

‘HISTORY WARS’ AND RECONCILIATION IN JAPAN AND KOREA

The Roles of Historians, Artists and Activists

Edited by

MICHAEL LEWIS

‘History Wars’ and Reconciliation in Japan and Korea

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Preface: Retrospect and Prospect in Northeast Asia's History Wars

So far, Northeast Asia's history wars have been a battle of words, at times made more emphatic by occasional protest demonstrations. That the exchanges over war and remembrance have been far more peaceful than the events they describe does not mean the conflict is less than genuine. In fact, our historical identities, whether created by first-hand experience or by waves of secondary influences, shape how we see ourselves and the others that make up the world. We may not know the who–when–why particulars of history, but that does nothing to limit our capacity to make sweeping historical judgments based on our received sense of the past.

But what are the history wars that carry such weight in forming both the individual and collective understanding of the past and present in Northeast Asia? As demonstrated by contributors' chapters in this collection, the answer is plural and changing.

The plurality can be seen in the various disciplinary categories used to study them. The conflict over historical accounts in textbooks, for example, poses questions for the political scientist as much as for the historian. Similarly the use of films, TV, and popular social media in generating potent if usually inaccurate pictures of prewar, wartime, and postwar pasts creates problems ripe for study by analysts in such fields as literature, media studies, and sociology. The chapters in this volume have been selected to demonstrate this variety in several of its representative forms.

Compounding the complexity of history wars plural is the tendency for such conflicts to change over time. As this volume enters its final stage of editing, two developments, as fresh as they are important, make clear this changeable character. The first is the announcement by the foreign min-

isters of both South Korea and Japan of their intent to resolve definitively the "comfort women" issue. The agreement is still under construction, but official statements from both governments pledge the making and acceptance of an official Japanese apology issued by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō together with a one-billion yen relief fund for the 46 surviving Korean victims. This major policy shift forward followed close on the heels of another in the opposite direction when South Korea's President Park Geun-hye rammed through national changes to unify historical interpretations presented in Korean textbooks. The step met with violent street demonstrations in Seoul to block a new nationalistic presentation of the nation's past. Commentators noted that Park's preference for a top-down centralized method of textbook selection and emphasis on patriotic content over historical accuracy were just the kind of measures encouraged for Japanese schools by Japan's most strident rightists.

As chapters in this volume make clear, particularly the overview "Introduction" by Peter Duus, the debates over wartime responsibility, guilt, and retribution are not age-old and unchanging but have a shape-shifting quality readily apparent in the decades since 1945. This plural quality in part results from the emergence of new facts of what was done during the war and left undone during the postwar peace. A clear example of this is the sound of new voices detailing the system of "comfort women" sexual slavery and calling out for acknowledgement and reckoning. Yuki Tanaka's "'Comfort Women Bashing' and Japan's Social Formation of Hegemonic Masculinity" considers the ramifications for contemporary Japanese society of what we now know.

The tendency of interpretations to shift, of course, is not simply because more is known today than was known before. The fluid character of the history wars throughout the period bears witness to the utility of the new or revised angle. Since 1945, they have served various political purposes, and prospects for this continuing are beyond doubt. This quality of the history wars is reminiscent of the Russian joke that observes that the future is assured; it is just the past that keeps changing. The way the past has been presented in schools in Korea and Japan is discussed in Ku Nan Hee's "East Asian History in Korean High Schools" and my "Japanese Textbooks in the Asian History Wars: The Waning Importance of Weapons of Mass Instruction." Both chapters emphasize the tendency of the history wars to morph into new conflicts depending on contemporary political circumstances. But the direction is not inevitably retrograde

and admits room for a degree of optimism on the classroom-teaching level and, as recent developments indicate, on a wider political front as well.

The various sides in the Asian history wars, particularly governments and affiliated institutions—ministries of education, schools, museums, and other memory sites—have obviously reshaped interpretations in accord with prevailing political winds. Popular culture and the mass media have additionally influenced official views through movies, novels, and manga. The result is that the pot is always being stirred, albeit more energetically during some periods than others. James Orr's "The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Postcolonial Japan: State, Shrine, and Honor for Ethnic Veterans, the Fallen, and their Bereaved" delves into the intersection of popular memory and political manipulation involving the Yasukuni Shrine, as well as legal issues that ensnare one-time colonial subjects, contemporary officialdom in Japan and neighboring countries, and legal institutions. Takashi Yoshida addresses the related issue of memory politics, particularly the treatment of colonial identity after colonization has ended, in his "Remembering Colonial Korea in Postwar Japan." Both Orr and Yoshida highlight the fact that the history wars create new interpretations of the past for domestic political purposes as well as international contestation.

Understanding the history wars in their full variety and changing forms is as important as it is challenging. The contributors to this volume speak to this in considering not only the history of the history wars, but the prospects for the future direction of conflict. The approach in several chapters, for example in those by Ku, Duus, Tanaka, and Yoshida, is explicitly prescriptive. In analyzing the past, assessing causes and consequences, recommendations are made for the future.

The authors of chapters dealing with cultural figures and the use of the past are less direct in their recommendations. Pankaj Mohan's "A Fresh Look at the Korea–Japan History War," Yasuko Claremont's "Young Poets Under the Shadow of War: Yun Dong-ju and Tachihara Michizō," and Roman Rosenbaum's "Oda Makoto and Literary Reconciliation" discuss the lives and works of poets, essayists, and historians less with an eye for policy recommendation than to explore the constants running through the contemporary history wars that were present during and after wartime.

The chapters in this volume, in taking diverse approaches and arriving at different conclusions, capture the very quality of Asian history wars. In each chapter, there is room for both optimism and concern. Again, this is much like the actual state of the ongoing history wars and the processes of

governments, nongovernmental organizations, teachers' groups, artists, and individual activists who continue to invoke the past and challenge our memory of it.

Sydney, Australia Michael Lewis

Acknowledgments

A well-worn sports cliché is that every success is a team effort. While this collection of chapters is undoubtedly the collaborative work of many generous colleagues, Dr. Yasuko Claremont of the University of Sydney's Department of Japanese Studies has been the star player. Dr. Claremont secured foundation support for the multiyear series of conferences that has produced this volume and promises additional studies to come. The first two conferences convened in 2011 at the University of Sydney on the theme of "The Asia-Pacific War: Return, Representation, Reconciliation" followed the next year by "Looking Back on the Asia-Pacific War: Art, Cinema, and Media." The third meeting in 2014, "Initiatives towards Peace and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific Basin," was at the Academy of Korean Studies, Seongnam, Korea, where scholars and graduate students from Korea, Japan, the USA, and Australia met for extensive discussions on history, memory, and the direction of postwar reconciliation.

Without Dr. Claremont's indefatigable work, as organizer and contributor, the project would never have reached its current stage. In many respects, she has led in all the roles mentioned in this volume's subtitle: historian, artist, and activist. Dr. Claremont's foundational work and ability to bring together colleagues, academics, and activists has lightened my role as a comparatively new team member and editor of this first collection of chapters.

The Japan Foundation provided generous grants for each of the major conferences that yielded this volume's chapters. The political sensitivities inherent in contemporary studies of history and memory in modern Korean–Japanese relations required courage on the Japan Foundation's part.

In Korea, the Academy of Korean Studies provided project support through its 2014 international conference on reconciliation, nongovernmental organizations, and the future of the Asian "history wars." The Academy's members demonstrated an encouraging willingness in allowing their organization to be the vessel to hold such a heady and at times politically charged mixture of deeply felt opinions touching on historical memory and prescriptions for the future. The Academy's President Professor Lee Bae Yong captured the importance of this meeting in her opening remarks on the fundamental importance of the Korea–Japan relationship and the need to find common ground despite the pain that at times comes with the search.

Professor Pankaj Mohan, the lead organizer on the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS) side, was instrumental to the meeting's success. Among his colleagues at the Academy, Jun Seong Ho, Director, The Centre for Comparative Korean Studies; Lee Jong Cheol, Professor, Faculty of Humanities; Han Hyeong Jo, Professor, Faculty of International Korean Studies; Moon Ok Pyo, Professor, Faculty of Culture and Arts; Lee Gil Sang, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences; and Lee Wan Bom, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences all enriched the discussion through their critical commentary. Questions and critiques by AKS postgraduate students also inform the content of the chapters that finally appear in this volume.

The University of Sydney has added to the support of the Japan Foundation and AKS. Dr. Jeffrey Riegel, former Head of School, School of Languages and Cultures, deserves particular thanks for local funding support. A number of colleagues in the Department of Japanese Studies also shared their time and talents. University of Sydney professors Judith Keene (History), Elizabeth Rechniewski (French Studies), and Peter Armstrong (Architecture) also have been enthusiastic supporters and contributors to the reconciliation project from its inception. At Palgrave, Anne Schult and Anca Pusca shephered the manuscript toward publication. I Finally, thanks are due to David Kelly, text editor for *Japanese Studies*, for his ever patient and precise editorial work.

Contents

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Yasuko Claremont has been teaching Japanese language, modern Japanese literature, and comparative literature since 1984. She specializes in modern poetry and the works of Oe Kenzaburō, the Nobel laureate for literature in 1994. Her wide range of scholarship includes literary translation, and research on Japanese journals of the 1920s (Josei, Shinseinen, and Nyonin geijutsu), noh drama and postwar reconciliation.

Since 2011, Claremont has been engaged in a five-year long workshop-based research on postwar reconciliation of the Asia-Pacific War. This approach turned out to be effective in enabling more students, scholars, and activists to exchange their views and to understand the complexities and meanings associated with reconciliation. Funded by the Japan Foundation she was able to arrange a conference on reconciliation at the Academy of Korean Studies near Seoul in 2014 with Korean colleagues there.

In 2015, the concluding conference entitled "Wounds, Scars, and Healing: Civil Society and Postwar Pacific Basin Reconciliation" was held at the University of Sydney commemorating the 70th anniversary since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. Claremont is now engaged in her major monograph entitled *The Pacific War between America and Japan 1941–1945: Its Impact and Legacy*, to be published in early 2017 by Routledge.

Peter Duus is William E. Bonsall Professor of History Emeritus at Stanford University. His specialty is modern Japanese history. His published work includes *Politics and Political Change in Taishō Japan* (1969), *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea* (1995),

several edited volumes on Japanese colonialism and imperialism, and numerous articles on modern Japan's modern intellectual, economic, and colonial history. He was the editor of Volume 6 of the *Cambridge History of Japan* (1988), and is the author of *Feudalism in Japan* (1968, 1976, 1993) and *Modern Japan* (1976, 1997). The latter work has been translated into Korean. His most recent work is *Rediscovering America: Japanese Perspectives on the American Century* (2011).

Nan Hee Ku is a professor at the Academy of Korean Studies. She has taught history in secondary schools for 10 years. She has also worked in South Korea's Ministry of Education for 11 years and developed history curriculums and conducted research in history education. At those times she pursued history dialogues among Korea, Japan, and China. Until now she has tried to develop the joint history textbooks and materials for Korea and Japan students with Japanese scholars.

She is currently carrying out extensive fieldwork in China and Japan. Previous co-authored books include History Education between Korea and Japan (Tokyo) and other works.

Michael Lewis is an historian of Japan with research interests in Japanese influence on modern East Asia's society and politics. He has written about major studies of mass movements in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Japan and investigated the roles of the crowd's popular "intellectuals," satirists and singers, in movements for and against the prewar Japanese empire. His monographs have been published by the University of California Press, Harvard, and Routledge. He is currently researching the history and future of Japanese–Korean relations and the place of popular cultural in the modern history of Northeast Asia. Before joining the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Sydney, he directed the Asian Studies Centre at Michigan State University, where he led in creating the first All-Asia US Department of Education National Resource Centre. He was elected Fellow of the Australian Academy in 2013.

Pankaj Mohan holds an M.A. in Korean history from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in East Asian history from the Australian National University, Canberra. Prior to joining Nalanda University, Rajgir (India), in 2015 as Professor of history, he taught Korean Studies/ Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen, the University of Sydney, and the Academy of Korean Studies, South Korea. He has written numerous book chapters and papers on early Korean his-

tory and Korean Buddhism. His most recent publication is an edited volume *The Early Korean Kingdom of Silla; Political Developments and Religious Ideology*.

James Orr Associate Professor and Chair of the East Asian Studies Department at Bucknell University, is a historian of postwar Japan specializing in Japanese national identity and collective remembrance of the Asia-Pacific War. He is the author of *Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (2001) and "Victims and Perpetrators in National Memory: Lessons from post-World War Two Japan," Revue suisse d'histoire/Swiss Historical Review 57.1 (2007). Orr maintains an enduring interest in ideological positioning in politics and culture regarding Hiroshima and war victimhood. His most recent work in this regard, in addition to the current volume's contribution focusing on disparate treatment of colonial veterans, the fallen, and the bereaved by the postwar Japanese state and Yasukuni Shrine, has focused on comparisons of collective remembrance of the atomic bombings and conventional air raids at the end of World War II in Europe and Asia. He is currently working on a history of Little League baseball as a form of youth sport culture in postwar Japan, tracing its Cold War organizational development and the discourses of gender, class, and nation that were contested on its fields.

Roman Rosenbaum specializes in postwar Japanese literature and popular cultural studies. He received his Ph.D. in Japanese Literature at the University of Sydney. In 2008, he received the Inoue Yasushi Award for best refereed journal article on Japanese literature in Australia. In 2010–2011, he spent one year as a visiting research professor at the International Research Centre for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) to complete a monograph on the social activist Oda Makoto. He is the editor of *Representation of Japanese History in Manga* (2013). His latest edited book is entitled *Visions of Precarity in Japanese Popular Culture and Literature* (2015).

Yuki Tanaka is an independent scholar and historian based in Melbourne, Australia. His book publications in English include: *Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the US Occupation* (2002) and *Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II* (1996), which provided extensive background material for a BBC TV documentary series "Horror in the East" produced in 2000. He is co-editor (with Marilyn Young) of *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth-Century*

History (2009) and (with Tim McCormack and Gerry Simpson), *Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited* (2011).

Takashi Yoshida is Professor of History at Western Michigan University and the author of *From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace: War and Peace Museums in Japan, China, and South Korea* (2014) and *The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China and the United States* (2006). He holds a doctoral degree in History from Columbia University. He also holds a master's degree in International Affairs from Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs and bachelor's degrees in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Chicago and in law from Aoyama Gakuin University. He is a recipient of the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace Awards Senior Fellowship (United States Institute of Peace), the Abe Fellowship (Social Science Research Council), the Carnegie Council Fellowship (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs), the Toyota Foundation Research Grant (Toyota Foundation), and the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Training Grant (United States Department of Education). He has also received the WMU Emerging Scholar Award and the College of Arts and Sciences Faculty Achievement Award in Teaching.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: History Wars in Postwar East Asia, 1945–2014

Peter Duus

Since the turn of the century, Japan's relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have deteriorated steadily. Conflicting claims over maritime territories, demands for redress of injuries inflicted during colonial or wartime occupation, and disputes over national historical narratives have deeply eroded a sense of mutual trust between the Japanese and their two most important neighbors. In 2014, bi-national public opinion surveys showed that 70 % of the South Korean respondents, and 86.8 % of the Chinese respondents, had an unfavorable impression of Japan. Respondents in Japanese reciprocated: 54.4 % had an unfavorable impression of South Korea and 93 % had an unfavorable impression of China.[1]

The so-called history issues are the most troublesome of these disputes. Territorial claims can be arbitrated in international bodies such as the International Court of Justice, and redress for forced laborers, comfort women and other victims of Japanese aggression can be adjudicated in the courts of one or the other country. By contrast, there are no institutional means for resolving disputes over history. Indeed, the complete resolution of such disputes may be unattainable.

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Writing history, after all, is not like carving inscriptions in stone; it is more like engaging in a conversation with no ultimate or logical end. The demand for absolute historical truth, except in the sense of what is factually accurate and what is not, seems a futile quest. The stories we tell about the past are constantly subject to revision as new evidence and perspectives appear. In Japan, for example, debates about the country's modern wars and colonial expansion have continued since 1945, and even today there is still no consensus on one historical narrative about them. There may never be one.

History, of course, is written not only by scholars but also by television producers, movie directors, newspaper editors, novelists, and Internet bloggers. In our digitalized world, historical narratives disseminated by public media probably have greater impact on the public than those taught in schools and universities. But at the heart of the "history wars" in East Asia are "official narratives" embedded in political speeches, in school textbooks, in public museums, and in public cemeteries, public monuments and other mnemonic sites under government control. What fuels these "history wars" is less disputes over facts—though there are many such disputes too—than disputes about what should be included in historical narratives, how events should be named and what message narratives should convey.

The "history wars" reveal deeply felt and quite understandable anger at what happened in Korea during Japanese colonial rule and in China under Japanese military occupation. The demand that the Japanese accept responsibility for war and oppression is at the center of every historical issue under dispute. But equally important, the conflict over history reflects a feeling that Japan humiliated both countries and that by failing to show remorse it continues to humiliate them. The "history wars" are bitter because of their impact on national self-esteem and national reputation—not only China's and Korea's but Japan's as well. As such they are driven as much by political passion as by political calculation, although they are driven by that too.

The "history wars" are embedded in what might be called a "politics of apology" that revolves around the moral stature of the parties involved. An apology requires that both parties agree that a wrong has been committed and the party committing the wrong admits to having done it. It establishes a moral hierarchy in which the aggrieved victim is morally superior and the perpetrating victimizer morally inferior. If the victim sees itself as already superior to the apologizer on other grounds the moral

gap may become even more pronounced. As one observer has suggested, victimhood creates a "bottomless line of moral credit."[2]

At best an apology can lead to reconciliation but, if not accepted with good will, it can have other outcomes. The aggrieved victim might judge the apology as insincere, insufficient or unsupported by action—or it might judge the wrong apologized for as inexcusable, and hence beyond apology. In that case "apology politics" leads not to reconciliation but the opposite, creating a downward spiral with the victim insisting on more apologizing, and the apologizer growing resentful at being constantly badgered again and again to do what it has already done. As long as the meaning of the apology remains in dispute, it piles new layers of conflict on an existing one. That, I believe, is where the "history wars" have led today. The PRC and ROK governments have continued to demand expressions of regret, remorse or apology from the Japanese government, and the Japanese government has continued to offer what it believes to be such expressions. But the history wars still have not come to an end.

Curiously, the "history wars" did not begin immediately after war in China and colonial rule in Korea ended in 1945. During the three decades that followed, as the Japanese slowly and painfully re-established relationships with its neighbors, history issues—including the "official" narrative of Japan's modern history—did not become a diplomatic or political problem. In part, this was because the dominant "official" narrative in Japan was the so-called Tokyo War Crimes Trial narrative that placed responsibility for the war and heinous war crimes on the Japanese military leadership and its civilian allies but absolved the general Japanese populace as innocent bystanders duped by their leaders. With memories of the war still fresh, most Japanese accepted the view that the Asia-Pacific war was a "bad war"—a war of aggression against its neighbors, and they also accepted the view that the Japanese people themselves had suffered from the Japanese military's ill-fated decisions. This narrative was echoed not only in school textbooks but also in film and fiction during the 1950s and 1960s.[3]

The "Tokyo War Crimes Trial" narrative was also accepted by the government of the PRC, which was anxious to reestablish economic if not political ties with Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. To be sure, ordinary Chinese had vivid memories of how Japanese troops behaved in the occupied areas, and the official PRC narrative referred to the war as the "Great Chinese War of Anti-Japanese Resistance." But the official line put the war in the context of a worldwide class struggle of oppressed workers everywhere against the

imperialist expansion generated by monopoly capitalism. In that struggle, Japan was just one of many enemies, including the USA, Great Britain and the other prewar imperialist powers.

During the 1950s, the PRC leadership, worried about new enemies and/or rivals—first the USA, and then the Soviet Union, chose to act leniently toward a weakened and demilitarized Japan. As Mao Tse-tung told a group of visiting Japanese Diet members in 1956: "In the past ordinary Chinese did not like the Japanese: now we like you very much. … The debts of the past are not an obstacle, nor are the present differences in social systems. Let bygones be bygones. As you have formally apologized for the debts you incurred in the past, it is not reasonable to ask you for payments of those debts. You cannot be asked to apologize every day, can you? It is not good for a nation to constantly feel guilty, and we can understand this point."[4]

This apparent expression of forgiveness was part of Mao's grand strategy to counterbalance American imperialism by pursuing "people's diplomacy" toward Japan in hope of weakening Japan's security ties to the USA and persuading it to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China. To this end, the PRC government not only expressed willingness to forgo reparations payments but also showed lenience toward Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) found guilty of Classes B and C war crimes, discouraged historical investigation of war crimes (including the Nanking Incident) and limited depiction of war crimes in movies about the war of resistance.

When diplomatic ties with Japan were re-established in 1972, the Japanese government announced that it felt "deep remorse" (*fukaku hansei suru*) for the damage done to the Chinese during war, and diplomatic reconciliation was achieved without a Chinese demand for reparations or redress for war victims. Through the 1970s Sino-Japanese relations remained comparatively cordial as trade, investment, technological transfers, and cultural exchanges grew. In 1978, the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship declared that neither nation would seek "hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other region." Indeed, after the Cultural Revolution came to an end, some Chinese officials and intellectuals began to look at Japan as a model for how their own country could accelerate its economic modernization.[5]

In the early postwar period, Japan's relationship with the ROK was far more fraught than its relationship with the PRC. The government of Syngman Rhee, who harbored a deep hatred and distrust of the Japanese,

was not forgiving of the immediate past as Mao Tse-tung was. Not surprisingly, the official ROK narrative in the 1950s and 1960s, as reflected in history textbooks, questioned the legality of the annexation and deplored political oppression, social suffering and economic exploitation under Japanese rule. The heroes in this narrative were the anti-Japanese resistance movements that led the way to "liberation" in 1945. But when Park Chung-hee came to power after a military coup in 1961, the anti-Japanese tenor of the "official narrative" was toned down by stressing the Korean people's "triumph over Japan" and its achievement of "self-reliance" and "independence" rather than the harshness of Japanese colonial rule.

Apart from disagreement over the legality of the annexation treaty, "history issues" per se were not central to the 1965 normalization negotiations between Japan and the Park regime, whose goal of speedy economic reconstruction trumped the impulse to confront Japan over its history as a colonizer. Park, already an admirer of the Meiji developmental model, was impressed by Japan's postwar recovery and, faced with a hostile regime in North Korea, he sought to cultivate friendly ties with Japan rather belabor its past transgressions. To be sure, during the normalization negotiations, the Japanese foreign minister expressed "deep remorse" for that past but the central issue for the ROK was how Japan should compensate Korea for damages suffered under Japanese control. That was resolved by a compromise: Japan gave up claims against Japanese property left in Korea in 1945 and promised the ROK a package of economic aid in the future in place of reparations. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders like Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku, who saw South Korea as important to Japan's security as a buffer against its Communist neighbors, were as anxious as Park to create closer bi-national ties.[6]

It was only in the 1980s that the "history wars"—diplomatic challenges to what the Chinese and Koreans thought to be changes in Japan's "official" narrative about the war—really began. Some have argued that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, seen by all three nations as a strategic threat, lessened external reasons for avoiding conflict over the pre-1945 past. But more important were three other factors: (1) regional economic growth; (2) domestic generational change; and (3) the emergence of new leaders with neo-nationalist domestic agendas.

First, during the 1970s and 1980s, the East Asia region enjoyed a "miraculous" spurt of economic growth at a time when the Western economies were reeling from "stagflation" and "oil crises." Even though Japan's economic growth rate had slowed down, the country had emerged

as an economic superpower, pouring a flood of consumer durables into the world market and providing generous official development assistance (ODA) packages to developing countries. In China, under the pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping, a program of economic modernization based on the introduction of market mechanisms and cooperation with the outside world was in full swing. In the ROK, the Park regime and its successors promoted rapid economic growth on a model strongly resembling the postwar Japanese economy. As all three economies grew so did trade, investment, and technological transfer among them.

Increased economic interaction within the East Asian region, of course, had positive consequences—a rapidly growing share of the global economy, rising per capita incomes, more comfortable living standards, and growing middle income strata. By dispelling any notion that East Asian culture or social values were a hindrance to economic and technological progress, regional economic growth brought an upsurge in national confidence and pride. Not surprisingly economic success reshaped the construction of national identities. Indeed, the notion that "Asian values" contributed to the relative economic success became a commonplace in all three countries. In China and Korea, many pointed to the importance of Confucian values in guiding economic change, and in Japan, values that had been dismissed as "feudal" immediately after the war—loyalty, harmony and collectivism—were now seen as the secret behind the "Japanese miracle." Thus, the comparative success of the East Asian economies vis-à-vis the Western economies laid the basis for a new surge of nationalism and affirmation of national self-esteem.

However, increasing economic ties among the three East Asian countries did not make them better neighbors. Accelerating growth in both PRC and ROK had a destabilizing impact on regional politics as they became competitors as well as economic partners of Japan. Indeed, the economic success of Japan's neighbors seemed to compromise not only Japan's position as the dominant economy in the region but also its role as one of the "locomotives" of the world economy. It upset an economic hierarchy in which Japan had been seen as the present and future economic leader of the region. Especially after the collapse of the "bubble" in the early 1990s, many Japanese began to fear that China's or Korea's gains were Japan's losses, and in the PRC and ROK, a Japan weakened economically could now be seen as a Japan weakened politically. The upsetting of the existing hierarchy added political frictions to the inevitable economic frictions that accompanied economic growth. Indeed, some commentators have argued

that the prospect of being surpassed by their neighbors led some Japanese politicians to adopt a more truculent attitude toward them.

Second, as the British historian R.G. Collingwood once observed, "All history is written from the standpoint of a particular present." Each generation writes its own history based on its own experience and its own historical vista. By the 1980s, a majority of the populations in all three countries had no direct experience of Japanese colonization, Japanese occupation or the Asia-Pacific War. Indeed, it was in the 1970s and 1980s that the first postwar generation in all three countries achieved adulthood—in Japan the so-called new humans (*shinjinrui*), in China the third generation and in Korea the 386 generation. Those who grew up in the postwar world may have heard from parents or grandparents about what war or occupation were like but their sense of personal involvement was weak. Much of what they learned about that history was second hand, gleaned from school textbooks or mass media that condensed a complex historical process into a few iconic events or slogans. As a result, they were also open to the telling of war stories that resonated with their own personal experience.

In Japan, for example, even though the postwar generation may have accepted the "Tokyo War Crimes Trial" view that the war was a bad war—a war of aggression—they had no sense of personal responsibility for the war. Their own memories were of a prosperous and peaceful Japan that neither threatened nor exploited its neighbors. Having also witnessed the continuation of conflict in the postwar world—for example, the "American War" in Vietnam—it was easy for them to conclude that the war Japan had waged was not so very different from the wars that other countries waged in the twentieth century. Given the decolonization of Southeast Asia after 1945, it was easy for them to accept the view put forward by conservative intellectuals like Hayashi Fusao that the Asia-Pacific War was really a "war of liberation" culminating Japan's "hundred years war" against the forces of Western imperialism in Asia. And in their school textbooks and comic books, they learned about the suffering that the war inflicted on the Japanese at home, a narrative of victimhood ironically promoted by both conservative and progressives who otherwise disagreed on the nature of the war itself.

Finally, by the 1980s, in all three countries a new generation of leaders, whose own sense of national identity was inevitably shaped by national economic change, turned to the promotion of nationalism—including the revision of official historical narratives—as a means of buttressing domestic

political support. In Japan, after a decade of declining support, the LDP recovered its solid voting base in the 1980s at the expense of the left-wing parties committed to the Tokyo War Crimes Trial narrative. Confident and assertive leaders like Nakasone Yasuhiro, backed by rank-and-file younger party members who had no memory of defeat, pursued an agenda of strengthening national defense capabilities and reviving a popular sense of patriotism to supplant what they saw as a dangerous popular pacifism. In the PRC, Deng Xiaoping, a more pragmatic and less ideological leader than Mao, was anxious to mollify party hard-liners who criticized him for being too soft toward the USA and the Nationalist government in Taiwan, and he also was determined to rebuild confidence in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the disastrous years of the Cultural Revolution. Finally, in the ROK, a rising democratic movement brought an end to nearly three decades of militarist rule in 1988, paving the way for government under a new generation of civilian leaders committed to democratic reform, protection of civil rights and open discussion of the colonial period that had been suppressed under the military regimes. When Kim Young Sam became president in 1993 he vowed to decolonize the past by dismantling its remnants, including the old Japanese Government General building in Seoul, which was torn down in 1995.

Against the background of these changes, the "history wars" erupted in reaction to attempts by Nakasone cabinet, backed by a coalition of vocal and persistent right-wing intellectuals and politicians, to restore popular pride in Japan and promote patriotism in the school system. During the 1970s, more extensive coverage of wartime atrocities, including the Nanking Incident, had begun to appear in school history textbooks. But in early 1982 the minister of education urged textbook publishers to "soften their approach to Japan's excesses during the war and put more stress on patriotism." What set off the conflict were Japanese news reports that publishers were being required to substitute the word *shinshutsu* (invasion) for the word *shinryaku* (aggression) in describing Japanese military incursions into China in 1937. Protests from the Beijing, Seoul, Pyongyang and Taipei were swift, forcing the first diplomatic crisis over "history issues."

What ensued was a pattern of interaction that repeated itself with increasing frequency over the next three decades. The Japanese government's response to its neighbors' protests was conciliatory. The chief cabinet secretary Miyazawa Kiichi issued a statement reaffirming the government's earlier expressions of remorse to the PRC and the ROK and

promising to make corrections in the textbooks in response to their objections. An amended curriculum guide called on schools to "develop friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries and to contribute to the peace and stability of Asia, and in turn, the world." Unfortunately, however, a new minister of education, Fujio Masayuki, objected publicly to letting other countries influence the content of Japanese textbooks. Although he was dismissed, right-wing LDP conservatives, who argued that the Asia-Pacific War was a war of liberation, continued to demand revision of the war narrative in history textbooks and tighter state control over textbook authorization. When the Ministry of Education (MOE) bureaucrats, backed by the teachers' union, moderate and centrist conservatives and the dwindling left, resisted these demands, diplomatic protests from Japan's neighbors tapered off in the late 1980s.

The tentative, seemingly contradictory or ambiguous, reaction of the Japanese government to protests from its neighbors is perhaps the main reason that those neighbors continued to insist that the "history issues" had not been resolved. Conciliatory gestures or direct apologies such as the Miyazawa statement on text books, the Kōno statement on the comfort women or the Kaifū and Hosokawa statements accepting responsibility for waging a "war of aggression" were undercut by the contrary assertions from right-wing conservative politicians. This left the impression that official statements were insincere at best or hypocritical at worst. The most egregious example of historical recalcitrance came in 1995, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the war's end, when the Murayama cabinet, a coalition of the conservative LDP and the left-wing Japanese Socialist Party, proposed a Diet resolution formally offering apology for the war and the suffering it caused. Although the resolution passed, only half of the lower house members voted on it, with the other half abstaining, and 90 or so conservative LDP representatives—including Abe Shinzō and many of the current leaders of the LDP—signed a petition opposing it.

These apparent contradictions or ambiguities simply reflected the fact that in Japan there was no official historical narrative enjoying broad public and political support.[7] Indeed, public opinion polls in the 1990s indicated that the Japanese public had not forgotten the damage done to neighboring peoples during the war and that they were well aware that Japanese aggression had a negative impact on how Japan's neighbors thought about their country. It was this popular antiwar and antimilitarist sentiment that the right-wing conservatives attempted to push back by clamoring for revision of history teaching in public schools. For example, in a much

publicized public campaign the so-called Society for Textbook Reform (*Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho or Tuskuru Kai*) submitted the draft of a less "masochistic" and more "positive" or "liberal" Japanese history textbook to the MOE for approval in 2000. The draft, however, was heavily revised during the MOE textbook screening process and eventually was adopted by only a handful of small school districts. For all the media attention "Society for Textbook Reform" received, the Japanese public and education bureaucrats were still comfortable with "masochistic" textbooks.[8]

We should not forget that what keeps the "history wars" going is not simply the lack of consensus in Japan about the "history issues" but the development of robust and assertive nationalism in both ROK and PRC. In the PRC, older leaders, alarmed in the late 1970s by street posters criticizing the Cultural Revolution and other signs of discontent with the CCP leadership, blamed this turn of opinion on the laxity of ideological training and the infiltration of foreign ideas. In 1982, Deng Xiaoping committed himself to a patriotic education campaign stressing the historic role of the CCP in bringing an end to foreign imperialism. A revised official textbook narrative paid greater attention to the Japanese as the main enemy during the war and emphasized the atrocities the Japanese committed. Previously, textbooks had treated the "War of Anti-Japanese Resistance" merely as one episode in the struggle for liberation but now the war was singled out as China's "first complete victory against foreign invasion." Japanese imperialist aggressors replaced Western imperialists and Nationalist traitors as the prime villains of the narrative, and more textbook space was devoted to the Nanking Incident and other atrocities.

During the 1990s, in response to continuing signs of discontent among Chinese youth—manifest in the 1989 Tienanmen Square incident—the push for patriotic education escalated. The construction of mnemonic sites buttressing the new official historical narrative began with the 1985 opening of the Nanking History Museum whose motto "Never forget national humiliation" was carved on its entrance wall. By the mid-1990s, a network of 100 mnemonic sites—battlegrounds, memorial halls, museums, and monuments—was laid out as part of the continuing patriotic education campaign. Twenty of these sites focused on the anti-Japanese war of resistance.[9]

The official patriotic education campaign was also buoyed by a liberalization of the mass media. The CCP no longer discouraged reporting on the war or wartime atrocities. Both TV dramas and movies began to portray—and magnify—the depravity of the Japanese military, the heroism

of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the triumph of popular resistance to the Japanese.[10] (Some Chinese observers joke that more Japanese soldiers have been "killed" in Chinese film studios than in all the wartime battlefields put together.) A newly flourishing publishing industry also sought to increase circulation or sales by offering vivid and sensational stories about the wartime past. The result was the spread of a visceral populist nationalism, not entirely under official guidance or control, particularly among the younger generation, that led to anti-Japanese riots and demonstrations in 2005 and 2012.

In the ROK, the shift in official historical narrative was less pronounced than in the PRC. Popular nationalism rooted in anti-Japanese sentiment was already well established. At least two of the country's main national holidays—March 1 and August 15—celebrated Korean resistance to Japanese colonial rule, and school textbooks treated the colonial period as one of resistance to Japanese rule and the struggle for liberation. The official narrative was embodied in the Independence Hall, opened in 1987 as the country's largest museum, with exhibits that celebrated the resistance movement and displayed the harshness and cruelty of Japanese rule in gruesome tableaus.

When democratically elected civilian governments came to power in the 1990s, new issues injected further passion into the "history wars." First, the question of redress for former Korean "comfort women" led to new demands for Japanese atonement. Linking the treatment of "comfort women" to other wartime brutalities added a new moral dimension to the "history wars," and placing the issue in the context of a growing global campaign for human rights, including women's rights, widened international support for the struggle. Second, centrist and left-wing intellectuals and politicians reopened a domestic debate about collaboration curbed by the Rhee and Park governments. Collaborators, they argued, were not only complicit with Japanese oppression, they were also responsible for a host of postwar ills—massacres during the Korean War, suppression of political dissent, acceding to Japanese pressure during the normalization negotiations, and economic overdependence on Japan.[11] While this was a purely domestic issue, it suggested that the country had still not shaken off the baleful effects of Japanese occupation.

What can be done to bring an end to the "history wars"? The pessimistic answer is: not much. Historical memory is long, especially if it is aggrieved memory. While studying Meiji expansion on the Korean peninsula I was surprised to learn that even in the 1890s, Korean peasants were singing songs about the defeat of the Hideyoshi invasion three

centuries before. And similarly, of course, the Irish still remember the centuries of English oppression that began with Oliver Cromwell, the Mexicans still remember that their North American neighbor walked off with large chunks of their territory in the 1840s, the Indians still remember the dark side of the British raj, and the Poles still remember the serial partition of their country by the Prussians, the Russians, and finally, the Austrians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Because history issues are so central to the definition of national identity the "history wars" in East Asia are likely to continue unabated even if the territorial and redress issues are resolved. The long-term danger, however, is that the "history wars" will nurture ethnic stereotyping that hardens into ethnic hatred as the combatants demonize one another. There are already signs that this is taking place. For example, a new genre of manga disseminating xenophobic stereotypes made its appearance in Japan in the late 1990s. Kobayashi Yoshinori's best-selling *Sensōron*, the pioneer work of the genre, not only dismissed the Nanking Incident and the recruitment of "comfort women" as fiction but also offered caricatures that ridiculed the Chinese and Koreans. Popular culture has taken a turn in a similar direction in the PRC, where the *People's Daily* online site recently unveiled an online game called "Shoot the Devils" that encourages players to "forever remember history" by allowing them to shoot Japanese war criminals—"Japanese devils."[12] And at a recent international manga convention in France, a Korean manga about the "comfort women" portrayed Japanese soldiers as vicious, snarling, slobbering dogs tearing off the clothes of an innocent Korean girl—an unsubtle metaphor for gang rape.

In the short term, a truce in the "history wars" does not seem probable. At the moment there seems to be no political will to negotiate one, but we can take heart in the fact that there have been moments in the recent past when reconciliation of a sort has achieved. In the case of Japan's relations with the ROK, for example, a genuine rapprochement seems to have been reached in 1998 when Prime Minister Obuchi offered President Kim Dae-jung a statement recognizing Japan's war responsibility and expressing remorse for the grave damage done its neighbors. Unfortunately that rapprochement was undermined by his successor Prime Minister Koizumi, who issued repeated personal apologies to the ROK but also made repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

All this does not mean that efforts to achieve a truce should be abandoned. One promising sign is that recently an important outsider, the USA, which has a long-term interest in maintaining peace and stability in

the East Asia region, has been doing more to persuade the combatants in the "history wars" to move toward reconciliation. But outside pressure is not easy, nor is it always effective. In the end, the main initiative for reconciliation must come from the political leadership of all three of the belligerents in the "history wars."

First, all parties should refrain from provocative actions that clearly invite inflammatory responses. There have been many such actions in recent years. In 2014, for example, the Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni shrine, the PRC National People's Congress announced two new anti-Japanese national holidays (commemoration of the Nanking Incident and victory over Japan), and the ROK government initiated the opening an An Jung-geun memorial museum in Harbin. Such acts cater to domestic audiences but they do so at the cost of regional peace and reconciliation.

Second, the time has come to stop bickering over what constitutes an apology and what does not. If the experience of the past 30 years is any guide, it is clear that there will never be agreement on that issue, if only because of the inability to find common language and common gestures of remorse. The tepid if not hostile Chinese and Korean reaction to the ambiguous but relatively conciliatory Abe statement in 2015 suggests that official Japanese apologies may not be forthcoming in the future. Perhaps the best apology that the Japanese government can now make is simply to state that it has not repeated the mistakes Japan made before 1945 and that it does not intend to make such mistakes again.[13] Of course, a concrete symbolic gesture, such as the visit of a Japanese cabinet minister or ambassador to the Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall or the Independence Hall of Korea, would send a strong symbolic message that the Japanese are aware of what those mistakes were.

Third, all parties should concentrate on negotiations for the redress of specific victims—former comfort women, unpaid forced laborers, victims of chemical and biological attacks, and the like. Negotiations, however, should not revolve around legal impediments to redress, which are manifold. Instead they should focus on a mode of redress that is not only politically possible but also morally responsible. After all, regaining national moral standing is better for national long-term interests than wrangling over legal responsibilities.

Finally, all parties should recognize that while telling stories about the national past to encourage pride in that past may be important in educating the young, teaching them to learn from the past—including mistakes

from the past—is even more important. As the well-worn truism goes, those who do not learn from the past risk repeating it. The rhetoric of neo-nationalism, with its emphasis on national pride or national humiliation, should not be allowed to obscure discussion of problems that each nation has faced in the past and how they solved, or failed to solve, them.

It is best to remember the wise words of President Richard von Weizsäcker in his speech to the German parliament in 1985 on the 40th anniversary of the war's end: "All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, must accept the past. We are all affected by its consequences and liable for it. The young and old generations must and can help each other to understand why it is vital to keep alive the memories. It is not a case of coming to terms with the past. This is not possible. It cannot be subsequently modified or made undone. However, anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present. Whoever refuses to remember the inhumanity is prone to new risks of infection."

Notes

1. "The Second Joint Japan-South Korea Public Opinion Poll (2014). Analysis Report on Comparative Data." www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5142.html. "The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll (2014) Analysis Report on the Comparative Data." www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5153.html.
2. The phrase is Tzvetan Todorov's, quoted in Thomas de Waal, "The G-Word: The Armenian Massacre and the Politics of Genocide," *Foreign Affairs* (January–February 2015): 147. An insightful discussion of the "politics of apology" can be found in Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
3. James J. Orr, *Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); Alexander Bukh, "Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 5 (2007): 683–704; Makita Tetsuo, "Nihonjin no sensō to heiwakan: sono jizoku to fūka," *Hōsō kenkyū to chōsa* (2000): 3–19.
4. Michael Yahuda, *Sino-Japanese Relations After the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 10.
5. Wang Zheng, "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education in China," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (2008): 783–806; He Yinan, "Remembering

and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006," *History and Memory* 19, no. 2 (2007): 48–72.

6. Park Sang-mi, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present," *The Journal of Korean Studies* 15, no. 1 (2010): 67–93; Kim Chang-rok, "The 'Treaty on Basic Relations' and the 'Agreement on Claims' Between the Republic of Korea and Japan," in *The Historical Perceptions of Korea and Japan*, ed. Hyun Dae-song (Paju-si: Nanam Publishing, 2008), 261–78; Kim Dong-choon, "Korea's Movement to Settle the Issues of the Past and Peace in Asia," *Korea Journal* 50, no. 4 (2010): 152–85.
7. The lack of consensus, for example, was reflected in the construction of mnemonic sites. While the Yushukan War Museum, associated with the Yasukuni shrine, reopened in 1985 with exhibitions extolling Japan's wars and the heroism of the men who fought them, in the late 1980s and 1990s new peace museums such as Osaka Peace and the Ritsumeikan Peace Museum emphasized war damage and the suffering of its victims, both domestic and foreign. The Hiroshima Peace Museum, criticized by some for not explaining historical context for the dropping of the first atomic bomb, added a wing that dealt with the issue in detail.
8. John K. Nelson, "Tempest in a Textbook: A Report on the New Middle School Textbooks in Japan," *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2002): 129–48; Yoshiko Nozaki, *War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 136–51.
9. Wang, "National Humiliation;" Wang Zheng, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 245–86.
10. Alisa Jones, "Revising the Past, Contesting the Future: Reforming History Education in Post-Mao China," in *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revising History in Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Steffi Richter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 223–244; Kirk A. Denton, "Horror and Atrocity: Memory of Japanese Imperialism in Chinese Museums," in *Re-envisioning the Chinese Revolution: The Policies and Poetics of Collective Memories in Reform China*, ed. Ching Kwan Lee and Guobin Yang (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), 245–86.
11. Chung Youn-tae, "Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea," *Korea Journal* 42, no. 3 (2002): 18–50; Chris Wilson, Danton Ford, and Alisa Jones, "The History Text: Framing Ethno-Cultural and Civic Nationalism in the Divided Korea," in *History Education and National Identity in East Asia,* ed. Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones (New York: Routledge, 2005), 227–253. For the last decade, but especially within the last year (2014), disputes over the narrative in

Korean history textbooks have led to a local "history war." The recent furor over a textbook that painted a positive picture of the colonial period pitted conservatives against centrists and leftists just as the debate over "revisionism" has in Japan.

12. "Video Game Uses Japanese War Criminals as Targets," *The New York Times*, February 27, 2014
13. As Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio put it in 2014: "What our nation needs to do is show that it has accepted the past humbly, repeatedly expressed remorse and above all, walked the path of peace for 69 years. And we need to explain that there will be no change in these diplomatic policies in the future either."

CHAPTER 2

Remembering Colonial Korea in Postwar Japan

Takashi Yoshida

Introduction

A number of museums in South Korea feature Japan's colonial rule and atrocities. Among these are the War Memorial Museum, the Seodaemun Prison History Hall, the Independence Hall, the Ahn Choong-Keun Memorial Hall, and the Historical Museum of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery. Most of these museums present a rather simplified version of Korea–Japan relations and Japan's colonial period. The first four remind me of Yasukuni Shrine's Yūshūkan war museum in this regard, as all of them embrace the patriotic national narrative and disregard many complexities of history.

As an example, the War Memorial Museum, opened in 1994 on the site of the former army headquarters and intended to commemorate the Korean War, dedicates a small section entitled "The Period of the Aggression of the Japanese Imperialism" to illuminate Korea's struggle against Japan. One panel offers this overview:

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> During the 5,000 years of its history, Korea has recovered wisely from many foreign incursions and national crises. However, in 1910, a shameful page was written in our history when the Japanese occupied Korea. Through the activities of the Righteous Armies, various resistance and independence movements both here and on foreign soil, and a strong sense of national unity, the long-awaited liberation of Korea from Japan was realized on 15 August 1945.[1]

Just like the Japanese patriotic museums, their South Korean counterparts emphasize binary foreign affairs ("we" vs. "them") and generally disregard friendship between Korean and Japanese peoples and transnational historical reconciliation movements, as recognizing either aspect may damage the monolithic national narrative of "our" nation and "our" people.

Often dismissed by the foreign mass media are the decades-long initiatives in Japan, driven by individuals and grass-roots organizations, to atone for that nation's wartime aggression and atrocities, to educate their fellow citizens on Japan's colonial rule in Korea, and to promote historical reconciliation between Japan and its neighboring nations. Since 1945, numerous scholarly and non-scholarly writings, films, songs, comic books, museum exhibits, and public lectures and gatherings in Japan have underscored Japan's wartime atrocities and aggression in Korea and have continually reminded the citizens of the oppression suffered there during the colonial period. This chapter traces such positive developments, and challenges a presumption that postwar Japan has been a monolithic nation with people who merely whitewash its colonial past.

Japanese Dissenters Prior to World War II

Even during the colonial period, certain Japanese challenged their government's colonial policy over Korea and pursued the cause of friendship between Japanese and Korean people. Yoshino Sakuzō, a Christian intellectual and prominent leader of the Taisho democratic movement, was one keen advocate of Korean autonomy.[2] In 1916, for example, Yoshino wrote an article titled "Observations on Manchuria and Korea," in which he condemned the oppressive nature of Japan's military rule in Korea and urged the government to implement egalitarian and humanitarian policies there.[3] While Yoshino did not necessarily demand the immediate independence of Korea, Yoshino's friend Kashiwagi Gien, a Protestant minister, advocated for immediate Korean independence as he saw the movement as patriotic and legitimate.[4]

Primarily under the patronage of Yoshino, the New Man Society (Shinjinkai) was founded in 1918 (and dissolved in 1929) to facilitate democratic ideas in Japan. The Society included Fukumoto Kazuo, a Marxist scholar, and his thinking—as well as Yoshino's—influenced many Koreans in Japan. According to the police, by 1928, approximately 8200 Koreans in Japan joined the Communist organizations.[5] While it is unknown how many of them were students, by then approximately 3700 Koreans were studying in Japan. The number of these students steadily increased during the latter half of the colonial period. In 1940, more than 20,000 Korean students were studying in Japan.[6] As Simon Kim's study points out, many of these students strove to build a viable Korean nationhood under the harsh reality of Japan's colonial policy.[7]

While Communist movements were severely suppressed in Japan and abroad, the united anticolonialists, regardless of their ethnicities or nationalities, confronted Japan's colonial rule in Asia. In February 1927, the First Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism was convened in Brussels, Belgium. In total, 174 people from 37 countries participated in the meeting, including four Korean delegates and one Japanese. The agenda included such items as Japan's oppression of Korean and Chinese peoples and their respective struggles against Japan. These participants unanimously endorsed the establishment of the League Against Imperialism (LAI) and for National Independence.[8] Approximately 130 people attended the League's first general council, held in Belgium in December 1927. Those in attendance included three Japanese delegates: Yosano Yuzuru (representative of Japan Labor-Farmer Party [Nihon rōnōtō]), Senda Korenari (representative of Worker-Farmer Party [Rōdōnōmintō]), and Katayama Sen (representative of Japan Communist Party [Nihon kyōsantō]). At the meeting, Yosano informed the League about the issues in colonial Korea, while Katayama discussed Japanese domestic and international matters of the time, including imperialism and Korea-related issues. Senda's focus was Japan's colonial policies in China.[9]

In November 1929, the LAI of Japan was founded in Tokyo. Its founding principles were to oppose imperialist wars, endorse colonial independence movements, and protect Soviet Russia. In particular, the League focused on supporting independence movements in Korea, Taiwan, and China. The members of this organization were mainly students, and in 1931, the League comprised some 1000 members in Tokyo and an additional 200 members in other major cities.[10] A number of Koreans, including students, joined the League and assumed the executive posts. In 1932,

the authorities arrested 12 Korean members and another 127 Korean members in 1933.[11] LAI printed newspapers and leaflets and distributed them among students and workers in major cities. Due to the repeated crackdowns, however, the League was nearly defunct by 1935.[12]

World War II and Memory During the Allied Occupation (1945–52)

Japan's defeat in World War II (WWII) was a significant turning point in regard to the war and memory. When the American Occupation forces surveyed Japanese opinions of the Pacific War, they learned that few Japanese knew what forces and decisions had led Japan to war, why it had been defeated, and whether Japan had committed atrocities during the war. Furthermore, the ordinary Japanese citizen evinced no strong feeling of moral responsibility for the crimes committed by the nation. Thus, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) considered it necessary to "bring the true facts before the people" and to "acquaint the Japanese with their responsibility for the war, with the atrocities they … committed, and with their war guilt."[13] Although SCAP rarely revealed Japan's war crimes and atrocities in its former colonies, it initiated the war guilt information program and disseminated knowledge of select Japanese wartime atrocities widely via various media communications, including newspapers, journals, radio, films, and textbooks. For example, a serialized feature titled "The History of the Pacific War" appeared in major newspapers for ten days in December 1945. These articles accused the Japanese militarists of hiding the truth of the war and stressed that the Japanese people must learn the "full story of the war." They provided a summary of what SCAP regarded as Japanese war crimes from 1931 to 1945, such as the Nanjing Massacre and the atrocities in Manila against Americans and Filipinos. Between 1946 and 1948, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East gave opportunities for Japanese to reflect on various war crimes that the nation had committed as the press relayed the court activities daily to its readers.[14]

Although critics such as Etō Jun accuse the American Occupation and its war guilt programs of brainwashing the Japanese people, they tend to overstate the case.[15] Contrary to their accusation, the American censors did not convert the ordinary Japanese public into a mere unthinking, pro-Allied monolith. Indeed, many Japanese willingly and passionately supported the reforms initiated by SCAP, including the war crimes tribunal. For exam-

ple, according to the SCAP Civil Intelligence Section, among the 5500 intercepted messages from letters, telegrams, and telephone calls between December 1948 and January 1949, 32 percent favored the verdicts of the tribunal while 28 percent opposed them. Ten percent of the correspondents expressed hope that the Japanese people would take responsibility for the war. Eight percent reflected no opinion, and the remainder were simply relieved and happy that the trial was over. In addition, the majority of those who supported the tribunal believed that the accused received lenient sentences and that many more responsible Japanese should be tried for their crimes.[16]

Reflecting such critical perceptions of the war, studies of Japanese war crimes and atrocities gradually increased in the postwar period. In the context of Korea, it was around the time of the Korean War that educators were urged to re-examine the study of Korean history in Japan. In February 1951, members of the Association for History Educators of Tokyo held a study session on the history of the Korean people. In June 1953, the Historical Science Society of Japan issued a special edition of its *Rekishigaku kenkyū* (Journal of Historical Studies) specifically on Korean studies. Yamabe Kentarō, who had advocated studying history from the perspectives of ordinary people, contributed an article titled "Nihon teikoku shugi no Chōsen shinryaku to Chōsen jinmin no hankō tōsō" (Invasion of Korea by Imperial Japan and the Struggles of the Korean People).[17] Similarly, in the same issue, Pak Kyong-sik re-examined Japan's policy over Korea in the Meiji period and the peasant revolution in 1894.[18] Such articles challenging the wartime and prewar narratives of Korean history that applauded Japan's colonial rule continued to be published in academic journals and in book form throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

From the 1950s to the 1970s: The Rise of Critical Korean Studies in Japan

Pak was a prolific author of material intended to enlighten readers about Japan's colonial rule and its effects on the Korean people. Born in 1922 in North Gyeongsang Province (in eastern present-day South Korea), Pak came to Ōita, Kyushu, with his parents and two sisters when he was six. For 16 years, he was taught to be a loyal subject of His Majesty. When he read available books on Korean history, he was always disappointed to discover that they emphasized the alleged backwardness and uncivil nature of Korean people. He often found himself questioning why he was

born a Korean, and consequently, grew up with an inferiority complex. He went to night college and, in September 1942, became a substitute teacher for an elementary school for two and a half years. No longer able to accept the fact that he was indirectly supporting Japan's war effort, he resigned in March 1945. One year later he enrolled in a college and majored in Asian history. After his graduation in 1949, he became a history teacher at a junior high school for Koreans primarily from North Korea. In 1960, he began teaching at Korea University in Tokyo, but his unauthorized publications resulted in his being forced to resign in 1970 by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, an organization which had close ties with North Korea. He then established a second-hand book store, taught at universities as an adjunct professor, and founded his own research institute. Throughout these years until his sudden death in 1998, he published his work tirelessly.[19] In the appraisal of Tonomura Masaru, professor of history at the University of Tokyo, Pak challenged the dominant scholarly perspective on Japan's colonialism in Korea and reminded Japanese citizens of Japan's harsh colonial policies toward Korea and their impacts on Korean people.[20]

In 1965, the year Japan concluded a normalization treaty with South Korea, Pak published his *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku* (Record of Korean Forced Mobilization), the first major book since the end of the war on the history of Korean forced labor in Japan during the colonial period.[21] It was the activities initiated by the Japan–China Friendship Association that inspired him to study the subject of forced labor. In February 1953, with the help of other humanitarian nongovernmental associations, the Association established the Committee for Mourning the Chinese Prisoners Who Died (Chūgokujin horyo junnansha irei jikkō iinkai). The committee members visited more than 130 forced labor sites, recovered the remains of nearly 3000 Chinese slave laborers, conducted memorial services, and repatriated the remains to China.[22] Pak participated in research seminars on Chinese forced mobilization and published a booklet titled "Taiheiyō sensōchū ni okeru Chōsenjin rōdōsha no kyōsei renkō ni tsuite" (On Forced Mobilization of Korean Workers during the Pacific War) in 1962.[23]

In the preface, Pak warned that only a fraction of the facts regarding Japan's colonial rule in Korea was known in Japan. In Pak's eyes, many Japanese were ignorant of Japan's colonial exploitation and oppression of the Korean people. Pak was particularly offended by remarks made by prominent Japanese politicians who attempted to propagate the notion

that Imperial Japan brought good governance to colonial Korea. To Pak, Japan's colonial policy toward Korean people was unspeakable, and words could not fully describe the true nature of tyranny during the 40 years of Japanese occupation. He believed that ignorance of Japan's colonial rule and its nature might allow Japan to repeat similar wrongdoings in the future, and that this lack of understanding would not serve the interests of Korean and Japanese people. Thus, he decided to write the book in order to forge an alliance and strengthen friendship between the two peoples.[24]

For Pak, the study of Koreans in Japan was an endless endeavor. In the 1970s, he published the two-volume *Nihon teikoku shugi no Chōsen shihai* (Korea under Japanese Imperial Rule), the five-volume *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin kankei shiryō shūsei* (Historical Materials on Koreans in Japan), *Tennōsei kokka to Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin* (The Imperial State and Koreans in Japan), *Chōsen: San'ichi dokuritsu undō* (March First Independence Movement in Korea), and *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin undōshi; 8/15 kaihōmae* (The History of Korean Movements until the August 15 Liberation).[25] Moreover, in 1976, Pak founded the Research Association for History of the Activism among Koreans in Japan (Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin undōshi kenkyūkai) and the following year began publishing a journal titled *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjinshi kenkyū* (Studies in the History of Koreans in Japan).[26]

Paralleling Pak's investigations, the 1970s also saw the development of the study of Korean victims of atomic bombs, Koreans in Sakhalin, and local histories of Korean residents in Japan.[27] In 1972, for example, Jōdo Takuya, a high school history teacher in Takamatsu, founded the Association for Documenting the Takamatsu Air Raids. While researching the history of the raids, they came across Korean victims of the bombings. The find shocked Jōdo and led him to research the history of Korean slave labor in the region. After two decades of research, Jōdo published his work in 1992.[28] Similarly, in the mid-1970s, inspired by the people's history (*minshūshi*) historiography pioneered by Irokawa Daikichi and Kanō Masanao, Tonohira Yoshihiko, a young Buddhist priest, and his friends decided to study the people's history in the Sorachi district of Hokkaido, where thousands of Koreans were exploited to build the Uryū dam and the Meiu rail line during the war.[29] They initiated the oral history project to examine the construction of these sites and interviewed Korean survivors, resulting in the discovery of the graves of these slave laborers and mortuary tablets at the local temples. Tonohira's activism never ceased. He and his allies have organized excavation projects, educational workshops, and

preservation endeavors as part of efforts to promote historical reconciliation between Korean and Japanese people that continue to this day.[30]

From the 1980s to the Present

Since the 1980s, the study of Japanese aggression in Korea and exploitation of Koreans in Japan has flourished. By the early 1990s, the study was no longer monopolized by a small number of scholars. A wide range of joint research projects, war-related site preservation movements, workshops, and conferences, various compensation lawsuits filed against the government and companies for their violations of the human rights of Korean individuals, collaborative efforts between Japanese and Korean pacifists to combat the historical revisionist movements in Japan, detailed discussion of Japan's colonialism in Korea in history textbooks, and museum exhibitions have taken place since then. While revisionist attempts to whitewash Japan's colonialism and wartime aggression intensified during this period, such progressive accounts are equally numerous and exemplify the complexity of Japanese society.

Responding to the attempt of the Japanese government to downplay Japanese colonialism in Korea in 1982, Korean and Japanese scholars established a joint research project to study Japanese history textbooks. In 1991 and 1992, these scholars organized a total of four public meetings in Japan and South Korea, attracting audiences of approximately 100 attendees to each.[31] The first meeting in March 1991 focused on the problems of the Japanese textbook authorization system and methodologies of textbook studies. At the second meeting in September 1991, the participants examined the descriptions from the 1850s to 1910 within Japanese high school history textbooks currently used in schools. The third, convening in March 1992, centered on the analysis of Japanese high school textbooks in regard to Japan's colonial policies from 1910 to 1945. At the last meeting in October 1992, the focus of the meeting was the so-called Fifteen Year War, the war that began with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and ended with Japan's defeat in 1945. To prepare for these conferences, Japanese scholars organized monthly seminars, and some 30 scholars, journalists, editors, teachers, undergraduate students, and graduate students participated in every seminar in those two years.[32]

Spinoff effects in Japan included publication of at least four books on the project: Kimijima Kazuhiko and Sakai Toshiki, *Chōsen/Kankoku wa Nihon no kyōkasho ni dō kakarete iruka* (How Korea and South Korea are

described in Japanese textbooks); Japan-South Korea Research Association for History Textbooks (Nik-Kan Rekishi Kyōkasho Kenkyūkai), *Kyōkasho o Nik-Kan kyōryoku de kangaeru* (Examining Textbooks through Japan-Korea Collaborative Efforts); Kimijima Kazuhiko, *Kyōkasho no shisō* (Ideologies in Textbooks); and Fujisawa Hōei, *Kankoku to no taiwa* (Dialogues with South Korea). In these books, the authors highlighted achievements of the project as well as unresolved matters. Many of the South Korean participants were not well informed about the Japanese textbook authorization system; one specific achievement of the project was disseminating a more accurate understanding of the system.[33] For Japanese participants such as Fujisawa, the dialogues with South Korean scholars provided an opportunity to become more familiar with their perspectives, one which he saw as necessary to promoting historical reconciliation between the peoples of the two countries.[34]

While this particular joint research project ended in 1993, similar efforts continued. Responding to another controversy over the textbook authored by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform in 2001, Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean intellectuals established a joint research project to exchange views on history and history education and share their common understandings in East Asian history and the people. Their ultimate goal was to promote peace in the region.[35] In March of the following year, they held the first meeting in Nanjing and agreed to work together to author a history textbook. Five months later, they met in Seoul and discussed basic guidelines and policies of the project. The participants agreed that the focus of the textbook should be the modern period, that the book should consist of chapters organized thematically, and that the textbook must overcome national particularism. The male and female authors included not only academics but also junior high school and high school teachers. Three years of discussions and revision preceded finalization of the draft.[36] In 2005, *A History That Opens the Future: The Modern and Contemporary History of Three East Asian Countries* was published in China, Japan, and South Korea.[37] In three years, over 270,000 copies were sold in the three countries: 130,000 copies in China, 79,000 in Japan, and 65,000 in South Korea.[38] The textbook has been used as supplementary reading in junior and senior high schools as well as in colleges in these countries.[39]

Joint research initiatives were certainly not limited to textbook projects. Noteworthy collaborations have been pursued in the realm of women's and gender history. In 1991, Kim Hak-sun and two other Korean women

forced into sexual slavery during WWII filed a lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court, demanding an official apology and compensation from the Japanese government. This provoked a number of Japanese scholars, peace activists, and organizations to research the topic thoroughly. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, professor of history at Chūō University, represents one specific example. Stunned by these women's testimonies, Yoshimi was motivated to study Japan's wartime violations of women's rights. His discovery of wartime documents in 1992 that attested to the plans, constructions, and operations of the "comfort stations" led the government to admit its involvement and subsequently issue an apology.[40] In 1994, after retiring from the *Asahi* newspaper, Matsui Yayori founded the Asia–Japan Women's Resource Center (AJWRC) and devoted her life work to convening the Women's International War Crimes Trial in Tokyo in 2000.

Matsui's interest in restoring women's rights in Asia began in the early 1970s. In 1973, she wrote a series of articles in the *Asahi* that exposed Japanese sex tourism to South Korea. From her perspective, such sex tours were no different from sexual slavery and reminded her of Japan's colonial rule.[41] On March 1, 1977, on the anniversary date of the March First Movement in colonial Korea, Matsui and six other women founded the Asian Women's Association (Ajia no Onnatachi no Kai). Its declaration states:

> Japan's "modernization" since the Meiji Restoration was indeed a history of aggression. Japanese women who lived during the same period were also accomplices in and perpetrators of Japan's aggression in Asia. We are finally learning this fact from women in Asia who stood up against discrimination.
>
> Our parents, friends, and lovers became vanguards (senpei) of Japanese invasion and [participated in] burnings, killings, looting, and raping of women. From now on, we will no longer be women who send their husbands and lovers off as an advance guard for economic and sexual invasions. Without this determination, we would never achieve liberation for ourselves. We today express sincere apologies to our sisters in Asia and declare that we will organize an alliance among women in Japan and combat [discrimination against women] as our Asian sisters have done.
>
> On the anniversary day of the March First Independence Movement when women in Korea laid their lives on the line for the uprising against Japan's rule, we, in an attempt to mark a first step, declare that we will steadily enlarge the circle of struggle.[42]

Indeed, Matsui expanded the circle not only in Japan but also beyond the Japanese national boundaries. Between 1981 and 1985, she was an *Asahi*

correspondent in Asia and enlightened the public about human rights violations against Asian women in war and peace. Her work included a 1984 article on Roh Su-bok, a Korean woman who was abducted by the Japanese police at the age of 21 and was forced to provide sex to the Japanese servicemen in Singapore and Thailand.[43] It was not surprising that after she retired from the *Asahi* Matsui founded AJWRC in 1994 and then later the Violence against Women in War Network, Japan (VAWW-NET Japan), in 1998. Moreover, she advocated for the Women's International War Crimes Trial in Tokyo to prosecute those who were responsible for forcefully mobilizing women into sexual servitude. Nearly 1000 people—600 from Japan and 400 from abroad—participated in the trial that was held in December 2000.[44] Although the trial concluded in less than a week, collaborative efforts have continued since then.

The publication of *Jendā no shiten kara miru Nik-Kan kingendaishi* (Modern Japanese and Korean History from a Perspective of Gender) was a result of one such effort.[45] Both Japanese and Korean researchers who had been working on Japan's military sexual slavery since the 1990s decided to unearth the history of the two peoples from a perspective of gender, and thus established a joint project in 2001 to construct a history that could be shared by ordinary citizens. Fifty-two Japanese and fourteen South Korean scholars participated in writing the 356-page volume. After four years of dialogue and at times heated debate, they finally published the book in the two countries in 2005. Suzuki Yūko, Japanese editor in chief, acknowledged that the book was not perfect, but she hoped that the project would be the first step toward further developing understanding of the modern history of Japan and Korea.[46]

By the end of the 2000s, educational opportunities for ordinary Japanese to study Japan's colonial rule in Korea and its crimes there were not limited to the written accounts. Many so-called peace museums have placed exhibits on Japanese aggression in Korea during the colonial period on permanent display. These museums include: the Osaka Human Rights Museum (Ōsaka jinken hakubutsukan, Osaka, established in 1985), the Grassroots House Peace Museum (Kusanoie, Kochi, established in 1989), the Osaka International Peace Center (Ōsaka kokusai heiwa sentā, Osaka, established in 1991), the Museum for Bamboo-Bush Grave Markers (Sasa no bohyō tenjikan, Hokkaido, established in 1992), the Kyoto Museum for World Peace at Ritsumeikan University (Ritsumeikan daigaku kokusai heiwa myūjiamu, Kyoto, established in 1992), the Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum (Oka Masaharu kinen Nagasaki heiwa

shiryōkan, Nagasaki, established in 1995), the Korea Museum (Kōrai hakubutsukan, Tokyo, established in 2001), the Women's Active Museum on War and Peace (Onna tachi no sensō to heiwa shiryōkan, Tokyo, established in 2005), the History Museum of Japanese Koreans (Zai-Nichi Kanjin rekishi shiryōkan, Tokyo, established in 2005), and Peace Aichi Museum of War and Peace (Sensō to heiwa shiryōkan Pīsu Aichi, Aichi, established in 2007).

The Osaka Human Rights Museum, for example, now includes exhibits such as Japan's forced mobilizations of men and women during the war and the Women's International War Crimes Trial in Tokyo in 2000. More than one million people have visited this museum from its opening to the present day. The Grassroots House Peace Museum is a micro museum established by the late Nishimori Shigeo, a biology teacher, who demolished half of his house and a built a four-story building whose first floor is used as a museum and lecture hall. The Museum for Bamboo-Bush Grave Markers, the former Kōkenji Temple, exhibits panels on slave labor in Shumarinai. The Kyoto Museum for World Peace examines the artifacts of and displays wall-size panels of that war, including the wartime military "comfort women" system. The Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum devotes its entire exhibition space to displaying artifacts related to Japan's wartime aggression in China, Korea, and other parts of Asia, as well as Japan's war responsibility. The Korea Museum commemorates Yun Dong-ju, a Korean student at Doshisha University who was killed in prison in 1945 by the police, and Asakawa Takumi, a Japanese forestry engineer in Korea who earned trust and respect in the local community. The Women's Active Museum on War and Peace, the museum to which Matsui Yayori donated her lifetime assets before her death, features the stories of the women forced into sexual servitude.[47] The History Museum of Japanese Koreans focuses on the lives of Koreans in Japan and highlights such historical events as the killing of thousands of Korean residents during the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923.[48] Peace Aichi allocates one of the three exhibition sections on its second floor to the Fifteen Year War, including consideration of Japan's colonial policies in Korea.[49] In addition to their exhibits, these museums frequently host lectures and conferences to enlighten the public about Japan's aggression in Asia and the Pacific.

In addition to these museums, various war-related sites across the nation stand as silent reminders of Japan's wartime atrocities and colonialism. Research and preservation of these sites originated in the 1970s, gradually

increased in the 1980s, and flourished from the 1990s onward.[50] For example, in the early 1980s, a group of students in Matsushiro, Nagano, investigated the underground imperial headquarters built by Korean slave laborers and appealed to the mayor to preserve the site and make it accessible to the public in the form of a peace memorial museum. In 1986, students, teachers, homemakers, and other peace activists formed the Association to Promote the Preservation of the Matsushiro Imperial General Headquarters. They initiated an oral history project and interviewed the survivors about their experience. As a result of such activism, the city restored a part of the headquarters and opened the facility to the public in 1990. The members of the Association volunteered to escort visitors every second Sunday and inform them of its historical significance, including the issues regarding the inhumane working conditions Korean men were subjected to. Five years later, citizens' organizations in Nagano established a monument at the entrance of the headquarters dedicated to Korean slave laborers.[51]

A few books on these war-related sites have been published since the 1980s, and they encourage visitors to study Japan's wartime aggression and atrocities and examine Japan's war responsibility. Many of these books were documented by local historians and published by local presses. These books include: *Ōsaka no sensō iseki: gaidobukku* (Guidebook: War-Related Sites in Osaka), *Bokura no machi nimo sensō ga atta: Naganoken no sensō iseki* (There was War in Our Town Too: War-Related Sites in Nagano Prefecture), *Machi mo mura mo senjō datta; Gifuken no sensō iseki* (Cities and Towns Were Also "Battlefields": War-Related Sites in Gifu), *Fotogaido Tōkyō no sensō to heiwa o aruku* (A Pictorial Walking Tour of War and Peace in Tokyo), *Heiwa no tame no gaidobukku Okinawa: shizen, shima-jima, rekishi, bunka, senseki, kichi* (Guidebook for Peace: Nature, Islands, History, Culture, War-Related Sites, and Bases), *Kanagawaken no sensō iseki* (War-Related Sites in Kanagawa Prefecture), *Aichi no sensō iseki gaido* (Guidebook of War-Related Sites in Aichi Prefecture), *Mie no sensō iseki* (War-Related Sites in Mie), *Gaidobukku: Kōchi no sensō iseki* (Guidebook: War-Related Sites in Kochi Prefecture), *Shiraberu sensō iseki no jiten* (Dictionary for Researching War-Related Sites), and *Nihon no sensō iseki* (War-Related Sites). Local peace activists often organize tours for visitors to these sites to promote awareness of Japan's responsibility for the war and colonialism.

Conclusion

Since the late 1990s, many more accounts denying Japan's aggression in Asia have been published. A wide variety of academics, television commentators, journalists, and law makers have attempted to justify Japan's colonial rule in Korea and war crimes against Korean women and men. Racist demonstrations and hate speech in Japan have received worldwide attention. The current prime minister of Japan, Abe Shinzō, has been a supporter of Japan's largest revisionist organization, Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi). If Japanese society were monolithically embracing revisionist views, there would be no hope of promoting historical reconciliation between the two nations. Refuting such accounts is certainly imperative, but too much focus on them will not only hinder the process of historical reconciliation but also invigorate the revisionists, as confrontation with adversaries only furthers their growth. They have been desperate to silence those who examine the war and colonialism from a critical viewpoint, but it is obvious that they have not been successful in doing so. Moreover, it is unlikely that they will be able to succeed in the foreseeable future, as Japanese society has developed vigorous pacifist movements, including the movement that examines Japan's aggression and colonialism and the impact on the local populations.

Notes

1. This information was acquired on my visit to the museum on July 8, 2002.
2. As to how Christianity influenced Yoshino, see, for example, Peter Duus, "Yoshino Sakuzō: The Christian as Political Critic," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 4:2 (Summer, 1978): 301–26.
3. "Man-Kan o shisatsu shite." See Tadayoshi Matsuo and S. Takiguchi, "The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the Japan Congregational Church in Korea," *Modern Asian Studies* 13:3 (1979): 426.
4. Ibid.
5. Simon Suk Yeon Kim, "Korean Students in Imperial Japan: From Visionaries to Participants in Nation Building, 1910–45," Dissertation, Yale University (December 2005), 107.
6. Ibid., 117.
7. Ibid.
8. Shakai Mondai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, *Nihon hantei dōmei shiryō* (Tokyo: Tōyōbunkasha, 1980), 1–2; Fredrik Petersson, "*We Are Neither Visionaries*

nor Utopian Dreamers": *Willi Münzenberg, the League against Imperialism, and the Comintern, 1925–33*, Dissertation, Åbo Akademi University (May 2013), 2.

9. Shakai Mondai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, *Nihon hantei dōmei*, 3–5.
10. Shakai Mondai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, *Wagakuni ni okeru kyōsanshugi undōshi gairon* (Tokyo: Tōyōbunkasha, 1971), 176–85, 284.
11. Shakai Mondai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, *Chōsenjin no kyōsan shugi undō* (Tokyo: Tōyōbunkasha, 1973), 159–64.
12. Shakai Mondai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, *Wagakuni ni okeru kyōsanshugi*, 176–85, 284.
13. "Memorandum for the Supreme Commander Allied Powers" (10 September 1945), p. 2, Record Group 331, Box 8548, File 27, National Archives.
14. Takashi Yoshida, *From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace: War and Peace Museums in Japan, China, and South Korea* (Portland ME: MerwinAsia, 2014), 10–16.
15. See, for example, Etō Jun, *Tozasareta gengo kūkan, senryōgun no ken'etsu to sengo Nihon* (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1989), 234–35, 250–51.
16. United States Civil Intelligence Section, *Civil Intelligence Section, Periodical Summary*, no. 36 (15 Jan 1949) (Tokyo: Gendai shiryō shuppan, 2006), vol. 11, 16–21.
17. Rekishi Kyōikusha Kyōgikai, *Rekishi kyōiku gojūnen no ayumi to kadai* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1997), 109.
18. Pak Kyong-Sik, *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō minzoku mondai* (Tokyo: San'ichi shobō, 1992), 306–40.
19. Ibid., 609–10, 616–23, 643.
20. Tonomura Masaru, "Sengo ni okeru zai-Nichi Chōsenjin to Nihon shakai," *Nenpō Nihon gendaishi*, vol. 4 (1998), 114.
21. Pak Kyong-Sik, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1965).
22. Takashi Yoshida, *The Making of the Rape of Nanking: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 56.
23. Pak, *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō minzoku mondai*, 15.
24. Pak, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku*, 1–3.
25. Pak, *Zai-Nichi Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō minzoku mondai*, 635.
26. Ibid., 16.
27. Ibid.
28. Jōdo Takuya, *Chōsenjin no kyōsei renkō to chōyō* (Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha, 1992), 5–6.
29. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Letters to the Dead," in *East Asia beyond the History Wars* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 94.
30. Yoshida, *From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace*, 62–66.

31. Kazuhiko Kimijima, "The Continuing Legacy of Japanese Colonialism: The Japan–South Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks," in *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States*, ed. L. Hein and M. Selden (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 203–04.
32. Kimijima Kazuhiko, *Kyōkasho no shisō: Nihon to Kankoku no kingendaishi* (Tokyo: Suzusawa shoten, 1996), 29–30.
33. See, for example, Kimijima, *Kyōkasho no shisō*, 42–43.
34. Fujisawa Hōei, *Kankoku to no taiwa* (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1998), 210–13.
35. Saitō Kazuharu, *Chūgoku rekishi kyōkasho to higashi Ajia rekishi taiwa* (Tokyo: Kadensha, 2008), 18.
36. Ibid., 28–29.
37. Nit-Chū-Kan Sangoku Kyōtsū Rekishi Kyōzai Iinkai, *Mirai o hiraku rekishi: Higashi Ajia sangoku no kingendaishi* (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2005).
38. Saitō, *Chūgoku rekishi kyōkasho*, 81–82.
39. Ibid., 89–107.
40. Suzanne O'Brien, "Translator's Introduction," in *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II*, ed. Yoshimi Yoshiaki (New York: Columbia University, 2000), 6–7.
41. Matsui Yayori, "Sexual Slavery in Korea," trans. Lora Sharnoff, *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 2:1 (Spring 1977): 23.
42. Onna tachi no sensō to heiwa shiryōkan, *Matsui Yayori zenshigoto* (Tokyo: Onna tachi no sensō to heiwa shiryōkan, 2006), 38.
43. Ibid., 23–25.
44. Ibid.
45. Nik-Kan "josei" kyōdō rekishi kyōzai henshū iinkai, *Jendā no shiten kara miru Nik-Kan kingendaishi* (Tokyo: Nashinokisha, 2005).
46. Ibid., 351.
47. Yoshida, *From Cultures of War to Cultures of Peace*, 49–50, 55–56, 65, 67–68, 84–86, 97–98, 100–02, 172.
48. http://www.j-koreans.org/ (accessed March 7, 2014).
49. http://www.peace-aichi.com/index.html (accessed March 7, 2014).
50. Jūbishi Shunbu and Kikuchi Minoru, *Shiraberu sensō iseki no jiten* (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2002), 2.
51. The Association to Promote the Preservation of the Matsushiro Imperial General Headquarters, *The Imperial General Headquarters of Matsushiro Guide Book* (Nagano: Association to Promote the Preservation of the Matsushiro Imperial General Headquarters, 1997), np; Matsushiro Chōsenjin "ianfu" no ie o nokosō jikkō iinkai, *Matsushiro o aruku* (Nagano: "Mō hitotsu no rekishikan Matsushiro" kensetsu jikkō iinkai, 1996), 8.

CHAPTER 3

The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Postcolonial Japan: State, Shrine, and Honor for Ethnic Veterans, the Fallen, and their Bereaved

James Orr

States, nations, and individuals heal the wounds of war in many ways. The more noble efforts seek transcendent truths in the arts. They seek communal cohesion in secular and religious ritual. They seek reflective resolve in memorial sites, and restorative justice in reconciliation commissions. Usually, states take care to honor their fallen, and, in the words of Lincoln's Second Inaugural, attempt "to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan." But what happens when the resolution of war alters the makeup of state sovereignties, making national and state affiliations and identities ambiguous, and confusing obligations to aid the victims of war? What happens when the transition to a peaceful postwar society transforms authority structures incompletely, confusing privileges to honor the fallen?

Consider two such contradictory Japanese efforts at postwar healing and reconciliation regarding ethnic Korean and Taiwanese imperial ser-

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vice veterans, their fallen comrades, and bereaved families. I refer first to their *exclusion* from veteran benefits in the newly reconstituted postcolonial and mono-ethnic Japanese political community. The end of the US Occupation in 1952 left non-Japanese veterans disqualified from military pensions because they were no longer members of the newly reconstituted mono-ethnic Japanese political community. Second, in contrast to this *exclusion* is their continuing *inclusion* in enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine, a practice closely associated with militarism, glorification of war, the imperial tradition, and State Shinto. Due to the postwar separation of church and state, Yasukuni was removed from state control, ostensibly privatized as a religious organization and so insulated from the changed political sensibilities regarding its prewar public mandate. Accordingly, it continues to claim these same ethnic Taiwanese and Korean veterans' spirits, enshrining thousands of their number who died in imperial military service.

We should note from the start that defeat and occupation reform alienated many Japanese from the imperial state's war policies and its imperialist presumptions on its subjects. The experience fundamentally changed the nature of Japanese civil society. Revelations about Japanese perpetrations belied the imperial state's rhetoric about liberating Asia. There also arose a deep sense that the Japanese as a people had been misled and their trust betrayed by militarist leaders. In this atmosphere, "the ultimate sacrifice" in wartime service to the emperor, ethnos, and state came to be seen in many quarters as meaningless death; as Oda Makoto observed, a "dog's death."[1] Acceptance of an authoritarian regime of domestic control, including institutionalized state religion and suppression of civil liberties, broadly came to be understood as antithetical to public welfare as well as personal wellbeing. Furthermore, with the loss of colonial territories along with their necessarily multi-ethnic imperial subjectivities, the mono-ethnic conception of national subjectivity went mostly unquestioned.[2] An ideology of war victimhood emerged to support a widespread, deeply held pacifist and, significantly for our purpose, mono-ethnic national identity that envisioned postwar Japan as a cultured, peace-loving nation unwilling to fight any more wars.[3]

This resolve was institutionalized in the 1947 Constitution, a constitution written by General MacArthur's staff but embraced by the vast majority of Japanese because along with Article Nine's renunciation of war, it included guarantees of civil liberties and representative government. In the Meiji Constitution, informed by the nineteenth-century legal doctrines of social monarchy and social freedom that privileged community

good over individual freedom, the rights and duties of imperial subjects were subordinated to the Emperor's prerogatives, explicitly so in times of war and national emergency (Meiji Article 31).[4] Constitutional order was implemented in the framework of the family state and emperor system ideologies. Under the 1947 Constitution, the individual's rights were made paramount, "the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs" (1947 Article 13), eliminating the Meiji Constitution limitation of rights to those "not antagonistic to their duties as subjects" (Meiji Article 28). Furthermore, Article 20 of the 1947 Constitution explicitly guarantees separation of church and state. In postwar Japan, these constitutional provisions and the popular embrace of peace and civil liberties, often carrying with it a distrust of the state and its calls for sacrifice of a military sort, complicated efforts by the dominant post-Occupation conservative governments to revive a conventional form of patriotism. Especially controversial has been patriotism that valorized military service and legitimized more intrusive state management of a citizen's private life. How could one praise military service, for example, after a war that many if not most condemned for betraying the citizen's trust in state leadership?

In discussing our current topic, we need to recognize the reality that postwar Japanese civil society differs from the prewar in three significant discourses that constructed postwar Japan: first as a pacifist, second as a mono-ethnic, and third as a liberal society.

Ethnic Korean and Taiwanese Exclusion from Veteran's Benefits

Although Korea and Taiwan had been colonial possessions for decades, it was mainly after the outbreak of hostilities in 1937 that the Japanese state became serious about incorporating colonial peoples fully into the life of the imperium. The *kōminka* or "imperial subjectivization" program, as Takashi Fujitani aptly translates it, Japanized colonial life using the iron fist with compulsory participation in State Shinto ritual at newly built state shrines, adoption of Japanese names and Japanese as the language of instruction, as well as Japanese military service. Koreans were allowed to volunteer for the Army from 1938, and Taiwanese from 1942; both ethnicities could volunteer for the Navy from August 1943. Conscription for Koreans began in 1944, for Taiwanese in 1945.[5] About 570,000 ethnic Korean and Taiwanese served in military and civilian auxiliary capacities, of whom some 48,000 died while in service.

After the war, the US Occupation authorities ended military benefits as a logical extension of the demilitarization of Japan, and for the duration of the Occupation, military-related persons had access only to general welfare programs. But on formal independence in 1952, the government appears to have had little difficulty in reinstating military benefits for Japanese nationals under the principle of "state compensation" (*kokka hoshō*). Ethnic Taiwanese and Koreans did not receive benefits, however, because Japan's defeat brought the loss of empire, and with it, the loss of Japanese citizenship.[6] The assumption at the time seems to have been that their interests would be represented by the states they now belonged to, and that the issue of postcolonial compensation would be taken up in bilateral negotiations with the respective postcolonial governments. This did not happen easily. As for the Taiwanese, Japan signed a treaty with the Nationalist Chinese government in 1952 that left the issue to future discussion, but neither government was overly motivated to deal with it, and the situation was further complicated when Japan switched diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the early 1970s. At that time, the PRC waived all claims, effectively leaving former colonials in the Republic of China without a state advocate.[7] In the case of the Koreans, the Korean War upheaval preempted the issue for some time. The normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965 did include a lump-sum payment to South Korea that was used in part to pay compensation to bereaved families resident in Korea, but Koreans resident in Japan were excluded from these payments. The issue was further complicated by the North Korean citizenship of many ethnic Koreans resident in Japan.

It has been the official Japanese government position that colonial veteran and bereaved family claims are null because of these interstate agreements. In other words, even though as former imperial subjects these men served in the Japanese military, they have been divested of the privilege to special state consideration because of their non-Japanese ethnicity and (accordingly) changed postcolonial nationality. Given this neglect, the Korean and Chinese governments share some responsibility for this disenfranchisement. Ironically, even though postwar Japan has a legal and political system that protects the rights of the individual against the claims of the state, these men lost such rights within the Japanese polity due to their revised national status or group identity and what amount to legal technicalities and diplomatic convenience.

Beyond the legal questions, though, lie issues of personal and national subjectivity. Wartime Japan was a "Great Empire" encompassing many ethnic nations as subjects of the Shōwa Emperor. The accretion of empire in the early twentieth century required modification of earlier late nineteenth-century ideologies that had originally helped constitute Japan as a modern, mono-ethnic nation-state—in one prominent articulation, a "family state" unified by ties of blood that linked all to the imperial family, consecrated in a civic religion known as State Shinto. These ideologies had to accommodate multi-ethnic, typically assimilationist conceptions of imperium that integrated Korean, Taiwanese, and inferentially during the expansionist days of the war other Asian peoples, as loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor. Inevitably, mono-ethnic conceptions of the purity of Japanese blood and spirit clashed and intermingled with these new multi-ethnic understandings of the imperial family writ large. Although they had been exempt from the military draft until late in the 1930s and early 1940s, manpower shortages during the war led to special volunteer systems and eventual conscription for Korean and Taiwanese colonials so that, as mentioned earlier, over half a million served in the imperial forces, as soldiers and civilian auxiliaries.[8] The loss of empire led to the resurgence of the mono-ethnic definition of Japanese-ness.[9] In retrospect, it seems a natural thing to have happened given the geopolitical realities. Postwar Japan, then, emerged as a mono-ethnic democracy that excluded resident ethnic minorities from many of the rights and privileges of the social–political compact.

Colonial veterans were not without exceptional Japanese advocates. Popular rejection of war and discomfort over collective remembrance delayed the first postindependence national memorial service until August 1963. But in that same month, Nippon Terebi (NTV) broadcast a caustic and graphic Ōshima Nagisa documentary entitled *Wasurerareta kōgun* or "Forgotten Imperial Army." The film focused on the plight of a small group of disabled Korean veterans known as the *Moto Nihongun Zainichi Kankokujin Shōigunjin-kai*, or the "Association of War-Disabled Korean Veterans of Japan."[10] An early episode in the film illustrates its tenor. With the 1937 *gunka* "Camp Song" (*Roei no uta*) audible in the back soundtrack, the documentary follows this group making a round of formal visits to Japanese government offices with their petition for treatment equal to Japanese wounded veterans. Turned down at every office from the Prime Minister's residence to the Foreign Ministry, the petitioning episode ends with the veterans hobbling away from the Diet building.

The extradiegetic music shifts at this point to a harsh Art Blakey jazz drum riff intended, as recollected by the film's music director, to echo African-American anger over discrimination and prejudice akin to the *zainichi* experience.[11]

The film thus traces the Korean veterans' political subjectivity from imperial soldiers performing their duties to the emperor and state to discriminated and effectively stateless minority in a postwar democracy. Ōshima's documentary is an exhortation to Japanese to fulfill a moral obligation to these men. But it is unclear in what capacity they should be honored, as loyal Japanese soldiers or as maltreated foreign nationals. In actuality, in 1962, the Health and Welfare Ministry had issued a circular indicating that Korean and Taiwanese veterans could receive assistance provided they gained Japanese citizenship and complied with family registry regulations. And in point of fact, 15 of the 17 members of this group did eventually naturalize for this reason. In 1966, after normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea, the ministry ended even this avenue for naturalized ethnic Korean veterans.[12]

Ōshima's documentary constituted a challenge both to postwar monoethnicity and to tendencies in the Japanese war victim discourse to neglect Japanese predations against nonethnic Japanese in Asia, imperial subject or not. This relative silence eroded in the late 1960s and 1970s for a variety of reasons. Awareness of Asian sensibilities and hence of other perspectives on the war were encouraged by Japanese government support for the US war in Vietnam, the resumption of diplomatic relations with mainland China, and the increase in Japanese trade in the region.[13] It was also in the early 1970s that a handful of Japanese wartime holdouts emerged from the jungles of Guam (Yokoi Shōichi 1972) and the Philippines (Onoda Hirō 1974), to much Japanese acclaim, and unease, for their fidelity to imperial duty was inspiring and disturbing. The last soldier widely reported to reappear was Taiwanese native and Imperial Japanese private Nakamura Teruo (aboriginal name is Attun Palalin; Chinese name is Li Guang-hui). His appearance out of the jungles of the Indonesian island of Morotai in late 1974, and his perceived ill treatment by the Japanese government brought to general sympathetic attention the fact that former Taiwanese imperial soldiers were not receiving pensions, nor even back pay.[14]

Japanese citizen groups formed to sponsor court challenges and pressure for legislation to make amends, for reasons of moral obligation, humanitarian concern, and national honor. Many Japanese continue to be sympathetic to the plight of Korean and Taiwanese veterans despite the

court system's formalistic rejection of their suits. The Japanese judiciary, for its part, lacks the activist tradition of judicial review in the American court system, and it demurs from mandating bureaucratic policy change. But the courts usually recognize implicitly the moral claim that Korean and Taiwanese veterans have been put at disadvantage compared to Japanese nationals, and typically encourage government agencies and the legislature to attend to their abandonment and rebuild international trust.[15]

In the case of Taiwanese, there had already been discussions in the Diet to legislate aid as early as 1968, and a Diet study group formed in 1977. In that year, 14 disabled Taiwanese veterans and bereaved families sued the Japanese government in the Tokyo District Court for equal treatment. At every stage of this litigation, in the February 1982 district court ruling against the plaintiffs, in the Tokyo High Court appeal dismissal of August 1985, and in the Supreme Court's April 1992 decision, the courts expressed understanding but ultimately ruled that the nationality restrictions made administrative sense given the contemporary expectations at the time of the early postwar international agreements. Litigation by Korean veterans for equal compensation has followed the same trajectory, with the wrinkle that the 1965 diplomatic agreement with South Korea ended formal legal Japanese state responsibility.[16]

The court rulings in the middle 1980s spurred further political efforts for redress. In 1987, the Diet formed a special consolation fund for Taiwanese distributed through the Red Cross. So as not to incur state responsibility, it was made explicit that this was a humanitarian act, and did not constitute state compensation as the benefits to Japanese nationals did.[17]

Ethnic Korean and Taiwanese Inclusion in Yasukuni Enshrinement

Where Taiwanese and Korean veterans have been disenfranchised of citizenship rights in the postwar political order, the spirits of their fallen comrades-in-arms remain enshrined in Yasukuni under the ideological presumptions of the wartime Japanese imperium. During the Occupation, the Americans instituted the principle of separation of church and state, freeing Yasukuni from political pressure to reflect national consensus regarding war; so, Yasukuni remains a symbol of wartime Japan and patriotic loyalty of an imperial sort. The enshrinement of 14 convicted A-class war criminals in 1978 has, rightly or wrongly, cemented Yasukuni as a

symbol of the worst of wartime Japan for both foreign states (signifying a war of aggression and military predations on foreign soil) and domestic civil rights activists (signifying the wartime leadership's betrayal of civic trust).[18]

Yasukuni Shrine was founded in 1869 (as Shōkonsha), renamed Yasukuni in 1879, to enshrine the spirits of all those who died fighting for the restoration of imperial rule. With imperial expansion, Yasukuni became closely connected not just with State Shinto but also with the imperial Army and Navy, the chief priest often having a military background.[19] To date, Japan has no real equivalent to a nationally supported, interfaith cemetery such as the Arlington National Cemetery outside of Washington, D.C., and only a partial equivalent to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier (Chidorigafuchi War Cemetery Garden).[20] The reason is a division between those who would support Yasukuni's prior claim to the exclusive privilege to honor national war dead, and those troubled by its intimate connection with wars of aggression, state religion, and its presumptive state claims on the lives of imperial subjects.

As a legacy of its special role in the prewar imperial ideologies, Yasukuni commands the enduring respect of conservative politicians. The Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, the major organization for families of military war dead, is especially known for advocating state support of Yasukuni Shrine, a controversial position that challenges both the postwar pacifist ethos and the principle of separation of church and state. In the early postwar years, the Association membership struggled over whether honoring the war dead should constitute glorification of military sacrifice or the contrary resolve to reject war in the future. Since the early 1950s, however, the organization has gradually shifted its emphasis toward "honoring the heroic spirits" of the military dead (*eirei no kenshō*), campaigning for reinstatement of government support for the shrine, and advocating official ministerial visits to Yasukuni.[21]

As part of its early efforts to rescind liberal elements of the Occupation legacy, in the late 1950s, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) began studying the renationalization of Yasukuni, though bills in the Diet to this effect have never passed.[22] And there is some indication interested parties have expanded enshrinement as a means of solidifying Bereaved Families Association support for the ruling LDP.[23] Whatever the case, in the years following the war, Yasukuni, in collaboration with the Health and Welfare Ministry, vastly expanded eligibility for enshrinement in general. Beforehand, battle death or wounds suffered on duty

was prerequisite. Afterwards, simply dying while on official duty sufficed. A total of 2,091,206 or just under 85 % of the 2,466,000 spirits at Yasukuni were enshrined after the war under the later lax rules.[24]

The fact that colonial fallen are on Yasukuni's rolls came to public attention in 1977 when the shrine asked a group of visiting Taiwanese to deliver notification of enshrinement to their families in Taiwan. Neither these Taiwanese families nor their Korean counterparts had previously been notified of their deceased's enshrinement.[25] There have been many demands for reversal of enshrinement at Yasukuni and other former State Shinto shrines over the years, but the shrines have jealously guarded their enshrined war heroes. Lawsuits to force Yasukuni to remove the names of certain "heroic spirits," brought not just by Taiwanese and Korean families but also by Okinawan, Christian and pacifist bereaved Japanese families, and by those who strive to protect the principle of separation of church and state, have achieved only marginal and temporary success before being overturned in higher courts.

At the time of writing, the most recent court ruling in this regard was rendered in Tokyo High Court on October 23, 2013, rejecting a suit brought by a small group of bereaved Korean families. The suits usually arise, as in this case, when Yasukuni refuses bereaved family requests for the spirits' removal from the enshrinement rolls. The shrine takes a doctrinal position that once enshrined (*gōshi*) the comingled spirits cannot be removed. The government is usually also sued because of administrative support given to Yasukuni in providing the lists of fallen. Again as in this case, courts typically find first that Yasukuni Shrine's activities are religious practices so the government cannot intervene, to do so would itself be a violation of the separation of church and state. Second, courts rule that the provision of lists such as the Health and Welfare Ministry provides are a part of routine administrative public service and cannot be argued to constitute government support of a particular religious practice.[26]

Especially noteworthy among the many suits is the latest brought by families of Okinawa war victims who were enshrined, unbeknownst to their family members, by the Shrine from October 1950 to October 1967. Okinawans were made eligible for the war-wounded and war-bereaved family assistance law in 1953, and by 1957, the Ministry of Health and Welfare had determined some 20 categories of war participation that qualified. In addition to those directly involved in battle, the categories included a wide range of Okinawans from civilian food and transportation workers and youth volunteer corps to participants in group suicide

(*shūdan jiketsu*). Soon after applications were accepted for the assistance law in 1958, the Ministry provided to Yasukuni the particulars of eligible individuals who were in turn enshrined. Most were enshrined from 1955 to 1959, but most striking was the 1967 enshrinement of a one-year-old who was deemed to have died consequent to military action and so eligible under the postwar criteria. Tried in the Naha Regional Court and then the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch, the rulings delivered on the first trial in October 2010 and on appeal in September 2011 followed the same pattern as the Korean ruling of the following year, mentioned above. While recognizing that government ministries provided Yasukuni with the information that enabled the enshrinement, the courts ruled that such assistance did not rise to the level of state aid to the ritual itself and violation of Article 20. Yasukuni Shrine's right to enshrine war dead trumped family rights to honor their dead.[27]

Comments

At war's end, the separation of church and state set Yasukuni as an institution loose from the dictates of state control; hence, it retains several imperialist presumptions of the wartime order. One is the glorification of military service, something the politically accountable postwar governments, until most recently, were unable to do.[28] Another is the conceit that the benevolence of Japanese imperial rule would naturally spread over multiple ethnic subaltern groups. Then there is the more extensive emperor system expectation that individual private interests, Japanese and subaltern, would be subordinate to the communal state interest. The crux of the issue here is that these wartime sensibilities, all of which are at odds with dominant postwar national identities, peace sentiments, and the established domestic civil liberty compact, are why Yasukuni refusal to strike former colonials and similarly aggrieved Japanese nationals from their enshrinement rolls continues to rile.

The politics of constitutional revision go far beyond the limits of our current discussion, but Yasukuni's enshrinement of Taiwanese and Korean War dead, appropriating their deaths as "heroic" sacrifices for the Japanese emperor, naturally elicit domestic fears of a repressive internal political order and regional fears of a remilitarized Japan with imperialist objectives. These dire possibilities seem less inconceivable these last few years, which have seen a gradual trend toward popular acceptance of the use of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in external military conflicts, the formal

adoption of a national flag and anthem, and, especially in the post-9/11 environment, renewed conservative efforts to revise the constitution.[29] As in the USA, under the rubric of special counter-terrorism measures, the government has expanded the permissible range of state activity in the name of national security. And most recently, conservative effectiveness in reorienting education curricula away from cultivating individuality toward developing respect for tradition and love of country seems to represent a trend toward a more state-oriented society.[30]

Postwar Japan was also postcolonial Japan. There emerged new identities and new legitimization or institutionalization of preexisting subjectivities that had been suppressed at the height of empire. Taking a step back from Japan, there has also been the evolution of a new moral economy globally, with higher expectations for restitution and hope for healing wounds of war.[31] Apology is every bit as important to this moral economy as money. In 1995, then Prime Minister Murayama, leader of the Japan Socialist Party heading up a coalition government, attempted to get consensus on a government apology for Japan's war conduct, but under those political conditions, he could only muster an evasive statement expressing regret for the war that dissatisfied those wanting an open apology. The Bereaved Families Association was vehemently opposed to any true apology, characterizing such intentions as a desecration to the memory of the heroic spirits. This outrage reflects the Association leadership's underlying resistance to altering an anachronistic view of the past, including a resistance to recognizing the repression inherent in the wartime mobilization and deaths of ethnic Korean and Taiwanese soldiers and their postwar mobilization for Yasukuni's glorification of military service for the emperor.[32] This attitude is also resonant with resistance to according ethnic Taiwanese and Koreans the same civil and social liberties that postwar Japanese enjoy in their democracy—the attitude one sensed in former Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō's references to "third-country persons."

On the one hand, Yasukuni's presumption to include ethnic colonials among the "honored" shrine spirits, ignoring their subaltern status, and on the other hand, the postwar "liberal" state's insistence to exclude the same—both ultimately exclude from full privilege. They both suppress acknowledgment of discrimination. It is to the Japanese judiciary's credit that while adopting a formalistic interpretation of the law, they recognize the inequity and call on the legislature and ministries to make it right.

It should also be acknowledged that not everyone necessarily shares the same subjectivity at the same time. As these postcolonial communities come into their own as entities apart from greater Japan, and gain partial and incomplete affiliation with new postcolonial governments (and their sensibilities), what had been for many a common acceptance of duty to Japanese empire is reinterpreted, re-membered, if you will, as imperialist oppression. Identities shift along with lived realities. A good example here I think is Nakamura Teruo/Suniyon/Attun Palalin/Li Guang-hui, the imperial army private who, when he came out of the jungle in 1974, identified himself as Japanese. He had volunteered for service, and when asked by skeptics if he had been forced to volunteer, he said simply that in those days when called to do something you did it.[33] Japanese conservatives who were excited by his devotion to service wanted to bring him to Japan. He just wanted to go home, but his home was now Taiwan in the Republic of China, not part of Japan. Most of the wounded Korean veterans in Ōshima's 1963 documentary chose to naturalize as Japanese in order to receive equivalent treatment as Japanese. That may have been a logical and pragmatic solution for these men, but when ethnic and national identities are confused, is it right to require renunciation of ethnicity in order to be treated fairly?

So what does the Taiwanese and Korean veteran experience tell us about the nature of postwar Japanese sensibilities in regard to reconciliation, civic duty and government obligation, and ethnic and national identities? A conflict of principles and a limitation of possibilities arose with the end of the Japanese empire. For one thing, the narrowing of the Japanese body politic into a mono-ethnic community disenfranchised now former imperial subjects who were Korean and Taiwanese. In reinstating military pensions and bereavement payments in 1952, was it really necessary for the Japanese establishment to restrict benefits to ethnic Japanese? After all, the Japanese polity still had a collective moral responsibility to those individuals who had sacrificed and served it as imperial subjects, and, one would think, at a minimum a contractual obligation. Yet, exclude these former imperial subjects is what they in effect did by creating citizenship as a requirement. Fiscal restraints must have come into play, and expectations of future international agreements that never occurred, but the Japanese state seems ultimately to have been dilatory in responsibly fulfilling its obligations to its former imperial servicemen. While as individuals these veterans were every bit as deserving of postwar state restitution, their ambiguous and ambivalent status as members of national groups severed

from the Japanese whole trumped their individual claims. In other words, the social contract that existed in imperial Japan assumed that the imperial state would take care of those who served it, but was replaced with a social contract of ethnic loyalty reified by international circumstance. In this conception, the postwar state had a new social contract with a smaller population. Yet the postwar Japanese state retained the essential prewar symbol of state, the Shōwa Emperor. Ostensibly, he and his successors are now symbols of the unity of the people and the state, but like any symbol, he can represent different things to different people.

Yasukuni Shrine was able to continue honoring those imperial loyalties precisely because it was legally if not ideologically "privatized" during the Allied occupation. This is the crux of the conflict over postwar state resistance to compensating colonial veterans and benign neglect toward Yasukuni. Yasukuni ritual was inextricably "public" and state sanctioned until the Occupation reforms, but that ritual still presumes to be public even after privatization. It is not just a question of separation of church and state, as the Americans insisted. It is Yasukuni's public service pretensions that cause problems for the postwar state. If prime ministers embrace the imperialist pretensions too openly, they lay themselves open to charges of violating the postwar democratic principle that Japan is a peace-loving, liberal state. So they have in the past ambiguously insisted that their visits were private acts, intended to honor the sacrifice to the postwar nation and contributions to the peace … or is it the imperial ideal? Where does one leave private allegiances behind and take up public ones? And if such ministerial visits, judicial allowances, and bureaucratic accommodation ever come to be recognized as publicly sanctioned, state support for Yasukuni, then would not that expose Yasukuni to political pressure to change its practices and mission?

Japanese society has undergone remarkable internationalization in the last few decades and the state has made considerable accommodation of this reality, while expressions of national pride have gained a wider sway. As for Yasukuni, the Chinreisha shrine on its grounds, founded in 1965 to recognize and honor fallen enemy combatants, has been released from the girdling steel fencing that hid it from view in the 1980s and 1990s. And the revelation that the Shōwa Emperor himself was uncomfortable with the enshrinement of A-class war criminals gives imperial sanction for honoring international sensibilities and rejecting historical revision.[34]

In his introduction to this volume, Peter Duus suggests that the history wars might be resolved through negotiation of the politically possible and

morally responsible, rather than through oppositional litigation. Yet laws are the state's way of codifying political and moral determinations, and if citizen groups continue their efforts at litigation, someday the Japanese courts may decide to engage more proactively in judicial review. Politics and morality shift with the winds of personal and communal subjectivities. An increasingly cosmopolitan yet nationalistic Japanese society will harbor contradictions. The questions to be determined are what communal values will prevail, and whether individual liberties and communal prerogatives are themselves contradictory.

Notes

1. Oda, *"Nanshi" no shisō.*
2. Oguma, *A Genealogy of "Japanese" Self-images.*
3. Orr, *The Victim as Hero.*
4. Beasley, "Meiji Political Institutions," 662–63.
5. I refer of course to commoner Koreans and not to nobility such as Prince Yi Wu, perhaps the most famous Korean of that class who served in the Japanese imperial army. Regarding *kōminka*, as Fujitani elaborates, "In general, this campaign of assimilation to Japaneseness is usually understood as seeking to extinguish the unique cultural life and traditions of the colonized peoples—or in the often-used expression, to 'obliterate the [Korean] ethnos' (*minzoku massatsu*). And within this context, the policy of enlisting colonial subjects into the military is generally explained as an attempt to demonstrate to Koreans and Taiwanese that the Japanese regarded them as their equals, even when they did not." Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, 37 ff. For a fuller consideration of the *kōminka* movement and colonial Japanese identities, see Ching, *Becoming "Japanese."*
6. For an extended discussion see Schmidt, "Disabled Colonial Veterans."
7. The Nationalist Chinese, engaged in ensconcing itself on Taiwan, were worried about compensation claims for lost Japanese property on Taiwan in addition to a natural reluctance to attend to the needs of Taiwanese who had recently fought against them. See Miyazaki, "Mō hitotsu no sensō sekinin," 28–31. Article 3 of the Republic of China–Japan Peace Treaty of 1952 deferred claims of former Japanese imperial soldiers to later discussion. As stated in the text, the PRC waived all claims. See Schmidt, "Disabled Colonial Veterans," 252.
8. In 1938, the Information Department of the Government General of Korea asserted the following multi-ethnic loyalties of Koreans who were volunteering for service. "The China Incident was the storm that … stirred awake the Japanese consciousness that had been sleeping deep within the

hearts of our Korean brethren. It gave fire to the mutual sympathy between Mainlanders and Koreans, a sympathy destined by blood. The ardent wish arose like a surging tide: 'Insofar as we are Japanese, we hope to serve as humble shields [for the nation] as members of the glorious Imperial Forces.'" Chōsen Sōtokufu Jōhōkyoku, *Atarashiki Chōsen* [The New Korea] (reprinted, Tokyo: Fūtōsha, 1982), 7. As quoted in Utsumi, "Korean 'Imperial Soldiers,'" 204–05.

9. Oguma, *A Genealogy of "Japanese" Self-images.*
10. As of April 2015 the film is viewable on the website "Daily Motion" at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x19kv93_忘れられた皇軍兵士_shortfilms
11. Music director Morimoto Takao reports that he chose the Art Blakey piece because African-Americans at the time knew what it was like to be discriminated against and oppressed. As interviewed in a Nippon Terebi documentary retrospective, "Hankotsu no dokyumentarisuto—Ōshima Nagisa—Wasurerareta kōgun to iu shōgeki," broadcast January 12, 2014. Available on the Daily Motion website cited above. The veterans are also shown being turned away from the South Korean diplomatic offices.
12. Schmidt, "Disabled Colonial Veterans," 239, n. 49.
13. Orr, *The Victim as Hero.*
14. Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers*, 160–78.
15. In the words of the 1985 Tokyo High Court decision, "it is expected that the government will overcome diplomatic, financial, political and legal problems and to clear away these disadvantages and increase international credibility." Schmidt, "Disabled Colonial Veterans," 241. For an exploration of the psychology of Taiwanese soldiers, see Chen, "Imperial Army Betrayed."
16. For a thorough English-language treatment of the Sok Song-gi and Chin Sok-ii case, see Schmidt, "Disabled Colonial Veterans," 242 ff.
17. Ibid., 241–42. The Asian Women's Fund set up in 1994 by the Japanese for the former "comfort women" took a similar form.
18. Han, "'Yasukuni Ajia-saiban' ni taisuru kōsatsu," 8. A-class war criminals were enshrined by virtue of their eligibility under the Families of the War Dead Assistance Law and Pension Law, as determined by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Shrine began receiving their names in 1966, and waited until 1978 to enshrine them all. Shimokoji, "Historical Issues in Japanese Diplomacy," 27–28.
19. Han, "'Yasukuni Ajia-saiban' ni taisuru kōsatsu." There actually exists a small side shrine, the Chinreisha or "spirit pacifying shrine," for Japanese who died in conflicts but were deemed not suitable for sanctuary in the main shrine, and for all foreign war dead. For a discussion of sites of remembrance at Yasukuni, see Breen, *Yasukuni: The War Dead.*

20. Chidorigafuchi was completed in March 1959 to harbor the ashes of some 348,800 military and military employees who died overseas and had no relatives to accept their repatriated remains. Tanaka, "Yasukuni Soshō ga tou shushō no sanpai."
21. Besides promoting the welfare of bereaved families, the Bereaved Families Association's predecessor organization's founding charter included among its goals "the construction of a peaceful Japan," "the welfare of all humanity," "the prevention of war," and "the establishment of perpetual world peace." In 1962, convicted A-class war criminal Kaya Okinori became the Association's Chair, and in 1964, the logo "prevention of war" was dropped from its newsletter heading. Tanaka argues that under Kaya's leadership, the Bereaved Families Association moved more rapidly toward advocating state support for Yasukuni and affirming military service as the locus of honoring the "heroic spirits." Tanaka, "Nihon Izokukai no 50-nen."
22. See Breen, *Yasukuni: The War Dead*, 20, 159.
23. Takenaka, "Enshrinement Politics."
24. Ibid. Takenaka states that only 251,135 of the total enshrinements for those who died in the conflict between September 1931 and August 1945 were conducted before April 1945, the last official enshrinement ceremony before defeat.
25. Near the end of the war the practice of publication (and presumably notification) of the names of those enshrined was ended. See ibid.
26. *Chosun online*, October 23, 2013 and January 13, 2014. Accessed April 2, 2014. The same month that the Tokyo High Court rendered this rejection of the Korean plaintiffs suit, another group of 27 bereaved family members of Korean fallen sued Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese government both for removal from shrine lists and for compensation due to infringement on their rights on how to honor their dead. *Asahi shinbun digital*, October 22, 2013, accessed April 5, 2014.
27. See Takara, "Okinawa Yasukuni Jinja gōshi torikeshi soshō." See the Japanese court system website, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20101202213911.pdf, for the ruling text itself (accessed April 11, 2014). See also Norma Field's discussion of a Christian widow's frustrated encounter with the state and the Yamaguchi Prefectural national defense shrine in Field, *In the Realm*.
28. Ever since Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's quasi-official visits to Yasukuni in the 1980s, high-level government officials' visits to the shrine have made it the focus of suspicion, both at home and abroad, that Japan would revert to its wartime imperialist predilections. The issue has become especially fraught with difficulty in the last few years, since the government has made significant strides toward reinstituting its military as an instru-

ment to be used in foreign policy, and in gaining popular acceptance of conventional patriotism. The first Gulf War in the early 1990s led to Japan's current military (the Self-Defense Forces) participation in UN-sponsored peace-keeping operations. And in the summer of 1999, conservative forces succeeded in making official the use of the *hinomaru* as national flag and the *kimigayo* as national anthem. But especially remarkably, in this post 9/11 environment, the government succeeded in legalizing a military mission in support of the "coalition of the willing" under the rubric of anti-terrorism special measures.

29. The 2014 LDP organization of constitutional revision assemblies, as reported in the Japanese press, is the latest effort to increase the state's prerogatives.
30. Compare the 1947 Fundamental Law on Education (http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/jamesorr/FundamentalLawonEducation1947.htm) with the 2006 revision (http://www.mext.go.jp/english/lawandplan/1303462.htm). For a useful summary of these efforts, see also Koide, "Critical New Stage."
31. See Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations.*
32. See, for example, Trefalt, *Japanese Army Stragglers*, 170–71. It is often stated that they were used as "cannon fodder," less well equipped than their Japanese brethren and sent on the most difficult missions in tune with the idea that indigenous Taiwanese were especially agile and able to move quickly and quietly in the jungle.
33. Ibid., 171.
34. See Breen, *Yasukuni: The War Dead*, 1–12.

CHAPTER 4

The "East Asian History" Elective in Korean High Schools: An Attempt at Reflective Education in Transnational Space

Nan Hee Ku

Abstract Since 2012, Korean high schools have been offering a completely new class, East Asian History. This new subject draws attention for its attempts to break the paradigm of current history education and pursue new methodologies and challenges to historical studies. What then is the reason why existing history education has come under challenge in Korea, and what are the outcomes? And what significance do those outcomes have beyond history education? This is the focus of this chapter. This chapter also treats the intention and objective as well as strategic objective of introducing this subject. I have focused my analysis on fundamental selection of contents and the examples used to illustrate the various historical events in East Asia. The narrative structure can be analyzed into five content organization principles as relativization, reconciliation, recognition, cooperation, and universality. And this chapter introduced some description cases and learning classes for these principles. Although there are yet many tasks to overcome to gain grounds in Korea, the attempt for a reflective history

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education in Korean high schools is opening a new era of transnational reconciliation and cooperation.

Introduction

Since 2012, Korean high schools have been offering a completely new class, East Asian History.[1] The name East Asian History naturally draws wide attention because such a class has never been attempted at secondary level in East Asia, or outside the region. This class's importance, however, is less in its name than in the methodology it pursues to understand history and the events it covers. Besides the novelty of the name, this new subject draws attention for its attempts to break the paradigm of current history education and pursue new methodologies and challenges to historical studies.

When addressing the course and its purpose, the curriculum document describes it as "an elective that aims at understanding human activities in East Asia and their cultural heritage in a historical context to enhance the understanding of this region," and notes further that it "aims at fostering the vision and attitude in pursuit of regional co-development and peace."

In addition, the purpose of opening this class lies in "creating an interest to achieve communal peace and prosperity based on reconciliation and collaboration by cultivating a balanced and objective understanding and ability to analyze East Asia's past and present."[2]

The first point of focus in these statements is the regional definition of "East Asia." The disciplinary approach to historiography in East Asia, including in Korea, has maintained a distinction between national and world history, and this same division has been observed in South Korean classrooms. The East Asian History elective goes beyond this blind spot, creating a new regional history by combining national and world history.

Secondly, this class endeavors to establish a new priority on development and peace in East Asia as a community. Traditionally, national history has adhered to an ethnocentric educational system, and focused on shaping the national identity of a people within their own country. At the same time, world history conveyed an understanding of many countries through a West-centric (or China-centric) lens. East Asian History, on the other hand, forms a regional history that extricates itself from Euro-centric and China-centric teachings through adopting an open and objective perspective on each of its constituent nations. In other words, it provides

a new perception for understanding the diverse historical developments and identities of one's own country within East Asia and its communal regional order.[3]

What then is the reason why existing history education has come under challenge in Korea, and what are the outcomes? Moreover, what significance do those outcomes have beyond history education when considering East Asian society? This is the focus of this chapter. First, I will examine the background of creating the East Asian History elective, noting the differences from the previous history curriculum. Next, I will closely analyze the narrative structure of its approved texts to show how the values claimed for East Asian History in its curriculum document are reflected in the textbooks. Lastly, I will present my findings collected in the classroom concerning actual outcomes and analyze their implications for new challenges and a future outlook for this course.

My conclusions must be somewhat tentative as East Asian History has only been offered in classrooms for the past three years or so. Given this short period, it may be too early to identify and examine the characteristics and outcomes of the course with unwavering certainty. Nevertheless, the approach taken by this new elective is sufficiently innovative and important that an interim report is justifiable even though the findings are partial, based on personal observations and networks, and may not be absolutely accurate.

Background and Current Status of East Asian History

There are several background factors behind the development of East Asian History in Korea, but the most important motive was the demand for new history education caused by its historical conflicts with Japan and China. Because in order to deal with it, the recognition that they should correct their own problems at first has been shaped.

In 2001, news of the Japanese Ministry of Education's official authorization of the Fusōsha textbook commissioned by the revisionist social movement group Tuskuru Kai caused widespread criticism in diverse circles in East Asia. In the beginning, criticism was heavily emotional, similar to the civil movements in the 1980s in South Korea that saw the issuing of signed petitions and holding of demonstrations. Yet, as time went by, the issue was no longer a conflict between two nations, but instead a frontline

formed between two opposing forces: one fanning the flames of the textbook dispute, the other trying to resolve it. The group merely fueling the dispute was isolated and closed, while the latter group trying to resolve textbook issues was forming a consensus at a world citizen level.

In order to subsidize this movement, the Korean government came forward with an agenda of history education for peaceful co-existence in international society. In May 2001, the Korean government officially suggested holding an East Asian regional conference to correct the history textbook distortion by Japan during the 161st United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Executive Board. In October of that year, the Korea–Japan summit agreed on a Japan–South Korea Joint History Research. Accordingly, the committee was founded in March 2002, and full-fledged research proceeded from 2003 to 2010. However, while some exchange on the academic outcome of detailed topics was successful, the joint research team did not reach sufficient common ground that could be reflected in textbooks or in academic studies.

While the government-supported went forward, joint research in the civil society sector beyond the national level has gained numerous results through researching textbook communication and arranging for alternative textbooks. These were possible due to several factors, but mainly because the researchers applied a self-critical stance rather than just pinpointing issues raised by others.

In the case of Korea an increasing demand for the improvement in history education accompanied the criticism against Japan since September 2001. The first demand was for a quantitative expansion of history education. During the late 1990s, educational curriculums underwent a reform, focusing on the utility and practicality reinforced by neoliberal movements during that period, which eventually led to a diminishing of humanities studies. In order to overcome this phenomenon, the number of hours and classes in the humanities were extended. Reformers furthermore demanded strict self-examination and reform of history education in general. Further demands ranged from the call for the change of a history textbook publication system, which is to change the current government-designated textbook into an authorized one,[4] to overcoming memorization-focused learning, criticizing pro-Japanese issues, and overcoming excessive ethnocentric teachings.[5] The level of these demands has opened up new perspectives from an interactionist viewpoint that aim

for the progressive succession of constructive criticism instead of mutual slander and confrontation of both nations' textbooks.

However, the movement soon encountered another bump in the road. In 2003, the Chinese newspaper Guangming-ribao (光明日報) an organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, officially asserted that Goguryeo (高句麗 Koguryo, Gaogouri) history was part of Chinese history, thereby inducing a new history conflict with China. As the history conflict with China was added to the existing one with Japan, the previous movement to self-examine each nation's history could no longer proceed and the historical issue of East Asia turned into a mid- and long-term quest without a feasible solution.[6] During this situation, students' usual interest toward Japanese and Chinese culture disappeared and their attention turned to the history of struggle, confrontation, and invasion or resistance. Teenagers began to develop a similar anti-Japanese sentiment like Koreans in their 70s who actually had experienced the Japanese Occupation. Subjective emotions and historical memory began to dominate over objectivity and daily experience.[7]

Civil society efforts proactively helped resolve this critical phase. These civil movements resulted in the development of several codeveloped history textbooks. The most representative publications are *Yoseongui nuneuro bon Hanilgunhyundaesa* (Modern History of Korea–Japan through the Eyes of Women) (2005) by Japan–South Korea's Women Joint History Compilation Committee; *Majubonun Hanilsa* (Face-to-Face History of Korea and Japan) 1, 2 (2006) by the National History Teachers' Group (Korea) and History Educators' Council (Japan); *Miraerul yeonun Yoksa* (A History to Open the Future) (2006) by the Trilateral Joint History Compilation Committee of Korea, Japan, and China; and *Hanil kyoryuui Yoksa* (The History of Exchange between Korea and Japan) (2007) by the Organization of Korean History Textbook and the Organization of Japanese History Education (afterward, Trilateral Joint History Compilation Committee of Korea, Japan and China published *Hanjungili hamkesun Tongasiagunhyundaesa* [Modern East Asian History written by Korea, China and Japan] and Japan–South Korea's Joint History Compilation Committee published *Hankukgwa Ilbon, gu saieu Yoksa* [The Shared History of Korea and Japan] 2013).

The practical work on joint history book development is a result of efforts to reconcile and cooperate with each other. While joint history research of Western Europe served as a benchmark for this project, the practical execution was based on an appeal of the Korean government to

the UNESCO Executive Board.[8] Going even further, Korea expanded the regular curriculum of compulsory education and created the course *East Asian History*.

Some meaningful findings can be identified in the course of establishing this new subject. First, while textbook dialogue was led by governments in Europe, it was civilian groups that led the dialogue in East Asia.[9] What issues democratic ideology should have resolved after the war in the twentieth century, only world citizenship of East Asia was able to resolve in the twenty-first century.

Secondly, it is noteworthy that the research outcome of civilians was actively introduced into institutions and offered in the regular curriculum. In this sense, the European example was taken a step further by being adapted to the Asian context. The best possible solution in the process was to firmly position the privately developed textbook into the official education system, considering the influence of textbooks and curriculums in Asian educational systems. The newly developed textbooks were thereby not a mere tangential reference book, but received the official textbook status within a regular curriculum.

Thirdly, the introduction to institutions was led by Korea, the nation victimized by war, not the antagonist nation, Japan. This attempt created a new interest and empathy within a transnational context, thereby suggesting a number of new possibilities within the conflict and solution composition of East Asian History.

The above points sharply contrast with the outcomes of the European case. It is noteworthy that Japan's insufficient reflection and evasion of responsibility of past affairs has triggered aggressive attention and joint confrontation of East Asians. East Asian distinct characteristics of sharing historic-cultural tradition over a long period of time further made such solidarity and joint recognition possible.

Lastly, contrary to the general development process of curriculum and textbooks based on academic outcomes, *East Asian History* was the first textbook to be developed prior to academic findings. Due to this development, Korean academia had the possibility to study the discourse of East Asia and the academic identity of East Asian History. The East Asian History reveals several interesting issues in the process of developing curriculums and textbooks. In general, the subjects in elementary and secondary schools are developed on the basis of academic disciplines. On the contrary, this course had been made before the academic base was firmly established. In other words, the development of curriculums and

textbooks had been previously achieved and this rather provided motive power to the history researches. It has become an opportunity for the historians to focus on the history education by showing that the history researches and development of history courses can be reversed, attract interests on the history, and expand the research areas. It is also meaningful in that it not only reestablishes a relationship of history and history education but also opens up all the new possibilities of being reciprocal to each other.

Currently, the course *East Asian History* has gained relatively wide interest and positive response in the schools. As of 2013, 1051 out of 2322 high schools offer *East Asian History*; that is, more than 45 % of Korean high schools teach this subject. In 2012, during the first year of implementation, *East Asian History* electives surpassed World History.[10]

Below I examine how above interest and positive response corresponds with the original purpose and intent of implementing *East Asian History* and the impact of the results.

Learning Method and Content Structure of *East Asian History*

Students' Prior Knowledge of the Subject Matter

One teacher's research on his students' existing knowledge of East Asia before the beginning of this course provides a certain amount of information for the meaning and direction of East Asian studies in Korea. The instructor conducted a quick survey on attitudes toward East Asian nations. The students' least favorite countries in the world proved to be (in order) North Korea, Japan, and China (their favorite countries were the USA, then France and the UK). At the same time, their answer on the countries they wished to have best relations with was USA—Japan—China. While Japan and China were among the least favored, the students still considered them as neighboring countries with which Korea had to build relations in the future.

When asked to elaborate on their ambivalent feelings toward Japan and China, students responded that they dislike these two nations because of their distortion of history. In other words, the history conflict between Korea, Japan, and China posed an obstacle to future harmony and peace between these nations. On the other hand, the students did not show any

response when, for example, asked about Vietnam, thereby indicating that Vietnam is not nearly as interesting to them as Japan or China. However, the students had some basic information and interest in Vietnam. When asked about the country in general, they mentioned national dishes like Pho and international marriage among others. In other words, while Vietnam is not considered an object of interest in a historical context, there exists a socio-cultural experience and interest through everyday life.[11]

The students' responses appear to indicate that the collective memory of persecution and conflict among them is excessively exaggerated while actual knowledge of their own country's history is lacking. On the other hand, the students showed some degree of socio-cultural empathy and goodwill. Conclusively, the course East Asian History must pursue a clear viewpoint that ultimately fosters friendship and peace by treating the history of persecution and conflict in a more dispassionate way, while at the same time complementing the areas which have been regarded as peripheral despite deserving greater attention.

Content Organization Principles

Does *East Asian History* reflect students' levels and needs? Survey methods can vary widely, but this chapter will focus on the intention and objective as well as strategic objective of introducing this subject. I will mainly review the narrative and concrete examples in textbooks, focusing on the three textbooks used since 2014, published by Visang Education, Chunjae Education, and Kyohaksa Publishing (Fig. 4.1).[12]

All three textbooks begin by offering an explanation of the purpose of *East Asian History*. Chunjae and BVisang both specify that "the textbook explores the past and present of the people and countries in East Asia with an objective and balanced voice as they pursue an expectation to live in peace and prosperity" (Chunjae p. 13, BVisang p. 13). Kyohaksa tells students that "East Asian history is a learning process [toward] realizing the value of peace and coexistence instead of focusing on opposition and conflict" (Kyohaksa p. 11). The textbooks share a vision of the importance of "a balanced viewpoint" (observation) and "peace and prosperity/coexistence" (striving for a universal value) as part of a common approach to prescribing the content and structure of *East Asian History*.

What learning strategy does *East Asian History* pursue? I have focused my analysis on fundamental selection of contents and the examples used to illustrate the various historical events in East Asia. Overall, the narrative

Fig. 4.1 Current East Asian History textbooks

structure can be divided into five content organization principles. The first principle deconstructs the division between a main powerful nation and neighboring nations, thereby encouraging an understanding of historical events in relative terms, based on equal values and levels.[13] Relativity enables consideration and composure when examining other standpoints. Second, the textbooks discuss historical incidents of pillage and violence as examples of attempts to exercise *imperiality*[14] opening a possibility for reflection and reconciliation. This method presents examples not only of other nations' exercise of *imperiality* but also those of one's own nation or forebears. The latter especially requires a scrupulous adherence to objectivity so that Korea too can make its own appropriate contribution to the search for forgiveness and reconciliation. Third, the narrative teaches that "otherness" should not be presented in a discriminatory way but rather as differences, in order to abolish cultural hierarchic systems and nurture respect for and understanding of diverse cultures. While the first principle is rooted in a political reading, this third principle tackles the issue from a cultural perspective. The fourth principle aims to shift the focus to interchange and collaboration from an undue emphasis on the history of conflicts. Lastly, universality and specificity are reanalyzed from a universal perspective of East Asian history beyond the understanding and interpretation of one single nation's history. The narrative structure can be schematized as follows (Table 4.1).



Table 4.1 Content organization principles of East Asian History

Content Analysis Based on Organization Principles

A few concrete examples best illustrate how the textbooks implement the content principles. Historical facts do not typically encapsulate just one principle but rather tend to exemplify several principles. I am following the principle classification I outlined above in the following examples drawn from the three textbooks.

Relativization Through Deconstructing Center and Periphery

The one-sided interpretation of major events through a hierarchical lens is deconstructed and an alternative pluralistic view of international relations is presented. Excerpts such as "Han were defeated by the Hsiung-Nu in the war … ending enormous tribute and an princess as the wife of Hun's

King" (B51p), show that the central Chinese dynasty was not always the supreme power in its region.

In addition, the tributary lord–subject system was not exclusively an expression of relations between the "central dynasty" (China) and other dynasties, but emerged in diverse places and forms. "Each nation in East Asia utilized the tributary lord–subject system when entering new relations with surrounding nations to display supremacy. Goguryeo thought of itself as the center of the world, Baekje called some small Mahan states *Namman* (southern barbarians) and received tribute from Tamla (Jeju); Japan created diplomatic conflicts with Shilla and Balhae by trying to treat them as tributary states" (Chunjae p. 62). Besides the Xiongnu, China at various times maintained friendly relations with the neighboring Turkic Khanate and Tibet through politics of marriage (Chunjae p. 63), an observation that implies international relations in East Asia were mainly constructed (and contested) along nonhierarchical center/periphery lines. In other words, political relations should be viewed as multilateral and pluralist. Furthermore, the textbooks also focus on regions previously regarded as less important or minor and ignored in the main texts, such as the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa), the center of trade between the Chinese Ming Dynasty, Korean Joseon and Muromachi Japan (Visang p. 157, Chunjae p. 163).

Disclosing Problems of Imperiality and Pursuing Reconciliation

Japan's invasion and subsequent brutalities lie at the center of disclosing the problems of *imperiality* in East Asia. The textbooks focus furthermore on clarifications on the problems in the postwar era, especially Japan government's evasion of war responsibility. The issue of military sexual slavery in particular occupies a substantial part of the East Asian History curriculum. But I would omit this specific example at this point since its details are already well known. For a better understanding, the process of the Tokyo Trial and Treaty of San Francisco are compared with that of Germany along with debate material (Chunjae p. 219) Especially, the students might be able to notice the facts that the Japanese emperor had been non-prosecuted, all the opinions of the damaged nations had been totally downplayed, the punishment of the Japanese class-A war criminals had been invalidated, by comparing the processes and results of Tokyo and Nurnberg trials (Visang pp. 220–221). At the same time, some materials are giving students opportunities to debate on the status changes of the Japanese emperor and the meaning of it by comparing the Constitution of

the Empire of Japan and the current Japanese Constitution(the so-called as the Pacifist Constitution). (Kyohaksa p. 200)

Additionally, the textbooks picture the issue of *imperiality* from a human rights viewpoint, clearly stressing that the oppression and violence of *imperiality* should not be repeated. The books also mention that "Japan's invasion inflicted pain on the Japanese population as well. As the Sino-Japanese War dragged on, economic control was reinforced with the promugation of a national mobilization bill. Political and ideological oppression intensified while loyalty to the Japanese Emperor was reinforced. … Civilian casualties reached 650,000. … The dropping of atomic bombs on Japan resulted in countless civilian casualties (Chunjae pp. 196–197) an casualties were 650,000 … it is noteworthy that Japanese loss was simultaneously covered while stating that dropping of atom bomb resulted in countless civilian victims" (Chunjae pp. 196–197) (Fig. 4.2).

Disclosure and criticism toward *imperiality* is not a simple antagonistic phenomenon between perpetrator and victim but rooted in the conflict relationship of imperialism and antiimperialism. Thus, by learning that the Japanese people also suffered as victims despite being the perpetrating


이야기 동아시아사 • 전쟁과 민간인

충칭 대공습과 민간인 피해

일본군은 중국의 항전이 계속되자, 1938년부터 1943년까지 중국 국민당 정부가 있던 충칭을 폭격하였다. 이 시기에 일본군이 충칭을 2백여 차례 폭격하여 10만 명이 넘는 중국인이 피해를 입었으며, 가옥 및 시가지의 대부분이 파괴되었다. 특히, 일본군은 1941년 6월 5일에 24대의 전투기를 3개 조로 편성하여 대규모 공습을 감행하였는데, 공습은 무려 5시간이나 계속되었다. 이때 한 방공 터널에서는 너무 많은 사람들이 몰린 데다가 통풍이 되지 않아 1,200명에 달하는 사람들이 질식해 죽었다. 충칭 폭격은 독일군이 에스파냐의 도시 게르니카를 폭격한 것에 비교되곤 한다.

▲ 충칭 대공습으로 사망한 사람들

오키나와 전투와 민간인 피해

1945년 3월 23일, 미군의 오키나와 포격으로 오키나와 전투가 시작되었다. 오키나와 섬은 남북 120km의 작은 섬이었으나, 미군은 54만 명의 대병력으로 이곳을 공격하였다. 일본군은 11만 명 정도였다. 일본군은 열세에도 불구하고 수많은 동굴과 지하 진지 등에 숨어 끝까지 저항하였다. 이는 연합군과 일본군의 '본토 결전'에 대비한 시간을 벌기 위한 것이었다. 이 전투에서 미군 12,500여 명, 일본군 9만 4,000여 명이 사망하였다. 그런데 오키나와 주민도 10만여 명이나 죽었다. 이 숫자 안에는 군대에 의해 집단 자결을 강요당한 주민의 수도 포함되어 있다.

▶ 오키나와 전투 당시 피난하는 어린이

03 침략 전쟁의 확대와 국제 연대 197

Fig. 4.2 War and civilian victims (Chunjae p. 197)

nation, Korean students were able to objectively criticize the destructive essence of imperialism.

Moving to the example of Vietnam,[15] "After war, Vietnam occupied communist Cambodia and established a pro-Vietnamese government. In addition, Vietnam was privy to Laos's civil war. The diplomatic relations in Vietnam with neighboring countries became estranged" (Chunjae p. 223). This description points out invasions committed by Vietnam after the war. In other words, the text introduces a complex rather than one-sided description of aggression, while making clear that violent actions cannot be excused even if the perpetrator may have been a victim itself or if the impact of that violence was only partial or temporary.

Presentation of *Imperiality* provides scope for reflection and self-examination. In one example, the text introduces the formal apology by former president Kim Dae-Jung regarding the tragic history and participation in the Vietnam War (Kyohaksa p. 223). The episode is used as a basis for students' self-examination of their nation's actions. It has the potential to provoke controversy for Korean Vietnam War veterans and some others. Nonetheless, this is a meaningful example of self-reflective study (Fig. 4.3).

Recognition of Difference Beyond Discrimination and Prejudice

This chapter in the text presents diverse natural environments and cultural customs without attempting to rank them. "Different life styles patterns


생각 넓히기

왜 김대중 대통령은 베트남 전쟁 참전에 대해 사과하였을까?

과거 한국은 베트남 전쟁 참전을 공산주의 세력의 침략으로 위험에 빠진 자유 우방 국가를 도운 것이라고 주장하였다. 그러나 베트남과 외교 관계를 맺은 후 양국의 교류가 확대되면서 과거사에 대한 올바른 정리를 할 필요성이 생겨났다.

1998년 김대중 대통령은 베트남을 방문하여 "냉전이라는 세계사의 흐름 속에서 양국이 불행을 겪었던 시기가 있었으나, 이를 극복하고 미래 지향적인 우호·협력 관계의 발전을 위해 함께 노력하자."고 두 나라 사이의 과거사를 언급하였다. 그 후 2001년 한국을 방문한 베트남의 판득르엉 주석과의 정상 회담에서 김대중 대통령은 "한국의 베트남 전쟁 참전과 관련, 불행한 전쟁에 참여해 본의 아니게 베트남 인들에게 고통을 준 데 대해 미안하게 생각한다."며 사과의 뜻을 표하였다. 이러한 사과는 한국과 베트남 관계의 미래 지향적 발전에 토대가 되었다.

베트남을 방문한 김대중 대통령

Fig. 4.3 Why did President Kim apologize for participation in the Vietnam War? (Kyohaksa p. 223)

of living derive from [human] efforts to adapt efficiently to the environment and cannot be judged on a cultural level. Peasants and agriculturists in farming regions supplement their needs through trading and exchanging crops, silk, cotton, and yeast with pastoralists for horses, fur, and dairy products in nomadic regions" (Chunjae pp. 18–19). This material gives a better understanding of farming and nomadic societies and how they have co-existed.

By introducing the diverse regional environments and diets of East Asians, the textbook creates a bond of understanding of different cultures through their different backgrounds. "The diet in agricultural societies like Vietnam mainly consists of Cóm (rice) and phở (rice noodles), while nomadic societies like that of the Mongols consume Buuz (dumpling with mutton filling), Suutee tsai (tea boiled with tea leaves), and Aaruul (a cracker made with fermented milk)" (Visang p. 19).

The story of Zhonghang Yue (中行說) is used as an interesting tale of discrimination and prejudice. Zhonghang Yue was a eunuch of Han China who was forcibly dispatched to Xiongnu and became an official of that government (Fig. 4.4).

One day, a Han envoy came to the Xiongnu region and berated the locals by picking on its people for not respecting the elderly and following Han traditions. In contradicting the envoy's speech, Zhonghang Yue, now serving as an official of the Xiongnu answered back that the nomadic tribes place more importance on youth and speed. He remarked "Don't speak rashly, you wimpish people of Han, living in soft houses." (Chunjae p. 20). It is an interesting story that demonstrates how outsiders assimilate to unique indigenous cultures by the fact that the person who was formerly a ranking Han eunuch could eventually serve as a Xiongnu government official following his dispatch to that region.

Focus on Exchange and Cooperation Rather than War and Conflict

This chapter introduces active international exchange in East Asia during the eighth century, introducing figures such as Choi Chiwon (崔致遠), Jang Bogo (張保皐), and Ennin (円仁). While previous curriculums introduced Choi Chiwon and Jang Bogo in Korean History classes and Ennin in World History classes, *East Asian History* focuses on all three of them together creating a better understanding on an international relations level



풍습은
자신의 몸에
맞는 옷과 같다.

농경 민족과 유목 민족은 생활 방식이나 가치관이 많이 다르다. 그러나 그것은 각각의 민족이 환경에 적응한 결과일 뿐, 결코 개인이나 민족의 우열을 가르는 기준이 될 수 없다.

한나라 때 중항열이라는 환관이 있었다. 그는 한 문제가 종친의 딸을 공주로 삼아 흉노의 연지(왕비)로 보낼 때 공주를 모시고 흉노로 갔다. 그는 선우에게 귀순해 살면서, 흉노를 위해 많은 조언을 하였다.

어느 날 한에서 온 사자가 이렇게 말했다.

"흉노에는 노인을 천대하는 풍습이 있소."

그러자 중항열은 사자를 꾸짖으며 이렇게 말했다.

"당신네 한의 풍습에도 주둔군이 수비를 위해 종군하여 떠나려 할 때, 그의 늙은 어버이는 자신의 따뜻하고 두꺼운 옷을 벗어 주고 영양 많고 맛있는 음식을 나누어 주어 보내지 않소?"

한나라 사자가 말했다.

"그렇소."

중항열은 말했다.

"흉노는 전투를 자주 하는 민족이오. 늙고 약한 사람은 싸울 수 없기 때문에 영양 많고 맛있는 음식을 건장한 사람들에게 먹이는 것이오. 이렇게 하여 스스로를 지키고 아버지와 아들이 오랫동안 서로를 보전할 수 있는 것이오. 이것을 두고 어찌 흉노가 노인을 천대한다고 하겠소?"

한의 사자가 말했다.

"흉노는 아버지와 아들이 같은 막사에서 살며 아버지가 죽으면 아들이 계모를 아내로 삼고, 형제가 죽으면 남아 있는 형제가 그의 아내를 맞아 자기 아내로 삼소. 의복과 관과 허리띠로 꾸미지도 않고 조정에서도 예의라곤 없소."

중항열이 말했다.

"(흉노의) 약속은 간편하여 실행하기 쉽고, 군주와 신하의 관계는 간단하고 쉬워, 한 나라의 정치가 마치 한 몸인 듯하오. 아버지, 아들, 형, 동생이 죽으면 그들의 아내를 맞아들여 자기 아내로 삼는 것은 대가 끊길까 염려하기 때문이오. 그래서 흉노는 변란이 발생하더라도 반드시 종족을 유지하오. 지금 중국에서는 드러내 놓고 자기 아버지나 형의 아내를 처로 삼는 일은 없지만, 오히려 친족이 멀어져 서로 죽이기도 하고 역성혁명을 일으켜 천자의 성이 바뀌기도 하는 것은 모두 이런 데서 생기는 것이오. 마음으로 생각하는 것과 달리, 예의만을 지키다 보면 윗사람과 아랫사람이 서로 원망하게 되오. 궁실과 가옥을 지나치게 아름답게 꾸미다 보면 생산할 힘을 다 쓰게 되오. (한은) 장정들이 힘써 밭을 갈고 누에를 쳐서 먹을거리와 입을 것을 구하고 성곽을 쌓아 자신을 방비하기 때문에, 백성은 전시에 싸워서 공을 이루는 데 시들고 평상시에는 생업에 지쳐 있소. 슬프다! 흙집에 사는 한나라 사람들이여! 함부로 말하지 마시오. 옷자락을 살랑살랑 움직이고 다니지만 옷을 입고 관을 쓴다 한들 무슨 소용이 있겠소?"

- 『사기』, 흉노열전 -

▼ 흉노 병사

020 :: I. 국가의 형성

Fig. 4.4 The story of Zhonghang Yue (Chunjae p. 20)

through a more contemporary three-dimensional understanding of Korea, China, and Japan (Fig. 4.5).

The history of exchange reaches more importance due to emigrants and immigrants in times of war. The text lists a number of historical figures who changed their own abode to the war adversary dynasty during the Imjin war in the sixteenth century. The book introduces Kim Chungsun (Japanese name, Sayaka) (Chunjae p. 138, Kyohaksa p. 110). He participated as a Japanese soldier in the war, but then moved to Joseon where he was later naturalized. Yi Sampyeong was captured to Japan during the war and created the Arita pottery culture in Japan (Chunjae p. 138, Kyohaksa p. 111). The story of Yeo Daenam who became the chief monk in the Honmyō temple (本妙寺) is introduced as well, and is used as material for historical reenactment for students to write a letter to his parents from Yeo Daenam's viewpoint.(Visang p. 167).

The story of the Japanese figure Kaneko Humiko and Bak Yeol (Visang p. 199, Chunjae p. 200) is a case that shows the power of belief and affection beyond national borders, showing two lovers facing Japanese imperialism, indicating the possibility of love and alliance against Japanese imperialism in extreme opposition and conflict.

Providing East Asian Perspective Beyond that of One National History

The element of providing an East Asian perspective is reflected in a variety of episodes in the East Asian History course and accompanying texts. The chapter begins with the introduction of common cultural elements.

Myths of each nation in East Asia serve as a base ground to introduce ancient cultural elements, helping students to recognize that the long history and superiority of their own nation and people is a common element in all mythology (Kyohaksa p. 33). Teachings of mythology had so far been distorted, mainly through influences of the emperor ideology in Japan. Through the oppressive teachings of Japan, Korean historians had excluded mythology from academia. Since Japan was defeated in World War II, all mythology issues have been excluded from every history class in Japan. On the other hand, in the case of Korea, national mythology teaching and values were exaggerated in order to compensate for previous oppressive learnings and create nationalistic sentiments (Fig. 4.6).

The new approach to teachings of mythology is therefore meaningful in that they use an objective approach in the form of a universal mythology. The influence of East Asian culture as a common basis persisting to the present is illustrated to recognize common elements in each culture.

Fig. 4.5 Peoples' coming and going during the war (Chunjae p. 138)


역사는 흐른다 | 동아시아 여러 지역의 신화

삼황오제, 중원에 농경 사회를 세우다

삼황오제는 오늘날 중국인들이 자신들의 조상으로 생각하는 전설상의 인물이다. 삼황은 대체로 복희, 여와, 신농을 가리키며 오제로는 황제, 전욱, 제곡, 요, 순이 있다.

삼황 가운데 복희는 어로와 말재를 가르쳤고, 여와는 사람을 창조하였다. 신농은 사람 몸에 소의 머리를 한 신으로 농업신이다.

복희와 여와

하늘신의 아들 게세르, 악신과 싸우다

게세르 신화는 천신의 자손인 게세르가 지상에서 행한 일을 노래한 서사시이다. 알타이, 티베트, 몽골, 만주 지역 유목인에게서 전해 오는 영웅 신화이다. 천신과의 싸움에서 진 악신들이 지상에서 홍수와 가뭄, 질병 등을 일으키자 하늘신의 아들인 게세르가 지상에 내려와 이들을 물리친다는 이야기다.

하늘에서 내려오는 게세르

단군, 나라를 세우다

단군 신화는 천손강림 신앙과 함께 동물을 신성시하는 특징을 보인다. 오곡을 다스리고 바람과 비를 관장하는 농경 신앙의 모습도 잘 나타나 있다.

하늘신 환인의 아들 환웅이 풍백, 우사, 운사 등 무리를 이끌고 태백산의 신단수 아래로 내려왔다. 곰과 범이 사람이 되기를 원하자 환웅은 쑥과 마늘을 주면서 100일 동안 동굴 속에서 생활하라고 하였다. 그러나 범은 견디지 못해 동굴에서 나오고 곰은 웅녀로 변해 환웅과 결혼하여 고조선을 건국한 단군을 낳았다.

단군

아마테라스, 태양의 신

아마테라스는 일본 천황의 가계가 유래하였다고 전해지는 태양의 여신이다. 일본 토착 종교의 최고신이며 '하늘에서 빛난다'는 뜻이다. 천상의 신인 아버지의 왼쪽 눈에서 태어난 그녀는 동생인 폭풍의 신이 말썽을 일으키자 동굴로 몸을 숨겼다. 이때부터 세상은 어둠으로 뒤덮였다. 이에 여러 신들이 그녀를 다시 맞아 빛을 되찾았고 그녀를 태양의 여신으로 모셨다. 이후 아마테라스가 손자를 지상으로 내려보내니 그 자손이 첫 천황이 되었다고 한다.

아마테라스

바다신과 산신이 결합하다

강한 힘을 가진 바다신 락룡무연과 아름다운 산신 어우캐의 결혼으로 알에서 100명의 아들이 탄생하였다. 아들의 반은 아버지를 따라 바다로, 나머지 반은 어머니를 따라 산으로 갔다. 산으로 간 아들 중 홍 가문이 베트남 최초의 나라인 반랑국을 세웠다고 전해진다.

락룡무연과 어우캐

3. 국가의 성립과 발전 • 33

Fig. 4.6 Birth myths in East Asia (Visang p. 33)

Tang's Changancheng or "Great Wall," Parhae's Sanggyoengseoung, and Japan's Heijōkyō (平城京) are listed consecutively as a means of describing the common elements of capital cities (Visang p. 48). The introduction and list of Confucian shrines still existing in present Korea, China,

and Japan (Visang p. 63) are used to illustrate the remaining influence and common elements of a shared East Asian culture in present day.

Pansori and Mask Dance in Korea, Beijing Opera in China, and Kabuki and Nō in Japan are introduced as parallel examples of folklore during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Examples include Joseon artist Kim Hong Do, Qing writer Cao Xueqin, and the kabuki actor Ichikawa Danjurō (Visang pp. 152–153, Chunjae p. 158). Historical figures and events occurring during similar periods are listed and analyzed to understand common and differing factors. In order to better illustrate the relationship between literary bureaucracy and military hierarchy, examples list "the literary bureaucracy based on Gwageo (Keju ch., State Exam) exerted general influence across East Asian society." The text simultaneously mentions

> the military regime ruled the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period in China, Late Three Kingdoms period on the Korean Peninsula, Goryeo Military Regime and Japan's feudal government period. … Warriors' military ethics based on loyalty and courage became the anchor of Japan's feudal system. Through the influence of Neo-Confucianism in the Edo period, warriors' ethics were based on the spirit of sacrifice, faith and frugality. (Chunjae pp. 100–101)

The pioneers who led all three countries to the modern era are narrated together, introducing Japan's Natsume Sōseki, China's Hu Shi, Korea's An Changho (Chunjae p. 206) as pioneers of cultural advances, and Kim Hongjip, Li Hongzhang, and Ito Hirobumi as advocates of national prosperity and defense (Chunjae p. 182). It is especially noticeable that Ito Hirobumi was introduced as a primary figure in the above issue even if he was one of the leading characters in colonization of Korea, later assassinated by Ahn Junggun for this reason.

Coming to the present, the section features the rapid economic development of East Asia. While listing common factors of economic growth in East Asian nations, the section further suggests that searching for a common future is necessary for future development and growth (Visang p. 228, Chunjae pp. 226–227, 232). Deng Xiaoping of China and Jung Juyoung of Korea are listed as representatives devoted to economic growth (Chunjae p. 230). Under the theme of democratization, the Kim Daejung regime in Korea, Chen Shuibian regime in Taiwan, and Democratic Party

regime in Japan (Visang p. 230, Chunjae pp. 234–235) are introduced (Fig. 4.7).

Additionally, the textbooks introduce new potential issues of consideration from an East Asian perspective. Previously the sixteenth century war between Korea and Japan was called the Imjin Japanese invasion and the Byeongja Barbarian invasion, respectively, and Japan and China also used different terms to name the war. The textbook gives the wars neutral names such as Imjin and Byeongja wars (Visang pp. 126–132, Chunjae pp. 132–135, Kyohaksa pp. 110–113). Especially, the Visang textbook includes an exercise for the search of the most suitable term (Visang p. 126). This is definitely a meaningful way to learn. It is a classroom approach applied as a learning exercise in classrooms through a textbook lesson, a lesson not seen in even higher academic levels in any of the three nations because of disagreement on fundamental issues.

The next chapter uses specific events and figures to reinterpret and reevaluate the historical meanings of significant events in the region's past. The unification of Three Kingdoms and Battle of Baekgang in Korea are described from an East Asian perspective (Kyohaksa p. 53). The achievements of Kim Chun-chu who unified the Three Kingdoms and established Shilla, are interpreted as diplomatic actions through his unique understanding of East Asian sentiment (Chunjae p. 64). The Korean War and Vietnam War are similarly illustrated from multilateral perspectives, including the USA, Japan, and Taiwan (Visang pp. 223–224, Chunjae pp. 222–223, Kyohaksa pp. 203–204).

The most important topic of East Asian History undoubtedly is the joint effort for peace and collaboration. In order to provide a better understanding and less emotional focus on conflict with Japan, the textbooks introduce historical figures during the period of Imperial Japan. Uchimura Kanzō, Sin Chaeho, and Ba Jin are introduced side by side as anarchists of East Asia (Chunjae p. 199) and the activities of Kōtoku Shūsui, Uchimura Kanzō (Visang pp. 197–198), Fuse Tatsuji, (Visang p. 199p, Chunjae p. 200), and Saitō Takao in Japan are introduced as figures who opposed the war (Chunjae p. 199) (Fig. 4.8).

The aim here is to defy unnecessary emotional confrontation or distrust by teaching students about historical Japanese figures who made an effort for peace and human rights.

Civilian movements are further introduced as examples of a consolidated aim for solidarity. Not just Korea but civil groups in Japan opened

Fig. 4.7 Democratization in Korea and Taiwan (Visang p. 240)

Fig. 4.8 The Japanese human rights activists against Japanese imperialism for Korea (Chunjae p. 200)

the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery in Tokyo.

Ten defendants, including Emperor Hirohito (Visang p. 249), were convicted. Furthermore, the section lists the Joint History Research for East Asian History and Civilian solidarity activities for sharing historic awareness (Visang pp. 246–252, Chunjae pp. 244–247, Kyohaksa pp. 228–233).

East Asian History classes clearly attempt to understand history in a new way by pursuing a universal value through close self-examination, denying the superiority of powerful nations which previously enjoyed privileged interpretations and treatment in national and world history classes, and focus on various historical figures through an equal lens for exchange and reciprocity (Fig. 4.9).

Current Efforts to Complement Self-Examination Through Diverse Story-Telling

Some East Asian History classes have implemented a more powerful teaching dynamic. One teacher in Gyeonggi-do invited a Japanese history professor to his class to speak on the theme of "Territorial issues: For the Peaceful Co-existence of Korea and Japan." The exchanges between Korean and Japanese students by devoted teachers have set many practical examples to the theoretical teachings in the classroom. For example, in one secondary school, the class held by one Japanese teacher has been continued for ten years. He has opened classes together with the students' usual Korean teacher on every last week of March with a presentation on Ahn Junggen, who assassinated Itō Hirobumi. The date is important because the 26th March is a special day designated to acknowledge Ahn's martyrdom. The visiting Japanese professor explained that:

> Ahn Junggeun's assassination of Itō Hirobumi was a right judgment. He was a true pacifist, denouncing the imperialism in pursuit of Oriental peace. Ahn's Japanese jailor, Jiba Toshichi, reportedly was so touched by the high principles of the person he guarded that he Ahn Junggeun's that he treasured the autograph he received from Ahn Junggeun. Even Jiba's descendants follow in his footsteps. Today, many people, myself included respect Ahn Junggeun and the number even seems on the increase.

1967 동남아시아 국가 연합 결성
1989 아시아 태평양 경제 협력체 성립
1998 동남아시아 국가 연합+3 정상 회의 개최
2005 동아시아 정상 회의 개최

▲ 여성 국제 전범 법정 (2000, 도쿄)

❸ 화해와 협력을 위한 모색

국제 연대의 움직임

일본 내 보수 강경파가 침략의 역사를 미화하는 역사 왜곡을 일삼자, 아시아 각국은 국제 연대를 통해 문제 해결에 나섰다. 이들은 도쿄에서 쇼와 천황을 비롯한 일본군 고위 관료의 전쟁 책임을 밝히는 민간 법정을 열었다. 아시아의 여성 단체와 시민 단체들도 일본 정부에 일본군 '위안부'에 대한 배상을 요구하는 소송을 제기하였다. 현재에도 일본군 '위안부' 문제를 둘러싼 국제 연대에 한국을 비롯하여 중국, 일본, 필리핀, 인도네시아, 네덜란드 등 많은 나라가 참여하고 있다.

역사 인식 공유를 위한 역사 대화

한·중·일 또는 한·일의 학자, 교사, 시민들은 일본의 역사 교과서 왜곡에 대응하고 역사 갈등을 완화하고자 공동 역사 교재를 발간하였다. 이들 공동 역사 교재는 서로의 역사에 대한 이해를 넓히고, 평화와 인권의 가치를 배워 동아시아의 평화에 기여할 수 있는 공통의 역사 인식을 마련하고자 하는 역사 대화의 산물이라 할 수 있다.

정부 차원에서도 공동 역사 연구를 진행하여 역사 인식의 차이를 극복하고자 노력하였다. 한·일 간에는 두 차례에 걸쳐 공동 연구가 이루어졌고, 중·일 간에도 공동 연구가 이루어져 학문적 교류를 통한 이해의 폭을 확대하는 데 기여하였다. 하지만 이러한 노력에도 민감한 문제들에 대해서는 여전히 일치된 의견을 내놓지 못하고 있다.

▲ 공동 역사 교재

더 알아보기 ● 역사 갈등 문제를 해결하기 위한 역사 공동 연구

▲ 한·일 역사 공동 연구 보고서

1990년대 중반, 자민당 집권이 무너진 후 구성된 일본 내각은 과거사에 대한 긍정적인 활동을 전개하였다. 무라야마 총리는 1995년에 과거 일본이 일으킨 침략 전쟁에 대하여 피해를 입은 아시아 각국과 시민들을 대상으로 전쟁 종결 50주년을 맞아 총리 명의의 담화를 발표하였다. 이어 김대중 – 오부치 정상 간에는 청소년과 문화 교류 등을 담은 한·일 공동 파트너십이 체결되었다. 또한, 과거의 역사 문제를 극복하고자 공동 역사 연구를 하기로 의견을 모았다. 이에 2002년부터 두 차례에 걸쳐 한국과 일본 사이에는 정부가 공동 역사 연구 위원회를 구성하여 공동 역사 연구를 진행하였다. 이를 본받아 일본과 중국 사이에도 공동 연구 위원회가 만들어져 활동하였다.

이와는 별도로 시민, 연구자, 교사들로 구성된 동아시아 각국의 시민 단체들은 상호 이해를 증진시키고 평화를 추구하고자 학술 교류를 실시하고, 공동 역사 교재를 집필하였다. 국가가 중심이 된 공동 연구는 많은 한계를 보였지만, 민간의 활동은 많은 성과와 함께 동아시아 각국에서 공감대를 확보하는 데 성공하였다.

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Fig. 4.9 The effort for reconciliation and cooperation (Chunjae p. 246)

Students who have taken his class have said "The fact that there had been comradeship for peace and justice between Korea and Japan despite the conflicts and violence is one of the valuable parts in the history. This story could not be seen on the textbooks and learning this fact from the Japanese teacher was very impressive and touching."[16]

One boys' high school asked students to participate in projects including the Wednesday Rally and visit to the War and Women's Rights Museum.[17] After the field trips and activities, students actively led a signed petition campaign to receive 100 million signatures to resolve the issue of military sexual slavery. They also conducted a Butterfly Fundraiser campaign and made donations (Figs. 4.10 and 4.11).[18]

Instead of a field trip, video materials are often used in the classrooms. Documentaries about the Vietnam War and movies dealing with the problems of Korean immigrants in Japan are useful exercises for studying reconciliation and collaboration. Students would not be able to resolve the issues presented in the documentaries or movies, but in turn, they learned to reapply the learnings to the problems of immigrant laborers

Fig. 4.10 The joint class with Korean and Japanese teachers about Ahn (March 2014)

Fig. 4.11 Students participating in Wednesday rally (provided The Korean council for the women drafted for military sexual slavery by Japan)

in Korea: problems to which they had previously been indifferent to or avoided to think about.[19] Such exercises are examples that history does not only teach about the past but can teach lessons for the future as well, especially with regard to co-existence and collaboration.

One teacher tried to raise his students' interest in Vietnam by introducing extra materials to each class, drawing parallels between Vietnam and Korea by focusing on the continuous invasion of Vietnam by other forces and the victorious fight for independence. During the end of the Vietnam section, he covered the issue of the Hami village cenotaph.[20] A tragic event led to the death of 35 civilians at the hands of the Korean military. In 2000, the Vietnam War Veteran Association of Korea donated 30,000 US dollars to the village and also erected a memorial cenotaph. Descriptions of the massacre incidents were engraved on the cenotaph by Hami villagers but the Vietnam War veterans overlaid the engravings with that of a lotus flower so as to not entirely disclose the facts of the incident. Students had a chance to understand this sensitive issue in approaching reconciliation and were able to sympathize with both sides.

At the end of class, students further realized that an official apology should be issued in order to reach reconciliation and they themselves were the subsequent generations who must try that. Through the short three-year history of East Asian History course, a variety of attempts have been made, reaching a consistently dynamic learning to pursue human rights, peace, and reconciliation across the nations. Undoubtedly, additional case studies that reveal the dynamics involved in this course will be gathered as *East Asian History continues to be offered in the schools.*

East Asian History Outcomes and Remaining Issues

The question of how much Korean students can learn and apply with regards to their studies of a culture of peace and co-existence through the new framework of *East Asian History* remains to be answered. It is yet early days for an accurate assessment of potential changes in the awareness of history through *East Asian History*. Nonetheless, *East Asian History* has been adopted in roughly 50 % of Korean high schools, indicating that half the work has been done already.

A recent survey on the necessity of *East Asian History* that questioned 292 students and 11 teachers yielded different responses from these two groups.[21] Most teachers answered that they viewed the objective of the course to be an effort to overcome the disconnection between Korean History and World History and exclusive nationalism. On the other hand, the majority of the students answered that they saw the aim as one making for a culturally relativistic viewpoint and an objective understanding of Korea's history. The latter group shows a closer understanding of the curriculum objective.

A more interesting fact on students' assessment of *East Asian History* can be found in an exercise by a teacher in Gyeonggi-do. He asked his students to fill in the blank "*East Asian History* is " The students' answers varied significantly, showing different directions in their understanding of the course.[22] A total of three directions could be subdivided through their answers. The first group answered "History connected to present day issues," "Korean history in a new light," and "Finding differences." Overall, the students shared the understanding that the class serves the purpose to objectify different historical events.

Another group responded "A diary that reveals contents that others wanted to conceal," "Healing from the past," and "Ways to understand

one another." This group saw the purpose in the revelations of a previously hidden and shameful history by seeking reconciliation and forgiveness.

Lastly, one group replied "Learning the communal culture in East Asia," "Guide to answer the question on reconciliation of Korea, China and Japan," "Not studies but common sense." These expressions display the understanding of East Asian History as an attempt to foster friendly cooperation and mutual understanding. The findings imply that East Asian History is so far successful in that students are gradually opening up to acknowledging one another's differences. They are learning to search that in the shared past there are more for instances of exchange, commonality, and a desire for co-existence than memories of conflict and confrontation in East Asia.

Conclusion

The attempt at reflective history education has its beginnings in Korean high schools. There are yet many tasks to overcome to gain grounds in Korea. In that sense, academia is uncovering more research domains under the title "East Asian History" including academic identity and interdisciplinary or cross-national fields. Furthermore, questions on the effectiveness of this subject with regard to the limitations of the current curriculum and interdisciplinary competition with other history subjects are causing further controversy in the educational field.[23]

Additionally, as the issue of historical conflicts with Japan and China do not show any sign of resolving in the near future, criticism continues regarding the concern that reflection and understanding of co-existence as being pursued by *East Asian History* is unnecessary and insignificant. Ultimately, the conclusion implies that efforts led by Korea only are not sufficient enough for an effective learning process of East Asian History in Korea.

Conversely, this reciprocity suggests that the outcomes of efforts and results in Korea are not exclusive property but rather the driving force to reach future amity and peace in East Asia. Even though the implementation of *East Asian History* was first assigned by the Korean government, the actual beginning was started through the efforts of civil society groups and their interactions. This new kind of history education in Korean high schools promises to begin a new era of transnational reconciliation and cooperation.

Notes

1. This class was first implemented in the curriculum of 2007 and the textbook was first developed in 2011, being offered in classes as of March 2012. However, the curriculum was partly modified in 2011 and a new edition of the textbook was developed and has been used since 2014.
2. Kyoyukbu (The Ministry of Education). "*Sahuigwa kyoyuk gwajeong* (The Curriculum of Social Studies)" Accessed March 2, 2015. http://www.ncic.re.kr/mobile.index2.do.
3. Gibong Kim, "Hanguk Yoksahakui jaeguseongul wihan bangbupuroseo Dongasiassa (East Asian History as a Methodology for Reconstructing History in Korea)," *Donbukayoksanonchong (Journal of Northeast Asia)* 40(2007): 185–891; Yongtae Yu, "Dongasia jiyoksa seosului hyunhwang gwa gwajae (Narrating the Regional History of East Asia in Korea's Recent Textbooks: The Present Situation and Tasks)," *Dongbukayoksanonchong* (Journal of Northeast Asia) 40 (2013): 192.
4. In Korea, government-designated textbooks began to be used during the military regime of the 1970s and these systems continued until the early 2000s.
5. Nanhee Ku, "Ni-Kan rekishi kyōiku o hodoite ikubeki ka (How should we solve the History Textbook Problems between Korea and Japan?)," in *Ni-Kan de kangaeru rekishi kyōiku—kyōkasho hikaku to tomoni—*(History Education from the views between Korea and Japan), ed. Masao Nitani et al. (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2010), 21.
6. The Goguryeo Dynasty rule extended from the first century BC to 668 AD, forming the foundation of Korea's ancient history. The main territory of Goguryeo lies in today's Northeast China, which is why China claims Goguryeo to be part of China's history.
7. While Koreans in their 30s to 50s with direct and indirect experiences with the Japanese Occupation had a more balanced like and dislike for Japan, teenagers were more negative toward the conflicts with Japan despite having only learned about Japan through textbooks. (Nanhee Ku, "Dongasia sokui hanilgwangesa kyoyuk—'Yoksajeok sahuiinsik'eurobuteo 'Sahuijeok Yoksainsik'euro (The learning of the Exchange History between Korea and Japan—from the Historical perception of Society to Social perception of History)" (paper presented at the symposium to launch "Hanilkyoryuui yoksa (The History of Exchange between Korea and Japan)," Seoul, March 25, 2008).
8. Simone Lässig (Georg Eckert Institute) who participated in the joint textbook development between Germany and France recalled that "the intention of this textbook is to examine the credibility of different historical justifications and discuss their rationale. The intention is to trigger question,

thought and empathy of others through the exploring their differences." Asahi Shinbun shūzaihan (Asahi Shinbun News Team), *Rekishi wa ikiteiru: Higashi Ajia no kingendaishi ga wakaru 10 no teema* (*History is alive: 10 themes for understanding the modern history of East Asia*) (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun, 2008), 345–346.

9. Jeongin Kim, "Dongasia gongdong yoeksakyojae gaebal, gu keonghumui gongyu wa dowakul wihan mosaek (Joint Projects of Developing History Education textbooks, based upon Cooperation of East-Asian countries)," *Yoksakyoyuk* (The Korean History Education Review) 101(2007): 36.
10. The number of textbooks used shows how widely *East Asian History* is learned.

School Year	Chunjae Education	Kyohaksa	Total
2012	38,162 copies (273 schools)	33,000 copies (22 schools)	71,162 copies (473 schools)
2013	87,595 copies (601 schools)	71,000 copies (450 schools)	158,595copies (1051 schools)

Junghyun Park, "Dongasia ui Silchun gwa gwajae (The Pratices and Challenges of 'East Asian History')" (paper presented at Ilhangukjae symposium [The International symposium on Korean and Japan] Tokyo, January 22, 2014.

11. Yukhun Kim, "*Choeum han Dongasiasa Suup* (My first *East Asian History* class)" (paper presented at Dongasiasa Suyup [East Asian history class] workshop—Naui dongasiasa suupul malhada [My *East Asian history* classes], Seoul, January 22, 2014).
12. *East Asian History* textbooks used since 2014 were written according to the revised curriculum of 2011.
13. Hwang, Jisook. "Sangdaewha sigakui Dongasiasa insik gwa kyoyukbangan (Recognition and Educational Suggestions on Relativetioncenered East Asian History)," *Yoksakyoyukyoengu* (*Studies on History Education*) 5(2007): 85–89.
14. *Imperiality* refers to the inclination to form, maintain, and extend a broad governing system including foreign regions and different tribes in addition to the phenomena it causes.
15. Defining the scope of East Asian history has been controversial on the process of the curriculum development. Finally, the consensus has been made to stress on historical, cultural standards rather than geographical standard, considering that it is a "history" class. Historically, it is noticeable that Vietnam has been included in the East Asian cultural sphere—the region where law system, Buddhism translated into Chinese, Confucianism,

Chinese character are diffused. Also, the relationship between Korea and Vietnam was one of the paramount background factors to include Vietnam in this region.

16. Nanhee Ku, observation of the Class by Cho Eunkyeong and Suzuki Hiroshi in Kuenyoung Middle School, Jeonju, March 27, 2014.
17. The official name is Regular Wednesday Rally, held to resolve the issue of military sexual slavery. It is held every Wednesday in front of the Embassy of Japan in Korea. The movement started in January 1992 and reached its 1000th rally by December 2011 with an annual participation of 50,000.
18. The Butterfly Fund was founded by Korean victims of sexual slavery and aims at supporting similar females in the world. So far its proceeds go to victims in Congo, Vietnam in addition to Korean women of sex slavery. (Nanhee Ku Interview about the Wednesday Rally Seoul, February 19, 2014)
19. Nanhee Ku, observation of the Class by Park Junghyun in Jamil High School Seoul, October 20, 2013.
20. Nanhee Ku, observation of the Class by Kim Yukhun in Doksan High School Seoul, September 20, 2014.
21. Yuryee Kim, "Godunghakkyo Dongasiasa daehan Yoksa gyosa wa hakseangdului insikbunseok (The Perception of History Teachers and Students about 'East Asian History' in High School)," *Yoksakyoyuk* (*The Korean History Education Review*) 130(2014): 26–27.
22. Joenga Choi, "*GyeonggiBukbu Dongasiasa Moim Sarye* (The case of teaching study group about East Asian History in the northern area of Gyeonggi-do)" (paper presented at *Dongasiasa Suyup* [East Asian history class] workshop—Naui dongasiasa suupul malhada [My East Asian history classes, Seoul], January 22, 2014).
23. In Korea, the success and failure of specific subjects depends on how often the subject is selected. As of now, high school curriculums are managed by offering elective courses of all subjects, and in that sense, Korean History and World History compete against each other within the same category. Besides, whether or not a subject is tested in the College Scholastic Ability Test (Korean SAT) hugely influences the ranking of a subject. In 2014 and 2015, the selection rate of "East Asian History" was 10.7 % and 11 %, respectively. As reference, Korean History accounted for 12.6 % and World History 8.5 % in 2015. The rates are calculated by the data of applicants' status report provided by the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation. ("Suneung Tonggye [The statistic of College Scholastic Ability Test]" accessed May 12, 2015 http://suneung.re.kr/sub/info.do?m=0404&s=suneung). Generally, students are reluctant to select history subjects compared to geography or civics.

CHAPTER 5

Japanese Textbooks in the Asian History Wars: The Waning Importance of Weapons of Mass Instruction

Michael Lewis

Introduction

Commentators on Japanese politics in and outside of Japan have issued dire warnings of a looming revisionist victory in the history wars arising from conservative groups' efforts to influence the selection of textbooks. Some contributors to this volume also express unease about a deepening chill in South Korea–Japan ties. This is not only because of textbooks but also from attempts to reinterpret Japan's Constitution, reopen the place of compulsion in the recruitment of "comfort women," and reassert the primacy of Japanese rights in regional territorial disputes. The warnings seem justified given the current dominance of a staunchly conservative Japanese national administration supportive of rightist views and the predictable response they draw from the Korean side. Yet, there are significant counter movements that began before the Abe government came to power—or, more accurately, before the current government acquired legislative control in an election that the inept Democratic Party of Japan lost more than

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the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won. This chapter assesses these steps to counter what currently appears to be a sharp turn to the right and contends that they will likely continue to exert a moderating influence once the Abe government is gone.

If the drift toward the right is slowed, it will not be thanks to a centrally orchestrated movement. Anti-rightist activities, many mounted by disparate civil society groups, do not present any kind of united or centrally coordinated response. In fact, so-called progressive political groups sometimes appear to be mutually (and perhaps intentionally) unaware of one another or even working at cross-purposes. But if these movements are not always of one voice in what they are for, they often find common cause in opposition to any kind of return to prewar patriotism or revision of the Constitution's anti-war Article Nine. Their uncoordinated activities are also more representative of popular attitudes about Japanese ties with regional neighbors than the stands of those strident groups that the media seems to find irresistibly newsworthy.

In this chapter, I maintain that while a very conservative group now dominates the LDP's current leadership and is setting the national political agenda in a manner that makes the rightist views appear mainstream and unstoppable, that appearance is deceptive and open to change. As evident in the LDP's devastating defeat in 2009 and the low turnout of voters that returned the party to power in 2014, the right wing of the LDP's grip on national power and its current advocacy of conservative revisionism may very well be transitory. Despite sensational news stories about the ongoing rise of the right, return to pre-1945 patriotism, and the textbook wars, the sky over Korea–Japan relations is not falling.

One cause for optimism comes from the fundamental nature of the rightist revisionism in Japan today. It is not a powerful, well-oiled political machine. In fact, if progressive attempts to resist conservative revisionism are disorganized and disjointed, opponents on the right are even more divided—if usually noisier. The supporters of patriotic textbooks are in motley groups that do not fit comfortably or agreeably under a single tent. In some instances, these organizations, if a web site or a sound truck can be called organizations, embrace nihilistic and anonymous thrill seekers who appear to hate Japanese politicians, even conservative LDP leaders, as much as resident Koreans.

Yet, it is not only the divisions among right revisionists that have reduced the importance of the textbook controversy. Over a half-century and more of battling over textbook content, during an alternating cycle

of progressive versus conservative content, the most controversial features of Japanese modern history in East Asia have been acknowledged repeatedly.[1] The toothpaste has long been out of the tube and attempts at revision, changing, and retelling the story will not put it back. It might be argued that the revisionist story is today addressing a new audience, but only a powerful willing suspension of disbelief—or one attempted by a conservative party in power—can reject the reality that a massacre happened in 1937 in Nanjing or that "comfort women" were coerced into serving as sex slaves. If enclaves in Japan refuse to acknowledge what their homegrown historians tell them about the region's modern history, a chorus outside Japan has repeatedly made these points clear to Japanese citizens since 1945.

Regular repetition of the textbook controversy, particularly since the early 1980s, has also imparted a routinized quality to the dispute that has reduced its power to shock. Revisionists' attempts to rewrite history, attempts at times supported and encouraged within Japan's national government, continue today as in the past whenever textbooks come up for Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT since 2001) authorization. But the repetitive three-step—rumored or real revision proposals at home, media fixation internationally, and reaction in Asia—has become formulaic in politicized expressions that in Japan and abroad often seem to overflow with manufactured indignation and affected rage. Again, one reason that the routine of revision and reaction seems to be becoming less effective is that historical facts, once acknowledged, are difficult to turn into non-facts.

In this chapter, I consider several attempts to defuse the textbook controversy and the transitory character of revisionism. Among the positive steps toward resolution are those by teachers and scholars to create a transnational and jointly produced modern history text and comparable activities by non-academic civil society organizations. The transnational history project is possible thanks to a movement toward converging interpretations of modern history in Japan, an inclination that accepts and thereby neutralizes some—but not all—of the contentious historical facts that make for friction among northeast Asia's governments and peoples. Division within Japan's right-wing movement is an additional factor that suggests optimism is warranted. Division on the right is a negative for supporters of more nationalistic textbooks and a positive for groups promoting regional accord. A final cause for optimism stems from political realism that fosters regional cooperation and reduces conflict. It is as undeniable as

it is inevitable that heated clashes over textbook revision and contending historical interpretations draw the media's attention. But the newsworthiness of such incidents tends to make observers forget the intertwined nature of the contending parties' fundamental economic and political interests. Keeping these common interests in mind reduces the dimensions of the textbook issue to a size perhaps closer to its actual importance.

The Textbook Wars and Cooperative Transnational Efforts: The Case of *The New East Asian Modern and Contemporary History*

Both the strengths and weaknesses of civil society efforts to counter right-wing historical revisionism are exemplified in the 2013 work, *The New East Asian Modern and Contemporary History* (Japanese title: *Atarashii Higashi Ajia no kin-gendai shi*). This two-volume history first published in Japan in late 2012 and reprinted in 2013, and around the same time in Korean and Chinese versions in those countries, is a genuinely original interpretation that creates a transnational narrative, one that agrees on the most significant points East Asia's modern history while recognizing minor differences.[2]

The authors give their main reason for seeking consensus in the "Afterword" in the Japanese edition noting, "Without a commonly shared sense of history in East Asia a shared peace cannot be achieved."[3] This goal grew less out of pacifistic idealism than the pragmatic view that the experience of war and colonialism has inextricably intertwined the modern history of Korea, China, and Japan. To state the obvious, there are great modern historical events that, like it or not, must be recognized as a shared history if they are to be accurately understood.

At more than dozen meetings held in Korea, China, and Japan between 2006 and 2012, writing teams wrestled with finding mutually acceptable content for both volumes of *The New East Asian Modern and Contemporary History*. Each nation's team included a representative from the other two nations to shape an integrated and internationally contextualized history and overcome the possibility of creating three parallel narratives that never intersect, a basic weakness recognized in earlier attempts to create a tri-national East Asian history.

Discussion, debate, and revision eventually led to compromises, but the drawn out process also created a growing awareness of the dangers of scholarship by committee. There was good reason for concern. A total of

44 editorial team members, 18 from Japan, 15 from China, and 11 from Korea, participated in the project aided by interpreters.[4] By late 2010, this large group's protracted deliberations began to raise fears about the project ever finding an end date. The more meetings, discussion, debate, and revision, the further the projected publication date of May 2011 retreated into the horizon. Only after overcoming a host of difficulties did the Japanese language edition finally appear in September 2012.

How effectively does the content of *Modern and Contemporary History* achieve its authors' intended goals? Looking at the work's contents based primarily on the Japanese language volumes, it appears that writers' major aims have been met. They have thoroughly integrated the history of the three nations while placing the past in a global context. The result goes beyond simple parallel, self-contained histories of each nation. Volume One, the general survey history, has also hit upon an acceptable periodization based on the premise of a traditional Sino-centric order, its transformation, and modern nations emerging out of war, colonization, revolution, industrialization, and a new post-Cold War international order. *Modern and Contemporary History*'s second volume, topically arranged and emphasizing social history, provides a clear understanding of the three nations' interconnected political, economic, technological, media, and gender relations. Together the two complementary volumes surpass earlier efforts at creating a balanced transnational interpretation and a reliable regional history.

The new work's effectiveness arises from a frankness not previously seen. This is evident in the authors' use of plain words such as "aggression," "invasion," "massacre," and "colonization" in chapters throughout both volumes. The writers exhibit little squeamishness regarding terms as they devote more of their energy to substantive issues. This does not mean that all the Japanese, Chinese, and Korean authors agreed on all points, but they clearly have gone beyond quibbling over terms to face more fundamental issues. We can see the commitment to take on major problems in a straightforward and integrated way in *Modern and Contemporary History*'s treatment of such divisive issues as the Nanjing Massacre.

The Japanese version of *Modern and Contemporary History* concurs with the standard Chinese historical account of the carnage.[5] The narrative cites a total death toll for the six weeks in 1937 at more than 300,000 civilians and prisoners. It also reports that soldiers committed approximately 20,000 rapes and destroyed nearly a quarter of the city's housing. These high-end death, injury, and damage estimates closely correspond

with figures determined by the International Tribunal of the Far East and China's Nanjing Military Tribunal. The Japanese version of the tri-national narrative is equally clear as to responsibility noting, " it can be fairly said the Nanjing genocidal incident was an organized action undertaken by the Japanese military" (*Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken wa Nihongun ni yoru soshikiteki na kōi datta to ieyō*).[6] The use of *daigyakusatsu* in the manner of a proper noun, a word that denotes a genocidal massacre, is also significant in diverging from previous textbook accounts and current recommendations for revision that withheld judgment on the degree of premeditation behind the incident and its brutality.[7]

The Japanese team's writers also agree with their Chinese and Korean counterparts on usually contentious issues such as "comfort women," the Japanese use of colonial subjects as soldiers, and forced labor. *Modern and Contemporary History*'s writers attempt to place these issues and incidents in the context of the times but do not suggest that context justifies what happened.[8]

How are we to assess the overall significance of *Modern and Contemporary History*? On one hand, the motivation for the project might be summed up as a noble effort that calls to mind the saying, "Blessed are the peacemakers." The generous work of scholars in three nations has taken years of meetings, debates, research, writing, and rewriting, and is certainly praiseworthy. On the other, the present reception of the joint project also brings to mind the familiar admonition that no good deed goes unpunished. Recent reviews of the jointly authored text question the writers' motives and take issue with the narrative's tone and substance.

In Japan, criticisms have come from the right and left. From one side, critics point out that *Modern and Contemporary History* is still too condemnatory of Japanese actions (the old masochism accusation); from the other, they attack the emphasis on the future and community (*kyōdōtai*) of East Asia as being more for Japan's benefit than for the region's. There is also the inevitable disagreement over the accuracy of specific facts.[9]

Such critical drubbing from the right and left may lead the authors to question if their efforts were worth it. Perhaps they will agree with Mary McCarthy, who observed, "Anybody who has ever tried to rectify an injustice or set a record straight comes to feel that he is going mad. And from a social point of view, he is *crazy*, for he is trying to undo something that is finished, to unravel the social fabric."[10] *Modern and Contemporary History*'s aim of setting the record straight and thereby unraveling fixed national narratives will not be welcomed by governments and groups that

do not want to see the social fabric rewoven. And reweaving is precisely what the writers are trying to accomplish. They have not simply written history (as if that is ever simple), but determinedly tried to solve an international problem deeply rooted in the domestic politics of Korea, China, and Japan.

The authors nevertheless have ample reason to take heart. Their work has led readers to confront views in many cases different from their own and certainly at odds with official national positions on the meaning of the modern past. This provocative process is to be valued even if the end result is not complete agreement. A common feature of each civil society multinational attempt at history composition, by the authors of *Modern and Contemporary History* and writers engaged in earlier efforts, seems to be the inevitable conclusion that, on some points, the only solution to the problem of creating a mutually acceptable regional history that transcends national borders is to agree to disagree. *Modern and Contemporary History* is certainly not the last skirmish in the East Asia history wars. But the debate the work has engendered undoubtedly advances the discourse. At the broadest level, the effort ratchets the discussion to a point more open than any government-sponsored attempt at finding international consensus. At the local level in Japan, the book is also being studied in small groups and in various communities as well as discussed in open academic conferences.[11]

General three-country sales figures are not yet available for *Modern and Contemporary History* but its predecessor volume, A *History to Open the Future* (English edition title) was distributed in an initial run of 300,000 for China, Korea, and Japan, of which 90,000 copies were sold in Japan as of April 2013. Since then, the book has been translated into English for distribution in the USA and Europe. It has also been used in secondary schools and universities in China, Korea, and Japan.[12] *Modern and Contemporary History* has also been used in classrooms in Korea and distributed in China.[13]

Other civil society groups have engaged in efforts that have directly and indirectly supported the creators of transnational textbooks. The list of these organizations is long and their activities wide ranging, but their aims in many ways run parallel to the goals of the Japanese authors of *Modern and Contemporary History*. They typically share an international focus, often working in coordination with the United Nations and other international agencies, sometimes including non-Japanese and Japanese official and unofficial minorities, and feature a bottom-up presentation of

the past. This shared interpretation and approach challenge the point of view inherent in some of the more conservative MEXT-authorized texts (and in revised interpretations presently under ministerial consideration). Public education projects by such groups as the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility typically argue that humanity comes before patriotism and that the citizen cannot allow the state to enforce collective beliefs that oppress individual rights at home or rekindle militaristic values supportive of aggression abroad. The Center and similar civil society organizations challenge historical interpretations emanating from the government-sanctioned educational system.

Among some of the most important and active non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are:

- Center of Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility (JWRC) (Nihon no Sensō Sekinin Shiryō Sentā)
- Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 (CTJN21) (Kodomo to Kyōkasho Zenkoku Netto 21)
- Violence Against Women in War Network Japan (VAWW NET Japan) together with Women's Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) (Sensō to Josei e no Bōryoku Nihon Nettowāku and Akutibu Myūjiamu: Josei no Sensō to Heiwa Shiryōkan)
- POW Research Network Japan (POWRNJ) (POW Kenkyūkai)

As evident in the names of these organizations, their specific political aims, members, and audiences are quite varied. The same can be said for the effectiveness in achieving their stated goals. The groups may not speak with a single voice, but they do provide healthy alternatives to rightist attempts to create a new and uniform historical memory and revive prewar attitudes toward fellow East Asians. Their accomplishments are achieved while working from a structural disadvantage. Unlike the state, NGOs (sometimes referred to as NPOs, non-profit organizations) do not possess a permanent institutional life and are geared toward specific issues and problems open to changing circumstances. They lack the political muscle of non-voluntary and legal government agencies and associations and are always financially vulnerable because they depend on donations and grants and lack the assured budgetary resources enjoyed by tax-supported state organizations. Despite such limitations, they still provide a countervailing voice that effectively advocates for political ends. As Kamila Sczepanska observes in her recent study of Japanese NGOs, they are far from omnipotent in

setting the political agenda. But just imagine how the situation would be without their attempts to counter rightist discourses supported by a friendly conservative party in power.[14]

Converging Historical Interpretations

The writers of *Modern and Contemporary History* may also find that even though their narrative has not been accepted in classrooms as a means of mass instruction, the textbooks presently used are drawing nearer to their interpretation of key historical points. This kind of convergence is not progressing in a straight line.[15] But the tendency toward acknowledgment of controversial facts has appeared in Japanese textbooks in the past and will likely continue in the future. Once such facts have been acknowledged, it is also difficult to dis-acknowledge them, although revisionists both past and present have attempted to do so.

A quick overview of textbooks used during the postwar decades bears this out. The 1931 Manchurian Incident and the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, for example, appeared in Ministry of Education textbooks approved in 1947. From the mid-1950s and the rise of the LDP-dominated 1955 System and the continuance of the Cold War, more conservative interpretations prevailed, but from 1982 through the 1990s progressive interpretations became dominant. In fact, textbooks authorized in 1994 mentioned the "comfort women," Unit 731, and the Nanjing Massacre. The pendulum swung back toward conservatism in 1996 with the emergence of the Tuskuru Kai and its demands for an end to "masochistic" narratives in classroom textbooks.[16] Yet the swing did not constitute a complete retreat or denial of fundamental facts, such as the severity of the Nanjing Massacre and the reality of the "comfort women," that had long been widely acknowledged by mainstream historians.

The resistance to rightist revision is evident in the fact that the Tuskuru Kai's version of a *New History* has proved singularly unpopular among teachers. In 2001 and 2005, MEXT approved the textbook but it proved a pyrrhic victory for the rightist organization because of the insignificant level of public school adoption rates. Fusōsha's 2005 revised version of *Atarashii kyōkasho*, although approved by MEXT, had an adoption rate of only 0.50 % in middle schools. This was better than the 2001 edition's 0.039 %, but is still quite small. As Mitani Hiroshi has observed, the Tuskuru Kai's effort "will most likely remain a marginal presence on the textbook market."[17] Along with weak adoption rates, the group's political

fortunes also waned. In his 2014 analysis of the textbook issue, Yangmo Ku notes that:

> The Tuskuru Kai [*sic*] suffered a decrease in its influence after 2001, as its textbooks received governmental approval yet its adoption rate was very low. It was reported that its membership decreased by 30 percent, dropping from about 10,000 in 2001 to 7,840 in 2004. Despite these diminishing circumstances, the Tuskuru Kai sought to gain the support from nationalist groups and LDP hawks in order to increase its textbook adoption rate for 2005.[18]

A recent analysis by Gabriela Romeu indicates that the texts most widely adopted for use in her sampling of Tokyo's middle school classrooms in 2012—and that will remain in use into 2016—conform closely to Western and East Asian interpretations that the war on the Asian mainland was an "invasion" and that the events in Nanjing in 1937 was a "massacre" and not an incident. In Romeu's sampling, she found that textbooks used in more than 70 % of the private schools in Tokyo adopted texts that presented these views while only 7.1 % of schools have adopted textbooks espousing, in her words, the "divergent" revised view. Furthermore, she discovered that the adoption rate of consensus view texts was even higher in public schools and lower for works associated with the Tuskuru Kai (e.g. the 2012 textbooks produced by Ikuhōsha and Jiyūsha). Romeu has admittedly gathered these statistics from scattered, Tokyo-centered, commercial sources and the numbers are at best unofficial estimates.[19] That said, the texts in use for the 2012–2016 term clearly conform to mainstream historical interpretations while the "divergent" or Tuskuru Kai interpretation, despite the support of conservative LDP leaders and nationalistic organization, has failed to gain much ground. With regard to adoption rates for various 2012 textbooks, Romeu's summary conclusion is:

> Given these [2012] adoption rates in comparison to the statistics for 2001, the middle school history education consists of a liberal (least nationalistic) to neutral portrayal of Japan's involvement in the Second Sino-Japanese War, as the controversial textbooks continue to show low adoption rates.[20]

Romeu also reminds us that the content of right revisionist textbooks has become less strident on some points. Such moderation may not be good news for some publishers, particularly as the frisson of public excitement over the latest education crisis fades. For Fusōsha, responsible for

publishing the Tuskuru Kai's *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* in 2001 and a revised version in 2005, the news has been so bad that the company is no longer in the textbook publishing business. As Mikyoung Kim has noted in reviewing the textbook wars since 1947 through the 2000s, "the market share of 'problematic' texts has been consistently dismal."[21]

The overall trend toward convergence is not irreversible, of course, nor does it allow for complacency among civil society groups resisting a return to prewar-type patriotism. This is evident in recent shifts in the Japanese national political landscape in 2015 in party and bureaucratic maneuvering taking place in conjunction with the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. The rightist Abe government's reelection win in December 2014 has unquestionably emboldened the current Minister of Education, Shimomura Hakubun, to push the pendulum back toward a more conservative approach. Yet even this attempt to manipulate the content of revised mainstream texts in line with the Abe administration's conservative agenda does not advocate adopting anything like the Tuskuru Kai's absolutist positions. What the Ministry's preliminary approval of 20 new texts announced in April 2015 has produced is the recognition in the texts of open issues. The ball is still in play, but changes endorsed by the current MEXT administration may ultimately be adopted, albeit with revisions. Proposed features in the textbooks will emphasize geography in providing an historical basis for Japanese ownership of islands also claimed by Korea and China.

Even more controversial, the Ministry is once again advocating calling the Nanjing Massacre the "Nanjing Incident." MEXT has also recommended that new textbooks indicate where there is room for debate in the current state of historical scholarship on sensitive issues. The specific recommendations for textbook revisions therefore back away from outright denial of the facts of Japanese history. Like most modest proposals, the recommendations have an insidious side. This coyness about historical facts injects doubt about issues, for example, the Nanjing Massacre, for which there is overwhelming historical certainty. The tactic is reminiscent of that used by groups that implicitly deny the reality of evolution, the holocaust, or global warming by arguing that the science or facts behind the theories are still open to debate. Denial may not represent the Japanese people's majority view but it is entirely in line with the Abe government's attempt to rewrite history. As with stands taken to deny scientific reality that is based on a preponderance of evidence, doubting that what happened at Nanjing was *really* a massacre will be discredited—more accurately, *again*

discredited. After all, "massacre" has been used in Japanese textbooks repeatedly in the past and it seems that any attempt to return to the earlier position will only work with people who obstinately ignore historical facts or can rationalize away body counts in the tens of thousands as somehow less atrocious than deaths in the hundreds of thousands.

The present official attempt at revision expresses a kind of desperation, a vain attempt to prop up an argument that has already been lost. Furthermore, it once again opens the Japanese national government to mockery and criticism. Given that the current MEXT recommendations for revising textbooks have little positive to propose other than that some historical questions be held open for debate (although others such as ownership of offshore islands should not), it is likely that converging interpretations along the lines of the *Modern and Contemporary History* will reappear once the current conservative LDP government departs. This view does not deny the conservative turn since the last round of official textbook authorization. But the change currently endorsed by MEXT may not be lasting given the unpopularity of the Abe administration, a government that has come to power thanks to the utter disarray of opposition parties, 3/11, and decline in popular participation in voting.

Rightist revisionism is also being checked by Japan's numerous civil society groups. Many of these are not directly connected with the textbook issues but have nonetheless worked to offer alternatives to the rightist interpretation and reinterpretations of prewar and wartime history. These organizations endeavor to decouple the experience of individuals during the war from the notion of *national* victimization. Humanizing the Japanese and non-Japanese experience through remembrance at wartime sites at home and abroad has worked to express this viewpoint. It can be seen in the efforts of the Japan Network to Protect War-Related Sites (Sensō Iseki Hozon Zenkoku Nettowaaku). This group stands out for its efforts to preserve war sites, not to valorize war or glorify the nation but to bring individual experience and national excesses into sharp relief. Members counter the romanticizing of prewar patriotism by accurately remembering both the suffering experienced and the suffering caused by Japanese people.[22]

In attempting to contextualize one's experience or understanding of the experiences of others in the social environment of the time, civil society education projects are transforming historical interpretations that were formerly considered provocative or controversial into commonly accepted facts of the past. Paradoxically, this effort to historicize may be happening

precisely thanks to the efforts of revisionist groups to block them. In creating a dispute, the rightist groups keen on rewriting textbooks that are less historically "masochistic" have drawn attention to the revisionist project but fallen short of having their version of history taught in the schools. This does not mean that rightist groups will give up. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that their retrograde position is not necessarily shared by most Japanese citizens. In addition to the lack of popular support for Abe's conservative politics, the transitory nature of his political success, and counter efforts by Japanese NGOs, a lack of unity among rightist groups suggests that their historical interpretation will not prevail.

Divisions on the Right

Many rightist groups in Japan today at times appear alike in that they are colorful, extreme, threatening, and because these shared qualities make their activities irresistible to a mass media hungry for the extreme and the unusual. But below the shared superficial attributes, the right is neither monolithic nor unified. The LDP-centered Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), whose "influential member" Kase Hideaki claims that "We are monarchists," has little in common with the internet's extreme 2-Channeru commentators who launch racist tirades against Koreans but also mock any kind of actual political activism, including that of the Nippon Kaigi. Some of these so-called nationalists even call Abe a "traitor." As Sakamoto Rumi has pointed out, even the discussion threads on 2-Channeru fail to present a consistent point of view. In her words, "There is no engagement, no argument, and no discussion." And, "While the posters regularly refer to historical and political issues between Japan and Korea, many do not seem to have much interest in actual history or politics."[23] If anything, they are reminiscent of the apolitical and alienated internet "trolls" whose sour attacks resemble sport taken up just for the perverse fun of it.

Splits among nationalists or faux nationalists are also evident in the differing positions taken by the Zaitokukai (Citizens' Group Against Special Rights for Korean Residents in Japan) and ostensibly nationalist Osaka mayor Hashimoto Tōru, who until quite recently led the right-wing Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai). The mayor and Sakurai Makoto, the Zaitokukai chairman, in October 2014, engaged in a shouting match that almost came to blows.[24] The video recording of the incident makes clear that nominal right-wingers can disagree violently among themselves,

and that on such issues as ethnic discrimination even rightist party leaders such as Mayor Hashimoto demonstrate their commitment to follow the rule of law.

One of the most curious recent developments that illustrates the splintered quality of rightist politics is the case of the 2002 movie *The Wartime History of Japan* (in Japanese *Rin toshite ai*). The movie, freely available on YouTube in Japanese with English-language subtitles, is a 67-minute professionally produced documentary directed by Izumi Ryūichi. Although not a "text" in the conventional sense of a textbook for classroom use, supporters of the film urge that it be shown as widely as possible, including in Japanese schools, as a corrective to the "masochistic" version of modern Japan history supposed forced upon students today.[25] The film uses sentimental music and strikingly beautiful images of nature and people as it portrays the modern history of Japan from the Meiji Restoration through to a rendition of World War II as a Japanese-led war of liberation. The film was subsidized by individual and group supporters of the Yasukuni Shrine and was to be screened there regularly after its exclusive premiere in 2002 at the Yūshūkan Museum attached to the shrine.

The film's narrative of Japanese sacrifices for fellow Asians and the victimization suffered for the courageous stand taken by Japanese wartime leaders, soldiers, and common people, seems to be a perfect match for the message that the revisionist right seeks to convey, whether in museum exhibits or classroom textbooks. But there is a reason that this film is showing on YouTube instead of being regularly screened at the Yūshūkan as originally intended. If we are to believe director Izumi, that reason is that his masterwork was just too provocative for the Yasukuni Shrine's top administrators.[26]

Before his death in 2010, Izumi took to the Internet to attack the Yasukuni leaders for besmirching both the memory and sacrifices of myriad Japanese soldiers who had given up their lives in the struggle to liberate Asia from Western imperialism. He also complained that he had been personally betrayed, in that promises made to him to show his film as a permanent installation at Yasukuni were broken after the second day of screening.[27] Izumi, commissioned to commemorate the Shrine's 130th anniversary in film, had intended the project to be his crowning work after a lifetime as an anime scriptwriter and film director. He dedicated himself to the project, not only directing but also narrating the documentary from start to finish. Upon learning that his work had no future in the Yūshūkan's permanent collection, he attacked Yasukuni's direc-

tors. His criticisms became unmistakably personal in indicting the shrine's administrators as too afraid of jeopardizing their easy and luxurious lives, an existence characterized by the daily enjoyment of fine wines and complete freedom from any economic worries. In his view, the very group entrusted with protecting and memorializing the brave soldiers who had sacrificed their all for Japan and Asia, had become no better than the weak-willed postwar "salary man" in their complacent and cowardly actions. After his experience with Yasukuni's leaders, Izumi no longer wanted to have his work shown in the shrine that they despoiled. In his words: "The doors to historical truth have been blocked. And the enemy is not the left wing, but resides precisely in the main citadel [of Yasukuni itself]."[28] This kind of internecine dispute is not unique. It also reminds us that movement for historical revision is not irreversible, inevitable, or unitary, but often involves disparate and even mutually antagonistic groups.

Rightist revisionism is also frequently challenged from *outside*. The Yasukuni Shrine organization has been challenged in court many times in the years since 1945. Among the more recent examples of this is a suit bought in 2005 by Okinawans who are suing to end Yasukuni's one-sided decision to enshrine their relatives.[29] Ongoing suits have also been filed in April 2014 against Prime Minister Abe for paying his respects at the shrine in his official capacity.[30]

The willingness of individuals and civil society organizations to resort to the courts is an important indicator of the general public's resistance to the Abe administration's attempts to revise the postwar Constitution. A nationwide poll undertaken by *Tokyo Shinbun* between 25 and 27 April 2014 reveals that 62 % of the people polled oppose any revision of Article 9, *an increase* from 58 % in June 2013. Half of those polled also oppose the current administration's revision of the Constitution to allow participation in collective self-defense and only 34 % are in favor.[31] The negative public reaction has contributed to a drop in the level of public support not just for constitution revision but also for the Abe government itself, which some media observers argue has caused the LDP to tone done efforts to rewrite the nation's founding document.[32] This is a significant statistic in that it points to an *increase in support* for leaving Article 9 unchanged despite a Cabinet-led campaign to go in the opposite direction during a period of tension and conflict in Japanese state-to-state ties with Korea and China.

Public opinion supporting leaving the Constitution unchanged is also advocated by many civil society groups. These organizations, how-

ever, also support a variety of causes not exclusively concerned with the textbook issue or school curricula. Smaller local groups often have more narrowly defined goals but overlap with national groups in seeking to de-romanticize the past and check the growth of Japan-centric patriotism. Representative NGOs include those engaged in war memory projects carried out at the Haebaru Army Barracks in Okinawa and Kamejima Mountain Underground Plant in Kurashiki, Okayama, and the underground command complex in Matsushiro, Nagano.[33] These groups do not attempt to glorify war or present Japanese people as victims. Their focus on common experiences of life lived under a wartime regime creates an identification, not with the nation, but with others, including war victims outside Japan. The fact that these kinds of mnemonic sites are not always authorized by the state helps deepen this identification.

Conclusion: Political Pragmatism and the Bearable Lightness of the Schoolbook Controversy

In a survey of liberal–conservative swings in the textbook wars since 1945, one salient feature to emerge is that controversies over schoolbooks can be both the cause and the result of friction between the Japanese government and governments of nearby nations. As Peter Duus and others have amply demonstrated, the textbook issue is one that really heats up not in 1945 but decades later in the 1980s, along with both greater regional integration and greater economic prosperity in northeast Asia.[34] The manner in which the textbooks have been created, used, and criticized has not been unchanging, but has shifted according to prevailing political and diplomatic winds. In this respect, the furor over textbooks can be variously described as a dependent variable, the tail on the dog, or a sideshow. This secondary quality is evident in the timing of textbook conflicts. In the Abe administration's recent recommendations on textbooks, it is hardly coincidental that reprising the history of national ownership of remote islands in junior high school readers is proposed during a period when Korean and Japanese patriots vie with one another to plant their respective national flags on these disputed territories. Today, as in the postwar past, the textbook controversies have become less the cause of clashing national interests than the result.

There is also a question about how heated the conflicts over textbooks really are. Obviously, the disagreements have triggered riots and protests

in Korea, China, and Japan, but they have not resulted in warfare. This may be because governments in South Korea and China can take a hostile attitude toward Japan over textbook-related issues—and sometimes vice versa—not because conflict is imminent but because the parties involved appear to agree that heated rhetoric is unlikely to turn into confrontational actions. In this manner, complaints about textbooks are a *safe* form of international conflict, one that demonstrates a limited capacity to escalate to substantial state-to-state confrontation. This ritualistic type of clash contrasts clearly with genuine interest-based conflicts that are too serious to permit the angry rhetoric used in exchanges over the textbook issues. In the case of warring textbooks, the potential for violence may have become inversely proportional to the media attention given the issue; that is, the more noise the less action.

The silence surrounding the China–North Korea border dispute, a current, continuing, interest-based international problem in which actual territory is at stake, illustrates this point. Today, the two nations share a common 850-mile border (1416 kilometers), generally following the course of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, but the demarcation of Korean and Chinese territory along the borderline is inconsistent. From the Korean perspective, the issue has stirred sufficient patriotic fervor that both North and South Korea have taken a unified stance in their maps. One reason for this common view is that the Chinese borderline runs through Mount Paektu, a mountain peak venerated as the source of the nation in foundation myths. The peak, supposedly Kim Il-Sung's birthplace, is such a fixture in North Korean patriotic dogma that the senior Kims have been depicted in colossal paintings standing at its peak. Its similar importance in South Korea is evident by its mention in the first line of the Republic of Korea's national anthem.[35] Given the peak's symbolic importance, China's claim to this sacred territory is comparable to a non-Japanese staking a special claim to Mount Fuji.

The conflict, of course, goes beyond symbolism. Also at stake in the dispute over the borderline is China's access to the Sea of Japan and differing interpretations of Chinese and Korean maritime boundaries. The lack of clarity about the border raises complicated differences related to national defense, shipping rights, fishery zones, and exploitation of oil, gas, and mineral resources. In short, the issue has all the makings of a genuine and heated clash of interests. Yet, despite the strong potential for conflict, the North Korean government has not made a diplomatic issue of the border since the 1980s.[36] North Korea's economic and diplomatic

dependence on the great power on its doorstep obviously is an important reason for the media silence surrounding this issue and accounts for the quiescent attitude taken by both Korean governments.

The Korea–China border issue provides a suggestive comparison with the state of Korea–Japanese relations over Japanese textbooks. The textbooks make for a contentious and well-publicized international dispute, not because they are so politically important but because they do not pose a genuine national security threat to any of the parties involved. They are useful for domestic politics, for hardening the nationalistic ground beneath the feet of all the political groups attempting to manipulate a highly emotional issue. In so doing, they divert attention from lagging economies or the predatory actions of one-party governments. But the heat generated by textbooks does not reach the threshold of combustion because the issue is not a vital national interest, let alone a cause of war.

The tendency for realpolitik considerations to outweigh textbooks in importance in state-to-state relations is also present in currently tense Sino-Japanese and Japanese–Korean ties. Despite the obvious state-to-state competition over resources, markets, territory, and prestige, market interdependence and all that goes under the rubric of "globalization," as well as the need for peace—alongside the memories of what has happened when the peace broke down over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—seems to call forth a common conclusion. This is, the peoples of Japan, China, and Korea may have difficulty living with one another, but the situation is far worse if they are in conflict.

The various domestic political uses of the textbook issues in China, Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, and other states do not support a conclusion that the textbook problem is unimportant. It clearly is. But it must be considered as dispassionately as possible. Schools are undeniable sites for socialization and the places where historical memories are created and reinforced. It is assumed that this general function is why they have become sites of mass instruction and battlefields for memory wars. But changing political circumstances may reduce their importance in creating and maintaining our deepest beliefs about the past.

As Mitani Hiroshi aptly points out, "The first characteristic of historical awareness in Japan today is that the role played by school textbooks is not very large."[37] He makes this observation because exposure to even the approved social studies texts touching on Japanese history is limited usually to elementary and middle school as part of social studies, and as an optional elective in high school in a curriculum centering on overseas

history, not the history of Japan. Moreover, as Japanese history is not required for university entrance exams and few study history in college, the school textbook battle seems to be a struggle over very few hearts and minds.

Many of those hearts and minds are also probably largely unmoved by the content of the social studies readers regardless of its content or lack thereof. Critics of pre-college Japanese middle and high school education often point to the dull emphasis on names and dates, in addition to the problem of attempting to cover too much in too little time, in explaining the poor grasp of Japan's history. Robert Fish, an expert on the modern history of education, describes the rushed reading in high school classes as "From the Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages."[38] In fact, 20 pages is the long version. Despite all the heat and ink generated by the textbook wars, this kind of history education does not produce either ardent patriots or progressive masochists. In Mitani's words, "even college graduates, as with those who did not attend college, enter society knowing almost nothing about the history of the society in which they were born and raised."[39]

This point brings us back to the authors of the *Modern and Contemporary History* text whose authors have made a virtue of necessity. Unable to have their work accepted for use in the pre-college classroom, they have decided to promote as a text for the adult reader. This seems like a wise choice because it is adults, albeit at times childish adults, and not children who are waging the textbook wars. And it is the adult audience that really needs an informed understanding of the modern past.

Notes

1. See Peter Duus' chapter in this volume for the cycle of progressive and conservative historical interpretations in textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education and its successor body since 1945.
2. *The New East Asian Modern and Contemporary History* should not to be confused with the rightist organization Tsukuru Kai's similarly titled work.
3. Nit-Chū-Kan Sankoku Kyōdō Rekishi Hensan Iin Kai [Japan–China–Korea Three-Nation Common History Compilation Committee], *Atarashii Higashi Ajia no kin-gendai shi II* [The New East Asian Modern and Contemporary History II] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron Sha, 2012), 243–44.
4. Ibid., 247–48.

5. Haruo Tohmatsu, "Japanese Textbooks in Comparative Perspective," in *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories*, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 116.
6. Nit-Chū-Kan Sankoku Kyōdō Rekishi Hensan Iin Kai, *Atarashii Higashi Ajia no kin-gendai shi I* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron Sha, 2012), 114.
7. Tohmatsu, "Comparative Perspective," 118.
8. Nit-Chū-Kan Sankoku Kyōdō Rekishi Hensan Iin Kai, *Atarashii kin-gendai shi II*, 91–95.
9. Yong-hwan Chong, "'Kokkyō o koeru rekishi' to wa nanika— *Atarashii Higashi Ajia no kin-gendaishi* o yomu" [What Is a "History that Transcends Borders?"], *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 910 (2013): 29.
10. Mary McCarthy, "My Confession," in *The Book of Twentieth-Century Essays*, ed. Ian Hamilton (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 164.
11. An example of a specific local meeting is the gathering on 10 July 2014 and later meetings at the Kitazawa Town Hall in Setagaya ward in Tokyo. Waseda University and other schools have sponsored academic meetings that have engaged the public in discussing the texts and their usefulness. On the Kitazawa discussions, see Yanada Takayuki comment on 30 July 2014 meeting to discuss *The New East Asian Modern and Contemporary History*, July 2014, *Yanada Takayuki kou itta*, Blog, July 2010, http://yanada.txt-nifty.com/yanada/2014/07/index.html
12. Ōbinata Sumio, "Nit-Chū-Kan Sankoku no kyōdō sagyō kara mietekuru mono: *Mirai o hiraku rekishi* kara *Atarashii Higashi Ajia no kin-gendaishi* e—takokukan rekishi kyōzai no bunseki shiten" [What We Can See from the Tri-National Japan-China-Korea Project : From *A History to Open the Future* to *The New East Asian Modern and Contemporary History*— Analysis from the Viewpoint of Multinational Teaching Materials], *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 910 (2013): 3. Admittedly the 300,000 copies of *History to Open the Future* is far fewer than the 710,000 copies of the Tsukuru Kai's *New History* sold in Japanese bookstores in 2003. One reason for robust sales is that the book was often purchased in bulk by rightist groups for mass distribution free of charge. One estimate puts the cost of distribution at a billion yen. Such funds could be raised thanks to the Tsukuru Kai's support from conservative LDP politicians, corporate sponsors, and media giants such as the *Sankei Shinbun*. Abe Shinzō had a prominent place among the Tsukuru Kai's backers. The novelty or curiosity value might have been another reason for *New History*'s high sales volume. In my case, I bought the Tsukuru Kai's text to understand how they could justify historical interpretations so seemingly at odds with reality. The book's extreme interpretation added to its novelty to a degree hard to measure. On the Tsukuru Kai's political, media, and financial supporters,

see David McNeill, "History Redux: Japan's Textbook Battle Reignites," *JPRI Working Paper*, June 2005, 1. http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp107.html

13. Arirang Prime—E210C11 Korea-China-Japan Joint History Textbook https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7ZPlOf5nYc. See also The China-Japan-Korea Common History Text Tri-National Committee, ed., *A History to Open the Future : Modern East Asian history and Regional Reconciliation*, Seoul, Minimum, 2010.
14. Kamila Szczepanska, "The Politics of War Memory in Japan 1990–2010: Progressive Civil Society Groups and the Contestation of Memory of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945)," *GEMC Journal* 8 (2013): 218. For a more thorough analysis of Japanese progressive NGOs and NPOs, see Kamila Szczepanska, *The Politics of War Memory in Japan: Progressive Civil Society Groups and the Contestation of Memory of the Asia-Pacific War* (London; New York: Routledge, 2014).
15. As I revise this essay during 2015, Japan's Minister of Education, Shimomura Hakubun, has supported new social studies textbooks to be used in junior high schools beginning in April 2016. The 18 textbooks approved for future use will include references to the historical basis for Japanese ownership of islands also claimed by Korea and China. Some of them also dilute descriptions of war crimes. One example of this is several that use "incident" instead of "massacre" with reference to the 1937 Nanjing atrocity. This is a conservative turn compared to the last MEXT-authorized selection of textbooks and a change of emphasis in the new priority given to geography and its bearing on contemporary territorial disputes. The more positive news is that not all of the MEXT approved texts have followed the ministry's guidelines. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's 1995 "heartfelt apology" for Japan's "colonial rule" and "aggression" remains in the texts as do references to Nanjing and "comfort women." This is a conservative turn but not an educational reverse course. Certain undeniable historical facts have not been refuted, although the attempt to reopen questions about some of them undoubtedly reflects the strong advocacy of the Abe government. "Hearts and Minds," *The Economist*, 10 April 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21648157-japan-reviews-history-textbooks-its-schoolchildren-and-riles-its-neighbours-hearts-and-minds; "Takeshima, Senkakus Cited in All New Social Studies Textbooks," *Japan Times*, 6 April 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/06/national/politics-diplomacy/takeshima-senkakus-cited-in-all-new-social-studies-textbooks/#.Ve_nC7QwyfR
16. Kim Yeong Hwan, "Considering Peace and History of East Asia through the Remains of Victims Who Were Forced to Take Work—A Special Attention to the Experience of 'East Asia Cooperative Workshops,'"[*sic*] in

Initiatives toward Peace and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific Basin, ed. Academy of Korean Studies (Gyeonggi, Republic of Korea: Academy of Korean Studies), 319–20.

17. Hiroshi Mitani, "Japan's History Textbook System and Its Controversies," in Daquing Yang et al., eds., *Toward a History Beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 262. On the increase to a 0.50 % adoption rate, see Hiroshi Mitani, "The Textbook Issue in Japan and East Asia: Institutional Framework, Controversies, and International Efforts for Common Histories," in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo eds. *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism* (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood, 2008), 88.
18. Yangmo Ku, "Japanese History Textbook Controversies, 1995-2010," *Pacific Focus*, 29, 2 (August 2014): 267.
19. Gabriela Romeu, "The Japanese History Textbook Controversy amid Post-War Sino-Japanese Relations," *Japan Studies Review* 18 (2014): 87–88. See also Szczepanska, "The Politics of War Memory in Japan 1990-2010," *GEMC Journal* 8 (2013): 218.
20. Romeu, "History Textbook Controversy," 89.
21. Mikyoung Kim, "Myth, Milieu, and Facts: History Textbook Controversies in Northeast Asia," in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo eds. *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism* (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood, 2008), 103.
22. The preservation group's home page provides a summary of the organization's aims and instructions on how to become a member. See http://homepage3.nifty.com/kibonoie/isikinituto.htm
23. Rumi Sakamoto, "'Koreans, Go Home!' Internet Nationalism in Contemporary Japan as a Digitally Mediated Subculture," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 9, no. 10/2 (2011), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Rumi-SAKAMOTO/3497/article.html, 3–4.
24. "Japanese 'Hate Speech' Debate Abandoned as Insults Fly," *The Guardian*, 21 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/21/japan-hate-speech-debate-abandoned-toru-hashimoto-makoto-sakurai. See also: "Hashimoto, Zaitokukai chairman get into shouting match," *Japan Today*, 21 October 2014, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/hashimoto-zaitokukai-chairman-get-into-shouting-match
25. The film is enthusiastically endorsed with two pages of recommendations for viewing beginning in December 2012 and ongoing thereafter on the video promotional site *Niconico douga* [sic], accessed (most recently) on 10 September 2015, http://www.nicovideo.jp/tag/凛として愛?sort=f
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28. "Hoshugawa no teki" Blog, 1 October 2010. There are also signs that the Yasukuni shrine's administrators are moderating their position so that their organization can become less of a lightning rod attracting international controversy. This is evident in their recent reconsideration of the idea of removing 14 war criminals—dis-enshrining if you will—from the memorial. This is being considered as a way to douse the controversies that routinely flare up and complicate relationships with the governments and peoples of Japan's important Asian neighbors.
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CHAPTER 6

The Controversy over the Ancient Korean State of Gaya: A Fresh Look at the Korea–Japan History War

Pankaj Mohan

The famous expression of Benedetto Croce, "all history is contemporary history," is intended to emphasize the ideological requirements and shifting political agenda that invariably underpin its writing. Romila Thapar elaborated this point succinctly when she defined history as a "dialogue between the present and the *assumed* past."[1] Similar to the British practice of creating a hegemonic account of India, Meiji Japan made a concerted effort to appropriate history as a conduit of its imperialist agenda and a tool to legitimize political supremacy over the Korean peninsula. It is remarkable that, among various theories that were put forward in the colonial period, the theory of Japan's colonial outpost in the Gaya region (Mimana in Japanese) became the most enduring and influential historical narrative of Japan's cultural and political hegemony. All the history textbooks published during the colonial era for students in both Japan and the colony alluded to this theory. For instance, the history textbooks issued by the office of the Japanese Governor-General in Korea for primary school students, namely *Jinjō shōgakkō kokushi hojū kyōzai* (Vol. 1), *Futsūgakkō*

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kokushi shōkan, and *Futsūgakkō kokushi kangichi*, made it explicit that the rulers of Yamato conquered and colonized the Gaya region. Echoes of this idea can be heard in the revisionist textbook *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* (The New History Textbook), published by Fusōsha in 2001.[2] Although several authors in the Western world have written on the so-called history war between Korea and Japan, controversy surrounding the Gaya region remains an understudied area of inquiry.[3]

A close examination of the literary and archaeological sources reveals that linkages between Korea and Japan date back to pre-historic times. The Chinese text *Sanguozhi*, which provides an authentic picture of political developments on the Korean peninsula, refers to Byeonhan region (on which Gaya states emerged) as an important source of iron for Wa (Japan). Although Japan did not engage in extensive cultural, economic, and political interaction with China until the early seventh century, it is important to remember that the Japanese people did not evolve the initial forms of their political institutions and define their cultural identity in complete isolation from the continent. Recent archaeological findings testify to the existence of solid connections between the early states on the Korean peninsula and Japanese archipelago. Commencing from the mid-sixth century CE when Buddhism and Confucianism spread to the entire Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipelago, the basic structures of Chinese imperial institutions were established as the endurable norm of state formation, leading to the creation of a uniquely cohesive cultural and intellectual space. However, the introduction of Chinese civilization created mutually incommensurate memories of the past in the two countries. An important aspect of Korea–Japan relations that has not yet been adequately appreciated is the fact that mutually divergent interpretations of the past, leading to misgivings about the apparent cultural symmetry and coherence of the two countries, is a direct consequence of the early ways in which Confucian culture was adopted and adapted in these two countries. The process of de-Confucianization and the related process nation-building project in modern times further intensified the conflict.

In this chapter, I will take the example of Gaya to illustrate the conflict. Japan's imperialist historiography gave credence to the mytho-historical records of the *Nihon Shoki* (also known as *Nihongi*) that the southern Korean state of Gaya (Mimana/Imna) served as the colonial outpost of Yamato Japan in ancient times. Korean historians, spearheaded by Kim Sok-hyong, put forward a counter-claim arguing that several Korean

colonies existed on the Japanese archipelago. A number of Japanese historians of Korea in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries assumed the role as producers of *hokoku bunsho* (writings in defense of the state), while Korea's contemporaneous historiography, a counter-discourse to the emperor-centered historiography of Japan, was placed in the service of nationalist ideology. In order to provide a nuanced understanding of the specific controversy surrounding Gaya, it is essential to provide an overview of the traditions of historical writing in Korea and Japan.

The Craft of History Writing in Korea and Japan

Korea was introduced to Confucianism in the fourth century, leading to the process of Sinicization, and it is remarkable that although the influence of Chinese civilization, and more specifically Confucian culture, permeated every area of intellectual endeavor, it found best expression in the field of history. This is really understandable, because in no other civilization in the pre-modern era has history wielded as much influence and appeal and acquired such range and richness as in China. The unique place of history in the Chinese world is evident in the remark of Confucius that "by the Spring and Autumn [Annals] men would know him and men would condemn him."[4] Subsequently, Mencius endorsed this remark when he wrote that "the compilation of the Spring and Autumn Annals was as monumental an achievement as Yu's controlling of the Flood and bringing peace to the Empire, and that when Confucius compiled this text, rebellious ministers and villainous sons were struck with terror."[5] The genre of historical writing in China was brought to a new level of sophistication and assumed a distinct form with the publication of the *Records of the Grand Historian* by Sima Qian in the first century BCE.[6] The format of dynastic history, developed in China, was subsequently used by historians not only in China but also in Korea and Japan. The *Spring and Autumn Annals* (Chunqiu), *Records of the Grand Historian* (Shiji), and *Book of Han* (Hanshu) formed core readings for any scholar in East Asia in the pre-modern era. Commencing from the fourth century, Koreans started compiling historical texts based on the Confucian framework and the model provided by Sima Qian.[7] These historical texts, however, survive only in the form of brief quotations in the Japanese *Nihon shoki*.

Adherence to the Confucian framework notwithstanding, Korean and Japanese historians faced the unique dilemma of reconciling their nativist impulse or proto-nationalist sentiments with the imperatives of the

Sinocentric/Confucian world order, which served to bolster their domestic legitimacy. In other words, Korea and Japan accommodated the format of Confucian historiography and accepted the broad parameters of the Confucian world order while never ceasing to emphasize in their narratives the distinctness of their racial identity. The historical consciousness of the early Korean historian was influenced by the memory of the protracted struggle that their ancestors waged against the Chinese states; the historical practice in Korea, therefore, involved undermining, excision, or modification of records about Chinese hegemony on the peninsula. In the Japanese context, adaptation of Confucian historiography resulted in the apotheosis of the ruling house of Yamato and enhancement of the power and prestige of Japanese emperors above their counterparts on the Korean peninsula.

In modern times, historians of Japan played a seminal role in not only shaping national identity but also lending substance and specificity to the project of defining and justifying Japan's expansionist nationalism based on the model of Western imperialism.[8] Carol Gluck has shown how historians addressed Japan's need to forge *kokutai*, a unique national identity that retained Japan's distinctive national spirit and customs while facilitating its de-Asianization/de-Confucianization and concomitant rise as a world power on a par with the West.[9] Even the brilliant scholarship of such path-breaking Japanese historians of the Meiji era as Shiratori Kurakichi, Kume Kunitake, and Hoshino Hisashi, who carried out pioneering research into ancient Korean history, could not escape the distortion of this Orientalist lens. One of the more influential theories about Korean history, formulated by Shiratori Kurakichi and subsequently endorsed by other scholars, was *taritsusei*, lack of autonomy.[10] Another theory formulated by scholars of Korean history in Meiji Japan was geographical determinism, the distorted view that the course of Korea's history was invariably and inevitably determined by political developments in China. Such other theories as historical changelessness or stagnation and the common origin of Korea and Japan (*Nissen dōjōron*) were also put forward.

Korean nationalism in the twentieth century, manifested mostly in the form of anti-imperialism, was often sustained and stimulated by the work of historians. Shin Chae-ho, the most prominent icon of Korea's nationalist historiography, defined History as a conflict between I (ego) and non-I (non-ego). Shin wrote that a nation or a national culture is in constant struggle with other nations or foreign cultural forces, and it either survives or perishes in this process. For him, state, minjok (people),

and history formed an inseparable troika: "If one diminishes the minjok, there is no history."[11] An intellectual who witnessed the decline and the eventual colonization of his country, the most humiliating event of its modern history, Shin wrote particularistic history charged with an intense realization of Korea's unique national identity and collective memory. Shin's writing was, furthermore, specifically concerned to rebut Japanese theories about Korean history, and was intended as a means to promote national cohesion and build national strength. For instance, Shin's emphases on Manchuria as an integral part of Korea's geographical self-identity and on Dangun, the legendary founder of Gojoseon, the first Korean state, as the symbol of racial uniqueness represented a response to the challenges of Japan's imperialist historiography.

Japanese Records on Gaya

If we place the Japanese records on the ancient Korean state of Gaya within the context of the nature of Japanese historiography, we realize that Gaya-related entries in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* were intended to stress the pre-eminence of Yamato royalty vis-à-vis not only Gaya but also two other southern states on the Korean peninsula linked with Yamato through close cultural and political ties. Indeed, the court historians of Japan who were entrusted with the task of compiling the two above-noted historical texts were obliged to place the Japanese emperor at the center of the East Asian world. There were, however, other issues that led to distortion about Gaya in the Japanese records. A large number of literati from Baekje, who crossed over to Japan after their state was annihilated in 660 by the joint Silla–Tang forces and the military expedition launched by Yamato in 663 to resurrect the fallen kingdom failed, were consumed with military bravado and apparently rewrote numerous historical texts on their lost kingdom in order to transform their current humiliation into past glory. The authors of the *Nihon shoki* relied on these Baekje sources for information on the ancient Korean states, and it is thus hardly surprising that Silla, the bitter enemy of Baekje, appears as a tribute-bearing vassal of Yamato and the state of Gaya that Silla had absorbed in the sixth century, is depicted as a Japanese colony from the fourth century onward. No Tae-don has argued that the *Nihon shoki*'s portrayal of Japan's pre-eminence and superior position of its rulers vis-à-vis those of the ancient Korean states was merely a backwards-projected replica of the situation that prevailed in the late seventh century.[12] After the joint forces of Silla and Tang completed

the task of peninsular conquest, and Tang China assumed political control of the peninsula, Silla took steps on the one hand to resume and cement its diplomatic ties with Japan, and on the other to drive Tang's occupation forces out of the peninsula by means of various military strategies. Since Silla could not afford to engage in hostilities with both its powerful neighbors, Japan took advantage of the precarious position of Silla and inclined to condescension. It is interesting to note that it was during this period of Japan's patronizing treatment of Silla that the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon shoki* were composed. Apparently, the portrayal of Japan's suzerainty over the southern Korean states is the back-cast projection of the power of Yamato administration in the late seventh century.

The fact that the court of Yamato did not rule over the regions of western Honshu and Kyushu in the fourth century and that the unification of the Japanese archipelago was a lengthy process that was completed in the late fifth or early sixth century makes *Nihon shoki*'s entries on Gaya highly suspect. Indeed, one entry in the *Nihon shoki* contradicts the claim of Yamato's conquest of the southern Korean kingdom in the fourth century. According to this text, King Sogo (King Geun Chogo, r. 346–375) of Baekje sent an envoy to the ruler of the state of Taksun in the Byeonhan (Gaya) region, to inquire about the way to reach Japan. The ruler of Taksun replied, "I have always heard that there is an honorable country in the East, but I have had no communication with it and I do not know the way." Two years subsequent to this event, Japanese envoys reached Taksun, and they were then directed by the ruler of Taksun to the court of King Sogo who gave them a generous gift of silk, bow and arrows, and iron.

Hirano Kunio argued that since the petty states of Gaya were militarily weak and failed to develop into a centralized state on the Chinese model, an outside power could have exercised some degree of military control over this region.[13] However, in the fourth century, Yamato's control of many parts of Japan was at best tenuous and its effective rule was confined primarily to the Kinai region, and it is therefore hard to imagine that a Yamato invasion of the Korean peninsula was feasible, much less successful. Japan did not extract iron ore during this period, and its need for a secure source of iron in the Gaya region of Korea is understandable. I am, therefore, tempted to accept the conjecture of Han Yong-u that Yamato Japan established a trade office in the Gaya region and its iron trade was managed by the limited number of Wa people who resided on both the Japanese archipelago Japan and the southern part of the Korean peninsula.[14]

In the initial decade of the Meiji period, the narrative of Silla's conquest by Empress Jingū and the status of Gaya as Japan's colonial outpost, as recorded in the *Nihon shoki*, became firmly entrenched.[15] In the mid-1870s when the Gwanggaeto stele was discovered in Manchuria, its reference to "the occupation of Silla, Baekje and Gaya by the invading Wa forces and their ultimate expulsion from the Korean peninsula by King Gwanggaeto" was widely used as a piece of solid evidence to support the entries in the *Nihon shoki*. Kan Masatomo (1891), Naka Michiyo (1893) and Miyake Yonekichi (1898) wrote on the Gwanggaeto stele, focusing on its significance as evidence of the formidable military might of ancient Japan. Japan placed such confidence in the historicity of this stele that eminent Japanese scholars of Oriental studies Torii Ryūzō, Sekino Tei, Imanishi Ryū, Ikeuchi Hiroshi and Umehara Matsuji all personally visited the site in Manchuria where it was discovered and wrote on the subject.[16] Shiratori Kurakichi started a campaign to move the stele to Japan so that it could serve as a reminder to the Japanese people of Japan's unchallenged military strength in ancient times.[17]

Korean scholars, who wrote on the subject, vehemently refuted any suggestion of the desecration of their sacred land by a foreign power in the pre-modern times. Lee Jinhui, a Japanese scholar of Korean descent, put forward an extraordinary theory that the original text was mutilated and manipulated by the Japanese Army officer Sakawa Kageaki who discovered the stele in Manchuria in the late nineteenth century, in order to favor Japan's imperialist interest.[18] Interesting as the theory is, it does not explain why his nationalist pride was not hurt by such expressions as "Wa bandits" and Wa thieves' which remain intact and why he did not alter or destroy the record of the victory of Goguryeo over Wa that the stele contains.

Wang Jianqun's book *Haotaiwangbei yanjiu* (*A Study on King Haotai Stele*)[19] represents the first major attempt in China to provide a meticulous account of the circumstances under which the stele was discovered and the process through which early impressions of the inscription were made and circulated among scholars in China and Japan. His discussion of the early techniques to make impressions provided compelling evidence to refute the arguments of Yi Chinhui. Wang pointed out that in the process of extraction from the site where it was buried, the stele was damaged and the inscription was partially defaced. Later, some local farmers, who sold impressions of the stele until the early twentieth century, filled in damaged parts and missing characters of the stele with lime. The early rubbings, therefore, gave a misleading impression of text-doctoring.

In one of my papers on the Gwanggaeto stele, I have argued that the reference to Wa in the stele is a rhetorical exaggeration in the style of ancient India's inscriptional "prasasti," or panegyric writings engraved on stone. Jangsu, the son of King Gwanggaeto who erected the stone, intended to magnify the valor of his father by claiming that he achieved military success over all the neighboring lands, including Japan, and thereby authenticate his status as a cakravartin ruler, a cosmocrat, a wheel (cosmos)-turning universal ruler who is victorious in all the four directions. Japan is, therefore, deliberately dragged into the Korean waters so that King Gwanggaeto has a legitimate reason to lead his army, repel the Japanese and assume control over Japan's prized possessions on the Korean peninsula—the three southern states of Silla, Baekje and Gaya.

It is worthy of note that the contemporary Indian stelae (third to fourth century CE) emphasized "digvijaya"—literally, conquest in all the directions—of the rulers to whom the stele were dedicated. One may cite the Allahabad pillar of Samudragupta or the Mandasor pillar inscription of Yasodharman which enumerate their victories across all the lands from ocean to ocean in the Indian subcontinent.[20] These Indian stelae contain such stereotypical expressions as "his fame pervaded the entire surface of the earth, caused by his conquest of the whole world," "skilful in engaging in hundred battles of various kinds," "exterminator of all kings, with no rival of equal power in the world whose fame was tasted by the waters of the four oceans." North China in the same period, bound with India by close Buddhist linkages and the attendant traffic of Indian monks, witnessed the same practice of inscribing effusive and exaggerated praise on funerary steles. The situation of inscribing falsehood in praise of the deceased became so pervasive and alarming that the state had to ban the practice through an imperial decree, as noted in the *Song Shu*, the dynastic Annal of Liu-Song:

> In the fourth year of Xianning [278 CE], Wudi of the Jin decreed again: "Steles and stone animals condone unwarranted accolade, and thus give rise to falsity and exaggeration. In terms of waste of money and harmful influence, nothing is more serious than this. Without exception, [the practice of erecting] steles and stone animals will be banned. During the Yixi reign period [408–418], Pei Songzhi, head of the Ministry of Sacrifices, recommended the reintroduction of the ban which has been in full force till now [i.e., the Liu-Song dynasty]."[21]

Goguryeo was obviously exposed to the Chinese tradition of historiography and panegyric inscriptions through its long interaction with the Chinese, and particularly in the fourth century when several leading Chinese literati fled North China in order to escape the civil war in the Murong kingdom, and were possibly absorbed into the Goguryeo officialdom, its knowledge of the Chinese tradition further deepened. The official acceptance of Buddhism and the establishment of a Confucian academy in 372 may be regarded as the endorsement of China's tradition or the Chinese cultural ensemble at the state level. The Gwanggaeto inscription, therefore, bears a distinct mark of this broad Sino-Indian cultural influence in the form of exaggerated praise to legitimize King Gwanggaeto's status as a sacred universal ruler. Accordingly, its reference to the Japanese conquest of the southern Korean states lacks credibility.

It is obvious that in order to assess the power and position of Gaya in East Asia, we need to combine critical analysis of early texts and an awareness of recent archaeological research.

State Formation of Gaya and Its Broad Cultural Frontier

A close look at the process of state formation of the state of Gaya, and at its broad cultural frontier extending to South China and India, lends further credence to the belief that it was not colonized by an outside power during its formative phase. In the *Sanguozhi* (K. *samguk chi*), a third-century Chinese text, the area west of the Nakdong river appears as the seat of tribal kingdoms of the Byeonhan area. It was not until late in that century that the chiefdoms of a Gaya league consisting of Geumgwan Gaya and other lesser kingdoms started to assume distinct shapes. Yi Hyon-hye has correctly pointed out that a tribal state of the Byeonhan area could not send an envoy to Japan in the third century because it was not yet equipped with the organizational structure required for maintaining diplomatic linkages with the outside world.[22] The excavations in Bokcheon dong and Daeseong dong also suggest that Gaya commenced using iron technology only after the third century, and that this change was a result of acculturation or peer-polity interaction with Goguryeo. Discovery of armor, horse stirrups and the funerary style of the northern tribes can be cited as remarkable changes in Gaya society of this later time,[23] and these provide evidence of sophistication of art and crafts as a result of interaction with more advanced powers on the Korean peninsula.

The early fifth-century Gwanggaeto inscription of Goguryeo refers to Gaya in a quite condescending tone as a "subject" of long standing.[24] Goguryeo may have exercised a certain level of hegemony over Gaya, as is evident in the discovery of numerous Goguryeo-style artifacts in the Gaya region,[25] but Gaya's determination to move out from under the umbrella of Goguryeo influence and to assert an independent identity was becoming increasingly manifest, and its growing political confidence soon led to its dispatch of an embassy to Southern Qi (479–502). Although Southern Qi was politically weak, and the military pressure of the powerful "barbarian" rulers of the north had led to a substantial loss of territory south of the Yangzi river, it was a center of Buddhist civilization and attracted envoys from several countries in southeast Asia. Lin Wei's study of the iconography of the Buddhist caves at Qixiashan, carved during the Southern Qi period, reveals the popularity of the Amitayus and Maitreya cults in this state.[26] The other important cultural achievement of Southern Qi is the "carving of a monumental Maitreya" on the side of Mount Shicheng in the present-day Zhejiang province.[27]

Gaya's attempt to open a direct diplomatic channel with China in the last decades of the fifth century coincided with the decline of Goguryeo's military power.[28] It was also possible because of the eclipse of Yamato and the process of dynastic change after the death of Bu (also known as Yūryaku).[29] The political instability of Yamato at the time is attested by the short reigns of four subsequent rulers, Seinei, Kenzō, Ninken, and Muretsu or Buretsu (being also the last four rulers of the first volume of *Nihon shoki*).[30]

Gaya's systematic process of state formation commenced when it established a more settled agrarian economy in the fourth century. Widespread application of iron tools to agriculture during the period is evidenced by the discovery of iron artifacts, including ploughshares, spade, axes, spades, shovels, adzes and axes of various shapes from *kobun* (tumuli) and other sites of the former Silla territory. These iron objects can be dated to between the fourth and sixth centuries.[31] Unlike iron objects of the previous centuries, artifacts of this period are hard and efficient, and demonstrate the smiths' familiarity with sophisticated iron-smelting processes.[32] Japanese sources indicate that in the sixth century immigrants from Gaya contributed immensely to the dissemination of advanced agricultural technology on the Japanese archipelago, and in the early sixth century established several large estates, known as *ōta miyake* (great rice paddy estates).[33]

The use of advanced iron tools in the clearing of vegetation cover and expansion of arable land goes hand in hand with deep cultivation, which effectively harnesses the fertility of the soil.[34] Use of advanced iron technology in the clearing of thick vegetation and construction of roads could well have facilitated an integrative process among tribal settlements (including Gaya) of the Byeonhan region which, according to the Chinese record *Sanguozhi*, were scattered and not yet subject to effective political control. Due primarily to these economic and technological changes, Gaya's old order, characterized by various scattered settlements, evolved into a new social and political order by the middle of the fifth century. Needless to say, these advances in agriculture and the concomitant surplus produce sustained and promoted the new urban spirit and led to the adoption of Buddhism.[35] The official patronage of Buddhism was expressed through the construction of Wanghusa (Queen Temple) in 452, apparently in commemoration of the princess of the Indian state of Ayodhya who is believed to have reached the shore of Gaya and been accepted by the founding ruler, Kim Suro, as his queen.[36] The question, nonetheless, arises whether the princess of Ayodhya really reached Gaya and married the Gaya ruler.

In the early centuries CE, Indians started sailing to Southeast Asian islands such as Suvrnadvipa and Yavadvipa (Java), leading to the so-called Indianization of Southeast Asia. Sravasti, the capital of Kosala, located in the vicinity of Saket (later known as Ayodhya) was a major trading center linked with the port city of Tamralipti (currently in West Bengal).[37] Ships departing from Tamralipti took merchants from north India to various parts of Southeast Asia. *Nihon shoki* records that in 654, a storm blew a vessel carrying a woman from Sravasti to Hyūga in southern Kyushu.[38] *Jnatadh arma kathang Sutra*, a text written in Prakrit which forms part of the sacred texts of Jainism, and also known by the name Nayadhammakahao, refers to India's trade linkages with the state of Kalik (apparently the Sanskrit rendering of Karak, the original name of Gaya) which is described as situated further north of Suvarnadvipa in the present-day Indonesia. The text describes how a ship was blown off course and reached the Kalik state where they found gold and precious stones in abundance, and were particularly impressed by a special breed of horse. When King Kanakketu ("Gold flag") heard about this land, he asked the merchants to visit Kalik island/peninsula again. On their second journey, they took several musical instruments, including *vina* whose influence may have been responsible for the evolution of *gayagum*, a stringed instrument of the Gaya region.[39] This Jaina text recounts the journey, which may have taken place in the

second or third-century AD, and there is a good probability that Kalik referred to Karak. Indian historians have identified Kalik with a country on the coast of East Africa[40] or Zanzibar.[41]

Gaya became an important seat of Buddhist culture at least a century before Japan embraced this faith. The fact that a prince of Gaya was named Weolgwang (Ch. Yueguang 月光 or Prince Moonlight) indicates that the cult of Maitreya played some role in the religion of Gaya royalty in the late fifth or the early sixth century. This was the period which witnessed the rise of the Maitreya cult in China, and it was also the age when an eschatological belief in the "end of the dharma" (*mofa*, Kor. *malbob*) embedded itself in the popular consciousness; both the trends, perhaps, dialectically interpenetrating and influencing each other. The idea of the "end of the dharma" was based on several theoretical formulations, including the Theory of the Three Ages. It was generally believed that, after the *parinirvana* of the Shakyamuni Buddha, the age of True Dharma will last for either 500 or 1000 years, and will progressively degenerate into the ages of Semblance Dharma and the End-of-the-Dharma.

In this period of social upheaval, Anna Siedel, points out, the dividing line between Buddhism and Daoism became progressively faint, and the Daoist belief in the appearance of a "divine redeemer" and the Buddhist vision of a messiah converged. According to her, those who propagated Buddhism among the masses linked their belief in the End-of-the-Dharma with the notion of apocalyptic apprehensions at the end of the cyclical period (*kalpa*), and the two notions were mutually independent in the original doctrine. The process led to another significant phenomenon. The character of the future Buddha Maitreya, who was originally to descend in the domain of a cakravartin marking "the peaceful golden age of the next kalpa's apogee," was now recast as an "apocalyptic hero." Apparently, Maitreya was now envisioned as a savior who would make his advent in the period of chaos and cataclysm, and "initiate"—to quote Anna Seidel—"the creation of a new and perfect world of Great Peace."[42] It was this Buddhist–Daoist synthesis and confluence of messianic expectations and apocalyptic fears that led the popular imagination to create a new Bodhisattva, Yueguang tongzi (Weolgwang tongja).

In the sixth century, when the cult of Yueguang was widespread in China, many popular disturbances and uprisings sought to manipulate its symbolic significance. Yueguang became synonymous with Maitreya, and the people now turned to this savior messiah with the hope that the

climate of decline and despair would soon be replaced by justice and happiness. When Monk Fajing, calling himself Dacheng (Mahayana), raised a rebellion in Yizhou (together with Li Guibo and other commoners), he put out the slogan "The New Buddha will appear, Old Devils will be wiped out."[43]

As noted earlier, Yueguang tongzi seems to have originated in the lower section of the Chinese society, but its growing popularity compelled the monastic elites to acknowledge its value. The fact that Narendrayasas, an Indian monk in Sui China, inserted a prophecy in one of his translations in 583 to the effect that Yueguang will be reincarnated as a powerful ruler of the Great Sui and patronize and propagate Buddhism with great devotion suggests the pervasive influence of the new bodhisattva on the Chinese mind.[44] One may also cite a Dunhuang text named *Shouluo biqiu yueguang tongzi jing* (dated to the sixth century according to E. Zurcher) which contains many place names on the Korean peninsula, and the opening episode of the text takes place at Taining monastery located in "junzi guo" (Kor. Kunja kuk), the Land of Gentlemen. While in the court of Southern Qi, the envoys from Gaya must have witnessed the influence of Maitreya or Weolgwang dongja, and giving the prince this name may justifiably be interpreted as a reflection of the influence of the cult of Maitreya.

Concluding Remarks

On the basis of the above discussion, a few tentative conclusions can be made. Although Gaya conducted brisk interaction with various ancient states on equal terms and it made efforts to equip itself with such ideas and institutions of continental provenance, Buddhism and Confucianism, it was absorbed by Silla before it attained institutional maturity as an early state. Because of its weak political position, it became an easy prey of political propaganda by both the rulers of Goguryeo, as is evident in the King Gwanggaeto stele, and the historical texts of early Japan that claimed it was their old vassal states. Numerous forces and factors led to various distortions about Gaya's status, and the reference of *Nihon shoki*, in particular, to the existence of a Japanese colonial outpost on Gaya territory is not borne out by any material evidence. The propaganda is apparently a product of the political imagination of Baekje immigrants to Japan after their state suffered defeat at the hands of Silla.

Notes

1. See Romila Thapar's Keynote lecture at the Lahore Literary Festival, titled "The Past as Present" (http://www.lahorelitfest.com/llf-2015/keynote-speech-romila-thapar/). She elaborated her points in an essay "Ideology and the Interpretations of Early Indian History," in *Cultural Pasts: Essays in Early Indian History,* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. Several other leading scholars of Indian history, including Ronal Inden, Nicholas Dirks and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, have discussed the linkage between historiography, cultural hegemony of the British Empire and legitimation of power. See Ronal Inden, *Imagining India*, London: Hurst, 200, pp. 15–16; Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, "A Brief History of Colonial Historiography in India," in Bharati Ray, ed., *Different Types of History*, Delhi: Pearson Longman, 2009, pp. 77–99; Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, Delhi: permanent Black, 2011, p. 32.
2. Kim Gayeon examined these issues in detail in her M.A. thesis, written under my supervision. See her work, "The Conflicts Surrounding Historical Textbooks of Korea and Japan: Focusing on Account of Ancient Relation between Korea and Japan," The Academy of Korean Studies, 2015. It is also worthy of note in this context that several important historians have emphasized the need for Korean historians to overcome the Japan-oriented historiographical approach. See Song Ki-ho, *Dongasia eui yeoksa bunjaeng* (Historical Conflict in East Asia) Seoul: Sol Books, 2007, especially chapters 5 and 9; also Yi Seong-si, "Gwanggaeto wangbi eui geollip mogjeok e gwanhan siron (A Tentative Research on the Purpose behind the Erection of the King Gwanggaeto Stele)," *Hanguk godaesa yeongu* 50, 2008, p. 175.
3. Some useful works on the "history wars" in East Asia are as follows: Edward Vickers (ed.), *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, London and New York, Routledge, 2005; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*. Westport CT: Praeger, 2008; Gotelind Müller (ed.), "Designing History," in *East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations.* London and New York, Routledge, 2011.
4. James Legge, 1971. *Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean*, Dover Publications (reprint), p. 85; Leonard Shihlien Hsü. 2005. *The Political Philosophy of Confucianism: An Interpretation of the Social and Political Ideas of Confucius*, London: Routledge (Reprint), p. 84.
5. James Legge, 1971. *Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean*, Dover Publications (reprint), p. 55.
6. This text has been translated meticulously by Burton Watson. See *Records of the Grand Historian, Selected by Burton Watson* , 2 vols (Watson 1969);

For an insightful discussion of the life and achievements of Sima Qian see *The Cloudy Mirror: Tension and Conflict in the Writings of Sima Qian* (Durrant 1995).

7. For a succinct account of historical writing in ancient Korea, see *Yeoksahak eui yeoksa* (Han 2002: 109–118).
8. Murayama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
9. Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 17; also see Elise K. Tipton, *Modern Japan: A Social and Political History*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 64–65.
10. "If we contextualise the Korean peninsula against the major historical forces of East Asia we may find a recognisable trend. And what is this trend? It is represented by the influence which the three forces outside the peninsula have been exerting on the course of Korean history. The influence emanating from the continental lands of China proper and Manchuria constitute two of these forces, and Japan is the third such force" (Shiratori Kurakichi, quoted in Yi Gi-baik's essay).
11. Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires1895-1919, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 182. Also see* Michael E .Robinson, "National Identity and the Thought of Sin Ch'aeho: Sadaejuui and Chuch'e in History and Politics." *The Journal of Korean Studies* 5 (1984): 121–142; Han Young-woo, "The Establishment and Development of Nationalist History," *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 5, 1992; Henry H. Em, "Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch'aeho's Historiography." In Shin and Robinson edited, *Colonial Modernity in Korea,* Harvard University Asia Center, 2001.
12. No Tae-don, *Samguk tongil jeonjaengsa* (History of the War of Unification between Three Korean Kingdoms) Seoul National University press, 2009.
13. Hirano Kunio, "The Yamato State and Korea in the 4th and 5th Centuries," Acta Asiatica, 31, 1977.
14. Han Young-woo, The History of Korea, National Institute of Korean History, 2009, p. 38. The point that the wa resided on both the Japanese archipelago and the Korean peninsula, was first put forward by Inoue Hideo in his book, *Mimana Nihonfu to wa*, Tōkyō: Azuma Shuppan, 1973. Also see Inoue Hideo, *Kodai Chōsen*, Tokyo, 1972, pp.76–80.
15. William Wayne Farris, *Sacred Texts and Buried Treasures: Issues in the Historical Archaeology of Ancient Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998, pp. 60–61.
16. Saeki Arikyo, Suzuki Yasutami, Takeda Yukio and several other scholars have produced insightful studies on the historiography of King Gwangaeto Stele in Japan. See Saeki Arikyo, Kodaidoohi (King gwanggaeto Stele), Tokyo: Rishosha, 1974; Takeda Yukio, "Studies on the King Kwanggaetó

Inscription and Their Basis," Memoirs of the Research Department of Toyo Bunko, 47, 1989; and Suzuki Yasutami, "Ilnoneseo-eui Gwanggaetowangbi takbon-gwa bimun yeongu" (Japanese Studies on the Rubbings and the Stele of King Gwanggaeto), Gwanggaetowang yeongu 100 nyeon (A Century of the Study of King Gwanggaeto Stele), edited by Koguryeo Research Society, Seoul: Hagyeon munhwa sa, 1996.

17. Hyung Il Pai, Constructing "Korean" Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard-Hallym Series on Korea, 2000, p. 27.
18. Yi Chin-hui, Gwanggaetowangpi-eui tamgu (Investigation into the King Gwanggaeto Stele), Trans. Yi Gi-dong, Iljogak, 1992.
19. Wang Jianqun's book *Haotaiwangbei yanjiu* (Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1984). King Gwanggaeto is also known by the name King Hotae (Ch. Haotai).
20. See John F Fleet, *Inscriptions of the Early Gupta kings and their Successors* [2nd rev. ed.] Varanasi Indological Books, 1966; Richard Salomon, *Indian Epigraphy: a Guide to the Study of Inscriptions in Sanskrit, Prakrit, and the other Indo-Aryan Languages* New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 229–236.
21. Song Shu, 15:407.
22. Yi Hyon-hye, Hanguk godae-eui saengsan-gwa gyoyok, Ilchogak, 1998, p. 301.
23. Kim Tae-sik, *Gaya Yonmaengsa*, Ilchogak, pp. 88–113; Shin Gyeong-ch'ol, "Joegeun Gaya Jiyeok-eui gogohak-jeok seonggwa," *Gayasa ron* Goryeodae hakkyo hangukhak yeonguso, pp. 110–113; Kim Chong-hak, "Gayasa yoengeui hyeonhwang" *Gayasa ron*, pp. 17–23.
24. For its translation, see Takashi Hatada, "An Interpretation of the King Gwanggaeto Inscription." *Korean Studies*, 3 (1979), pp. 1–17.
    Ken Gardiner, "Unromancing the Stone: Interpretation of Kwanggaeto Inscription." Unpublished Seminar Paper.
25. For an insightful analysis of Goguryeo–Kaya relations since the late fourth century, see Yi Yong-sik, "Gaya jeguk-kwa Goguryeo-eui gyoryusa," a paper read at the Goguryeo Conference held at Korea University in May 2005.
26. Lin, Wei, "The Buddhist Caves at Qixiashan, China (Southern Dynasties, 420–589 CE)," PhD thesis, Ohio State University, History of Art, 2007.
27. Angela Falco Howard, Li Song, Wu Hung, Yang Hong, et al., *Chinese sculpture*, Yale 2006, p. 265.
28. Even in the early sixth century, Goguryeo tenaciously refused to reconcile itself to the new political reality of Silla's alignment with Baekje. In the Zhengshi era (504–508), a Goguryeo envoy visited the Northern Chinese

dynasty of Wei, presented tributes (gold from Buyeo and precious stone from Silla) and complained that Buyeo was under military pressure from the Mulgil (Malgal) race and that Silla (rendered she-luo) had been annexed by Baekje. *Weishu*, Lie zhuan vol. 88, Goguryeo.

29. *Nihon shoki*, I book XIV, (Trans. by Aston), pp. 333–372.
30. Ibid, pp. 373–407. The sources do not allude to any dynastic change, as any such admission would dilute the claim of the uninterrupted and unique monarchical institution, derived from the Sun Goddess.
31. Though the rudimentary knowledge of iron metallurgy seems to have spread to the northern parts of the Korean peninsula several centuries before the Christian era, southern states could not channelize their iron resources effectively to their agricultural practices until the late fourth or fifth century. Though a number of scholars have attempted working hypotheses on the sources and routes of diffusion of iron in the peninsula, I found the following two short studies to be adequate for my present needs: Sarah Taylor, "The Introduction and Development of Iron Production in Korea: A survey," *World Archaeology,* 20–3 (1989) pp. 422–433; Donald B. Wagner, "Early Iron in China, Korea, and Japan," Unpublished paper originally prepared for a discussion at the Roundtable, *Korean excavations of iron armour: Political and Technological Implications for Protohistoric East Asia*, organized by Dr. Gina Barnes at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Los Angeles, 25–28 March 1993. (URL: http://coco.ihi.ku.dk/~dbwagner/KoreanFe/KoreanFe.html). Application of iron technology to intensive agriculture and the attendant economic and political changes in Silla have been examined in the following works: Yi Hyon-hye, "Samguksidae-eui nongeup gisul-gwa sahoe baljeon—4-5 segi sillasahoe-reul jungsimeuro" *Hanguk sanggosa hakbo* 10 (1991); Jeon Deok-jae, "4-6 segi nongeop saengsannyeok-ui baldal-gwa sahoe byeondong," *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil*, 4, (1990), and "Silla Yukbu cheje yeongu," a PhD dissertation, Seoul National University, 1995 (subsequently published by the Ilchogak publishers).
32. Chon Tok-chae, 1990, ibid.
33. Joan Piggot, *Japanese Kingship*, p. 71.
34. Compare R.S. Sharma, *Perspectives in Social and Economic History of Early India*. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, pp. 154–164.
35. Relying on the vast corpus of archaeological data, Chon Tok-chae has delineated a complete picture of economic and political changes that emerged in the fourth and sixth centuries Silla. See his "4-6 segi nongop saengsannyok-ui paldal-gwa sahoe pyondong." op. cit., and "Silla chu'gunje-ui songnip paegyong yon'gu," *H'an'guksa ron*, 21 (1990) Seoul.
36. *Samguk yusa* (Garak guk-gi section).

37. G.P. Singh, Facets of Indian History and Culture, DK Print World, 2003, p. 126.
38. Charles Holcombe, Trade-Buddhism: Maritime Trade, Immigration and the Buddhist Landfall in Early Japan.
The Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 119, 1999.
39. Jñātā dharmakathāṅga sūtra [microform]/Amolaka Ṛṣijī Mahārāja kṛta Hindī bhāṣānuvāda sahita Published Sikandarābāda (Dakṣiṇa) : Jaina Śāstroddhāra Mudrālaya, 1918, sutra 611–705
40. G.P. Singh, Op. Cit. p. 119.
41. Moti Chandra, Sarthvaha, Patna 1953; Trade and Trade Route in Ancient India, Abhinav Publications, 1977, p. 166. Motichandra has mistakenly interpreted the horse with a line or stripe on the body, mentioned in the text, as a zebra. The text describes the beautiful mane of the horse (which zebras lack), and furthermore, it discusses in detail how the king employed a groom to tame it and train it in different tricks and feats.
42. Anna Seidel, "Chronicles of Taoist Studies in the West 1950–1990," *Cahiers d'Extreme-Asie* 5 (1989–1990), p. 291. Also see her article "Taoist Messiahnism," *Numen* 31 (1984), p. 161.
43. Tang Zhangru, "Mile Xinyangji qi xuailuo," in his *Weijin nanbeichaoshi lun shiyi,* Beijing: Zhonghua shuzu, 1983, p. 190.
44. Eric Zurcher, Prince Moonlight: Messianism and Eschatology in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism, T'oung Pao, 68–1/3, 1982 pp. 25–26.

CHAPTER 7

Young Poets Under the Shadow of War: Yun Dong-ju and Tachihara Michizō

Yasuko Claremont

The poems in this chapter were written by two young poets, Tachihara Michizō (1914–1939) and Yun Dong-ju (1917–1945), in wartime Japan and Japanese-occupied Korea. Tachihara was a young Japanese architect. Yun was a Korean student majoring in English at Dôshisha University, Kyoto. He was a Christian. Their lives were comparable in many ways: they both lived during wartime and died young, Tachihara by tuberculosis at the age of 25 and Yun at the age of 28 in the Fukuoka Prison under the suspicious circumstance that he may have been poisoned. Their poems were essentially lyrical by using nature symbolically such as, 'stars', 'sky' and 'light and shadow'. One could easily feel how pure their poems were, contrary to their wartime living circumstances. They never met each other, but Yun read Tachihara's poetry when he came to Japan in 1942.[1]

The commanding feature in their poetry is not the impact on the individual of external violence, such as conflict in battle or the bombing of civilians. Here we find another kind of impact on citizens through thought control, coercion, and fear, all originating from the Japanese state and aimed at suppressing dissent. In the works of both poets, the

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theme that stands out is their determination to find pathways to adaptation and inner harmony, escaping from the coercive grip of the state and its dominance. The impact of the Japanese state on its own people and the people it had conquered occupies an important place in the poems. It was impossible for the poets to ignore the invasive environment in which they were living. Particularly, Yun's poems reveal strong feelings of resistance and agony at the fate that befell his homeland and people.

Social Oppression in Japan

Before discussing the poems, it is necessary to sketch in the autocratic background in which they were written and the compelling influence it had in the making of the poems. The framework of the Japanese empire comprised three interlocked levels of governance. At its head was the Emperor, a mythical figure of divine lineage whose symbolism united the nation. The emperor's authority was beyond question. Acting in the Emperor's name were the Diet, the bureaucracy and the military, and underpinning these was a third level, widespread throughout society, combining administrators with multiple functions, the police, the secret police, organizations responsible for propaganda, and the army, which infiltrated all institutions, particularly the national education system. Moreover, a host of laws was in place, repressing free speech and collective meetings.

It must be said, however, the Meiji–Taishō period was one of growth fuelled by Westernization. Liberal and social movements also existed for a time, such as the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement. Socialist movements under the guise of 'proletarian culture' popularized the idea of equality in the 1920s and 1930s. Numerous publications of newspapers and magazines in liberal thinking, including coterie magazines, were abundant. Indeed, on the streets, mass entertainers sang their *sōshi-bushi* (activist songs) satirizing political corruptions and scandals. Soeda Azenbō was 'one of the first stars of a new national mass culture in modern Japan',[2] representing the protest of the people who sought civil rights and the freedom of speech. All were crushed, however, when Japan's expansionist policies came into force, leading toward the Asia-Pacific war. In this latter period, it is the powerful grip of the state on the life of the individual that is featured in Tachihara's poems.

Poems by Tachihara Michizō (1914–1939)

Tachihara Michizō was born in Nihonbashi, Tokyo. His father ran a business manufacturing wooden boxes for packaging. From his formative years, Tachihara was excellent in pastel drawings and writing *tanka* poems. He was a boy prodigy but physically weak. He majored in English at higher school and in architecture at Tokyo Imperial University. As a student of architecture, the department awarded Tachihara the Tatsuno Kingo Prize for his architectural design each year for three years. After graduation, he began working for an architectural office in April 1937 but left there due to his poor health in July 1938. He privately published his two anthologies: *Wasurenagusa ni yosu* (Ode to the Forget-me-not), July 1937 and *Akatsuki to yū no shi* (Poetry between dawn and dusk), December 1937. Tachihara's literary career reflects the literary trends at the time. Earlier he was absorbed in *tanka* and was influenced by Ishikawa Takuboku (1886–1912) whose experiments of writing *tanka* in three lines led him to write free verse in colloquial Japanese. The themes that Tachihara followed, however, were abstractions expressed through lyrical images of nature, for example, birds, trees, the clouds, the sky and the rhythms of poetic diction. His poetry remains pure and youthful partly because of his poetic material as well as his early tragic death. He read Heine, Rilke, Baudelaire, Rimbaud and Valery, and had a close connection with his friends who were already renowned poets and writers, such as Murō Saisei, Hori Tatsuo and Hagiwara Sakutarō. He saw his life as being ephemeral like the passage that takes place between dawn and dusk, as the title of his anthology suggested. He was physically unfit for military duty. His poetry does not express social criticisms but he was fully aware of the oppression resulting from wartime. A couple of years before his death, he was associated with a right-wing journal *Kogito* (Cogito) and its founder, Yasuda Yojūrō. Tachihara's long-standing friend and poet Sugiura Minpei connected this association with Tachihara's desperation in overcoming the fear of death: '[Tachihara] was attracted by the idea that would bridge the gap between life and death by joining a right wing group whose slogans were, for example, "unity", "action", "determination" and "the celebration of Japan's cultural heritage", or simply he had to cling to something like this group'.[3]

In this sense, Tachihara was struggling to find a pathway for his survival in wartime, and it underpins all of Tachihara Michizō's poems. The

first one I shall introduce here is entitled 'Watashi no kaette kuru no wa' (Where I am returning to), and was written in the 1930s.[4]

Where I am Returning to (私のかへって るのは)[5]

Where I am returning to is always this place.
An old iron bed is at the corner.
Three hard wooden chairs are here and there.
The ceiling is low, stuffy. Here is the place.

A lamp for you being here,
My lamp becomes a bright night, and
A small charcoal fire for you making the kettle sing.
All the things in my room are at rest.

—Today also I returned here,
Exhausted by walking alone in the city,
Calling on friends and finding them gone.
Today I was on my guard and became increasingly thirsty.

The windowless and walled room,
Gently it changes in appearance.
When I walk here
Light and shadow flicker and interplay with my footsteps.

In the first two stanzas, the poet remembers the room as it once was with its two inhabitants, a place of peace and rest. In stanza three, current reality has overwhelmed it. The poet walks until he is exhausted and alone in a friendless city. He calls on friends only to find that they are no longer there. Have they simply moved of their own volition, or been conscripted into the armed forces, splitting relationships or even charged with an offense and gaoled? There is no way of knowing. He is watchful, keeping on his guard and becoming increasingly thirsty, which could also be interpreted as a symbol of his psychological state and physical exhaustion. In the last stanza, he is back in the room again, either in memory or in present time, or both simultaneously, only to find that it is now ever-changing and that 'shadows flicker and interplay with my footsteps'. Thus in this first poem, Tachihara is reaching out of present time into a recreation of the past where memory is a way of arriving at an inner peace. The symbol of the room is ambivalent; a powerful memory in its own right, but certainly one interpretation is that the poet is forced into the confinement of his own inner consciousness as a place of freedom and release.

Immediately, the opening line, 'Where I am returning to is always this place', signals the return to the past through memory. As the poem continues, the past saturates the present, becoming it. In this context, we are not given the slightest hint of individuality in 'I' or 'you'. They remain symbolic figures of the binding together of a man and a woman, figures of the time engulfed in torrent that sweeps them away. Within this symbolism, the vivid, focused detail of living in the room in stanzas two and three confirm the reality of life shared there in the past. The third stanza takes us right outside the room. 'I' is walking alone in the streets, finding friends gone, on his guard (why?) as he walks in an interplay of light and shadow. The certainty of living in the room has vanished into the certitude of uncertainty and menace. This is the unsaid but powerful theme of this little poem.

The theme of the past overwhelming the present is repeated in Tachihara's 'A Short Narrative Poem', which becomes a direct indictment of the state dominating the individual.

A Short Narrative Poem (「小譚詩」)[6]

I turned on the light.
You were there beside me reading a book.
So quiet was the room that our low voices
Could still be heard even in its farthest recesses of the room.
(Everyone stayed listening.)

Later I turned off the light.
You were beside me sleeping.
In your dreams your nursery rhymes could be heard.
(Everyone stayed listening.)

Many nights passed in the same way.
The wind shrieked and on the tower the cock cried out;
—March to the banner! Jack the soldier, shake the bells, donkey!

And then morning came, a real morning.
Another night followed, a new night.
The room remained empty, as it was left.

Again an idyllic scene set in the ordinariness of a room is depicted in the first two stanzas, but this time a note of menace intrudes. There are people

listening to what is happening inside the room and outside the room, leaving nowhere to go. The couple live in a nightmare of menace and implication, an echo of Franz Kafka's *The Trial*, where the protagonist is caught up in a huge intangible net devised by the state. In stanza three, the mood of intimidation increases as the wind shrieks and the cock crows, and then in line three of the stanza the coercion of the military is denounced with 'March to the banner! Jack the soldier, shake the bells, donkey!'. At last, the state intervenes so that the individual is reduced to a compliant donkey, an agent and puppet of the military. The original Japanese word has *kanji* '*heishi*' (兵士) with *katakana* 'Jack' for reading beside it. In my translation, I took liberty of using 'Jack', which is equivalent to *Tarō*, everyman in Japanese. It is likely that Tachihara avoided getting censored. And so it is that the poem ends with the room empty, 'as it was left'. Again we have no details, only a sinister aftermath.

'The Allure of Sleep', our final poem by Tachihara, rises to a metaphysical level. It is a poem in which the poet identifies the human self as being part of the universe existing on a plane far removed from civil or military law. It is through this metaphysical perspective and the enduring power of love that Tachihara is able to find and express a pathway to inner peace where living in fear and coercion have no place. It is also a valedictory poem celebrating the love between a man and a woman in a time of dissolution and uncertainty.

The Allure of Sleep (「眠りの誘い」)[7]

Good night, gentle girls.
Good night, braided soft black hair.
Beside your bed there is a walnut-colored candle stand.
Something living has been conceived,
(All around, the world is covered in snow, ceaselessly falling.)

Always I will sing for you.
I am in the dark outside the window, I am inside the window,
I am inside your sleep, and in the depth of your dreams.
Again and again I will keep singing for you.

Like a lamp that has been lit,
Like the wind, like stars,
My voice will be heard in many ways

> After that, you will see white apple flowers bloom
> Forming small green apples slowly ripening to red
> In the brief time while you are sleeping.

The poem begins in a tone of remembrance, evoking how vivid and joyful life once was. Then in the fourth line, the phrase 'something living was conceived' is immediately counterpointed by 'all around, the world is covered in snow, ceaselessly falling'. This technique of contrasting past and present within the focus of a small space, a room, can be seen in all three poems. In the next two stanzas, the poet speaks from a position that is both outside time and within it as if his existence is indestructible, an enduring fragment in the universe. The poem takes the form of a dialogue between the poet and the girls, yet the girls are sleeping. This means that the poet is talking to himself. He dreams that his poetry will bloom and bear green apples that ripen to red. While the imagery is lyrical, the poem remains in the realm of a dream.

The three poems I have discussed echo the *Dasein* (existence) central to Martin Heidegger's ontological philosophy, in which he establishes that the answer to the question 'What is being?' stems from the daily environment of the world. 'The world is not primarily the world of the sciences, but an everyday world, the "life-world" (Husserl). It is disclosed to us not by scientific knowledge, but by pre-scientific experiences, by care and by moods'.[8] Tachihara's poems are based first on the reality of everyday experience which preoccupy the poet, shaping his state of mind when he finds the room now empty, friends that have vanished or the sinister connotations attached to 'whispering', which outside the room could represent accusations, forcing those inside the room to whisper also. Indeed, 'whispering' can extrapolate, signifying threat and instability in society as whole.

The poems 'A short narrative poem' and 'The allure of sleep' are from the anthology *Poetry of dawn and dusk*. The anthology contains Tachihara's note, which reads:

> You can describe [my poetry] as being a lament for the lost, or being wearied by sadness. Where I live is between light and dark, between dawn and dusk. It is a formless and transitory place where both denial and affirmation have no place, and it is covered over by neither shadow nor light. The life of a human being consists in floating between the living and the dead, who can take the form of metal, crystal, or an angel.[9]

Tachihara views himself as a 'middle person' who is neither living nor dead. It seems to me that the note reflects not only his living on the edge but also uncertainty aroused by wartime. The journal, *Shiki* (Four Seasons) published the memorial issue for Tachihara in May 1939, a time when publications were routinely censored. Suzuki Tōru appraised Tachihara's poetry as one of contradictions, comprising resignation and yet motivation for making poetry, in which the poet's lyrical expression was inevitably restrained even while sensing imminent tragedy. Suzuki pointed out that 'poetry is experiencing an extraordinary period of this time of war'.[10]

The Japanese Annexation of Korea

Following Japan's full annexation of Korea in 1910, the colonial authority pursued an intensive assimilation program aimed at forcing Koreans to abandon their national heritage and identity and become loyal servants of the Emperor. Korean cultural texts were removed from schools. Korean students had to learn and speak Japanese, replacing their native language. The Koreans were treated by the Japanese as an underclass in their own country. Making the whole population communicate in Japanese was a national priority. People were forced off their land and out of their homes and businesses without compensation. No Korean could occupy a position of authority. Taxes were arbitrarily raised. And to control Koreans further, the Japanese established a system of military policing, allowing the Japanese police and the military to detain members of the public without charge and to brutally mistreat them. The suppression of the Korean people by the Japanese was unrelenting, provoking in the end a massive backlash. On 1 March 1919, an estimated two million Koreans rose up in peaceful demonstrations throughout the country, proclaiming the people's right to regain their sovereignty and independence. The protest was put down savagely by the Japanese army: 7509 Koreans were killed, 15,849 were wounded, and 46,303 arrested, of whom some 10,000 were tried and convicted.[11] Many others were taken to the infamous Seodaemun Prison in Seoul where they faced torture and death without due process. In a notorious atrocity, Japanese police and soldiers herded all the inhabitants of the village of Jeam-ri into a church, locked the doors and then burnt it to the ground, incinerating everyone inside.[12] It was in an atmosphere of this kind, of threat, inequality, and horror that Yun Dong-ju later wrote his poems.

Poems by Yun Dong-ju (1917–1945)

Yun Dong-ju was born in Longjing, Jilin, China, which is now China's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, in a settlement where Korean anti-colonialists had migrated to cultivate the barren land. Previously in Korea, the settlers had lived under the occupation of foreign powers (China, Russia and Japan). Longjing was a key area for anti-Japanese campaigns. This may well be one reason why Yun was subsequently arrested in Japan.

Yun's family was Christian. His grandfather and father were teachers. He went to a Christian school and graduated from Yonhee Chonmun Hakkyo, now Yonsei University, majoring in Arts. On graduation, he wanted to publish his anthology *Sky, Wind, Stars and Poetry*, but found no means of doing so. He then made three copies in his own handwriting, one of which became the original copy of his first anthology, posthumously published under the same title. It was written in Korean at the time when the Korean language was banned by Imperial Japan's colonial rule. This fact alone tells us Yun's spirit of maintaining his identity and resistance.[13]

Yun entered Rikkyō University in Tokyo in 1942 and moved to Dōshisha University in Kyoto in the same year. It is likely that he wanted to be with his cousin Song Mon-gyu, who was studying at Kyoto University. Both of them were arrested under suspicion of promoting the Korean independence movement. They were sentenced to imprisonment for two years and sent to Fukuoka Prison. Yun died in February 1945. When Yun's father came to collect his son's body, Song Mon-gyu told him that they were being injected every day with an unknown substance. Only one month later, Song also died in the prison.[14]

The following poems by Yun were written between 1934 and 1942. The first of these is titled 'No Tomorrow—an innocent question', written when Yun was only 17.

No Tomorrow—an innocent question (「明日はない—幼な心の問い」)[15]

Tomorrow, tomorrow. People keep saying it.
I keep doubting it.
At night you go to bed and then daybreak comes.
Tomorrow will be there.
I am yearning for a new day.
When I look around after my sleep

It is no longer tomorrow
But still today.

Brothers!
No tomorrow for us.

In this poem, the symbolism is quite clear. At the time of its writing, Korea had been under Japanese occupation since 1910. Japan had crushed the independence movement in 1919, ensuring that the Koreans remained an underclass in their own land. So there is no tomorrow, only one continuous today. In 'No Tomorrow—an innocent question' despair gives way to acceptance. The grip of Japan on Korea is firm. For the Korean population, there will be no release. The huge desire that the people have to return to independence is futile. There will be no tomorrow, only the reality of today, where their lives are devoted to the benefit of Japan. Imaginatively expressed, the poem centers on the dominance and exploitation of Japan, yet it is not directly expressed in a single word. 'It is no longer tomorrow, but still today'. The independence movement in 1919 has long gone.

Our next poem, 'Windows', is a short descriptive poem which can be read as simply catching a moment early in the morning at a school. But in its imagery it, also contains ambivalent implications.

Windows (窓)[16]

To open my lungs
I go to the windows.
—Looking out the windows is a living lesson.

Make the fire bright.
This room is icy.

When I see
A red-colored leaf flying around
It looks like a small whirlwind rising.

All the same, this morning when
The sun is shining fully on the cold glass windows
I hope the bell starting the class will ring out soon.

The first three lines are again about repression. Release from its signs is reduced to the banality of looking out windows, noticing the sun glistening on the glass and hoping that the school bell will ring soon. The living

lesson which the poet sees is a countryside now fully the property of the Japanese empire. The icy room can be interpreted as the oppressed and dismal state of the Koreans, and the red-colored leaf flying in a whirlwind the predicament of Korea caught in turmoil.

So far, the first two poems gain their force through ambiguity and implication, and the imaginative interpretations that accompany this. The same artistic technique of implication through symbolism which stops short of direct statement can be seen in our third poem 'This kind of day', where the description of a mundane scene is interlaced with sinister overtones as we are taken into the poet's mind and shown what is tormenting him there.

This kind of day (「このような日」)[17]

Today the five-colored flag and the Japanese flag
Flutter at the gate on the tops of stone pillars
As if they are a friendly pair.
Children run about in the area marked out for them.

Now education means indoctrination.
The children's minds have become so bare
They no longer understand the meaning of the word "contradiction".

On this kind of day
I can't stop memories
Of my stubborn older brother long dead.

'This kind of day', written in 1936, returns to direct imagery and protest. The two flags of Japan and Korea flutter at the gate as if to show the joining of friendship and brotherhood that is not there. It conceals the reality of a subservient union in which the Koreans are chained to the Japanese. The second stanza is outright confrontation, denouncing a national education system that is based on indoctrination. And in the third stanza, there is further denunciation contained in the devastating line 'I can't stop memories of my stubborn older brother, now dead'. First, we are not told how the older brother died. The single adjective, 'stubborn', expands at once in its implications when placed in the context of the occupation and particularly the vicious repression of Koreans demanding a return to independence. The descriptive adjective hints at a violent death for the older brother of the poet. The last stanza gains great force and impact by its unexpectedness and its sudden personal connotations.

By 1941, five years after 'This kind of day', the mood of Yun's work has darkened further. Like Tachihara, Yun has chosen a small room as a symbol of confinement and retreat. 'Returning at Night'[18] (帰ってきて見る夜) is one of his last poems, written in prose form. The first paragraph contrasts the outside world with the solitude of being in the room, and making the room dark releases him from the reality of the day that has just come to an end. Then—

> Now I seek a change of air and open the window, but when I look quietly outside it is as dark as the room. The road on which I came, braving the rain, is still wet as the rain continues pouring down, like our society as it stands today.
>
> I have no way of washing away the resentment I feel, so when I shut my eyes quietly a voice seeping into my heart is ripening as if it were an apple.

This is the poem of someone who feels trapped. Just as in 'No Tomorrow—an innocent question', outside and inside are both one in the dark, blanketed together. It is only when the poet shuts his eyes that he is able to live in his own thoughts. The likening of society to a wet road is an ominous intrusion.

'Counting the Stars' (星をかぞえる夜)[19] is dated November 1941. It is a deeply evocative poem in which past, present and future all fuse together to form a complete cycle of life. It is a poem of farewell and of Yun's final identification with the vastness of the universe, far removed from the grip of the state. The first three stanzas are in the form of an overture celebrating the poet's youth:

> In the sky where the season is passing
> Autumn is fully spread out.
>
> It looks to me that I can count all the stars in the depth of autumn
> Without any worries.
>
> The reasons why I cannot complete counting the stars
> That will be engraved as one or two in my heart are:
> The morning will come so easily to me,
> Tomorrow night will always be there,
> And my youth is not yet exhausted.

Then he lists significant emotional moments that have taken place in his life, giving each a star. After this comes the names of people he has known and of the great European poets he has read. All are now streaming away in memory:

These people are far away
As the stars are in the distance.

Mother, you are as far away in Pukgando
As the stars are in the distance.

I am full of longing.
So, on the top of a hill
Where the light of these countless stars pours down
I wrote my name one letter at a time
Then covered it with soil.

The insect chirping all night through
Grieves at our history of shame.

Yet when winter is gone and spring arrives at my stars
Like a lawn on my grave
Grass will cover it in pride
On the top of the hill where the letters of my name have been buried.

This poem needs no explanations because the images of countless stars and the poet's remembrances are clear. Yet, why did he have to bury each letter of his name? The words such as 'shame' and 'pride' indicate the fact that Korean people then had lost their language. His own buried name will revive as in 'grass will cover it'. Such affirmation of hope ends the poem with no sense of bitterness.

Summation

The sets of poems by these two poets demonstrate how powerful control by the state can be, reducing its citizens to compliant units, and how in the struggle for self-realization both poets arrived at a spiritual level linking their identities to the creative forces of the universe far removed from everyday reality. In contrast to Tachihara's poems, Yun's focus is national, embracing all the people of Korea. 'Brothers!/No tomorrow for us' sets the tone and the plight of subjugation that the people find themselves in. Again it is the explicit implication in 'Windows' where 'looking out the windows is a living lesson'. The countryside now belongs to the Japanese, and the Koreans, once landowners, have been forced out. The Koreans now see themselves as an enforced underclass, working for the Japanese in their own country. So it is in the third poem by Yun, 'This kind of day', that we find his deep-felt emotions emerging: despair that the flags of Japan and Korea now fly together 'as if they were a friendly pair', while

at the same time ‘education means indoctrination’, and sorrow that he cannot stop ‘memories of my stubborn older brother, now dead’. The words ‘stubborn’ and ‘now dead’ are highly evocative, bringing with them echoes from the past, particularly relating to Ryu Gwan-sun, a student who on the first day of the proclamation of Korean independence in 1919 was arrested for shouting out the words ‘Long live Korean independence’. She died in prison on 28 September 1920. Her last words were ‘Japan will fail’.[20] Today, Ryu Gwan-sun is revered as a heroine, symbolizing the spirit of Korea. Similarly, Yun has been admired for his poems that protest the colonization of Korea by Imperial Japan in such a calm and measured way. As with Ryu Gwan-sun, Yun also was killed by the Japanese.

In Yun’s fourth poem, ‘Returning at Night’, the small room that he is in is suffocating, but when he opens the window for ‘a change of air’, rain is pelting down in the dark ‘like our society as it stands today’, which is an image of the bleakness of living in Korea under Japanese rule. The symbolism and its implications are obvious, and he can find ‘no way of washing away my resentment’. This little group of selected poems by Yun rises to a climax in ‘Counting the Stars’. Unlike Tachihara, who concentrates on a personal relationship and who foretells an active future for himself as a voice still existing in nature, Yun enumerates all the people he has known, significant moments that have shaped his life, and the great poets he has read and who have become part of his being—all his past history is taken with him into his death, where the letters making up his name are engraved and buried on the top of a hill. Both poets find a pathway to the inner peace that death will provide; each will remain part of the great cycles of the universe, but, whether in rhetoric or not, Tachihara asserts his continuing existence and the power of enduring love, whereas Yun foreshadows the anonymity of his existence in death, as a name only in letters he has buried. Yun’s poems bring into confrontation two opposite things: the spiritually negative outlook brought about in Korea by Japan’s annexation and the vibrant culture that the country once had. Past and present coexist in conflicting symbols of the brutal indifference inflicted by Japan on Korean society and of a lost way of life.

It is remarkable, though not surprising, that in Yun’s reflections on the past, all joyous and productive memories have been blotted out as the bleakness of the present moves in to replace them. The past and its continuance *is* the present, and its powerful, autocratic impact can be felt in every poem. Often there is no mention of the past but it is there, transformed into the present through implications rising out of the imagery.

In both sets, there are lines which are highly suggestive and expand in their implications, all pointing to the thoroughgoing suppression of the people by the state. But equally the methods used in (and by) Japan apply to all dictatorships, contemporary examples being Nazi Germany and communist Russia. In Japan, Germany and Russia, freedom of speech was effectively stamped out. Tachihara's telling phrase 'everyone stayed listening' both inside the room and outside is sinister in its implications, while 'March to the banner! Jack the soldier, shake the bells, donkey!' is an outright denunciation of military enforcement. Yun is blunt, too, with 'Brothers! There will be no tomorrow' and 'Now education means indoctrination'. With its all-encompassing powers executed through three administrative arms—the law and its multiple regulations, the bureaucracy and its agents enforcing and often interpreting them, and the military assuming civic rule, including education—the government of Japan had effectively regimented the nation and subdued it to its will.

In the work of both poets, three themes stand out: the power of the state, in this case Imperial Japan, the intersection of past and present, and the joining together of memory and death as a pathway found by both poets to self-realization. Yet, while they address common themes, we must remember the markedly different societies in which they lived. Dominated by the state though he was, Tachihara was still part of a dominant group, a Japanese man living in Japan with a profession as an architect, whereas in Korea the Koreans were stamped on and subjugated in their own country. In simple but evocative poems, Yun writes of national despair and resignation, of a land wrested from the Koreans, a culture destroyed, the population intimidated and fear in everyday life. Yun takes a much wider perspective than Tachihara, the perspective of a nation being driven to abandon its own heritage and being systematically deprived of their flourishing past. Yun's poetry speaks to Korea's plight.

Tachihara's emotional world—once the shared love of a man and a woman—has now vanished. This personal loss is so deeply felt that he is still united with the young woman in death, his voice in the wind, his presence in the surrounding dark, his presence not obliterated. For both poets, spiritual realization lay in release from life and a fresh identification as part of the universe. That meant for Tachihara the concentration of enduring love in farewell. The memory of the two of them goes with him into oblivion.

In his essay 'The Servile State', John Anderson has eloquently said: 'We may, I think, properly apply the term "servile" to those states which are

marked by the suppression of all political opposition and thus of all independent enterprise', and he concludes his essay by observing that 'the measure of freedom in any enterprise is the extent of opposition to the ruling order … the servile state is the unopposed state'.[21] It is a contention canvassed as long ago as in the text of Euripides' play, *The Phoenician Women*, written around 405 B.C., in an exchange between Jocasta and her son Polyneices:

> **Polyneices**: The worst is this: the right of free speech does not exist.
> **Jocasta**: That's a slave's life—to be forbidden to speak one's mind.

This quotation is included in Foucault's *Fearless Speech* where he, too, pertinently comments that 'if you do not have the right of free speech, you are unable to exercise any kind of power, and thus you are in the same situation as a slave'.[22]

In his book *The Pacific War*, Ienaga Saburō gives a vivid account of the intensity of military involvement in school education and the climate in which he himself was educated:

> Starting in 1925, active duty military officers were assigned to every school (except girls schools), and military training became part of the regular curriculum. The next year youth training centers were established in every city, town and village as part of a four-year program of four hundred hours of military instruction for males whose formal education ended at elementary school.[23]

Ienaga's conclusion is compelling: 'Laws and public education, used as instruments of coercion and manipulation, were the decisive factors that made it impossible for the Japanese people to stop their country from launching the Pacific War'.[24]

By dominating national education and controlling and restricting information to the people, the Japanese government was able to achieve unity and support for its political objectives. However, it is clear in our discussion here that no government could suppress both poets' artistic voices and social criticism.

Notes

1. A coupling of Tachihara and Yun was mentioned by Ibaragi Noriko in *Hanguru e no*o Hangul, Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, pp. 247–249.
2. Michael Lewis, *A Life Adrift*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, p. xxix.
3. Tachihara Michizō, *Tachihara Michizō shishū*, ed. Sugihara Minhei, Iwanami Bunko, 1988, pp. 438–439.

4. All translations of poems in this chapter are mine; in each of them, I have tried to capture the spirit of what is being said while remaining as close as possible to the text.
5. This poem is in the section entitled 'Late manuscripts' in *Tachihara Michizō shishū*, pp. 273–274. The poems in the section were written between 1934 and 1938.
6. Ibid. p. 44. This poem is the third poem in the ten numbered poems in his second anthology, *Poetry between Dawn and Dusk*, in 1937.
7. Ibid. pp. 46–7.
8. M.J. Inwood, 'Martin Heidegger', in *The Philosophers, Introducing Great Western Thinkers*, (ed.) Ted Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 237.
9. Quoted in Gōhara Hiroshi, *Tachihara Michizō*, Tokyo: Kashinsha, 1980, p.26.
10. Suzuki Akira, 'Tachihara Michizō shi', *Shiki*, July 1939: 28.
11. 'March First Movement', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Britaninica.com (accessed 12 October 2015).
12. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_1st_Movement (accessed 14 December 2015).
13. Christy Soojong Choi's thesis entitled *The Three Korean Poets* (Harvard University, 2009) clearly documented Yun's activism through his poetry (p. 33): 'The historical and cultural forces of invasive colonialism and restive nationalism are inscribed in Yun's poetry. He is a supremely political poet, if he is political at all, largely by his refusal to let his sentiments and reactions be determined by oppressive external forces, or the usual modes of opposition to those forces'.
14. Yun Dong-ju, *Sora to kaze to hoshi to shi*, ed. Kim Shi Jong, Iwanami Bunko, 2012, pp. 149–154.
15. Ibid. 88–89.
16. Ibid. 60–61.
17. Ibid. 75–76.
18. Ibid. 13.
19. Ibid. 31–34.
20. Mary Connor, 'Famous Koreans: Six Portraits', *Education About Asia*, Vol. 6, Number 2, Fall 2001, aas2.asian-studies.org/EAA/EAA-Archives/6/2/421.pdf, accessed 1 May 2015.
21. John Anderson, 'The Servile State', *Australian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, pp. 23–32.
22. Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, Los Angeles: Semiotext (e) Foreign Agents, 2001, p. 29.
23. Ienaga Saburō, *The Pacific War*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, p. 28.
24. Ibid. p. 32.

CHAPTER 8

Oda Makoto and Literary Reconciliation: The Rise of Civil Societies in Japan and Korea in the Wake of the Asia-Pacific War

Roman Rosenbaum

Introduction

During a time when most Japanese were ignorant about Korea despite the vibrant presence of Korean communities in the Kansai region, Oda Makoto (小田実, 1932–2007) was immersed in the local Korean communities as a natural part of his sociocultural surroundings in Kobe. This ignorance has led Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo to declare that "a specter is haunting East Asia, a specter of the memories of the past, resurrected by the resurgence of nationalism that is gaining momentum in Japan, China, and South Korea, and snatching away hope for forging a new international framework based on regional cooperation."[1] Oda refers to Korean areas in Japan in several of his books to make the point that during his youth Japan's south-central Kansai region was already functioning as a multicultural region.[2] Following his first visit to South Korea in 1963,

All translations in this text are my own unless otherwise stated.

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he remarked that the contemporary relationship between Korea and Japan resembled that between Japan and America in many ways. Just as many Americans did not know about the firebombings of Japanese cities, many Japanese did not know anything about the occupation of Korea. One of the Korean government officials he met there recounted an episode from when he was on exchange in America and met a young Japanese exchange student. They met every day and talked in Japanese. When one day he was asked where he had learned Japanese, he told him that he had learned it at school, but reminisced about the fact that he was hit harshly if he used Korean at school. He could only laugh wryly at the innocence of the inquiry.[3]

In a sense it was Oda's first-hand experience of the firebombings in the Asia-Pacific War that awoke him to this Japanese want of empathy, which awakened one of the most shocking events in Oda's life—when he thought that war had finally ended, it began again on the Korean peninsula. Oda's engagement with Korea, just before the widespread Japanese citizen movement opposing Japan's involvement in the Vietnam War first gained momentum, was a crucial turning point that triggered his transformation from non-involvement to political and social engagement as an activist. Oda's early encounter with Korea started during his childhood when he grew up among Osaka's Korean diaspora. He was one of a new generation of political activists and intellectuals that included the likes of Kaikō Takeshi, Ōe Kenzaburō and Nosaka Akiyuki, who experienced the final devastating years of the war during their childhood and became known as *yakeato* generation or those who were not burdened with the stigma of perpetrators in the Asia-Pacific War. The trauma and scars of this generation also turned them into the chief advocates of postwar democracy and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. In Oda's case, this meant that he aspired to meet and engage directly with the *shomin* or "common people" in Asia, and his reportage at the coalface of Korean society did not reflect the dominant academic or political discourse of the time, but was probably more influential in exposing non-mainstream public opinion and grassroots sensibilities to the prevailing state of Korea–Japan relations. His popular discourse on Korean affairs arguably aided the transition from the condescending sociopolitical historical engagement of a former "colony" to one of a partnership that sought mutual benefit for two independent national entities. Oda's discourse on Korean otherness within Japan is

unrivaled in Japanese literature and manifests a candid appraisal of the companionship that exists between Korea and Japan.

Oda Makoto's Literature of Korea

> The "declaration" from Tanaka, received by Yūri one week ago, was a letter. Since they had somehow drifted apart recently, it was strange enough to receive a letter from him, but the content was even more unexpected. Inside was a single sheet of writing paper with the following words: "I am writing this letter [to say something] I think you already knew about deep down but I have kept silent about for a long time, and now I want to set things straight." There was a comment that explained that his name was in fact Bak kjai shik (*sic*) and he was Korean. After that it finished with the words: "From now on I want you to be the friend of the Korean Bak kjai shik and not of the Japanese known as Tanaka Shunji."[4]

This passage is taken from Oda's second long novel entitled *Waga jinsei no toki* (*The Time of My Life*), written between 1952 and 1956, very early in his prolific writing career while he was still at university, and before he engaged in social activism to become the spokesperson for the anti-Vietnam War grassroots movement, Beheiren.[5] It was a defining time in Oda's life, and even though he spent five years completing the manuscript, he was not happy with the result and felt that he had reached an impasse once he had written all he could from his limited personal experience. It was time, in his own words, to reinvigorate his philosophical stance and discover new things to write about.[6] It was for this purpose that he left Japan and traveled to the USA on a Fulbright Scholarship in 1958, a trip that would culminate in his most successful book: the travelogue *Nan demo mite yarō* (*I Will Look at Everything*, 1961).

After early successes, Oda's *Waga jinsei no toki* was heavily criticized by the literary critic Shinoda Hajime for "exhibiting all the failings of the novelistic genre."[7] Despite the fact that Oda would later agree, believing that the novel was a complete failure when he reread it at a later stage of his life,[8] it remains conspicuous for candidly portraying the university environment as a microcosm of Japanese society under the oppressive law against subversive activities (Hakai Katsudō Bōshihō), which was imposed from July 21, 1952. This law in effect further curtailed freedom of speech and the democratic political philosophy enshrined in Japan's postwar Japanese constitution.[9] Furthermore, the novel helpfully outlines Oda's

philosophical position through its portrayal of the interstitial character of Bak kjai shik, a student activist and friend of the protagonist Yūri who articulates Oda's nascent discourse on alterity and resident Koreans in Japan. Oda would frequently return to this topic later in his literary career as an integral part of his fiction. In the above citation from the first chapter of *Waga jinsei no toki*, Bak confesses to the narrator Yūri and her friend Naganuma that he is in fact a Korean and not Japanese. Oda would later write that his fascination with Korea was sparked by the sudden outbreak of the Korean War, his upbringing in Osaka with its large Zainichi Korean population, and conversations with a close friend who was Korean, all of which contributed as material toward his first long novel.[10]

Yet, Oda at the time was beset by problems that made him what contemporary writer Matsugi Nobuhiko has characterized as a "skeptic who had been unable to act because he had been fatally wounded by the past."[11] This was a reference to the social and psychological nihilism Oda experienced during the final days of the Asia-Pacific War. This inability to act physically within the postwar social discourse hampered Oda as a writer, who could only express abstract psychological precepts without real humanistic content. This positioning as bystander was also evident in the lack of action and involvement of Oda's fictional protagonists like Okada in *Asatte no shūki* (*Diary of the Day after Tomorrow*, 1951) and Naganuma in *Waga jinsei no toki*, both of whom lamented the status quo without doing anything about it.

By adopting Korean alterity in his fictional universe, Oda laid one of the foundations of his later discourse. This early explorative introverted period marked the beginning of a life-long passionate engagement with Korea as Japan's social and cultural alter ego. It also shaped his sociopolitical career as the spokesperson for disenfranchised communities in Japan and his literary career as a diasporic transnational writer of counter-hegemonic literature in the context of Japan's orthodox *bundan* literary tradition. Oda's discourse on Korea is one of the defining aspects of his literature. His engagement with what he perceived to be Japan's historical alter ego can be followed in his critical essays (both the travelogues and social criticism) and his novels featuring Korean characters.

Shortly after returning from the USA in April 1960, Oda began writing his second long novel entitled *America* (1962), where he outlined his relationship to Japan and the USA. Oda gradually began to direct his attention to the other within Japanese society and embarked on his first trip to Korea on August 15, 1963. The account of this trip was eventually

published as *Kankoku: Nan demo mite yarō* (*Korea: I will look at anything*, 1963) and was later republished in Oda's omnibus essay collection on Korea entitled *Watashi to Chōsen* (*Korea and I*, 1977), where it was retitled *Sore o sakete tōru koto wa dekinai* (*We Cannot Pass by and Avoid This*).

Oda also wrote an entire book on his second experience traveling to North Korea entitled *Kita-chōsen no hitobito* (*The people of North Korea*, 1978). It is fair to say that Korea and in particular Korean fictitious characters feature prominently in many of Oda's stories, and this fact alone demonstrates that Korea's sociopolitical dimension in relation to Japan constitutes a vital element in Oda's fictional universe. In fact, his creation of disenfranchised Korean characters and the accompanying unadulterated depiction of racism—including several examples of highly charged offensive speech—are the hallmark of a writer who aimed to shock his readers out of their complacency. His racist depictions of Korean characters culminated in two novellas entitled *Hiemono* (*Something Chilled*, 1975)[12] and *Hane nakereba* (*Without Wings*, 1975), which caused an outrage and led to severe criticism of his discourse. Partially to blame was the inflammatory colloquial language Oda employed unflinchingly to reflect the bigotry and racism found in the ways Japanese spoke about Korean minority groups. Because the work also compares the discrimination experienced by Koreans to that of Japan's *burakumin* community, it was criticized by the leading activist Hijikata Tetsu, who questioned the merits of Oda's negative characterizations of ostracized communities in Japan.[13] Yet, despite the criticism he attracted, Oda continued to depict Korean characters as a vital part of his fictional discourse throughout his long career, and his view of Japan is never complete without the presence of the Korean alterity in his narrative universe.

In 1990, Oda also completed a monograph on his mother-in-law entitled *Omoni taiheiki* (Omoni's [mother's] Great Peace Chronicle, 1990) and in 1997 received the Kawabata Yasunari literary award for a story revolving around his Korean father-in-law entitled "*Aboji*" *o fumu* (*Stomping on Father*, 1996). Even in works dealing primarily with Japanese sociopolitical issues, like his bestselling *Gyokusai* (*The Breaking Jewel*, 1999) which relates Japan's role during the Asia-Pacific War, Japan's Korean alter ego manifests its enigmatic presence. Oda's conceptualization of the Korean ubiquity in Japanese discourse goes some way toward explaining his style of *zentai shōsetsu* (holistic novel).

Due in no small part to the large number of Korean narratives in Oda's oeuvre, as well as to his prolific career as a writer-activist, he was officially

invited by the government of South Korea as observer and reporter to the annual celebration of Chogukhaebang'ŭi nal, Korea's National Liberation Day (literally: Restoration of the Light Day) on August 15, 1963. The trip was a life-changing experience for Oda, and his travels in Korea would firmly consolidate the image of Japan's ambivalent role as victim but also perpetrator in Asia.

Toward a Treatise of Korea–Japan Relations

In his early treatise on Korea entitled "Kankoku: nan demo mite yarō," Oda recounts his first impressions of not Korea itself but, more importantly, the differences in attitude among the various participants who visited Korea during the National Liberation Day celebration. He recorded in particular the attitudes of the older Japanese in the group.[14] Besides the multicultural visiting party of four, they were also accompanied by an elderly Japanese painter who had lived in Seoul for 30 years and a Japanese person who had worked in the field of Japanese–Korean friendship relationships. It was the elderly Japanese who remarked that "this country is just like Japan, it does not feel at all like we have gone overseas."[15] Oda felt completely different; although he was unconsciously aware that Korea was intimately connected to Japan, Korea reminded him of a *shinkōkoku* (arising nation) akin to the new Asian and African nations.

Oda notices that Koreans above the age of 30 spoke fluent Japanese and that significant differences emerged according to whether one spoke Japanese or English with them. When Japanese was used, Oda detected a distinct sense of "the oppressive memory of the past [*kako no omokurushii kioku*]," which was not evident when English was used. Oda, who belonged to a younger generation, did not see Korea in terms of its history as a former Japanese colony. Hence, it is the postcolonial attitude he detected in his older Japanese colleagues that attracted his attention. Their stance appeared to reflect colonial vestiges still evident in early postwar Japanese political discourse and represented by politicians like Ōno Banboku,[16] who proclaimed during a visit to Seoul that the Japanese Empire had done great things in Korea. This attitude emerged prominently in the Korea–Japan normalization talks, which began in March 1952 and were not completed until June 1965. The main reason for the stalled negotiation was the general attitude of the Japanese government, represented in 1953 by the chief Japanese delegate in negotiations, Kubota Kan'ichirō who told his Korean counterpart that Japan's 35-year occupation of Korea was beneficial to the

Korean people.[17] Such words caused a firestorm in Korea, and the talks were stalemated for the next five years in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. Oda detected and reported the legacy of this equivocal attitude of Japan's older prewar generation in his colleagues who both acknowledged that Japanese exploited Korea and at the same time held the firm belief that Japan had achieved good things in its former colony.

Here too the situation reminded Oda of postwar Japan's own relationship with the USA: no matter how hard Japan tries, it is unable to counter the overarching presence of its "mighty neighbor across the sea." The problem with the bilateral relationship between Korea and Japan and attempts to normalize diplomatic relations by Park Chung-hee's military government in the early 60s are explained by Oda through the metaphor of the *wakareta fūfu* (estranged couple), in which Japan inevitable assumes the role of domineering husband because of its colonial past. This is essentially similar to Korean ambivalence toward Japan, which either looks longingly at Japan as the Promised Land or as a cheap imitation of European civilization.[18] This ambiguity in turn creates a polarity in Japanese people between feeling "too humble" because of the atrocities committed by Japan and "too haughty" for the achievements of Japan's colonial project. Wherever Oda went in the Korean countryside, he was torn between the two oppositional attitudes and constantly reminded by Korea's landscape of the impact of Japanese colonialism, ranging from the Korean railway system that Japan built to the destruction of rural temples as part of the first Japanese invasion (1592–1593) by Toyotomi Hideyoshi's forces.

After the official formal obligations attached to the Korean government invitations were fulfilled, Oda traveled by himself to South Korea's rural areas and interviews the local students. He was surprised to find that the elderly people in many of Korea's regional communities still remembered Japanese and in some cases still embraced the propaganda of Japan's colonial period. In comparison to this older stratum of Korean society, Oda was also surprised by the animosity of the younger generation, who on Cheju Island ask him questions like "Why do the Japanese hate Koreans?"[19]

Oda discovers an explanation for this animosity in an experience at Gangneung, a city in Gangwon province on the east coast of South Korea, where he meets a local intellectual and talks with him in Japanese. Oda expresses his solidarity when they discuss the evil of Japanese imperialism and both agree that the end of colonialism is a favorable development for both nations. Oda relates how speaking Japanese attracted the attention of two young men, who asked him whether he was Japanese. When he told

them he was, they handed him a small paper parcel and ran away shouting "a gift!" The parcel turns out to be filled with excrement. The Korean intellectual comments to Oda that the men are too young to have personal experience of Japanese imperialism and its repercussions; for youths of their generation, an anti-Japanese mentality is purely a reflex, fostered by anti-Japanese sentiments in the press and education system.[20] Oda agrees and elaborates that, as with anti-Japanese sentiments, for these young people, anti-communism too is nothing but a handed-down conceptual hatred. Just as the young people in Japan have no direct experience of war, so the equivalent Korean generation no longer has recourse to anti-communist experiences. As a result, the jingoism and xenophobia of young Koreans are essentially inherited from the older generations. But that is also where Oda admits that his theory breaks down because many Koreans who were indoctrinated during their schooling outgrow these learned sentiments of hatred and begin to acknowledge the importance of Korean reunification.[21]

Because of this ambivalent relationship, Oda remarks that when he is asked "Do you like this country?" he cannot answer the question because of the overwhelming sense of accountability that exists between the two nations. It is precisely because of this sense of commitment that Oda as an outsider is unable to neither praise nor criticize the perspective of the Park administration about what amounts to *taningoto* or "somebody else's problem."[22] Although this may at first seem paradoxical, Oda explains that it is precisely because of this bilateral sentiment of commitment that Japanese unconsciously avoid being bogged down with Korean issues. Arising out of this paradoxical situation is the commonsense opinion of intellectuals that the normalization of diplomatic relations with Korea should wait for the dissolution of military political power and North-South unification. But when could this absolute imperative of North-South unification be realized? Oda's solution to the impasse is deceptively simple, and he suggests that we must reimagine the relationship between the two countries as one between *aka no tanin* (complete strangers),[23] thus enabling establishment of an objective relationship between the two countries based on the postwar status quo.

Korea as Trigger for Oda's Political Activism in Japan

In 1964, South Korea and Japan came close to achieving the goal of political normalization which they had pursued through various stages from the first talks held in March 1952 to the conclusion of the Japan–Korea

Basic Treaty signed on June 22, 1965. The breakthrough in the complex negotiation process, which included the issues of reparation, territorial disputes and, most critically, South Korean assistance in the escalating Vietnam War, came in 1964, when the negotiations temporarily stopped due to violent domestic demonstrations by Korean students who sensed the talks were nearing resolution. Shortly after Oda's visit and interviews with Korean students, the situation further intensified, and President Park Chung-hee suppressed the fierce anti-treaty protests with martial law in June 1964.[24] We can glimpse the precarious state of Korean affairs in 1964 in a press release of the US State Department which observed: "Student anti-government riots in 1964, followed by the imposition of martial law, threatened South Korean stability. President Park Chung-hee reluctantly accepted U.S. advice to defuse the crisis by removing some of his senior advisers."[25]

For Oda, who would eventually become instrumental in Japan's own anti-Vietnam War movement known as Beheiren, which was active from 1965 to 1974,[26] this particular trip to Korea was instrumental in developing his anti-Vietnam discourse, and in terms of his ideological development, it provided cross-cultural context to the emergence of his later development of the *higaisha* (victim) versus *kagaisha* (victimizer) discourse in his social criticism. Oda explains the importance of his sociopolitical engagement with Korea as follows:

> What the commotion in Korea reminds me of is exactly the storm whipped up in Japan four years ago during the ANPO revision. The two are similar. For example, just as the movement that started with opposition to the ANPO revision broke its banks and developed in the direction of protecting democracy, the opposition to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan[27] was aimed at overthrowing the Park regime but also developed into a movement to safeguard nationalism and democracy.[28]

Oda reminisced about the first anniversary of the 1960 renewal of the Japan-US Security treaty (ANPO) when hundreds of thousands of protesters surrounded the Japanese Diet building every day to express their opposition to the bilateral treaty. Only 15 years had passed since Japan had emerged from the devastation of the Asia-Pacific War, which was still vivid in people's memories. Yoshikawa Yuichi, then Secretary-General of the anti-Vietnam War movement, Beheiren, remarked that public opinion in those days feared that after the outbreak of the Korean War and the launch of the Self-Defense Forces in the 1950s, the tide was once again

turning and Japan was heading into a war beyond its control.[29] Public outrage about the undemocratic course of action of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who railroaded the revision of the bilateral treaty through the Diet, further inflamed the situation when the revised treaty, ratified on June 23, 1960, committed the USA to help defend Japan if it came under attack and also forced Japan to provide bases and ports for US forces. This stirred up public concern that Japan may once again become drawn into an unwanted international conflict. The focus of public opinion at the time gradually shifted from concerns of war to the unreliable state of Japan's democracy in the light of Kishi's hard-line stance.[30] Oda compared the authoritarian rule of Kishi and Park and noted similarities in the threats to democracy. His analogy would lead him toward a philosophical stance that ultimately held Japan's acquiescence to American demands, and by extension Korean commitment of support, fundamentally responsible for the atrocities and human rights violations committed in Vietnam under the pretext of democracy. Democracy at home was seriously undermined by authoritarian governments, and this led Oda to extrapolate the global implications of the Japan–Korea alliance in a new light:

> What I felt keenly in Korea was the resemblances between the relationship between Korea and Japan to the relationship of Japan with America. In the same way as America always exists above Japan, Japan always exists above Korea. There might be some people who don't feel that way, but for better or worse, it is how the young generation who were driven into this "no way out" situation felt it. I think that one of the aspects of the ANPO struggle was a movement that sought the mental independence of the Japanese. Likewise, this movement of the Korean students is similar in nature.[31]

Needless to say that this harsh comparison was perceived as inflammatory and as working against the future cooperation of the two neighboring countries. Oda was eventually banned from returning to Korea, and his books were prohibited in Korea. Nevertheless, he vigorously defended his position on Korea via critical essays and public roundtable talks.[32]

From Literature to Political Engagement

To make matters worse, Oda did not limit his involvement to travel reportage, but also participated in the international movement to resolve the abduction of Kim Dae-jung, one of South Korea's most promising

politicians, who became known as the "Nelson Mandela of Asia" for his resilient opposition to authoritarian rule. Kim entered politics in 1954 during the administration of Korea's first president, Syngman Rhee, who was sidelined by the May 16 military coup in 1961. Rhee still managed to develop into an effective opposition leader during the dictatorial presidency of Park Chung-hee, but in August 1973, he was almost killed during a kidnapping from a hotel in Tokyo[33] by agents from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). This incident followed his open criticism of President Park's *yushin*[34] program, which granted near-dictatorial powers to the president, and only the intervention of American ambassador Philip Habib saved him from being drowned.

Oda became involved in the Kim Dae-jung abduction in 1973 during another political movement to free the dissident poet Kim Ji-ha, because he had promised an American peace activist, who was his friend, that he would arrange a meeting with the Korean opposition leader. It was because of the abduction of one Kim and the imprisonment of another, that Oda became deeply involved in the movement to support Korean democratization during the authoritarian Fourth Republic (1972–1979). At the time, Beheiren protests were penetrating all socioeconomic layers of Japanese society, so much so that Oda could utilize the considerable resources and high profile of the Japanese grassroots movement to support democracy in Korea.[35] Also, because of Korea's heavy involvement in the Vietnam War, many of the intellectuals and ordinary citizens who supported *Beheiren* seamlessly partook in the movement to democratize Korea. Oda outlines his reason for getting involved in Korean politics and the democratization process of Korea as follows:

> I just want to make clear that in all cases [of my involvement in Korea], everything was first and foremost a problem that arose from my own nation and society. The problem of Korean democratisation was not just about Korea. The obstruction of democratisation was a problem that hinged on the existence of the Japanese state itself, which colluded with the military dictatorial political power that suppressed the movement of a people who sought democratisation. I was working for the purpose of Japanese democratisation.[36]

As a result of the international support arising from Oda's involvement, Kim Dae-jung survived his kidnapping but was not able to meet with Oda in person until 1992. This was also the year when Oda was allowed back into Korea for the first time after being declared a *kihi jinbutsu* or "a person to

be avoided at all cost,"[37] due to his lengthy support of pro-democracy activists opposing the Park government. The two activists were able to meet at Kim's residency in Seoul after the ban on Oda's two books on Korea, *Omoni Taiheiki* (1990) and *Mingan Taikōki* (1991),[38] was eventually lifted, and he was invited to partake in the book launch of the Korean translations.[39]

Toward a Literary Dialectic of Korea

Oda's politically charged essay collections on the two Koreas are not the only controversial aspect of his discourse on Korea. In a high-profile roundtable talk with Furui Yoshikichi, Inoue Hisashi and Komori Yōichi conducted in 2004, Oda remarked that "the most shocking thing during our high school years was the Korean War. Just when we thought that there was no more war, another one had started."[40] Since the experience of war overshadowed his entire childhood, when Japan's defeat in the Asia-Pacific War in 1945 finally brought an end to the firebombings Oda had experienced in Osaka when he was only 13-year-old, the prospect of another war right next to Japan during his adolescence with the possibility of Japan being once again engulfed by war was unbearable to him. It was this confrontation with the possibility of war in Korea that forced Oda to engage directly with the heritage of Japan's colonial legacy in Korea. Oda's upbringing in Osaka had exposed him to the disenfranchised presence of Korea in Japan from a very early age. Oda frequently reminisces about his first encounter with the Korean community in his neighborhood and wondered about what impact it might have had early on in his childhood. He explains that he often went wondering about the *bessekai* (different world) of the *hantōjin no machi* (city of the peninsular folk) and believed at the time that *hantōjin* were Japanese just like *Osakajin*.[41] Oda depicts the international quality of a "quirky community" called "Korean-polis," which was a term he observed on an armband somebody was wearing:

> My cosmopolitan or rather my hodgepodge personality was formed because even today there are still fields close by my house where wild boars were kept which evoked small Korean settlements and I grew up in a geography where you couldn't tell whether it was Korea or Japan. [42]

In this rather revealing passage, Oda points out that transcultural and transnational communities already existed in Japan in not insignificant quantities well before Japan's imperialistic expansion brought an end to prewar cosmopolitan multiculturalism.[43] In fact, the above translation of

ikaino (猪飼野) as "fields where wild boars are kept" is somewhat insufficient since the term also refers to a geographical area that straddles the southeastern Higashinari and Ikuno districts in Osaka. Even historically, the region is associated with *toraijin*,[44] who have settled the region in the reign of Emperor Nintoku around about the third-century AD. In particular the area is well-known for *toraijin* from the ancient Korean kingdom of Kudara (百済) and was therefore known in ancient times as Kudara-goori (百済郡). Increasing industrialization of the Kansai area produced a need for cheap labor migration from Korea and eventually created the largest Korean community in Japan. In his usual inimitable fashion, Oda explains that "just like Osaka, where I was born and grew up, the peninsula, was unmistakably a part of Japan and people from the peninsula where a part of the Japanese people just like people from Osaka." [45] In other words, Oda grew up in an environment where the Korean presence was a natural part of Japan's historical multiculturalism. As a result when Oda begins to notice and write about the importance of the Korean community in Japan, the resulting social and literary discourse on Korea becomes one of the defining aspects of his recusant literature.

In particular, as far as his *zentai shōsetsu* or long polyphonic narratives are concerned, Korean fictitious characters feature prominently and often occupy key textual positions. In fact, it is no overstatement to articulate that many of Oda's stories have Koreans as main protagonists and thereby give a voice to the deracinated Korean communities within Japan. For instance, in his international magnum opus *Hiroshima* (*The Bomb*, 1981),[46] Oda enlarges the traditional Japanese/American hegemonic view of the nuclear holocaust and includes a multiethnical cast including many more atypical victims like the Indonesian student Abdullah Hassan, Eul Sun the Korean émigré, who grew up in Hiroshima and Pok Cha the second generation *zainichi kankokujin* (resident Koreans).[47] Later in *The Breaking Jewel*, Oda relates the story of Japanese SergeantNakamaru's squad and his interaction with Corporal Kon—the non-commissioned Korean officer—against the backdrop of a small South Pacific island engulfed by the onslaught of the final days of World War II. Just like in many of his other novels, one of Oda's central protagonists is the interstitial figure of the Korean conscript Corporal Kon, who participates in the suicide battles of the Japanese Pacific campaign.

Oda depicts Corporal Kon, who insists on pronouncing his name in the Japanese manner rather than the Korean equivalent "Kim," as determined to beat the Japanese at their own game by proving that he is the best soldier in the regiment. It was unusual for Koreans to be inducted on active duty with the Japanese forces. Instead, most were civilian employees

required to perform labor for the military. Many of the so-called Japanese prisoners during the first years of the war were in fact Korean laborers, mustered in their villages and sent to the islands of the Pacific to build airfields or harbor facilities. Kon, however, insists that he is a Japanese soldier, even though he comes from "the peninsula."[48] Donald Keene's translation and analysis of Oda's novella illustrates the modus operandi of Oda's penchant for in-between interstitial characters, trickster figures, and those who do not neatly fit into stereotypical typecasts. Oda breaks conventions, explores taboos and most importantly transcends simplistic black and white dichotomies so prevalent in our daily lives.

One of Oda's most successful novellas is "'Aboji' o fumu" [Stomping on Father, 1996], about his Korean in-laws, and he received the 24th Kawabata Yasunari Prize for Literature in 1997 for this very personal story.

> *Aboji* and *Omoni* are 'Koreans residents in Japan from the South.' Yet it is complicated to separate each into their respective political categories and I have no intention of discussing this and that about political jurisdiction. Currently the state of affairs of the North-South division lacks common sense and is irrational and I cannot give a rational explanation. If I try to discuss something that cannot be explained rationally, I will go crazy myself. *Aboji* once said to me, 'Oda, I was a Korean before Pak-han and Kim-san were born,' and thus explained the entire irrational and nonsensical state of affair. 'Kim san' was of course Kim Il-sung from the North and 'Pak-han' was Park Chung-hee from the South. This is of course a story from when the two were still alive.[49]

This story marks one of the highlights in Oda's fictional universe and combines his penchant for uniting the public with the private by suggesting that the distinction really does not exist at all. Nothing is ever clearly distinguishable and the political and social aspects of our lives intertwine seamlessly into a polyphonic tapestry that is our life. The only thing clearly distinguishable is our personal attitude toward controversial issues and whether we choose to engage or not. This in a nutshell is the message we can distill from the engaging fiction of Oda Makoto.

Toward a Conclusion

Some historical account analyzes the Korea–Japan relationship as hinging on the dominating and invasive role of Japan over Korea, and I have argued above that it is in the postwar fiction and through the cultural criticism of Oda Makoto, that we find the first emergence of an independent

Korean subject position in equality with its Japanese counterpart within the context of Japanese literature and popular culture. Oda consistently portrays a postwar Korea–Japan dialectic that stresses a relationship of mutual dependency in the environment of Japan's rapid economic growth, which goes beyond the prewar colonizer versus colonized dichotomy.

The above examination of Oda's literature on Korea in combination with his travel and engagement serves to highlight his role as an underappreciated ambassador, who worked tirelessly toward cross-cultural reconciliation. Oda's writings on Korea demonstrate that his ecriture poses as one of the leading grassroots mediating agencies of reconciliation. One way of looking at Oda's continuing urge to travel to hostile areas that are "anti-Japanese" like Korea throughout his life is that those travels serve as a kind of self-imposed exilic experience to overcome the hegemony of the Japanese nation state and its homogeneity discourse so prevalent during the postwar years when Japan attempted to overcome the psychology of defeat and moved steadily toward the emergence of the *Nihonjinron* debate[50] in the 1970s. Oda's peripatetic lifestyle continued throughout his life, and in his concluding remarks to his first trip to South Korea, he explains the significance of the Korean nation in the following way:

> In discussing South Korean affairs and thinking about North Korea we end up thinking and discussing about our own [Japanese] way of life. I discussed South Korean affairs every evening for five days with the Japanese reporters before we went home, and we always ended up discussing Japanese issues.[51]

As has been pointed out repeatedly in the above discussion of Oda's discourse on Korea as Japan's historical alter ego; the perceived shortcomings in Korean sociopolitical affairs ultimately are a result of the failure of democracy in Japan. Korea for Oda serves as a barometer of Japan's own troubled relationship with the USA and the war in Vietnam, and of its larger status in the world. Oda rhetorically demonstrated that as historical doppelganger, it is only through a mutual recognition of the two nation's co-dependence that the two fledgling postwar societies could establish themselves on the world stage.

Oda's reportage and the ensuing controversy of citizen's engagement in Japan's sociopolitical affairs exemplify how the paradigm change from imperialistic militarism to democracy has not yet taken root in the political sphere of Japanese government policies. Oda leadership of Beheiren far exceeded its mandate of anti-war activism. Through his international connections, he became the architect that involved Beheiren in a multitude

of international issues ranging from the normalization with Korea, the dismantling of American bases in Okinawa and Japanese reintegration into the Asian community. The resulting wide-ranging grassroots activism triggered an unprecedented level of citizen engagement in the sociopolitical affairs of postwar Japan. The involvement of ordinary citizens in governmental affairs was still considered as a transgression in an atmosphere where the nascent rights of citizens were only steadily taking hold and whose culmination would not erupt until sometime later in 1965 during the emergence of Beheiren as the foremost anti-Vietnam citizen movement in Asia.

Oda's trip to South Korea just before the large-scale grassroots Japanese citizen movement, which opposed Japan's involvement in the Vietnam War, was a crucial turning point that triggered his transformation from primarily literary involvement to political and social engagement as an activist that opposed the prevalent discourse of Japan as a victimized nation. It is largely the emergence of a new generation of politically motivated scholarly activists like Oda Makoto, Kaikō Takeshi, Ōe Kenzaburō and Tsurumi Shunsuke, who were no longer pre-occupied with the stigma of perpetrators in the Asia-Pacific War that enabled the surfacing of Japan's first true democratic postbellum philosophy.

Oda's direct engagement with the *shomin* in Korea, and his reportage from the coal face of Korean society did not reflect the dominant academic or political discourse of the time. It introduced public opinion and grassroots sensibilities as a counter-hegemonic discourse into the prevalent zeitgeist of Korean–Japan relations at a turning point of their sociopolitical historical engagement from colonial discourse to that of independent and mutually beneficial national entities. The ensuing criticism of his expose as unlearned is misplaced since it reflects the thought and sensibility of folk culture in Korea just like it would in Japan later on when Oda launches the anti-Vietnam movement.

Notes

1. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo (eds), *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*, 2008, ix.
2. Oda Makoto, *Sekai ga katarikakeru*, 1980, 266.
3. Oda Makoto, 'Kankoku ni tsuite [About Korea]', *Oda Makoto zenshigoto*, Vol.7, 243. See also Oguma Eiji, *Minshū to aikoku*, 764. The notion of selective historical memory is also discussed by James Orr in *The Victim as*

Hero (2001, 32), noting that the adoption of the term "Pacific War" instead of "Asia-Pacific War" aided the forgetting of causes that originated in the (second) Sino-Japanese war.

4. Kuroko Kazuo, *Oda Makoto: 'tada no hito' no shisō to bungaku*, 2002, 70.
5. Short for "Betonamu ni heiwa o shimin rengō" or the Citizens' League for Peace in Vietnam.
6. Oda uses the phrase "kazaana o akeru" or literally to "open a vent and let in fresh air," to express his philosophical stagnation at the time. For details, see Oda Makoto, *Oda Makoto Hyōron-sen*, vol. 4, 2002, 569.
7. Oda Makoto, *Oda Makoto zenshigoto*, Vol. 1, 1970, 422. For a detailed appraisal of the work by the writer Matsugi Nobuhiko (真継伸彦), see also 423.
8. Ibid., 410.
9. This law outlines the States powers in regard to originally leftist groups and subversive activities in particular the perceived danger arising from the increasing influence of the Communist party. It enabled increased sentencing and was later used for terrorism and sabotage.
10. Oda Makoto, "Kankoku: nan demo mite yarō," 1963, 60.
11. Oda Makoto. *Oda Makoto zenshigoto*, Vol. 1, 1970, 423–4.
12. For a detailed discussion of the controversial nature of *Hiemono*, see Fowler Edward. "The Buraku in Modern Japanese Literature: Texts and Contexts." *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1. (Winter, 2000): 1–39.
13. A detailed discussion of the background to this controversy is beyond the scope of this chapter. For details, see Ibid., 29.
14. Oda, "Kankoku: nan demo mite yarō," 61.
15. Ibid., 62.
16. Also Ōno Bamboku (大野伴睦). Born in 1890, an important conservative leader in the first two decades of the postwar period who was actively involved in the Liberal Party from 1945.
17. Junji Banno, *The Political Economy of Japanese Society*, 1998, 132.
18. Oda, Kankoku: nan demo mite yarō, 65.
19. Ibid., 68.
20. Oda, "Kankoku: nan demo mite yarō," 69.
21. Ibid., 71.
22. Oda adopts the English word: "commit" to describe Japan's involvement in Korea. I have rendered this as a sense of "accountability" due to long-standing historical relationship between the two countries. Ibid., 81.
23. Ibid.
24. For details see Park Won-soon, "Korea-Japan Treaty, Breakthrough for Nation Building," 2010.
25. Release of Foreign Relations, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea Region, 1964–1968 by the U.S. State Department, released on October 30, 2000.

Online at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/state/fruskorea.html> (accessed: March 29, 2015).

26. Note that Oda wrote several books on this topic including: *Kabe o yaburu* [Tear down the wall, 1964] and *Nihon no chishiki-jin* [Japanese intellectuals, 1964].
27. Formerly known as *nikkan kokkō kaifuku* (日韓国交回復) or Normalization of Korea-Japan diplomatic relations.
28. Oda, *Sengo o hiraku shisō*, 1965, 207.
29. Keiji Hirano, "Legacy of 1960 protest movement lives," 2010.
30. Ibid.
31. Oda Makoto, "Kankoku nit suite" in *Sengo wo hiraku shisō*, 207–8.
32. See for example the debate between Oda Makoto and Fujishima Udai entitled: "Kankoku ni tsuite ronsō [Debate about Korea]" in *Chūō Kōron*, 1969, 142–51.
33. At the time Kim was living in exile but when he came to Tokyo for a visit he was kidnapped in broad daylight from the Grand Palace hotel with the help of the Japanese police and handed to the KCIA agents.
34. *Yushin* refers to the concept of "restoration" and was most likely inspired by the Japanese term "Meiji ishin" (Meiji Restoration), which highlights Park Chung-hee's education in the Japanese military and his experience in the Manchukuo Imperial Army. Issued during South Korea's Fourth Republic the emergency constitution followed Park's declaration of a state of emergency and bestowed almost unlimited dictatorial powers to the president, such as unlimited re-election and a presidential term of six years.
35. Hyun Soon-hye. *Watashi no Sokoku ha sekai desu*, 2007, 71–2.
36. Oda Makoto, "Nihon no shimin toshite ajia no mirai wo kangaeru" in Oda Makoto Hyoron-sen Vol.4, 2002, 356. Oda notes in a footnote to the title that he had written this article for the inaugural issue of the Korean magazine *Tōdai Hihyō* in 1997.
37. Oda Makoto. Oda Makoto Hyoron-sen 4, 2002, 408.
38. This complex title refers to "the power of the people" (民の力) is akin to a "rock" (岩), while *taikō* (太閤) refers to Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉) and his invasion of Korea. The long roman-fleuve recounts the Korean invasion from the perspective of the common people.
39. Oda Makoto. Oda Makoto Hyoron-sen 4, 2002, 408.
40. Inoue Hisashi and Komori Yōichi, *Zadankai Showa Bungakushi* [Round-table-talk: Shōwa literary history], Vol.6, 2004, 256.
41. Oda Makoto. *Sekai ga Katarikakeru*, 268–9.
42. Oda Makoto, *Watashi to tennō: hitobito no naka no tennō* [*Me and the emperor: the emperor inside us*], 1988, 13.
43. Oda Makoto, *Sekai ga katarikakeru*, 266.

44. Literally: "people brought over" to Japan in particular from China and Korea. The industrialization and economic boom from World War I, led to the settlement by Korean laborers, and the eventual foundation of Korea town during the Asia-Pacific war.
45. Oda Makoto, *Sekai ga Katarikakeru*, 268–9.
46. Oda Makoto, *Hiroshima*, 1981.
47. For details, see the review by Ōe Kenzaburō *Kenpō kyūjō, ashita wo kaeru* (Article 9 of the Constitution: Changing tomorrow), 2008, 5–11.
48. Oda Makoto, *Gyokusai* (*The Breaking Jewel*), English translation 2006, xi.
49. This translation is from the 1998 publication of the short story anthology by the same name, Oda, "Aboji" o fumu, 11.
50. Variously translated as "theories of Japanese uniqueness," or "theories about the Japanese," the term is usually interpreted as the reemergence of cultural nationalism in Japan. For details, see Kosaku Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism in Japan*, 1992, 2–3.
51. Oda, "Kankoku: nan demo mite yarō," 81.

CHAPTER 9

"Comfort Women Bashing" and Japan's Social Formation of Hegemonic Masculinity

Yuki Tanaka

For many years, Japan's current Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has been one of the most vocal deniers of Japan's responsibility for the so-called comfort women system,[1] the sex slave system operated by the Japanese Imperial Forces in many parts of the Asia-Pacific during the 15-year Asia-Pacific War between 1931 and 1945.[2] Moreover, Abe has been associated with extreme nationalist groups such as the Association of a Liberalist View of History (Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyū Kai) and the Association of Young Parliamentarians for Japan's Future and Historical Education (Nipponn no Zento to Rekishi-kyōiku o Kangaeru Wakate-giin no Kai), both of which have been at the forefront of the movement denying the existence of the Japanese military sex slave system. These nationalist associations have also been the core groups attempting to sanitize many other Japanese war crimes, including the Nanjing Massacre.

In this chapter, I first briefly examine Prime Minister Abe's long involvement in various movements that deny the historical facts of Japan's war atrocities and argue for a nationalistic education in Japanese school curricula. It also demonstrates how Abe frequently changes his own attitude toward the comfort women issue, opportunistically calculating the

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political situation each time. In doing so, I explain how the "comfort women bashing" promoted by Abe and his supporters is endangering Japan's democracy itself. In the second part of the chapter, I analyze Japan's present social formation, which allows Japanese men, in particular nationalistic male politicians, to openly exercise hegemonic masculinity. For this purpose, I examine Japan's current socioeconomic systems, which clearly discriminate against women. I focus on various social problems that confront Japanese women such as the employment system, domestic violence and sexualized popular culture, which widely disseminate ideas of hegemonic masculinity into Japanese society, influencing everyone, including women. In conclusion, I make a proposal for setting up a law equivalent to Article 130 of the German Criminal Law (the so-called Auschwitz Lie Law) as a countermeasure to confront "comfort women bashing," which is rapidly gaining momentum and adversely impacting popular thinking about Japan's war responsibility.

Timeline of Abe's Involvement in the Comfort Women Issue

On January 16, 1992, at a meeting with South Korean President Roh Tae-woo in Seoul, Japan's Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa admitted that the Japanese Imperial Forces were responsible for setting up the so-called comfort women system. He promised that the Japanese government would investigate this matter further.

The Japanese government examined relevant Japanese official documents and reports prepared by the Allied (in particular, the USA) Forces during the war, as well as the proceedings of the Dutch military war crimes tribunal conducted in Batavia in 1948 on the so-called Semarang Incident. They also conducted interviews with 16 Korean former comfort women. On August 4, 1993, as a result of the findings revealed by these official investigations, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei issued a statement subsequently known as the "Kono Statement." It reads in part as follows:

> The Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited

against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

Undeniably, this was an act, involving the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.[3]

The statement concluded by saying, "We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake, by forever engraving such issues in our memories *through the study and teaching of history*" (*rekishi kenkyū, rekishi kyōiku o tsūjite, kono yō na mondai o nagaku kioku ni todome, onaji ayamachi o kesshite kurikaesanai to iu katai ketsui o aratamete hyōshi suru*).[4] In accordance with this commitment, the Japanese government encouraged school textbook publishing houses to include references to the comfort women issue. As a result, from 1997 onward, all editions published by the seven school textbook publishing houses included references to the comfort women issue as well as other issues related to Japan's war responsibility in their junior high school textbooks on Japanese history.

After 1996, however, certain nationalist politicians, academics, journalists and right-wing political groups began a fierce campaign against these textbook reforms, claiming that the comfort women system was not a sex slave system but a legitimate prostitution business arrangement. They strongly demanded that references to the comfort women issue be withdrawn from school textbooks. At the same time, they also claimed that Japanese war atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre were a Chinese fabrication, and that the Japanese never committed such war crimes.[5] In June 1996, some hard-liners from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) formed an organization called the Association of Parliamentarians for a Bright Japan. Abe, who was elected as a member of the Lower House in the Diet for the first time three years before, became the deputy secretary of this organization. In February 1997, it was relaunched under the name Association of Young Parliamentarians for Japan's Future and Historical Education. Again Abe became the secretary, and together with Nakagawa Shōichi, its president, Abe initiated a campaign within the Diet condemning the Japanese education as "heavily biased."[6]

For many years, Abe has been closely collaborating with nationalist scholars such as Fujioka Nobukatsu, former Professor of Education at Tokyo University and one of the leading members of the group calling itself the Association for a Liberalist View of History. On January 30, 1997, Fujioka and other members of this group formed another organization called the Association for Producing New Textbooks (Atarashii Kyōkasho o Tuskuru Kai, hereafter APNT). In April 2004, APNT successfully submitted its own version of textbooks for Japanese history and social studies to the Ministry of Education for approval. Needless to say, these textbooks make no reference to any war crimes committed by the Japanese Imperial Forces in many parts of the Asia-Pacific. Instead, they justify Japan's military conduct and emphasize the superiority of the Japanese nation and culture. The APNT's textbooks were initially published by Fuyō Publishing House, a subsidiary of Fuji-Sankei Corporation, Japan's most conservative and nationalistic media group (newspaper and TV), and are now published by two different right-wing publishing houses. The APNT has been gradually increasing the number of schools that adopt its textbooks.[7]

Due to unremitting political pressure on textbook publishing houses by Abe, his nationalistic colleagues and politicians, as well as bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education, the number of history texts referring to the comfort women issue rapidly decreased within a few years. In 2000, the above people, together with the APNT, succeeded in having the school textbook selection system amended so as to take away the power to select textbooks from schoolteachers and vest it with the Education Board of each local council. By 2006, no junior high school textbooks in Japan referred to the comfort women issue any longer. All the publishers had submitted to the political pressure of Abe and his group, self-regulating so as not to include the issue of comfort women in their textbooks.[8] However, recent criticism from other countries including the USA about the way the Japanese government is handling this matter has brought about another change, and some new textbooks to be used from 2016 have re-introduced the issue. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Education has demanded that publishing houses include a statement that there is no evidence to prove that women were forced to become military sex slaves.[9]

Over five days between December 8 and 12, 2000, an organization called Violence Against Women in War-Network Japan (hereafter VAWW-Net Japan), in collaboration with many other women's organizations, convened the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery in Tokyo. About 400 foreigners including 64

former comfort women from eight different nations participated in this people's tribunal, and every day more than a thousand people attended the trial. At this tribunal, Emperor Hirohito, General Tōjō Hideki and seven other Japanese top military leaders were indicted, and all were found guilty.

VAWW-Net Japan gave NHK (Japanese Broadcasting Corporation) full support to film the entire proceeding of the tribunal and to produce a documentary program on this theme as a part of the series called "How Should We Adjudicate War?" When the program was aired on January 30, 2001, however, it was clear that it had been substantially sabotaged.[10] On its website, VAWW-Net Japan later explained how the program was sabotaged:

> There was no mention of the Tribunal's official name, or of keywords such as "the Japanese military," and "the system of sexual slavery." There were no scenes shot inside the hall where the Tribunal was held, the sponsoring organizations were not mentioned, nor were there any comments from the sponsors. Most importantly, there was not one word about the verdict, which was not only the most significant aspect of the Tribunal but also went to the heart of the overall theme of the series, "How Should We Adjudicate War?" All favorable comments concerning the Tribunal were cut. There was very little testimony from survivors in the program, and that of the two Japanese veterans who served as witnesses was cut out altogether. The program opened with the moderator's disparaging comments on the Tribunal, followed by a right-wing scholar's lengthy condemnation of the Tribunal and abusive statements concerning former "comfort women" (claiming that they were prostitutes, that there was no evidence to back up their testimony, etc.).[11]

In fact, shortly after the tribunal concluded, right-wing political groups started demanding that NHK cancels the program. A few days before the program was aired, about 30 right-wing activists stormed the NHK head office building in Tokyo, repeating the same demand.[12]

On January 12, 2005, and again on January 18, 2005, *Asahi Shinbun*, one of Japan's largest national newspapers, reported that NHK sabotaged the program because of repeated demands made by Abe and Nakagawa. It is likely that the above-mentioned right-wing groups approached Abe and Nakagawa and asked them to put pressure on NHK while they themselves also campaigned hard against NHK's planned program. Clearly, the political intervention by Abe and Nakagawa was a violation of Japan's Constitution that protects freedom of information. Yet, the lawsuit instigated by

VAWW-Net Japan against NHK dealt only with the content of the program and did not deal with this political intervention, so that Abe and Nakagawa were free from prosecution.[13]

On September 26, 2006, Abe was elected as prime minister of Japan. On October 5, he stated in a Diet committee that there is no evidence to prove that comfort women were forcibly taken into comfort stations, so the issue must not be taught in junior high schools. Abe used the expression "coercion in the narrow sense" to indicate "abduction" or "kidnap." By defining "coercion" simply as "abduction" and "kidnap," he sidestepped the fact that many women were deceived and conned into becoming sex slaves or sold to comfort stations because of poverty.[14] At the same time, he completely ignored cases such as Jan Ruff-O'Herne and other Dutch women who are known to have been forcibly taken from internment camps and put into comfort stations, a fact verified at the Dutch military war crimes tribunal in 1948.[15] At the same time, he stated that the so-called class-A war criminals tried at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal were not criminals according to Japan's domestic law. He claimed that Japan had no option but to accept the judgment of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal because of the political situation at the time.[16] It seems obvious that Abe adopted the concept of "coercion in the narrow sense" from the members of APNT such as Fujioka, as well as from their interpretation of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

In January 2007, Mike Honda, a member of the US House of Representatives, proposed a resolution that the House request that Japan

> formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as comfort women, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II.[17]

On March 16, 2007, Abe stated that he would respect the Kono Statement. He added, however, that it was confirmed at a cabinet meeting that there is no evidence in the documents found by the Japanese government to prove that women were forcibly taken away by Japanese military forces or police.

On March 24, 2007, the *Washington Post* severely criticized Abe's attitude toward the comfort women issue as "double talk." It read in part

> What's odd—and offensive—is … to roll back Japan's acceptance of responsibility for the abduction, rape and sexual enslavement of tens of thousands

> of women during World War II. Responding to a pending resolution in the U.S. Congress calling for an official apology, Mr. Abe has twice this month issued statements claiming there is no documentation proving that the Japanese military participated in abducting the women … he should straightforwardly accept responsibility for Japan's own crimes—and apologize to the victims he has slandered.[18]

The *New York Times* and many other newspapers in Korea, China, Taiwan and the Philippines also ran similar articles criticizing Abe's dishonest approach to this issue.

On March 27, 2007, Abe met US President George Bush at Camp David. At the press conference after this meeting, Abe said:

> Well, in my meeting with the congressional representatives yesterday, I explained my thoughts, and that is I do have deep-felt sympathy that my people [sic] had to serve as comfort women, were placed in extreme hardships, and had to suffer that sacrifice; and that I, as Prime Minister of Japan, expressed my apologies, and also expressed my apologies for the fact that they were placed in that sort of circumstance. The 20th century was a century when human rights were violated in many parts of the world. So we have to make the 21st century a century—a wonderful century in which no human rights are violated. And I, myself, and Japan wish to make significant contributions to that end. And so I explained these thoughts to the President.

Bush replied to this by saying:

> The comfort women issue is a regrettable chapter in the history of the world, and I accept the Prime Minister's apology. I thought it was very—I thought his statements—Kono's statement, as well as statements here in the United States were very straightforward and from his heart. And I'm looking forward to working with this man to lead our nations forward. And that's what we spent time discussing today. We had a personal visit on the issue. He gave his—he told me what was on his heart about the issue, and I appreciated his candor. And our jobs are to, obviously, learn lessons from the past. All of us need to learn lessons from the past and lead our nations forward. That's what the Prime Minister is doing in a very capable way.[19]

It is extraordinary that Japan's prime minister expressed apologies for the comfort women issue in the USA, and that the US president accepted his apology while both completely ignored the actual victims of the Japanese military sex enslavement.

Abe has never expressed his apologies directly to any former comfort women since this meeting with Bush at Camp David in March 2007. When the House of Representatives passed Honda's resolution on July 30, 2007,[20] Abe simply said "it was disappointing."

Abe's prime ministership lasted less than one year, and he resigned on August 27, 2007. On November 4, 2012, a group called the Committee for Historical Facts consisting of 38 Japanese Diet members together with 14 academics and journalists published an advertisement captioned "Yes, we remember the facts" in the *Star-Ledger*, the major newspaper in the state of New Jersey. In this advertisement, they insisted that there is no evidence to support the claim that comfort women were forcibly taken into comfort stations. Among the list of 38 Diet members was Abe's name, despite the fact that he had supposedly apologized to former comfort women in Washington, DC, five years earlier. The same advertisement (headed "The Facts") was published in the *Washington Post* on June 14, 2007. Yet, on that occasion, Abe's name was not included in the members of the Committee for Historical Facts. It seems obvious that Abe, who was still prime minister at the time, hesitated to blatantly negate Japan's responsibility for the violation of human rights of military sex slaves, as less than three months earlier he had expressed "deep sympathy" to former comfort women during his trip to the USA.

On December 26, 2012, Abe returned to power. In April 2013, he again began making statements to discredit not only the Kono Statement but also the Murayama Statement. In August 1995, then prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi issued a special statement for the 50th anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War, and officially apologized for Japan's aggression into neighboring Asian nations. This statement was endorsed at the Diet as the Statement of the Renunciation of War (Fusen Ketsugi). Abe repeatedly said in the Diet that there is no clear academic or legal definition of "a war of aggression," and therefore Japan's war against China was not a war of aggression.[21]

At a press conference on May 13, 2013, Hashimoto Tōru, then Mayor of Osaka, virtually repeated the same claim that Abe was making to discredit the Kono Statement. Moreover, Hashimoto stated "For soldiers who risked their lives in circumstances where bullets are flying around like rain and wind, if you wanted them to get some rest, a comfort woman system was necessary. That's clear to anyone." He also said "The US troops based in Japan today should patronize the local sex industry more, to help reduce rapes and other assaults."[22] Hashimoto was severely condemned

by Koreans as well as many Americans including the mayor and Board of Supervisors of San Francisco, a sister city of Osaka.

In fact, Hashimoto's statement created a huge scandal throughout the world. In addition, the US government also criticized Abe's negative comments on the Kono and Murayama Statements. It is almost certain that this swinging political mood concerning the comfort women issue changed Abe's public stance again, motivating him to claim that his position is different to Hashimoto's, and that he feels sincerely sorry for former comfort women.

On May 17, 2013, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Japan adopted by the Committee at its 50th session. In this report, the Committee recommended that "the State party take all necessary measures to address the lasting effects of the exploitation and to guarantee the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by 'comfort women.'" The Committee also recommended that "the State party educate the public on the exploitation on 'comfort women' so as to prevent hate speech and other manifestations that stigmatize them."[23]

On May 31, 2013, the UN Committee Against Torture issued a special recommendation to the Japanese government specifically on the issue of comfort women. The Committee condemned the Japanese government for repeatedly ignoring recommendations made by many other UN human rights mechanisms including the Human Rights Committee and requested the immediate implementation of the following five administrative measures. The Japanese Government should:

(a) publicly acknowledge legal responsibility for the crimes of sexual slavery, and prosecute and punish perpetrators with appropriate penalties;
(b) refute attempts to deny the facts by the government authorities and public figures and to re-traumatize the victims through such repeated denials;
(c) disclose related materials, and investigate the facts thoroughly;
(d) recognize the victim's right to redress, and accordingly provide them full and effective redress and reparation, including compensation, satisfaction and the means for as full rehabilitation as possible; and
(e) educate the general public about the issue and include the events in all history textbooks, as a means of preventing further violations of the State party's obligations under the Convention.[24]

Abe and his cabinet members decided to ignore both recommendations, claiming that Japan has no obligation to adopt them because those recommendations have no legal binding force.

Growing "Comfort Women Bashing" Promoted by Abe and His Supporters

In July 2013, the LDP led by Abe won a landslide victory in the election for the Upper House of the Diet, resulting in complete control of both the Lower and Upper Houses by the LDP. This led Abe to believe that he now had absolute power to adopt any policies that he wanted to introduce. Again he began working hard to discredit the Kono and Murayama Statements and visited Yasukuni Shrine, ignoring US government advice not to do so. In addition, he introduced the Protection of National Secrecy Law (Tokutei Himitsu no Hogo ni kansuru Hōritsu), and began trying to change Japan's Constitution to fully remilitarize the nation.

In October 2013, Abe appointed many of his own friends, who share the same nationalistic ideas, to influential official positions. For example, Etō Seiichi, an LDP parliamentarian who has supported Abe's nationalistic campaign for many years, was appointed aide (*hosakan*) to the prime minister; Professor Yagi Hideji, former president of the APNT, became a member of the Education Rebuilding Council (Kyōiku Saisei Jikkō Kaigi); Momii Katsuto, former Deputy President of Mitsui Trading Company, took on the directorship of NHK; and Hyakuta Naoki, writer, and Hasegawa Michiko, a professor of sociology, both ultranationalists, were appointed to the NHK board. At his first press conference after taking up his position as head of NHK, Momii defended the nation's use of wartime comfort women and dismissed press freedom concerns about the new state secrets law.[25] Hyakuta publicly stated that the Nanjing Massacre was a fabrication designed to cancel out US atrocities such as the firebombing of Tokyo and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[26] Hasegawa still believes that Japan's emperor is a divine being, and she has referred to feminism as "pathogenic germs."[27]

Partly because of strong public criticism of the statements made by Momii and other people who were appointed by Abe to senior positions within governmental organizations, and partly because of rapidly growing right-wing support, Abe and close associates such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide probably thought that it was now time that they should completely discredit the Kono Statement and begin work to

replace it with an Abe Statement. For some time, they prepared the Abe Statement to be issued in August 2015 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War.[28]

To this end, the Abe government made an announcement in February 2014 that it would review the Kono Statement, by examining testimonies given by former Korean comfort women that were used in its drafting in 1993. At the same time, however, in an attempt to avoid further criticism, particularly from the US government, it was announced that the Abe cabinet would retain the Kono Statement as the Japanese government's official statement on the matter. This was a clear contradiction: on the one hand, Abe and his colleagues claimed they would maintain the Kono Statement as national policy, yet on the other hand, they were virtually trying to blacken it.

As expected, the review of the Kono Statement, which was published in June 2014, states that testimonies given by former Korean comfort women and used to draft the statement were not substantiated by other evidence, leading to the claim that they do not by themselves verify the fact that women were forced to become sex slaves. Overall the report attempts to give the strong impression that, due to political pressure from the Korean government at the time, the Japanese government accepted those testimonies as evidence of sex slavery despite their doubtfulness. In other words, it slanders former comfort women as liars. In this way, it is clear that the report was written to support the stance of the Abe cabinet on this issue by deliberately ignoring many other relevant official documents that were utilized to draw up the Kono Statement. The review report is in fact a complete fabrication and a grave insult to the victims of Japan's military sex slavery.[29]

Moreover, the report also praises the Asian Women's Fund program, which was initiated under the Murayama cabinet in 1995 and operated for ten years between 1997 and 2007. The aim of this fund program was to compensate former comfort women with 2 million yen per person. Yet, because the Japanese government was reluctant to acknowledge full responsibility for military sex slavery, the government provided only the administrative costs of running the program, and the actual compensation fund was raised through donations from the private sector, in particular public workers' unions and private corporations.[30] Furthermore, the Japanese government under the cabinet of Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who succeeded Murayama as prime minister in January 1996, tried to use payments under this program as a bargaining chip to persuade some former

comfort women who were taking legal proceedings against the government in the Japanese courts to withdraw their complaints. Because of the halfhearted and politically motivated nature of the funding program, many former comfort women were reluctant to accept compensation, demanding that the Japanese government acknowledge full responsibility and provide the entire compensation sum. The result was that the program failed, particularly in Korea. Yet, the review report claims that, despite the program's general success, it was not very successful in Korea due to sabotage by NGOs supporting former comfort women and the uncooperative attitude of the Korean government.[31] In this way, the report again criticizes Koreans and fails to objectively self-analyze Japanese government conduct in this matter.

By defaming the Kono Statement in this way, the Abe cabinet invited further criticism of Abe's policy from international organizations such as the UN Human Rights Committee. In July 2014, this committee issued Concluding Observations on Japan's human rights issues, in which the way the Japanese government deals with former comfort women was severely condemned. It states in part, "The Committee is also concerned about re-victimization of the former comfort women by attacks on their reputations, including some *by public officials* and some that are *encouraged by the State party's equivocal position*."[32] It is regrettable that Abe and his supporters do not realize how badly they are damaging Japan's reputation by conducting a "comfort women bashing" campaign in this way.

On August 5 and 6, 2014, *Asahi Shinbun*, which in addition to being one of the largest national dailies, is regarded as the most progressive newspaper in Japan, unexpectedly ran a series of articles on the comfort women issue. In this, *Asahi* admitted that, among the numerous articles on the comfort women issue, it has published so far, 16 articles published between September 1982 and March 1997 were based on false testimony from a man called Yoshida Seiji. In 1983, Yoshida published a book entitled *My War Crimes*, in which he claimed that he was responsible for abducting 205 Korean women from Jeju Island in May 1943 to make them serve as comfort women. He attracted much media attention at the time and gave public talks at various places in Japan and Korea in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was not only *Asahi* but also other major newspapers including *Sankei*, *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* that published similar articles based on Yoshida's testimony. By early 1992, however, some historians and journalists began to notice discrepancies in his talks and cast doubt on his claims. Consequently, by the late 1990s, all the media

stopped using Yoshida's testimony as a source of credible information, having noticed that Yoshida was making false testimonies to seek media attention and make money as a result.[33]

Asahi's sudden public admission of its mistake 17 years after ceasing to use Yoshida's testimony is very strange. It is even more curious that the *Sankei*, *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* newspapers, as well as a few popular weekly magazines, severely condemned the *Asahi* for fabricating stories of the abductions of Korean women to make them sex slaves. They did so while pretending that they themselves had never used Yoshida's testimony in their own reportage on the comfort women issue. Several right-wing politicians took advantage of this affair, saying that *Asahi*'s fabrication disproved testimonies by former comfort women who claimed that they had been coerced into becoming sex slaves against their will, and that consequently the Kono Statement should be discarded. Abe also criticized the *Asahi*, alleging that due to its serious error false information on comfort women had been circulated worldwide, giving many people a completely wrong understanding of comfort women.[34] It is also strange that there were very few reports that Yoshida's testimony was never used as a source of information for producing the Kono Statement.[35] It can only be surmised that this whole affair criticizing *Asahi Newspaper* was an attempt to gain political control and to manipulate the Japanese media, the final aim being to discredit the Kono Statement yet again.

During this politically motivated campaign against the *Asahi*, some right-wing organizations began intimidating retired *Asahi* journalists who had written articles on the comfort women issues, using telephone calls and e-mails. One of these retired journalists, Uemura Takashi, has been hired as a part-time lecturer at Hokusei Gakuen University, a private university in Sapporo City, for the past several years. Hokusei Gakuen University also received many phone calls and e-mails demanding Uemura's immediate dismissal from his post. Intimidating blackmail also featured, with threats to bomb the university and attack students. This was despite the fact that Uemura did not use Yoshida's testimony at all to write his articles. Strong demands from many concerned citizens that it does not bow to such terror threats; the university eventually decided to continue to employ Uemura, retracting its initial decision to discontinue his employment from the following academic year.[36]

In addition to "comfort women bashing," racial harassment, in particular the so-called hate speech and demonstrations, against Korean residents in Japan by extremists has been increasing for several years now. Despite

repeated warnings on this issue by the UN Human Rights Committee, the Japanese government has not taken any serious countermeasures, instead stating that "freedom of speech" is guaranteed by Japan's constitution and law. Clearly, the "comfort women bashing" movement promoted by Japan's prime minister and supported by his fellow politicians and right-wing nationalists is now seriously endangering Japan's democracy.

Japanese Social Formation Based on Hegemonic Masculinity

According to an opinion survey conducted by a local TV channel three weeks after Osaka mayor Hashimoto's controversial statement in May 2013, 4929 of 6392 people (i.e., more than 70 percent) said that they did not have any problem with the statement.[37] Although it is not clear how many women were among the 4929, it is astonishing that the majority of people did not regard Hashimoto's sexist and misogynistic statement as offensive and disgraceful. Indeed, it is quite surprising that not only men in general but also the majority of women in Japan do not think that the comfort women bashing phenomenon vigorously promoted by Japan's prime minister and his colleagues is reprehensibly sexist and misogynic.

It is vital to examine Japan's social formation in order to comprehend why such discriminatory ideas and sociopolitical systems against women are still maintained despite the modern and advanced outlook of Japanese society.

According to the Global Gender Gap Index 2013, Japan ranks 105th out of 136 nations surveyed by the World Economic Forum. The Index is "the gap between men and women in four fundamental categories: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival and Political Empowerment." Japan's ratio of female legislators, senior officers and managers ranks 106th out of 136. Its ratio of women in parliament is 120th out of 136. Currently, the number of female parliamentarians in the Lower House of the Diet is only 39 out of 480, or about 8 percent. Such statistics make it unsurprising that comfort women bashing is rife in the male-dominated Diet.[38]

Although Japan introduced an Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1986, women's wages are currently 70 percent of men's wages for the same work. The number of female workers certainly increased after the introduction of this law, although two-thirds of women workers are so-called non-regular employees, many of whom are in fact part-time workers. The annual income of 40 percent of Japanese female workers is below 2 million

yen (about US$20,000). One-third of unmarried Japanese female workers in their teens and twenties, that is, 1.1 million young female workers, are so-called under-class workers, with an annual income of below 1.14 million yen (US$11,400), which is less than half the Japanese average income. Shockingly, 57 percent of Japanese single mothers with a child or children under 19-year-old are in this "under-class" category.[39]

After Japan's "bubble economy" burst in the late 1990s, many companies started hiring "non-regular employees" in order to curtail labor costs. Now 40 percent of all Japanese workers, in effect more than 20 million people, are so-called non-regular employees, without fully protected workers' rights. Seventy percent of these 20 million workers are women. Female workers, particularly young, unmarried women or single mothers, cannot survive unless they have two or three non-regular or part-time jobs.[40] Yet, Abe's government is planning to further deregulate the labor market so that Japanese companies will be able to exploit the labor of "non-regular employees" more easily.

Many young single mothers are victims of domestic violence, popularly known as "DV" in Japanese. Due to the stress caused by prolonged, deep economic depression, the number of DV cases has been rapidly increasing in Japan for a number of years now. According to statistical data produced by the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office, the Center for Supporting Victims dealt with 68,000 DV cases throughout the country in 2008. This figure increased to more than 89,500 in 2012. The number of children suffering from severe psychological problems due to violence committed by their fathers against their mothers is also on the increase. In 2013, a total of 8059 such cases were reported to police throughout Japan. This figure of reported cases seems to be the tip of the iceberg. Many DV victims struggle to survive due to the lack of a financial support system for such women. Increasingly, therefore, these women become sex workers to support themselves and their dependents.[41] According to a recent report on an NHK TV news program, some so-called escort agencies offer childcare facilities to sex workers with small children.[42]

As mentioned above, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law was introduced in Japan in 1986. Yet, by implementing this law, most Japanese companies demanded that female workers fit the male paradigm and comply with the same demands made of male workers. This ignored the needs of women with families, thereby preventing them from continuing to contribute in a positive manner. Essentially, in fact, the new law did not change the patriarchal Japanese system, but instead reinforced it.[43]

Although the Japanese traditional employment system has gone through tremendous changes in the last few decades, the majority of people still generally hold the traditional belief that men should support women, and that women should devote themselves to domestic work. It is often said that gender ideology among the younger generation in Japan has been rapidly changing in recent years, yet in reality it seems that the popular idea of gender roles still remains as it has always been. According to a survey conducted by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and published on March 8, 2014, shortly before International Women's Day, on average Japanese women spend five hours a day doing unpaid (domestic) work, while their male counterparts spend an average of only one hour two minutes. This is the greatest disparity of all the OECD member nations. Norway is the best, where women spend three and a half hours and men spend three hours a day on unpaid work.[44]

Traditional gender ideology continues to be reinforced in popular culture as well. For example, feature films with themes of Kamikaze pilots or other types of suicide attacks are extremely popular, and almost every year a few such films are produced and screened throughout the country. The format of such films is typically that of a young hero being forced to die on a suicidal mission, knowing full well that Japan will lose the war anyway. He overcomes his fear of death, rationalizing his act of self-annihilation as an act of love for his mother or girlfriend. The deaths of such young men are thus romanticized and at the same time exploited to enhance nationalism. The underlying message to both male and female viewers subconsciously cultivates the idea of hegemonic masculinity—that men are actively engaged in dominating others and women should passively accept such behavior as natural. Women appear not to realize that they are in fact accepting discrimination unquestioningly.

It is astonishing that several popular weekly magazines widely read mainly by businessmen and other male workers include large, full page, erotic pictures of nude women every week. *Shukan Gendai* (*Weekly Today*) and *Shukan Posuto* (*Weekly Post*) are the two most typical examples. The former is the second most popular weekly magazine in Japan, with a weekly circulation of 580,000 copies. *Shukan Posuto* has the fourth largest circulation of 467,000 copies per week. In addition, many Japanese men read weekly manga magazines, some of which regularly feature violent sexual scenes. Of course, pornographic magazines are published in many countries, but the volume of popular weekly magazines in Japan—equivalent to *Time* or *Newsweek* in the English-speaking world—yet publishing

erotic female images in each issue seems extreme. Moreover, the fact that Japanese people, including women, do not think it offensive is astonishing. It seems that, to some extent, even women accept Japan's hegemonic, masculine social situation as normal. It should also be noted that it is *Shukan Gendai* and *Shukan Posuto*, in addition to *Shukan Bunshun*, which regularly run highly racist, anti-Korean articles. These publications, together with other major newspapers, which claimed that comfort women were not sex slaves but prostitutes, were responsible for the above-mentioned campaign against *Asahi Shinbun*.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that it is not possible to make crucial changes to the existing political situation concerning the comfort women issue simply by criticizing the policies and attitude of Abe and other nationalist politicians who maintain an ideology of hegemonic masculinity. In order to really address this issue, it is essential to break down the foundation of the contemporary Japanese social formation, which persistently sustains and reinforces the socioeconomic structure and ideology based on hegemonic masculinity. To achieve this goal, all Japanese people, both men and women, need to be educated in new gender ideology, based on the universal philosophy of the real equality of individuals, regardless of sexual identity.

As an initial step toward this goal, I propose to promote civil movements which demand the introduction of a quota system into Japanese politics. This kind of social reform is essential in order to properly reflect women's voices in politics and to make our society gender-equal. More than one hundred nations worldwide have already adopted the quota system in their election systems. Norway is probably the most advanced nation in this sense, as it stipulates by law that at least 40 percent of parliamentarians must be women. In Germany, both the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party voluntarily introduced the quota system for the selection of their candidates, thereby increasing the number of women politicians.[45] Initially we also need to demand that all Japanese political parties adopt a voluntary quota system for selection of candidates. If this were successful, it would naturally lead to the introduction of the quota system in local and national parliaments. Undoubtedly, this would bring a significant change to Japan's socioeconomic structure and ideology based on hegemonic masculinity.

Finally, I propose that we promote a civil movement demanding new legislation, equivalent to Article 130 of the German Criminal Law (the so-called Auschwitz Lie Law).[46] This would criminalize public statements and publications that deny historical facts of Japanese war crimes, including military sex slavery and the Nanjing Massacre, committed in various parts of the Asia-Pacific for 15 years between 1931 and 1945. We need also to legislate the criminalization of "hate speech" in the same way that Article 130 of the German Criminal Law includes the criminalization of "Racial hatred offenses." In fact, similar laws have already been adopted by France, Spain, Portugal, Slovakia, Romania, Albania and Israel. In these countries, it is a criminal act to deny not only the Jewish holocaust, but also the Armenian holocaust, as well as any judicial decisions made by the International Criminal Court.

This proposal would be extremely difficult in the current political climate in Japan. I propose to request nations in the Asia-Pacific, in particular Korea, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and many Pacific Island nations that became victims of Japanese war atrocities during the war, to introduce a "Japanese War Crimes Lie Law" in their own nations. I also propose to request these nations to clearly state their "territorial jurisdiction" in conjunction with this law, so that any Japanese citizen, including a former prime minister, who violates this law, can be arrested if he or she visits a nation that has adopted this law. (Unfortunately, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, a person who presently holds an official governmental position cannot be arrested or tried in a foreign country.)

The real aim of such an international movement is not simply to criminalize the activities of falsifying history but to educate people to respect the personal dignity and human rights of war victims. Japanese people, in particular younger generations, who have not been properly educated about Japan's war responsibility and have little opportunity to access the relevant knowledge, should be given an incentive from outside Japan to think about such important issues.

Notes

1. Many feminist scholars and activists are critical of the expression "comfort women," claiming it evokes the false impression that these women provided a voluntary service. Moreover, they say, the term masks the sexual and violent aspects of the system. I agree that it is an official euphemism

and should be replaced with the more accurate "Japanese military sex slaves." However, as the term "comfort women" has been widely used by historians for the last few decades, I, too, have used it in this chapter, although I share the view that it is clearly a euphemism.

2. Many publications on the issue of the so-called comfort women have appeared in Japanese, Korean and English. Some of the major English publications on this topic are: Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War*; Yoshimi, *Comfort Women*; Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the US Occupation*; Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan*.
3. Author's translation; original at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/kono.html
4. Ibid., emphasis added.
5. Tawara, "Kyōkasho mondai to uyoku no dōkō," 162–68.
6. Tawara, "Abe shushō no rekishi ninshiki no raireki o saguru."
7. Tawara, "Kyōkasho mondai to uyoku no dōkō," 168–75.
8. Ibid.
9. "Kyōkasho kentei kaitei unagasu seifu kenkai ni motozuku kenkai ga nai."
10. For details, see VAWW-Net Home Page (http://vawwrac.org/nhk01).
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Yamamoto, "Jūgun ianfu mondai no keii."
15. Thirty-six young Dutch women including Jan Ruff-O'Herne were forcibly taken from internment camps in the Dutch East Indies and put into comfort stations in Semarang in 1944. The Japanese officers who were responsible for this so-called "Semarang comfort women incident" were tried at the Batavia Temporary Court Martial in 1948. As a result, Army Major Okada was sentenced to death, and 11 others were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 2 to 20 years. The Japanese translation of the proceedings of this trial is available in Kajimura, Muraoka and Kasuya, *Ianfu kyōsei renkō*.
16. Yamamoto, "Jūgun ianfu mondai no keii."
17. Tokudome, "The Japanese Apology on the 'Comfort Women' Cannot Be Considered Official: Interview with Congressman Michael Honda."
18. "Shinzo Abe's Double Talk."
19. "President Bush and Prime Minister Abe of Japan Participate in a Joint Press Availability."
20. "Text of a resolution."
21. "Shushō shinryaku no teigi sadamatte inai Murayama danwa ni karami tōben."

22. "Japan WWII 'Comfort Women' were 'necessary'—Hashimoto".
23. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *Concluding observations on the 3rd periodic report of Japan*.
24. UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Japan.
25. "NHK Momii shin kaicho jūgun ianfu doko no kuni ni mo atta."
26. "Bei Hyakuta Naoki-shi hatsugen hijōshiki Tōkyō saiban hihan ni hanron."
27. Hasegawa, "Kyū-jo kaisei no jitsugen ni wa josei no yakuwari ga jūdai."
28. Partly because of political pressure from the US government and partly because of strong criticism from neighboring Asian nations, in particular Korea and China, in his actual statement of August 2015 Abe could not deny the historical existence of the Japanese military's sex slave system and thus briefly touched on this issue yet avoided expressing a serious apology. See his statement: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html
29. Kōno Danwa Sakusei Katei ni Kansuru Kentō Chiimu, *Ianfu mondai o meguru ikkan-kan no yaritori no keii*.
30. Toda, "Ajia josei kikin ni kansuru ichi kenkyū."
31. Toda, "Ajia josei kikin ni kansuru ichi kenkyū."
32. UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Japan (emphasis added).
33. For more details, see Tanaka, "Naze *Asahi shinbun* wa kōgeki mokuhyō ni sareta no ka."
34. "Ianfu mondai de Nippon kizutsuketa shushō *Asahi shinbun* ni taishi."
35. Tanaka, "*Asahi* ga shusei shita 'Yoshida Seiji shōgen' wa 'Kōno danwa' sakusei ni wa mattaku tsukawarete inai."
36. Uemura, "Watashi wa tatakau: futō na basshingu ni kusshinai."
37. JCAST News, June 3, 2013.
38. The Global Gender Gap Index 2013.
39. Takeshita, "Josei no rōdō: hinkon no genjō to kadai."
40. "Boshi katei hinkon no haikei shinguru mazaa 100 nin chōsa;" Fujiwara, "Boshi katei setai no hinkon to gakureki."
41. Sudo and Miyamoto, *Fujin hogo shisetu to baishun, hinkon, DV mondai*.
42. *Close Up Gendai*, broadcast on January 28, 2014.
43. Takeshita, *Josei o katsuyō suru kuni shinai kuni*.
44. "Japanese Men Come In Low on Shared Housework Survey."
45. Quota Project: Global Database of Quotas for Women.
46. Bazyler, "Holocaust Denial Laws and Other Legislation Criminalizing Promotion of Nazism."

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