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BRINGING THE SETTLER COLONY HOME

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

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Decolonization and the French of Algeria

Bringing the Settler Colony Home

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This book is dedicated to my sister, and to my grandparents who lived their own colonial and postcolonial histories

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Introduction

Repatriation and the Republic

In 1978, four years into his term as President of the French Fifth Republic, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing charged legislators with the task of drafting a new law that would "indemnify" the 1.5 million "repatriates," a term, which referred to the French citizens who left the colonies during decolonization. The vast majority, almost one million, were from former French Algeria. The official definition of the repatriate was: "a citizen who either had to leave or who considered it necessary [*estimer devoir*] to leave territories that were formerly under French sovereignty, protectorate, or tutelage."[1] On the day the new indemnities law was passed, Giscard appeared on television to make the historic announcement. Reaffirming his commitment to the principle of "national solidarity," the president proclaimed that he would ensure the Republic's duties to its repatriate citizens and see to it that "justice be rendered to those compatriots who have contributed to the grandeur of France in the course of the past decades."[2] For the repatriates, and for the French of Algeria especially, it was a long-awaited decision.

The French president's decision to embrace the former settlers was a response to the active lobby of the associations created by the repatriates of North Africa, with the most resounding demands being made by those from Algeria. Giscard's advocacy for monetary as well as moral compensation to people who had vehemently defended *Algérie française* and had even formed a paramilitary organization to overthrow the Metropolitan government during decolonization

marked a critical point in the national narrative about France's Algerian past. This book centers on the relations between the French Fifth Republic and the repatriates from Algeria since 1962. As it argues, the evolution in the attitudes with regard to the French from Algeria remains constitutive of decolonization and the forging of the post-empire nation.

The repatriate as a legal status for the French who were coming from the colonies entered the French law books in December 1961, just as France was about to renounce its jurisdiction and sovereignty in Algeria, which France had annexed constitutionally in 1848. The term "repatriate" prior to 1961 was used by government officials to refer to the citizens who had evacuated the newly liberated nations of Indochina, Egypt, and the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, all of which became free from French rule by 1956. It was not until the final months of 1961, however, when Algeria's self-determination had become imminent, that France devised an official repatriate status to include the citizens of Algeria who were expected to leave the soon to be liberated settler colony. But the Repatriate Law as it applied to the French of Algeria stirred heated debates within the French legislature as Algeria was still legally and constitutionally a part of France in 1961. These citizens would not really be leaving foreign soil and "coming back" to their country, as the term implied. They had been living in the French departments [*départements*] in Algeria for generations.

On March 19, 1962, France and Algeria signed the Evian Accords, which made independence all but official; French Algeria was no more. As France readied to withdraw from Algeria, it insisted that the settler citizens stay and become a part of the Algerian nation. As far as the Metropole was concerned, these citizens belonged in North Africa. That summer, however, 750,000 French citizens including 100,000 naturalized Jews and several thousand pro-French Muslim Algerians fled the nationalist takeover and departed for the Metropole. In face of this great exodus, France was now forced to frame the mass evacuation in a way that was consistent with the ongoing narratives about Algeria's decolonization as an ineluctable fact of History as Todd Shepard has explained.[3] The end of French presence in Algeria would be defined purportedly as the restoration of the French nation to an original cultural, and natural boundary.[4] In light of this narrative,

the French of Algeria would be simply returning to their country. The repatriate category stripped the settlers of their colonial origins, and disavowed France's Algerian settler colonial past.

What was striking about Giscard's statement was its break from previous government policies that addressed the French from Algeria. Charles de Gaulle, first president of the Fifth Republic, was unequivocal in his refusal to consider the evacuees from Algeria as casualties of the war or as victims of decolonization. Starting in the 1970s, however, de Gaulle's successors would begin to accommodate and even embrace the national belonging of the once-shunned citizens from the settler colony. In doing so, they began to prop up the repatriates as citizens who were deserving of the nation's respect and gratitude for their contributions to the nation's past grandeur. The chapters that follow explain the significance of this evolution in what I call repatriation politics.

Although Repatriation politics applied to all those who left the former colonies in Africa and Asia, this book examines repatriation politics as it applied to the French who left Algeria. Repatriation politics is seen here as the French government's means to negotiate a post-French-Algerian nationhood, one which must perpetually negate the settler colonial past, find a just narrative behind relinquishing sovereignty in Algeria, while ascribing an innate French identity to colonists and citizens whose national belonging had been otherwise contested if not rejected during the Algerian War. For the Fifth Republic, it was important to strip the French from Algeria of their settler colonial origins and define post-1962 France as the ingathering of previously dispersed citizens. While the first decade of the Fifth Republic shielded repatriation politics from the public eye, later decades saw deliberate efforts to publicize the government's embrace of the repatriates from Algeria. This shift in policy did not lead to any legal alterations to the repatriate category. As this book shows, it was the electoral mobilization of the repatriates and the government's concerns to identify the national belonging of the variety of populations who arrived from Algeria after 1962, which compelled a more positive distinction to be placed on the settlers and citizens from former French Algeria. Inversely, a negative distinction was placed on Muslim migrant workers and their families who had supposedly endorsed independence.

Beginnings

As the Algerian War entered its seventh brutal year, on May 20, 1961, a delegation of French officials sat down to negotiations in the town of Evian with eight members of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), the core representatives of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA).[5] The French Fifth Republic, inaugurated just three years earlier with Charles de Gaulle at its helm, was about to renounce its sovereignty over Algeria. Over the seven years of fighting, the FLN had risen to symbolize the vanguard of Third World liberation movements. France, on the other hand, faced the loss of American financial support and struggled to justify its cause with the newly empowered Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations.[6] In a war that had become a battle for world opinion, what remained for France in 1961 was to formalize the terms of its withdrawal from Algeria and provide a coherent revision to the narrative of French national sovereignty.[7]

To settle the terms of Algeria's impending autonomy, the French delegation affirmed the distinction between their own holistic nation grounded in a shared "spiritual principle" and the Algerian "population," an alloy of different Arabo-Berber ethnic groups and various "minorities."[8] Among the minorities, the French delegates claimed, were the one million "Europeans" who had called *Algérie française* their home and country for generations. "Europeans" in 1961 had come to mean the "non-Muslim" citizens in French Algeria, comprising 900,000 white colonials of mixed European descent known otherwise as *pieds noirs* or "black feet" a term used by Metropolitans to conjure up the soiled feet of poor whites,[9] and the 120,000 naturalized Jews of mainly North African but also various mixed European backgrounds.

The French delegation insisted to the GPRA that these "Europeans" should be allowed to share in the destiny of Algeria after independence, and that the FLN must install all adequate measures to "make the European minority feel that they are members of the Algerian people."[10] The FLN could express only incredulity at the sanguine attitude of the French. After seven years of extreme violence that cleaved large sections of the Muslim and European populations into two hostile camps, few in Algeria could have imagined that the Europeans would stay. But the French government's concerns were directed elsewhere; the main goal was to disown these citizens and

leave them behind in Algeria. As the negotiations at Evian showed, the citizens of the settler society, once considered living embodiments of a multi-continental sovereignty "from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset," had suddenly become redundant to both decolonizing nations.

Prior to the mass exodus, one deputy, Alain Peyrefitte, who would soon be Minister of Repatriates, suggested partitioning Algeria and creating an ethnic enclave for the settlers. Peyrefitte's argument was that the loss of the colonists' European character over generations had tainted and diminished their Frenchness, distancing them from the true French "stock" (*de souche*) of the Metropole:

> The French in Algeria were like the English of the Antipodes: neither English nor Australian, nor New Zealander; they had of necessity acclimatized to the colonized lands for long periods much like the autochthonous populations they encountered in these lands. The Europeans in French Algeria are a singular people, and like the Boers, New Zealanders, and French Canadians, will ultimately be more at home in Algeria than in *Europe*.[11]

At Evian, Algeria and France both agreed that the splitting apart of a unified jurisdiction into two distinct sovereign polities meant that an individual could only be *either* Algerian *or* French. For the FLN, the Europeans were extraneous to their nation, as they shared neither the customs nor language, nor the social consciousness of the Algerian people. The French responded that the Europeans, with their attachment to Algeria, would stay in Algeria, eventually take on Algerian nationality and share in the country's destiny. But in making such claims, the French delegates implied that the Europeans' attachment to Algeria made them more Algerian than French. It no longer mattered to France that all the European colonists and Jews in Algeria had possessed French nationality since the nineteenth century. What mattered was that these citizens were out of place in the post-empire conception of nationhood in France whereby Metropolitan lineage had become essential to identifying the French stock [*de souche*].

The European settlers and Jews were not only French nationals, but they had also received French schooling and served in the French military in Algeria. Having avoided inter-ethnic marriages with Muslim North Africans, settlers had retained their European lineage and Jews their communal cultural identity. Although the vast

majority of settlers traced their ancestries to Spain, Italy, and other Mediterranean countries other than metropolitan France, so did a large number of their compatriots north of the Mediterranean.[12] The Algerian Jews, too, were French citizens since 1870, and had stayed committed to *Algérie française* throughout the War of Independence. They consistently declined Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's invitations to join the Jewish homeland, even though many had suffered through anti-Semitism in Algeria and subscribed to the Zionist cause in the wake of World War II.[13] In essence, for Metropolitan officials, to be French meant one could no longer claim Algerian and settler colonial origins.

While the cease-fire negotiations were still underway, politicians in Paris weighed in on why the Europeans should remain in independent Algeria rather than come to continental France. Alain Peyrefitte maintained that Europeans in Algeria were not really "French of French stock [*de souche*]" as were the people in the Metropole.[14] What this Frenchness consisted of was never explained, but only implied, as Peyrefitte placed emphasis on the connection that all individuals have to the physical environment of their country, most notably the soil. These colonists of Algeria did not have connections to Europe or to metropolitan France in ways that would make them sufficiently and truly French, according to Peyrefitte.[15] The foreign ancestries of the European Algerians were not the sole cause for concern, however. He presumed that "even those in Algeria who were [of French stock]" would face difficulties if they tried to assimilate into the Metropole. They had no personal ties to Europe and no attachment to the European environment and ways of life.[16]

The mass departure proved Metropolitan officials wrong. In 1964, the *de facto* refugee crisis that unfolded with the exodus of 1962 was compounded by the arrival of over 75,000 harkis, the Muslim Algerian soldiers who had fought on the French side during the War of Independence. The harkis had been abandoned by the French on the eve of the Evian talks but were brought over to France after 1962 with the help of the French military. For government officials, the mass migration of the French from Algeria could not but signal multiple failures in their overall political approach to decolonization, including the plans to leave the French population intact in Algeria. It also undermined French efforts to discredit the FLN's declarations about Algeria as a country of Arabic-speaking Muslims, and forced the

French to recognize the flaws in their own claim that the Europeans in Algeria were too attached to their country to come to France. After the Algerian War, few on the European continent wished to dwell on the memories of the brutal conflict. The arrival of the pieds noirs was especially worrisome for many because of the paramilitary organization of the OAS [*Organisation de l'armée secrète*] and its violent tactics to derail the French withdrawal from Algeria and remove President de Gaulle from power.[17]

For the French in the Metropole, the encounter with the citizens from Algeria was to confront a bygone empire and discomfiting French past. These displaced citizens from Algeria appeared even more foreign to metropolitans than the Portuguese and Italian workers who were arriving at this time in large numbers, even as they shared the same Mediterranean backgrounds.[18] The Jewish citizens were even more unfamiliar to Metropolitans, as most Jews had North African ancestries with only remote European ties. The French Algerian Jews were descended from Berber and other indigenous North African converts who had mixed with Iberian Jews since the seventh century, Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain during the Inquisition,[19] Levantine merchants who had mediated trade between France and North Africa prior to the French conquest, and a small number of Ashkenazic Jews from eastern Europe.[20] A much smaller number of Muslim notables from Algeria who arrived alongside the settlers and Jews and who were often leaders of tribal villages were not always westernized in their dress or lifestyle. Finally, the harkis, who arrived in France soon afterwards, were perceived through the unnerving lens of the war. In Paris, the name "harkis" was associated with the auxiliaries recruited by the Parisian police to track the movements of FLN sympathizers among the tens of thousands of Algerian workers in the capital. In a city deeply divided over the validity of the Algerian War, their presence had often met with disdain.[21]

The arrival of these communities in 1962 therefore presented the government with an impossible dilemma: how would France, having claimed that the partisans of *Algérie française* would not be able to assimilate in the Metropole, now admit that they were in fact French? The massive displacement and relocation of the settler colony came during what Maxim Silverman and others have described as the post-World War II "Europeanization," of France, which extended to the political, economic, and cultural spheres of national reconstruction.[22]

Fourth Republic and Fifth Republic officials reinforced France's European identity, history, institutions, political orientation, human composition, and geography, to claim a civilization whose epicenter lay squarely within the European continent. The French transposed this Europeanizing project onto the decolonization of Algeria, insisting that Algeria was not French because it was, in essence, a North African entity with a culture and history that were entirely different from those of France.

As historians have noted, the politics of returning France to its European and Republican heritage met with critical challenges as migrant workers arrived from the former colonies during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Most recently Émile Chabal and others have noted that the postcolonial crisis of Republican unity in France was most keenly felt in the 1980s because large numbers of immigrants from the former colonies had settled with their families in France, igniting anti-immigration sentiment throughout the country. This hostility would hit a high note with the headscarf affair in 1989, when two schoolgirls were expelled for wearing their "veils" or *foulards* to school.[23] But as this study argues, it was in fact the earlier arrival of the citizens from French Algeria, with their diverse ethno-cultural backgrounds, who first profoundly challenged French self-understanding and Republican nationhood after World War II.

By April 8, 1962, one month after the signing of the Evian Accords and just three months before Algeria's independence, all of the non-Muslim citizens leaving Algeria were officially received as "repatriates," The Repatriate Law would be applied to the harkis retroactively in 1965. The category stripped the settlers and Jewish citizens of their Algerian heritage, glossed over the controversy of their displacement, and veiled over the government's failure to emerge out of the Algerian War as a fully unified nation with Algeria intact. Repatriation policy, which in principle applied to all the French who "came home" from the colonies during decolonization, carried the most urgency with respect to the French from Algeria. The forced imposition of the "repatriate" status, by obscuring the unintended outcome of its politics of decolonization in Algeria, allowed the Gaullist government to manage and categorize this population to keep them under the state's supervision. The displacement of Algeria's settler society would also import all the complexities of its ethno-cultural hetero-

geneity and tensions into the Metropole, and bring with it the failure of assimilation and the unattained promises of French civilization.

The three decades that followed the initial application of the Repatriate Law first to the pieds noirs and Jews, and later the harkis, remained mired in the project of detaching these citizens from their settler colonial past. But in the end, this project was unsuccessful. The Fifth Republic's post-1962 national identity has turned on squaring multiple conflicting narratives aimed at making repatriation possible: that the French from Algeria were compatriots coming home, that France was culturally unified as a European nation, and eventually, that these citizens were innately French because they had shown consistent allegiance to the French Republic even if they were in need of the state's help and guidance to become fully French. The consequences of Repatriation policy on French politics over the long term were profound. Repatriation long after the repatriates "came home" resulted in intractable contradictions in the post-empire French narrative: that Algeria was not France, but that the French from Algeria had been and were in fact French; that they needed to become even more integrated, and later, more appreciated and compensated as French citizens, so that repatriation as a policy must always continue, serving to pursue the ultimate goal of achieving Republican unity.

As each successive post-1962 government tried to force a predetermined French lineage on the colonial migrants as repatriates, the more those citizens sought recognition of their adhesion to the Republic *and* their Algerian origins; the more the government treated them as a distinct "repatriate" sub-group within the French polity, the less their Frenchness and full assimilation seemed realizable. But as immigration especially of North Africans increasingly raised fears of a splintering Republican nation in the decades that followed Algerian independence, the government began to claim that the Algerians in France were rejecting Republican values, while the opposite was true for the repatriates from Algeria. The latter came to take on a more positive presence as wrongfully neglected citizens deserving of recognition and respect. The essence of the postcolonial predicament and the Republican *dis*unity of France lie here; that is, in the ever un-assimilable liminal space occupied by the French Algerian repatriates in the decolonizing Republic and the persistent ambivalence surrounding Algeria in the French national narrative. What repatriation politics ultimately shows is

that decolonization, in the sense of confronting the Algerian past as a colonial past, remains incomplete.

This study differs in significant ways from the important contributions made by historians, and most notably by Todd Shepard to the field of French decolonization. The fact that it covers a much longer period is crucial. By tracing the longer evolution of this specific strand of repatriation, this study shows that repatriation has evolved as a means to rewrite the Algerian past in collaboration with the repatriate communities. This study also engages with the voices of repatriates. Their role in continuing repatriation politics has been central. Together with repatriates from Algeria, the French state after 1962 began to impose a taxonomy on all the various communities from Algeria, placing the interest of repatriates in contradistinction to the burdens brought on by the non-repatriate, Muslim Algerians in France. French Muslim repatriates and immigrants of Algerian descent were viewed differently according to their distinct relations to the Algerian War. Over the years, the government has considered the integration of these different populations in contrapuntal ways, so that the integration of repatriates, including the harkis would always be regarded as a moral obligation while the integration of the intractable "immigrants" would be seen as an extension of French benevolence. French immigration policy especially as regards those of Muslim and Algerian descent after 1962 must therefore be understood in conjunction with repatriation politics.

This study does not address the mechanisms and logistics of putting these repatriation policies into practice. Rather, it is about the philosophy behind the policies and the ways in which such policies enabled the obfuscation of the colonial past. In that regard, this work differs also from the recent contribution made by Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, though his impressive analysis of repatriation policies has provided support for the arguments in this book.

Summary of chapters

The first chapter presents a brief history of the French in Algeria. It explains the settler colonial context in which French identity was forged in Algeria among Europeans and Jews. The use of the term settler colonialism throughout the chapter might raise questions for historians of French decolonization since the term colony was used

by French officials to refute Algeria's French status. Algeria's departmental status has made it difficult for historians to conceptualize the colony beyond its legal identity. But Algeria was both French and a settler colony. As the first chapter shows, it is only by considering French Algeria's legal identity and settler colonial particularities that we can explain the notions of Frenchness among its inhabitants.

The second chapter is about the final months of the Algerian War when the French in the Metropole and the French in Algeria developed divergent attitudes about Algeria's future. The third chapter shows how the experiences of the Algerian War on each side of the Mediterranean became critical to their differing understandings of France, Europe, and Republican nationhood after 1962. The fourth chapter is about the origins of the Repatriation Law and its evolution in the 1960s and the 1970s. This chapter relates repatriation policies to new concerns about immigration and Franco-Algerian diplomatic tensions.

The fifth chapter discusses Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's repatriation policy. It also highlights the shifts in France's dealings with the harkis under Giscard's presidency. The chapter continues the discussion of how the integration of the repatriates from Algeria remained tied to French post-empire interventions in North Africa as well as to domestic concerns over immigration. The sixth chapter moves from the late 1970s to the 1980s to explain the socialist government's more aggressive measures to restore the repatriates to public favor while it experimented with its own brand of pluralism or "the politics of difference." As the politics of difference attempted to collapse the distinction between Muslim harkis and other Muslims in France, however, socialists came under fire from the right for blurring the line between repatriates and "immigrants." The right wing National Front would see in this a chance to undermine the socialist pluralist project.

The final chapter keys in on the voices of the repatriates as they were expressed in commemorative activities, political rallies, literature, and films. These expressions attest to the repatriates' own framing of their past in ways that were more palatable to a post-empire audience. The pied noir, Jewish, and harki literary imagination remains to this day a powerful transmitter of social meanings and cultural values that have sanitized the colonial past and have found a receptive audience in France. Such expressions of the settler past have resulted in new and de-politicized interpretations of a troubled past.

A note on terminology

I have used the term Europeans or pieds noirs to refer to the white settlers of diverse European backgrounds who were born and raised in Algeria. During the Algerian War, the term European was the official designation for the non-Muslim population, which included the Jews. I have noted this official usage when necessary. The Muslim population of French Algeria including the harkis are noted as Muslim Algerians. The book uses the term repatriates when analyzing policies and laws that addressed the citizens from Algeria. The book limits the story to the repatriates from French Algeria unless otherwise noted.

1
French Settler Colonialism in Algeria

Settler colonial foundations

France was a settler colony in Algeria until 1962. This section provides an overview of settler colonial history in French Algeria, and explains the political and socio-economic setting from which the repatriate protagonists in this story emerged and out of which they forged a settler colonial Frenchness.[1] The significance of this chapter is to show that Algeria's social relations gave way to an understanding of Frenchness that differed in specific ways from that of the Metropolitans.

Historians have shied away from identifying Algeria as a colony because the French government used these terms with the specific aim of undercutting Algeria's French status during the Algerian War.[3] This study places emphasis on settler colonialism as a distinctive set of material and ideological conditions. As an analytic category, settler colonialism conceptualizes the particular political, legal, and economic practices that made the notion of Frenchness in Algeria distinct from that in the Metropole.

By definition, settler societies were historically founded by exogenous migrants whose aim was to establish permanent residence on colonized lands. This desire for permanence inevitably led to the expropriation of land that was already inhabited by a native population. Violence became intrinsic to "indigenous de-territorialization."[4] In conceptual terms, in settler colonialism, as Lorenzo Veracini explains, the migration of the settler to the colony is a "foundational" sovereign movement, for settlers aim to create "a new political

order."[5] Thus the systematic alienation of native inhabitants from the political order was always interconnected with settler efforts to undermine native proprietary rights and access to the land.

In the process of overtaking native proprietorship, the settler polity creates what Veracini calls "two alterities": those migrants of the home country who do not partake in founding a new political order, and those existing inhabitants in the colonized lands who do not autonomously join the settler polity.[6] In the new political order, settlers establish themselves "as normative" while the "subalterities" are defined in distinction to and in interaction with them.[7] From the perspective of the settler, the colonized joins the settler polity, but always "eventually," while assimilation is always set by the settlers as the course toward achieving European standards of normativity.[8] The indigenous people are, in the end, "denied any state-making capability";[9] they are not even indigenous. In displacing the native population and claiming the colony as their permanent home, the settler competes with the native for claims to indigeneity.

In this chapter and throughout the study, the term "settler" designates the non-Jewish European colonists who arrived in Algeria during the nineteenth century, as well as their descendants. The Jews in Algeria who were originally placed in the category of "natives" alongside Muslim Algerians, were absorbed into the settler polity in 1870, but only those living north of the Sahara. The Mozabite Jews in the Sahara were made French only in 1961.[10] The civic membership of northern Jews was the result of initiatives of elite members of the Metropolitan Jewish consistory, but and once naturalized, Jews eventually became advocates of the French Algerian framework and benefited from the same civil status and rights as their European counterparts. Conceptually, however, they cannot be identified as settlers as they did not arrive as exogenous agents for the purpose of colonization. The experiences of Jews in Algeria as "both colonized *and* colonizer" distinguished them from Europeans and from the Muslim population.[11] To allude to the whole of the French non-Muslim community, the chapters will thus use the phrase "settlers and Jews."

In Algeria, the goal of eradicating Muslim Algerian presence was never fully attained by the French. The Muslim population remained resilient in their numbers throughout the colonial period despite decades of brutal wars and massacres. The Muslim population even

surged in the years that followed World War II. The desire to uproot and remove the indigenous people was not absent in Algeria,[12] and as was the case with other settler societies, the contest over land became determinant in the relations forged between colonizing settlers and Muslim Algerians throughout the colonial period. The desired aim of extermination in Algeria was hampered by several factors. Arab and Berber resistance forces led formidable battles against the invading French army until 1847, while resistance in the Kabyle continued until the 1870s. The force of the French military alone was insufficient to displace the entire Muslim population. Entrenched tribal ownership of the land made expropriation a more protracted process. In addition, Algerians proved immune to pathogens from Europe that in other colonial contexts had razed indigenous populations.[13] This failure to eradicate the Muslim population led to a constant demographic asymmetry in Algeria, which settlers saw as a permanent source of danger and threat to their security. In fact, French Algeria's entire economic and political history could arguably be conceived in terms of this numerical imbalance in favor of the Muslim population and the challenges this posed for the settler society in maintaining hegemony.

In settler colonialism, the founding of a new political order is also attended by a push to attain autonomy from the Metropole, with some colonies ultimately founding sovereign "successor states," as Anglo-settler societies did in the United States, Canada, and the Antipodes.[14] The settlers' relations with the Metropole are thus always ambivalent, since they

> occup[y] a place caught between two First Worlds, two origins of authority and authenticity. One of these is the originating world of Europe, the Imperium – the source of its principal cultural authority. The other First World is that of the First Nations whose authority they not only replaced and effaced, but also desired.[15]

In Algeria's case, although efforts were made intermittently to expand settler self-governance, movements for greater autonomy faced difficulties due to the settler society's ultimate dependence on French jurisdiction for political legitimacy. The geographical proximity of Algeria to France and its administrative ties to

the government in Paris made it difficult for settlers to imagine a complete break with Metropolitan France. But as with other settler societies, the French in Algeria deeply resented Metropolitan intervention, and tensions with the government in Paris persisted as an endemic feature of French Algeria's history. Such tensions would intensify during the interwar period when the settler community fought off reforms proposed by the leftist Populist Front in France. Clashes with the Metropole would reach their apogee during the Algerian War as settler vigilantism turned into seditious uprisings and violent confrontation with Metropolitan authorities, as we will see. A brief overview of the settler colony's history is in order, to give context to the development of French Algerian identities.

Colonization through civilian settlement in Algeria followed on the heels of the 1830 conquest of the Ottoman *beylik,* first with the invasion by the Restoration monarch Charles X (1815–1830). The constitutional July Monarchy (1830–1848) put forward civilian settlement as a means to stabilize control over confiscated lands. The goal was to implant French civilization and help displace the backward and stagnant customs of the Arabs.[16] As Alexis de Tocqueville put it in a report written while he served on a government commission, Algeria would ideally "resemble [France] in everything."[17] In 1848, the Second Republic, which succeeded the July Monarchy, formally incorporated Algeria as three French departments: Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. But jurisdiction over land did not cohere with jurisdiction over all of the inhabitants in the colony, and Muslim and Jewish peoples were subjugated under the pernicious *Code Indigénat*, which deprived them of all rights and allowed the French courts to deliver punishment to non-Europeans for any slight infraction considered injurious to the Europeans.

Metropolitan transplants were the first colonists in Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, but immigrants from the Mediterranean regions of Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece soon surpassed those from the Metropole in number, so that by 1850, more than half of the 483,500 European colonists living in Algeria were from countries other than France, as Jennifer Sessions has found.[18] Although French officials at this time encouraged the settlement of farmers who would cultivate small family plots with government subsidies and concessions, the majority of Metropolitan transplants were manual laborers and

wageworkers who preferred the towns to the farms.[19] Newly arrived Europeans from Spain, Italy, and other parts of the Mediterranean also flocked to the towns and worked as small-scale entrepreneurs and shopkeepers.

The failure to make Algeria a colony of virtuous farmers was also owed to the difficulties of climatic variation and the unfamiliar character of the soil, which made agriculture exceedingly challenging. In the late nineteenth century, the increased circulation of American and Asian grains on the global market adversely affected Algeria's exports, even with its exclusive access to the Metropolitan market.[20] Many settlers sold off their plots and headed for the urban areas. By the early twentieth century, it was only the capital-rich large estate owners who could sustain the risks of farming in such a dry climate. They survived as the primary landholding class, while most colonists became urban denizens and self-labeled *gens modestes*. It is not uncommon to find in the many pied noir memoirs written after 1962 a strong emphasis on their humble and even impoverished backgrounds in Algeria.

Class division within the settler society coexisted alongside the ethnicization of labor in Algeria. Algerian farmers who were pushed off the arable lands became the main source of cheap labor in the colony. And as only a small number of Europeans remained on the land, Algerian agriculture remained dependent on native labor.[21] This dependency on Algerian labor resulted in a vertical wage scale that placed higher value on European work than on work done by Muslim farmers. Specific types of work were reserved exclusively for the Europeans and denied to Muslim workers. This was especially true in viticulture where the division of labor was clear-cut along ethnic lines. By 1911, wine production was the principal source of wealth in Algeria, valued at 44% of the total European assets in the colony.[22] While "delicate vineyard work" such as was given to Europeans brought them better pay,[23] Muslim Algerian workers were restricted to the unskilled tasks including such work as "breaking the soil, hoeing, and deep plowing, or to seasonal work, such as harvesting the grapes."[24]

The ethnic differentiation in wages and work was also found in the urban areas. In nineteenth-century Bône in the department of Constantine, for example, in addition to the large industries such as

mining, Europeans owned a variety of smaller urban industries such as cork, tiles, bricks, and pottery.[25] If the history of colonial Bône was any indication, Muslim entrepreneurship in the cities in Algeria was limited at best to local eateries and small shops that sold mainly foodstuffs and daily necessities requiring almost no capital investment.[26] The ethnicization of labor in Algeria thus reinforced the perception among Europeans that Muslim Algerians were unskilled, uneducated, idle, and only able to carry out the most menial tasks.[27] Textbooks during the interwar period drew comparisons between Europeans and Algerians according to such socio-economic markers as occupation. Even as the colony was represented as a harmonious community of Europeans and Muslims, the educational literature insisted on the "vast cultural void" and economic barriers between the two worlds.[28]

Labor relations were indicative of settler colonial social relations, but it was the contest over land that most profoundly shaped settler colonial policies and relations with the Muslim population. Even though the conquest of Algeria failed to completely eliminate the Muslim occupants on the land, the expropriation of land was still carried out in much the same spirit as other settler colonies where native inhabitants were forcibly removed with treaties and extra-legal transactions intended to make room for colonists. As France began to establish ownership of conquered lands during the mid-nineteenth century, it became necessary to formalize the procedures of land transactions through official transfers and exchange of titles in recognition of France's victory and right to the spoils of land. The structure of land ownership in Ottoman Algiers was highly complex, however, and invading French forces were often at a loss as to how to identify the deeds and titles to the land that could verify its exact status. Frustrated by the difficulty of distinguishing between privately owned land and public domain, French administrators forcibly convened claimants to present their titles at certain times and places, so that absence from these proceedings would result in the automatic conversion of unclaimed lands into public domain liable to seizure.[29]

In the 1860s, systematic efforts were underway to assimilate remaining lands inhabited by Arabs into the French land tenure system. The Sénatus-consultes of 1863 and 1865 were the

byproducts of this era. These two laws established new rules about the status of Muslim subjects and their relationship with France. The double-sided aspect of the laws; that is, the continued confiscation of land and the administration of legal identities for Muslim subjects, is significant, for it spoke to the dual purposes of Algeria's settler colonialism – the assimilation of land and the legal subjugation of peoples who inhabited that land. The 1863 Sénatus-consulte achieved a major step in uprooting the Muslim population and detaching them politically and legally from the land. It did this by allowing communal lands previously regarded as indivisible to be fully subject to French tenure laws. As historian Patricia Lorcin rightly contends, systematic sequestration began in earnest with the 1863 Sénatus-consulte.[30]

The 1865 Sénatus-consulte, on the other hand, provided Muslims or Jews categorized as *indigènes* with eligibility to apply for French civil status on the condition that they renounce their adhesion to religious customs, Qur'anic and otherwise. That is, they were forced to pay allegiance to the French Civil Code in exchange for legal status and rights. Few complied. According to the 1865 Sénatus-consulte, "Muslim or Jewish *indigènes* who wish[ed] to possess the rights of French citizenship … could submit a request and declare that [they] are willing to be governed by the civil and political laws of France."[31] Todd Shepard explains this 1865 law as an "assimilationist" measure, which effectively expanded the purview of French jurisdiction by co-opting local customs and Islamic practices related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance under French jurisdiction.[32]

The settler colony in Algeria was thus comprised of two different legal regimes that, while they "coexisted," also reified the binary division within settler colonial societies: the indigenous population who had previously inhabited the land, and settlers who sought to establish exclusive proprietorship over this land. With the passing of the Sénatus-consulte, Jérôme Napoléon, Minister of Algeria and the Colonies declared that the idea was to "expunge the foundations of social organizations. The tribe must disintegrate in order to become assimilated into our organization … It is the means, the only means at our disposal to undermine tribal cohesion and to divest it of all political functions, to substitute it with our own municipal order."[33] This view was held widely by French administrators as a maxim.

If the Sénatus-consultes began the sequestration of lands in earnest, then laws devised during the 1870s under the Third Republic accelerated the process, this time with the forceful intervention of the settlers. With the founding of the Third Republic in 1871, colonist representatives came to wield considerable influence in the Chamber of Deputies. Most had supported the 1848 Second Republic and its official policies of colonization, and were thus given broader representation under the new Republic. In other words, settlers considered themselves Republican as they allied with the participants of the Revolution of 1848. In 1871, settlers from Algeria held six seats altogether in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The French deputies of Algeria had contested the 1865 Sénatus-consulte's granting of rights to Muslims and also opposed the 1870 Crémieux Decree, which granted Jews full rights as citizens.[34] Settlers could not undermine the decree, but in 1873, they lobbied successfully to pass the eponymous Warnier Law, named for the leader of the colonist parliamentary delegation. This law was meant to appease the disaffected settlers who had opposed extending the right to apply for citizenship to the Muslim Algerians as provided by the 1865 Sénatus-consulte. The 1873 Warnier Law redefined the terms of land ownership so that individual families were made the unit of title-bearers, and not the traditionally designated tribal leaders. Enormous tracts of land were thus converted into individual property holdings for sale and transfer into settler hands.

During the interwar period, the French Third Republic made several attempts to extend rights to Muslims. In 1919, the Jonnart Law allowed some Muslim Algerians over the age of 25 the right to vote in restricted local elections.[35] In 1936, the Popular Front government proposed the Blum-Viollette Act to extend rights to the Muslim populace without their having to relinquish their customary Qur'anic status. Settler opposition was strong enough, however, that the Metropole decided not to have the Chamber of Deputies put it to a vote.[36] Towards the end of World War II in 1944, the Provisional Government of France or GPRF reaffirmed Algeria's integral place in greater France and granted some 65,000 Muslims full citizenship rights without requiring the renunciation of their affiliation with Islam.[37] Consequently, the French Union established by the Fourth Republic's constitution in 1946 to encompass the Metropole and all overseas territories indicated that cultural assimilation was no longer

the principle behind naturalization for Muslim Algerians. And yet the low number of the enfranchised among Muslims signalled the limitations of such gestures to guarantee equal membership in the settler polity to the colonized populace.

Despite the removal of certain restrictions on the acquisition of French citizenship, namely the renunciation of religious affiliation and adhesion to Qur'anic customs, political representation for the majority Muslim population remained within limited bounds after 1946. The French Union, which comprised France and its overseas territories maintained the divided electoral colleges in Algeria. In the elections of 1946, over 500,000 citizens, mainly European but also a small number of naturalized Muslim citizens, voted in the first college, while 1,600,800 Muslims of "local customary status" voted in the second college, with each college electing fifteen members to the National Assembly in Paris. The electoral college in Algeria remained split until 1958, when the newly inaugurated Fifth Republic declared all Algerians full French citizens, "who could maintain their civil status, in Algeria as well as in the metropole."[38] France had finally assimilated Algeria.

1958 complicates the analytic conception of Algeria as a settler colony. Settlers and colonized subjects were no longer separated by their legal statuses after 1958. But 1958 was in fact a last-ditch attempt by the newly established Fifth Republic to maintain French presence in Algeria. The abrupt decision to give full French status to all Muslims could hardly repair the deep antagonisms that had separated the European and Muslim communities for generations, nor could it eradicate a nationalist movement determined to push for full independence.

Settlers conceded to the granting of full citizenship to the Muslim population in 1958 as a compromise. But the legal assimilation of Muslim Algerians hardly altered settler perceptions of the Muslim majority or their understanding of French Algeria's history. Historically, the violence that permeated settler societies was always doubled. Conquest and expropriation unfolded alongside settler struggles to establish a stable community in a hostile and alien environment. In settler narratives, the confiscation of land is therefore transposed from the experiences of invasion and conquest to collective survival and resistance against native resistance. In settler narratives, the violence of colonial conquest or warfare against native

inhabitants is gradually suppressed, while the trauma of settlement is selectively retained as the main topos of collective memory. Conquest is considered as that which preceded their arrival to the colony.

For the French in Algeria, Muslim Arab resistors were themselves historically a colonizing force, having oppressed and conquered the Algerian Kabyles classified as Berbers, who were considered European by lineage. The settlers thus emerge as claimants of land that had been wrongfully usurped by Arab conquerors, and settler history is redeemed through the struggles they faced in reinvigorating the soil, which had remained barren under the backward Arab conquerors. In settler narratives, the Muslim population brought on their own marginalization by rejecting French civilization and assimilation. In French Algeria where the Muslim population retained constant numbers throughout the colonial period, the settler narrative was all the more persistent in undermining Muslim claims to the land. For the French settlers in Algeria, the withdrawal of sovereignty in 1962 would thus signify the relinquishing of a birthright and the right to a homeland.

Jews in French Algeria

The movement to make Algerian Jews French was spearheaded by Adolphe Crémieux, Minister of Justice in 1870 and one of the leading figures of the Paris consistory, the primary lay Jewish organization founded by Napoleon Bonaparte. The movement to assimilate Algerian Jews had its beginnings in 1842. Two prominent members of the Marseilles consistory, Joseph Cohen, president of the consistory and his younger colleague Jacques-Isaac Altaras toured Algeria and reported back on the condition of Jews after the 1830 conquest.[39] The report stated that the Jewish community in Algeria had been living for centuries under the "vengeful yoke of the Arabs."[40] Altaras and Cohen added that Jews, "unlike the Moors," did not oppose civilization, "but rather sought to quench the thirst that resulted from their losses to the French."[41] Altaras made a case for the Jews in Algeria, by way of the community's potential to vitalize the colony's economy. The French had destroyed existing commercial networks, introduced complicated fiscal laws and a customs and patenting system, and had imposed expenses on necessities unknown to Jews prior to the arrival of the French. Altaras claimed that whereas the "Moors" showed only

"laziness" and hostility, the Jews adjusted by moving towards various forms of investments and concessions. Civilization then, for the consistory, was defined as a measure of economic ingenuity. Alexis de Tocqueville's aspirations for a market economy in Algeria where the nexus of "humanity and the budget" would be entwined to create a common interest among the French and the Algerians, could not have found a better group to validate such an experiment.[42] Altaras concluded that it was France's duty to respond to the economic perspicacity of the Algerian Jews.

Jews were in need only of a *patrie*, according to Altaras and Cohen, for if they should have a *patrie*, their true worth and contribution would be better demonstrated, a fact the two rabbis claimed had already been proven in other European lands:

> Sentiments and passions are not abstract or immutable. They need the nurturing of concrete forces in order to develop; civil and military courage come from love of the *patrie*, this noble instinct of the soul is what allows men to connect to the soil where they can exercise their civic life… the armies of Holland and Belgium are teeming with Jews. Poland roused an entire regiment whose bravery was remarkable. Our Republic, as with Italy, could demonstrate with pride, the noble and valorous soldiers born within the bosom of the Jewish faith.[43]

Altaras and Cohen then described the benefits to be gained in assimilating Jews in Algeria. As interpreters and important mediators in negotiations, learned Jews were argued to be indispensable.[44] For the two Metropolitans, the degree of Jewish assimilation in Algeria could already be measured by the willingness of Jews to distance themselves from the Muslim population; Algerian Jews were also first and foremost Jews, and should not be compelled to abandon their religious identity. Far from it. Crémieux believed that "Jewish difference" was necessary for the vitality of the community, and made them in fact worthy of becoming civilized French citizens.

It was not religion that prevented their assimilation, stated Altaras, but rather the everyday habits and customs imbibed through life in an Arab land that prevented their Europeanization: "Their assimilation is manifest in the smallest details. Already in a great number of homes, they have adopted European style furniture and amenities mixed with

indigenous furnishings."[45] Different cities were seen to have varied in their degree of Europeanization and assimilation. Altaras argued that Algiers was the most assimilated, then Bône, Philippeville, and Oran, and finally, Mostaganem. The "Israelites" of Constantine were still deeply marked by Arab culture,[46] but the majority of Jews were gathered in Oran and Algiers. Altaras thus asked, "in the state of this tendency that we have seen among the Israelites towards a complete fusion of [indigenous and French] customs and habits, why should France continue to sustain a difference in civil status [for Jews]?"[47] Algerian Jews showed a willing accommodation to modern ways of life. All that remained then for Altaras was the modification of certain tendencies in their practice of Judaism.

For a people so worthy of civic assimilation, their religious life could hardly be left to backward traditions, Altaras argued. Altaras and Cohen argued that Judaism in metropolitan France was superior to the primitive, dogmatic, and uncivilized Judaism in Algeria, which conjured the Hebraic practices of medieval Europe – "a school where individuals fought ardently over the most futile propositions."[48] Altaras insisted that no rabbi in Algeria was remotely able to give Jews "the powerful impulse necessary in the époque of transition."[49] Superstition was prevalent among the masses, Altaras wrote, and the rabbis had only to exploit the grievances of the masses to move them further toward it. What qualities in fact then constituted the proper form or civilized method of Talmud scholarship was never explained, but was only implied as the opposite of superstition. France must, he argued, complete its civilizing mission of Algerian Judaism as it had of Judaism in France, and remove elements that might inhibit evolution toward a properly civilized religious culture. Altaras claimed that, "it is the duty of a great nation such as France, to bring to life the flame of civilization so as not to leave in our midst, religious judges who are armed with blades repugnant to our social mores … And just as barbaric arms of torture were removed from the tribunals of ancient ecclesiastics, so should the same instruments be eliminated in Algeria."[50]

Jewish naturalization in Algeria was finally successful, not because of the deep desires and forceful petition of the community, but because the metropolitan Jewish elite was interested in fostering a particular brand of secular Jewish culture throughout France including French Algeria. The legal assimilation of Jews did not ingratiate them with the European community, however, and anti-Semitism remained

endemic to Algerian society.[51] Jews in Algeria thus retained a highly ambivalent understanding of what it meant to be French.

Settler colonialism on the eve of the Algerian War

In 1960, according to the statistical bureau of the Governor General's office, there were approximately 1,039,597 European and Jewish French citizens who called Algeria home. The number of Jewish French citizens in Algeria alone was somewhere between 100,000 and 120,000 in 1960.[52] By the time of the Algerian War, "Europeans" became a commonly used term for settlers and Jews though few Jews referred to themselves as European. This one million "non-Muslim" population (settlers and Jews) was predominantly urban. Of this one million, 855,900 lived in the 55 most populated towns in Algeria in 1960.[53] But in most cities, the Muslim population still made up the majority. In Algiers proper in 1960, for example, there were 326,800 Europeans and 628,100 Algerians. In Oran, 217,800 Europeans lived among 260,300 Muslim Algerians, while the commune of Constantine was overwhelmingly Muslim Algerian, with a ratio of 363,600 Muslims to only 39,900 Europeans.[54]

The cities were profoundly segregated, however – if not by spatial separation, then by wealth and occupation. The majority of Europeans and Jews kept to the more amenable and wealthier quarters, while Muslim Algerians lived in the crowded and impoverished areas. In 1960, the same statistical bureau studied the composition of each district or *arrondissement* in Algiers and identified a strong correlation between levels of wealth, sanitation, and urban amenities in each district and their ethnic composition. Central-Algiers, for example, was home to approximately 44,040 European and Jewish residents and only 6,500 Algerians. The Casbah on the other hand, a densely populated and impoverished sector in Algiers, housed 103,084 "Muslim" residents and just 21,160 "non-Muslims."[55] The French Algerian journalist Henri Alleg had noted in his memoirs that the main thoroughfares and terraces, cafés, bars, and other public gathering sites in Algiers were rarely frequented by Algerians.[56]

> It wasn't like in the South African cities where postings indicated that natives were not admitted but if an Algerian should venture there, by ignorance or to provoke, people would let him know

> very quickly – and brutally if the Algerian should protest – that he was not welcome there and that it would be better for him not to insist otherwise.[57]

On the eve of the Algerian War in 1954, statistics also showed that the majority of European and Jewish males throughout urban Algeria worked in small businesses and had independent professions, while only a minority, about 2000, worked in agriculture. According to the 1954 report of the *Annuaire statistique*, there were 8,228 settler and Jewish liberal professionals, including doctors, lawyers, and teachers in the three largest communes, while 12,022 were manual craftsmen [artisans] who might also have owned their own shops. These figures would remain consistent until the end of the Algerian War. Meanwhile, upper-level functionaries numbered about 13,090 in these communes, while the number of lower-level subalterns was 14,200. Office clerks and desk workers who were not considered liberal professionals also accounted for a high proportion of urbanite European men, numbering approximately 23,265. Another large grouping of salaried workers was "non-manual skilled employees," numbering about 20,416.[58] Police and army employees numbered 12,464. It was relatively less common for women to work outside the household. Those who did so mainly worked in secretarial jobs or as clerks. Women of the lower class were domestic workers, the number amounting in 1960 to 7,271.[59]

In 1960, there were 9,042,597 Muslim Algerians throughout the municipalities of Algeria (the sum total of Muslim living in both municipal and rural areas was approximately 10,196,740).[60] The overall standard of living among Muslim Algerians was significantly lower than that of most Europeans. In 1954, only 773 of the approximately 9 million Muslim Algerians were elite functionaries, for example. The overall statistical analysis showed a complete inversion of the corresponding number of Europeans in all occupational categories. Of the Muslim Algerian women who worked, 40% were domestic workers.[61] The statistics showed that a significant number of Muslim Algerians worked in salaried positions. Over 207,400 out of the 374,309 Algerian males counted in the census were considered regular "wage earners." The category of wage earners is misleading, however, since it included such disparate income groups as desk workers and manual laborers. According to the fieldwork data gathered by the *Maison des*

sciences de l'homme, the percentage of European agricultural workers in 1960 earning between 50 and 100 francs a month was only 1.7%, whereas over 62% of Algerians earned a monthly income that fell below 100 francs, and more than a third of these made less than 50 francs a month.[62] To get a better sense of the poverty implied by a 50-franc-a-month wage in 1960, we can compare it to the wage earned by a European cleaning woman (one of the most impoverished groups of settlers) four decades earlier in 1921 – approximately 80 francs a month, the salary earned by Albert Camus's mother.[63] We can extrapolate from these figures that only the poorest working class settlers (both industrial and agricultural) would have had frequent social interaction in the workplace with Algerians.

During the late 1950s, the young ethnologist Pierre Bourdieu conducted studies on the network of human relations that dictated the boundaries of social mobility for "Europeans" and "Algerians." The differences he focused on had less to do with the huge gap in living standards than it did with the types of everyday human resources accessible to "Europeans" (including Jews) as opposed to most Muslim Algerians:

> The importance placed on personal relations must be understood in reference to the general conception of human relations held by both Algerians and the French of Algeria. Everything unfolds as if one is trying always to convert bureaucratic, impersonal relations into personal and direct ones… the solidarity of "caste" gives them positions of authority… all Europeans can resituate approximately every other European in a social category at least equivalent to their own. The personalization of relations imposes the least favorable categories on Algerians, but it is the only protection against an order into which they are thrown unarmed, without any possessions.[64]

Allocation of social welfare, which did not require personal connections, was also decided in favor of European and Jewish citizens over Algerians. When Camus's father died, for example, Camus's mother became eligible for an annual financial subsidy of 800 francs. Also, as children deprived of a father, young Albert and his brothers received free medical visits, scholarships, and other subsidies that were not accessible to the majority of Muslim Algerians who might have found

themselves in similar situations.[65] Unemployment was much more common among Muslim Algerians and on average, each Algerian household supported a higher number of family members. According to a study carried out by the political group, the Club Jean Moulin, the total level of unemployment among agricultural workers in Algeria in 1954 was approximately 147,200, out of which 133,100 were Muslim.[66]

What Bourdieu's study showed was not just a socio-economic disparity between the privileged class of citizens and the majority of native Algerians, but also the impact this disparity had on the social relations between Europeans and Muslims on the eve of the Algerian War. As one Algerian cabinet-maker explained in an interview with Bourdieu, "The European is preferred here ... for us, unemployment is natural; for the European, it's a scandal that anyone would stand for it. The administration and other Europeans do everything they can to help find him something."[67] Said another grocer in Sidi-bel-Abbès, "My father had a dozen hectares of land. And who took it from him? It was the *colons*." A worker in a bakery in Saïda concurred, "There is no equality ... A Muslim landowner asks for 200,000 francs from a bank, he gets 40,000. A European who rents asks 500,000 francs and gets the entire sum. The government has to help the peasant [*fellah*]."[68] In the end, for Algerians, the world they lived in offered few opportunities, and only limited access to human and material resources unless they belonged to the upper echelons of the Algerian elite.

The restricted expansion of citizenship for the select 65,000 Muslim elites in the 1940s hardly altered such sentiments. Even as most settlers recognized that changes were needed to appease the Muslim population and improve their situation in order to divert their attention away from nationalist influences, they could not imagine reforms that would uplift the Muslim population from misery and deprivation. Instead, they were preoccupied with the threat posed by Islam on a largely illiterate population. In 1952, the Governor General's office requested the chief administrator of each commune in Algeria to prepare reports on the general outlook of the population in their districts.[69] According to the local administrators, religion was the main fuel behind popular passions and discontent toward Europeans. The reports distinguished between an anodyne Islam, reclusive and pious, on the one hand, and the popular Islam practiced by most

Algerians who were uneducated and prone to radicalism. An administrator in the arrondissement of Orléansville wrote that, "for the people, [Islam] is mixed with superstition. [Islam proper] is better understood and practiced only by a few cultivated members of the elite, loyal to their culture and to the Muslim civilization."[70] Another report from the arrondissement of Blida located south of Algiers stated that, "the Muslim population is very much attached to their religion but they possess only elementary and confused notions of the dogmas and precepts of their faith, and were thus easily swayed by nationalist propaganda." As argued by one mayor from Touggourt: "the extremist parties try very hard to use this solidarity of Islam to position the masses against us, and it is beyond doubt that if they are guaranteed this weapon, it would be most dangerous for us."[71]

On the other hand, representatives perceived the traditional Islamic brotherhoods of the Marabouts and Zawiyas [*Zaouias*] to be indifferent to politics, and thus an important asset to the preservation of French authority in Algeria. Their teachings supposedly maintained a level of order, a "tranquil" effect on the population.[72] According to the mayor of Isahnounene, a mixed commune, "the presence of a Zaouia whose role is strictly religious has built a moral reputation amongst the local population."[73] The pious orders were not antagonistic to the West, as one administrator in Djelfa emphasized: "The Marabouts do certainly represent a static form of Islam, but this attitude has allowed them to remain aloof of the anti-French trend of the Orient, which for us constitutes the most immediate danger."[74]

The religious group that invoked vigilance in the eyes of settler administrators were the reformist Ulemas [*Oulemas*] because the movement endeavored to wed Algerian identity to Islam and the Arabic language against the incursion of French culture.[75] The Ulemas were also often seated near the more populated towns. Mostaganem and Relizane near Oran were just such towns. They established "circles" [*nadi*] which, according to one administrator, was always the first sure step to the creation of schools aimed at religious proselytizing. Administrators were highly suspicious of the *nadi* because Muslim schools had become legal in 1948, and had provided the Ulemas sites in which to exercise their influence without interference from authorities.[76] According to the administrator in Fedj M'Zala in the department of Constantine, the Ulemas were utilizing mosques for "intense proselytizing," thus alienating the more pious Marabouts

and Zawiyas.[77] Wrote the official in Fejd M'Zala, "the European has the impression of being encircled by a hostile Ulema network. The European knows that in the classes on the 'cult of the Koran', the [Ulemas] often provide tendentious interpretations."[78] They were held responsible for introducing a "fanatic Islam," and "exacerbating the gulf between the two civilizations."[79] The commissariat of Bordj-Bou-Arreridj near Sétif in western Constantine was more direct in holding the Ulemas accountable as the main nexus through which other nationalist groups connected and spread, whether it be the UDMA (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto) under Ferhat Abbas, considered a more moderate leader, or the PPA (Algerian Populist Party) under the more radical Messali Hadj.[80]

Most officials were agreed that it was the educated middle class, or *classe moyenne* of Algerians, "that would decide the fate of French presence in Algeria." In the communes, they held positions just below the elite families, and were "small scale merchants and artisans," or "lower tier functionaries, subaltern officers, and small scale property owners," one administrator from Mascara near Oran proclaimed. They were "the armature of this country."[81] Most often francophone in their schooling, they were interested in maintaining a certain standard of living in the municipalities. Within each commune, explained an administrator of La Soummam (east of Algiers),

> a political core exists, centered around local notables, [and the middle class of] farmers, merchants, industrialists, and functionaries, who divide among themselves the elected positions in the local administration. They are the members of the *Djemmas*, members of the administrative councils, jurists in the criminal courts, etc … All of them speak French; some possess a high level of education. They shape public opinion.[82]

It was above all the rural youth that seemed to settler officials the most volatile, impressionable and vulnerable to infiltration by anti-colonial propaganda. They were the uneducated population, apparently easily swayed and "too ill equipped to distinguish the differences between doctrines of diverse separatist (nationalist) groups."[83] The paradox of sustaining popular trust, however, was to use a "show of force," officials lamented.[84] "Even the smallest weakness is quickly

exploited" by the Algerians, wrote a municipal council member from Taguercift in the upper Sahara. The restoration of the French government's prestige and to act with a mixed policy of "paternal authority, solicitude, and justice" were commonly stated objectives.

Hardly any of the settlers in 1952 were willing to acknowledge the successes of separatist propaganda. They argued that if the French instilled order in rural areas, the popular following of nationalist movements would be short-lived or at least remain superficial. "70 percent of the masses are not interested in political struggles," said one military commander in Touggourt.[85] But as one administrator admitted in El-Golea (an oasis in the Sahara), the hostility and suspicion with which the rural masses regarded Europeans had made for a difficult situation. The French could only influence the hearts and minds of the local population through the local elite.[86] Some attributed the discontent among the Muslim population to material deprivation, but the disparity in living standards and wages did not register as outcomes of structural inequity in the colony that could only be remedied at the expense of settler privileges. Those who did acknowledge the economic disparity could not see the organic connection between long-standing effects of economic deprivation and desire for political autonomy. "Algeria's problem is not a political problem … the predominant problem is economic and social. The solution to this will condition all others," wrote one administrator in Aïn-Touta near the Aurès. In a similar vein, another wrote from the mountainous region of the Ouarsenis, southwest of Algiers, that the religious question would be resolved through material benevolence: "There is now little chance of acting directly on the religious and political attitudes of the population … but it is possible for us to carry out an economic and cultural plan … which will bring the [masses] closer to us."[87]

Some administrators believed that increased interaction was key to attenuating nationalist sentiments. More communication and contact had to be opened up between "Europeans" and "Muslims," a Blida administrator answered.[88] Another official in Affreville argued that Europeans needed to show more interest in Algerians and to allow them to participate "in the life of their community [*la vie de la cité*]."[89] A sub-prefect of Miliana explained that, "Muslims must be allowed to live not only in the memory of their ancestral splendor, but in its future, … it is necessary to create jobs and associations

where all people would mix together."[90] But this "mingling" would be restricted to the *évolués*, who would be the bridge between the two communities, commented an administrator from Orléansville.

In general, settler administrators argued for the inclusion of a trustworthy secular Muslim Algerian elite who would convey French interests to the rural masses and repel any nationalist sentiment or hopes for separatism. Few if any within the settler community viewed the Muslim population's inclination towards nationalism as the refusal on the part of the Europeans to deliver on the promises of full assimilation. Already in 1944, eight years before the communal reports were commissioned, Ferhat Abbas, who had until then embraced the full assimilation of the Algerians into the French framework, expressed his disillusionment with France's promises to bring true equality to the colony. On March 14, 1944, Abbas would join forces with the Ulemas and the Algerian Communist Party to form the *Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté* (AML), an organization that professed its opposition to the colonial and imperial French Republic.[91] 1958 had come too late for the settler colony to convince even those moderates who might have accepted the French framework. How the settlers tried to assert their political will as the nationalists gained the upper hand in the Algerian War is the subject of the next chapter.

2
The Algerian War in the Settler Colony

De Gaulle and Algeria

In 1957, after three years of brutal military onslaught in Algeria, the Fourth Republic's socialist government led by Guy Mollet collapsed. Mollet's government had failed to make good on its promise to eradicate the FLN and settle the "Algerian crisis." The settler community in Algeria had grown impatient with the government and now placed greater trust in the military leadership, namely in general Raoul Salan. In the Metropole, opponents in the Radical party, the communists, and right wing Poujadists all pointed to the futility of Mollet's military strategies and the unsustainable strains on the government's fiscal resources. Between June 1957 and May 14, 1958, two prime ministers from the powerful Radical party, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury and Félix Gaillard took office one after the other, but neither was able to stabilize a majority leadership. Finally, Christian Democrat Pierre Pflimlin was approved in parliament as prime minister on May 13, 1958. Pflimlin's nomination, however, sounded the death-knell for the Fourth Republic in Algeria, and the news of his premiership would incite a political sedition in Algiers. Supporters of general Charles de Gaulle and former members of the Resistance had been entrenched in Algeria readying for action to topple the sitting government and bring the general back to power.

Defenders of *Algérie française* were vehemently opposed to Pflimlin's nomination primarily because Pflimlin had favored negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. The nomination was the final straw in the mounting tensions between Metropole and the settler populace

since the founding of the Fourth Republic in 1946. On May 13, 1958, Generals Raoul Salan, Edmond Jouhoud, and Jacques Massu along with the Gaullist and former Governor General Jacques Soustelle who had *de facto* control in Algeria orchestrated a coup in Algiers, seizing the government general's headquarters, galvanizing the pieds noirs into a mass demonstration against Pflimlin on the eve of his investiture.[1] The leaders of the coup called on Charles de Gaulle to save the country and unify Algeria and France once and for all. On May 16, Salan and his core group who had led the coup formed the Committee of Public Safety and took full control in Algiers. During the days following the coup, the generals mobilized the demonstrators into a celebration of fraternity between Europeans and Muslims. In the main forum in Algiers, Salan called out the name of de Gaulle to a euphoric crowd, marking the Fourth Republic's demise. Throughout the month of May, the military and counter-insurgency operatives helped stage multiple "burnings of the veil" in which Muslim women would throw down their veils in fire-pits to demonstrate their defiance against Islamic authority and Algerian traditions while European women cheered them on;[2] France was here to stay.

De Gaulle, careful not to admit to any involvement in the coup, began preparations to seize the reins of government. On May 28, 1958, Pflimlin resigned, and President René Coty signed over extraordinary powers to the general, making de Gaulle interim prime minister. On June 4, the general flew to Algiers. With arms raised, he stood in face of a massive crowd and pronounced the now famous phrase, "I have understood you!" Subsequent events would show that his "understanding" of the French in Algeria did not necessarily mean that he was willing to go to the ends to save French Algeria. But in September of 1958, the settlers remained hopeful: de Gaulle was voted to the presidency with over 80% of the vote in the Metropole, and 96% in Algeria.[3] The constitution of the Fifth Republic was ratified in September through a referendum and enacted the following month on October 4, ceding extraordinary executive command to the new president elect to resolve the Algerian crisis and stamp out the FLN. De Gaulle finally achieved his long-awaited goal of centralizing the executive power in France and diminishing the place of parliament, and was inaugurated in January 1959. The Fifth Republic was thus born out of the ambitions to keep Algeria French.

May 1958 was a turning point for the nationalists also. The FLN, unnerved by the mass rally in Algiers, formed the Algerian

Provisional Government (GPRA) in Cairo and took their struggle onto the world stage, gaining the support of newly liberated nations as well as that of the more reserved backing of the United States. President Dwight Eisenhower had made the decision that the United States could no longer openly support France and remain indifferent to Third World populist movements.[4] In the summer of 1959, the United Nations General Assembly agreed to place Algeria's independence on the October agenda. As the FLN gained ground on the diplomatic front, radical pro-French Algerian contingents led by General Salan continued to form voluntary networks of public safety committees. These committees were in effect the loci of power in Algeria and the sites through which army officers gained influence among the settlers.[5] Settler support for the generals who led May 13 soon became a source of uneasiness for de Gaulle's government. What if the top brass succeeded in capturing Algeria for itself? As historian of the Fourth Republic Georgette Elgey has remarked, de Gaulle was a general without an army ever since he left the government in 1953.[6] No one was more aware of his slipping popularity in Algeria than the general himself. It became urgent for de Gaulle to prevail over the dissenting top brass who wielded actual power and influence in Algeria. And if the FLN could not be eradicated with the help of the French army in Algeria, then the general and his government would have to exert every bit of authority to deal with both.

Approximately six months into de Gaulle's presidency, in July 1959, the first prime minister of the Fifth Republic Michel Debré proposed a new "evolutionary" status for Algeria; "Algeria would acquire its own personality."[7] Debré's plan consisted of new administrative institutions and "reciprocal guarantees" deemed necessary to assure a more tolerant relationship between the settlers and the Muslim community.[8] In August 1959, the general summoned Debré to his private residence in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises to discuss his designs for Algeria. In his memoirs, the former prime minister remarked that his meeting with the general was a turning point in the government's plans for Algeria. The prime minister, a known supporter of *Algérie française*, recounted his surprise at the general's plan to declare self-determination: "I went there ... I remained in his office, our heads locked together for two long hours ... he spoke of his project, which was to have Algerians choose, in a matter of several months if not years, between integration, association, or secession."[9]

As Debré recounted, his pleas to the general to abandon the idea of self-determination were "in vain." A critical issue had eluded de Gaulle, Debré wrote. In giving "Algerians [the right] to choose their own future," the president had apparently lost sight of the fate of one million European settlers in Algeria.[10] From de Gaulle's perspective, however, it was Debré and other supporters of French Algeria who had lost sight of the risk of maintaining French presence. A key factor in de Gaulle's decision was the decline in American support, without which military victories alone would be of little consequence. As de Gaulle saw it, most nations, the United States included, would rather stand behind Algeria's national liberation than behind the interests of the French settlers.

On September 16, 1959, de Gaulle delivered his much-anticipated speech on television and the radio to be broadcast throughout the Metropole and Algeria. In his historic address, the general announced that the time had come to "envision the day when the men and women who inhabit Algeria will decide their destiny freely and knowingly."[11] The speech sent shockwaves throughout Algeria. But for a war-weary Metropolitan public still in the midst of a consumerist boom, the general's policy held strong appeal. De Gaulle's consideration of Algerian autonomy reconceptualized the notion of Algerian "personality" so that it could only mean one thing – a viable and autonomous Algerian entity outside the French framework. Helping Algeria fulfill its "personality" had become a much more honorable cause than supporting the status quo. It would mean the fulfillment of French benevolence toward Algeria. As de Gaulle stated, "[i]n all respects, because it is the nature of things, the future of Algeria will be at once based on its personality and on a close solidarity with Metropole France ... Who if not France could realize this great political, economic, social, and cultural endeavour?"[12] As Todd Shepard has shown, this "natural" course of things would become the core of the French understanding of decolonization.[13] Decolonization had become a "predetermined endpoint," and therefore ineluctable.[14]

De Gaulle proposed three options under which Algeria could attain sovereignty: secession, by completely cutting off all ties with France; complete integration and absorption into France (*Francization*); or a "Government of the Algerians by the Algerians dependent on French aid and in close union with France in economy, education,

defense, and foreign relations."[15] A referendum would be held to decide Algeria's future as a self-determined people constituted by multiple ethnic communities living alongside each other. De Gaulle proclaimed that the Europeans would share the fate of the "Arab, Mozabite [Saharan Jews], and the Kabyle communities in Algeria."[16] Little public mention was made of the fate of settlers otherwise.

Debré's account vividly describes his personal distress over the fate of the European community in Algeria upon leaving his meeting with de Gaulle. For the prime minister, the French community in Algeria was key to maintaining a Mediterranean economic and cultural zone under French influence and out of the reach of Islam: "The importance of the Mediterranean for the economic future and the politics of France required new measures in as much as the influence of a reinforced Islam was expected to exercise at our expense."[17] The main problem for Debré was to convince settlers to make concessions and to delay Algerian autonomy and rally international support for France. For President de Gaulle, settlers had little role to play in containing Islam.[18] At a meeting with his ministers during the spring of 1959, the general fumed at the "humming-bird-brained integrationists" who insisted on maintaining Algeria in the fold of greater France, or *la plus grande France*. He instead argued that, should France succeed in integrating the nine million Arabs, these would then "install themselves in France as if here were their home ... it would be the end of France![19] My town would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises [Colombey of the Two Churches], but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées [Colombey of the Two Mosques]!"[20] For Republican universalism to work, de Gaulle believed, it would have to be uniform in its cultural identity and racial makeup.

For de Gaulle, the prime minister's hope to rally international support against Algerian independence as a delusion. If anything, only by granting Algeria autonomy and acquiring voluntary cooperation from a willing Algerian people, he argued, would France be relieved of the enormous economic and political burdens that came with the Algerian colony. De Gaulle shared the views of contemporary journalists and economic experts who saw Algeria as an obstacle to the internationalization of the French economy. Since the beginning of his presidency, de Gaulle emphasized the future of France as a European economy. From his standpoint, the settler-oriented Algerian markets depended on archaic protectionist measures and diverted French

attention from the European Economic Community or EEC [*espace économique commun*].[21] As the political experts calling themselves the Jean Moulin Club confirmed, Algeria could not survive if one million settlers, or one-tenth of Algeria's population, monopolized privileges at the expense of the economic development of nine million Muslim Algerians.[22] In 1957, the Director of Economic Planning Overseas, Pierre Moussa also published a study relaying the arduous task of maintaining economic equilibrium in the colonies. Unlike most other studies that excluded Algeria from the list of colonies to gauge the ratio of costs to benefits of overseas markets, Moussa included Algeria as an important component in his analysis.[23] Moussa emphasized the overproduction of commodities in Algeria among other colonies that would ultimately make their way to an already satiated French market. Investments in overseas building projects, especially the HLMs in Algerian cities, new roads in the Sahara, and refineries in Oran, did not stimulate the national economy, but in fact continued to overstretch the national budget.[24]

Concerns about the cost of protectionism in Algeria as published in works by political experts gained wider currency during the late 1950s, and de Gaulle himself reiterated these concerns in his famous April 1961 speech in which he declared that "Algeria costs [France] too much," relative to the benefits reaped from maintaining French presence.[25] De Gaulle, like Mendès-France before him, saw decolonization as a necessary choice between reverting to an antiquated protectionist economy on the one hand, and advancing toward open international trade with Europe on the other.[26] What France would lose in Algeria, de Gaulle hoped, would be regained in Europe.[27] The French discovery of precious oil and gas deposits in the Sahara in 1956 initially deterred Metropolitan officials from fully dismissing Algeria's economic importance, but de Gaulle was confident that whatever resources Algeria had to offer would be available to French interests if proper diplomatic strategies were applied. France had, after all, sealed potentially lucrative concessions with the newly independent West and Sub-Saharan African colonies after independence, and for de Gaulle, there was no reason why similar results could not be achieved in Algeria. As part of the Constantine Plan of October 1959, a vast and ambitious five-year modernization plan to restructure the Algerian economy and its administration, de Gaulle placed responsibility for the new initiatives and planning on

young functionaries and technicians dispatched from the Metropole, marginalizing settlers in the management of capital investments.[28] Moreover, a central tenet of the Constantine Plan was to modernize Algeria in ways that would lessen the socio-economic gap between the Europeans and the Algerians, to achieve the "evolution" of the Muslim community, what the Plan called the "internal homogenization of human development." This included the redistribution of 700,000 hectares of land to the Muslim majority.[29]

Although de Gaulle himself was preparing for a radical break with *Algérie française*, prominent officials on the left and the right still backed the continuation of the French framework in Algeria, even if they were not committed to taking action on its behalf. Among those who supported French presence were, most notably, the former Minister Residents in Algeria, Robert Lacoste and Jacques Soustelle, the protagonist of May 13, Léon Delbecque, former Fourth Republic prime ministers Georges Bidault and Antoine Pinay, and members of the *Rassemblement pour l'Algérie française*, organized in the wake of the coup in Algiers.[30] With de Gaulle's declaration of self-determination, the meaning of French grandeur and Republican unity was hotly contested on both sides of the Mediterranean. De Gaulle had a decisive advantage, however: Metropolitan public opinion. With the September speech, the general was about to end the Algerian War and along with it, French presence in Algeria. In doing so, he would disavow the settler colonial foundations of the Fifth Republic.

Vigilantism and popular politics in French Algeria

In October 1955, a national poll taken by the Institute of Public Opinion [IFOP] showed that 49% of the Metropolitan public believed that Algeria's departmental status should be maintained.[31] Dien bien phû and the loss of Indochina had unified French opinion on both sides of the Mediterranean leading up to the Algerian War, which had erupted just one year earlier.[32] In 1956, however, the enthusiasm waned in the Metropole with only 40% responding favorably to the defense of *Algérie française*.[33] Several factors contributed to this decline. Early in February 1956, on an official tour of Algeria, Fourth Republic Prime Minister Guy Mollet confronted an angry crowd of settlers on his way through the city in a motorcade. The Europeans in Algeria were in uproar over Mollet's decision to name Georges

Catroux, a less enthusiastic advocate of *Algérie française*, as Minister Resident in Algeria. Upon sighting Mollet, the angry crowd pelted the minister with rotten vegetables, leaving him drenched in juices.[34] The incident resulted in the replacement nomination of Robert Lacoste who was well known for his sympathies with the French in Algeria. Another factor in turning Metropolitan opinion against the Algerian War, and one closer to home, was the precipitous increase in the military deployment of Metropolitans. Some tens of thousands of reservists were called to Algeria from France in 1956, at a time when so many had previously served tours in Indochina.[35]

In 1954, another controversy provoked heated public debate. The systematic use of torture by the French army during its interrogation of prisoners suspected of aiding the FLN had leaked out to the public. Reports of torture incited vehement opposition among intellectuals in both leftist and conservative camps, and had a profound impact on public opinion in regards to the Algerian War.[36] The controversy over torture intensified during the 1957 Battle of Algiers when first-hand accounts of those subjected to torture were made public. Prominent intellectuals on the left, most famously Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone Beauvoir, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, launched vociferous campaigns against the use of torture, and made explicit the theoretical connections between the abuses of the military and the violence inherent to colonial power.[37] In his trenchant polemic against imperialism, Sartre likened European civilization to the "strip-tease of humanism" and described decolonization as the necessary exorcism of "the savagely rooted settler in each and every one of us."[38] In turn, Pierre Vidal-Naquet publicized the "Audin Affair" of 1957 in which a young math instructor named Maurice Audin known for his FLN sympathies was arrested and then reported missing. Audin had been subjected to torture, the evidence for which came to light in Vidal-Naquet's subsequent writings about the affair.[39] The debate over torture was not enough to turn Metropolitan public opinion completely against French presence in Algeria. It was not until 1961 that the French in the Metropole became openly opposed to continuing the conflict with the founding of the OAS, the armed paramilitary organization made up of settlers and dissenting army officers, as will be seen later.

For the pieds noirs, the military intervention in Algeria had concrete meaning beyond maintaining the French framework. The

full eradication of the nationalist movement was the necessary condition of their self-preservation in Algeria. 1945 had already exposed the risks of delaying action against anti-French rebels. On May 8, 1945, V-Day celebrations in Sétif and Guelma, two towns in the department of Constantine, turned into a bloody conflict between Muslim Algerians, the Europeans, and the French army. During the public march to commemorate V-Day in Sétif, Muslim demonstrators unfurled banners revealing the forbidden crescent and star insignia of the Algerian flag. After an unidentified shot was heard, the police intervened and fired on the crowd, killing several demonstrators. Some of the Algerians took revenge on the settlers living in nearby Kherrata.[40] The retaliation against the Muslims who attacked Europeans was especially ferocious. In Guelma, a town of 4,000 Europeans and 16,500 Muslims, the settler militia took matters into their own hands and attacked Muslim villagers, leaving over 1,000 Muslims dead. For the settlers, Sétif and Guelma became the most recent symbols of Muslim anti-European violence while for the Algerian nationalists, these events marked a point of no return, sure evidence that France would never fulfill its promises of equality and assimilation.

When the Algerian War erupted on November 1, 1954, the memories of Guelma and Sétif were still fresh in the minds of many Europeans. With the eruption of the Algerian War, local militia activity sprouted across the major cities, giving rise to homegrown popular movements that rejected what settlers perceived to be the inertia of mainstream political parties. The agenda of these populist groups was first and foremost the safeguarding of sovereignty [*souveraineté*] in Algeria, a task which many pieds noirs believed the political parties in the Metropole had neglected. Large numbers of settlers began to abandon party affiliations to join the legion of popular groups in Algeria, most of which had no other program than the unconditional preservation of Algeria as a French province.

These organizations began bleeding the Leftist parties in Algeria of their "troops," according to surveillance reports from the Governor General's office. Even the party *dirigeants* barely held on, only doing so for sentimental reasons.[41] In 1957, the PCA [*Parti communiste algérien*] leadership and its rank and file debated the public response the party should give with regard to the FLN. As another intelligence report noted, "the dockworkers and unskilled workers, all of whom

were formerly devoted communists, rejected the party line and were turning out to be the most fervent partisans of *Algérie française*."[42] After the Battle of Algiers in 1957, in which massive numbers of French paratroopers were called in to break the strikes led by the FLN in the capital, populist political groups in Algeria began to exhibit a more radical and even paramilitary streak. As vigilante groups, they attracted a significant following. One prominent group, the *Union française nord africaine* or UFNA, collected 10,000 adherents under the leadership of Boyer Banse. In Oran, the *Volonté algérienne*, touting a similar type of vigilante populism pulled in some 3,000 members. The *Amicale française de l'Algérie* in Bône was weaker but still had 1,000 members. The *Comité d'entente des anciens combattants d'Algérie et du Sahara* was also formed in Algeria in 1955, attracting pied-noir veterans and reserves from the two World Wars. Student groups joined faculty members to form the *Mouvement universitaire pour le maintien de la souveraineté française en Algérie* (MUPMSFA). In fact, enough faculty members had joined that the group came to be known as the "party of professors." They were intent on distinguishing themselves from the *enseignants*, the latter being associated with progressive causes.

These rudimentary grass roots groups had no real platform except to defend "settler sovereignty." They served mainly as arenas for forging personal networks and experimenting with vigilante training. Many were short-lived. But their significance lies less in their success or failure than in the rapidity with which they could recruit members and spread. When an organization split up and disappeared (the most common reason being close police surveillance), others quickly appeared in its wake. Individuals who had founded one vigilante group would often disperse and become founders of new ones. Sometimes the goal was simply to attract police attention, such as the *Organisation de Résistance de l'Algérie française* and the *Comité de Restauration française*. Unlike the paramilitary terror organization of the OAS, which was largely comprised of Metropolitan contingents of the French army, these were neither underground nor paramilitary. Some organizations such as *Jeune nation* and the *Union pour le salut et le renouveau de l'Algérie française* were extensions of pro-*Algérie française* movements begun in the Metropole by high-profile dissenters who sought out local adherents in the colony. The *Union pour le salut* was founded by

former Minister Resident and staunch advocate of French Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, who sought to connect directly with settlers in Algeria through the *Union*. These organizations attest to the willing bottom-up activism among the Europeans who were not part of the OAS.

If settlers did not join vigilante groups, they signed up to join the Territorial Units (UTs), established by Jacques Soustelle at the beginning of the war to mobilize the pieds noirs in reserve units alongside the army. The UTs soon gathered up settler enthusiasts. In 1958, over 35,100 joined the UT in Algiers while 20,500 joined in Oran.[43] What was striking about the UTs, in addition to their numbers, was what happened once they were disbanded (the army had disbanded the UTs on the grounds that they were depleting the male work force in Algeria). Former UT reservists acted as a vigilante force, organizing demonstrations and keeping guard over public buildings and facilities, directing traffic flows, and barring people from getting on public transportation, blockading public roads, and keeping surveillance across crowded public gathering places.[44] They also organized mass strikes, mobilizing 5,000–6,000 workers in Constantine, and held commemorative events honoring the fallen during the battles with the FLN.[45] Even though May 13 ultimately led to the closure of many vigilante organizations, it did not lay popular politics to rest. Those versed in policing and vigilantism actively took up propaganda activities. They broadcast Pétainist slogans harking back to the Vichy National Revolution of God-Work-Family- *Patrie*. Prominent organizations like the *Front national française* (FNF) modeled themselves on Metropolitan right-wing movements such as that led by the Pétainist Pierre Poujade.

The mass gathering at the forum in Algiers on May 13 was possible in 1958 precisely because the settlers were organized into these vigilante groups. These organizations were again revived in the days that followed de Gaulle's September 1959 Declaration. In 1960, when de Gaulle summoned Jacques Massu to Paris and stripped him of his functions after Massu had let slip his misgivings about the general's strategies in Algeria to a German newspaper, massive strikes were called by popular settler organizations in defense of Massu.[46] From January 1960 until the end of 1961, extremists in Algeria along with dissenting pro-French Algerian contingents in the army saw themselves in battle with the Metropole to save *Algérie*

française. In January 1960, the FAF [*Front Algérie française*] led by Joseph Ortiz, a brasserie and bar owner and the General Association of the Students of Algiers [*Association générale des étudiants d'Alger*] headed by a future leader of the OAS Pierre Lagaillarde, launched the "week of the barricades" during which students and activists occupied the University of Algiers and blocked off major thoroughfares in the city. The students at the barricades were removed in a matter of days, but the street battle became a precursor to a series of violent clashes that would erupt between defenders of French Algeria and those soldiers and authorities who answered to the government in the Metropole.

Photo of the barricades of 1960

On December 8, 1960, the right-wing groups in Algeria successfully mobilized large-scale strikes throughout Algiers, Oran, and Constantine during de Gaulle's tumultuous visit through these cities. During his visits, de Gaulle attempted to rally the support of the rank and file of the French army and reassure an incredulous settler audience that France would never abandon Algeria.[47] According to gendarme reports from Algiers, Oran, and Bône, an average of 5,000 people took to the streets in each city to show their opposition to Algeria's self-determination and to the government.[48] The Metropolitans stood in support of de Gaulle's policy. In fact, from 1960 to 1961, it seemed that France was split in two, between its settler colonial population on the one side and the citizens in the Metropole on the other.

French Jews in the Algerian War

The Jewish communities in Algeria were beginning to formulate their own response to the crisis, and the reactions were less incendiary than those of the European settler community. During the first years of the Algerian War, the information reports of the Algerian Jewish committee of social studies or CJAES [*Comité juif algérien des études sociales*], an organization set up after World War II to support Jewish culture and Judaism in Algeria, were, after 1954, peppered with news of "anti-Jewish" incidents by the FLN.[49] The CJAES noted that the FLN was launching grenade attacks in bars and cafés "frequented by Jews."[50] In these reports the FLN was often substituted with the broader category of "Muslim" [*musulmans*], evidence that many Jews were beginning to associate the FLN with the greater Muslim community in Algeria.

Prior to 1956, in cities like Batna in the Constantine department where Jews and Arabs had engaged in active commercial trade with one another for generations, economic activity between the communities continued without much disruption despite the intermittent attacks against Jewish establishments. Judaism in Batna still showed "intense activity" throughout the war and remained undeterred during the first two years of the war. In 1955, Jewish merchants in Batna who were trading in textile, native jewelry, and foodstuffs experienced violent attacks on their stores. And in the wake of a FLN campaign in the region, the CJAES reported that despite "the excellent

relations maintained by Jews in the locality with the Arabs of the region, commerce suffered somewhat due to a boycott imposed by the guerrillas." When the boycott ended, things returned to normal in the community. Batna's Jews apparently perceived the situation with optimism, unlike the Europeans. After 1956, however, reports from the Jewish community wrote warily of the noticeable hostility that had intensified between Arabs and Jews: "the Arabs guarded the same sentiment against Jews as they did against Europeans."[51] Enmity between the two communities seemed to vary depending on the size of the town or city. In small townships where only a few Jews lived, anti-Jewish attacks were reported as being more common, by the CJAES. This was the case in Ain-Beida, Tebessa, Biskra and Khenchela. In the larger cities, Arab-Jewish relations seemed less perturbed. Tlemcen, a city with a large Jewish community, (with 10,000 Europeans, 65,000 Muslims, and 5,000 Jews in 1958), was the only major city, which repeatedly experienced Jewish-Muslim hostility.

From 1954 to 1959, as the Algerian War raged on, Jacques Lazarus, head of the CJAES, remained preoccupied with the diffusion of Jewish culture in Algeria than with the threat of Algerian nationalism. His primary concern was to raise cultural consciousness among the Jews and recruit members to the World Jewish Congress.[52] Lazarus stated with enthusiasm in a report that:

> in each of the synagogues, the call to the World Jewish Congress was read out loud at Souccoth and dozens of subscriptions were collected… The project to create a Cultural Center had been well received and preparations were well underway. A special room was offered by the consistory… we have already sent a series of important books for the library, and we expect to expedite records and to purchase a record player.[53]

In addition, religious education was also looked after as Lazarus placed a *Talmud Torah* and *Yechivoth* at their disposal. Batna at this time was also given a new consistory.[54] Worried that towns with a small Jewish community did not have proper synagogues and rabbis to nurture the spiritual life of Jews, Lazarus noted that "Tebessa has no real spiritual leader… Saint-Arnaud does not have a rabbi nor a consistory, but since they are situated 27 km from? (illegible) once a week, they could receive the visit of a *schohet* (person sanctioned to

slaughter animals according to proper ritual) that would guarantee a ritual slaughter."[55] In Sétif, a town with a relatively active Jewish population but also nationalist activity, it was noted that a Talmud instructor was needed for the children. These and many other similar memos attested to the persistent interest in restoring Jewish education and culture, rather than a focus on Muslim Algerian anti-colonial nationalism.[56]

It was not until 1959, when de Gaulle proposed Algeria's self-determination, that Jewish community leaders began expressing real fear with regard to the future of Jews in Algeria. Their trepidation, however, went beyond the aggressions of the FLN. Jews in Algeria had long endured European anti-Semitism, and 1959 would once again raise anxieties as de Gaulle proposed Algerian self-determination and gave his prognosis for all French citizens living in Algeria. In his 1959 declaration, de Gaulle stated that Jews, Arabs, and the Mozabites (M'zabs) who were Jews without French status living south of the Sahara, were distinct communities in Algeria, living alongside the Europeans. Jews, as de Gaulle proposed, would continue to live with one another in Algeria after self-determination.[57] De Gaulle's mention of the Jews as a separate community from the Europeans once again provoked deep-seated fears among French Algerian Jews. With the FLN now seeking independence, Jews began to assert their adhesion to France and insist upon their French belonging. French Jews in Algeria at this time were still reeling from the memories of the Vichy years and the persecution of Jews. In 1940, Vichy leaders in Algeria had revoked the French citizenship of all Algerian Jews by declaring the Crémieux decree null and void. French citizenship was restored to the Jews in 1942, but only after the World Zionist Organization and American Jewish advocacy groups aggressively pressured the French government and the Allied forces in Algeria to reinstate the Crémieux decree. The restoration of the decree did not completely allay the fears of French Jews in Algeria.

One month after de Gaulle's speech, the representatives of the CJAES met with Delegate General Paul Délouvrier to affirm their integral place in the nation and their equal status with the European settlers. Jacques Lazarus explained to Délouvrier that "in terms of [their] being Jewish," they found themselves in a highly delicate situation, much more than other elements of the population in Algeria: "We

are, as Jews, in a particular situation; we risk being defined by some as natives of this land, and as thus, 'Algerians' rather than French."[58] Throughout the Algerian War, the CJAES made consistent effort to publicize Jewish adhesion to France as well as Jewish support for French presence in Algeria even as Jews maintained their position as a minority with a distinctive cultural affiliation. The CJAES did not downplay their Jewish identity and Zionist sentiments. In a letter to a friend living in the Metropole, Lazarus wrote that the Jews in Algeria wished to maintain their identity and values: "We wish to express ourselves freely as Jews. We do not wish to be forced to remain silent with respect to Israel or the Arab states."[59]

The FLN meanwhile, published its own articles calling for the unity between Muslim and Jewish Algerians in 1961. In one such publication, the FLN stated that it "considers Jews profoundly different from the Europeans. The Jews of Algeria were not colonial invaders; [Jews were] Algerians by history, language, and traditions, and were French since 1871 by a decree issued by the French government. As Algerians, they will have a place in 'independent Algeria.'"[60] Very few Jews sympathized with the FLN's propaganda. The few who did were members of the Communist Party, such as Henri Alleg, né Henri Salem. But the vast majority of Jews, whether they were from Algiers, Oran, or Constantine, chose France as their nation. In 1962, most Jews headed for France, and not Israel.[61]

During the last two years of the Algerian War, as the OAS emerged to wage open battle against Algeria's independence, and as Jews who lived in fear of losing Algeria to the FLN began to show support for the OAS with some even joining its ranks. The official position taken by Lazarus was to oppose the violent tactics and strategies of the OAS, however.[62] The office of the General Direction of Political Affairs and Information, the interim French headquarters wrote to Metropolitan authorities that until the autumn of 1961, most Jews in the major cities had distanced themselves from the radicals, or *ultras*, and the OAS. A large portion of the urban Jews had leftist leanings and were affiliated with the socialists or SFIO (the French Section of the Workers' International) or with syndicates. 1961 was a turning point, however, as the FLN used increasingly aggressive tactics against Jewish establishments and fueled pro-European sentiment among the Jews. French authorities thus saw a notable fluctuation in Jewish reactions to the FLN and later to the OAS.

Jewish participation in the OAS has been widely acknowledged by historians, though just how many actually joined the organization and why, remain difficult to know exactly. Jewish sympathy with the OAS appeared almost always in regions where there was strong European support for the OAS. Thus, it would be important to examine European-Jewish relations in addition to Arab-Jewish relations to gauge where Jews stood with regard to the OAS. In the greater Constantine region, neither the Europeans nor the Jews strongly supported the extremists.[63] But in the Oranais and Algiers regions, the story was different. A breakdown of the Jewish reaction to the OAS from city to city showed that in Oran and Sidi-Bel-Abbès, there was conspicuous Jewish support for the OAS, especially among the youth.[64] Authorities made similar observations in Tiaret and Mostaganem, where a high degree of hostility toward de Gaulle fueled pro-OAS sentiment throughout European and Jewish neighborhoods. According to one witness, a profanation of the Jewish cemetery in Oran in 1960 had triggered a radicalization of the Jewish community, so that following the event, "the entire community passed to the side of the European resistance."[65] In Tlemcen and Saida, on the other hand, cities that were considered part of the "greater Oran region," the relationship between the extremist settlers and the Jewish residents was rather weak because Jews were leaving in large numbers for the Metropole. According to one report from the Delegate General's office in Algeria to the Ministry of Algerian Affairs in Paris in January 1962, Jews in Algeria preferred a vigilante defence of the community to a Zionist military front. They rejected Israel's active consular promotion of immigration to Algeria. As most Jews in Algeria would insist, they wished to remain French in France.

The radicalization in Algeria elicited open criticism and censure in the Metropole.[66] The Bouches-du-Rhône prefecture reported to the Ministry of Interior in 1960 that they often "hear [from the Marseillais], 'what can we do? We send them our youth. The War in Algeria costs us so much. And they are still not happy' ... Even when observers showed sympathy, they considered the *colons* to be influenced by the 'feverish atmosphere in which they live[d].'"[67] Throughout the Metropole, student syndicates, schoolteachers, CGT (French confederation of trade unions) representatives, factory employers and employees, and local progressive associations all signed petitions in support of peace in Algeria in October, 1960, two months

prior to de Gaulle's turbulent visit to Algiers.[68] The petition, signed on October 20, called for full political and military negotiations with the FLN "for a cease-fire in Algeria, and to apply the principle of self-determination."[69] The mayor of Arles personally addressed the prefect the next day and submitted a resolution put together by delegations from seventeen different public establishments, including the EDF (national electric company), the GDF (national gas company), the PTT (postal service workers), the delegation of the movement for workers' freedom, the CGT, syndicates of employees in the health sector and hospitals, employees of stationery companies, and employees of the nationwide franchise department store Monoprix. Delegation members called for negotiations with the GPRA and expressed their full support of Algeria's self-determination.[70]

On October 28, 1960, "A Day of Peace in Algeria" was declared in the Metropole, and large-scale demonstrations took place in Paris as well as in other major cities reflecting public support for de Gaulle's decision to negotiate a cease-fire with the FLN. Fifteen thousand people marched for peace in Paris, while police reports from Toulouse and Rennes reported 2,000 demonstrators on the same day in each city. Both Dijon and Nevers saw 2,500 people in the streets, with 3,500 in Clermont-Ferrand. Nîmes, Avignon, Toulon, Bordeaux, Rouen, Lille, and Angers all reported over 2,000 people each, while Grenoble and Brest saw over 4,000 in their cities. Even Montpellier, a city which had a fairly influential right-wing contingent, saw a relatively strong turn out of 3,000 demonstrators calling for negotiations with the GPRA, while in Lyon, the police reportedly used tear gas grenades to disperse a crowd that became especially impassioned when another demonstration of a much smaller but equally vocal group obstructed its path yelling slogans in defence of *Algérie française*.[71]

For the pied-noir settlers and Jews in Algeria, France and French Algeria were inseparable entities. The radical defence of French sovereignty stemmed from their absolute dependence on the legal framework that had given legitimacy to their French belonging and as French citizens with rights. In the Algerian settler colonial context, Frenchness was not only identified with a civil status but also with a set of conditions that guaranteed the cultural, economic, and political supremacy of the non-Muslim French population. If Jews did not always participate openly in radical movements, they nevertheless defended the French framework, which had lifted them out of the

category of *indigènes*. For the Jews, French Algeria allowed them to dodge the fate of the Muslim Algerians, and retain their rights as full members of the polity. The Algerian War revealed the political differences that had long distinguished the France in Algeria from the France in the Metropole. For the French in Algeria, to negotiate with the FLN was to compromise the conditions that had guaranteed their survival as a minority community with rights amidst a large subjugated majority.

3
Repatriation: Bringing the Settler Colony "Home"

Negotiating European presence in Algeria

Between June 1960 and February 1961, as tensions mounted in Algeria, a group of magistrates, professors of law, syndicate and union leaders, and elected officials in the Metropole came together to form the "Association for the Safeguard of Judicial Institutions and the Defense of Individual Liberties." The Association convened four times with the goal of drafting a text for the government's cease-fire talks with the FLN, which were planned for February 1961 at Evian, near the border with Switzerland.[1] Among the key agenda for the Association was the future of the Europeans if Algeria should achieve autonomy. The Association members agreed that the Europeans would become a "minority population" in Algeria with special rights. The terms of these rights and Algeria's obligation to uphold them were drawn from the 1948 U.N. Charter on the Declaration of Human Rights. The text drafted by the Association declared that it would be Algeria's duty to ensure that the Europeans would have "the right to nationality," the "right to partake in the government of his country," and "the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community", the very rights stated in Article 27 of the U.N. Charter.[2]

The use of the term "minority" was unusual in French official parlance.[3] The term, as mentioned in the Introduction to this book, was meant to reinforce the French claim that Algeria was not an integrated nation or culture but rather an amalgam of diverse minority populations who did not all share a common Arabo-Islamic culture. The French delegation's use of this category was suggestive of the Gaullist government's understanding of decolonization in Algeria.

As Georges Balandier observed in 1951, a decade prior to the talks at Evian, it was the "white population in South Africa that [began] to see its situation as a minority problem [*problème de minorité*]; and so it was the case in North Africa."[4] These whites believed that their dominant positions were under threat from the colonized. "This fact of [settler minorities] beginning to view itself as a minority 'problem' is interesting," Balandier wrote, and was a reminder that for whites, the concept of "minority" a numerical notion, had "sociological meaning only in the colonial situation."[5]

The Association's and later the French delegation's allusion to the future of the Europeans in Algeria as a minority problem resonated with the concerns shared by whites living in the colonies in the era of decolonization, as Balandier rightly pointed out. At the Evian talks, the French and FLN delegates debated the terms by which the Europeans would be identified in a post-independent Algeria. The French delegation proceeded on the assumption that the Europeans would stay in Algeria of their own volition, while insisting that they could no longer assimilate as proper French citizens in the Metropole. In 1961, as negotiations were underway, Denis Périer-Daville, a journalist of *Le Figaro* invoked a long-forgotten essay written by one lieutenant and scholar Paul Azan, who had argued as far back as 1903, that "…the Europeans of Algeria…have become increasingly independent of French tutelage, and having adapted to the environment, or better yet, to the soil, had become a new race…the two races who lived alongside one another have headed toward a special and unique mentality, which will become an Algerian mentality."[6] Anthropologist Germaine Tillion who brought attention to the plight of the Muslim community in Algeria during the war also referred to the intertwined and "complementary" co-existence of the "European minority" and the "Arab majority" in French Algeria. Progressives and conservatives alike thus shared similar perceptions of the settlers.[7]

Metropolitan observations with respect to the French from Algeria did not lead to extended analyses of the settler colonial society however. What concerned these writers was the specific ways in which such perceptions provided evidence of pied-noir deviations from French culture proper, that is, the culture of the Metropole. In short, these observations reflected back on Metropolitan notions of Frenchness, which would reject a North African heritage and in turn, insist on a long-term acculturation in Europe.

In the spring of 1961, officials in Paris noted a surge in the number of families leaving French Algeria, and surmised that up to 380,000 settlers might be leaving Algeria over the course of four years. With the negotiations underway and settler morale low in Algeria, officials began to consider measures that could address Europeans who were leaving. But with the delegation at Evian still in negotiation over the guarantees for Europeans, legislators in Paris could not openly anticipate a large numbers of refugees.[8] As Yann Scioldo-Zürcher has recently noted, French officials were already dealing with thousands of French citizens who had come from Egypt following the Suez crisis in 1956 and from Indochina in 1954, though a systematic policy had not yet been established to receive them. With the arrival of the French from the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, the government set in motion certain measures for these "repatriates" to receive monetary aid.[9] But it was not until 1961 that the government, in light of the increasing number of departures from Algeria, began taking actual steps to prepare a law specifically for those leaving the former colonies. Legislators devised a definition for all nationals leaving the former territories and colonies as "repatriates."

In 1961 as officials deliberated the proper classification of the French from Algeria, Louis Joxe, Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs, argued that it was "not suitable to introduce this problem immediately to the public."[10] As Todd Shepard has explained, Joxe was insistent that the preparations for the French of Algeria remain "discreet," and be carried out "under the guise of operations already underway for other countries."[11] Repatriation operations would not be handled by the Office of Algerian Affairs, but by the Commissariat to the Aid and Orientation of Repatriates, an office that answered to the Ministry of the Interior.[12] To discourage a massive departure, Joxe stressed to those who were still in Algeria that repatriates would be denied compensation for damages related specifically to their departure. They would receive assistance only, in the form of reimbursements for travel expenses and temporary relief. Repatriates would have to turn to the government's munificence to get help. The government would not be responsible or be held accountable for the losses that the evacuees might incur during their departure. Joxe hoped that the repatriates would stay in Algeria.

In the fall of 1961, the government notified the French in Algeria that it would provide aid in case they found themselves in the Metropole. But official memos revealed that there was a perverse logic to such initiatives. As Robert Boulin, newly appointed Minister to Repatriates stated: "an accelerated movement [to the Metropole] could be greatly reduced if the Metropole treats its repatriates well."[13] That is, relocation to the Metropole was presented as a last resort. Repatriates were encouraged to persevere in Algeria first, rather than leave out of desperation. Government officials believed the Europeans would delay their departure if they had peace of mind, and were reassured that subsidies would be provided if necessary. After all, Algeria was their home. Boulin advised the legislature that "the government should avert a contagious [desire to] return [to the Metropole] ... the best solution would be to negotiate a privileged status for them in North Africa."[14]

In 1961, alternative plans were devised by government officials and liaisons in South America including French businessmen in Latin America, to send a select group of repatriates to Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. Repatriates from the former Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 had already travelled to Latin America as part of a experiment, though few among them had achieved success economically. In January 1961, the French ambassador in Rio de Janeiro corresponded with Louis Joxe about directing the pieds noirs toward Brazil.[15] In February 1961, the head of a French mining company in Paraguay, Leon Fragnaud, corresponded with that country's Ministry of National Defense to discuss the "installation of the French *colons* in the north of Paraguay."[16] In his letter to the French ambassador, Fragnaud underlined the arable lands of South America awaiting colonization. He described an immense stretch of land in the northwest part of the country near the border with Bolivia – 10,000 square kilometers, "practically empty on which people could cultivate and farm under excellent conditions, and certainly those crops that are well adapted to the climate and rainfall of this region."[17] Fragnaud explained that 70,000 hectares could be provided to 250 families if they were willing to come.[18]

In July 1961, Marc Rochet, the Director of American Affairs at the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Brazil met with Brazilian officials to discuss the reception of the French from Algeria.[19] Brazilian consul Marciano da Rocha announced his own plans to visit Algiers and

then Paris to meet with French officials. These emigration projects targeted pied-noir farmers or at least those acquainted with agriculture.[20] Officials in charge of Algerian affairs explained that there was very little opportunity in the Metropole for pieds noirs with agricultural occupations. The best alternative would be emigration to places where agriculture remained central and would be "inevitable" as a way of life and means of sustenance.[21] French officials inside Latin America were fully aware of the feeble rate of success among the repatriates who had already immigrated to Brazil from Tunisia and Morocco between 1955 and 1956. Officials in France's Technical Advising Office on Economic Studies and Migration or OTEM [*Office technique d'études économiques et des migrations*] took charge and planned for the emigration to Brazil and Argentina. In February 1962, the first of the immigrant families were settled in Brazil. The move to Latin America was a costly endeavour for most families. Each family was expected to prepare at least 300,000 francs to relocate.[22] Other officials suggested New Caledonia and New Hebrides as less costly options, and 1,000 families signed on to try their lot in the far-off regions of the Pacific.[23]

Officials considered the relocation of settlers to Latin America as a natural extension of their background as colonists or *colons* for whom land was an essential. As an article in *Le Figaro* on August 23, 1961 also explained, French families in Latin America would "constitute a model colony to which vast territories would be entrusted."[24] To help move Europeans to South America, the government collaborated with the SOMNIVAC [*Société pour la mise en valeur agricole de la Corse*], the company that was created in 1957 to help relocate repatriates from Morocco and Tunisia to Corsica, an island that had seen many settlers set off for North Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[25] Again, the idea was to restore the settlers to their ancestral home and calling. Officials also believed that the transport of repatriates to Brazil and Argentina would help defuse the potential agitation among repatriate communities in the Metropole, according to an unsigned security report most likely issued from the Ministry charged with Algerian Affairs.[26] But the trail of the migrants to Latin America dwindled over time as the prospect proved daunting for most families.

The majority of the French in Algeria decided that the Metropole was their only option. The mass exodus of repatriates from Algeria took place between late May and mid-July of 1962.[27] Once Generals Salan and Jouhoud agreed to a truce with the FLN in the name of the OAS, on June 17, 1962, most French citizens in Algeria gave up any hope of staying.[28] Algeria's independence was finally declared on July 5, 1962, triggering large-scale celebrations throughout Algeria and further propelling the departure of the Europeans. From the perspective of the pieds noirs, as one Évelyn Lever explained, there were only two options: the first was "exile," the other a "painful conversion" in an Algeria dominated by the FLN whose sole aim, in their eyes, had been to combat the presence of the Europeans.[29] In 1962, over 750,000 French settlers crossed the Mediterranean.[30] By December 1963, 913,100 repatriate entries from Algeria were recorded at the ports, among which counted 100,000 French Jews. By 1963, the mass departures brought to France almost the entire European and Jewish populations of Algeria.[31] Incoming repatriates were required to register their former addresses in Algeria along with the new domicile in France.[32] Such records were devised and consulted in order to disperse the migrants so as to avoid concentrations of repatriate communities in metropolitan France but the government's strategy failed and repatriates settled predominantly along the cities of the southern littoral.

Cities in France	Repatriates
Paris region	34,645
Lille	7.059
Rennes	5,973
Bordeaux	18,736
Toulouse	21,640
Metz	8,373
Dijon	6,559
Tours	5584
Lyon	25541
Marseille	72010

Europeans in France, 1962 [IGAMES statistics]

To organize France's absorption of repatriates, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou and the Minister of Repatriates Robert Boulin quickly convened a commission made up of representatives from each government ministry and sector of the economy. In order to receive assistance, repatriates were forced to report all movements to the government.[33] The strict collection and monitoring of identity cards provided officials with "the exact number of repatriates moving throughout France."[34] By 1968, 66.8% of the repatriates from Algeria were concentrated in the southern departments. The Provence-Côte-D'Azur regions received over 23% of the Algerian repatriates, while Paris counted 17%, and the Languedoc-Roussillon, Rhône-Alpes and the Midi-Pyrénées all together received 33%.[35]

Arrival by ships of Europeans repatriated from Algeria in 1962

The most urgent task for the government was to provide adequate lodgings for the tens of thousands of repatriates. Throughout 1962, government offices requisitioned chateaus, schools, convents, seminaries, hospitals, factory buildings, military barracks, and whatever spaces were available to house the incoming repatriates from Algeria. In 1963, the government planned the construction of 35,000 new HLMs or low-income apartments specifically for the repatriates. 10,000 new Logécos, housing units for modest working families, were also procured for the repatriates.[36] Another 28,000 HLMs that were under construction in 1963 were set aside for the repatriates while housing developers were given subsidies so that a percentage of new housing units would be reserved and allocated on loan to the repatriates.[37] 35,333 additional HLMs were planned for construction to help alleviate the housing shortages while 20 to 30% of all HLMs under construction were reserved for repatriates in departments that received a large number of the evacuees from Algeria.[38]

As Yann Scioldo-Zürcher has explained, despite the continual allocation of new housing units for the repatriates coming from Algeria, the number of waitlisted families far exceeded that of homes actually available for immediate living. This was true not only in the southern cities but also in the Seine department near and around Paris, which added to the mounting frustration of many repatriates who felt stranded in temporary accommodations.[39] Even when new housing units were made available, repatriate families were forced to wait several months before moving in. In towns that received a large number of repatriates from Algeria, everyday tensions became commonplace between Metropolitan residents and the newly arrived immigrants. Letters began to arrive at the prefects' offices from local residents about the disruptions caused by the incoming repatriates from Algeria. In one such letter, a mother of four living in Aix-en-Provence complained that her apartment sat above a local office that served the repatriates (The office consisted of four rooms on the fourth floor).[40] "It is already two years since we have had to tolerate all the inconveniences here. she wrote, "I am bothered at all hours of the day as people who, having received no response from the office staff, come and ring my bell persistently. And they are always perched on the staircases and landings. Every time I try to leave my apartment, they seem to take malicious pleasure in my attempt to hurry away."[41] The angry woman accused the repatriates

of having used her trash bin as a toilet, and expressed regret that policemen no longer stood guard in the building to maintain order and cleanliness.[42]

> Three hundred repatriate families have now settled in Port-de-Bouc, and are living in deplorable conditions. Two and sometimes three families share a one-bedroom flat while fifteen to twenty people have been found in two and three-bedroom apartments. Some have even built their own barracks, adding to the shanty-town situation. ... it is imperative that our commune be granted a special program; it would be unjust that the inhabitants of Port-de-Bouc suffer in future programs because of the presence of repatriates.[43]

The mayor's plea reflected the dual sentiment common to many officials at this time; while they hoped to obtain special funds from the prefects, they also expressed frustration that repatriates chipped away at municipal coffers and the much-needed resources for local development. Larger cities like Aix-en-Provence were no more eager to take on new migrants. In September 1962, the mayor of Aix wrote to the sub-prefect to complain about the negligence of the administration with regard to the overcrowding in the city. Reminding officials that Aix and Marseille were exempt from obligations to incoming migrants because of previous entries from the Protectorates, the mayor pointed out that his city had "exhausted its housing, and currently has great problems employing the surplus of laborers," given the population increase in recent years.[44]

Very little was heard from repatriates at this time. Their relative reticence was owed to fears that filing such complaints might undermine their chances for receiving government and subsidies. Repatriates were more likely to write subdued and deferential pleas to officials. One pied-noir functionary living in the department of Doubs in the Franche-Comté region near the Swiss border wrote to the prime minister's office in order to request an adjustment to his pensions.[45] In the letter, he introduced himself as a "Frenchman by origin," who had served in the local police brigade on the outskirts of Algiers since 1946, where he had received threats from "Algerians" in 1957. He explained that the Algerians ultimately gave him a

chance to escape because of his good attitude toward the "indigenes [*indigènes*]." He had always been "very respectful of natives and their just merits," had always treated them "humanely," and because he did not lose his temper with them, he was spared.[46] He was resigned to Algeria's fate, and believed it was futile to resist what changes lay ahead: "French Algeria was becoming 'arabicized' and would increasingly become so with the end of our civilization."[47] In other such letters, repatriates were eager to appear compliant, sensitive to public opinion that accused the colonists of transporting their radicalism and anti-Arab sentiments to France.[48]

Employment was another area that required a massive deployment of government energies. All prefects were required to inform the ministries as to which jobs and how many were available in their departments in the various sectors of commerce and trade, industry, and private businesses. While civil servants could receive support from their relevant public bureaus, entrepreneurs and business owners who were self-employed in Algeria fared worse, and were obliged to wait months if not years before they could attain wage-earning positions or obtain enough capital to continue a living in the Metropole. This was not to say that government aid was absent. According to the data currently available to researchers, the Puy-de-Dôme department in the central region of France, only 98 out of 250 who registered for "employment reinsertion" were able to find full employment by 1964, as Scioldo-Zürcher has discovered.[49]

The integration of the repatriates relied on *ad hoc* implementations rather than on deliberate and long term strategies. But with respect to repatriate frustrations, there was more than material deprivation to consider. The French of Algeria measured their difficulties against the living standards they had been accustomed to in French Algeria and all that they left behind. Unlike immigrants who had come in search of better work conditions and living standards, the repatriates from Algeria soon saw government aid as falling short of what they believed were owed to them as citizens. In written responses to queries from the author, many of the French repatriates from Algeria openly discussed the properties and assets they had left behind in Algeria if primarily to emphasize the government's inability to help them retrieve their possessions. In one case, a woman who left Algeria at the age of five could recall the acreage of the vineyards

(over 350) owned by her grandparents in Medea as well as annexes belonging to the vineyard, a testament to the abiding memories of the property they had left behind in 1962. Another man spoke of the distilleries that were owned by the family. Still another family mentioned a three-star hotel in Oran, a restaurant business, an additional hotel with 200 beds, and a dental practice left behind in Algeria. When it came to government aid, almost all those interviewed responded that subsidies were miniscule and insufficient to continue the lifestyle they had maintained. As one woman who had arrived at the age of three would recount: "We weren't rich in Algeria, we lived in a rental apartment, but we lived normally … we left everything behind there!"[50]

In the coming years, the resentment and anxieties of displacement among the pieds noirs would turn to more aggressive opposition to the government, and repatriate associations would begin drawing on such sentiments to mobilize a repatriate platform and electorate.

Repatriates of a different color

During the summer of 1962, tens of thousands of Muslim Algerians who had served the French military tried desperately to leave Algeria in fear of retaliation from FLN militants.[51] The majority of Algerians who had served the French were not functionaries, but auxiliary soldiers or harkis, mobilized during the Algerian War. It is still not clear to this day exactly how many of the auxiliaries made their way successfully to France after 1962. The statistics vary greatly and range anywhere from 87,000 to 95,000. It is also roughly estimated that well over 10,000 harkis were killed during the mass purge in Algeria after independence with some historians placing the death rate at 100,000. As late as 1983, Raymond Courrière, François Mitterrand's newly appointed Secretary of State to Repatriates sent a request to the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, or INSEE [*Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques*] to provide numerical data for the harkis living in France. The INSEE responded that it had no accurate information but only general estimates that dated back to the 1960s.[52]

Today, it is easier to locate archival information about the harkis than it is for the pieds noirs, an important indication of the nation's different attitudes toward the two communities after decolonization. Most of the documents concerning the harkis have been carefully archived in the army archives at Vincennes. The history of France's relationship with the auxiliaries, their salaries, and fact sheets having to do with their deployment are all accessible to willing researchers. On the other hand, the files of pied noir families are considered strictly private papers, and largely closed off to the public. These papers remain the property of the pieds noirs and are managed by the representatives of agencies whose primary role is to distribute aid and maintain information for registered repatriates. The lives of the harkis insofar as they pertain to the Algerian War are not considered so private, the reasons for which will become evident in a later chapter.

The term harkis originated with the Arabic term *harkas*, meaning "movement," and was originally a designation for one of the many sections within the auxiliary infantry force mobilized in counter-insurgency operations in Algeria starting in 1956. The harkis were charged with combat and surveillance assistance. Other auxiliary groups included (1) the French-speaking recruits attached to the "Special Administrative Sections" or SAS [*Sections administratives spécialisées*], a civilian outreach unit that worked alongside the French army to help with schooling and health services during the war, (2) the auxiliary police force or *mokahzenis*, (3) the indigenous rural police force or GMPR [*Groupe mobile de protection rurale*], and (4) the mobile security forces or GMS [*Groupe mobile de sécurité*]. In 1960, four years after their initial recruitment, the French government counted a total of approximately 185,000 "autochthonous men" in the French army in Algeria: 70,000 harkis; 15,000 GMS auxiliaries; 20,000 *mokahzenis*; 60,000 self-defence units; and some various other 20,000 soldiers.[53] Starting in 1960 the category harkis gradually came to include all the auxiliaries employed by the French army. The harkis who actually participated in combat operations were of great advantage to the French army, especially in the mountainous terrain of Algeria's interior. One army memo commended the harkis' "rustic quality, the knowledge they had of the enemy,

and their connections with the local population," as well as their versatility in missions involving enemy pursuit and intelligence gathering.[54]

Officials in Paris had deep reservations about the harkis since they had had little contact with Europeans prior to their deployment. They were seen as possessing all the qualities associated with mercenaries, and their loyalty was considered dubious. Many had been recruited from poor families who spoke little or no French. A large number of the harkis were in fact illiterate.[55] Some were believed to have come from families who were in communication with the FLN, thus placing commanding French officers in danger.

In 1959, when de Gaulle had declared Algeria's self-determination, the army considered discharging the harkis, but guerrilla combat immediately intensified following the Declaration, and the harkis became quite important.[56] In addition to the usual contracts that were binding for ten to 18 months, the army created day-to-day contracts, whenever and wherever combat took place.[57] The central command in Algeria however became apprehensive about the army's growing dependency on the harkis. A report from central command noted in 1960 that the harkis' "every move must be watched, their numbers constantly monitored and their maneuvers controlled at every level and chain of command."[58] Even entire families and villages from which the harkis were recruited, were subject to constant surveillance.[59]

In 1961, while cease-fire talks were still going on, officials debated the future of the harkis. According to one secret memo, the army feared that the harkis would rebel if they discovered that France was withdrawing from Algeria. The author of the memo warned of a "Sepoy rebellion," referring to the revolt raised against the British by the Indian soldiers of the East India Company in 1857.[60] A range of options were considered, such as redistributing them to the rank and file of the Algerian police force, or placing them in various civilian administrative jobs in Algeria. It soon became apparent, however, that the harkis' lack of education and training would make planning for such a future virtually impossible:

> In conclusion, there is no real foreseeable solution for the problem of the harkis. At best, their fatalism will simply lead them back

Repatriated people arrive in Marseille aboard the ship Ville de Tunis in 1962

> to the miserable jobs they held before entering the harka, and at worst, there will be a host of abductions and massacres or armed desertion. We will first of all have to stop any further employment of the harkis.[61]

The report showed that the French army was clearly aware of the dangers the harkis would face if left behind without any guarantees or protection, and yet the only solution offered was to reduce the recruitment. The army command in Algeria concluded that by the end of 1961, the number of harkis would be cut by half.[62]

With the signing of the Evian Accords, almost all of the harkis were released from duty. Four months after the Accords were signed, the army's worst predictions came true. A "secret and urgent" memo from a military source read: "the purge led by the ALN, the armed wing of the FLN has been ferocious and only grows worse as the weeks unfold, in particular in the second and fourth Wilayas. 2,300 people have demanded asylum; 1,200 more are asking for asylum in Algiers, 1,000 in Philippeville."[63] The army command was soon forced to set up camps throughout Algeria in the months following the Evian Accords. Some 6,200 harkis and their families found their way to the shelters by July and "the numbers were increasing at a rapid rate, nearly twenty a day."[64]

The government and the army received numerous requests from those who had served as commanders of harki units to set up a systematic transport of the harkis to France. In August 1962, the superior command of the army in Algeria noted in a "very secret" memo dispatched to the commanding admiral in Mers-el-Kébir where large numbers of harkis were being detained by French authorities that it was important to dissuade army personnel from helping the harkis. The memo stated that all officers should be duly warned that if they were to help the harkis to come to France, it would be placing them at great risk. "The harkis would face extreme economic difficulty because they would be unable to gain employment."[65] Officials also tried to dissuade the officers by alerting them to the physical hardships endured by the harkis currently in France: "It seems that the harkis displaced outside their country are incapable of adapting, and the civilian and military administrators who are in charge of them here are worried about their living conditions this winter."[66]

In October 1961, one officer tried to transport some sixty harki families from their commune of Rouached in Constantine to his home city of Angoulême in the Charente. The SAS officer wrote to the mayor of Angoulême for help. The mayor, moved by the letter promised the officer who was also his former student to try and answer his wish. The mayor convened his cabinet and contacted several realtors to search for possible accommodations for the families, finally locating a small complex just outside the city. The mayor then contacted the Secretary of Repatriates to obtain a loan of 140,000 francs to reserve the lodgings. The Secretary's office, however, declined to help and

sent the case off to another administrative bureau, which apparently dealt with Algerian migrants. Again, the request for money was declined. The Prefect in his department of the Charente was no more willing than the Secretary of Repatriates. The point was made clear that European repatriates came first.[67] He wrote:

> No doubt, our European compatriots from Algeria would vehemently oppose any attempt to prioritize the French Muslims in distributing financial aid, even though the French Muslims were fully entitled. In considering the psychological effect, we cannot have such a migration take place because it will create a precedent and unleash a massive, explosive, and uncontrollable migration of Muslims to the Metropole even before the government could devise measures that would deal with the different categories of repatriates.[68]

The prefect added condescendingly that, "perhaps the personal friend [of the officer], the sub-prefect of Mila in Constantine, might offer some protection for his inhabitants?…The mayor presented to me his [new] plan to appeal to the public for help. I imagine the end result would be most pathetic."[69] Needless to say, the whole project was abandoned.

The leftist journal, *Le Combat*, meanwhile publicized a damning statement made by the Secretary of Algerian Affairs, Louis Joxe who admitted that:

> all auxiliaries who arrive on Metropolitan shores without government permission will be sent back to Algeria where they shall remain until a definitive destination is decided. I am aware that propagandists might interpret this order as a refusal to guarantee the future [safety] of those who have remained faithful to us; it is advised that we not expose any more information with regards to this aforementioned measure.[70]

In April 1962, the French army in Algeria managed to transfer approximately 9,400 former auxiliaries and members of their families to France.[71] Hoping to limit as many refugees as possible, the Ministry of Interior restricted entries to those who could document

the threats they actually received from the FLN: "Those who never actually worked in the army but were only interested in food and shelter in the camps should be promptly rejected."[72] But for many, it was not always possible to provide evidence of the risks they faced if they stayed behind in Algeria. For the French government, the harkis' services during the war were not enough to secure a safe passageway to France.

The soldiers who were successfully transported to France were referred to as "French Muslims," "Muslim refugees" or simply "refugees." The harkis were not granted the status of "repatriates"[73] even though they were assimilated as French citizens in 1958 and had served as soldiers in the French army.[74] The law that granted the harkis repatriate status was ratified only in 1964. Despite efforts to prevent harkis from entering on French soil, it was in fact difficult to distinguish between the harkis and notables or elite Muslims arriving at the ports. The main piece of identification required of all evacuees was a card issued by officials in Algiers at the time of their departure. Upon their arrival in Marseilles, they were each given a travel pass by the general consulate. A copy of each identification card was then sent back to the French embassy in Algeria.[75] Elite Muslim notables were sent to the destination of their choosing but if the individual was identified as a harki, he was first taken to Mers-el-Kébir and then to select camps set up specifically to receive the soldiers.

Officials in southern France were not always confident in identifying the harkis and distinguishing them from other Algerians, as one incident that occurred during July 1962 showed. On July 9, 1962, the sub-prefect of the department of the Var sent a memo to the prefect, marked "SECRET," to explain a case of mistaken identities. The incident had occurred over the weekend, and involved some 600 "Muslim repatriates" or elite Algerians who had arrived by boat two days earlier. According to the memo, on Friday, July 6, the sub-prefect had received notice from officials in Algeria that he should prepare to receive some 600 Muslim repatriates "of high standing" who would arrive by boat, *le Phocée*, in Toulon.[76] The passengers aboard the *Phocée* were supposedly Algerians who had served with the colonial administration. They were noted as being "of quality." Some of them might very well have been naturalized by the law of

1944, which had bestowed citizenship on a certain category of functionaries, Muslim administrators and elected officials with European connections. Orders were given by way of government circulars to treat the Algerians "exactly like European [repatriates]."[77] Under no circumstances should the said notables be taken to the Camp de Larzac, a notorious compound reserved only for the harkis. Each of the passengers on the *Phocée* had apparently arranged his destination ahead of time. Most were headed for Paris, others for Lille. With these instructions in mind, the sub-prefect thought to direct those who had not made any prior arrangements to the Camp de la Rye in Vienne, a site reserved for "Muslim repatriates of very high status, and therefore *no* harkis."[78]

When the passengers arrived on Saturday after five o'clock in the evening, the sub-prefect sent a team of policemen to the port to help escort the passengers. It was then and there that things went awry. The commissioner of police, who helped the passengers disembark, notified the sub-prefect's office that only 41 out of the 575 Muslim passengers knew where they were headed. The rest seemed disoriented and incommunicative, and gave no indication that they were notables of any kind. The sub-prefect confirmed the police commissioner's observations in person, and was at a loss as to where the "Muslim repatriates" should be sent next. The sub-prefect explained in his memo that he then returned to consult Paris officials by telephone in order to receive proper instructions, but the office in Paris informed him that, because it was a Saturday night, there was no one who could help. The sub-prefect explained in the report: "I then telephoned the service of repatriates in Marseilles, and was told that it was the General Inspector of Extraordinary Missions, or IGAME [*Inspecteur général en mission extraordinaire*] that handled the reception of Muslim repatriates."[79]

The sub-prefect then called his colleague, an administrator in the Bouches-du-Rhône, and received authorization to send a maximum of "one hundred Muslim repatriates" to Marseille. He also called his colleague at the Camp de la Rye, who was ready to take in some of the Muslim passengers, 200 in fact…so I was then left with 275 in Toulon."[80] The sub-prefect then claimed that he later received instructions from the Secretary of Repatriates to facilitate the passage of the men to wherever they wished to go. He then "taking every

precaution," made sure the group would be transported all together, He even registered all of their baggage under a single ticket so that none of them would stray from their charted route during their travel.[81]

On Monday, however, a memo was dispatched by the prefect of the Var himself to the Minister of Interior and to the Secretary of Repatriates. The memo revealed all the anxieties of an official who had completely failed in his duties. It was discovered that the Muslim travelers who were now somewhere in Lille or Paris, were hardly notables, but unidentified families from the Kabyle who should have been detained in the Camp de Larzac as harkis. The prefect explained that by the time he had been notified of the incident by his sub-prefect, the travelers had already boarded the train.[82]

Almost all the auxiliaries were placed in the camps set up especially for their arrival. No decision was made as to whether the camps were temporary or permanent. Military personnel were deployed to each camp, many of whom had served in Algeria. When the Minister of Repatriates proposed a complete demilitarization of the camps, one parliament member objected to this idea and argued that the harkis responded better to military commanders than they did to civilian personnel:

> The harkis actually understand a certain level of military discipline, to which they are habituated, and all the more so with regard to officers who have served in Algeria, most notably with the SAS, who understand their mentality well. The harkis are much more reticent toward civilian personnel.[83]

The prefect of police in Paris, and one-time prefect of Constantine in Algeria during the Algerian War, Maurice Papon, was especially suspicious of the growing number of harki migrants finding their way to the capital.[84] In June 1963, a report was filed by the technical services division or SAT [*service d'assistance technique*] of the Paris police, titled the "Problems Posed by the Reception and Reordering of Muslim Algerian Refugees in the Department of the Seine." According to the report, many of the refugees were traveling on their own unaccompanied, and were thus becoming indistinguishable from immigrants. The report warned that officials must therefore be aware of Algerian workers "posing" as ex-auxiliaries to collect aid from municipal

offices.[85] The report explained that "Muslim refugees" from Algeria were divided into two groups: the first were the harkis, and the second were the "civilian Muslim refugees." The latter category included elected Muslim officials who had served as mayors, municipal councilmen, or figures of authority in the villages, "whose loyalties were never known to have faltered and who for this reason, were forced to abandon their native soil."[86]

If a harki was spared detainment in the camps, he faced insurmountable obstacles trying to make a living with no help. The police and its SAT services devised an identification system allegedly to help Algerian refugees find housing and employment. According to a SAT report: "Until now, those [civilians] whose identities have been verified have had no problem finding work, either through private companies or in the same administrative work that employed them in Algeria."[87] This report failed to add that the few civilian refugees who had found work did so through connections and recommendations. The harkis on the other hand if they were lucky enough, were picked up by special organizations run by former SAS officers. More than a simple record of military service was required if the harki and his family were to receive adequate allocations and become eligible for hire. The fortunate few benefited from individual sponsors, mostly former soldiers who had worked with the harkis during the war, and who submitted a note of good faith to relevant government offices or companies.[88] One Colonel Schoen wrote in a confidential letter to Michael Massenet, head of the "Inter-ministerial Committee of Social Action for French Muslims," about a former subordinate. Schoen remarked that the "proud *nif* from the Kabyle" needed help and was currently working as a night guard in a Paris hotel after several abortive attempts to obtain a decent day job.[89] Schoen also added that this former harki "expressed himself with ease in French, and could easily be taken for a metropolitan."[90]

But these were the rare few who slipped through the tight controls maintained over the harkis. A good majority of harki families continued to live in camps or *Cités d'Accueil*, which were small agglomerations of various forms of shelter, well into the late 1970s. The Camp du Larzac was the largest among them, home to some 4,000 harkis in 1962.[91] There were the camps Saint-Livrade (also home to Eurasian repatriates from Indochina after 1954), de Bias in the Lot-et-Garonne, Saint-Maurice de l'Ardoise and the Camp

Saint-Laurent-des-Arbres in the Gard. The camps provided minimally equipped shelters. The harkis were forced to work in close proximity to the camps, mostly in forestry since the camps were situated in wooded areas and forests. Harki families also lived and worked near urban development zones or ZUPs throughout southern France, while a few harki villages sprouted up in the north, just outside of Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing near the Belgian border. Aside from sporadic visits by the prefect and various officials, there was very little interaction with Metropolitans. Until the 1970s, it was evident that the repatriation of the pieds noirs took precedence over the reception of the harkis, and the problem of the harkis remained hidden from the public.

The Repatriation of a different creed

Although Jews had French citizenship, they were not seen as truly French once they arrived. Thanks to Todd Shepard and Sarah Sussman, we have substantial information about the experiences of Jews during the last months of the Algerian War and their first years in the Metropole. To this, I will add my own research conducted in the American Jewish Archives in Cincinnati, Ohio in the United States.

If France reluctantly received French Algerian Jews, then the government of Israel also saw opportunity to intervene on behalf of Jews during the Algerian War. While obtaining a fair level of success in gaining émigrés from Morocco and Tunisia, the government of David Ben-Gurion detected only minimal enthusiasm in Algeria. With the offer of visas and economic subsidies, 580 Jews ended up relocating in Israel between 1954 and 1955.[92] Taking serious interest in the possible stakes raised by Arab nationalism in Algeria, the Israeli government did not limit its intervention to consular affairs. In 2005, the Israeli daily newspaper, the *Maariv*, carried a story about the historical activities of the Mossad in Algeria during the war of independence. The article cited interviews with former Mossad agents who recounted working underground and arming the "young Jews of Constantine" during the Algerian War to rout the ALN. Two former Mossad members, Shlomo Havilio and "agent" Avraham Barzilai, now 78, spoke openly about having been sent by Israeli special services to Algeria in 1956 to organize underground Jewish cells. They

had in fact crossed into Algeria from Egypt where they had taken part in organizing armed resistance against Egyptian president Gamal Nasser.[93]

Constantine was not the only region in which there was active militant intervention on the part of Israeli organizations. French sources concerning the surveillance of Israeli military activity in Algeria are not open to public viewing, but documents issued by the Information services in La Rocher allude strongly (*laissé entendre*) to the active presence in Oran of former IRGOUN (the Israeli national military organization) members and to their training of Algerian Jewish commandos.[94] In fact, French intelligence reports refer repeatedly to "persistent rumors" about a Jewish counter-insurgency movement consisting solely of Oranais Jewish youth who had come back from Israel where they received military training. No other evidence was given in the French surveillance reports save for mention that the tactics used by the Constantine Jewish militants "resembled" those once used by the IRGOUN.[95]

The actual impact that such military backing of Algerian Jews by Israeli groups is difficult to assess. Jewish residents of Constantine did leave for Israel in greater numbers compared to those in Oran or Algiers, but the numbers that headed for Israel were still much less significant than those who left for France. By 1969, Israel had received a maximum of 10% of all Jews from Algeria.[96] In 1962, when it became clear to Israeli officials that Algerian Jews were less than enthused by the prospect of moving to Israel, then Foreign Minister Golda Meir expressed her "astonishment at the lack of understanding of the French authorities" and their reluctance to encourage the immigration of Algerian Jews to her country. In response, one French administrator replied rather apathetically that, "the Jewish community in Algeria was at one with the French community" and that "Jews in Algeria have the same rights as other French [citizens]."[97] This was a formalistic response issued by a government with lingering memories of the Vichy past, a government all too conscious of the blight to its already tarnished image should it encourage the "Israelites" to take up residence and nationality elsewhere.

The blind side was in fact on the side of Meir and Ben-Gurion's government, more concerned with Arab-Jewish relations than they

were with the actual aspirations of the Algerian Jews. Sharing Meir's views, Ben-Gurion himself declared in an interview with Serge Groussard of the French daily *Le Figaro* in 1961, that "…the Muslims in Algeria, like all Muslims consider themselves Arabs, which they in fact are…if I were French, I would be cautious not to place too much hope on the Algerian Muslims, not even on those who consider themselves assimilated; I would not trust them."[98] Even if Algerian Jews did not trust the "Arabs" in Algeria, this did not mean they gave themselves to Israel either. In fact, Jews were more likely to join the right wing vigilante defense of French Algeria than respond to the call from Israel. If they had looked on with interest at international and cultural Zionist movements, they did not revamp this interest into a military or civic loyalty to Israel.

When the Jews left for France, they were aided by Jewish leaders both secular and religious from Algeria and in the Metropole. The Unified Jewish Social Funds or FSJU [*Fonds Social Juif Unifié*] founded in 1949 was among those that came to the aid of Jewish repatriates. The FSJU helped register the incoming migrants and provide assistance with housing, employment, and subsistence aid. They also helped set up schooling for children while building synagogues for practicing North African Jews in areas where there was previously none, such as Toulouse, Villiers de Bel and Perigueux.[99] Unlike the pied noir repatriates, Jews from Algeria settled primarily in areas and towns near Paris. In the Paris region alone, there was an increase of up to 30,000 Jews between 1962 and 1963. By 1963, a total of 80,000 Jews were living in the Paris region.[100] These Jews distinguished themselves from the Ashkenazi population already living in the Metropole. In one interview, a representative of the FSJU echoed the sentiment shared by many newly arrived Jews from Algeria who identified themselves as North African *and* French: "The North Africans are not uncivilized as some tend to believe in France. They are simply products of a different civilization." They came to France as citizens and as North African Jews, as formerly part of the settler society's minority "European community". As will be seen in Chapter 7, their understanding of Frenchness remained deeply ambivalent.

In the decades following the Algerian War, the French government would gradually assemble a new narrative about the repatriates

from Algeria. Along with representatives of the European repatriate community from Algeria, Fifth Republic leaders would attempt to override the distinct histories of the citizens and soldiers from Algeria, and impose another story of return and recovery, one that allowed for the continuing obfuscation of the Republic's foundations in Algeria and the uprooting of its settler society.

4
Gaullists and the Repatriate Challenge

"The principle is solidarity, not indemnity"

Since the mass evacuation of the French of Algeria in 1962, the most contentious point of debate between the repatriate community and the Fifth Republic has been the question of indemnification for properties left behind in Algeria. For repatriates, the dispute over indemnities was really about the responsibilities of the state. For the French in Algeria, the Fifth Republic had relinquished sovereign territory and displaced one million citizens from their homeland. For the French state, repatriation was the tragic outcome of an unavoidable historical event. As far as the government was concerned, the state could not recompense the repatriates for their losses; it had not instigated the mass departure.

In April 1962, the evacuees from Algeria officially became citizens who either had to leave or who "considered it necessary [*estimer devoir*]" to leave territories that were formerly under French sovereignty, protectorship or tutelage."[1] A key principle underlying the Repatriate Law was "national solidarity," a phrase introduced more than fifteen years earlier in the 1946 Constitution of the Fourth Republic: "The nation proclaims the solidarity and equality of all French [nationals] with respect to their duties in face of national calamities." The Repatriate Law likewise framed the identity of repatriates in terms of their responsibilities to the national collective, and not in terms of what they might be owed for their losses or injuries. They were not casualties but citizens who had a role to play in the country's recovery from the war. In this respect, their

duties to the nation were no different from those of Metropolitans. With the Repatriate Law, national solidarity would be achieved "through an ensemble of measures, the purpose of which [was] to integrate the French of Algeria in the economic and social fabric of the nation."[2] As Todd Shepard has explained, the Repatriate Law allowed the government to "avoid any affirmation of the state's responsibility for compensation."[3]

In 1961, when legislators debated the terms of the Repatriate Law, Secretary of State to the Repatriates Robert Boulin insisted on repatriation as a policy of "assistance," consisting of short-term subsidies and not long-term compensations. Boulin argued that the repatriates should "contribute to the modernization and economic productivity of the nation. The effort to help repatriates should thus be combined with the effort to expand the nation's economy."[4] To emphasize the responsibilities of repatriates to the nation, senator André Armengaud, spokesman for the "Finance Commission and Budget Controller of the Nation's Economic Accounts" argued that the Repatriate Law "should not employ words that might suggest unconditional charity."[5]

> The law we are voting for is *a law of solidarity, not indemnity*. No right is recognized for the French repatriate, but the solidarity exercised through this law will fully benefit them as long as they participate in the economic advancement of the nation.[6]

On the issue of housing, for example, Armengaud warned that if the government were to give priority to repatriates in the distribution of low-income housing, it would "impinge negatively on the legitimate needs and rights of other citizens."[7] The aid granted to repatriates would have to be supplementary rather than exceptional. The state was not making amends, or admitting to any wrongdoing. Government subsidies were not to be regarded as reparations, and would only extend to housing, basic travel fees, medical funds for the ill or handicapped, and miscellaneous fees incurred during their repatriation. These were immediately granted, as they were the rights of all citizens.[8] Several decrees were added to the final version of the Repatriate Law to allow "exceptional compensation for the elderly and invalids, the physically and mentally incapacitated, and those who found it difficult or impossible to work."[9]

No mention was made of indemnities or reparations, however. As Gaullist officials saw it, the property that was left behind in Algeria no longer fell under French jurisdiction. As Jacques Ribs, a lawyer who advocated on behalf of repatriates at the court of appeal in Paris pointed out, the government made the clear distinction between "reclassification [*reclassement*]" in the Metropole and "indemnification," the first being related to the state's obligation to its citizens, the latter being a moral question and therefore beyond the purview of the government.[10]

The French state's refusal to address the indemnification of lost property also had to do with the diplomatic relations with Algeria after 1962. Algeria was envisioned by the Gaullist government as a diplomatic gateway to the rest of Africa where France would retain its influence and global position in face of the growing reach of American hegemony and NATO interference.[11] For de Gaulle's government, the repatriates' demands for indemnities could not take precedence over French economic and political interests in Algeria. The first three years of diplomacy with the FLN proved to be precarious as the Algerian leadership itself struggled to stabilize amidst the internal chaos and turmoil that marked Ahmed Ben Bella's presidency. French officials were anxious to continue the terms of the Evian Accords, which granted France access to nuclear test sites in the Sahara free of foreign intervention. Vast supplies of uranium extracted from the Sahara were seen as vital to asserting France's status as a contender in the field of nuclear power. Gaullist technocrats and scientists envisioned their future as the "builders of a French-African industrial community."[12] Algeria's resources were considered integral to this vision. According to Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs:

> France has no interest in seeing at its door front, a hostile power willing to submerge all of North Africa in political turmoil… our military interests are no less important. We have, by way of the Evian Accords, a fifteen-year renewable lease on the base of Mers-el-Kébir. We also have a five-year term lease on all bases in the Sahara, enabling us to carry out nuclear experiments indispensable to our [nuclear] 'Strike Force' [*force de frappe*]. All this would be difficult [without Algeria] and would cost an exorbitant amount if France should have to use the Pacific instead [for nuclear testing].[13]

In addition to uranium deposits, Algeria's oil and natural gas reserves were highly prioritized agenda items for France. Oil was discovered in 1955, just one year after the Algerian War had erupted, and France was able to obtain full rights to the oil fields along with more than three-quarters of the gas reserves under the terms of the Evian Accords. These gave France the leverage it needed in its global competition against American and British international oil companies. It was all the more important to maintain cordial terms with the FLN.[14] Yves Roland Billecart, one of the French delegates at Evian, had reminded the GPRA that the resources in the Sahara were the property of France: "there had been no financing of petroleum research on the part of the FLN." All research was conducted by the private French oil company SN Repal, Billcart noted.[15] The Evian Accords had granted France the same right to collect revenue from the production of petroleum, which it had enjoyed under the Saharan Oil Code of 1958 when Algeria was still a part of France.[16] Similar provisions were applied to the extraction and export of natural gas. Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville argued that France "was legally the proprietor of gas reserves in the Sahara," because it was France that had invested in its extraction.[17]

Algeria quickly became the second largest exporter after Iraq of hydrocarbon chemicals and gases to France,[18] and surpassed Britain to become the fourth largest supplier of natural resources to France after the United States, the Bénélux nations, and Germany.[19] In 1950, Algeria exported 2 million tons of hydrocarbon gases to France. By 1966, the total had jumped to 18 billion tons.[20] French companies flocked to Algeria in 1962 to begin or resume public works projects, including road paving, telecommunications, airport maintenance, and the building of runways, factories and housing. It was a Gaullist technologist Jean-Louis Cottier who declared that, "in came the technocrats to build the Franco-African industrial community. In them, the science of engineers is united with the will of captains. The new French strategy, that is, French peace, will be brought to the world."[21] In the realm of Franco-Algerian diplomacy, repatriate demands were distractions if not impediments and risked having adverse effects on cooperation agreements. Further developments within Algeria, however, would make it difficult for the French government to ignore repatriate demands entirely.

Algeria and the nationalization of land

During de Gaulle's presidency, public investments in Algeria far outweighed private ones.[22] The French state felt the pinch as Algeria increasingly attracted foreign interest and investments. Eastern Bloc nations such as Poland and Yugoslavia, and western European nations including Germany, Britain, and Italy all took interest in the newly liberated Algeria. The Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States continued to make massive amounts of credit available to Algeria for construction projects.[23] France vied for prominence, and signed 36 new amendments to the Evian Accords between March 1962 and December 1963 so as to remove any obstacles to new public business transactions in Algeria.[24] Following the massive technocratic "cooperation" agreements signed with France in 1962, Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella gave priority access to French financial investors and technocrats. The exodus of the French had deprived Algeria's economy of an entire class of educated professionals and industrial and agricultural managers.[25] The country had lost more than 2,700 doctors, 1,000 pharmacists and dentists, and over 85% of its technically skilled personnel overnight. The management staff of over 450 factories left for France. More than 200,000 apartments were deserted as well as numerous hospitals, schools, and farms.[26] If the FLN leadership asserted its authority over domestic resources, it was greatly limited by the lack of resources. France still remained very much the motor behind Algeria's economic recovery.

It was in the domain of land reform that Algeria's leaders communicated their dominance and authority. Algeria's land tenure system underwent profound changes during the presidencies of Ben Bella and his successor Houari Boumédiène. These included large-scale land reforms that would provoke the wrath of the repatriates across the Mediterranean. In 1962, Ben Bella inaugurated the "General Direction of the Plan and Economic Studies" [*Direction générale du Plan et des Études Économiques*]. One of the most urgent tasks in the plan was to organize and consolidate the more than 22,000 farms and estates that had been deserted by Europeans and repossessed through unregulated exchanges and transactions. During the Algerian War, French officials had uprooted more than two million Muslim inhabitants from the rural interior supposedly to clear rebel

zones. While many migrated to the cities after independence, hundreds of thousands who had been removed from their homes made their way back to their places of origin and to the evacuated farms to find work.[27] Many of these farms had come under new ownership. Among these proprietors were former FLN commanders of the Wilayas that had taken control of the villages and residences within their respective administrative units during the war.[28] The chaotic movement of impoverished migrants and the acquisitive management of the farms made rural regions highly volatile places. Ben Bella took steps to assert the party's authority, and placed restraints on those who had taken possession of the abandoned farms.[29]

Ben Bella issued an ordinance on August 24, 1962 to classify all "properties that have not been occupied or used by the owner for more than two months" as "vacant" lands.[30] The law stipulated that all properties belonging to this category would be placed under the administration of the prefects.[31] Ben Bella, a student of Yugoslav socialism and its workers' self-management movement moved ahead with a similar system in Algeria. To implement agrarian self-management, Ben Bella established rules against private transactions of land. In March of 1963, large farms were placed under the supervision of public agencies, which were in turn placed under the "Office of National Agrarian Reform," [*Office national de la réforme agraire*] or ONRA. In the meanwhile, a decree was issued on March 19, 1963, one year after the Evian Accords, to declare that commercial and financial firms, industries, manufacturers, mining companies, and agricultural- and forestry-related industries and businesses would be considered vacant if they were inactive at the time the decree was issued. All other forms of immobile properties were also deemed vacant if they were left unoccupied or unattended for more than two consecutive months, a common situation among most properties deserted by Europeans.[32] Vacant lands were thus placed under the governance of public officials who could oversee new self-management initiatives. Self-management was autonomous from the state in name only. In practice, Ben Bella sought to exercise his full authority where possible.

The March decree set the stage for the subsequent nationalization of agrarian lands, immobile properties, and businesses.[33] On October 1, 1963, a benchmark decree was passed, which declared

that agricultural lands would be automatically nationalized if they had not yet been placed under the management and authority of the prefects. The October decree was the first law to declare that land ownership was the exclusive right of Algerian nationals or the right of those who had at the least taken steps to apply for Algerian nationality.[34] In a public speech, while referring to the agrarian self-management [*autogéstion*] movement, the president remarked that Algeria had attained "the first step of the long march … by putting the soil of Algeria in the hands of Algerians. The spoliators have been chased out. The people are sovereign on their lands."[35]

Repatriate representatives across the Mediterranean were outraged. They saw the decrees passed by Ben Bella's government as a direct affront to their suspended rights as property holders. The real blow from the viewpoint of the repatriates came when the French government left Ben Bella's reforms unchallenged. In a memo issued by the Office of General Affairs in the French embassy in Algeria in November of 1963, officials declared that, "cooperation would go on despite Algeria's failure to uphold its promise to maintain the defense and security of European property in Algeria."[36] French authorities of the Secretariat of Algerian Affairs were resolute: "Algeria has violated the agreements of the Evian Accords; it would be vain to deny it. But France must however remain committed to the politics of cooperation."

> The connection between our two countries has now been shattered … and the government is moving toward a classic mode of state-to-state cooperation. We are in agreement with the Algerian government, which has voiced its willing dedication to the politics of cooperation: equal-to-equal, founded on reciprocal interests, 'mutual aid, not aid' … It behooves us to demonstrate [to the Algerians] that the politics of France remains unchanged in its principles.[37]

If de Gaulle's government could obtain what it wanted in terms of energy resources, its passive response to the nationalization of unclaimed farms that had once belonged to the Europeans would pose considerable problems for the Republic's interactions with the repatriates from Algeria. Between 1963 and 1965 when the cooperation agreements with Algeria were extended, opponents of the

government's repatriate politics openly insisted that France indemnify the repatriates for lost assets and property by confronting the FLN government. But Gaullist administrators insisted that it should be Algeria and not France that must compensate repatriates for their losses. René Pleven, former Fourth Republic prime minister firmly opposed the Gaullist view, and drove the point home with his criticism of the fundamental contradiction in de Gaulle's repatriation politics:

> The [French] government believes it is the new foreign states and not our own who should assure future indemnities. This argument would be valid if our nationals had been installed in foreign countries, or if they had been employed in foreign companies at the latter's risks and losses. This would be the case for the French who lived in Egypt. But the situation is very different for the French from Algeria; Algeria was French territory.[38]

Pleven and others who had endorsed French Algeria argued that civilian settlements in Algeria were the product of Metropolitan colonization projects.[39] But in the immediate post-Algerian War years, the Gaullists maintained the upper hand where policies concerning the French from Algeria were concerned.

Repatriation as economic "reinstallation"

In keeping with the concept of "national solidarity," the principle behind integration became to insert repatriates in positions where they could contribute their skills to the economy. The idea was to discourage repatriates from assigning responsibility to the state, and to instill in them a sense of duty to the country. To put this principle into practice, a new Commission of Coordination for the Reinstallation of Overseas French Citizens was created by government decree in 1962 and placed under the remit of the prime minister's office.[40] The responsibility of distributing aid to the repatriates would now fall to this *ad hoc* Commission, but its representatives were not selected on the basis of their expertise in Algerian affairs. Instead, they were members of organizations otherwise engaged in labor disputes and wage settlements: the National Council of French Employers, the Confederation of Small Businesses, the

National Union of Liberal Professions, the CGT (general confederation of work), the Confederation of Manual Laborers and Skilled Workers, and the National Circle of Young Agricultural Employees, among others.[41] Government ministries also sent delegates to sit on the Commission, but while all other ministries each had a single representative, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs had five.[42] Directors of various statistical or financial institutions, banks, creditors, construction companies, and builders were also called upon to participate in "reinstalling" repatriates.[43] In essence, the integration of citizens from the colonies was transformed into an economic and financial problem, which would be worked out by setting figures and budgets, and not by debating the extraordinary circumstances of the people in question. In fact, the real purpose of the Commission was to fix the terms of aid to the repatriates, so that legal demands for indemnities for lost property would not be successful in the future.

The strategy for "reinstallation" as devised by the Commission envisioned the insertion of people back into their original professions. The Secretariat to Repatriates in liaison with the Commission sent out field officers to each prefect to survey possible job openings for repatriates and to coordinate between repatriates and local employers who responded to the survey.[44] All repatriates were strongly encouraged to look for similar if not identical occupations as those they had held in Algeria. For example, repatriates who held administrative jobs as functionaries were expected to continue within the same ministries and *cadres* that had employed them in French Algeria. Salaried employees in Algeria were to be cared for by their relevant syndicates or trade unions. Those who had worked as doctors, pharmacists, dentists, lawyers, farmers, or teachers in Algeria were encouraged to take up to those occupations in France. As for independently employed individuals, they would receive loans so that similar businesses could be started in France. In the end, however, these plans, which were mostly debated behind the closed doors of legislative chambers, were never successful in practice.

No one had been more conscious of the potential problems with the "reclassification" scheme in 1961 than the Secretary of Repatriates, Robert Boulin. Boulin remarked that the demographic and professional composition of repatriates did not correspond to the kinds of jobs France needed or desired at this time. In this respect, the

idea of repatriate contribution to the economy became contradictory. France was in "a period of high demand for employment," Boulin explained in a closed session with senate members, "But [the skills] being presented to us [by repatriates] is not exactly what we need ... The repatriates who were coming back to the metropole belonged to the service sector, which [in France] was already an oversaturated division of the economy."[45] Boulin then proceeded in stark and frank terms about repatriates, stating that only the most extraordinary operation of integration would prevent the Metropole from facing "the downgraded, unproductive milieu ready for agitation".[46] Moreover, in Boulin's view, few repatriates were willing to leave southern France in search of a job when there was no real guarantee of employment.

Boulin's "extraordinary operation of integration" conceived of repatriation in terms of its impact on the French economy as a whole rather than its effects on the individual repatriate. Here, his worries were alleviated since the higher unemployment rate among repatriates did not significantly affect the national unemployment rate, which hovered at 1% in 1962 and 2.1% in 1968. Unemployment among the repatriates was much higher at 4.5%.,[47] Such approaches to repatriation roiled the community and its representatives. It would not be long before repatriates would mobilize their energies against the general and his government.

Anti-Gaullist mobilization of repatriates

In 1965, de Gaulle ran for a second term in office. The final round of the presidential elections brought the general face to face with the much younger and highly ambitious François Mitterrand. Unlike de Gaulle, Mitterrand had grasped the potential advantages of gaining repatriate support. He marshalled the community's resentments against the general. Mitterrand's ties to the pied noir community dated back to the years of the Algerian War when he had served first as Minister of the Interior (1954–1955) and then as Minister of Justice (1956–1957). Repatriates remembered him for his tough stance against the FLN. Mitterrand had authorized the use of the guillotine against FLN prisoners during his term as Minister of Justice, a historical record that was occluded in public memory by Mitterrand's abolishment of the death penalty as President of the Republic in 1981. For

repatriates in 1965, however, he proved a worthy alternative to the unpopular de Gaulle.

The mobilization of the repatriate vote in 1965 would not have been possible without the concerted effort of repatriate representatives from Tunisia and Morocco who had come together as the National Association of the French from North Africa, Overseas, and their Friends [*Association nationale des Français d'Afrique du nord, d'Outre-mer et de leurs amis*] or what became known as the ANFANOMA. The ANFANOMA emerged as the most important repatriate organization after the Algerian War and published the widely distributed serial magazine, the *France Horizon*, which is still in circulation today. In 1962, the ANFANOMA saw in the arrival of the French from Algeria an opportunity to invigorate and expand the association. The ANFANOMA was buoyed by the massive influx of the French from Algeria and its leadership began to characterize the demands made by new arrivals as if they were the interest of the entire community of repatriates from the colonies. Between 1957 and 1962, the *France Horizon* followed the events in Algeria carefully, and printed detailed information about parliamentary debates, laws, decrees, and speeches relating to the *colons* and also reported on developments concerning the Repatriate Law. More importantly, the ANFANOMA actively reached out to the pieds-noirs, encouraging them to register to vote for the upcoming elections, local as well as national.[48]

The ANFANOMA's prominence produced direct contacts with government officials. In November 1962, ANFANOMA representatives met with Alain Peyrefitte, who had succeeded Robert Boulin as State Secretary of Repatriates in 1962. As the president of ANFANOMA reminded Peyrefitte, the French state in fact owed moral and material reparations to all repatriates: "The state must provide immediate assistance to the French who have come from the territories where the French tricolor once flew. The [repatriates] who have suffered through decolonization are entitled to more rights than others."[49] If repatriates deserved special privileges as dispossessed victims of a historic calamity, then they were also entitled as French citizens to receive indemnities. Pierre Dromigny, lawyer and a former delegate to the Algerian Assembly argued the case for indemnities from the standpoint of the 1789 Rights of Man and Citizen: "Property being

a sacred and inviolable right, nothing can be taken from the citizen, unless it is to serve public need. And when property is taken, there must always be just compensation."[50] The French state was thus derelict in its duty to protect the rights of its citizens, Dromigny argued. Moreover, the French in Algeria were products of the state's ambitions in Algeria, and could not be expected to shoulder the nation's colonial past alone.

> The implantation of French [citizens] overseas resulted in a politics of colonization practiced since the centuries by all governments and all regimes. In the same manner, the politics of decolonization has resulted in the last years, from the will of the French nation. Thus the French who found themselves overseas as a result of government decisions now find themselves in the Metropole as a result of the reversed politics of decolonization, which had nothing to do with their will or decision whatsoever.[51]

The ANFANOMA expanded and opened local sections where large numbers of repatriates were living. In 1962, the association could gather audiences in the thousands throughout the southern cities. In Lyon, over 20,000 repatriates gathered in a single assembly in December 1962 to gain redress of their demands from the government.[52] By 1965, repatriates were poised to show the force of their collective discontent. In 1965, ANFANOMA president Léon Battesti courted then candidate François Mitterrand and invited the latter to speak about the problem of amnesties for former OAS members and indemnities for all those who experienced financial and material losses. Mitterrand pledged his willing support. In 1965, Mitterrand proved to be the most repatriate-friendly candidate. He had been vocal in his opposition to de Gaulle after the war and had written openly in support of the repatriates in *France Horizon*.[53] During a major ANFANOMA convention, Battesti spoke to thousands of repatriates about the importance of the 1965 elections and the main electoral slogan of "Anybody but de Gaulle!"[54] The same slogan appeared on *France Horizon's* front page in December 1965. The audience was tuning in.

The first round in the presidential elections showed that de Gaulle had lost what the prefects considered to be a noteworthy number of votes in the southern regions from Perpignan to Nice, precisely those

areas where repatriates from Algeria had been added to the local population. The prefect of the Isère for example reported that the second round results showed the department to be in the anti-Gaullist camp. "It is because of the extreme right-wing [repatriates] that François Mitterrand, the major contender in the second round could surpass expectations in his [electoral] 'score' against general de Gaulle," read the Isère report.[55] The prefect attributed this unprecedented anti-Gaullist vote in the Isère to the repatriates who had recently been added to the population:

> More than 25,000 repatriates from North Africa are now installed in the department, and they comprise without doubt the majority of the 22,000 votes given in the first round to the strongest opponent, Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, the lawyer who had defended the OAS leader general Raoul Salan, and then again in the second round for François Mitterrand.[56]

In the Pyrenées-Orientales, the department near the border with Spain, 20,000 voters had been added to the electorate since 1962. All of the votes obtained by Tixier-Vignancour in the first round were given over to Mitterrand in the second according to the prefect report from Perpignan, the capital city of the Pyrenées-Orientales. "This result is owed to the repatriates from Algeria and elements of the extreme right."[57] Similar remarks flowed in from other prefectures, including the Puy-de-Dôme in the Auvergne region, and the Vaucluse in the south. The Var department on the Mediterranean reported that de Gaulle obtained 47.43% of the votes in the second round against Mitterrand in 1965, whereas the general had received close to 50% of the vote during the 1962 April Referendum. The prefect attributed the 2.5% decline in votes for de Gaulle to the roughly 25,000 votes that the repatriates had presumably given to Mitterrand.[58] Although prefecture reports were more often than not routine demonstrations of allegiance to the leadership in Paris, the nervousness surrounding the repatriate vote in 1965 and the widespread concerns about the concomitant surge in Mitterrand's popularity were well-founded. As Chapter 6 will show, Mitterrand was certainly buoyed by the turnout and would answer the call of the repatriates during his presidential campaign in 1980.

Repatriates speak

The years between 1962 and 1965 saw clashes between repatriates and local Muslim residents in the cities where both populations lived. In 1964, for example, two Provençal cities, Aix-en-Provence and La Seyne-sur-Mer, were hosts to the meetings of the Association of Algerian Workers [*Amicale des travailleurs algériens*], which had communist leanings. In Aix-en-Provence, the association convened in a movie theater, while in La Seyne, where city officials were mostly communists, the *Amicale* made use of the Hôtel de Ville. The latter decision angered ANFANOMA representatives.[59] A group of pieds-noirs, mostly students, held a demonstration to protest the public accommodation of the *Amicale* meetings. As pieds noirs and Muslim immigrants found themselves living side by side as neighbors in housing complexes, memories of the Algerian past inflamed resentments.

Personal testimonies that made their way into the archives attest to the disgruntled repatriates as they awaited aid from a reluctant government and encountered annoyed, even hostile local residents. A repatriate, Madame Argentine N, residing in Aix-en-Provence in 1964 wrote to the main delegate office in nearby Marseilles to complain about a certain delegate worker in particular. Madame N had visited the delegate office on behalf of her elderly mother, a diabetic suffering from the hardening of the arteries. She wrote to complain about a Madame Bardet, who "had a reputation for being rude to all repatriates visiting her office." Bardet had told N that her mother "had no right to any kind of subsidy because she lived with the family." Bardet had apparently replied with "revolting words," according to N, to say that, "in any case, you have no real recourse since the papers will land in my office and I will be the one in charge!"[60]

The disparity between what individuals believed were their entitlements and the circumstances in which they were placed at the time of their arrival shaped their political responsiveness. One pied-noir from Constantine would reply in a newspaper interview shortly after his arrival:

> I sold foodstuffs in my shop in Oran with my wife and my young daughter who helped us. When I was forced to return because we had lost everything including personal furniture, I

> inquired everywhere in France to obtain a loan to buy a shop where we could sell food, even a very little one. I've been waiting for months but it has been very difficult because the costs of running businesses are very expensive here and there are delays in getting bank loans … You know how it is when you work for more than twenty years, and to think that you would live worse than you had before, it's just not possible![61]

In the Seine, local officials received letters from pied-noir repatriates trapped in temporary lodgings or low-income neighborhoods. According to the Paris Bureau of Social Aid, one M. Richet was admitted to the Baudricourt center, in the 13th arrondissement, which had been designated to take in repatriates as of August 1962.[62] A list showed that most of those who entered the Baudricourt transit center were middle-aged, and were born between 1920 and 1921 in Algeria. Grievances addressed by one letter-writer, Richet, were typical:

> As you know, we are repatriates (underlined); we have lost things – a home, a 5 pièce (3 bedroom) villa, a job, car, furniture, which I hear still remains unsold … we believed the promises made by the government in the December 1961 Repatriate Law. We believed we would be provided subsidies, benefits and premiums, and you know all this was false, at least for those who are not Algerians![63]

He goes on to list all the bad things there: bad food, poor kitchen facilities, and "and as most of my neighbors are Arabs, it's a real clamor – and well, should we ever be seen with a pork cutlet … I would not even venture to mention the ambiance – all sorts of noises brawls, domestic fights. I would imagine that's the lot of many of the buildings." Richet will not pay until he can verify that all others who have been penalized for delayed payments actually paid up. He demands relocation and goes on that "there are not only Arabs, but also Greeks, who while not even married dare to exploit family allocations."[64]

Anti-immigrant sentiment was hardly unique to Richet. The prevalence of anti-Algerian and anti-immigrant sentiment among

repatriates has meaning insofar as these help explain the urgent need among the repatriates to demonstrate their French identity and belonging. The Evian negotiations had shown that citizenship alone could not guarantee their acceptance by the Metropole. Richet's disparaging comments about his Arab (and Greek) neighbors were meant to emphasize his own European and French difference and apparent sophistication. The very banality of his complaints spoke to Richet's efforts to show that he shared the anti-Arab sentiments of his Metropolitan counterparts. But repatriates were inclined to mobilize such sentiments in order to advance a collective cause and it is this that the ANFANOMA was prepared to exploit in earnest.

Association leaders appealed to their members to vote only for those candidates who would fight for reparations and amnesty for repatriates. The *France Horizon* advised that each voter consult the "Civic Information Committee" set up in local electoral districts by the ANFANOMA. Information about the candidates were collected and distributed by the association.[65] Indeed the diffusion of information in the name of the association could be decisive. The ANFANOMA could sway votes to help candidates who could promise results for their repatriate constituency. As the secretary general of ANFANOMA noted, "certain sections of the association have reaped spectacular results in the last municipal elections by distributing information [about the candidates] and we have decided to adopt this [strategy] throughout the entire hexagon."[66] At this time, over 200 ANFANOMA sections were founded throughout France.[67] Volunteers were asked to verify the registration of member repatriates in each commune while newly arrived repatriates were advised to register immediately with their local ANFANOMA section. The sick or elderly were even provided special services and means of transportation to the polls.[68]

The ANFANOMA continued with their mass congresses after de Gaulle had won his second term in office in 1965. In Toulouse, thousands of repatriates convened in the *Palais des sports*, a local arena. Again, the main focus of the gathering was indemnities. The commotion caused by repatriate gatherings and rallies were such that municipal council members, mayors, and other administrators could no longer afford to ignore their collective voices. The representatives of the Haute-

Garonne and the Tarn made visits to the ANFANOMA, while mayors and municipal council members from cities near Toulouse regularly appeared at ANFANOMA conventions in their cities.[69] In February 1967 during the municipal elections, *France Horizon* again selected candidates they hoped would speak for repatriate causes. Often, the candidates themselves were repatriates from Algeria. In the Seine, for example, one Roger Gromand was profiled as a candidate "who knew North Africa well because he had held several functionary positions there."[70] A practicing lawyer, Gromand also had a diploma from the School of Oriental Languages. Another, Roger Fenech, was described as a repatriate of Tunisian origins, and was president of the ANFANOMA section in Lyon. The advertisement read: "Fenech is presented in the second district in Lyon, where tens of thousands of repatriates are living. Pradel, the mayor of Lyon, has given his endorsement."[71] Even Paris had its share of repatriate candidates. Paul Garson, for example, was a lawyer whose parents had lived in Algeria for many years. The *France Horizon* noted the following: "He fought for France in World War II, and was running against a Gaullist candidate and a communist candidate in the 17th arrondissement."[72]

The ANFANOMA remained undeterred during the 1960s by the government's firm refusal to discuss indemnities. Individual members of ANFANOMA in fact took their claims to the tribunals. One repatriate lawyer argued: "it would be impossible to suppose that judicial rulings by the [Algerian] Supreme Court would prescribe restitutions or reparations."[73] Then who was responsible? It was the state that was most "morally" indebted to repatriates, ANFANOMA insisted. Moreover, they argued, the Republican Constitution clearly states that, "the nation proclaims the solidarity and equality of all French citizens before the responsibility of the state in national calamities."[74] Was it not the French nation that had pledged to uphold the Evian Accords and all that they promised to its European inhabitants in Algeria? And had not the French majority voted "yes" to the 1962 referendum, which ratified the Accords? According to repatriate lawyer Duverger, the referendum was an official endorsement of the Accords and in effect had activated the otherwise defunct treaty so that it should have binding legal effect within the bounds of French jurisdiction.[75]

Repatriates also challenged local rulings by going to the highest constitutional court in the country, the *Conseil d'État*, which assessed

the integrity of court rulings. Such was the case when a Toulouse tribunal rejected a case brought forth by a repatriate who asked for compensation for his losses during the war. As the Toulouse court saw it, "there exist[ed] no legal measures to distribute the reparations demanded by the litigant, and therefore the request is denied.[76] The repatriate plaintiff appealed to the judges of the *Conseil d'Etat*, the high court, which oversees the application of laws in France.[77] The legal reporter for *France Horizon* contested the decision of the Toulouse tribunal, arguing that the lack of "legal measures" was not in keeping with the spirit or principle of the Boulin law: "it was the Boulin law, which stated that, a law will be fixed in conjunction with circumstances, and specify indemnities in the case of spoliation and indefinite loss of property belonging to the repatriate. How can we then say in principle, that there are 'no legal measures' in favor of indemnities for lost property?"[78] Through such cases, a legal and political articulation of repatriate rights was developed for the purpose of protecting repatriate rights.

There are a few examples of court cases in which a repatriate litigant received a favorable ruling. One such case was brought to an administrative court in Marseille in April 1966. The plaintiff was "M.A.," who had worked as a flour miller in Algeria, and was defended by a repatriate lawyer. M.A. brought charges against the Interior Ministry for denying him money for his so-called funds for career conversion, which were reserved especially for repatriates who had been self-employed before coming to France. Unlike functionaries who could be reintroduced to their administrative bureaus in the Metropole, or other salaried employees who could in principle rely on unions to reincorporate them into their respective areas of work, the independent entrepreneur had no such recourse. The court decided in favor of M.A. because in this case, there was a clear error by officials administering the distribution of the said allocation of funds for career conversion.[79]

In Paris, a SA RAL Gauci & Co., which had owned a commercial weapons and arms business in Philippeville in Constantine, brought their case to the administrative court against the Ministry of the Army and the Secretary of Algerian Affairs, employing on their behalf a repatriate lawyer named Portolano. In March 1962, just before the Evian Accords were signed, the entire stock of the company's ammunition had been seized by the police following the

orders of the prefect of Constantine. The company demanded the entire value of the merchandise and all interest on lost sales starting from March 12, 1962. The ammunition had gone missing when the Algerian government apparently relocated the weaponry to a military camp in Pehau, Algeria in July 1962, at which point France lost track of its location. The court found that the initial action taken by the French police was in accordance with the law, which declared that all arms should be taken and placed under the control of the French army. The court held, however, that it was the fault of the French army for losing track of armaments that had been under its surveillance. Despite this, the court ruled that it lacked the ability to award indemnities for lost property and that the case be resubmitted to the French army.

Judicial rulings against the repatriates were based on the absence of legal precedent or legal remedies. Symbolic and largely unsuccessful as the cases were legally, ANFANOMA made a point of publicizing them to its members and to subscribers. The point was to show that repatriates could in fact take legal action and claim rights. For the most part, public opinion did not agree with the repatriates that they should be compensated. Many believed the repatriates had already received sufficient aid. Of the 1000 people surveyed by the independent national polling services of SOFRES, 48% believed that one-tenth of the annual national budget, the amount reserved in 1970 by the government for repatriates, was "sufficient." 18% believed that the government had paid out more than was necessary, and only 16% responded that the financial compensation was "insufficient."[80] To the survey question, "Many repatriates have abandoned their property in the territories they were forced to leave. In your opinion, what should the French state do [for them]," 37% responded that the government should restrict indemnities to the most deprived, 23% believed that the poor should take priority, and 22% believed that indemnities should be shouldered by the newly independent country where the properties were located.[81]

The general opinion in France during the mid-1960s and early 1970s was that repatriates were neither victims nor refugees, but people who had freely chosen France over Algeria. It was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that indemnities would be considered

by the government as a necessary extension of repatriates' rights as citizens. During the 1960s, Franco-Algerian relations took precedence over repatriate demands. Gradually, a different context took shape as de Gaulle's presidency came to a close, bringing on changes in the government's attitude toward indemnities for the repatriates.

5
Repatriation after de Gaulle: Pompidou and Giscard

The Harkis are not like other Algerians

While repatriation politics in the immediate aftermath of the Algerian War was about promoting the slogan of national solidarity and deferring indemnities, Gaullists also faced criticism from within official circles especially with regard to the treatment of Muslim repatriates or harkis. These criticisms would urge a new approach to the harkis, but not until the mid 1970s would actual laws be put in place to change their situation in France. It was Georges Pompidou, de Gaulle's prime minister and later himself president of the Republic from 1969 to 1974, who dealt directly with, and issued responses to criticisms leveled at the Gaullist government's treatment of the harkis. This chapter traces the contentious debate within official circles surrounding the harkis during the 1960s and examines the ways in which this debate intersected with the rising concerns over the presence of Algerians in France.

Pompidou was in many ways the epigone of his more illustrious predecessor. His subsequent political record as president was evidence of the resilience of the Gaullist legacy even after the upheaval of May 1968, which had made it all but impossible for Gaullism to remain a viable political stance. May '68 did not radically alter the ways in which officials at the state level perceived of decolonization and the Algerian War. There was no new initiative to confront the colonial past or effort to reflect on the Algerian struggle as a fight for independence. Instead, the social upheaval of '68 only confirmed for de Gaulle and his successors that the assimilation of the French of Algeria as repatriates would be critical to burying the Algerian past. In June and July of 1968, on the

heels of the May upheaval, de Gaulle thus granted amnesty to members of the OAS.[1] The years immediately following de Gaulle's resignation in 1969 saw the government improve relations with repatriates while restraining the liberties of Algerian workers living in France. May '68 therefore had mirror opposite effects at the popular and state levels. While invigorating a more anti-colonial stance among intellectuals and students, '68 urged officials to mend relations with repatriates and restrict the liberties granted to other groups from Algeria.

In her incisive analysis of "May '68 and its afterlives," Kristin Ross underlines the impact that decolonization had on the "dislocations" of agentive perspectives among students and intellectuals as they reached across the social and cultural divide and formed alliances with the workers. The memory of the Algerian War and the brutalities of police oppression formed an important backdrop to this alliance, as Ross explains.[2] Ross invokes Jacques Rancière who viewed 1968 as "a political opening to the otherness represented by the two classical 'others' of political modernity, the worker and the colonial subject."[3] To consider the extended repercussions of the Algerian War, Ross frames the analysis of '68 to include the years leading up to the mid-1970s when the enthusiasm for political action that had led to the eruption of May '68 finally acceded to disillusionment and conservatism. The period analyzed in Ross's work overlapped precisely with Pompidou's term as president. But at the state level, a pessimistic view of immigration and the attendant anxieties about Algerians in France prompted officials to take the opposite course with regard to "otherness." With Pompidou as president, repatriation politics began gravitating toward issues concerning the harkis, in ways that disparaged the Algerians who were not harkis. For the government, any consideration of the "other" only resulted in tougher restrictions on the rights of non-repatriate migrants from Algeria, and a more reticent approach to the Algerian past.

Prior to '68, criticism of the Gaullists' treatment of Muslim repatriates had originated with officials who were in charge of providing social services to migrant Algerian workers and their families in France.[4] In 1958, as president elect of the newly inaugurated Fifth Republic, de Gaulle had created a network of welfare programs to provide social aid to Algerian workers and their families, known as the Social Action Fund or FAS [*Fonds d'action sociale*].[5] The FAS maintained operations after 1962. In the fall of 1962, FAS officials

began to question the validity of providing services to Muslim Algerians who had come to France as migrant workers prior to independence.[6] After all, these Algerians were now citizens of an independent and sovereign nation and had become foreigners in France. The director of the FAS, Michel Massenet, requested that the prime minister redefine the proper role of the FAS. In 1964, Massenet reported that social workers who had hitherto devoted services to Algerian immigrants no longer felt justified in doing so:

> We have noted a certain disillusionment ... with the resignation of FAS representatives who were devoted [to their job] and had shown unmatched competence ... now, those who have carried out their work in the national interest hesitate to carry out their tasks, realizing that their mission no longer has a *raison d'être* after Algerian independence. Would they be qualified to intervene in favor of Muslim workers from Algeria who have for the most part become foreigners?[7]

Pompidou as prime minister, remained sensitive to the demand for cheap labor amongst French industries at this time. He was reluctant to restrict FAS services to Algerian workers. Pompidou chose instead to approach the complaints of the FAS with caution: Massenet was to continue distributing aid to Algerian workers for an additional three years until 1966, but the FAS budget would be reduced by 50%. Pompidou added that private industries and employers should now consider hiring the harkis, who were French nationals and former combatants of the French army, and therefore clearly distinct from other Algerians.[8] But in another statement made within the same year, the prime minister proclaimed that immigration was "a means of creating a certain flexibility in the labor market and avoiding social tension."[9] If the principle of French citizenship compelled a more attentive consideration of the harkis, the needs of the industries took precedence. In 1966, the Minister of Social Affairs, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, concurred with the prime minister's views. He stated that "[i]llegal immigration itself is not without a certain value, for were we to pursue a policy of strict enforcement of the rules and international agreements governing this area, we would perhaps lack the manpower we need."[10]

Officials in law enforcement and national security were among the strongest opponents of the Gaullist government's liberal policy towards Algerian immigrants. The Coordination Services for Information on North Africans or SCINA [*Service de coordination des informations nord-africaines*], an organization that specialized in the surveillance of North African workers, voiced criticism against what they perceived as privileges accorded to Algerian migrant workers by the Franco-Algerian cooperation treaties. On the one hand, SCINA authorities admitted that "the presence on French soil of numerous Algerian workers" led to the "most solid link between Algeria and France," and agreed that money sent home to Algeria by the workers was, "an important guarantee for the subsistence of the Muslim population in Algeria."[11] On the other hand, they chastised government leaders for allowing the FLN government to "abuse its extra-territorial privileges" in France:

> The FLN possesses a sort of 'arsenal' in France: its own courts, social services networks, and its own police. The right to open Arab schools on our territory will presumably be allowed by the Algerian government. Ours is a government of capitulations, because France will have conceded to an Arab state.[12]

What was striking was the distinction that intelligence bureaus constantly drew between the harkis and other Algerians. This distinction in effect classified and ordered the different Muslim Algerians in France by way of their loyalty to France during the Algerian War.

The mid to late 1960s was a "transitional period in the evolution of the discourse of immigration in France," as Maxim Silverman has noted.[13] It was also a time, as Silverman explains, when a "laissez-faire approach towards immigration of the early to mid-1960s switched to a more interventionist approach by the state."[14] Immigration was transitioning from being an economic concern to a social problem, especially when it concerned immigration from Algeria.[15] This consideration of the priority that the harkis supposedly had over other Algerians, however, was not really based on genuine sympathy toward the harkis' situation in France. SAT officials warned against the import of internecine tensions among Algerians to the Metropole, and noted that the conflict between FLN nationalists and harkis in Algeria, which

resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of harkis, might very well create unwanted disturbances in France, especially in areas where they could end up living together. The harkis were dangerous, the SAT report warned, and "although they were non-commissioned, they were fully capable of handling all kinds of light firearms, which they had learned to use while serving alongside France in the infantry [during the war]."[16] Despite their misgivings, the SAT nevertheless argued that it was the harkis and not immigrant laborers who should be the main recipients of social aid:

> In conclusion, and without making remarks that would amount to discrimination against Algerians in the Seine department, the moment has perhaps come to modify the distribution of social aid for Algerians, so that it is given foremost to those who must bear the consequences of having served France.[17]

The prefect of police forwarded the SAT report to Massenet and added that, "the report underlined the need to give priority to [French Muslim] refugees and not to the traditional Algerian migrants in areas of employment and housing."[18] Algerian migrant workers were described as arrogant beneficiaries of privileges that were otherwise denied to all other minorities from the former colonies. In a monthly meeting of the SAT in February of 1963, one official claimed that, "most Algerian workers have come to assume that they have priority in employment above other African workers, notably the blacks [*noirs*], the Moroccans, and the Tunisians."[19]

SAT officials meanwhile pointed to a troubling pattern among the harkis. The harkis declared their loyalty on paper but were reluctant to apply for full French nationality when the opportunity arose. The passive attitude toward citizenship differed from other Algerian immigrants, who actively sought French nationality, especially if they had worked in France prior to Algerian independence. But the SAT nevertheless defended the harkis: "while it is true that most Algerians who opted for French nationality were assimilated and had been in the Metropole a long time, the ex-harkis and former civilian employees were often reluctant to apply for [French] nationality for fear of reprisals against their parents still living in Algeria."[20]

The SAT pointed out that a great number of Algerian workers had, at one time or another, obtained help from the FLN or the Communist

Party. In fact, the PCF had incited Algerian workers to commit violent acts against the harkis, according to the report.

The PCF had been embroiled in a legal confrontation with the Prefect of Police a few years before, during the so-called Operation Harki, which began in 1959. This was Maurice Papon's recruitment of pro-French harkis to track down and arrest FLN suspects in Paris. Trained in France, the harkis were installed in the 13th arrondissement in Paris in March of 1960. By the fall of 1960, 600 harkis were scattered across the southern *arrondissements* of Paris.[21] The PCF accused the harkis of being colonial agents of the French police and thus accomplices in the systematic abuse of Algerian workers in France.

In 1961, Leftist newspapers published several articles about the notorious "Harki Affair," which involved several Algerian workers, two in particular, who claimed they were tortured and abused by a group of harkis. During this time, rumors had already circulated around Paris that the harkis were engaged in violent attacks against Algerian workers suspected of participating in FLN political missions. The Communist paper *L'Humanité* published detailed and gruesome testimonies by the two victims, A. Medjmedj and M. Khaldi who were taken from their homes by a "harki lieutenant" and imprisoned without judicial recourse. The two men were charged with having smuggled in illegal FLN pamphlets.[22] The incident had apparently taken place in the HLM apartment on rue Montreuil, where the two Algerian workers were living. According to the testimony, the harki officer barged in on the two men and brandished the random papers that had been lying on the floor and claimed these to be censored FLN pamphlets, hurling invectives and threatening the suspects with knives. Once in prison, the two were then beaten and subjected to water torture.[23] Photos were printed in *L'Humanité* to verify the bruises and scars suffered by the Algerian workers.

SAT officials used the incidence as evidence of the animosities that divided the different communities of Algerians living in France, and proposed monitoring the relations between the harkis and Algerian workers whenever possible. In the southern department of the Gard, for example, a change in accommodations for a community of harkis gave rise to contentions between officials organizing the relocation and the police. The latter raised issue with the fact that only the harkis were being placed under such close surveillance and not other

Algerians in the department. The notorious Camp de Rivesaltes, which had housed harkis, was being closed down due to its dilapidated condition. All residents of Rivesaltes were moved to another camp in Lascours. Officials meticulously screened the harkis again during the move, verifying names, places of origin, numbers and names of family members, and the length of time they had spent in the camp.[24] The performance of this task, which took up much time and resources, generated complaints from the police as to why such monitoring should be conducted only for the harkis and not other Algerians. An official in the prefecture's security bureau complained about the leniency shown to Algerian workers:

> If I seem to be insistent on examining each of the cases of harkis before registering their status as repatriates. I do not see why we should remain so reserved about the much more problematic declarations filed by Algerian migrants, many of whom hardly try to conceal their affiliation with the FLN; [nor do I see] why we are instructed to refrain from portraying the [immigrant] in negative light, unless they have committed grave crimes.[25]

The 1970s brought new concerns for the government as the children of harki families, many of whom were born in France, began to voice discontent with their living conditions and with the way they were treated relative to Algerian workers. The timing of these political protests mattered – the political consciousness of the harki children were maturing at a time when Algerian immigration was increasingly becoming a social and political concern in France. In response to the protests of the harki children living in the camps, Pompidou's administration discussed the possible dismantling of the camps as a step toward the social integration of the harkis. But the dismantling of the camps would not take place until the next administration, led by former Gaullist and conservative liberal, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Liberating the harkis

In the fall of 1973, the prefect of the department of the Lot-et-Garonne, Paul Feuilloloy, convened two gatherings with local authorities and journalists at the two camp sites for Muslim and Indochinese repatriates located in the department. The goal was to discuss the future of

the camps and their residents.[26] The local administrators and elected deputies who were present at these meetings expressed reservations as to whether the camps should be dismantled. Feuilloloy wrote that the French nationals [*ressortissants français*] of North African origins in the Bias camp fell under two categories: the first was the actual ex-auxiliaries, that is, the harkis, who were in fact "loyal to France, and posed no major problems;" and the second was the family members of harkis. This latter group, according to the prefect's report, felt "misunderstood, embittered, and badly treated," whereas their fathers were still faithful to, and less willing to voice resistance towards the French government.[27] A social aid worker who attended the meeting alongside Feuilloloy submitted her own report in which she observed that the second generation was very different from their fathers. She wrote about the attitudes of young girls and adolescent boys and noted that while "the younger girls seemed attracted to a western lifestyle, the young men seemed to revert to traditional Muslim customs."[28] The young men were described as "defiant," and resentful toward a government they believed had brought on great unhappiness to their parents.[29] Feuilloloy's visit was part of the government's efforts to show concern for the harkis as reports of agitation from within the camps began to trickle in from the prefectures. Officials like Feuilloloy deliberated the long-term consequences of letting the discontent fester among the younger generation of harkis.

The radicalization of the harki youth did become the impetus for change in the 1970s. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who was elected president in 1974, had courted the repatriate vote during the presidential election when he ran against François Mitterrand. This time, repatriates mobilized in favor of Giscard. Giscard had promised indemnities for the repatriates and expressed a desire to restrict Algerian immigration to France. Meanwhile, the deputy mayor of Hyères in the department of the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur in the southeast, Mario Benard, was charged with a special mission to determine whether the harkis should be accorded full veteran status., On November 21, 1974, the legislature adopted a law that finally recognized the harkis as veterans of the French military. Soon thereafter, the pensions bureau of the Secretary of State for Veterans was called upon by the National Assembly to allocate pensions for the harkis as French veterans, and was instructed to consider "any injuries the harkis might have incurred while they were detained [in Algeria] as a result of their services to France."[30]

Such compensatory measures signaled a move away from improvised aid to a more formalized system of allocations commensurate with the particular services provided by the harkis. In classifying the harkis as veterans and former Muslim administrators as retired functionaries, officials evaluated their services as contributions to the nation and to national solidarity. No reference to the colonial context was made, however. In practice, formal measures to recognize the harkis were not always respected, and discrimination continued. According to Interior Ministry reports, local public employees repeatedly made mistakes and denied "French Muslims" i.e. harkis proper documentation, even as administrators were repeatedly reminded to exercise care.[31] While the new measures conveyed the government's intent to improve the lot of the harkis, few of them or their family members could attest to changes in their everyday lives as a result.

In 1975, several related incidents occurred in the harki camps in the department of the Gard that made their integration a national issue. On June 20, 1975, four young harki men of the Camp St. Laurent-des-Arbres took a 60-year-old security guard from the neighboring camp hostage. It appeared that the young men in the camps had received instructions from a certain M'hamed Laradji, leader of a recently formed association of French Muslim repatriates known as the Confederation of French Muslim Repatriates from Algeria and Friends [*Confédération des français musulmans d'Algérie et des amis*] or CFMRAA.[32] The June 20th issue of *France-Soir* cited the comments of a Muslim repatriate and ex-deputy from Algiers named Kaouah concerning the deplorable situation of the harkis in France. Kaouah stated that, "thirteen years after the Algerian exodus, how many harkis are in France? 500,000! We still have no right of free travel such as those enjoyed by immigrant workers. We demand that the French Muslims be allowed to exercise the same rights and guarantees for travel to and from Algeria as do the [Algerian] immigrants."[33] Kaouah added that in recent years, private rather than public initiatives had done more to help resolve the employment crisis among the harkis. The "private initiatives" Kaouah was referring to were ones taken up by the pieds-noirs or by former French officers who had occasionally offered aid to the harkis in France, such as the "industrial plant managed by an ex-officer [of the Algerian war] who only wished to hire harkis.[34]

On March 19, 1971, exactly nine years after the signing of the Evian Accords, an ex-deputy from French Algeria, Laklouf Galhem,

self-immolated on the Boulevard Raspail in Paris to protest the government's disregard for French Muslim repatriates. Two years later on August 1, 1973, the first association of "North African Repatriates" was formed by Ahmed Kaberseli, but met with little success.[35] In 1973 and 1974, a number of associations were formed but the representatives of these associations were not always of harki background. In fact, most of the representatives had served as elected officials and were francophone Muslim Algerians with intimate ties to the colonial administration in French Algeria. These were the elite members of the repatriate community who began to speak in the name of the harki community.

The first such association to receive critical media and political attention was the FNRCI, or the National Front of French Repatriates of the Islamic Faith [*Front national des français rapatriés de confession islamique*], founded by a prominent ex-deputy of the former Algerian assembly, Ahmed Djebbour, in 1972–1973. Djebbour was also a close acquaintance of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the ex-paratrooper in the Algerian War and leader of the nascent right-wing National Front.[36] An internal memo of the prime minister's office noted that FNRCI's behind-the-scenes agitator was the same M'hamed Laradji who would later incite the hostage incident in 1975.[37] Laradji had been a *qadi* in French Algeria, and had briefly taken on the role of president of the FNRCI in France before he and his followers splintered into a separate association in 1974. The vice-president of the FNRCI was a European and former member of the OAS.[38] As the more elite members of the Algerian repatriate community began to organize in France, they formed close ties with the right-wing ranks of pied-noir representatives and associations.

The FNRCI would not have been of any real consequence to officials had it not flexed its electoral muscles by rallying repatriates of Algerian origins to the Giscard presidential camp in 1974.[39] In May 1975, a few months into the Giscard presidency, a permanent inter-ministerial commission was created, and an Algerian repatriate, Mahdi Belhaddad, was placed at its head. The stated goal of the commission was "to study the problem of the French of Islamic origins [*français de souche islamique*]," the distinction given to repatriates of harki and other mostly elite Muslim Algerian origins. At this time, both harki representatives and the government adopted an ethno-cultural identification for the harkis. The persistence of the

repatriate representatives and harki children were starting to pay off. In June 1975, a memo was issued by the Direction of the Population and Migration attached to the Ministry of Work. "Just who were the harkis?" the report began. "They were the 185,000 men recruited to provide various military services to the nation's army," the report continued.[40] "On November 21, 1974, Parliament adopted a new law to assign veteran status to all French Muslims who had served in the military as auxiliaries."[41] But the law, as the report explained, was not always faithfully applied because "certain administrative services were greatly confused and could not tell the difference between the harkis who are French nationals of the Islamic faith, and Muslim immigrants who are actually Algerian citizens."[42] The report also noted the mistakes committed by rank and file functionaries as they "failed to note the unquestionable rights of repatriates, which were in principle equal to all other Metropolitans."[43]

The media exposed a more negative profile. The harkis frequently made the pages of regional dailies, but mainly in stories involving skirmishes with local Muslim shopkeepers. In Avignon, Muslim storeowners, usually of Algerian descent, reported vandalism and attacks allegedly by harkis. In December 1975, Avignon business owners of Algerian background – mainly liquor storeowners and restaurant managers, complained that the harkis who had been recently released from internment sought out businesses owned by non-harki Algerians to cause havoc. Some were allegedly involved in extortion and racketeering.[44] They were reported to be mostly young sons of former harki combatants and were now armed with hunting rifles and pistols. Some had apparently stashed arms and explosives near the camps to use for this very purpose.[45]

Perturbed by recent incidents of violence, deputy and former Gaullist Jacques Dominati approached Prime Minister Raymond Barre in 1977 with the idea of opening communication with the BIAC [*bureaux d'information, d'aide administrative et de conseils*], the network of offices set up to distribute information, administrative assistance, and counsel to the harkis.[46] Dominati recommended that the prime minister pay a visit to the more prominent harki repatriate associations during the festivities of *Aid el Kébir*, the Muslim lunar feast, which celebrated the end of the pilgrimage month. The underlying message was that it was better to engage the harkis than to ignore them.

Dominati predicted that the harkis would become a potential voting bloc. A document from the prime minister's office testified to this effect: the report titled, "The Situation of French Muslims and Repatriates of Non-European Origins" warned that if the government were to count the heads of all "non-European repatriates, including those from the Asian and West and sub-Saharan Africa, this number would amount to more than 500,000 ... and the only way to reduce all difficulties in the upcoming 1978 elections would be for the prime minister to put the entire weight of his authority on this matter."[47]

The prime minister in turn dispatched a memo to all prefects in 1977, which emphasized that the naturalization of the harkis was of the utmost urgency, as was the normalization of the legal status of all Algerians in France. In addition, the prime minister reminded all prefects that they must

> punish and prevent all discrimination against [Muslim] repatriates reported to the prefecture; Preference in employment must be given to the repatriate youth. Vacant posts must be offered to the French Muslims from North Africa; you must help the auxiliaries of the army to acquire property; Finally, you must put an end to any acts that might risk conveying to our compatriots that they are anything other than French.[48]

The government's positive attitude toward the harkis stood in stark contrast to the rhetoric applied to other Algerians at this time. In 1974, Giscard formally restricted immigration from Algeria, emphasizing the need to normalize the status of those who had been living in France since the Algerian War. In 1974, there were 3.5 to 4 million Algerians in France. A new post of Secretary of State to Foreign Workers was created under Giscard.[49] In 1977, the third minister to hold the post, Lionel Stoléru, inaugurated a "repatriation" plan for all non-naturalized immigrants in France who would willingly return to their country of citizenship. A sum of 10,000 francs was offered per individual. This plan failed terribly, however, due to opposition from employers of immigrant workers and the *Conseil d'état,* which saw the measure as contradictory to the principle of integration. The plan was quietly abandoned under Mitterrand in 1981.[50]

On paper, it looked like the harkis stood to benefit from the domestic hostility toward Algerian workers and their families. But in truth very little was done to actually improve the conditions endured by the harkis and their families.

Indemnifying the pieds noirs

During Pompidou's term, the pieds noirs were making significant strides in their efforts to obtain indemnities. There was some government effort to look into indemnities for the repatriates in the early 1970s, even before Giscard came to the presidency. But it was Giscard who extended an official response to repatriates, and who, after making a commitment to them as a presidential candidate, received their collective electoral support.[51] On the eve of his second campaign trip during the 1973 presidential elections, Giscard received a delegation of repatriates. After this meeting, M. Viard, the spokesperson for the ANFANOMA, announced that "in due concern for the place that repatriates occupy in the national community," the ANFANOMA would encourage its members to support Giscard for the presidency. In response to a journalist who inquired about the reasons for ANFANOMA's support for Giscard, Viard replied that, Giscard had given his word that he was ready and committed to making substantive and effective changes, first to ensure the full indemnification of repatriates, which would be a departure from de Gaulle's rejection of indemnities, and second, to pursue full amnesty for all those implicated in the pro-French Algerian movement during the Algerian War. Lastly, Viard noted that Giscard was committed to helping French Muslim compatriots who were also repatriates.

Giscard had come to the presidency at a time when Franco-Algerian relations were also entering a new phase. In 1965, Algerian president Ahmed Ben Bella was ousted by a coup led up by his Defense Minister, Houari Boumédiène. Boumédiène then seized power to become Algeria's president. The Boumédiène regime, backed by the military, established an authoritarian and state-centered model of economic development while it touted a militant socialist ideology.[52] Algeria gradually emerged as an important member of the nonaligned movement at this time, and allowed Boumédiène to exercise a much more forceful voice in negotiations with foreign countries. Boumédiène was more assertive than his predecessor had been in

demanding Algeria's rights to oil extraction facilities, and was ultimately able to nationalize facilities in 1965 as was explained in the previous chapter.[53] By 1971, Algeria's nationalization of its natural resources and facilities was near completion, allowing Boumédiène to pronounce decolonization complete. But while Boumédiène voiced confidence in face of foreign investors, Algeria had accumulated a trade imbalance with France, and continued to invite French technicians and engineers or *coopérants* to manage their state-run development projects.[54]

In 1974, Algeria's Minister of Industry Belaid Abdesselam reaffirmed Algeria's good relations with France. Boumédiène attempted to square Algeria's identity as an independent nation with economic exigencies and a nation with cordial diplomatic ties with France. France, after all, was the largest importer of Algeria's natural resources. Algeria in return acknowledged the importance of French intervention in the extraction and export of its natural resources. This intervention was also crucial given the increasing disparity between the high cost of extracting its resources and the protracted returns from sales and production, which exacerbated Algeria's debt crisis during the late 1970s.[55] France thus gained an upper hand in its economic negotiations with Algeria.

From the late 1960s onward, Pompidou and his successor President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing could respond to repatriate demands without weighing the possible risks this would pose to Franco-Algerian relations. Giscard never made overt declarations about the precedence of diplomatic relations with Algeria over repatriate indemnities as his predecessors had done. In fact, in February 1978, Giscard d'Estaing declared the Evian Accords no longer binding or viable for Franco-Algerian relations. Giscard had always been a supporter of indemnities. As head of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance during Pompidou's administration, Giscard was responsible for the landmark decree, the first of its kind, which had declared the need to indemnify "the French who were dispossessed of property situated in territories placed previously under the sovereignty, the protectorship, or trusteeship of France."[56] The decree assured that the value of agricultural lands would be compensated according to fixed valuations of the irrigated proportion of each arable field, the average usage of dams, various cultivations produced on the lands, while immobile properties would be accorded a fixed value by the measure of actual dimensions. Cities and provincial towns in Algeria

were zoned according to the number of inhabitants who resided in them prior to decolonization, while real estate was valued according to the specific location of the properties.

Giscard and Boumédiène's relationship became rocky, marked by tense moments and impromptu policy decisions. It was Giscard who closed the door on immigration from Algeria in 1974 following the global oil crisis, and specified new regulations in the movement and employment of Algerian laborers in France.[57] When Boumédiène voiced public discontent at this time toward the French treatment of Algerian migrants, Giscard made gestures to improve the living conditions of Algerians who were currently employed in France and opened a Secretariat of Emigrant Labor to handle such matters. In exchange for improving the welfare of immigrants in France, Algeria was obliged to relax controls over several frozen financial accounts and capital assets that had been withheld from the Europeans after their flight from Algeria. Boumédiène released the money to France.[58]

Repatriates of the ANFANOMA gained confidence during Giscard's presidency as France obtained diplomatic leverage with Algeria. Their pleas with, and pressures on, the government met with successes. In 1977, a parliamentary debate brought together past advocates of *Algérie française*, including Jacques Soustelle, along with key repatriate representatives who took the podium to make a case for indemnities. Jean Bonhomme delivered a defense of the "pieds noirs who had sacrificed all for nothing. The Algerian struggle has not liberated the country but rather sentenced its people to perennial misery … Do you remember when we the pieds noirs were condemned as exploiters! colonialiasts! imperialists and fascists when in reality we were the victims trapped in fear and desperation, our backs to the wall?"[59] There were three key points to indemnification as Bonhomme contended. The first was moral. The pieds noirs were betrayed by France and should now be compensated for this abandonment; the second was political. The repatriates merited compensation because they were made "victims to an illusory politics of Algerian emancipation." Illusory, because for Bonhomme, independence had only brought on poverty and degradation for the Algerians. The third point was material. Bonhomme argued simply that the state owed its citizens compensation after having provoked a national and historic catastrophe.

> In place of a country that was ready to attain a democratic life, there exists in Algeria today penury and fatigue among people forced to accept the socialism of the nationalists. This is a country where democratic fiction obscures the reality of a militaristic administration … a country in regression economically and politically.[60] The Algerians have all the assets in hand, the petrol under their soil, and have shown not the slightest concern for their expatriates and the population that lives in misery …

Jacques Soustelle also intervened to denounce the "illegal referendums" that had enabled the French government to ratify Algeria's self-determination in 1962: "The Referendum of January 8th was voted with 55.9% of the Metropolitan vote and only 33.1% of the Algerian vote. The April 8th Referendum was not even voted in Algeria."[61] Soustelle then lashed at de Gaulle's past acquiescence to the "excesses" of Ahmed Ben Bella: "Repatriates are not exploiters, but victims of expropriation!"[62]

Giscard finally passed the Law on Indemnities in 1978. The law had symbolic significance in the history of repatriation politics. For the first time, the French state had as good as admitted to its role in the displacement of the French in Algeria. As mentioned in the introduction to this book, the passage of the law grabbed media headlines and was considered a momentous occasion, with Giscard himself appearing on television to declare the law's historic importance: France had given due recognition to the repatriates' "contribution to the grandeur of the nation." Indemnities thus became constitutive of the post-colonial commemoration of the Algerian past, but as such, left little room to consider the settler colonial history and the repercussions of this history on the Muslim majority. Giscard's administration also set up an Agency for the Indemnification of Repatriates, and responded to repatriate demands. Although he had not abandoned the notion of "national solidarity," solidarity now referred to the duty of the nation to accord honor to repatriates, and to pay homage to those who had been wronged by the injustices of decolonization. For, as Bonhomme wished to remind his fellow citizens:

> We must stop acting and speaking as if France had, with the departure of its citizens, permitted Algeria to recover its liberty and

> independence, and attain democracy. With regard to the country at present left to misery and violence, we should place greater importance on the value and works of the French of Algeria.[63]

The 1970s thus saw the state's increased effort to appease the repatriates, including the harkis. As Franco-Algerian relations turned in France's favor, Giscard showed more confidence in granting repatriates their indemnities while giving recognition to the harkis. Algerians fared less well during Giscard's administration. With the 1970s, repatriates became increasingly active in advancing their cause with the government while the harkis moved to center stage in debates about what it meant to integrate repatriates versus immigrants. The French government continued to rewrite its Algerian past in light of repatriate demands and the narratives that these ultimately entailed.

6
A Socialist Politics of Repatriation

Erasing "all nature of scars and divisions" of the Algerian past

In 1980, François Mitterrand addressed the president of ANFANOMA once again, this time as a presidential candidate, to reaffirm his commitment to all repatriates "so that [France] may heal all wounds emanating from the Algerian drama."[1] Mitterrand also addressed the "compatriots of the Islamic faith, for whom France must make special effort to place on an absolute and equal footing [with all], all the while respecting and supporting their cultural and religious specificity."[2] During his campaign, the Mitterrand camp issued a daily newsletter called "The Socialist Combat." The committee that edited the newsletter was headed by a pied noir, Madame Jourdan, whose repatriate status and family origins in Sétif, Algeria, were highlighted for the campaign.[3] Under Jourdan's supervision, special brochures were printed to publicize Mitterrand's promises to the repatriates. In addition to pointing out the value inherent in the memory and culture of the "French repatriates," and the special right to indemnities and amnesty for all, the brochure proclaimed the need to respect the identity of the harkis, or "French Muslims."[4]

As president, Mitterrand reaffirmed the state's duties to the repatriates and sought to strengthen ties with the repatriate community. He vowed a new spirit [*nouvel état* d'esprit] in repatriation politics, reinstituted the Secretary to the State in the Service of Repatriates, and named Raymond Courrière to the post. The socialist government would carry out a comprehensive and wide-ranging set of reforms

with the aim of helping the French public "understand the moral questions" behind repatriation. An official Guide to the Rights of Repatriates declared its mission to resolve the array of problems still experienced by repatriates: "Twenty years after the tragic events that had forced 1.5 million of our compatriots to leave their birthplace and the land where they had built their lives, repatriates were still in need of the government's full attention."[5] In Agen, a Central Service for Repatriates was established to ensure the proper application of the 1961 Repatriate Law; in Bordeaux, a Delegation for the Reception and Installation was introduced; and in Paris, the ANIFOM [*Agence nationale pour l'indemnisation des Français d'Outre-mer*] was created "to assess the value of property lost in Algeria." Public money allocated to help repatriates was increased by almost 30%. Courrière became a key figure in Mitterrand's government, accompanying him on a state visit to Algeria and maintaining a public profile that made him one of the most visible figures in government. Mitterrand and Courrière publicized their goal of granting repatriates the "right to the past, and a right to the future" – words that would become a permanent legacy for repatriation politics in France. And by enacting a new law, the socialist government was about to rewrite the entire Algerian past by celebrating the careers and lives of all those who had previously been the target of sanctions and censure by the French state for their sedition during the Algerian War.

The Law of December 3, 1982 was yet another benchmark in the French government's approach to its past and future with regard to Algeria. The mission of the law was first to "efface all types of scars that resulted from the events that tore apart the nation and second, to offer repatriates a new future."[6] To heal the wounds of the Algerian past, full amnesty would be granted to all repatriates, and "all disciplinary sanctions placed on certain military personnel, functionaries and magistrates" in relation to the Algerian War would be removed.[7] In addition, all French Muslims who served in the French administration prior to Algeria's independence would be able to claim pensions for the services they provided prior to 1962 even if they acquired French citizenship after 1962. The government also planned to involve the governments of North Africa to "better defend the rights of repatriates," which would include the repatriation of cemeteries to France and the right to transfer certain financial accounts [*comptes d'attente*] and assets held in Algeria.[8]

The Secretary of State to Repatriates Raymond Courrière organized his own cabinet with numerous administrators whose jobs included: maintaining communication with regional administrators and officials; relaying information between the ministry and parliament; managing legal affairs; overseeing laws and decrees relevant to repatriates; relaying information between the ministry and the ANIFOM, and seeing to their financial needs and pensions. A Permanent National Commission was established to help repatriates preserve their cultural heritage, as well as to bring together repatriates of European and Muslim backgrounds to help stamp out prejudices and misconceptions. A liaison office was also created to help the secretary maintain close contact with members of repatriate associations. Courrière made himself accessible to the associations – "More than 55,000 letters from associations were addressed to the secretary, who wrote back 59,000 personal responses."[9] Official publications made specific mention of the secretary's role in "facilitating and smoothing" relations with the repatriate community, whose members had become impatient with "the delays and complications" of securing administrative services.[10]

In 1982, a National Delegation for the Education, Social Action and Cultural Affairs for Repatriates [*Office national à l'action sociale, educative, et culturelle*] or ONASEC was established in Carcassonne with satellite offices in 16 major cities throughout France and was given the mandate of attending to the specific needs of the "French Repatriates of North Africans origins" and their "right to difference."[11] The aim of the delegation was to ensure that "the repatriates of the Islamic faith be admitted under common law and be able to exercise their rights as citizens fully and unconditionally." But in arguing for the equal rights of the harkis as citizens, the PS (socialist party) also stressed the cultural difference of the harkis and their right to express their North African heritage. During his campaign, Mitterrand claimed that the "preservation of the customs and traditions of French Muslims was indispensable to their harmonious thriving in the national community."[12] For the socialists, the "right to difference" would be an antidote to the denigration of the harkis who had served France. This emphasis on the cultural identity of the Muslim repatriates was conceived as part of a new pluralist experiment during the early Mitterrand years, which turned the spotlight on all Muslims in France, thereby classifying the harkis within the larger category of

Algerians in France. The notion of the "right to difference" marked a brief departure from the secular and color-blind norms of Republican practice, but it ultimately failed to win over the harkis.

French repatriates of North African origins and the right to difference

No doubt having observed the politicization of the harki community under Giscard, Mitterrand took special care to appeal to the community. The harkis became central to the socialist politics of repatriation and the experiment with the "right to difference" as seen in the previous section. Prior to his appointment as Secretary to Repatriates, Courrière had been a former senator from Couiza, a city in the southern department of the Aude in the region of Languedoc-Roussillon where a large number of harki families had settled after 1962. As secretary, Courrière collaborated with the Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity to propose a "renovation of the educative system that would encourage the social and professional integration of young French Muslim [repatriates]."[13] This initiative was behind the establishment of the ONASEC, which supplanted the former Inter-ministerial Mission for French Muslims created during Giscard's presidency. ONASEC was charged not only with ensuring the "right to difference," but also with overseeing all the material conditions that were believed to be necessary for the exercise of this right, including housing, schooling, professional training and apprenticeships, and the preservation of cultural patrimony, that is, of their Islamic faith.

In Couiza, Courrière established the National Institute of Higher Studies for Muslims [*Institut national des hautes études musulmanes*] to benefit the "sons of French Muslim repatriates who studied Arabic as a first or second language in high school."[14] The students would improve their Arabic for a period of three years at the Institute. This training was supposed to prepare the harkis for a career in the private and public sectors by specializing in economic, commercial, or diplomatic relations with the Arab world.[15] In his speech at the opening ceremony for the school, which was installed inside the Château Ducs de Joyeuse – today the chateau is a bed and breakfast tourist attraction – Courrière stated that the Institute would "only

improve France's relations and interactions with the Arab world as well as help the [French Muslim] youth to recognize the reality of their cultural and religious heritage."[16] ONASEC distributed subsidies to harkis associations so they could hold Arabic classes. Regional councils [*conseils régionaux*] were encouraged to support the construction of mosques and reserve special burial plots for Muslims in local cemeteries. Pilgrims to Mecca would receive subventions. Medical and administrative services were promised to repatriates who planned to embark on the pilgrimage while the pilgrimage itself would receive the official sponsorship of the ONASEC.[17]

In Courrière's view, cultural assertion was the "most powerful protection against racism."[18] Courrière noted that 400,000 French repatriates of North African descent were living in virtual ghettos, unable to integrate. His cabinet thus inaugurated the Services for the Information, Administrative Aid and Counsel [to Repatriates] or SIAC, which aimed to help the harkis overcome isolation and achieve full integration. To this end, Courrière requested that all prefectures appoint regional delegates to help educate the harkis on the guarantees of French common law.[19] He underlined the need to allow for a freer expression of their cultural heritage in France.

Although in keeping with the socialist agenda to promote the idea of a diverse France, Courrière's politics of difference and the concomitant advocacy of a Muslim identity and heritage for the repatriates was not entirely consistent with some of the government's articulations of "difference." In 1981, Henri Giordan, a full time lecturer at the CNRS and specialist in cultural relations and regional studies, wrote a report on the state of cultural diversity in France at the behest of Jack Lang, Mitterrand's Minister of Culture. The report was titled, "Cultural Democracy and the Right to Difference," and was intended to outline the "regional and minority cultures" of France. Giordan highlighted "local initiatives interested in the spread of linguistic differences and the differences of customs, all of which added to the richness that was France."[20] Giordan was in fact referring to the regional variations across France. He listed the dialects of Alsatian German (high and low) in the east, Basque and Catalan near the Pyrenées, Breton on the Atlantic, Flemish to the north, the languages of the Occitan, the Franco-Provençal languages, and by extension,

Creole, as linguistic examples of a polyglot and multi-cultural France. Finally, there was French Corsica.[21] The only ethno-cultural minorities mentioned outside these linguistic groups were Jewish, Armenian, and Romani.[22]

There was no mention of French Muslim repatriates in Giordan's report. It was in fact immigrant associations that began to call attention to a Muslim presence in France and it was they who appropriated the right to difference for the purpose of asserting the cultural heritage of people from non-European countries who were not repatriates. One such association, Exchanges and Cultures, lamented that minority cultures in France had been overtaken by a homogeneous "majority population and its dominant culture," and were thus forced to undergo a "de-culturation" or the loss of all self-knowledge. This, they argued, led to cultural impoverishment in France: "Unfortunately, today's relationships between people of different nationalities [origins] are too often marked by misunderstandings."[23] The association consisting of those with North African backgrounds called for efforts to raise the French public's consciousness about the "immensely rich historical and cultural exchange between the Maghreb and the West."[24] Subsequently, the government also accepted "immigrants" as part of multicultural France. Socialists backed the notion of integration as a form of cultural "insertion," as the absorption of minorities while allowing them to preserve their heritage and difference. In 1984, the Ministry of Culture even helped fund and promote a major exhibition at the Beaubourg Pompidou Center, titled "Children of Immigration" to display minority cultures in France with special focus on the North African community. But public attendance was low and drew the attention mainly of Maghrebis.[25]

The discourse of Courrière's Ministry and that of the immigrant associations converged on the notion of the right to difference for all French Muslims, including the harkis. Both Courrière and immigrant rights associations emphasized the advantages of cultivating a linguistic heritage for political and cultural purposes. But Courrière's emphasis on the shared identities between French Muslim repatriates and other Muslim North Africans in France incited opposition from the right; Courrière had blurred the distinction between the harkis who had supported France and other Algerians who had backed independence. When asked by a journalist how the French government

would actually go about "paying homage" to the harki community, Courrière simply replied that the public needed to be educated, and that the French [*Français de souche*] should understand the right to difference for the Muslim repatriates. The secretary then expressed regret over the difficulties experienced by French Muslim repatriates and the deplorable conditions in which they were still living. "Just like immigrant children, the children of harkis who are French nationals are victims of unemployment and marginalization."[26] For Courrière, these conditions in fact brought Muslim repatriates [who were citizens] and other Algerians [who were "immigrants"] together.

> The youngest Muslim repatriates who are French-born are now grouped together in the *banlieues* and live in ghettos inside the outlying ghettos inhabited by immigrants. This is why we call the [harkis] the immigrants of the interior ... It is sad to see that we had denied rifles to the first generation – (the harkis could not freely arm themselves even as soldiers) – and we now deny the second generation brooms. But if the relations between the first generation of harkis and Algerian immigrants were difficult, this is no longer true of the younger generation harkis.[27]

Courrière's office admonished officials who refused to treat the harkis like other French citizens.[28] According to a factsheet used by the secretary, out of the 162 demands for veteran status recently submitted by the harkis, only eight had been approved.[29] Courrière attributed the low approval rate to pervasive anti-Arab, anti-immigration sentiments. Racism became both cause and effect, and a tautological argument, which the socialists used to explain the marginalization of the harkis. Courrière recognized racism as an endemic problem for the repatriates, but the government's "right to difference" initiative ethnicized the harkis a subset of the larger Algerian population in France.

The optimism of the socialist promotion of the right to difference soon ran against the controversy that was brewing over immigration during the late 1970s and early 1980s. At this time in the early to mid-1980s, the socialist party was confronted with the growing popularity of the right's anti-immigration platform and its most outspoken advocate, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Soon the contention over

repatriation politics would lead to a shift in the socialists' outlook on immigration and the presence of Algerians in France. Le Pen accused the socialists of being too "soft" on the problem of immigration.[30] Having made inroads in the cities in southern France where repatriate presence was prominent, the National Front was most successful in areas where voter turnout was low, and where anti-immigration sentiment was on the rise.[31] As political scientists David Bell and Byron Criddle have noted, northern industrial cities such as Roubaix, a long time stronghold of the Communists, was leaning towards the National Front.[32] 1983 marked a turning point. The 1983 municipal elections was a test for the socialist government, as the right criticized the government's failure to deliver on promises of financial reform, decentralization, immigration and repatriation. The Front consistently reached out to the repatriate community, including the harkis. Le Pen criticized the socialists' failure to integrate the repatriates and disparaged their effort to collapse what they saw as fundamental distinctions between the Muslim repatriates and the [Algerian] immigrants.

The Front's platform was buoyed by the mass strikes that erupted in 1981 and lasted three years at the automobile plants of Citröen-Aulnay and Talbot-Poissy, where between 70% and 72% of the workforce was of North African descent.[33] The strikes fueled anxieties about the "Islamicization" of the country's workforce. In 1983, the National Front first gained significant ground by obtaining 11% of the municipal votes in the 20th arrondissement in Paris.[34] This allowed them to advance to the second round as election laws were changed to enable smaller parties without a chance at a majority to advance to the second round with a certain minimum number of votes in the first round.

Amid less than impressive results in the regional elections and with the ongoing strikes that provoked anti-immigration opinion, the socialist government was compelled to turned away from the politics of difference. As a result, the Secretary to Repatriates was forced to take a different approach to the harkis. The harkis were to receive special recognition not because of their right to difference, but because they had served France as soldiers of the French army during the Algerian War. The socialists were compelled to highlight above all the agenda set by Giscard's administration: the harkis had served the Republic in ways that other Algerians had not.

Harkis and French Muslims: soon to be a million voters

After 1983, repatriation politics became a battleground between the left and the right. The socialists thus focused greater attention on the European as well as Muslim repatriates as a special electorate, one that clearly separated them from other groups from Algeria. One of the most outspoken pied-noir supporters of the socialist party at this time was G. M., who worked alongside Courrière, advising the Secretary on the morale of the repatriate community.[35] In a note of synthesis, G.M. warned Courrière that the National Front eyed Muslim repatriates as a potential electoral base:

> The extreme right has played off the hate that they have harbored against the *fellaghas* and *bradeurs* and have enlisted certain members of the harki community; this they did with more ease as they have set out to prosecute immigrants of the Maghreb with whom repatriates currently compete at every turn for housing, jobs, etcetera.[36]

G.M. argued that Le Pen knew how to exploit past hostilities between harkis and other Muslims of Algerian descent. G.M. eventually became head of ONASEC and invented a new category for repatriates that would clarify their exact and unique history and civil status, and help distinguish them from the Algerian immigrants. His vision was articulated in a document titled "French Maghrebis: soon [to be] one million voters?" According to G.M., the harkis should be understood in relation to the greater community of Muslim Maghrebis living in France. In the document, the "French of Maghreb origins" referred to three different groups from North Africa who all together numbered one million. The first of these were individuals with French citizenship. They were French-born and were the fourth generation to be living in France. These individuals were classified as the *anciens*. The first generation of *anciens* had served as cannon fodder during World War I or had filled French factories as underpaid workers. Many were born of mixed marriages – G.M. noted as examples the singer Edith Piaf and actresses Marie-José Nat and Isabelle Adjani.[37]

The second community was apparently made up of the harkis and their families. This community numbered approximately 500,000, more than 400,000 of whom were said to be children. As G.M. explained, "their French identity cards have been useless, and they suffer from the same

problem as immigrants – that is, racism, unemployment, and crime."[38] G.M. did not conceal the real interest his party had in this community: "we are often reminded that they are French during the electoral period! There is a kind of caesura, however, since many have the mentality of a veteran and at times might offer electoral support to the extreme right. The second generation is especially recalcitrant and unyielding."[39] The goal was to keep them out of the reach of the National Front.

The third Maghrebi community described by G.M. consisted of the second generation of North African immigrants who had arrived between 1955 and 1975. Theirs was originally an immigration of single males, which, G.M. explained, gradually turned into an immigration of families as their children were born and raised in France.[40] Some had identity cards issued by Algeria, others from France. As G.M. explained: "while this group includes many individuals who are reluctant to claim French identity, there is a growing willingness among them, the *beurs*, to actually go and retrieve identification papers (citizenship documents) from city halls. Many in this generation supported the idea of a pluri-cultural France and want to *rediscover* a certain collective memory."

In order to tie the three groups together conceptually, G.M. suggested a new term: "French citizens of Maghrebi Muslim extraction." The label signified the legal status of North Africans as citizens; it also indicated their cultural roots and set them clearly apart from Muslims of Turkish or sub-Saharan African origins; and finally, it indicated their religious affiliation and thereby drew a clear distinction between this group and the pieds noirs and Sephardic Jews also from North Africa.[41] The elongated term invented by G.M. remained on paper. In G.M.'s schema, the harkis remained a minority community defined by their geographic and ethno-cultural ancestry. They were not as assimilated and "French" as the first generation of immigrants from Algeria – partly because they were not of mixed parentage – but they were still preferred over the second generation of Algerians, the *beurs*, whose parents had come as migrant workers to France. By grouping together all those who came from Algeria, G.M. and the socialists revealed their understanding of repatriation politics as part of a larger politics of putting order on the diverse populations from Algeria to order and classify all people of Algerian backgrounds in France.

The socialists' desire to fulfill a unified and holistic France that could move past the debilitating memories of the Algerian War while

retaining the ethno-cultural distinction of repatriates ultimately reverted back to a discourse of integration that turned again on a selective interpretation of history: It would be the historical role played by French Muslim repatriates that would distinguish them from other Muslims of Algerian and North African origins who were allegedly disgruntled with Republican ideals. Since the Mitterrand presidency, the harkis have been the favored minority of many conservatives. The harkis have been touted as the group most faithful to the Republic and therefore more deserving of France's recognition than other migrants from Algeria and their French-born children, especially the *beur* youth of the *banlieues*. The 1990s saw the rekindling of the hopes and prejudices that attended the Algerian War as the repatriates of Algeria, the harkis in particular, were thrust into the public eye and given special consideration as the forgotten embodiments of a lost French North Africa.

In 1993, French sociologist Dominique Schnapper, daughter of Raymond Aron, wrote a preface to a book authored by a son of a former harki soldier, Mohand Hamoumou. Hamoumou was a professor and elected official in Grenoble.[42] The subject of Schnapper's preface was the remarkable sacrifice rendered by the Muslim mobile units in the French army during the Algerian War. Schnapper's intellectual pedigree attracted attention to the book at a time when the very term harki remained obscure for most French readers. The partnering of a celebrated intellectual with a largely unknown writer and son of a repatriate from the Kabyle who had spent his childhood in an internment camp in France signaled a new alliance between public figures and harki activists. This collaboration would eventually lead to a conservative and controversial interpretation of the Algerian War.

Schnapper argued that the harki's services and loyalty to France was sure proof that Algerian nationalism conceived as a united struggle for independence was in fact a myth. In her preface, Schnapper denounced Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for banning the re-entry of the harkis into Algeria, and criticized the FLN's demonization of the former soldiers as imperial collaborators. Schnapper lamented that, "to this day, the harkis still do not have the same rights in their country of origin as the Algerian immigrants who can still travel freely to Algeria."[43] Whereas so many Algerians had come to France to enjoy the rights granted to them through the cooperation between the two countries after the war,

the harkis had apparently disappeared into oblivion. By pointing to the pro-French services rendered by the harkis, Schnapper undercut the FLN's authority to speak for the Algerian nation. As she saw it, there was no shared interest that had bound together all Algerians during the war, no unifying anti-colonial struggle to speak of. By joining up with the French against the FLN, the harkis, she argued, had disproved the notion of "total resistance of the Algerian people against the colonial power":[44]

> This myth of the unified Algerian nation allowed the [FLN] leadership to condemn 'traitors' who, for various reasons, were associated with the [French] administration and the French army. The Algerian nation thus founded its legitimacy on the alleged treason of the harkis and the elite who are now assimilated in France ... The Algerian government still refuses amnesty to the harkis.

The FLN had turned the harkis into apostates of the Algerian nation in order to sustain a historical illusion, Schnapper contended. As she condemned the FLN's treatment of the harkis, the sociologist extended another powerful myth into the present – that the harkis had served France out of loyalty to the Republican cause. Schnapper also called on France to correct the offenses against the harkis. The fate of the harkis after 1962 had exposed deficiencies in the Republic's ability to live up to its principles. If France was to denounce the persecution of the harkis by the FLN, it would have to make good on its own claims, Schnapper argued. The Republic would have to honor its repatriate citizens, especially those who had made exceptional sacrifices for the nation.

As Mitterrand's government faced challenges from the right, it continued to strengthen relations with repatriate pied noir and harki organizations. One of the more formidable and pro-leftist associations was RECOURS, which was made up largely of repatriates from Algeria. RECOURS first appeared in 1976. The primary cause it promoted was identical to all other repatriate associations, to obtain full indemnities for its constituents.[45] And like other associations, RECOURS had an active record of mobilizing the pied noir community during elections. But unlike other associations, it had close ties with the left, including the Communist party. In the municipal elections of 1989, it actively endorsed a socialist Georges Frêche in Montpellier and a communist Paul Balmigère in Béziers as well as Gaullist and

conservative RPR and centrist UDF candidates.[46] The RECOURS also maintained close relations with Jacques Chirac, then prime minister under Mitterrand. Originally known for his adhesion to Gaullism, Chirac would soon work to amend his position on indemnities to curry favor with the repatriates. He became a strong advocate of indemnities and remained a faithful supporter thereafter. By 1986, Prime Minister Chirac sought to pursue the "total integration of the repatriate community" by rewarding the citizens who had "rendered the [North African] lands fertile."[47] In 1987, Chirac passed a critical law of indemnities, which would only be superseded by a new law under his presidency in 2003.

Chirac went even further in his accommodation of repatriate demands during his two terms as President of the Republic. This time, the government responded not just to indemnities but also to demands from repatriates that the government officially recognize and pay homage to the historical contributions made by the French overseas to the nation. Chirac responded, and addressed both the pieds noirs and the harkis. In 2001, he made a historic speech in a ceremony honoring the harki soldiers and their services at the Invalides. With pomp and circumstance, harki representatives were decorated by Chirac himself. Alongside them were the spahis and other troops who served in the North African army. A tribute was paid to all those who served the Republic in the North African armies throughout history. Chirac noted in his speech that the harkis were brutally massacred by the FLN and that it was time to honor their sacrifice. Few words were said about the counterinsurgency operations that created indigenous auxiliary troops to fight against their countrymen, but only that the Republic was in debt as a result. The survival of the Republic was the overriding theme. In May 2002, Chirac's prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, announced the creation of yet another Inter-ministerial Mission, which would be inaugurated the following month to execute the government's decisions with regard to the repatriates. The premise again was to honor those "who fought and gave their blood to France."[48] No mention was made of the actual aims of these colonial wars.

Finally, on December 5, 2002, on the promenade of Quai Branly near the Eiffel Tower in Paris, President Chirac unveiled the "National Memorial of the Algerian War and the Battles of Morocco and Tunisia," honoring the 23,000 French soldiers and harkis who died in North Africa between 1952 and 1962.[49] The monument is composed of three

imposing columns each six meters high, made of burnished limestone extracted from the local quarries. Down the middle of each column are scrolling electronic diodes that spell out the names of the deceased along with messages about the Algerian War.[50] The December 5 date chosen for the dedication of the monument was significant. The Algerian-born Minister delegate for veterans' affairs, Mékachera Hamlaoui, proposed the date on behalf of the repatriate community from North Africa. The repatriate community had long lobbied for the revision of the timeline of the Algerian War to include the violent confrontations that had erupted between the French army and the settler protesters in the months following the March 19 signing of the Evian Accords.[51] As such, the commemoration articulated a history that defined the Algerian War as a war of just causes and sacrifice for France. The Algerian War by this interpretation did not hold significance as an anti-colonial conflict or national liberation struggle. The soldiers were no longer colonized subjects or in the case of European soldiers, colonists, but only faithful partisans of the Republic.

The Quai Branly National Memorial to the Algerian War and the Battles in Tunisia and Morocco



Quai Branly monument plaque

7
Repatriates Narrate the Colonial Past

As Lorenzo Veracini has noted, settlers unlike colonists do not return to their place of origin. Settlers "do not discover [and return like colonists], they carry their sovereignty and lifestyles with them."[1] The French of Algeria did "return," however, to the Metropole. Their settler accounts did not end with the "closing in" of frontiers as did Australian outback stories or North American narratives in which settlers were able to found sovereign states to supersede all previous phases of their historical passage.[2] For the French of Algeria, repatriation could not be understood as a "return." In their narratives, repatriation could only mean a missed opportunity, loss, and uprooting from land that had been rightfully theirs. Their final destination, the Metropole, could never supersede the French Algerian past as a just resolution. Their narratives thus turned on longing for what could have been rather than what became. These narratives were more than personal memories. They recounted the past from the settler's perspective, and reinserted the French Algerian past into a coherent national narrative. The theme of "what was and could have been" appealed to a wider public and became a powerful means of connecting the sentiments of the French from Algeria to the broader French public. Such literary productions, I argue, have depoliticized historical controversies and broadened public interest in and ultimately support for the repatriates from Algeria.

One of the most important magazines read by pieds noirs today is the *Algérianiste*. This quarterly publishes solicited articles or voluntary

contributions on a wide variety of topics important to the pied-noir community. Immensely popular from its first issue in the early 1970s, the *Algérianiste* still boasts over 7,000 regular subscribers.[3] The *Algérianiste* is the mouthpiece for the *Cercle Algérianiste,* founded in 1973 to promote an explicitly cultural rather than political identity. The *Algérianiste* features articles, which make ample use of archival and personal photos, public documents, and newspapers from French Algeria. Many pieces feature historical themes about colonial achievements and cultural vibrancy in Algeria, including articles about schools, hospitals, scientific research institutes, courts, commerce, and businesses, along with profiles of respected colonial war heroes, politicians, writers, and artists familiar to the former settler community.[4]

One of the two founders of the *Algérianiste* was Jacques Villard, a former student representative of repatriates in Algeria. Villard was a self-proclaimed follower of Louis Bertrand, the popular proponent of a racialized Latin identity in Algeria in the 1930s. The other founder was Villard's friend and fellow repatriate Maurice Calmein, founder and first president of the *Cercle*. Both Villard and Calmein enrolled as students in Montpellier just after their arrival in France in 1962. Montpellier, with its network of universities, proved hospitable to many right-wing student groups including one made up largely of the existing and newly arrived pied-noir youth. As Lee Whitfield has explained, the greater Languedoc-Roussillon region, of which Montpellier was the capital, had long-standing historical ties with the Algerian settler economy. Languedoc residents thus remained sympathetic to the French from Algeria at the same time they harbored resentment towards the FLN nationalists who wielded considerable influence over the Algerian laborers in the region's vineyards.[5] Not surprisingly, Languedoc stayed a hotbed of resistance to Gaullist reforms during the period of decolonization and throughout the 1960s. A large segment of the Languedoc electorate, an unusually high 57%, voted against the 1962 referendum to decide the fate of the Evian Accords.[6]

During the 1960s, Villard headed the Montpellier-based *Fédération des étudiants rapatriés*, while Calmein was active in the *Amicale universitaire pieds noirs*.[7] Villard and Calmein later explained that the *Algérianiste* originated with the impulse to preserve a cultural legacy that was quickly being forgotten with the end of French Algeria. In 1973, Villard and Calmein began producing a bulletin, the precursor to the *Algérianiste*, consisting of homespun broadsheets carrying

short articles about French Algeria, printed using an antiquated copy machine they had purchased out of pocket.[8] The *Algérianiste* was, however, given new momentum when two journalists of the *Aurore* and the *Midi Libre*, both major dailies with pro-repatriate leanings, agreed to publish the *Cercle's* articles, eventually giving Villard and Calmein a much wider audience.[9] With the support from the community and from interested pieds noirs, the *Algérianiste* came into regular publication by the *Cercle* starting in 1973.

The name of the journal was not by accident. The term was originally a designation created by celebrated settler writers in Algeria at the turn of the century to refer to the unique literary themes and interests of writers in French Algeria. Jean Pomier, the famous writer of French Algeria was one of several who founded the Association of Algerian Writers and of the Algerianism Movement [*L'Association des écrivains algériens et du mouvement Algérianisme*].[10] The term *Algérianiste* had apparently originated in 1910 during a café conversation between members of a prominent writer's circle, which included such popular authors as Robert Randau, Jean Pomier, and Lucienne Favre.[11] One enthusiast Félix Lagrot compared the founding spirit of the new *Algérianiste* to the revitalization of "[Byzantine culture] in Greece after the fall of Rome, and Romanesque culture in the wake of the barbarian invasion."[12] In excavating the term, the new generation of *Algérianiste* founders claimed as their goal, the renewed interest in the revival of a Latin culture, but one fitted for a different era.[13]

By regenerating interest in French Algeria after 1962, the *Algérianiste* also proposed correcting apparent historical inaccuracies. Occasionally, editorials explicitly protested the demonization of colonialism, calling on "all French repatriates of Algeria – pieds noirs and French Muslims" to rise up against the unjust depiction of the French from Algeria as "slave-driving *colons* and racist *petits blancs* who alienated natives from the dominant culture, and [in the case of the OAS], resorted to terrorism and used scorched earth tactics."[14] The editorial pointed to the positive elements of French presence in Algeria, including the efforts to render the land fertile, the work of doctors in the *bled* and that of teachers, land-clearers, and builders; and the presence of schools, hospitals, factories and workshops. One letter from Maurice Calmein declared that the journal would contest the ways Metropolitan schools taught their students about events in Algeria. The *Cercle* would undertake "a campaign of action in order

to denounce what it considered a political aversion to historical truth."[15]

We came from the colony to save the patrie![16]

In over 85 issues of the *Algérianiste*, starting with the March issue of 1987, no other topic was addressed with more frequency than World War II. Repatriates recounting Algeria's experience during World War II dwelled on the African Army and its participation in the European campaigns after 1942. A well-known pied-noir amateur historian Georges Bosc and frequent contributor to the *Algérianiste* remarked in 1992 that the African Army's "liberation" campaigns were the "most under-appreciated" in the nation's history.[17] Given the fascist past in French Algeria, the pieds noirs should not have been so eager to revive discussions of the World War II. After the 1940 armistice, French North Africa became an unoccupied zone, and home to some of France's most virulently right-wing anti-Semitic Vichy commanders and policy-makers. These Vichyites took charge of removing Jews from all administrative positions, universities, and medical facilities throughout North Africa. They revoked the Crémieux decree, depriving which deprived the Jews of their French citizenship and reverted them to *indigènes*. In short, Vichy North Africa should not have been among the list of topics to showcase the pride of settlers. But French North Africa was also the backdrop to the Allied forces' massive invasion of North Africa in November 1942, and the launching pad for the liberation campaigns in Europe, and thus allowed for a story of redemption and heroism.

It was not until the 1980s that repatriates actively publicized North Africa's role in World War II. The 1980s marked a turning point in re-assessments of wartime France, as historian Henry Rousso has argued in *The Vichy Syndrome*. Rousso's study has shown that by 1983, there was growing public willingness to entertain less idealized views of the Résistance and of de Gaulle's ties to it. The most dramatic shift seen in the opinion polls at this time was the steep decline in hostility toward the head of Vichy France, Marshal Pétain.[18] Opinion polls showed that between 1971 and 1983, the opinions of both the older and younger generations had become less hostile toward Pétain. In 1971, 51% of the younger generation had still believed in punishing him. By 1983, only 36% of the younger age group and 38% of the older age group believed that Pétain should have been punished.

In 1992, a historical anniversary occasioned a fresh opportunity for repatriates to introduce to the wider public the role that Pétain played in Algeria along with their own historical experiences during World War II. For the pieds noirs, time had come to revise the public's understanding of Vichy North Africa. November 8, 1992 marked the 50-year anniversary of "Operation Torch," among the largest amphibious landings of the Allied forces in the war. The operation placed Algiers under siege, resulting in an almost overnight shift in French North Africa's political and military alignment.[19] With but a short-lived resistance, the Vichy army succumbed to the Allied invasion (staged by the 34th division of the American infantry).[20] The Allies had already sealed a deal with the Vichy commanders to obtain their cooperation. Secret talks had begun long before with Maxime Weygand, the delegate general in North Africa and notorious proponent of the deportation of Jews.[21] The plan conceived by General Eisenhower was to leave Pétain's second in charge, French High Commissioner François Darlan, in full command over the African Army.[22] Henri Giraud and Alphonse Juin, generals who had made their names in North Africa before and during the Vichy regime were also to retain their command over French troops. As the most senior Vichy commanders negotiated with the Americans, rank and file soldiers made a futile attempt to resist the invasion, but they were ultimately unsuccessful.

The African Army gained the Allied command some 200,000 men, mostly comprised of French colonial subjects. The Allied command had combined de Gaulle's Free France forces with the African Army, to the displeasure of the settlers and Vichy commanders. De Gaulle was seen in Algeria as the man who had tried to establish Free French control over the colonies, and had attempted to wrestle Syria and Senegal from Vichy control with the help of the British. His close ties to the British was criticized when the latter attacked the Vichy-led fleet off the coast of Mers-el-Kébir. Repatriate historians repeatedly pointed to Charles de Gaulle's absence during Operation Torch. They tried to rehabilitate the dishonorable reputation of Vichy leaders. Bosc for example persistently emphasized that the United States had in fact maintained proactive contact with Vichy leaders prior to the invasion of unoccupied North Africa. The cooperative diplomacy with the United States, Bosc argued, disproved allegations that Vichy North Africa had been dependent on Hitler, or that it had been an inveterate enemy of the Americans.[23] Bosc and others argued that French North Africa's political decisions

had never been motivated by pro-Nazi convictions but rather on principles necessary to maintaining France's sovereignty and control of its empire.[24] The American consul to Algeria, Robert Murphy, did indeed, as was stated in the pages of the *Algérianiste*, maintain close ties with Weygand, the delegate general in North Africa. One article in the *Algérianiste* printed in bright colors the pact that had been signed by Murphy and Vichy general Henri Giraud in 1941, which included a set of promises made by the United States to "restore France to full independence with all its extended territories and grandeur intact, [and all] that she possessed prior to the war in Europe as well as overseas."[25] One René Bérard argued that the most important goal of the Vichy command in North Africa had always been to "defend French Africa at all costs," a goal that he alleged took priority over the collaboration with Nazi Germany.[26] Another contributor to the journal, Gaston Palisser, wrote that North Africa had been highly coveted by Hitler, and that France was indebted to Marshal Pétain and Weygand for the survival of French Algeria and the empire.[27]

Repatriate veterans from World War II contributed testimonies to the *Algérianste* of their experiences during the war. One Jean Florentin claimed that he had faced three options in 1940: go to England and fight with the British, be transferred to North Africa and the Levant and join a pro-armistice unit, or remain in France and participate in the resistance: "I chose to take the second route and transfer to Tunisia to join the African Army. In doing this, I realized a dream I had embraced since adolescence: to follow in my father's footsteps to become an officer in the African Army."[28] The African Army made up three fourths of the troops that fought in the Tunisian campaign with the remaining one quarter from the metropole – and it was the African army that fought at the head of the campaign."[29] Other contributors wrote of the valiant Muslim troops of the African Army who embodied the unity and loyalty of colonial subjects within the French empire. The author of one article described the Moroccan *goumiers* who fought in Italy, as "fierce warriors" naturally accustomed to mountainous terrains.[30] The Algerian riflemen of the third D.I.A who had joined the Italian campaign in Naples were also mentioned in these accounts as dedicated soldiers.[31] These accounts were supposed to demonstrate the strong camaraderie among the Europeans in the colonies and indigenous colonial subjects who came to save the patrie.

If World War II was a favorite topic among the pieds noirs, then another recurring topic had to do with the fervent attachment of settlers to the land. The pied-noir attachment to the land signified the fundamental predicament of settlers who were forced to "return." Metropolitan soil could not stand in for the homeland they had lost. This theme of lost land was revived in the government's consistent commemoration of the repatriates. The sentiment of loss resonated at both official and popular levels as the government's commemoration of the repatriates suggested that it was the nation's duty to recognize, share in, and atone for the losses of repatriates. As Jacques Chirac declared in 1986:

> Our compatriots, the repatriates from overseas, especially from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have suffered the cruelties of History. They were forced to leave the land they loved and had rendered fertile. Justice must be achieved. It is the obligation of a great country such as France to do just that. It is for this reason that I have passed new measures concerning amnesty, debt, pensions, and indemnities. We must think of all of the French of North Africa who have fallen in the field of honor. Their memories must not be extinguished; their names must not be forgotten.

Land, youth, and love in the colony

Jean Pélégri (b.1920, d.2003) was a writer of fiction and the author of the autobiographical novel *Les Oliviers de la justice,* written during the Algerian War in 1959.[32] Pélégri adapted the novel into a successful film in 1962 placing him in the world of mainstream cinema. After two decades of writing mostly fiction, Pélégri wrote *Ma mère Algérie* in 1988, an autobiography, in which he strongly identified with his Algerian roots: "What can I say of France? I don't have an intimate knowledge of it. As for me, all my knowledge, all the memories and all sensations necessary to making an author who he is, came from Algeria."[33]

The central theme of the book, as suggested by the title, had to do with Pélégri's visceral attachment to the Algerian land as a child. The underlying message delivered by Pélégri was profound: simple innocence and man-made history were at irresolvable odds in colonial Algeria. He wrote: "When I was a child, Saïd, the Algerian boy who lived nearby, did not go to school. At the time, I was envious that he did not go to school, not knowing he was not

allowed there. Because I was a child, I did not know that the land was taken by force, and I did not suspect anything."[34]

But what was it exactly that Pélégri envied about the Algerian children? Wrote Pélégri, "the Algerian children could continue to play during the day, to wander the farm, the roads, and the hidden cavities in the farm grounds."[35] The "ditch" [*fossé*] was an important metaphor throughout Pélégri's work. Holes in the ground were where things, people, and their relationships lay hidden. They were not trampled on by the ugly forces of colonial misery that lay above the surface. It was a layer of history untainted: "Unfortunately, colonialism went on *outside* our hidden holes, as another history [*un autre histoire*]. Colonialism rendered most unnatural the everyday relations [between people], and introduced segregation everywhere."[36] Colonialism then, for Pélégri, was an aberration, a deviation from the natural innocence of youth, corrupting its protective shelter: "I know that under the apparent and official history of Algeria where injustice and colonial inequalities prevailed, unfurled another history between Algerians and pieds noirs, there where intimate relations were forged everyday, a *subterranean* history, as real as the history that lay above it."[37]

The film made of *Les Oliviers de la justice* was awarded the top prize at the Cannes Festival in 1962. Critics and judges praised its subtle portrayal of the human faces of colonial life (the film was directed by an American, James Bleu, and Pélégri played the role of his father). The novel and movie touched on the most sensitive topic of the day – the impending end of French Algeria. The novel's narration was in the first person, and depicted French Algeria as seen through the eyes of a young settler who, in 1959, returned to his childhood home on an olive grove estate to attend to his dying father. The autobiographical elements were unmistakable. The film moves between the violence of the ongoing war and the peaceful days of the narrator's youth on the estate. Pélégri described the settlers' disdain for the "Arab *fellaghas*" during the war, contrasting this attitude with his own tender feelings for the native friends of his youth. There was the mysterious Embarek, the wise *marabout*, whom the narrator used to visit as a child: "Embarek, the old *marabout* taught me many things ... he and Bouaza, the night guard." The young man remembers as a child watching Embarek pray: " ... at the foot of the palms, like the great *marabout* Sidi Moussa, and we would rest in this clandestine place until Embarek finished his prayer. If I love so much my native land, it is because of this place where Embarek prayed – the *peace in the shadows*, and of the

pious kiss [he placed on the ground as he prayed]."[38] At his father's funeral, the son reunited with his old acquaintances: Idir, a young and faithful Kabyle who made the long trek to attend the funeral and asks, "do you remember me, M'sieur Michel?", and Krim and Bouaza, the former night guards on the farm who played ball with him decades ago – all of them loyal and warm-hearted – each of them part of the underground history, which had managed to persist even during the most violent periods of colonial history. The death of the young man's father comes to signify the loss of peace and humanity, bringing together those who believed in the goodness of the past.

Speaking through the protagonist, Pélégri thought of the war as the inevitable result of the indifference shown by French authorities to the quiet *peace in the shadows,* which like the peace in the caverns on the farmland lay concealed to the settlers except those who looked for it. France showed only brutal disregard for the quietude shielded beneath the shadows, a quietude that signified the silent devotion of the majority to France. That everything had gone completely awry had become most apparent to Pélégri when the Muslims were arrested and tortured for having demanded the "sole honor to be French."[39] Most "Muslims" only wanted to obtain equal rights and become true French citizens, Pélégri argued. These were not nationalists – nationalism, Pélégri believed, was a misguided label. The majority had no intention of seeking independence.[40] In the end, Pélégri never acknowledged nationalism in Algeria as an integral part of anti-colonial resistance. The Algerian War spiralled into unspeakable violence for Pélégri, because the French nation was unwilling to heed the voices of its loyal subjects. In identifying a neutral, peaceful, and innocent space hidden from outsiders, Pélégri took a morally irreproachable position from which to observe colonialism. It was not accidental that many pieds noirs chose childhood as the main lens through which to remember the Algerian past. In this realm of memory, Algeria was no longer a colonized territory, but a place for connecting personal memories to a collective history, so that individual lives retained perpetual innocence unconnected to the history of colonial exploitation.

Marie Cardinal was another skillful narrator of the themes of youth and love of the land. Cardinal made her name in the French literary scene with the award-winning novel, *Les Mots pour le dire*, published in 1975 by Grasset.[41] *Les Mots* is, in many ways, a remarkable book. It is

a clear-headed chronicle of Cardinal's personal experience of mental illness as she underwent years of psychoanalysis.[42] The author's intractable desire to be cured drove her to the brinks of complete mental bereavement as well as brought her back to normalcy. On the surface, *Les Mots* has almost nothing to do with Algeria. Algeria is, however, omnipresent in the roots of her illness, which she imagined had been implanted in her by the "Thing." Algeria since remained an integral part of her self-understanding of the treatment she received. Cardinal had been attacked by an Algerian hiding in her house, an episode she recalled during a session with her doctor. Cardinal saw the assault and violation as the moment of profound amputation. The trauma began when Algeria, the life giver had morphed into Algeria, the object of fear: "It seems to me that the Thing took root in me permanently when I understood that we were to assassinate Algeria. For Algeria was my real mother. I carried her inside me the way a child carries the blood of the parents in its veins."[43]

Five years later, Cardinal wrote another autobiographical memoir, *To The Country of My Roots* [*Au pays de mes racines*], in which she pays a visit to Algeria with her daughter after her divorce. "Why did I return [to Algeria]?" she asked in the opening pages:

> It was not the houses I lived in that drew me back [to Algeria], nor the places from where the phantoms would reconstitute themselves, piercing my faintest memories to wander around in them. No, it was something that came from the land, the sky, and the sea, which made me want to go – something, which for me could only be found in the precious locales of the terrestrial world. I am actually *incapable of imagining it*.[44]

In other words, she could not be content to re-create Algeria in her mind – she had to find its soil under her feet once again. The phrase "impossibility of imagination" here was sufficient to show the reader Cardinal's inextricable ties to the land and her compulsion to return to it.

> To live anywhere else but *there* changed for me the meaning of the phrase, *to live*. To live elsewhere has become synonymous with slaving away, organizing my life, structuring my life, with planning my life. *Over there*, to live was to live; it was to indulge in the habitual movements of humanity without suffering, without

> complaining or rejoicing, but to simply accept things as they were. Since I left Algeria, there were no longer such instances where I was in perfect harmony with the world, free of constraints.[45]

In this striking paragraph, Cardinal identifies true living with physically inhabiting the Algerian land. She attributed serenity and harmony to the settler colonial world by normalizing the everyday existence within it. Life in the settler colony was in fact embodied, for Cardinal; bodily living was only possible when rooted in a certain place. Cardinal, like Pélégri, evoked empathy not with the usual story of the exodus and exile, but rather by appealing to the unjust separation from the land that she was forced to endure. "The pieds noirs were at once victims and executioners [*bourreau*]," she wrote.[46] It was the doubled position that would allow the pieds noirs to absolve themselves of a colonial past and at the same time appeal to a more forbearing public.

She suggested that her supposedly severed existence was a clear violation of basic human and even animal life: "I do not seek to exonerate the pieds noirs. I am one of them, and it is inexcusable," she wrote. At the same time:

> I know why the pieds noirs fell into perdition: it was the result of a passionate love, [like] a dog in heat. It was nothing more than that. It would be impossible to imagine that a person had not yet copulated with the earth, fertilized it, and beautified it…it was a blind passion, bestial, brutal, and stupid, but an authentic passion, archaic, and pure.[47]

This love for the land was untamable because it was sexually primal, innate, and predetermined at the moment of birth on the soil. But for Cardinal, such love also allowed physical and mental purchase on the land forever, ultimately to transcend and overpower politics. "…I cannot but think that there, *là-bas,* is my home, that there, where I was born, where I began to see, to understand, to hear, to love. To pull me [away] from Algeria, is to pull off my head, my intestines, my heart, my soul. It is my home, and there is nothing to say, and I have no bad conscience [saying] this, despite everything."[48] In this regard, she implied that her love for Algeria was no different from the love felt by Algerians for their land. She, too, was a native.

Cardinal did not forget that such love was behind the violence that had been inflicted on the Algerians by members of the OAS [*Organisation de l'armée secrète*]. But even this violence was pardonable for Cardinal because it emanated from passion for the land, a love strong enough to blind:

> I know that for a handful of *pieds noirs* there were important interests at risk. But it was not these interests that were behind the OAS. [Rather], it was a blind love for the country, a mad love for this land. Even for those who did not possess any land [of their own], there was a passionate attachment to the sky, the sea, to the wind, the warmth, and to the mountains.[49]

What Cardinal proposed was in fact extraordinary: legal ownership of an estate or land was not necessary to prove the settler's attachment to the land. It was enough to feel passion for the soil, for the natural environment, and for the physical contours of the country. In Cardinal's view, to deny the right to reconnect with the land would be to violate the person's fundamental grounds for existence, literally. Cardinal thus moved seamlessly between love for the land and compassion for the most atrocious acts of colonial violence.

A work less profound but still very much in keeping with the theme of innocence is *Pardon, mon Algérie, tranche de vie*, by Geneviève Fournier-Giusti, who became a schoolteacher in France after the Algerian War. Fournier-Giusti wrote of the blameless enthusiasm of her generation during the Algerian War. The book gives insight into the moment the Algerian War became *her* war:

> the first memory that left any real and lasting imprint on my mind was an enormous demonstration, which allowed us to cry out our will to remain *French*… this day was a day of celebration for me because my parents let me go with my sister and older brother to a place close to the public garden.[50]

Fournier-Giusti recounted the takeover of the nearby high school by the OAS during one such demonstration: "we youth demonstrated for everything and nothing, for the protection of our high school where there were murders, in order to help the OAS save our country… this milieu was always charged and in turmoil. [It was]

fantastic and magical."[51] The author presented the passions of youth coupled with innocence as explanations for her support of the OAS in the war: "the four years of war in the *djebels*, the French soldiers murdered, civilians massacred – French or Algerian, and inhabitants terrorized… all of this remained unknown to me, held back from me, and I was not conscious of it. I had no real notion of the real war."[52] Innocence however transitioned into an active engagement: "Our role was to distribute OAS tracts, very discreetly, in the shops and to passersby… what sensation of pride, of power and force I felt! What honor! It was magnificent, the war, it rendered [us] strong and invulnerable."[53]

Historian Eric Savarèse labeled writers such as Cardinal and Pélégri as humanists, placing them apart from other writers who were more overtly political. Alain Vircondolet an academic and a philosopher by training – his most recent work was on the nineteenth-century writer J.K. Huysmans – arrived as an adolescent in the Metropole in 1962 and settled with his family in the city of Limoges. Vircondolet wrote *Alger l'amour* in 1982. In it, he writes, not without some resentment toward Metropolitans: "The pain and ordeal we suffered have given us knowledge of the world and a most acute existence, unlike the comfortable existence of the people of Paris or elsewhere for that matter: These people know nothing of the secret and magical links, which unite us to our birthplace, the land where we were born – *terre natale*."[54] As Vircondolet saw it, those who had never had the opportunity to experience Algeria could never mentally possess the land. This mental exercise is for Vircondolet, as it was for Cardinal and Pélégri, an entrancing experience.

The exclusive knowledge and authority over the terrain inherited by settlers through birth, life, and death in Algeria as described by Vircondolet is striking:

> The return [of the pied noir] is grave, a trip made in search of psychic equilibrium. It has nothing to do with tourism or curiosity. I was returning to my childhood, and perhaps even further beyond that still. By way of the land, I was returning to my ancestors, and to the essential knowledge of the soil, the sun, the sea, the dirty salted spindrift so lavishly sprayed, all that which the war and exile have completely muzzled.[55]

As birth and life tied the settler to the land, so death imparted a permanent belonging to the land. Visits to family graves became a key theme in countless pied noir memoirs. Vircondolet implied that these pilgrimages carried redemptive meaning for the pieds noirs exiled in France.

Even in cases where a writer wished not to be associated with the term pied noir, as was the case of many Jewish repatriates, personal attachment to the land is still a resounding motif. In an interview given in 1989, Jewish writer Jean-Luc Allouche reminded his interviewer, "I don't feel that I am a pied noir. I don't like them; I say this even though I know it is naïve to ignore that at a certain point, it might become apparent that I resemble them."[56] Allouche contemplates his "black sheep" identity among the pieds noirs throughout the book.[57] But Allouche's description of his personal attachment to Algeria rings with a familiar tone: "It is difficult. It is uncomfortable for me to say which is really my home."[58] Allouche added, "certainly, no other country can separate me [from France]," but, "I would never claim France as my own today, even as I enjoy all its delights."[59] At the same time, Allouche revealed the ambivalence that many Jews felt with regard to French Algeria. Allouche directed his readers toward his feelings about the rejection of Jews like himself in French Algeria:

> I once believed too much that Algeria [could be] mine, just as I had believed my mother's bosom [could be] mine, until one day, I was severed from it. It showed me that it had the power to abandon me. I was left alone with the illusion that I might have been permanently rooted there somehow.[60]

In many ways, Allouche's rendition of loss as a physical experience recalls Cardinal's writings. But Allouche also questioned the permanence of national belonging – and turned decolonization and Algeria's independence into questions about the fragility of national belonging.

For many highly educated Jews, the discrimination they faced in Algeria profoundly shaped their ambivalence towards France. In this, their rendition of French belonging differed greatly from that of the European pieds noirs. They recalled the tragic loss of French status,

the descent into the category of the indigene, and the anti-Semitism that prevailed in French Algeria. Such sentiments made their way into their writings. Even those intellectual Jews who rarely ventured into their personal pasts found it necessary to write about Algeria's. Jacques Derrida, also Jewish and raised in Algeria, recalled the unique experience of Jews who lost their French status in Algeria during World War II. Derrida gave the following speech in a colloquium in the United States. It is worth citing at length:

> [Citizenship] was not some superficial or superstructural predicate floating on the surface of experience. Especially not when this citizenship is, through and through, *precarious, recent, threatened,* and more artificial than ever. That is 'my case'; the at once typical and uncommon situation of which I would like to speak. Especially not when one has obtained this citizenship in the course of one's life, which has perhaps happened to several Americans present at this colloquium, but also, and above all, not when one has lost it *in the course of one's life,* which has certainly not happened to almost any American. And if one day some individual or other has seen their citizenship *itself withdrawn,* has that ever happened to a *group* as such? I am of course not referring to some ethnic group seceding, liberating itself one day from another nation-state, or giving up one's citizenship in order to give itself another one in a newly instituted state ... No, I am speaking of a 'community' group, a supposedly *ethnic* or *religious* group that finds itself one day deprived, as a group, of its citizenship by a state that, with the brutality of a unilateral decision, withdraws it without asking for their opinion, and *without the said group gaining back any other citizenship. No other.* Now I have experienced that. ... one fine day, without, once again, my asking for anything, and still too young to know it in a properly political way, I found the aforementioned citizenship again ... That was, I think in 1943; I had still never gone to 'France'; I had never been there. In essence, a citizenship ... is not natural. ... the artifice and precariousness of citizenship appear better when it is inscribed in memory as a recent acquisition: for example the French citizenship granted to the Jews of Algeria by the Crémieux decree in 1870. Or, better yet, in the traumatic memory of a 'degradation', of a loss of citizenship: for example,

> the loss of French citizenship, less than a century later, for the same Jews of Algeria.[61]

For Derrida, the historical memory of settler colonial society was displaced onto the "traumatic" loss and degradation that Jews had experienced under Vichy governance. He emphasized the disjunctures in a Franco-Maghrebi and Jewish identity, one that derives from a "disorder" of several non-overlapping affinities: a [French] linguistic affiliation, Algerian birth, French nationality, and the connection to the social and natural landscape.

Fellow Jewish writer from Algeria, Hélène Cixous was a product of two Jewish families that had crossed paths in French Algeria at the turn of the century. Hungarian and Sephardic on her father's side and German Ashkenazi on her mother's, Cixous was born in Oran in 1937 where her grandparents had first settled. When still a child, she later moved to Algiers where she trained in philosophy and English literature. Like Allouche, Cixous, too, wished not to be associated with a pied noir identity: "that famous pied noir language – I did not know it. I felt the accent was part of the repressive world it apparently expressed."[62] She claimed that she lived on the periphery of colonialism because her father practiced medicine in an Arab neighborhood outside of Algiers.[63] "I felt I was neither from Algeria, nor from France. I was in between the two. I refused to identify myself with the 'French,' with their repressive manner and way of mistreating others. I know some who were open and generous, but the majority conducted themselves with a blind and deaf attitude toward others."[64] She noted the anti-Semitism from both her European and Algerian neighbors.

Cixous, however, described a very strong attachment to Oran, her native city:

> I felt that I should never like to return to Oran. I wanted to keep the memory of Oran pristine. To see Oran again might very well invoke in me a great joy, but as with all trips that take you back somewhere, it would alter my purest memory, replacing old memories with the new. I did not want that. I lived in absolute magic while in Oran. It was the Oran of marvels.[65]

But in Cixous's mind (as with Allouche), Algeria was a place always of the past. For both Cixous and Allouche, Algeria was only Algeria insofar as it had a French past. At the same time, For Cixous, relative to Oran, Algiers was less glorious. But Oran remained "a paradise."[66]

At the same time, Cixous consciously averted discussions of "nationalism," or "national identity." She refused to be pinned by political categories, whether it be pied noir, Algerian, or even French. She would be identified only by her writing and literary or philosophical expression. With regard to her decision to move to the Metropole in 1955, she explained it as moving to the place where the French language took her; Paris became her linguistic sanctuary.[67] Unlike Derrida who underlined disjuncture, Cixous preferred to identify her literary existence in terms of a non-territorialized, abstract nationality: "I adopted a literary nationality."[68] Still, Cixous retained her ebullience towards her native Oran, which for her was devoid of tragedy. Her identification with Oran was physical and pure, based on the innocence of childhood and family, just as much as in the writings of other *pieds noirs*. Oran was reminiscent of childhood happiness and innocence, full of memories with which she strongly remained connected.

Cixous's memories of Oran as a city in which Jewish professionals could lead a relatively peaceful life during the post World War II years, revealed the important distinctions of class, education levels, and place of residence in French Algeria for the Jews, and also spoke to the degree of Jewish assimilation in French Algeria at this time. Many Jews in the coastal cities, especially in Algiers and Oran had begun to abandon religious practice during the interwar period. Philippeville (now Skikda), in Constantine was a prime example. The 1,100 strong Jewish community "showed little signs of [Jewish] cultural life," unlike the Jews of Constantine's interior, as one internal report drawn up by a Jewish organization in the mid 1950s stated. "Jews [in Philippeville] are Jews in so far as they keep kosher and commemorate Yom-Kippur."[69]

Among the Jewish repatriates from Algeria, meanwhile, those from Constantine were the most familiar with Jewish traditions. As one Daniel A, who grew up in Constantine during the 1950s recounted, "boys would go each day to *Talmud-Torah* for two hours after school,

then again on Thursday and Sunday mornings."[70] A relatively large number of Jews in Constantine as opposed to Algiers or Oran kept kosher and maintained customary practices of animal slaughters overseen by rabbis.[71] *Chabbat* was very important, and reciting the *Kaddish* on the anniversary of deaths, or visiting graves on Friday afternoons was another common practice. During marriages, the *miqveh, hammam, henna,* and *tahnia,* and various other Arab customs were also commonly practiced among Algerian Jews until the 1950s in Constantine.[72] Sétif, a city of mixed Muslim and Jewish inhabitants in Constantine, and the site of the bloody suppression of the 1945 V-day demonstrations, had a relatively strong Jewish culture in the 1950s. In the 1950s, Sétif had two synagogues attended regularly only by the men, and a Hebrew "Sunday School" that had a strong attendance among teen-agers. Jewish repatriates remembered their avoiding Christian dance parties or bars as teenagers. In fact, not until the end of the 1950s did Jews and Christians mix together in Sétif.[73] The consistory rabbis in the city had very strong ties to the community, and often intervened in family affairs and conjugal disputes.[74] While Constantine saw a high degree of interest in Zionism among its Jews after World War II, this never translated into open support of Israel nor an interest to settle in the new Jewish state.[75] The Jews of French Algeria remained committed to their French status even their understanding of what it meant to be French was marked by ambivalence.

The literary energies of the pieds noirs and Jewish repatriates have drawn the attention of scholars and critics especially since the 1990s. In 2002, French researcher and sociologist Éric Savarèse published a book titled *The Invention of the Pieds-noirs* [*L'Invention des pieds noirs*]. In it, he argued that France now more than ever needed a balanced view of the pied noir community, whose members, Savarèse lamented, have been too often mistakenly charged with the full extent of colonial violence and exploitation. Savarèse hailed the recent publication by Jeannine Verdès-Leroux (CNRS), *The French of Algeria* [*Les Français d'Algérie*], as an exemplary model of this much-needed balanced scholarship.[76] Wrote Savarèse of his colleague, "[f]ar from limiting her critique to a superficial anti-colonialism, Verdès-Leroux has managed to strike a balance between two existing hegemonic interpretations: one that only seeks to praise

the French achievement in the colonies and the other, a narrow-minded anti-colonialism, which has erected an impenetrable wall between the colonizer and colonized."[77] Savarèse claimed that he himself opposed this rigid and myopic brand of "totalitarian anti-colonialism," in France."[78] He called for a "median path," whereby historians could denounce "the economic exploitation of the indigenous population or colonial massacres while still reminding the public of French achievements [in the colonies]."[79] Savarèse's reading of history resonated with the government's efforts to celebrate France's presence and history overseas.

Savarèse and Verdès-Leroux were interested in the "rich human interactions" that unfolded independently of political motives and ideologies.[80] Everyday relations between the Europeans and the Muslim Algerians were too "complex and diverse" to be characterized simply as imperial or colonial, Savarèse argued. In fact, it was only through literature and first-hand accounts written by pieds noirs, and not through historical analysis, that the complexities of colonial life achieved genuine expression. Savarèse thus reserved his most trenchant criticism for those "academic ideologues" in France who have overlooked such human interactions and complexities. Such oversight has led to faulty literary interpretations. Savarèse argued that academicians have wrongfully belittled Albert Camus's *The Stranger* as a literary justification of colonial ideology. He contended that such a disparaging view of Camus's works was anti-colonialist scholarship gone too far.[81]

The two authors who have stood out for Savarèse as writers producing literature in the spirit of Albert Camus were none other than Jean Pélégri and Marie Cardinal. According to Savarèse, these authors brought to life the unseen everyday exchanges that took place even in the worst of circumstances between the pieds noirs and the Algerians. For Savarèse and Verdès-Leroux, colonialism has boundaries that can be transcended through goodness and personal ties. To acknowledge Camus's settler perspective for Savarèse, is to distort the author's true humanity; the very notion of a settler colonial perspective is value-laden, ideological, and devoid of complexity.

Scholars like Savarèse and Verdès-Leroux have propagated powerful scholarly interpretations of settler colonialism in ways that have shied away from critical historical analysis. Meanwhile, their reading of Camus, Cardinal, and Pélégri is focused on the intimate, the

personal, and the sentimental, which they claim can cut through the blinding ideological entanglements. Such views cannot really explain or deconstruct colonialism so much as skirt beneath its structures, however. Although there is a disparity in the interpretation of literature by scholars and the reading of history by politicians, the evasive reading of the French colonial past in Algeria resonates on both registers. The reading of the Algerian past among the producers of culture and producers of policies has thus cohered in France.

Epilogue

On May 22, 2002, Jacques Chirac's prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, announced the creation of the Inter-ministerial Mission for repatriates, or MIR.[1] The High Council of Repatriates was also inaugurated to give official patronage to repatriate groups wishing to convene and deliberate pertinent issues, the most pressing among them being indemnities. In March 2003, after nearly four decades of negotiations with repatriate organizations, Raffarin nominated Michel Diefenbacher, a deputy from the Lot-et-Garonne, a department with a sizeable repatriate community, to draft a report on the evolution of the French government's "moral and material reparation" to the repatriates of pied noir and harki origins from 1961 to the present. Diefenbacher carried out the study over the course of six months in close liaison with the Inter-ministerial Mission for Repatriates and the High Council of Repatriates, organizations comprised of prominent representatives from the elite ranks of North African repatriates, the majority of whom were from Algeria.

Diefenbacher himself described his mission as the "search for solutions that would permit the national recognition of the material and moral rights of repatriates."[2] The government's numerous adaptations [of the 1961 Boulin Repatriate Law] had only "reinforced the conviction among repatriates that the nation refuses to assign to the French saga overseas, the place it merits in the nation's history."[3] In his comments on the mission, Diefenbacher argued that:

> no material reparation will truly be judged satisfactory unless it is accompanied by the clear affirmation of a renewed will to

> underscore, in face of national public opinion and in face of the international community, the pride that our country feels with regard to the actions of the French overseas for over a century.[4]

Reparations were, for Diefenbacher, more than a means to compensate settlers for material losses experienced during decolonization; they were a symbolic pledge to restore "the actions of the French overseas" to their rightful place in the nation's history. Diefenbacher's statement was far removed from the Fifth Republic's initial refusal to grant indemnities to repatriates. What made Diefenbacher's statement even more significant was the favorable interpretation of French presence in Algeria, to render it as a history of national grandeur. Diefenbacher, who championed the historical contribution made by repatriates was not a novice to repatriation politics. He had been a fixture in Giscard's administration and figured among those actively engaged in incorporating a positive view of the French Algerian past into the national narrative.

In May, the majority centrist party, the UMP, established first in 2002 as the party of Jacques Chirac, submitted a bill to parliament, urging the "recognition of the positive work accomplished by the French in Algeria."[5] In December 2003, a debate opened in the senate to consider yet another initiative, the problem of educating students across the country about the contributions made by the French especially in North Africa to the nation. The pied noir associations had for many years raised issue with the absence of repatriate history in French textbooks. Legislators were about to change this. In the senate, senator after senator noted the praiseworthy accomplishments of the French in North Africa who had gone overseas and "fertilized Algeria." They were the "colonial administrators, teachers, doctors, entrepreneurs, farmers, workers of all races, confessions and conditions to build the cities, roads, railways, airports, industries and public buildings" on French soil overseas.[6] And yet, as one senator regretted, "public opinion has been disparaging [towards repatriates]. These men and women are often regarded as perpetrators who must shoulder the responsibility of the Algerian War, when in fact they were the war's first victims."[7] Another senator, Jacques Peyrat, expressed his regret that interpretations of the Algerian War have

always been biased and skewed toward the most uncharitable views of France and those who had suffered the most:

> the Algerian War was a war that imposed on our army a role it never wanted; our country ceded a part of its territory, its populations and its riches, whereas their armies were victorious on site. Our soldiers turned up as "torturers," despite the fact that they successfully finished their mission in so many areas beyond combat – in territorial administration, provision of aid, in education, and even as police.[8]

The senator, J. Kerguéris, reminded his peers that "restoring the dignity of the repatriates," and including their works in the instruction of history in the schools "would be key to moving past the tragedies of the Algerian War, and would be essential to combatting the rampant communitarianism" that has divided France.[9] Communitarianism being a byword for divisive identity politics especially among minorities who have allegedly contested Republican ideals of integration, the senator was making a point about the public's putative disinterest in the repatriates and their inverse support for other minority groups.

Conservatives were not alone in their concern for "restoring the dignity" of the repatriates. In the National Assembly, during a session that opened in June 2004, communist deputy from the Hérault, François Liberti, also noted the nation's duty to honor the pieds noirs, the harkis, and their descendants, and to "pay homage to the considerable accomplishments of these men and women during the 132 years they were living in Algeria," which was "a difficult and most trying land."[10] Diefenbacher interjected to underline the need to educate future generations about the "epic of greater France," and to "tell the truth about the men and women, who had started out with only their bare hands who had not yet learned to doubt themselves and were only filled with confidence and hope."[11] Socialist deputies chimed in, to give their endorsement to the legislative project that was being considered by the High Council and the parliament to make adjustments to the country's history textbooks. The Minister delegate to veterans and a harki repatriate himself, Hamlaoui Mékachéra, echoed the concerns of the repatriates eager to modify the textbooks. A working group of specialists was already in place, and included members of the High Council of Repatriates, teachers,

repatriates from all backgrounds, and officials from the Ministry of Education to discuss new textbooks, which would inform students of the historical contributions made by repatriates.

In February 2005, as legislators finalized the terms of the law that would change the content of the country's schoolbooks, repatriation again became a lightning rod for a heated debate over the meaning of the colonial past. The February Law of 2005 was quickly passed without fanfare by the French legislature. The law stated that it was the nation's duty to recognize the "men and women who participated in the many achievements in North Africa and in territories that were previously placed under French sovereignty." Article 4 of the law, however, provoked immediate and angry responses from educators and intellectuals, with its mandate that all schools must include history lessons on the positive historical role played by the French overseas in their curriculum.[12] Public intellectuals and university faculty members decried the French government's distortion of history and its restrictions on pedagogical freedom.[13] Soon after the Colonial Law was passed, 1001 historians and instructors signed a petition opposing the law. The petition was published in *Le Monde* in March 2005 and later in the socialist daily *Libération* in December. The petitioners called for the abrogation of Article 4, citing the state's doctrinaire imposition of a "teleological view of history," and denouncing the violation of scholarly "neutrality" and freedom of thought "central to the principles of *laïcité*."[14]

The petitioners inveighed against the government's indifference to the history of "forced labor, racism, and massacres,"[15] and argued that the "Colonial Law" as it was now called by the public was an attempt to shield the nation from its imperial past.[16] Well-known sociologist Gérard Noiriel expressed his regret that at a time when historical research has unearthed so many concrete cases of crime, suffering, and exploitation connected to colonization, politicians have chosen to ignore these facts to advance their partisan cause; the law was in fact speaking for people who have been "condemned by the logic of history."[17] Historians Claude Liauzu, Sylvie Thénault and others who signed the petition protesting the Colonial Law argued that the historian's responsibility lay in transmitting a progressive memory, to integrate every episode of violence that has occurred throughout history in all its forms, and to make [these episodes] intelligible so that they do not recur in the future.[18] In 2006, President Chirac repealed Article

4, otherwise leaving the law largely intact. If the government's intervention in education provoked heated opposition, the rest of the law's clauses on indemnities and their moral significance were never made a point of protest, even though decisions concerning indemnities were also premised on controversial interpretations of the past.

Repatriation policies concerning the French from Algeria post 1968 have consisted of moral and financial reparations. I have argued that the government's acquiescence was owed in part to the political mobilization by repatriates during critical elections. But these concessions also revealed the shared eagerness among officials since 1962 to bury the historical controversies related to the building of a settler society in which Frenchness was lived and embodied by a diverse mixture of ethno-cultural groups whose understanding of greater France differed from that of the Metropolitans. Repatriation also gave way to a politics of classification and delineating a nationhood whereby all those who came from Algeria whether European, Jewish, or Muslim, would be assembled and merited according to the specific role they played during the Algerian conflict. Repatriation implied the ingathering of citizens who had French status and were "dislocated" from the Metropole prior to 1962. The category of repatriate thus allowed the Fifth Republic to distinguish between those French citizens who were temporarily residing outside the country on the one hand – for 132 years in the case of the pieds noirs, Jews, and harkis from Algeria – and Muslims from Algeria who might have had French status prior to 1962 but who could no longer hold this status. The politics of integrating the French Muslim repatriates held acute importance in this regard as it distanced Muslim North Africans from French history and society.

Repatriation as the integration of the French of Algeria has remained central to the doubled politics of Republican nation-building and decolonization in France after 1962. The politics of repatriation has been premised on the notion that the Republic was reclaiming its citizens after 1962, and thus allowed a complete disavowal of the settler colonial project in French Algeria. Included in this category of citizens were the harkis, who in time were set apart from other Muslim Algerians in France as having made exceptional sacrifices to the nation during the Algerian War. Each leader of the Fifth Republic tried to identify himself as a strong advocate of repatriate needs and rights. Post-1968 presidents paid tribute to the compatriots who had, as they argued, brought civilization to Algeria only to face neglect and discrimination from their Metropolitan

compatriots. Ironically, repatriation, a policy meant to bury the Algerian past by turning settlers into returnees, resulted in the persistence of Algeria in official policies and commemorations an Algeria made more palatable to Republican cohesion and honor.

The politics of remembering the Algerian past has been fuelled by the commemorations pursued by repatriates. These efforts of the French from Algeria have resulted not just in indemnities, but also in such controversial projects such as museums and monuments dedicated to honoring the history and lives of the French in Algeria. In Montpellier, for example, the idea of a museum was put forth by the socialist mayor of the city, Georges Frêche.[19] Frêche, as mentioned in Chapter 6, was endorsed by RECOURS, a pied noir association. 20% of Montpellier's electorate happens to be made up of repatriates. The project ran into an impasse when the historian Daniel Lefeuvre, who had been invited to consult on the project clashed with repatriates over the main mission of the museum. The representatives of the repatriate associations saw the museum as a chance to showcase the positive works that they believed colonization had ultimately brought to Algeria.

The effort of French leaders to maintain good relations with repatriates continues today. During his presidential campaign in 2007, UMP candidate Nicolas Sarkozy visited pied noir and harki repatriates and promised them his commitment to indemnities and recognition. In May of that year, Sarkozy addressed the repatriates of the CLAN-R, the Liaison Committee of Repatriate Associations [*Comité de liaison des associations des rapatriés*]. To the pieds noirs, he confirmed France's moral debt to the French of Algeria. To the harkis, Sarkozy officially recognized France's responsibility for the unjust treatment and abuses the harkis had suffered after their arrival. Finally, the Europeans who died during demonstrations against Algerian independence and the final confrontation with the French military would be remembered as citizens who "died for France." By 2008, new indemnity measures would go into effect, including new rates of financial aid and the cancellation of all debt for the retired.[20]

Sarkozy urged Algeria and France to rebuild [their future] together, "without repentance [*repentance*], without rewriting history," contradicting the very role that the French state has played in rewriting the settler colonial past. Sarkozy meanwhile took steps to strengthen economic ties with Algeria: "Algeria has immense energy resources. France has mastered the technology related to nuclear power-generated electricity. We must find in this the basis for an equitable

cooperation."[21] As president, Sarkozy also continued the government's business of engineering contracts with the Algerian government. As this book shows, Sarkozy was just the latest in the line of French leaders to attempt a double-sided politics, combining diplomatic cooperation with Algeria with the appeasement of the repatriate community.

Today, controversies continue as to the commemoration of repatriate history, primarily for the French from Algeria. In Perpignan and Montpellier, pied noir associations are battling local opposition as they continue efforts to erect monuments and museums commemorating their past. Cities along the southern littoral have been witness to similar tensions between repatriates and local residents, many of whom are of Muslim Algerian descent or background. While historians have noted the amnesia surrounding France's Algerian heritage, this study emphasizes a politics of remembering, one which foregrounds French Algeria as a once glorious national past. It also shows how repatriation politics continues as a policy of nation-building as it categorizes and arranges the different populations from Algeria in the national narrative according to their respective loyalties during the Algerian War. As such, repatriation politics remains constitutive of French decolonization.

Nicolas Sarkozy visits repatriates in Nice, 2007

Notes

Introduction

1. Loi no. 61–1439 du 26 décembre 1961 relative à l'acceuil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer.
2. http://www.ina.fr/video/CAA7801113801.
3. See Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
4. See Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization.*
5. The GPRA was founded in Cairo in 1958. Its first president was Ferhat Abbas who was later replaced by Benyoucef Ben Khedda. At Evian, the GPRA was represented by Belkacem Krim, Ahmed Francis, Saad Dahlab, Ahmed Boumendjel, Ben Yahia, Slimane, Ali Mendjel, Taieb Boulahrouf. The French were led by the Minister of Algerian Affairs, Louis Joxe. For a full text of the talks, see *Vers la paix en Algérie, les négociations d'Évian dans les archives diplomatiques françaises 15 janvier 1961 – 29 juin 1962* (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2003).
6. The United Nations General Assembly recognized Algeria's right to independence in 1960, which proved to be a turning point in the war. Starting in 1961, the French faced grave difficulties on all fronts. Inside Algeria, dissenting factions of the French army had staged a coup against the government in a last-ditch attempt to defend *Algérie française*. The United States, frustrated by military debacles on the French side and mindful of the ascent of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN, minimized its outward endorsement of the French cause. In metropolitan France, domestic support began to diminish significantly, undermining morale in Algeria. See Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution, Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 120; on the various disastrous French military campaigns, see Connelly, 125–133. For comprehensive accounts of the war, see Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie* (Paris, France: Fayard, 2001). General accounts of the war include Sylvie Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris: Larousse, 2005); Benjamin Stora and Mohammed Harbi, *La guerre d'Algérie 1954–1962* (Paris: Pluriel, 2010); *L'histoire de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004). For literature concerning torture and specific aspects of the war, see Benjamin Stora, *La gangrène ou l'oubli* (Paris: La Découverte, 2005), Raphaëlle Branche, *La torture et l'Armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie, 1954–1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). For the most recent publication in English, see Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War, 1830–1962* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013).

7. As Matthew Connelly writes, the Algerian War unfolded largely in the public eye of an international system in which newly liberated nations had emerged as an influential political voice. Although the actual impact of the Afro-Asian bloc on the war is difficult to assess, this became secondary to the *perception* of the Cold War adversaries, which saw the FLN as a populist struggle for anti-colonial liberation. Connelly, 120.
8. Louis Joxe invoked the Third Republic philosopher Ernest Renan who in his famous essay, *What is the Nation?,* defined France as a nation come together through a "spiritual principle."
9. The exact etymology of this term is still not known. By some accounts, Algerians called French conquerors "black feet" because of their black boots. In turn, colonists had called the Arabs "black feet" because many worked in fields or in the hulls of ships hauling coal. But during the Algerian War, the term became current among Metropolitans as a derogatory term for the settlers in Algeria.
10. *Vers la paix en Algérie,* 98.
11. Alain Peyrefitte, *Faut-il partager Algérie?* (Paris: Plon, 1961), 20.
12. As Gérard Noiriel notes, despite the fact that France had one of the highest rates of immigration in Europe throughout the nineteenth century, immigration has been excised from the nation's memory. In 1975, for every "older generation" Algerian, there were ten "older generation" French citizens of Italian origin. Gérard Noiriel, trans., Geoffroy de Laforçade, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 29. In 1962, the numbers would have been roughly similar.
13. Sung-eun Choi, "Complex Compatriots: Jews in Post-Vichy French Algeria," in *Journal of North African Studies* 17:5 (2012), 863–880. In 1961, France naturalized over 2,400 Saharan Jews in the M'zab region. It is known that many of these Saharan Jews chose to immigrate to Israel. See Sarah Abrevaya Stein, *Saharan Jews and the Fate of French Algeria* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014). Shepard explains that, in contrast, most of the Mozabite Jews left for France, and that many of those who first chose to go to Israel subsequently emigrated to France. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 246.
14. Peyrefitte, *Faut-il partager Algérie?*, 20.
15. The concept of "rootedness in the soil," while commonplace in European and non-European conceptions of national belonging in the nineteenth century, was invoked for different reasons and with distinct ramifications in different countries. Gérard Noiriel attributes the French use of this concept to the entrenched presence of the peasantry in France, well into the late nineteenth century. See Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot; Les origines républicaines de Vichy* (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1999).
16. Alain Peyrefitte, *Faut-il partager Algérie?* 20, 51. In 1960, upon meeting de Gaulle, Israel's prime minister David Ben-Gurion recommended that France follow Israel's example and reserve a fixed territory for Europeans inside Algeria. The prime minister argued that, "Israel was a success because … [the Jews] were self-sufficient to live amongst

[them]selves." Peyrefitte concurred that just as "Jews were able to build a cohesive community on the principle of racial exclusion favorable to their survival," so should the French in Algeria. But in Algeria, Peyrefitte argued, the "Lebanese" solution was more ideal whereby the Europeans would "co-exist freely" alongside other minority religious groups, and remain tied to a larger sovereign entity. Peyrefitte, 73–75; 77.

17. On the Metropolitan perception of the OAS and its association with fascism, see Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 83–90.
18. We know that until the late 1960s, the predominant immigrant groups were the Italians and the Portuguese. For immigration from Europe, see Gérard Noiriel, trans., Geoffroy de Laforcade *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France* (London: Routledge, 1992), Georges Tapinos, *L'Immigration étrangère en France, 1946–1973* (Paris: Institute national d'études démographiques, 1975).
19. For a brief overview of the Iberian-North African trajectory of Sephardic Jews from the seventh century onward, see Saddek Benkada, "A Moment in Sephardi History: The Reestablishment of the Jewish Community of Oran, 1792–1831" in Emily Benichou and Daniel J. Gottreich, eds, *Jewish Culture and Society in North Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 168–176.
20. For literature that includes accounts of Algerian Jews, see Michel Abitbol, *Les deux terres promises: les juifs de France et le sionisme, 1897–1945* (Paris: Tempus Perrin, 2010); Joëlle Bahloul, *Ethnographie d'une minorité éthnique. Les juifs nord-africains en France* (Paris: La Kahena, 1981); Esther Benbassa, *Histoire des Juifs de France* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997); Haim Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews of North Africa*, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1981).
21. Melissa K. Byrnes, "French Like Us? Municipal Policies and North African Migrants in the Paris Banlieues, 1945–1975." PhD diss. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2008), 115–116.
22. Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Race, and Citizenship in Modern France* (London: Routledge, 1992).
23. Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic: Nation, State, and Citizenship in Contemporary France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 80–104; 186–208.

1 French Settler Colonialism in Algeria

1. A select bibliography includes Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event* (London: Cassell, 1999); "Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of 'Race'," in *American Historical Review* 106 (2001), 866–905; "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," in *Journal of Genocide Research* 8:4 (2006), 387–409; Lorenzo Veracini, "Historylessness: Australia as a Settler Colonial Collective," in *Postcolonial Studies* 10:3

(2007), 271–285; *Settler Colonialism, A Theoretical Overview* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

2. George M. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy, A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (Oxford, New York, NY, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982), xi.
3. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 7.
4. Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 105.
5. Ibid., 53.
6. Ibid.,17.
7. Ibid., 17.
8. Ibid., 39.
9. Ibid., 105.
10. Sarah Stein, *Saharan Jews*.
11. Joshua Schreier, *Arabs of the Jewish Faith, The Civilizing Mission in Colonial Algeria* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 10.
12. Jennifer Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 180.
13. Philip Curtin, *Death by Migration: Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 93–94. Jennifer Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*.
14. Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism,* 53.
15. Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson, "Settler Colonies" in Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray, eds, *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 360–376; 369. Cited in Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism,* 9.
16. Jennifer Sessions's *By Sword and Plow, France and the Conquest of Algeria* remains by far the most comprehensive and compelling account of the first decades of French Algerian history.
17. Alexander de Tocqueville, "First Report on Algeria (1847)" in Jennifer Pitts, ed., *Writings on Empire and Slavery* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), introduction, xxxvii, 162.
18. Jennifer Sessions notes that this number was higher than the European population in Australia during this time. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow,* 290.
19. Ibid., 280.
20. Charles-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, tome 2: De l'insurrection de 1871 à la guerre de libération de 1954* (Paris, France: PUF, 1979), 101.
21. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow,* 181.
22. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Agérie,* 116.
23. Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1882–1914* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 66.
24. Ibid., 67.
25. David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône 1870–1920* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 98–116.
26. Ibid., 120–121.

27. See Jonathan Gosnell, *The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 1930–1954* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002).
28. Ibid., 64.
29. John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 19.
30. Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 85.
31. Laure Blévis, "Les avatars de la citoyenneté en Algérie colonial ou les paradoxes d'une categorization," in *Droit et Société,* 48 (2001), 557–580, 563.
32. Todd Shepard, "Thinking between Metropole and Colony: The French Republic, 'Exceptional Promotion,' and the 'Integration' of Algerians, 1955–1962," in Martin Thomas ed., *The French Colonial Mind, Volume 1: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 298–323, 301.
33. Kamel Kateb, *Européens, 'Indigènes', et juifs* (Paris: PUF, 2001), 77.
34. Laure Blévis explains that the civil code in French Algeria had placed a specific distinction between "citizenship" and "nationality," a distinction, which did not exist in the Metropole. When Jews in Algeria became French citizens in 1870 through the Crémieux decree, they were legally being lifted out of the category "indigenes." Jurists in Algeria argued that Jewish acquisition of citizenship status should therefore be understood not as a process of naturalization – since naturalization indicated the exchange of one nationality for another, but rather as a process of "obtaining the right to be French." "Les avatars," in *Droit et Société,* 567.
35. Socialist deputies had attempted a more radical measure to enfranchise the Muslim populace but the settler lobby undermined the legislation. Martin Thomas and others have noted that "421,000 Muslims were enfranchised by the law," Martin Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics, and Society* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005), 67–68; Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 37. See also Samuel Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism: The Extreme Right in Algeria, 1919–1939* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 16. Shepard states that the law also allowed "native Algerians" to access civil service [*function publique*] posts.
36. See Samuel Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism* and Martin Thomas, *The French Empire between the Wars*, 109.
37. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 30.
38. Ibid., 46.
39. The entire Altaras-Cohen report is reproduced in English and in Hebrew in Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Les Juifs d'Algérie et la France (1830–1855)* (Jerusalem: Institut Ben-Zvi, Centre de recherches sur les juifs d'Afrique du nord, 1981), 70.
40. Schwarzfuchs, *Les juifs* .
41. Ibid., 71.

42. Alexis de Tocqueville, "First Report on Algeria" in Jennifer Pitts, trans., *Alexis de Tocqueville, Writings on Empire and Slavery* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 146.
43. Schwarzfuchs, *Les juifs*, 98.
44. Ibid., 83.
45. Ibid., 85.
46. Ibid., 86.
47. Ibid., 114.
48. Ibid., 111.
49. Ibid., 11.
50. Ibid., 119.
51. Sam Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism*, 30.
52. Census-taking in Algeria expanded in 1946 when new experts were dispatched from the INSEE, France's demographic institute in the Metropole, to form the statistical office of the newly established Secretariat for Economic Affairs in the Governor General's administration. Kamel Kateb, *Européens, "Indigènes" and Juifs en Algérie* (1830–1962), 227–228. It was the experts of this census office in Algeria that carried out the major study on overpopulation in Algeria. Jacques Breil, *Algérie surpeuplée, orientations pour une politique de population* (Alger: Sécretariat social d'Alger, 1958).
53. Tableau I – "Population municipale, urbaine et rurale de 1886 à 1954", in *Annuaire statistique de l'Algérie* (Alger: Ministère de l'Algérie, Direction générale des affaires économiques et de l'industrialisation, service de la statistique générale, 1960), 19. These communes in order were: Algiers, Affreville, Birmandreïs, Boghari, Bordj-Menaïel, Bouïra, Bouzaréa, El-Biar, Guyotville, Hussein-Dey, Koléa, Kouba, l'Arba, Maison-Carrée, Marengo, Saint-Eugène; Oran, Arcole, Arzew, Perrégaux, Mers-el-Kébir, La Sénia; Constantine, Aumale, Blida, Boufarik, Cherchell, Médéa, Miliana, Orléansville, Ténès, Tizi-Ouzou, Aïn-Témouchent, Mascara, Saïda, Mostaganem, Relizane, Sidi-Bel-Abbès, Tiaret, Tlemcen, Béni-Saf, Nemours, Hammam-Bou-Hadjar, Saint-Denis-au-Sig, Frenda, Marnia, Tébessa, Barna, Batna, Biskra, Bône, Bougie, La Calle, Djidjelli, Guelma, Souk-Ahras, Philippeville, Stora, Sétif, Aïn-Beïda, Kehnchela, Bordj-Bou-Arreridj, and Saint-Arnaud.
54. Tableau III. – "Population des départements et arrondissements algériens," in *Annuaire statistique* (1960), 21–22. On the eve of the Algerian War, Europeans and Jews outnumbered Muslims and the ratio of "naturalized non-Muslims" to "Muslims" was 156,527: 131,346; Tableau IV. – "Population des grandes villes au 31–10–54," in *Annuaire statistique* (1956–1957), 20.
55. Tableau IV. – "Population des principales villes d'Algérie (1960)," in *Annuaire statistique* (1961), 23. Bab-el-Oued was another predominantly "European" district. Hussein-Dey, Maison-Carrée, Saint-Eugène, and Bouzaréah had a majority "Muslim" population after World War II.
56. Henri Alleg, *Mémoire algériennes* (Paris: Stock, 1958), 13.

57. Ibid., 13.
58. Tableau V. – "Population active par catégories socio-professionnelles au 31–10–54," in *Annuaire statistique* (1956–1957), 21.
59. Ibid.
60. "Tableau I. – Population de l'Algérie et du Sahara par catégorie d'après les divers recensements effectués depuis 1856," in *Annuaire statistique* (1961), 19.
61. "Tableau V. – Population active par catégories socio-professionnelles au 31 octobre 1954," in *Annuaire statistique* (1954), 21.
62. It is not clear whether or not these sociologists included Jews in their category of "European." Alain Darbel, Jean-Paul Rivet, Claude Seibel, Pierre Bourdieu, *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie: Données statistiques,* Maison des sciences de l'homme, *Recherches méditerranéennes* (Paris, La Haye: Mouton & Co., 1963), 100, 183. The documents of the *Recherches méditerranéennes* were published in collaboration with *Le conseil méditerranéen de recherches en sciences sociales, le centre d'études des sociétés méditerranéennes in* Aix-en-Provence, *l'école pratique des hautes études, la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, the Institute of Social Anthropology* of St. Anthony's College, Oxford University, *le centre des sciences sociales d'athènes, l'institut turc d'histoire économique de l'université d'Istanbul,* and *the Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change,* The University of Chicago.
63. This was Hélène Sintès-Camus's income when her son and future writer Albert Camus was just eight years old in 1921. See Olivier Todd, *Albert Camus, une vie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 22.
64. Bourdieu also mentioned the social connections necessary in dealing with administrative affairs: "It was also rare to address administrators without a mediator. Affairs such as renewing a passport or obtaining a seat on the plane for example operated through an intermediary or a known relation. Thus developed a faith in the power of human relations." Pierre Bourdieu, "Étude sociologique," *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*, 274.
65. Olivier Todd, *Albert Camus, une vie*, 24.
66. *Deux pièces de dossier d'Algérie,* II: "La solidarité économique franco-algérienne" (Paris, France: Éditions du Seuil, 1961), 104.
67. "Artisan ébéniste," Alger. Bourdieu, *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie,* 495.
68. Pierre Bourdieu, "Étude sociologique", 494.
69. Cabinet, CAOM 10CAB/28. *L'Algérie du demi-siècle vue par les autorités locales*, issued in January, 1954. At the time, Algeria was divided into *Communes de plein exercice,* controlled fully by settlers; *Communes mixtes* where Muslim functionaries represented the commune though under French surveillance, and *communes indigènes,* which included *centres municipaux*. In the *communes de plein exercice,* the survey was completed by the sub-prefects, and in the *Communes mixtes,* by the head of the commune.
70. "Melée de superstitions dans le peuple, cette religion est mieux compris et mieux pratiquée par une élite peu nombreuse mais cultivée, fidèle à la culture et à la civilisation musulmane," in *L'Algérie du demi-siècle*, CAOM 10CAB/28.

71. *L'Algérie du demi-siècle,* 113.
72. "Il appartient à l'Autorité française de soutenir les Confréries et Marabouts, facteurs d'ordre et de tranquillité … leur influence varie avec la personnalité de leurs Chefs, mais elle est toujours utile. Les attaques dont elles ont l'objet de la part des parties anti-français sont d'ailleurs une prévue de l'aide qu'elles sont susceptibles de nous apporter." Touggourt. *L'Algérie du demi-siècle,* 114.
73. Centre municipal d'Issahnounen, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle,* 118.
74. Djelfa, commune mixte, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle,* 118.
75. The Association of Ulemas was established in 1931 under Ben Badis, and was called the AUMA [*Association des Ulema musulmans algériens*].
76. The French administration had legalized Muslim schools and teaching in Arabic in 1948. Administrator, mixed commune of Fedj M'Zala, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle*, 122.
77. *L'Algérie du demi-siècle*, 122.
78. Administrator, Ain M'Lila, in the department of Constantine, Ibid., 125.
79. *L'Algérie du demi-siècle,* 125.
80. CPE, Bordj-Bou-Arreridj, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle*, 125.
81. Administrator, Mascara, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle*, 135.
82. Ibid., 136.
83. Administrator, Les Braz, mixed commune, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle*, 138.
84. El-Milia, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle* 152.
85. *L'Algérie du demi-siècle*.
86. El-Golea, *L'Algérie du demi-siècle* ,149.
87. *L'Algérie du demi-siècle,* 249.
88. Ibid., 261.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. See Martin Evans on Abbas and his reaction to the 1944 reforms. Evans, *Algeria, France's Undeclared War*, 73.

2 The Algerian War in the Settler Colony

1. For literature on 13 May, see Geneviève Keiffer, Marc Ferro, *Le 13 mai 1958* (Paris: La Documentation française, 1985); Michel Winock, *L'agonie de la IVe République: 13 mai 1958* (Paris: Gallimard, 2006).
2. See Neil Macmaster, *Burning of the Veil: The Burning of the Veil and the 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women 1954–1962* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2012).
3. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2005), 287.
4. A major consideration for the American and French governments at this time was Egypt's president, Nasser whom officials in both countries feared would unite a pan-Arab and Islamic nationalism capable of challenging the West's influence in North Africa and "Black Africa." The rapprochement between Algeria and Tunisia also led to the American distrust of

French diplomatic leverage with Tunisia. Most of all, global opinion favored global integration "on the basis of racial equality, self-determination, and cultural cosmopolitanism. See Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 108, 129, 153.

5. Rod Kedward notes that the Fifth Republic was in the beginning identified with the person of de Gaulle. *La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 388.
6. Georgette Elgey, *L'Histoire de la IVe République. La fin, La République des Tourmentes 1954–1959* (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 599.
7. The word *personnalité* , or "personality" was often used in French political and intellectual discourse to designate a unique national identity. One of the most significant uses of this term in the twentieth century was in a 1929 monograph by the renowned geographer, André Siegfried. The book was a compilation of lectures Siegfried had delivered on French politics at the Williamstown Institute of Politics in Massachusetts in 1928. In the book titled *France, A Study in Nationality*, Siegfried described France as a country which resembled no other, "for her conception of production, of politics, and of life is essentially her own." The so-called French personality, according to Siegfried, was a "finished product by the end of the eighteenth century," and remained more or less static thereafter, allowing the United States and its "captains of industry" and the "businessmen" of Germany to outpace the agriculture-based French economy. With the French economy superseded by the new rising industrial class in the United States and Germany, Siegfried wrote that "bourgeois" individuality in France had become antiquated. See Siegfried, *France, A Study in Nationality* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1929), 1–2.
8. Michel Debré, *Gouverner, Mémoires 1958–1962*, t. 3 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), 226.
9. Ibid., 226.
10. Ibid.
11. Charles De Gaulle, *Discours et messages, 1958–1962* (Paris: Plon, 1970).
12. De Gaulle, *Discours et Messages,* 121.
13. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization.*
14. Shepard, Ibid., 4.
15. De Gaulle, *Discours et messages,* 121.
16. "The interior regime in Algeria should be a federal type, where the diverse communities, French, Arab, Kabyle, Mozabite, etc. will co-habitate in the country, and obtain guarantees relevant to the lives of each [community] and thereby found a framework for their cooperation." Charles De Gaulle, "Allocution radiodiffusée et télévisée prononcée au Palais de l'Elysée," 16 septembre 1959, in *Discours et messages*, 121–122.
17. Michel Debré, *Gouverner,* 196. Debré also made his views known in August of 1959 in special cabinet meetings, during which he insisted on the need to "ensure the democratic expression of Algeria" in order to "safeguard France's strategic, economic, and political interests," and emphasized the need to continue and rally international support for France. Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution,* 206.

18. De Gaulle did not attempt to hide his aversion to acknowledging Muslims as French during private cabinet meetings. As Alain Peyrefitte wrote, de Gaulle had at one point exclaimed: "Let's not fool ourselves. Those Muslims, have you been [to Algeria] to see them? Have you watched them with their turbans and their djellabas? You see very well that they are not French! ... Try mixing oil and vinegar. Shake the bottle, but after a second, they separate. The Arabs are Arabs, the French are French!" Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle* (Paris: Fayard, 2002), 66. Peyrefitte had the opportunity to sit in ministerial meetings with de Gaulle. At the time he was a young Gaullist deputy, Peyrefitte would serve as Minister of Repatriates under de Gaulle and as Minister of Information under Georges Pompidou. He became a member of the Académie française in 1977.
19. Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle,* 201.
20. According to the general, France could, in principle, be a France of many [ethnic] origins, "yellow, brown, or black," but "we are, after all, European and of the white race (race blanche), of Greek and Latin culture and of the Christian religion. ... France would remain open to its universal vocation if and only if these [non-European] races stayed a minority." Peyrefitte, Ibid., 66.
21. Serge Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle* (London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 108.
22. Le Club Jean Moulin, *Les perspectives d'emploi des Européens en Algérie,* 1.
23. Most famously, Raymond Cartier of the weekly *Paris-Match* traveled to the AOF to report on what he saw as the futility of financial aid to Africa. "FIDES (Financement pour le développement économique et social) and its handful of millions are nothing in the face of the discouraging gap [in West Africa]," Cartier wrote, "the worn-out lands, the indigenous tedium, and the vastness that stretches without men, without water ... It's no wonder that FIDES pours its money into the cities, which are capable of emitting at least some limited glitter. To double the funds of FIDES would resolve thing. The true question is whether the resources of France alone are in fact sufficient to transform the great portion of impoverished [peoples] living in this ungrateful continent." Raymond Cartier, "En France noir avec Raymond Cartier, La France sème ses milliards, les africains disent, 'c'est bien tard'" in *Paris-Match* no. 384(1956), 34.
24. Pierre Moussa, *Les Chances économiques de la communauté franco-africaine* (FNSP-Armand Colin, 1957), 129.
25. In a press conference held in April of 1961, de Gaulle addressed the burden of maintaining Algeria. "Algeria costs us, it's the least that we can say, [it] costs rather than benefits us. As for administrative, economic investments, social aid, cultural development or necessary finances to maintain order, what we provide [Algeria] in terms of effort, money, and human resources, they bring no equivalent compensation." This speech is often seen in the context of the general's frustrations with the delay in the Evian negotiations as an instrument to speed up the talks, rather than as a detailed economic report or analysis. "Conférence de presse tenue au palais de l'Elysée." 11 avril, 1961, in de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, 288.

26. Jacques Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme française: histoire d'un divorce* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), 373.
27. The increase in the proportion of French exports to European nations versus French trade within the franc zone (mostly with the colonies) between 1958 and 1970 was dramatic. In 1960, the European Common Market absorbed 10% of French exports and the franc zone 30%, while ten years later in 1970, 50% was absorbed by the Common Market and 10% by the franc zone. Serge Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle,* 108.
28. See *Rapport général, Plan de Constantine, 1959–1963* (Délégation générale du gouvernement en Algérie, Direction du plan et des études économiques, 1960).
29. De Gaulle made it obligatory for all young functionaries entering the services of the state in all sectors of administration, law, army, education, and public services to fulfill a portion of their post in the remote Arab, Kabyle, and Mozabite regions in Algeria. The terms of the Constantine Plan also included such measures as the calibration of wages in Algeria with those of the Metropole, the creation of 400,000 new jobs, the rescaling of public transportation, commerce, and service industries, and a greater financial investment in steel production in Algeria. *Discours et messages, Avec le renouveau, 1958–1962* (Paris: Plon, 1970), 48.
30. Serge Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle,* 40.
31. Charles-Robert Ageron, "L'Opinion française à travers les sondages," in Jean-Pierre Rioux, ed., *La guerre d'Algérie et les Français* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 28.
32. Alfred Grosser described it best when he wrote that the Algerian War "divided each Frenchman within himself." Grosser wrote: "I will concede that certain French people were 99 percent in favor of Algerian autonomy and 1 percent in favor of French Algeria, while others were 99 percent sympathetic to French Algeria and 1 percent the political ideal of self-determination." Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy under De Gaulle,* trans. Lois Ames Pattison (Boston: Little and Brown, 1967), 30.
33. Charles-Robert Ageron, "L'opinion française," 28.
34. Mollet was forced to call in Robert Lacoste as resident Governor General after the incident. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (London: Macmillan, 2002), 148–150.
35. Charles-Robert Ageron, "L'opinion française," 28.
36. Not all on the Left were opposed to the use of torture. Socialists who led the Fourth Republic establishment during the Algerian War did not give written orders to torture, but officials within Guy Mollet's entourage including Max Lejeune and Minister Resident Robert Lacoste sanctioned its use verbally, as Martin Evans described. Martin Evans, *Algeria, France's Undeclared War,* 200.
37. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *L'Affaire Audin, La Raison d'état, Textes publiés par le Comité Audin* (Paris: Minuit, 1962). For the most recent and powerful discussions on torture during the Algerian War, see Sylvie Thénault, *Une Drôle de justice, les magistrats dans la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Découverte, 2001), and Raphaelle Branche, *La Torture et l'armée pendant la guerre*

d'Algérie, 1954–1962 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). See also Henri Alleg, *La Question,* and Louisette Ighilahriz and Anne Nivat, *Algérienne* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2001), also made into a documentary, *Woman is Courage* (2003). Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*.

38. Jean-Paul Sartre, preface to Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* (London, UK: Penguin, 2001), 21.
39. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *L'Affaire Audin*.
40. See Marcel Reggui and Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, *Les massacres de Guelma: Algérie, mai 1945, une enquête inedite sur la furie des milices colonials* (Paris: La Découverte, 2005); Jean-Louis Planche, *Sétif 1945: histoire d'un massacre annoncé* (Paris: Perrin, 2006); Mehana Amrani, *Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie: les discours français sur les massacres de Sétif, Kherrata et Guelma* (Paris: Harmattan, 2010); Abed Abidat, Jean-Louis Planche, *8 mai 1945: tragédie dans le Constantinois: Sétif, Guelma, Kherrata* (Images plurielles, 2010).
41. CADN Alger 33/Ambassade.
42. Bureau d'Études, Délégation Générale d'Algérie, 2. CADN Alger B/ Ambassade/33. Alger, décembre 1960.
43. Benjamin P. Nickels, "Unsettling French Algeria: Settlement, Terror, and Violence in the French-Algerian War, 1954–1962." PhD diss. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 367.
44. CADN Alger 33/Ambassade.
45. Ibid.
46. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* interview was the downfall of Jacques Massu. Massu was stripped of his functions and recalled to Paris.
47. Yves Courrière, *Les Feux du désespoir, La Guerre d'Algérie, IV*: *La Fin d'un empire* (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 27–29.
48. "Le Délégué général en Algérie à Monsieur le Ministre de l'État chargé des Affaires algériennes, au sujet des journées du 11 au 16 décembre 1960." Marked Confidential. CAOM 81F/137.
49. See Sarah Sussman, "Changing Lands, Changing Identities, the Migration of Algerian Jews to France, 1954–1967." Phd Diss. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
50. "Note d'Information, Attentats anti-juifs dans le Département de Constantine," WJC AJA Series H3, folder 2.
51. "Strictement confidentiel, La situation dans le Constantinois," WJC AJA Series H3, folder2.
52. The Jews of Tlemcen and Batna were the first to depart for France during the Algerian War. A conflict that occurred in 1956, the nature of which was not described by Lazarus in his report on Tlemcen, had apparently led to some 100 Jews being injured and five killed. Ibid., p. 3, "Note d'information, voyage de M. Jacques Lazarus dans l'Ouest Algérien 12 au 16 octobre 1958," 3. WJC AJA Series H3, Folder 7.
53. Ibid., p. 4, WJC AJA Series H3, Folder 7.
54. "Note d'information, déplacement de Jacques Lazarus dans le Constantine," 9 au 11 novembre 1958, p. 3.
55. WJC AJA, Series 3H, folder 2.

56. WJC AJA, Series 6H, folder 1.
57. The listing of Jews and M'zabs as separate communities outside the French community was later deleted from all published versions of de Gaulle's 1959 Declaration. Todd Shepard, *Invention of Decolonization,* 152.
58. "Réunion du CJAES," WJC Series H4, Folder 3.
59. Alger, le 6 février 1961, letter signed by Lazarus and addressed to "Monsieur Rabi" in Briançon (Hautes Alpes), WJC AJA Series 4H, Folder 5.
60. "Le FLN et la question de la minorité européenne," WJC AJA Series H4, Folder 5.
61. According to the sources of the AJDC in Paris, the rate of Algerians moving to Israel was all but negligible. In 1955, at the height of world-wide migration to Israel, 575 Jews emigrated from Algeria. Tunisia saw over 1000 migrate to Israel as early as 1950, although there too, the migration slowed considerably in the 1950s. See "Rapport sur l'Algérie, 6 décembre 1955," Arch. AJDC/Jerusalem 49B/56.208; reprinted in Michael Laskier, *North African Jewry in the Twentieth Century, the Jews of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 315.
62. Jews rarely joined the OAS, but many acknowledged that they knew other Jews who had joined, in much the same spirit as the settlers. See "Mémoire concernant les juifs d'Oran," WJC AJA Series H7, folder 8.
63. "Direction de la Sûrété nationale en Algérie." CADN 21PO/A/77.
64. Ibid.
65. Sarah Sussman, "Changing Lands, Changing Identities," 114.
66. "Délégation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, à Monsieur le minister de l'état, chargé des affaires algériennes. Objet: au sujet des journées du 11 au 16," 3. 1960 was the first year in which FLN banners and Algerian flags were openly wielded by Muslim demonstrators. In Algiers, 90 "Muslims" and 6 "Europeans" were killed as a result of this open support of Algerian nationalism, while hundreds were injured and hospitalized. Oran and Constantine also saw similar numbers of casualties. CAOM 81F/137.
67. BDR Cabinet 137W/381.
68. Ibid.
69. "Monsieur le préfet, au nom du conseil municipal et de la population laborieuse de notre village…" BDR Cabinet 137W/429.
70. BDR Cabinet 137W/429.
71. Ibid.

3 Repatriation: Bringing the Settler Colony "Home"

1. "Le Colloque de Grenoble," *Le Monde,* 5/6 mars 1961; "Le Colloque de Grenoble et le problème des garanties," in *France Observateur*, 9 mars 1961.
2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 via resolution 217A. Article 2 specified that, "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race,

colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty."

3. The works of Louis Wirth were influential in propagating the concept of minority rights in the United States. See Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups," in Ralph Linton, ed., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis, The Present Position of Minorities in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945). See Balandier's references to Wirth in Georges Balandier, "La situation coloniale: approche théorique," in *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* XI (1951), 44–79, reprinted as "The Colonial Situation, A Theoretical Approach," in Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *Social Change, The Colonial Situation* (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), 34–61.
4. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation," http://classiques.uqac.ca/contemporains/balandier_georges/situation_coloniale_1951/situation_coloniale_1951.pdf, 23.
5. Ibid., 24.
6. Patrick de Ruffray, "A propos de l'Algérie, prophétie imprévue," in Le *Figaro,* le 7 février, 1961.
7. Denis Périer-Daville, "Troisième colloque sur les aspects juridiques de la guerre d'Algérie, garanties aux minorités: aucune des solutions apportées dans d'autres pays n'est valable." In *Le Figaro,* March 4, 1961.
8. For debates surrounding the government's plans for "repatriating" the French of Algeria, see Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 147. As Shepard explains, opponents of the policy argued that such measures were evidence of the government's "tacit admission of the impending disaster" this policy would produce in Algeria.
9. Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*. Scioldo-Zürcher notes that such offices were open to the repatriates in 1956, though no systemic policy existed prior to 1961.
10. Joxe, MAE 100.
11. Cited in Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 146. As Shepard notes, it was the Club Jean Moulin that made explicit mention of Algeria in relation to "repatriation."
12. MAE 100.
13. Robert Boulin, "Avis-projet de loi." CAC 930275/94.
14. CAC 930275/94.
15. Correspondence between Louis Joxe and James Baeyens, January and February, 1961, CAOM 81F/1039. Previous correspondence in 1955 and 1956 clearly showed the doubts officials had with respect to the successful immigration to South America of the French from North Africa. The ambassador to Brazil at the time, Bernard Hardion compared the French from North Africa to the Portuguese who were also immigrating

to Brazil in large numbers at this time, noting that the French did not speak Portuguese, while Italians and Spaniards could assimilate within their respective communities in Brazil. "Monsieur Bernard Hardion, Ambassadeur de France au Brésil, à son excellence Monsieur Christian Pineau, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Conventions administratives et sociales," Rio de Janeiro, Brésil, 18 septembre 1956.

16. Leon Fragnaud to the French ambassador in Ascencio, Paraguay, 15 February, 1961. CAOM 81F/1039.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. "Compte rendu de la réunion tenue le 4 juillet 1961 au Ministère des Affaires étrangères au sujet de l'émigration à l'étranger des Français d'Algérie," in CAOM 81F/1039.
20. "Commissariat à l'aide et à l'orientation des Français rapatriés," Paris, le 17 juin 1961. CAOM 81F/1039.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. "Des Colons français se fixeraient en Argentine, Article paru dans Le Figaro du 23 août 1961," CAOM 81F/1039.
25. "Sur le Reclassement dans l'agriculture des rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord fixés en Corse," CAC 990459/1.
26. Ibid.
27. Évelyn Lever, "L'OAS et les *pieds noirs,*" in Charles-Robert Ageron, ed., *L'Algérie des Français* (Saint-Amand: Seuil, 1993), 223.
28. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 530. Salan himself was attacked by OAS radicals just prior to the OAS- FLN talks.
29. Évelyn Lever, "L'OAS et les *pieds noirs,*" 223.
30. "Nombre total de rapatriés ayant bénéficié de measures d'aide et de la loi du 26 décembre 1961 – Situation au 31 décembre 1964," in CAC 930275/94.
31. "Annexe, Evaluation du nombre des rapatriés," in CAC 930275/94. Approximately 216,000 of the Europeans were accounted for by some discrepancy or margins of error in calculations or as having: (1) emigrated to Morocco, Spain, or Israel; or (2) entered into France via other countries, such as Spain or Italy.
32. CAC 920172/9.
33. "Direction générale de la population et l'Action sociale, sous-direction du peuplement, Ministère de la Santé publique et de al population," 22 juin 1962, CAC 930275/94.
34. "Localisation des rapatriés en France," CAC 930275/94.
35. "Les Rapatriés d'Algérie dans la région parisienne," in *Annales de géographie, Bulletin de la Société de géographie,* Novembre-Décembre 1974–83e année, no. 460, 644–683.
36. The Logecos were erected for the first time in the early 1950s by the Fourth Republic's Ministry of Reconstruction. See Nichole C. Rudolph,

At Home in Postwar France: Modern Mass Housing and the Right to Comfort (New York, NY: Berghahn books, 2015), 121; By the end of the 1950s, HLMs and Logecos "accounted for nearly 60% of new housing units, and by 1963, there were over 700,000 Logecos in France." Brian Newsome, *French Urban Planning, 1940–1968: The Construction and Deconstruction of an Authoritarian System* (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2009), 103.

37. Pierre Baillet, *Les Rapatriés d'Algérie en France* (Paris: Documentation française, 1976), 9.
38. Ibid.
39. The situation of housing is explained in Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain,* 231–247.
40. BDR 99W/245.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Communication between the mayor of Port-de-Bouc and the sub-prefect, Ibid.
44. Mayor of Aix-en-Provence to the sub-prefect, BDR 99W245.
45. "Monsieur le Président du Conseil des Ministres," 3 mars 1963, CAC 970007/210.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. For a study of Metropolitan opinion about the pieds noirs and the OAS, see Todd Shepard, "Pieds-Noirs, Bêtes Noirs: Anti-'European of Algeria' Racism at the Close of the French Empire," in Patricia Lorcin, *Algeria & France, 1800–2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 150–163.
49. Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir metropolitain*, 269.
50. The interviews cited in this text were drawn from written correspondences with consenting interviewees.
51. As Matthew Connelly noted, the tragic aspect of decolonization in many of the former colonies was the overwhelming number of deaths caused by civil conflict between competing nationalisms that ensued after the departure of the colonial powers. Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 269, 273. Historians have not really reached a consensus about the estimated number of harkis murdered in Algeria after 1962. Benjamin Stora and Alistair Horne hold to a conservative figure of 10,000 while *harki* associations have placed the number of deaths at approximately 100,000–150,000. French historian Guy Pervillé has simply noted that the numbers ranged between 10,000 and 100,000 and explained that any count would be partial. See Michel Roux, *Les Harkis, les oubliés de l'histoire* (Paris: Éditions de la découverte, 1991), 200–203. See also Benjamin Stora, *La Gangrène et l'oubli*, 175–176, 200–202; Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 537–538.
52. "We have absolutely no statistics concerning the repatriation of French Muslims aside from partial information contained in a 1972 report." See letter from Raymond Courrier to Madame Lacombe of the National

Delegation for Educational, Social, and Cultural Action," in CAC 910281/4.

53. CAC 910281, Folder 1, "Rapport," 10 juin 1975, Ministère du Travail, Direction de la Population et des Migrations.
54. "Commandement en Chef des forces en Algérie, 22 septembre, 1960: Instruction sur l'Emploi, la gestion et l'administration des personnels harkis," in SHAT [*Service historique de l'armée de terre*], 1H 1260/1. Up to 60,000 harkis were mobilized by 1960 according to this same report.
55. In 1960, various tests were administered during recruitment to screen the level of education among the harkis. 80% of the harkis did not speak fluent French. "Études: agent majeur de promotion pour les Français de souche nord-africaine, 1956" in SHAT 1H 1260/5.
56. "Instruction et formation des cadres FSNA," in SHAT 1H 1391/1. For a detailed discussion of the FSNA and FSE as drawing a false distinction between the French soldiers of North African origins and the soldiers of European origins, see Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* chapter 9: "Rejecting the Muslims."
57. "Commandement en Chef des forces en Algérie, 22 septembre, 1960," in SHAT 1H 1260/1.
58. Ibid.
59. By June 1961, the average number of children in harki families was three. SHAT 1H, 1260/1.
60. SHAT 1H 1397/8.
61. "Problèmes posés par les harkis au moment du Cessez-le-feu," in SHAT 1H 1397/8.
62. Ibid.
63. "Primo: July 24, 1962, message," in SHAT 1H 1397/8.
64. "Fiche concernant les musulmans menacées : à l'attention de M. le colonel Bruch," in Ibid.
65. From the commandement supérieur des forces armées françaises en Algérie, Etat-major interarmées: "Très secret," for the Amiral Commandant suprérieur de la Base stratégique de Mers-el-Kébir," Ibid.
66. "Commandement supérieur des forces armées françaises en Algérie," SHAT 1H 1397/8.
67. Communication between the prefecture of the Charente and the Minister of Interior in CAC 770346/10.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Note addressée à Christian Fouchet, haut commissaire de la République en Algérie, par Louis Joxe, cited in Michel Roux, *Les Harkis,* 212–213. Also cited in Philippe Tripier, *Autopsie de la guerre d'Algérie* (Editions France-Empire, 1972), 558. Tripier cited a telegram addressed to Fouchet from Joxe, the first words of which were: "all individual initiatives to install French Muslims in the metropole are forbidden." See Michel Roux, *Les Harkis,* fn. 5, 213.
71. Michel Roux, *Les Harkis,* 214.

72. "Commandement supérieur des forces armées françaises en Algérie," SHAT 1H 1397/8.
73. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 231.
74. Ibid., 19.
75. "Fiches de renseignement, Transmission à la Direction renseignements généraux note pour le directeur général de la Surété nationale, Direction de la règlementation, Ministre de l'Intérieur," CAC 910281/10.
76. IGAME, SECRET 9 juillet 1962, Sous-préfet du Var, CAC 910467/1.
77. 9 juillet 1962, Sous-préfet du Var, CAC 910467/1
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. "Maurice-Grimaud pour le Ministère de l'Intérieur," in CAC 910467/1. Many SAS officers took it upon themselves to aid the families of the harkis they had served with during the Algerian War. Some like Jean-Pierre Senat helped evacuate up to five or six families per week, while others like ex-SAS officer Captain Guérin helped them find lodgings and jobs in France. Roux, *Les Harkis,* 210–211.
84. Maurice Papon was in fact suspicious of all Algerians in Paris. Papon was the notorious prefect of police behind the mass arrests of Algerian demonstrators who had violated a curfew order on October 17, 1961. In the midst of the suppression, Algerians were brutally attacked and bodies were found floating in the Seine. More than 200 people were said to have been killed. Papon was later placed in charge of suppressing an anti-OAS demonstration at the Charonne metro station, which again turned into a brutal police suppression of demonstrators. For recent literature on the demonstration and its suppression, see Alain Dewerpe, *Charonne 8 février 1962: Anthropologie historique d'un massacre d'État* (Paris: Folio, 2006); Jean-Paul Brunet, *Charonne: Lumières sur une tragédie* (Paris: Flammarion, 2003). For studies on the 1961 massacre, see Jean-Luc Einaudi, *Bataille de Paris*, 17 octobre 1961 (Paris: Seuil, 1991); Marcel Péju and Paulette Péju, Le 17 octobre des Algériens (Paris: La Découverte, 2012).
85. According to the report, by 1963, 1,834 harkis and 208 civilians had registered their residence in Paris. The actual number of Muslim repatriates from Algeria was estimated at around 4,000 in 1963 in the Seine. 1,462 harkis out of the 1,834 were from the Petite and Grande Kabyle, the region that was also home to many of the Algerian migrant workers who moved to France during the colonial period. "Des problèmes posés par l'acceuil et la prise en charge et le reclassement des refugiés musulmans algériens dans le département de la Seine," Service d'assistance technique, cabinet du préfet, Préfecture de police, Paris, le 25 juin 1963," 7. CAC 770391/8. See also CAC 770391/3.
86. Ibid. The report further added that many had escaped summary executions in the Kabyle following Algerian independence. The police report argued

that the biggest obstacle to the successful integration of refugees from Algeria was the difficulty of identifying their loyalty to France and verifying the dangers they faced from continuing to live in Algeria. The report explained that the identities and reputations of the former soldiers or "ex-auxiliary" forces could be verified by calling on the testimony of French officers who served and commanded auxiliary regiments. CAC 770391/3.

87. "Whoever it is, each case is studied in depth. The inquiries are often long, and are carried out by officers or functionaries having some knowledge of the said activities [in Algeria] of repatriate candidates. When the surveys show favorable results, a certificate is delivered. It is this document that permits the refugee to claim repatriate status, and allows the individual to claim the diverse allocations that would aid him for a certain time. So far, out of 208 civilians who registered with the prefect, 118 have received certificates." "Des problèmes posés par l'acceuil et la prise en charge et le reclassement des refugiés musulmans algériens dans le département de la Seine," Service d'assistance technique, cabinet du préfet, Préfecture de police, Paris, le 25 juin 1963. CAC 770391/3.
88. CAC 770391/8.
89. The word "nif" is colloquial Algerian for "the proud one" or "the smug one." Papers of the "Comité national de solidarité pour les Français musulmans refugiés," CAC 770391/8.
90. "Comité national," CAC 770391/8.
91. CAC 910467/1.
92. Official Israeli statistics state that 7948 Jews from Algeria arrived between 1955 to 1996. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical of Israël,* no.48, Jérusalem, 1997, 158–9. Cited in Joëlle Allouche-Benayoun, Doris Bensimon, *Les juifs d'Algérie, Mémoires et identités plurielles* (Paris: Stavit, 1998), 362.
93. http://www.algeria-watch.de/fr/article/hist/1954–1962/mossad_fln.htm.
94. Direction de la Sûreté nationale en Algérie. CADN 21PO/A/77.
95. Ibid.
96. M. Louis D'Allier chargé d'affaires de France a.i. en Israel à son excellence monsieur Couve de Murville. Ministre des Affaires étrangères. 13 Septembre 1962. CADN 21PO/A/77.
97. Telegramme deTel Aviv à la Direction politique, March 9, 1961, MAE 121 bis. Meir replied diplomatically that she indeed acknowledged the cultural bond the Jews of Algeria had with France and the French people. At this time the French government resisted opening an Israeli consulate in Algiers and decided that recognition of the Jewish Agency's own diplomatic relations with Israel would be one way to delaying official channels for Franco-Israeli diplomatic relations in Algeria. MAE 121 bis.
98. Note, sure les commandos juifs d'Oran. CADN 21PO/A/77.
99. "L'Intégration communautaire dans l'hexagone," in *l'Arche* (mai-juin 1972), 53–57, 55.
100. Ibid., 57.

4 Gaullists and the Repatriate Challenge

1. Loi no. 61–1439 du 26 décembre 1961 relative à l'acceuil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer.
2. Ibid.
3. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization,* 150.
4. "Exposé des motifs," in *Projet de loi, rélatif à l'acceuil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer* présenté au nom de M. Michel Debré (Premier Minister), Roger Frey (Ministre de l'Intérieur), Maurice Couve de Murville (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères), Wilfred Baumgartner (Ministre des Finances et des Affaires Économiques), Robert Boulin (Secrétaire d'État aux Rapatriés), Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (Secrétaire d'État aux Finances), CAC 930275/94.
5. André Armengaud, "Avis présenté au nom de la Commission des Finances, du Contrôle budgétaire et des comptes économiques de la nation sur le projet de loi à l'accueil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer," in CAC 930275/94.
6. André Fosset, "Rapport, au nom de la Commission des Lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du règlement et d'administration générale sur le projet de loi relatif à l'accueil et à la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer." CAC 930275/94. Italics added.
7. André Armengaud, "Avis présenté au nom de la Commission des Finances, CAC 930275/94. Italics are mine. .
8. These were the "prestations de retour, prestations sociales et les secours exceptionnels, prestations de subsistance, subventions d'installation, indemnités particulières procureront un capital de ressources nécessaires à des catégories défavorisées par l'âge ou l'incapacité physique dont les biens outre-mer," ...Jean Clémenceau, *Le Guide administratif, juridique et social du rapatrié* (EJUS, 1964), 12.
9. "Décret du 10 mars 1962, Articles 37, 38, 39; arrêté du 10 mars 1962, *J.O* du 11 mars 1963, *J.O* du 25 août 1963, reprinted in Clémenceau, *Le Guide administratif,* 36.
10. Jacques Ribs, *L'indemnisation des Français depossédés outré-mer* (Librairie Dalloz, 1971).
11. After becoming a key member of NATO in the period between 1959 and 1966, De Gaulle pulled back from NATO, first by withdrawing the navy in 1963, and finally by leaving the military structure of NATO altogether. De Gaulle's international policy was aimed at contending with American global hegemony. De Gaulle condemned the intervention of the United States in various "Third World" countries during the 1960s; namely, the 1964 invasion of the Congo and the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic under Lyndon Johnson. Jean Lacouture, Alan Sheridan trans., *De Gaulle the Ruler, 1945–1970* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1992), 344; 378–380.
12. It is often forgotten that French national identity under de Gaulle was strongly linked to the advancement of science and technology. Historian Gabrielle Hecht has argued that de Gaulle was especially keen

to compensate for the decline of empire with the prestige that came with technological prowess, as evidenced in his ardent support of the CEA, France's official atomic energy organization. Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France, Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

13. "Note sur l'aide financière de la France à l'Algérie, 13 novembre 1963," MAE 125. The mention of the Pacific was in reference to American nuclear testing sites on the Marshall Islands in Micronesia starting in 1946, although France would also begin atmospheric and underground nuclear testing in 1966 in Tuamatos, Moruroa, and Fangataufa in Polynesia. Details concerning the French tests in the Pacific are still secret.
14. Mohamed Bouzidi, "Algeria's Policy toward France: 1962–1972." Ph.D Diss. (Denver, CO: University of Denver, 1972), 90.
15. The future status of the Sahara was heatedly discussed in the Evian meetings between May 1961 and February 1962. The French delegation had originally wished to claim Sahara an autonomous territory, while the GPRA insisted on the Sahara as an integral part of the Algerian land and future Republic. For the specific discussion on the financing of petroleum research before 1961, see the 8th meeting, Saturday, June 3, 1961, morning session, in *Vers la paix en Algérie, Les Négociations d'Évian dans les Archives diplomatiques françaises 15 janvier 1961 à 29 juin 1962* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003), 146–147.
16. John H. Lichtblau, "Oil in the North African Economy," in Leon Carl Brown, ed., *State and Society in Independent North Africa* (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1966), 275.
17. "Note sur l'aide financière de la France à l'Algérie," 21 novembre 1963, in MAE 125.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. *La Documentation française* (Paris: Direction de l'information légale et administrative, 1968), cited in Mohamed Bouzidi, "Algeria's Policy toward France," 90.
21. Cited in Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France,* 39.
22. Prominent private French companies entered joint ventures with over 90 firms already active in Algeria, many of which had begun operations under French management prior to independence. The most famous of these companies was Routière Colas, a global construction company, which is today the largest construction company in the world. Other companies included Air Liquide, the Compagnie générale de constructions téléphoniques, and the Société de grands travaux de l'Est. "Note sur l'aide financière de la France à l'Algérie, 13 novembre 1963," MAE 125. Private investments, despite the freedom companies enjoyed to operate in Algeria, never caught up to public investments, which had surpassed one billion US dollars by 1961. Private investments in total amounted to about $200 million just before the war ended. A.J. Meyer, "Economic Planning in North Africa," in Brown ed., *State and Society in Independent North Africa,*, 234–257, 245.

23. "Note sur l'aide financière de la France à l'Algérie, 13 novembre 1963," MAE 125. It would take another decade before the United States became a prominent investor and developer in Algeria. See Philip J. Akre, "Algeria and the Politics of Energy-Based Industrialization," in John P. Entelis and Phillip C. Naylor, eds, *State and Society in Algeria* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
24. Mohamed Bouzidi, "Algeria's Foreign Policy," 53.
25. Samir Amin, *L'Économie du Maghreb, La colonisation et la décolonisation* (Paris: Les Éditions du minuit, 1966), 258–261; 267.
26. *Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord,* (Paris: CNRS, 1964), 548–569.
27. During the war, entire villages had been destroyed, and crops and livestock burned or napalmed. In 1962, only five agronomists remained in the entire country. See Will Swearingen, "Agricultural Policies and the Growing Food Security Crisis," in *State and Society in Algeria*, 118–119, cited in Keith Griffin "Algerian Agriculture in Transition," in I. W. Zartman, ed., *Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Maghreb* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1973).
28. David Ottoway, *Algeria, Politics of a Socialist Revolution* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 52.
29. This takeover of former colonial property by indigenous elite and wealthy prospectors occurred throughout the decolonized nations, driving an "internal struggle between remnants of imperial forces and those embedded in traditional resistance in Africa." Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong'O, *Decolonising the Mind ; the Politics of Language in African Literature* (London, UK and Portsmouth, NH: James Currey, 1992).
30. "Section II, L'Ordonnance du 24 août 1962," in Vedel, *Droit à l'indemnisation,* 13.
31. Ibid., 13.
32. 18 mars 1963, Ahmed Ben Bella, "Décret n 63–88, portant réglementation des biens vacants," *Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne* 26 mars. 1963, reprinted in Annexe, *L'Indemnisation des Français dépossédés outre-mer* (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1971), 137–139.
33. Will Swearingen, "Agricultural Policies and the Growing Food Security Crisis," in *State and Society in Algeria*, 118–119. In 1968, the ONRA was dismantled and all lands fell under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture.
34. *Le Droit à l'indemnisation des Français d'Algérie atteints par des mesures de dépossession,* op. cit., 20.
35. Ahmed Ben Bella, *Discours du président Ben Bella* (Alger: Ministère de l'information, 1963).
36. Fiche, "Coopération franco-algérien, 18 novembre 1963," Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE) 125.
37. "Note sur l'aide financière de la France à l'Algérie," 21 novembre 1963, in MAE 125.
38. Débats parlementaires, *J.O.* 1965, novembre 7. Reprinted in *France Horizon,* November 1965. Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF).
39. *France Horizon,* November 1965.

40. "Commission d'étude et de coordination pour la réinstallation des Français d'outre-mer," in CAC 930275/94.
41. The full list was as follows: Conseil national du Patronat français, Confédération générale des petits et moyennes entreprises, Confédération nationale des classes moyennes, Centre des jeunes patrons, Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles, Cercle national des jeunes agriculteurs, Confédération nationale artisanale, Union nationale des professions libérales et Confédération des travailleurs intellectuels de France, Confédération générale des cadres, confédération générale du travail, Confédération générale du travail-force ouvrière, and Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens. "Arrêté portant nomination des membres de la Commission de coordination pour la réinstallation des Français d'Outre-Mer," in CAC 930275/94.
42. The ministries that sent representatives were as follows: Ministry of Cooperation, Ministry Charged with Algerian Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Public Works and Transports, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Work, Ministry of Public Health and Population, and Ministry of Construction. CAC 930275/94.
43. CAC 930275/94.
44. Club Jean Moulin, "Les Perspectives d'emploi des Européens en Algérie, préambule," in CAC 930275/94.
45. Ibid. In this regard, repatriates were different from guest workers and labor migrants. Whereas the latter had all the desirable skills for employers but the undesirable traits foreigners, repatriates carried with them the critical asset of civil status but had little to contribute in terms of economic skills. See Kristin Surak, "Guestworkers: A Taxonomy," in *New Left Review* 84 (2013), 84–102.
46. Club Jean Moulin. "Les Perspectives," in CAC 930275/94.
47. Jennifer Hunt, "The Impact of the 1962 Repatriates from Algeria on the French Labor Market," in *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 45:3 (April 1992), 556–572; 558.
48. *France Horizon,* November 1962.
49. Ibid..
50. *France Horizon,* July–-August, 1963, 9.
51. Conférence de presse, Secrétariat de Liaison des Associations des rapatriés et des organismes intéressés au sort des rapatriés, le 26 juin 1963, Paris. Hadjez, ancien bâtonnier du Barreau de Blida ; Pierre Dromigny, ancien député à l'Assemblée algérienne, *France Horizon,* July–August 1963, 9.
52. *France Horizon,* December 1962.
53. Mitterrand criticized General Salan's putsch and later became a target of the OAS. This, however did not affect Mitterrand's standing with the pieds noirs who voted for him in 1965.
54. *France Horizon,* November 1965.

55. "Notes de commentaires sur le résultats du deuxième tour des élections présidentielles dans le département de l'Isère," CAC 780654/25.
56. Ibid.
57. Réponse à circulaire télégraphique, Décembre 1965. The Pyrénées-Orientales voted in favor of the April Referendum of 1962, which ratified the Evian Accords. CAC 780654/25.
58. Ibid.
59. *France Horizon,* March 1964.
60. Bouches-du-Rhône Departmental Archives (BDR) 99W/245. I have kept the last name unspecified in respect for archival rules against citing living persons.
61. *France-Horizon,* avril 1963, 11. Oran was the second largest city in Algeria, and the only city in which Europeans outnumbered indigenous Algerians.
62. "Hébergement des rapatriés," in Seine Departmental Archives, 1483W/63.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. *France Horizon,* February 1966.
66. "Point de vue du Secrétaire Général," in *France Horizon,* February 1966.
67. Ibid.
68. "Point de vue," *France Horizon.*
69. *France Horizon,* November 1966.
70. *France Horizon,* February 1967.
71. Ibid.
72. "Tribune éléctorale," *France Horizon,* February 1967.
73. "Le fondement du droit à indemnité des français atteints par des dépossessions ou des spoliations," *Le Droit à l'indemnisation,* 52.
74. Ibid., 53.
75. Ibid., 54.
76. "Jugement du tribunal administrative, de Toulouse, en date du 12 mars 1966, Affaire SA, St Louis Domaine de Blazens-Aude," in *France Horizon, 1966.*
77. To see the role played by the *conseil d'Etat* in cases involving repatriates, see Bernadette Catayud, Thèse de Doctorat, "Le Contentieux de l'Indemnisation des biens des rapatriés d'Algérie: origines et problématiques" (Tours, France: Université François Rabelais, 1998), 385–459.
78. *France Horizon,* April 1966.
79. *France Horizon,* May 1966.
80. 18% responded "without any opinion." "Resultats d'un sondage de la SOFRES effectué entre le 6 et le 14 mai 1970 auprès d'un échantillon national de 1 000 personnes agées de 21 ans et plus, Sondage réalisé pour le compte du Comité Interministeriel pour l'Information," 4. Archives of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP), viewed upon special request.
81. "Résultats d'un sondage," Ibid., 6.

5 Repatriation after de Gaulle: Pompidou and Giscard

1. Julian Bourg, *From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007); Stéphane Gacon, *L'Amnistie de la commune à la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: L'Univers historique, 2002).
2. Kristin Ross, *May '68 and its Afterlives* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 24–27.
3. Jacques Rancière, interview, "Democracy Means Equality," *Radical Philosophy* 82:33 (March/April 1997). Cited in Ross, Ibid., 25.
4. For a history of welfare programs directed at Algerian families during the War of Independence, see Amelia Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State During Decolonization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
5. As Amelia Lyons has explained, the FAS (and the Constantine Plan) represented part of a two-pronged Gaullist policy in Algeria "alongside the expansion of military and police operations." Lyons, Ibid., 14.
6. CAC 770391/3.
7. An official memo drawn up in 1963 on the "Project of the Social Realization of Benefits for Algerian Migrants Working in France," noted that during 1962, approximately 26,000 Algerian workers had entered and then stayed in France, all of whom were able to benefit from the "free circulation" law as part of the 1962 Evian Accords ratified by a national referendum. 20,000 workers left France for Algeria in July and August of 1962. From September to December of that year, however, 45,000 (re) entered France, amounting to a net influx of 26,000 Algerian workers. Over the course of 1963, as the project report stated, the opinion of the French administration evolved considerably with regard to funding the welfare for foreign nationals; such funding was no longer justified in the eyes of many. CAC 770391/3.
8. "Pompidou au secrétaire d'État auprès du premier ministre chargé des affaires algériennes," 16 février 1963.
9. 3 Septembre, cited in Antonio Perotti, *L'Immigration en France depuis 1900* (Paris: CIEMI, 1985), 17. Also cited in Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation,* 44.
10. Ibid., 44. Jeanneney, it must be remembered, was also involved in transporting repatriates to Canada and Argentina. Also cited in D. Godard, *Pourquoi il faut devenir socialiste révolutionnaire* (Socialisme International, 1994).
11. CAC 770391/3.
12. CAC 770391/3: "La migration algérienne et les perspectives de coopération entre la France et l'Algérie."
13. Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation,* 70.
14. Ibid., 70.
15. Ibid., 71.
16. "Des problèmes posés par l'acceuil et la prise en charge et le reclassement des refugiés musulmans algériens dans le département de la Seine," Service

d'assistance technique, cabinet du préfet, Préfecture de police, Paris, le 25 juin 1963." CAC 770391/3.
17. CAC 770391/3.
18. From the prefect of police to Michel Massenet, 10 juillet 1963, "Des problèmes posés par l'Accueil: La prise en charge et le reclassement des refugiés musulmans algériens dans le département de la Seine," in CAC 770391/8.
19. Monthly meeting of SAT officers, 5 février 1963, CAC 770391/9.
20. SAT officials also noted that many Algerians still possessed their identity cards, or *Carte d'identité française*, issued before 1962. Many of them were afraid it may be revoked along with the right to remain in France, and thus refrained from visiting [Algerian] consular offices. Monthly meeting of the SAT officers, 5 février 1963, CAC 770391/9.
21. For a more detailed account, see Paulette Péju, *Les Harkis à Paris* (Paris: François Maspero, 1961). The harkis were placed in lodgings where most of the residents were Algerian workers. They were directed to harass the workers until they evacuated the premises. Péju, *Les Harkis à Paris*, 12.
22. Bibliothèque nationale de la France, FNSP, Coupures de Presse, FRA 57 (038), *L'Humanité*, March 7, 1961.
23. The story was also printed in *Le Monde*, but on December 29, 1961.
24. "Fiches de renseignement, Transmission à la Direction renseignements généraux, note pour le directeur général de la Surété nationale, Direction de la règlementation, Ministère de l'Intérieur," CAC 910281/10.
25. Ibid.
26. Paul Feuilloloy had in 1948 served in the general consulate in Bône, in Constantine. He participated in inspections of prisons in Algeria as part of the penitentiary administration and was part of the Services of Education under Surveillance. See CAC 960048/15.
27. CAC 870256/7.
28. Ibid.
29. The author of the report decided that the "Eurasian French nationals," who also inhabited a part of Camp St Livrade, were very different from their Muslim counterparts, and were "practically integrated." The social worker had overlooked the differences that set the two communities apart. Eurasian residents of the camps were not veterans or functionaries who had served the colonial administration and military, and the children therefore did not look upon the French government with the same kind of resentment. Many of the children had mixed parentage and faced less prejudice than the harki children. CAC 870256/7.
30. "Circulaire du 17 décembre 1975: Secrétariat d'État aux Anciens combatants/Direction des Pensions/Bureau d'études générales et de la réglementation des pensions," in CAC 910281/2.
31. "Lettre personnelle du Ministre d'État sous direction du Ministre de l'Intérieur," et CAC 910281/2.
32. *L'Aurore*, 20 juin 1975. Press clippings, CAC 870256/7.
33. *France-Soir*, 20 juin 1975, Press clippings, CAC 870256/7.

34. Kaouah later appeared 14th on the list of candidates presented by Jean-Marie Le Pen to the European parliament in 1984. See Michel Roux, *Les Harkis*, 343.
35. Ibid., 341.
36. Le Pen later lost his left eye in a brawl that took place during a campaign rally for Djebbour who became a deputy in the National Assembly after 1962. Mohand Hamoumou, *Et ils sont devenus harkis*.
37. Laradji, Kaouah, and Saïd Boualam, commander of the Légion d'honneur and ex-deputy of Orléansville in French Algeria, formed the CFMRAA discussed above.
38. Michel Roux, *Les Harkis*, 345.
39. Ibid., 301.
40. "Rapport, Ministère du travail, Direction de la Population et des migrations," June 10, 1975, CAC 910281/1.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. CAC 960134/14.
45. Ibid.
46. "Situation des Français musulmans et des personnes rapatriées d'outre mer de souche non-européenne," in CAC 910281/1.
47. Document du Secrétaire d'État auprès du premier minister au premier ministre, "Situation des Français musulmans et des personnes rapatriées d'outre-mer de souche non-européene," 28 juillet 1977.
48. CAC 910281/1.
49. Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation*, 54.
50. Patrick Weil, *La France et ses étrangers* (Paris: Gallimard, 1991).
51. "Les rapatriés chez Giscard," http://www.ina.fr/video/CAF92017909/les-rapatries-chez-valery-giscard-d-estaing-video.html.
52. See Jeffrer James Byrne, "Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s," in *Diplomatic History* 33:3 (2009), 427–447.
53. The nationalization of Algeria's oil facilities was the result of a complex set of negotiations between Algeria and France over revenues, debt, and price and production decisions. The end result, however, was not entirely in Algeria's favor because of the particular type of Algerian crude oil, which was considered unsuitable for high volumes of export. Economic decolonization and independence from France were nevertheless accomplished. Phillip C. Naylor, *France and Algeria, A History of Decolonization and Transformation* (University Press of Florida, 2000), 93–100.
54. Ibid., 121–123.
55. During the 1970s, Algeria actively sought out investments from the United States. The financial loans and revenues, however, resulted in yet more debt, mostly because the income was used for the payment of rent on facilities, and did not effectively turn into productive income, a typical cause of debt at this time in many African oil producing countries. See

Philip J. Akre, "Algeria and the Politics of Energy-Based Industrialization," in John Entelis and Michael Suleiman, eds, *State, Culture, and Society in Arab North Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 90–93.

56. Jacques Ribs, *L'Indemnisation des Français dépossédés outre-mer* (Librairie Dalloz, 1971), Annexe, 190–191.
57. As Spain fell into political instability with Franco's physical illness, Morocco and France collaborated to wrestle the Western Sahara from Spain. The nationalists of the Sahrawi or the "Polisario" (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) were backed by Morocco and France during their struggle against Spain. Algeria, however, intervened to vie for influence over the Polisario against Morocco. The Polisario targeted French technicians in the war zone, thereby leading Giscard to intervene while the French public blamed Algerian military backing of the Polisario as the cause of French casualties. See Phillip Naylor, *France and Algeria*, 114–166.
58. Giscard d'Estaing was invited to Algeria in the spring of 1964. On his official state visit, Giscard confirmed the importance that each country held for the other. This particular phase in the warming of Franco-Algerian relations is known as the *Relancement,* which soon collapsed in face of Giscard's aggressive regulation of the Algerian population in France. Phillip Naylor provides a good account of Giscard's foreign policy. See Phillip C. Naylor, *France and Algeria,* 117–123.
59. "Indemnisation des Français rapatriés d'outre-mer," Première session ordinaire de 1977. 2e séance du mardi 29 novembre 1977. *J.O. Assemblée nationale*. 1977, 8008.
60. Ibid., 8008.
61. Ibid., 8009.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.

6 A Socialist Politics of Repatriation

1. "Telecommunication de François Mitterrand à Monsieur le Président de…". CAC 910281/1.
2. CAC 910281/1.
3. "Lisez! Combat Socialiste, Le quotidian du parti socialiste, Comité national de soutien à François Mitterrand," in CAC 910281/1.
4. "Lisez! Combat Socialiste, Le quotidian du parti socialiste," in CAC 910281/1.
5. Secrétariat chargé des Rapatriés, *Dossier-guide des Droits des Rapatriés* (1983), 16.
6. *Dossier-guide,* 16.
7. Loi 3 décembre 1983. This law modified the terms of the 1974 Amnesty Law, which had modified the terms of the preceding laws condemning citizens who had opposed decolonization.
8. *Dossier-guide,* 16–17.

9. Secrétariat d'État auprès du Premier Ministre chargé des Rapatriés, *Bilan annuel du secrétariat d'État auprès du pm chargé des rapatriés,* 14.
10. *Bilan annuel,* 14.
11. *Bilan annuel,* 3–4.
12. *Dossier-guide,* 17.
13. "Préparation pour le IX Plan," in CAC 910281/1.
14. Document, "Courrière a inauguré à Couiza, l'Institut national des hautes études musulmans," CAC 910281/9.
15. *Bilan annuel,* 10.
16. Document, "Courrière a inauguré à Couiza," CAC 910281/9.
17. CAC 910281/9. I could not verify how many of these trips actually took place, nor how many people were selected, nor the criteria for selection .
18. "Vie quotidienne: la reinsertion des Français musulmans," CAC 910281/1.
19. *Bilan annuel*, 10.
20. Henri Giordan, Démocratie culturelle et droit à la différence, Rapport présenté à Jack Lang, ministre de la Culture (Paris: La Documentation française, 1982).
21. Henri Giordan, Démocratie culturelle et droit à la différence, 56.
22. Giordan, "Démocratie culturelle et droit à la différence," 56.
23. "Échanges et Cultures, section d'action pédagogique et culturelle," 1983, CAC 910281/9.
24. CAC 910281/9.
25. Richard Derderian, *North Africans in Contemporary France: Becoming Visible* (New York, NY: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004). 72.
26. CAC 910281/2.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. CAC 910281/4.
30. David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, "French Municipal Elections of 1983," in *Parliamentary Affairs* 36 (1986), 348–357; 353.
31. On the latest history of the National Front, see Valérie Igounet, *Le Front national de 1972 à nos jours: le parti, les hommes, les idées* (Paris: Seuil, 2014); Edward G. DeClair, *Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).
32. David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, "French Municipal Elections of 1983," 354.
33. Yvan Gastaut, *L'immigration et l'opinion en France sous la Vème République* (Paris: Seuil, 2000).
34. David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, "French Municipal Elections of 1983," 354.
35. Because of strict restrictions placed on the use of personal names contained in this particular document, I have decided to use only the initials.
36. "Le parti socialiste et les Français musulmans," CAC 910281/3.
37. G.M., CAC 910281/3.
38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.
40. This is a typical sketch of the pattern of immigration from Algeria to France. Amelia Lyons has shown that this pattern was an ideal type, which was contradicted in reality. Family immigration formed some of the earliest migrations to France from Algeria. See Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during Decolonization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
41. ONASEC: "Les Français Maghrébins, bientôt un million d'électeurs?" in CAC 910281/3.
42. Hamoumou teaches at a management school in Grenoble and is mayor of the town of Volvic. He is founder of a major harki association, the AGIR. Mohand Hamoumou, *Et ils sont devenus harkis* (Paris: Fayard, 1993)
43. Dominique Schnapper, preface to Mohand Hamoumou, Ibid., 8.
44. Schnapper compared the myth of total anti-colonial resistance to the myth of total resistance in France to the fascists during WW II. The right of immigrants referred here by Schnapper is the right to circulate between Algeria and France.
45. "Genèse de la loi du 23 février 2005: [1] le lobby pied-noir. Article mis en ligne le lundi 20 février 2006. www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=1188. 2/8.
46. Ibid.
47. "Discours de politique générale de Jacque Chirac à l'Assemblée nationale le 9 avril 1986. Cited in Ibid. 4/8.
48. "Extraits des débats parlementaires," article mise en ligne le mardi 12 avril 2005. www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=588. 1/6.
49. "Mémorial de la guerre en Algérie et des Combats du Maroc et de la Tunisie," Quai Branly, Paris. See photo.
50. The first column has names streaming down in blue, and pays homage to the French soldiers in all the North African wars; the second column, emitting letters in white lights, pays special homage to the "auxiliary French Muslims" [*supplétifs français musulmans*] who fought for the French during the Algerian War and to those who died at the hands of FLN militants after 1962. The third column, lit in red, completes the tricolor as an interactive column where additional names may be placed. At the foot of the columns lies a flat stone, on which an epitaph is engraved: "To the memory of the soldiers who died for France in the Algerian War and the battles in Tunisia and Morocco, and to all the members of auxiliary forces killed after the cease-fire in Algeria, among whom many remain unidentified."
51. The two most important dates for pieds noirs today are the July 26 Rue d'Isly massacre in Algiers and the July 5th suppression in Oran, both of which occurred in 1962. Representatives of repatriate associations and of a non-repatriate veteran organization, the FNACA (The National Federation of Veterans of the Algerian War), the latter consisting mostly of metropolitan draftees, have been embroiled in a debate to decide the final end date of the Algerian War.

7 Repatriates Narrate the Colonial Past

1. Lorenzi Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 99.
2. Ibid., 99.
3. According to the *Cercle Algérianiste* there are anywhere between 7,000 and 10,000 subscribers to the *Algérianiste*.
4. All issues of the magazine since its beginning may be found in the C.D.H.A [*Centre des documentation historique en Algérie*] in Aix-en-Provence.
5. Lee Whitfield, "Algeria in France: French Citizens, the War, and Right Wing Populism in the Reckoning of the Republic in Languedoc, 1954–1962," in *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History* vol. 33 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan University Library, 2005) pp. 412–432.
6. Lee Whitfield, "Algeria in France," Ibid., 430; See also Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 104. Both authors cite the surveys published by François Goguel, *Chroniques électorales, La Cinquième République: les scrutins politiques de 1945 à nos jours* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1983), 158.
7. Jacques Villard, "La Création du Cercle algérianiste," *Textes divers,* document published at http://algerianisme-toulousain.org.
8. Villard, "La Création du Cercle algérianiste," Ibid.
9. Jacque Villard recalled that, "the first bulletins of the *Cercle* appeared in the *Aurore,* thanks to our friends who wrote the *Chronique des Rapatriés,* René Attar and Francis Attard of the *Midi Libre*." Villard, Ibid.
10. Jean Pomier, "Le Temps des Algérianistes," in *l'Algérianiste,* no.9 (March 1980), 13.
11. Georges Hourant, pied noir and currently a literature professor in La Roche-Sur-Yon claimed that the term was first introduced when Pomier referred to Randau as an *Algérianiste* during their regular meetings. The writers had apparently gathered every Wednesday in the *Gruber* on the rue de la Liberté." *L'Algérianiste,* no. 17 (March 1982), 21.
12. Félix Lagrot, "La Culture *pied-noir*," in *l'Algérianiste,* no. 16 (December 15, 1981), 6–7.
13. Many scholars have brushed off the journal as amateurish and nostalgic. On numerous occasions when I visited the Center for the Documents of Algerian History (CDHA), a library housing pied noir publications and various documents in Aix-en-Provence, the members of the associations there referred me to articles in the *Algérianiste* which they believed would help answer my questions.
14. Maurice Calmein, "La Lettre du president, Le Cercle algérianiste part en guerre contre l'enseignement," in *l'Algérianiste*, no. 14 (1981).
15. Maurice Calmein, Ibid.
16. This phrase comes from the lyrics of a popular song about the African Army: *Nous venons des colonies pour sauver la Patrie*.
17. Georges Bosc, "La Victoire oubliée," in *l'Algérianiste*, no. 60 (1992), 4.

18. Henry Rousso, Arthur Goldhammer trans., *The Vichy Syndrome, History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 290.
19. The landing took place in the early hours of November 8, 1942 in Algiers, Oran, Casablanca, Sofi, and Port Lyautey in northern Morocco. It was conceived in large part by the British, who had convinced the United States that North Africa provided fewer risks and strategic advantages for a direct invasion of Europe. William Breuer, *Operation Torch: the Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa* (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1985). 107,000-men landed off the coast of North Africa.
20. For *l'Algérianiste* accounts of Operation Torch and its preparations, see René Bérard, "Historique des événements de 1940 à 1942," *l'Algérianiste*, no. 60 (1992), 7–11; Gaston Palisser, "22 October 1942: L'entrevue de Cherchell, prelude à l'Opération Torch," *l'Algérianiste*, no. 60 (1992), 13–22; Georges Bosc, "Opération Torch, Les préliminaires," *Algérianiste*, no. 60 (1992), 23–34.
21. See Jacques Cantier, *L'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002); Albert Merglen, *Novembre 1942: La grande honte* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993).
22. Securing François Darlan's participation was fortuitous. Darlan's main post was not originally in Algeria; his son was, however, a senior officer in Algeria and had suddenly fallen ill with polio. It was during a brief visit to see his son that Darlan was approached by Eisenhower, who jumped at the chance to recruit him. A caricature of Darlan appeared in the 1942 film *Casablanca*, in the guise of a leading Vichy officer who broke down at the news that his son had contracted polio. The scene suggested the fragile and dithering behavior of French Vichyites, in contrast to the unwavering and malevolent Nazis.
23. Georges Bosc, "Opération Torch, Les préliminaires," l'*Algérianiste*, no. 60 (1992), 23–34.
24. Even though, as Robert Paxton has explained, Vichy Prime Minister Pierre Laval expended considerable effort to earn Hitler's trust as an ally, Hitler's interest in French Africa did create anxieties among Vichyites. See Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard, New Order, 1940–1944* (New York: Knopf, Random House, 1972), 56–58.
25. Georges Bosc, "Opération Torch, Les préliminaires," 33.
26. René Bérard, "Historique des événements de 1940 à 1942," in l'*Algérianiste,* no. 65 (1994), 7.
27. Gaston Palissser, "Le débarquement allié en Afrique du Nord, Berlin, Rome et…Madrid," in l'*Algérianiste*, no. 19 (December 2000), 17–18.
28. Jean Florentin, "La Renaissance de l'Armée française," l'*Algérianiste* (June 1987), 51–63.
29. Robert Fouich, Ibid., 58.
30. Georges Bosc, "Une Seule armée pour un seul drapeau," 3–32; 30.
31. Ibid.

32. Selected works by Pélégri: *L'Embarquement du lundi* (Paris: Gallimard, 1952); *Les Oliviers de la justice* (Paris: Gallimard, 1959) (awarded the Charles Veillon prize in 1964); *Le Maboul* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963); *Les Monuments du déluge* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1967); *Slimane* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1968); *Le Cheval dans la ville* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972);*Ma mere Algérie,* Alger: Éditions Laphonic, 1989/Paris: Actes Sud, 1990; *Noir*, in *Lépold Senghor* (Luxembourg: Bibliothèque nationale, 1983); Les étés perdus, Paris: Le Seuil, 1999.
33. Pélégri, *Ma mère Algérie* (Actes Sud, 1988), 66.
34. Ibid., 33.
35. Ibid., 33.
36. Ibid., 15.
37. Ibid., 33.
38. *Les Oliviers de la justice*, 23.
39. Ibid., 257.
40. Ibid., 205.
41. *Les Mots pour le dire* was awarded the Prix Littré in 1976. The Littré is the award for the best medical arts book published in France. I thank Patricia Lorcin for sharing her thoughts about teaching Cardinal's novels to her undergraduate students.
42. Cardinal suffered from a cervical ailment which triggered her neurosis.
43. Marie Cardinal, *Les Mots pour le dire* (Paris: Grasset, 1976), 106.
44. Marie Cardinal, *Au pays de mes racines* (Paris: Grasset, 1980), 7–8, see also 20. Italics are mine.
45. Ibid., 8.
46. Ibid., 27.
47. Ibid., 74.
48. Ibid., 80, author's capitalization.
49. Ibid., 88.
50. Fournier-Giusti, *Pardon, mon Algérie, tranche de vie* (Éditions 1900–2050, 2004), 51.
51. Ibid., 63.
52. Ibid., 5.
53. Ibid., 5.
54. Alain Vircondolet, *Alger, l'amour* (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 1982), 22.
55. Ibid, 39.
56. Jean-Luc Allouche, "L'Algérie ne m'est rien" in Monique Ayoun and Jean-Pierre Stora, eds, *Mon Algérie* (Paris: Agropole, 1989), 19.
57. Ibid., 23.
58. Ibid., 46.
59. Ibid., 46.
60. Ibid., 46.
61. Jacques Derrida, Patrick Mensah trans., *Monolingualism of the Other OR, the Prosthesis of Origin* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 15–16. The oral version of this text was presented at a colloquium held on April

23–25, 1992, in Baton Rouge at Louisiana State University. Throughout the colloquium, Derrida referred to himself as a "Franco-Maghrebian."
62. Hélène Cixous, in *Mon Algérie*, 88.
63. Ibid., 88. The town was Clos Salembier.
64. Ibid., 89.
65. Ibid., 90. See also her account of her family, in Hélène Cixous, Mireille Calle-Gruber, Eric Prenowitz trans., *Rootprints, Memory and Life Writing* (London, New York: Routledge, 1997), 196.
66. Hélène Cixous, *Rootprints*, Ibid., 196.
67. Ibid., 204.
68. Ibid., 204.
69. WJC AHA H4/1.
70. Joëlle Allouche-Benayoun and Doris Bensimon, *Les Juifs d'Algérie, Mémoires et identités plurielles* (Paris: Éditions Stavit, 1998), 65.
71. Ibid., 134.
72. Ibid., 134.
73. Joëlle Bahloul, *La Maison de mémoire, Ethnologie d'une demeure judéo-arabe en Algérie (1937*–1961*)* (Paris: Métailié, 1992), 98.
74. Ibid., 92–93.
75. American Jewish Archives, World Jewish Congress, Series H3, Folder 2. (The report concluded that the *Aliya* propaganda might be successful in Bône.)
76. Éric Savarèse, *L'Invention des pieds noirs* (Paris: Séguier, 2002), 85.
77. Ibid., 87.
78. Ibid., 87.
79. Ibid., 90.
80. Ibid., 75–80.
81. Ibid., 87.

Epilogue

1. See Chapter 6.
2. Diefenbacher, "Rapport établi à la demande du Premier Ministre: Parachever l'effort de solidarité nationale envers les rapatriés; Promouvoir l'oeuvre collective de la France outre-mer," (septembre 2003), 4.
3. The word "saga" is my translation of the French word *épopée,* for which there exists no real English cognate. The term is often used to describe only those historical events having truly heroic and awe-inspiring dimensions, something like the way English speakers would describe an event as being of "epic proportions."
4. Diefenbacher, "Rapport," 5.
5. Proposition de loi, no.667.
6. "Débats au Sénat, séance du 17 décembre 2003. Extraits: www.ldh-toulon-net.php?page=imprimer&id_article=588. 1/6.
7. Joseph Kerguéris, sénateur du Morbihan, group Union centrist. Ibid., 1/6.

8. Jacques Peyrat, sénateur des Alpes-Maritimes, groupe UMP. Ibid., 2/6.
9. Ibid., 1/6.
10. "Assemblée nationale, 1ere séance du vendredi 11 juin, 2004." Ibid., 3/6
11. Ibid., 4/6.
12. The first of the law's articles declared the nation's heartfelt recognition of the "men and women who participated in the [historical] work achieved by France in the former Algerian departments, Morocco, Tunisia, and Indochina as well as in other territories previously placed under French sovereignty." Loi no. 2005–158 du 24 février 2005 "portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés," Article 1er: "La Nation exprime sa reconnaissance aux femmes et aux hommes qui ont participé à l'oeuvre accomplie par la France dans les anciens départements français d'Algérie, au Maroc et Tunisie et en Indochine ainsi que dans les territoires placés antérieurement sous la souveraineté française," in *Journal Officiel de la République française* 23 février 2005. Article 4 read as follows: "Les programmes de recherche universitaire accordent à l'histoire de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord, la place qu'elle mérite. Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence francaise outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord, et accordent à l'histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants de l'armée francaise issus de ces territoires la place éminente à laquelle ils ont droit. La coopération permettant la mise en relation des sources orales et écrites disponibles en France et à l'étranger est encouragée," in *Journal Officiel,* Ibid. Texte 2 sur 113.
13. I attended two private gatherings in Paris 2003 with members of AJIR, the association for Muslim soldiers who fought for France in the Algerian War [*Association justice information reparation pour les Harkis*], during which mention was made of the bill and the progress it was making in parliament.
14. "La Plate-forme des historiens, contre la loi du 23 février 2005," *Le Monde,* March 25, 2005.
15. The petition used the term, *communautarism*. It denotes the politics of interest groups based on some political, religious, or loosely defined cultural affiliation. "Pétition d'historiens sur la loi du 23 février 2005," portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés." Published in *Le Monde* and *Libération*. As with the "headscarf affair," it was again the schools that became the site for a debate over conflicting Republican ideologies. For a discussion of the importance of schools as places of civic debate and education, see Leora Auslander, "Bavarian Crucifixes and French Headscarves, Religious Signs and the Postmodern European State," in *Cultural Dynamics* 12:3 (2000), 283–309.
16. Antoinette Burton has explained that in the British context the British empire is always portrayed as external to the history of "Britain." See Antoinette Burton, "Who Needs the Nation? Interrogating 'British'

History," in *Journal of Historical Sociology* 10:3 (September 1997), 227–248.

17. "Loi du 23 février 2005: Gérard Noiriel: je m'inquiète de ce virage conservateur," This interview was published on www.ldh-toulon.net. (Section de Toulon de la Ligue des droits de l'Homme).
18. Ibid.
19. Jean-Marc Leclerc, "À Montpellier, le projet de centre qui devait célébrer la période de 1830 à 1962 est au mort." *Le Figaro,* le 7 novembre 2005.
20. Laietitia Van Eeckhout, "Le candidat de l'UMP veut réhabiliter les rapatriés d'Algérie, *Le monde,* 21 avril 2007.
21. Ibid.

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