palgrave▸pivot

POLICING NEW RISKS IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY

Edited by

Jonas Campion and
Xavier Rousseaux

▶ **Policing New Risks in Modern European History**

World Histories of Crime, Culture and Violence

Series Editors: **Marianna Muravyeva** and **Raisa Toivo**

Palgrave's World Histories of Crime, Culture, and Violence seeks to publish research monographs, collections of scholarly essays, multi-authored books, and Palgrave Pivots addressing themes and issues of interdisciplinary histories of crime, criminal justice, criminal policy, culture, and violence globally and on a wide chronological scale (from the ancient to the modern period). It focuses on interdisciplinary studies, historically contextualized, across various cultures and spaces employing a wide range of methodologies and conceptual frameworks.

Editorial Board: Jerome Bourgon, University of Lyon, Director of Asian Studies Institute, Constanta Ghitulescu, University of Bucharest, Manon van der Heijden, Leiden University, Bill Hebenton, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice School of Law, University of Manchester, Stacy Hynd, University of Exeter, Willbur Miller, SUNY, New York, Judith Pallot, University of Oxford, James Sharpe, York University, Philip C. Shon, Technical University of Ontario, Ricardo Salvatore, Florida International University, Peter Spierenburg, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Stephen Toth, Arizona State University

Titles include:

Jonas Campion and Xavier Rousseaux *(editors)*
POLICING NEW RISKS IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY

Forthcoming titles:

Anastasia Dukova
A HISTORY OF THE DUBLIN METROPOLITAN POLICE AND ITS COLONIAL LEGACY

palgrave▶**pivot**

Policing New Risks in Modern European History

Edited by

▶

Jonas Campion
Université Lille 3, France and Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium

and

Xavier Rousseaux
FRS-FNRS, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium

palgrave
macmillan

Contents

Acknowledgements

▶

Notes on Contributors

Jonas Campion is a postdoctoral researcher funded by the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region at the Institut de recherches historiques du Septentrion (Irhis, U. Lille 3, France), and invited Lecturer in History at the UCLouvain, Belgium. From 2011 to 2014, he was FRS-FNRS Postdoctoral Researcher attached to the Centre of Law and Justice History (UCLouvain, Belgium). He is currently working on security policies and police history in Europe. He holds a PhD in History at UCLouvain and Paris IV Sorbonne (2009) on European *Gendarmeries* at the end of the Second World War, and in 2011 published *Les gendarmes belges, français et néerlandais à la sortie de la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Bruxelles, André Versaille). He recently published 'Gendarmeries, territorial control and State reinforcement at the ends of world wars (Belgium, France and The Netherlands, 1914–1950)', *European History Review/Revue européenne d'histoire,* Vol. 2, No. 3, 2015, pp. 451–467 and 'Maintaining law and order in a democratic and pilarised country: the Belgian Gendarmerie between 1918 and 1957', *The Journal on European History of Law*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2015, pp. 68–76.

Margo De Koster is a part-time professor in the Criminology Department of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Lecturer in Historical Criminology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and vice-coordinator of the Belgian research network IAP Network 7/22 (Belgian Science Policy), 'Justice & Populations. The Belgian experience in international Perspective, 1795–1950', coord. Prof. Xavier Rousseaux, UCLouvain. She studied history and sociology

at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, where she worked from 1998 to 2006 in the History Department as a researcher of the Belgian National Fund for Scientific research, and obtained her PhD on girl delinquency in the interwar period in 2003. She conducts historical-criminological research on juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice, girls and women in criminal justice, urban policing, and transgressive uses of urban public space.

Amandine Lauro is a postdoctoral researcher of the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FRS-FNRS) at the Free University of Brussels (ULB). Her research interests include histories of imperialism in Central Africa, gender and sexual politics of empire, colonial policing, and urban order. She has published on colonial prostitution, interracial sexuality, gender and colonial law and more recently on urban policing, race, and colonial surveillance in the Belgian Congo.

Laurent López is an associate researcher at the CESDIP (Centre for Sociological Research on Law and Criminal Justice Institutions) and at the Centre for Nineteenth Century History (University Paris-Sorbonne). He is specialized in French and European police forces history, in particular the relations between *gendarmes* (French military police) and policemen. He obtained a PhD in History in 2012. His thesis was published in 2014 under the title *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu. Gendarmes et policiers, coacteurs de la sécurité publique sous la Troisième République (1870–1914)*. His last work is 'Servir la République après avoir juré fidélité à Napoléon III. Les réintégrations sans épuration des commissaires de police', *Histoire & Mesure*, 2014, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 107–134.

Guus Meershoek is Lecturer in Police History at the Dutch Police Academy (Apeldoorn) and Assistant Professor in Political Sciences at the University of Twente, the Netherlands. He studied Political Sciences at the University of Amsterdam and wrote a dissertation on the Amsterdam police and the German occupation (*Dienaren van het gezag*, 1999). His main research interests are modern policing, safety governance, and the history of the Dutch police. He did research on organized crime and the fight against organized crime, on traffic policing, on undercover policing, and on international police cooperation and participated in a project on the history of the Dutch police. A special topic is the persecution and deportation of the Dutch Jews during the German occupation. He published several books, among these are *De groep IJzerman. Hoe de politie infiltreerde in de links-radicale beweging van de jaren zestig* (2011) and

De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse politie. De Gemeentepolitie in een verand-erende samenleving (2006). He is co-chair of the Criminal Justice History Network of the bi-annual European Social Science History Conference (ESSHC).

Xavier Rousseaux is Research Director at the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FRS-FNRS), and a professor at the Université catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain, Belgium), Centre for Law and Justice History. Working on the history of crime and justice, he is coordinating the IAP Network 7/22 (Belgian Science Policy), 'Justice & populations: The Belgian experience in international perspective, 1795–1950'. He recently coedited the following books: M. De Koster, H. Leuwers, D. Luyten, X. Rousseaux (eds), *Justice in Wartimes and Revolution Europe/Justice en temps de guerre et revolutions 1750–1950* (2012) and J.-M. Berlière, J. Campion, L. Lacché, X. Rousseaux (eds), *Justices militaires et guerres mondiales/Military Justice and World Wars (1914–1950)* (2013). He also published 'A history of crime and criminal justice in Europe', in S. Body-Gendrot, K. Kerezsi, M. Hought, R. Lévy, S. Snacken (eds), *Handbook of European Criminology* (2013).

David Somer is working (since 2005) as analyst and archivist for the Belgian Ministry of Justice. He is also working in a Probation Commission. He holds a Master's in History and another in Sociology and is currently self-financed PhD student at the Centre for Law and Justice History (UCLouvain, Belgium). He collaborates occasionally in some projects related to the history of the Belgian intelligence service (co-organization in 2005 of an exhibition on the Belgian State Security service, events organized by the 'Belgian Intelligence Study Center').

1

New Threats or Phantom Menace? Police Institutions Facing Crises

Jonas Campion and Xavier Rousseaux

▶ **Abstract:** *Social, economic, political, regime, or environmental crises bring about challenging periods for the proper working of society. Crises take part in the transformation process of structures and practices of established authorities. The latter develop new policies to best handle these unconventional times and safeguard the effectiveness or legitimacy of their actions in changing environments. The relation of police forces toward crises is ambivalent. As guarantors of order closely linked with the authorities they serve, they would allegedly be wary of – or even defiant towards – changes, which are seen as synonyms of 'fears', 'threats', or 'risks' for order and public security. On the other hand, crises also appear to be periods of institutional opportunity for police forces.*

Social, economic, political, regime, or environmental crises bring about challenging periods for the proper working of society. Crises take part in the transformation process of structures and practices of established authorities. The latter develop new policies to best handle these unconventional times and safeguard the effectiveness or legitimacy of their actions in changing environments (Boucher, Falochet, 2012; Rosenthal, Arjen Boin, 2012). In contemporary states, one of the major consequences of crises is to foster changes in the frameworks of citizenship and social statuses, which are reconfigured between victims, 'dangerous' groups to be closely watched, leading elites, or populations which have been recently integrated within the social and political life of the state.

The relation of police forces towards crises is ambivalent by definition (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, 1978; Oram, 2003; Reinke, 2008). As guarantors of order closely linked with the authorities they serve, they would allegedly be wary of – or even defiant towards – changes, which are seen as synonyms of 'fears', 'threats', or 'risks' for order and public security. On the other hand, crises also appear to be periods of institutional opportunity for police forces. These periods that act as reform experiments, where the exception becomes the norm, reveal loopholes or necessities and foster autonomies. They are also characterized by an acceleration of police forces' transformation or growth paces.

This ambivalence regarding the effects of crises on the short run should be put in perspective thanks to an analysis of the changes in the policing structures framing societies in the medium term. Since the 19th century, with the development of the Modern State, police bodies structured themselves and bureaucratized. The police function became an occupation (Reinke, De Koster, 2014). This professionalization went hand in hand with a wider set of tasks entrusted to the police, which corresponded to the wider scope of intervention of public authorities. The authorities' competences gradually extended from the public toward the private sphere while covering economic, social, family, industry, or health issues. The emergence of a 'modern police' (Napoli, 2003), is undoubtedly essential to understanding the way the states deal with crises and their consequences.

The police's attitude and role in times of crisis need to be scrutinized in detail in view of how important they are for life in society. Acting as an interface between multiple authorities (political, administrative, judicial, or military), official institutions and a population that has to be controlled and protected, the police are key players in the social sphere. In order

to comprehend the peculiar relation between the police and crises, the researcher's attention must cover time and space.

In this book, which includes most papers presented at the occasion of a GERN *Interlabo* workshop in June 2014,[1] we consider police responses to the processes, the forms and paces of social changes that have taken place in the wake of the successive crises which have structured societies from the 19th century in Continental and Western Europe (France, Belgium, Netherlands) or within the colonial world (Belgian Congo). Analysing the polysemic notion of crisis from a new perspective, this book studies the transformation of the police institution, especially as regards its objective of security management in these particular periods. By tackling the history of the police institution at a time when its framework of action changed, we focus our analysis both on the reality and the intellectual development and identification process of the threats that caused these changes. Our goal is to demonstrate to what extent the police are an important stakeholder of the social construction of contemporary risk, how they are influenced by the latter, and are consequently an ideal point of view to observe the steps in developing responses to 'perceived' risk within each society.

Our aim is to understand when, how, and why police bodies and police staff adapted their organisation and practices to these unusual circumstances. Fitting in line with a socio-political history of the state – in view of the fundamental links existing between police institutions and police functions, as well as the authorities they serve (Fijnaut, 1979; Loubet Del Bayle, 2006) –, this perspective's purpose is to analyse continuities and discontinuities in police history. Between facts, myths, fears, strategies, and amplifications, this is a political economy of security that needs to be brought to light, between the offer proposed by multifaceted and legally bound police forces; changing demands according to political stakes, ideological stakes, and public opinion's weight; and human, material, and financial means that were sometimes limited or inadequate.

In this introduction, we first propose a socio-historical analysis of the concepts of 'risk' and 'threat', as well as of the 'security' required to deal with them. We will then shift to the police institution. On the one hand, in the light of the gathered papers and an expanding historiography, we underline the methodological perspectives which are a critical aspect of an innovative historical approach to police systems. On the other hand, building on these first analyses, we will introduce a few hypotheses for a history of risk management through the prism of police issues.

A historical approach to risk and security[2]

The police institution which, according to Paolo Napoli or Dominique Monjardet, cannot be exclusively defined by what it represents (Napoli, 2003; Monjardet, 1996 and 2008), but also by its actions, is one of the most debated research topics in social sciences (sociology, political sciences, law, criminology) and – in recent years – history. There are several reasons for such a dynamism: the role of ever-growing importance played by police bodies in the functioning and dysfunctioning of social life; the massive amount of documentation produced by police forces, extensively used by historians (Berlière, 1998, 2001 and 2009); the observation that researches on policing are all the more necessary to understand society because of the wide gap between norms and practices.

In this perspective, the 'modern' police institution would be one of the first social institutions trying to predict future disorders in order to deal with today's law enforcement. In many ways, this observation is in accordance with the reflections on risk sociology. This has been central to recent debates, especially in the French-speaking scientific sphere since Ulrich Beck's book *Risk Society* was translated in 2001, after its initial publication in German in 1986 (Beck, 2001). In this book, Beck is the first to develop the observation of a breaking in modern society, characterized by the emergence of new risks of unprecedented magnitude, especially in industrial and technological fields (Niget, Peticlerc, 2012). According to this approach, the issue of the distribution of these risks should be raised in order to guarantee a certain level of security and respond to a need for insurability. In the end, this insurability is impossible to guarantee in many fields considering the new kinds of risks which have to be addressed.

Although they are stimulating as 'know-how sociology', Beck's works have been criticized. Among the most relevant criticisms, those summarised by Jean-François Cauchie and Gilles Chantraine are based on questioning the comprehensive, unique, and general character of this approach to risk. In order to go beyond these limits, they propose to contextualize the concept of risk based on the governmentalist approaches initiated by Michel Foucault. In this framework, risk and risk management become tools 'to guide behaviours and the carrying out of a particular power underpinned by a specific political rationality' (Chantraine, Cauchie, 2006). This

new rationality proves to be a kind of governmentality (Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1996) which can be defined as a 'form of activity aiming at influencing, guiding or affecting the behaviours of one or more persons'.

The link with the policing institution then becomes obvious. Indeed, if governmentality has to be understood as 'the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that enable to carry out this very specific, although very complex, form of power [...] which aims at controlling the population', modern police indeed appears as an ideal tool according to the triple dimension identified by Foucault: set of technologies; form of power tending to supersede the sovereignty and discipline; result of the transformation of the state into a governmentalized state' (Foucault, 2004, p. 112). The police institution is typically confronted with the management of risks to social order, especially those who derive from an ever-increasing circulation of people, goods, and ideas (Blanc-Chaleard, Douki, Dyonet, Millot, 2001 and Deflem, 2002). Within the development of Western societies, the police are a response that emerged simultaneously to this new perception of social risk from the 17th century to guarantee both an individual and collective security.

Methodological references for an entangled history

This observation shows that it is compulsory to analyse the police management of crises and the risks that derive from it, but also to underline their impact on police bodies. In this perspective, we first need to emphasize a few essential insights of a renewed historical analysis of policing duties. Used in various ways by the participants to this book, these insights both outline and define the methodological framework and points of reference aimed at going deeper into a socio-political history of the police forces. These insights will favour a well-structured understanding of risks realities and related discourses.

Firstly, analysing police responses to risks requires taking into account the diversity of stakeholders at play. A socio-political history of social regulations needs to be carried out. This is a known fact: The police are a multifaceted authority, from the point of view of carried out tasks (which are traditionally divided in administrative, judicial or

state-related missions, though the terms used may vary) (Bittner, 1990, pp. 82–232) and the multiple bodies they are made up of. Police tasks are divided into many divisions. This leads to the coexistence of multiple institutions, which can be distinguished by their territorial distribution, their theoretical competences, the missions they carry out, their civil or military identity, their hierarchy, and, more recently, their private or state-related character (Ocqueteau, 1997 and 2004; Leloup, 2014). Thus, this results in the emergence of 'police systems', in their own right (Levy, 2012), made up of multiple institutions that compete with each other and complete one another, the structures of which are based on political philosophical choices related to the state, citizens, or fundamental freedoms and restricted by temporary or local circumstances.[3]

Ultimately, within increasingly centralized states, political, and judicial decision-makers endeavoured to propose coordinated and comprehensive response to threats and risks, in spite of a recurring 'police wars' discourse (regarding this topic, see Laurent López's paper which illustrates the latent conflict between military police and civil police) (López, 2014). The researchers need to focus on understanding the different steps in the development of police systems by both considering the institution as a whole and also each of its components. It is necessary to analyse the links, the relations and logics that bind the different stakeholders together, that is to say (judicial, municipal and national) police bodies, the *gendarmeries*, the army, intelligence services, private bodies active in the security field, but also the state's political, judicial, and administrative institutions. This results in a nuanced understanding of the security landscape which is defined according to its missions and action levels. Is this a consistent system or rather a mix of multiple stakeholders organized according to a more or less hierarchical task distribution?

Police practices are partly determined by the stakeholders the police interact with. In order to establish the legality and legitimacy of police forces, a society-specific triangle relationship is defined between the authorities, the police system, (as well as its institutional interests), and the populations. This relationship articulates around hierarchical dynamics, control dynamics, and cooperation or opposition logics (Emsley, Weinberger, 1991; Mawby, 2002 and De Koster, 2010). The triangle can become more complex: fringe groups, experts, opinion makers, but also occupational groups are all sub-categories that need to be considered (this is a non-exhaustive list), as they play a role in defining threats, in

taking into account social transformation or the resulting police response (Fijnaut, 2014). As illustrated by David Somer, the debates concerning the difficulty to establish a Criminology and Forensic Police School in post-First World War Belgium exemplify this situation. Multiple stakeholders need to participate in this debate and exchange their concurring or opposing views regarding an essential policing issue (the professionalization and training of a new police), putting forward institutional, social, political, scientific, or economic arguments.

Secondly, a multi-scale approach to understanding threats must be used. Levels of scale need to be used alternately and adequately in order to define the links between international issues and local realities (Gribaudi, Grendi and Lepetit, 1996). If the complexities of police systems are taken into account with local, regional, and national institutions, civil or military bodies, the same type of deviances and threats can obviously not be considered. Yet, they derive from a specific time, society, and perception. The research work therefore has to pass from one focal point to another and follow the reconfiguration of police forces, the perception and definition of threats between ultra-local, regional, national, and transnational levels. It is up to the researcher to determine the right scale to be used, without hesitating to change the focus according to his needs, sources, and the addressed issues. The researcher needs to define the geographic reality that makes sense by choosing between a town, a region, an industrial area, or circulation logic. It is necessary to shift from a (trans)national to a local perspective in order to observe the changes in (trans)national stakes on the field. Yet, the focus then needs to shift from a local to a national viewpoint in order to shed light on the way the security policy is shaped from the perspective of low-ranking police staff's practices. In this respect, both the 'community policing officer' and the national representative at the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) or Interpol have a first-hand knowledge of policing.

Restricting the focus of research to national scale is obviously insufficient. Contemporary society is confronted with growing concerns as to how to deal with a criminality perceived as increasingly mobile and able to cross frontiers (Knepper, 2009 and 2011). The perception of threat is transnational in nature, with populations (gypsies, anarchists, refugees and stateless people, notorious criminals, terrorists) circulating more easily thanks to the development of highways for personal, economic, or geopolitical motives (Deflem, 2002; Smeets, 2011). Between circulation,

acculturation, and repulsion phenomena, the police responses to these new conditions also fit in line with a transnational logic. Recent works carried out with the support of the ANR (National Research Agency) in France, such as CIRSAP (*Circulations des savoirs policiers*/ Circulation of police knowledge) and SYSPOE (*Systèmes policiers en Europe*/ Police systems in Europe) (Denis, Denys, 2012; Denys, 2012) projects, have largely demonstrated this principle. From this perspective, the colonies cannot be left hidden in the background.[4] As is shown by Amandine Lauro when she deals with the example of Belgian Congo where urban order was maintained, a particular dynamic of transfers and influences was established between the metropolis and the colony where the reality and the direction of exchanges need to be examined: between Europe and overseas territories, which sphere was an experiment laboratory for the other?

Thirdly, the analysis of police responses to threats requires discussing the chronology and periodization of the studied phenomena. The diversity of social, economic, and political rhythms is already well-known. Undoubtedly, in terms of order, it is required to distinguish (and discuss), the (traumatic) event step, the precursory step (the fear for the event), and the reaction step (resulting judicial system, adjustments and reforms of law and police bodies) (Bastard, Delvaux, Mouhanna, Schoenaers, 2012 and 2015). This preliminary analysis has to be linked to the specific institutional pace of police bodies as well as their continuities and discontinuities. The objective is to establish the link between these temporalities. How does the pace of security policy implementation adjust to the socio-political pace, but also with that of the administration, the institutions, and the police? In this respect, several analysis perspectives can be used: budgets, regulations, hierarchies, but also human perspectives.

From an institutional standpoint, understanding the police's temporality requires considering staff generations involved in the events. A possible methodology is to analyse their career paths, to characterize them according to their participation in defining events, reflect on their experience or inexperience (following massive recruitment waves), but also to bring to light the networks (professional and sociability networks) that developed between members of a generation. Guus Meershoek's paper shows the gradual increase in importance of a generation of Dutch police officers who were university graduates and had close links with the United States in the 1980s. This generation actively participated

in a renewal of the police institution which had gone through several challenging periods. From a wider perspective, individual and collective approaches have to be combined in this respect. Crossing these analyses with sociologist tools will undoubtedly provide food for thought to address the issue of police temporalities. Biographies, life accounts, and prosopographical analyses are all tools which can be used and applied to different police institutions, periods, and geographic spheres (Berlière, Levy, 2010 and Smeets, Van Es, Meershoek, 2014).

Analyses leads for a risk-focused police history

The main hypothesis of this book is that political authorities of the central, social and welfare states were concerned about a societal change which would be 'exogenous' to the policies they carried out. In order to guarantee order, they would at least try to accompany societal changes, while running the risk of jeopardizing social order, the safety of goods and people, and the sustainability of the state. Therefore, the objective of the authorities is to frame, restrict, or even encourage change so that it is carried out in accordance with the rules of life in society. To that end, they relied on police institutions which represented the state and the authorities on the whole territory. To confirm this hypothesis, we need to successively analyse the conditions of risk construction and the role police bodies played in risk construction before addressing the logics they developed to deal with it.

Origin, perception, construction and development of risk

Risk construction results from an exchange and confrontation of point of views and 'extreme' situations. In this framework, the police interact with the authorities they serve, the administrations, the population but also dangerous ('deviant') groups. It is necessary to shed light on the degrees of convergence or divergence of points of view and discourses in this dynamic of determining what is risky. They highlight the relations between the state and its institutions, their degree of autonomy, and the strategies they develop.

The origin of the threat must be taken into account: Is it a slow and diffuse phenomenon or, on the contrary, a sudden scandal or catastrophe, a propagating 'moral panic' (Cohen, 1972; Chauvaud, 2011;

Machiels, Niget, 2013)? Does it fit in line with a lasting historicity, or does it result from a temporary phenomenon related to contemporary change? Afterward, we need to see how and by whom the threat is built. Political declarations, views of the elites, experts, opinion makers (press, publicists, civil society) need to be considered and linked to the policing views related to this notion. Both the potential hierarchy between these groups and the associated genealogies or influences deserve to be closely analysed. In the long run, we also need to think of the source we use as pieces of evidence, research bases, and indicators (statistics, polls, surveys, discourses, accounts) (Vesentini, 2005; Robert, Zauberman, 2011). By contrast, in spite of being broadly historical in nature, risk also has unchanging formal characteristics and steps across the periods (emergence, need for a reaction, possibility to frame it or not). We can add to the mix the recurring stereotypes, often created at the occasion of a traumatic event and cyclically reactivated at later stages (Grandière, Molin, 2003).

Even if we focus on the police, analysing risk construction requires adopting the point of view of the 'opponents'. Are the latter aware of the risk they represent? How do they feel about it? Do they try to take advantage of the risk they represent by increasing it for internal reasons related to strategy or legitimacy? Can we see a 'victimization' process of deviant people and is it anchored in a role-play strategy? Should the reasons for the latter be analysed? At the European scale, the action and strategy of communist organisations and the fear they inspired in the inter-war period is an obvious analysis field on the topic (Campion, 2015).

More recently, the risk can also have an accidental dimension: The state must be able to predict, handle, and respond to natural disasters, industrial accidents, and epidemics (Aubry, Marcondes, 2014). The sensitivity to 'catastrophes' increased with the state's ambition to monopolize the collective response to this type of events, as the resilience towards them decreased. Catastrophes, regarded as inevitable under the *Ancien Régime*, became unacceptable situations that needed to be contained, restricted, guaranteed, and in some cases, mended. The response to this risk that affects both populations and infrastructures also requires the intervention of police institutions.[5] The latter must take part in and adapt to this new context of employment. These administrations, which were used to take repressive actions and safeguard security, shifted to a notion of 'public' service that needs to be specified (de Broux, 2009).

Police's logics, responses and adaptations

We have just examined the emergence and identification process of risks within the contemporary state. The acknowledgement of these risks result in public policies – which change over time – developed in order to satisfactorily respond to these risks, that is to say safeguarding individual and collective security. At the police level, the same multifaceted process of threat definition can be observed. The police bodies take part in defining a sociology, a chronology, and a geography of risk. The consistency between the risk as defined by the police and as defined by other sources (experts, political world, pressure groups, press) is sometimes only relative. Besides, nuances in the way the threat was perceived can be seen according to the concerns of the considered policing institution (primary mission), the studied moment, the considered geographic and demographic sphere (colony/metropolis; towns/rural areas; border areas, industrial areas, densely or sparsely populated areas). Yet, the police do not only characterize the threat. They also provide a response to this threat, which is partly influenced by political authorities. This imposed or voluntary response must be characterized at several levels, between the individual, his institution, and the policing system it is integrated with.

Firstly, at *macro* level, the logics guiding the relations between police bodies, judicial, and administrative authorities need to be put in perspective. Particularly, they shed light on the degree of autonomy and strategy of policing institutions (Denys, 2008), which have often been left hidden in the background by the research world. Especially, the police logics need to be confronted with the possibilities they have. In this respect, an economic approach to the police institution should not be neglected. We know very little of the policing institutions' budgets, which are nonetheless useful indicators on the long-run for security priorities while determining – probably as much as the regulatory framework – the intervention possibilities and the paces of changes in challenging circumstances. Beyond what the police actually do, the budgets determine what the police can do. Budgetary documents, in spite of being 'arid' in nature, deserve nonetheless a renewed attention from the researcher in terms of data collection and handling. They are all the more interesting as budgets are one of the only contexts where police stakes are publicly discussed. The case of Belgian *gendarmerie* is a typical example for this. Before the foundational law organising the institution was adopted in

December 1957, the Parliament only carried out its supervisory role on the institution as a reaction to budgetary documents that were handed over by the executive power, which worked in a very autonomous way on the matter (Campion, 2013).

At the intermediate (*meso*) level, while the stakeholders' role should not be overlooked (personalities of middle and high-ranking officers, autonomy, training, and skills), the police's adaptation to risks should first be considered from a structural perspective. We need to underline the emergence of new bodies, the territorial reorganisation of old institutions, and the choice to establish new units and departments within them. The gradual specialization process that the police bodies went through also needs to be considered. Specialized police staff appeared in areas such as traffic control, public order keeping, youth, (anti)-terrorism or computer crime, all possessing specific financial and technical means, and their own doctrines.[6]

The policing response should also be understood from the point of view of the available material means and the debates they give rise to as for their development, their adoption, or their use. Uniforms, accommodation, workspaces, motor vehicles, communication channels, crowd control tools, graduated response tools, enquiry and scientific police equipment, and allocated armament (lethal or not) are all elements that determine the implementation of a police practice, directly impacting its efficiency or the degree of coercion and violence used (Ludtke, Reinke, Sturm, 2011). Beyond the objects themselves, it is necessary to open the way for a history of police logistics, fitting in line with the innovative current of 'function materiality' (*matérialité des fonctions*).

At the *micro* level, our attention is drawn to the police officer as an individual. As professional and social groups, but also as individuals, the staffs are central to defining a police response to threats. As for the higher-ranking officers, their numbers and sociological profiles vary. Factors such as recruitment pools and the process of professional mobility throughout careers are essential (Houte, 2011). They especially determine the knowledge of the field and the populations to control. In part, the sociological issue leads to a set of practices ranging from informal repression in case of strong proximity between the profile of police officers and that of the populations, to logics of 'hostile' territory occupation in the opposite situation. The issue of training and police knowledge is also of utmost importance in order to understand the police logics in a nuanced way (Kalifa, Milliot, 2008; Milliot, 2008).

Lastly, policing is widely influenced by the ongoing professional values within institutions and by the community spirit or the professional *habitus* of their members. These are strong identity topics that partly determine the place of the police within the public sphere as well as their social integration (Piernas, 2003; Sheptycki, 2010; Meershoek, 2012). The analysis of these shared values requires an in-depth study and all hierarchical levels must be considered. Considering the institutional policies that lead to their adoption, we also need to identify the *media* that are used for their circulation (Meyer, 2012) and their actual impact. The discourses, the press, internal publications, and also ceremonies are undoubtedly strongly revealing elements for these dynamics. Ultimately, the existence of (internal and external) control bodies or instances in charge of enforcing these values, and the acknowledgement or sanction policies they implement need to be taken into account as factors influencing the way threats are handled as far as *policing* is concerned.

The practices and techniques implemented *in situ* by the police should also be examined and compared, in particular, with the regulatory framework and existing doctrine. The issue of the state violence and its modulation both relate to the police staff's degree of autonomy and to the hierarchical control procedures they have to deal with. Both realities take part in defining the methods used by the police to handle risk. This field action must also be considered as a strategy (Fecteau, Harvey, 2005) aimed at building up or consolidating an institutional legitimacy and defending/keeping a position within an administrative system: For a police institution, the fact of being mobilized, even to face a sometimes overrated risk, can also help justify one's position, role, and means or claim new ones.

Perspectives

In the end, what are the elements that stand out from these analyses on crises, risks, and policing within the modern state? From a methodological point of view, we have already emphasised a few methodological references in order to further develop historical approaches to policing institutions. To renew the historiography, we now need to reflect on the reality, the transformations, and the complexity of police systems. The research must cross boundaries – that are sometimes artificial – between periods, geographic spheres, institutions, and policing duties to

understand the socio-political stakes of the public security. In this respect, the heuristic resort to such concepts as security, crisis management, or the analysis of policing practices in terms of public policies undoubtedly have a potential. Indeed, they require us to rethink the frameworks of police realities by going beyond the traditional time-related, geographic, or institutional frameworks.

As illustrated by the papers put together in this book, the interest of a socio-historical approach to the police bodies through the prism of risk management anchored in periods of social changes is obvious. This approach enables us to reflect on both the logics guiding the steps in the development of police forces within the contemporary state as well as policing. It enables us to use a functional and systemic analysis of police worlds establishing a link between institutions, individuals, regulatory frameworks, professional representations, and practices. Various levels of scale and political, social, economic or criminological perspectives can be used. Undoubtedly, this approach inspired by risk sociology emphasizes and nuances the gradual adaptation of the police bodies since the 19th century. The *Ancien Régime*'s 'good policing' was superseded by a repressive body within the liberal state, and also analyses the collaboration that developed within the police forces to serve citizens. We believe that the research projects carried out by sociologists and criminologists inspired by risk sociology call for a revision of the history of policing duties in social communities around five major axes:

1   Between the constant process of informal regulations and the judicial regulations dynamics which can be rigid at times, the police has been shaped as a specific sphere for assessing and negotiating ordinary risk. Unlike judicial authorities, which are restricted by the formal rules of law and relatively distant from social disruptions, the police bodies appear as an institution entirely governed by risk perception: They are simultaneously experts in detecting risks and sldo a tool used to prevent, protect from, and predict the analysed risks.
2   The chronology of 'policing modernisation' must be revised. The 'traditional' model started to fade away in the 17th century, when social order was no longer warranted by God, but by the ruler. The 'police' stopped being the interpretation of divine will and became a tool aimed at dealing with present-day issues and at anticipating future disruptions. Urban development played a central role in

triggering these changes, essentially through an early pacification of public behaviours (Rousseaux, Dauven, Musin, 2009).

3   The diversification of police bodies that started from the 18th century corresponds, to some extent, to a gradual stratification of different risks. This diversity was shaped as some stakeholders (including police officers) took advantage of the representations of the threat. In this sense, the representations do not simply hinder the knowledge of reality. In fact, they are objects anchored in reality. Police practices are a good indicator of risks that are officially highlighted, unofficially perceived, and actually assumed. Yet, the development of these new threats within society does not prevent the local police from keeping their traditional role, which leads to contradictions between official stances and daily practices. It would be interesting to measure whether the shift between the discourses on threats and the response practices increased over time, consolidating the paradox of the inability of social control bodies to respond to these imaginary risks.

4   Globally, the three types of police as defined by sociology interact with three distinct spheres of threat. Community police react to threats jeopardizing the existence of local community (epidemics, accidents, fires). It corresponds to a level of risk which is shared by the group. The law and order police responds to threats perceived by the authorities as jeopardizing the global state's society. Criminal police responds to threats concerning the individual as a stakeholder of the social contract: it would allegedly represent a response to an individual-level risk which is collectively represented.

5   Within the debate on resource allocation and on state's intervention in social regulations, the social construction of both the threat and the corresponding security response becomes an important task for police systems. The police bodies' competition derives from priorities put on the agenda, their defined level of importance and the way they are handled, as police forces have to live up to the expectations of both the authorities they serve and of the populations, while being subject to pressures from *lobbies,* or parties within the state, from administrators and the media. This is the price for the legitimization of police institutions. Therefore, we can affirm that, throughout the centuries, the police have learned to govern (themselves) through risk.

As for the initial question guiding our argumentation (actual threat or phantom menace?), the reply has to be put into perspective. Between myths and facts, threats are unstable notions resulting from various views on which an agreement needs to be reached. Undoubtedly, throughout the successive changes it has gone through, the contemporary state has seen new threats emerge, has reactivated old ones, or imagined others. The same goes for police forces and populations, whose actions derive from these threats, but who can also take part in their emergence. Therefore, from a security standpoint, crises are not necessarily periods where policies change completely. We need to constantly confront the multiple sources of risk definition with each other by analysing them from the perspective of the social, political, economic, local, and temporary factors at the root of these challenging periods.

Systematic observations related to risk construction and security policies will help determine leads to be analysed so as to comprehend a few long-term trends in the socio-political changes that took place in the regulation of the contemporary European state. On the one hand, they will be able to carry out – from a historical perspective – the difficult assessment of public security policies aimed at responding to perceived risks within each contemporary society. On the other hand, they will highlight the (false?) paradox of a democracy that increasingly asserted itself, while building up simultaneously to an increasingly repressive policing (as is testified to – in recent years – by a surge in police staff, an ultra-specialization of police forces, the available equipment or the increasingly recurrent public declarations on insecurity).

Notes

1   'A response to new threats? Police institutions and societal transitions. Sociohistorical perspectives, Europe, 19th–20th centuries'. *Interlabo* GERN workshop, 13 June 2014, organized by UCLouvain's Centre for Law and Justice History (CHDJ). See http://www.uclouvain.be/467361.html, consulted on 8 july 2015. A special thanks to Benoit Mihaïl from the *Musée de la police fédérale* for the host of this meeting.
2   See our first analyses on the topic, especially (Rousseaux, 2012).
3   The debates concerning the organisation of the Dutch police body in the 19th and 20th centuries exemplify the divisions related to police task distribution. On the long-run, they led to a largely divided and frequently reformed institution (Fijnaut, 2009).

4 Research works on this topic have multiplied. See the international conference 'Policing Empires. Social Control, Political Transition, (Post-)Colonial Legacies' held in Brussels in December 2013 under the auspices of GERN 'Colonial and Postcolonial Policing' workgroup.

5 For example, at the time of the devastating 1953 floods in Netherlands (Waleboer, 2003).

6 Please find below the list of French *gendarmerie*'s specialized units established over the course of the 20th century (Luc, 2004, p. 865 ss.).

Bibliography

H. Aubry, L. Marcondes (eds.) (2014) *La culture du risque en question. Des inondations aux débordements nucléaires* (Paris: La Dispute).

B. Bastard, D. Delvaux, C. Mouhanna, F. Schoenaers (2012) *L'esprit du temps. L'accélération dans l'institution judiciaire en France et en Belgique,* research report by *Mission de recherche "Droit et Justice"* (Paris).

B. Bastard, D. Delvaux, C. Mouhanna, F. Schoenaers (2015) 'Vitesse ou précipitation ? La question du temps dans le traitement des affaires pénales en France et en Belgique', *Droit et Société,* Vol. 90, No. 2, 271–286.

U. Beck (2001) *La société du risque. Sur la voie d'une autre modernité* translated from German by L. Bernardi (Paris: Aubier) (1st edition Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986).

J.-M. Berlière (1998) 'Archives de police : du fantasme au mirage', in F. Chauvaud, J.-G. Petit (eds.) *L'histoire contemporaine et les usages des archives judiciaires. 1800–1939* (Paris: H. Champion, 291–304).

J.-M. Berlière (2001) 'Archives de police/ historiens policiers ?', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine,* Vol. 48, No. 4bis, 57–68.

J.-M. Berlière (2009), 'Archives 'interdites', archives 'spéciales'? Quelques réflexions à propos des archives policières', in J. Campion (ed.) *Les archives des polices en Belgique : des méconnues de la recherche* (Bruxelles: AGR/PAI Just-his.be, 111–131).

J.-M. Berlière, R. Lévy (eds.) (2010) *Le témoin, le sociologue et l'historien. Quand les policiers se mettent à table* (Paris: Nouveau Monde).

E. Bittner (1990) *Aspects of police Work* (Boston: Northeastern University Press).

M.-C. Blanc-Chaleard, C. Douki, N. Dyonet, V. Milliot (eds.) (2001) *Police et migrants en France (1667–1939)* (Rennes: PUR).

M. Boucher, V. Falochet (eds.) (2012) *Regards croisés sur la régulation sociale des désordres* (Paris, L'harmattan).

J. Campion (2013) *De Rijkswacht (1918–1957): De Belgische Gendarmerie tussen evolutie en revolutie* (Buren: Stichting Vrienden van het Museum der Koninklijke Marechaussee).

J. Campion (2015) 'Gendarmes facing political violence (Belgium, 1918–1940)', in C. Millington, K. Passmore (eds.) *Political Violence and Democracy in Western Europe (1918–1940)* (Basinsgstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 160–173).

G. Chantraine, J.-F. Cauchie (2006) 'Risque(s) et gouvernementalité', *Socio-logos*, No. 1, http://socio-logos.revues.org/13, consulted on 10 September 2014.

F. Chauvaud (2011) *L'ennemie intime. La peur : perceptions, expressions, effets* (Rennes: PUR).

S. Cohen (1972) *Folk devils and moral panics* (London: Mac Gibbon and Kee).

P-O. de Broux (2009) 'Une brève histoire de la notion belge de 'service public' : de la France à l'Europe', in X. Rousseaux, A. Wijffels, D. Heirbaut (eds.) *Histoire du droit et de la justice. Une nouvelle génération de recherches* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 613–629).

M. Deflem (2002) *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

M. De Koster (2010) 'De verhouding politie-bevolking in historisch perspectief. Wederzijdse afhankelijkheid en stilzwijgende contracten', *Justitiële Verkenningen,* No. 2, 91–93.

V. Denis, C. Denys (eds.) (2012) *Polices d'Empires, XVIIIe- XIXe siècles* (Rennes: PUR).

C. Denys (2008) 'Institutions, corps, services', in J.-M. Berlière, C. Denys, D. Kalifa, V. Milliot (eds.) *Métiers de police. Être policier en Europe, XVIIIe-XXe siècle* (Rennes: PUR, 37–43).

C. Denys (ed.) (2012) *Circulations policières 1750–1914* (Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion).

C. Emsley, B. Weinberger (eds.) (1991) *Policing Western Europe: politics, professionalism, and public order 1850–1940* (New York: Greenwood Press).

J.-M. Fecteau, J. Harvey (eds.) (2005) *La régulation sociale entre l'acteur et l'institution. Pour une problématique historique de l'interaction/ Agency* and *Institutions in Social Regulation. Towards an historical understanding of their Interaction* (Quebec: Presses de l'Université).

C. Fijnaut (1979) *Opdat de macht en toevlucht zij ? Een historische studie van het politieapparaat als een politieke instelling* (Antwerpen-Arnhem: Kluwer).

C. Fijnaut (2009) *An history of the Dutch Police* (Amsterdam: Boom).

C. Fijnaut (2014) *Criminologie en strafrechtsbedeling* (Amsterdam: Boom).

M. Foucault (2004) *Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France, 1977–1978* (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil).

M. Grandière, M. Molin (eds.) (2003) *Le stéréotype, outil de régulation sociale* (Rennes: PUR).

C. Gordon (1991) 'Governmental Rationality: An Introduction', in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, P. Miller (eds.) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1–52).

E. Grendi (1996) 'Repenser la micro-histoire ?', in J. Revel (ed.) *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris: Gallimard, 233–243).

M. Gribaudi (1996) 'Échelle, Pertinence, Configuration', in J. Revel (ed.) *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris: Gallimard, 112–139).

S. Hall, C. Critcher, T. Jefferson (eds.) (1978) *Policing the Crisis: mugging, the State and law and order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan).

A.-D. Houte (2011) 'Les mutations de gendarmes depuis le 19ᵉ siècle, entre contrainte institutionnelle et liberté individuelle', *Travail et Emploi,* No. 127, 29–39.

D. Kalifa, V. Milliot (2008) 'Les voies de la professionnalisation', in J-M. Berlière, C. Denys, D. Kalifa, V. Milliot (eds.) *Métiers de police. Être policier en Europe, XVIIIe-XXe siècle*, (Rennes: PUR, 547–551).

P. Knepper (2009) *The Invention of International Crime: A Global Issue in the Making, 1881–1914* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

P. Knepper (2011) *International Crime in the 20th Century*, *The League of Nations Era, 1919–1939* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

P. Leloup (2014) *Private en commerciële veiligheidszorg in België. Een historisch-criminologisch onderzoek (1870–1934)* (Antwerpen: Maklu).

B. Lepetit (1996) 'De l'échelle en histoire', in J. Revel (ed.) *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris: Gallimard, 71–94).

R. Levy (2012) 'Du bon usage des 'modèles' de police. Point de vue sociologique et point de vue historique, à propos de The Policing Web, de Jean-Paul Brodeur', *Champ pénal – penal field,* No. 9, http://champpenal.revues.org/8269, consulted on 10 September 2014.

L. López (2014) *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu. Gendarmes et policiers, coacteurs de la sécurité publique sous la Troisième République (1870–1914)* (Paris: PUPS).

J.-L. Loubet Del Bayle (2006) *Police et politique. Une approche sociologique* (Paris : L'harmattan).

J.-N. Luc (ed.) (2004) *Histoire de la Maréchaussée et de la gendarmerie. Guide de recherches* (Maisons-Alfort: SHGN).

A. Ludtke, H. Reinke, M. Sturm (2011) *Polizei, Gewalt Und Staat Im 20. Jahrhundert* (Dresde: VS Verslag).

C. Machiels, D. Niget (2013) *Protection de l'enfance et paniques morales* (Paris: Fabert).

B. Majerus (2011) 'La baignoire, le lit et la porte. La vie sociale des objets de la psychiatrie', *Genèses*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 95–119.

V. Milliot (ed.) (2008) 'Histoire des savoirs policiers en Europe (XVIII-XXe siècles)', *Revue d'histoire des sciences humaines,* Vol. 19, No. 2.

R. C. Mawby (2002) *Policing Images, communication and legitimacy* (London: Routledge).

G. Meershoek (2012) *Onzichtbaar, Integer, weinig gerespecteerd. Grondtrekken van de Nederlandse politietraditie* (Apeldoorn: PolitieAcademie).

M. Meyer (ed.) (2012) *Médiatiser la police. Policer les médias* (Lausanne: Antipodes).

D. Monjardet (1996) *Ce que fait la police, sociologie de la force publique* (Paris: La Découverte).

D. Monjardet (2008) *Notes inédites sur les choses policières 1999–2006,* followed by A. Chauvenet, F. Ocqueteau (eds.) *Le sociologue, la politique et la police* (Paris: La Découverte).

P. Napoli (2003) *Naissance de la police moderne : pouvoir, normes, société* (Paris: La Découverte).

D. Niget and M. Petitclerc (2012) 'Le risque comme culture de la temporalité', in D. Niget, M. Petitclerc (eds.) *Pour une histoire du risque. Québec, France, Belgique* (Rennes–Montreal: PUR/PUQ, 1–33).

F. Ocqueteau (1997) *Les défis de la sécurité privée. Protection et surveillance dans la France d'aujourd'hui* (Paris: L'harmattan).

F. Ocqueteau (2004) *Polices. Entre État et Marché* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po).

G. Oram (ed.) (2003) *Conflict & Legality: Policing mid-twentieth century Europe* (London: Routledge).

A. Piernas (2003) 'Un exemple, un modèle, un guide ? Le gendarme des années 30 d'après la Revue de la gendarmerie'*, Sociétés & Représentations,* No. 16, *Figures de gendarmes,* Jean–Noël. Luc (ed.), 53–64.

M. Porret, V. Fontana, L. Maugué (eds.) (2012) *Bois, fers et papiers de justice. Histoire matérielle du droit de punir* (Genève: Georg).

H. Reinke (2008) 'Être policier en temps de crise', in J.-M. Berlière, C. Denys, D. Kalifa, V. Milliot (eds.) *Métiers de police. Être policier en Europe, XVIIIe-XXe siècle* (Rennes: PUR, 469–473).

H. Reinke, M. De Koster (2014) 'History of the Police Profession', in G. Bruinsma, D. Weisburd (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice* (New York: Springer, 2296–2308).

P. Robert, R. Zauberman (2011) *Mesurer la délinquance* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po).

N. Rose (1996), 'Governing advanced liberal democracies', in A. Barry, T. Osborne, N. Rose (eds.) *Foucault And Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and the Rationalities of Government*, (London: Routledge, 37–64).

U. Rosenthal, R. Arjen Boin, L. K. Comfort (eds.) (2001) *Managing Crises. Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas).

X. Rousseaux (2012) '(Se) gouverner par les risques : réflexions sur la police et le crime dans les sociétés modernes', in D. Niget, M. Petitclerc (eds.) *Pour une histoire du risque. Québec, France, Belgique* (Rennes-Montreal: PUR/PUQ, 243–259).

X. Rousseaux, B. Dauven, A. Musin (2009), 'Civilisation des mœurs et/ ou disciplinarisation sociale ? Les sociétés urbaines face à la violence en Europe (1300–1800)', in L. Mucchielli, P. Spierenburg (eds.) *Histoire de l'homicide en Europe. De la fin du Moyen-Âge à nos jours,* (Paris: La Découverte, 275–323).

J. Sheptycki (2010) 'The Raft of the Medusa. Further contribution towards a Constabulary Ethics', *Cahiers Politiestudies*, No. 16, 39–55.

J. Smeets (2011) *Marius Van Houten: marechaussee en diplomat* (Amsterdam: Boom).

J. Smeets, T. Van Es, G. Meershoek (2014) *In de frontlinie. Tien politiemannen en de duitse bezetting* (Amsterdam: Boom).

F. Vesentini (ed.) (2005) *Les chiffres du crime en débat. Regards croisés sur la statistique pénale en Belgique (1830–2005)* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia).

K.J. Waleboer (2003) *De Koninklijke Marechaussee op de Zuid-Hollandse Eilanden tijdens de watersnood in februari 1953* (Putten: Stichting Streekhistorie).

2

Crossing Frontiers to Chase Offenders: The Hardships of French and Belgian Police Collaboration at the Beginning of the 20th Century

Laurent López

Abstract: *At the end of the long 19th century, the French and Belgian police forces experienced similar criticisms, stakes, and reorganization projects in many ways. The unification and centralization of judicial research, the teaching and modernization of questioning techniques, and the professionalization and specialization of law enforcement were significant issues in the public debate. Thus, they caused deep corporative divisions. The existence of increasingly dangerous and fewer and fewer repressed offenders – due to an increasingly fast mobility – who easily crossed frontiers was one of the main threats debated in the European spheres of criminal lawyers, legal practitioners, police officers, and other specialists.*

At the end of the long 19th century, the French and Belgian police forces experienced similar criticisms, stakes, and reorganization projects in many ways (Keunings, 2009). The unification and centralization of judicial investigations, the teaching and modernization of questioning techniques, and the professionalization and specialization of law enforcement were significant issues in public debate. However, both within and without police bodies, these changes were questioned. Police bodies disagreed on the necessary reforms to be enacted. There was a sense that criminality was on the rise. Offenders were regarded as increasingly dangerous and less and less repressed since they were more mobile and easily crossed frontiers. This threat was considered one of the top priorities in the European spheres of criminal lawyers, legal practitioners, and police officers. In France, in the wake of the 6th Congress of Criminal Anthropology that was held in Turin in the spring of 1906, a disciple of Alphonse Bertillon warned against the 'quotidienne extension du crime international' ('daily expansion of international crime') that was, according to him, 'un danger social de premier ordre, qui exige pour le combattre une police adaptée à ces conditions nouvelles de lutte' ('a highly significant social danger, which requires the police to adapt to these new conditions of struggle against crime') (Locard, 1906, p. 145).

A few months later, a diplomatic situation related to policing between France and Belgium provided an example of these security concerns. The creation of a free zone on both sides of the frontier was proposed by the *directeur de la Sûreté générale* in Paris (Head of the General Security Department) to Belgian authorities to enable French and Belgian police forces to chase offenders despite the territorial constraint. This can be seen as 'the police's adaptation to the frontier's specific conditions' (Rousseaux, 2008). To this end, the *Préfet du Nord* (Prefect of the Nord department) imagined an unprecedented agreement between French and Belgian police in order to thwart what was regarded as a criminal danger that evaded inadequate repressive structures (Caulier, 2008). The French senior official was confident in his plan and could not imagine that it would be welcomed with reluctance by Belgian government, which gave its preference to more traditional forms of collaboration that involved the intervention of *gendarmes* in uniform.

The frontiers of the late 19th century, new perspectives for an old police system

At a time when France experienced the assassination of its head of state, President Sadi Carnot, as did other countries (Tsar Alexander II was murdered in March 1881),[1] the Minister of Justice Armand Fallières resolutely put forward that 'la répression des attentats criminels est d'un intérêt de plus en plus international, et jamais la solidarité des diverses nations européennes dans le crime et la peine n'a été plus manifeste qu'à notre époque' ('the repression of criminal assaults is increasingly taking on an international scope, and never before has solidarity between European nations in crime and sorrow been as obvious as it is today') (Compte général de l'administration de la justice criminelle pour l'année 1891, 1894, p. XV). Indeed, since Tsar Alexander II's assassination, the 'propaganda of the deed' advocated by Paul Brousse and his followers, expressed at first by way of revolutionary claims, turned to illegal – or even murderous – acts, legitimized by the yearly congress of the *Fédération anarchiste jurassienne* (Jura Department Anarchist Federation) in Autumn 1880 and by the Workers' International Congress in July 1881. The Police Prefecture's archives in Paris recorded a surge in activist actions from these years onwards.

With the anarchists circulating through and between the European countries where they sought refuge – for instance Belgium and the UK – and to the countries where repression was the heaviest, (such as the Central Empires as of the 1880s and France from the 1890s onwards), police forces faced an issue that was old, but took new shapes. How to control, monitor, and thwart this national or even international mobility? The difficulty was that agents of the law enforcement force's jurisdictions were restricted to the limits of a municipality for police officers who had a civil status, or that a canton for military *gendarmes* (a body that existed in all countries previously invaded by Napoleon's troops). This enables us to rephrase the issue that the order-keeping forces faced at the time: was the root cause of the issue the criminals' mobility, or was it the jurisdictional limits of the police services that restricted their freedom of action? As we can see, the way the issue is formulated leads to different solutions and redefines responsibility stakes.

Since this exceptional situation called for the establishment of closer relationships and collaborations between European law enforcement

forces, the measures taken to prevent and repress anarchist violence gave rise to frequent communications between the French police and their British, Italian, Russian, and German counterparts. The Police Prefecture's Archives testify to this as of 1880. Italian or British police officers sent information to Paris regarding actions taken by anarchists living in their respective countries (BA 308). In the mid-1890s, the French Ministry of the Interior's General Security Department also established a network of 'safe correspondents' in London and Brussels. A report listed the benefits of this collaboration: 'Par ce moyen, toute surprise de ce côté devient impossible, surtout si cette surprise était le résultat d'un plan concerté entre les anarchistes réfugiés à Londres et ceux disséminés sur les diverses parties de notre territoire' ('This prevents any risk of surprise from that side, especially in the event of an action resulting from a collusion between the anarchists who sought refuge in London and those scattered throughout our territory') (*Centre des archives contemporaines*/ Centre for Contemporary Archives [CAC], 19940493, article 121, 1860, report concerning the Moreau brigade, 25 January 1899). The 1898 international conference held in Rome and the 1904 conference in Saint Petersburg were devoted to finding ways of fighting the 'companions', particularly through the organisation of an international police (Deflem, 2002, p. 67). In 1907, the Swiss criminal lawyer, Rudolph-Archibald Reiss, also called for a 'police internationalization' (1907, p. 23) which, he thought, had become necessary in view of the emergence of a widespread cosmopolitan criminality.

Yet, despite these pressing and numerous attempts at setting up cross-border collaborations, no continent-wide official collective system emerged. Repressive innovations remained restricted to the states that implemented them, such as the 'association de malfaiteurs' (criminal conspiracy) incrimination in France (law of 18 December 1893, articles 265 to 268 of the Penal Code). This new incrimination, which laid down that 'quiconque pourra être condamné aux travaux forcés ou à la relégation s'il est suspecté d'avoir participé à une entente entre des individus dans le but de porter atteinte à des biens ou des personnes' ('any citizen suspected of partaking in a collusion aiming at damaging material properties or harming individuals may be sentenced to hard labour or *relégation* [penal servitude in French colonies]'), allowed police to arrest anarchists as well as individuals suspected of supporting the 'companions'. The incrimination endured after the anarchists disappeared. Nowadays, it is still an essential tool for magistrates in their fight against all kinds

of organized crime or terrorism. In order to deal with this absence of progress, France tried to set up a bilateral arrangement with Belgium. Yet, the type of collaboration it implied concerned matters of judicial police, not of political surveillance.

Before discussing the collaboration plan proposed by Prefect Vincent in detail, it is useful to present some aspects of the policing landscape in these countries in the early 20th century to analyse the conditions of a possible cooperation between the police forces of the Kingdom of Belgium and of the French Republic. From a wider perspective, this quick overview confirms the surge in security concerns regarding the organization of judicial police. In France, the structure of the police bodies was marked by dualism: a national *gendarmerie* with a staff of approximately 20,000 soldiers was spread throughout the territory, in the countryside as well as in urban areas, with brigades made up of around four to five men per canton. The *gendarmerie* was a versatile troop and took on order-keeping missions as well as judicial police assignments. For the latter, its actions were clearly restricted by the compartmentalization into districts. Municipal police troops shared the same difficulty. Except for the *Police spéciale des chemins de fer* (Special Railway Police), a body in charge of collecting administrative intelligence with a staff of less than 500 men, France did not have a national repressive force before December 1907, when the decree that created the judicial police mobile brigades (*brigades mobiles*) was enacted.

With criminal affairs regularly hitting the headlines and a growing use of criminal statistics in politics, the security issue and the police's organisation had been in the spotlight for at least a decade. This background favoured the institutional rise of the police while the *gendarmerie* relatively lost momentum, mainly because of internal disagreements that undermined any will to adapt. To sum up, the *gendarmerie*'s lack of willingness to change gave free range to the Ministry of the Interior's General Security Department ('*la Sûreté*') to create innovative repression methods and to strengthen its services' position within the territorial structure of the law enforcement force (López, 2014).

In Belgium, a similar concern for security issues worried the parliamentary spheres as well as the specialists in judicial and police-related matters. In spring 1906, during the 6th International Congress of Criminal Anthropology, Belgium was said to experience a resurgence of 'serious' forms of criminality (Tovo and Rota, 1908, p. 168, underlined by the authors). At least since the late 1870s, parliamentarians had pointed

out the police bodies' lack of efficiency (Van Outrive, Cartuyvels and Ponsaers, 1991, p. 42). Improvement and reform projects were designed but never came into force and the following decades showed an increase in *gendarmerie*'s prominence (Keunings, 2009). The judicial police's modernization was neglected in large urban areas as well as in rural areas while unresolved issues prevented law enforcement forces from working effectively. Lastly, the supporters of an increased judicial and police unification opposed the fierce partisans of local *gendarmerie*, which was preponderant.

Prefect Louis Vincent's project of a convention between France and Belgium

In many ways, 1907 was a turning point for the French police's history. The murders committed over the two previous years in northern France by the Pollet brothers' gang, also known as the 'Hazebrouck's bandits', hit the headlines. Several times, the offenders escaped the investigations by seeking refuge in Belgium. Officially, the gang was suspected of 120 armed robberies, six homicides, and seven murder attempts. The victims of these crimes were tortured and mutilated, which added to the terror the gang inspired. In 1906, a former and famous superintendent of the Paris Police Prefecture took the opportunity to mock the incompetence of 'cette bonne gendarmerie départementale que Nadaud a chantée et qui est composée de braves gens bien coiffés, admirablement bottés … mais peu aptes au métier de limier auquel on les destine' ('this good old departmental gendarmerie Nadaud sang about, made up of good people with tidy hair and nice boots... but lacking the skills required to handle investigations') (Journal de la Gendarmerie, 29 April 1906, p. 274).

Ten years earlier, the same police officer had published best-selling memoirs in which he criticized the blindness of *gendarmes* who went so far as to accommodate and feed a wanted criminal: 'Ainsi, cet homme, de Belgique à Paris, avait passé par toutes les brigades de gendarmerie où était affiché son signalement et personne ne l'avait reconnu. Après cela, étonnez-vous qu'un individu dont le signalement se trouve dans toutes les mains se promène tranquillement sur le boulevard, sans que personne songe [sic] à l'arrêter !' ('This man showed up in all *gendarmerie* brigades where his wanted poster was put up, from Belgium to Paris, and nobody had recognised him. Therefore, it is not surprising that a criminal

whose description has been communicated to all *gendarmerie* services can quietly walk down the streets without risking arrest by an agent !') (Goron, 1897, p. 453–454). Did the description above correspond to reality or was it only a reference to a sarcastic image of the *gendarme* which could already be seen in the second half of the 1880s? 'Il arrive souvent que, dans les caricatures, on représente un caissier filant sur la Belgique. Derrière lui est un gendarme qui le poursuit. Mais le fugitif arrive à un poteau sur lequel est écrit ce mot magique : frontière. Triomphant, il se retourne et fait un pied de nez au pauvre Pandore qui agite les bras désespérément' ('In caricatures, the cashier is often depicted fleeing to Belgium. A gendarme is running after him. But the fugitive crosses a sign on which the magical word is written: border. Exulting, he turns and cocks a snook at the poor Pandore [a nickname given to gendarmes as from the second half of the 19th century], waving his arms in despair') (Hogier Grison, 1887, p. 2).

At the end of February, 1907, the abbot Jules-Auguste Lemire, deputy of the Nord department, called out to the Minister of the Interior Georges Clemenceau regarding crimes committed in that department (Session of the Chamber of deputies, 28 February 1907, Journal Officiel issued on 1 March 1907). In early March, 1907, Célestin Hennion, who had been Head of the Ministry of the Interior's General Security Department as of 30 January, tasked Louis Vincent, Prefect of the Nord department, with solving a security crisis which took a political turn. As recommended by Célestin Hennion, it was necessary to 'empêcher les facilités que les criminels ont actuellement de se soustraire aux recherches en passant de France en Belgique, et réciproquement' ('find ways to prevent criminals from escaping investigations by crossing the French border towards Belgium or the other way around as easily as they can now') (CAC, 19940500, article 13, letter from the President of the Council, Minister of the Interior [signed by Célestin Hennion] to the Prefect of the Nord department, 4 March 1907). Taking advantage of the criminal background, the former Head of the Special Railway Police, started a large reform to centralize and modernize judicial investigations nationwide. One of the most notable measures was the creation of twelve judicial police mobile brigades at the end of the year, which was preceded with the establishment of the general control of departmental investigation services on 4 March 1907, that is to say the day the letter regarding the establishment of a neutral area at the frontier between France and Belgium was written. The cross-border cooperation project belonged

to an overarching initiative to deeply reorganize an emerging national policing system.

Hennion, who was born in the Nord department – and whose previous functions had made particularly aware of issues concerning offenders' mobility and the risks taken by travelling officials – knew very well the issues related to border control and the challenges brought about by the increase in criminals' mobility thanks to the bicycle, railway, and cars. Therefore, he contemplated establishing 'la neutralisation, de chaque côté de la frontière, d'une zone à déterminer du territoire français et belge, dans laquelle la police des deux pays aurait le pouvoir de continuer la surveillance exercée sur les individus suspects et même de procéder à l'arrestation des coupables qu'elle aurait découverts, de concert, en pareil cas, avec la police locale intéressée' ('a neutral area to be determined on either side of the border, within which the police forces from both countries would be entitled to pursue their investigations on suspected individuals and even to arrest located offenders, in collaboration with local police'). In response, the prefect underlined that international law forbade 'd'autoriser les agents français à prendre en Belgique et à ramener en France de vive force, les auteurs des infractions commises en France et vice versa. Une telle réforme ne serait certainement admise par aucun parlement' ('to allow French agents to arrest offenders who committed a crime in France on Belgian territory and to take them back to France by force, and the other way around. Such a reform would certainly not be endorsed by any Parliament'). Yet, he considered that 'il semble au contraire relativement facile, tout en prenant les plus minutieuses précautions pour éviter des abus contre la liberté individuelle des nationaux, de tracer de chaque côté de la frontière franco-belge, et par voie d'entente diplomatique, une zone d'une certaine étendue dans laquelle la police des deux pays aurait le pouvoir de continuer la surveillance exercée sur les individus suspects et même de procéder à l'arrestation des présumés coupables, de concert toutefois avec la police locale intéressée' ('It seems relatively easy, while taking all necessary precautions to avoid any abuse against the nationals' individual liberty, to outline a diplomatically agreed area on either side of the Franco-Belgian border, within which the police forces from both countries would be entitled to pursue their investigations on suspected individuals and even to arrest located offenders in collaboration with local police') (CAC, 19940500, article 13, report of the Prefect of the Nord department to the President of the Council, Ministry of the Interior regarding the 'Franco-Belgian Convention Project', 20 March 1907).

Was the creation of a cross-border area where the police forces of both bordering countries would be entitled to watch and arrest suspects an entirely new idea in the early 20th century? Prefect Vincent referred to the previously established convention between France and Switzerland of 13 May 1882 regarding the 'rapports de voisinage et sur la surveillance des forêts des zones limitrophes' ('neighbourly relations and the surveillance of forests in the bordering areas') (Journal officiel de la République française, 13 May 1882). One of the articles notably laid down that the respective French and Swiss police forces committed to pursue their nationals who committed crimes within their national forest space on the neighbouring territory. By combining the provisions of this agreement with the convention signed between France and Belgium on 15 August 1874 and 20 March 1875 regarding the extradition of offenders, which laid down that the arrest of a suspect must be preceded by the delivery of an arrest warrant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which was never done), the prefect proposed an eight article text he believed could be adopted by the French Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium's parliaments.

Belgian authorities' preference for French *gendarmes* over French police officers

Yet, the Belgian government proved less enthusiastic about this project regarding an 'accord international sur la base du droit de suite' (international agreement on grounds of the right of pursuit). Jules Renkin, who had been appointed Minister of Justice in May, 1907, only saw disadvantages in setting up such a system. Was this clear reluctance caused by personal motives related to his occupation as a lawyer? Was there a diplomatic reason for this reluctance, based on the need to preserve Belgian independence, which depended on its neutrality? Does it testify to internal conflicts between central power and municipal authorities in order to organize the policing system? The Minister of Justice's reaction may be strongly related to the latter motive, though not exclusively. It must also be noted that, while Belgium and France experienced apparently similar changes in their security concerns, the structures that resulted from them followed opposing directions. Indeed, while the French situation was characterized by the emergence of a centralized judicial police and the growing influence of the superintendents'

corporation, the Belgian *gendarmerie* acquired a degree of prominence that could not be matched by local police forces, still deemed badly organized and lacking the necessary means, even in large urban areas. It should also be noted that the political situation between both countries probably did not favour a close collaboration. Furthermore, while the Republic was dominated by anticlerical radical socialists, Belgium was ruled by a Catholic government.

From a Belgian point of view, the establishment of 'relations fréquentes entre les gendarmeries française et belge' ('frequent relations between the French and Belgian *gendarmerie*') in order to build an 'entente efficace' ('effective collaboration') (CAC, 19940500, article 13, report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of the Interior, 17 September 1907) was preferred to the system designed by Prefect Vincent, but General Security Department did not react positively to that wish. Among his arguments, the Prefect of the Nord department mentioned, yet confusingly, 'la création d'un corps de gendarmerie internationale' ('the creation of an international *gendarmerie* corps') (as described in the Journal de la gendarmerie de France, 8 April 1904, p. 233).[2] In parallel, Célestin Hennion probably prepared for the national deployment of the new judicial police. Perhaps he also considered the creation of an international police network, as testified to by the attempt at setting up a right of cross-border pursuit for mobile brigades. Therefore, the French senior official did not care for this preference granted to the *gendarmerie*. Be that as it may, this refusal confirmed Luc Keuning's words concerning Belgium, who considered that 'undoubtedly, the *maréchaussée* was on a roll and won – on the eve of the war – the battle against municipal police forces' (Keunings, 2009, p. 79).

Indeed, the Belgian Minister of Justice pragmatically preferred to stick to already existing cross-border arrangements. The Belgian *gendarmes* organized patrols in collaboration with their French, Luxembourgish, German, and Dutch counterparts. Jonas Campion found several pieces of evidence that verified collaborations and cohabitations between the Belgian and Dutch *gendarmeries*, on the one hand, and the Belgian and French *gendarmeries*, on the other hand, as early as the early 20th century. These later intensified during the inter-war period (Campion, 2014). However, we do not know whether this Franco-Belgian collaboration in the early 20th century followed or preceded the unsuccessful attempt at establishing a convention between both countries. Did the Belgian minister consider the threat exaggerated or was he wary of the hidden

expansionist projects of Célestin Hennion for the criminal police of the French Ministry of the Interior? In the 1880s, Luxembourgish authorities already underlined their difficulties in establishing collaboration with Belgian *gendarmerie,* whereas joint patrols already existed with the French and German *gendarmes* (Archives nationales du Luxembourg/ National Luxembourg archives, J-079-049, letter from the chief public prosecutor to the secretary general of Justice in Luxembourg, 10 July 1883).

Paradoxically, even though Belgium turned down the French project in 1907, police knowledge exchanges between France and Belgium worked far more smoothly than the collaboration between both states. Both law enforcement forces looked for ideas to create new repressive systems at the other side of the border . The French *gendarmes* followed the example of experiences carried out in Belgium. In doing so, they forgot their Belgian counterparts had taken their own inspiration from the creation of the mobile brigades by the General Security Department. The French military corporative press advocated for the creation of a mobile *gendarmerie* that would carry out judicial police missions: 'Ce n'est pas seulement de la mobilité que nous donnerait ce nouveau corps, se serait, en outre, une sorte d'école, obligatoire et préparatoire au métier de gendarme, permettant à chacun, après un stage déterminé, et au fur et à mesure des vacances, de bifurquer, soit dans la gendarmerie stable, sédentaire, appelée à vivre au milieu des populations rurales, métier d'isolés, soit à rendre des services dans la gendarmerie nomade, métier de groupe. L'expérience a été tentée chez nos voisins de Belgique. Dans ce pays, nul ne peut servir dans une brigade ou un poste isolé, s'il n'a fait partie, auparavant, d'un noyau mobile où son instruction et son éducation professionnelles ont été parachevées' ('This new corps would not only provide us with mobility, but could also be used as a sort of mandatory and preparatory training for the *gendarme*'s job. According to job vacancies, it would enable all staff to either opt for the stable, sedentary *gendarmerie*, living among rural populations, which is an isolated occupation [underlined in the text] or serve in the mobile *gendarmerie*, a group occupation [underlined in the text]. This experience has been tested in Belgium, where no agent is allowed to serve in an isolated brigade or position before having worked in a mobile team to finalise his professional training') (Journal de la gendarmerie de France, 19 December 1909, pp. 839–840). This description is probably overly optimistic given the nearly total lack of initial training in Belgian *gendarmerie*, but it testifies to mutual observations between bordering police forces.

Regarding imported innovations, a few years before, the French police press mentioned the multiplication of attempts at introducing police dogs in Paris and in provincial towns (Nancy, Bordeaux) following Belgian and German examples. A long praising article was also devoted to the Ghent municipal police and highlighted the organisational characteristics that French police should take inspiration from (Journal des commissaires de police, August 1906, pp. 218–225). As for Belgium, Belgian magistrates and criminal lawyers, such as Eugène Goddefroy (1912), a police officer in Ostend, or Eugène Stockis (1909) from Liège where he founded the first forensic laboratory, went to Paris Police Prefecture to learn the basics of anthropometric techniques developed by Alphonse Bertillon. This was intended to introduce them to their country or at least praise their postulated advantages. At the same time, Luxembourgish *gendarmes* and officials were also welcomed to take part in training sessions at the Police Prefecture or in the General Security Department's mobile brigades to learn methods to centralize and modernize judicial investigations in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (López, to be published).

Conclusions

In 1914, when the first International Judicial Police Congress was organized in Monaco, the criminal lawyer from Lausanne Rudolph-Archibald Reiss claimed that 'la police criminelle est internationale par essence' ('criminal police is inherently international') (Reiss, 1914, p. 156). The failure of the Franco-Belgian cross-border cooperation project shows the gap between the calls for cross-border collaboration between police forces and the exchange of ideas and expertize, on the one hand, and reasons of states restricted by their territorial borders, on the other hand (López, 2014). This example both mitigates and confirms David Bailey's words who was right in claiming that 'the relation between police and society is reciprocal – society shapes what the police are, the police influence what society may become' (Bailey, 1985, p.159).

All these steps, even unsuccessful attempts, opened the way for the 1923 establishment of an international police body, the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), which had been delayed by the First World War. Built over time, the international network of criminologists, criminal lawyers, legal practitioners, police officers, and *gendarmes,*

in which France played a central role at the European scale, obviously had an ability for innovation that got ahead of diplomacy.

Notes

1   In June 1894, President Sadi Carnot was killed on the road to Lyon by the Italian anarchist Santo Caserio. The latter claimed he acted to avenge Auguste Vaillant, who had been condemned to death penalty for throwing an explosive device in the Chamber of deputies in December 1893.
2   This police force sent to Macedonia was partly made up of Belgian and French *gendarmes* and aimed at reorganizing the Macedonian *gendarmerie*, under the authority of the Turkish government, in the background of nationalist tensions (Journal de la gendarmerie de France, 18 February 1906, p. 102).

Bibliography

(1894) *Compte général de l'administration de la justice criminelle pour l'année 1891* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale).

Anonymous (1904) 'En Macédoine', *Journal de la gendarmerie de France*, No. 2268, 8 April, 233.

Anonymous (1906) 'La réorganisation de la gendarmerie internationale', *Journal de la gendarmerie de France*, No. 2365, 18 February, 102.

Anonymous (1906) 'Comme on juge la gendarmerie, retranscription d'extraits de l'entretien avec le commissaire Goron paru dans Le Grand Illustré', *Journal de la Gendarmerie*, No. 2375, 29 April, 274.

Anonymous (1906) 'La police de Gand. Les veilleurs et les chiens policiers', *Journal des commissaires de police*, No. 8, August, 218–225.

Anonymous (1909) 'La gendarmerie mobile (suite)', *Journal de la gendarmerie de France*, No. 2565, 19 December, 839–840.

D. H. Bailey (1985) *Patterns of Policing. A Comparative International Analysis* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press).

A. Caulier (2008) 'S'adapter au temps et à l'espace: le maillage policier dans le département du Nord sous le Second Empire', in J.-M. Berlière, C. Denys, D. Kalifa and V. Milliot (eds.) *Métiers de police. Être policier en Europe, XVIIIe–XXe siècle* (Rennes: PUR, 333–344).

J. Campion (2014) 'Belgian Gendarmerie and the Foreign Polices during the Inter-war: Encounters, cooperation, concurrence, and circulation of ideas', unpublished working paper.

M. Deflem (2002) *Policing World Society. Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation* (New York: Oxford University Press).

E. Goddefroy (1912) *Déductions d'ordre technique en matière de recherches judiciaires* (Ostende: Impr. Leys & Pilaeis).

M.-F. Goron (1897) *Les Mémoires de M. Goron, ancien chef de la Sûreté*, Vol. 2 *À travers le crime* (Paris: E. Flammarion).

Hogier Grison (1887) *La Police: ce qu'elle était, ce qu'elle est, ce qu'elle doit être* (Paris: Librairie illustrée).

L. Keunings (2009) *Des polices si tranquilles. Une histoire de l'appareil policier belge au XIXe siècle* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain).

E. Locard (1906) 'Les services actuels d'identification et la fiche internationale', *Archives de l'anthropologie criminelle*, Vol. 21, 145–206.

L. López (2014) *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu. Gendarmes et policiers, coacteurs de la sécurité publique sous la Troisième République (1870–1914)* (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne).

L. López (to be published) 'Nous doter de vrais gendarmes de police. La gendarmerie luxembourgeoise et la refondation de la police judiciaire du Grand-Duché au début du XXe siècle', in J.-N. Luc, A.-D. Houte (eds.) *Les Gendarmeries dans le monde* (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne).

R.-A. Reiss (1907) *Un code télégraphique du portrait parlé* (Paris: A. Maloine).

R.-A. Reiss (1914) *Contribution à la réorganisation de la police* (Paris: Payot).

X. Rousseaux (2008) 'La police ou l'art de s'adapter: adapter les ordres ou s'adapter aux menaces ?', in J.-M. Berlière, C. Denys, D. Kalifa and V. Milliot (eds.) *Métiers de police. Être policier en Europe, XVIIIe–XXe siècle* (Rennes: PUR, 303–313).

R. de Ryckère (1912) *La police scientifique* (Bruxelles: Ferdinand Larcier).

E. Stockis (1909) *Quelques instructions à la police judiciaire* (Bruxelles: Impr. Piette).

C. Tovo and M. Rota (1908) 'Sur une loi du développement de la criminalité', in *Comptes rendus du VIe congrès d'anthropologie criminelle (Turin, 28 Avril- 3 Mai 1906)* (Turino: Bocca Frères, 167–169).

L. Van Outrive, Y. Cartuyvels and P. Ponsaers (1991) *Les polices en Belgique. Histoire socio-politique du système policier de 1794 à nos jours* (Bruxelles: EVO).

3

The Criminology and Forensic Police School: The Twofold Project to Humanize Judicial Practice and to Implement Technical Police in Belgium

David Somer

Abstract: *In Belgium, education courses for police officers, and especially detectives, had been long debated since the 1880s in Parliament, mainly in the field of law enforcement (judges, lawyers, coroners, …). The establishment of the 'Criminology and Forensic Police School' in 1920 was the first step in setting up a full-fledged education course for police officers in Belgium. The subsuming ideological framework of this new institution was the fight against crime, which was seen as a social disease. Fears were growing in relation with transformation and internationalization of criminality, seen as a risk for society.*

Debates related to the need to reform the police system and the creation of a police body specialized in judicial tasks, as well as the training of its agents, emerged in several European countries from the 1870s onward. They testify to a new approach to the risks modern societies faced and to the centralization and professionalization of the state, its officials, and public policies. Consequently, police training institutions were established in Europe: the *Scuola di polizia scientifica* (Forensic Police School) in Rome (1895), the *Institut de Police scientifique de l'Université de Lausanne* (Forensic Police Institute of the Lausanne University) (1909), the *École Pratique Professionnelle des Services Actifs de la Préfecture* (Professional Practice School for the Prefecture's Active Departments) in Paris (1914). At the same time, expert institutions, such as the forensic police laboratories, emerged. The most famous one was that of Dr Edmond Locard in Lyon (1910).

New theories, new debates

In a changing Belgian society, marked by the second Industrial Revolution and the emergence of mass democracy, new concerns and issues progressively appeared: In 'an international crime hub, the new developments in "criminal science" mostly concern the middle class living in urban areas, where the effects of industrialisation are increasingly noticeable and where the fear for the burglar, the second offender and the anarchist is palpable'(Keunings, 2009, p. 48). The need to create appropriate tools to fight against criminality and reform the penal system focused the attention of Belgium's stakeholders of the judicial and forensic science worlds. One of the responses was to turn police officers and magistrates into experts, but also to use them as relays for the new forensic and psychiatric knowledge. The emerging forensic science is meant as a response to the weaknesses of testimonies (Darmon, 1989). These debates were also influenced by the Lombrosian criminal anthropology. Thanks to the social defence theory developed by Adolphe Prins, a Professor of Law at the *Université libre de Bruxelles* (ULB, Brussels Free French-speaking university), criminal anthropology gained momentum. The Belgian school acquired international recognition thanks to figures like Paul Héger or Dr Louis Vervaeck. They used the *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie*, published in 1907, as a communication channel in their efforts to shift the focus of penal law from crimes towards criminals (De Bont, 2001, p. 69).

Though the political elites were aware of these issues, the progress was slow until 1918 (École de Criminologie et de police scientifique [ECPS] – A.G. 110, Vol. 8, Appendix to the minutes of 18 March 1964 session of the Comité Régulateur des polices judiciaires, [1964]). However, these new ideas were progressively relayed by leading figures of the Ministry of Justice (Jules Le Jeune, Henri Carton de Wiart and Émile Vandervelde). Prominent magistrates and other players of the medical world also supported this 'volonté de chercher le malade mental qui se cache en tout criminel – malade qu'il faudra traiter' ('effort to identify the mental disorder in any criminal and to heal it') (Louwage, 1945, p. 12–13).

In the wake of the First World War, reforms were all the more necessary for Belgian society, as the conflict had left the police bodies weakened and disorganized. In Belgium, this background led to in-depth reforms in the legal field and the policing system: new bodies were created, the police was assigned new missions, and new methods were implemented to deal with new stakes. The *gendarmerie*'s role was emphasized and it benefited from an increase in staff Judicial police were created and they started to benefit from professional training. After the conflict, the establishment of the *École de Criminologie et de Police Scientifique* (The Criminology and Forensic Police School, ECPS) in connection with the Ministry of Justice fit in line with the convergence between old and new trends of thought and the redefinition of the security stakeholders.

This article deals with the following topics: firstly, an introduction to the background in which the ECPS emerged (its models and the set of measures in which it fit); then the structure of the new institution and the courses it delivered; and then the challenge of integrating with the policing and university landscapes in the 1920s.

The institutionalization of a new school of thought

Inspiration sources

In regards to the institutionalization process of criminology and forensic police, Belgium had to catch up. Despite the foundation of the *École de perfectionnement pour les agents de police communale* (Professional training school for municipal police agents) by Mr Goddefroy in Ostend in 1911, its scope was very specific and local (Revue belge de police administrative et judiciaire, 1911, pp. 51–52). In 1912, the Ministry of Justice, headed

by Henri Carton de Wiart, examined the possibility of establishing a Criminal Police Institute. Unfortunately, this project was aborted. He even sent the *avocat général* (Advocate General) De Rijkere to visit the institutes in Paris, Lyon, Lausanne, and Rome to see how criminal science was taught there (R. De Rijkere, 1913, pp. 561–612). In the wake of the First World War, Belgian experts took their inspiration from experiences carried out abroad to set up their modernization policy. The end of the conflict quickly enabled the ideas and people committed to fighting criminality to circulate freely once again. This led to the foundation of the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) (Denis, 2012). At the same time, a consensus was also reached around Dr Vervaeck's methods in the field of criminal anthropology. Bertillon's anthropometry lost its prominence and Vucetich's dactyloscopy started to achieve great success in Belgium (De Bont, 2001, p. 69).

Émile Vandervelde's ideas

In Belgium, socialist Émile Vandervelde was the kingpin for change. He was the Minister of Justice between 1918 and 1921. In line with the reforms carried out by Catholic minister Le Jeune, he aimed at humanizing the penal judicial system. In order to design and set up reforms, he gathered many counsellors who shared his ideas: Dr Héger-Gilbert and Dr Vervaeck and the magistrates Jean Servais and Léon Cornil. His inspiration sources were both anchored in pragmatism and his 'revolutionary vision' (Polasky, 1995a, p. 136). He was resolutely reformist, but his policy did not stand out from Marxist ideology, though he adapted it in the light of the socialist movement's experiences (Polasky, 1995b, pp. 162–163). Yet, the influence of Adolphe Prins's (his professor at ULB) theories on his vision cannot be denied (Mary, 1990, pp. 161–184). Besides, the forensic medicine training of Dr Héger-Gilbert deeply influenced him and opened him to Darwinism and to Lombroso's theories (De Ruyver, 1988, p. 79).

These reforms should also be replaced in the context of Émile Vandervelde's commitment to eugenics, which is less known. He published a book on the topic marked by social Darwinism and inspired by socialism (Massart, Vandervelde, 1893). In the 1920s, he was appointed to several leading positions in the *Société d'Eugénique* (Eugenics society), which promoted eugenicist ideas strongly shaped by hygienism (De Raes, 1989, p. 419). Many members of this society were magistrates and scientists who played a central role in the minister's school and projects.

The reform of prisons

According to Vandervelde's penal vision, the root causes for a criminal's actions needed to be identified. Criminals should not only be punished, they should also learn. Prison sentences and inmates had to be handled on an individual basis to ensure the criminal's rehabilitation. Therefore, criminal management was no longer restricted to repressive sentences of imprisonment, which called for the creation of new types of prisons ('school prisons', 'sanatorium prisons', etc). This new system resulted in 'a differentiated penitentiary organisation, a veritable network of special-ised institutions or wings with varying regimes and often with different cadres of personnel' (Radzinowicz, 1999, p. 62). To this end, minister Vandervelde created the *Service d'Anthropologie Pénitentiaire* (Penitentiary Anthropology Service) in 1920, which was headed by Dr Vervaeck. The latter was not a mere pawn in the ambitious reforms of the socio-penal world undertaken by the minister; he also inspired them (Depreeuw, 1993, p. 152). The role of the *Service d'Anthropologie Pénitentiaire* was twofold: study the prison's population in order to create new prison management tools (typologies...), on the one hand, and on the other hand (Radzinowicz, 1999, pp. 57–58), identify criminals who required guidance to be rehabilitated throughout their prison term within one of the newly created institutions.

Judicial police

Vandervelde's work also led to the establishment of a new specialized police service, dedicated to repressing crime and offences: the *Police judiciaire près les Parquets* (Prosecution Service Police). It was created on 7 April 1919, without long parliamentary debates. Based on several projects developed before the war, the reasons put forward to support its creation were the surge in criminality and armed banditry (Annales Parlementaires. Chambre des représentants, ordinary session of 1918–1919, pp. 388–393; Le Moniteur belge, 12 April 1919, pp. 1485–1487). The judicial police personnel was placed under the authority of the *procureur du Roi* (King's prosecutor), but its administrative management was entrusted to the *Administration de la Sûreté Publique* (Administration of Public Security). To handle recruitment, the Ministry of Justice aimed at appointing judicial police officers among the *commissaires de police communale* (superintendents of municipal police) and the members of the *Sûreté Militaire* (Military Security Department) (Welter, 2011, p. 54).

This department, although it did not handle 'political police' assignments, could also take part – like the *Gendarmerie* – in the surveillance of circles considered as radical and jeopardizing public order because they did not fit in the traditional political framework (Cartuyvels, Ponsaers, Van Outrive, 1991, p. 109). This is all the more important as the members of the new police corps were very close to their colleagues of the *Sûreté de l'État* (State Security Department) and this proximity was reflected by regular and long-term staff transfers from one department to the other (these were especially frequent after the Second World War) (Rousseaux, Somer, 2005, pp. 62–65).

Develop knowledge and expertize

The *École de Criminologie et de Police Scientifique* resulted from all these reforms and was created by the 15 October 1920 Royal Decree (Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 1920, pp. 556–558). Though the project to establish such a school had been initiated under the previous Minister of Justice, Carton de Wiart (Documents parlementaires de Belgique. Chambre des Représentants, ordinary session of 1912–1913, document no. 12 and Annales Parlementaires. Sénat, ordinary session 1911–1912, p. 292), it had remained in the pipeline for several years.

It seems that the ECPS was already operating long before its official establishment. As a matter of fact, it welcomed future judicial police officers of the prosecution office as soon as the institution was founded. The school was opened on a trial basis before considering setting up a permanent school, as mentioned in the *Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*: 'Le ministre de la justice a décidé de créer à titre d'essai, à Bruxelles une école de police scientifique pour les officiers et agents de la police judiciaire nouvellement créée. Notre pays était, en effet, presque le seul en Europe où n'existait pas d'enseignement de l'espèce. Seules quelques communes – Bruxelles et Liège – notamment avaient organisé des cours pratiques pour leurs agents. L'absence d'éducation professionnelle suffisante met nos policiers, malgré leur bonne volonté, en état d'infériorité dans leur lutte contre les malfaiteurs. [...] Dans la suite, le cadre de cet enseignement sera élargi de telle façon que nos futurs magistrats pourront y trouver une orientation scientifique précieuse' ('On a trial basis, the Ministry of Justice decided to create a forensic police school in Brussels for officers and agents of the newly created judicial police. Indeed, our country was almost the only one in Europe where such a school did not

exist. Only a few municipalities, such as Brussels and Liège, had organized practical lessons for their agents. The lack of sufficient professional training puts our police staff in a situation of inferiority in their fight against offenders, despite their goodwill. [...] In the future, the scope of this training will be extended to further develop the scientific expertize of our future magistrates.') (Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 1920, pp. 181–182).

As soon as the ECPS was created, the aim was to give an international dimension to the institution. A few visits to foreign institutions were organized. These visits were carried out by the future school director, Dr Gustave De Rechter and by the Head of the *Service d'identité judiciaire* (Judicial Identity Department), Théodore Borgerhoff. These visits took place in the *Institut de police scientifique* (Forensic Police Institute) in Lausanne, in the *Laboratoire de police technique* (Technical Police Laboratory) in Lyon and in the *Service de l'identité judiciaire* (Judicial Identity Department) in Paris. The trips were described in a report presented to the ECPS executive board on 8 January 1921, which was published in the *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie* (De Rechter, 1921, pp. 212–221, 305–309 and 533–544). Other minor inspiration sources could also be mentioned, such as Austria (ECPS – 6 J, Letter from the General Administrator to the Minister of Justice, 11 December 1920, p. 2). The following year, a visit to the Forensic Police School in Rome was carried out. This visit, which took place at a later stage, strongly influenced debates at the ECPS concerning clinical applications of the criminal anthropology course at the prison of Forest. Based on the observations made in the Italian institution, Director De Rechter arranged that a trial for practical lessons be conducted (using actual prisoners for demonstration purposes), in spite of the disagreement and reluctance of many board members (ECPS – Farde PV [Minutes file] 1920–1939, Board minutes of 21 February 1922, pp. 2–4).

As soon as it was founded, the ECPS experienced tensions related to the balance between its judicial and policing objectives. Minister Vandervelde clearly favoured judicial training. The Minister was little interested in police staff training regarding police investigation techniques and gave his preference for magistrates and legal practitioner's training in order to further develop their collaboration with psychiatrists (De Ruyver, 1988, p. 86). In fact, he counted on magistrates to communicate their knowledge in their prosecution office to colleagues and police staff. He allowed magistrates and police officers to take their own

decisions regarding most aspects of police training. This is why so many magistrates attended the executive board, together with representatives of the forensic scientists, teachers, and police officers. Émile Vandervelde also did not wish to neglect the ECPS' laboratories and their role in judicial expertize (Borgerhoff, 1931, p. 288). Once the institution was established, the minister did not interfere any longer in the ECPS operations. He totally lost his interest for the school after his term of office when he returned to Parliament as a deputy.

In practice: the Criminology and Forensic Police School at work

General framework

Established in October 1920, the institution was under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and managed by the *Administration de la Sûreté Publique*. This administration also included the *Police des Étrangers et de la Sûreté de l'État* (Foreigners and State Security Police). The Judicial Police was also placed under its tutelage. Yet, the school only appeared in the Public Security Department's official organisation chart in 1927 (Put, 1990, pp. 78–79). The ECPS management consisted of a limited permanent staff with a director and a secretary in charge of administration and three laboratory technicians, later supervised by a laboratory head. The personnel already worked before the institution was officially opened and before having been appointed, which led to an administrative imbroglio (ECPS – 6 J, Letter from Secretary Borgerhoff to the Minister of Justice, 25 November 1920, pp. 2–3). Dr Gustave De Rechter was the school's first director. He was a forensic scientist and law court expert and also the ECPS Laboratory Head (*SPF Justice – Administration Centrale*/ Belgian Federal Ministry of Justice, Central Administration, note to the Minister, 7 February 1935, p. 1).

The ECPS was led by an executive board which defined most of its course of action. The board's decisions were declared final and the role of the Ministry of Justice's administration was to 'leur donner formes légales et administratives' ('give them legal and administrative force') (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 21 March 1921, p. 2). The board was mainly composed of magistrates (40%), which fit in line with Émile Vandervelde's vision. The judicial police services were poorly

represented (15%) along with representatives of the academic community (15%), the upper management, and the Ministry (15%). We can also mention the presence of 'outsiders', such as Brussels' burgomaster and the chairman of the Bar association (15%), whose attendance was scarce. In theory, the Minister of Justice is the board's chairman (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 21 March 1921, p. 2). Therefore, the school's curriculum was based on the magistrates' perspective on socio-penal work, rather than on a technical and scientific perspective focusing on policing functions. All the more so as magistrates were the most active members of the executive board's meetings.

Specialized equipment

Upon its foundation, the ECPS took advantage of private initiatives. Located underneath Brussels law court, it took over the premises and the equipment of the former 'Musée de médecine légale' ('Forensic Science Museum') of Dr Héger-Gilbert (Borgerhoff, 1931, p. 286–287). The ECPS also benefited from Mr Gillet's photography equipment which was already used by the Prosecution office.[1] In spite of being located in the Brussels law court's attic and pompously called *laboratoire de photographie judiciaire* (judicial photography laboratory), it was in fact only a backroom which contained personal property. Later on, the equipment was acquired by the State and the personnel integrated with the school staff in March 1921 (De Rechter, 1921, p. 542). This laboratory's competences gradually extended to physics and chemistry experiments within the framework of judicial expert assessments, thanks to the personal equipment provided by Dr De Rechter.

The creation of an educational museum was suggested by the ECPS foundation as a way of presenting interesting exhibits. The museum also resulted from an initiative undertaken by several forensic scientists in Brussels (Borgerhoff, 1931, p. 286). Such a museum, which already existed abroad, was aimed at providing additional educational material – more concrete than long descriptions – to courses, 'as exhibits and as places of learning, the criminological museums symbolised not only the representation or mediation of contemporary theories of criminology, but also the specific belief in the ability of objects to express ideas' (Regerner, 2003, p. 43).

However, Brussels law court's premises were not built to host classes and laboratories. The school's premises were not transformed

before the mid-1920s, which had a heavy impact on the school's operations in its early years: 'Jusqu'ici l'institution ne dispose que de locaux plutôt rudimentaires situés sous les combles du palais de Justice. […] Mais il existe un plan de transformation dont l'exécution dotera l'école de salles appropriées à leur destination' ('Until now, the institution has had to cope with rather rudimentary premises located underneath the law court. […] Yet, a transformation plan has been designed thanks to which these premises will be adapted to their purpose') (Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 1921, p. 109). The transformation works were delayed several times before finally being carried out for the ECPS 10th anniversary.

The curriculum's structure

Upon its foundation, the institution's curriculum was articulated around two sets of courses with different objectives: the superior level (*École de Criminologie*/Criminology school) and the inferior level (*École de Police Scientifique*/Forensic Police School). Yet, they should not be considered as distinct trainings, since many courses and tenured teachers were the same in both course levels.

The superior level, organized for 'des hommes de fait' ('fact-driven professionals'), such as magistrates, lawyers or police officers, mainly focused on criminal science (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 8 January 1921, p. 12). The training was made up of seven courses given in 175 lessons, mainly related to psychomedical sciences (60), forensic science and related subject matters (53):

> *Anthropologie criminelle et démonstrations pratiques* (Criminal anthropology and practical demonstrations), Mr Vervaeck (20 lessons);
>
> *Droit pénal appliqué et procédure pénale appliquée* (Applied penal law and applied penal procedure), Mr Cornil (30 lessons);
>
> *Psychologie normale et pathologique* (Normal and pathological psychology), Mr Ley (30 lessons);
>
> *Médecine légale* (Forensic science) in three parts: *Médecine légale avec démonstrations* (Forensic science with demonstrations), Mr Héger-Gilbert (20 lessons), *Toxicologie* (Toxicology), Mr De Laet (five lessons), *sérolog*ie (Serology), Mr Bruynoghe from Louvain (5 lessons),
>
> *Notions de physique et de chimie préparatoire – Balistique* (Preparatory notions of physics and chemistry – Ballistics), Colonel Mage (12 lessons),

Police scientifique (Forensic police) in two parts: *Police scientifique* (Forensic police), Mr Servais and Mr Stockis (40 lessons), *Portrait parlé*, Mr Gillet, (10 lessons and practical demonstrations),

Organisation et fonctionnement des services d'identification (Organisation and practices of identification departments), Mr Borgerhoff (three lessons and practical demonstrations).

Chaire de statistique (Chair of statistics), M. Gillard.

The inferior level was intended for police staff. The number of subject matters was more limited. The courses were developed as introductions to those given in the superior level, except for courses regarding forensic police. Merging old and new training methods, the inferior level's curriculum aimed at providing agents with a (minimal) theoretical and technical training. These police were supposed to learn the rest through their daily policing assignments (Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 1920, pp. 181–182):

Éléments de droit pénal appliqué et de procédures pénales (Principles of applied penal law and penal procedures), Mr Collard;

Éléments de médecine légale (Principles of forensic science), Mr Héger-Gilbert (ten lessons);

Éléments d'anthropologie criminelle et de médecine mentale, mœurs et habitudes des malfaiteurs, psychologie du témoignage (Principles of criminal anthropology and psychiatric medicine, criminal's behaviours and habits, witness statement psychology), Mr Vervaeck;

Police scientifique (Forensic police) in three parts: *Procédés d'identification, preuves indiciales, techniques des vols, perquisitions, emballage des pièces à conviction* (Identification processes, clues, robbery techniques, police raids, exhibit wrapping), Mr De Rechter (10 lessons), *Camouflage, examen des lieux, éléments de pratique* (Camouflage, examination of the scene, practical elements), Mr Stockis (4 lessons), *Portrait parlé et photographie judiciaire* ('Portrait parlé' and judicial photography), Mr Gillet (30 lessons).

This training curriculum notably lacks the presence of technical experts, whose training had been considered for a time before being delayed by magistrates. It should also be noted that classes were only given in French until the mid-1920s.

School communication: *La Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie*

The Minister of Justice was aware of the importance of communication and undertook an original initiative in order to provide the school with an official journal. To this end, he used an existing journal, the *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie* which had been created from the merger of the *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie* (Penal Law and Criminology Journal) and the *Archives Internationales de Médecine Légale* (Forensic Science International Archives) (Kaminski, 1995, p. 14).[2] The journal's aim was to be the 'bulletin scientifique' (scientific newsletter) (ECPS – 6 J, Letter from the Minister of Justice, 19 November 1920) and to publish the school's official announcements, events, speeches, research findings, etc. The minister Émile Vandervelde saw it as a propaganda tool to communicate the school's knowledge in courts and tribunals, but also in prisons and other establishments related to the judicial sphere, such as mental institutions. This initiative was somewhat original in comparison with what was done abroad, where professional publications with a very limited number of copies were often published, such as the *Bulletin de l'École de police scientifique et du service de signalement* (Forensic Police School and Identification Department Newsletter) (About, 2005, pp. 179–180).

The school's position in the Belgian landscape of the interwar period

For a long time, the ECPS was the only policing training institution. All police bodies enrolled their members in the institution, such as the judicial police, the *Sûreté de l'État* (State Security Department), the *comité supérieur de contrôle* (High Control Committee), the municipal police, the *gendarmerie*, etc.

Tensions and competition around technical and forensic police training

The *gendarme*s were also invited to enrol in the school as soon as the institution was founded, but more important synergies with the *gendarmerie* were also developed. The *gendarmerie*'s general staff also advertised

for the school every year. On top of regularly enrolled students, private lessons were also given to the *gendarmes* in the early 1920s (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 22 September 1921, p. 3). The ECPS publications and manuals were widely distributed and used among the *gendarmerie* in order to carry out the agents' training (*Centre de documentation de la police*/ Police Documentation Centre [CDC], notes no. 558 and 559/3 of the Gendarmerie corps, 22 November 1922). This documentation filled a gap in the *gendarmes*' training. Indeed, the reference book used for the *gendarmerie*'s training, called 'théorie Berth' ('Berth's theory') did not include content on technical and forensic police until 1937. The instructions for lifting fingerprints were quite basic and the book frequently advised readers to ask for the laboratory technicians' help (Berth, 1937, pp. 299–314).

In spite of these synergies, there was also a certain degree of competition between the ECPS and the *gendarmerie*, which testifies to the *gendarmerie*'s will to gain a more prominent role into police system. Indeed, the Ministry of National Defence allowed the *gendarmerie* 'la constitution d'un musée criminel au Dépôt du corps' ('to open a *gendarmerie*'s crime museum') (CDC, gendarmerie's note no. 8143, 12 November 1923). This initiative was clearly in competition with the school's museum, which caused discontent among teachers as well as the executive board.

The school also tried to encourage municipal police staff to enrol. The success was limited, mainly because the classes were only given in French. In 1923, the lack of motivation of local police bodies to have their staff enrolled was a cause for concern in the executive board. The board launched a campaign, which could be regarded as a cry of distress, to attract new students. Various and unsuccessful measures were taken in order to add an administrative value to the ECPS certificate. For instance, the Ministry of the Interior was ordered to prioritize promotions of police staff who had followed the ECPS training (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 14 March 1923, pp. 2–3).

A major change in the training of policing techniques took place in 1935. In order to improve the skills of staff members holding management positions, decrees were enacted that determined a certificate to be obtained for the positions of *commissaire* (superintendent) and *commissaire-adjoint* (assistant superintendent) for the municipal police and established local police schools (Revue belge de la police administrative et judiciaire, 1935, pp. 217–218). The *Administrateur de la Sûreté*

Publique (Head of the Public Security Department), Robert de Foy, took the opportunity to request the Ministry of the Interior to establish a great national police school under the authority of the Criminology School: 'Pareille école donnerait un enseignement uniforme à tous les officiers de police du royaume. L'École de Criminologie et de Police Scientifique, dont les locaux sont situés au Palais de Justice, serait l'embryon de cette école qui deviendrait la pépinière de nos corps de police' ('Such a school would provide a consistent training for all police officers in the Kingdom. The Criminology and forensic police school, which is located in the premises of Brussels law court, would be the cornerstone of this school that would nurture our police bodies' skills') (SPF Justice – Administration Centrale, letter from the Administrateur de la Sûreté Publique de Foy to the Ministry of the Interior, 15 January 1936, p. 2).

However, the Minister of the Interior proved to be reluctant regarding this proposal. Although he was in favour of turning the ECPS into a real Police Academy, he considered that making it the only institution entitled to issue diplomas would be complex to realise in practice (SPF Justice – Administration Centrale, letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Minister of Justice, 18 January, 1936). The Head of the Security Department was also tasked by the Ministry of Justice with establishing a report taking stock of the situation regarding municipal police training. Robert de Foy took into account his correspondence with the Minister of the Interior in writing his report and insisted that the ECPS was not entitled to deliver certificates to the municipal police's staff members who followed courses to become superintendents, but 'de développer les connaissances criminologiques et de l'enseigner à ceux qui à titres divers, participent à la répression criminelle ; en fait c'est un cours de perfectionnement pour ceux qui sont investis d'une fonction de police judiciaire' ('to develop criminological knowledge and to teach it to those who take part in criminal repression in various ways. It is a professional training school aimed at developing the skills of staff members already holding a position in judicial police') (SPF Justice – Administration Centrale, letter from the Head of Security Department of the Ministry of Justice, 26 March 1936, p. 2).

Once local police schools and the *brevet de commissaire* (superintendent certificate) were established in 1935, the roles of the different schools were better outlined. According to what Benoit Majerus said concerning the Brussels' institution, 'it appears that the criminology and forensic police

school became a necessary step for Brussels' police officers' (Majerus, 2005, p. 230). Besides, the high number of municipal police agents who followed the school's curriculum suggests that it also was very popular with low-ranking agents, even though the Brussels' police were known for their lack of competence. There was no real institution competing with the ECPS before German occupation and the establishment of Tervuren's educational centre on 10 June 1942 by the Secretary General for the Ministry of the Interior Romsée, a Flemish nationalist who was a follower of the New Order's ideas.

Criminology as a university science?

For the ECPS Board, the acknowledgement of the school's curriculum did not only require the validity of certificates issued by the ECPS to be recognized. The school also needed to be considered on an equal footing with university education. The Minister of Justice requested the Chief Public Prosecutor Servais to examine the possibilities to grant a legal personality to the Criminology School and to classify it 'parmi les établissements d'enseignement supérieur' ('as a university-level establishment') (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 27 November 1927, pp. 3–4.). The director followed the Minister's proposal and based himself on the foreign examples to request that the ECPS be acknowledged as a university-level educational establishment, even though it was not part of a university (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Director's yearly report for year 1927–1928, pp. 6–7). The director also proposed to grant the school's teachers the same wages as university professors. Although his request was accepted and transferred to the Ministry of Finance, the latter kept on turning it down throughout the 1920s and 1930s. These refusals for financial motives put an end to the ECPS attempts to obtain the status of a university-level establishment.

Even if the ECPS failed to establish itself and to be acknowledged as a university-level school, criminology started to gain momentum within universities. In 1929, the *Université catholique de Louvain* (UCL)'s Faculty of Law created the *École des sciences criminelles* (School of Criminal Sciences) through the impetus given by Pr Louis Braffort and Dr De Greeff (Aertsen, Casselma and Parmentier, 2012, pp. 17–22). Criminology training, which mainly focused at first on anthropology and psychiatric sciences, changed over time and started to deal with law, sociology, biology, psychology, and mental hygiene (Peters, Van Kerckvoorde

and Van Outrive, 1980, p. 199). The ECPS may have been a model for Braffort (Fijnaut, 2014, p. 498). Inspired by UCL, but also by French and American examples, the *Université Libre de Bruxelles* (ULB) followed suit. The *École de criminologie* (Criminology School) was founded in 1936 at the instigation of Léon Cornil and Dr De Craene (respectively teacher and administrator at ECPS), with a very similar curriculum to that of Louvain (Peters, Van Kerckvoorde and Van Outrive, 1980, p. 200), but with a will to provide courses of forensic police that supplemented those given at ECPS (Fijnaut, 2014, p. 508).

The board, which had to deal with the need to replace the school's director,[3] duly noted this new situation and tried to define how the ECPS stood out: 'l'École a un rôle purement éducateur et d'application pour les magistrats et les cadres de la police et qu'elle doit laisser aux institutions scientifiques, universitaires et autres, nombreuses dans le pays, le domaine de la recherche scientifique pure' ('The school's role is to educate and teach practical principles to magistrates and police management staff. We need to leave pure scientific research to the numerous universities and scientific institutions in our country') (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 27 June 1935, p. 3).

In 1937, a project that called for the setting up of criminology courses in the state universities of Ghent and Liège once again led to discontent among ECPS teachers. They were concerned, as was the executive board, that giving access to such courses to people who did not belong to policing and judicial circles would give the opportunity to criminals to use this information in committing crimes.[4] The reform questioned the exclusivity the school had maintained until then regarding criminology and forensic police training (ECPS – Farde PV 1920–1939, Board minutes of 8 July 1937, p. 7).

The ECPS director played down this concern and claimed that there was no similarity between the provided curricula. According to him, the courses given at ECPS focused on practice, as opposed to the more theoretical university approach. Yet, the board lodged a complaint with the Ministry of Public Education. The minister tried to appease the voiced concerns, which were also communicated to the Minister of Justice (ECPS – 6 J, School board meeting, 19 November 1937, p. 3). In any event, the ECPS was unable to prevent the creation of criminology schools in Ghent and Liège, enacted by Royal Decree on 10 May 1938, even though the school held that police staff would not belong to the target audience of these new schools. As was the case for ULB, an ECPS teacher

(Mr F. Thomas) took part in the foundation of Ghent's school (Fijnaut, 2014, pp. 510–511).

Ultimately, the ECPS lacked the necessary support to be acknowledged at university and administrative levels because of its low visibility and the tutelage of the Ministry of Justice. What's more, the teachers' behaviour proved to be very ambivalent. While they sometimes defended the ECPS' central role and importance, they also had leading positions in new criminology schools established by universities. In the long run, this failure proved detrimental to the operations and the scope of the school's courses, which were taken over by various institutions.

Conclusions

The new security challenges of the late 19th century and early 20th century gave rise to debates in the circles of law and medical professionals regarding the need to reform police investigation methods. The objective was to make sure they benefited from the advantages offered by scientific progress. Another aim was to provide magistrates with practical knowledge.

As a response to these challenges, the *École de Criminologie et de Police Scientifique* was created in a favourable context, thanks to the support of Émile Vandervelde, a minister ready to conduct a voluntarist policy that relied on foreign examples and his 'faith in science and mankind'. This new school also showed the government's will to standardize police services and to centralize them (or at least to centralize their training). Over time, this will for centralization, which aimed at responding to the growing scope of crime, proved consistent. At the same time, however, oppositions to these reforms remained at work within security policies carried out in Belgium (municipal independence, competition between police bodies, etc).

At first, the ECPS had a de facto monopoly upon policing and criminology knowledge. It undeniably played a pioneering role in the field of training in the Belgian policing and judicial landscape. Even though the emergence of the school responded to an essential need for training, a series of challenges rapidly appeared and restricted its scope: a lack of interest of ministers in charge, but also a political class with an outdated vision of the police; the stinginess and procedural heaviness

of central administration; an aging management and teaching personnel; the lack of attendance of the magistrates-students to classes; an unbalanced executive board with overrepresented magistrates to the detriment of the academic and scientific staff; and the school's monolingualism, which made it an exclusively French-speaking institution, had considerable implications in a country where linguistic divisions were on the rise.

Therefore, the initial impetus quickly died out. The first signs of decline already appeared in the 1930s and there was no clear framework regarding the school's objectives, except for Émile Vandervelde's vision when he founded it. The relation to science also showed contradictions. The experience and the 'calling' were emphasized as much as the training in criminal identification techniques. Photography aroused suspicion and knowledge was seen as the privilege of an informed minority, which would strengthen criminality if it could be accessed by a larger audience. New policing methods did not mean the end of older practices.

The ECPS was torn between tradition and modernity and could not measure up to the emerging schools created in universities. Likewise, the other police bodies also started to consider the professionalization and the training of their staff as a requirement in the Belgian police landscape. Although the school tried to stand out by putting forward the differences in the training it provided to maintain its position, its arguments on complementarity could not hide its growing obsolescence. The school's staff did not identify specific threats or forms of criminality around which the courses could be structured.

To conclude, it must also be pointed out that on top of its educational and informative role, the ECPS also played an essential function of creating professional connections between agents from various institutions in charge of repressing crimes. The role played by educational institutions in setting up a specific habitus for a socio-professional category has been illustrated many times over. The stakeholders of the time were fully aware of this particularity and emphasized it. In the end, the pioneering ECPS became a poorly funded institution with a curriculum that was not acknowledged by the authorities. In spite of the lack of recognition by administrative authorities, the school acquired its legitimacy in the eyes of those involved on the ground thanks to the professional connections it was able to create and to the setting up of shared standards.

Notes

1   *Chef du poste d'identification* (Head of the identification office) at the Forest-lez-Bruxelles's prison and *photographe du parquet* (prosecution office's photographer).

2   Created in 1907 at the instigation of lawyer Rutjens, its founding fathers were magistrates Raymond De Rijkere and Henri Jaspar. Adolphe Prins was quickly appointed Chairman of its editing board and the journal rapidly became the French-speaking channel for the *Union Internationale de Droit Pénal* (International Society for Penal Law). Its publication stopped during the First World War and it was issued again in 1920.

3   From the early 1930s on, Director De Rechter's health declined. He could no longer assume his position as a teacher or conduct his scientific tasks. Therefore, he was replaced. In 1935, the school director's management, who was 74 years old, was clearly questioned by the *Administration de la Sûreté Publique*. The executive board was divided on the issue of electing a successor. Under the impulse of high-ranking magistrates, a professional military, Colonel Deguent, was selected instead of Dr De Laet, a forensic scientist and teacher at ECPS and ULB.

4   For the same reason, the distribution of the manuals was limited and the ECPS courses were only opened to a select audience of professionals.

Bibliography

Anonymous (1911) 'Une intéressante brochure sur la preuve par la Dactyloscopie. Des écoles de police belges', *Revue belge de la police administrative et judiciaire*, 51–52.

Anonymous (1920) 'Ecole de police scientifique', *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie*, 181–182.

Anonymous (1920) 'L'école belge de criminologie et de police scientifique', *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie*, 556–558.

Anonymous (1921), *Revue Pénitentiaire et de Droit Pénal*, No. 495, 248–261 and 337–355.

Anonymous (1922), *Revue Pénitentiaire et de Droit Pénal*, No. 496, 39–76.

Anonymous (1936) 'A propos de l'article: la réforme pénitentiaire en Belgique', *Revue belge de la police administrative et judiciaire*, 52–54.

I. About (2005) 'Naissance d'une science policière de l'identification en Italie (1902–1922)', *Les Cahiers de la sécurité*, No. 56, 167–200.

I. Aertsen J. Casselma and S. Parmentier (2012) *Tachtig jaar criminologie aan de Leuvense universiteit: onderwijs, onderzoek en praktijk*, (Antwerpen: Maklu).

C. Berth (1937) *Le service de la police judiciaire et administrative par demandes et par réponses, à l'usage du corps de la Gendarmerie belge, d'après la théorie du capitaine C. Berth. Édition mise en rapport avec la législation et la jurisprudence, suivie des instructions sur les recherches techniques*, (Bruxelles: Ed. Lesigne).

Y. Cartuyvels, P. Ponsaers and L. Van Outrive (1991) *Les polices en Belgique. Histoire socio-politique du système policier de 1794 à nos jours*, (Bruxelles: EVO).

P. Darmon (1989) *Médecins et assassins à la belle époque. La médicalisation du crime*, (Paris: Seuil).

R. De Bont (2001) 'Meten en verzoenen. Louis Vervaeck en de Belgische criminele antropologie circa 1900–1940', *Cahiers d'histoire du temps présent*, No. 9, 63–104.

W. Depreeuw (1993) 'Louis Vervaeck 1872–1943', in C. Fijnaut (ed.) *Gestalen uit het verleden, 32 voorgangers in de strafrechtswetenschap de strafrechtspleging en de criminologie*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 61–68).

W. De Raes (1989) 'Eugenetika in de Belgische medische wereld tijdens het interbellum', *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis*, Vol. 20, No. 3–4, 399–464.

G. de Rechter (1921) 'Les Ecoles de criminologie et de police scientifique (Lausanne, Lyon, Paris)', *Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie*, 212–221, 305–309, 533–544.

R. De Rijkere (1913) 'L'enseignement de la police judiciaire à Paris, Lausanne, Rome', *Archives d'anthropologie criminelle*, Vol. 28, 561–612.

B. De Ruyver (1988) *De strafrechtelijke politiek gevoerd onder de socialistische Ministers van Justitie E. Vandervelde, P. Vermeylen en A. Vranckx*, (Antwerpen: Kluwer).

C. Denis (2012) *Circulations policières 1750–1914*, (Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses du Septentrion).

C. Fijnaut (2014) *Criminologie en strafrechtsbedeling. Een historische en transatlantische inleiding*, (Amsterdam: Boom).

D. Kaminski (1995) *Entre criminologie et droit pénal: un siècle de publications en Europe et aux Etats-Unis*, (Bruxelles: De Boeck).

L. Keunings (2009) *Des polices si tranquilles Une histoire de l'appareil policier belge au XIXe siècle*, (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain).

F. E. Louwage (1945) *Psychologie et criminalité*, (Ninove: Ed. Anneessens).

P. Mary (1990) 'De la cellule à l'atelier. Prins et la naissance du traitement des détenus en Belgique', in Ph. Mary and P. Van der Vorst (eds.) *Cent ans de criminologie à l'U.L.B. Adolphe Prins, l'Union internationale de droit pénal, le cercle universitaire pour les études criminologiques*, (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 161–184).

B. Majerus (2005) *Occupations et logiques policières. La police communale de Bruxelles pendant la Première et Deuxième Guerres mondiales (1914–1918 et 1940–1944)*, (ULB: PhD in history).

J. Massart, E. Vandervelde (1893) *Parasitisme organique et parasitisme sociale*, (Paris: s.n.).

T. Peters J. Van Kerckvoorde and L. Van Outrive (1980), *Vijftig jaar criminologie-onderwijs: een groei naar zelfstandigheid*, dans *Panopticon*, (Antwerpen: Kluwer).

J. Polasky (1995a) *Émile Vandervelde, le patron*, (Bruxelles: Labor).

J. Polasky (1995b) *The democratic Socialism of Émile Vandervelde. Between Reform and Revolution*, (Oxford-Washington: Berg).

E. Put (1990) *Het Ministerie van Justicie (1831–1988)*, Vol. 1, (Bruxelles: AGR).

L. Radzinowicz (1999) *Adventure in Criminology*, (London: Routledge).

S. Regener (2003) 'Criminal Museums and the visualisation of Evil', *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/ Crime, History & Societies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 43–56.

X. Rousseaux and D. Somer (2005) 'Pour une histoire de la Sûreté de l'État en Belgique. Essai autour de 175 années de pénombre', in M. Cools K. Dassen and R. Libert (eds.) *La Sûreté. Essais sur les 175 ans de la Sûreté de l'Etat*, (Bruxelles: Politeia, 49–74).

F. Welter (2011) 'Quand l'intérêt public se heurte aux obstacles institutionnels et matériels. Une police judiciaire près les parquets, solution aux défis de la police judiciaire en Belgique', *Cahiers d'histoire du temps présent*, Vol. 24, 35–64.

4

Suspect Cities and the (Re)Making of Colonial Order: Urbanization, Security Anxieties and Police Reforms in Postwar Congo (1945–1960)

Amandine Lauro

▶

Abstract: *Between the end of the Second World War and the decolonization process, Congolese cities grew spectacularly, leading in some cases—such as in the capital Kinshasa—to a fourfold increase in African urban residents. These radical transformations of the colonial landscape (both spatial and social) raised new security challenges for Belgian authorities. Indeed, as their development coincided with dramatic social changes and with the rise of anticolonial disorders, urban spaces generated specific anxieties over the dangers of unruly 'detribalized' Africans (and their proximity to white populations), and over the weaknesses of colonial control and police institutions.*

'We make war everyday'

In March 1950, an anonymous group of Congolese men self-identified as 'your soldiers and policemen' sent a letter of complaint to the Governor General of the Belgian Congo. The letter requested better salaries and working conditions for the soldiers of the *Force Publique*, the colonial army that had been in charge of the maintenance of law and order in the colony since the 1880s and that was still mainly used as a military police force in the 1950s (Shaw, 1984; Vanderstraeten, 1985; Jacobs et al., 1994; Coll., 2010). Referring precisely to their policing tasks, soldiers wrote: 'Because of you, we make war everyday' and insisted that without their work, there would be 'no peace' within the Belgian Congo (*Archives africaines*/ African Archives [AA], *SPF Affaires Étrangères*/ FPS Foreign Affairs, Collection Government General of Leopoldville [GG], 16097, anonymous to GG (General Governor), 26 March 1950.)[1]

 The letter was taken seriously by the military high command (AA, GG, 16097, report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Staff, 24 May 1950). In addition to their accusatory tone, soldiers mobilized rhetoric of imperial comparison (highlighting French and British alleged generosity towards colonial soldiers) that could only worry Belgian colonial authorities. Their long-running insecurities about both foreign influence and Belgium's international reputation as a worthy colonial power remained indeed strong after the Second World War (Vanthemsche, 2008). Within the Congo itself, while the loyalty of the *Force Publique* appeared as unquestionable and the last mutiny of 1944 as nothing more than a bad memory,[2] patterns of obedience and reliability were nevertheless part of the daily preoccupations of white officers as well as of colonial administrators, especially in the context of the everyday maintenance of law and order. Unsurprisingly, when complaining about their work, civil policemen were subjected to similar investigations than those encountered by the anonymous soldiers of March 1950. During the same period, a single letter from a small group of (anonymous again)[3] urban policemen could for instance trigger a wave of forensic investigations in order to uncover the identity of the senders (AA, GG, 5521, anonymous to GG, 11 April 1946).[4] In the Belgian Congo as in many other colonial contexts, the (absolute) loyalty of police forces to the colonial regime and its agents was considered as crucial to the maintenance of public order and to the securing of colonial control and hierarchies (Anderson, Killingray, 1991; Killingray, 1999; Sinclair, 2006;

Blanchard, 2011; Thomas, 2012; Debos, Glasman, 2012; Bat, Courtin, 2012). No challenge could be tolerated in this regard, especially in a time of growing disorders and of emergence of new forms of delinquency.[5]

For African soldiers and policemen, the actual challenge was the 'war' they were fighting in their everyday work in the streets of the Belgian Congo. Interestingly, the dramatic vocabulary used in the letter echoes the alarming language sometimes employed by the colonial press when evoking urban criminality[6] and by official instructions reminding policemen of the many potential threats they were to be vigilant to: 'Nothing resembles a peaceful citizen more than a temporarily inactive rioter waiting for the right moment to rise' (AA, GG, 18096, Secret-Ordre Public-Directives no. 1 sur la tactique de la Police Territoriale agissant pour le maintien de l'ordre, [1957], p. 30) warned the guidebook of the urban police in 1957. Yet this lexicon is not exactly the one that can be found in history books about postwar Congo. At the height of their economic prosperity and of their confidence in paternalistic methods of rule, Belgian colonial authorities seem to have remained blind to the possibility of anticolonial unrest in their 'model-colony' until the second half of the 1950s. Some historians went so far as to use the expression 'Pax Belgica' to characterize the alleged absence of disorders and consequently of any kind of (notable) violent repression between the end of the Second World War and the eve of decolonization (Vanderstraeten, 1992).

While it remains true that there were no large uprisings, no massive riots, and little nationalist pro-independence formal movements for much of that period, 'Pax Belgica' looks quite the *a posteriori* reconstruction, at least in the light of the police records of the colony. This view builds on narrow definitions not only of protest movements, but also of what constituted 'disorder' in colonial Congo. It is also quite consistent with official metropolitan mythologies of a 'peaceful' colony untouched by the troubles and prospects of social unrest and anticolonial turmoil that informed so widely reporting habits, political discussions, and more generally the 'colonial common sense' (Stoler, 2009) of Belgian rulers during that period and that contributed to render less visible the scale of anxieties and doubts which perspire through so many records of the local colonial administration.

In this chapter, my aim is not to challenge the narratives of Congolese decolonization (Young, 1965; Bouvier, 1965; Coll. 1992; Mutamba, 1998; Etambala 2008) nor the ongoing discussion of the definition of political

contest in colonial Congo (Monaville, 2014), but to explore security anxieties associated with urban spaces and the ways in which they informed visions of maintenance of law and order after the Second World War. Congolese cities grew spectacularly during that period, leading in some cases – such as in the capital Kinshasa, then known as Leopoldville – to a fourfold increase in African urban residents (Denis, 1956; Pain, 1983; Gondola, 1997). As elsewhere in colonial Africa (Fourchard, Albert, 2003; Burton, 2005), these radical transformations of the urban colonial landscape (both spatial and social) raised new security challenges and specific anxieties over the dangers of unruly 'detribalized' Africans (and their proximity to white populations) as well as over the weaknesses of colonial control and police institutions. This chapter thus examines the role played by urban areas in the construction of new security threats and their impact on police reform projects in a late-colonial context. Based on a range of untapped archival sources and with Kinshasa as a main case-study, it examines the (re)making of colonial (urban) order (as it was debated not only by colonial policy makers but also by African elites) and the ways in which these new 'risks' informed colonial police priorities and structures. It argues that the dynamics of postwar (attempted) reforms of the Congolese law and order *apparatus* were largely influenced by the rise of urban security concerns that challenged previous definitions of repressive strategies to preserve colonial order. Finally, in the light of recent works on colonial policing and of the importance still given to the repression of uprisings and protests (whether of a political nature or linked to the political economy of colonial rule), it pleads for a broader consideration of 'ordinary' disorders and threats in the history of late-colonial police institutions.

Urbanization, Social Change and Security Anxieties in Colonial Congo

Cities played a particular and ambiguous role in the security preoccupations of colonial rulers and of their policing arsenal. Considered as outposts of civilization, colonial urban spaces were privileged sites of colonial modernity and authority implementation, where European control was particularly powerful – and visible – while being, at the same time, places of uncontrollability and contestations (Anderson, Rathbone, 2000; Salm, Falola, 2005; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2006). In the Congo

basin, urbanization began well before colonialism, but the imposition of Belgian rule precipitated its development to an unprecedented scale from the early 20th century (Gondola, 1997). The new regime of exploitation and the colonial booming economy relied heavily on Congolese migrant labor, but financial concerns and distrust of the formation of urbanized African proletariat initially brought Belgian authorities to limit urban settlements and to try to discourage workers from remaining in cities. From the 1930s, recognition of the ineluctability of the permanence of urban centers led to new regulations aiming at a stabilization of Congolese urban communities and at a renewed control of the mobility and behaviors of city dwellers (Baumer, 1939; Higginson, 1989). While the first urban police corps were also created during that period (Lauro, 2011), the protest and anticolonial agenda remained largely dominated by rural movements (Jewsiewicki, 1976a; Vellut, 1987; Thomas, 2012).

Still, from the beginning of the interwar period, the worrying consequences of urbanization from a social as much as from a security perspective were heavily debated on the Belgian colonial stage. Cities were accused to breed 'detribalization' among Congolese people: the destruction of their 'customary' embeddedness in the disciplinary frame of their 'traditional' social structures, in particular, was presented as having 'liberated them from their terrors and often also from all moral laws' (Ryckmans, 1934, p. 115). The fact that 'traditional' mechanisms of 'tribal' control seemed lost for good was deemed as a threat for the ordered and productive urban environment colonial authorities were seeking to create. Urban 'natives' were presented as 'abandoned to themselves' (Guebels, 1991 [1919], p. 213), 'deeply distressed' (Van Hove, 1943, p. 50), 'unstable' (Baumer, 1939, p. 22) and therefore as 'easy preys to all kinds of troublemakers' (Charles, 1937, p. 53), in a discursive and political correlation linking urbanization, uprooting, and indiscipline. As in many other African contexts (Cooper, 1983; Hodgson, McCurdy, 2001; Burton, 2005; Fourchard 2005), colonial anxieties over urban growth crystallized anxieties arising from social and cultural change. The influx of young rural migrants, the (relative) freedom of behavior offered by urban life, and the emergence of new identities and of new patterns of authority and respectability were condensed in concerns that also testify to the challenges that these evolutions brought to the colonial arsenal of surveillance and control measures (including policing ones).

After the Second World War, these fears (and challenges) were heightened by the unprecedented growth of Congolese cities. For instance,

the population of Leopoldville expanded from a bit less than 55.000 dwellers at the beginning of the war to more than 400.000 (including only 20.000 white colonists) at the time of Independence. This change of scale urged urban planning initiatives attempting to organize urban extension and combining modernizing, developmental perspectives with tighter control of African settlements and populations (Beeckman, Lagae, 2015). But in urban design as in migration schemes matters, colonial plans could never, despite their authoritarian nature, be fully implemented. The strict disciplinary and bureaucratic management of urban migrations and settlements, the criminalization of illegal mobility and even the postwar refinement of tools employed by the colonial administration (with regard to pass laws, residence permits' delivery and identification techniques at large) did not prevent the presence of many *irréguliers* (illegal migrants) in towns. In postwar Kinshasa, estimates of their number varied around 5% of the total inhabitants (Denis, 1956), but more alarmist proportions were often mentioned (Capelle, 1947; Denis, 1956). In any case, they drew security anxieties out of proportion to their actual presence. Old metropolitan fears about vagrancy, urban marginality and criminality (Vercammen, Vanruyssevelt, 2015), specific colonial definitions (and imaginations) of crime (Willis, 1991; Burton, 2004; Locatelli, 2007; Brunet-Laruche, 2012), and social and economic norms colluded in concerns about Congolese 'undesirables', 'idlers', 'vagrants', 'voluntary unemployed', and 'parasites', as they were then called by colonial analysts. Similarly to what Andrew Burton has shown for Eastern Africa (Burton, 2005; Burton, Ocobock 2009), the postwar period was marked by a shift of anxieties and policies from 'detribalization' in general to these specific (unclear) categories who did not fit the program of urban labor stabilization and resorted to informal economic activities for survival. These men and women 'impoverish the industrious part of the population' and the 'parasitism' (a label largely used in the Belgian Congo to refer to people leaving outside urban formal employment and infrastructures) 'which reigns in the city vitiates its atmosphere', summed up a colonial administrator (Grevisse, 1951). Contagion was a key-element of these discourses, not only in a moral or socio-economic perspective, but also in terms of order maintenance. This 'floating' 'African underclass' (Burton, 2005) was indeed perceived as a threat for the security of the city inhabitants – colonized and above all colonizers. In the Belgian Congo, while there is little doubt that the priorities of colonial repression were, as in many other parts of colonial

Africa, of a political nature, social offenses and petty criminality were never conceived as entirely distinct from political threats. Similarly, concerns over 'rebellious youth' (Waller, 2005) and the growth of generational indiscipline as a symptom of urban social disruption (Gondola, 2009 and 2013; Ngongo 2015) blended fears of chaos on the streets with fears of the risk that the 'willingness to question the authority of seniors' might imply 'a challenge to the legitimacy of colonialism' (Burgess, Burton, 2010, p. 9). As an official report in the late 1940s put it, these 'rootless individuals [...] who have nothing to lose and whose aspirations are not always reasonable, are easily influenced by subversive ideas and likely to be drawn into excesses' (Rapport annuel, 1948). In spite of a growing body of academic literature devoted to urbanization and to the development of a valuable sociological expertize on city dwellers' socio-economic difficulties (Comhaire-Sylvain, 1950; Denis, 1956 and 1958; Baeck, 1956; Forde, 1956; Davreux et al., 1957; Lux, 1959; Raymaeckers, 1960),[7] colonial knowledge remained limited and strategies to control these crowds not very effective. As anticolonial discontent developed, this heightened anxieties about the risks posed by the presence of *indésirables* and the strong-arm methods used by the police and the *Force Publique*, whose operating vocabulary appears edifying ('raids', 'clean-up operations', etc.).

Dangerous Encounters? Racial Tensions and Security Risks in the Streets of Leopoldville

In this context, direct interracial encounters and incidents also implied threats colonial authorities were particularly sensitive about. While they were not specific to the urban situation, these risks generated increased anxieties in cities precisely because of security reasons.

Segregation measures were strategic –even if not always effective – tools of colonial maintenance of law and order (Goerg, 2003; Fourchard, Albert, 2003). In the Belgian Congo, anxieties about transgressions of racial boundaries had played an important role in the definition of urban security priorities and of police institutions from the beginning of the 20th century (Lauro, 2011). As in other colonial situations, the narrowing of racial distance was considered as a potential source of danger for the colonizing community and urban spaces seemed to offer (too) many opportunities (whether public or intimate) in this regard. Segregation was indeed

not only a matter of urban planning, sanitation schemes, and legal organization; it also required an everyday enforcement and surveillance – and that was the job of the police. Despite official discourses about the emergence of the *communauté belgo-congolaise* – an harmonious, racially mixed, colonial society –, urban life in the Belgian Congo implied a daily surveillance of colonized and colonizers' mobility and circulations within the city, especially in times of social and political tensions. In a way, the susceptibility of Belgian colonial rulers in this regard mirrors the strict limitations placed on imperial mobility between the metropole and the colony that was one of the most striking features of Belgian colonialism (Stanard, 2014). This is particularly well reflected in concerns about intermediate groups – such as poor whites, non-Congolese Africans, or foreigners at large – perceived as threats (both of a political and criminal nature) to the maintenance of racial boundaries (and hierarchies of rule) and white prestige. Albeit control measures and police surveillance, undesirable and sometimes conflictive encounters happened. They reveal the scale of latent racial tensions in urban society (already denounced by some conversant observers)[8] and of security risks involved in these so-called 'minor' incidents.

One of the most significant examples of such problematic yet mundane confrontations[9] was road traffic accidents. In the 1950s, several motorized vehicles accidents in Leopoldville escalated into violent acts, protests, or in what was qualified in official reports as '*attentats*' ('terror attacks') (Rapport annuel, 1956, p. 6). The peak of this accident crisis was marked in 1955 when a particularly dramatic series of collisions provoked by European drivers (and impacting African victims) were followed by angry protests from Congolese crowds of up to hundreds of people. Damages were mainly material, but 'it was very close'[10] that they became of a more human nature.[11] Colonial authorities were all the more concerned that feelings of insecurity consequently grew among Europeans, leading some of them to declare that from then on, they would drive armed: 'What would happen if, one day, a car driver, feeling unsafe, hurt innocent or even guilty people?' Euphemistically, the discussion concluded with the statement that 'this kind of conduct is not going to bring white and black people closer' (AA, GG, 7008, minute session Comité Urbain Leopoldville, 7 April 1955). In colonial Africa, motorized transport embodied modernity and speed both on a symbolic and functional level (Gewald, Lunin, Van Walvaren, 2009). Traffic and car accidents involved entangled and complex relationships

between people, vehicles, and urban space, and interpretative attempts of this violence should take into consideration the multiplicity of potential meanings, imaginaries and implications (White, 1993; Gewald, Lunin, Van Walvaren, 2009) linked to these incidents in the specific social, political, and economic context of the Congolese urban society of the 1950s. Further research will certainly clarify these issues, but we can safely assume that this 'accident crisis' had to do with tensions and resentment born of the racialized, hierarchical access to technology and mobility within the city organized by the colonial regime.[12] For Belgian authorities, these incidents broke the order of proper urban and racial circulation and prerogatives, all the more that the police, who materialized the face of the colonial state in the streets, seemed unable to manage such incidents. Indeed, accidents and interracial confrontations on Leopoldville's roads exposed the difficulties and contradictions of the 'dirty work of empire' (Bloembergen, 2007) that was colonial policing. Traffic constables were mainly Congolese and, while they were supposed to be civilizing agents of the modern late-colonial state, European drivers were not always willing to take orders from them. At the same time, police priority was to enforce colonial order and to preserve its categories of rule at (almost) any (brutal) cost; that policemen used violence against angry mobs doesn't seem very surprising in these circumstances, even if these behaviors, because they raised further hostility, appeared themselves to be additional sources of danger for colonial authorities (AA, GG, 7008, minute session Comité Urbain Leopoldville, 7 April 1955).

African Voices on Urban Disorders

Urban order and security were first and foremost matters of concern for Congolese people. Studies on colonial policing have demonstrated that in colonial situations, police priorities were always focused on the defense of imperial rule and interests (whether political or economical), far more than on the prevention of criminality among colonized communities (Anderson, Killingray, 1991; Fourchard, 2003; Thomas, 2012). The Belgian Congo was certainly no exception in this regard. Even police services themselves admitted their significant helplessness in controlling (and even just patrolling) some entire districts of Leopoldville. 'At night, the insecurity in the cité is complete'

(AA, FP, 2670, report on the organization and functioning of Leopoldville Territorial Police by the Substitute of the Royal Prosecutor Leopoldville, 9 November 1954) confessed a confidential report. This was also the point of view of the capital's Congolese elites serving at the *Conseil de Cité*, the natives' advisory board set up by the colonial administration at the end of the Second World War (Mutamba, 1998). Their discussions were filled with complaints about urban disorders. In many ways, the objects of their discontent were similar to those of colonial authorities. They called for a stricter control of 'undesirables' and unemployed, highlighting the risk that left without resources, these men 'might become fearsome thieves, murderers' (AA, GG, 19603, J. Assoba, member of the *Conseil de Cité* Leopoldville to TA (Territorial administrator) in charge of African populations Leopoldville, 4 june 1953). They criticized the lack of 'discipline' of young people (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 28 February 1945) and from the 1950s talked explicitly about the problems created by juvenile delinquency.[13] Complaints about other groups were more scarce, but not inexistent: suspicion towards non-Congolese Africans in Leopoldville and worries following specific interracial incidents for instance were debated in the 1940s (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 28 July 1946 and 13 May 1945).

However, Congolese notables were also very critical of the inability (or unwillingness) of Belgian authorities to provide security in their districts, underlining that the flourishing of disorders which plagued the city was to be attributed to the weaknesses of police forces. They regularly decried 'the obvious police shortfall in the natives areas' (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 16 July 1944) and pointed at the scarcity of policemen and police patrols (especially at night). Many of the members of the *Conseil de Cité* were also Urban Districts Chiefs (*Chefs de Quartier*) and insisted they were left completely helpless in case of troubles (fights, scuffles, etc.) in the areas they were supposed to be responsible for. Some of them were experienced in maintenance of order matters and suggested precise strategies often linked to the surveillance of places of nightlife sociability. In 1947, Henri Bongolo, a former sergeant of the *Force Publique* and the first *Chef de Cité* of the capital, recommended a priority reinforcement of police presence at strategic crossroads during weekends (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 15 June 1947).[14] Despite the reassuring (yet patronizing) answers of the colonial administration,[15] notables kept

insisting during meetings that 'it takes too long to call the police, and even longer to get a response and see it arrive on site' (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 16 February 1950), to say nothing of their doubts about the methods of police recruits. Tales of brutality and violence, or suspects attached and dragged by a rope around their neck (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 17 September 1944, 31 January 1945 and 20 July 1947), were voiced (and heard). Speaking on behalf of the city inhabitants, the *Conseil de Cité* also grieved about the little interest paid by police services to African problems: filing a complaint could take several days and queues of Congolese people waiting to be heard in front of police-stations were common (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 16 July and 20 August 1944).

It remains difficult to determine how far these criticisms might have been taken into consideration by the Belgian administration, but there is evidence they were listened to. Compared to other voices on urban disorders, Congolese urban notables established clear causal links between insecurity and police's weaknesses and questioned the meaning and consequence of the unbalanced distribution of police staff assigned to European and African districts (AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 16 July 1944). While they did not convert colonial authorities to ideals of community policing, awareness of the risk implied by Congolese people turning away from colonial institutions to report criminal behaviors and solve their disputes grew among colonial authorities (King's Prosecutor Leopoldville to Governor Province Leopoldville, 15 April 1958). Whether this could mean a potential threat to the state monopole of violence or a source of lost knowledge about colonized people, this was not something Belgians administrators were willing to wager on. In voicing some of the grievances of the *Banalipopo* (the true 'children of Leopoldville') and their own, Congolese elites contributed to postwar dynamics of reform of police institutions.

Reforming the Police

At the end of the Second World War, police reform was not the only matter of debate for Belgian colonial authorities. The whole colonial project was thought to be in need of reform in order to adapt to the

new international context and to socio-economic evolutions in the colony, and ultimately in order to secure its long-term maintenance. Modernization and natives' welfare ('*le bien-être indigène*') were key-words of the official 'developmental colonialism' policies that were promoted (Jewsiewicki, 1976b; Vanthemsche, 1994). In 1945, discussions about the future of maintenance of law and order were prompted by the necessity to adapt to these evolutions and notably to what they meant in terms of urban growth: reports on public order and delinquency in Leopoldville during the war underlined the role played by the urban civil police (its 'vigilance', its 'firmness', and also its 'tactfulness') in the maintenance of security in spite of the population influx and of the war effort's social consequences (AA, *Collection affaires indigènes*/Collection Natives' Affairs [AI], 4736, report on public order in Leopoldville, 2 July 1945). The fact that the last major protest movements of the war had come from urban and industrial centers was also a lesson to learn from.[16]

The immediate aftermath of the war was also marked by heated debates about the future of the *Force Publique* and of its organization. In similar terms to those used just after the First World War (Marechal, 1976; Shaw, 1984), discussions were heated by of the colonial army and more particularly on its dual mission – as a war force in charge of the defense of the country (as '*troupes campées*') and as a repressive force in charge of the maintenance of order within the colonial territory (as '*troupes en service territorial*'). Some, such as the Governor General (and with him a large part of the territorial administration), were in favor of a radical overhaul of this organization and suggested that soldiers should be replaced by policemen reporting directly to the civilian administration (Vanderstraeten, 1992, p. 504). Others, such as the Commander-in-Chief of the *Force Publique*, thought that the existing dual mission (and organization) of the army should only be slightly modified, notably on the ground that the troops assigned to the military defense of the colony were the ultimate guardians of colonial order in case of massive revolts (Vanderstraeten, 1992, pp. 505–506). Here again, the threatening prospect of simultaneous uprisings in the three (and far apart) main industrial regions of the Congo played a role (AA, FP, 2782, Commander-in-Chief *a.i.* FP to GG, 31 January 1945). In 1946, an expert commission was appointed to determine the best solution (AA, FP, 2431, report of the Commission on Reorganization of the Force Publique, May 1946); its members concluded that the *Force Publique* had to leave

combat tasks to a special division managed by the metropolitan army and to focus primarily on its maintenance of law and order missions (and to receive an appropriate and specialized training in order to do so); they also recommended the establishment of an additional civil police force. For budgetary, institutional, and (probably also) political reasons, the external defense part of the plan could never be implemented and the dual mandate of the *Force Publique* remained until Independence. Calls to the reinforcement of civilian policing, by contrast, were more productive, even if the difficulties raised by their implementation are illustrative of the ambiguities at stake in security and policing reforms in a late-colonial context.

The challenges encapsulated in these debates and in the forthcoming creation of the *police territoriale* in 1948 were indeed complex and sometimes contradictory. On the one hand, colonial authorities wished to modernize their maintenance of law and order system and to embrace new visions of civilian, professional, and specialized policing methods to meet the aspirations to a less military, less coercive policing. This new vision of policing was in accordance with postwar perspectives on the remodeling of the Belgian colonial project and with the new attention devoted to the 'common good' of colonial subjects. On the other hand, the weakening of the military forces that were still considered as the main line of defense of colonial interests was a potential threat to the Congo's internal security, especially in an era of decolonization – or at least of growing disobedience. This tension was certainly not unique to the Belgian Congo. As Georgina Sinclair has demonstrated for the British Empire, most of the postwar years' plans to reform, demilitarize, and standardize colonial policing were 'swept away by the practicalities of policing the end of an empire' (Sinclair, 2006, p. 59). However, the Congolese equation was a bit distinctive: those who were in favor of a more civilian policing style were less concerned about the (future) legacy of Belgian imperialism or about 'modern' ideals of policing by consent, than convinced that colonial order would best be guaranteed by a reinforcement of the importance and prerogatives of the civil police (imagined as closer to 'natives', as generating less antagonism and overall as best able to provide colonial authorities with information on Africans' 'state of mind'). That these projects of police reform triggered questions about intelligence gathering in the colony is therefore not surprising.[17]

If we rely on legal texts, the only successful significant reform project of the postwar years was the creation of the *police territoriale* (territorial police) by the enactment of a 1948 law (Bulletin Administratif du Congo Belge, 1949, Ordonnance no. 21/432 of 10 December 1948 concerning the creation of the *corps de police territoriale*, p. 4). It was announced by an official press release which insisted on 'the importance of the role played by these auxiliaries of European authority' (AA, PPA, 3516, CongoPresse press release no. 35, 15 February 1949), but said little about the lack of enthusiasm that seemed to have surrounded the reform. While undoubtedly born of the general willingness to develop civil policing, the organization of the *police territoriale* was planned in very vague terms and based on unclear budget previsions. The legal text provided for the establishment of a police force in the whole colony run by (and depending on) the territorial administration, but was at the same time explicitly designed to replace the *police urbaine* corps[18], indicating that its main intent was urban spaces. It complicated an already complex maintenance of law and order landscape consisting of the *Force Publique* and its *troupes en service territorial* (who were military but accountable, for their civil operations, to administrative authorities), of other types of urban police (such as the '*police des centres extracoutumiers*')[19], of State Security services (the '*Sûreté*') (Vanderwalle, Brassine, 1973; Gijs, 2014), of private companies police forces[20] and of the newly reformed *European Volunteers Corps*[21] – to say nothing of the police role played by 'customary' authorities in rural zones, of the large police prerogatives of colonial administrators, and of the investigations led by the judiciary police. The reform was also far from the demands of local police authorities whose on-the-ground visions of urban order reinforcement prioritized additional staffing, bigger budgets, better training for African recruits (AA, GG, 5521, Chief of the Urban Police Leopoldville to District Commissioner, 12 August 1946) and more specialized units over institutional reforms.[22] Finally, it also took place in a context of ongoing conversations and of (more radical) projects about policing and security challenges that were all swept away by the 1948 *ordonnance* – but not for very long.

Indeed, it became quickly clear that the creation of the territorial police was not going to bring the changes some had been hoping for. It was only (and slowly) implemented in the large-scale cities of the colony and it entailed not much more than a new name for the previous urban police corps. From the early 1950s, concerns about the limited efficiency of the existing policing organization in face of the rise of urban disorders

and anticolonial sentiments sparked off debates and new reform projects. None of them was ever going to be translated into legal texts and implemented, but they attest to the reform dynamics which affected the Belgian colonizing world and to the complexity of the tensions at stake – between the military and the civil, between the metropole and the colony, between competing visions of colonial policing and governance and ultimately between colonizers and colonized (Anderson, Killingray, 1992). That reform projects succeeded or failed does therefore not shape our criteria of exploration here; what they might reveal about colonial modes of governance and bureaucratic (ir)rationalities (Bezes, 2009) in face of new security risks does, all the more that all these 'irrelevant failed proposals, utopian visions and improbable projects' (Stoler, 2002, 101) expose the limits of the colonial consensus about 'Pax Belgica' and its reproduction.

In 1954, colonial authorities were congratulating themselves on the steady increase of the personnel of the territorial police: approximately 4400 Congolese policemen for the whole Congo (led by a handful of white *commissaires*) (Rapport annuel, 1954 and 1955)[23] and a bit more than 800 for Leopoldville only were employed (AA, GG, 7008, minute session Comité Urbain Léopoldville, 15 July 1954). Local rulers did not even hesitate to make comparisons with the metropole, underlining that there were more policemen (and a better *ratio* of official reports per agent) in Leopoldville than in the Belgian town of Liège... but without mentioning than Leopoldville's population was twice more numerous.

In spite of these positive statements, concerns about the organization of order maintenance and urban surveillance were still present at various levels of the administrative hierarchy. In a context of apprehensions linked to the Cold War, to the (violent) acceleration of decolonization in Africa and to 'political subversion' risks (Gijs, 2014), and of military and counterinsurgency plans to foil these threats (Vanderstraeten, 1992), the Colonial Office chose to request the expertize of a colonel of the Belgian *Gendarmerie* who had also served as a Police Commissioner in the Congo during the interwar period.[24] Colonel Charlier had already intervened (more or less) spontaneously in the debates surrounding police reform projects in the 1940s – with little success. His striking views and quite lucid diagnosis on the state of colonial policing were only matched by his hopeless faith in the creation of a Congolese *gendarmerie* as the perfect solution to all maintenance of law and order difficulties in the colony (AA, PPA, 3516, note sur l'organisation de la gendarmerie coloniale by

Colonel of Gendarmerie Charlier, [1947]). A few years later, his opinions had not changed much, but his opponents were less vindictive.[25] His focus on 'everyday' policing (a police 'for the masses' as one of his detractors named it) (AA, PPA, 3516, note by the Military Advisor of the MC, 12 January 1948), his criticism of the rivalry of the different forces in charge of the maintenance of order, of the lack of proper training (and consequently of professionalism) of soldiers and policemen, and of their isolation from African populations because of camp life and of the coercive vision of their work met new interest among the colonial administration. More particularly, the challenges and 'emergency' (AA, FP, 2670, MC to GG, 18 April 1955) of reforming the police of urban centers made his ideas interesting: Charlier was sent to Leopoldville for a study (and feasibility) mission devoted to urban police reforms in July 1955. In spite of the cold reception from local authorities, Charlier was appointed a few months later as 'General Inspector of Territorial Police Forces', a newly created function aiming at the reorganization of the territorial police in urban centers with Leopoldville as a case-control city for what was conceived as a pilot project (AA, FP, 2670, MC to GG, 16 April 1956).

Charlier's actions and proposals raised old questions that were heavily debated[26] but never really answered. Not surprisingly given his missionary ambition in favor of a Congolese *gendarmerie*, he was preoccupied by the imbrications of civilian and military prerogatives in the maintenance of urban order and by the potential advantages of a centralization of security services. Metropolitan as well as colonial authorities had already debated about these questions with surprising references to 'democracy', stating, for instance, that the separation between the *Force Publique* and the *police territoriale* was a guarantee of political balance and stability (AA, FP, 2670, MC to GG, 1 February 1955). 'We do not live under an absolutist regime, and Belgium is not a Republic of Central America' mentioned a report (AA, FP, 2670, report of the Leopoldville Commission on FP and PT questions, s.d.) – even if confidential instructions to policemen kept repeating that 'it must never be forgotten that we are here dealing not with a foreign enemy, but with nationals […]' (AA, GG, 18096, directive no. 1 sur la tactique de la Police Territoriale agissant pour le maintien de l'ordre, [1957], p. 30). Proper training and professionalization were also important issues: professional schools were only set up in the 1950s and in the middle of the decade, some police detachments in Leopoldville still included up to 80% of illiterate policemen (AA, FP,

2670, Colonel of Gendarmerie Charlier to MC, [1955]). Most of them were barely able to fulfill bureaucratic tasks and legal duties, to the great dissatisfaction of judicial authorities and of Congolese policemen themselves (AA, FP, 2670, report on the organization and functioning of Leopoldville Territorial Police by the Substitute of the Royal Prosecutor Leopoldville, 9 November 1954 and anonymous ['Votre Ba Police Yayo'] to GG, 20 July 1953). Most importantly, the question of the adaptation of police forces to their new urban priorities was also a source of concern. The priority importance of urban dangers was now acknowledged by all actors of the Belgian-Congolese maintenance of order. Even the old *Force Publique*, whose repressive emergency strategies had, until then, mainly been designed for rural uprisings, was paying increasing attention to techniques of control of 'urban crowds' (AA, FP, 2670, MC to GG, December 1954).[27] Nevertheless, the way in which this urban threat should be managed (and the modernization of urban security forces put into practice) remained a polarizing issue. While some thought that a more systematic involvement of military troops was desirable,[28] others felt that modernization projects would be best served by police civilianization and specialization.

A specific kind of policing embodied these last ambitions in a striking manner: the traffic police. Significantly, it was the only police force to be regularly featured visually in colonial propaganda and official publications.[29] Images of smart policemen, buttoned up tight in their flawless uniforms, standing in the middle of the busy streets of Leopoldville and orchestrating the ballet of cars in a modern American-like urban and architectural landscape (Lagae, 2007) were indeed quite powerful. They told the story of a police force that was able to domesticate technology, modernity, and urban space. For colonial authorities, this was never a strictly technological issue. As in other contexts, traffic police was as much 'a police on the road than a police of the road' (Hamelin, Spenlehauer, 2006; Bloembergen, 2007). It was especially the case from the mid-1950s, when road accidents involved, as discussed earlier, brawls and incidents, even if the modernization of traffic regulation forces had been a preoccupation since the beginning of the postwar era. In the capital, a special division of police had been appointed to the management of traffic during the Second World War (AA, AI, 4736, report on public order in Leopoldville, 2 July 1945), but the fast growing number of automobile users in the second-half of the 1940s, combined with new urban order requirements, meant that repeated calls for the reinforcement

and the professionalization of traffic regulation were soon made (AA, GG, 5521, District Commissioner Leopoldville to Chief of Urban Police, [1946]). Traffic constables had to be organized in a specialized squad and appropriately trained so that they could develop the technical and intellectual skills required for this civilizing task. They had to be well equipped and their visibility on the streets made questions of uniforms and bodily prestige important issues.[30] Their work should reflect the new civilianized and preventive principles of the police (AA, GG, 7008, minute session Comité Urbain Léopoldville, 2 February 1956), in short (and as in quite different contexts) an order 'based on urban flows' management and no more on a logic of confrontation' (Deluermoz, 2009, p. 21).

According to these points of view, the *Force Publique* and its military methods could obviously not be the solution to urban order difficulties and should only be used in last resort (AA, FP, 2670, note unsigned, [1955/1956]). Soldiers were not sufficiently trained for daily operations of urban order and their (sometimes violent) *faux-pas* towards African urban residents might generate additional trouble ('Ma Mukande. Service d'ordre...', *L'Avenir Colonial*, 14 May 1955). Even their plans of intervention in case of riots were questioned. In a prophetic note, Charlier summed up his doubts: 'The *Force Publique* pretends to be able to maintain order anywhere and anytime. I don't share this opinion. The FP has known rebellions and will know some again [...]. There must also be an agreement on the ways in which order should be maintained: if it just means using guns, machines and canons to end disorders, ok. But who will benefit from the corpses?' (AA, FP, 2670, report of General Inspector of Territorial Police Forces, [1958])

Again, the absence of ties between policemen and local populations and the disinterest of police services for their preventive and crime-fighting missions in African districts was pointed out. Magistrates were especially alarmist about this. In Leopoldville, they kept underlining the 'extreme danger' of the 'lack of trust in the protection and efficiency of the police' (AA, FP, 2670, King's Prosecutor Leopoldville to Governor Province Leopoldville, 15 April 1958) and the consequent proliferation of rumors and of 'psychosis of fear' among Congolese people: ' They will end up believing we are unable to protect them' warned one of these legal professionals, adding that 'police officers [...] should give up the idea that a good police is necessarily an attack police' (AA, FP, 2670, report on the organization and functioning of Leopoldville Territorial Police by the Substitute of the Royal Prosecutor Leopoldville, 9 November 1954,

pp. 11–13). That some authorities thought that civil policemen were better equipped for riots' repression than soldiers because of their experience of hateful crowds is edifying (AA, FP, 2670, report of General Inspector of Territorial Police Forces, [1958]).

Conclusion

'We have reached a stage at which we cannot allow any incident to get out of hand': This warning, based on the evidence of the limits of police ability to control urban crowds (even 'female' ones) (AA, FP, 2670, note by the Military Advisor of the MC, 7 December 1957) in Leopoldville and calling for an umpteenth reform of police services in the urban centers of the colony was never really answered. Despite the consensus among colonial authorities on the importance of the threat of urban disorders in a context of escalating anticolonial tensions, no final decision could be made with regard to police reform until the very eve of Congolese Independence, in June 1960. Admittedly, urban civil police troops were constantly reinforced: there were more than 7000 Congolese policemen working for the *Police Territoriale* in the entire colony, and twice more policemen on the streets of Leopoldville than a few years before. Nevertheless, this increase in police staff did not mean that more policemen were allocated to streets of African districts (AA, FP, 2670, Inspector General of Territorial Police Services to GG, 19 February 1958), neither that the *Force Publique* had lost its urban interventions' prerogatives. In Kinshasa, the colonial army was regularly called to intervene as part of raids aiming at 'undesirables', of traffic control operations, of special street patrols or of large transfers of prisoners. Institutionally, these interventions were formalized in 1959 with the official creation of a *Gendarmerie coloniale* – a very late reform which, once again, did not significantly modify the landscape of police organization. The *Gendarmerie* was indeed merely a new label for the old *troupes en service territorial* of the *Force Publique* and had little to do with the renewal ambitions of a Charlier, for instance.

This reform was implemented a few weeks after the January 1959 riots in Leopoldville. As turning-points in the history of colonial Congo, these riots led Belgian authorities to finally acknowledge that 'their' Congo was well engaged on the path to decolonization. Their disastrous and bloody handling brought light on the work of both the police and the *Force Publique* and on its limits. They also exposed the (urban) security

reflex of colonial authorities. As the report of the Belgian parliamentary commission in charge of investigating the hows and whys of the riots underlined the role played by the 'urban plague' – irregulars, unemployed, and troubled youths – and by racial discrimination and tensions, the colonial administration and its police services resorted to their old strategies (AA, GG, 17672): large scale operations of 'clean-up' of 'undesirables' and of alleged juvenile delinquents, massive repatriations, criticisms against 'poor whites' (accused to feed anti-white hostility with their alleged racist attitudes) and a minor legal brush of some of the most racially discriminating regulations – which did not bring any significant change for urban inhabitants.

But the 1959 uprising also exposed the repressive underside of the 'Pax Belgica' that has long been denounced by Congolese men and women – whether elites sitting at the *Conseil de Cité* or more ordinary people – who voiced stories of 'undesirables' expulsions, of batons beatings, of suspects dragged by the neck, of crimes and thefts unpunished and of unfair repatriation in petition letters, in popular songs and even at football matches: '*Commissaires* from Europe, policemen of the Whites, go back home' sang the crowd in Kinshasa's stadium in 1957 (Salmon, 1992, p. 366). Because they challenged the definition of urban order colonial authorities and their police agents sought to implement in the 'model-colony', all contributed to postwar dynamics of (missed) reform of police institutions. As much as, if not more than the repression of spectacular protests (whether political demonstrations, violent insurrections or workers' strikes), the troubles that were part of the daily work of the police (whether road accidents, night patrols, or search for 'irregulars' city dwellers) and the anxieties they aroused offer fascinating entry-points into the tensions within urban society, colonial 'order of things' in the Belgian Congo and, overall, the 'impossible control of the colonial city' (House, 2012).

Notes

1 Translated from Lingala (all translations are from French unless stated otherwise).
2 The military garrison of Luluabourg mutinied in February 1944. Despite its scale and violence, the mutiny was described the following year in official public reports as an 'incident' and as 'too specific' to be considered as really significant (Rapport annuel, 1945).

3   Archival records show that anonymous letters were a common way of communicating with the colonial bureaucracy in the Belgian Congo (Bolamba, 1948). On anonymity in colonial Africa, see Newell, 2013. On policemen claims and agency in colonial Africa, Stapelton, 2011, Glasman, 2014.

4   In this case, tests made by the scientific police proved successful as they were able to trace the letter back to a specific police station (and then typing machine) of Leopoldville.

5   Preliminary research results tend to show that, at least until the mid-1950s, the main grounds for dismissal for Congolese policemen was indiscipline and lack of 'trustworthiness'. See AA, GG, 19574 and AA, GG, 18281 for the urban police of Kinshasa.

6   Words like 'gangsterism' and tales of the lynching of cars and attacks on policemen were not uncommon in the (mainly white) colonial press published in Leopoldville in the 1950s. See for instance *Le Courrier d'Afrique* (9 December 1954) and *L'Avenir* (26 June 1957 and 13 February 1958).

7   For the Katanga region, see the overview and analysis of Rubbers, Poncelet, 2015.

8   See, for instance, the analysis of J. Van Wing (1951) which stated that outbursts of urban violence against colonials were not to be interpreted as a symptom of 'anti-white racism' but as the product of persistent European racist attitudes towards African people.

9   (Interracial) sports' competitions also offer interesting case-studies in this regard (yet to be explored in full details) (Salmon, 1992).

10 According to the words of the report by the *Force Publique* following its intervention after a Congolese had been run over by a motorcycle ridden by a European woman (April 1955). AA, Collection Force Publique [FP], 2451. For other examples, see in the same file, report of the 1st-class Adjudant in charge of cartage control, 9 April 1955 and instructions of the Commander-in-chief of the Force Publique to all Commanders, 8 April 1955, as well as several reports in AA, GG, 7008. There is also evidence of a road accidents' crisis in 1955 in the Katanga region (Rapport annuel, 1955).

11 Some drivers were apparently 'lynched' and some reports spoke of 'barbarian acts' but it is still difficult to determine what this meant exactly. See for instance AA, FP, 2670, report on the organization and functioning of Leopoldville Territorial Police by the Substitute of the Royal Prosecutor Leopoldville, 9 November 1954 and Rapport annuel, 1957.

12 Similarly, traffic accidents also exposed social tensions in 20th century urban Europe (Luckin, 1997; Deluermoz, 2009).

13 This topic also surfaced in *La Voix du Congolais*, the official periodical of Congolese *Evolués* created in 1945, as Ngongo has shown (Ngongo, 2012, 30–34). See for instance Bolamba, 1953 and 1956.

14   On H. Bongolo, see Mutamba, 1998.

15   'The council member knows strictly nothing about the organization of police services in the *cité*' replied for instance in 1946 a pissed-of Police Chief Commissioner. AA, GG, 17603, minute session Conseil de Cité Leopoldville, 15 December 1946.

16   'We should now be prepared to face an increase of more frequent, more violent, and overall more generalized troubles than in the past' warned the military authorities while reminding the colonial government of the recent urban uprisings in the Lower Congo region. Annual Report of the Force Publique 1946 quoted in Vanderstraeten, 1992, 503–504. This context was of course not unique to the Belgian Congo, see Cooper, 1996.

17   In general, the theme of the growing 'distant relationship between white and black people' was a leitmotiv of postwar security concerns – and reports. AA, PPA, 3516, note from the Director of the Natives Affairs Section to MC, 23 February 1946.

18   The text stated that the ordonnance on the *police territoriale* cancels and replaces the previous measures on the urban police forces of March 1927 (Bulletin Administratif du Congo Belge, 1949, p. 4).

19   Created by the ordonnance of 2 February 1934 and reformed in 1954 (Piron, Devos, 1954, p. 367).

20   The legal dispositions on private police forces were mainly designed for mining zones (Piron, Devos, 1954, p. 1455) but in Kinshasa for instance, both the Sabena – the National Airline Company – and the Otraco – the Office of Colonial Transports – had their own private security forces in the 1950s. There were also non-official groups acting outside legal authority such as, at the very end of the colonial period, private militia organized by Congolese political groups (AA, FP, 2456).

21   The *Corps de Volontaires Européens* were created during the interwar period as a European, white force of defense for Europeans (Lauro, 2011). They were reactivated after the Second World War by the ordonnance of 1st April 1948 (Bulletin Administratif du Congo Belge, 1948, p. 1325) to ensure the protection of Europeans in case of (urban) riots or revolts, AA, PPA, 3516.

22   Such as in the case of the port city of Matadi, considered as an entrance door for subversive individuals, ideas and equipment's. Even the State Security agreed with the urban police on this point: 'This is a security question threatening the whole colony' stated the General Administrator of the State Security. AA, GG, 18957, General Administrator of the State Security to GG, 22 August 1947.

23   In 1955, there were 123 white officers for the whole colony (and for 5591 African policemen).

24   Henri Charlier (1908–1959). (Bulletin du CRAOCA, 1997–1998).

25   His 1947 radical proposals had indeed encountered general opposition from the *Force Publique* leaders as well as from the police and administration services. Institutional and budgetary obstacles were invoked but the competition that a gendarmerie would have represented should not be neglected. See AA, PPA, 3516 and AA, FP, 2670.

26   Including in the colonial press. See for instance 'La police territoriale' (*L'Avenir*, 31 December 1955), 'La réorganisation de la police territoriale congolaise' (*L'Avenir*, 25 January 1956), 'La police à Léopoldville: un effort qui doit être poursuivi' (*L'Avenir*, 29 November 1956), 'Police ou gendarmerie?' (*Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 9 March 1957) and 'Réorganisation de la police' *(Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 9 May 1958).

27   See also the last editions of the confidential booklets 'Instructions pour les Officiers et Sous-officiers appelés à participer aux mesures contre les collectivités indigènes pour le maintien de l'Ordre Public' and 'Maintien et Rétablissement de l'ordre public au Congo Belge' in AA, GG, 18096 and AA, FP, 2456.

28   See the exchange of views in AA, FP, 2451 and a positive account in 'La FP gardienne de l'ordre public' (*Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 27 April 1955).

29   See for instance the Inforcongo pictures (Whyms, 1956) and on the cover page of *La Revue Congolaise Illustrée* (sept. 1956) (Cornet, Gillet, 2010, p. 68).

30   See for instance the criticisms of the 'Mission Charlier' report summarized for MC, November 1955. AA, FP, 2670.

Bibliography

(1945–1959) *Rapport annuel sur l'administration du Congo Belge présenté aux Chambres législatives* (Bruxelles).

(1998) 'Dossiers du CROCA. Les carnets du Colonel de Gendarmerie Charlier', *Bulletin Trimestriel du Cercle Royal des Anciens Officiers des Campagnes d'Afriques*.

D. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds.) (1991) *Policing the Empire. Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

D. Anderson, D. and D. Killingray (eds.) (1992) *Policing and Decolonisation. Politics, Nationalism and the Police 1917–1965* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

D. Anderson and R. Rathbone (eds.) (2000) *Africa's Urban Past* (Portsmouth NH: Heinemann).

L. Baeck (1956) 'Léopoldville, phénomène urbain africain', *Zaïre: revue congolaise*, Vol. 10, No. 6, 613–636.

J-P. Bat, N. Courtin (eds.) (2012) *Maintenir l'ordre colonial. Afrique et Madagascar, XIXe–XXe siècles* (Rennes: PUR).

G. Baumer (1939) *Les centres indigènes extra-coutumiers au Congo Belge* (Paris: Loviton & Cie).

L. Beeckmans and J. Lagae (2015) 'Kinshasa's syndrome-planning in historical perspective: from Belgian colonial capital to self-constructed megalopolis', in C. Nunes Silva (ed.) *Urban planning in Sub-Saharan Africa : colonial and post-colonial planning cultures* (New York: Routledge, 201–224).

P. Bezes (2009) *Réinventer l'État. Les réformes de l'administration française (1962–2008)* (Paris: PUF).

E. Blanchard (ed.) (2011) *Métiers de police en situation coloniale*, Special Issue of *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/ Crime, History & Societies*, Vol. 15, No. 2.

M. Bloembergen (2007) 'The Dirty Work of Empire: Modern Policing and Public Order in Surabaya, 1911–1919', *Indonesia*, Vol. 83, 119–150.

A. Bolamba (1948) 'Lettres anonymes et faux rapports', *Nsango Ya Bisu – Journal bi-mensuel de la Force Publique*, Vol. 52.

A. Bolamba (1953) 'La protection des enfants mineurs', *La Voix du Congolais*, Vol. 84.

A. Bolamba (1956) 'La Jeunesse des Villes', *La Voix du Congolais*, Vol. 120.

P. Bouvier (1965) *L'accession du Congo Belge à l'Indépendance* (Bruxelles: Institut de Sociologie).

B. Brunet-Laruche (2012) 'Discipliner les villes coloniales: la police et l'ordre urbain au Dahomey pendant l'entre-deux-guerres', *Criminocorpus*, http://criminocorpus.revues.org/1678, consulted on 15 July 2015.

G.T. Burgess and A. Burton (2010) 'Introduction' in A. Burton and H. Charton-Birgot (eds.) *Generations Past. Youth in East African History* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1–24).

A. Burton (2004) '*Jamii ya wahalifu*. The growth of crime in a colonial African urban centre: Dar Es Salaam, Tanganyika, 1919–1961', *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/ Crime, History & Societies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 85–115.

A. Burton (2005) *African Underclass: Urbanization, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar Es Salaam, 1919–61* (Oxford: James Currey).

A. Burton and P. Ocobock (2008) 'The Traveling Native: Vagrancy and Colonial Control in British East Africa' in A.L. Beier and P. Ocobock (eds.) *Cast Out: Vagrancy and Homelessness in Global and Historical Perspective* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 270–301).

E. Capelle (1947) *La cité indigène de Léopoldville* (Kinshasa: Centre d'Etudes Sociales Africaines).

P. Charles (1937) 'Le problème des centres extracoutumiers et quelques-uns de ses aspects', in *Institut Colonial International. Compte-rendu de la XXIIIème session tenue à Londres les 5, 6, 7 et 8 octobre 1936* (Bruxelles, s.n.).

Collective (1992) *Recueil d'études Congo 1955–1960* (Bruxelles: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer).

Collective (2010) *Lisolo na Bisu, 1885–1960. Le soldat congolais de la Force Publique (Bruxelles: MRAHM).*

S. Comhaire-Sylvain (1950) *Food and Leisure among the African Youth of Léopoldville (Belgian Congo)* (Cape Town: School of African Studies).

F. Cooper (ed.) (1983) *Struggle for the City: Migrant Labor, Capital, and the State in Urban Africa* (Beverly Hills: Sage).

F. Cooper (1996) *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (*Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).

C. Coquery-Vidrovitch (2006) 'De la ville en Afrique noire', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences sociales*, Vol. 61, No. 5, 1087–1119.

A. Cornet et F. Gillet (2010) *Congo-Belgique, 1955–1965. Entre propagande et réalité* (Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre).

L. Davreux et al. (1957) *Le chômage au Congo Belge: rapport d'enquête* (Bruxelles: CEMUBAC).

M. Debos, J. Glasman (eds.) (2012) *Corps habillés. Politique des corps habillés, Special Issue of Politique Africaine*, Vol. 128.

Q. Deluermoz (2009) 'Rouler à la baguette ? Les agents du service des voitures et la difficile codification des circulations à Paris (1892–1914)', *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/ Crime, History & Societies,* Vol. 14, No. 1, 5–27.

J. Denis (1956) 'Léopoldville. Étude de géographie urbaine et sociale', *Zaïre*, Vol. 6, 563–611.

J. Denis (1958) *Le phénomène urbain en Afrique centrale* (Bruxelles: IRSAC).

M. Etambala (2008) *De teloorgang van een modelkolonie: Belgisch-Congo (1958–1960)* (Leuven: Acco).

D. Forde (1956) *Social Implication of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara* (Paris: UNESCO).

L. Fourchard, I.O. Albert (eds.) (2003) *Sécurité, crime et ségrégation dans les villes d'Afrique de l'Ouest du 19ème siècle à nos jours/Security, Crime and Segregation in West African Cities since the 19th century* (Paris: Karthala).

L. Fourchard (2006) 'Lagos and the invention of juvenile delinquency in Nigeria 1920–1960', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 115–137.

J-B. Gewald, S. Lunin and K. Van Walvaren (eds.) (2009) *The Speed of Change. Motor Vehicles and People in Africa, 1890–2000* (Leiden: Brill).

A-S. Gijs (2015) *Le pouvoir de l'absent : les avatars de l'anticommunisme au Congo (1920–1961)* (UCL: PhD in History).

J. Glasman (2014) 'Unruly Agents: Police Reform, Bureaucratization and Policemen's Agency in Interwar Togo', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 55, No. 1, 79–100.

O. Goerg (2003) 'De la ségrégation coloniale à la tentation sécessionniste: l'urbanisme sécuritaire' in L. Fourchard and I.O. Albert (eds.) *Sécurité, crime et ségrégation dans les villes d'Afrique de l'Ouest du 19ème siècle à nos jours* (Paris: Karthala, 245–261).

C.D. Gondola (1997) *Villes miroirs. Migrations et identités urbaines à Kinshasa et Brazzaville 1930–1970* (Paris: L'harmattan).

C.D. Gondola (2009) 'Tropical Cow Boys: Western, Violence and Masculinity among the Young Bills of Kinshasa', *Afrique et Histoire*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 75–98.

C.D. Gondola (2013) 'Le culte du cow-boy et les figures du masculin à Kinshasa dans les années 1950', *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, Vol. 209/210, No. 1, 173–199.

F. Grevisse (1951) *Le Centre Extra-Coutumier d'Élisabethville* (Bruxelles: Institut Royal Colonial Belge).

L. Guebels (ed.) (1991), *Relation complète des travaux de la Commission permanente pour la protection des indigènes au Congo belge (1911–1951)* (Gembloux: Duculot).

F. Hamelin, V. Spenlehauer (2006) 'Road Policing as a state tool. What tells the genesis of the California Highway Patrol', *Policing and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 261–284.

J. Higginson (1989) *A working class in the making. Belgian colonial labor policy, private enterprise, and the African mineworker, 1907–1951* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).

D. L. Hodgson and S. McCurdy (eds.) (2001) *'Wicked' Women and the Reconfiguration of Gender in Africa*, (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann).

J. House (2012) 'L'impossible contrôle d'une ville coloniale? Casablanca, décembre 1952', *Genèses*, Vol. 86, No. 1, 78–103.

E. Jacobs et al. (eds.) (1994) *Défense et maintien de l'ordre en Afrique centrale à l'époque contemporaine de la colonisation belge (1908–1962). Actes du colloque international du 17 octobre 1992* (Bruxelles: MRAHM).

B. Jewsiewicki (1976a) 'La contestation sociale et la naissance du prolétariat au Zaïre au cours de la première moitié du XXe siècle', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 47–70.

B. Jewsiewicki (1976b) 'L'expérience d'un état-providence en Afrique noire', *Réflexions historiques*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 79–103.

L. Keunings, B. Majerus and X. Rousseaux (2004) 'L'évolution de l'appareil policier en Belgique (1830–2002)', in D. Heirbaut, X. Rousseaux, K. Velle (eds.) *Politieke en sociale geschiedenis in België (van 1830 tot heden). Histoire politique et sociale de la justice en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours*, (Brugge: Die Keure, 271–317).

D. Killingray (1999) *Guardians of Empire. The Armed Forces of the Colonial Power 1700–1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

J. Lagae (2007) 'Léopoldville: Bruxelles. Villes miroirs? L'architecture et l'urbanisme d'une capitale coloniale', *Cahiers Africains*, Vol. 73, 67–99.

F. Locatelli (1997) 'Oziosi, Vagabondi E Pregiudicati: Labor, Law, and Crime in Colonial Asmara, 1890–1941', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 225–250.

A. Lauro (2011) 'Maintenir l'ordre dans la *colonie-modèle*. Notes sur les désordres urbains et la police des frontières raciales au Congo Belge', *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés/ Crime, History & Societies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 97–121.

B. Luckin (1997) 'War on the Roads: Traffic Accidents and Social Tension in Britain, 1939–1945' in R. Cooter and B. Luckin (eds.) *Accidents in History: Injuries, Fatalities and Social Relations* (Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 234–254).

A. Lux (1959) 'Les avantages économiques du parasitisme dans les villes africaines', *Folia scientifica Africae centralis*, Vol. 3, 49–53.

P. Marechal (1976) 'Philippe Molitor en de verdediging van Belgisch-Congo (1912–1920)', *Africa-Tervuren*, Vol. 22, No. 2/4, 68–93.

P. Monaville (2014) 'Histoires politiques congolaises. Esquisse d'une réflexion sur la chronologie', in P. Van Schuylenbergh, C. Lanneau and M. Dumoulin (eds.) *L'Afrique Belge aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Nouvelles recherches et perspectives en histoire coloniale* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 73–87).

J-M. Mutamba Makombo (1998) *Du Congo belge au Congo indépendant, 1940–1960. Émergence des évolués et genèse du nationalisme* (Kinshasa: Institut de Formation et d'Etudes Politiques).

S. Newell (2013) *The Power to Name. A History of Anonymity in Colonial West Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press).

E. Ngongo (2012) *La délinquance juvénile au Congo Belge (1908–1960) : construction du problème et réponses judiciaires des autorités coloniales. Autour du décret du 6 décembre 1950 sur l'Enfance délinquante* (UCL : MA Thesis in history).

E. Ngongo (2015) 'Un danger pour les honnêtes gens. Les politiques de répression de l'enfance délinquante au Congo belge 1920–1960', *Revue d'histoire de l'enfance irrégulière*, Vol. 17, 193–215.

M. Pain (1983) *Kinshasa, la ville et la cité* (Paris: Editions de l'ORSTOM).

P. Piron, J. Devos (1954) *Codes et lois du Congo Belge* (Bruxelles: Larcier).

P. Raymaeckers (1960) *Matériaux pour une étude sociologique de la jeunesse africaine du milieu extra-coutumier de Léopoldville* (Kinshasa: IRES).

B. Rubbers, M. Poncelet (2015) 'Sociologie coloniale au Congo belge. Les études sur le Katanga industriel et urbain à la veille de l'indépendance', *Genèses*, Vol. 99, No. 2, 93–112.

P. Ryckmans (1934) *La politique coloniale* (Bruxelles: Éditions Rex).

S. Salm and T. Falola (eds.) (2005) *African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press).

P. Salmon (1992) 'Un prélude à janvier 1959?' in *Recueil d'études Congo 1955–1960* (Bruxelles: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer), pp. 359–370.

B. Shaw (1984) *Force Publique, Force Unique: The Military in the Belgian Congo 1914–1939* (University of Wisconsin: Ph.D).

G. Sinclair (2006) *At the End of the Line. Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame (1940–1980)* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

M. Stanard (2014) 'Belgium, the Congo, and Imperial Immobility: A Singular Empire and the Historiography of the Single Analytic Field', *French Colonial History*, Vol. 15, 87–110.

T. Stapleton (2011) *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923–80 (*Rochester: University of Rochester Press).

A.L. Stoler (2002) 'Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance', *Archival Science*, Vol. 2, 87–109.

A.L. Stoler (2009) *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

M. Thomas (2007) *Empires of Intelligence. Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

M. Thomas (2012) *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

F. Vanderstraeten (1985) *De la Force Publique à l'Armée Nationale Congolaise. Histoire d'une mutinerie, juillet 1960* (Gembloux: Duculot).

F. Vanderstraeten (1992) 'La Force Publique et le maintien de la Pax Belgica 1944-janvier 1959', in *Recueil d'études Congo 1955–1960* (Bruxelles: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, 495–524).

J. Vanhove (1943) *Regards sur notre Congo* (Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre).

G. Vanthemsche (1994) *Genèse et portée du 'Plan Décennal' du Congo Belge (1949–1959)* (Bruxelles: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer).

G. Vanthemsche (2007) *La Belgique et le Congo. Empreintes d'une colonie 1885–1980* (Bruxelles: Complexe).

J-L. Vellut (1987) 'Résistance et espaces de liberté dans l'histoire coloniale du Zaïre: avant la marche à l'Indépendance, ca 1876–1945, in C. Coquery-Vidrovitch et al. (eds.) *Rébellions-Révolutions au Zaïre 1963–1965* (Paris: L'harmattan, 24–73).

R. Vercammen and V. Vanruyssevelt (2015) 'Het 'probleem' van landloperij en bedelarij in België (1890–1910)', *Journal of Belgian History*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 120–161.

R. Waller (2006) 'Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 77–92.

L. White 'Cars out of place: vampires, technology and labor in East and Central Africa', in F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler (eds.) *Tensions of Empire: Colonial culture in a bourgeois world* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 27–50).

A. Vanderwalle and J. Brassine (1973) *Les rapports secrets de la Sûreté congolaise 1959–1960* (Bruxelles: Editions Arts et Voyages).

J. Van Wing (1951) 'Le Congo déraille', *Bulletin de l'Institut Royal Colonial Belge*, Vol. 22, 609–626.

Whyms (1956) *Léopoldville. Son histoire 1881–1956* (Bruxelles: Office de Publicité).

J. Willis (1991) 'Thieves, drunkards and vagrants: defining crime in colonial Mombasa, 1902–1932' in D. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds.) (1991) *Policing the Empire. Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 219–235.

C. Young (1965) *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

5

The Dutch Police and the Explosion of Violence in the Early 1980s

Guus Meershoek

Abstract: *The first half of the 1980s is by far the most violent period in Dutch post-war history. Demonstrations against the eviction of squatters from occupied buildings and against nuclear power plants invariably culminated in battles with the police. This chapter argues that the explosion of violence and its containment can best be understood as the effect of the non-simultaneous carry-over of the cultural changes that started in the late sixties. The new outlook and the new manners started to penetrate the police much later than elsewhere, right at the moment a backlash occurred in politics and society. That belated penetration would enable the police to successfully contain the violence.*

The first half of the 1980s is by far the most violent period in Dutch post-war history (Duyvendak, 1992). Demonstrations opposing the eviction of squatters from occupied buildings and against nuclear power plants invariably culminated in battles with the police. On 30 April 1980, the day Queen Beatrix was inaugurated, Amsterdam turned into a battle-field: all over the city, protesting youth clashed with the riot police over and over again. Using brute force in February 1981, the largest ever police force in Dutch history evicted squatters and thousands of their support-ers from a small area in the Nijmegen city centre that was destined to become a parking lot. All involved, especially the demonstrators and the police personnel, were deeply impressed. After the clashes, official evalu-ation studies were produced and members of the protest movements presented their point of view in books and movies (Wietsma, Vonk, Van der Burght, 1982; Commissie Heijder, 1987).

Thirty years later, relevant archives were opened and historians started to focus their attention on this period. It now becomes possible to put the events in a broader context and to assess them from a broader perspec-tive. Below, I will argue that the explosion of violence and its containment can best be understood as the effect of the non-simultaneous carry-over of the cultural changes that started in the late sixties. The new outlook and the new manners started to penetrate the police much later than elsewhere, right at the moment a backlash occurred in politics and soci-ety. That belated penetration would decisively influence the settlement of the clashes. The manners which had empowered rebellious youth in the first half of the 1970s enabled the police a decade later to successfully handle the disintegrating youth movement and to contain the violence relatively smoothly.

New challenges, old police strategies

In the early 1960s, while the standard of living rose rapidly, Dutch soci-ety came alive. Disturbances no longer only led to irritation and a quick restoration of public order, but also to positive appraisal, imitation, and social change. Through music and movies, often of American origin, a new generation of young people discovered, a fresh youth culture, withdrew from paternalistic family relations and religiously segregated organizations and began to propagate passionately new, post-materialist values. In 1965 and 1966, this youth came into sharp conflict with the

police several times. For example, the wedding of Princess Beatrix in Amsterdam was severely disrupted; in June, 1966, Amsterdam was the scene of major riots. The authorities charged that the police leadership and moved the beacons quickly (Kennedy, 1995). Some traditional politicians even fraternized with rebellious youngsters.

One should understand 'the signs of the times', it is called in Dutch governmental circles, and the government eagerly wanted to show that they did. Public finances enabled them to meet the new desires. Increasing the well-being of the population became the main political objective. This still had to be reached by planning, as was practice since the war, but room was made for public participation in policy making. This way the government strived to meet the demands for participation in society, while hoping to contain the unrest. Nevertheless, there were many social conflicts like demonstrations and occupations. Often, the activists won. When that was not the case, as in the evacuation of the psychiatric institution, *Dennendal,* and the construction of a subway line through the Amsterdam *Nieuwmarktbuurt*, it created upheaval. The demise of the religiously compartmentalized society and the social and economic globalization, however, seemed unstoppable (Hellema, Wielinga, Wilp, 2012).

The confrontation with the protesting youth left the police disconcerted. At leading positions were officers who had embraced some years before an Anglo-Saxon professional *ethos* that focused on law enforcement, put criminal investigation and traffic policing centre stage and expected much from car patrolling and computer. They were innovative but had a blind spot for public order policing. The latter was still based on experiences from the 1930s and the German occupation (Proot, 1965). This explained the rigid reaction to the protesting youngsters. The failure of their Amsterdam colleagues was a painful surprise for them. The immediate dismissal of the Amsterdam Chief of police and the nomination of a commission of investigation, fully consisting of outsiders, were perceived as attacks on their professional dignity. The prominent innovator and Nijmegen chief of police, Frans Perrick, thought the activism of young people undermined public authority, and signaled an increase in crime. He feared a politicization of police management. In his opinion, the only way out for the police would be a return to a neutral, independent position (Perrick, 1971). The new social-democrat Amsterdam mayor and former Minister of Justice, Ivo Samkalden, shared his conviction and put his police force under

tight central leadership. Only The Hague's chief of police, Kees Peijster, and his Groningen colleague, Karel Heijink, considered the clashes a wakeup call for the police making them ready to reform their forces. For example, Peijster started to enrol large numbers of women in his force (Meershoek, 2012).

In 1977, both developments reached a turning point. During the previous four years, the Netherlands were ruled by a progressive government that met many left wing expectations but gradually started to disappoint its grassroots supporters. The government declared to strive for a fair distribution of power, knowledge, and income but turned out to be powerless against the economic crisis. It had put an end to a radical experiment in the already mentioned psychiatric hospital and its Minister of Justice stubbornly refused women the right to abortion. In 1977, the leftwing parties won the elections, but were unable to form a coalition government. A right wing government of Christian-democrats and Liberals was installed. The change of government coincided with a change in public opinion. Rising unemployment aroused pessimism and the news about the development of a so-called neutron bomb awakened fears of a revival of the Cold War. Among young people, the punk movement came into fashion, propagating 'no future' and preaching self-reliance.

Increase or reform the police? Facing the crisis

Thus, in 1977, the optimistic, reformist culture of the 1960s came to an end in politics and society. It then only began within the police. The starting point was the report, *Politie in Verandering* (The Changing Police), released shortly before the elections (Heijink, 1977). Three years earlier, the Minister of the Interior had asked the police leadership to calculate how much the police had to be expanded in order to perform its tasks properly. The main chiefs of police had selected their best young officers for the job, but these had given their own twist to the honourable task. According to the report, the police didn't need more personnel but had to decentralize their organization. The police had to join the rapidly changing society, exchange the rigid internal hierarchy for smooth, functional relationships, and create small teams in all police districts. The existing strength of the police would then suffice. The minister was not amused. But the police, who were daily confronted with the rigid hierarchical

relationships, embraced this call for change. Some officers succeeded to start small experiments in their own force, others started to study sociology or law in their spare time, and a few became members of a political party (Meershoek, 2007).

The 1970s was a quiet decade, compared with the turbulent second half of the 1960s. There were riots in The Hague, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam but these were limited in time and scope. Much attention was given to the kidnapping of the French ambassador by Japanese terrorists and the train hijackings and hostage taking by young Moluccan militants.[1] These were radical actions, unprecedented for The Netherlands, and they incited the government to create some small antiterrorist units. However, their impact on the police organization was small. Many police officers served in riot squads on these occasions, but these units only guarded the surroundings. That was not considered useful police work. Afterwards, in governmental circles, they even seriously considered relieving the police of that task, transfering it to the military, and dissolving the riot squads.

Quite unexpectedly, things changed in 1980. It all began in Amsterdam. There, for some years, youngsters who had wanted to study in the city, for example, and had trouble finding accommodation to their liking, squatted buildings that were kept empty for speculation or were abandoned to enable urban renewal. This phenomenon attracted large scale public attention when squatters who had moved into three vacant, colossal buildings along the *Keizersgracht* in the city centre, refused to leave it even with a court order. They announced that they were going to defend the building with all means available. The mayor hesitated to instruct the police to evacuate the buildings out of fear of sparking violence. In February, at the start of the weekend, squatters violently recaptured a squatted building that had been evacuated by the police, expelled the police from the area, and erected barricades in the streets. For one weekend, anarchy reigned in a small part of the city. Immediately after the weekend, the police and the *gendarmerie* set the streets free again with brute force (Duivenvoorden, 2000). Everybody expected that revenge would be taken at the already announced inauguration of the new Queen on the 30 April. The Amsterdam police rapidly started to buy ice hockey clothing in Canada for their riot squads.

In the morning of 30 April 1980, the accumulated social tensions came to a head as a result of an uncoordinated police action against a symbolic occupation by squatters (Hofland, 1980). The riot squads and

the mounted police had lost all of their deterrent effect. Within a few hours, all over the city, police and protesters were caught in small and large battles. Around the Dam, where the inauguration took place, the police had to defy a barrage of stones. Many police officers suffered serious injuries. Immediately after these so-called *Kroningsrellen* (Coronation Riots), a new Amsterdam police leadership started to evacuate systematically major squatted buildings.[2] By force and with special technical means, such as hoisting cranes, building after building was cleared. The still growing squatter's movement offered vigorous resistance. The campaign exhausted the police force.

Crisis and searching for a new approach

The *Kroningsrellen* deeply impressed the government and created solid political support for a review of public order policing. Several evaluation studies were conducted, there was funding for adequate protective clothing of the riot squads and young police officers were enabled to organize a conference to discuss alternative approaches to public order policing (Rapport studieconferentie Warnsveld, 1980). A new approach was not developed by mayors or politicians but by police officers, contemporaries of the authors of the report *Politie in Verandering*. They had been leading the riot squads. The mayors and police leadership, not knowing a way out of the difficulties, offered them full liberties to experiment. A demonstration against a nuclear plant in Almelo in 1978 that had proceeded peacefully thanks to close contact with the protesters, informing them in advance of police actions and keeping the riot squads out of sight, served as an example. An intellectual source of inspiration was the study, *Niet alleen met stok en steen* (No only by stick and stone) by Gerhard Dijkhuis which adapted all kinds of American therapeutic insights to address hostility and aggression for police use (Dijkhuis, 1982). It also instructed police officers how to deal with the impulses and temptations of their own men and how they could stop escalation of violence and de-escalate upcoming conflicts with demonstrators. The young police officers were willing to offer protesters opportunities to attract public attention. The new approach required from the commanders of the riot squads to formulate a strategy based on previously collected information about the protesters and officially accepted guidelines how to deal with violent demonstrators. The commander should be assisted with an experienced

staff. Because the Dutch police was organized locally, the approach was implemented step by step.

Meanwhile, there were fierce confrontations between the police and demonstrators, squatters, and other activists outside Amsterdam too. In February 1981, squatters defended a series of houses in Nijmegen that were deemed to be destroyed in favour of a parking lot. The local police did not cope with the situation and conflict escalated. Shortly before the planned evacuation, police and *gendarmerie* (*Koninklijke Marechaussee*) from all over the country rushed to their assistance, among them the officers that had designed the new approach. They established a new staff and hastily created a plan. However, they could not prevent violent confrontations. In September, a blockade of the nuclear power plant at Dodewaard was organized. A year earlier, fifteen thousand people had made the same effort but the action was rained out after a day. This time, forty thousand protesters showed up, stayed there for several days, and faced considerable police violence. Following this, a large demonstration against the police violence erupted in nearby Arnhem. Within the police ranks too, critical voices could then be heard.

The new approach in public order policing slowly gained ground. At the end of 1980, a well-known squatted building in Amsterdam (*De Grote Wetering*) was evacuated by force. For the first time, the riot squad was assisted by so-called arrest teams: plainclothes policemen who unexpectedly arrested violent squatters. Half a year later, during a demonstration in Almelo, the police leadership was supported by a staff of experienced police officers and was acting according to an officially accepted scenario, based on previously collected information about the purpose and background of the demonstrators. At the same time, the members of the riot squads received new equipment including white helmets, wicker shields, and protective clothing. The innovations did not create an immediate end to the violence, but they enabled the police to act more boldly and to better control the upcoming conflicts. That proved to be the case in September 1982, when the Utrecht police successfully evacuated the forest of Amelisweerd that was occupied in protest against the construction of a highway (Meershoek, 2007).

In November 1981, the Amsterdam police successfully managed a massive demonstration against nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, they still met with violent resistance when they entered with force into squatted buildings to remove the inhabitants. The most violent confrontation occurred in October, 1982, when, by surprise, they cleared the heavily

defended occupied building, *Lucky Luyk* The Amsterdam mayor had secured the support of public opinion in advance by designating the building for youth housing. Afterwards, the supporters of the occupiers arrived late and unleashed their anger by destroying windows of public buildings (Meershoek, 2007). However, the unsuccessful, violent defence raised within the squatters' movement a debate about the use of violent means. It proved to be the beginning of the end of the squatters' movement.

In the summer of 1983, the peaceful parts of the squatters' movement and the anti-nuclear movement were boosted by the emergence of a mass protest movement against nuclear weapons. NATO had asked its member countries (including the Netherlands) to install cruise missiles on its air bases. Four months later, half a million people protested in The Hague against a positive decision by the government. Following a British example of the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp, radical activists erected a tent camp beside the air base of Woensdrecht, where the missiles might be stored. Several times, the air base was hermetically sealed off from the outside world by massive demonstrations. The camp, which would remain in place for nearly two years, was a base of operations to start protest actions. Additionally, it supported all kinds of protests elsewhere in the country. Nevertheless, the local police succeeded in preserving the peace by maintaining close contact with the protesters to discover their motives. The police also gave them opportunities to raise public attention of their goals. In these years, the training centre of the riot squads were set on new footing which completed the turnaround in public order policing.

Around 1985, the protest movements were confronted with the loss of support combined with a hardening of the more radical parts. This was especially evident in the impoverished Amsterdam neighbourhood, *Staatsliedenbuurt,* where squatters controlled a significant part of the distribution of houses and thus blocked the renovation of the area. Meanwhile, police officers belonging to the generation of the authors of *Politie in Verandering* reached the leading position in the police forces. In Amsterdam, one of them became chief of the district *Staatsliedenbuurt*. He created a neighbourhood team and introduced a new, de-escalating approach to regain control over the area. He was successful but, after several months, he was confronted with a backlash too. The evacuation of an occupied building turned into a violent confrontation and, afterwards, one of the arrested squatters, the 23 year old Hans Kok, died in a

police cell, the first and only fatality during these years. Furious public reactions followed, but these could not halt the decline of the squatters' movement. In the following years, more than one hundred buildings were evacuated peacefully in this neighbourhood and urban renewal could start there too (Meershoek, 2007).

Conclusions

The first half of the 1980s was not only the most violent period in post-war Dutch history, but also a time when public order policing changed most radically. Remarkably, this change did not involve a hardening of police practice (which given the heavy work load of the police and the violence they encountered might be expected), but a diversification and flexibilization. The police got better equipment, but were not dehumanized. The strategy of the police was no longer focused on getting quick control over the battlefield, but on de-escalating the conflict by making contact with the protesters and offering them opportunities to present their message to a wider public and on planned repression if things still got out of hand. This approach proved to be effective in the end.

This transformation of public order policing was developed and implemented by police officers who had joined the police during the second half of the 1960s, who were better educated than their superiors and who were offended by the inflexible approach of the latter towards their rebellious peers. When these newer officers were commanding the riots squads at the beginning of the 1980s, they were offered great freedom to act by these superiors who did not know how to deal with the riots. The officers used this freedom to its full extent. While these policemen had the pleasant experience to realize their own ideas, to take the initiative and to act well prepared, the activists had the fatalistic conviction of No Future, distrusted the government and felt being hit in the close by the police. These feelings were a source of violence and embittered resistance, resistance that was effectively contained. After the mid-1980s the squatters' movement slowly disappeared and the number of riots fast decreased. The same officers who had introduced the new approach to public order policing in the Dutch police then reached the top positions in the local forces and started to introduce the kind of community policing that had been outlined in the report, *Politie in Verandering*. Thus the 1960s reached their completion in the police too.

Notes

1 These young Moluccans wanted to take revenge for the Dutch government's broken promises toward their fathers serving in the Dutch colonial army and who had withdrawn with the Dutch from Indonesia when that nation became independent.

2 The description is wrong. In The Netherlands, the monarch is not crowned but inaugurated.

Bibliography

O. Adang (1998) *Hooligans, autonomen, agenten. Geweld en politieoptreden in relsituaties* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom).

Commissie Heijder (1987) *Geweldgebruik door de politie* (s.n.).

G. Dijkhuis (1982) *Niet alleen met stok en steen. Een literatuuranalyse van niet-gewelddadige methoden van relbeheersing* (Oegstgeest: FOSS).

E. Duivenvoorden (2000) *Een voet tussen de deur. Geschiedenis van de kraakbeweging 1964–1999* (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers).

J.W. Duyvendak (ed.) (1992) *Tussen verbeelding en macht. 25 jaar nieuwe sociale bewegingen in Nederland* (Amsterdam: SUA).

K. Heijink, K. Heijink, H. Andersson, J.Th.A.M. Berkhout, E.E. Nordholt, P.C. Peters, M.A. Straver, J. Wiarda. (1977) *Politie in Verandering. Een voorlopig theoretisch model* (Den Haag: Staatsdrukkerij).

D. Hellema, F. Wielinga dan, M. Wilp (eds) (2012) *Radikalismus und politische Reformen. Beiträge zur deutschen und niederländischen Geschichte in den 1970er Jahren.* (Münster: Waxmann).

H.J.A. Hofland, (1981) *De stadsoorlog. Amsterdam '80* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff).

J. Saskia, et al. (1980) *Het hek moet van de Dam* (Amsterdam: Lont).

J. Kennedy (1995) *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig* (Amsterdam: Boom).

G. Meershoek (2007) *De Gemeentepolitie in een veranderende samenleving* (Amsterdam: Boom).

G. Meershoek (2012) *Kees Peijster en de herijking van de maatschappelijke politiefunctie* (Den Haag: Boom Lemma).

F. Perrick (1971) 'Gezagshandhaving in huidige democratie', *Tijdschrift voor de Politie*, 97–106.

A.B.J. Proot (1965) *Het optreden van de politie* (s.n.).

Rapport Studieconferentie Warnsveld (1980) *Het grootschalig politieoptreden na 1980* (s.n.).

A. Wietsma, J. Vonk, F. Van der Burght (1982) *Als je leven je lief is. Vraaggesprekken met krakers en kraaksters* (Amsterdam: Lont).

6

Conclusion: Risk Policing and the Art of Adaptation

Margo De Koster

Abstract: *Social transformation processes bring about increased social tensions and problems, but also innovation, accelerated growth, or reform. With new possibilities also come new challenges and anxieties about disruptive and threatening phenomena. The main responsibility for preserving order and eliminating threats was assigned to public police institutions. This chapter brings some historical and criminological observations about risk and police transformation in modern Europe.*

The policing of risks is, as the introduction by Jonas Campion and Xavier Rousseaux to this volume rightfully highlights, a core aspect of policing. Police bodies 'have learned to govern (themselves) through risk'[1], primarily by policing social change and transition. Social transformation processes bring about increased social tensions and problems, but also innovation, accelerated growth or reform. With new possibilities also come new challenges and anxieties about disruptive and threatening phenomena. In Europe's history, the most important sites as well as the catalysts of social change have always been the cities. Thus, both ambitions to frame and control social change, and the development of specific instances charged with these tasks, already existed in urban centres long before the nineteenth-century birth of modern policing. Already from the Late Middle Ages onward, states were increasingly prone to develop ambitious legal programs to cement or to restore the social order. Yet, for the implementation of such policies, states were largely dependent on urban administrations that developed social and security policies of their own and often ignored or modified the directives of the central administration to suit local needs and interests. Intermingling with the interactions between cities and states were local interest groups and a growing number of law enforcement officials on the ground who executed, implemented, negotiated and influenced social policy *in practice.*

Gradually, during this process, the main responsibility for preserving order and eliminating threats was assigned to public police institutions, which have become, in Ericson's words, 'the front-line agents in the reproduction of social order' (Ericson, 2005, p. 215). As indicated by Jonas Campion and Xavier Rousseaux in their introduction, the police have become an important stakeholder in the social construction of risk at the same time. Risk construction becomes particularly visible in times of crisis, when conventional order in society is (perceived as being) under threat and the collectivity is forced to reaffirm its central values in order to reproduce itself (Durkheim, 1912/1968). This is done through the construction of social problems and via discourses identifying menaces and threats – both problem situations and problem populations – which stress the need for public responses and indicate which orientation the latter should take.

It is important to carefully unravel the complex interplay of various conditions, actors, and problem-definitions in this process of risk construction, as well as to discover recurrent patterns through time.

Do punctual crises provoking a temporary heightening of intolerance thresholds in society start off this process, or is it rather a cyclic phenomenon involving, for example, recurrent *moral panics*? Is there contrast, conflict, or overlap between official and public risk perceptions and problem-definitions? How do the police participate in the definition of the problem and is there any space for police autonomy and priorities? Are there gaps or is there rather consensus between the risk discourses of public authorities and those of police institutions? Finally, as the authors of the introductory chapter ask, is the risk involved an 'actual threat or phantom menace'? A first point made clear by the different subsequent chapters presenting case-studies is that risk construction invariably combines reality with the imaginary, or in the words of W.I. Thomas: 'if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences' (Thomas, 1928, p. 572).

Regarding the responses developed in order to manage and prevent the risks perceived, the chapters in this book all illustrate, in one way or another, that instead of classical control theories, the broad notion of 'governance' offers the most interesting perspective. This implies abandoning the idea of a massive, monolithic, and ever effective state regulation and control and rather considering a wide range of inter-mingling social actors, needs, interests, and practices influencing police responses and interventions. In particular, public reactions and uses of control instances, whereby individuals and social groups instrumental-ize the 'threat' to their own ends, can significantly counter, weaken, or even completely invert the intended security and control measures. For Ericson, this micro-level of everyday transactions with the citizenry is even the most important when examining police systems: 'its [the police's] success at keeping intact the glass menagerie of social order, continues to rely first and foremost on this level' (Ericson, 2005, p. 215).

As a result of the various actors and problem-definitions involved, actual practices of risk management and policing are complex, and multifaceted. They often contain contradictory elements, loopholes, and discrepancies between stated goals and real goals, in addition to gaps between objectives and results. This comes as no surprise: it reveals the eternal paradox, as the introductory chapter has pointed out, of the inability of social control bodies to effectively respond to the risks. The police have been assigned, and have taken on, an impossible responsibil-ity for crime control and risk management, which they are never able to fulfill entirely, yet this is always used as key indicator of their success. In

practice, the police are not maintaining order but constantly *negotiating* it (Manning, 2005). Further, next to their actual interventions, the police's authority and impact depend largely on their symbolic status in society, that is, as the disciplined 'thin blue line' that stands between order and chaos (Loader, 1997) – mandated and obliged by law 'to deal with every exigency in which force may have to be used' (Bittner, 2005, p. 35).

In sum, criteria of efficiency and effectiveness are not the central or most interesting aspects to take into account when evaluating security policies and police management of risks. Rather, the real challenge is to identify their logics, claims, stakeholders and impact in the field, where there is always a mix of continuity and change to be found. How do police forces and systems adapt to changing social conditions; which are the margins for change; how large are the constraints under which they operate, such as lacking manpower and technological resources, and how do processes of professionalization and specialization play a part in this art of adaptation (Rousseaux, 2008)?

These questions have been put at the forefront in this book, for the period from the late 19th century until the second half of the 20th century, in case-studies of political and police reactions and adaptation to the 'risks' of societal change in certain Western European (Belgium, France, The Netherlands) and colonial settings, presenting both normal and exceptional situations of crisis.

Security responses often involve reform of the police system itself. Such reform can take place at the level of the police's role and function, when new concepts and expectations toward the police are introduced, at the level of police structures or at the level of police practice. An initial possible conclusion here is that police reform, in particular reforms set up in response to a crisis, has mostly tended to involve *structural recon-figurations*, and much less often changes in police practice and the police's occupational culture. This appears to be a parallel with what has also been asserted, for example, for decades of police reform in 20th century Belgium (Enhus, Ponsaers, 2005).

Changes in 'cop culture' are rarely a direct result of the introduction of new institutions, organizational frameworks, and theories. Rather, as criminological studies (Chan, 2003) and also David Somer's chapter in this book show, training is what plays a crucial role in the creation of a *habitus* for a specific socio-professional category, such as the police. Indeed, David Somer demonstrates how, in the end, the essential function performed by the Belgian *École de Criminologie et de police scientifique*

(Criminology and Forensic Police School), established in October 1920, has been to socialize police personnel coming from a broad range of forces and horizons into collaborative police work, and crime detection and repression in particular. Further, this case is another illustration of the conflicts rising when new concepts and techniques are introduced into police systems, between these new, 'scientific' forms of knowledge on the one hand, and practical knowledge of the field on the other. This street-level police knowledge, as we could call it, draws on experience, the 'sacred fire' of the calling and the 'rules of thumb' that mediate between the departmental regulations, legal codes, and the actual events the police officer witnesses on the street (Manning, 2005). It was precisely because the *École de Criminologie et de police scientifique* continued to grant much importance to the latter, David Somer asserts, combined with other important obstacles such as a lack of political interest and vision, that the institution relatively quickly, already in the 1930s, lost its initial central position in the field of police training and its monopoly on the criminological and police sciences to the upcoming universities.

Resistance of the field to change has become a recurrent, almost traditional theme in police historiography and current police studies. It has brought several scholars to the conclusion that police reform mostly generates new 'narratives of change' at policy level only, rather than actual changes in police work (Hoogenboom, 2008). The chapter by Guus Meershoek in this volume provides us with another picture, which corrects somehow this rather pessimistic and static analysis of the potential of the police field for reform. In the Netherlands in the 1980s, it was accomplished precisely from the bottom up, by policemen drawing on experience as leaders of riot squads of the 1960s, who had now reached the leading position in the police forces. A successful shift towards a new approach of public order policing was realized. Police strategies for dealing with forms of violent protest underwent significant diversification and flexibilization. The new approach of de-escalating the conflict by establishing contact with the protesters, offering them a forum to communicate their views to a larger audience, and of resorting to repressive interventions only in last instance, if things nevertheless got out of hand, proved to be effective.

Adaptation could also turn out to be a failure, yet still produce important effects, as is shown by Laurent López's chapter on early 20th century attempts at setting up French-Belgian cross-border police cooperation. This project never made it further than a few initiatives, despite being

carried by an international network of police officers, lawyers, and magistrates, who were defining 'mobile criminals' as a new general threat to security and aimed to boost close collaboration between Europe's public police forces in the prevention and repression of organized crime. This case offers a clear illustration of conflicting priorities and perceptions of risks between different political and police authorities and international and national levels. There proved to be an important gap between the calls for cross-border police repression of organized crime and actual exchanges of police knowledge and personnel on the one hand, and states' (Belgium, in this case) own logics and priorities focused on internal social threats on the other. Despite the failed attempts, the growing network of justice and police officials and the first experiments of French-Belgian police cooperation opened up the way to the creation of a new body for international law enforcement cooperation, which the First World War postponed to 1923: the International Criminal Police Commission (the future INTERPOL).

Other 'threats' appear to have enjoyed large consensus in wider political and police circles and in public opinion alike, and came to occupy a central place in the police management of risks and problem populations, showing remarkable continuity across time. Among the most important were the circulation of people, goods, and ideas, and in particular migrants and travelling groups, who increasingly became the subject of public and official concern and attempts to control (or 'police') their movements from the 16th century onward. Indeed, since the *Ancien Régime*, the explicit endeavor to control migrants has been a major driving force behind the development of modern policing and the professionalization of police practices in Europe (De Koster, Reinke, 2015). This is pointed out in the introductory chapter and is also illustrated clearly by the case of the Belgian Congo, presented by Amandine Lauro. In a context of urbanization and heightened migration, travelling groups and young migrants in particular became the central concern of the authorities in the Belgian Congo and were defined as the problem populations of the colony, 'the' major menace which required reorganization of the colonial police system. This example of long-term continuity in the definition of problem or 'risk' populations does not exclude, however, the possibility of important shifts, as the Dutch case suggests. What is fascinating here is that a former problem group, of the 1960s violent rioters, switched status entirely a few decades later and became the thriving force behind police reform. This case also brings to the forefront the

importance of notions of temporality, and that of generational effects in particular, in the assessment of change in police systems. Or, as Guus Meershoek concludes, the reforms introduced in Dutch public order policing in the 1980s were to a great extent belated effects and reveal that 'the 1960s reached their completion in the police too'.[2]

Another issue recurrently defined as a problem or menace, not in the first place to the social order, but specifically to the functioning of police forces and crime control, is that of the border. As the chapter of Laurent López shows, the adaptation of police organization and functioning to the reality of borders became a central concern among authorities towards the end of the nineteenth century in Europe. More than ever before, control instances were confronted with the challenge to exert control and surveillance over a heightened territorial mobility within and across the nation-state's borders, and to reduce it eventually, whereas all public police forces, whether civil or military bodies, were constricted to their specific jurisdictions, losing track when the border was crossed. Also interesting to note here is that Laurent López demonstrates how, next to police and justice professionals, public opinion also participated in this process of risk construction, with the border as a problem for the police (and crime control) appearing in caricaturist images in the popular press.

Finally, the issue of borders alerts us to the fact that both the social construction of risk and actual risk policing have a specific geographical dimension, in this sense that certain zones and their inhabitants are defined as 'spaces of risk' and that police surveillance of these spaces contributes both to the demarcation and the reproduction of their boundaries. Further examination of the precise geographies of (perceived) risk and risk policing provides new possibilities to capture the interplay between risk construction, security policy discourses and measures, and the priorities and logics of police action in the field, or in other words, to understand the dynamics of police adaptation to social change and transition.[3]

Notes

1   See the introductory chapter, 'New threats or phantom menace? Police institutions facing crises' by Jonas Campion and Xavier Rousseaux.
2   See the chapter by Guus Meershoek, 'The Dutch Police and the Explosion of Violence in the Early 1980s'.

3   This was the central theme of the recent international conference 'Les systèmes policiers et leurs territoires (XVIIIe-XIXe siècles)', organized in the framework of ANR-SYSPOE project and held on 2–3 July 2015 in Aix-en-Provence, France. See http://syspoe.hypotheses.org/454, consulted on 20 July 2015.

Bibliography

E. Bittner (2005) 'Florence Nightingale in the pursuit of Willie Sutton: a theory of the police', in T. Newburn (ed.) *Policing. Key Readings* (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 233–268).

J.B.L. Chan (2003) 'Police and New Technologies', in T. Newburn (ed.) *Handbook of Policing* (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 655–679).

M. De Koster, H. Reinke (2015) 'Policing Minorities', in P. Knepper, A. Johansen (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Crime and Criminal Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press).

É. Durkheim, (1912/1968) *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France).

E. Enhus, P. Ponsaers (2005), 'Onmacht tot cultuurverandering: politiehervorming in België', *Tijdschrift voor Criminologie*, Vol. 47, 345–354.

R.V. Ericson (2005) 'Police as reproducers of order', in T. Newburn (ed.) *Policing. Key Readings* (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 215–246).

A.B. Hoogenboom (2008) 'Fictional and Factual Policing: The Case of Reassurance Policing', in M. Easton, et al. (eds.) *Reflections on Reassurance Policing in the Low Countries* (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 173–194).

I. Loader (1997) 'Policing and the social: Questions of symbolic power', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1–18.

P.K. Manning (2005) 'The police mandate, strategies, and appearances', in T. Newburn (ed.) *Policing. Key Readings* (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 191–214).

W.I. Thomas, D.S. Thomas (1928) *The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).

X. Rousseaux (2008) 'La police ou l'art de s'adapter: adapter les ordres ou s'adapter aux menaces ?', in J.-M. Berlière, C. Denys, D. Kalifa and V. Milliot (eds.) *Métiers de police. Être policier en Europe, XVIIIe–XXe siècle* (Rennes: PUR, 303–313).

Index