ... I wish you victory and glory ... God be with you ...” ([Diefthinsis Istorias Stratou, 1977, p. 30](#)).

GEF's first appointed commander was Colonel John Daskalopoulos. The GEF included an infantry regiment (from the 42nd Brigade of the IX Infantry Division) of Special Composition of about 1,000 men, and the 13th flight (squadron) of transportation aircrafts Dakota was assembled in November and transferred in the first 10 days of December 1950 to Pusan (South Korea). A directorate under the command of a senior officer was formed to play the role of liaison office to the UN's General Command Headquarters (GCHQs) for the Far East based in Tokyo-Japan ([Diefthinsis Istorias Stratou, 1977](#)).

The GEF embarked on a US transport troop ship and after a 24-day trip through the Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean, Ceylon, Singapore Straights, and the China Sea arrived in the 9th of December 1950 in the South Korean port of Pusan.

After a most enthusiastic welcome by local authorities, the people and representatives of the allies, the GEF was provided with artillery, weapons,

vehicles, special uniforms, boots, sleeping bags, raincoats, gloves, and other equipment.

Then GEF was transported north and had the opportunity to fraternize with allied troops from other nations such as United States, France, the Netherlands, Philippines, United Kingdom, etc.

The first time the GEF was involved in action was the period from December 18, 1950 to January 23, 1951.

#### 4. THE GEF IN ACTION

The GEF decisively contributed to the defense of Korea. They valiantly participated in many offensive and defensive battles on the ground.

Besides the peculiar environmental and weather conditions, opposing forces who did not take into account number of losses and who defended the land with an astonishing obstinacy heavily outnumbered the GEF and the other UN forces. Although the UN forces had the upper hand because of superior field artillery, air control, and unlimited means of transportation and logistical support, in several instances the enemy created for them very difficult tactical conditions. This was initially achieved by allurement and surprise tactics, penetrations and maneuvers in depth and night activities during their offensive operations. It can be said that the GEF and the other UN forces, including United States, had as their enemy a well-organized and relatively modern war machinery. The enemy's human force was characterized mainly by discipline, fighting skills, and disregard of the risk of death. In order to face such an enemy, it was indispensable to have permanent "wariness" and "determination," especially in cases of favorable development of operations.

The battles were numerous and recorded in great detail in many sources, mainly the official archives of the Hellenic Armed Forces. In brief the operations are summarized below:

*January–March 1951:* offensive battles in the Tsunsiou-Ikton-Kuan-Ni line;

*April–November 1951:* offensive and defensive battles in the Seoul-Uizubu-Imtzin-Yokton river axis. Action around Hill No. 313 (Scots) – Kalgok;

*December 1951–April 1952:* mainly defensive operations in the Imzin river area;

*April–July 1952:* reserve force duties north of the greater Seoul-Sungian-Ni area;

*July–October 1952:* offensive and defensive operations in the Imzin river area;

*November–December 1952:* defensive operations in the Tsorvor area;

*January–June 1953:* defensive operations in the North Vankzemal area on the so-called Missouri area;

*June–December 1952:* defensive operations in the Yioming-Pikeomg Ni-Ong until the signing of the armistice of July 27, 1953.

In the fall of 1953, the United Nations requested the Greek government another infantry battalion to replace the withdrawing French force. So the GEF was reinforced to Regiment size. Between May and July 1954, the GEF Regiment fortified defensive positions in the Tsorvon area. It stayed on as a reserve force until it was dissolved in March 1955 (Diefthinsis Istorias Stratou, 1977, pp. 35–181).

The contribution of the GEF-Air Force should not be neglected. It participated with a squadron of transport craft (DC-47's) arriving among the first on Korean soil. Originally involving seven aircrafts, to which two more were added to replace losses, manned by 67 officers and crew, including 25 fighter pilots. One characteristic example of the contribution of the GEF-Air Force was its operational record in just one month, September 1951 with 82 war missions!

Only in the year 1951, the GEF-Air Force carried out:

- 741 war missions,
- 4,047 and 45 minute flight time,
- 13,886 people transported,
- 3,846 wounded transported, and
- 5,168,134 materials delivered (Diefthinsis Istorias Stratou, 1977, pp. 182–188).

The GEF losses in Korea were:

- dead officers: 14,
- dead soldiers: 168,
- injured officers: 30, and
- injured soldiers: 429 (Diefthinsis Istorias Stratou, 1977, pp. 277–240).

Besides having received a specially hard training in Lamia (a city in the middle of Greece) before deployment, the operational readiness and the successes of the GEF (infantry units and air force squadron) in Korea were due to the high level of training which they preserved during the breaks of the fighting, the acquired war experience of the officers during the Civil War

in Greece of period 1946–1949, the excellent discipline of individuals and units, as well as to their superb high spirit.

On July 27, 1953, a treaty was signed. Yet, on January 1, 1954, the GEF forced to Regiment and remained in Korea as a peacekeeping force until December 1955. In total, a number of 102,555 men served (669 officers, 9,566 soldiers) while losses amounted to 185 killed, 577 wounded, and 4 aircrafts destroyed.

## **5. HUMANISTIC AND SPIRITUAL WORK OF GEF**

Besides to the support to Greek fighters during combat, the GEF officers in Korea were remarkably active at charitable work in favor of South Koreans as well as important cultural activity.

Most important toward this direction and more especially in spreading the orthodox Christian faith in the area was the contribution of the military priests of GEF. The responsible military priest, besides his regular tasks, was preaching regularly according to the Church's order in the front lines, while at the same time providing care to the people of Korea, by visiting units offering spiritual assistance to the EGF' personnel – while also searching for the few, initially, Korean orthodox Christians in Seoul. Thereafter, the Battalion, through the military priest, gathered the orthodox community in Seoul. Later, a collection of money among the GEF's personnel helped realize the construction of the Church of Saint Nicholas in the center of Seoul. With the ordination of a Korean Priest from the orthodox bishop in Tokyo, the orthodox in Seoul came together, while with the assistance of GEF an important number of Korean were attracted to orthodoxy. The Regiment of GEF continued actively the work of the Battalion, systematized and increased the accomplishment of baptisms of Korean children from Greek officers and soldiers in the Holy Church of Saint Nicholas in Seoul, the divine co-service performed jointly by the priest of GEF and the Korean Priest.

Also, important was the service offered on the part of the GEF's Medical Department to the local people. More specifically, the doctors of the GEF were providing medical and pharmaceutical care to Korean wounded, adults and children, often shot by enemy fire. Also, there are many reports for officers and soldiers of care administration, who distributed food supplies of GEF to South Koreans of the operations areas (often to orphan children of 14–18 years of age who followed the GEF and were under its protection) (Genementzis, 2007).

## 6. CONCLUSION

Greek participation in the Korean War was highly recognized by the South Koreans themselves. It should be mentioned that, in appreciation of the contribution of GEC in the Korean War, the Government of South Korea built in the Youtsu Kioun Tzi Do, near Seoul (the famous Heros' Valley), a grandiose hero's tomb for the Greek fighters, inscribing on a plaque: "These brave soldiers of Greece have incarnated the flourishing freedom, and the living freedom. Honor and glory to the fallen warriors." In another plaque the history of the participation of the GEF in the Korean War is remembered.

The dead, injured, and other fighters have been highly recognized and decorated worldwide. For their contribution in the operations for evacuating Zoungnam, the Greek squadron was complimented by the president of the United States, while the administration of war transports decorated nine officers, six chief sergeants, and four airmen with the air medal.

After Korea, other missions followed, for example, missions in Congo (Zaire) in 1961, during the efforts of the United Nations to consolidate independence of the State of Somalia in 1993, by providing human welfare and medical assistance in South Africa, missions at the borders of Iraq–Kuwait, Georgia, Nagorno Karabagh, etc.

At present, the Greek Armed Forces participate in peace missions with the Greek Force of Bosnia, the Greek Force of Albania, the Greek Force of Kosovo, the Greek Force of Afghanistan, as well as in the operations "Active Endeavors" and "Enduring Freedom," while also deploying observers in smaller international missions. In this respect, Greece continues its participation in the international community.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. R. Moelker, the Netherlands Defense Academy, for his suggestions and recommendations.

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# ESDP AND RUSSIA: A DECADE OF UNFULFILLED PROMISE ☆

Sandra Fernandes

## ABSTRACT

*The European Union (EU) is commonly, and vaguely, labelled as a sui generis foreign policy actor. The European Security Strategy (2003) advances, in an imprecise manner, the possible use of 'robust' responses to international challenges, when needed. The military dimension of the EU has to be found in its evolving but still incipient Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since the launch of ESDP and its first missions in 2003, the EU has been able to conduct a noticeable progress on two fronts. On the one hand, it enhances internal capabilities for crisis management; on the other hand, it favours the principle of participation of third countries in missions. The present analysis considers EU international military cooperation in a strategic neighbourhood: Eastern Europe. We take into account the EU necessity to rely on relevant non-EU players to launch missions. We argue that ESDP missions' success depends not only on*

☆This paper is an edited version of the research presented at the International Conference on 'Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution in a Globalized World', July 2008, Seoul, Korea. The presentation included an additional comparison of ESDP involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, contributed by Luis Saraiva. This version is at disposal by e-mail: sfernandes@eeg.uminho.pt and saraiva\_luis@hotmail.com.

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**  
**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 233–258**  
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**ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A018**



*these external actors, namely on the consideration of power gaps, but also on domestic EU constraints. We explore the causes of poor cooperation with Russia on ESDP and the perspectives for crisis management in Europe. Considering ESDP activities in Eastern Europe, we conclude that the balance between civilian and military tools is not adequate to engage more seriously with Russia towards the stabilisation of the 'common' neighbourhood.*

## **1. INTRODUCTION: LOOKING EAST – A DIFFICULT ROLE FOR ESDP<sup>1</sup>**

The European Union (EU) is commonly, and rather vaguely, labelled as a *sui generis* foreign policy actor. How accurate is this label? The 2003 *European Security Strategy* advances, in an imprecise manner, the possible use of 'robust' responses to international challenges when needed (European Council, 2003). The military dimension of the EU has to be found in its evolving but still incipient Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since the launch of ESDP and its first missions in 2003, the EU has been able to conduct a noticeable progress on two fronts. On the one hand, it enhances internal capabilities for crisis management; on the other hand, it favours the principle of the participation of third countries in missions.

The *Strategy* is today under revision since it has to correspond to the fast-evolving EU instruments developed towards crisis prevention and management. Since 2003, more than 20 ESDP operations and missions were launched on three continents. Despite the rapid initial achievements, the EU still faces structural challenges, namely in terms of military capabilities (the need for an industrial base and a European defence market). The political will to act collectively is also crucial because the EU's military capabilities are those of the member states. The High Representative for CFSP, Solana (2008), underlined that the actual state of play is certainly satisfying but not sufficient. Furthermore, he stresses that 'Europe is not an option among others. It is the unique horizon which is up to our political and strategic ambitions'.

These European ambitions are mainly directed at its neighbourhood. The strategic objective of creating security in this area is not only materialised in the *Strategy*. Brussels further advanced this goal in the 2003 *Wider Europe* concept and in the subsequent *European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)* (European Commission, 2003). The ENP is convergent with this strategic

aim and it also states the effective sharing of values as a condition to develop relations. Brussels is becoming more demanding and intrusive in domestic and neighbourhood affairs and proposes a stability model for a greater part of its eastern and southern borders. The *common neighbourhood* in fact reflects the EU's enlarged view of its external role at the borders. Nonetheless, specific security issues arise in these non-candidate countries and the EU method to address them so far seems mainly oriented to 'soft' measures. Brussels needs to cooperate with key regional players, such as Russia and regional states and organisations. Furthermore, the Georgian–Russian conflict of August 2008 underscored the need for the EU to devise a different model of relationship with Moscow.

Our analysis aims at assessing EU international military cooperation in the Eastern Europe strategic neighbourhood. We mainly address the feasibility of launching EU missions, considering the need to rely on relevant non-EU players. To achieve this, we analyse the causes of poor cooperation with Russia on ESDP and the perspectives for 'frozen' conflicts in Europe. We aim at characterising the multifaceted use of ESDP and its difficult role in Europe, against the background of Russian presence and the existing security architecture.

## **2. EU–RUSSIA SECURITY DIALOGUE: INSTITUTIONALISED AND RECENT**

From the EU perspective, the purpose of the relationship with Moscow is to avoid new dividing lines in Europe after having overcome the previous one (bipolarity). A notorious approximation of former enemies has emerged, mainly from the late 1990s onwards. Since 1999, the relationship has gained a greater strategic density. Concretely, an institutional framework of cooperation has been created, composed of five main elements:

- (i) The first one is the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), from which all the output of the relationship stems.
- (ii) In 1999, two strategic documents were adopted by the two parties (European Council, 1999; The Russian Federation, 1999).
- (iii) Since 1998, biannual summits have taken place.
- (iv) There are also technical cooperation bodies, which prepare summits and implement decisions.
- (v) EU cooperation programmes are also instruments of the relationship created by Brussels.

In 1995, a signal of political will was sent by the [European Commission \(1995, p. 12\)](#) towards Moscow. It stated the need to discuss with Russia the future security architecture of Europe and the relationship with NATO. Another signal is the fact that a more qualified political dialogue began de facto after the signature of the PCA in 1994 and before its ratification in 1997.<sup>2</sup>

The PCA is the basis and the cornerstone for the emergence of the political dialogue, which is the first visible result of the agreement. It also replaces the former treaty with the USSR of 1989. It is a mixed agreement and all-inclusive: for 10 years, it was meant to manage economic, commercial and political relations. In the spirit of the PCA, there is the promotion of international peace and stability, in equality and partnership. One of the original commitments is to adopt the principles of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and human rights observance. This agreement represents a qualitative leap forward in comparison with the previous one with the Soviet Union, whose sole objectives were stability and economic recovery with technical assistance.

The PCA has also allowed for dynamism in the evolution of the relationship. The document contains a minimal definition of the political dialogue, but cooperation has gone far beyond its Article 6 Title II. Security and defence were areas solely and generally mentioned through reference to the development of a political dialogue aimed at establishing new forms of consultation and cooperation to promote international security, as mentioned above.<sup>3</sup> In 2000, this dynamism was concretely embodied in an ad hoc *Joint Declaration on strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters in Europe*, adopted in Paris. Until the creation of the four common spaces in 2003 (see below), five declarations of this type were endorsed. Once again, taking into account the fact that the political dialogue already took place between 1994 and 1997, there was a mutual willingness to lay the groundwork for the development of the interaction. It is also linked to the evolution of the EU as a security actor, with the creation of its CFSP/ESDP. Since the creation of new institutions under the Treaty of Nice (2001), in CSFP/ESDP, Russia also meets with the Political and Security Committee of the EU (PSC) and the Military Committee.

The PCA creates a structure of cooperation at various levels: the biannual summits, the Annual Cooperation Council at the ministerial level (in 2004, it has been replaced by a more flexible body, the Permanent Cooperation Council), the Cooperation Committee sessions, *Troika* meetings and Political Directors meetings, sub-committees on technical issues, and Parliamentary cooperation through committees in the Duma and the European Parliament.

Since 2003, Russia has declined to have more sub-committee meetings at the expert level, except for custom matters. Since 2004, no expert committees have taken place either. This may be due to two factors.<sup>4</sup> First, there are coordinating problems between the several federal and ministry services from the Russian side. Second, there is a difference in the perception of the level of the meetings: for the EU, they are technical and it was represented at the level of heads of units, contrary to the Russian counterpart which was represented at a higher level by deputy ministers. However, sectorial dialogues are taking place between the European Commission and Russia on a wide range of economic and technical issues. Last year, for instance, Russia and the European Commission launched three new dialogues on microeconomics and finances, investment and early warning in energy.

In 1999, two strategic documents were adopted by each part ([European Council, 1999](#); [The Russian Federation, 1999](#)). Today, they are obsolete because they were replaced by the Action Plans adopted in 2005 (see further analysis). Nonetheless, their contents are interesting in the way in which they highlight the nature of the relationship. For both Brussels and Moscow, they were a new kind of document. Their contents are mainly convergent. The EU document was criticised as being pleonastic, when seen alongside the PCA, and not offering anything new. We can nonetheless consider that it was another EU signal in its global trend to foster relations with Russia.<sup>5</sup> One striking common aspect of the documents is the following: both identify the necessity to improve and concretise political dialogue. It is, then, the first manifestation of the lack of implementation of the PCA, which was starting to appear as a flaw in the relationship. From both sides, the level of rhetoric is high but concrete cooperative results are somewhat lacking. Another trend is present in both documents and this is also going to be confirmed as a pattern in the relationship: economic objectives are enhanced. Separately, we can highlight the following: on the Russian side, pragmatism is visible with the notion of 'economic security' and the necessity to interact with the CFSP (future summits will in fact discuss this). On the EU side, four domains of action are identified: (i) consolidation of democracy and the state of law, (ii) integration of Russia into a European economic and social space, (iii) cooperation to consolidate the stability and security in Europe and the world and (iv) common challenges on the European continent. The third and fourth domains include the need of the Russian participation in conflict prevention and crisis management.

The year 2003 is a turning point in the framework of EU–Russian cooperation because it brought an ad hoc structure of cooperation, which in

practice replaces the PCA even if it remains the basis of the relationship. For instance, as long as Russia is not a World Trade Organisation (WTO) member and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is not negotiated with Brussels, the provisions of the PCA are fundamental to trade and investment relations (Ryabkov, 2008). At the St. Petersburg summit, four common spaces were created: (i) a Common Economic Space; (ii) a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; (iii) a Common Space of Cooperation in the Field of External Security; and (iv) a Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. The third common space deepens and widens the agenda in conflict prevention, crisis management and rehabilitation post-conflict (the so-called 'frozen conflicts'). This summit also introduced other innovations. The Cooperation Council was transformed into a Permanent Cooperation Council. The adoption of Action Plans was meant to implement the four spaces. The Action Plans should have been approved in 2004 but because of the crisis around the Ukrainian presidential elections, they were approved in 2005 (we analyse this situation below).

One important aspect in EU–Russian relations is the fact that the 'low politics' agenda (economics and trade) has been more developed than the 'high politics' agenda (security and conflicts). Generally, the results of the summits are marked by continuity, pragmatism, some security dialogue (with the discussion of a relative role for Russia in ESDP and third-states' issues) and the creation of some political confidence. As mentioned above, the first declaration in the security field was issued in 2000. It included (i) concrete measures and (ii) common objectives for peace and security. At the operational level, cooperation in crisis management was established as a field for further development, as well as regular consultations at the expert level. Both considered the evolution of these practical aspects related to the evolution of the European integration process in this domain (EU–Russia Summit, 2000). Concretely, two effects occurred from this first step of the political dialogue towards a security dimension. Russia participated in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2003, and withdrew in the spring of 2006. This is the information available publicly but, in fact, the EU and Russia were not able to conclude the negotiations of the agreement needed for Russian participation. As a result, no Russian forces were actually sent to the theatre of operations. The first ESDP mission in which Moscow contributes is actually the EUFOR Tchad/RCA, since the signing of an agreement in late 2008. Russia was also the first non-EU country to have regular meetings with the PSC, created in 2001 after the Nice Treaty signature. This represents an additional institutional channel in the framework of cooperation and in the security dimension of the political

dialogue. Furthermore, Russia was invited to participate in the active phase of the joint EU–NATO exercise of crisis management CME/CRISEX03. At the academic level, joint studies have been conducted between Russian scholars and the Institute for Security Studies of the EU.

### **3. THE LIMITS OF RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH THE EU THROUGH ESDP**

The forthcoming entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon could be an opportunity to improve the EU–Russia security dialogue. Namely, the *troika* PSC meetings with Russia (discuss CFSP issues only) have neither delivered enough concrete results nor cooperated in the scope of ESDP. Russia is not satisfied with the arrangements proposed by the EU to all third states in general. There is also a need for a package of technical agreements to clarify how classified information can be protected, namely in Russia. One of the main obstacles to further discussion on ESDP issues is the fact that Russia does not participate in missions on the ground. Talks on details are not possible if there is no field experience, since the exercises are virtual, and if they do not take part in missions.

Moreover, Russian involvement in exercises is limited and not even all member states participate. Russia is also not inclined to have contacts with the European Defence Agency (EDA). Issues such as Moldova or Georgia are not discussed in the EU Military Committee, since it is confined to crisis management and military capabilities. Limitations also come from the member states because some of them consider that cooperation with Russia on ESDP is linked to their cooperation with other states, such as Ukraine and Turkey. The clear EU red lines on ESDP are twofold: preserve EU decision-making autonomy and the conditions for Russian participation in EU crisis management operations (defined by the arrangements of the Seville European Council). The most recent step in common activities under ESDP is the launch of expert talks at the working level, since 2006. It is a step towards familiarisation with ESDP and the evolution of Russian armed forces. These talks are unique since they are organised only with Russia and Ukraine, in this format.<sup>6</sup>

The St. Petersburg third common space is sensitive at three levels: internally, towards Russia and towards Ukraine and Georgia. The internal willingness to develop ESDP and the quality of the offers to third countries are important aspects. If the EU becomes a more credible external actor

taking into account the institutional changes, then it could improve its security dialogue with Russia, possibly next year. The EU also represents an added value compared to NATO, since it can discuss a less sensitive agenda (not including missile defence, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)), mostly dealing with crisis management, and since Russia has demonstrated that it is inclined to use this leverage to balance strained relations with NATO and the United States.

The goal of promoting peace on an equal basis foreseen in the PCA has, in part, been concretised through the agenda. All third-country issues are in fact discussed at all levels of the institutional framework. The most sensitive issues, such as frozen conflicts (Moldova and Georgia), are more present since the adoption of the Road Map for the third common space, in November 2005. Nonetheless, the conflicts are not addressed in a way that challenges Russia as a major and almost unique player there. The EU soft approach to these countries will presumably not solve the situation in the short term. Helping Moldova and Georgia through confidence-building measures is certainly useful for their European aspirations but it has not helped to address Russia as an unavoidable part of the solution, nor does this help to create constructive and cooperative policies. Even if the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia caught the observers by surprise, it is illustrative of the above analysis.

#### **4. ESDP AND THE ‘COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD’**

This state of play concerning poor Russian cooperation with ESDP missions leads us to consider the question in another perspective. What are the ESDP missions developed in the common neighbourhood and what are their main results? How does Russia relate to them? The fact that Moscow did not oppose the EU involvement in Moldova through the EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (*EUBAM*) can be seen as a positive sign for further developments. The mission was launched in late 2005 and has been extended until 2009. Its main role is to ‘assist with the modernisation of management of their common border in accordance with European standards, and to help in the search for a resolution to the ‘frozen conflict’ over the separatist Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova’.<sup>7</sup> Even if the mission is supported by the EU Special Representative (EUSR) Border Team for Moldova, this mission is carried out by the European Commission. In the Georgian case, *EUJUST Themis* (EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia) was the first ESDP mission in this

domain, aiming at supporting the reform of the criminal justice system. Today, the Union is present in Georgia through the 2006 ENP Action Plan, namely along the fourth priority area 'Enhance cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security, including in the field of border management'.<sup>8</sup> The border reform is supported by the EUSR Border Support Team, as in Moldova for the EUBAM. This task is now being extended to the internal borders with the two separatist entities to promote confidence-building. The recent Russian recognition of independence of the separatist entities is now bringing uncertainties in the concretisation of these elements.

The EU approach towards Moldova and Georgia does not bring results in terms of engaging Russia positively. On the contrary, Russia views the overall ENP as an interference in its *near abroad*. This is less problematic than the engagement of NATO, or the United States stance (missile defence project), in Central and Eastern Europe, but it provokes a will to reassert Russian power and sovereignty. Globally, the EU post-enlargement ambitions in the common neighbourhood are those of a post-modern actor (Krastev, 2007), in contrast with Russian traditional sovereign prerogatives. Instead of becoming an idealised European partner, Russia is becoming, from the EU perspective, a challenging foreign policy actor.

If we consider the 2004 crisis surrounding the presidential election in Ukraine, we can also identify a pattern in EU–Russian difficulties. Despite the divergences over the Ukrainian crisis, no diplomatic rupture occurred at the Hague Summit that year. The real obstacle at the time was the notion of 'common neighbourhood'. Brussels wanted to introduce this concept in the Road Maps to concretise the four common spaces. It was underlined at the time that 'Russia is suspicious of the EU's push to regard countries such as Ukraine as a 'common neighbourhood' for which the two sides share a measure of responsibility' (Dombey & Ostrovsky, 2004). The interests were in fact different. For the EU, the challenge was to stabilise its external border in the context of the *Wider Europe*, through the democratisation of a Newly Independent State. For Russia, besides historical reasons, it was about the affirmation of its post-imperial characteristics and mostly about the need to avoid reinforcing a 'club' to which it does not belong, and which is growing and rebalancing the European equilibrium. Moscow faces the uncomfortable situation of the loss of former allies and seeks to maintain a relevant position in a Europe that is more and more defined by the EU. In the wording of the Road Map for the Third Common Space of External Security, the compromise was



found in 2005. The adopted formulation concerning crisis management was ‘regions adjacent to’:

they will give particular attention to securing international stability, *including in the regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders*. (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 35)

We can synthesise the divergence about these ‘adjacent regions’ comparing two concepts that reveal two different world visions: ‘zone of influence’ for the Kremlin versus ‘neighbourhood policy’ for the EU. Moscow reacts with reticence to the latter because of its sovereign sensibility and prerogatives towards its *near abroad*.<sup>9</sup> The fear of a domino effect caused by the ‘colour revolutions’ (democratisation and Europeanisation of Ukraine and Georgia, and European orientations of Moldova) is also motivating the affirmation of sovereign prerogatives in the *near abroad*. As mentioned above, the process of European integration carried out by the EU embodies post-modern values of relative sovereignty. This is not in line with traditional principles of international politics, more visible in the Russian concept of territorial sovereignty. A feature of the relation, as outlined above, is also that the ‘low politics’ agenda is more developed than the ‘high politics’ agenda. This is due to the fact that the security dialogue was not foreseen in a specific way in the PCA, and started later in 2000, and also due to the fact that the EU began to implement its ESDP only in 1999. Then, the economic purposes have been prioritised compared to the proclaimed political values. During the late 1990s, Russia viewed the EU as a possible alternative to NATO in Europe but its dissatisfaction with its role in ESPD has conduced Moscow to re-evaluate the added value of its European choices.

## 5. THE LACK OF POLITICAL CONVERGENCE

The actual state of play reveals that the Russians are more interested in military cooperation than the EU. Member states are still reluctant to enhance cooperation between themselves. There is no EU–Russia agreement to launch joint missions and this puts a brake on the solution to ‘frozen conflict’ in Europe. Moldova (Transnistria) is probably the case offering the best prospects but, for the moment, the EU is the one pushing Moscow and not the other way round. On the one hand, the Kremlin wants to be involved in the decision-making process on an equal footing with Brussels. On the other hand, the EU considers Russian participation at the same level as the participation of other third states, based on the framework of the

Seville Council conclusions. Globally, Moscow wants more influence and integration compared to what the Europeans are willing to concede. The resulting problem consists in defining what and how to negotiate with Moscow. [Appendix](#) illustrates the lack of convergence between the EU and Russia to cooperate in order to foster the stated common goals of their dialogue: effective multilateralism and the promotion of regional organisations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. It is especially visible as far as the 'common neighbourhood' is concerned. Since August 2008, the remarks in the [appendix](#) concerning the two Georgian separatist entities have generated even more concern, namely because of Russian recognition of their independence.

The ESDP presence in the Balkans is also linked to EU–Russia relations. The fact that Moscow opposes the February 2008 Kosovo unilateral declaration of independence is perturbing the launch of a civilian mission. The legal aspects had to be discussed since it could not simply substitute the ongoing United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Kremlin argues that the *EU Rule of Law Mission* (EULEX) ([Conseil de l'Union européenne, 2008](#)) would not be legal because the UN Council did not recognise the independence of Kosovo. Nonetheless, under the Security Council resolution 1244, a scope for EULEX is being found ([Council of the European Union, 2008](#)). In the previous 2003 civilian ESDP mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia participated in a negotiation process but this did not come to a result. This was the first attempt for a Russian participation in an ESDP mission, until the recent contribution to the Union mission in Africa (EUFOR Chad/CAR). It might be a promising Russian signal for the time being. The eventual participation of Moscow in EULEX is extremely difficult to foresee, since Kosovo is one of the main divisive issues in the political dialogue. This fact has contributed to slowing down all security dialogue under the third common space. This was experienced, for instance, during the Permanent Cooperation Council meeting last December. Although the agenda included the discussion of an agreement about classified information, the subject was not even mentioned. In fact, the Kosovo dispute took all the attention and turned the meeting into a fastidious exercise.<sup>10</sup>

It is then still unclear how the transition will be done from UNMIK to EULEX. The launching of the mission has been complicated by two factors: the lack of UN approval of Kosovo independence and divergences between member states about the recognition of the new entity. By June 2008, a total of 300 personnel were already on the ground but they will be operational only if the UNMIK is reconfigured and transfers its authority through the

signing of a contract with the EU. This process should take 120 days, even if the EU is willing and ready to assume the transition immediately.<sup>11</sup> The interpretation of the resolution 1244, mentioned above, is at the core of the difficulties. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's legal ground to justify EULEX consists of saying that the EU could 'assume an enhanced operational role in Kosovo in accordance with resolution 1244' (MacDonald, 2008). The EU would then take on some aspects of the UN's role. For Moscow, EULEX cannot hand over UNMIK because the UN Council has not approved the move. We have to draw a parallel with what happened in last February about the independence of Kosovo, when International Law was used and interpreted in two opposite manners to justify the pro and contra positions.

Questioning the uniqueness of Kosovo's case is today fundamental for security dialogue in Europe and for Russian policies towards its neighbours and Western partners. One can view the Kosovo case through two different lenses: the legal view and/or the political. Both imply several dilemmas. This complex way of approaching the case of Kosovo independence can blur the understanding of the concrete situation. On the one hand, one could argue in favour of Kosovo's independence based on legal aspects, that is, on existing conditions for 'just secession' such as the existence of 'just causes' (US understanding; Coppieters, Knaus, Bugajskiand, & Trenin, 2008). The contrary can also be stated if one considers that the causes are not strong enough to justify legitimate secession (Russian stance). As a consequence, International Law can be used for both opposing arguments. On the other hand, political arguments are also a decisive part of the question. Since 1999, the United States, the EU and the United Nations supported the idea of an independent Kosovo. They have a political responsibility in the current situation and it was hardly foreseeable for them to withdraw their support for a unilateral declaration of independence.

The question of considering Kosovo a precedent for other 'frozen conflicts' is linked to the legal approach, referred to above. If one considers that the same conditions are present in Kosovo and Transnistria, for instance, then Kosovo could be considered a precedent. Nonetheless, this is very difficult to argue since the concrete conditions on the ground and the historical backgrounds are different. Politically, it is possible to consider Kosovo a precedent if one wishes to support other separatist regions but the case would not be easy to sustain. It is also true that Kosovo's independence benefits from a strong political support from Western countries, which is not the case for Abkhazia and south Ossetia. So, the consideration of a precedent is not easy to argue but it can be used on the political level and it

depends on the political will to do so. For the Kremlin, the recognition of their independence, last 26 August, can be interpreted as leverage on Georgia and indirectly on NATO, to avoid undesirable outcomes such as enlargement.<sup>12</sup> *Teltschik (2008)*, chairman of the Munich Conference on Security Policy, underlines that any NATO enlargement would require a clarification of NATO–Russia relations. Imagination should be used to define what it could mean.

## **6. THE THIRD COMMON SPACE: PROSPECTS FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION**

Under the St. Petersburg third common space of external security and the 2005 Road Map to concretise this area of cooperation, five priorities are identified.<sup>13</sup> One of them, cooperation in crisis management, is directly connected to ESDP. The other four are mainly dealt with through CFSP. The political and security dialogue with Moscow, through the CFSP, has intensified even if the ‘common neighbourhood’ is clearly a difficult area of cooperation, as we underlined above, and as the current crisis in Georgia further highlights. Russia ranks first among non-EU countries undertaking the greatest number of meetings with the EU, at all levels. In neighbourhood issues, the role of the EUSRs for Moldova and South Caucasus has improved the dialogue with Moscow (*Grévi, 2008*). These moves are recent but it is a signal of the potential for an EU–Russia dialogue on ‘frozen conflicts’. K. Mizsei was appointed for Moldova in February 2007 and P. Semneby for South Caucasus in February 2006.

Mizsei stresses that his meetings in Moscow have been fruitful and that there is a realistic momentum to re-launch the ‘5+2’ format of negotiations (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, as well as the EU and the United States). The situation in Transnistria is different from other conflicts because there are no deep ethnic or religious roots (*Miszei, 2008*). The package of security issues (presence of Russian troops) is as important, in negotiations with Russia, as the talks about the status of the separatist entity. Russia considers Moldova’s neutrality as a key condition for the settlement of the conflict. As *Miszei (2008)* underlines, a simple declaration of neutrality by Chisinau would not be enough for Moscow, because it wants a real leverage on Moldovan foreign policy and a military presence on the ground. Russia is suspicious since the Ukrainian precedent (government

change through the 'Orange Revolution') and feeds dissatisfaction with NATO's role in Europe.

Concerning the case of Georgia, Foreign Minister [Tkeshelashvili \(2008\)](#) points out other rationales that complicate the resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In her opinion, the main obstacle to engage in a positive dynamic (result-oriented) lays in the format of negotiations. Russia is considered as the main peace broker on the ground but it is in fact a non-neutral actor. The format should then be diversified to include other actors with an equal role. EU officials of the Council Secretariat globally acknowledge more hopeful prospects of solving the Transnistrian dispute, based on the dialogue with Russia, compared to other issues such as Georgia or the final status of Kosovo. For Georgia, the August war confirms further this view.

Under the priority 'cooperation in crisis management', of the third common space Road Map, two achievements are visible in the scope of ESDP, since 2006. These results mainly reflect progress on transparency and mutual understanding. First, military expert talks have taken place. In this context, there have been high-level meetings between the EU Military Committee and the Russian Chief of Defence. These developments seem to have been encouraged by the Russian side.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, already since 2002, the EU Military Committee meets with officers of the Ministry of Defence. Moscow also appointed a liaison officer in Brussels ([Lynch, 2003](#)). Second, Russia participates in crisis management exercises (Milex) and training, in the context of the European Security and Defense College (ESDC) created in 2005. The fact that Russia is willing to provide four MI-8 MT utility helicopters (transport helicopters), with full supporting equipment and up to 120 personnel ([Press Release, 2008](#)), for the EUFOR Chad/CAR, is a positive sign in an area of potential development. Nonetheless, it does not directly address the EU's well-known deficiencies in strategic airlift or the existing mutual will for Russian contribution with long-haul transport and heavy transport aircraft.

Non-proliferation is an area of cooperation offering prospects for closer interaction between the EU and Russia. It is not an ESDP domain, as it is discussed under CFSP. Nonetheless, it is an important element of the security dialogue that can contribute to an improved political convergence between the two parties and impact on the willingness to cooperate further on ESDP issues. One of the priorities of the third common space is 'non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament' ([Council of the European Union, 2005](#)). This goal is pursued using the *G8 Global*

*Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction*, created in 2002. In this context, last year the EU implemented two projects in Russia. One is directed at the destruction of chemical weapons. The other is aimed at the protection of a nuclear site. The funding proceeds from CFSP. The European Commission has also assumed compromises to fund the G8 Global Partnership. The EU is not satisfied with disproportionate attention that Moscow pays to the four priority areas defined by the G8. The Kremlin is more inclined to foster chemical weapons destruction and nuclear submarines dismantlement, at the expense of the disposal of fissile material and the redirection of former weapon scientists. The dialogue with Russia is then directed in the framework of the G8 Global Partnership. Furthermore, Brussels adopted, in 2003, a *Strategy against the Weapons of Mass Destruction*,<sup>15</sup> focusing, namely on export control regimes. Brussels is willing to elicit Russian support for the accession of EU member states to specific agreements. Russia has not yet agreed because it is not itself included in the Australian Group. Moscow establishes a linkage between these two accessions.

In the non-proliferation dialogue, ballistic missile proliferation is also an item of discussion. Brussels is worried by the stance taken by Russia about the 2002 *Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation* (HCOC). Since January 2008, Russia suspended its commitment towards the Pre-Launch Notification, which was endorsed in 2004.<sup>16</sup> This move is based on the following argument: the United States has never provided such notices, despite the fact that they delivered HCOC annual reports. Washington argues that it would be able to provide advance notification since a *Joint Data Exchange Centre* would be operational. The whole issue is part of the arms reduction talks between the United States and Russia. It is inextricably linked to the problem of confidence-building measures and transparency and to the American will to extend its missile shield to the European continent. In the following section, we analyse the broader context in which the EU–Russia security dialogue develops in order to evidence further the rationales informing their military cooperation.

## **7. THE SHADOW OF NATO AND THE UNITED STATES ON EU–RUSSIA MILITARY COOPERATION**

In the defence realm, the rapprochement of the Russian Federation towards Europe is not separable from its adaptation with NATO. This is due not

only to the role of the transatlantic Alliance in European security and to its eastern enlargements. The Russian perception of the EU and NATO has also played an important role: Moscow considered Brussels as an alternative to the Alliance in Europe, at least in the long term. If we consider the process of adaptation to the new international system, the evolution and enlargement of both organisations are not separable. NATO is therefore an important vector in EU–Russian relations. This fact is underlined by the incomplete nature of the EU as a security and defence actor. In these domains, Brussels clarified with NATO certain modalities in order to assume greater responsibility in Europe. In December 2002, the ‘Berlin plus’ agreement defined the EU’s role in peace management and conflict prevention, based on the Petersberg missions.<sup>17</sup>

The 1997 *NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security*, and the creation of the Permanent Joint Council, replaced in 2002 by the NATO–Russia Council, revealed the changes in the NATO–Russia relationship. Two main factors influenced the attitude of the Kremlin towards the Alliance. First, Moscow viewed the organisation as a challenge to its security interests. Second, it also wanted to prevent a situation whereby Russia would have no access to a core European security structure. The Russian opposition to NATO’s enlargement has not always been coherent, but the construction of a cooperative relation with Moscow has been deeper compared to other partners.

The leadership transition from Yeltsin to Putin has altered Moscow’s perception of the Alliance. In mid-2001, the Kremlin decided to restore relations that had been cut off after the divergence concerning the intervention of NATO in Kosovo in 1999. The number of official meetings grew significantly. We consider that the acceptance of the Alliance as a main security provider in Europe emerged as a provisional acceptance of a status quo. The last has been imposed on Moscow by its weaker position in the balance of power. It has not been accepted as an irreversible fact but as a transitional need to avoid its marginalisation in the management of European security. At the beginning of the 1990s, the opposition to NATO reflected Russia’s hostility towards the unipolarity of the system, embodied by the United States of America. This was accompanied by an idea formulated by Gorbachev and also voiced by Yeltsin: a Europe for the Europeans, as a ‘common house’. The hostility remained despite an acceptance of NATO’s role and enlargements. The use of force in Kosovo in 1999 confirmed this reluctant acceptance and caused frustration in Moscow. In this context, the evolution of the process of European integration, in order to transform the EU into a global security actor, is primordial in

Russian perceptions. It would favour looser ties between European security and Washington. It is also important to underline that Russian security interests in the EU could be reinforced by the strong economic relevance of the EU for the Kremlin.

Missile defence is a recurrent irritant in US–Russia relations. It is mainly a bilateral issue that is poorly addressed multilaterally because of flaws in the existing security architecture. The discussion about the implementation of a missile shield in Europe has provoked intense transatlantic debate, mainly since 2007. It is an old issue in a new context. It is part of the arms control and arms reduction talks that began during the Cold War. Later, Washington expressed its will to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 but faced Russian opposition to this move. The main US argument is a change in the perception of threats at the global stage and a need to develop efficient defence systems. After September 11, the bilateral Russian–American relationship improved and in December 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from it. The European site would be the third in the US system, complementing the other two in Alaska and California.

The 1990 CFE Treaty is connected to the missile shield irritant between the two countries and European countries. This agreement installed a cooperative restraint in Europe in the field of conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains. An adapted version was signed in 1999 at the Istanbul OSCE Summit. A component of the Treaty is also the limitation of ceilings in the ‘flank’ regions, namely in the Russian North Caucasus. This legally binding framework is also weakened by specific conditions from the Russian side, as well as developments. NATO allies have not yet ratified the Treaty. They are awaiting Russian compliance with the adapted CFE flank provisions and the commitments it assumed, at the Istanbul summit, regarding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova. Moreover, in December 2007, Moscow decided to suspend its implementation for several reasons (Socor, 2007). Russia is concerned, namely by the fact that the Baltic States are now NATO members and have not yet ratified the adapted version (they are not in the 1990 version because they were part of Russia), because it could allow NATO deployments there. Among the list of reasons presented, the most important is the fact that Russia challenges the Treaty in itself and seeks a total renegotiation to advance its own favourable terms. Russian demands have thus assumed a higher stake in the context of Moscow’s opposition to the US missile defence.

There is little doubt that missile defence in Europe would alter the existing equilibrium and the existing deterrence capacities. In Webb’s view, it would



undermine diplomacy and multilateral arms control in favour of unilateral use of force, as in Iraq. The American agenda of missile defence 'does not fit with the cooperative security model that Europeans supports' (Webb, 2008). For the United States, it would improve its capacity to deter an eventual attack from Iran or North Korea. Arms proliferation is also a risk pointed out by the opponents of the system. Once more, two conflicting views emerge. On the one side, one can argue that the missile defence would represent a deterrent, avoiding the risk of an attack or of the will to develop nuclear weapons (Thränert, 2007).<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, one can argue that a vicious circle phenomenon would occur (similar to the Cold War arms race) and alternative weaponry would be developed to counter the deterrence effect of the missile shield. The fact that Russia is engaging in a military build-up is already seen as a move in that direction (Muller, 2007). Moreover, the Russian reliance on nuclear armaments, and apparently weak investment in conventional forces, is now used by the United States to justify the need for a modern nuclear deterrent (The Moscow Times, 2008). This is an additional US argument, besides the primary Iran motive. This can also be viewed as an inconsistency in the discourse, since Washington has repeatedly declared that the planned missile shield is not directed against the Russian Federation.

For European countries, it is not certain that they would benefit from such a system, since it could provoke an arms race that would threaten the continent. It is also unclear how the two hosting countries will have control over the system. There would be a unique American control, further deepening the lack of collective solutions between EU member states and NATO allies. There is a need to further discuss in a collective manner the consequences of such a system and its implications for the future of ESDP and relations with Russia. Although member states retain sovereignty on the issue and are allowed to engage in bilateral moves with Washington, there is a growing unease in Brussels. The specificities of the integration process require at least a consultation, not to mention the growing appeal for European internal solidarity, namely towards Russia. Even if ESDP does not cover missile defence, Javier Solana stated that:

the treaties in force allocated sovereignty over this issue to the member states, but this must be compatible with EU's general interest in security. (Euractiv, 2007)

ESDP is influential in defining the EU's role as a global actor in the medium and long terms. In the third common space of EU–Russia cooperation (see Section 1), the two main aspects are: crisis management and non-proliferation. Ryabkov (2008) identified a divergence of views on

only a few issues in these two areas (concerning separatist entities).<sup>19</sup> Non-proliferation is then a key in the cooperation agenda. Russia ranks first among non-EU countries undertaking the greatest number of meetings with the EU, at all levels. It is also a special NATO partner. Nonetheless, there is a vacuum in the available security architecture that fails to link the several multilateral and bilateral forums on missile defence and related issues.

Taking into account recent meetings, we can characterise the current state of play as the following: political and security interdependency is recognised but the ‘arm-wrestling’ goes on. The achievements are so far reduced even if the communication channels remain open. It is still necessary to solve the tensions in order to manage a more constructive relation, namely with member states of the EU and NATO. The fact that two (and recently three, with Lithuania) of them are involved in the Russian dispute with Washington to install the missile defence system further complicates matters. This is a particularly sensitive issue, since Russia has been seeking a closer cooperation with the EU in defence, since 1999. Moscow feels it has not reciprocated and would consider a greater EU involvement in European security a way of reassessing the US role in NATO and Europe.

## **8. CONCLUSION: THE NEED TO BALANCE CIVIL AND MILITARY ENGAGEMENT OF ESDP**

The fact that the EU is better defined as a post-modern actor has consequences for its ability to develop ESDP involvement. Depending on the security challenge and on the relative power and needs in the partner countries, Brussels is more or less able to use ESDP as a tool with which to tackle security crises. In the Russian case, EU’s ambitions in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus raise a specific catalogue of security concerns. ‘Frozen conflicts’ and Balkan disintegration are addressed by different tools (ESDP, ENP and accession). This is the case because here Brussels is dealing with candidate and non-candidate countries. Moreover, Russia is the biggest European neighbour and is not willing to become a member of the EU. For the time being, Russia has cooperated only in one ESDP mission, and is not willing to cooperate in the ENP framework. The contribution of four helicopters to the EUFOR Chad/CAR is a positive but very recent signal. It may create conditions for further military cooperation under ESDP. Nonetheless, the Russian–Georgian crisis of August 2008 further complicates the current context.

In EU–Russia relations, understanding the recent difficulties in creating political convergence is crucial to interpreting the poor military cooperation so far. Furthermore, today there is a complex ‘basket’ of security issues that relate to each other and undermine cooperation on ‘frozen conflicts’. The fact that Russia does not fulfil the *Istanbul commitments* and is willing to withdraw from the *CFE Treaty* is weakening the legal bases for solutions. This affects conventional armaments and troops stationing in the disputed regions. The Kosovo independence raises also the case for a precedent to other situations. Moreover, Russia is opposing the US project to install a missile shield in two EU member states. As a consequence of bilateral strains between Moscow and Washington, the arms control treaties are endangered. And following on from this, the range of EU–Russia cooperation, namely in non-proliferation, could also be damaged.

The prospects for EU–Russia cooperation under ESDP are conditioned by the above-mentioned need to foster political convergence. The two actors are embedded in the process of defining their role in the ‘common neighbourhood’. They also have to define their place taking into account the structural function of NATO in the European security architecture. As far as Russia is concerned, the August war with Tbilisi certainly pointed out unilateral and military reactions to these questions. The deepening of CFSP/ESDP is regularly pointed out as a precondition for the EU to be an empowered global actor and a stability provider. Nonetheless, the political context is a core variable to understanding the difficulties of engaging with Russia in common security challenges. As the French Permanent Representative to the EU underlines: ‘structures cannot be by themselves the solution for a political problem’ (Roger, 2006). In the case of cooperation with Russia, both prospects are needed: more political convergence and a better EU ‘offer’. Nonetheless, even if Brussels has a responsibility to create alternatives that are acceptable to Russia, for its part, Russia also has the responsibility to interact positively and in a less confrontational way.

In the context of the transformation of the nature of security, traditional military intervention is still needed. Does the EU need such a capacity? This is arguable in conflict resolution when a strong response can be considered the only solution to violent crisis. In the case of Russia, it would also help to bring Russia back to Europe and rebalance the contested role of the United States and NATO. Currently, Brussels is using its ENP as a core instrument towards stability in the post-Soviet space. We can question the value of this approach to address ‘frozen conflicts’ in delivering short- and medium-term results (especially after the ‘defrosting’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

As the recent Russian–Georgian war may demonstrate, relative power is an important variable that determines the feasibility of launching missions. Even if the civil component of ESDP has been a valuable element to promote stability, political rapprochement is a key element that needs to be further advanced in the relationship with Moscow in order to engage more seriously in the stabilisation of the European neighbourhood. Where and how Russia and the EU fit into the regional structure of cooperation is a conundrum. The development of the military component of ESDP could form one element of an answer, besides the need to develop civilian instruments to address complex security situations.

## NOTES

1. This paper is in part based on primary evidence gathered from interviews conducted by the author with EU officials, Russian officials and experts from January 2007 to May 2008.

2. In March 1993, the Council of the EU decided to accelerate negotiations with Russia. Since 1994, the committee created by the agreement with the USSR in 1989 was not used. Until then the relationship with the USSR aimed solely at economic stabilisation and recuperation, with the support of technical assistance. The year 1995 marks then the intensification of the political dialogue.

3. *Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and the Russian Federation, of the Other Part*, retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm)

4. This is stated by a source in the European Commission.

5. It is the EU's first document in application of the new article 13 of the Treaty of the European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam), which created the 'Common Strategies'.

6. Source in the Council of the European Union. Interview conducted in December 2007.

7. EUBAM official website <http://www.eubam.org>

8. *EU/Georgia Action Plan*, retrieved July 2008, from [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/august/tradoc\\_135746.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/august/tradoc_135746.pdf)

9. The *near abroad* corresponds to the 14 Newly Independent States which integrated the USSR. This zone of vital interest, or at least sphere of influence, is fundamental to the Russian perception of threat. The *common neighbourhood* reflects the enlarged EU's view of its external role in the borders.

10. Diplomatic sources and Council Secretariat sources.

11. Source in the Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels, June 2008.

12. In the context of Ukrainian aspirations to join NATO, the Duma approved last June a resolution that demands the revision of the 1997 Treaty, provided that Kiev continues the accession process. This is also an instrumental move to hinder Ukrainian perspectives.

13. The five priority areas are: strengthened dialogue and cooperation on the international scene; fight against terrorism; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament; cooperation in crisis management; and cooperation in the field of civil protection. The *Road Maps of the Four EU–Russia Common Spaces* are available at [http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p\\_494.htm](http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_494.htm)

14. Source in the Council Secretariate.

15. See [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/august/tradoc\\_118532.en03.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/august/tradoc_118532.en03.pdf) and <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/01/38/52/cdd7374c.pdf>

16. See [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008\\_03/RussiaHalts.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/RussiaHalts.asp)

17. The Petersberg missions have been included in the CFSP after the Council of Nice, in December 2000. They cover humanitarian missions, peace management and operations of peace restoration through the use of armed forces. The content of these missions is interesting because it considers the human aspect of security, which is central in the management of the new types of conflicts.

18. Thränert develops a refined argument about the deterrent effect of the missile defence, namely as a tool for crisis management. It is also interesting to note a Russian argument. The fact that Moscow helps Iran to develop a civil nuclear technology is helping non-proliferation, once it controls the production process and recovers the wasted fuel, preventing its use for military purposes.

19. Mr. Ryabkov is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Director of the Department of European Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

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## APPENDIX

### Russian Reassessment of International Commitments causing Special EU Concern in the Second and Third Common Space of Cooperation by July 2008

International Commitment	Russian Stance	Common Space
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); Case Iliascu	Does not fully implement the decision	II
Protocol 6 on abolition of the death penalty; Protocol 14 on ECHR Reform		II
Rights of minorities (OSCE and Council of Europe)	Minorities in Russia are respected, including in Chechnya	II
Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT); UN Committee against Torture	Does not agree with the publication of reports	II
	Does not implement recommendations	
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT)	Does not accede	II
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates	Are not allowed to visit people detained in North Caucasus since 2004 (not in line with the Geneva Convention)	II
UN Special Rapporteurs on torture and summary executions	Restriction of visits in North Caucasus	II
Delivery of humanitarian aid to North Caucasus by the UN and the ICRC	Difficulties of delivery since 2006 driven by the authorities.	II



**APPENDIX. (Continued)**

International Commitment	Russian Stance	Common Space
	Moscow argues that terrorist activities are helped by this mean	
1981 Council of Europe Convention on Personal Data Protection	Not fully ratified Delays a Eurojust–Russia cooperation	II
1970 Convention on the taking of evidence	Does not cooperate (Litvinenko case)	II
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)	Has not ratified	III
OSCE in the ‘frozen conflicts’	Limiting its role	III
Istanbul commitments	Russian troops remain in Transnistria even if Russia withdrew from the two military bases in Georgia (except the third in Abkhazia)	III
CIS ban on trading links with Abkhazia	Withdrew	III
Number of CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia	Increase	III
First ESDP mission	Withdrew	III
EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina		
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Does not agree with the membership of all EU member states	III
G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (2002)	Does not agree with its geographical expansion and partial interest in the areas of cooperation Wants to keep the level of projects and financial assistance towards Russia	III

*Sources:* European Commission (2008).

Press reviews from the *Financial Times*, the *Moscow Times*, *Le Monde* and the *New York Times*. Official websites of the Council of Europe, the UN and the OSCE.

**PART III**  
**SOCIAL, PROFESSIONAL AND**  
**POLITICAL ASPECTS OF**  
**ASYMMETRIC WARFARE**



# ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: AN INTRODUCTION

Giuseppe Caforio

## ABSTRACT

*This section deals with asymmetric warfare and its nature as well as the issues that it creates. The reason for devoting such a large part of the Seoul conference and of these proceedings to this type of warfare derives from the fact that it has changed many rules of the game of conflict.*

*This change has imposed a profound transformation on the military, not only tactical but also structural, preparatory and mental.*

*The commitment to adaptation, to change, to the broadening of mentalities and horizons that asymmetric warfare requires of the military today thus motivates the plurality – and also the heterogeneity – of the studies presented in the chapters of this section.*

## INTRODUCTION

This section deals with asymmetric warfare and its nature as well as the issues that it creates. The reason for devoting such a large part of the Seoul conference and of these proceedings to this type of warfare derives from the fact that it has changed many rules of the game of conflict (and the “war games” have not yet adapted to them).

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos

Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 261–266

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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A019

This change has imposed a profound transformation on the military, not only tactical but also structural, preparatory and mental.

As Hermann Jung (see Jung, 2009) writes: “Preparing forces to operate in a world where asymmetry appears to be the only logical option for adversaries will require some significant and innovative adaptations to training and education methods.”

As we all know, an asymmetric conflict typically involves two actors, one “strong” and one “weak,” and as I have already written in another study (Caforio, 2008): “Today, the weak side’s offensive *tool* is man, and man is often no longer a person who carries and operates a weapon but is himself a *weapon* who sacrifices himself to strike the adversary, and he does this because his mind has been convinced to do it.”

The characteristics of this form of struggle can be summarized thusly (Caforio, op. cit.): “The asymmetric form of warfare appears to be characterised by a prevalently political and ideological (often religious) nature, by a diligent effort to exploit the media, by consciously and determinedly ignoring any ethical standard. The strategy is to gain political power through sowing fear and hatred, to create a climate of terror, to eliminate moderate voices and to defeat tolerance.”

All this occurs in a world that is globalized and therefore reactive like an echo chamber, but where globalization itself is going through a process of mutation and is being partially superseded by the rise of “glocalization”<sup>1</sup> (see also the essay by Udi Lebel, 2009). Everything occurs in an unstable context, therefore, which requires constant adaptation and makes planning and design activities increasingly difficult and risky, activities that for centuries – at least starting from the rise of Clausewitzian thought – have constituted the principal work of military general staffs.

Globalization is not an instrument of the developed Western democracies only, and as William Hartman (2002) observes, “It is not completely progressive and technology is morally neutral. The same tools being used to advance world societies and economies can also be used to help destroy them.”

The historical trend of asymmetric conflict appears to increasingly favor the weak side of the confrontation, at least according to the studies by J. David Singer and Melvin Small cited by Ivan Arreguín-Toft (2001). Indeed, if we look at the period of approximately two centuries covered by Singer’s seminal Correlates of War data set, we discover that, over time, “strong actors” have been losing more and more asymmetric conflicts.

This is a clear manifestation of the difficulty and the delay with which the strong side countries (Western countries, by and large<sup>2</sup>) have faced up to this

new form of conflict. On the concrete level, it is necessary to arrive at the theory and the practice of the American general David Petraeus<sup>3</sup> to see a first effective attempt at adaptation to asymmetric warfare.

On the geopolitical plane, then, as I have already stated in another study (Caforio, 2008): “The negative effects of globalization have created a large disenfranchised population primarily centered in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This disenfranchised population has become the recruitment pool and their countries have become training bases for the networked terrorist and criminal who take advantage of the tools of globalization. Democratic societies cannot take very strong measures of citizen control, and that facilitates extreme groups to insert and to grow inside these societies. Besides, the porous environment allows one to move around the world undetected.”

And it is precisely in these countries that glocalization, understood here as the insertion of local elements and aspects into a global strategy, is born, developed, and extended to warfare.

In asymmetric warfare the primary use of communication and, especially, of the new *information and communication technologies* (ICTs)<sup>4</sup> transfers an essential part of the military confrontation from the traditional “battlefield” to a media confrontation. The actual results of the armed clashes – often quite brief and episodic, firefights more than battles – count less and less, and their use and exploitation through the media more and more. As well illustrated in a report of the International Crisis Group in Afghanistan cited by Matt Armstrong (2008): “Unfortunately, we tend to view information operations as supplementing kinetic [fighting] operations. For the Taliban, however, information objectives tend to drive kinetic operations ... virtually every kinetic operation they undertake is specifically designed to influence attitudes or perceptions.”

Armstrong again (op. cit.), with reference to the same theater of operations, provides an interesting example of the tools used locally in the fight by the weak side in this asymmetric warfare: “A website in the name of the former regime – the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – is used as an international distribution center for leadership statements and inflated tales of battlefield exploits. While fairly rudimentary, this is not a small effort; updates appear several times a day in five languages. Magazines put out by the movement or its supporters provide a further source of information on leadership structures and issues considered to be of importance. But for the largely rural and illiterate population, great efforts are also put into conveying preaching and battle reports via DVDs, audio cassettes, *shabnamah* (night letters – pamphlets or leaflets usually containing threats)

and traditional nationalist songs and poems. The Taliban also increasingly uses mobile phones to spread its message.” A mature use here of glocalization processes seems evident.

The tardiness of Western general staffs in acknowledging the importance of communication as a military combat tool and in providing effective countermeasures appears clear if one considers that as early as in 2002 a major in the U.S. army wrote (William Hartmann, 2002): “The media has had a tremendous effect on a nation’s ability to pursue its national objectives in modern times. We saw the effects when the U.S. was forced out of Vietnam after the horrible images of the Tet offensive, out of Lebanon after the Marine barracks bombing, and out of Mogadishu after 18 Army soldiers were killed and dragged through the streets. Did the death of 18 soldiers truly change the tactical balance of power on the streets of Mogadishu? Absolutely not.”

In all of these situations it is clear what the weak side was attempting to do: use the media to achieve objectives that were not attainable by military means.

From what is briefly outlined and summarized above – a general treatment of asymmetric warfare would require far more space – readying military forces to operate in a world where asymmetry appears to be the only logical option for adversaries will require significant, innovative adaptation of training and education methods by the military.

Taking the Iraq conflict as an example, Wilbur J. Scott (Scott et al., 2009) observes: “Even the casual observer now has been exposed to an ever-growing list of descriptors for the Iraq war: irregular, long, small, asymmetric, 4th generation, counterinsurgency, and full-spectrum are all terms that appear in the popular and professional literature. These terms, emphasizing differing aspects of the conflict, share a common reference to wars departing from the conventional frame of reference upon which most modern armies are built.”

To understand this departure from the traditional frame of reference, first of all we have to consider the multidimensional aspects of the military engagement. The military today has to execute different operations (humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, combat, reconstruction, nation building, etc.) simultaneously rather than sequentially. As Gen Dake (1999) writes: “We believe a marine will be engaged in humanitarian assistance at sunrise, peacekeeping at noon, and conventional combat at sundown.”

The commitment to adaptation, to change, to the broadening of mentalities and horizons that asymmetric warfare requires of the military today thus motivates the plurality – and also the heterogeneity – of the studies presented in Seoul on this topic and concretized here in this section.

## NOTES

1. The term “glocalization” stems from Japanese business practices in the 1980s, as a combination of the words “globalization” and “localization,” used to describe a product or service that is developed and distributed globally but is also fashioned to accommodate the user or consumer in a local market. This means that the product or service may be tailored to conform with local laws, customs, or consumer preferences. By definition, products or services that are effectively “glocalized” are going to be of much greater interest to the end user. Recently its use has been extended to other contexts, particularly of the social sciences (see, for instance, Thomas L. Friedman, 2005).

2. By “Western countries” I mean here not only those that physically belong to this geopolitical area as it is traditionally understood, but also all those countries that, especially following the end of the cold war, drew inspiration from Western models and appear, at least in the general trends, to be politically ranged in this area.

3. Gen David H. Petraeus was appointed supreme commander of U.S. forces in Iraq by President George Bush in January 2007. The new commander surrounded himself with a staff of officers of great strategic competence (dubbed “the Petraeus Thinkers”) and elaborated strategies that, taking local situations into account, implemented more effective forms of collaboration with the Iraqi forces and authorities, as well as ways of contributing to the country’s material and moral reconstruction, respecting the needs and particularities of the territories they were operating in. These strategies achieved the noted successes and, together with Petraeus’ thought contribution (see Petraeus, 2006, as well as his *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* of 2007), led to a revision of American deployment doctrines.

4. They include all the software, interfaces and devices that connect up to computers and make possible, through the use of a technological support aimed at the elaboration of symbolic systems, the construction, negotiation, and sharing of significances. Mobile phones should also be included in this list, due to their ability to send SMSs to an unspecified number of recipients, as well as dissemination tools like DVDs.

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# EXPEDITIONARY MILITARY NETWORKS AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE<sup>☆</sup>

Paul C. van Fenema

## ABSTRACT

*Military organizations participating in current expeditionary missions face new challenge associated with dilemmas common to asymmetric warfare. Apart from dilemmas faced by local government, populations, and organizations, military organizations struggle with their task environment, performance, and main and supportive processes. Complementing doctrinal innovations in this area, the chapter proposes a generic model linking these processes to value creation, and it examines specific changes introduced by asymmetric warfare. Notable changes include the increasingly dialectic, constructivist, and discordant nature of organizational processes. Moreover, asymmetric warfare challenges singular definitions of military organizations' and their members' professional identity, and demands ongoing, in-depth learning.*

<sup>☆</sup>This study is part of an ongoing research project on the comprehensive approach and heterogeneous value creation with Joseph Soeters, Netherlands Defence Academy.

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**  
**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 267–283**  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A020

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, military organizations have increasingly faced complex, asymmetric missions involving crisis response, peace keeping, defensive, and sometimes offensive operations (Noonan, 2003). In expeditionary operations aimed at international and local interests (Dolson, 2005; Simon, 2005; USMC, 1998), they attempt to address the needs and expectations from a wide range of stakeholders (Beerres & van Fenema, 2008; Cleland, 1988). Echoing earlier literature on requisite variety, Osinga (2007, p. 130) proposes that in order “to flourish and grow in (the) many-sided uncertain and ever changing world that surrounds us ... we have to make intuitive within ourselves those many practices we need to meet the exigencies of that world.” These practices commonly require multiple military organizations collaborating in networks (Dechesne, Van den Berg, & Soeters, 2007; van Fenema & Soeters, 2008; van Hees, 2006), relating to NGOs and local governmental organizations (Rietjens & Bollen, 2008; Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2003).

This chapter focuses on military networks facing asymmetric warfare challenges in expeditionary operations. Missions in Europe (Bosnia), Middle East (Afghanistan and Iraq), and Africa illustrate the challenges of these operations (Coyne, 2007). Yet descriptions of problems encountered in asymmetric warfare offer insufficient insight into recurrent, cross-mission challenges. Moreover, network operations in asymmetric warfare seem disconnected from high-tech network-centric warfare concepts (e.g., Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 2000). To contribute to these gaps, this chapter develops a generic model of network value-creation processes to examine the challenges introduced by asymmetric warfare. The chapter concludes with opportunities for future research.

## 2. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

In asymmetric warfare, conflicts evolve in multiple dimensions characterizing societal and human life. Early generations of warfare (Lind, Schmitt, Sutton, & Wilson, 1989) concerned military organizations engaging in more or less rigidly orchestrated fights, tied to geographical areas and national governments, and mostly separate from civil life. More recent – fourth and fifth – warfare generations (which may include elements of earlier generations) involve a variety of dimensions, including social, economic, legal, and financial resources and infrastructures. These “wars among the

people” (Smith, 2005) tend not to fit the traditional climax notion of winning–losing, but to evolve on the longer term in an unpredictable manner, hence the term long war (Carafano, 2003).

Asymmetric warfare is unusual and innovative in its deployment and combination of instruments, methods, targets, and timing (De Landa, 2003; Gray, 2002). It raises the complexity and number and severity of dilemmas for the opponent, making it:

Difficult to respond to in a discriminate and proportionate manner. It is of the nature of asymmetric threats that they are apt to pose a level-of – response dilemma to the victim. The military response readily available tends to be unduly heavy-handed, if not plainly irrelevant, while the policy hunt for the carefully measured and precisely targeted reply all too easily can be ensnared in a lengthy political process which inhibits any real action. (Gray, 2002)

In common military thinking, friction concerns the direct or indirect confrontation with an opposing force (De Landa, 2003; Osinga, 2007). Successful handling of this type of friction refers to territorial gain or order of battle (which army survives or is likely to survive) (Clancy & Crossett, 2007). Asymmetric warfare, on the other hand, introduces friction in multiple dimensions, with an emphasis on the network-internal experience of friction. This situation results from the fact that when networks of military organizations respond, they could pursue three objectives (Clancy & Crossett, 2007, p. 96):

- to disrupt the enemy’s ability to sustain a continuing level of violence (Clancy & Crossett, 2007, p. 95);
- to avoid counterforce’s relevance and legitimacy to the population;
- the stability of the environment as perceived by the population.

These objectives vary in terms of target groups, stakeholders, processes, and methods. Achieving them is likely to be accompanied by a number of dilemmas. In fact, dilemmas in asymmetric warfare are faced by different groups. First, the local population – including tribal militias (Perlez, 2008) – assesses on a continuous basis whom to trust on the short term and the long term for basic needs such as physical and economic survival, security, and political stability. Regime replacement by military means, commonly accompanied by large-scale suffering, seems to contradict stabilization, societal development, and “winning hearts and minds” of a region, at least in the perception of the population. Local population also faces the difficulty of making sense of various military organizations involved in a range of efforts to promote stability and value creation: “A day after the

villagers in Khost received the money for their new school, the same company of Marines was on a very different mission 10 miles to the west. Marines raid a suspected Taliban bomb maker's compound" (Coghlan, 2004). Second, government at local and national levels, interacting with military organizations, struggles to make the transition toward a new era of post-conflict operating. At the same time, they are pressed by groups and forces attempting to regain power. And third, expeditionary military networks, the main focus of this chapter, face numerous and severe dilemmas in their day-to-day operations and on a local and international policy level.

### *2.1. No Easy Concepts and Labels*

In the international political and diplomatic arena, international missions get shaped in terms of objectives, boundary conditions, and resources. This process may result in mission concepts that reflect interests and negotiation processes that do not match conditions in the theater (Beauregard, 1998). Within the theater, assessing – also called bracketing (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), framing, or categorizing – situations in asymmetric warfare such as identifying the enemy and examining the type of conflict, the severity of a threat, and performance success (Beeres & van Fenema, 2008) is a major challenge. Likewise, labeling operations in particular terms – for example, peace operations (see the UN's Brahimi (2000) report) – with associated rules of engagement may appear ineffective in a particular context (Beauregard, 1998). Concepts driving these processes may fail to capture the complexity of local realities.

### *2.2. No Easy Network-External Relationships*

Networks of military organizations define themselves and their relationships not only in military terms. They interact with local governments and other organizations (including militia; Perlez & Shah, 2008), granting contracts, obtaining information, and building trust and capabilities. However, these efforts make them vulnerable to abuse and miscalculations (e.g., using local interpreters and contractors). Military organizations' management of their organizational and network level boundaries thus becomes more complex. While intervening in local societal processes, military networks have their own values, structures, religious and ethical standards, procedures, and preferences. These may conflict with local customs, prompting an initial

response of intervention that may contradict efforts to respect local autonomy, or evoking a pragmatic, compromise-oriented attitude (see also Chapter 17, this volume). Counterforces may abuse standards held by the military network, for example, mingling with civilians. Similarly, relating to non-military organizations – including government and media – in the local theater and abroad introduces challenges of defining a degree of transparency and boundaries for information and knowledge sharing (Loebbecke & van Fenema, 1998, 2000). Such sharing may be indispensable for operation effectiveness but may also jeopardize troop security.

### *2.3. No Easy Local Management*

Local economies often rely on illegal services and products, for example, poppy cultivation, relying on organized crime, and other opposing organizations. Disruption of these activities and associated organizations may serve security purposes but endanger local commitment to the military networks' mission (Coghlan, 2004). Likewise, configuring local presence in terms of continuity, formality, and types of services provided appears difficult. Showing force may increase resistance, while remaining on the background could hamper the population's feeling of security (Petraeus, 2008). Actions – including mere presence – may evoke a wide variety of perceptions from different stakeholders, especially when the area is violent and collateral damage occurs.

### *2.4. Not Easy to Define Encounter with Opposing Forces*

While traditional relationships with an opposing force are defined in terms of hostility, at times negotiation on particular topics may be beneficial. “The Taliban, threatening to kill 23 South Korean hostages unless an equal number of their own fighters were released, on Sunday extended the deadline of their ultimatum by 24 hours, said a man identifying himself as a spokesman for the insurgents. *A delegation from Korea arrived in Afghanistan today and we hope to talk to them*, the spokesman, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, said by telephone from an unknown location. *We are optimistic that the Afghan government can be convinced to release our prisoners*” (Bearak, 2007). Such negotiation may, however, elicit further hostage taking and – depending on local culture and media – an undesirable image of weakness among opposing forces.

In order to handle these dilemma areas, networked military organizations apply concepts such as the comprehensive approach (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008), three-block warfare (Krulak, 1999), and counterinsurgency (COIN) (*Afghan Counterinsurgency: In the Words of the Commanders*, 2007). Following these doctrinal innovations (Petraeus, 2008), military organizations work with military and other organizations to ensure heterogeneous yet coherent value (JCS, 2001, 2002; van Fenema & Uiterwijk, 2008; Wells, 2007). Heterogeneity refers to the variety of activities deployed, requiring different competencies at the network and organizational level. According to General Terrance R. Dake (USMC), three-block operations encompass the following:

... we believe a marine will be engaged in humanitarian assistance at sunrise, peacekeeping at noon, and conventional combat at sundown. These three activities will all occur within a three-block area on the same day. What are the implications of such a scenario? ... What are the requirements for adequately preparing our young service members for the challenge of the complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical three-block war? ... The challenges a young NCO (Noncommissioned Officers) will face in the three-block war demand intelligence, creativity, resilience, and a strength of character. These traits and characteristics must be nurtured and developed through a demanding training and education curriculum. Such a curriculum must emphasize leadership, integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and personal accountability. (Dake, 1999)

The underpinning idea of approaches countering asymmetric warfare is to categorize local groups on a range from pro-expeditionary network to moderate to opposed to the network's mission. Specific strategies apply to these groups. Those in favor of the mission are supported, moderate groups are separated from opposing forces, and operations and movement of those against the mission are severely disrupted and isolated from external resource networks (*Afghan Counterinsurgency: In the Words of the Commanders*, 2007; Brocades Zaalberg, 2006). Concepts such as the comprehensive approach, three-block warfare, and COIN (*Afghan Counterinsurgency: In the Words of the Commanders*, 2007) offer some insight in the variety of activities expected from military networks and NGOs to accomplish this, yet they are still incomplete according to a Dutch army lieutenant-colonel:

The three block operations concept is aimed at winning trust from the population, not primarily defeating an enemy. Collateral damage hampers commitment from the local population. This approach calls for a truly different approach from participating troops. Of course the Dutch army has a lot of experience with peace support operations. Yet doctrines required for sequential or parallel execution of three block operations have been insufficiently elaborated. (Oosthoek, 2006)

Moreover, military networks may be tempted to emphasize the unique nature of each mission and theater, without understanding the generic implications of asymmetric warfare for their network's functioning. A key challenge thus becomes to understand how the task environment characterizing asymmetric warfare influences value-creation processes of networks. To this end, a model of network processes is developed in order to examine these influences.

### **3. A PROCESS MODEL OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS**

Interorganizational networks increasingly dominate private and public fields, including electronics, fashion, food, infrastructure, disaster relief, and military (coalition and multi-service) operations (Abraham, 2004/2005; Busquets, Rodon, & Wareham, 2006; Denning, 2006; Donald & Stefano, 2008; Grandori & Soda, 2005). Literature on networks commonly examines network nodes and network structural features in a static or dynamic manner (Baker, 1992; Kapucu, 2005; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007), tied to node and network performance (Beeres & van Fenema, 2008; Tsai, 2001). Recently, following trends in organization studies, network researchers have started to explore network organization mechanisms (Grandori, 1999; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001). Moreover, process perspectives are adopted. This literature examines phases through which networks proceed – preparing, activating, and performing (van Baalen & van Fenema, *forthcoming*), and processes constituting the network's value creation and performance delivery (Rietjens, Beeres, & van Fenema, 2008). The latter perspective allows us to understand the difficulty military networks experience when engaging in asymmetric warfare. Instead of merely focusing on IT-enabled information-based perspectives (Alberts et al., 2000; van Donge, 2006), I build a model of network processes and value creation. Theories about decision-making (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Teoret, 1976), organizations (Kogut & Zander, 1996), collective mind (Weick & Roberts, 1993), organizational learning (Zollo & Winter, 2002), OODA loop (Coram, 2004; Osinga, 2007), and value creation (Kang, Morris, & Snell, 2007; Porter, 1998) suggest that organizational performance relies on processes of observing, interpreting, strategizing, organizing, and acting (van der Laan, de Brito, van Fenema, & Vermaesen, 2009). This main cycle, applied at the



network level, is supported by information processing, learning, and professional identity definition processes (Fig. 1, rectangular boxes).

Following the main process backwards, the network’s performance materializes through situated, organized activities (e.g., patrolling and intervening in a mission area). These value-generating activities follow from organizing and decision-making processes, which in turn depend on interpreting and observing processes. The main process cycle is supported by information processing, learning, and professional identity definition. In networks, organizations share and divide responsibility for main and supportive processes (Rietjens et al., 2008). Asymmetric warfare influences the nature of these processes.




Fig. 1. Expeditionary Military Networks and Asymmetric Warfare: A Process Model.

## **4. EXPEDITIONARY MILITARY NETWORKS AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE**

This chapter seeks to understand how asymmetric warfare influences value-creation processes of networks (Fig. 1, sections identified with a ► symbol). I examine the task environment, performance, and main and supportive processes.

### *4.1. Task Environment*

Asymmetric warfare changes the task environment from a traditional warzone defined in tactical military terms to an environment where military networks have to understand the complexity of a fragile state. It consists of multiple groups with diverse interests, cultural sensitivities, and instability.

### *4.2. Performance*

In this task environment, military networks – in cooperation with non-military organizations – execute a mission that requires a variety of activities (heterogeneous value creation). As the variety of activity and effect categories increases, their coherence and effectiveness becomes more difficult to define, observe, and measure (Beeres & van Fenema, 2008; Perkins & Jackson, 2004). Moreover, the diversity of stakeholders leads to different – often conflicting – interpretations and experiences.

### *4.3. Main Processes*

The network's performance is composed of different activities situated in a particular region. While compositeness characterizes common military activities as well (Clemons & Santamaria, 2002; McRaven, 1996), asymmetric warfare adds diversity to it. Coordinating under this condition requires more information processing (McCann & Galbraith, 1981; Mohrman, 1993).

The process of organizing activities for asymmetric warfare does not rely on a univocal military doctrine (e.g., ambush, maneuver warfare, and urban operations) and approach to planning, but on a range of methods and approaches (Rietjens, 2006). Hence, in parallel with actually organizing activities themselves, discussion *about* this process is likely to occur.

Military networks are composed of organizations from different geographical and cultural areas, introducing different interests and logics related to an asymmetric warfare mission (Beauregard, 1998; Weinberger, 2002). As network members interact with non-military organizations as well, conflicts are inevitable with respect to policy decisions, rules of engagement, and so forth.

Military organizations – like medical professionals (Weick et al., 2005) – are trained to interpret their task environment along common categorical dimensions. They focus on activity and contextual features that are considered relevant for their problem solving and intervention processes. With asymmetric warfare, such *Verstehen* is not straightforward, demanding a more constructivist (Schultze & Leidner, 2002; Spender, 1995) and dialectical process (Robey, Ross, & Boudreau, 2002; Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006) to relate diverse interpretations of the task environment.

Likewise, knowing what to focus on when observing a task environment becomes challenging. Defining their mission and relevant context, networks choose what they find important (Brohm, 2005). Apart from paying attention to environmental resources with direct military relevance, increasingly new dimensions (social, cultural, political, and economic) are being included, for example, the US Army's Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program and recent Human Terrain System seek to generate insight into local society from an anthropological point of view; see also Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, and Smith (2006), McFate (2005), and Renzi (2006). These innovative programs bring together professionals from diverse background and sometimes lead to frustration and controversy within and between non-military and military communities, for example, Weinberger (2008) and <http://cryptome.org/hts-madness.htm>.

#### 4.4. Supportive Processes

Information processes accompany the main processes. Information is collected, stored, and made available through technical and human infrastructures (Desouza & Evaristo, 2004; Oshri, van Fenema, & Kotlarsky, 2008). Military networks increasingly rely on a variety of approaches to information (Borgman, 2000), including multi-cue representation of physical environments, elaborate instructions, and simulation spaces. Asymmetric warfare extends these approaches with personal, subjective information (Brookes, 2007; Schultze & Leidner, 2002). The role of this type of

information and its processing is likely to differ from more concrete, objective information.

Military networks encountering asymmetric warfare invest in pre-mission, mission, and ex post learning because of the complex task environment and the diversity of actors involved (Soeters & van Fenema, 2007). “When the UN Secretary General asked the Netherlands in April 1992 to participate in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) it was clear that the marines needed a new mission oriented training program ... From this period on, training focused more and more on subjects like cultural information, intercultural communication, negotiation techniques, specific topographic information, knowledge about ethnic and national groups and political players. Step by step marines learnt a coherent campaign plan in which all actors are involved is needed to achieve the success desired by government and the UN” (Kitzen, Bon, & Bosch, 2008). Reflection from diverse perspectives contributes to the knowledge intensity of mission activities and insight into network effectiveness.

Military organizations have been used to particular selection, socialization, and training schemes aimed at conformity and cohesion (Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull, 2003). In asymmetric warfare, defining a professional identity becomes more complex as various human functions and skill sets are required. Moreover, networks dealing with asymmetric warfare consist of a diverse range of professionals (legal specialists, entrepreneurs, anthropologists, etc.) with their own professional community and identity. In search of common ground, professionals relate their expertise with the overall mission and reflect on their contributions and perspectives.

## **5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

The objective of this chapter was to understand how asymmetric warfare influences value-creation processes of expeditionary military networks. The introduced model of network processes offers opportunities for thinking about the implications of this type of warfare. The dilemmas mentioned earlier can now be reinterpreted using the model. The local population faces challenges of interpreting the variety of network efforts, and of deciding whom to trust. Local government must deal with the problem of deciding whom to tie up with, formally and informally. Expeditionary military networks face challenges associated with the main and supportive processes. Obtaining relevant information and interpreting it from different angles

(e.g., military operations, legal and societal perspective) requires a variety of experts closely connected to allow for discussion (Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Hilhorst, 2008; Tsoukas, 2005). Deciding on the network's position with respect to local authorities, groups, and opposing forces requires confrontation between the network's own (stakeholder) preferences and local expectations and needs. Orchestrating the effects of various activities demands preceding coordination to examine the implications of various scenarios (Coghlan, 2004), as well as frequent feedback loops. And assessing the value created by the network involves challenges of defining relevant measurement categories and feedback loops that take expectations of in- and extra-theater stakeholders into account.

Having pointed at some of the challenges asymmetric warfare introduces for expeditionary military networks, future research is necessary. First, a multi-level perspective could offer insight into the relationship between organizational and network level processes (Monge & Contractor, 2003; Perlow, Gittel, & Katz, 2004). Second, network learning remains a relevant yet underexplored topic. "Learning not only to live but also to work with NGOs to create new governance schemes for addressing social problems is becoming the cutting edge of policy and strategy" (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001). Different levels of cooperation and coupling between network members may be called for depending on, for instance, the phase of asymmetric warfare and opportunities for network maturation (Beeres & van Fenema, 2008; van Baalen & van Fenema, forthcoming). Third, the dilemmas at various stages of the network process model suggest a need for ongoing dialectical interactions. Instead of clearly notable convergence of perspectives and positions suggested in literature on technology adaptation (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994), new theory could be developed for asymmetric warfare explaining the process, economics, and politics of continuous dialectics within expeditionary military networks and between these networks and various groups in their task environment. Fourth, mission concepts and rules of engagement could take the dilemma-intense nature of the task environment into account. Frequent checks of the mission's relevance and performance could ensure a fit between in-theater reality and network policies at the international level (see, f.i., the Brahimi report). And finally, expeditionary military networks face different task environments ranging from traditional warzones to more complex war-among-the-people situations characterized by dilemmas. The model introduced in this chapter may contribute to network theories exploring specific implications of different environmental properties for network operations and performance.

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# PAYDAY IN THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY: FROM WESTERN ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITIES TO LOCAL REALITIES

Christiaan Davids and Joseph Soeters

## ABSTRACT

*Afghanistan is without a doubt one of the poorest countries in the world and it has all the characteristics of a failed state. In such a country, where there is neither a physical nor an economic infrastructure of any significance, the payment of salaries is an overwhelming problem for government organisations. The international community is providing advisers and trainers for Afghan government organisations, including the armed forces, in order to combat these kinds of problems. This article focuses on how the payment of salaries is organised within the 205th Corps of the Afghan National Army and ascertains if there are proper ways for a developing army to adopt Western ideas on financial and general management. Our research indicates that the payment and accountability ideas within the 205th Corps are fully in line with the processes in any Western armed forces or government organisation. Only when matters literally fall beyond the scope of the West-dominated organisation and payments are to be made in the outlying areas, uncertainties arise which can lead to questions and even friction.*

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**

**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 285–303**

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**ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A021**

*Furthermore, specific focal points derived from our literature review and our study are the concept of recording a number of basic details and keeping the disclosure relatively limited, and adapted to local needs.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The responsibility for the development of the Afghan armed forces and police force lies with the Afghan government, which is supported in this respect by Western countries. That support was arranged in the so-called Bonn Agreement of 2001 (Rubin & Hamidzada, 2007; Carnahan, Minning, Bontjer, & Guimbert, 2004). In the first instance, the build-up and training of the armed forces were mainly allocated to the United States (Ayub & Kouvo, 2008; Sky, 2006). Since 2007, the build-up of the armed forces had also been supported directly by NATO troops. Payment of the personnel of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is a cause for concern. The *Daily Telegraph* reported in 2005:

Thousands of soldiers are deserting Afghanistan's new British- and American-trained national army, their morale undermined by poor conditions and the threat from the Taliban. (...) Morale has also been hit by rows over money. Afghanistan has no banking system so soldiers' families must wait for them to return from duty with their wages, which start at £40 a month. It is a decent wage in Afghanistan but for many soldiers the delay is putting their families at risk of starvation. (*Daily Telegraph* (UK), 9 June 2005)

The World Bank identified the same problems in a publication on the transformation of fiscal and economic management in Afghanistan (2004). Electronic transfer of money? Government employees, including soldiers, have to be paid in cash. Insurance for soldiers? If there are casualties, there has to be cash available to pay the hospital and the family. Chan (2007, p. 10) indicates specifically that the development of the ANA is suffering the negative effects of 'poor pay, faulty weapons, ammunition shortages and lack of protective gear'.

In a country such as Afghanistan, where there is neither a physical nor an economic infrastructure of any significance (e.g. Misra, 2004), the payment of salaries is an overwhelming problem for the government organisations. The international community is providing advisers and trainers for government organisations, including the armed forces, in order to combat these kinds of problems. This article – on the crossroad of management and social science (e.g. Storey, 1985) in the military (Sinno, 2008) – focuses on how the payment of salaries is organised within the Afghan 205th Corps; this Corps

was the first unit to operate outside Kabul after the fall of the Taliban. A related question is to ascertain if there are proper ways to have a developing army adopt Western ideas on financial and general management. What are the problems and how can they be solved in the future?

The relevance of these questions can hardly be overestimated. The economic and social development of conflict areas is seriously hampered when there is no satisfactory integration and treatment of soldiers and combatants in the new armed forces and other organisations (e.g. [Tessema & Soeters, 2006](#)). Armed individuals in conflict areas may simply opt to fight for whoever pays them and the armed forces which are legitimate in our eyes are merely one of those options. [Ferguson \(1998\)](#) shows that payment of soldiers is an issue which has long posed problems for armies. In the Second World War, for instance, security on payday was a well-known stumbling block. [Grunow \(2006\)](#) refers to problems in the build-up of the Iraqi army, such as gaining insight into troop numbers and the fact that one of the only ways to keep soldiers in the army is 'the promise of a paycheck' (p. 9).

## **2. MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

Afghanistan is without a doubt one of the poorest countries in the world and it has all the characteristics of a failed state. Failed states are countries where conflicts can easily erupt ([Collier, 2007](#)), because poverty and social inequality can lead to frustration and even to violence, while at the same time there are no adequate government organisations, such as a modern and professional police force and army, to control the potential violence. Modern and professional in this respect means that the principles of good governance are upheld. Key features of good governance are the application of rules without discrimination, career development on the basis of knowledge, qualifications and performance, standards for work and output, written records of tasks, processes and activities and, especially, the absence of nepotism. Naturally, a number of these management factors are essential for the orderly payment of salaries. They involve what by European standards are long-standing criteria for defining bureaucracy as developed by Max Weber about a century ago (e.g. [Perrow, 1972](#); [Scott, 1992](#); [Du Gay, 2000](#)). Bureaucracy refers to an organisational structure based on the principle of instrumental rationality, the value of which cannot be overestimated. The alternative, pre-modern organisation has characteristics which make working and living together very difficult. At least, that is the Western view.

In developing countries, managing and organising activities is conducted differently, as Western managers have discovered through trial and error. It has only been in the past decades that the idea has taken root that Western concepts of management cannot simply be applied in developing countries. Concepts such as participative leadership, socio-technical organisation, brainstorming and performance measurement cannot simply be applied indiscriminately in developing countries, let alone in so-called failed states (Kiggundu, Jörgensen, & Hafsi, 1983; Jörgensen, Hafsi, & Kiggundu, 1986; Kiggundu, 1986, 1994; Jaeger & Kanungo, 1990; Mendoca & Kanungo, 1996). A clash of mindsets on these subjects can exist already between Western military and civilian officials (Piiparinen, 2007). In the area of financial management and accounting, too, it is clear that views on accountability and management of income and expenditure are culturally bound and differ from country to country (e.g. Hofstede, 1987; Chanchani & MacGregor, 1999). That means that anything which is self-evident in Western countries with regard to financial and general management is not necessarily so elsewhere in the world, especially not in failed states (Baydoun & Willett, 1995).

What exactly are those differences in management and accounting practice? We will limit our scope to a number of main issues, bearing in mind that any distinction between Western countries and developing countries is bound to be a very rough one, to the extent that there is a risk of stereotyping.

First, in developing countries, so-called pre-modern organisation is based on *whom you know*, which is much more important than *what you know*. Unlike Western organisations, in which knowledge, skills and performance evaluation are decisive factors, in pre-modern organisation, relationships are the key factor (Soeters & Tessema, 2004). Who has access to the organisation, who works in it and who is in charge are all to a great extent determined by family ties, religious and/or political connections or by regional or tribal relationships. This particularism is known as an expression of cultural collectivism: group ties are more important than individual performance and characteristics. Another characteristic is the lack of a stable and defined division of tasks and the fact that the subordinates are 'at the disposal' of the leader. As a result, the subordinates can have no clear expectations regarding their own futures (Scott, 1992, pp. 40–41). The distance in terms of power between the leader and the rest of the organisation is therefore great. On the other hand, the leader has the general obligation to take care of his 'followers'. This style of leadership, which occurs frequently in non-Western organisations, is referred to as

‘paternalism’. This means that the leader must take care of the people in his organisation as if they were his children (Aycan, 2008). In this organisational ‘family focus’, what is important is the welfare of the people in the organisation, balanced by the fact that the leader can expect undivided loyalty and submissive behaviour-ingratiation in the eyes of the Western world (Smith, 2008, p. 327) – from his ‘children’. Another factor in this respect is the fact that in non-Western countries, concepts such as ‘honour’, ‘shame’, ‘(loss of) face’ and ‘politeness’ play a huge role, especially for those who are more highly respected (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Bosman, Soeters, & Ait Bari, 2008). This is the case to an even greater extent in countries in Central and Eastern Asia (Smith, 2008, p. 329).

A second characteristic of organisations in developing countries concerns the ability to ‘get things done’, in spite of everything (Smith, 2008). Given that government organisations in particular in developing countries are often found to be unwieldy and viscous (Jørgensen et al., 1986), it is remarkable that creative and clever solutions are always found for (short-term) problems. There always seems to be a way to work around barriers and find the right people. In doing so, favours are done and tacit references are made to outstanding ‘bills’ or common interests. In the Chinese context, this phenomenon is known as *Guanxi*, and in Arab countries it is referred to as *Wasta*: pulling the right strings to get a problem solved (Smith, 2008). This method can have either a positive or a negative outcome. In the best case it is the lubricant which gets the machine running smoothly, but in the worst case, if the relationships gain too much importance, there is a risk of nepotism, corruption and even (the threat of) violence (see also Johnson & Soeters, 2008). These are all things which in today’s Western world are considered to be absolutely reprehensible, unethical and, in their extreme forms, criminal. As has been said earlier, however, this method need not always be considered to be negative. Of course, this second aspect of organisations in developing countries – ‘managing to get things done’ – is inextricably linked to the ‘family’ nature of organisations in these countries.

Third, it has to be said that in current Western organisations, the bureaucracy which used to be considered the ideal situation has in fact already become obsolete, not as far as the legalistic substantiation is concerned (the comprehensive, measurable application of rules and procedures) but with regard to the lack of performance-driven attitudes. In response to the increasingly expensive and poorly functioning government organisation, around 25 years ago so-called new public management was developed in the West. This management orientation emphasises management information, performance and results. It attaches much less



importance to thinking in terms of resources and activities, which is very common in armed forces organisations. Status is not acquired by means of large departments and budgets, but by achieving the best possible results with the available resources. This management style was not introduced overnight in the West either and the introduction of this way of thinking even led to new and unwanted, even perverse effects in organisations (De Bruijn, 2007; see also Birnberg, Turopolec, & Young, 1983). It can be assumed that such a form of management orientation will meet with even more resistance in non-Western countries (Soeters & Tessema, 2004). There, family and political accents still dominate the legalistic-bureaucratic characteristics of organisations, never mind the organisations wanting to be judged by widely visible results.

As far as accounting practices are concerned, we have already established that, in developing countries, financial management in the public sector and other organisation is different from what is common practice in Western countries. Without discussing and substantiating this in too much detail, it can nonetheless be said that accounting practices in developing countries are less 'professional' from a Western point of view. There is also a greater tendency to be secretive rather than transparent where the handling of financial data is concerned (Baydoun & Willett, 1995, p. 71). Lastly, it can be pointed out that in developing countries, the exchange of information is often done verbally rather than in writing, whereas written records are accepted wisdom in Western thinking with regard to management and accounting (Brown, Tower, & Taplin, 2005). In the context of these differences, there is much debate over the question as to whether the needs of Westerners (i.e. the colonial rulers in the past and multinationals or development-cooperation services nowadays) actually tie in with the needs of the decision-makers in developing countries (see also Wijewardena & Yapa, 1998). These findings and issues could lead to efforts at harmonisation of the Western accounting practices and those of developing countries being given up before they were even started. Such a radical point of view would seem undesirable, without necessarily meaning that everything in this area could and should be exactly the same everywhere. The type of information would appear to be a factor, for instance. Due to its neutral and technical nature, basic information should be able to be measured and recorded in a uniform manner. The disclosure practices, however, could be different in the West and in developing countries (Baydoun & Willett, 1995, pp. 84-86; Chanchani & MacGregor, 1999, p. 16).

Given this variation in management and accounting practices between organisations from the West and in developing countries, it should come as

no surprise that when Western military personnel and members of the ANA have to work together, this can lead to misunderstandings. Cultural friction between the two parties can even be expected, not so much in the military operational, core issues, but rather where general and financial management are concerned. The question is therefore how serious that cultural friction is and whether dynamics can be identified which will lead to an increasing convergence in management and accounting practices in the future.

### **3. SET-UP OF THE STUDY**

This study was designed as participative observation (de Walt & de Walt, 2002), and can be seen as an example of ‘undercover economy’, so to speak (Harford, 2006). This method was chosen in order to gain thorough insight into the circumstances in which this kind of military organisation operates, and to be able to understand the structure of general management, logistics and financial management. The opportunities to conduct this type of research in this kind of organisation in real operational circumstances are few (Grónlund & Catusus, 2005). Therefore, this study is unique in its set-up and content.

The data on which this article is based were gathered during field research at various Afghan, NATO and American military organisations in southern Afghanistan. The study was conducted in the period from August to November 2007. In that period, the first author worked for a NATO organisation in the area of operation (Kandahar); during that period, he made more than 10 visits to the ANA, conducted 15 interviews with Afghan and Western military personnel and did an extensive documentation analysis. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner and transcriptions were made of every interview. The interviews were then compared and analysed on the basis of available documentation. To conclude these interviews, in July 2008 he conducted an interview with a Western officer who worked as a coach to the ANA during the research period.

In addition to the interviews and the analysis of various source documents, the first author participated in meetings and training sessions of the Afghan army near Kandahar. Specific follow-up research was then conducted on the basis of the interviews, the document analysis and the findings from the meetings and training sessions.

Participative observation is well suited to such follow-up research. It is a pre-condition for gaining more thorough insight, due to the limited nature

of the studies conducted so far into these organisations. It was not clear beforehand what the findings would be. This way, an iterative process was created, from theory to practice.

## 4. FINDINGS

### *4.1. Context*

In December 2001 during the Bonn summit, Afghan factions agreed to the formation of an Afghan government (Rubin & Hamidzada, 2007). A key component to this agreement was the establishment of a United Nations-mandated international security force in Afghanistan. In resolution 1386, the UN Security Council thereupon authorised the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF's aim was to support the Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining security in and around Kabul. In 2006, a framework was agreed for the continuation of the support to Afghanistan and the endorsement of the Interim Afghan Development Strategy (Nixon & Ponzio, 2007).

Part of the reconstruction concerns the development of the Afghan Security Sector, that is, the armed forces and the police organisations. This is an important issue for the countries contributing military units to ISAF, as a functioning Afghan security structure is seen to create the conditions which should lead eventually to ISAF being able to leave Afghanistan (Chan, 2007).

The development of the security services is and continues to be the responsibility of the Afghan government. The international community provides support in the form of resources and training. The support is organised with the help of partner nations. Partner nations support the reconstruction of Afghanistan, each carrying out specifically assigned tasks. For instance, the German government was the partner nation for the establishment of the police force. Since 2001, the United States has been the partner nation for the build-up of the ANA. For this purpose, the United States has set up an extensive training programme and made resources available to the ANA. In February 2007, the North Atlantic Council agreed to a more extensive role for NATO with regard to the support and training of the ANA. The aim is for the ANA to consist of around 70,000 well-trained and well-equipped personnel (Rubin & Hamidzada, 2007). At the time of the study, some 36,000 personnel were working for the ANA.

#### *4.2. Training and Coaching the Afghan National Army*

One of the instruments implemented by the United States and NATO for training the ANA is Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). The ETTs (US) and OMLTs (NATO) train and coach the ANA. To this end, the teams often live and work at an ANA base and actually accompany units to mission areas. The teams advise Afghan units in the areas of operations, logistics and finance and provide coordination in combat with NATO and US units. The ETTs and OMLTs are linked with and assigned to combat, combat-support and logistic units up to the kandak level. A kandak is a unit similar to a company and consists of around 100–150 military personnel.

The teams are made up of (military) specialists in the various areas of expertise. The ETTs and OMLTs are composed according to the availability of specialists and the requirements of the Afghan army units; their composition may therefore vary. The United States also make use of private-military contractors, such as MPRI and DynCorp. For instance, during the period of data collection, the training of the staff of the Afghan 205th Corps was conducted by a former battalion commander from the United States who currently works for MPRI.

#### *4.3. Soldiers' Payment – A Process Analysis*

The 205th Corps is one of the five corps of the ANA. It operates mainly in southern Afghanistan and has its headquarters in Kandahar, next to the NATO air force base, Kandahar Airfield. Most of its units are based and operate specifically in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Nimroz. At the time of the study, the 205th Corps comprised around 8,000 personnel.

All personnel are paid at the location where they are based. Several of those locations cannot be reached easily and without danger. The so-called forward operating bases in particular can be surrounded by hostile areas. One of the Western soldiers whom we interviewed and who worked for the ANA in one of the southern provinces gave an apt description of this context:

The ANA soldiers really wanted to leave the area of operations. If an aircraft came to collect soldiers who were due to go on leave, there would often be huge fights at the aircraft door. We would then quickly intervene and send everyone back and then sort out exactly who was really due to go on leave and who wasn't.




Fig. 1. Payment Process.

The soldiers are paid by so-called ‘pay teams’. These pay teams consist of two or three people, one of whom is the financial officer of the unit responsible for the team.

Pay teams collect money from the financial division of the corps in Kandahar and then travel to the ANA soldiers, NCOs and officers to hand them their pay. Fig. 1 shows the process that should eventually lead to the orderly payment of the salaries.

The payment process begins in Kabul, the central location where all ANA recruits report in order to attend two months’ basic training. After the training, they are assigned to a kandak, and travel to the kandak’s location. As soon as they report to their kandak, a personnel officer registers them in the personnel administration. Every month, that personnel officer reports the number of personnel, the number of days that personnel have been AWOL (Absent Without Leave) and any specific payments to be made, such

as number of days in the field, to the personnel division at brigade level. The brigade level collates the reports and sends them to the headquarters in Kabul. This is shown on the left-hand side of *Fig. 1*.

At the kandak level, a section is responsible for the finances of the kandak. Besides the salary payments, this financial section is also responsible for payments for such things as clothing and fresh food for the units. For the purpose of the salary payments, the pay officer also reports the personnel numbers to the financial division at the brigade and corps levels. This is done using, *inter alia*, the reports from the personnel divisions. This is shown on the right-hand side of *Fig. 1*.

At the corps level, the various reports from the personnel and financial divisions are collated. The financial division of the corps then submits those data to a representative of the Ministry of Finance who has an office at the army base. After the data have been checked by that representative, who checks and recalculates all the salary payments individually, they are sent to the audit division of the corps itself, which then also checks them. When the figures have been approved, the financial division receives permission to draw up a so-called MOD 16 form. This form is the request for transfer of the funds to the bank in Kandahar. The form is sent to a local office of the Ministry of Finance in Kandahar, which forwards the request to the Ministry of Finance in Kabul.

The Ministry of Finance then effects the transfer of funds of the accounts of the bank in Kandahar. The account numbers correspond to the units receiving the salaries. This information is communicated to the finance office in Kandahar, which writes out cheques which the pay teams of the units cash at the bank. When the cheques are ready, the corps finance division informs a pay team so that they can collect the requested salaries from the bank.

The unit's pay team – consisting of ANA officials – travels to the bank in Kandahar and to the corps headquarters in Kandahar to report and to deposit any remaining funds from the previous salary payment, and withdraws the new salary payment. The team then travels to all the locations where their units are based and pays the salaries. Every soldier signs for receipt of his own salary. This is often done with a thumbprint, as many are unable to write. The payment process at the unit location can take several days. On one of the occasions observed, the process took two days. This involved the payment of two months' salary.

First, the soldiers were lined up and went one by one to the office where the pay team was. On this occasion, the pay team consisted of five officials. The first official checked the soldier's ID card and his contract. The second official wrote down the soldier's details and then the soldier had to make a

thumbprint on the payroll. The third official actually handed over the money. The fourth official wrote down the amount paid and the soldier's details again and the fifth official checked the records. Subsequently, all the soldiers were lined up again outside and then the procedure was repeated for the second month's salary. All personnel, the soldiers, NCOs and officers, followed this procedure.

The lists of names, salaries paid and the signatures form the reports which the pay teams submit to the corps by way of accountability. The financial division of the corps submits the pay teams' reports to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defence. The ministries check the data against the budgets and the money deposits and withdrawals.

#### *4.4. Payment – Practice and Storytelling*

The process analysis described above was done on the basis of observations during various visits to the headquarters of the 205th Corps of the ANA and interviews with ANA officers. Besides these observations and interviews, interviews were also conducted with Canadian, American, Dutch and British military personnel who work with ANA soldiers in the southern provinces. These interviews revealed that Western ideas regarding checks and balances do not always catch on in the Afghan circumstances and administrative culture.

The Western soldiers indicated in the interviews that the further the units' locations are from Kandahar, the less regular the visits from the pay teams, and thus the salary payments, are. There is in fact just one good indicator of when the units will be paid, namely the soldiers' leave requests. The soldiers learn from their acquaintances when exactly they will be paid, after which they always want to go on leave to take the money home. This involves travelling, as there is no working banking system outside Kandahar. It is no exception for the journey to take them to the other side of the country if that is where they come from. One of the focal points in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is therefore the establishment of electronic banking. One of the developments during the study was the placing of an ATM at the corps base.

A number of the interviewees also indicated that there was a varying picture of the degree of order and accountability of the actual payment. Particularly remarkable are the situations in which the amount of money paid out is different from the amount that was requested according to the payroll. There are also situations where the personnel give part of their pay to their commander. These two situations are explained below.

First, the amount of money carried by the pay team is not always enough for the unit. The further the team has travelled and the more units have already been paid, the greater the chance is of money having disappeared. A possible explanation is the payment of money to guarantee safe passage. There are, however, also cases where a significant sum of money is left over after payment. Neither of these situations fit in with the idea that the salary requests are made on the basis of authorised personnel numbers.

Second, interviewees have indicated that it is common practice for a soldier to pay a percentage of his salary to his commander, who in turn pays a percentage to his commander, etc. The interviewees indicated that this is part of the culture of looking after each other. 'My commander looks after me and I look after him'. Given the context, fighting side by side in inhospitable areas, looking after each other has a clear significance. It has been observed that the pay team keeps exact records of these payments alongside the records of the salary payments.

One of the main problems is verifying the personnel numbers. These numbers form the basis for the amount of money that goes to the units. The reports from the Afghan commanders in the field and the numbers counted by the Western mentors are often not the same. At the time of the study, this was one of the key issues that needed to be solved, the idea being to count the units on a weekly basis and then base the further administration on those numbers. That is not to say that the mentors' numbers are necessarily incorrect, but it is impossible to verify.

As regards the personnel counts, it is interesting to note the differences in the perceived use and importance of a fixed organisation with defined jobs. Western ideas focus on an authorised organisation, in which one of the aspects of good organisation entails personnel having defined jobs with tasks and responsibilities. The experiences of Western soldiers have shown that Afghan soldiers do not necessarily hold the same view. If you ask an ANA soldier today what his job is, he could be a driver. If you ask him again tomorrow, he might be a gunner in his unit. The background to this is that Afghan soldiers think more in terms of soldiers, NCOs and officers. Particularly the categories of soldier and NCO indicate that they are capable of doing work at a certain level and that they can perform various duties. Every day they look at what has to be done and then soldiers are assigned to do those tasks. This method makes it difficult from a Western point of view to make an orderly list of jobs and employees and thus provide a basis for the salary payments. In general, this type of organising is far from being bureaucratic in the Weberian sense of the word (Du Gay, 2000).



## 5. INTERPRETATION

The United States, the European Community and other international donors provide resources which enable the ANA to operate. They are therefore entitled to request some form of accountability for the funds spent and consequently put a great deal of effort into obtaining that accountability. These efforts have indeed been fruitful, for in practice various processes are running exactly the way the Western community wants them to. As the process analysis has shown, the payment and accountability ideas at the HQs are fully in line with the processes in any Western armed forces or government organisation. And even if there are differences within the HQ in working methods (Afghans who in Western views are unable to work according to the planning and control cycle), things generally work out right, as is so often the case in management processes in developing countries. Only when matters literally fall beyond the scope of the West-dominated HQ and payments are to be made in the outlying areas do uncertainties arise which can lead to questions and even friction. Money seems to disappear, at least that is what Western soldiers suspect because the accountability regarding the payment of salaries is lacking.

Generally speaking, we are seeing friction between the legalistic-bureaucratic style of Western general and financial management and the pre-modern form of organisation that prevails in Afghanistan. It is important to realise that this case is not unique. These practices can be seen elsewhere as well, for instance, in various (post-)conflict areas in Africa (e.g. [Soeters & Tessema, 2004](#)). We can understand the findings from the interviews in the light of the outcome of our literature review, which focused on differences in management and accounting practices between the West and developing countries, more in particular in failed states and even more particularly Afghanistan.

It is suspected that money is leaking away to the commanders, fully in line with the paternalistic and collectivistic culture and style of management in Afghanistan. As 'fathers' they must take care of their 'children', but conversely, especially in developing countries, the 'children' must also take care of the 'fathers', submissively and with a great deal of respect for their senior age. This can include soldiers making payments to their commanders, payments which are sometimes even made directly by the payment officers.

In addition, it is conceivable that the payment officers are forced to call in favours from people inside and outside the organisation in order to get things done. This may lead, for instance, to semi-criminal or criminal payments being made in order to gain access to the areas where the pay

teams have to pay the salaries. This is not uncommon in conflict areas. Of course, these payments are not recorded in writing, but are based on verbal agreements. All of this can be understood within the context of the Afghan culture (or that of developing countries in general). It is not compatible, however, with Western accounting practices, in which professionalism and transparency in written accountability are unconditional requirements.

There is, however, a more universal factor in the equation. Theft and fraud occur in workplaces throughout the world (Mars, 1982). One of the determinants of behaviour, in this case of theft and fraud, is *opportunity* (besides *want* and *need*). There are sufficient checks built in to the payment procedures at the HQs, based on the instructions of the Western authorities which are actually present *at those HQs*, and on the fact that everyone, *collectively*, follows those instructions. There is therefore both formal and social control and that is generally enough for the processes to run in the way the organisation wants them to (e.g. Fiske, 2004, p. 2). If, however, those conditions are not met – no visible presence of higher authority and no social control responses to deviance (see Osgood, Wilson, O'Malley, Bachman, & Johnston, 1996) – dysfunction, in this case possibly fraud, is more easily conceivable. In the military world, it has been established that violence-related dysfunction tends to occur when there are no leaders or colleagues from outside the unit present. This occurs most often during patrols in areas far away from the compound (van Doorn, 1975). There is a notable parallel with the payment of the ANA soldiers.

## 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE

In the debate on the cultural context of accounting and financial management, and international management in general, Western managers sometimes sigh that it would be better to stop trying to harmonise management and accounting practices (Baydoun & Willett, 1995). There have been too many setbacks for them to continue to believe in it. This both discouraging and radical point of view is actually too extreme, and unnecessary.

In general, organisations in the same sector (such as police) tend to start looking alike. In organisational theory, this is known as *isomorphism* (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). This tendency to isomorphism is the result of coercive laws and regulations, of similar normative views among professionals who have all had the same education, and of mimetic behaviour whereby the practice of benchmarking competitors' best practices is the best

known form. As regards the situation of the armed forces in Afghanistan, it has already been shown to be probable (Soeters, 2008) that Western armies operating in Afghanistan show the same tendency towards isomorphism, simply because all armies want to learn from each other 'what works best'. This is referred to as experiential isomorphism: isomorphism as the result of learning from each other what yields the best result, including the fewest casualties.

It is quite conceivable that such coercive, learning, comparative and experiential processes will also lead to isomorphism in the financial management of the ANA. In fact, as we have seen, these processes are already ongoing at the HQs in Kabul and Kandahar. When the procedures go beyond the safe haven of the compound, however, isomorphism becomes a more difficult goal to achieve. It may therefore be important to realise that isomorphism does not necessarily mean that the party in question, that is, the ANA, should imitate the Western armed forces in every aspect. Within the discipline of international marketing, it was recently discovered that the transnational model, dominated by the West, does not suffice for doing business in the so-called emerging markets. Marketing strategies will have to be reinvented in order to respond to the local customs, possibilities and insights (London & Hart, 2004); only then can success be guaranteed in these new markets. The best of both cultures, that of the West and that of the developing countries, must be united and combined in order to achieve appropriate approaches. International accounting and international financial management will have to follow the same course and that goes for the armed forces which are currently operating in Afghanistan as well.

Specific focal points derived from our literature review and our study are the concept of recording a number of basic details and keeping the disclosure relatively limited, and adapted to local needs. Second, it would seem to be important not to set excessive requirements for written planning and control. Even in the Western world there are doubts as to the use of existing extensive disclosure requirements and practices (e.g. Hopwood, 1974), never mind wanting to impose them on the Afghans. Lastly, the payment process beyond the gates of the compound will have to be controlled better, either by having Western officials accompany the pay teams or by rotating the Afghan soldiers who carry out the payments. Other arrangements may also be possible. It may also have to be accepted that some of the payment money disappears. Not the money that disappears through theft and fraud, of course, but maybe the amounts that are used 'differently' – for instance, paying commanders – simply because that is how the Afghan community works. This may ensure that the Afghan military

organisation achieves its aims, albeit in a way that is different from what is customary in the West.

Recognising that fact requires adaptability, on both sides. Both sides need to be truly open to learning from each other. This is only possible if all parties work with the same objectives and logic, or attempt to align them if this is not the case (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 1996). That is the task which faces the Western armed forces: ensuring that their presence is not seen as foreign rule, but as a means which will allow Afghan society to develop for the better. That can only be done together with the Afghans, certainly not without them.

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# NEW WINE, NEW BOTTLES, OR BOTH? SOCIAL SCIENCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THINKING ABOUT AND REORGANIZING FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

Wilbur J. Scott, George R. Mastroianni and David R. McCone

## ABSTRACT

*The U.S. military is designed to take on a similarly constructed foreign military located across some line of demarcation. The goal of such conventional warfare is to incapacitate or annihilate the enemy military, whereupon victory is achieved – a task for which the U.S. military has no peer on the current world scene or the foreseeable future. However, the U.S.'s adversaries since the end of the Cold War have not been conventional forces, as evidenced most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps recently have become volcanoes of change in order to adapt their operational styles to this reality. In the past, departures from the conventional mode in similar circumstances have been temporary. Currently, there is considerable discussion in the U.S. defense establishment about how persistent these*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos  
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 305–327  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A023



*types of nonconventional threats are likely to be in the future and whether it is necessary to change the configuration of the U.S. military accordingly. A centerpiece of this discussion is a new Counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual 3-24 addressing issues related to the postures the military and support establishments may take. This paper discusses some events prior to the writing of the new COIN Manual, comments on issues raised by the Manual and its doctrine, and offers some social science implications for thinking about and implementing the doctrine.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Continuing attempts to understand the conflict in Iraq and its implications for the future of the American defense establishment have produced a large and growing literature. Indeed, it requires concerted effort to keep abreast of the growing flood of books and articles, many inspired by the torrent of change within the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, the two U.S. services most directly involved in the effort. Even the casual observer now has been exposed to an ever-growing list of descriptors for the Iraq war: irregular, long, small, asymmetric, fourth generation, counterinsurgency (COIN), and full spectrum are all terms that appear in the popular and professional literature.

These terms, emphasizing differing aspects of the conflict, share a common reference to wars departing from the conventional frame of reference on which most modern armies are built. The U.S. military, for example, is designed to employ massive firepower derived from state-of-the-art, technologically sophisticated weapon systems directed at a similarly configured military located neatly across some line of demarcation. The goal of such warfare is to incapacitate or annihilate the enemy military, whereupon victory is achieved. Virtually everyone concedes that the U.S. military as a conventional fighting force has no peer on the current world scene or in the foreseeable future.

However, the U.S.'s adversaries in recent conflicts have not been conventional forces. Indeed, verbal gymnastics are at times required to describe exactly what they are. For example, in the case of the Global War on Terror, military analyst Cassidy (2006, p. 3) characterizes al-Qaeda and its loose affiliates as "a mutating and ideologically driven global insurgency engendered by a stateless, adaptive, complex, and polycephalous host ...." To say that the U.S. military has found this predicament frustrating is an understatement. Its institutional ambivalence to such conflicts harkens back

to the words of an indignant U.S. general during the Vietnam War: “I will be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war!”<sup>1</sup> Currently, operations other than conventional warfare are sometimes referred to jokingly within the U.S. military as things we would rather avoid (TWWRA).

Fortunately, this is only part of the story. As hinted above, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps recently have become volcanoes of change, precisely because they have had two choices: one, fight the war in Iraq they are equipped to fight, even if it is the wrong one, or, two, adapt their fighting style there to the contingencies encountered on the ground. Increasingly, they have done the latter. Indeed, the elevation of General David Petraeus, the Army’s foremost COIN expert, to lead the war in Iraq since 2006 underscores that a new approach was needed. Until 2006, as we and others have noted, adaptation had been largely at the battalion or even company level and therefore the province of junior and mid-level officers, noncommissioned officers, and line soldiers themselves (Scott, McCone, & Mastroianni, 2006, 2009; McCone, Scott, & Mastroianni, 2007; Ricks, 2006).

Within Iraq, then, change has begun from the bottom up in the Army and Marine Corps. Whether these changes will be ephemeral or durable will hinge on top-down initiatives currently being considered to change the configuration of the U.S. military fundamentally in anticipation of future threats. Bottom-up responses to changing conditions have occurred before in U.S. military history, only to be quietly shuttled to the dustbin by institutional, bureaucratic, and economic forces invested in the preservation of the old ways. Whether this will be the fate of the current initiatives remains to be seen.

Various scholars and military analysts have turned their attention to the vast implications for our nation’s future military configuration and obligations. A centerpiece of this discussion is a new *COIN Field Manual* 3-24 (2007) addressing issues related to the various postures the military and support establishments may take. This paper discusses some events prior to the writing of the new *COIN Manual*, comments on issues raised by the *Manual* and its doctrine, and offers some social science implications for thinking about and implementing the doctrine.

## **2. INCREMENTAL STEPS TOWARD COUNTERINSURGENCY**

During the summer of 2004, we had the opportunity to collect oral histories from soldiers stationed at Ft. Carson, Colorado, who had been deployed to

Iraq as members of two such units: the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) and the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division (3rd BCT/4th ID). In 2006, we conducted focus groups with soldiers from the 3rd ACR who had just returned from Iraq following their second deployment. Both of these units excel at the type of warfare the U.S. military does best, which is *not* what they were called upon to do in Iraq. As armored-scout and mechanized-infantry units, they expected to engage Iraqi armored units in a short campaign featuring their technological wizardry applied with overwhelming force. The inevitable crushing defeat of the Iraqi Army, they anticipated, would be followed by the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, a welcome by the Iraqi people as liberators, and a short occupation in which power transferred to a friendly and appreciative non-*Baathist* Iraqi government. Iraqi oil revenues would cover the cost of the venture. They had every reason to think this would be so: this was precisely the scenario that top-level U.S. Department of Defense planners envisioned.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, the Iraqi Army did fold on cue, but what ensued has proved to be a rude awakening. Instead of peace and prosperity, a growing and resourceful insurgency developed, centered at first among former Iraqi Army soldiers and *Baath* party members. These hard-core resisters adapted familiar guerilla tactics to effectively harass heavily armed American units. They soon tapped into a wider network of *jihadists* and foreign fighters, and their violence against civilians eventually triggered factional fighting and sectarian warfare among wider pools of Iraqis. Initially, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other top officials resisted the notion that an insurgency was underway. Consequently, no coherent strategy was developed and communicated to American units on the ground until after a new Secretary of Defense took over in November 2006, more than three years after the United States toppled Saddam Hussein. In the interim, units such as the 3rd ACR and the 3rd BCT/4th ID were left to develop their own tactical responses.

In earlier papers, we showed that these units sought gamely to deal with the situation while maintaining high levels of commitment to the Army and the overall mission (Scott et al., 2006; McCone et al., 2007). While a single summary statement may be a bit unfair, they did so during the first deployment largely by straining to impose their style of warfare onto the transpiring insurgency. Specifically, both units settled into aggressive, armor-based, patrol-and-search routines. Though well intentioned, these techniques proved heavy-handed and counterproductive in an urban-guerilla, heavily populated environment.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, in preparation for

their second deployment, then-Col. H.R. McMaster, the 3rd ACR's new regimental commander, drastically modified training regimens at Ft. Carson in the first months of 2005. The focus was on creating a new COIN combat script in keeping with what some Army commanders in Iraq called "full-spectrum" warfare, that is, "lethal" military operations augmented with "nonlethal" methods ranging from the restoration of basic infrastructure to the promotion of self-governance.<sup>4</sup>

For example, in combination with selected elements of conventional training, Col. McMaster developed Iraq-specific training scenarios and an Iraqi-style "village" peopled by soldiers and civilians dressed in *dishdashas* to play the role of Iraqis (cf. Galloway, 2004; Whittle, 2005; Barnes, 2006). McMaster repeatedly stressed that hard-core insurgents, *jihadists*, and foreign fighters, who needed to be dealt with coercively, made up only a small fraction of the population. The bulk of the populace, he argued, was sitting on the fence, waiting to see what the Americans did. These role-playing scenarios therefore simulated situations the troops typically had encountered in Iraq and emphasized culturally aware procedures to ferret out the "bad guys" without alienating bystanders.<sup>5</sup> A fundamental theme was, "Don't do the enemy's work," that is, do not push the fence-sitters into the insurgents' camp. The question in assessing dilemma training was, "did the soldiers' decisions about how to act fall within the 'rumble strips,' i.e., the parameters of the 3rd ACR's new guidelines?" (Hickey, 2007).

The adjustments by the 3rd ACR led to their successful campaign in 2005 to retake the city of Tal'Afar (Packer, 2006; McCone et al., 2007), an operation hailed by President Bush (and others) as a model for successfully dealing with the now entrenched and determined insurgency in Iraq. At the same time, a debate ensued within the defense establishment about whether this type of warfare was an aberration or a system-reordering crisis. Defense analyst Barnett (2004, pp. 269–270), who favors the latter position and repeatedly has briefed defense professionals accordingly, summarizes the reactions he typically encounters. Some defense professionals assert that "9/11 ... [was] only a supercrime," implying that the security landscape and mission remain the same: "Catch the responsible criminals and life goes on." Others contend, "We only do nation-states. If you need a Taliban or Saddam taken down, fine ... [but] our product line should remain the same ...." Among some who see a significant shift, there still is caution: "[Ok], yes, we must transform Defense as a whole, but we ... still need to concentrate on defeating other militaries .... Don't *crucify* this military."

### 3. “A RADICAL FIELD MANUAL”

As this debate raged on, the Army’s General David Petraeus and Marine Corps’ Lt. General James Amos spearheaded an intense effort to bring coherence to the battlefield by providing a doctrine consistent with adaptations by U.S. units in Iraq. In the late months of 2005 and early part of 2006, a team of military officers and nonmilitary professionals – journalists, academics, and human rights activists – worked feverishly under their direction to craft a new field manual. Published in 2007, the *Manual* details the nuances of COIN with sections on integrating civilian and military activities, developing actionable intelligence, designing and executing COIN operations, training the host-nation’s security forces, and, finally, defining COIN’s leadership and ethical dimensions. Along the way are many notes on necessary organizational and cultural shifts the armed services will have to make. In this respect, it appears to be a standard military field manual, sensibly and conscientiously covering a litany of related topics. However, the *Manual* also is a clarion call for substantially reorganizing the military. As Sarah Sewall – director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University and one of the *Manual*’s contributors – notes, “those who fail to see the manual as radical probably don’t understand it, or at least understand what it’s up against” (COIN Field Manual, 2007, p. xxi).

What makes the *Manual* radical? The *Manual* outlines three principles that represent a, well, radical departure from conventional U.S. military doctrine (COIN Field Manual, 2007, pp. xxiv–xxxii). First, it advances a population-centered, rather than an insurgent-centered, approach to conducting COIN operations. The latter would center on killing “bad guys,” while the former focuses on winning over civilians’ hearts and minds as its top priority. This emphasis gives collateral damage, that is, the deaths of innocent civilians as a result of military action, a whole new meaning. In an insurgent-centered approach, some collateral damage, though undesirable and maybe even unintended, comes with the turf, especially when insurgents intentionally mingle with civilians. In a population-centered approach, lethal force must be applied with utmost precision and restraint, ever mindful of the second- and third-order effects so as not to “do the enemy’s work.” The killing of civilians is unwanted, even when unintended, because it almost always alienates the indigenous population, driving a psychological wedge between them and COIN units. This dictum may stick in the craw of some American soldiers and marines. As one of our interviewees told us, “My MOS (military occupational specialty) gives me license to kill people. I didn’t sign up to be a social worker.”

The second principle is related to the first: precision-and-restraint necessarily entails more risk than customary U.S. battlefield immediate-action drills, which almost always emphasize “force protection,” that is, keeping U.S. soldiers and marines alive at the expense of anyone else in the vicinity. The *Manual* suggests that precision-and-restraint and force-protection are reconcilable, but in practical terms the former are almost never as pro-active as force-protection principles would like them to be. Though soldiers in focus groups we conducted were well aware of Col. McMaster’s mantra, “Don’t do the enemy’s work,” they at times harbored concerns that this might interfere with defending themselves aggressively. Indeed, a 3rd ACR intelligence officer noted in his memoir a very popular bit of bathroom graffiti during the second deployment in Iraq, “*Better to be judged by twelve than carried by six*” (Olson, 2007, p. 46).<sup>6</sup>

The third principle provides the exit strategy: the battle is won when the local population has more reasons to side with the central government supported by COIN operations than with the insurgents. With support of the people, the central government now is able to sustain itself and COIN forces can go home. Of course, this assumes that there *is* a central government and that it is worth supporting. Many important elements of this process ordinarily would fall squarely within the domain of nonmilitary experts in U.S. government agencies – for example, the State Department (DOS) and the Agency for International Development (USAID) – or even nongovernmental development and humanitarian organizations. However, while some sort of coordinated effort might be highly desirable, the *Manual* suggests that, in security-tenuous situations, individual soldiers and marines will have to expand their skill sets to incorporate a range of these otherwise nonmilitary tasks. This means that they must be able to mingle and interact with the population effectively, a task normally anathema to armored scouts and tankers whose unofficial credo is *Death before dismount*.

Clearly, these principles present a challenge to the current configuration and culture of the U.S. military, despite its recent incremental changes. Lively debate will likely continue on the extent to which the vision of the new *COIN Manual* should be embraced as appropriate and necessary or resisted as a dangerous diversion.

#### 4. SOME SOCIAL SCIENCE CONTRIBUTIONS

If retooling the U.S. defense establishment is undertaken, we can anticipate that the process will meet with a great deal of resistance, and the pace and

proportion of such changes will be highly controversial. Can we, as social scientists, help to understand the issues? To tease out forces that will make this transition complicated and difficult, we offer some contributions from the social sciences that may be helpful, focusing first on insights for thinking about irregular warfare and then reorganizing for irregular warfare.

#### *4.1. Thinking about Irregular Warfare*

Current definitions of the War on Terror<sup>7</sup> are tightly wound, at least in the United States, around the destruction of the World Trade Center. This perspective misses the broader context within which this action occurred, leading to stunted conclusions about its causes and necessary reactions to it. Barnett's analysis provides a point of departure for understanding the events of September 11. He begins by devising a map depicting two regions, one made up of countries operating within globalization's "expanding web of connectivity," the Functioning Core, and the other made up of areas disconnected from it, the Unincorporated Gap (Barnett, 2004, p. 121). The Functioning Core – which includes Russia and China, examples of a near-peer the United States actually is primed to fight – poses minimal security threats since it is in the interest of its countries and their constituents to follow rule-sets that promote continued co-operation. Their very connectedness, every which way, operates as a kind of "mutually assured dependence," thereby reducing the threat of outright violence and conflict among them. The Unincorporated Gap is another matter. Their very disconnectedness, however it has come about, portends danger because countries, actors, and groups in this situation lack the incentives to obey the violence-avoiding rule-sets operational in the core (Barnett, 2004, pp. 122–137).

Barnett charts responses by the U.S. military since the end of the Cold War in 1990 through the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this time frame, the U.S. military carried out roughly 140 actions on foreign soil, excluding humanitarian responses. These actions included evacuations, peace or relief efforts, contingency positionings, shows of force, and actual combat actions (Barnett, 2004, pp. 144–145). All 140 actions took place geographically within the Unincorporated Gap, with four areas – Haiti, Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Iraq – making up 80% of the Pentagon's business. The failed-state syndrome will produce, Barnett concludes, a succession of similar crises for future U.S. military intervention.

Barnett himself does not provide any references to suggest from whence he derived the concepts "Functioning Core" and "Unincorporated Gap."

However, similar concepts are the central currency in a major social science theoretical perspective, world-system theory, associated most closely with the work of Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989).<sup>8</sup> While there are many competing versions of the theory, most world-system approaches work from the contention that, in the modern era, variously defined, there is a single, global economic system containing sectors labeled core, periphery, and the semi-periphery. Historically, the core has become rich by operating as the engine of industrial activity, while much of the periphery, through colonialization and subsequent indigenous but despotic rule, has remained poor by serving as suppliers of raw materials – minerals, precious metals, spices, etc. – to the core. Recently, some countries previously in the periphery, particularly in East Asia, have moved into the semi-periphery by serving as magnets for corporations from the core looking to out-source their production plants. And, of course, countries in the Middle East with oil have moved into the semi-periphery by forming a cartel to control the flow of this invaluable commodity to the core.

The main point is that it is not possible to analyze the contingencies for any particular country without taking into account its historical and current location in the world-system. While the current world-system produces untold wealth, its effects nevertheless are felt in quite distorted ways. Many in the Functioning Core, to use Barnett's term (which appears to include both the core and the semi-periphery), are making out quite well. Others in the periphery – the Unincorporated Gap – are impoverished and being left woefully behind. There are distorted impacts *within* these sectors as well: skilled, blue-collar workers in the core have seen many of their jobs migrate to the semi-periphery, and local elites in the periphery have cut deals with transnational corporations which make them, but not their countries, fabulously wealthy.

In this context, the post-Cold War era has, in the words of Italian social and military analyst, Caforio (2007, p. 4), opened a Pandora's box "from which have ... emerged religious wars, ethnic conflicts, the disintegration of states and the birth of new state entities often at odds with each other." These developments, he notes, are strongly at odds with the core's interests in free trade and globalization and have produced an explosion of constabulary and combat operations as militaries from core nations have sought to constrain the violence. It is in this context too that backlashes against globalization have occurred. These have been particularly concentrated in areas of the periphery that have experienced heavy doses of Westernization without corresponding economic development. Here failed states become incubators for terrorism as local gangs and militias, often



overlapping with kinship or sectarian groups, step in to perform tasks ordinarily provided by effective governments. In the semi-periphery countries of the Middle East, the backlash has occurred *despite* development. Here a radical version of Islam has served as a vehicle to direct anger and frustration at both indigenous local elites and the West, the former made immensely wealthy by deals with agents of the latter.

These dynamics show no signs of abating any time soon and remind us that the many forms of violence mentioned in the previous paragraph are not random events but ones embedded in a destabilized, global process. All this points to a clear and simple guideline for winning the War on Terror: shrink the Gap. To make this the main focus of a military doctrine would truly be “radical,” as this is a decidedly more political than military stance.

There are more considerations, not the least of which is that a nonstate actor such as Osama bin Laden could hardly achieve the notoriety he has without an interconnected, globalized world as a stage. Hence, social science research has implications for a more empirically refined understanding of the enemy in the War on Terror. A common-sense explanation for why young Muslim males join *jihadist* groups, such as those affiliated with al-Qaeda, is that they are illiterate, poverty-stricken, or insane. A related contention is that al-Qaeda recruiters and Muslim *imams* “brainwash” susceptible youths to get them to do their bidding. Former foreign service officer, Sageman (2004, 2008), who holds a M.D. in psychiatry and Ph.D. in political sociology, has assembled and analyzed the profiles and life histories of more than 500 operatives associated with terrorist attacks sponsored by al-Qaeda. From this, he has presented a theoretically and empirically informed picture of al-Qaeda as a social movement.

How does the common-sense account hold up in the face of these data? In short, not very well. For starters, Sageman (2004, pp. 1–7, 18–24) shows that what usually is referred to as al-Qaeda is a core group – Sageman designates them al-Qaeda Central – in a larger, loosely affiliated Islamic, “revivalist” movement. Revivalist movements have developed sporadically within Islam over the centuries, as they have within other of the world religions, including Christianity. Such movements typically are attempts to regain or return to an earlier version of the religion, seen by its adherents as more in keeping with the original tenets of that faith. In the case of this Islamic revivalist movement, it seeks to establish an Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines and advocates the use of violence (a peculiar interpretation of *jihad*) to achieve this end.

al-Qaeda Central has been this movement’s key organized entity since the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1988. Despite the notoriety

of Osama bin Laden, a Saudi, as its ringleader, most of al-Qaeda Central's members are long-time *jihadists* from Egypt, dating back to the assassination of that country's president, Anwar Sadat, in 1981. The very recent affiliates of al-Qaeda Central comprise three clusters having distinct geographical bases: a North African group located in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, an Arab-states group from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen, and a Southeast Asian group located primarily in Indonesia. The sizes of these clusters are quite small, numbering in the hundreds, and the links with al-Qaeda Central are quite informal and ephemeral. Similarly, the cells making up any particular cluster typically consist of less than a dozen members and the ties with other cells and the larger cluster tend toward the informal and transitory.

Who joins these cells and clusters and why? Turning first to the question of who joins (Sageman, 2004, pp. 70–91), most are adults in their 20s and come from middle-class families. As youths, the majority of those in al-Qaeda Central and the Arab-states and Southeast Asian clusters had been notably religious, while the majority of the North African group had been largely secular. In any case, an overwhelming majority of all joiners were educated in secular rather than religious schools, and three-fourths of them attended college or completed baccalaureate or higher degrees in a technical or “hard” sciences field. Finally, Sageman could detect no pattern in the profiles concerning mental illness or personality disorders.

Sageman argues that the how's and why's of these young men joining a terror network are very similar to those described years ago by sociologists John Lofland and Rodney Stark in their classic study of the Unification Church, more popularly known as “the Moonies.”<sup>9</sup> Among Moonie converts, for example, most had recently experienced a disruptive turning point in their lives, for example, moving to a new city, starting or finishing schooling, or losing a job. Similarly, with the exception of the Saudis who participated in the attacks on 9/11, an overwhelming majority of those in Sageman's analysis took the first steps in a process leading to participation in al-Qaeda while living in a country other than the one in which they had grown up. Typically in exile or in pursuit of higher education, they were only partially assimilated in this new country of residence, living on its social and cultural margins. Few were employed full time.<sup>10</sup>

This relative deprivation, Sageman contends, has two consequences: their marginal status heightens awareness of being Muslim and, two, provides motivation to seek out other Muslims. Hence, these immigrant men often gravitate toward a mosque in search of people who share language and cultural preferences. Among those who become friends and roommates,

there develops a preoccupation with being Muslim, a perception of the mistreatment of Muslims in the modern world, and the adoption of a Muslim life-style in terms of appearance, food, and worship. This preoccupation for some becomes an obsession, leading them to become “*jihadist* wannabes.” The decision to seek out a radical *jihadist* organization usually is a group one, that is, four to eight close friends or roommates decide collectively to take the step. Underscoring the parallels with the Moonie conversion process, Sageman (2004, pp. 119–120) observes: “Revivalist social movements like the global ... jihad are vigorous social enterprises. They provide immediate social and emotional rewards of close community and a sense of totality. ... In the absence of such support, [radical] beliefs and faith fade.”

Interestingly, al-Qaeda Central and its affiliates devote almost no resources to recruitment. As might be gleaned from the above, their operatives typically are approached by volunteers. al-Qaeda then has the luxury of sifting through this applicant pool for cells with the appropriate characteristics for success, sometimes determined at training camps where they can be closely scrutinized and evaluated. Prime criteria are commitment to the cause, ability to master training regimens, and competence in working as a team. A large number of cells are told, “thanks, but no thanks,” for falling short in one or more of these areas. For its part, al-Qaeda Central also accepts proposals for terrorist activity, which they review and critique. From these, they endorse, fund, and provide technical support for a small number.

While all of these activities are carried out by whacky zealots, Sageman’s analysis makes clear that simply labeling them so provides very little by way of explanation or understanding of the phenomenon. Further, one cannot help but be struck by how this portrait of the “enemy” in the War on Terror, and of the broader phenomenon in which he is embedded, invokes a range of nonmilitary considerations and responses. Indeed, while certainly not excluding military ones, these would seem to alert us again that the solution cannot be essentially a military one.

#### *4.2. Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare*

The U.S. military has stood at this crossroads – *whether* to change, and, if so, *how*, *how much*, and *how fast* – many times before. Yet, as we have already shown, U.S. units were configured and trained to do conventional warfare against a modern army, but were unprepared for an insurgency in

Iraq. U.S. military leaders wishing to install COIN operations in Iraq have relied heavily on accounts of French lessons – learned in Indochina and Algeria or British take-away points from Malaya and Kenya. Among the works consulted is a comparison of the British success in Malaya with the U.S. failure in Vietnam by the U.S. Army's Lt. Colonel Nagl (2002). Subtitled, “*Learning to eat Soup with a Knife*,” Nagl uses the metaphor to highlight that COIN does not come easily to a conventional military. While Nagl's work is insightful and the Army's willingness to consult it is laudable, the predicament led political sociologist Roxborough (2006, p. 334) to observe wryly:

What the subtitle of Nagl's book tells us is that the U.S. military has a conceptual toolbox that lacks essential tools ... The question is: why doesn't the U.S. military have a spoon in its toolbox – why must it rely on a knife? The puzzle is twofold: why doesn't the U.S. military already have the right tools in its toolbox, and why does it continue to believe that inadequate tools will do the job?

Successful organizations are especially loathe to change. The study of formal organizations helps clarify why organizations behave in ways that appear irrational or counterproductive to the casual observer. Strategic change theory, developed by social scientists primarily in business and management, offers some insights into why change is difficult (cf., Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). Some theorists have noted that the very advantages that make successful organizations successful may operate as a kind of “competency trap”: organizational competencies can easily become rigidities in turbulent environments. This is not simply a matter of being stubborn. If big enough and resource-rich enough, a once successful but now-beleaguered organization can rely on these to muddle through, or, on a more positive note, a determined commitment to competencies that made an organization great might carry it through tough times.

Roxborough and military historian Johnson (2007) have independently surveyed the U.S. military's institutional response to previous pressures to reorient and reconfigure in the modern era. This presents an immensely varied menu of conflicts,<sup>11</sup> and, as both Roxborough and Johnson note, the Army and Marine Corps have shown a laudable capacity to adapt. However, World War II and the Cold War have endured throughout as the preferred template. Consequently, each adaptation marking a departure from conventional warfare has begun anew, as if encountered for the first time.

For example, President John Kennedy in 1961 directed the Department of Defense to evaluate the U.S. military's capacity for conducting COIN operations in Vietnam. The President was assured by the Pentagon that the U.S. military was prepared for “any eventuality,” and the Army Chief of

Staff minimized the differences between conventional and irregular warfare, stating, “any good soldier can handle guerillas” (Blaufarb, 1977, p. 80, quoted in Johnson, 2007, p. 11). Not surprisingly, then, Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander of all U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968, orchestrated a variation of conventional warfare against the insurgency in the South who operated in coordination with a guerilla-style military from the North. In 1968, his replacement, Gen. Creighton Abrams, began a modest shift toward COIN operations that unfortunately proved to be too-little-too-late. There were important lessons learned from these operations, but these were not the major take-away points from the war. Rather, in what became known as the Powell doctrine (after General Colin Powell), the principle of “no more Vietnams” became one of no more military engagements without overwhelming decisive force amenable to a military solution. The last decades of the Cold War thus allowed a comfortable return to preparation for “high-end” warfare with the Soviets on the North German plain (Roxborough, 2006, p. 331, 334–335).

Hence, when another round of insurgency presented itself in El Salvador, the U.S. military handed the chore to its Special Forces – still a stretch, as these Forces had not done COIN in Vietnam. At first, the Special Forces-advised Salvadoran army conducted search-and-destroy missions against the insurgents, spearheaded by the Communist-inspired and -supported *Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front* (FMLN). However, FMLN countered effectively with classic hit-and-run guerilla tactics, producing a Vietnam-like quagmire. In response, Special Forces helped increase the strike capacity of the Salvadoran army *and* reorient it toward COIN operations.<sup>12</sup> Further, the election of more moderate political leaders during the 1980s allowed land reforms to address hearts-and-minds issues and, luckily, in-fighting within the FMLN ranks sapped insurgent focus and effectiveness. Finally, in 1991, an agreement led to a cease-fire and the incorporation of FMLN into the political system as a political party.

Many analysts regard the Salvadoran insurgency and COIN as a strikingly illustrative case. Key take-away points include the realization that the host government and army ultimately must win the COIN, the flip side being that it is wise to avoid direct, massive involvement by the U.S. military. Indeed, as Roxborough (2006, p. 337) notes, the Army’s own subsequent 1990 Field Manual 100-20, *Military Operations in Low-intensity Conflict*, contains the following observation:

The burden of carrying on the conflict must remain with the government or the insurgents. To do otherwise is to “Americanize” the conflict, destroying the legitimacy of

the entity we are attempting to assist ... If the host nation's government cannot sustain or reestablish its legitimacy, the counterinsurgency will become war – with the United States in the role of the invader. This underlines the necessity of committing US combat forces only in extreme circumstances.

However, few insights from El Salvador filtered into the larger U.S. military. Largely, they remained the individual, rather than the institutional, experience of the Special Forces soldiers who served there.

One might suspect that COIN has fared better within the Marine Corps, given its notable history of involvements in Latin American “small wars” from the end of the 19th century until the 1930s. However, as [Roxborough \(2006, pp. 337–340\)](#) and Johnson show, the Marine Corps also has clung to its own version of the World War II template, where it made its mark as an amphibious assault force. In Vietnam, the Marine Corps did set aside some special units, called Combined Action Platoons, specifically to conduct COIN operations, only to be admonished by Gen. Westmoreland “to join the big war.” After Vietnam, the Marine Corps, like the Army, returned to its World War II roots. However, with the demise of the Cold War, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. [Kruslak \(1999\)](#) advanced the concept of the “three-block” war as a script for marines in post-Cold War peacekeeping missions. According to this, in a walk down three city blocks in a “Third World” country somewhere, a Marine should be prepared to fight kinetically one block, operate as a policeman-on-the-beat on the next, and deliver humanitarian assistance on the third. This capability was seen as one which would be added to the Corps’ amphibious assault repertoire.

Given this history, what might we expect from the current deliberations at the crossroads? If we accept the idea that the current emphasis on COIN, as a central representative of irregular warfare, represents more than an aberration, there are at least three classes of response possible: (1) the military can attempt to augment its conventional, war-fighting skills with a full set of COIN capabilities for the force as a whole, (2) the military can attempt to create COIN capabilities within specialized units organizationally separate from forces with traditional, conventional capabilities, or (3) the nation could rely more heavily on a new capacity for nation-building created in other agencies, such as the Department of State and the USAID.

In a recent *Military Review* article, [Chiarelli and Smith \(2007\)](#) note that, like it or not, the mission of nation-building in the United States probably will remain largely with the military for the foreseeable future. As defense budgets dwarf those of other likely players, the very scale of the problem moderates against any significant transfer of nation-building responsibilities to non-Department of Defense agencies. In any case, they argue, expanding

the flexibility of combat units is attainable and preserves options across the spectrum of conflict.

On the other hand, Barnett (and others) has argued that specialization is the answer. Rather than retooling troops and units already selected and trained for conventional combat, this approach – one force for conventional warfare and one for irregular operations – would permit the recruitment and socialization of personnel suited to the peculiar demands of each. A two-pronged force also offers a hedge against future security uncertainties.

Sewall's introduction to the *COIN Manual* asks us to consider option three. She notes: "The manual highlights military dependence not simply upon civilian political direction ... but also upon civilian capacities in the field. It asks the U.S. civilian leadership and bureaucracy to take on some of the responsibility and burden." These capacities are represented by an alphabet soup of U.S. government agencies and departments, inter-governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and civilian contractors.

There are several potential obstacles to accomplishing this kind of integration. In a nutshell, people and money are the stuff of bureaucracy, both justified on the basis of mission. If missions are transferred, reduced, shared, increased, or otherwise adjusted, there may well be impacts on personnel or budget. Because resources are closely connected to organizational (and individual) interests, and because competition for resources is the field of honor on which the leaders of bureaucracies do battle, resource competition will be a major factor in any proposed bureaucratic realignment. Sewall memorably points out that there are more people playing in U.S. Army bands than there are serving as Foreign Service officers. Such a comparison invites speculation about the consequences of, say, shifting a significant portion of the Defense Department's current de facto responsibility for stability and support operations to the Department of State: where will the people and money to support the needed capabilities within state come from?

In a sense, the United States has done its recent war-making activities on the cheap. Thirty years and counting since the end of universal conscription and conversion to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), large segments of U.S. society now have had no direct contact with or experience within the military and, hence, regard it with a mixture of awe and suspicion. However, as [Mastroianni and Scott \(2008\)](#) note, this cozy arrangement could be threatened by the burdensome service demanded by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At base is a classic "free-rider" problem, a dilemma introduced to modern social science by economist Olson (1965, 1971). Olson argued that it

is in the interest of most individuals to loaf when the concerted actions of a few produce a common good. With the AVF, so long as a sufficient number of volunteers step forward to fill the bill, the lives of the vast majority of Americans remain unfettered by military service. Similarly, [Chiarelli and Smith \(2007, p. 38\)](#) have noted a societal version of the free-rider problem:

To maximize our ability to succeed in current and future conflicts, we must change this mindset. ... The U.S. as a Nation – and indeed most of the U.S. Government – has not gone to war since 9/11. Instead, the Departments of Defense and State and the Central Intelligence Agency are at war while the American people and most of the other institutions of national power have largely gone about their normal business.

In sum, to “do COIN right,” the U.S. government itself would have to be capable of coordinated planning, execution, and monitoring of varied operations across disparate agencies – to date, not its long suit. This capability also would require disparate agencies and organizations to reconsider their roles and missions, and to work together with others in accomplishing the mission – again, to date, not their long suit. Finally, some change in the way Americans have become accustomed to talking about and doing war – for example, accepting more nuanced and less traditional definitions of success, as illustrated in El Salvador – might be necessary before implementing any large-scale change in the defense establishment.

## **5. DISCUSSION**

Our review of the social science literature reveals several themes. One, the current global world-system – one in which many beneficiaries are intensely connected while the “lesser included” (to use Barnett’s term) are woefully left out – portends a future in which irregular rather than conventional warfare is the norm. In such scenarios the definition of and solution to security problems are at their core, socio-political rather than military in nature. Further, the nature and composition of the enemy in the War on Terror does not lend itself easily to military definitions and solutions. Hence, while “Shrink the Gap!” may not seem much of a battle cry, it directs attention and effort to the kinds of systemic shortcomings that need be addressed in a successful “War on Terror.” Despite these considerations, if its powerful organizational bias holds true, the U.S. military’s current fixation on irregular warfare once again is more likely to be fleeting than permanent, especially as U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan subsides.



There are caveats surrounding each of these contentions. As we write this concluding section, Russia, a member of what Barnett termed the Functioning Core, has responded aggressively and militarily to Georgia's attempt to heel in its breakaway territories. Still seething from the extension of NATO membership to former Soviet republics, Russian leaders have drawn a line in the sand, stating that its national pride is more important than economic ties with the West. While this may be more bluster than bottom-line reality, this is not what one would expect from a certified member of the Functioning Core.

Missing too from our description of al-Qaeda Central and its affiliates are the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and potential adversaries in Iran. While the composition of al-Qaeda may defy conventional military wisdom and operations, those in Afghanistan and Iraq have substantial "security tenuous," and hence, military, dimensions that stand as a separate (but related) dilemma to the strategic, global contours described above.

Unpredictable as well are the final take-away points from the seemingly successful "troop surge" by the United States in Iraq since 2006.<sup>13</sup> There are competing versions for the surge's apparent success which, on closer examination, reflect underlying tensions over whether institutional shifts within the military are necessary. For example, General Petraeus himself has advanced nuanced accounts of the milestones attained during the surge (Petraeus, 2007; Report to Congress, 2008). Using very carefully chosen language, he contends that the "security environment improved" during this time, allowing the Iraqi government to assume more responsibility for its own fate. He warned, however, that the encouraging developments were "tenuous" and "reversible." A key component of the surge included the relocation of large numbers of troops from large forward operating bases (FOBs) where, to this point, U.S. units had hunkered down and which therefore served as areas *from which* to conduct patrols. Instead small groups of soldiers and marines were dispersed during the surge to outposts within Iraqi neighborhoods where they were more vulnerable but, importantly, also more effective at establishing relationships with the locals. This created pathways for building trust and the many benefits that come with it for countering insurgents, chiefly, on-the-spot reconnaissance and improved, actionable intelligence for focusing "lethal" operations and for carrying out "nonlethal" ones as well. Two associated developments were fortuitous. al-Qaeda in Iraq's practice of brutally executing Iraqis who co-operated with the United States angered Sunni tribal leaders, particularly in al-Anbar province, leading many of them to join forces with the United States. Also, Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadar stood down his militia,

the Mahdi Army. Where all this will lead, and under what time frame, still is painfully unclear. The situation, General Petraeus warned, remained “tenuous” and “reversible.”

A competing account of the surge reflects a different take. For example, Air Force Major General Dunlap (2008, pp. 54–56), writing in the summer 2008 edition of *Parameters*, pooh-poohs the *COIN Manual's* “Zen-like” features, asserting instead that expertly applied force alone can defeat an insurgency. He attributes the surge’s success to an “extraordinary amount of killing and capturing” attributable to the extensive and increasingly effective use since 2006 of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision air strikes in destroying terrorist cells. In case the reader might miss the big picture concerning the critical role of airpower in COIN operations in lieu of manpower-intensive boots-on-the-ground, Dunlap (2008, pp. 54–55) asserts:

The real question ... is whether [the *COIN Manual's*] approach is a practical, sustainable ... strategy for the twenty-first century. What is worrisome ... is that there are nearly 40 countries more populous than Iraq, some of which are failing or already failed states. ... Although the Army has recently met its recruiting goals, it has done so by inducting thousands of troops without high school degrees and thousands more requiring “moral waivers ....”

These observations and caveats suggest there still is an array of questions on the table. An honest conversation among the American people about what it means to go to war, particularly in the post-Cold War era, seems long overdue. Points of discussion might include what it means to “fight” a war such as the one on terror or what it means to achieve “victory.” What, in other words, might be a realistic set of expectations regarding the course and outcome of such a war? And, finally, what kind of commitment from the American people would it take, and, what kind of military configuration could best do this? Potentially this presages schisms *within* the military itself between the older generation of officers who cut their teeth on conventional warfare and the younger generation who has admirably adapted to the contingencies of irregular warfare, or, more generally, between those services predisposed to do “small wars” well and those left yearning for the days of “big wars.”

When the contours of any future changes emerge from the fog of debate, they will have to be implemented by individuals, groups, organizations, and bureaucracies. As this project of reordering national security capabilities for an uncertain future gets underway, social scientists can and should be deeply involved in helping to smooth what is likely to be a very rocky ride.

## NOTES

1. Cassidy (2006, pp. 21, 33), quoted from Jenkins (1970).
2. As reputable accounts, for example, Ricks (2006) and Gordon and Trainor (2006) have shown, top military leaders requested a substantially larger invasion force. They were however overruled by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who steadfastly preferred a small, fast-moving strike force. Also, both the Secretary and Vice-President Dick Cheney predicted quick victory, a reception by the Iraqi people as liberators, and a rapid, smooth transition to a new legitimate government.
3. Then-Col. H.R. McMaster, a Central Command staff officer in 2003 and commander of the 3rd ACR for its second deployment, described the early efforts by U.S. units in Iraq as follows: "When we first got here, we made a lot of mistakes. We were like a blind man, trying to do the right thing but breaking a lot of things." Quoted in Packer (2006).
4. Maj. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, former commander, and Maj. Peter Michaelis, an operations officer, both in 1st Cavalry Division, critiqued Task Force Baghdad, a 39,000-soldier, 62-battalion force centered in and around Baghdad during 2004, of which they were a part. Their analysis called for "full-spectrum" operations, that is, the implementation both of "lethal" combat operations *and* of "nonlethal" activities, including the training of Iraqi security forces, the restoration of essential services (power, water, and waste management), the promotion of self-governance, and the creation of employment opportunities. Chiarelli and Michaelis (2005, pp. 14–15) acknowledged that the Army's current "regulations, bureaucratic processes, staff relationships, and culture," well suited for lethal tasks, mitigate *against* carrying out the nonlethal dimensions of the equation effectively.
5. The approach also placed a heavy emphasis on treating Iraqi detainees in accordance with Geneva Convention guidelines *and* Iraqi law – the latter a recognition that ultimately the detainees should be processed and adjudicated within the Iraqi legal system.
6. Literally, the phrase means, better to be wrong and subject to court-martial than to be right but dead.
7. The Global War on Terror is a term advanced by the Bush Administration to refer to its objectives and repertoire of military responses to the bombing of the World Trade Center, September 11, 2001.
8. For an introduction to the world of world-system theory, see Hall (1996, 2000) and Wallerstein (2004).
9. See Lofland and Stark (1965) and Stark and Bainbridge (1980), cited and reviewed in Sageman (2004, pp. 126–128). The term "Moonies" is a reference to the Church's founder, the Rev. Sun Myung Moon of South Korea.
10. As Sageman (2004, p. 95) notes: "[The] lack of full-time jobs integrating them into their communities compounded their loneliness while away from home. This unemployment must have been a definite grievance and a source frustration in these generally gifted individuals."
11. The modern era spans military interventions in Latin America and the two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century; the Cold War in the much of the century's second half, punctuated by Korea in the 1950s, Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s, and the counterinsurgency in El Salvador in the 1980s; and, finally,

Gulf War I in 1990–1991, the air war in Bosnia in the 1990s, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 have followed.

12. For a description, see Waghelstein (2003), cited in Roxborough (2006).

13. The so-called “troop surge” refers to a plan announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007, to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in Iraq by sending five additional Army brigades and extending the tours of about 4,000 marines. The stated purpose was to increase troop strength by approximately 30,000 soldiers and marines in the process of implementing General Petraeus’ revised counterinsurgency strategy.

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# INTERACTION RITUALS AND LANGUAGE MEDIATION DURING PEACE MISSIONS: EXPERIENCES FROM AFGHANISTAN

Iris Hoedemaekers and Joseph Soeters

## ABSTRACT

*In this chapter, we focus on the processes of communication during peace missions in far-away countries, where local people in general do not master Western languages such as English and French. Afghanistan is such a country where the international community conducts large-scale peace operations that bring along many situations in which the military needs to talk to local people. In such situations, interpreters mastering the local languages (Darsi and Pashtu) are needed. In our study, we focus on their work, how they think they should fulfil their task, and their relation between the military who hire them and the local people to which they in fact belong. This in-between position makes them strangers in their own country. Goffman's work on strategic interaction, the management of face and embarrassment as well as interaction rituals in general constitute the theoretical backbone of this study.*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos  
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 329–352  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A024



'Amazing, yes. Actually, I've been trying to get through to him for weeks,' he said. 'Lucky thing, really.'

The driver, who spoke almost no English, asked me what Philip had said. I told him he had said *God is good*, which, indeed, is what I believe he was saying.

Hari (2008, p. 10)

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Communication in peace operations is of great importance; it is at least as significant as gunfights. Communication with local civilians is important because of the necessity to create support for the peace mission and to collect information about imminent hostilities (Bos & Soeters, 2006; van Dijk, 2008; van Dijk & Soeters, 2008). The major Dutch military mission today takes place in the province of Uruzgan in conflict-ridden southern Afghanistan. Because the country's languages are unknown in the European world, the Defense organization uses interpreters to make communication with locals possible (see also Pouligny, 2006). Interpreters accompany the Dutch soldiers on patrol and during negotiations, for instance, between the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the local government. They also support the soldiers during the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). During the mission, national interpreters (originally from Afghanistan, living in the Netherlands) are deployed next to interpreters who are directly recruited from the local population. This study concentrates on various aspects of the work of these interpreters.

We will focus on the interpreter's tasks and the process of language mediation. The central question to be answered is: 'which role do the interpreters have in the communication process during peace missions?' We want to ascertain what actually happens in settings where the interpreters act as a bridge between the interlocutors because of their understanding of the source *as well as* the target language. Do the interpreters translate the words of the interlocutors verbatim, or do they make a summary of the spoken words? Which role do the interpreters allot themselves: 'mediator' or 'translation machine'?

In addition, we concentrate on interaction rituals that occur during the conversations. Relevant in this connection are concepts like embarrassment, trust and distrust, face, honour and politeness. Distance between the soldiers and the interpreters and even distrust among the soldiers seem to be recurring matters (Bos & Soeters, 2006). This concerns not only the safety

issues, but also the communicative aspects of their work. Soldiers say that ‘the interpreter translated much more than I said’ or the other way around: ‘my interlocutor told a long story and the interpreter translated it in only two sentences’. Questions to be posed here are: in what way does the interpreter actually affect the conversations? Is it true that interpreters sometimes translate more, or less, than what has been said? If so, *why* does that happen?

To study these matters, we use Erving Goffman’s insights with respect to communication, the presentation of self, strategic interaction, forms of talk and face-to-face conversations. His micro-sociology of interaction rituals, added with views developed by Scheff (1990) and Collins (2004), constitutes the theoretical backbone of this study.

## 2. GOFFMAN’S RELEVANCE

### 2.1. Roles in Speaking

Goffman argues that we spend most of our time not in giving information but in giving shows (Burns, 1992, p. 304). His theory about social roles in interaction was inspired by the idea that daily life equates with a theatre (Goffman, 1959). Practising a role implies behaviour that is suitable given specific social positions (mother, teacher, politician, police officer, etc.). Roles and positions come along with certain expectations. A role consists of a set of rules or standards that serve as a guideline on how to behave. Individuals usually possess more than one role: someone can be a soldier during the day and a father in the evening. But an individual can also dissociate himself from his role. Goffman (1961) calls this role distancing. If somebody does not agree with the associations and expectations that are part of the role, the individual can try to decrease the significance of that role, or change it. But that would not be possible in all situations.

For our analysis of language mediation in peace missions, one of the Goffman’s studies seems particularly relevant – his analysis of *Radio Talk*.

In this analysis, Goffman (1981, pp. 197–327) describes which roles a radio speaker can adopt during a broadcast. Goffman (1981, pp. 226–227) distinguishes three different roles in radio talk: the *animator*, the *author* and the *principal*. These three roles together comprise what can be called the production format of an utterance. The first role is that of animator, ‘the sounding box from which utterances come’. This can also be referred to as *recitation*, *aloud reading* or *memorization*. The second role is the one of

author, ‘the agent who puts together, composes or scripts the lines that are uttered’. Here the speaker has more freedom than in the previous role, but he or she has a track to stay on, and there is a theme to hold on to. The third and last role is the one of *principal*, ‘the party to whose position, stand and belief, the words attest’. This is referred to as *fresh talk*, which implies that the text is autonomously formulated by the speaker.

Even though the principal has the largest space to manoeuvre, there is always a *slave* relation between the radio speaker and the events he is reporting: ‘he is free to pick his own phrases, as in other kinds of fresh talk but not free to stray appreciably from what participants and those familiar with the reported world would see as “what is going on”’. So, if something unexpected, for instance, during a soccer match, happens, this too must be reported by the radio speaker (Goffman, 1981, p. 233). Finally, in analysing radio talk, Goffman subdivides speech faults, of which *gaffes* form a particularly relevant category here. Gaffes are ‘unintended and unknowing breaches in “manners” or some norm of “good” conduct – breaches of the kind that are realized in speech, but can also be perpetrated through other modes of activity. Thus: indiscretion, tactlessness, indelicacy, irreverence, immodesty, intrusiveness, etc.’ (Goffman, 1981, p. 210).

We will show that all this is relevant for our analysis of language mediation during peace operations. For instance, the idea of interpreters as being ‘translation machines’ comes close to Goffman’s idea of animator, whereas the concept of mediator bridging the two cultures of the military and the local population is akin to Goffman’s notion of the principal in speaking. But there is more.

## 2.2. *Strategic Interaction, Simmelian Ties and Strangers*

According to Goffman, individuals will try to control interactions. Burns (1992, p. 60) quotes Goffman: ‘that in all interaction a basic underlying theme is the desire of each participant to guide and control the responses made by the others present’. So all participants in an interaction situation play their own game and all players have their own particular interests. Hence, interaction – often – is strategic interaction. All interests are of influence in the development of an interaction. Information and expressive behaviour therefore can be manipulated, distorted or concealed by one side and uncovered or extracted and interpreted or misinterpreted on the other (Burns, 1992, p. 59). Because all the participants play their own game with their own interests, it is ‘a mosaic of ill-understood, varying practices’, in which there is

a mixture of interdependence and conflict, and of partnership and competition (Burns, 1992, p. 63). For example, if a teacher instructs her students not to incorporate extensive reviews of the literature in their essays, students may respond by not reviewing the literature at all, or to do so extremely shortly.

In interactions, there are always combinations of trust, control and suspension between people in play (Möllering, 2005, p. 295). Goffman uses the notion of strategic interaction particularly in relation to what has been written about espionage, smuggling and criminal conspiracies. Our research context is not as spectacular as espionage and criminal behaviour, but gradually we will discover that the interaction between the interpreters and the locals on one side and the military people on the other does not diverge that much from those atmospheres. In this regard, the notion of Simmelian ties – derived from the thinking of one of the founding fathers in sociology Georg Simmel – may be important.

Krackhardt (1999) states that two people are Simmelian tied to each other if they are mutually and strongly bonded to each other and if they are mutually and strongly bonded to at least one other party too. Simmelian ties are strong ties, embedded in a clique, a group of people. A person is most constraint whenever he must satisfy two sets of cliques, like Krackhardt (1999, p. 190) shows in the model shown in Fig. 1.

Krackhardt (1999, p. 182) explains that ‘Simmelian ties strengthen the bond between actors at a price: they also subject the players to group norms. [...] But the more cliques one has Simmelian ties to, the more restrictions there are on one’s behaviour’.

Bos and Soeters (2006, pp. 265–266) have used this notion in their article on interpreters during peace missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan. They refer to Simmel’s theory (1980) about ‘the stranger’ to point out the balancing act between trust and distrust that interpreters need to perform while working for the mission. They have to balance between the two cliques they are tied to: the military people, who hire them, and the locals who take part in the interaction with the soldiers (when being interrogated or in negotiations about funding the construction of a school, for instance). Their article shows




Fig. 1. Simmelian Ties (Krackhardt, 1999, p. 190).

the interpreters feel appreciated and trusted by the soldiers, when it comes to language mediation in interactions with the local population. However, at base camp, they struggle with indifferences; they are given the cold shoulder, because they are strangers, far away and close by at the same time. On the other hand, they are sometimes confronted with negative reactions from their compatriots too ('traitors'; Pouligny, 2006, p. 95), in particular from those who belong to the other factions in the arena. The violence threats they sometimes experience clearly 'restrict their behaviour' and are in fact the consequence of 'torturing ties' (Krackhardt, 1999).

### 2.3. Goffman's Face Concept, and Politeness too

There is yet another aspect of Goffman's work that seems relevant for our topic: his face theory (Goffman, 1967, pp. 5–46). Goffman (1967, p. 5) defines *face* as: 'an image of self, delineated in terms of approved social attributes – albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself'. In the case of face keeping, people attempt to save or protect their own or someone else's face or image. From Goffman's point of view, the participants in a social interaction are not to lose their face. It is not appropriate to say everything in any situation, and sometimes a special way of stating something is required. That is because harming an individual's face could lead to harming your own face.

Goffman (1967, pp. 47–95) focuses on codes or rules of behaviour which apply to every society, codes which guarantee that everyone acts appropriately. Rules of conduct impose a kind of 'oughtness' on people, because they provide a guide for action, which is 'recommended not because it is pleasant, cheap or effective but because it is suitable or just' (Burns, 1992, p. 40; Goffman 1967, p. 48). In this connection, it is important to realize that people are sensitive to the amount of deference they are being awarded. If they believe they are receiving too much, or – more frequently – too little, they will feel embarrassed. This shows that communication leads very directly to the *realm of feeling* (Scheff, 1990, p. 99). Goffman argues that embarrassment and the anticipation of embarrassment are pervasive in social interaction; embarrassment needs to be eschewed because it comes along with feelings of shame and anger. Given this sensitivity, avoiding embarrassment – keeping face and honour so to speak – can be considered as a universal rule of conduct; however, the expression of this rule of conduct varies across cultures (Smith, Bond, & Kağıtçıbaşı, 2006).

In collectivist cultures, and the cultures in the Middle East in particular, losing face is considered a serious and pervasive problem, more so than in the Western hemisphere (e.g. Patai, 2002, pp. 108–113). So, considering face and honour has a significant influence on daily life and comes forward in every interaction. To be able to understand the reason why someone behaves the way he does, honour must be kept in mind. To have face is like being acknowledged explicitly as an honourable person and to be treated with proper respect. Losing face means a violation of one's image. A basic thought of honour is that individuals are first and foremost members of a group. This is the fundamental difference with the West where receiving too little deference – losing face – is an individual matter, and only that. In the (Middle) East, however, whenever an individual misbehaves, the honour of the family, clan or tribe is violated and vice versa. The honour of a family, clan or tribe could be primarily the capacity of protecting their women both in the group and in their homes. Violation of the home denotes the incapability to protect the women and decreases someone's claim for honour (Dupree, 2005; Vogelsang, 2002).

Based on Goffman's *face theory*, Brown and Levinson (1987) developed their *politeness theory* (see also Argyle, 1992). This theory delves more deeply into the idea of face keeping. *Face* is, according to them, '... something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction' (Brown & Levinson, 1987, p. 61). Every individual possesses face for the outer world, that is, a public image. Whenever an actor will accomplish a (non-) linguistic deed that could cause losing face to the speaker or hearer, the actor will try to bring in a politeness strategy to decrease the risk or damage (Mazid, 2006, p. 76). Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 62) distinguish two types of face, *positive* and *negative*. *Positive face* implies the wish to be respected and appreciated, and manifests itself in people's tendency to accommodate to each other with respect to the language spoken, the accent, the way of introducing, loudness or the length of utterance (Argyle, 1992, p. 19 ff). *Negative face* implies the need for privacy, autonomy and freedom of act. Requesting something could be an act that encroaches on an individual's autonomy. The perspective is that the other person would not fulfil the request if the one making the request did not ask for it. So, by making a request, someone's face may be violated.

An act that endangers one's face is called a *face threatening act* (FTA). A FTA may come in four ways: 'open and direct', 'direct, however in combination with positive or negative politeness', 'off record, indirect' or 'the FTA could be omitted at all' (Brown & Levinson, 1987, pp. 62–64).

The wish for keeping face eventually leads to politeness strategies. By using these strategies, a FTA can be accomplished and a person's face or image will be protected at the same time.

The politeness strategies are subdivided in solidarity politeness (i.e. positive politeness) and respect politeness – that is, negative politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1987, pp. 101–226). The positive strategies aim at the hearer's need to be understood, beloved and appreciated. One tries to concede to something experienced as pleasant by the other. For example, the use of *in-group identity markers* such as *mom*, *honey*, *buddy* and *mate*; striving for consensus by bringing up safe subjects like 'the weather'; using *white lies* because it is better to tell a lie than to damage a person's face; starting a conversation by means of *small talk* to prove the speaker is not just here for accomplishing the FTA; and making an offer or promise, even when the offer or promise is false. The negative politeness strategies, on the other hand, aim at infracting a person's autonomy and freedom as little as possible. The FTA in this case can be formulated as a request worded in an indirect way, or it can be compensated to restore the balance. An example of a negative strategy is the use of honorifics like *sir* in English or *saheb* in Pashtu.

The *off record* way to accomplish a FTA forms a different category. A communicative act is *off record* if there is a possibility to attach more than one intention to it. The actor provides himself an escape by justifiable interpretations. He leaves the way of interpretation to the other person. These strategies contain, among others, hedging or expressing oneself in a moderate way, exaggerating, using metaphors and being vague, ambiguous or incomplete. The Afghan way of language usage contains a lot of metaphors such as references to the Quran and *hadith* (the deeds and statements of the prophet Muhammed), all common in Islamic cultures. Interpreters in peace missions often play a role in this connection. They try to tone down wording considered too hard, or hold back from translating words that they think may endanger the atmosphere of politeness (Pouligny, 2006, p. 94).

#### 2.4. Natural or Failed Interactions

Pursuing Goffman's and Brown's and Levinson's work even further, Collins (2004, pp. 47–48) has elaborated a theory of interaction rituals: wedding ceremonies, funerals, scheduled or spontaneous political manifestations, or social encounters such as meetings, conferences or ordinary conversations in

the Goffmanian sense. These interaction rituals have four main and variable ingredients or conditions and four main outcomes; this is displayed in Fig. 2.

The figure shows that the first ingredient is that two or more individuals are together in the same place, so they can affect each other by their presence. The second is that there are boundaries to outsiders, implying that participants know who takes part and who does not. The third condition is that the people focus their attention on a common object or activity, and by communicating this they are mutually aware of each other’s focus of attention. The last is that they share a common mood or emotional experience. All these ingredients feed back on each other and numbers 3 and 4 reinforce. As we can see in the figure, there are four outcomes when the ingredients successfully combine. First, the participants will feel group solidarity. Second, they will feel emotional energy, a feeling of confidence, strength, enthusiasm and initiative in taking action. Third, there are symbols that represent the group like visual icons, gestures or words, that the members feel associated with, also called *sacred objects*. And last, they have feelings of morality towards the group.

A ritual, according to Collins (2004, pp. 49–51), is a formal ceremony, the going through of a set of stereotyped actions. But these are just contributing ingredients. The participants also need to feel a shared emotion and sense a mutual participation by becoming aware of each other’s consciousness. The mutual focus of attention is crucial for the ritual to work. For example, calling people by their first names, or not, is a small-scale ritual. But not all rituals are successful. If they are not, a low level of effervescence and no shared entrainment comes forward, and there is no (or a low) feeling of




Fig. 2. Interaction Ritual (Collins, 2004, p. 48).



group solidarity, no respect for group symbols and no heightened emotional energy. A flat feeling unaffected by the ritual, a sense of a drag, boredom and constraint may arise which may even lead to depression or the desire to escape; then obviously, the ritual has failed.

We aim to ascertain if the language mediation situations in peace missions in southern Afghanistan – clearly interaction rituals too – tend to be naturally successful or failing. In general, we aim to find out how much of the *Goffmanian* theory we have discussed can be recognized in real life observations and interviews with interpreters living and working for the Dutch military in southern Afghanistan.

### 3. RESEARCH CONTEXT AND SET-UP OF THE STUDY

Afghanistan is part of the Islamic world and is characterized like other Muslim countries by a rich literary culture and an illiterate society (Misra, 2004; Dupree, 2005). *Dari* or *Farsi* and *Pashtu* are the official and most spoken languages of Afghanistan. Forty-nine languages exist in Afghanistan and *Dari* is its lingua franca (Emadi, 2005). Both *Dari* and *Pashtu* are part of the Indo-European language family. Both languages contain a number of (Arabic) loanwords for Islamic affairs. The script is in Arabic, completed with four more consonants in *Dari* and nine in *Pashtu* (Dupree, 2005, pp. 66–70). In Uruzgan, *Pashtu* is the most spoken language and the language is an important aspect of ‘being Pashtun’ (Vogelsang, 2002, p. 19). Every *Pashtun* tribe knows its own *Pashtu* dialect and a large part of the Afghan population is bilingual. The ANA soldiers in Uruzgan are educated and trained by, among others, the Dutch armed forces; the ANA soldiers are from every part of Afghanistan, and many of them speak *Dari*. The interpreters are bilingual and speak both *Dari* and *Pashtu* (and also other languages like English and Urdu, and the national interpreters also Dutch).

Islam can be found in every aspect of the Afghan society, like other Islamic countries (Emadi, 2005, p. 64). Many conventions and values in the Islamic World have their origin in Islam and the etiquettes and language usage are comparable with countries in the Middle East. Afghanistan characterizes itself by a high-context culture of communicating: indirect, and lots of the information is concealed in the context. Gestures, tone, rank and status symbols are part of the communication. The Netherlands is characterized by a low-context culture of communicating: direct, and only

words are enough. Intercultural communication in peace operations is therefore a relevant factor. Misunderstandings may arise because people tend to interpret the interlocutors' communication by their own communication system. This may cause ineffective communication (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; Gudykunst, 1998). This goes for verbal and non-verbal communication and body language. A well-known example is that of the foreign soldiers putting up their thumbs to local villagers in Afghanistan. In Europe a positive gesture, but for Afghans it is very provocative; it means so much as to put up two fingers at someone in Europe. Avoiding eye contact is another well-known example which causes misunderstandings in communication; it can be polite in some parts of the world but is seen as rude in other parts.

### *3.1. Set-up and Methodology of the Study*

The data used in this article were collected in January 2008 during a working visit at Camp Holland in Tarin Kowt in the province of Uruzgan in southern Afghanistan. The visit lasted for 10 days and was a collaborative effort of two researchers, the first author and a co-researcher.<sup>1</sup>

In total, about 80–90 local interpreters work at the base, living in the immediate surroundings of the camp. They are employed by the Dutch military; they wear a Dutch uniform but have no military rank. In total, eight of the local interpreters were interviewed; their age varied between 20 and 27 years of age; hence, the local interpreters were relatively young. Their commander commended them to cooperate with us and they gave their own approval too. These interviews were conducted in English.

In addition, interviews were conducted with seven, so-called national interpreters. These interpreters are fully militarized and they work for the Dutch Ministry of Defense. They have a rank ranging from warrant officer to captain, and their age ranges from 33 to 47 years. Originating from Afghanistan, they have all lived in the Netherlands over the last period of time, between 7 and 15 years. The interviews with them were conducted in the Dutch language.

Most of the interviews were taped with a recorder in a private room.<sup>2</sup> The interview protocol was divided into several categories, including: demographic data, experience in the job, position in the unit, communication styles and culture/religion/gender issues, as well as leisure time, religious experience and values. All the interpreters were Muslims, although they had varying personal views on religion. None of the interpreters who were

interviewed has had a professional career as an interpreter prior to the mission.

In addition, the researchers attended and recorded two meetings. The first meeting lasted approximately 30 min, and consisted of a negotiation between a soldier and a local civilian in the presence of a local interpreter. The second meeting lasted approximately 1 h and was a weekly meeting of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) and representatives of the ANA. Present were officers of the OMLT and the ANA and two local interpreters. Because one of the interpreters could not stop coughing, he requested to be replaced by another interpreter. Both recordings have been translated into English, word by word, which was done by Afghans living in the Netherlands.

In the mission in Uruzgan, both *Dari* and *Pashtu* are used. Especially working with the ANA and the ANP requires the use of both languages, because the Afghan soldiers and police officers come from regions all over the country. The national interpreters communicate with the soldiers in Dutch, the local interpreters in English. Their level of English is not very high, which makes it harder to communicate with the Dutch soldiers; unfortunately, this is rather common in peace missions (Poulligny, 2006, p. 94).

## 4. THE INTERPRETERS IN THE PEACE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

### *4.1. The Role of the Interpreter*

The interpreters in the peace mission in Uruzgan refer to their position as ‘the eyes and ears of ISAF’. Without the interpreters the soldiers cannot do their work, because they depend on their interpreters in every single contact with the Afghan population. The interpreters are aware of the fact that they possess crucial knowledge. The interpreters explain they are not always able to translate literally, because in some situations this would be inappropriate and harmful to the honour of an Afghan. The interpreters in the peace mission in Uruzgan translate consecutively. If the sentences are not too long, there probably would not be any problems, but when the text to remember extends, translating word by word will be more difficult. Then, the interpreter is likely to give his or her own interpretation or an abstract of what has been said.

All three roles described by Goffman in his essay *Radio Talk* – *animator*, *author* and *principal* – can be found in the data that were collected during the meetings. When the interpreter adopts the role of *animator*, he translates literally whatever the speaker said. This is what Goffman calls *recitation* or *memorization*: the interpreter remembers the words or sentences the speaker said and translates it word by word. This role matches the idea of the ‘translation machine’ (Bos & Soeters, 2006, p. 264) and it also indicates the *slave* relation the interpreter has towards what is going on. Whenever an interpreter adopts the *author* role, he will translate what the speaker said but he adds some words, gives a little advice to the hearer about what the speaker means or reformulates the (indirect) utterances in order to make them better understandable. However, there is a track to stay on; the text is formulated autonomously, but there is a theme to hold on to. Whenever the interpreter adopts the last role of *principal*, he will speak for himself, for example, in case the interpreter raises a question in the conversation. This is what is called *fresh talk*, which implies that the text is formulated by the animator. In the negotiation in the PRT house, the interpreter adopts all three roles in very few sentences:

*S (soldier): Euh, what brings you here?*

*I (interpreter): What brings you here, I mean what kind of problems do you have?*

*A (Afghan): it is about our land. [...]*

The interpreter starts his translation in the *animator* role, he translates literally what *S* asks. Immediately after that, he (*I*) switches to *author* by explaining to *A* what *S* means. Two sentences further, the interpreter switches to the role of *principal*:

*A: It is about, the other day, two trucks with containers were driving there.*

*I: You mean, the road which the trucks with the grain also use?*

*A: No, No, No, [...] they told me [...] that we should find a contractor and then after that they could build these chaks.*

*I: How many days ago was that?*

The interpreter takes the initiative in asking questions and obviously acts as a *principal*. When the soldier raises a question, sometimes the interpreter answers; in such a case, he also acts as a *principal*, as he speaks for himself:

*S: Small bridge.*

*I: Yeah.*

*S: Small bridge. What's damaged? Is the ditch damaged?*

*I: Yeahhh.*

*S: or the bridge damaged?*

*I: Nonono, the ditch*

*S: The ditch the stream the ditch is damaged and not the bridge.*

*I: not the bridge and after that he will make. [...]*

During the entire conversation, the interpreter acts alternately as *animator*, *author* and *principal*. He switches between these three roles and acts frequently as an *author* and a *principal*. Mostly this happens when he needs to clarify something for either the soldier or the Afghan. The interpreter adopts this role consciously in order to be able to clarify what is meant and to prevent situations of miscommunication. In the meeting with the Dutch soldiers and the ANA soldiers, the interpreter does not act by definition as an *animator*. This emerges during the next part of the meeting:

*S: When I promised you last week that we would be more critical every week as we progress*

*I: I promised you we would have these kind of meetings every week. [...]*

*S: [...] is that I have the impression that the camp looks better every week that I have a look around*

*I: every time I walk around the camp, the camp looks good and better, I can see it looks good and better.*

The interpreter mitigates the first part *S* says by leaving out the ‘critical’ part. In the next sentence, he reinforces the words of *S* by repeating his positive words. In this meeting, age and status probably played a part because both local interpreters were very young and they were dealing with high officers (among them an Afghan General), who were many years older than they were. The interpreter acts communicatively in a subservient way when he apologizes to the general. After some confusion about the translation of a word, the interpreter continues in *Dari*: ‘forgive me, my Afghan vocabulary is weak’. The general answers that it is no problem and the interpreter apologizes once again.

The case of role distancing can be found in the interpreters’ view of their job. They do not see themselves as ‘translation machines’ but more as cultural advisors or mediators. An interpreter who not only translates, but also gives (cultural) advice enhances his position and role of cultural advisor and decreases the one of ‘translation machine’. In some cases, the interpreters act in the capacity of soldiers, distancing themselves totally from their interpreters’ role. This can happen, for example, during a debriefing or a patrol:

They overlooked one thing about the mission area and task. They told me it was indeed an important point and they said it was a good thing I thought of it. [...]. “There have been missions in which I only had a security role. When we stop during the driving to do a check, I join in.” [...] “Sometimes, when a new group of soldiers comes in, they do not know the routine. Then, when we go on patrol with a number of vehicles and somebody

walks between our vehicles, sometimes nobody says something to this person but it could very well be a suicide bomber. Then I ask the guys what they are doing, if they did not get a briefing and why nobody is paying attention. You can not see if it is a suicide bomber or not. I tell the soldiers then that they should tell this person that he is not allowed to walk between these vehicles. (Interview #4)<sup>3</sup>

In the latter case, the interpreter steps out of his role completely, and he acts as an experienced soldier. Another example of interpreters stepping out of their role is in case they act as mediators in conflict situations between the Afghan civilians and the Dutch soldiers. For example, when a crowd must be soothed or in the following case:

A while ago, during a patrol, there were some Dutch guys who broke the door of a mosque, they went in and knocked over a box with pieces of the Quran and started singing and shouting in the speakers. The ANA soldiers came to me very angry: "if it happens once again, we will not work with you anymore". [...] I went with them to the commander [...], he asked me what we should do now. I told him "okay, let me take care of it". Me and two of the ANA soldiers went back to the mosque, we put back the door, put away the pieces of the Quran and cleaned everything. [...] I calmed down the ANA soldiers and explained them the guys can make mistakes, they are also humans and maybe they did not know the box had a Quran in it, after all, the box contained loose pieces of paper so maybe they were not able to see it. But the Dutch soldiers had to promise them they would not go into a mosque anymore. We had to arrange the ANA soldiers would search in the mosques. [...] The guys promised me it would never happen again. (Interview #4)

#### *4.2. Strategic Interaction*

All 'players' in an interaction situation in a peace mission (soldier, interpreter and Afghan local) play their own game, implying that all have their own interests. For instance, soldiers are interested in intelligence and gaining support for their mission, locals may have an interest in receiving money for infrastructure in their villages, whereas an interpreter is concerned about doing a good job for the military while protecting his own safety. This last issue is of particular importance when talking about strategic interaction in the Goffmanian sense.

Every interpreter points out that he does not feel safe. Not only are *they* in danger, but their entire families are in danger too. Safety is an issue not only for the soldiers in their working relation with the interpreters, but also for the interpreters in their relation with the local civilians. This is a clear example of 'torturing' Simmelian ties. The interpreters feel they are in serious danger and face a real threat while working for the Dutch defence organization. Interpreters define they do not want to be on any pictures and

that they are afraid for retaliation. The family members of the national interpreters who still live in Afghanistan are not always aware of the fact their relative works for the Dutch military; if they are, it is kept quiet accurately in fear the community will find out. If someone finds out about it, it could cause the entire family to be in danger. As to the local interpreters only their closest family knows, but they too keep it quiet for the outside world out of fear of retaliation aimed at their family, and also out of fear someone might recognize them in the future which could cause serious troubles to the interpreter himself or his family.

If an interpreter is abducted he would get killed immediately in a horrible way. A soldier could possibly bring in money, while the interpreter only is a burden for the Opposing Military Forces. (Interview #7)

Given this hazardous relation, the interpreters need to act precariously strategic in their work: offending locals might cost their lives; after all, embarrassment comes along with shame and anger (Scheff, 1990). Without doubt, this situation creates a lot of suspension which does not eliminate the uncertainty, but makes it liveable *for the time being* (Möllering, 2005, p. 296). We will see later how this situation affects the interpreters' relation with the Dutch soldiers.

Because the interpreter adopts a certain role in the communication process, he is able to affect the conversation: he can manipulate, distort or conceal what was said. By choosing certain utterances, the interpreter creates some sort of atmosphere which, he feels, is appropriate for the event he is in at that moment.

Strategic interaction in translations can be harmful because whenever the interpreter does not translate word by word, relevant words or sentences could be translated differently or not at all. On the other hand, translating differently can very well have a positive effect. In case the interpreter senses something is said too directly, he or she can mitigate the utterance more or less. This means he will communicate whatever the soldier means but in a more appropriate way. Due to the importance of honour and respect in the Afghan culture, adapting the words can very well cause an important positive effect.

The interpreter senses if and when it is better to reformulate a soldier's utterance just to prevent injuring an Afghan's honour. On the other hand, the interpreter also prevents the Dutch soldiers from experiencing embarrassment just by formulating the question in a slightly different way or by giving the advice to the soldier to postpone his question or not to bring up a (delicate) subject at all. The interpreters provide examples of the

moments they actually did advise the soldiers to avoid a subject or rephrase it; this mostly applies to the subject of women:

For example, we were on a mission with a Dutch officer and the provincial governor. During the lunch they discussed horseback riding. The officer told both his daughters loved horses and that they also ride. But that was not the right time or environment to speak about daughters. I told him: "I'm sorry sir but this is not the right moment to tell that" "Not?" "No." "So what should I do now?" "Speak about yourself." The officer went on saying: "I like the sport too and I also ride in The Netherlands". The conversation went on and the people were happy. In these official conversations you do not discuss daughters or women. What happens inside the homes, stays there. Afghan people do not do that and do not expect others to do it. This way we provide in tips and tools. (Interview #4)

Giving advice to soldiers is not limited to communication only, but also includes history, culture (customs), gender and Islam. The following example shows how the interpreters can give advice. In some cases, the national interpreters provide the Afghan population with information about the Netherlands:

I explain about religion, history and tribes. I show the soldiers pictures of Kabul, I want to provide them some cultural awareness. I also tell the local people "these people left their fathers and mothers behind to help you. In here you get the same aid like the Dutch". I tell the people in the hospital about the Dutch culture and their food. Once, I joined an Afghan woman to talk to a Dutch female nurse, she wanted to tell her she loved her like her own daughter and she asked her if she wanted to tell her something about the Netherlands and her home. The woman was very happy, I explained to her what it is ISAF does and that they are here to help. (Interview #3)

Behaviour or utterances from soldiers to the local people are reasons to give advice. According to one of the national interpreters, the soldiers sometimes convey in front of the locals that they themselves are not religious, even though the population of Uruzgan is deeply religious and not ready for such opinions. The local people are afraid they will become non-religious too. Soldiers who show the young local interpreters pornographic magazines are also an annoyance according to one of the interpreters.

Gender aspects in general constitute an area where interpreters feel they need to give advice to the soldiers. All the interpreters feel the subject 'women' is a delicate matter. The protected status of women in Uruzgan is such that unknown men (men outside their close family) are not allowed to speak to them, because it could impugn their honour. And when a woman's honour is impugned, the honour of the entire family or even the whole tribe could be stained. The interpreters show that only female soldiers are allowed to speak with Afghan women. When no other possibility can be found, and



a man must speak to a woman, the interpreters turn out to be very ingenious. They will, for instance, contact the woman's neighbour first to find out if there is any other relative close by they can speak with. Or even more ingenious:

There was no female interpreter with us, so this was a challenge. They asked me what we should do. I took a big cloth, hang it near by the door and stood behind it. I addressed her with 'mother' or 'sister' and explained her we wanted to talk with her. [...] When we need to search a vehicle with women and children in it, I tell them to open the window and address them with 'mother' or 'sister'. First we ask the men permission, we explain we need to search the vehicle for weapons. I ask permission to ask them some questions. Obviously, the voice tells us if it is a man or a woman and I ask them to show their hands or fingers, this way we can recognize if it is a man or a woman. When we search the homes we announce just before we start so the women are able to cover themselves for and from the soldiers. We explain we respect them and that they are like my mother or sister, this shows I respect them. (Interview #4)

#### 4.3. Face and Politeness in Translation

Hence, the interpreter uses the politeness strategy of 'in-group identity markers' like 'sister' and 'mother' to show he belongs to the same group (see also Bosman, Soeters, & Ait Bari, 2008). Clearly, this is an aspect of strategically interacting in order to smoothen the interaction and avoid any (safety) problems. Using this strategy creates an environment of trust. Honorifics also occur a lot in Afghan society:

It is necessary to treat the elderly with respect. It is disrespectful to address an old man by his name, you address them by using honorifics like hajji.<sup>4</sup> And when you speak with an Afghan woman you can address her by saying 'mother' or 'sister', this creates a basis for trust. (Interview #3)

In response to the question if he translates literally or not, a local interpreter shows he makes use of a strategy of apologizing before committing a FTA:

I translate everything, that is my job, both what the Afghan says and what the Dutch says. Because if I translate half, maybe we can not understand each other. Even if there are bad words I will excuse myself first and I tell that I am just the interpreter but I do translate it. (Interview #8)

A conversation in Afghanistan always starts with *small talk*: a little conversation about family, health and other small talk (see also Stewart, 2004):

... the mission commander is responsible for the conversation and asks the questions, but not immediately. First we need to talk a little bit and drink some tea. We discuss the problems in the village and of the people. Introduce the conversation easily and slowly we will reach the original subject of the conversation. (Interview #4)

In the meeting with the ANA and OMLT soldiers, the differences in conversational techniques become visible: the Dutch soldiers start with a simple 'welcome' and pursue with bringing up their points. The Afghan general, on the contrary, starts by bidding the researchers and the soldiers a welcome, and then he goes on with telling the meeting is very successful and repeats his happiness and gratefulness for all kinds of developments. When he wants to bring up a problem, he uses phrases such as 'maybe we can discuss this in the future'. The differences in communication styles between the Afghans and the Dutch became very clear in this meeting.

Using metaphors, which is also a politeness strategy, is very normal in Afghanistan. The interpreters mention this in the interviews and when a local interpreter starts talking about good behaviour and showing respect towards the civilians, he phrases 'good behaviour' as follows:

Good behaviour is like, for example if you have two trees, one with fruit and one without fruit. The one with fruit is like a person with good behaviour and the tree without fruit is like someone who is educated but doesn't behave well. (Interview #10)

Regarding the cultural differences, an interpreter conveys:

The Dutch, some of them want to make clean ship and some Afghans don't want to make clean ship and some do. Also some want to turn the table and some don't. (Interview #8)

This is a clear example of indirectness. Placed in the context, the interpreter seems to say that not all people are ready for changes and can understand the cultural differences.

White lies seem to appear too. From informal conversations with Dutch soldiers, the impression emerged that some interpreters complain about soldiers' behaviour towards them and the local civilians. Yet, all the interpreters assured the researchers they have never had any problems with Dutch soldiers. One of the interpreters tells us he finds it a political question and he wishes not to answer. It seems like the interpreters provided us with the desirable answers and rather tell a lie than directly tell us the soldiers' behaviour is not always right. This looks like strategic interaction; the interpreters do not want to injure the soldiers' face and therefore they do not specify their experiences. But because of the 'political question' remark, it is clear that there have been incidents.

#### *4.4. Failed or Successful Interaction Rituals*

As mentioned previously, both the national and the local interpreters do not feel safe in their job. The national interpreters do not want to go on patrol without a weapon; they do not feel safe and they sense they are the first target for the enemy. This endangers their relation with the ordinary military men. They share the opinion the soldiers are not able to look after them and that they are responsible for their own safety.

I feel I am being treated differently than the other soldiers. Last year I was in the bazaar in Chora and the district governor and the commander came to me, they knew I was an interpreter. On both sides there were armed men. I thought I will join the Dutch soldier and he will look after me, but they just let me down. [...] The second time, I was in the bazaar in Tarin Kowt, I had my vest and my helmet with me but we came with a Bushmaster (an armoured vehicle). They told me we would talk with the governor. I said, oh my vest and my helmet are in the Bushmaster but the Bushmaster just drove away and I had to go without my vest and my helmet. The next day, there was a visitor from the ministry of Foreign Affairs and I had to join him to translate at the bazaar. So I asked "where is the Bushmaster, because I need my helmet". They told me it was gone and I walked at the bazaar all day without a vest or a helmet. They don't pay attention. Usually they tell us the soldiers will look after us, and we were not allowed to wear any weapons, but I have seen several times, the soldiers do not look after their interpreters. [...] I'm not saying they don't want to look after me, but they just are not capable of, all people must take care of their selves, they just don't have time to do that. (Interview #2)

The number of soldiers who fully trust the interpreters, on the other hand, is not very high. These problems can be explained with the Simmelian tie concept. The interpreters in the peace missions are tied to the soldiers because they work for them, but they are culturally tied to the Afghan civilians. The interpreters are tied to both the Dutch and the Afghan rules of conduct. Especially the Afghan rules of conduct are very strict because of the Afghan in-group culture. The interpreters must, in a way, satisfy both parties; at least that is what both parties expect them to do. This can bring particularly the local interpreters in Afghanistan in a difficult position. The soldiers do not fully trust them because they are 'locals' and they do not know what intentions they have, whereas the locals do not fully trust them because they work for ISAF, for which reason they may be seen as traitors.

This raises the issue of the appreciation of the (working) relation between the soldiers and the interpreters. A survey among Dutch soldiers returning from Uruzgan<sup>5</sup> shows a large part of the soldiers who explicitly appreciates the interpreters' work in terms of being useful, adequate and satisfying. Yet, the interpreters are seen as outsiders in the army unit (see also [Bos & Soeters, 2006](#)). For instance, only 18% of the soldiers declare they fraternize

with the national interpreters and in case of the local interpreters this percentage is only 15. Even though the more educated *officers* belonging to the PRT display a much larger inclination towards fraternizing with the interpreters (up to 48%), the majority of the *soldiers* only has contact with the interpreters for professional reasons. There does not seem to be much of a unity between the soldiers and the interpreters outside working hours. Most of the interpreters go and drink some tea in the evenings, usually with their fellow interpreters, national and local; however, the national interpreters declare they do not want to get involved with the local 'boys' too intensively.

The interpreters themselves at first declare the cooperation between them and the soldiers is fine. From the interviews, however, the impression emerges that there have been certain incidents in which the cooperation was actually quite tense. All the interpreters explain they face(d) intolerance and during the working visit we also heard a number of negative opinions regarding the interpreters. One of the interpreters explains what influence intolerance and lack of respect may have:

There have been incidents in the cooperation between soldiers and interpreters. [...] There (...) have been (...) personal offences, laughing at us and things like that. They have blocked the showers, they throw your bed out of the room because you're not allowed to sleep with the Dutch or they even send you away from their rooms. They also scold, I apologize for the words, but they sometimes say, "fucking country", "fucking population", "every Afghan is a Talib". If I hear these things, it's an offence, I'm not able to work anymore. [...] It injures your honour if these things happen. [...] I also hear them say that the Dutch are allowed to laugh at anyone. [...] I tell them, "You may think this way, I know a lot of Dutch who are against laughing at other population groups. And what you say is against what the politics is trying to do in here. They are here to build a good relationship with the population and to win their confidence". How can we continue the mission if you feel you are allowed to laugh at anyone. You do not only harm yourself and your own unit, but also the entire Dutch politics. [...] These offences take place everywhere, towards the interpreters but also during missions towards the population. (Interview #5)

This interpreter defines he feels offended by the utterances and that they injure his honour. He is obviously hurt that he himself and the population are not always respected by the soldiers. Although the soldiers tend to call each other not by their name but by their job title, the interpreters point out they feel offended when they are addressed with 'hey *terp* come here'. If addressed this way, they feel they are treated without respect. The soldiers, on the other hand, feel it is normal to call them this way because they call all their colleagues this way; it is some sort of a ritual.

However, this ritual may turn out not to be very successful in the meaning Collins (2004) has attributed to this concept. Following his list of ritual ingredients (Collins, 2004, pp. 48–51), there certainly is group assembly (bodily co-presence) between the interacting military men and the interpreters (although hardly during leisure time). Yet, there are limited barriers to outsiders (the interpreters still have their relations with the local population), while their mutual focus of attention and their shared mood is less than one could wish for, as we must deduce from the findings we just presented. The consequence is that the interaction ritual between the interpreters and the soldiers may tend to be failing, draining emotional energy of all participants in the ritual (implying a flat feeling, a sense of a drag and boredom), leading to minor group solidarity and common standards of morality. If it were not for the salaries, local interpreters could even develop a desire to escape, following Collins.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis has shown that the interpreters consciously do not act as ‘translation machines’. By acting as cultural mediators, the interpreters try to keep ‘face’ for the Dutch soldiers as well as for the Afghans. Whenever the honour of an Afghan is injured, it could cause a loss of face for his family or the entire tribe. On the other hand, whenever the Dutch lose face because the soldiers are not able to behave in an appropriate way or because they speak about subjects that are not suitable, the consequences for the mission could be negative. If the Afghan population feels they, their religion or their culture are disrespected by the Dutch, they will no longer have faith in the Dutch and the Dutch would not be able to ‘win their hearts and minds’.

If the situation does not permit the interpreter to give advice, the interpreters decide what is and what is not suitable to translate. They can mitigate or reformulate the uttered sentence. The interpreters are supposed to filter the meaning of the message out of the context and then give their interpretation to the soldiers. So, the reason for changing or adjusting the translation is to be found in the culture of the Afghan society and its communication style.

The interpreters are aware of their task, *transferring communication*, and they take this task very seriously. But they are also aware of the honour culture. Every act of the interpreter regarding translations is related to ‘keeping face’ and to politeness. The interpreters need to ‘interact

strategically', not only for the Afghans, but also for the Dutch soldiers, as well as for themselves. All parties in these Simmelian cliques are vulnerable to a large degree.

The interaction rituals between the soldiers and the interpreter do not always seem to be optimal. The interpreters feel they are not always treated in a proper manner and the soldiers sense they cannot fully trust the interpreters. There is some kind of a segregation between the soldiers and the interpreters, leading to a faint degree of group solidarity, enthusiasm and emotional energy. The interpreters feel the Dutch soldiers should be better prepared for their job prior to deployment; they hold the opinion that the Dutch soldiers must receive more training in cultural awareness in regards of Afghan peculiarities and subtleties. This training should regard cultural awareness not only concerning the population, but also concerning the cooperation with the interpreters themselves.

The importance of the work of interpreters is not to be undervalued. Without the interpreters, no mission is possible. They make communication with the local population effective by communicating in an intercultural, appropriate way and by respecting the cultural values next to the linguistic part of their work. Because of this, they are able to prevent conflicts and to contribute to making the peace mission a success. The interpreter in peace missions in Afghanistan is not only a translator and an advisor, but also, in this political and cultural context, most of all a *face protector*.

## NOTES

1. Mrs. Andrea van Dijk, a Ph.D. student at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Tilburg University.

2. Not all the interpreters wanted their voice to be recorded due to safety reasons; in that case, the interview was written down.

3. For safety reasons, the interviews are anonymous and numbered; so the interpreters' privacy and identities are secured.

4. A *hajji* is someone who has completed the pilgrimage to Mecca.

5. The sample consisted of 278 soldiers and 26 PRT officers returning from deployment; these are raw data that will be analysed in a later publication.

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# NEW WAYS OF MILITARY THINKING AND ACTING FOR A BETTER WORLD: NEW MODELS – PREPARING FORCES TO MASTER UNAVOIDABLE TRANSITIONS

Hermann Jung

## ABSTRACT

*Preparing forces and their allies to operate in a world where asymmetry appears to be the only logical option for adversaries will require some significant and innovative adaptations to training and education methods. New models in leadership, selection, training, and education of leaders and troops are necessary to cope with complexity, non-predictability in conflict solving, and peace support operations. Multidimensional thinking and acting in military decision-making and applying new learning models to build up a climate of change and innovation on all levels of the armed forces is necessary. Organizational learning models, already applied in reshaping civil enterprises, are also useful in restructuring military forces and prepare them for the new challenges. T. Edmunds argues that the emerging new roles of the military cannot only be derived from an “objective functional reassessment” of the nature of new threats but are emerging, rather, as “a consequence of domestic and international*

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**Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos**  
**Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 353–393**  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A025



*socio-political influences that shape state' perception of what their Armed Forces should look like and the purposes they should serve." There is a higher priority for intercultural competences for leaders of all levels of responsibility, especially regarding the operational regions of the future and the globalized outcomes of conflicts in general. Research in this domain shows that methods of "face work" are best accomplished by Ting-Toomey's "identity negotiation." Reshaping, restructuring, and preparing for new core rolls of the military and civil task forces are only to master when the responsible leaders manage to overcome the so-called "blind spot in leadership theories" (C.O. Scharmer), so leadership seems to be more and more a collective method of finding the "self."*

## 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

European Forces are currently undergoing fundamental shifts in their core rolls.<sup>1</sup> Essentially, global players and their allies must master the asymmetric domain. Long-held assumptions about what armed forces are for and how they should be structured are deeply challenged by:

- a decline in the significance of the defence of national territory as a core-structuring principle;
- the increasing necessity to project power abroad swiftly, leading to an organizational model of smaller, highly skilled, flexible force structures;
- the emergence of new security challenges, such as terrorism, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking, etc.;
- a wider domestic responsibility in the social, political, and nation-building domain of states;
- the emergence of non-state adversaries using more likely asymmetric approaches.

Currently, JV2010<sup>2</sup> and JV2020<sup>3</sup> seek to overcome these political and strategic new demands by simply achieving full-spectrum dominance and relying on four primary operational concepts – dominant manoeuvre, focused logistics, precision engagement, and full dimension protection, all enabled by information superiority and interoperability. Additionally there is the problem of fully integrated allied forces and security agencies with no comparable standards in training and education.

But as [Edmunds \(2006\)](#) in his publication argues, the emerging new roles of the military cannot only be derived from an "objective functional

reassessment” of the nature of new threats but are emerging, rather, as “a consequence of domestic and international socio-political influences that shape state’s perception of what their armed forces should look like and the purposes they should serve.”

## **2. TRAINING AND EDUCATION**

Preparing forces and their allies to operate in a world where asymmetry appears to be the only logical option for adversaries will require some significant and innovative adaptations to training and education methods. Essentially, the likely use of asymmetric approaches by adversaries requires that especially the global player’s force be trained to face a multiplicity of asymmetric, from a host of players in a vast array of complex environments, all intended to foil the forces’ ability to deploy and fight as designed. It cannot rely on training to face a like-minded enemy military force as a successful approach for military preparation against asymmetry because the world of conflict is no longer a simple blue versus red equation, but increasingly a blue versus red versus green versus orange *mélange*. The challenge of training and educating a force for asymmetry will be an imposing one for the military training system that has perfected the preparation of forces for war for over 50 years. Successfully preparing forces will mean allowing asymmetry to be a valid, legitimate partner in training, education, exercises, and experimentation. Training and education must begin to incorporate asymmetry as a fact of life, one which requires military personnel to adapt the way they learn and think about the complex operational environments they face and the potential for asymmetry to be a dominant challenge. Educating forces of Western democracies will mean to embrace and cope with uncertainty as a key component to developing adaptive leaders who can effectively manage the demands of future operational environments.

The force must become adept at internalizing what are now considered different ways of learning about and coping with future conflict, but which, over time, will become second nature. Similar to the way planners now use the crisis action planning process as a guideline to prepare for an operation, their training and education allow them to adapt this process to emerging situations. They know which steps must be taken and which can be bypassed, based on experience and insight but within established parameters of recognized military mission areas. In the same way, forces trained throughout their careers to assess and plan for potential operational

environments – incorporating asymmetric dynamics as a matter of course – will facilitate adaptive courses of action most suitable to achieving success. Exercises must allow asymmetric “red teams” to bring the full force of their potential to bear. Over time, as exercise participants are allowed to explore the dynamics of asymmetry involved, a new level of learning will be achieved. Insights into how to anticipate asymmetric approaches, how various actors can bring asymmetry to bear on mission phases, and how the effects of asymmetry can be reduced or mitigated will be gained and provide a true value added for the training audience.

Experimentation and threat exploration are probably the most valuable vehicles in force preparation for asymmetry. They offer the best opportunity to develop the methods and organizational structures that will defeat asymmetry or render it irrelevant.

Through experimentation and exploration, unconstrained by rigid adherence to existing doctrine and operational concepts, potential offensive strategies or pro-active response mechanisms to asymmetry can emerge.

### *2.1. Transformation<sup>4</sup>*

The intent of this transition is to develop the appropriate processes, refine doctrine, organization, training, materials, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), and institutionalize consideration of asymmetric dynamics as a relevant, legitimate concern at all levels among all disciplines. The end-state transformation would essentially fully integrate the asymmetric domain into the JV2010 and JV2020 construct. The transformation would result in the problem of asymmetry becoming manageable and with some exceptions, a normal part of military operations today and tomorrow. Transformation would institutionalize understanding of the scope, significance, and impact of the problem set, and provide the necessary tools and processes to support planning and operational responses to asymmetry. Some asymmetric threats will still fall outside the military’s ability to anticipate or will require a unique response outside the normal parameters of strategy, plans, and operational processes.

### *2.2. Innovative Leadership<sup>5</sup>*

The dynamic nature of joint operations in the 21st century battlespace will require a continued emphasis on developing strong leadership skills. While

we must do everything possible to leverage the power of advanced technologies, there are inherent limitations. Confronting the inevitable friction and fog of war<sup>6</sup> against a resourceful and strong minded adversary, the human dimension including innovative strategic and operational thinking and strong leadership will be essential to achieve decisive results. Effective leadership provides our greatest hedge against uncertainty. Western Forces and their allies will build on the enduring foundation of functional expertise, core values, and high ethical standards.<sup>7</sup> Future leaders at all levels of command must understand the interrelationships among military power, diplomacy, and economic pressure, as well as the role of various government agencies and non-governmental actors, in achieving security objectives. They will require a sophisticated understanding of historical context and communication skills to succeed in the future. The evolution of command structures, increased pace and scope of operations, and the continuing refinement of force structure and organizations will require leaders with a knowledge of the capabilities of all services. Without sacrificing their basic service competencies, these future leaders must be schooled in joint operations from the beginning of their careers. This leadership development must begin with rigorous selection processes and extend beyond formal education and training. Hands-on experience in a variety of progressive assignments must stress innovation, dealing with ambiguity, and a sophisticated understanding of the military art. In short, all leaders must demonstrate the very highest levels of skill and versatility in ever more complex joint and multinational operations.

### **3. MULTIDIMENSIONAL THINKING AND ACTING<sup>8</sup>**

Experts maintain that the current approach to military operations – strategic, operational, and tactical – as it is true for all Western democracies – is too linear for today’s contemporary operating environment. Future warfighters must move beyond linear thought and action to a realm of thinking and acting that recognizes and accepts paired yet opposite ideas and actions: “Look before you leap,” and at the same time understand that “he who hesitates is lost.”

Traditionally, nation-state attacks another with military force, and the response is rather predictable.

Today, the qualities of nation-states are no longer required to initiate attacks; attacks may not even have traditional military qualities, and prediction is just not as calculable as before.

“Asymmetric warfare” shapes the future. Some postulate that the problem of asymmetric conflict is at the strategic level. The underlying assumption of Western military thinking and acting is that we can address asymmetric problems with hierarchically directed linear thinking. The argument is that the strategic, operational, and tactical paradigm exists because it enables the military to adapt through echelonment.

The danger is that structure ends up driving response instead of needed capabilities and values driving organizational response.

### *3.1. Fractal Thinking*

Linear way of thinking and acting is inadequate, given the nature of conflict in the postmodern era. The preferred new paradigm must have several characteristics that set it apart from the traditional strategic paradigm:

It must have a fractal quality that allows us to take simultaneous full spectrum looks at human information processing.

What we really need is an alternative paradigm that gives us a new and better way of thinking and acting. The new approach should provide a range of insights that enable commanders to instantly conceptualize a pattern of multidimensional possibilities that lead to breakthrough concepts and values.

### *3.2. Change and Innovation*

Change is constant, encompassing every aspect of our lives. Significant forces – globalization, restructuring of the international order, and the rise of internetted communications – have dramatically transformed our personal landscape and the world in which we live. Within a short span of a decade, the information age has exacerbated the continuous challenge of change. Few remain untouched.

Most large organizations, particularly commercial enterprises, have found that innovation is the key to institutional survival, embracing continuous adaptation to remain ahead of their competitors. For the military, this notion of relentless competition has a special significance. Our “competitors” are living, thinking, adaptive adversaries who mean to destroy us and the society we defend. Our choice is quite clear: “adapt or die.” Failure does

not mean Chapter 9/11 and an updated resume. Failure means death and destruction for ourselves, our comrades, and all that we cherish.

Failure, though unthinkable, is not impossible. A position as the world's leading military power only reinforces the imperative for adaptation, innovation, and learning. Emerging powers are studying our successes, efficiently copying our strengths and tailoring their own capabilities to attack our perceived vulnerabilities. Others are developing asymmetric strategies, developing threats that avoid or circumvent our current capabilities altogether. In the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment we face for the foreseeable future, if we were to choose merely one advantage over our adversaries, it would certainly be the following: to be superior in the art of learning and adaptation. This is the imperative for a culture of innovation in all Western democracies. The underpinnings of such a culture exist throughout the US Army and elsewhere in Western cultures today. In the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have proven that we have soldiers and leaders of courage and imagination, innovative warriors who adapt on an hourly basis to overcome a determined adversary. And in spite of societal stereotypes, the US Army has an extraordinary record of anticipating and leading change.

Changing our culture now is not about introducing innovation – we know what innovation is. It is about changing how and when we innovate in order to abbreviate the cycles of change. It is about taking our legacy of tactical innovation and extending it to the strategic and institutional dimensions of our Army.

Ultimately, our ability to rapidly adapt our DOTMLPF will be the measure of our institutionally agility – and clear proof of a culture of innovation.

#### **4. A CULTURE OF INNOVATION**

Culture is our set of subconscious assumptions – an organization's collective "state of mind." As such, it is frustratingly difficult to describe and articulate. The Department of the Army has tentatively defined a culture of innovation as one in which people at all levels pro-actively develop and implement new ways of achieving individual, unit, and institutional excellence and effectiveness. A culture of innovation is typified by an environment within which every single person in the organization is invested in the organization's success and feels a responsibility to implement new and better ways to achieve organizational objectives. People are encouraged to try alternative paths, test ideas to the point of failure, and learn from the

experience. Experimentation and prudent risk taking are admired and encouraged – and experimentation is not a destination to be reached but an unending process of trial, feedback, learning, renewal, and experimentation again. The organization as a whole is agile, ready to learn, continually changing, and improving. It is fast, flexible, and is never prepared to say “we have finished getting better.”

If we do not develop within the institutional Army an ability to innovate at the pace required of the rapidly evolving future battlespace, then we will become increasingly irrelevant to the soldiers who walk point and the officer and NCOs who lead them. The most significant change we must assimilate is the rate of change itself. Our institutional Army and field Army must relate seamlessly to ensure continued success and a critical element of this relationship is creating an institutional culture of innovation that supports today’s fighting force, while designing and building tomorrow’s. How do we do that? What has prevented us in the past and how can we begin to make changes immediately that will eventually change the institutional cultural?

#### *4.1. Impediments to a Culture of Innovation*

We have noted that as a set of unconscious assumptions, the Army’s culture is difficult to articulate. The impediments to a culture of innovation may be equally subtle, but we must recognize them if organizational behaviours are to change, and ultimately the culture itself.

##### *4.1.1. Responsibility*

Leadership of the Army is an awesome responsibility. Senior leaders are stewards of the nation’s ultimate arm of decision – the foundation of our national security. The Army has real world obligations that must be met on a daily basis, and even more daunting strategic response obligations to Regional Combatant Commanders around the globe. Leaders understand the need to anticipate and lead change for the future, but they are also compelled by the obligations of the present. Every responsible Army senior leader must ask: “What if we fight tonight?” Such responsibilities do not preclude the desire for change – they may in fact reinforce them. But they significantly narrow the range and scope of feasible innovative pursuits.

##### *4.1.2. Complexity*

Modern land warfare is one of the most complex undertakings imaginable. Our basic way of war is to apply every available means of national power in

synergetic combinations that overwhelm our opponents. This application requires a dizzying array of skills, techniques, forces, and munitions. Each application must account for land terrain environments which are diverse, unique, and dynamic. The complexity of land warfare makes it extremely difficult to estimate the second- and third-order effects of any one action. A central tenet of Army thinking – later adopted by the Joint community – is the criticality of viewing any change comprehensively (across the dimensions of DOTLMPF). Army leaders understand this implicitly and view significant change with care. They are – quite properly – concerned that any innovation is properly integrated so that it can reinforce the synergy of our combined arms operations.

#### *4.1.3. Process*

The prescription for complexity is process, and over time the Army has applied this antidote to the point of addiction. Process is important, but excessive focus on process versus product significantly impedes innovation. Process is better suited for optimization rather than innovation. A process-dependent organization like the Army can quickly lose the product forest in the process trees. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution System, the Army's resource allocation process, is by itself a complex monster that demands constant feeding. PPBES exerts a powerful gravitational force on any effort to change and can cause timely ideas to languish because the process is too long, too complicated to be understood, and not responsive to the pace of ideas and technology. Below the Institutional Army level, internal processes and structures that lend required order and routine to our lives can also hinder innovation. Examples include human resource policies that manage people as inputs rather than outputs, labyrinthine organizational structures that frustrate interdisciplinary networking, and reporting procedures that focus more on things than on ideas. The notion of process is central to our pursuit of a culture of innovation, because there is another culture – the culture of process – that it must supplant.

#### *4.1.4. Army Campaign Mindset*

Every organization is both beneficiary and prisoner to its past successes, and the Western Armies have an extraordinary record of success in its charter for prompt and sustained combat on land. Up to this point, geography and the international environment have allowed us to focus on the sustained dimension of our mission following deployment. In our thinking, combat developments, training, and wargaming, we are more apt to examine the Army engaged rather than the Army deploying. We deployed before we



fought, to be sure, but in the past these deployments have afforded us the time to adjust, react, and adapt our organizations, equipments, and plans to the targeted threat. But in this globalized world our geography is no longer a protection, and we must deploy rapidly – and fight immediately – to deter and defeat our adversaries. There is a renewed premium on adaptation and innovation, not only on the part of our tactical formations, but also on the part of the institutional Army which deploys them.

Our mental image was not only one of sustained combat – it was primarily an Army image. Joint coordination was the task of a higher echelon headquarters, and such coordination focused on deconfliction rather than interdependence. In a joint environment that was only deconflicted, we really did not need to know much about the joint context. We developed Army concepts-based requirements and doctrine, long before the emergence of joint concepts and doctrine. Where an organizational hierarchy manages knowledge by subordinating it to process, the potency of the knowledge the institution does possess is inevitably dissipated. With all operations reduced to routine, knowledge counts for less and less until its acuity – its capacity for affecting change – simply disappears. The management of expert knowledge, which existed in abundance at all organizational levels, nevertheless worked against its critical influence over the larger, policy-level decisions made within the agency (Spiller).

That reality has changed. Rather than an Army-specific campaign mindset, we seek a joint and expeditionary mindset. Such a mindset is necessary but will bring its own challenges, because joint planning and development brings its own set of responsibilities, complexities, and yes – processes – thereby reinforcing the imperative for a culture of innovation.

#### *4.2. The Innovator's Dilemma*

In the book *The Innovator's Dilemma*, Christensen examined the reasons why “leaders lose” – why companies, many of them very good companies, fail to stay atop their field when confronted with disruptive market and technological change. Most successful businesses became number one in their field within a cultural and organizational framework that both its leaders and its customers were heavily invested in. Fundamentally changing that framework at the height of success was completely counterintuitive. The Army faces a similar challenge. When the Army vetted the idea of transformation with the Combatant Commanders four years ago, most acknowledged the need for change – but many also stated that their near-term

requirement was for “another heavy division.” Our “customers” are more focused on the optimization of their current capabilities as a hedge against today’s potential crises, rather than how the force will look and operate in 20 years.

There are other impediments to innovation, but those described provide a sufficient glimpse of the challenges that the institutional Army must overcome to become rapidly innovative.

#### *4.2.1. Changing the Mindset*

Paradoxically, to alter our culture, we must address everything – other than culture. As John Kotter describes in *Leading Change*, culture is not amenable to direct attack. No amount of blue ribbon panels, chain teaching, or “Innovative Activity Reports” will change the culture. Behaviour drives culture. To change the culture, we must change behaviour.

Changing mindset in the military domain should not reject traditional levels of analysis such as strategy, operations, and tactics but should put them as secondary concepts.

It must emphasize concepts such as simultaneity of paradoxes, comprehending activities in multiple time orientations, and embracing environmental complexity (unpredictability) as a normal condition.

Some may argue that increasing the speed of linear decision-making will address the chaotic nature of unfolding events, but that is not the case. But above all, linear thinking and acting disallow the existence of contradiction.

The proposed alternatives suggest that information processing is paradoxical, considers multiple time orientations, is non-linear, and is more than two dimensional.

This new way of thinking goes beyond rational thinking.


### *4.3. Multidimensional Thinking*

Multidimensional thinking makes it possible to make sense of the postmodern world in an almost circular, interconnected, interdependent way and, as a result, represents a more accurate understanding of the nature of complex human information processing. The “Janusian framework” provides a complex, four-way, interdependent, interactive model for thinking and acting that goes beyond the traditional linear processing associated with strategy, operations, and tactics and helps us to understand what we could otherwise not decipher or comprehend. The framework provides the remarkable insight that the basic pattern of thinking and acting

is fractal. In other words, conceptual patterns repeat endlessly, regardless of the field of study we are interested in.

In 1965, Emery and Trist produced a seminal work describing “the causal texture of organizational environments.” These descriptions were based on the degree of turbulence (placid, disturbed, and turbulent) and the degree of interconnectedness present in the organization (random, clustered, reactive, and mutual). They organized these conditions into four environmental conditions: placid–clustered, turbulent–mutual, disturbed–reactive, and placid–random. Emery and Trist suggest there are corresponding coping mechanisms for each texture of the environment. The Janusian four-square (multidimensional) model applies to studying postmodern conflict like an overlay. It offers substantial insight also into the war on terrorism. The authors propose that these conditions correspond to four types of conflict that also yield distinctive coping mechanisms.

The (Janusian) multidimensional paradigm corresponds remarkably well with Emery and Trist’s model. It is important to remember that the four environments depicted in the following figure always exist simultaneously. Strategy, operations, and tactics are relevant only in addressing type C conflict in its ideal form. Type C conflict does not occur in isolation from the other types of conflict but in combination with them; hence, the strategic–operational–tactical thinking and acting is insufficient.



Relying on strategy, operations, and tactics as patterned responses to conflict alone produces always a certain amount of structural inertia. Unfortunately large hierarchical structured forces are often the source of undesirable structural inertia. The structural inertia that afflicts large organizations impedes their learning from small and dispersed operations.

So current Training Doctrines (TRADOC) cannot translate such experiences into force structure very well. When TRADOC tries to synthesize lessons learned, it tends to miss the essence and differences of each operation; hence, the value of change is diluted. Postmodern conflict should be examined not only through the constrained lens of strategic direction, campaigns, and tactics, but also on a larger pattern of information processing through a pattern of multidimensional thinking. To embrace this new paradigm, we must transcend old ways of thinking and acting. For the military, a transformation in thinking and acting must accompany the Army's effort to transform its current organizational structure and equipment. In other words, military leaders must understand the fractal aspects of examining the approach to thinking about how and why permanent organizations are structured as well as understand how to apply fractal notions to task-organized echelons. The flexibility that is achieved through task organizing must become common within the units themselves. Units must become more self-organizing. This framework permits all four types of conflict to occur simultaneously in various intensities.

#### *4.3.1. Low-intensity, High-uncertainty Conflict (Type A Conflict)<sup>9</sup>*

Tactics are insufficient, and strategy becomes important because survival becomes the dominant motivator. Strategy's purpose is to find the optimal location of safety in the environment.

#### *4.3.2. High-intensity, High-uncertainty Conflict (Type B Conflict)*

The turbulent field and the effects of unpredictable mutual causality shown in quadrant B are the dominant conflict types we are faced with today. In turbulent fields, boundary protection (strategy), linked tactics (operations), and order (tactics) no longer suffice. Events are so mutually causal that there is no longer a distinction between what was once considered tactical and that relatively autonomous and covert special forces teams or individuals sometimes make assessments and have to act without anything more than the strongly held values of their profession and country.

In reality, these ideal types of conflict do not occur apart from one another. The multidimensional framework permits all four to occur simultaneously in remarkable patterns. The authors maintain that type B conflicts dominate the pattern of the present war on terrorism which has strategic significance. Today, all global players are deeply enmeshed in global and regional activities. Consequences that flow from activities in such an environment are highly uncertain and interconnected so that exclusively relying on the hierarchy of strategy, operations, and tactics becomes problematic because of the need to adjust rapidly to situational change.

#### *4.3.3. High-intensity, Low-uncertainty Conflict (Type C Conflict)*

Coping requires an operational level of response because tactics and strategy are no longer sufficient. Global players see others emerge and occupy a similar status in our environmental domain. This type of environment dominated world conflict in the 20th century.

#### *4.3.4. Low-intensity, Low-uncertainty Conflict (Type D Conflict)*

“There is no distinction between tactics and strategy,” and the optimal strategy is just the simple tactic of attempting to do one’s best to react in real time. At best, only partial stability of the environment can be achieved because strategic, operational, and tactical processes neither influence events rapidly enough nor are they flexible enough for the random nature of type B conflict. In B–D patterns of conflict, stability can only be achieved through shared values because strategy, operations, and tactics cannot direct obligatory responses rapidly enough. Responses must come from a diffuse and flexible capability, which is the result of dispersed thinking and acting, based on appreciating the emerging situation and executing decisions based on a common set of values as well as habitual or professional action such as well-rehearsed standing operating procedures. For example, relatively autonomous and covert special forces teams or individuals sometimes make assessments and act without anything more than the strongly held values of their profession and country. US Army Rangers displayed this idealistic thinking and acting when rescuing their fellow soldiers in Somalia in 1993.<sup>10</sup> Strategy, operations, and tactics were so compressed that they were relegated to secondary criteria for decision-making. In this situation, these Rangers displayed an on-the-ground example of non-hierarchical thinking and acting that went beyond strategy, operations, and tactics. The leader’s challenge becomes how to shape an appropriate value system that leads soldiers to do the right thing. A list of formal organizational

values – something that all Western Army has recently developed – may be insufficient. The intuitive “reasonable man” view of humankind assumes dominance over the value-maximizing “rational man” concept. These autonomous social forces outweigh formal rules and structure, and free us to think in new configurations. Leaders can no longer rely on the dominant framework of processing information predominantly through the metaphysical interpretations of existentialism and rationality. Instead, leaders use the coping mechanism of shared values and specific routine actions to understand surprise or the enemy’s intent. The difference we must perceive in our present condition is that, in light of the human processing the type B pattern of conflict requires, idealism must dominate multidimensional thinking and acting. In the postmodern conflict, we must understand not only where the enemy is located physically, but also where he is morally related – what drove him to accept a certain set of moral values that put him there in the first place.


In the B–D pattern of conflict, we must provide at least secondary, but not necessarily less important, emphasis on the reactive coping mechanism of doing the best we can. The B–D pattern requires the simultaneous, instinctive actions of the highly trained tribal warrior and the cleverness of the 21st century soldier-entrepreneur. The framework requires formulating new and complex recipes for thinking and acting in multiple patterns rather than embracing a singular one. Instead of using a linear thinking model to decide between competing values, the trick is to find a positive zone among them by using a non-linear thinking model. All patterns in various mixtures are important to give relevance to the simultaneity of opposites, multiple time orientations, complex spatial relationships, and degrees of interconnected cause and effect.

#### *4.4. Implications for Military Leaders*

##### *4.4.1. Thinking and Acting in Opposites; Embracing a Unity of Opposites*

Weick (1979) explains that “People try to fit novel interpretations and actions. New forms of organizing, such as the highly flexible network organizations, require a new power structure, something that the traditional military culture may find inconceivable: rank and hierarchical positional authority would have to give way to expert power and lateral forms of leadership. But when something new does not fit with the past, it is often discarded or misread.”

4.4.2. *The Emerging Dominance of Idealism*



The postmodern era requires that our military leaders embrace new types of thinking and acting that affect postmodern living. These new types of thinking and acting exist simultaneously and with varying intensities and ambiguities as shown in the above figure. When military leaders consciously adopt the multidimensional paradigm as an intellectual framework, they add tremendous value and balance to their understanding of strategy, operation, and tactics. Military leaders must be able to link and integrate military, political, social, and psychological thought processes into a coherent approach to thinking about warfare and military operations in a complex world; otherwise, they might get locked into a linear mode of thought that not only limits their options, but also leads them onto the wrong conflict path.

A greater emphasis should be placed on non-routine, appreciative inquiry – appreciative intelligence that considers multiple and different patterned sensemaking across multiple time orientations. How we work will also be affected, requiring multiple and simultaneous responses. In a B–D pattern of conflict, how we work will require an expanded reverence for philosophical interests such as clashes of the spiritual sensing of reality or value-to-value relationships.

Weick further explains that “[Leadership] problems persist because [leaders] continue to believe that there are such things as unilateral

causation, independent and dependent variables, origins, and terminations .... Those assertions are wrong because each of them demonstrably also operates in the opposite direction: So productivity affects leadership style, children socialize parents, responses affect stimuli, means affect ends, actions affect desires. In every one of these examples, causation is circular, not linear.”

Leaders must look at today’s conflict in terms of global sensemaking and realize that adversaries use values to motivate a different kind of soldier and to shape the battlefield. In today’s conflicts, terrorists control the environment, a B quadrant activity, yet the Western global players have been responding bureaucratically, a type D response. So forming the Homeland Security Office, tightening airport and airplane security, and screening mail are all bureaucratic responses to the type B environment. To be successful in this war, Western democracies must create an environment that is more turbulent and uncertain for the terrorists than the one they created for the West.

The terrorized Western democracies must seize the initiative in the B quadrant while sustaining the others. They must embrace dispersed, decentralized control and self-designing or self-managing capabilities that current systems do not promote or even allow to the needed degree. Many military commanders want to develop practical doctrinal prescriptions because they embrace the rational actor model. They should move away from such absolute linear thinking. Especially the United States cannot afford to play a linear, tactical game of localized checkers while its adversaries play a patterned, global game of three-dimensional chess – one that uses a variety of moves employing different capabilities that can be sacrificed as long as the objective is not achieved.

#### *4.4.3. Developing Hyperadaptive Organization Structures that Emphasize Teams that can Anticipate and Respond under Type B Conflict*


Non-routine, appreciative inquiry shapes the need to self-organized non-traditional intelligent organizations that consider multiple and different patterned meanings. Organizing requires emphasis on building teams, not monolithic, hierarchical units. In practical terms, this means organizing the military as an integral part of larger government capabilities based on multiple continua of adaptations needed for infinite configurations of conflict. There is a big difference between fighting a conflict by using current organizational capabilities and fighting a conflict by organizing around required capabilities.

The politico-hierarchical structure, or “polyarchy,” of current Western politico-military system is inadequate for type B conflict. New forms of



organizing, such as the highly flexible network organizations, require a new power structure, something that the traditional military culture may find inconceivable. Rank and hierarchical positional authority would have to give way to expert power and lateral forms of leadership. Instead of addressing levels of leadership – clearly a linear way of responding – the military must address patterned archetypes of the environment that require leadership effectiveness. Traditional top-down leadership can no longer be the only consideration for military management. Rather, the emerging pattern of conflict is best met with non-traditional, ad hoc, flexible ways of organizing with members who are continuously self-designing, capabilities based on their unyielding shared values, and mutual understanding of what is happening in the environment. This kind of adaptive organizing encourages innovative social and technical designs that are non-hierarchical and to some extent non-rational. Perhaps the special operations forces models become more attractive. Thinking and acting without orders must be acknowledged as sometimes appropriate in a government and with our citizenry.

Today’s environment will require developing and training confident, self-aware multidimensional thinking and acting military and political leaders who are comfortable with lateral contribution to the planning process and situational assessments regardless of the contributor’s rank or position. This new paradigm requires a fundamental shift from the hierarchical “strategic, organizational, and direct leadership” espoused by current Western Army doctrines.



The new leadership paradigm is all about role complexity. Those who sense and feel shifting organization and environmental patterns and adapt accordingly lead the most effective organizations. Modern Western leadership has to transcend the need for hierarchical leadership because leaders focus on serving and developing high-performance teams.

The short names for these simultaneous roles are:

the motivator, leading commitment (type A conflict);  
the vision setter, leading into an uncertain future (type B conflict);  
the taskmaster, leading against identifiable challenges (type C conflict);  
the analyser, leading compliance (type D conflict).

The notion that values associated with type B conflict and the values of habit associated with type D conflict must become a key source of thinking and acting multidimensional should be embraced. This type of conflict cannot be coped with traditional tactical–operational–strategic linear ways of thinking. But military leaders should not throw away their learning and styles associated with type A and C conflicts – they are still important and must exist simultaneously. However, Western military theories and institutionalized thinking processes are still dominated by a paradigm of linear thinking; hence, the questions of strategy, operations, and tactics still dominate the paradigm for reasoning and responding. Unfortunately, Western military teaching and training institutions are reluctant to make the intellectual pedagogical leap to include a more non-linear, flexible way of theorizing and taking action.

Leaders must individually interpret the environment while maintaining others' visions of it. They must compete while cooperating, and must obey orders, rules, and doctrine while simultaneously thinking and acting to defy them. Military leaders must be able to see themselves through the “eyes” of the supposed adversary to be fit for the 21st-century wars.

## **5. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING**

Argyris and Schön (1978) suggest that each member of an organization constructs his or her own representation or image of the theory-in-use of the whole organization. The picture is always incomplete – and people, thus, are continually working to add pieces and to get a view of the whole. An organization is like an organism, each of whose cells contains a particular, partial, changing image of itself in relation to the whole. And like such an

organism, the organization's practice stems from those very images. Organization is an artefact of individual ways of representing organization.

Hence, organizational learning must concern itself not with static entities called organizations, but with an active process of organizing which is, at root, a cognitive enterprise. Individual members are continually engaged in attempting to know the organization, and to know themselves in the context of the organization. At the same time, their continuing efforts to know and to test their knowledge represent the object of their inquiry.

Members require external references. There must be public representations of organizational theory-in-use to which individuals can refer. This is the function of organizational maps. These are the shared descriptions of the organization which individuals jointly construct and use to guide their own inquiry.

Organizational theory-in-use, continually constructed through individual inquiry, is encoded in private images and public maps. These are the media of organizational learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978, pp. 16–17).

With this set of moves, we can see how Argyris and Schön connect up the individual world of the worker and practitioner with the world of organization. By looking at the way the people jointly construct maps, it is then possible to talk about organizational learning (involving the detection and correction of error) and organizational theory-in-use. For organizational learning to occur, “learning agents,” discoveries, inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organizational memory. If they are not encoded in the images that individuals have, and the maps they construct with others, then “the individual will have learned but the organization will not have done so.”

### *5.1. Different Learning Models*


To fully appreciate theory-in-use, we require a model of the processes involved. To this end, Argyris and Schön (1978) initially looked to three elements:

*Governing variables:* Those dimensions that people are trying to keep within acceptable limits. Any action is likely to impact upon a number of such variables – thus, any situation can trigger a trade-off among governing variables.

*Action strategies:* The moves and plans used by people to keep their governing values within the acceptable range.


*Consequences:* What happens as a result of an action. These can be both intended – those actor believes will result – and unintended. In addition, those consequences can be for the self, and/or for others.

In this dynamic organizational schema, single-loop learning is characterized as when, “members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and external environment of the organization by detecting errors which they then correct so as to maintain the central features of theory-in-use.”



On the other hand, double-loop learning comprises those sorts of organizational inquiry which resolve incompatible organizational norms by setting new priorities and weightings of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves together with associated strategies and assumptions.

This process can be represented quite easily by a simple amendment of our initial representation of theory-in-use.



Single-loop learning seems to be present when goals, values, frameworks, and, to a significant extent, strategies are taken for granted. The emphasis is on techniques and making techniques more efficient.

The significant features of double-loop learning include the ability to call upon good quality data and to make inferences. It looks to include the views and experiences of participants rather than seeking to impose a view on the situation. Theories should be made explicit and tested, and positions should be reasoned and open to exploration by others. In other words, double-loop learning can be seen as dialogical – and more likely to be found in settings and organizations that look to shared leadership. It looks to:

- emphasize common goals and mutual influence;
- encourage open communication, and to publicly test assumptions and beliefs;
- combine advocacy with inquiry.

### *5.1.1. Double-loop Learning Characteristics*

Double-loop learning models are characterized by:

valid information;  
free and informed choice;  
internal commitment.

The strategies of double-loop learning include:

sharing control;  
participation in design and implementation of action.

The double-loop learning is operationalized by:

attribution and evaluation illustrated with relatively directly observable data;  
surfacing conflicting view;  
encouraging public testing of evaluations.

The consequences of double-loop learning should include:

minimally defensive relationships;  
high freedom of choice;  
increased likelihood of double-loop learning.

### *5.1.2. Single-loop Learning Characteristics*

Single-loop learning models are characterized by:

defensiveness, self-fulfilling prophecies;  
self-fuelling processes;  
escalating error.

These systems involve a web of feedback loops that “make organizational assumptions and behavioural routines self-reinforcing – inhibiting “detection and correction of error” and giving rise to mistrust, defensiveness and self-fulfilling prophecy.”

In other words, if individuals in an organization make use of single-loop learning models, the organization itself can begin to function in ways that act against its long-term interests. Indeed, in a very real sense, systems can begin to malfunction. As Argyris and Schön put it, “The actions we take to promote productive organizational learning actually inhibit deeper

learning.” The challenge is, then, to create a rare phenomenon – a double-loop learning system.

According to *Argyris and Schön (1978)*, the “interventionist” has therefore to move through six phases of work with his clients:

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Phase 1	Mapping the problem as clients see it. This includes the factors and relationships that define the problem, and the relationship with the living systems of the organization
Phase 2	The internalization of the map by clients. Through inquiry and confrontation, the interventionists work with clients to develop a map for which clients can accept responsibility. However, it also needs to be comprehensive
Phase 3	Test the model. This involves looking at what “testable predictions” can be derived from the map – and looking to practice and history to see if the predictions stand up. If they do not, the map has to be modified
Phase 4	Invent solutions to the problem and simulate them to explore their possible impact
Phase 5	Produce the intervention
Phase 6	Study the impact. This allows for the correction of errors as well as generating knowledge for future designs. If things work well under the conditions specified by the model, then the map is not disconfirmed

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By running through this sequence and attending to key criteria suggested by double-loop learning, it is argued that organizational development is possible. The process entails looking for the maximum participation of clients, minimizing the risks of candid participation, starting where people want to begin (often with instrumental problems), and designing methods so that they value rationality and honesty.

### *5.2. Evaluation*

How are we to evaluate these models and line of argument?

First, we can say that while there has been a growing research base concerning the models and interventionist strategy, it is still limited – and

people sympathetic to the approach have largely undertaken it. However, as Senge's (2002) experience demonstrates, the process and the focus on reflection-in-action does appear to bear fruit in terms of people's connection with the exercise and their readiness to explore personal and organizational questions.

Second, it is assumed that "second loop learning" takes place in a climate of openness where "political behaviour is minimized." This is an assumption that can be questioned. It depends on the meaning of the term "political." It could be argued that organizations are inherently political – and that it is important to recognize this. Organizations can be seen as coalitions of various individuals and interest groups. Organizational goals, structure, and policies emerge from an ongoing process of bargaining and negotiation among major interest groups. Thus, perhaps we need to develop a theory that looks to the political nature of structures, knowledge, and information.

Third, and this might be my prejudice, I think we need to be distrustful of bipolar models like "single-loop vs. double-loop learning models." They tend to set up an "either-or" orientation. They are useful as teaching or sensitizing devices, alerting us to different and important aspects of organizational life, but the area between the models – and even beyond them – might well yield interesting alternatives.


Fourth, the interventionist strategy is staged or phased – and this does bring with it some more problems. Why should things operate in this order? Rather than there being phases, we could argue that intervention of this kind involves a number of elements, dimensions, and phases working at different levels simultaneously.

This said, the theorizing of theory-in-action, the transitional power of the models, and the conceptualization of organizational learning have been, and continue to be, significant contributions to our appreciation of processes in organizations. The notion of "double-loop learning" does help us to approach some of the more taken-for-granted aspects of organizations and experiences. It provides us with a way of naming a phenomenon and problem, and a possible way of "learning our way." Argyris and Schön have made a significant contribution to pragmatic learning theory and by introducing the term "theory" or "theory in action," they provide the function of abstract conceptualization more structure and more coherence.

It is a significant development – but it has gone largely unnoticed in the adult education and lifelong learning fields. This is a result, in part, of rather blinkered reading by professionals and academics within that area, and

because Argyris and Schön did not address, to any significant degree, the arena directly.<sup>11</sup>

## **6. A NEW LIFELONG LEARNING FIELD – INTERCULTURAL LEARNING AS IDENTITY NEGOTIATION<sup>12</sup>**




New means of analysing intercultural training situations and adapting them to the need of military task forces are presented by Engström's system of "active theory" in connection with Ting-Toomey's concept of "mindful identity negotiation."<sup>13</sup>

Engström develops his interpretation of activity theory in accordance with assumptions and concepts of the "cultural-historical theory of activity," which was developed by Vygotsky (1978), Leontjev (1978, 1981), and Luria (1979), in short: activity theory.<sup>14</sup>

### *6.1. A Frame of a Socially Distributed Activity System*

This frame connects the individual intercultural learning procedure with all other interdependent variables – the group of trainers or scholars following the same aim creating the total learning environment. The projected outcome is no longer momentary and only situational. On the contrary, it consists of new objectified meanings which are important for the learning community.





Arising contradictions and opposing forces between central elements of the activity system are indicated by double arrows (figure).

In the light of the dynamics in the presented “activity system,” we have to give up the imagination of a learning process of a continuum from novice to expert as a simple linear process of internalizing as much of the necessary knowledge. On the contrary, we need to distinguish between internalizing of ideas, artefacts, and procedures already developed and their externalization as a creative new act as the learning process is going on. Both belong to experience and practice – when practice is understood as a meaningful collective activity, not only as individual rehearsing of learned skills.<sup>15</sup> These two processes of internalization and externalization can be seen as recurrent processes.

Before explaining the system in details, it is necessary to describe the notions of each basic element:

*Subject* refers to the individual or group whose point of view is adopted in the analysis. The *object* refers to situation-bound goals to be achieved by certain actions, for example, categories for describing intercultural interaction situations and necessary organizational plans directed to the activity.

*Instruments* or tools refer to artefacts as human products, for example, cultural objects, signs or symbols, language, mental concepts, and social institutions.

*Rules* refer to explicit or implicit regulations that determine or constrain actions. *Community* refers to all participants in an activity system who share the same object/aim. *Division of labour* refers to the distribution of tasks, authority, or benefits of the activity system.

The *outcome* refers to the transformed objects, such as new patterns of collaboration, new intellectual tools, concepts, theories, etc.

The central idea of activity theory is mediation of human action through cultural artefacts. It means that the subject and the object are mediated by instruments or cultural artefacts, such as symbols and representations of various kinds. But at the same time, the activity is also mediated by less visible social mediators like rules, community, and division of labour (Engeström, 1992, p. 12).

The *tensions* and *contradictions* which arise between the elements of the activity system are the motivating force of change and development. Thus, activity systems are characterized by continuous transitions and transformations between the components. The activity system does not exist in a vacuum. It is rather one node in a multidimensional network of interdependent activity systems.

#### *6.1.1. Ting-Toomey's Mindful Identity Negotiation*

Weber (2005) had the idea to combine the “activity theory system” with the “mindful identity negotiation” framework. In her opinion, Ting-Toomey’s (1999) heuristic framework of “mindful identity negotiation” fits into the system, because she also places major emphasis on the aspects of identity.

#### *6.1.2. Understanding Cultures (Ting-Toomey, 1992)*

Ting-Toomey draws upon work that discusses communication between Eastern and Western cultures, specifically between Asia Pacific cultures and US and Canadian cultures in terms of individualism and collectivism. The individualism/collectivism dynamic has been researched by cross-cultural psychologists, management people, and communications people. The findings, below, are sources in Professor Ting-Toomey’s research.

#### *6.1.3. Understanding Cultures: Four Dimensions of Organizational Management Practices*

Hofstede (1993) has been doing research in the international management area over the past 20 years. His latest database includes US-based multinational subsidiaries consisting of organizational management practices

in 50 countries. Hofstede discusses four dimensions in understanding organizational management practices:

1. *Individualism–collectivism*: This dimension centres on organizational practices in individualistic cultures such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and Great Britain contrasted with collectivistic cultures in East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore).
2. *Power distance*: Low power distance (Canada and the United States) subscribes to equal power distribution versus high power distance (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, etc.) in hierarchical structures.
3. *Uncertainty avoidance*: Hofstede found that Canada and the United States are low in uncertainty avoidance, that is, they like to take risks and individual initiative, and enjoy conflict, whereas cultures like Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea are high in uncertainty avoidance, that is, they do not like conflict, but pursue group harmony; people within these organizations need clear rules, procedures, and clearly defined job responsibilities.
4. *Masculinity versus femininity*: This dimension has been controversial because many people feel it is sexist. Hofstede discovered that Japan rated high on masculine dimensions (males expect an “in-charge” role). In contrast, countries like Norway and Sweden have a stronger feminine dimension, which means that roles are more fluid between males and females. Canada rated high on the masculine dimension compared with many Northern European organizational practices.

*Individualism–Collectivism.* Individualism–collectivism appears to be the most useful of the four dimensions. Professor Ting-Toomey (and her colleagues), Michael Bond, Harry Triandis, and Geert Hofstede consistently found that the individualistic and collectivistic dimension teaches the most about differences between cultures, particularly between East Asian and Western cultures. Individualism and collectivism are connected with the concept of identity, that is, the way we see our sense of self. Individualistic cultures emphasize the “I” identity and collectivistic cultures emphasize the “we” identity, which is a fundamental difference between Western and Eastern cultures. The relational and communication patterns of this dimension are discussed below.

*Relational Patterns.* The communication process in individualistic cultures focuses on interindividual levels, while collective cultures focus on the group base (whether you are in-group, one of us; or out-group, one of

them). However, individualism and collectivism is not a polarized dimension: cultures function on a continuum. For instance, within the United States or Canada, there are pockets of individualistic ethnic communities and pockets of collectivistic ethnic communities. So when discussing the individualistic versus collectivistic dimension, we are talking about patterns or value orientations within a country, in which there may be many variations. Pointing out the patterns and understanding them is the first step in learning to respect the differences.

*Communication Patterns.* In individualistic cultures, people tend to be verbally direct: we value communication openness, learn to self-disclose, like to be clear and straightforward, and contribute to a positive management climate, whereas in collectivistic group-oriented cultures, indirect communication is preferred because the image of group harmony is essential. In Western cultures, talking is very therapeutic; in Asian cultures, there is an emphasis on observing and reflecting about the process. It is rare in Asian cultures to have open conflict, because it appears to disrupt group harmony.

## *6.2. Face Negotiation*

Professor Ting-Toomey's work focuses on face negotiation and conflict styles. She sees face as symbolic and as a claimed sense of self-respect in a relational situation. Face is a universal phenomenon because everyone would like to be respected; everyone needs a sense of self-respect. But how we manage the strategies in maintaining, saving, or honouring one's face differs across cultures.

### *6.2.1. Low versus High Contexts*

The low versus high context communication framework was developed by Hall (1976). Low versus high contexts (used similarly to individualism and collectivism) focus on the communication process itself. Low context centres on individualistic values and stresses verbal communication, while the high context system centres on group orientations and stresses non-verbal communication.

Immigrant cultures with a pioneer spirit such as Canada, the United States, and Australia tend to exhibit low context communication styles, whereas high context cultures seem to have a longer continuity and history

of culture; so for them, where there is a historical, cultural, or relational context, it is important to understand the communication process.

The low versus high context framework in face negotiation has been used in Professor Ting-Toomey's research in the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan. She has also collected data from Australia, Thailand, and India. Her research consists of open-ended questionnaires and interview data with nearly 1,500 students and colleagues. Some of the concepts she explores are outlined below:

*Face saving:* The following question was asked – “What is the meaning of face?” American students tended to equate the concept of face with saving their own face, that is, pride, reputation, credibility, and self-respect (relating to the ego). For them, face is more individualistic, low context, and is associated with intrapsychic phenomena. Japanese students, on the other hand, understand the concept of face to be related to honour, claimed self-image, and the family/organization. For them, there is more awareness of relational dynamics in the concept of face saving.

*Face giving:* American students could not offer a meaning for face giving, whereas Asian business people/students could talk about the meaning of this term. Therefore, we may assume that face giving is more of an Eastern concern. To Asians, face giving means allowing room for the other person to recover his/her face – room to manoeuvre and negotiate – so both can gain face in the end. For Westerners, face seems to be a dichotomous concept: we either lose face or save face. For Easterners, face is considered to be a mutual, interdependent concept, and is a relational and group phenomenon. Public face is a concern in at least two-thirds of the world's cultures. But in Western cultures, there is also a sense of individual self-respect, the right to be treated with respect, and not to be embarrassed.

*Face losing:* For Americans, loss of face means personal failure, loss of self-esteem, or loss of self-pride on an individual attribution basis, whereas for Japanese and Korean subjects, loss of face means disrupting group harmony, bringing shame to their family, classmates, or company.

*Recovery from face loss:* For Americans and Canadians, humour is a strategy used to recover from face loss; if that does not work in a serious situation, other strategies that may be used are defensive strategies and attack strategies – clear win-lose strategies. Asian cultures, on the other hand, focus more on maintaining the image of a win-win process.

*Conflict:* Conflict is face related in that face appears to be a predictor of what conflict strategies are being used. American subjects, for example, tend

to adopt self-face preservation and maintenance, focus on self-face issues, use control-focused conflict strategies and confrontational strategies, and display stronger win-lose orientations. Asian subjects, on the other hand, tend to use face-smoothing strategies, mutual-face preservation strategies, and conflict avoidance strategies. People from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China use more compromising strategies; Japanese use more controlling styles (i.e., competitive) with out-group members and conflict avoidance with in-group members.

*Face issues:* The word "shame" occurs when feelings are associated with face issues –shame in relation to self, parents, or group situations. However, practices differ between Japanese and Chinese: for the Japanese, if they disgrace their organization, they may also disgrace themselves and their family; for the Chinese, any disgrace reflects on their family honour.

*Dimensions of face:* American subjects centre on autonomy face (freedom) where privacy or personal space is important; high context, collectivistic cultures focus rather on "approval" face. In low context cultures, individual (intrinsic) accountability is emphasized; in high context cultures, however, group accountability or group dynamics may dominate.

### *6.3. Theoretical Implications*

Professor Ting-Toomey has provided a construct for understanding Asian business practices and communication style differences in order to develop other constructs for theoretical and research ideas. Some ideas are conceptualized below:

1. More multicultural team research efforts are needed. We should pay more attention to indigenous cultures, and look at their attitudes towards business practices and communication style differences. We need to identify core constructs with which we are unfamiliar, and are in danger of overlooking. Increased sensitivity is important because of global economic changes.
2. In training people to go overseas, it is critical to teach about low versus high context cultures as part of their applied skills. Listening skills are important in high context cultures. (In Chinese, the character for listening implies listening with your ears, eyes, and heart.) When collectivistic people come to individualistic cultures, they should learn

to share more information, self-disclose, seek information more openly, and seek to reduce uncertainty more than they normally would.

3. Within the face-negotiation framework, identity is important: how do we see the self? Who constitutes the in-group and the out-group? How do we move from out-group to in-group circles? What do we need to do in moving from ritualistic to substantive behavioural acts?
4. How do we develop face-work competency? There are four stages in communication competency:
  - (a) unconscious incompetence implies fundamental ignorance on the cognitive and behavioural levels;
  - (b) conscious incompetence means that behaviour is understood but not synchronized, for example, awareness that there are too many awkward pauses and silences;
  - (c) conscious competence or the “mindful stage” means cognitively understanding communication differences, the patterns and variations of different cultures, and working on behavioural face-work competence;
  - (d) unconscious competence is rather like driving a car or swimming; at a certain point, it becomes spontaneous, natural. Spontaneity is part of practicing face work; you adjust and you adapt. You become “mindlessly mindful” at this final stage.

### 6.3.1. *Motives*

- Socio-economic conditions, multicultural attitudes, degree of institutional support, in- and out-group definitions, degree of cultural differences;
- motivational expectations and cultural knowledge;
- existence of networks, ethnic media, and interpersonal adaptation ability.<sup>16</sup>

Knowledge about one’s own and other cultures is the most critical component in managing intercultural differences.

### 6.3.2. *Communication Skills*

Ting-Toomey suggests various interaction and communication skills:

- “mindful” observation;
- “mindful” listening;
- practicing verbal empathy;
- practicing identity confirmation;
- face-work management skills;
- building up trust;

- collaborative dialogue skills;
- self-reflection.

Mindful identity negotiation requires a high degree of consciousness and reflectivity about the elements and processes of an intercultural encounter. This includes becoming aware of one's own history, value orientations, views, identity needs, etc., as well as questioning one's own routinized behaviour and practices.<sup>17</sup>

#### *6.4. Mindful Identity Negotiation*

This process seems to be crucial to intercultural relationship and in any form of intercultural learning.


The confrontation between different patterns of interpretation and practice leads the individuals to some kind of self-reflection so that they recognize that there are alternative ways to handle a new cultural phenomenon. It is also necessary for the individuals to understand their own identities.

The discussion, in which both partners or groups present, evoke, challenge, and/or support their own and other's desired identities, is often characterized by disharmony. It helps the individuals to come to the insight that there something must be done. This corresponds to the first phase of the expansive learning cycle.

To gain more insight into the alien patterns of interpretation and thinking, the individuals develop adequate instruments of mindful observation/listening. This information enables them to figure out the identity needs, attitudes, cultural orientations, and further cultural knowledge.

They then integrate and transform their extended cultural knowledge with other pending issues, developing relationships and/or conflict styles to develop mindful intercultural skills for the ongoing collective activity. When the partners achieve a commonly shared meaning through negotiation and reach their goals, they feel understood, respected, and supported, and they will judge their negotiation process as appropriate, effective, and satisfactory. So the partners develop a so-called *interculture*.<sup>18</sup> This phase corresponds to the third phase of the expansive learning cycle creating a *new vision*.





The whole process has to be repeated in each new encounter but for economic reasons the partner groups routinize this process. But routines must be controlled from time to time to avoid misunderstandings and failures within the activity system and from time to time implementing necessary adaptations into the model.

## 7. THE BLIND SPOT IN LEADERSHIP THEORIES: INTRODUCTION (SCHARMER, 2002)

There is a blind spot in leadership theory, in the social sciences as well as in our everyday social experience. This blind spot concerns the inner place from which an action – what we do – originates. In the process of conducting our daily business and social lives, we are usually well aware of what we do and what others do; we also have some understanding of the process: how we do things and the processes we and others use when we act. And yet there is a blind spot. If we were to ask the question, “Where does our action come from?” most of us would be unable to provide an answer. The blind spot concerns the (inner) source from which we operate when we do what we do – the quality of attention that we use to relate to and bring forth the world. It is not only what leaders do and how they do it, but also that “interior condition,” the inner place from which they operate. It also can be assumed that organizations, institutions, and societies as a whole may have this blind spot – not only individuals. These theoretical considerations are based on the

Kolb's type of experiential learning: learning based on reflecting the experiences of the past. However, in working with leadership teams across sectors and industries, studies showed that leaders cannot meet the challenges they face by operating only with a past-driven learning cycle. It seemed they have an access to different sources of learning. The existence of a deeper source and cycle of learning, and its uncovering and articulation, is the main thread of Scharmer's studies. He argued that in order to learn from the future as it emerges, individuals, groups, and institutions have to shift the inner place from which they operate. In order to enhance the capacity for creating profound innovations, leaders have to become aware of an inner place from which they operate as individuals and as collective entities, the source from which their action originates.

### *7.1. An Archaeology of Social Fields*

Scharmer refers to this territory of social reality creation as a "field" because a field is "a living system – just as the earth is a living organism."<sup>19</sup> So the quality of the social field is a function of those elements of the field that are invisible to the eye; thus, every good organizational leader focuses all his/her attention on sustaining and enhancing the quality of the social field that he/she is responsible for. The living quality of the – in reality – invisible social field is invisible. The issue in working with social fields is that we have not yet learned how to see behind the social structure, and how to decipher the subtle structures. As every practitioner and experienced consultant knows, it is this invisible territory that is the most important when it comes to creating the conditions for high performance in teams, organizations, and the wider institutional environment. The coming-into-being of social reality starts before people behave and interact in an observable manner.

#### *7.1.1. Field Structures of Attention*


The structure of attention of the actor, group, or organization is the blind spot (in the social field) that corresponds to the invisible structure of the social field beneath the surface. Each field structure of attention embodies a particular type of relationship between the self and the world. Each one makes visible what otherwise is not: the grounding in an archetypal gesture out of which social systems are enacted moment by moment. Scharmer identifies seven field structures of attention – seven procedures linking the self with the world, in order to map the territory of the blind spot (see figure). He calls them:

1. downloading: projecting habits of thought (seeing 0);
2. seeing: precise observation from outside (seeing 1);
3. sensing: perception from within the field/whole (seeing 2);
4. presencing: perception from the source/highest future possibility (seeing 3);
5. crystallizing vision and intent (seeing/acting from the future field);
6. prototyping living examples and microcosms (in dialogue with emerging environments);
7. embodying the new in practices, routines, and infrastructures.

7.2. *The U-process of Presencing*

These seven field structures of attention describe seven different procedures of relating to and bringing forth the (invisible) world. Presencing means to sense and bring into the present everyone’s highest future potential. Every human being and social system has the ability to activate and access this deeper capacity.

And yet, although most people have had already brief experiences of that sort in their lives, presencing is not only very difficult to sustain, but also undoubtedly more difficult to perform on a collective, or institutional, level. In most organizations, people spend most of their time downloading, rather than sensing, or presencing, and so are unable to assess their best future possibilities.



The core of this thesis is a new, collectively enacted social art and technology – “a social technology of freedom.” The basic mechanism of this

technology revolves around illuminating the blind spot. Viewed from this angle, leadership is the capacity to shift the inner place from which a system operates. Accordingly, the most important tool is the leader's self, his or her capacity to perform that shift.

*Presencing* is both an individual and a collective procedure. For a social system to be transformed, it must cross a subtle threshold, a threshold that Scharmer refers to as the eye of the needle. What is the needle's eye? It is the self – people's highest future possibility, both individually and collectively. In the moment we approach that deep threshold, the human beings are able to let go – as economist Brian Arthur once put it, “everything that is not essential has to go away.”

Having crossed this threshold, we experience a subtle and yet fundamental shift of the social field. Scharmer calls it *inversion*, that is, instead of operating with our selves at the centre, we change our focus to operate from a field that begins to emerge from the surrounding periphery.

The U-process of presencing involves three different movements of awareness, or stages:

- *co-sensing*: opening up to the world outside – becoming one with the world;
- *co-inspiring*: opening up to a world within – becoming one with one's deepest source of future possibility;
- *co-creating*: bringing the emerging future into being.

The three movements that constitute the U-process are forming a body of resonance, out of which people begin to experience the deep process of presencing. By this, three tangible transformations can be observed: a transformation of social space (decentring), social time (slowing down to stillness), and self (collapsing the boundaries of the ego).

The noticeable outcomes of this process include a heightened level of self, energy, and commitment; an ongoing field reality that can be tapped and activated later; and profound long-term changes.

### *7.2.1. Three Bodies of Methodology*

*Co-sensing*: Requires precise observation, such as science, phenomenology, and the creative arts.

*Co-inspiring*: Includes the contemplative and meditative practices of the various wisdom traditions across cultures (Buddhist, Taoist, Confucianist, Hinduist, Shamanist, as well as Western such as Anthroposophical meditation practices).

*Co-creating*: Includes engineering and design, architecture, and the creative arts.

### *7.3. Leadership as Collective Meditation in Action*

Viewed from this perspective, leadership is shifting the place from which a system operates. That is what leaders do – and what the most effective leaders have always done: refocus and reconfigure the structure of collective attention. They shift the inner place from where people and systems attend to the world and themselves. Shifting the structure of attention does for organizations what meditation does for individuals: it deepens the process of becoming aware and increases the number of options for responding to a given situation. The art of leadership, from this perspective, is about facilitating the practice of collective meditation in action.

The inner work of cultivating this leadership capacity involves an inversion of one's field quality of attention. The thresholds one crosses when moving down the left arm of the U involve the inversion of:

*thinking*: from being bound by judgmental reactions to appreciative inquiry (“accessing your ignorance”);

*feeling*: from being bound by emotional reactions to opening up one's heart as a gateway to sensing (“accessing your emotional intelligence”);

*will*: from being bound by old intentions and identities to letting go and opening up to one's higher self as the gateway to presencing the new (“accessing your self”).

### *7.4. Leadership as Dialogic Action Research*

The methods deployed are threefold: phenomenology, dialogue, and action research. All three methods look at the same key issue: the intertwined constitution of knowledge, reality, and self. All three follow the dictum of Kurt Lewin, the founder of action research: “You cannot understand a system unless you change it.” But each method has a different point of departure: phenomenology uses the first-person point of view (individual consciousness); dialogue uses the second-person point of view (fields of conversation); and action research uses the third-person point of view (enactment of institutional patterns and structures). These three perspectives will interweave and grow together as one interdependent process.

## 8. CONCLUSION

IST operations require a different set of strategic and operational concepts than warfighting. This concept needs to be solidly grounded in mass psychology, with the full integration of cultural distinctions. It should identify the type and phasing of military activities most likely to restore stability under specific conditions. A concept for rapidly recreating the security forces of a collapsed or transforming state is also needed.

IST operations need to be fully integrated into the military's program of leader development, education, and training. But because IST operations are, in their essence, interagency (and usually multinational), this process cannot be limited to the military. As these operations are generally performed under the umbrella of a UN or other international mandate, leader development, professional education, and training procedures must include the domain of intercultural competence. This means the military must get accustomed to a dynamic development on the security market and see itself as a competitor.

Not only internationally composed units, but also the various foreign cultures that the units encounter in their regions of employment make it necessary to understand different cultures. So the necessary transition of forces must include every soldier's personality, and his identity. To go further in this process means also a higher potential in creativity in this new environment – a complete new learning climate is necessary to allow organizational learning processes even during deployment. This again calls for new methods of restructuring and reshaping and to overcome the blind spot in leadership.

## NOTES

1. The term "armed forces," in the narrow sense, refers to regular armed forces, but the effects discussed in this article apply in a wider sense also for police forces and other security agencies when they are deployed in cooperation with regular forces.

2. <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/history/jv2010.pdf>.

3. <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/baseline.htm>.

4. See DoD (March).

5. See JV2010, p. 28.

6. For broader discussions, see Beyerchen, A.D. (1996, 1998).

7. For broader information, see U.S.FM 22-100, Army Leadership.

8. For broader information, see Paparone and Crupi (2002). These authors call this method of thinking and acting "Janusian," that would mean thinking and

deciding in (only) two directions. But they propose at the end at least a decision method, in more than two directions; therefore, it is better to speak of “multidimensional,” the author.

9. These planning styles are roughly based on one author’s earlier work. See Paparone (2001). For an explanation of trust, see Paparone, C. R. *The nature of trust in and between organizations: What the U. S. Army professional needs to know*, unpublished (Figure 3: Comparison chart for Janusian conflict types).

10. See the account in Bowden (1999).

11. <http://www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm> (accessed 2008).

12. For more information, see Ting-Toomey (1999), and Engeström (1999).

13. The following part is broadly taken out of Weber (2005).

14. Activity theory has been elaborated by many authors from various disciplines. Moll (2001) states in his article in the *Handbook on Research on Teaching*. Today activity theory can be seen as an interdisciplinary approach.

15. Engeström (1992, p. 15) cited in Weber (2005).

16. Ting-Toomey (1999, pp. 233–260), cited in Weber (2005).

17. Ting-Toomey (1999, pp. 8, 40), cited in Weber (2005).

18. See Bolton (1995), cited in Weber (2005).

19. See Scharmer (2002).

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# THE ASYMMETRIC ANSWERS (WITH THE FOCUS ON RUSSIA'S RHETORIC AND ACTIONS)

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## ABSTRACT

*The paper starts with a brief review of the notion of 'asymmetric warfare' and asymmetric answers in the rhetoric of Soviet leaders. The point to be stressed is that the 'asymmetric answer' is always an unequal response by definition. The main idea of such a response is very clear: to eliminate the existing power imbalance at minimal expenses of the weaker side. The threats of 'asymmetric answers' on real or imagined international challenges and dangers have returned to the Russian president rhetoric in early 2000s. What has happened? The range of possible causes of this policy shift varies from the US foreign policy and various geopolitical issues to domestic reasons associated with the elections to come. The paper analyses the main versions. What actions are standing behind the words about the 'asymmetric answers' that might shape the landscape of international relations of the first half of the 21st century? The paper highlights this issue and looks onto the observed future of international relations.*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos  
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 395–413  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A022

## 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The term ‘asymmetric warfare’ describes a situation in which one side disposes its military superiority over the opponent while the other, objectively militarily weaker, side tries to do all it is able to decide the fight for itself despite this inequality. Because of a principal imbalance of power between the two conflicting sides, the reaction of the weaker side could be qualified as an ‘asymmetric answer’.

The point we must stress is that the ‘asymmetric answer’ is always an *unequal* response by definition. The main idea of such a response is very clear: to eliminate the existing power imbalance at minimal expenses of the weaker side. Therefore, most analysts talk about how to uncover the weak points of the stronger opponent or/and how to make use of the weakness of the superior side.

The essence of asymmetric answer depends on the size and stage of conflict – whether the conflict is in a latent or open form, on which phase is a military confrontation or a war-like dispute, etc. Clearly, the real asymmetric actions in war-like conflicts differ greatly from declarations about asymmetric answers in days of peace.

The actions could be both defensive and offensive, and very different by nature. They could be either pure political or economical, including various media actions aimed for mobilization of international support and public opinion against an unfriendly government, not speaking about a terrorist way of using force. But they always depend primarily on a political will, ingenuity and resourcefulness of the weaker side leadership along with a geopolitical situation at large.

In peace time, the numerous statements of a weaker side about its ‘asymmetric answer’ against new threats (actions or plans) posed by a stronger side are more about intentions, not immediate actions. Actually it is just avowals about ‘unavoidable and cheap counter-actions’ to be developed in the future. They show non-readiness of the government of weaker side to oppose a new reality.

These statements are important parts of governmental rhetoric. Their function is dual, at least. As covert threats they are messages addressed to principal opponents at the international arena, the international community at large and/or international public opinion as a target audience. As promises they are basically aimed to mobilize the domestic audience, that is tax-payers inside the country. They are appeals to the nation to sacrifice more for national security under a newly emerged challenge.

There is a view that a basic law of classical physics – that every action generates an equal and opposite reaction – has its counterpart in international relations: the action of a stronger side, aiming to break the power balance, eventually generates opposition that, over time, causes the hegemonic state to overextend and overspend in an effort to remain dominant. We will not argue whether this view is correct. The fact is certain that challenges posed by stronger sides are principal causes of numerous declarations about asymmetric answers of weaker sides.

The question of how many strategic calculations by security and foreign policy decision-makers rely on rationality, available information and prognosis, and how much they depended on emotions and phobias, could be raised up in this context. Of course, nobody knows the exact answer, which varies in each particular case, but it is strange if, speaking of it, one has ignored decision-makers' sentiments, perceptions and misperceptions. To rely on the premise that all decisions made in foreign policy are highly rational is not rational at all (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, 1985).

In the 'war of words', we deal mostly with propaganda, not reliable information about the real content of 'asymmetric' answers/actions. And this point brings us to general questions about goals and effects of geopolitical rhetoric, about how the threatening declarations are perceived by both domestic and international audiences, etc. In this paper we have no room for discussing these topics.

Another point to be stressed is that all in all these 'postponed actions' may be not so effective or cheap as initially declared. The avowals about cheap and effective counter-actions may be a pure bluff, blackmailing and conscious disinformation. Nobody knows for sure whether the promises to create an 'asymmetric answer' are empty threats or not. Analysts have to discover what is hidden behind a flood of words, threats and promises, attempt to evaluate possible consequences, etc. But it is not an easy job.

One basic problem in evaluating the credibility of coming threats in global politics is unavoidable uncertainty; predictions are contrary to facts too often (take the myth about Saddam Hussein's development of WMD as an example). It implies that we must be skeptical about predictions. This is not because the predictions are implied by incomplete information, but because the intelligence estimates are probabilistic by nature and strongly depend on perceptions, stereotypes and phobias.

Against this background, let us take a brief look on the US–Russia missile defense dispute as an illustration.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. THE PLACE OF THE TERM 'ASYMMETRIC ANSWER' IN THE GEOPOLITICAL LEXICON OF SOVIET/RUSSIAN LEADERS

The term 'an asymmetric answer' had been included into the political vocabulary of the Soviet leaders in early 1980s as an explanation of Russia's 'adequate response' to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the then US President Ronald Reagan. No doubt this expression was designed for both international and domestic audiences. The Soviet propaganda used this expression permanently. The aim was to demonstrate the willingness and capability of the USSR, the economically weaker side, to create specific means which were able to damage the stronger opponent at minimal expenses. It was intended to shelter confusion and weakness behind a flood of arrogant words addressed partly to the enemy and basically to the nation. The whole aim of practical politics of that time was to keep the Soviet populace alarmed by menacing it with an endless series of threats, some of which were real, and some imaginary.

Meanwhile, announcing the SDI or the *Star Wars* program, Ronald Reagan gave a start to researching for a complete anti-ballistic missile (ABM) shield that should be constructed on the newest technological basis. In fact, the USSR was invited to the new arms race. The Russians got a challenge either to create means able to overcome the most sophisticated American missile shield, parts of which would be located in space, or to lose.

Here I must remind you that the idea of missile shield was initially discussed in mid-1960s, when US President Lyndon Johnson announced the deployment of a modest ABM system (1968). Then a Nixon administration negotiated the 1972 ABM Treaty with the USSR. The ABM Treaty worked till summer of 2002, when the Bush administration withdrew from the treaty in a unilateral way.

The idea of 'asymmetric answer' to the SDI in the light of the existing ABM Treaty limitations, in my opinion, should be portrayed as a 'no trespassing' sign erected by the Soviet Union to put others on notice that the Russians had the courage to confront with the United States by scientific knowledge and missile technology if necessary. Such an interpretation of 'asymmetric answers' to the *Star Wars* program was spread in the Soviet media of that time. And, as we know, the Soviet Union had intensified researches in the area of space weaponry and other fields alike.

During the *perestroika*, the wording of 'asymmetric answer' to Reagan's *Star Wars* program had dropped from the political dictionary of the Soviet

leadership. Expressions of this kind were inconsistent with Gorbachev's 'new thinking'.

Russia had loudly voiced the concern about the intention of the United States to break the ABM Treaty by the end of 1990s. The wording of 'asymmetric answer' returned to the diplomatic rhetoric of Russian negotiators, but, in my view, it looked more a routine exercise than a serious threat.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps, things looked entirely different if one thought that then US negotiators perceived the Russian warning as *blackmailing*. Before throwing this idea away, let us note three things about it. First, it was not obvious that such a threat was an empty one. Second, the United States was not ready to withdraw from the ABM Treaty at that time. The truth is that at that time if ballistic missiles were fired at the United States, then the US military could not protect their national territory from incoming ballistic missiles, especially those with multiple warheads. Third, although the Soviet Union, the American partner in the 1972 ABM Treaty, did not exist anymore, Russia as its successor kept all treaty commitments. Though Russia resisted changing the 1972 ABM Treaty, she agreed that after the demise of the USSR the entire agreement became archaic, and this country was ready for negotiations about amendments to the agreement. Then, in 1990s, the ABM Treaty was critical to economically weak Russia as confirmation of its great power status at the international arena.

It should also be noted that in September 2000, before leaving the White House, President Bill Clinton announced that he would not go ahead with the development of national missile defense system (NMD), deferring any decision to his successor, G.W. Bush.<sup>3</sup> He decided as well that it is better to keep the 1972 ABM Treaty untouched.

In December 2002, US president George W. Bush announced plans for the development of initial defense capabilities, which included ground-based and sea-based missile interceptors, as well as sensors located in space. Washington has explained the project as a means to defend the United States and its European allies from a potential attack by 'rogue states', that is Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

Soon after this announcement, the next step was made. On June 13, 2002, the United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty with Russia, which banned the deployment of missile defense outside the national territory. It was done because the effective missile defense should be deployed as close to the trouble spot as possible.

Today the 1972 ABM Treaty limitations are invalid.<sup>4</sup> And the United States can freely deploy elements of the missile defense system in

Central Europe where currently the so-called ‘third interceptor’s site of the US ABM system’ has been planned to be located.

The Russian Federation readily raised a voice against the American unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, but that was all its leaders could do along with promises to upgrade the country’s strategic forces.<sup>5</sup> We do not think that Russia feared that the US missile umbrella could make the United States invulnerable to missile attack and thus would allow the United States to strike Russia without fear of retaliation.<sup>6</sup> Most likely the Russian leadership thought that by keeping the ABM Treaty, they had a *legal* barrier to prevent Americans from developing something more dangerous than just the ‘limited’ shield Bush claimed to want.

While conceding that a new ballistic missile threat was emerging, the Russian leadership emphasized that the problem of deployment was actually part of a broader problem of WMD and missile’s technology proliferation and therefore should be considered within a framework of international legal and political non-proliferation arrangements.

The post-Soviet Russian leadership, including Russia’s second President Vladimir Putin, always emphasized its respect of the existing treaties and international laws, at least in public.<sup>7</sup> They hold warm personal relations with Western leaders despite disagreements on certain geopolitical issues. But the idea that a handshake between Putin and Bush, or between their successors – Medvedev in Russia and, perhaps, Obama in the United States – could overthrow their commitment to national interests seems ludicrous to us.<sup>8</sup>

If Russia’s major goal in 2000 was to make the United States postpone an NMD decision, that goal was reached with Clinton’s acting to defer a deployment decision to the next administration. But then *deferral was a tactic, not a real policy*.

The wording of ‘asymmetric answer’ became an important part of Mr. Putin’s rhetoric a few years ago, when Moscow fully realized how consistent is Washington’s intention to deploy ABM interceptors in Central Europe, that is very close to the Russian borders.<sup>9</sup> The American president and his lieutenants tried to justify their decision, but all attempts to persuade the Russians, who strongly opposed the idea of deployment of components of the US ABM out of the American mainland, failed. Russia does not believe in capacities of Iran or other ‘rogue states’ to fire missiles to Washington, DC.<sup>10</sup> The Russians offered to use their radar in Azerbaijan as a joint early warning center – the American considered the radar as out-of-date; after that Americans came with another proposal which the Russians, in their turn, rejected, and so on. In short, each time the US–Russia

cooperation on this sensitive issue has been deflected or rejected by one or the other side.<sup>11</sup>

Perhaps, the alarming messages of Russian leaders were addressed mainly to public opinion, aimed to ignite anti-American moods in Poland and the Czech Republic. But, as we know, the governments of these two states have ignored the public protests, and, when all things considered, it means the Kremlin has lost its information war against deploying the US ABM system components in Europe.

The range of possible causes of the mentioned shift of Putin's tone in recent years (2005–2008) presented in the Western press varied from the US foreign policy to Russian domestic reasons. In my view, domestic reasons never determined Russia's position on foreign policy in the same degree as in the United States. Therefore, in my view, a main cause of Putin's irritation was Bush's obsession to implement his plan into practice till the end of his second term despite Russia's objection.

What can we gain from this brief excursus through the history of protracted disputes over missile defense? If one looks in detail, it becomes apparent that the participants almost never had a good understanding of each other's worldviews. Signals that seemed clear to Putin as a sender were often missed or misinterpreted by G.W. Bush, the receiver.

### **3. ABOUT RUSSIA'S PERCEPTION OF NATO MISSILE DEFENSE TALKS**

Currently NATO countries are discussing an idea of comprehensive missile defense which can protect all alliance's members. Naturally, the Russian observers could not ignore these debates, yet it was just a talk about the architecture of entire project. Again, while thinking about the future, one should answer concrete questions: first, is there a real danger of missile offensive to Europe? From where is the attack against Europe expected to come? Second, are all member-states equally engaged in the project, or do the decisions regard just a few countries? And if this is the case – who in particular and why?

The alliance is studying the hows, not whys of this plan.<sup>12</sup> To put it simply, it is what NATO defense ministers think a potential threat is like, not what it actually is, and it is what determines their decisions.<sup>13</sup> In my view, few experts doubt that Russia's opposition will slow NATO's missile defense implementation.<sup>14</sup>



The deeply rooted prejudice against the Russians or a latent Russophobia produced an appeal explicitly to already-existing traditional threat perception. We will not speculate whether Russia is still perceived as a main menace to the West despite numerous declarations about a strategic partnership, collaboration in a fight against international (Islamic) terrorism and a change of global geopolitical landscape. We will also not discuss the deeply rooted mutual mistrust towards the truthfulness of the Russian/American security and foreign policy as a foundation of the missile defense rhetoric in the West and Russia. Such speculations are fun, but what good are they?

The conclusion to be drawn from media about what the public has heard from NATO is that *the danger does not come from the East but lies in the East (!)*. The entire story looks as a *parade of mistrust*. As we see, old phobias are alive.<sup>15</sup>

This brings us to the second benchmark of this paper: what is actually covered behind the wording of ‘asymmetric answer’ in Russia’s presidential rhetoric?

#### **4. THE PERCEPTION OF US NMD AS A THREAT TO RUSSIA AND THE CONTENT OF RUSSIA’S ASYMMETRIC ANSWER**

Soon after the US President Bush exposed publicly his missile defense plan, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin announced his ‘asymmetric answer’. It was on June 18, 2001. Putin was speaking about upgrading Russia’s nuclear arsenal mounting and returning multiple warheads on its strategic missiles, and said that Russia would be likely to stop reducing its long-range missile and bomber forces as part of the package of ‘asymmetric’ steps. Later in the address to the Russian parliament (the State Duma) prior to the vote on START II ratification, President Putin affirmed that Russia’s response to US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be to withdraw from all disarmament treaties, including START I, START II, INF and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), as well as to renounce Russian adherence to the Bush–Gorbachev reciprocal unilateral initiatives on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.

During the last six years Putin repeated his threats several times,<sup>16</sup> but we have no room to follow his avowals chronically.

Only after the United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty (continued adherence to which was a condition specified in the Russian START II ratification law) did Russia announce that it considered itself no longer bound by the provisions of START II. By reason of coming interceptors' deployment in Central Europe – at least partly – Russia has unilaterally withdrew from the CFE Treaty and promised to retarget missiles to Europe. As another part of the 'asymmetric response', the Russians also considered withdrawing from the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missile (INF Treaty) and resuming production of medium-range rockets. Yet it is not clear so far whether the last threat, which was initially exposed in 2000, is backed by real actions.

The idea behind missile defense has always been to save the American people from the disastrous consequences of nuclear attack. How ironic it is that today there are sound reasons to believe that Russia would be most likely to retarget some of its missiles to Europe as a part of its 'asymmetric answer'.

Russia's foreign and security policy elites suspect that Washington has been encircling Russia by interceptors' ring<sup>17</sup> and encroaching on what Russians call their near-abroad. Paranoid or not, Russia's elites have come to a troublesome consensus about US intentions. It helps us to understand why American intentions to deploy few interceptors in Central Europe have taken on threatening overtones for Kremlin policy makers.

Since the Reagan time, the US NMD plan served as a powerful impulse to frighten the Russian public into sacrificing more for its defense. The political discourse regarding the positioning of the American ABM system in Europe has followed the same pattern as the discussion of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, and earlier in 1980s regarding the *Star Wars* program.<sup>18</sup> In all three cases, the Russian responses were named the 'asymmetric answer', and the rationale for bringing up this term was to prepare the nation for a new, moderate (by definition) increase of military expenses.

We remember that shortly before Mr. Rumsfeld became Mr. Bush's defense secretary in 2001, he chaired the commission that concluded that 'space warfare was virtually inevitable'. To 'negate the hostile use of space against us', the commission said, 'America would need to be able to project power in, from, and through space' – a challenge neither Russia nor China is likely to ignore.<sup>19</sup> The recent (February 2008) usage of a sea-based anti-missile weapon against the broken US intelligence satellite that actually looked more like a test of interceptor's ability will, in our view, provoke a speedier development of anti-satellite weapons in Russia and China. A new arms race in space, by no doubt, will have a spillover effect.<sup>20</sup>

The American media simply laughed at Putin's words that with US plans for a limited defense against ballistic missiles, 'a new arms race has been unleashed in the world'. As Richard N. Perle wrote in *The Washington Post* on March 3, 2008: 'We should greet Russian threats to race with amusement and a big yawn: They would be competing against themselves. If Putin wishes to pour petro-rubles into building more missiles, our response should be limited to sympathy for the ordinary Russians whose taxes will be squandered, much as they were with catastrophic consequences during the Cold War'. The conclusion was that 'with his rhetoric, Putin hopes to excite the opponents of a limited U.S. missile defense system and those politicians here and abroad who will be unnerved by Russian threats of a new "arms race", but he 'should relax''.<sup>21</sup>

This is a characteristic depiction of Russia's reaction to deploying the US interceptors in Central Europe in the Western media.

It should also be noted that some serious students of international relations maintain a view that the AMD deployment would not lead to another world-wide arms race because the Cold War mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine had been dissipated as both the United States and Russia seek to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and address more conventional 21st century threats. Despite a reliance on nuclear deterrence proclaimed in the military doctrine of the RF and the United States, nuclear weapons are not the weapons of the 21st century because, first of all, they are the last chance weapons and, second, the rapid development of new powerful and precise non-nuclear weapons can successfully replace nuclear weaponry in certain applications, missile defense systems and other state-of-the-art military technologies. Others feel that an arms race is impossible as no other nation on earth has the economic capability to compete in such an arms race with the United States. As a result, an arms race defined by the 'old rules' will not materialize in the 21st century, and therefore the US ABM defense deployments near Russia or China's borders will have little or no effect on the WMD proliferation around the world. Instead, great countries will continue to retool their conventional forces.

There is a certain rationale in such a view, yet only the coming future will definitely show whether the nuclear competition and/or the proliferation of long-range missiles is halted. The threats are different. It is true. But a global fear of Iranian military nuclear program confirms that a 'national nuclear might' is still the most valid argument in international affairs, which ensures anyone a respectable status. Unfortunately, today there is a good reason to believe that the probability of a new, costly arms race is increasing. SIPRI reports back this conclusion with proof.

To cut a long story short, the Russian defense officials are not afraid of ongoing modernization of the US missile defense; they know that waterproof missile defense is technically unfeasible.<sup>22</sup> Among Russia's military-political strategists, the missile defense issue is perceived primarily from the perspective of the Russian-US strategic nuclear balance and prospects of existing international treaties.

Concern is expressed that US deployment of an NMD component in Europe will lead to an imbalance between Russia and the United States, thus weakening Russia's deterrent in the future. Of course, they were told by their American counterparts that the limited European AMD system would not undermine Russia's deterrence because Russia keeps its nuclear forces on constant alert (to permit launch on warning) and would continue to do so. But this argument does not work.

In the Russian view, one serious concern is also a possible, though unlikely, decision by the United States to return to a limited nuclear testing regime because the United States had not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The famous 2002 US-Russia agreement about reductions of nuclear arsenals must be mentioned too because, as we know, soon after the United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russia agreed to make major reductions in its strategic offensive forces. Today many experts are concerned with the following questions: will the deployment of 'small' land-based component of the US NMD in Europe hinder the next arms-cutting deal? How far can the next reductions in nuclear weapons be negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation with all the dangers that an atmosphere of growing mutual mistrust brings back?<sup>23</sup>

Now again for a brief aside: we do believe readers have recognized that the deterrence of Cold War – the concepts of 'MAD' and 'massive retaliation' – is not working today. The Russian authorities swear not to repeat the Soviet mistakes. And it is a pity if these declarations are just words. It is worth remembering that the rest of the world may not see us the way we see ourselves. Unfortunately, the logic of Cold War has not gone away.<sup>24</sup>

Most Western observers of the Russian-American dispute about missile defense are concerned with the following question: how is the growth of Russia's resistance to missile defenses linked with the Russia's transformation into an 'energy superpower'? No one in Russia is surprised with such a conjunction. The Western observers often proffer an explanation of Russia's behavior couched in economic terms – today it is oil contracts, and earlier it was the repayment of Soviet-era debt. However, in our view, such a simplistic analysis fails to account for Russia's essential motives.

Political use of oil exports and gas supply to Europe is depicted by the Western media as a mean for the realization of Russia's ambition to take back its great power status. Meanwhile, in reality the Western countries that consume Russian gas and oil and Russia that produce and sell these products are mutually dependent. This country always fulfills energy contracts with the West. *As one wise person said, the Russians would not drink their petrol, if the West did not buy it.* It also means that cutting of energy supplies cannot be a good 'asymmetric answer' for Russia.

To resume: the full content of Russia's 'asymmetric answer' to the deployment of elements of the US AMD system in two Eastern European countries remains unclosed. A development of a Russian hypersonic missile warhead, which has an ability to overcome any missile shield and can fully negate the most robust NMD the United States might muster, is an inseparable part of the asymmetric answer policy.<sup>25</sup> And it is just one argument in support of this point.

In our view, Putin's angry words could be interpreted as a *deterrent threat*. 'The deterrent threat is often compared with a 'Beware of Dog' notice, in this case with a notice of 'Beware of the Russian Bear'!

'The deterrent treat should work!' – claimed the architects of the Russian security and foreign policy. But, in our view, this alarming notice does not convince others of the seriousness of Russia's intent. Nevertheless, we do think that numerous statements about Russia's asymmetric answers should not be completely dismissed as propaganda or a bluff.

History shows that a country's weakness does not last for ever. Nowadays Russia is not as poor and weak as it was in 1990s and 2002, yet perhaps not as strong as the former USSR in 1980s. Today there is no question whether the Russian government could come up with enough money to do so or not. The flood of oil money allows it.

Of course, we do not consider all aspects, but, perhaps, we have got some insights about the real meaning of the wording of 'asymmetric answer' and its perceptions in the West and Russia. And here – as the third issue I want to treat today – is an attempt to take a look into the nearest future.

## 5. THE CONTINUATION OF DIALOGUE

In the Editorial of *The Boston Globe* of April 8, 2008, devoted to results of the last Putin–Bush summit in Sochi, we read: 'The missile defense system is a foolish venture. Until realistic tests prove that the current system can overcome its present inability to discriminate between live warheads and

easily produced decoys, the technological argument against deployment of the system is overwhelming. And never mind the Kremlin's fear that such a missile defense system means Washington has revived a Cold War-style containment policy. The new president will have to question the signals it sends to others. If the system is to be directed solely at Iran, doesn't that mean that America accepts that a nuclear-armed Iran is inevitable? And if the system is meant only to protect Europe from Iranian missiles, why are the governments of Western Europe so unenthusiastic about the plan?<sup>26</sup>

As easy to see, the American newspaper set up the same questions and drew the similar conclusions as the Russians did.

In my view, there is no sign of any significant or fundamental change of Russia's negative attitude towards the missile defense quarrel since the new Russian president Dmitry Medvedev came to power. Nonetheless, I agree with the conclusion made in the above-cited Editorial that 'Putin and Bush were able to agree on an agenda for future cooperation on counter-terrorism; trade and Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization; nuclear non-proliferation; and energy policy. This is a road map their successors should be willing to follow. *It will be much easier to follow once the barricade of Bush's missile-defense plan has been removed*' (emphasis added).<sup>26</sup>

We do hope that a responsible leadership of Russia and Dmitry Medvedev as the newly elected Russia's president, as well as the Russian society, would likely prevent 'freezing' the cooperation with Europe or pushing the country to a new military and political confrontation with the United States.<sup>27</sup> We think that a new national leader cannot craft policy on the basis that the future will pretty much resemble the past because then any new change will come as a shock for which Russia is not prepared.

Indeed, time marches on, but like eight years ago America today possesses an overwhelming military superiority that will not be undone a decade or longer. The change of presidents in Russia and the United States in 2008 presumes the continuation of dialogue about US missile defense in Europe because its outcome is not clear at the time of writing. However, we do think that the next US administration will abandon Bush's effort to station interceptors' bases in Europe.

No doubt, the new US bases in Poland and the Czech Republic will not become a reality rather soon. The ruling elite of these two nations thinks that like in the Cold War period, the Americans are playing a paramount role in guaranteeing Europe's security from what they consider as 'a common enemy'.<sup>28</sup> But the Americans may change their plans.

Some Americans may feel pride or even a bit of condescension in such a dependency of Poland and the Czech Republic. Indeed, it costs America less

to defend its interests in Europe if these two Central European countries are strongly tied to the United States.<sup>29</sup>

Moreover, it must be clear that the anticipated future is supposed to be linked to one's current behaviour. No doubt President G.W. Bush benefited greatly from Putin's loyalty.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the political problem of coming future can be best framed as: how much of President Putin's post-September 11 policy is Russia ready to abandon in response to deploying of interceptors in Central Europe?

This is not a place to speculate about this subject.<sup>31</sup> Instead let us consider the following question: if the United States had a complete Star Wars' missile shield on September 11, would it have saved the Twins Towers? The answer definitely is 'no', and it is very unlikely that the United States will be attacked by nuclear missiles launched from another country in the next years.<sup>32</sup>

It makes no sense to spend more money for the purpose of missile defense, when the real threat does not come from ballistic nuclear missiles fired at the United States from other countries.<sup>33</sup> The principal point, in our view, is that to design a missile defense that is just enough for the purposes of dealing with accidental or unintended launch is a mere technical problem, while to deal with 'rogue' states or to fight international terrorism is a political problem, and this difference is not yet well understood. Therefore, we must agree that the real issue is how to deal with real threats as they emerge, how to develop a true and comprehensive non-proliferation strategy and how to ensure that the overall global security is increasing rather than decreasing by whatever efforts are undertaken.<sup>34</sup>

## 6. CONCLUSION

The protracted US–Russia missile defense dispute is a perfect illustration of how the concept of so-called 'asymmetric answer' is implanted into geopolitical practice. The asymmetric answer threats were traits of the Soviet rhetoric during the Cold War and, are presented in the present Russian political lexicon. Will such rhetoric be also a characteristic of the coming future? That is a question.

We believe that 'asymmetric answers' in modern global politics, while redefining deterrence, are nevertheless part of discredited security paradigm. The old appeals to understand the others (i.e. the motivations and interests as they apply to the missile defense issue) and to offer a mutually acceptable solution are vital today as never before. Otherwise, these answers/actions

will lead to greater global instability and not to the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems through diplomacy.

The greatest threat to the future comes not from Al Qaeda but from the most powerful states. A great irony of this situation is that all governments are well aware about this.<sup>35</sup> I do agree that ‘murmurings about the onset of a new Cold War help nobody’.<sup>36</sup> Changing policy’s course is not so simple but it can – and must – be done. It is the ultimate responsibility of governments to ensure that the major problems of the coming future are addressed through principles based on a perfect understanding of the new security situation and through actions built on a correct evaluation of risks, not inherited phobias and myths.

## NOTES

1. Moscow’s perception of US missile defense plan has been analysed in my article ‘The American–Russian dispute about missile defense’ to be published in *Connections* later this year. About popular reactions in Russia and Europe to the US–Russia disagreement on missile defense, see my essay ‘The Temptation of Missile Defense’ in the coming issue of *Central European Political Sciences Review* (No. 29–30, 2008). In all mentioned papers, only data from open sources are used, and, of course, all responsibility for conclusions and assumptions belongs to the author.

2. See a good review of the state-of-arts at that time made by [Kile \(2000\)](#).

3. Despite the focus which candidate Bush tried to put on this issue, it did not play a significant role in his campaign according to the American election analysts (the author drew this conclusion from private communications with Northwestern University professor Kenneth Janda and other American political scientists).

4. The US Congress had not ratified the 1997 additional protocol, which bound the START II Treaty to the 1972 ABM Treaty.

5. Moscow’s response, delivered in a statement by President Vladimir Putin, expressed disagreement with the US decision but simultaneously emphasized the Russian official diplomatic position that the United States is not a threat to Russia. Putin also talked about speeding of reforming of strategic forces. See more in [Kortunov \(2002\)](#).

6. See the discussion of this issue in [Wagner \(1991\)](#).

7. In our view, the juridical background of Putin and his closest advisers should be taken into account in this retrospective policy analysis.

8. We do not question here whether these two outstanding personalities helped drive the US–Russian relationship or not, because according to the press Bush and Putin used their personal relationship to tackle the thorny issues beyond arms control, such as international terrorism, etc.

9. The peak of criticism was in 2007. After Munich (I am speaking here about the famous Munich speech of Putin in spring of 2007), he was branded as a man disloyal to the ‘friend Bush’ by the American media.



10. We have to notice that by the end of the second Bush term in the American foreign policy vocabulary, the term 'rogue states' has been replaced by the wording of 'states of concern'.

11. See about a clash of arguments of the two sides in the chapter in Rukavishnikov (2007).

12. In 2005, more than 7-in-10 (71%) of Europeans favoured the deployment of a NATO missile defense capability able to protect the continent from attack by missiles bearing weapons of mass destruction, according to a poll that was jointly sponsored by the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies and Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. By contrast, only 16% thought that NATO should not have this capability. The poll was conducted by the polling firm of Novatris/Harris with a margin error rate of  $\pm 2.9\%$  in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Denmark. Further, 73% suggested it is a good idea for NATO to expand such a defensive system to protect troops in the field as well as citizens at home (<http://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org>).

13. Virtually all East European members of the North Atlantic alliance continue to fear the possibility that Russia will once again seek to dominate the region; they thus see a NATO shield as a guarantee against that possibility.

14. It seems nobody among NATO members ever took seriously the statement made by Vladimir Putin, after he was elected as President of Russia in March 2000, that if the West views Russia as an equitable partner, then Russia might, with the passage of time, join NATO.

15. There is a long historical tradition of Western perceptions of the threat from the East. That conception played an important role in the assessment of Soviet policy and the planning of Western strategists during the Cold War.

16. Perhaps initially Putin had illusions regarding a consistency of Bush's missile defense policy and thought that it might be changed because of Russia's concessions after September 11, 2001. Since 2003 he showed his disagreements with the US policy in public, and then he repeatedly argued that the United States seeks to set itself into a state of hegemony over the world. In various press commentaries regarding Putin's Russia, there was a turn with which we all were familiar in the past; only the names have changed – 'Stalin is still holding there', 'Russia has returned to her paranoid autocratic tradition', etc. Take, for example, the following words printed in spring 2008: 'By agreeing to place an American defense system in Eastern Europe, NATO has given the Kremlin the perfect excuse to further cement its autocratic rule. [...] By caving into most of President Bush's demands, the United States' European allies have supplied the Kremlin with the perfect pretext for continuing to govern Russia in the authoritarian fashion that took hold in the late Nineties, after that brief dalliance with liberal democracy' (Service, 2008).

17. The American media emphasized the point that the US ABM program is 'limited' and the number of interceptors is 'modest', that is dozens at first, and may be near 200 or 300 after that. About 100 of these missiles should be located in Alaska, and others located in Central Europe and likely Turkey. In addition to these missiles, there are a certain number of interceptors stationed on sea-based launching platforms. All in all, it looks like a chain of (anti-ballistic) missile sites along the perimeter of the Russian Federation and borders of the People's Republic of China.

It is a striking reminder of the Cold War strategy construction aimed to isolate Russia and its allies.

18. The debate concerning the coming deployment of the US ABM components in Central Europe in the Russian media has been driven by a tiny group of military commentators, while the public has played a negligible role. As the Russian objections had been ignored once again, many plain Russians, following Putin's anti-Western rhetoric, believe America is still pushing its old security agenda, and the US administration is pursuing methodical anti-Russian policy. In September 2007, 60% of respondents thought the US anti-missile system represents more of a threat to Russia than Iran's nuclear program or North Korea's nuclear weapons, according to an opinion poll.

19. Cited from *The Economist*, May 5, 2001, p. 21.

20. In fact, Russia/the USSR is a pioneer in this area (a set of successful tests of anti-satellite weapons was conducted in 1970s–1980s), but according to sources this country had temporarily stopped all work in this area in the beginning of 1990s. As for China, this nation accelerated its anti-satellite weaponry and missile programs in early 2000s. Only in 2006 did China demonstrate its ability to kick off the space object, yet not with the same skill as the leading space nations. In response to the US plan of TMD deployment in Taiwan, China continues to build up its conventional missile forces. If China is indeed to become 'the superpower of the 21st century', as some experts argue, the next few years may be vital in its transformation into a great space nation. Although China is not listed as a 'rogue state', it is China's transformation into a great military power that the United States should pay attention to.

21. [Perle \(2008\)](#); all citations above are taken from the on-line version of this article at [washingtonpost.com](http://washingtonpost.com).

22. While the United States is deploying its NMD system, the Russian MIRVed (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) ICBMs become a guarantee for Russia that the US system could not threaten the Russian deterrent, since it could be overwhelmed with Russian ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads. It should be noted that the call for the rearming of ICBMs with multiple hypersonic warheads is actually the action contradicting one of the fundamental provisions of START II.

23. Keeping in mind the revival of Russian economy and the unsettled dispute over the missile defense issue, it is safe to say that the country would be likely to preserve the nuclear balance (parity) with the United States without the deeper cuts envisioned by START III, not to mention the constraints of START II. While experts differ on how the Russian nuclear arsenal will evolve over the next decade, most agree that it will hardly exceed the current level of 1,500–2,000 deployed warheads by the year 2020 for pure technical and economic reasons, and that 800–1,000 deployed warheads is a more realistic estimate. While technical reasons are the limits of service life of certain types of already-deployed heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMs, with the range greater than 5,500 km), the economic reasons are related to the country's capacity to produce the new ballistic missiles (like the *Topol-M*) in order to replace the old ones. Regarding Putin's position that 'it is important that Russia and the USA move together or in parallel towards radical reduction of nuclear munitions', experts emphasized the word 'parallel' (in the sense of parallel reductions).

24. The deployment of interceptors in Europe is a new edition of the old concept of *geographically extended defense*. Although the prospect of nuclear war was never strong, during most of the time of the Cold War, this concept was attractive enough to justify the costs of defense systems positioned far from the American mainland. And as we see, it has not been replaced with 'new concepts of deterrence' as Mr. Bush once said. To those – including Russians or European observers – who might have had any doubts about the fundamental reason for Bush's obsession of the NMD, we guess this historical parallel can dispel all questions.

25. These weapons have a capability that is unique. To be completely correct, the above-mentioned project was launched long before the issue of missile defense in Central Europe became a hot topic of the day. As a rule, it takes several years or even more than a decade to develop a new warhead or a carrier rocket, a launcher.

26. Cited from Boston.com, released on April 8, 2008.

27. The very fact that the ABM system in Central Europe is American makes elements of anti-Americanism an avoidable feature of the Russian president anti-missile defense rhetoric. Yet, as one wise man said, those who object that silly American idea have no sense of humor because alike nuclear weapons in Europe during the Cold War, the US AMD system does not hurt anyone.

28. We do not agree entirely with the opinion that 'Central Europeans lost self-confidence through two world wars and self-reliance in the Cold War, and now they find it easier to defer to the United States in the issue of missile defense'. This arrogant opinion should not be a correct explanation. Yet we do agree that a mixed reaction of the public opinion to the Bush proposal reflects a fear of the Russian bear which is still spread amongst part of Central European elites. Many in the Czech Republic and Poland said 'no' repeatedly, but without effect. 'It is a desire of Americans to dominate, not the real threats, that explains such harassment of Central Europeans' – one of the European colleagues said to the author of this paper in private communication. And added: 'there is nothing natural, friendly, or affectionate about degrading a country or persisting with unwelcome or inappropriate advances'.

29. In the United States, the public's attitude towards particular foreign policy issues depends primarily on the degree to which the policy advanced American national interest, whether such a policy involves use of military force and then the costs and other details.

30. After the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001, Moscow's response, delivered in a statement by President Vladimir Putin, expressed disagreement with the American decision but diplomatically emphasized the official position that United States is not a threat to Russia. After events of 9/11, Putin agreed to building of the US airbases in ex-Soviet Central Asia republics and helped to win the war against Taliban in Afghanistan, and then Russia ratified the START II and agreed to make major reductions in its strategic offensive forces (the US–Russia nuclear weapons reduction agreement signed in 2002).

31. Many traditional-minded people within Russia now argue that Putin's reorientation towards the West was a strategic mistake that must be reversed. They say how ridiculous it is to discuss energy security of Europe while turning a blind eye on the anti-ballistic missile shields, new launchers, advanced warheads for long-range missiles and other kinds of smart weapons, which are modernizing under the cover of 'successful summits'!

32. Most people in the United States think it is unlikely that Russia could launch an attack against their country. According to *Rasmussen Reports* in February 2008, 76% of respondents were not worried about this possibility (*Source*: Angus Reid Global Monitor).

33. On the other hand, some plain Americans still believe that ‘even if a NMD system is 80 percent reliable, that’s better than nothing’.

34. Here we rephrase a bit the words of Robert Hunter, former US Ambassador to NATO, said on February 10, 2001 in his 2001 Ernest Bevin Memorial lecture at the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom.

35. There was an impression that September 11, 2001 not only changed US policies, but also brought the end of the post-Cold War period. Alas, it was a premature inference. Instead of the long-awaited global stability that it seemed to promise, the beginning of the 21st century has given way to a ‘cold peace’ that replaced the ‘cold war’ of the previous century. This chilly period seems to be long. The Cold War of the 20th century became history, but that did not mean that all areas of confrontation between Russia and the West ceased to exist.

36. *Ibid.*, *The Observer*, April 7, 2008.

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# THE SYMMETRIES OF ASYMMETRY: MYTHS SURROUNDING THE NOTION OF ASYMMETRIC WAR

Antulio J. Echevarria II

## ABSTRACT

*This paper will attempt to shatter some of the myths about asymmetric warfare. Recently, the term “asymmetric” has been used a great deal in defense literature. In many cases, it is as if “asymmetric warfare” represents a newer and cleverer way of fighting. However, the notion, or rather the presumption, that the belligerents in any war have been, or can ever be, symmetrical in the first place – and that symmetry is less clever or desirable than asymmetry, particularly when it comes to strategy – is baseless. Symmetry between or among opposing parties is actually rarer than asymmetry. Moreover, the larger strategic asymmetries, which are obviously more evident, are not necessarily the most important with respect to determining outcomes. The term does not, in fact, lend itself to a precise definition; its continued use is, thus, counterproductive.*

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Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos  
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 12A, 415–426  
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ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A026

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The term “asymmetric” has become enormously popular in today’s scholarly and defense literature, but that does not mean its use is beneficial, or helps us understand contemporary warfare any better. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Use of the term is counterproductive, and works against clear-headed thinking about today’s strategic issues. Nonetheless, we find it appearing more frequently in official publications, such as the articles and speeches of U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and blog sites, such as [smallwarjournal.com](http://smallwarjournal.com).<sup>1</sup> The history of the term’s use in historical and political science studies is a long one, reaching back at least to the 1970s, though its mention in official documents does not seem to have occurred until the mid-1990s.<sup>2</sup> However, use of the term virtually exploded after 9/11.<sup>3</sup> Now, we find not just a wealth of books and articles discussing asymmetric warfare, but also some defense-related journals actually using the term in their titles.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Army has even created an Asymmetric Warfare Group based in Fort Meade, Maryland, the mission of which is to provide advice and assistance to army and joint force commanders in order “to enhance the combat effectiveness of the operational forces and to enable the defeat of asymmetric threats.”<sup>5</sup> So, the term has not only grown in popularity, it has acquired a functional significance.

The term asymmetric has also taken on an air of legitimacy of late, as signified by its increased use in official literature. The U.S. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report used the term asymmetric 14 times ([Buffaloe, 2006](#), p. 5). In early 2008, for instance, Secretary Gates wrote that the United States needed to change its defense “priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called ‘asymmetric warfare’ ... We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time” ([Gates, 2008](#)). Again, in a speech delivered several months later, Gates explicitly equated “asymmetric” war to “irregular” war, making it clear that he believed the United States needed some additional capabilities to address such conflicts.<sup>6</sup> These cases represent just a few of the examples of how official references to the term have imparted a certain legitimacy not only to the label itself, but also to those theorists, defense analysts, and strategists who claim that asymmetric warfare is the unqualified future of war.<sup>7</sup>

This legitimacy, even if chimerical, was quickly appropriated by the “small wars” school of thought in the debate now underway in American defense circles. That debate concerns how much force structure to dedicate to winning so-called asymmetric or irregular wars.<sup>8</sup> The “small wars” school

of thought maintains that asymmetry is the future, and the future is now; ergo, U.S. forces must be fundamentally restructured for the many “small” conflicts that now populate the contemporary strategic environment, and seem likely to continue to do so. An opposing view holds that major conflicts, either with North Korea or some other state or state-sponsored threat, are still possible, and that a thorough restructuring based on contemporary – rather than future – concerns thus would be ill advised; even states as economically underdeveloped as Iran and China will pose serious threats by 2025, particularly given the anticipated proliferation of precision-guided munitions.<sup>9</sup> In actuality, both sides of the debate tend to cling to extremes. In any case, the U.S. Department of Defense is demonstrably too conservative an organization to accept the high degree of risk entailed in transforming wholly one way or the other; either course would sacrifice operational flexibility and undermine deterrence.

Of course, debates within the defense community often resort to rhetorical excess in order to be heard above the din raised by lobbyists and special interest groups. Nonetheless, Secretary Gates’ pronouncement that U.S. defense policy will be based on “balance” should serve notice to both extremes. However, it also raises the question, as the Defense Secretary himself admits, as to what types and what ratio of forces would actually constitute balance.<sup>10</sup> Invariably, balance, which in any case is always in the eye of the beholder, means there will not be enough forces to do some kinds of missions. So, the question comes down to which missions will have higher priority. Along which part of the spectrum of armed conflict, in other words, should one accept higher risk? Yet, that is a question made more – rather than less – difficult by the term asymmetric, which is egregiously overused and, ultimately, too vague to be helpful.<sup>11</sup> The remainder of this essay discusses the two types of usage to which the term is put, the flawed assumptions underpinning those uses, the various types of asymmetry that exist and which, ultimately, make arriving at a useful definition unlikely.

## 2. TYPES OF USAGE

As noted above, the term asymmetric is grossly overused in scholarly and defense literature, usually appearing in conjunction with words like “strategy” or “tactics” or “war.” It is generally applied in two ways. The first and most frequent use is when it is employed by those who believe that asymmetric warfare is a newer and cleverer way of fighting.<sup>12</sup> These individuals depict it as a way of gaining surprise or leverage by means of a



new method or weapon that will exploit an adversary's weakness, as if such efforts were something new to warfare. Reading any of the classic military theorists – whether Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, or Liddell Hart – shows that such thinking is not new at all, but has been a mainstay in military thought for centuries. A general assumption underpinning this usage is that asymmetric warfare is what the weak use against the strong, and very often, or so the argument goes, with success.<sup>13</sup>

A recent example now frequently found in defense literature is the approach used by Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon conflict.<sup>14</sup> Hezbollah is portrayed as the quintessential asymmetric force that confounded Israeli tactics and strategy through the use of its “asymmetric” rockets and guerrilla methods. However, closer examination reveals that Hezbollah's methods were actually closer to the light infantry tactics found in Soviet doctrine than they were to typical guerrilla techniques. Hezbollah fighters, for instance, did tend to stand and fight on occasion, something guerrilla forces do not normally do. The use of mines, mutually supporting fighting positions, and coordinated direct and indirect fires designed to channel Israeli armor into antitank kill zones was also evident, which again suggests the influence of Soviet light infantry doctrine. Also, most Hezbollah fighters wore a standard, recognizable uniform, rather than attempting to blend-in among the populace with civilian attire. Taken together, this evidence suggests that Hezbollah is aspiring to be a regular force, rather than remain a guerrilla one.<sup>15</sup> That aspiration should not be surprising given the importance the organization places on achieving and maintaining political and military legitimacy. Thus, its apparent evolution toward a regular force should not have been unanticipated.

At the same time, it is worth remembering that when one party employs a so-called asymmetric method or weapon, the other is, by definition, doing the same. In order to have asymmetry in the first place, we must have two objects to compare. This fact does not appear to have been fully grasped by those who use the term, since many of them seem to look at a conflict, or potential conflict, from one side only. As an example, we could cite the slogans touted by contemporary air power theorists in the United States, which claimed that air power was America's asymmetric advantage.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, many have extended the notion of asymmetric advantage to encompass the technological superiority of U.S. forces in general (Fein, 2005). Unfortunately, asymmetry in itself does not necessarily create a useable advantage. That depends upon the particulars of the situation. The asymmetric advantages of one side may be balanced by the asymmetric advantages of the other; or the most prominent advantages of either side

may actually be unavailable in time of crisis due to specific circumstances, such as restrictive rules of engagement, which could preclude the employment of certain weapons and procedures.

The second common use of the term asymmetric is to describe any conflict that differs from a so-called traditional or conventional war. Examples of such conflicts include irregular wars, guerrilla wars, insurgencies, and so-called small wars.<sup>17</sup> The term has even been applied to stabilization and reconstruction operations.<sup>18</sup> These types of conflicts or operations are hastily and improperly referred to as asymmetric because they are seen as the exception rather than the rule in military history; yet, that implied balance may appear true only because history, being what historians write, is not a comprehensive reflection of the past. It reflects, only and inevitably, what historians themselves are able to determine, think is important, or wish to emphasize about the past. Even Clausewitz, the master military theorist himself, recognized that there were more so-called small wars (where the objectives were limited) in the past than ones where a complete overthrow was sought, and his theory needed to reflect that reality. In contrast, scholars and defense analysts appear to see the latter type of conflicts, such as the First and Second World Wars, as more aptly fitting the model (or rule) of what war is supposed to be.

As a case in point, the United States has fought more small wars than large ones throughout its history; it actually has forces specifically designed for such wars, and has had them for some time. Historian Max Boot, for instance, has pointed out that America's role in so-called small wars has long been overlooked; there were more than 30 such wars from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the end of the Cold War (Boot, 2002). When we compare that number to that of so-called traditional wars – the Civil War, First World War, Second World War, Korea, and Iraq (1990) – the ratio becomes clearer: the United States has been involved in five or six small wars for every traditional one. With this sort of ratio, it is far more accurate to describe small wars as the tradition or the norm and large conflicts as the exceptions. Consequently, describing America's contemporary conflicts (or foes) as symmetrical or asymmetrical contributes little to our existing knowledge, and in fact is evidence of a palpable lack of understanding of the relatively brief military history of the United States. Indeed, the American way of war, which is really a way of battle, cannot be understood without accounting for the many small wars in which the United States participated (Echevarria, 2004). The upshot of all this is that scholars and defense analysts may be using the wrong model: large wars are the exception, not the rule.

### 3. FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS

These usages rest upon two faulty assumptions. The first is that asymmetry is somehow naturally better than symmetry because it comes at a foe in an unexpected way and the second is that asymmetry is less common than symmetry. In fact, neither symmetry nor asymmetry is better than the other: both are merely neutral descriptors. It is impossible for one foe to fight another asymmetrically, unless the former is also being fought asymmetrically by the latter. So, the value of asymmetry itself disappears. Moreover, in all cases, the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric is purely academic. Asymmetry is virtually unavoidable: it exists even when antagonists are not consciously trying to create it, or actively trying to use it to gain an advantage. No belligerents have ever been, nor can ever be, truly symmetrical. One has to work at achieving symmetry, whereas asymmetry, however minor, is the natural product of political, cultural, geographic, and economic differences among belligerents. Throughout history, every conflict has been more asymmetrical than symmetrical: it is the rule rather than the exception. In short, every competitor is asymmetric to us in important ways, and every two conflicts are asymmetric in important ways.

### 4. TYPES OF ASYMMETRIES

When we take a closer look at asymmetries, we see that they can be of kind or of degree. The hoplite wars of ancient Greece, for instance, would appear, on the surface at least, to have been about as symmetrical as it is possible to be. Yet, closer examination reveals that the numbers engaged on each side were rarely the same; the leadership and training were almost never equal; and the geographic positions, strength of economies, and the number and value of allies were almost always uneven (Kagan, 2003). All of these factors matter and, as studies of military failure illustrate, some of them matter enormously (Strauss & Ober, 1992).

The Battle of Leuctra (371 BC), for instance, appears to have been a clash between two apparently symmetrical forces, but in reality it represents a clash between asymmetries of degree and of kind. Disparities in numbers, training, and leadership are asymmetries of degree. Fundamental differences in military strategy, types of weapons, or sources of strength – Sparta was clearly a land power and Athens a naval power – are examples of asymmetries of kind (Lazenby, 2004; Kagan, 2003).

Asymmetry	Type
Numbers of forces	Degree
Types of forces	Kind
Type/quality of leadership	Kind
Type/amount of training	Kind/degree
Tactics and strategies	Kind
Geopolitical differences	Kind/degree
Economic differences	Kind/degree

Distinguishing between asymmetries of degree or of kind helps to demystify the term by providing a simple, but viable, framework for understanding the types of differences and their significance. Yet, it also shows that asymmetrical wars are the rule, rather than the exception. In fact, truly symmetrical wars do not appear to exist beyond a superficial comparison.

Asymmetries of kind may appear, at first glance, to be more decisive, and thus more important, than those of degree; indeed, some would argue that the term asymmetry should only be applied to a major difference in kind. However, asymmetries of kind are not necessarily more decisive than those of degree. Local superiority of numbers, an asymmetry of degree, helped a Theban army overcome a Spartan one at the battle of Leuctra (371 BC), and changed the regional balance of power in ancient Greece, at least for a time.

The Thebans, in fact, were at about a two-to-one (11,000–6,000) numerical (asymmetric) disadvantage overall. However, they managed to achieve local numerical superiority on their left flank, the Spartan's right flank, by using an asymmetric formation, a phalanx 48–50 ranks deep instead of the standard 8–12 ranks. As the position of honor was always on the right, the Theban commander, Epaminondas, could be sure he would face the flower of Spartan infantry at the point where his asymmetric formation was strongest. By sheer force of numbers, he crushed the Spartan right flank, which broke the morale of the rest (Sidwell, 2005).

As mentioned above, another example might be the Second World War, which is often used as the model for so-called “big,” traditional, or symmetrical wars. Presumably, this war is considered symmetrical because the powers engaged in it used conventional means – armies, navies, and air forces – of military power (Williams, 2007). We can also see an obvious similarity in the way the various opponents organized themselves and fought. However, when we analyze the various powers involved in the conflict more closely, we find that a number of asymmetries of kind and of

degree which are simply too numerous to list. We find asymmetries of kind in terms of political motivation, given the different ideologies at work. We find asymmetries of degree at every level of military organization and in every type of military technology. So, even though both sides used mechanized ground forces, and modern navies and air forces, there were also countless differences in degree – from strategy to leadership to doctrine to tactics to numerical strength – which nullified the similarities. In addition, each side sought and employed unconventional weapons, such as the German V-1 and V-2 and the American atomic bomb, that render the notion of symmetry entirely useless.

## 5. A FAILURE TO DEFINE

At first blush, it might seem that we can resolve this issue by crafting a clearer, more precise definition of asymmetry. However, several analysts have already attempted to do so – without success. Some define asymmetry as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action” (Metz & Johnson, 2001, pp. 5–8). But, one has to wonder where the symmetry would be: opposing sides never think or act the same, so asymmetry would characterize every conflict. Others define asymmetry as “hostilities in which the two sides use or have available to them radically different weaponry and strategies” (Bell, 2001, p. 5). But, how does one define “radically” different? Still others see asymmetric conflicts as “those in which one side is possessed of overwhelming power with respect to its adversary” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. xi). Again, difficulties occur with terms like “overwhelming” – how much power is actually needed to qualify as overwhelming? Or, some define an asymmetric conflict more simply as one in which “two states with unequal power resources confront each other on the battlefield” (Paul, 1994, p. 3). But, when are states ever truly equal in power? That is never the case, in fact.

Even distinctions emanating from the U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group do not solve the problem. One officer commented that: “Whereas traditional warfare is linear in nature, Asymmetric Warfare is multi-dimensional and amorphous. One category blends into the other. One action affects the other” (Buffaloe, 2006, p. 15). While the idea of maintaining an organization dedicated specifically to thinking about the problem of asymmetry in warfare is a commendable one, this particular

point of view is unsustainable. We might like to think of traditional warfare as if it were linear; however, it is anything but. Traditional warfare, referring back to the world wars mentioned above, is multidimensional, with political, cultural, and economic dimensions playing as important a role in such wars as they do in any other. With the Second World War, especially, being almost as total as one could get, how is it possible that the political, cultural, and economic dimensions would not play major roles? It was a war fought for extremely high stakes politically; consequently, it was a war laced through with political influence, on all sides.

The real danger of keeping a term like asymmetry in service is that it will lead to muddled thinking and inferior decisions because it will encourage us to believe that different norms should apply to them. For example, one government official wrote: “Asymmetric warfare can wreak its greatest damage by producing an ill-judged response by the state”(O’Brien MP, 2002). The problem with this statement is that any “symmetrical” war could, in fact, do the same. Policymakers should approach any war with this statement in mind. We gain little; indeed, we actually lose a great deal by treating asymmetrical wars as if they were the only ones for which an “ill-judged response” might cause great damage. Similarly, we should not fall into the trap of thinking that certain military principles only apply to one sort of war, whether it is labeled symmetrical or asymmetrical (Bellany, 2002).

Some analysts have suggested that the defense community settle on a compromise between the terms symmetric and asymmetric. The term they propose using instead is “hybrid” war, meaning some combination of symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts (McCuen, 2008). However, this compromise is not useful. As we have seen, because every war has an abundance of asymmetry and (on paper at least) some symmetry, every war would be essentially a hybrid war. In that case, the label would have no useful meaning.

Consequently, the definitions above are essentially built upon a fiction. And, unfortunately, no definition can truly help sweep away the confused thinking that surrounds the term. Asymmetries – in nature and war – are simply too plentiful. Indeed, the minor ones, whether of kind or degree, may prove to be decisive in the end; hence, they cannot be discounted. Any legitimate definition would have to include them as well as major differences, which would in turn make the definition unusable. In short, it is rarely a single asymmetry, but rather a combination of them – such as strategy, leadership, and resources – which proves critical in determining the outcome of a conflict.

## 6. CONCLUSION

As this paper has shown, symmetry itself is rarely more than superficial. There are no truly symmetrical foes, and no truly symmetrical wars. Symmetry, while it might exist on paper, is never truly present in practice, where asymmetries of degree can make a decisive difference. The essential activity for decision makers, then, is to understand what the differences are among belligerents and whether they might reveal critical weaknesses that can be exploited.

Asymmetries abound. Yet, it is not possible to judge a priori whether a minor or a major one would prove conclusive in a conflict. Even so-called radical asymmetries, such as those found at the level of grand strategies or national or regional sources of power, are not always the most important in determining outcomes. Asymmetries that we might consider only minor can nonetheless prove decisive. So, the argument cannot be made that asymmetry should only concern major or radical differences.

Therefore, the best solution, indeed the only reasonable one, is to jettison the term altogether. What we need in any case is not knowledge that a particular kind of war or strategy or foe is asymmetric. All of them are. So that fact tells us very little. What we need, instead, is to know just how each case is different. What are the specific differences, and what are the implications of those differences for political and military decision makers? Those are the truly critical questions. Labels such as “asymmetric” will only delay finding the answers.

## NOTES

1. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/>
2. Compare Mack (1975); see Metz and Johnson (2001); Buffaloe (2006).
3. As an example: Bell (2001).
4. See: <http://lefrontasymetrique.blogspot.com/>; “L’objectif du “Front Asymétrique” est de fournir une information de qualité et en profondeur sur le terrorisme et les insurrections à travers le monde. Le blog alterne compte-rendu de rapports et analyses originals.”
5. <http://www.awg.army.mil/>
6. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/17411>, Secretary Gates’ Speech delivered at National Defense University, September 20, 2008.
7. Among those are several of the contributions in Wheeler (2008); Barnett (2003); <http://www.thomaspbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm>
8. Mazzar (2008) summarizes the debate, and offers a critique of the small wars school of thought.

9. The case for caution is presented in National Intelligence Council (2008); [http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_2025\\_project.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html)
10. Gates, Speech delivered at National Defense University, September 20, 2008.
11. See also Blank (2003).
12. “International: Asymmetric War Poses New Challenges,” *Oxford Analytica* (October 24, 2001), 1, is representative of this view.
13. Examples are Findley and Edwards (2007); Arreguin-Toft (2005); and Paul (1994).
14. For example, Lt. Col. John Sayen, “The Overburden of America’s Outdated Defenses,” in *America’s Defense Meltdown*, 14.
15. Biddle and Friedman (2008) argue that Hezbollah was closer to a traditional light infantry force than to a guerrilla model. My own observations of the interviews suggests that Soviet light infantry tactics were the model.
16. Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., (2006); <http://www.afji.com/2006/09/2009013>.
17. See Lowther (2007).
18. “Military support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations,” Department of Defense Directive no. 3000.05, November 28, 2005.

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