


**VERTRIEBENE AND PIEDS-NOIRS
IN POSTWAR GERMANY AND FRANCE**

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Edited by **Manuel Borutta**
and **Jan C. Jansen**



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Comparative Perspectives

Edited by

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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Introduction, selection and editorial matter © Manuel Borutta &
Jan C. Jansen 2016

Individual chapters © Respective authors 2016

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2016 978-1-137-50840-9

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First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

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Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of Nature America, Inc., One New York Plaza, Suite 4500, New York, NY 10004-1562.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

ISBN 978–1–349–70150–6
E-PDF ISBN: 978–1–137–50841–6
DOI: 10.1057/9781137508416

Distribution in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world is by Palgrave Macmillan®, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record for the book is available from the British Library.

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Acknowledgments

This volume began as an experiment – a conference titled ‘The Nation and its Repatriates: Pieds-Noirs and Vertriebene in Comparative Perspective’, held at the German Historical Institute in Paris (DHIP) in March 2012. This conference brought, for the very first time, two academic communities into dialogue that had hitherto remained separated; those working on the German expellees and those specializing in the French repatriates from Algeria. Most of the chapters published here were first presented at this conference. Others were written specifically for this book, which also is the result of many conversations between the editors and the contributors from Finland, France, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

We want to express our gratitude to our co-organiser Raphaëlle Branche and to the DHIP for providing the venue and funding for the conference, especially its deputy director Stefan Martens, Luna Hoppe, and Dunja Houelleu for their invaluable support in organizing it. We also wish to thank the Research Group ‘Global Processes’ and the Cluster of Excellence ‘Cultural Foundations of Social Integration’, both at the University of Konstanz, for their generous funding of the conference. Further thanks go to the ‘Centre d’histoire sociale du XXe siècle’ at Université Paris-I Panthéon; the Direction de la mémoire, du patrimoine et des archives du Ministère de la Défense et des Anciens Combattants; the Institut Universitaire de France; and the Center for Mediterranean Studies at the Ruhr-University Bochum, for their financial support.

We are grateful to those who gave papers, comments, and chaired sessions at the conference: Omar Carlier, Fanny Colonna (1934–2014), Sebastian Conrad, Fabrice d’Almeida, Béatrice Fleury, Jacques Frémeaux, Jean-Jacques Jordi, Piotr Madajczyk, Jürgen Osterhammel, Steffen Prauser, Hassan Remaoun, Maren Röger, Andrea L. Smith, Philipp Ther, Gregor Thum, and Jakob Vogel, and to all the conference attendees for their comments and suggestions.

We would like to thank the anonymous Palgrave Macmillan reviewers, as well as Pertti Ahonen, Mathias Beer, Christopher Clark, Mihran Dabag, Constantin Goschler, Volker Heins, Mischa Honeck, Jean-Jacques Jordi, David Lazar, Fabian Lemmes, Till van Rahden, Andrea L. Smith, and Nina Verheyen for their valuable advice on the project and on drafts of several contributions. Moreover, we wish to thank

John Tittensor for translating the chapters written by Michèle Baussant, Etienne François, Eric Savarese, and Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, and the DHIP for providing funding for this. Working with Palgrave Macmillan, in particular Peter Cary, Lynda Cooper, Jenny McCall, and Jade Moulds, has been a pleasure. Special thanks go to Kevin Hall, Irina Kiauka, Till Knobloch, Ulrike Koppermann, Lennart Lein, Brian North, Sebastian Peters, Dorothea Römer, Cora Schmitt-Ott, Patricia Sutcliff, and Lara Track for their crucial help in preparing the manuscript for publication.

Bochum/Washington, DC

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List of Abbreviations

ACDP	Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin (Archive for Christian Democratic Policy)
AdPdD	Archives départementales du Puy-de-Dôme (Departmental Archives of Puy-de-Dôme)
ADS	Archives départementales de la Seine (Departmental Archives of Seine)
AdsD	Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Archive of Social Democracy of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation)
AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)
ANFANOMA	Association nationale des Français d'Afrique du Nord, d'outre-mer et de leurs amis (National Association of North African and Overseas French and their Friends)
ANPNPA	Association nationale des Pieds Noirs progressistes et leurs amis (National Association of Progressive Pieds-Noirs and their Friends)
ASCA	Association pour la sauvegarde des cimetières d'Algérie (Algerian Cemeteries Protection Association)
BAK	Bundesarchiv Koblenz (German Federal Archives)
BDI	Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (Federation of German Industries)
BdV	Bund der Vertriebenen (Federation of Expellees)
BHE	Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (League of Expellees and Disenfranchised)
BvD	Bund der vertriebenen Deutschen (League of Expelled Germans)
BVFG	Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz (Federal Expellee Law)
CAC	Archives Nationales, centre des archives contemporaines (National Archives, Centre for Contemporary Archives)
CARAN	Centre d'accueil et de recherche des Archives Nationales (Reception and Research Centre of the National Archives)

CASOC	Caisse d'assurances sociales du commerce de la région de Constantine (Social Security Agency of the Constantine Region)
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CFTC	Confédération Française des travailleurs chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian Workers)
CGT-FO	Confédération générale du travail – force ouvrière (General Confederation of Labour – Workers' Force)
CNSR	Conseil national supérieur des rapatriés (Higher National Council of Repatriates)
CSU	Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DM	Deutsche Mark (German Mark)
DNVP	Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's Party)
DP	Deutsche Partei (German Party)
DRP	Deutsche Reichspartei (German Reich Party)
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FF	Franc français (French Franc)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (Algerian National Liberation Front)
FN	Front National (National Front)
FNACA	Fédération nationale des anciens combattants en Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie (National Federation of Veterans of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia)
FNFANOM	Fédération nationale des Français d'Afrique du Nord et d'outre-mer (National Federation of the French of North Africa and Overseas)
FNR	Front national des rapatriés (National Front of Repatriates)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
FURR	Fédération pour l'unité des réfugiés, des rapatriés et de leurs amis (Federation for the Unity of Refugees and Repatriates)
GB/BHE	Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Disenfranchised)
GDR	German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik)

GPRF	Gouvernement provisoire de la République Française (Provisional Government of the French Republic)
HStAH	Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (Main State Archive of Hanover)
JORF	Journal officiel de la République Française (Official Gazette of the French Republic)
JPN	Jeune Pied-Noir (Young Pied-Noir)
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
OAS	Organisation armée secrète (Organization of the Secret Army)
OFPRA	Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)
Pegida	Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West)
PPN	Parti des Pieds-Noirs (Pieds-Noirs Party)
RANFRAN	Rassemblement des Français d'Afrique du Nord (National Alliance of North African French)
RECOURS	Rassemblement et coordination des rapatriés et spoliés d'outre-mer (Assembly and Coordination of the Repatriates and Dispossessed from Overseas)
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic)
SBZ	Sowjetische Besatzungszone (Soviet Occupation Zone)
SDA	Sudetendeutsches Archiv (Sudeten German Archive)
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
StBKAH	Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (Chancellor Adenauer House Foundation)
UDF	Union pour la démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy)
UMP	Union pour un mouvement populaire (Union for a Popular Movement)
USDIFRA	Union syndicale de défense des intérêts des Français repliés d'Algérie (Union for the Interests of the French Withdrawn from Algeria)

- VdL Verband der Landsmannschaften (Association of
Homeland Societies)
- VOL Vereinigte Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften (United East
German Homeland Societies)
- ZvD Zentralverband vertriebener Deutscher (Central
Association of Expelled Germans)

1

Comparing Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs: Introduction

Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen

After 1945 and 1962, Germany and France witnessed immigration movements of unprecedented scale and type. Military defeat and the loss of significant parts of their territory pushed millions of refugees and expellees from Central and Eastern Europe and from North Africa to the two neighboring countries: the Germans from the East (*Vertriebene*) and the French of now independent Algeria (*rapatriés*, later often referred to as *Pieds-Noirs*). This demographic influx from former national provinces and imperial borderlands posed serious financial, logistical, and administrative challenges for both societies. Since many of these immigrants and their ancestors had lived far away from the core regions of postwar Germany and France – speaking unfamiliar dialects or different languages, practicing different cultural and religious traditions – they were perceived as culturally different, if not inferior, and were rejected by many of their fellow citizens.

Yet their national belonging was never officially questioned. Both states considered them as ‘nationals’ and assisted them with effective institutional help and vast financial support, making their socio-economic integration an often overlooked aspect of the expansion of postwar European welfare states. However, despite their successful socio-economic integration, expellees and repatriates alike formed distinct communities and founded their own organizations, which soon became important political factors and electoral pressure groups. Their memories of the lost homelands east of the Oder–Neisse line and south of the Carpathian Mountains and the Mediterranean Sea caused tensions on a national and even international level, and painfully reminded their fellow citizens of failed imperial projects and mass violence. The integration of these specific migrant groups had sweeping effects for both postwar Germany and France: it impacted the definition of citizenship

and the construction of the post-1945 state, altered the associational and political landscape, and left deep marks in the public memory of crucial chapters in national histories.

Despite these striking parallels, already noticed by scholars of other disciplines,¹ historians have studied *Vertriebene* and *Pieds-Noirs* in isolation from each other. *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France* breaks with this conventional approach by comparing both groups systematically and placing them within larger processes that reshaped Europe after World War II. While the existing comparative literature on twentieth-century population transfers is mainly concerned with the forms and dynamics of coercive mass migration,² this volume compares the complex processes of integration and the manifold consequences for the receiving societies that followed.³ In this way, the book sets out to reassess the lasting impact ‘reverse migration’⁴ had on European nation-states and societies.

Global context: postwar reconstruction, decolonization, and the reshaping of Western Europe

The postwar decades were a crucial period in twentieth-century European history – the continent had been devastated by the war, and was increasingly divided by the East–West conflict. Western European countries lost their colonial empires but also experienced rapid economic growth and a new integration on a supranational level. This shared historical moment was the larger context for the integration of expellees and repatriates in postwar Germany and France.⁵ France and the western part of Germany shared a more similar political and economic context. The comparison will mainly cover France and West Germany, though East Germany will be taken into account as well.

First, the dissolution of empires had lasting consequences for the conception of the nation-state. Central and Eastern Europe (especially Poland) and Algeria had been of equivalent significance for Germany and France as parts of larger ‘imagined geographies’ that nurtured fantasies of territorial expansion, provoked policies of colonial settlement and national assimilation, and sustained national imperial identities.⁶ After the loss of these territories, imperial concepts of the nation-state lay in shambles, and the place of the nation in the world had to be redefined. Thereafter, West Germany and France oriented themselves towards a supranational integration of Western Europe – an orientation that complemented their new self-conceptions as post-imperial nations, which emerged with the integration of expellees and repatriates.⁷

Second, the integration of expellees and repatriates took place in the context of economic growth far greater than the global average. Though the West German 'economic miracle' (*Wirtschaftswunder*) and the French 'Glorious Thirty' (*Trente Glorieuses*) became part of specifically national cultures of remembrance, this economic boom was a common Western European experience. Though it is not easy to assess, apparently, expellees and repatriates both contributed to and benefited from economic growth. While the boom was obviously a prerequisite to their integration and 'absorption' into the labor market, the abundant and available workforce also fueled the expanding economy.⁸ The extensive socio-economic integration programs towards the two groups, for example in the house building sector, further contributed to the economic momentum.

Third, in the 1950s and 1960s, the European welfare state reached unprecedented levels. Though based on different national traditions, sometimes reaching back into the nineteenth century, the massive expansion of public expenditures on social policy was a common pattern among the Western European states. The integration programs set up by the West German and French states to provide the expellees and repatriates with labor and housing, and partly to compensate for their financial losses, were an important driving force behind this development. While the Equalization of Burdens Act (*Lastenausgleichsgesetz*) induced payments to the amount of DM145.3 billion to the expellees between 1952 and 2001, the French state spent FF26 billion for the integration of the repatriates (1962–70), and another FF28.7 billion for their compensation (1970–81).⁹ Both cases show that the expansion of social expenditures was also a reaction to the consequences of war and a means to pacify potentially dangerous or rebellious groups.¹⁰ The specific welfare provisions for expellees and repatriates also suggest that notwithstanding a general postwar tendency to universalize social rights (on the basis of citizenship),¹¹ particular legal claims continued to coexist.

Fourth, the emerging Cold War constituted an important international backdrop to this process.¹² This was most obvious in the case of the German expellees, who were split up between two antagonistic political and ideological systems. While the communist regime of East Germany stopped financial help for the so-called 'resettlers' in the mid-1950s, declaring that they had been successfully integrated and assimilated, the socio-economic integration of expellees in West Germany was soon depicted as a 'miracle' (*Integrationswunder*). It became an essential part of the West German *Wirtschaftswunder* myth and a

crucial element of Western Cold War propaganda.¹³ By contrast, the integration of the Pieds-Noirs was barely linked to the Cold War context, though, from 1969, it was the subject of domestic rivalry among Gaullists, socialists, and communists competing to best provide for this voting group.¹⁴

Fifth, and finally, the integration of expellees and repatriates was part of a dramatic shift in global migration flows that Europe experienced during the postwar period.¹⁵ After having been a continent of emigration for more than a century, Western Europe (at least countries like West Germany and France) now became a destination of mass immigration. In most countries, internal migrants were increasingly outnumbered by foreign labor migrants, in France mainly from the former colonial empire, in West Germany by Mediterranean 'guest workers'. Scholars in the European history of migration have long tended to focus on these forms of 'free' labor migration, while the study of involuntary forms of mobility (such as the slave trade or indentured labor for example) has been relegated to non-European societies.¹⁶ However, twentieth-century European societies were also shaped by unfree forms of mobility. The confluence of these different forms of migration and the continuities between them needs to be analyzed.¹⁷

A comparative approach: different settings, similar challenges

This volume examines the histories of expellees and repatriates against the backdrop of a shared postwar/post-imperial moment. Rather than pursuing a transnational approach that focuses on transfers and entanglements, *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France* adopts a comparative perspective. Critics of comparative history argue that historical comparisons rely on artificially separated units that are closely interconnected in empirical reality.¹⁸ Yet, as French historian Marc Bloch had noticed already in 1928, relational and comparative perspectives do not exclude, but complement, each other.¹⁹ Furthermore, some historical phenomena cannot be explained primarily by their connections and interactions. Germany and France after 1945 shared a highly entangled history (as they did before). France was among the Allied forces in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and almost vetoed the settlement of expellees in its occupation zone.²⁰ By contrast, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) received a great deal of support from East and West Germany during its fight for Algerian independence.²¹ Many further cross-connections could be cited. However, these entanglements

were not the main forces behind the integration of Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs.²²

Because historical comparisons flesh out commonalities and differences between individual cases that help to describe, interpret, and explain them in greater depth, they enable us to carve out peculiarities, to check generalizations, to defamiliarize the familiar, and to de-provincialize concepts by forcing us to reconsider assumptions about the singularity of the cases.²³ Thus, a comparison focusing on the integration of both groups does not 'essentialize' the two nations as static units but sheds light on their spatial and cultural variability and exposes the changing and unstable nature of German and French 'nationhood'.

Some major differences between expulsion from the Eastern provinces and repatriation from Algeria can be stated from the outset. First, the difference in the number of migrants was large. While the repatriates numbered about a million, which made up less than three percent of the French metropolitan population, the expellees numbered more than twelve million. Almost eight million – constituting roughly a fifth of the population – ended up in the Western occupation zones (mainly in the British and American sectors), which became FRG territory in 1949. More than four million expelled Germans arrived in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ), the future German Democratic Republic (GDR), making up a quarter of its inhabitants.²⁴ In a similar vein, the death toll amongst those expelled or repatriated was very different: while researchers have recently pointed to hundreds of disappearances among civilians at the end of the Algerian War, several hundred thousand people died or disappeared during the expulsion.²⁵ In both cases the numbers of the dead have been highly disputed and politicized.²⁶

Second, these two waves of mass migration took place in different historical contexts.²⁷ The 'flight and expulsion' of Germans from the East took place during the final period and the aftermath of World War II (1944–50) and has to be seen against the background of Nazi policies of 'ethnic cleansing' in Central and Eastern Europe between 1938 and 1944. During this period, the creation of ethnically homogeneous states through mass resettlements and 'population transfers' was still internationally sanctioned as a way to build stable societies and postwar order. Hence, the expulsion of the Germans was at least in part the result of agreements between the Allied Powers.²⁸ By contrast, the 'exodus' of French citizens from Algeria – beginning in the 1950s, swelling in 1960–1, and culminating in 1962²⁹ – resulted from a different kind of war, the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), which has to be seen in the context of worldwide decolonization.³⁰

It was neither state-organized nor did it result from an international agreement.

Third, the postwar scenarios varied substantially. While the effects of the Algerian War with France remained largely within the political realm, causing the breakdown of the Fourth Republic and returning Charles de Gaulle to power, Germany lay in ruins in 1945. Due to wartime destruction and the number of other relocated, displaced, or repatriated persons and refugees (eight to ten million by the end of the war), an integrated 'receiving society' barely existed; locals and immigrants had to rebuild one together.³¹ Furthermore, Germany was not a sovereign country. Even after the foundation of the two German states in 1949, Allied occupation and territorial division strongly influenced the way the integration of the expellees was carried out.

Fourth, and finally, the lost territories had different stories. The largest number of expellees (seven million) came from Eastern territories of the German Empire (1871–1945) which had belonged to Prussia since the eighteenth century. The Silesian Wars (1740–63) and the Partitions of Poland (1772–95) had transformed Prussia into a German–Polish empire. In 1830, the kingdom initiated a policy of German settlement and cultural assimilation in its Polish-speaking territories that was continued after the foundation of the German Empire in 1871.³² This policy was disrupted after World War I when 90 percent of Posen and 66 percent of West Prussia were ceded to Poland, accompanied by the mass emigration of 1.5 million Germans from these areas and the dissolved Habsburg and Russian empires.³³

The second largest group of expellees (three million) came from border regions of Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland, including parts of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), where Germans had been settling since the Middle Ages. While medieval colonists had often adapted to their surrounding cultures, 'nationalization' of the different ethnic groups had started in the late nineteenth century under the Habsburg monarchy. The Nazis transformed these nationalist policies into a systematic policy of ethnic cleansing and mass murder in Central and Eastern Europe. The 'General Plan for the East' envisioned the eastward extension of the German border by a thousand kilometers, the resettlement of this huge area by 'ethnic Germans' (*Volksdeutsche*), and the enslavement, removal and/or elimination of its 31 million 'Slavic' inhabitants.³⁴

By contrast, the French settlement in Algeria was a more recent phenomenon.³⁵ In the late 1830s, the French state officially started to settle French citizens in the colony, and in 1848 Algeria became an integral part of French national territory. Yet by the end of the nineteenth

century, more than a half of the colonists came from other European countries like Spain and Italy, and from Mediterranean islands such as Malta and the Balearic Islands. In order to win this demographic ‘battle’ with Spain and Italy, France naturalized the Algerian Jews (1870) and the Europeans born in Algeria (1889). Nevertheless, since Muslims could only gain full citizenship if they abandoned their right to be judged under local civil law or by local law courts, which was considered ‘apostasy’ by the majority of the population, the ‘French’ always remained a minority in ‘French Algeria’, never comprising more than roughly thirteen percent of the population and remaining concentrated in the coastal towns.³⁶ Though French rule in Algeria was based on racial discrimination, expropriation, and violence, the colonial state never aimed at the systematic enslavement, expulsion, or extermination of the colonized population. In this sense, the wartime Nazi empire was, indeed, a very different type of empire, not interested in managing cultural or ethnic difference but in destroying it.

Since the two cases differ considerably with regard to the origins, forms, and circumstances of migration, scholars have preferred to compare them with other cases whose overall settings are deemed to be more similar. The expulsion of the Germans has been regarded as part of a broader history of ethnic cleansing and population transfers in twentieth-century Europe, stretching from the Balkan Wars (1912–13) to the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s.³⁷ The *Pieds-Noirs*, in turn, have mainly been analyzed in conjunction with other decolonization migrants such as those who came from Indonesia to the Netherlands in the late 1940s or the Portuguese ‘returnees’ (*retornados*) from Angola and Mozambique who arrived in the mid-1970s.³⁸ This volume breaks away from these established patterns of analysis by comparing one of the largest instances of ethnic cleansing with the most important case of decolonization migration. It does so by shifting the focus away from the origins and forms to the aftermath of these two instances of mass migration. Though they came in different numbers, from different contexts, and under different circumstances, the *Vertriebene* and the *Pieds-Noirs* nevertheless have a lot in common as a group of migrants, in their integration, and in their impact on the receiving societies.

Peculiar migrants: *Vertriebene*, rapatriés, and *Pieds-Noirs*

Expellees and repatriates hold a particular place in twentieth-century German and French histories of migration. Even though they share important features with other groups of people leaving their homes and

settling in new places, official and popular discourses alike have been unwilling or unable to consider them migrants. Even academic scholars have long been hesitant to include them in history textbooks of migration or approach their cases within the categories of migration studies.

Official language coined specific terms, or reused already existing categories, to treat both groups as distinct from other immigrants. During the early postwar years, a variety of designations existed for the Germans from the Eastern territories, including terms such as 'refugees', 'internal migrants', 'deportees', or 'returnees'. Yet when it became clear by the end of 1945 that these people – unlike the eight to ten million displaced persons from Western Europe – could not return to their former places of residence, the US Military Government of Germany started to call them 'expellees' ('non-repatriable Germans from foreign countries and from former Prussian regions east of the Oder and Goerlitzer Neisse') and 'new citizens' (*Neubürger*), denoting the goal of their 'total economic, social and political assimilation in the German community'.³⁹ By contrast, French authorities used the very term 'repatriation', (*rapatriement*) which had originally referred to military personal, displaced persons, prisoners of war, and other people who were brought back to their place of origin when military action ended. As the process of decolonization gained momentum, 'repatriation' became the official term for the (re)incorporation of French citizens from former colonies into metropolitan France.⁴⁰

Neither term was neutral but delivered propagandistic messages: 'expellees' put emphasis on the violent and unjust nature of migration, alluding to their violent expulsion. After 1947, expellees in West Germany started to call themselves *Vertriebene*. Contrary to the original intention of the US Military Government, 'expellees' did not clearly rule out the designated people's 'right to the homeland', a slogan invented by the 'Federation of Expellees' in 1950 and embraced by all major political parties and governments in the FRG throughout the 1950s.⁴¹ The more technical and apparently neutral term 'repatriation', used in France, suggested an administrative and intentional process of 'homecoming' from territories no longer considered part of the nation or empire. This inverted a colonialist discourse that had declared Algeria an integral part of France for more than a century. This idea was in line with the official French policy since the early 1960s, which represented the hitherto unthinkable independence of Algeria as an adjustment to a general historical trend and cast the idea that the country had been an integral part of the French nation as an illusion.⁴²

In contrast to the expellees, the repatriates started to deviate from their official designation by referring to themselves as *Pieds-Noirs* (black-foot) – a term with unclear etymology that emerged in the mid-1950s.⁴³ Similar to France, the state authorities in East Germany (SBZ/GDR) preferred a technical term for its migrants, labeling them ‘resettlers’ (*Umsiedler*), a term that had been invented by the Nazis. By the mid-1950s, the phrase disappeared from official language under the premise that the process of integration and assimilation had been completed – which was a propagandistic fiction as well.⁴⁴

Despite their different designations, *Vertriebene* and *Pieds-Noirs* share fundamental characteristics that allow us to bring them together in a common analytical framework. First, both groups were neither ‘internal’ migrants (for example, migration into the cities from rural areas) nor ‘international’ migrants (that is, migration between countries), but oscillated between these classic migration categories. This ambiguous, liminal position constitutes the specific character of their migration: while their country of origin had been considered the same as their country of arrival, their migration marked the drawing of a political border between the two.⁴⁵ In contrast to ‘international’ migrants, both expellees and repatriates already had (or quickly received) the citizenship of their new homeland, while unlike ‘internal’ migrants, their country of origin was no longer considered part of the same political entity.⁴⁶

Second, from a macro-historical point of view, both expellees and repatriates share a dynamic of global ‘un-mixing’, of rapid ‘contraction’ and concentration after a period of demographic expansion, stretched over several decades or even centuries.⁴⁷ Again, migration theory does not provide a common category to account for this fact. Terms like ‘remigration’ or ‘return migration’ do not apply, as in most cases ‘emigration’ and ‘return’ did not occur within the span of a lifetime. In the case of the repatriates, a majority of them did not even have any French ‘ancestry’. The only macro-historical attempt to include *Vertriebene* (and other postwar expellees) and *Pieds-Noirs* (and other migrants of decolonization) in one single category – that by social geographer Ceri Peach – employed the vague term ‘reflux’.⁴⁸

Third, expellees and repatriates fall within the range of forms of involuntary mass migration. A closer comparison can show different degrees of coercion, both between the two groups as well as within each of them.⁴⁹ Yet, for the receiving countries, their arrival presented similar challenges: within a short period of time, a considerable number of migrants arrived with often no more than their most personal items. As they arrived in their ‘home country’ (that is, the country they were

citizens or ethnic ‘descendants’ of), they could not be sent away, and it was clear from the outset that the state had to take care of their most immediate needs and also provide for their socio-economic integration in the long run.

Fourth, both groups received a peculiar legal status and benefited from particular migration regimes that evolved around them. Specific ministries were in charge of them – the Federal Ministry for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims (1949–69) and the Ministry of the Repatriates (1962–4, 1986–8, and 1993–5).⁵⁰ Laws defined who was an ‘expellee’/‘repatriate’ – and who was not. On 19 May 1953, the Federal Expellee Law (*Bundesvertriebenengesetz*) defined the (hereditary) status of German citizens and people of ethnic German descent who had been forced to leave the former German provinces or other areas outside the 1937 borders of the German Reich.⁵¹ The repatriates were granted legal status on 26 December 1961, with a law that defined them as persons of French nationality who ‘had to [leave] or felt forced to leave’ a territory formerly under French sovereignty.⁵² Both states not only stipulated that expellees and repatriates were totally equal to other citizens but also granted them specific rights for their socio-economic advancement. While West Germany’s definition of expellee was extremely inclusive (ethnic and intergenerational), France’s definition of repatriate was narrow, based on citizenship and a person’s specific date of arrival. As a further difference, the German Expellee Law granted specific rights to preserve expellees’ cultural traditions and heritage, whereas the French law had no such provision for repatriates. Against the backdrop of these specific migration regimes, some scholars have included Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in the category of ‘privileged migrants’.⁵³

It should go without saying that the German expellees and the French repatriates are not the only groups that share these characteristics. Yet they rank among the most important examples overall and constitute the largest groups of this type in twentieth-century Germany and France. Bringing them together can add a new dimension to the now classic Franco-German comparison of nationhood and nationality.⁵⁴

A symmetrical comparison

This volume sets out to compare Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs as special sorts of migrants. In contrast to the existing comparative literature on forced population movements in the twentieth century, this comparison extends to the integration processes and consequences that followed the arrival of these groups of migrants. In a radical departure from other

volumes in both relevant fields of research, twentieth-century 'ethnic cleansing' and decolonization migration,⁵⁵ *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France* is based on a strictly symmetrical structure. The focus on two major cases allows the complexity of both cases to be taken into account, because the comparison is carried out on different analytical levels.

Each part of this book highlights one of six major aspects of the comparison between expellees and repatriates: (Part I) the impact of 1945 and 1962 on the construction of post-imperial nationhood in postwar Germany and France; (Part II) the two states' integration policies; (Part III) the self-organization and representation of the immigrants; (Part IV) their political integration and participation; (Part V) the commemorative practices and emotions of Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in their new homelands; and (Part VI) the politics of remembrance on the national and international level. Each of the six parts consists of two chapters, one relating to each of the cases. While most of the chapters take up historical approaches, perspectives from neighboring disciplines (especially cultural anthropology, political science, and other social sciences) are also taken into account.

With its structure stretching from the immediate postwar period to the present day, this volume provides a long-term perspective on both groups. Such a broad perspective departs from an inclusive definition of Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs. This encompasses all individuals that fall into the legal category and/or claim this category for themselves. Even though the status of Pied-Noir is not hereditary from a legal point of view (in contrast to the expellee status), subsequent generations have made claims on the term as a socio-cultural category. Such a long-term perspective does not ignore changing – or fading – group solidarities over time. Rather, it helps with an understanding of the importance of intergenerational change and the dynamics of successful or (more often) failed transmission of identity and memory.

Post-imperial nationhood and ethnicity

Despite the huge differences between 'German East' and 'French Algeria', recent scholarship has suggested that both territories were of equivalent significance to their respective nation and that their loss had a comparable impact on them.⁵⁶ Part I, 'From Empire to Nation-State: 1945 and 1962', examines the migration of expellees and repatriates as part of a shared postwar and post-imperial moment in European history. In fact, the decades after 1945 marked the end of empire, whether continental or intercontinental, as the dominant type of global political

organization.⁵⁷ This process initiated a crucial period in the history of Western European nation-states, during which time these states, after centuries of territorial expansion, shrank to their metropolitan core regions and turned more fully toward European supranational integration.⁵⁸ Shelley Baranowski's chapter on German imperial nationhood during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and Todd Shepard's chapter on the erasure of the French imperial nation-state in 1962 place the migration of expellees and repatriates against the background of this macro-historical transformation. Both chapters assess imperial continuities and discontinuities that shaped the integration of expellees and repatriates in postwar Germany and France.

The two cases reveal different conceptions of expansion and imperial rule that were pushed to their extremes at the very moment they ended in 1945 and 1962 respectively. Baranowski stresses the long-term rejection of multi-ethnicity in modern Germany, characterizing the German empire as being obsessed with ethnocultural homogeneity. This stood in stark contrast to other empires' tendency to acknowledge, reinforce, and manage diversity among their subjects.⁵⁹ Following the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, ethnocentrism pervaded the German imagination, with an enlarged Germany in the 'East' seen as uniting a dispersed and divided people. The Citizenship Law of 1913 put emphasis on descent and reflected the fear that Poles and Jewish immigrants would be unable to assimilate and that Polish immigrants would reinforce the resistance to Germanization in East Prussia. Against this backdrop, the Nazi wartime empire in Eastern Europe pushed this logic to its extreme, pursuing a vision of an ethnically homogeneous 'East' through resettlement and genocide.

Shepard, in contrast, points to the massive efforts to integrate the remaining (mainly African) French empire after World War II and to define the rights of its members, now regarded as 'citizens' of the 'French Union'. While Algeria's status had remained unclear for a long time, the war of independence generated new and more radical solutions for the colony that alternated between making it a federation and fully 'integrating' it with the metropole. As a consequence of reinforced 'integration', political and social citizenship was extended to the Muslim population in 1958.

From 1945 and 1962 respectively, the two Germanys and France sought to break with imperial conceptions of the nation, yet they did so in different ways. As both Baranowski's and Shepard's chapters show, the way the migrants from the lost territories were categorized played a crucial role in shaping post-imperial nationhood. Notwithstanding the

two German states' official rejection of imperialism, Baranowski emphasizes that the imperial legacy of an ethnic conception of Germanness survived in the FRG. The FRG's Basic Law conferred citizenship on 'ethnic Germans', ensuring them a 'right to return'. The continued inflow of *Aussiedler* (until 1992) and *Spätaussiedler* (after 1993) well beyond the actual period of expulsions and flight was a long-term consequence of this. By contrast, immigrants from other countries and their children born in the country had very restricted access to citizenship until 2000.

While Baranowski thus stresses the continuities in the West German case, Shepard depicts 1962 as a watershed of modern French history, marking an anti-imperial, that is, anti-universalist, turn in the republic and transforming France from empire to the 'hexagon'. The treatment of the different imperial 'citizens' and especially the populations of Algeria was pivotal in this transformation. The process of defining who ought to be considered 'French' in the 'post-Algerian' French republic, unraveled the complex supranational relations created in the late colonial period. Only the 'Europeans' of Algeria were recognized as truly French 'repatriates'. In violation of their former integration, the Muslims of Algeria were not automatically considered French citizens, and the *harkis* who had fought on the French side during the war were abandoned to their fate. Those who made it to France were regarded as 'refugees'. Categorizing post-imperial migrants thus 'worked to erase the 132 years of French claims that Algeria was France' (Shepard).

Despite the very different settings and policies pursued in the two countries, West Germany and France experienced similar long-term consequences in the making of post-imperial nationhood, which the two chapters carve out: the broad inclusion of ethnic Germans living outside the (new) core regions of the country and the inclusion of 'Europeans' from Algeria went hand in hand with the exclusion of 'others' who were considered culturally or ethnically different. In the process of developing different migration regimes for expellees and repatriates and 'other' migrants, citizenship revealed – or was given – an ethnocentric core.

Socio-economic integration

The mass migration of expellees and repatriates not only constituted a crucial moment in the German and French reshaping of nationhood; it also forced the states to break new ground in the field of state-run social policies. The money spent on integrating repatriates and expellees in France and West Germany was unparalleled in the history of both countries. Part II, 'Repatriation and Integration', analyzes the state policies developed in France and the two German states to integrate expellees

and repatriates. Michael Schwartz's chapter looks at East and West Germany and Yann Scioldo-Zürcher's chapter examines France, allowing for a triangular comparison of the three states involved.

The chapters demonstrate that different concepts of integration prevailed in each of the three cases. While the Allied powers, the GDR, and France wished to 'assimilate' the migrants as quickly and thoroughly as possible, the FRG developed a different policy of 'incorporation' (*Eingliederung*) with the intention of combining the necessities of economic integration with the political wish to preserve the cultural peculiarities of the expellees and to promise them a right to return to their 'homeland' (*Heimatrecht*). Thus, while the GDR had already recognized the Oder-Neisse line in 1950, the Social-Liberal government under Willy Brandt only did so twenty years later. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) continued to support the expellees' 'right to the homeland' until 1991. Despite these different approaches – and the extremely different socio-economic settings in Germany in 1945 and in France in 1962 – a common emphasis was put on economic integration.

As Schwartz traces in his comparative chapter on East and West Germany, both states first pursued the Allied goal of rapidly assimilating the migrants in the German community before policies diverged from 1952–3 on: while the GDR stopped its social policy for the 'resettlers', the Equalization of Burdens Law in the FRG initiated the greatest redistribution of wealth the German state had ever undertaken before reunification. This was partly due to the international context – while the GDR needed to show consideration for its Eastern European partners, the Western Bloc had an interest in raising pressure on the communist regimes. Moreover, while the authoritarian GDR government could just decree from above that the expellees had been successfully integrated, the more pluralistic FRG had gradually allowed them to get organized and to lobby.

The Pieds-Noirs had less influence on the process of their socio-economic 'repatriation'. Yet, as Scioldo-Zürcher shows, the French state took care of them on an unparalleled scale. A new social policy was invented after 1961–2. Those arriving after March 1962, when the Evian Accords for Algerian independence were prepared, benefited from a slew of new laws and from innovative administrative practices that provided assistance. A huge administrative machine was set up, initiating a large-scale state intervention involving jobs, housing, and social security benefits in order to prevent the pauperization and political bewilderment of this group of newcomers. They were perceived as a danger to law and order because of their alleged violent opposition to Algerian independence.

Though the three states may have displayed different attitudes towards expellees and repatriates – distance and surveillance (France, GDR), proximity and involvement in decision-making (FRG) – their integration policies have more in common than mere extent. Importantly, they all created a peculiar legal status for these migrants, granting them specific rights and appropriate administrative structures (on a smaller scale and over a shorter period in East Germany). The entitlement to national ‘burden-sharing’ was the legal privilege of a clearly defined category of migrants that Scioldo-Zürcher calls ‘national migrants’. In none of the cases did the measures taken in the case of the expellees and repatriates function as a blueprint for other types of migrants or people in need. In West Germany, foreign ‘guest workers’ were not included in the official system of social benefits and services but were bound to a distinct (and less comprehensive) welfare system.⁶⁰ In France, diverging migration regimes also took shape in the wake of decolonization. While the state was socially conscious, interventionist, and protective with regard to those recognized as ‘repatriates’, it did not show similar commitment to non-French European or Muslim immigrants from Algeria, including the *harkis*. Even if migrants from the French empire were included in the social system in principle, their access to the ex-metropole and the French labor market was drastically restricted from the 1960s.⁶¹

While creating specific migration regimes for expellees and repatriates, the three states designed very different rules that would define the group concerned and the type of rights they would be entitled to. The short-lived ‘resettler’ policy in the GDR thus contrasts with the inheritability of the expellee status in West Germany; the inclusive definition based on ‘descent’ in FRG expellee legislation compared to the exclusive definition of the repatriate status in France based on the date of arrival; and the right to state support in the promotion of cultural ‘heritage’ in West Germany in contrast to the focus on the socio-economic advancement and assimilation in France and the GDR.

Despite the enormous financial support for these migrants, full economic integration only materialized slowly: with huge regional disparities, unemployment rates among expellees and repatriates remained significantly higher until the late 1960s in the German case, and until the early 1980s in the French case.⁶² While the term ‘integration’ should not gloss over the manifold conflicts that were part of this process,⁶³ nor ignore the heterogeneity of the locals’ and the migrants’ cultures, ‘satisfaction’ about social status was achieved among Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs. While the French state was discreet about its efforts for

the repatriates, the governments of East and West Germany publicly competed with each other about which one had done more for their expellees.

Group integration and associational life

Expellees and repatriates were not mere passive objects of legislation and state-run integration programs. From their arrival in their new homeland, they began to network among themselves, set up organizations, defend their interests, and express their ideas. Part III, 'Self-Organization and Representation', analyzes the vital role that associations played in constituting Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs as social and political groups. Pertti Ahonen's chapter on the *Vertriebenenverbände* in West Germany and Claire Eldridge's chapter on *pied-noir* associations, delve into complicated and embattled territories that are often regarded as monolithic blocs, from the outside.

Both chapters demonstrate that associational life among expellees and repatriates was marked by deep tensions between the quest for unity and internal divisions. Thus, despite the fact that their outward appearance was dominated by some well-known pressure groups, their associations reflected the heterogeneity of the two groups. Along with organizations representing the (material, political, cultural) interests of the groups as a whole, scores of associations were formed on the basis of profession or vocation, of pre-1945 or pre-1962 origin, or of identity issues, serving a variety of (emotional, sociable) functions for particular subgroups. As Ahonen and Eldridge show, the associational fields were structured differently for Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs. The *Vertriebenenverbände* developed a central, national, and vertical organization (although differentiated into various regional groups), with the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV)) serving as a national umbrella organization. However, some (origin-related) 'Homeland Societies' (*Landsmannschaften*) such as the Silesian and the Sudeten German associations, remained particularly strong, visible, and semi-autonomous. The structure of the *pied-noir* associational field was, in general, less hierarchical and more fluid, having its backbone on the regional and the local levels.

Neither the more hierarchical organization nor the looser structure prevented internal conflicts, divisions over ideological or strategic orientations, or personal rivalries from coming to the fore. In France, such struggles between competing leaders and ideological directions took on violent forms in 1993, when a repatriate leader was assassinated by other Pieds-Noirs. The question of the extent to which a specific association

has the right to represent the entire group goes beyond rivalries within the associational field but applies to these organizations as a whole. In fact, as Ahonen and Eldrige point out, only a minority among *Vertriebene* and *Pieds-Noirs* have been members of these associations. The *Vertriebenenverbände* were mainly comprised of former *Reichsdeutsche* and Sudeten Germans (most of their leaders belonging to the old elites and having a Nazi or *völkisch* attitude⁶⁴), while *Volksdeutsche* and women remained under-represented. As expellees and repatriates were gradually integrated into local society and generational change occurred, their membership declined.

While they could not prevent internal divisions or rivalry for leadership, expellee and *pied-noir* leaders believed an outward appearance of unity and solidarity was needed for group interests to be successfully represented vis-à-vis the state and the receiving society. The importance of the political context was most obvious in the case of the *Vertriebenenverbände* and their connection to the Cold War context. Until 1948, the Western Allies prevented the expellees from founding political parties or groups, before discovering their organizations as useful tools of anti-communist mobilization. By building up links with political parties (more obviously in the German case) or threatening to 'blackmail' politicians through collective votes (a strategy used by certain *pied-noir* leaders), expellee and repatriate associations alike sought to impact government policy and party programs.

In several respects, they lobbied, mostly successfully, for similar goals such as housing, employment, and material compensation. Yet, the specific *Heimatpolitik* ('homeland policy') pursued by the *Vertriebenenverbände* marked a notable difference between the two cases: from the outset, expellee associations sought to promote distinct expellee cultures and lobbied to return to their homelands as their main (long-term) goal. Ironically, it was this very core of separatist *Heimatpolitik* that, according to Ahonen, expedited the expellees' integration into West German society. While it functioned as a sort of narcotic against massive suffering in the first postwar years, this clinging to an increasingly unrealistic irredentism alienated many of the associations' members, gradually marginalizing the organizations politically from the 1960s. The *pied-noir* associations turned more recently, in the mid-1970s, towards cultural heritage, identity politics, and demands for moral recognition, without irredentist claims. While the state has started to embrace some of their initiatives, the siege mentality cultivated by *pied-noir* associations has also discouraged many in subsequent generations from being active within them.

Political integration

Expellees and repatriates were peculiar migrants not least because they were equipped with full political rights. They constituted a not negligible portion of the national electorate and could access political parties and public posts. In contrast to groups of 'normal' migrants, they could thus not be ignored in the political process or by political parties and had an immediate impact on the political landscape. Part IV, 'Political Impact and Participation', sheds light on the ways expellees and repatriates changed the political landscapes in West Germany and France. While both groups are now often identified with certain positions or party affiliations, Frank Bösch's chapter on party membership among expellees in the FRG and Eric Savarese's analysis of repatriate voting behavior in France describe the political integration of both groups in their new homelands as protracted and ambivalent processes.

First, the chapters show that both groups were spread out on the political spectrum of established parties, especially during the first decades after their arrival. Due to their status as outsiders, expellees tended to join outsider parties (CDU/CSU in Protestant regions, SPD in rural areas) except the Communist Party, which, in their view, had been discredited by the Red Army and the GDR's recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. In a reaction to the foundation of an expellee party, the right-wing Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE) in 1950, Christian and Social Democrats established special sub-organizations in order to win the expellees over. Both parties took up the BdV's 'right to the homeland' claims and offered prominent expellee activists career opportunities, a competition that was still not entirely closed throughout the 1960s.

Likewise, the political leanings of French repatriates were heterogeneous and subject to historical change. Savarese rejects the still widespread belief in a uniform *pied-noir* vote as a powerful political myth that came up in the aftermath of the French municipal elections in 1977, when a prominent *pied-noir* association claimed to have organized a collective vote in Southern France. In contrast to the Vertriebene, the political choice of repatriates was not restricted by anti-communism, but by a fierce rejection of Gaullism, as they blamed de Gaulle for 'abandoning' French Algeria after they had put great hopes in his accession to power in 1958.

Second, the chapters demonstrate that a stronger affinity of the two groups (or at least of their recognizable representatives) for certain conservative or right-wing parties is a more recent phenomenon

and the result of a complicated process of political integration. Bösch's chapter thus challenges the conventional narrative that the Christian Democrats easily managed to integrate the expellees. While the SPD proved even more successful in recruiting expellee representatives in the beginning, Adenauer's CDU finally managed to integrate some of the most prominent ones. The New *Ostpolitik* under the Social-Liberal government, including the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line in 1970, further estranged expellee activists from the SPD. Hence, only in the 1970s did the CDU/CSU become their favored political party.

Public debates over the past decades have linked the *pied-noir* vote to a new right-wing formation, the National Front (FN, established in 1972). While, according to Savarese, the rise of the FN cannot be attributed to the impact of the *pied-noir* community and its alleged racism, the above-average proportion of FN voters among Pieds-Noirs calls for an explanation. While he does take socio-economic factors and the inherited rejection of Gaullism as a major conservative formation into account, Savarese proposes a model based on 'historical trauma' caused by the experience of everyday violence during the Algerian War and resulting in a psychological conflation of perpetrators of violence during the war and Maghrebin immigrants in France.

Third, the emergence of particular group-related parties remained a short-lived experience in both cases. To be sure, the expellee party BHE in 1950 did have an immediate impact on the West German political scene. Perceived as a special interest party that was well connected with the *Vertriebenenverbände*, it soon came to powerfully represent the expellees, entering the Bundestag in 1953 and Adenauer's coalition. Yet when the major parties, especially the CDU/CSU, became more engaged in recruiting expellee representatives and votes, the BHE ceased to be a major political force after a few years. The Pieds-Noirs did not found their own party until much later, in 1999, which had almost no impact on the political agenda. Both groups and their representatives preferred to pursue their interests in connection with more established political parties and by doing so, changed the political landscapes. While many expellee activists committed themselves to one party (the CDU/CSU) after an initial period of two or three decades, the Pieds-Noirs remained generally more flexible over time.

Memories – private, public, and political

Vertriebene and *Pieds-Noirs* not only constituted pressure groups with shared socio-economic interests and needs. They also conceived of themselves as communities whose members were bound together by

shared historical experience. Thus, memories referring to their lost 'homeland' and forced departure, the cultivation of a common heritage and vision of the past were constitutive of their cohesion as socio-political groups.⁶⁵ Expellee and repatriate memories took various forms and followed different patterns, depending on their contexts. While, for several decades, they were primarily cultivated in private or semi-private spaces, in the 1990s they began to spur fierce debates nationwide.⁶⁶ As Etienne François points out in the conclusion to this volume, it is in the sphere of these memories, and of the dynamics and cultural practices pertaining to these memories, that striking parallels and some connections between the two cases can be found.

Part V, 'Commemorative Practices and Emotions', compares the symbolic forms and practices of group memories and their role in constituting Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs as social communities. Tobias Weger in his chapter on forms of symbolic communication among German expellees from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Michèle Baussant in her chapter on pilgrimages as forms of *pied-noir* commemoration demonstrate that such memories have taken various shapes; they have been presented in a range of media from songs, semi-academic publications, and memoirs to homeland museums or private collections; and from monuments and street names to secular or religious ceremonies. In both cases, semi-public forms and spaces have played a major role in cultivating group memories. Notably, the various associations have formed, in Baussant's words, 'a vigorous wellspring of shared memory'. The borders between these semi-public spaces of commemoration and private and broader public spheres are porous and not clearly drawn. While some practices, such as the 'homeland corners' described by Weger, are to be found in family homes as well, the group commemorations can also reverberate within the national or even international public sphere. Due to the inherent irredentism of *Heimatpolitik*, the cultivation of memories of the 'East' has been as politically explosive.

The role the state and public authorities have played in the cultivation of the two groups' cultural heritage varies considerably: *pied-noir* commemorations tend to reflect a fraught relationship with political and religious authorities; the West German Law on Refugees and Exiles of 1953, by contrast, provides the Vertriebene with the legal right to state-supported preservation and promotion of their cultural heritage. While the 'post-Algerian' French state sought to keep the repatriates 'invisible' by rapidly integrating them socio-economically, the FRG arranged to sustain expellees' visibility.⁶⁷

As is true of all forms of public remembrance, expellee and *pied-noir* memory cultures are based on the use of certain material objects and rituals. In their chapters, Weger and Baussant highlight the overwhelming importance of everyday objects and practices, such as regional foods, or specific secular or religious festivities, from the lost 'homeland'. The 'forced migration' of these objects and practices to their new homelands rendered them media of memory, as well as means to create 'extraterritorial spaces' (Baussant). Such spaces are centered on nostalgic reconstructions of the lost homeland, often depicted as an everyday idyll. With the homeland at their center, these forms of commemoration also function as a repository of a specific vision of the past, which, to different degrees, evolves into a counter-history against 'official' representations of earlier days. Thus, in various instances and especially during the first postwar decades, ideas, ideologies, and symbols from former periods persisted in expellee memorial culture, with associations' using symbols from the Holy Roman Empire or the Nazi period or pervasive negative stereotypes of Slavic peoples in descriptions of the 'East'. In a similar vein, *pied-noir* discourse tends to reproduce certain elements of colonial discourse, especially the 'pioneer tradition' (Savarese), depicting Algeria as being entirely a European (that is, French) creation. This colonial pioneer myth had already obtained full-fledged commemorative forms in interwar Algeria.⁶⁸ Given the French state's reluctance to stress public assistance for the repatriates, after 1962 a post-decolonization version of this narrative centering on the Pieds-Noirs' own achievements in resettling in the metropole was added.⁶⁹

Finally, while they may appear to be overtly politicized, as a means to underpin claims to the lost homelands, the forms of commemoration among Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs are still subject to very different uses, interests, and emotions – from outright revanchism to private mourning. As Baussant points out with regard to *pied-noir* pilgrimages in France, a decidedly religious and not primarily political practice may ironically help to sustain overtly political counter-narratives.

The various similarities between expellee and repatriate commemoration call for further research comparing them to other forms of migrant cultures. While there will be many intriguing points of comparison to other groups of migrants, especially among victims of all kinds of involuntary migration, both groups have gained particular prominence in recent debates about national commemoration in both countries. Part VI, 'Politics of Remembrance', analyzes this international 'memory

boom' since the 1990s and the contexts, forms, actors, and conflicts of publicly commemorating these groups.

In the chapter on Germany, Stefan Troebst focuses on the main bone of contention in the domestic as well as the international arena, the project of a national museum of expulsion(s). Jan C. Jansen's chapter on the French case identifies the different arenas, actors, and dynamics that mark the conflict-ridden transformation of the end of French Algeria and its aftermath from an object of semi-public and rather low-scale commemoration to a topic of national significance. Both chapters make clear that in France as well as in Germany, these public controversies and commemorative activities since the 1990s are to be seen in the light of broader discussions that revisit and reassess national histories and identities. National (German reunification, generational change among politicians, migration, and so on) and international transformations (the end of the Cold War, European unification, and transnationalization of Holocaust memory, for example) alike provide the backdrop to these debates.

In the years following 1945 and 1962 respectively, the West German and the French state pursued diverging strategies with regard to the memory of the two groups. While the early FRG actively promoted the commemoration and academic study of 'expulsion' and 'incorporation',⁷⁰ the French state was long hesitant to venture into this field. Fueled by the alleged duty to remedy a collective 'oblivion' or 'taboo', both states have, since the 1990s, engaged in similar debates about the creation of official sites of national memory surrounding expellees and repatriates.

At the same time, expellee and *pied-noir* associations sought to influence these national debates, lobbying for lasting commemorative forms of national recognition and using their connections with the political class. While German public controversies focused around the project of a national Center Against Expulsion brought forth by the BdV in 2000, the French public witnessed several ambitious *pied-noir*-related projects, including national monuments, a national overseas museum, and the well-known French law on colonialism of 2005 that was meant, among other things, to convey a positive image of French colonialism in school teaching. Both chapters also emphasize the limitations of these forms of memory lobbying. What was possible in the local and semi-public space of association-run commemoration encountered a wider audience and opposition on the national – and international – levels. The BdV's project did not materialize but was replaced by several national and international projects that put the topic of flight and expulsion into

a European context. Even worse for *pied-noir* activists, most of their initiatives for national recognition have not been realized at all, leading to further radicalization among certain subgroups.

Despite the obvious parallels, there remain at least four significant differences between the two cases as described by Troebst and Jansen. First, the discursive field in which the Pieds-Noirs' case is being debated appears to be less focused and less clearly confined than the German discussions. Memory lobbying in the case of the German expellees has been concentrated on the moment of expulsion and their official recognition as victims. While some of their actors tend to obscure the context of National Socialism and German occupation in Eastern Europe, the history of the Third Reich and World War II are not subject to discussion in themselves. In the Pieds-Noirs' case, by contrast, their commemorative activities merge seamlessly into a much larger context. They are closely intertwined with struggles surrounding decolonization as a whole and even the past before repatriation, that is, a debate about the colonial past, which was particularly intense for Algeria but also difficult for the colonial empire as a whole.

Second, the subject of French 'colonial memories' has become a public arena in which an increasing number of social groups with diverging interests and visions of the past interact. While the Vertriebene do not act in complete isolation from their social, political, and media environment any more than the French do, the latter case is particularly complicated in that it involves social groups with very different visions of the (colonial) past, such as former anti-colonial activists or (other) migrant societies. This multitude of actors has given the French state much less room for maneuver to the point that most ambitious projects so far have failed.

Third, the colonial past and its remembrance in France have become a sort of frame of reference, a background against which social and political problems and conflicts of present-day society such as racism and discrimination are described and carried out. In Germany, this has been generally less the case. Only in very few instances has the history of the expulsion been used in current political discourse, most recently in the debates about the increased inflow of refugees into Germany in 2015.⁷¹

Fourth, the international arena has had an important impact on the German and French controversies. Both Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs have couched their memory lobbying in terms of victimization, drawing largely on international or transnational patterns of Holocaust commemoration since the 1980s. In both cases, initiatives for

national recognition have been followed and criticized in other countries, mainly in Poland and Algeria, and have led to diplomatic tensions. Yet, while growing exchange among Germany, Poland, and other Central European states and their civil societies seems to have paved the way to a 'transition from a divided to a shareable – if not shared – memory of the flight and expulsion of the German populations' (François), forms of international collaboration have not materialized in the Franco-Algerian case. Yet, even in the case of the expulsions, the balance between expellee lobbies, academia, and international cooperation proves fragile, as the recent conflicts over the directorship of the 'Federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation' in Berlin illustrate.

While 'flight and expulsion' and the 'exodus' of Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs have been remembered extensively, the integration of these groups in postwar Germany and France has not. Myths have obscured how conflicted and protracted this process of assimilation actually was. Fictions of national unity and ethnic homogeneity have disguised the cultural differences and diversity that these two groups brought to the two postwar societies, which were further augmented by concomitant or subsequent immigrants who were not considered an integral part of the national community. Such myths were the driving forces of the remarkable integration efforts in Germany and France vis-à-vis these peculiar groups of migrants. After post-1945 Germany and post-1962 France had integrated them successfully overall, the multiculturalism Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs brought in faded into the background and was no longer seen as a quintessential feature of a society shaped by immigration. Rather, both groups came to be regarded as individual cases, as byproducts of specific national histories, marked by recognizable peculiarities, oddities, and some privileges.

This volume challenges the very idea that Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs are to be considered incomparable and singular entities. By subjecting their histories to a systematic comparison, it becomes clear that 'nationalization' and 'singularization' are an essential part of their status as a peculiar group of migrants. While building on the fruits of the most recent and innovative scholarship in both fields, this comparison is but a first foray into a still unknown terrain. Rather than closing a debate or taking stock, one of its main purposes is to open the discussion and to illustrate the benefits of thinking outside the box of our established categories.

Our comparison thus seeks to generate new questions on each of the cases (or both). It aims to stimulate new comparative perspectives of other cases of 'peculiar' or 'regular' migrants. It calls for further

research into the specific conditions and transformations of the post-1945 European states and the coincidence of processes of renationalization and supranational integration. It emphasizes the coexistence of different migration regimes and their complicated interactions with expanding (and later contracting) welfare states, the entanglements of which are not yet fully understood. It underscores the need to rethink, refine, and complicate the established typologies of migration theory. And, last but not least, it sheds light on how much both nation-states, under different conditions and with varying levels of success, were willing and able to do for the integration of (certain) migrants, even as they grappled, and continue to grapple, with the challenges of being major destinations for immigrants and refugees.

Notes

1. Ceri Peach, 'Postwar Migration to Europe: Reflux, Influx, Refuge', *Social Science Quarterly*, 78(2) (1997): 269–83; Andrea L. Smith, 'Introduction', in Andrea L. Smith, ed., *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam, 2003), 9–31, 29.
2. Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Michael Schwartz, *Ethnische 'Säuberungen' in der Moderne: Globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2013); Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe* (New York, 2014).
3. With regard to Germany, we can build on a considerable body of literature. For a general survey of the economic, social, and political integration of the refugees and expellees in West Germany in English, see Ian Connor, *Refugees and Expellees in Post-War Germany* (Manchester, 2007). On integration processes of the repatriates in France, see Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris, 2010).
4. Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, 2002), 499.
5. See Mark Mazower, Jessica Reinisch and David Feldman, eds, *Post-War Reconstruction in Europe: International Perspectives, 1945–1949* (Oxford, 2011); Dan Stone, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History* (Oxford, 2012).
6. David Blackbourn, 'Das Kaiserreich transnational: Eine Skizze', in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds, *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen, 2004), 302–24; Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, 2010), 144–202; Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009); Manuel Borutta, 'Nach der Méditerranée: Frankreich, Algerien und das Mittelmeer', *Neue Politische Literatur*, 56(3) (2011): 405–26; Gregor Thum, 'Megalomania and Angst: The Nineteenth-Century Mythicization of Germany's Eastern Borderlands', in Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds, *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the*

- German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington, 2013), 42–60.
7. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London, 2005), 303. With regard to West Germany, one may argue that the insistence on the borders of 1937 was all but post-imperial. Yet the way the FRG perceived its role in the international arena was considerably less aggressive than German *Weltpolitik* in the decades before; see Johannes Paulmann, *Die Haltung der Zurückhaltung: Auswärtige Selbstdarstellungen nach 1945 und die Suche nach einem erneuerten Selbstverständnis in der Bundesrepublik* (Bremen, 2006).
 8. With regard to West Germany, see Mathias Beer, *Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen: Voraussetzungen, Verlauf, Folgen* (Munich, 2011), 122; Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge* (Munich, 2001), 195; Werner Abelshausen, *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (Bonn, 2011), 293–5, 320–4; Gerald Ambrosius, ‘Der Beitrag der deutschen Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge zum Wachstum der westdeutschen Wirtschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 37(2) (1996): 39–71. On the French case, Pierre Baillet, ‘L’intégration des rapatriés d’Algérie en France’, *Population*, 30(2) (1975): 303–14, here 307; Anthony Rowley, ‘La réinsertion économique des rapatriés’, in Jean-Pierre Rioux, ed., *La guerre d’Algérie et les Français* (Paris, 1990), 348–52. In economics, the German expellees have recently become an important case in the study of the long-term economic impact of (forced) migration; see, for example, Isabel Ruiz and Carlos Vargas-Silva, ‘The Economics of Forced Migration’, *Journal of Development Studies*, 49(6) (2013): 772–84.
 9. Figures from Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Munich, 2008), 100; Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 300, 350. See Lutz Wiegand, *Der Lastenausgleich in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1985* (Frankfurt, 1992).
 10. Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2014), 651–7; Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 300, 398.
 11. Chris Pierson and Matthieu Leimgruber, ‘Intellectual Roots’, in Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State* (Oxford, 2010), 32–44, 43.
 12. Hartmut Kaelble, *Kalter Krieg und Wohlfahrtsstaat: Europa 1945–1989* (Munich, 2011).
 13. See Beer, *Flucht und Vertreibung*, 116, 118–19, 122–3, 126.
 14. Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 333, 338.
 15. Klaus J. Bade, *Migration in European History* (Malden, 2003); Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, 519–20.
 16. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, ‘Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives’, in Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, eds, *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Bern, 3rd edn, 2005), 9–38, here 11.
 17. For comprehensive approaches, see Dirk Hoerder, ‘Migrations and Belongings’, in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed., *A World Connecting, 1870–1945*, *History of the World 5* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 433–89 and Bade, *Migration*; for Germany, see Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik*.

18. On this debate, see Margrit Pernau, *Transnationale Geschichte* (Göttingen, 2009), 30–5.
19. Marc Bloch, 'Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes' [1928], in Marc Bloch, *Mélanges historiques*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1963), 16–40.
20. Mathias Beer, 'Die französische Besatzungszone in Deutschland als Aufnahmegebiet für deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhaussen, and Stefan Troebst, eds, *Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 2010), 252–5.
21. Claus Leggewie, *Kofferträger: Das Algerien-Projekt der Linken im Adenauer-Deutschland* (Berlin, 1984); Patrice G. Poutrus, 'An den Grenzen des proletarischen Internationalismus. Algerische Flüchtlinge in der DDR', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 55(2) (2007): 162–78.
22. In his preface to Hans W. Schoenberg, *Germans from the East: A Study of their Migration, Resettlement, and Subsequent Group History since 1945* (The Hague, 1970), viii–ix, the political scientist Alfred Grosser claims that after the loss of Algeria in 1962, the French 'wished to know just how the Germans, who had had to absorb many millions of people, had been so successful. Even so, however, France could not fully appreciate the German effort, because, given the favorable conditions of the French economy at the time, the reception of French from Algeria proceeded with relative ease, and did not call for such critical measures as the "equalization of burdens" policy in a devastated Germany.' Yet Grosser gives no evidence for a French wish to learn from the Germans.
23. See Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, 'Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History', in Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, eds, *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York, 2010), 1–30.
24. Johannes-Dieter Steinert, 'Die große Flucht und die Jahre danach: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in den vier Besatzungszonen', in Hans-Erich Volkmann, ed., *Ende des Dritten Reiches – Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs: Eine perspektivische Rückschau* (Munich, 1995), 557–79, 561.
25. On these figures, see Beer, *Flucht und Vertreibung*, 127–34; Jean-Jacques Jordi, *Un silence d'Etat: les disparus civils européens de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris, 2011).
26. See Ruediger Overmans, 'Personelle Verluste der deutschen Bevölkerung durch Flucht und Vertreibung', *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 26(2) (1994): 51–65.
27. On the different phases and destinations of the refugees' and expellees' migration, see Bernadetta Nitschke, *Vertreibung und Aussiedlung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus Polen 1945 bis 1949* (Munich, 2003).
28. R. M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven, 2012); Detlef Brandes, *Der Weg zur Vertreibung 1938–1945: Pläne und Entscheidungen zum 'Transfer' der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und aus Polen* (Munich, 2001).
29. See Jean-Jacques Jordi, *De l'exode à l'exil: rapatriés et Pieds-Noirs en France* (Paris, 1993); Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 132–8.
30. For good general surveys of the war and its impact on France, see Sylvie Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris, 2005); Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford, 2012); Raphaëlle Branche

- and Sylvie Thénault, eds, *La France en guerre 1954–1962: expériences métropolitaines de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris, 2008).
31. Beer, *Flucht und Vertreibung*, 28–9.
 32. Philipp Ther, 'Imperial instead of National History: Positioning Modern German History on the Map of European Empires', in Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber, eds, *Imperial Rule* (Budapest, 2004), 47–66; Edward Ross Dickinson, 'The German Empire: An Empire?', *History Workshop*, 66(1) (2008): 129–62; Róisín Healy, 'From Commonwealth to Colony? Poland under Prussia', in Róisín Healy and Enrico del Lago, eds, *The Shadow of Colonialism on Europe's Modern Past* (Basingstoke, 2014), 109–25.
 33. Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922* (Ithaca, 2010).
 34. Richard Evans, *The Third Reich at War 1939–1945* (London, 2008), 173–4; Isabel Heinemann, 'Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut': *Das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas* (Göttingen, 2003). On *Volksdeutsche*, see Isabel Heinemann, 'Ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) in the German Reich and in German-Occupied Territories in World War II', in Klaus J. Bade, Pieter C. Emmer, Leo Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer, eds, *The Encyclopedia of European Migration and Minorities: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present* (Cambridge, 2011), 359–62.
 35. For comprehensive accounts, see Abderrahmane Bouchène, Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, Ouanassa Siari Tengour, and Sylvie Thénault, eds, *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale (1830–1962)* (Paris and Algiers, 2012); John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington, 2nd edn, 2005).
 36. Andrea L. Smith, 'Citizenship in the Colony: Naturalization Law and Legal Assimilation in 19th Century Algeria', *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 19(1) (1996): 33–49.
 37. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*; Ther, *The Dark Side*; Schwartz, *Säuberungen*.
 38. Smith, *Invisible Migrants*; Jean-Louis Miège, ed., *L'Europe retrouvée: les migrations de la décolonisation* (Paris, 1994); Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen, and Gert Oostindie, eds, *Postcolonial Migrants and Identity Politics: Europe, Russia, Japan, and the United States in Comparison* (New York, 2012).
 39. Mathias Beer, 'Flüchtlinge – Ausgewiesene – Neubürger – Heimatvertriebene: Flüchtlingspolitik und Flüchtlingsintegration in Deutschland nach 1945, begriffsgeschichtlich betrachtet', in Mathias Beer, Martin Kintzinger, and Marita Krauss, eds, *Migration and Integration: Aufnahme und Eingliederung im historischen Wandel* (Stuttgart, 1997), 145–66, here 157, 162.
 40. Scioldo-Zücher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 91–4.
 41. See Beer, 'Flüchtlinge', 165.
 42. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization in France: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, 2006), 101–35.
 43. Michèle Assante and Odile Plaisante, 'Origine et enjeu de la dénomination "pied-noir"', *Langage et société*, 60 (1992): 49–65.
 44. Dierk Hoffmann and Michael Schwartz, eds, *Geglückte Integration? Spezifika und Vergleichbarkeiten der Vertriebenen-Eingliederung in der SBZ/DDR* (Munich, 1999); Michael Schwartz, *Vertriebene und 'Umsiedlerpolitik': Integrationskonflikte in den deutschen Nachkriegs-Gesellschaften und die Assimilationsstrategien in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1961* (Munich, 2004).

45. In the German case, this holds particularly true to the expellees from the former Eastern territories and to some degree to the Sudeten Germans. It does not apply to the case of the *Volksdeutsche*, Germans settled in territory occupied by the German army.
46. For certain subgroups, the process of granting citizenship could take several years. *Sudetendeutsche* had to wait until 1955; *Baltendeutsche* were also discriminated legally. See Pertti Ahonen, 'Reflections on Forced Migrations: Transnational Realities and National Narratives in Post-1945 (West) Germany', *German History*, 32(4) (2014): 599–614, 606.
47. For overviews of such twentieth-century 'un-mixing' processes in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean respectively, see Rogers Brubaker, 'Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative Perspectives', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 18(2) (1995): 189–218; Jan C. Jansen, 'Unmixing the Mediterranean? Migration, demographische "Entmischung" und Globalgeschichte', in Boris Barth, Stefanie Gänger, and Niels P. Petersson, eds, *Globalgeschichten: Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven* (Frankfurt, 2014), 291–313.
48. Peach, 'Postwar Migration'.
49. For a close examination of different degrees of coercion, see Andrea L. Smith, 'Coerced or Free? Considering Post-colonial Returns', in Richard Bessel and Claudia Haake, eds, *Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World* (Oxford, 2009), 395–414.
50. Mathias Beer, 'Symbolische Politik? Entstehung, Aufbau und Funktion des Bundesministeriums für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte', in Jochen Oltmer, ed., *Migration steuern und verwalten: Deutschland vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Osnabrück, 2003), 295–322; Valérie Esclanon-Morin, *Les rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours* (Paris, 2007).
51. 'Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge (Bundesvertriebenengesetz BfVG) vom 19. Mai 1953', *Bundesgesetzblatt* 1953, Part I, 22 May 1953: 201–31.
52. *Journal Officiel de la République Française [JORF]*, *Lois et Décrets*, 28 December 1961: 11996.
53. See the important comparisons in Jasna Čapo Žmegač, 'Ethnically Privileged Migrants in Their New Homelands', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 18(2) (2005): 199–215; Rainer Ohliger, 'Privileged Migrants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands: Return Migrants, Repatriates, and Expellees after 1945', in Hanna Schissler and Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, eds, *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition* (New York, 2005), 35–60.
54. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Patrick Weil, *How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789* (Durham, 2008); Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds, *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Stanford, 2008); Annemarie Sammartino, 'After Brubaker: Citizenship in Modern Germany, 1848 to Today', *German History*, 27(3) (2009): 581–99.
55. Bessel and Haake, *Removing Peoples*; Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee, eds, *Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke, 2011); Pertti Ahonen, Gustavo Corni, Jerzy Kochanowski, Rainer Schulze, Tamás Stark, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *People*

- on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and Its Aftermath (Oxford, 2008); Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White, eds, *The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion and Displacement in Post-War Europe, 1944–9* (London, 2011); Smith, *Invisible Migrants*; Miège, *Europe retrouvée*; Bosma et al., *Postcolonial Migrants*.
56. Blackbourn, 'Kaiserreich', 323–4.
 57. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, 2010), chapter 13.
 58. Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation: Das Ende der Imperien* (Munich, 2013), 117–18.
 59. See, for example, Stephen Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2002), 9–34.
 60. Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Stephen Castles, 'Migration, Minorities, and Welfare States', in Christopher Pierson, Francis G. Castles, and Ingela K. Naumann, eds, *The Welfare State Reader* (Cambridge, 3rd edn, 2014), 254–72, 257.
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 64. Michael Schwartz, *Funktionäre mit Vergangenheit: Das Gründungspräsidium des Bundes der Vertriebenen und das 'Dritte Reich'* (Munich, 2013).
 65. See Eva Hahn and Hans-Henning Hahn, *Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythen, Geschichte* (Paderborn, 2010); Andrew Demshuk, *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970* (Cambridge, 2012); Stephan Scholz, *Vertriebenen Denkmäler – Topographie einer deutschen Erinnerungslandschaft* (Paderborn, 2015); Joëlle Hureau, *La mémoire des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris, 2nd edn, 2010); Michèle Baussant, *Pieds-Noirs: mémoires d'exils* (Paris, 2002).
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 67. The term 'invisible migrant' is borrowed from Smith, *Invisible Migrants*.
 68. Jan C. Jansen, *Erobern und Erinnern: Symbolpolitik, öffentlicher Raum und französischer Kolonialismus in Algerien, 1830–1950* (Munich, 2013), 241–332.
 69. Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 391.

70. 'Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte', ed., *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa*, 5 vols. (Bonn, 1953–63); Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, eds, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland: Ihre Eingliederung und ihr Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik und Geistesleben*, Preface by Theodor Oberländer, 3 vols. (Kiel, 1959).
71. On public debates as to what extent the fate of today's refugees is comparable to the expellees, see 'Beleidigung der Vertriebenen', 28 August 2015, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/umstrittene-aeusserung-von-joachim-herrmann-beleidigung-der-vertriebenen-1.2625337> (accessed 13 September 2015). Before these recent debates, Armin Laschet, former integration minister in North Rhine–Westphalia, has already used the history of the expellees as an argument for his migration and integration policy, characterizing West Germany after 1945 as an immigration society. See Armin Laschet, *Die Aufsteigerrepublik: Zuwanderung als Chance* (Cologne, 2009).

Part I

From Empire to Nation-State: 1945 and 1962

2

Legacies of *Lebensraum*: German Identity and Multi-Ethnicity

Shelley Baranowski

Since the mid-1990s, historians of Germany have rediscovered ‘empire’ as a category of analysis that permits a deeper exploration of the multiple meanings of ‘Germany’ and its territorial fluctuations over time. They have looked especially closely at the maritime empire of the Second German Empire from 1884 to 1918, its impact on German identity, its earlier roots, and its relevance to subsequent periods in German history. Although research and debate on the imperialism of the *Kaiserreich* continues to thrive, German aspirations to a continental European empire inspired in part by the German migrations eastward from the Holy Roman Empire during the Middle Ages have received increased attention. As David Blackbourn argued recently, *Mitteleuropa*, or alternatively *Osteuropa*, was as important to Germans as India was to Great Britain and Algeria to France. Compared to the desire to colonize the ‘East’, Imperial Germany’s short-lived ‘blue water’ empire paled in significance.¹ Not surprisingly, the need to assess the Nazi regime’s murderous *Drang nach Osten*, its continuities and ruptures with earlier imperial imaginings, contribute to this trend. Yet if the defeat of Nazism ended German expansionism, the ‘East’ left its traces in the forced migrations of ethnic Germans to what remained of the Reich. The destruction of the Nazi empire and the rediscovery of past precedents to cope with defeat shaped the most critical issue that the postwar Germans had to confront as postcolonial societies: who indeed was ‘German’?

Empire and its demise

After 1900, visions of a new German empire became central to the nationalist imagination. Radical nationalists, such as Heinrich Class and Alfred Hugenberg, aspired to a revitalized imperium as a bulwark against

foreign intervention and as a home for Germans dispersed throughout east central and southeastern Europe. In their eyes, the Bismarckian unification in 1871 was just the beginning, a foundation for further expansion as far as Constantinople and the Black Sea. Not only would the enlarged empire embrace the Germans of continental Europe, it would also encourage the return of those who had emigrated to the Americas. Together, they would bring German *Kultur* to the barbarous Slavs.² The Second Empire never realized those ambitions despite its formidable economic and military power and its possessions in Africa, the Pacific, and coastal China. Its defeat in World War I caused the dissolution of the Hohenzollern monarchy, a significant loss of territory and population, and the confiscation of its overseas empire. Millions of Germans, including those in Prussian territories ceded to Poland, remained outside Germany's borders.

For many Germans, the Weimar Republic symbolized defeat and foreign domination. Yet the memory of German military's huge, if temporary, gains at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 at the expense of the Soviet Union, the *Freikorps'* campaigns in the Baltic in 1919, the Germans 'stranded' in the successor states of former empires, and the dread of Slavs and Jews magnified by the Bolshevik Revolution, reinvigorated and radicalized the dream of expansion. The Third Reich did not simply aspire to link German communities and 'civilize' non-Germans. Rather as embodied in its 'General Plan East', which built upon ideas first considered during World War I, it imagined new colonies of racially-selected Germans resettled throughout Europe to assure the economic modernization and biological revitalization of the *Volk*. Aside from identifying indigenous peoples with German blood in an attempt to recover the residues of the German colonization of the Middle Ages, and dragooning those among the rest capable of work, the Third Reich strove to remove or eliminate Polish and Soviet Slavs and especially millions of Jews. A nightmare of resettlement and genocide testified to the Third Reich's most distinctive and contradictory ambition: the creation of an empire defined by racial homogeneity. In part the multicultural and less hierarchical imperial models of postwar European powers – especially France – testified to the delegitimization of overt racism after Nazism.³

United by the scale of Nazi imperialism, the 'Grand Alliance' destroyed the Third Reich. The occupation and division of Germany, the dissolution of Prussia, the flight or expulsion of some twelve million ethnic Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Balkans, and the emergence of two blocs dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States, altered the geography that sustained previous visions

of empire. Germany's losses exceeded those of the Great War. In addition to its civilian and military casualties, the contraction of its eastern borders to the Oder and Neisse Rivers resulted in the loss of forty percent of its interwar territory as of 1937 before the Nazi annexations of Austria and the Sudetenland. Unlike France, which sought to preserve its empire in the belief that it sustained the Free French contribution to the Allied victory, a German empire was no longer feasible in light of postwar realities.⁴

The two German states that emerged in 1949 with the onset of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), broke with Nazism by officially rejecting imperialism. Each established democracies, the one liberal, the other socialist. No longer the site of German unity and revival, the 'East' now meant the catastrophe of defeat and for West Germany the nightmare of communism. Yet an important legacy survived, the imagined community of German 'tribes'; a conception embedded in earlier visions of uniting a dispersed and divided people now reinforced by the Allied agreement to the 'transfer' of Germans from outside the Reich to what remained of Germany. Although the GDR's socialist citizen would signify a different standard for belonging, the FRG's commitment to descent as the defining criterion for citizenship would ultimately prevail. Because the FRG was the stronger and more prosperous of the two, it became a magnet for dissatisfied East Germans in the 1950s before the GDR closed its borders and especially in the late 1980s as the GDR dissolved.

Past precedents and present imperatives: ethnicity and expellees in the two Germanys

The huge Nazi resettlement schemes and the subsequent defeat of the Third Reich brought disaster to the German diaspora, some communities of which extended back 700 years. Whether previously uprooted by Nazism, fleeing the Red Army as the Third Reich crumbled, or evicted by postwar governments, German refugees trekked westward. Like the Algerian Pieds-Noirs, they personified the humiliating end to a vicious colonial war and the uncertain prospects of integration upon their 'return' to an unfamiliar metropole.⁵ As well as meeting Stalin's demand that Soviet boundaries extend westward, the Allies sanctioned the population 'transfers' to eliminate the foundations of Prussian militarism, compensate Eastern European nations for their suffering under the German occupation, and prevent a recurrence of the minority conflicts

that bedeviled the interwar successor states. In fact, the migration of Germans belonged to a broader context made worse by the war that Nazi Germany unleashed, the 'unmixing of peoples' in the Eurasian 'shatter zone' since the 1870s, which resulted from the ethnicizing and nationalizing of imperial subjects.⁶ Now the effort to create homogeneous nation-states, be they of Soviet occupiers, local postwar governments, or the western Allies, sent Germans packing.⁷ Yet unable to handle the millions of stateless people who overwhelmed their resources, occupation authorities left local German leaders to contend with the new arrivals.

The three western Allied zones that became the FRG absorbed nearly three-quarters of the expellees. In accepting responsibility for Nazism's ruthless population policies, the FRG's Basic Law granted asylum to persecuted foreigners and overturned the Nuremberg Laws that limited full citizenship to 'Aryans'. Moreover, it conferred citizenship on German refugees, who qualified according to the Imperial and Weimar precedent of *jus sanguinis*, or law of descent. It promised the 'right of return' to those who remained outside the FRG, including those in the GDR. Thus the FRG dissolved the Third Reich's distinction between *Reichsdeutsche*, that is Germans with Reich citizenship, and *Volksdeutsche*, ethnic Germans from beyond the Reich's borders who had not previously held Reich citizenship.⁸ It provided the common denominator of descent to incorporate what were in fact diverse peoples divided by region, cultural traditions, and historical experience.

However, descent was not automatically reducible to ethnicity, for according to Imperial and Weimar law immigrants (with difficulty) could become citizens after several generations of residence. Yet because it was crucial to nationalizing millions of Germans, it would discourage the acceptance and integration of 'others'.⁹ In essence the politics of citizenship expressed the myth of a common German 'victimhood' attributed not to National Socialism but to the Allies. Hence the term 'expellee' depicted passive recipients of the actions of others. It covered those whom National Socialism 'resettled', refugees from the Soviet advance, and Germans ousted by 'wild' or government-initiated expulsions. Like Reich Germans victimized by Allied bombing, 'expellees' also suffered simply by being German.¹⁰

To be sure, eligibility for citizenship belied the rocky reception that many newcomers experienced. The competition for food, housing, and initially jobs incurred the resentment of residents. The seeming strangeness of the new arrivals prompted resident Germans to disparage them as 'foreigners', 'Poles', or 'gypsies'.¹¹ To contain the social and

political problems that expellees presented, which included the fear that their regional and national lobbies would form an extra parliamentary opposition, the Christian Democratic-led government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer offered economic as well as legal security.

The Equalization of Burdens Act of 1952 taxed residents who had survived the war relatively unscathed to compensate expellees, prisoners of war, widows, orphans, and victims of persecution or material destruction.¹² Social and economic inequality persisted between newcomers and 'natives', and some expellees departed for the USA and Canada. Nevertheless, monetary compensation, the government's courtship of expellees, and the West German 'Economic Miracle', persuaded most to see their future in West Germany.¹³ To neutralize expellee organizations, many of them representing Germans from the former Prussian east, and to exploit the provisional status of the Oder–Neisse boundary as stipulated at the Potsdam Conference, the Adenauer government advocated a reunified Germany that returned to its 1937 borders before the Nazi annexations of Austria and the Sudetenland.¹⁴

At the founding of the German Democratic Republic and its incorporation into the Soviet Bloc, the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) quickly moved to assimilate East Germany's four million expellees with promises of a standard of living equal to that of residents. To fulfill its commitment to erasing social and cultural distinctions between natives and newcomers, the GDR instituted a modest restitution program and interest-free loans. By settling most of its newcomers in rural areas, the SED combined two critical tasks; redistributing the property of large estate owners, and resettling ethnic Germans to underpopulated regions.¹⁵

Unlike the CDU-led West Germany, which provided space for expellees to express their distinctiveness, the SED prohibited expellee organizations and discouraged the public discussion of their double trauma, displacement and the subordination of their homelands to communist rule. Indeed, the GDR used the term 'resettlers' to describe the newcomers rather than 'expellees' because the latter contradicted the myth of the Red Army as 'liberator'. In 1950, the SED formally ratified the Oder–Neisse line and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia as the justifiable consequence of the Nazi regime's criminality.¹⁶ In yet another significant departure from the FRG, the GDR's criteria for citizenship separated Germanness from descent. Although in practice birth conferred citizenship on most, socialist rights and responsibilities and a new vision of the nation as a 'socialist *Heimat*' defined the GDR citizen (*Bürger*).¹⁷

Contrary to the SED's 'totalitarian' reputation, clandestine subcultures of refugees and expellees pushed back against the SED's prohibitions despite being subjected to extensive surveillance. The arts and especially literature provided an opening through which the distinctive experiences of 'resettlers' and their meaning could be expressed.¹⁸ Yet the GDR's determination to render the expulsions invisible to public memory encouraged many 'resettlers' to move once more, this time to the Federal Republic. Neither undercapitalized restitution through land reform, nor a standard of living that lagged behind that of other East Germans, nor the state's unwillingness to acknowledge the pain of its 'new citizens' encouraged expellees to accept their lot. Thousands fled to the relative openness and prosperity of West Germany before the GDR closed its borders, in effect legitimatizing the FRG's exclusive claim to represent Germandom.

Throughout the Adenauer era, the West German government insisted upon the renegotiation of the Oder–Neisse line and the return of the 'lost' territories in the east. Despite suspicions of Adenauer's well-known anti-Prussianism and his unambiguous Atlanticist foreign policy, Adenauer wanted the restoration of the former Prussian territories and went so far as to imagine a reunited Germany's 'peaceful' colonization of the 'East' in the manner of the Teutonic Knights.¹⁹ The influence of expellee organizations and especially their national umbrella, the Federation of Expellees (BdV) was considerable, for it reinforced the government's refusal to recognize the outcomes of the Cold War and overrode the pressure from business and center-left constituencies to improve the FRG's relations with its eastern neighbors.²⁰

In a similar vein, the Hallstein Doctrine, which refused diplomatic relations to nations that recognized the GDR, denied the GDR's legitimacy and reinforced the FRG's claim to exclusive representation.²¹ In fact, neither Adenauer's pipe dream of colonizing the 'East' nor even the 'modest' goal of a reunited Germany with its 1937 borders, which no Weimar nationalist would have accepted, was achievable. If the Allies at Potsdam saw the Oder–Neisse boundary as 'temporary' pending a final settlement, the breakdown of the 'Grand Alliance' ensured the de facto sovereignty of Poland and the Soviet Union over former Prussian territory.

By the mid-1960s, two developments forced a change in West German policy, beginning with the full recognition that the Western Allies would not seriously challenge the Cold War divide. The unwillingness of the United States, the strongest of the Allies, to intervene in the East German workers' uprising in 1953 and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 should

have been the handwriting on the wall. Yet the GDR's decision in August 1961 to enclose West Berlin with a wall and barbed wire and shut down the last escape hatch to the FRG with little more than verbal condemnations from the West, ended months of inter-Allied conflict over the city's status.²²

Moreover, recovering the 'lost homelands' became less important to the West German public at large and even to refugees and expellees themselves.²³ Nostalgic commemorations that celebrated provincial and regional identities allowed many to assuage the pain of their loss, while reports of conditions in the homelands, often cast in anti-Slavic stereotypes of ruination, persuaded exiles that they could never return. 'Homesick tours' to former German territory in Poland further confirmed the irreversibility of their departure. Indeed for Germans who remained behind after the initial migrations, going 'home' meant seeking a better life in West Germany rather than remaining as minorities in hostile and radically transformed environments.²⁴

Such shifts in thinking accompanied Adenauer's retirement in 1963, the waning of CDU rule, and in 1969 the ascendancy of the Social Democratic-Liberal Democratic coalition under its chancellor Willy Brandt. Recognizing that a future reunification could not occur without accepting the Oder-Neisse line, Brandt concluded treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland in 1972 that acknowledged the boundary as 'inviolable'. In addition to the FRG's de facto recognition of the GDR in the same year, thus burying the Hallstein Doctrine, a treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1973 nullified the 1938 Munich agreement, the most notorious episode in the prewar appeasement of Hitler.²⁵ Although the FRG recognized the Oder-Neisse and Czech-German boundaries as 'inviolable' rather than 'unconditional', a concession to the vehement opposition of expellee organizations, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* represented a major step toward accepting the territorial consequences of Hitler's war for *Lebensraum*. Yet another legacy of empire, the imagined ethnic bonds of Germanness, had yet to be confronted.

Problematic outsiders: occupying armies, Jews, and 'guest' workers

In West Germany the task of accommodating German refugees and expellees had been enormous, but the bestowal of citizenship, the public recognition of their plight, and a booming economy eased their integration. Although less successful than the FRG, the GDR's version of citizenship sought to unite residents and newcomers. Yet others who

populated the occupation zones after the defeat of the Third Reich, the German–Jewish remnant, Jewish displaced persons from Eastern Europe, and Allied soldiers, posed greater difficulties. Although Jews personified Nazism’s greatest crime and received offers of citizenship (or the restoration of it for German Jews) for that reason, pervasive anti-Semitism encouraged most to emigrate.

In West Germany the Jewish community numbered only 25,000 by the end of the 1950s.²⁶ In the GDR, Jewish victims received recognition and restitution as ‘victims of fascism’, but the SED’s campaign against the ‘cosmopolitanism’ (foreignness) of its high-ranking Jewish members and its hostility to Israel forced Jews to emigrate or deny their Jewishness.²⁷ Allied soldiers and especially their offspring, starting with the children of women whom Soviet soldiers had raped, were stigmatized as ‘Mongols’ or ‘Russians’.²⁸ The children of German women and Black soldiers, especially African–American GIs, faced marginalization as youths, and social and economic discrimination as adults. Yet because Allied armies refused to acknowledge the paternity of their soldiers, the FRG and the GDR had little choice but to grant citizenship to ‘occupation children’.²⁹

Foreign workers, whom West Germany engaged to offset labor shortages, assumed a different status because they were never supposed to become citizens at all. Hired in response to the scarcity of German workers and to meet employers’ desire for a mobile workforce, the German states assumed that imported labor would be temporary. Thus between 1955 and 1973, the FRG recruited thousands of ‘guest’ workers from Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, and especially Turkey which in the latter case fulfilled the diplomatic objective of economic collaboration with a NATO ally.³⁰ With the later influx of spouses and children, the number of foreigners exceeded four million by the late 1970s. The GDR recruited ‘contract workers’ from Poland, Vietnam, Cuba, Mozambique, and Angola to fill the gap left by Germans who fled to the west. Like West Germany, the GDR’s program served a diplomatic purpose, in this case establishing fraternal ties with other socialist states.³¹ Yet the migration of foreign workers proved intractable over the long term because historical precedent and the terms of employment foreclosed the possibility of belonging.

The Federal Republic’s employment of foreign workers derived from Imperial and Prussian precedent, the recruitment of Polish seasonal laborers to replace Germans who migrated to the cities for better wages.³² In fact, the emphasis on descent in the 1913 Imperial citizenship law reflected the fear that Polish and Jewish migrants were

incapable of assimilation, and that migrant Poles especially encouraged the resistance of Prussian Poles against Germanization.³³ Given two-year contracts, West German 'guest workers', that is foreigners without the right to naturalization, lived in employer-owned barracks and later urban ghettos segregated from the native population, the domestic equivalent to their place on the shop floor as performers of tasks that Germans refused to do.³⁴

Problems arose, however, when corporate needs undermined the program's original intention. Because it cost more to train new workers every two years than to keep them as long as needed, employers pressed the government to allow the extension of contracts. By the mid-1960s, regional practices and court decisions resulted in the right of workers to change employers and for many the right to an extended residency. Family reunions contributed to the growth of the foreign population, despite the stoppage of the labor recruitment program in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis.³⁵

By the late 1970s, the evidence that the 'guest worker' program had evolved beyond its original intentions demanded a clarification of the place of foreign workers in West German society. The Social-Liberal coalition of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt proposed to eliminate the status of 'guest worker' and make foreign residents eligible for what he termed 'integration'. In rejecting the coalition's proposal, the CDU and its allies claimed that cultural differences between Germans and foreigners were unbridgeable, a position that hardened with the surge of nationalism that in 1982 accompanied its return to power. To be sure, a significant pro-immigration lobby, which developed outside the CDU-dominated corridors of power, began to have an impact by the late 1980s. Grassroots activists among Social Democrats, Greens, the churches, and foreign residents themselves, lobbied for citizenship reform, such that even prominent voices in the CDU and the Free Democrats, the parties most resistant to it, recognized the need for reform. Yet the barriers to naturalization embedded in social experience and German practice, the lengthy residency requirement, inconsistencies among the federal states in the willingness to naturalize, the lack of linguistic and cultural fluency in segregated conditions, and the inability to measure up to ethnocultural expectations, created formidable impediments to overcome.³⁶

Although less numerous in the GDR, foreign workers from other socialist countries, especially Vietnamese and Mozambicans, faced greater restrictions than in West Germany.³⁷ Despite its official adherence to 'socialist fraternalism', the GDR treated imported workers as

temporary stopgaps. Yet unlike in West Germany where foreigners gained freedom of movement and found housing outside the hostels once their families joined them (albeit in the poorer sections of cities), the East German government kept contract workers separate from the native population, organized them in homogeneous 'brigades', regulated their leisure time, and subjected them to Stasi surveillance. Although supposed to be paid the same wages as Germans for the same work, they usually took the lowest-paid jobs. To be sure, as the exodus of East Germans mounted in the late 1980s, the increasing demand for contract workers meant fewer limitations, so they could escape the hostels and control their leisure time. Vietnamese workers especially found a niche in the parallel economy making clothes for East Germans to compensate for the shortages and poor quality of manufactured goods.³⁸

Yet the 'temporary' status of foreigners and social reality itself worked against the acceptance of outsiders. Aside from the occasional friendly interactions with Germans, distance or hostility was more common. Attacks on foreigners became a way especially for young men to tout their 'unsocialist' nationalism and their anger at the GDR's economic and political failings. Racism against Africans was especially prevalent. Drawing upon stereotypes drawn from the Imperial Germany's pre-World War I overseas empire, East Germans described them as little as better than 'bushmen'.³⁹ With the SED's disintegration in 1989 and merger with West Germany the following year, the depth of antagonism toward foreigners became even more apparent.

Toward a new Germany: unification and the problem of diversity

The collapse of the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s ended the Cold War and enabled the unification of the two Germanys. Despite the concern of Germany's former enemies as to the united Germany's impact – its population and economy were one-third larger than those of their neighbors⁴⁰ – popular pressure proved irresistible. When the GDR opened its borders on 9 November 1989, East Germans demanded unification with the FRG as the route to political freedom and a higher standard of living. Other East Germans had already departed their country after Hungary opened its borders in the spring of 1989, flooding West Germany by the thousands.

After forty-five years without a permanent settlement to the German question, the Allies collectively agreed to unification with conditions.

In addition to committing the new Germany to European integration, the Treaty of Final Settlement in September 1990 recognized the permanence of its borders and its renunciation of territorial claims against other states. Although the Christian Democratic Chancellor Helmut Kohl, sensitive to the CDU's expellee base, wavered before publicly committing himself to the boundaries, Kohl's desire for reunification and Allied insistence on their permanence took priority.⁴¹ The result was a merger on West German terms: its constitution, its federal system, its capitalist economy, and even its political parties prevailed. Nevertheless the costs were enormous. In addition to the infrastructural renovation of the new German states and the task of integrating the citizens of a state that no longer existed, united Germany confronted a new wave of immigration that strained its resources. The influx of Soviet Jews, refugees from the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, and the two million German 'late resettlers' from the former Soviet Bloc, brought the debate over Germanness to a head.

The euphoria of unification dampened the pressure for citizenship reform even as joy gave way to disillusion. Although the Kohl government granted Soviet Jews residence and eventual citizenship, it also invoked the Basic Law's 'right of return' and the precedent of descent to accommodate 'resettlers', including many with few linguistic or cultural ties to Germany.⁴² Violent anti-foreigner xenophobia exploded especially as the costs of unification mounted. In Eastern Germany, the unfulfilled promises of unification encouraged angry youths to attack contract workers and refugees in the economically depressed towns of Hoyerswerda and Rostock. Similarly Western German skinheads assaulted Turks and asylum seekers. In an attempt to assuage popular outrage, a new law in 1993 restricted the once sacrosanct right of asylum by barring the entry of most asylum seekers. As a sop to the center-left, the same legislation included modest steps to ease naturalization for resident foreigners and restrict the flow of 'late resettlers', mitigating the blatant favoritism that the government initially extended to them.⁴³ Yet the fundamental issue, the need to accept the reality of a multi-ethnic Germany, remained submerged.

Ultimately broadening the criteria for citizenship would come only with the election of a center-left government. The victory of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's Social Democratic-Green coalition in 1998, which ended sixteen years of CDU rule, resulted in reforms that went into effect in 2000.⁴⁴ For the first time, automatic citizenship was conferred

at birth (*jus soli*, or law of the soil) for children born in Germany to at least one parent with eight years of residence. The path to citizenship was eased for children of foreign residents born prior to 2000. In addition, the beneficiaries could now claim dual citizenship up to the age of twenty-three, at which point they would have to opt for one or the other. The term of residence required for naturalization was reduced from fifteen years to eight.⁴⁵ In 2005, a new immigration law went into effect to attract highly-skilled workers, who would be eligible for permanent residence.

The reforms were significant, inasmuch as they accepted the principle of *jus soli* for the first time. Yet center-right and popular opposition to the Schröder government's more radical proposals, which included the recognition of dual citizenship, forced the compromise that became law. In the years since, the still lengthy process and cost of naturalization has raised questions as to the new law's effectiveness in creating new citizens.⁴⁶ Moreover, evidence of persistent inequality and long-term unemployment, especially among Germans with a 'migration background', suggests that barriers to equal life chances remain between native Germans (primarily western Germans) and Germans with foreign-born parents.⁴⁷

Disparities in education and income, as well as near exclusively 'foreign' neighborhoods, express and reinforce German fears of hybridity. To be sure, there is as yet no anti-immigration political party in Germany with an appeal comparable to that of the far-rightist parties in France, the UK, and the Netherlands, despite recent gains in state elections by the Alternative for Germany (AfD).⁴⁸ Yet the popularity of Thilo Sarrazin's book *Germany Does Itself In* (*Deutschland schafft sich ab*), which suggested that Germany's Muslims were incapable of integration, and the resistance of Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamicization of the West) to a new wave of asylum seekers indicates that anti-foreigner sentiment has hardly disappeared.⁴⁹ Even commemoration of the Holocaust, the very emblem of the Nazi pursuit of homogeneity, has often avoided applying its lessons to the present as if the past had little to say about resistance to immigration.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, compared to the French expectation of outright assimilation, one could argue that the acceptance of multi-ethnicity is greater in Germany and not only because there is domestic support for it.⁵¹ Germany's shrinking population and the mobility of labor within the European Union reinforce it, even if the encouragement of immigration is mainly limited to the skilled and high-salaried.⁵²

Conclusion

The resistance to multi-ethnicity resided in historically grounded ethno-cultural assumptions that seemed 'natural', particularly in the Federal Republic, which at its founding enshrined them in its Basic Law. Ethnocentrism lay at the core of the imagination of an enlarged Germany in the 'East', subsequently radicalized under National Socialism that would unite and protect Germans against Slavs and Jews. The consequences of defeat, expulsions and occupation, reinforced ethnocentrism after empire, because nationalizing millions of German refugees was crucial to absorbing them. Jewish victims of Nazism and 'occupation children' could, and did, receive citizenship, yet their 'otherness' was a barrier to their acceptance, and foreign workers resided in limbo for decades. The division of Germany into two and the rivalry between them further complicated the question of identity. The GDR established a new standard for belonging, but social realities and the FRG's appeal to disaffected East Germans undermined socialist models. If the forced renunciation of expansionism broke decisively with the past, the suspicion of difference persisted.

The xenophobia that accompanied reunification and its immediate legislative outcome suggested that the 'Berlin Republic' would continue to deny the diversity of its population. The 1993 law limiting the right of asylum gratuitously capitulated to anti-foreign sentiment without addressing the status of foreign residents. Nevertheless the same law, which made citizenship for 'late resettlers' more difficult to obtain, acknowledged the re-emergence of a pro-immigration coalition in response to the attacks on foreigners that would bear fruit by the end of the decade. The 2000 citizenship reform fell short of reformers' expectations, but it expanded the basis for citizenship and laid the foundations for the further encouragement of immigration. No doubt the fear of hybridity persists as do the structural inequalities which those of 'migration background' face. Yet it is clear enough that a significant legacy of the 'East' is receding.

Notes

1. David Blackbourn, 'Das Kaiserreich transnational. Eine Skizze', in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds, *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen, 2004), 322–3.
2. Wolfgang Mommsen, *Der Erste Weltkrieg: Anfang vom Ende des bürgerliche Zeitalters* (Frankfurt, 2005), 96–7; MacGregor Knox, *Origins and Dynamics*

- of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships, vol. 1: *To the Threshold of Power, 1922/33* (Cambridge, 2007), 54–7.
3. See Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present* (Oxford, 2009) for a recent synthesis, and especially Ulrike Jureit, *Das Ordnen von Räumen: Territorium und Lebensraum in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg, 2012), 287–385. For empire as defined by cultural difference, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and Politics of Difference* (Princeton, 2010), 8–11. On French colonial policy after the war, see Todd Shepard's chapter in this volume.
 4. Again see Todd Shepard's chapter in this volume. See also Jennifer L. Foray, *Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands* (Cambridge, 2012).
 5. See Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, 2006).
 6. Of the estimated fourteen million ethnic Germans who fled, two million died before they reached the occupation zones. See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 5 vols., vol. 5: *Bundesrepublik und DDR, 1949–1990* (Munich, 2008), 35. For the periodization of mass violence, see Donald Bloxham, Martin Conway, Robert Gerwarth, A. Dirk Moses, and Klaus Weinbauer, 'Europe in the World: Systems and Cultures of Violence', in Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth, eds, *Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, 2011), 11–39.
 7. See Klaus-Dietmar Henke, 'Der Weg nach Potsdam – Die Alliierten und die Vertreibung', in Wolfgang Benz, ed., *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen* (Frankfurt, 1985), 49–69. The substantial literature on the expulsions begins with the collection edited by Theodor Schieder, first published in 1954, *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa*, 5 vols. (Munich, 1984). In contrast to the Schieder collection, subsequent studies treat the expulsions as the consequence of the Nazi *Lebensraum* project. See Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* (New York, 2009), 211–45; Detlef Brandes, *Der Weg zur Vertreibung, 1938–1945: Pläne und Entscheidungen zum 'Transfer' der Deutschen aus den Tschechoslovakei und aus Polen* (Munich, 2nd edn, 2005); Andrew Demshuk, *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970* (Cambridge, 2012), 33–62; R. M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven, 2012); Eva Hahn and Hans-Henning Hahn, *Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern* (Paderborn, 2010); Pascal Maeder, *Forging a New Heimat: Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada* (Göttingen, 2011); Ulrich Merten, *Forgotten Voices: The Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II* (New Brunswick, 2012); Hugo Service, *Germans into Poles: Communism, Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2012); and Gregor Thum, *Uprooted: How Breslau became Wrocław during the Century of Expulsions*, trans. Tom Lampert and Allison Brown (Princeton, 2011), chapters 1–4.
 8. Citizenship was automatic for refugees from former German territories as of 1937. Others received it either by Allied authorities before 1949 or during the 1950s. See Maeder, *Forging a New Heimat*, 105, and Pertti Ahonen, 'On Forced Migrations: Transnational Realities and National Narratives in Post-1945 (West) Germany', *German History*, 32(4) (2014): 599–614, here 606.

9. On the complexities of citizenship in the *Kaiserreich* and the Weimar Republic, see Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2001), 177–327; and Annemarie Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922* (Ithaca, 2010), 19–24. See also Annemarie Sammartino, 'After Brubaker: Citizenship in Modern Germany, 1848 to Today', *German History*, 27(4) (2009): 581–99.
10. See Hahn and Hahn, *Vertreibung*, 489–583; and Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, 2001), 21–87.
11. See Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Munich, 2008), 27–86; and Rainer Schulze, 'Growing Discontent: Relations between Native and Refugee Populations in a Rural District in Western Germany after the Second World War', in Robert G. Moeller, ed., *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor, 1997), 53–72.
12. Kossert, *Kalte Heimat*, 136. For the upward mobility (in general) of expellees and their transnational movements, see Maeder, *Forging a New Heimat*, 210–14, 239; and Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und 'Zeitgeist' in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre* (Hamburg, 1995), 49.
13. Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1955* (Göttingen, 1982), 240–3; Rüdiger Wenzel, *Die große Verschiebung? Das Ringen um den Lastenausgleich in Nachkriegsdeutschland von den ersten Vorarbeiten bis zur Verabschiedung des Gesetzes 1952* (Stuttgart, 2008).
14. See Pertti Aho, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945–1990* (Oxford, 2003), 54–114; and the table on the distribution of expellees in Hahn and Hahn, *Vertreibung*, 26.
15. See Douglas, *Orderly and Humane*, 321–5; and Philipp Ther, *Deutsche und Polnische Vertriebene: Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen 1945–1956* (Göttingen, 1998), especially 171–203. For a comparison between the expellee policies of the GDR and FRG, see Michael Schwartz's chapter in this volume.
16. Mary Fulbrook, *Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships* (Oxford, 2011), 267–8.
17. See Jan Palmowski, 'Citizenship, Identity, and Community in the German Democratic Republic', in Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds, *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Stanford, 2008): 73–91, and especially Palmowski's book, *Inventing the Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945–90* (Cambridge, 2009).
18. Liulevicius, *The German Myth*, 217–18. On the arts, see Bill Niven, *Representations of Flight and Expulsion in East German Prose Works* (Rochester, 2014). For an effective challenge to the application of 'totalitarianism' to the GDR, see Andrew I. Port, *Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic* (Cambridge, 2007).
19. Hahn and Hahn, *Vertreibung*, 212–14
20. Aho, *After the Expulsion*, 119–41. In addition to Aho's work, see Katarzyna Stokłosa, *Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik 1945–1990* (Göttingen, 2011), 35–55.

21. On the competition between the FRG and GDR, see William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969* (Chapel Hill, 2003), 10–13.
22. On the Berlin crisis and the development of *Ostpolitik*, see Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York, 1993), 58–83.
23. Axel Schildt, 'Mending Fences: The Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Europe', in Eduard Mühle, ed., *Germany and the European East in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 2003), 153–79, here 167.
24. Demshuk, *The Lost German East*, 185–262, and 'What was the "Right to the Heimat"? West German Expellees and the Many Meanings of *Heimkehr*', *Central European History*, 45(3) (2012): 523–56, here 543–6. Some 370,000 German-speakers from Poland emigrated to West Germany between 1955 and 1970. In addition to Demshuk's discussion of memory and nostalgia in his book *The Lost German East*, 1–32, see Gregor Thum, 'Mythische Landschaften: Das Bild vom "deutschen Osten" und die Zäsuren des 20. Jahrhunderts', in Gregor Thum, ed., *Traumland Osten: Deutsche Bilder vom östlichen Europa im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2006), 181–212; and Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 681–8.
25. See Ahonen, *After the Expulsion*, 203–42, for the details, as well as Stokłosa, *Polen*, 95–330.
26. Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton, 2007), 237–68.
27. Mike Dennis and Norman LaPorte, 'Between Torah and Sickle: Jews in East Germany, 1845–1990', in Mike Dennis and Norman LaPorte, eds, *State and Minorities in Communist East Germany* (New York, 2011), 28–44; Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 106–61.
28. Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies*, 48–68; Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation* (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 69–140.
29. Heide Fehrenbach, *Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (Princeton, 2005), 46–106, 132–88.
30. Denis Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds, *Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration 1955–2005* (Berkeley, 2007), 9; Rita Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge, 2007), 33–52.
31. Göktürk et al., *Germany in Transit*, 11.
32. Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980: Seasonal Workers/Forced Laborers/Guest Workers*, trans. William Templer (Ann Arbor, 1990), 9–85.
33. Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, 292–3. On Polish migration from a global perspective, see Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Munich, 2006), 124–67.
34. Herbert, *History of Foreign Labor*, 209–54; Konrad Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995* (Oxford, 2006), 243–4.
35. Eva Kolinsky, 'Meanings of Migration in East Germany and the West German Model', in Mike Dennis and Eva Kolinsky, eds, *United and Divided: Germany since 1990* (New York, 2004), 152–3.

36. Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach, 'German Democracy and the Question of Difference', in Rita Chin, Heide Fehrenbach, Geoff Eley, and Atina Grossmann, eds, *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe* (Ann Arbor, 2009), 102–36, here 113–15; Joyce Marie Mushaben, 'From Ausländer to Inlander: The Changing Faces of Citizenship in Post-Wall Germany', in Jeffrey J. Anderson and Eric Langenbacher, eds, *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Germany at the Twentieth Anniversary of Unification* (New York, 2010), 141–64, here 161.
37. In 1989, roughly 150,000 foreigners worked in the GDR, 85,000 of which were contract workers brought in through bilateral agreements. See Mike Dennis, 'Asian and African Workers in the Niches of Society', in Mike Dennis and Norman LaPorte, eds, *State and Minorities*, 87–123, here 89.
38. Kolinsky, 'Meanings of Migration', 153–7; Dennis, 'Asian and African Workers'.
39. See Dennis, 'Asian and African Workers', 112–17; and Young-sun Hong, '"The Benefits of Health Must Spread Among All": International Solidarity, Health, and Race in the East German Encounter with the Third World', in Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, eds, *Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics* (Ann Arbor, 2008), 183–210.
40. Michael Geyer and Konrad Jarausch, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton and Oxford, 2003), 188.
41. Kiran Klaus Patel, 'Germany and European Integration', in Helmut Walser Smith, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History* (Oxford, 2011), 775–94, here 787. On Kohl's position, see Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name*, 227–31.
42. Göktürk et al., *Germany in Transit*, 14.
43. Chin and Fehrenbach, 'German Democracy', 115–21. On the compromise, see Marc Morjé Howard, 'The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law', *German Politics*, 17(1) (2008): 41–62, here 45.
44. See Chin, *The Guest Worker Question*, 262–3.
45. Howard, 'Causes and Consequences', 52–4.
46. *Ibid.*, 55–8; David Abraham, 'Immigration and Social Solidarity in a Time of Crisis: The Welfare State and Integration', http://works.bepress.com/david_abraham/1: 34 (accessed 30 April 2014).
47. Hilary Silver, 'The Social Integration of Germany since Unification', in Anderson and Langenbacher, *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic*, 194–5. Mushaben, 'From Ausländer to Inländer', 160–79, is more optimistic because of Chancellor Merkel's support for integration.
48. For a comparison between Germany and the UK, see 'UK and Germany have very different attitudes toward immigration', *The Guardian*, 26 November 2014.
49. By the end of 2010, the book had sold over one million copies. The press coverage of Sarrazin was extensive. See Matthias Matussek, 'Sarrazin-Debatte: Die Gegenwut', *Der Spiegel*, 6 September 2010; Christoph Rug, 'Studie zu deutschen Einstellung: Wie groß Sarrazins Basis wirklich ist', *Der Spiegel*, 13 October 2010; and 'Was man in Deutschland NICHT sagen darf', *Die Zeit*, 16 April 2010. Ironically, the law which denies asylum to those who cross into Germany from a 'safe' country (that is, Germany's EU neighbors) has

not discouraged the recent and significant influx of asylum seekers. See, for example, 'Das Boot ist leer', *Die Zeit*, 11 October 2014.

50. Chin and Fehrenbach, 'German Democracy', 135.
51. On the Europeanness of the French Republic after the Algerian War and its abandonment of 'overseas citizenship', see Todd Shepard's chapter in this volume.
52. 'The new land of opportunity for immigrants is Germany', *Washington Post*, 27 July 2014.

3

The Birth of the Hexagon: 1962 and the Erasure of France's Supranational History

Todd Shepard

In an article that appeared in *Les lieux de memoires* (1997), the historian Eugen Weber explained that it was not until the early 1960s that the term 'the Hexagon' became widely used by French writers to describe France, notably by those in the human sciences. It is somewhat difficult to convince informed observers that the seemingly self-evident description is so recent. The country does, after all, have six sides, as any map of Europe that includes political boundaries makes clear. Weber's argument comes more sharply into view when he dates its emergence to around 1962. Although he does not directly link it to the end of French Algeria in that year, the date reminds readers that the territorial boundaries of modern France were never just European, although in 1962 the percentage of its territory outside of Europe shrunk from more than 50 percent to far less than 20 percent (with almost all of that in sparsely populated French Guiana). In 1848, the French constitution had declared that Algeria's territory was part of France. 'From empire to hexagon' was how a 1981 study evoked the result of 'decolonization'.¹

In 1962, almost all of those Algerians who were known as 'Europeans' – who others named *Pieds-Noirs*, or settlers – became repatriates, people who came back to their (European) homeland. Other Algerians with French citizenship who sought to stay in France by fleeing to the metropole, those known as *harkis* (and others who, like them, had been categorized as 'Muslim') were shuffled into the category refugees. Both terms worked to erase the 132 years of French claims that Algeria was France, by obscuring the position of these French people from Algeria. France became, territorially, more European at the

very moment it affirmed that only those people from Algeria who were 'European' were truly French.

The fact that the hexagonal metaphor is so recent has conceptual importance, for it challenges presumptions that the modern history of France can be fully understood via a purely 'nation-state' approach. It is thus worth noting the irony that Weber's article appears in a multi-volume opus that – as historian of immigration Gerard Noiriel trenchantly remarked in his response to the first edition – had no articles focused on France's overseas empire and only one article about the importance of the empire within the metropole.² There are also intriguing tensions between ongoing efforts to think the importance of empire in making the modern French nation-state and the work of Weber, most notably his seminal work, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (1976). On the one hand, the many subsequent critiques of the modernization thesis that underwrote his project and, equally important, of the Jacobin and centralizing certainties that drove the narrative emerged in dialogue with 'the imperial turn' in French history.³ The insistent focus, most notably, on the motor role of 'the margins' that motivated many recent efforts to challenge the erasure of empire from modern French history aligns more easily with works such as Peter Sahlin's *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*, with its straightforward critique of Weber's arguments.⁴

On the other hand, *Peasants into Frenchmen* became a necessary reference in the emergence of scholarship that demonstrated that imperialism had been foundational for shaping metropolitan, 'hexagonal' France. In a brief but very evocative section, Weber notes that the *francization* campaigns that sought to unify the language and the daily practices of people across France were anchored in theories of assimilation, which were most clearly articulated in French plans for Algeria. For historians inspired by postcolonial critique, in dialogue with the work of British 'new imperial' historians, or eager to think 'metropole and colony in one analytic frame', this clear indication of how overseas empire shaped state action and the history of France has been generative indeed.⁵

In the last two decades, and with growing intensity, historians of France have become ever more attentive to the role of empire, yet much of this work offers reassurance to proponents of a wholly 'national' history of the post-1798 French state rather than necessary challenges. This is notably the case with historians' focus on exceptional situations, specifically of often extreme violence, whether over the course of French

rule of their overseas colonies or during the events that produced what we know as decolonization. Such work needs to continue and grow, and it has already begun to reinsert the difficult and very real facts they reveal into current discussions. Unlike the history of twentieth-century Germany, where analyses of the roles of violence have been foundational, such understandings have been missing in French discussions, and recent work on French violence linked to empire and its demise help remedy this problem. Yet it has also participated in erasing how much more empire and decolonization contributed to the ways that France is governed and how being French is defined, both in the past and the present.

Many scholars have described how the French forgot their country's colonial past and silenced discussions of the 'events of Algeria', from Benjamin Stora's *The Gangrene and Forgetting* to constant invocations of 'the war without a name'.⁶ Alain Resnais' brilliant 1963 film *Muriel ou le temps d'un retour*, I argue, offers a filmic template for such analyses of traumatized repression, in which the levels and types of French violence that accompanied decolonization stymie efforts to understand, or even just recount.⁷ Attention to the 'trauma' of violence has often obscured the work of erasure that took place, as a long history of insisting that France included Algeria and Algerians, and making laws and choices that advanced this view, were quickly deemed unspeakable. Historical research into the years when Algeria became independent shows that there were active decisions made to distinguish French from Algerian. History was erased, rather than being repressed.⁸

The most important French historians on the Algerian War, notably Benjamin Stora, Sylvie Thénault, and Raphaëlle Branche, even as they have done marvelous work have emphatically placed their histories of the Algerian War in the framework of nation versus nation. Thénault, in particular, has insisted that the messy conflict, with all of the many names assigned at the time and since, needs to be renamed, once and for all, as the 'war for Algerian independence'. It is an ahistorical title, one not affixed to the conflict in contemporary documents that, with its insistent internationalization of the conflict, denies that other, non-national developments fully matter.⁹ Yet historians also need to pay attention to the more complicated institutional and representational developments that cannot be easily categorized as 'positive' or 'negative' or reassuringly slotted into 'republican' or 'anti-republican' or 'French' or 'Algerian'. Paying attention to empire as constitutive of France, that is, points us toward categories and descriptions of French history that are unfamiliar and yet merit attention.

Decolonization, many argue, marked the end of the Republic's imperial 'detour', of practices and arguments that flagrantly violated republican values, comforted the Republic's enemies, and thus sapped its institutions. This vision echoes some of the small number of French voices that, before 1959, struggled to have France recognize that the time for empire was over. It also rehearses the claims of President Charles de Gaulle, who worked tirelessly after 1959 to pretend that he and France had chosen decolonization, in Africa and then Algeria, rather than been forced out by circumstances beyond their control.¹⁰ A quite different interpretation presents the history of decolonization as key to understanding how the pursuit and government of empire were, rather than a diversion, an inextricable part of the French history of republics and republicanism since 1792.

Every French republic, after all, was also an empire; historically, the overwhelming majority of republicans had accepted empire, some had ardently called for it, and many anti-colonialists relied on non-, even anti-, republican arguments.¹¹ More specifically, the history of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, notably their institutions, were both tied to often forgotten but substantive efforts to redefine republican principles and state structure in order, first, to keep the colonies and, then, to get out of Algeria. When the Algerian Revolution forced their hand, French governments planned and put in place extensive and innovative social and economic reforms, meant to improve connections between Algerian and metropolitan French departments and people.¹² Such late colonial efforts of integrating the empire and its 'citizens' differed radically from the Nazi empire in Eastern Europe and its quest for ethnic homogeneity.¹³ In part, they were also a response to the breakdown of the Third Reich and the post-1945 delegitimization of racism.

In their underexplored archives, debates about what form the French state should take in order to keep Algeria part of France play an unexpected role. Such discussions led to important decisions, which shifted sharply and repeatedly between 'nation-state', a state based in a nation made up of all people in Algeria as well as the metropole (what some proponents went so far as to term a 'Franco-Algerian' or 'Franco-Muslim' nation¹⁴), and 'supranational' state, with plans to establish a republic that, in Algeria, would be 'federal' or 'federative'. This supranational French history continues to matter, despite the efforts of historians to focus only on the French nation-state, on the 'hexagon' that (finally) took shape in 1962. For France continues to be deeply involved in another supranational project that emerged in those years – 'Europe' –

and continues to be governed by the state, the Fifth Republic, that emerged in the midst of the Algerian Revolution.

The strange defeat, free France, and the empire

Retrospectively, the defeat of Nazism and fascism in 1945 seemed to promise an end as well to the age of European empires. The Allies, after all, fought in the name of democracy and in opposition to the Axis Powers' blatant and brutal celebration of both racial hierarchies and imperialism.¹⁵ Yet among French politicians, intellectuals, and officials – notably those who most loudly trumpeted the republic's triumph – such views were seldom heard. Rather, leaders who had fought to defeat Vichy drew very different lessons from recent French history. The French government's capitulation to Germany, on 22 June 1940, and the 10 July vote at Vichy to transform the republic into the 'French State' magnified the bond between republic and empire. Symbolically, on 21 June 1940, some thirty French politicians embarked on the ship *Massilia* for French Morocco, where they planned to re-establish a republican government that could continue the fight against Germany (they were arrested on arrival).¹⁶

Less well known at the time, but more successfully, on 18 June, Charles de Gaulle proclaimed from London that the empire meant that the Republic could and would fight on. It was in French colonies that his claim to embody a still-existing Republic, which rendered the Vichy State's exercise of sovereignty illegitimate, gradually gained strength. In autumn 1940, Félix Éboué, Governor-General of Chad, recognized de Gaulle's authority, buttressing it with French (African) territories and troops.¹⁷ Eventually, the hundreds of thousands of French soldiers raised overseas allowed Free France to participate in the Liberation of Europe and, as the battle-song of the Algerian-based Army of Africa proclaimed, 'to come from the colonies / to save *la Patrie*'.¹⁸

The dark days of World War II proved to many that France needed its overseas colonies more than ever. In the words of socialist deputy Paul Ramadier, 'the problem of empire is now the problem of our country's life and existence'.¹⁹ For de Gaulle and others, the empire's gift of both troops and evidence that the Republic had soldiered on after June 1940, anchored his efforts to deny American supremacy over France: as Gaston Monnerville, deputy from Guyana, proclaimed on 12 May 1945, 'without its Empire, France would be nothing but a liberated country. Thanks to its Empire, France is one of the victors.'²⁰ Such interpretations gave added urgency to efforts to counter calls, from

among the colonized and on the world stage, for quick independence for all colonies. With similar convictions, British officials, most vocally Winston Churchill, who had authored the 1941 Atlantic Charter alongside President Franklin D. Roosevelt, worked to sidestep its anti-colonial summons 'to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them'.²¹

Both before and after their return to Paris, de Gaulle and other French leaders forthrightly contested the Atlantic Charter's roadmap. The 1944 Brazzaville Conference, which brought together colonial administrators to map out the new principles and structures that were supposed to redefine the empire, formally declared that neither 'the idea of autonomy' nor '*le self-government* [in English in the original]' were among the options.²² In perhaps the most brazen repudiation of Roosevelt's wartime promise that European empires would end, the French version of the United Nations' Charter of 1946 differed starkly from its English-language 'twin'. Whereas the latter committed signatories 'to develop self-government' in their colonies, the former enjoined them merely (as an English translation of the Charter's French version makes clear) 'to develop the ability of colonized peoples to administer themselves'.²³

The 'Overseas' and Federal Republic

In 1947, the newspaper *Le Monde* interpreted the 'end of the British Empire' in India as resulting from Britain's historical incapacity to respond to popular demands for liberation. France's revolutionary heritage, by contrast, made it possible for the republic to maintain the shape of the empire yet wholly alter its content.²⁴ To show how much would change, French officials began with new names. Speaking at Brazzaville, Charles de Gaulle had invoked the 'Bloc France-Colonies', and commentators had many other suggestions for renaming the French Empire; one article, for example, called for a 'Global France' (*La France mondiale*), while a book co-authored by the Senegalese poet/politician Léopold Sédar Senghor proposed the 'French Imperial Community'. It was the term of the French Union, first advanced by the Provisional Government of the French Republic's Minister of the Colonies, which quickly gained popularity. By 1945, it also had become de rigueur to refer to colonial territories as 'Overseas France'. The new Constitution of October 1946 ensconced both names in law. Yet there were not just new names: words that were central to the history of French republicanism were redefined. In a series of laws, including the Constitutions of 1946

and 1958, definitions of 'republic' and 'citizen' were repeatedly stretched and reworked.²⁵ While they threatened to render these dual leitmotifs of modern French history meaningless, such maneuvers suggested that the right institutional frame would allow anti-colonial challenges to be overcome.

The Constitution of 1946 defined the Republic to include the metropole as well as 'Overseas France', itself divided into 'Overseas Departments' and 'Overseas Territories'. The former title was given in 1947 to the so-called Old Colonies, which had been French before 1789; these had the same governmental institutions as the metropole. The latter category encompassed the former colonies. Legally, it was unclear whether the three departments of Algeria were part of the metropole or had the status of 'overseas departments'.²⁶ Unlike either, but like Overseas Territories, they shared a local assembly. Such confusion typified this era of indecision, which resulted from the unresolved conflict between federalists and those committed to the (Jacobin) traditions of French republicanism.

This certainty that the nation could be revitalized by participating in new supranational states influenced French debates. This, rather than any suspicion of the nation, helps explain why, from 1944 to 1954 French politicians (whether Christian Democrats, Socialists, Pierre Mendès France, or de Gaulle); intellectuals, in publications as diverse as *Les Temps modernes*, *Preuves*, *Le Monde*, *Témoignage chrétien*, or *Le Figaro*; union leaders associated with the General Confederation Labor – Workers' Force (CGT-FO); and the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC), proclaimed their attachment to federalism, to commonwealths, to unions, to supranational organizations. New institutional connections within Western Europe were one focus; however, transforming existing imperial ties between the metropole and its overseas territories, colonies, and protectorates was even more important. The Constitutions of 1946 and 1958, as well as many other laws and projects proposed that France and the territories and peoples that France had conquered should seek, together, to move beyond both the empire and the nation-state; this did not mean dissolving or moving beyond nations.

One approach sought to federalize connections as a way to escape Empire and to recognize, as one jurist put it, that 'France does not have an empire, she is an empire . . . a Global France'.²⁷ Beginning at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference, there were repeated proposals to transform the empire into a federation. René Capitant, Minister of Education in the Provisional Government of the French Republic (GPRF) and a close ally of de Gaulle, argued during the first Constitutive Assembly, 'the French

Union will be federal or it will not be'.²⁸ Various Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists as well, gave strong support to federalist French Union schemes which received vocal backing from 'indigenous' deputies representing the colonies, such as Senghor of Senegal and Ferhat Abbas of Algeria. The French Union that came into being, however, was not a federation; final decisions remained in the hands of what one speaker termed the 'federative organ' and what another called 'the locomotive': France.²⁹

The Franco-Algerian republic

While reticent to embrace federalism, it was only during two relatively short periods between 1945 and 1962 that a French government clearly marked its preference for a centralized republic, over and against any supranational structure. In early 1955, in response to the 1 November 1954 attacks that announced the start of the Algerian Revolution, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France named Jacques Soustelle to take over as Governor-General of Algeria.

The anthropologist and Gaullist politician had been a visible supporter of federalism since his brief tenure as minister of the colonies in 1945. His federalism was the focus of right-wing critics of the government's response to the rebellion. According to an anonymous pamphlet from February 1955, 'Soustelle... has declared himself in favor of a Federal French Republic "from Dunkirk to Tananrive [Madagascar]" that would include a Federal Assembly and Government'.³⁰ Soustelle told legislators in both Paris and Algiers that, although one of the most well-known supporters of federalism, he no longer supported a federal solution: with a new policy termed 'integration', he and the government both would move beyond colonial-era debates over assimilation versus association and focus their efforts on building what he called a Franco-Muslim (or Franco-Algerian) Republic, which would include France and Algeria and be dealt with as a unit distinct from the French Union. He argued that figuring out how to synthesize the diverse populations of Algeria with the people of France would revitalize the nation as well as the republic.³¹

The left-wing Republican Front won elections in January 1956 on a platform that rejected integrationism and supported peace in Algeria; some integrationist social reforms were, in fact, adopted, but between then and 1958, French governments renewed federalist possibilities. In Europe, the 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Community; in French sub-Saharan Africa, the Defferre Law of June 1956

territorialized the budget and most government responsibilities; in Algeria, the Loi-Cadre of February 1958 established an explicitly federal form of government – the existing twelve departments, which a 1957 reform had mapped out, and the Southern Territories of the Sahara that would be transformed into fifteen departments and four to six regions. Alongside ‘the Algerian population’, internal government discussion identified ‘international public opinion’ as the target of these reforms.³²

This move toward federalism provoked violent reactions, which led directly to the republic’s collapse. In May 1958, a massive demonstration in Algiers, which demanded that the French government guarantee Algeria’s place in the republic, led to the fall of the Fourth Republic. Even some observers who wanted Algerian independence, or accepted it as inevitable, were surprised at the enthusiastic crowds, made up of both ‘Europeans’ and ‘Muslims’; many came to believe that, as in other ‘revolutionary’ moments, fraternity had emerged to redefine the republic. Decisions taken in 1958, notably the October Constitution, aimed to manage new forms of autonomy for most of the remaining former colonies while staving off any autonomy for the Algerian departments; they did so by resolving the constant post-1945 indecision concerning the connections between France and its overseas possessions.

The new Fifth Republic distinguished Algeria from the other territories, affirming that it was one with the metropole – a republican center – while leaving the status of Overseas Departments untouched and redefining the Union as a Community (a much looser relationship that soon led to formal independence for all the territories of West and Equatorial Africa).³³ Officially, distinctions between the continental and Algerian shores of the ‘metropole’ now were based on exceptional laws – notably a series of social welfare provisions to address the results of discrimination and extravagant restrictions on civil liberties to crush nationalist activity – rather than being the norm.

The meaning of citizenship

The enormous uncertainty around the institution of citizenship was also resolved in 1958. During World War II, the National Council of the Resistance had made ‘An Extension of Political, Social, and Economic Rights to the Indigenous and Colonial Populations’ a key principal in its 1944 platform; the recommendations from the Brazzaville Conference declared a ‘concern to push aside anything that leads to subordination and, to the contrary, take account of the consent of colonial

populations'; while Monnerville and others linked the need to extend new liberties to the 'the blood debt' that France owed its colonial subjects. Between 1944 and 1947, France abolished the status of 'colonial subject'; extended French citizenship to all former French subjects from the Overseas Territories (colonies) and Algeria; and created a new French Union citizenship, which included all French citizens (newly minted as well as the others) and the peoples of the 'associated states' and protectorates who had their own (non-French) nationality – Morocco, Tunisia, and the new Indochinese Federation.

What Parisian decision-makers failed to do was define what rights accompanied either status. Some were clear: forced labor and the infamous 'native codes' were abolished; 'French citizenship' guaranteed free circulation throughout the Union, including France; all 'citizens' were eligible for civil service posts.³⁴ Most were unclear: the double college system divided all elected posts between those with 'French status' and those with 'local' status, yet some 'qualified' men with 'local' status were given 'French status'; Algerians with 'local status', who had restricted political rights in Algeria enjoyed full political rights if they moved to the metropole; laws proclaimed that 'local status' women would have the vote, which French women had won in 1944, yet many places, such as Algeria, did not extend this right. Tens of millions of people from outside the metropole now carried a title sacralized by the French Revolution, but accompanied by multiple, radically different and wholly unequal sets of rights.

These inequalities and ambiguities resulted from the decision of the second constitutive assembly, elected in June 1946, not to resolve the uncertainties. The immediate goal was to avoid extending the vote to the majority of non-European 'French citizens': in the words of former Prime Minister and Radical Party stalwart Edouard Hériot, this might give 'overseas citizens' more votes than 'citizens of the metropole', in which case 'France would become the colony of its former colonies'; his speech led, within days, to the project being sidelined. Plans for territorial assemblies to be elected via universal suffrage were shelved, replaced with a double college system, which guaranteed that 'Europeans' in Algeria and colonists elsewhere would be disproportionately represented. All references to the consent of colonial peoples, notably to their right to leave the Union, also disappeared from the project.³⁵

The immediate recognition given to the political rights of 'overseas citizens' was small: a new French Union Assembly theoretically represented France's 'new citizens', those from what used to be known as colonies, but the body contained as many metropolitan representatives

as overseas ones. In any event, it was a legislature without legislative authority. It was not until 1956 that Félix Houphouët-Boigny from Côte d'Ivoire became the first African minister in a French government. There were, however, more gains in terms of social rights. Across West Africa, notably, labor unions invoked citizenship in their successful efforts to gain the same social rights as other French people, including a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and family allowances.³⁶

As with uncertainties about the shape of the republic, the Algerian War brought some clarity to what citizenship meant. In 1958, the double college system was abolished, giving all Algerians (including women) equal political rights. Elections that year led to dozens of so-called Muslims from Algeria entering parliament; they made up just under ten percent of French deputies and senators. The 'Muslim' Nafissa Sid-Cara was named Secretary of State for Muslim Social Affairs in January 1959. A new legal definition of 'Muslims from Algeria', based on origins (and not religion), allowed the extension of 'exceptional' political and social rights to this group of French citizens. A new electoral law guaranteed a minimum number of seats for 'Muslims' in all elections held in Algeria, from the National Assembly to municipal councils.

The extension of social rights went further than formal equality. Officials began to refer to the concept of 'discrimination' in order to explain why it was necessary to take exceptional measures to create the possibility for real equality. Interestingly, the first official French document to refer to 'discrimination' appears to be a 1954 report on the situation of 'Algerian Muslim' workers in the metropole.³⁷ Subsequent plans for integrationist policies explained the cause of the problem as economic inequality accentuated by anti-Algerian racism in France as well as Algeria. While there were some real effects on the lives of Algerians, it is also significant that the Fifth Republic used these policies, which targeted anti-Algerian racism and its consequences, as models for the 'social promotion' policies it inaugurated across France in 1959. A 'social citizenship' approach sidelined questions of class to address specific forms of group handicap (for example, illiterates; disaster victims; farmers after a drought).³⁸

Not an empire: a republic confronting racism

The government presented these policies on the world stage as emblematic of the Fifth Republic. In 1959, Prime Minister Michel Debré pushed the French Army to name a 'Muslim' general 'before the next session of the UN General Assembly'. Integrationism, French ambassadors

and officials repeated, showed that the French Republic, once again, was pioneering efforts to create 'liberty, equality, fraternity' and extend the 'rights of Man', this time in a context of stark ethnic differences. Algeria, they reminded listeners, was not a colony; the situation there should be compared, instead, to the far less aggressive efforts to fight the effects of racism in countries like the Soviet Union or the United States of America.³⁹

From World War II onwards, French leaders preferred to contrast their plans to bring justice to all Algerians through comparison with the 'hypocritical' anti-colonialism and anti-racism of the US and the USSR. In fact, the most direct challenges to French colonialism came not from the two superpowers but from colonized peoples themselves. Many demonstrations were met with a heavy hand, notably against nationalists. In early May 1945, reacting to news that the war in Europe had been won, anti-colonial demonstrators took to the street in Damascus and in Sétif, Algeria. The former was largely peaceful until 29 May, when French forces bombed the parliament building and 'modern quarters', killing at least four hundred Syrians; during the latter, violent attacks targeted local 'Europeans', murdering about one hundred. The French response was brutal, massacring (perhaps tens of) thousands and rounding up nationalists across Algeria. In March 1947, a violent revolt broke out in Madagascar, shaped jointly by recent elections and rural discontent; French repression over the next year killed upwards of one hundred thousand Malagasy.⁴⁰

The two most significant French wars of decolonization – first in Indochina, then Algeria – witnessed even greater violence. These episodes forced responses from many French politicians and intellectuals, which revealed much about how they envisioned the republic's role in its overseas possessions. On the left, there was no unified response, with events in Algeria producing the greatest divergences and uncertainty. Beyond small groups on the far left, intellectuals such as Simone de Beauvoir and Francis Jeanson, who rejected republicanism, and a minority of Communist dissidents, very few could bring themselves to support the Islamically-inflected Algerian nationalists – particularly after the National Liberation Front (FLN) announced its use of terrorism as a tactic.

Saving the republic

It was the use of terrorism in 1961 and 1962 by the pro-French Algeria Secret Army Organization (OAS) – which targeted random 'Muslims',

Gaullists, and leftists in Algeria, and intellectuals and left-wing targets in the metropole – that finally catalyzed a formidable left-wing movement for the ‘defense of the republic’. Earlier critics of French forces’ systematic use of torture on ‘suspect’ Algerians had castigated the violation of republican principles. The protests that developed in early 1962 moved beyond arguments that a colonial ‘gangrene’ was damaging the republic to insist that the delayed decolonization of Algeria threatened to let ‘fascists’ abolish the republic altogether.⁴¹

This mobilization, I would suggest, established many of the claims and certainties that have shaped subsequent discussions by historians. Ben Stora’s *Le transfert d’une mémoire*, for example, deploys evidence and argument to give depth to a claim – that France had a ‘southern problem’ which, like the USA, involved a more reactionary and racist population troubling efforts to modernize – that emerged among ‘new left’ journalists in 1962, as they reported on the mass arrival of Pieds-Noirs in Southern France.⁴² Most importantly, however, the war’s end mobilization anchored the argument that to support ‘empire’, that is French Algeria, was anti-republican at best, and that, at worst, what typified this movement could fruitfully be compared to fascism.

Over the following months, the French government reached a ceasefire and then withdrew from a now independent Algeria. It took advantage of this process to redefine key aspects of the republic. During the fight to keep Algerian French, exceptional laws had temporarily authorized the violation of civil liberties (for example, press censorship; exceptional tribunals; police searches after sunset; mandatory ID cards); the need to leave Algeria (and fight the OAS) legitimated making these measures part of French law. Executive power to interfere in court decisions was extended. The marginalization of legislative power, and the affirmation of executive primacy, which most jurists and politicians had understood to be exceptional – linked, that is, to the Algerian emergency – became standard practice. This redefinition of the republic was accompanied by a reframing of the nation, as the French government, in violation of the Evian Accords that led to Algerian independence, stripped almost all Muslims of Algeria of their French citizenship; the ‘European’ minority, however, was allowed to hold onto theirs. As citizens, the latter enjoyed the right to ‘repatriate’ to France. Another executive decision authorized government efforts to treat ‘Muslims’ who had worked to keep Algeria French, the so-called *harkis*, as potential refugees, rather than repatriating them as citizens.

If, as Shelley Baranowski’s chapter in this volume emphasizes, the Nazi Empire had been built on the drive to homogenize, it was after

1962 – after Algeria had been lost – that French governments shifted abruptly from celebrating the opportunities offered by diversity to seeking to define French people as (almost all) ‘European’. In the fall of 1962, a referendum, widely seen as violating the Constitution, authorized the direct election of the President of the Republic. Former Prime Minister Michel Debré, explaining why he had not included this proposal in the 1958 text, which he had largely authored, closed the circle that Edouard Hériot had opened in 1946: in 1958 ‘the body of electors was the body of electors of the French Union, with all the African peoples and the Muslims of Algeria’. Under those conditions, he continued, ‘election by universal suffrage was impossible’.⁴³

The government’s response to Algerian independence made the Fifth Republic more ‘European’ than any regime since 1789 – and, as the republic became the Hexagon, established government institutions that broke with republican doxa. That response also served to exclude from French history the central role that overseas lands and peoples had played. Such a move was possible because French voters were eager to clear away the confusion that post-1944 efforts to maintain French positions around the globe had entailed.

Ambiguities surrounding the French Union and ‘overseas citizenship’ had created widespread public bewilderment over which parts of the world were France; what kind of people were French; what a republic was; and what citizenship meant. Most interesting, perhaps, was how decolonization – and Algerian independence most emblematically – came to be seen as a victory for ‘the republic’, a republic defined primarily in reference to abstract values (liberty, equality, and fraternity; the rights of Man), rather than a failure of efforts by actual republics (above all the Fourth and Fifth) to transform the colonies into France. This European Republic, stripped of its most important non-European territories and with most of its non-‘European’ nationals stripped of the right to hold onto their French citizenship, could become more fully focused on building Europe.

Europe, however, remains a project that has yet to displace France in most French discussions and, indeed, often seems unlikely to ever do so. It should be no surprise that many of the actors and many of the debates that continue to trouble France, still today, are linked to the ex-colonies. Particularly notable are those who, through personal experience, family ties, or political engagement, were troubled, affected, even devastated by the end of French Algeria. While the vast majority of ‘Europeans’ from Algeria, or of *harkis*, or the descendants and families of either group have had little connection with far-right politics, the anti-European Front National makes much of its solidarity with them.

How to think about Islam and Muslims in France – a concern that French governments had finally begun to address more seriously because of the FLN's revolution, yet which their victory erased from French memories – also continues to be tied, in many minds and debates, to the former imperial territories, notably Algeria. Muslim questions have been particularly tense in the context of the politics of Europe. Indeed, while pro-European political groups have had little success in mobilizing across state boundaries, Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West), a virulently anti-'Islamization of Europe' movement that, beginning in 2014 took root in parts of Germany, has had some success in mobilizing crowds in places like the UK and France. It has also received support from far-right politicians across Europe, including France's Marine Le Pen. Like the pre-1962 French past that Algerian independence cast into shadow, these ongoing 'European' developments insistently remind us that French history continues to be supranational, even as its historians have too often continued to prefer the clarity of national distinctions to the more complex reality of the past.

Notes

1. Eugen Weber, 'L'Hexagone', in Pierre Nora, ed., *Les lieux de mémoire*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1997), 3:1171–90; Georges Spillmann, *De l'empire à l'hexagone* (Paris, 1981).
2. Gérard Noiriel, *Le creuset français: histoire de l'immigration (19^{ème}–20^{ème} siècles)* (Paris, 1988), chapter 1.
3. On this turn, see esp. Gary Wilder, 'From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effect of Historiographic Turns', *The American Historical Review*, 117(3) (2012): 723–45.
4. Peter Sahllins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, 1989).
5. See Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, 1976), chapter 29; Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, 'Introduction: Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule', *American Ethnologist*, 16(4) (1989): 609–21.
6. See Benjamin Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris, 1991), and also, for example, Alec Hargreaves, ed., *Memory, Empire, and Postcolonialism: Legacies of French Colonialism* (Lanham, 2005); Brigitte Gaiti, 'Les ratés de l'histoire: une manifestation sans suites: le 17 octobre 1961 à Paris', *Sociétés contemporaines*, 20 (1994): 11–37; and John E. Talbott, *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954–1962* (New York, 1980).
7. For an analysis of the film, see E. Cardonne-Arlyck, 'Espaces muets et intimité perverse: de Muriel (Resnais, 1962) à Caché (Haneke, 2005)', *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies*, 12(2) (2008): 265–75.
8. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, 2nd edn, 2008).

9. Sylvie Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne* (Paris, 2005).
10. See Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor* (New York, 1971). On these developments, see Todd Shepard, 'Decolonization and the Republic', in Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christophe Prochasson, eds, *The French Republic* (Ithaca, 2011), 252–61.
11. See, for example, Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago, 2005).
12. See Todd Shepard, 'Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO: A Transnational History of Anti-Racism and Empire, 1932–1962', *Journal of Global History*, 6(2) (2011): 273–97.
13. See Shelley Baranowski's chapter in this volume.
14. 'Entretien: Jacques Soustelle', *Le Monde*, 16 January 1956.
15. Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York, 2000).
16. Martin Thomas, *The French Empire at War, 1940–1945* (Manchester, 2007).
17. *Ibid.*
18. K. H. Adler, 'Indigènes after Indigènes: Post-War France and its North African Troops', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 20(3) (2013): 463–78.
19. Marc Michel, 'L'empire colonial dans les débats parlementaires', in Serge Berstein and Pierre Milza, eds, *L'Année 1947* (Paris, 2000), 189–217.
20. Charles-Robert Ageron, 'La survivance d'un mythe: la puissance par l'empire colonial (1944–1947)', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 72(269) (1985): 387–403, here 388.
21. From article 9 of the Atlantic Charter; for the text of this treaty, see Samuel Rosenman, ed., *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 10: *The Call to Battle Stations 1941* (New York, 1950), 314.
22. Marika Sherwood, '"Diplomatic Platitudes": The Atlantic Charter, The United Nations and Colonial Independence', *Immigrants & Minorities*, 15(2) (1996): 135–50.
23. The quoted translation of the United Nations Charter is from Louis Rolland and Pierre Lampué, *Précis de droit des pays d'outre-mer, territoires, départements, états associés* (Paris, 2nd edn, 1952), 25.
24. John Kent, *The Internationalization of Colonialism: Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939–1956* (Oxford, 1992), 287.
25. Max Beloff, 'The Federal Solution in Its Application to Europe, Asia, and Africa', *Political Studies*, 1(2) (1953): 114–31; René Capitant, *Démocratie et participation politique dans les institutions françaises, de 1875 à nos jours* (Paris, 1972).
26. Paul-Emile Viard, *Les caractères politiques et le régime législatif de l'Algérie* (Paris, 1949), 10–16, argues that it was legally part of the metropole; Pierre Lampué in Rolland and Lampué, *Précis de droit des pays outre-mer*, that it was distinct.
27. Clotaire Bée, 'La doctrine d'intégration', *Recueil Penant*, 2 (1946): 27–48, here 33.
28. On Capitant's federalism, see Nicolas Wahl, 'Aux origines de la nouvelle constitution', *Revue française de science politique*, 9(1) (1959): 51–2 ; René Capitant, *Pour une constitution fédérale* (Strasbourg, 1946); on the role of federalism for Charles de Gaulle at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, see, for example, Wilfried Loth, 'De Gaulle et la construction: la révision d'un

- mythe', *Francia*, 20(3) (1993): 61–72. For an extended analysis, see Todd Shepard, 'A l'heure des "grands ensembles" et de la guerre d'Algérie: L'"État-nation" en question', *Monde(s): Revue d'histoire transnationale*, 1 (2012): 113–34.
29. Alfred Grosser, *La IVe République et sa politique étrangère* (Paris, 1961), 248–51.
 30. Anon., 'M. Jacques Soustelle...', s.d., February 1955, 1, Centre d'accueil et de recherché des Archives Nationales (CARAN), 4AG/528.
 31. Jacques Soustelle, *Aimée et souffrante Algérie* (Paris, 1956), 36; 'Entretien: Jacques Soustelle'; Shepard, 'Algeria, France, Mexico, UNESCO', 290–5.
 32. Anon., 'Note relative à un projet de loi-cadre pour l'Algérie', 3 August 1957, 1, CARAN, 4AG/532. On the connections between these reforms and latter metropolitan-focused regionalization, see Romain Pasquier, *La capacité politique des régions: une comparaison France/Espagne* (Rennes, 2004).
 33. For a clear indication of how much contemporary analysis of the Constitution of October 1958 focused on the redefining of links between the metropole and *outré-mer*, see Nicole Richard and Claude Jourdan, 'Éléments de bibliographie sur la Constitution de 1958', *Revue française de science politique*, 9(1) (1959): 212–28.
 34. See Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge, 1996); Seti Y. Gableame Gbedemah, 'L'échec de la politique française d'intégration au Togo sous tutelle', in Nicoué Lodjou Gayibor, ed., *Les Togolais face à la colonisation* (Lomé, 1994), 111–47.
 35. Jean Fremigacci, 'Les parlementaires africains face à la construction européenne, 1953–1957', *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, 77(1) (2005), 5–16.
 36. François Borella, *L'évolution politique et juridique de l'union française depuis 1946* (Paris, 1958); see Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*.
 37. Gérard Noiriel, *Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France (XIXe-XXe siècle)* (Paris, 2007), 438 and 552–3; see Léo Bogart, 'Les Algériens en France, adaptation réussie et non réussie', in Alain Girard and Jean Stoetzel, eds, *Français et immigrés, Vol. II: Nouveaux documents sur l'adaptation: Algériens, Italiens, Polonais; le service social d'aide aux immigrants* (Paris, 1954), 17–93.
 38. See Shepard, 'Decolonization and the Republic'.
 39. [Michel Debré], 'Lettre circulaire aux postes diplomatiques.../A.s. Prochain débat de l'Assemblée des Nations Unies sur l'Algérie', December 1959, Papiers Debré, Fondation Sciences Politiques: 2 DE 75, 1–14.
 40. Charles-Robert Ageron, 'Mai 1945 en Algérie. Enjeu de mémoire et histoire', *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, 39 (1995): 52–6.
 41. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 183–8.
 42. Benjamin Stora, *Le transfert d'une mémoire: de l'Algérie française au racisme anti-arabe* (Paris, 1999).
 43. Guy Mollet, Edgar Faure, and Michel Debré, 'Trois anciens chefs du gouvernement s'expliquent sur le référendum', *Paris-Match*, 704, 6 October 1962: 58.

Part II

Repatriation and Integration

4

Assimilation versus Incorporation: Expellee Integration Policies in East and West Germany after 1945

Michael Schwartz

In 1968, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) broadcast a film based on the socialist novel, *Wege übers Land* (*Ways Across the Country*). Both novel and film provided a remarkable historical and political interpretation of the fate of refugees and expellees who lived in the East German State.¹ Officially they were called *Umsiedler* (resettlers), following a decisive order of the Soviet Military Administration in the autumn of 1945 that was meant to suppress the then prevailing, but politically inconvenient, reference to ‘refugees’. A taboo of the communist dictatorship was broken in showing scenes of the flight of German women and children in the winter of 1945, along with the crimes of the Nazi regime against Jews and Poles as being the cause for the later flight of German civilians. It was in no way wrong – in fact it was much clearer than in contemporary West German film productions – however, it overemphasized and isolated these issues.

Much more distorting was the movie’s focus on a female refugee who had become a National Socialist settler in occupied Poland after 1939. Consequently, her flight in 1945 simply meant a departure from stolen territory and a return to her real homeland; thus, repatriation by retaliation. This created the false impression that all of the 12–15 million German refugees and expellees had been only short-term occupants of foreign countries and had been justly pushed back into their regular fatherland after the failure of its imperialistic aggression in Eastern Europe. ‘Heim ins Reich’ (‘Back into the Reich’), as the expulsionist Eastern European governments had put it in utterly cynical and propagandistic terms.

In reality, such a short-term colonist was hardly to be found among the millions of German victims of ethnic cleansing. Indeed, there had been some 900,000 who had been 'resettled' during World War II by the Nazi regime, with 650,000 of them being relocated in occupied Poland. However, these people did not come as colonists from the German Reich, but rather originated from Soviet East Poland, the Baltic States, the USSR, Romania, and Yugoslavia where they often had lived for centuries. Moreover, the large majority of the 12 million surviving expellees in 1950 came from prewar East German provinces (seven million) and from Czechoslovakia (three million). These people had been living there for many generations, despite the fact that Polish nationalists considered East Germany as ancient Polish property (*urpolnische Gebiete*) that had been only 'regained' in 1945, and that Czech nationalists downgraded their Sudeten German neighbors as sheer 'colonists and immigrants' instead of fellow citizens.

Indeed, these 'colonists' had at one time been invited to resettle by medieval Bohemian kings, and the many generations of their descendants would live longer in Bohemia than the white population from Europe would in America beginning in 1492. Therefore, in inter-allied negotiations during World War II the topic of ancient Polish rights to German provinces was hastily silenced. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt caustically remarked that if this argument was valid, even Great Britain would be entitled to reclaim the United States as its former colony² (in this circle of white male state leaders, nobody considered the rights of the native 'Indians' of the Americas).

Therefore the ideological term 'repatriates' – the official designation for European 'returnees' from Algeria in post-1962 France – was rarely in use in occupied Germany, not even in communist GDR, which created a sharp contrast to communist Poland. Only the Soviet military administration between 1945 and 1949 had established a department for 'repatriation', which did not only bring back Soviet forced laborers into the realm of Stalinism, but also many of those ethnic Germans who had been resettled by Hitler during World War II. But these Germans were not repatriated into their old Soviet homelands; rather they were deported into Soviet labor camps or remote Central Asian regions.

Certainly the notion of 'resettlers' within the GDR was a euphemistic term, but nonetheless its use avoided the fiction of people simply being returned into their 'real' native homeland. This was the deception of the 'repatriate' concept as it would be applied to 2.5 million Polish forced migrants who had to leave their homes in Eastern Poland after it had been annexed by the Soviets. As usual, the term disguised reality.

These Poles had to leave because they were threatened by a communist dictatorship and by Ukrainian nationalist partisans. They were 'repatriated' into a homeland that was not their native country, but only 'home' from a nationalist ideological perspective. Similar was the fate of those 12 million Germans who survived ethnic cleansing between 1944 and 1950. Undeniably, the West German term of 'expellees' also did not depict the whole spectrum of a process that would not even be comprehensively described by the triad of 'flight, expulsion, and forced resettlement' that would come to be used by West German scholarship in the 1980s. In truth, the notion of 'expellees' came much closer to reality than 'resettlers' or 'repatriates'.

Integration or assimilation?

The massive forced migrations of German refugees and expellees at the end of World War II changed the two postwar German societies in a similar, but not identical way.³ In both cases, the democratic FRG and the non-democratic GDR, which were each founded in 1949, experienced an influx in immigration. With 12 million people arriving, these states were transformed into veritable immigration societies. To be sure, this was against the will of the indigenous majority, as well as the wishes of the immigrants themselves, being as they were compelled by Allied policy. The fact that the process of immigration mainly developed between (predominately ethnic) Germans did not ease the process of assimilation; nevertheless, it was this ethnic 'equality' that soon developed into a legal equality, affirming that process of immigration and integration among Germans – similar to the policy towards Pieds-Noirs in France – as a 'privileged immigration' regarded in terms of law and of social policy.⁴

Even if absolute numbers were significantly higher in West Germany, nearly 4.5 million expellee-immigrants were received into the Soviet Zone of Occupation between 1945 and 1950 representing a far higher proportion than the FRG (24.1 percent versus 17.9 percent of the total postwar population). Eight of the twelve million surviving German expellees lived in the Federal Republic in 1950, an additional four million in the GDR, and 430,000 in Austria. Compared to 1939, the population of the two postwar German states had increased by ten million people. There were great regional differences as well. Whereas the French attempted to halt the advance of Eastern expellees into their German zone of occupation, the population of British-occupied Schleswig-Holstein (30.7 percent) and Lower Saxony (26.5 percent) had

relatively high expellee proportions, followed by US-American Bavaria (20.7 percent) and Hesse (17.2 percent). In the Soviet occupation zone (SBZ) the expellee proportion ranged from an exorbitant 43.3 percent in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania to 17.2 percent in Saxony. Initially, expellees mainly lived in rural areas, causing harsh social and cultural conflicts within village populations.⁵

While the Federal Republic continued to receive immigrants after 1950, accepting expellees and other refugees from the GDR and a new category of 'guest workers' from Southern Europe and Turkey, the large drain of people 'fleeing the Republic' transformed the GDR into an emigration society. This development was only be stopped by building the Berlin Wall in 1961. Yet, since a third of these 2.7 million '*Republikflüchtige*' (GDR refugees) were former expellees from the East (who had been officially renamed as 'resettlers' or 'former resettlers' in SBZ/GDR in 1945 or 1950), the integration of the remaining expellees became easier for the communist regime. The significant loss of qualified young workers went hand in hand with a reduction in potential political and social conflicts, reducing the number of dissidents and increasing the number of socially mobile profiteers who took over social positions that had been vacated by Soviet de-nazification, communist transformation or '*Republikflucht*' in GDR society. The diverging demographic and political developments and the socio-economic systems in both German states created different opportunities for individual expellee integration.

The first years of both postwar societies were characterized by Allied policies of rapid assimilation, and a denial of integration on the part of the German population that believed the 'refugee problem' (West) or 'resettler problem' (East) could only be solved by the return of the expellees to their old homelands. Therefore, integration policies were initiated by American, British and Soviet Allied occupation authorities. These Allied dreams of assimilation, however, were not fulfilled; rather the Allied unwillingness to revise the eastern border of Germany was the driving force for the emergence of a serious expellee integration policy in both states. While the GDR government accepted the irreversibility of territorial losses as early as 1950, against the will of the vast majority of the population, the early governments of the FRG preferred a 'domestic policy' (*Heimatpolitik*) leaving open the question of territorial revisions and expellee emigration. Despite these differences, both German states developed integration policies. While the GDR initiated a 'resettler policy' without any revisionistic reservation, the Federal Republic integrated just that reservation into its 'expellee policy'.

While the communist regime in East Berlin tried to assimilate the expellees, Adenauer's conservative governments in Bonn practiced a policy of 'incorporation' (*Eingliederungspolitik*) that intended to combine the necessities of economic integration with the political wish to preserve cultural group identities. This ambivalent Western policy effectively promoted social integration, but impeded the assimilation of the expellees. Remarkable subventions for expellee organizations (especially the regionally focused *Landsmannschaften*) kept alive specific regional group identities. The limits of the preservationist approach can be demonstrated not only in the massive decrease of membership in such organizations as early as around 1960,⁶ but also by the significant shift of expellee identities from initial politicization to subsequent neutralization by historicization.

By contrast, Soviet zone and GDR authorities intended integration without alternatives, including even complete cultural assimilation – and in this respect the French integration policy towards the repatriates resembled more the GDR approach than the FRG revisionist 'incorporation' policy.⁷ The result was a combination of political repression, ideological indoctrination, and societal dynamic pressure for assimilation. A basic premise of this policy was not to question the German territorial losses in the East and the resulting mass expulsion, which were interpreted as a logical consequence of Nazism and Nazi crimes. Even marginal corrections of the Eastern border, initially discussed by some SED leaders like Wilhelm Pieck (the later President of the GDR), were rapidly banned from East German official discourses. While the assimilationist policy of GDR authorities overtook the social processes of integration in order to enforce them, creating serious difficulties of adaptation for many expellees, the incorporation policy of the FRG tried to slow down the social tendencies towards assimilation in order to keep the rhetorics of 'leaving open' the question of Germany's Eastern border (that indeed would not be formally settled before 1990). In both cases the impact of integration policy was limited, compared to the assimilationist dynamics of social developments, especially after generational changes.

The often acclaimed 'miracle of the integration' of the expellees in West Germany⁸ has been explained by the fact that the postwar development of West Germany would have not only meant one-sided assimilation that demanded changes from the expellee 'newcomers' alone, but in fact would have changed the postwar society for every German, regardless of expellee–indigenous divisions.⁹ This view is interesting and partially even correct, especially for the situations in big

industrial centers like the Ruhr area or newly invented industrial complexes like Wolfsburg in the West or Stalinstadt/Eisenhüttenstadt in the East.

But the vast majority of expellees lived in rural areas or small towns during the first postwar decade. Rural society, with its relatively stable social hierarchies and milieus, did not guarantee equal chances of social integration and advancement to newcomers, but rather in most cases brutal integration at the lowest social level (*Unterschichtung*).¹⁰ The expellees after 1945 had filled the gap of former foreign forced laborers after the defeat of the Nazi war empire.¹¹ Therefore, ethnological studies demonstrate caution towards the notion of common postwar integration of all Germans; instead, for many expellees after the catastrophe of flight and expulsion there followed a second crisis upon arrival, that being characterized by a lack of 'national solidarity'. This 'cultural shock' of being downgraded and discriminated in one's own *Vaterland* had deep, long-term impact.¹²

This conflict-centered approach towards the integrational dynamics of the postwar era should be taken seriously. Notwithstanding subsequent processes of social rapprochement and interweavement, the phenomenon of euphemizing retrospective 'integration ideology' should be put into a historical context as well. 'A terminus like "integration"' tends to harmonize 'the historical facts even in memory', not least by reducing a personal biography to a 'pure success story', fading down all negative experiences like the early 'time of diffamation and discrimination'. Yet, individual memories should not be the only source for the correction of dominating social interpretations of history; too often these socially-produced notions of history are the filter for perceiving a person's individual history.¹³

Early steps of integration have been mostly a form of adaptation of the newcomers to social structures with unfavorable, if not adverse, power relations. The conflicts between the refugees, the have-nots and field-thieves, the 'hordes' from the East that swamped the rest of Germany, and the 'indigenous' Germans have been depicted as a 'completely new front of class struggle',¹⁴ which was only alleviated around 1960. Yet the 'indigenous culture' was far from being homogeneous, and the identities of the refugees were also extremely heterogeneous. What partly united the latter, were more or less common experiences of flight and expulsion, of the wish to return, and of social discrimination in the so-called 'new homeland'.¹⁵ Since there were hardly less disagreements and conflicts among expellees than in the majority of the population, any mobilization based on unity of interests – that indeed was attempted

by the expellee party Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE) and by the lobby organization Bund der vertriebenen Deutschen (BvD) in West Germany during the 1950s – could only be partially and temporarily successful.¹⁶ While economic integration proceeded and social interactions intensified (for example marriages increased),¹⁷ the masses of expellees and indigenous people ceased standing ‘against each other like blocks ready to massacre each other the day after’.¹⁸ During the decisive integrational decade between 1955 and 1965 these confrontational identities lost their social cohesion. Those expellees who remained ‘losers’ were marginalized even more strongly than before because their problems were not the same as those of the majority of their group.

An indicator for the long-lasting social asymmetries between the immigrants and the majority of the population were the lasting (but diminishing) claims to restore the prewar social hierarchy of the expellees who had experienced a massive leveling by means of expulsion and expropriation.¹⁹ Such claims would be raised to consider expellee farmers (*Flüchtlingsbauern*) even during the 1960s. Yet only the 91,000 ‘new resettler farmers’ (*Umsiedler-Neubauern*) in the GDR (under special conditions of the so-called *Bodenreform*) achieved some restoration of their former status (at a very low level), while West Germany did not touch private property and only offered rather fruitless subventions of tiny tenancies or secondary occupations, thus establishing ten thousand new expellee farms.²⁰

In the FRG there existed a long-term intergenerational disadvantage for expellees (admittedly in a highly differentiated industrial society) who were only able to catch up and equalize in the third generation after the war.²¹ In order to explain the fast depolitization of the expellees during the 1960s, it must be taken into account that the experiences of this group differed considerably from the very beginning. Historians soon learned to distinguish between ‘refugees’, ‘expellees’, and ‘forced migrants’.²² They had undergone different types of forced migration, had different experiences with perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, and had different experiences within their new integrational society.

Another group which is usually not included in this consideration were the ‘homeless returnees’ (*heimatlose Heimkehrer*), the masses of released German prisoners of war whose homelands meanwhile had become targets of Allied forced removal policies. Moreover, there were important differences according to sex and generation – not only during flight and expulsion (which have been defined as the ‘hour of the women’ by Christian Graf von Krockow, because most of the men were

absent), but also concerning the 'life chances' (Ralf Dahrendorf) in the new homelands. Additionally, the integration of the expellees was influenced by their former social positions, by their different amounts of 'cultural capital' (Pierre Bourdieu), as well as by their postwar experiences of being downgraded, being restored, or moving up in society.

The diverse regional and cultural origins created a further difference between expellees – not so much in the ideological sense of distinguished 'characteristics of the German tribes' (*Stammeseigenschaften*), which West German incorporation policy tried to preserve and East German resettler policy tried to dissolve, but rather as socio-cultural preconditions of more or less successful social and political integrations into specific local contexts. Expellees from more industrialized regions like the Sudetenland or Silesia showed a stronger inclination to integrate into the industrial societies of West and East Germany, but also a higher degree of political participation than fellow expellees from agrarian regions. Ethnic German 'resettlers' from southeastern Europe tended to perpetuate their tradition of self-seclusion, which they had practiced over centuries in German villages within foreign surroundings. Thus, the 'expellee' did not exist – at best as an abstraction or as a cliché.

Two German rival policies of integration after 1945: concepts and measures

The ethnic approach of the FRG becomes clear if we look at the postwar debates on the 'inclusion', or 'organic' integration, not of individuals, but of entire ethnocultural 'regional groups' into an alleged 'national body' of the German nation. Theodor Oberländer, Adenauer's influential Federal Minister for Expellees between 1953 and 1960 (when he as a well-known former Nazi was forced to resign after Polish and GDR allegations that he had taken part in an anti-Semitic massacre during World War II²³) proclaimed the fateful question whether millions of German expellees could be 'really incorporated' or simply would develop into a 'mass', as in the GDR.²⁴ The incorporation approach not only had National Socialist, but also much broader conservative ideological roots, which originated from the 19th century or at least from the interwar period. Moreover, many protagonists of West German expellee policy had been involved in ethnonationalistic minority struggles before 1945 – Oberländer in East Prussia; his drab successor Hans Krüger (CDU, Federal Minister for Expellees in 1963–4) in Pomerania and West Prussia; and the same was true for Sudeten German Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, or Baltic German Axel de Vries.²⁵

A major protagonist of inclusionist ideology was the Baltic German sociologist and former Nazi Max Hildebert Boehm.²⁶ For him, the problem of the displaced people was not only a social, but mainly an 'ethnic' issue. In 1951, Boehm criticized the process of real integration in the Federal Republic as an unwanted triumph of modern 'civilization' over long-grown 'culture', a 'process of decomposition of the German agricultural basic culture and the overgrowth of a metropolitan Talmi-civilization'.²⁷ Instead, he preferred a political preservation of ethnic regional identities. The conservation of an organic group identity through massive subsidies to expellee organizations appeared urgent to Boehm, since not only the Soviets but also the Western Allies had implemented mixed settlements and a coalition ban during the early postwar years – 'key decisions' against the model of organic inclusion in favor of an assimilationist melting of the expellees. In an official publication of the Federal Ministry for Expellees of 1959, Boehm warned that 'substantial opportunities for a collective and organic integration of East Germans to the west and south of our fatherland' could be 'buried once and for all' by these measures; because at that time 'operations of leveling and mechanical insertion of East Germans to the western environment' had been brought 'forcibly and irreversibly in motion'.²⁸

Likewise, leading West German officials defined integration as 'incorporation', being opposed to any assimilation. The long-time State Secretary of the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Peter Paul Nahm (CDU), warned not to confuse 'inclusion' with a 'melting down'.²⁹ By defining 'incorporation' (*Eingliederung*) as an attempt to secure for the displaced either their 'earlier or in the course of development newly detected desirable place in society' within the 'new environment', he wished to harmonize the rather conflicting goals of status restoration and upward mobility. However, the more the State Secretary implored the 'pursuit of restoring the harmonious social structure of the [former] homelands' – refuting the 'collectivist ideology' in Soviet 'satellite fields' of the GDR – the more difficult it became to dismiss the 'assumption or expectation' (being obvious in times of West German economic growth) of being able to replace the homelands of the individual by a general economic rise.

Despising that 'materialist viewpoint', it required some self-deception to assert categorically in 1959 that the displaced people living in West Germany would never become an 'assimilated Bavarian or Rhinelander or Hesse', but would remain a citizen of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia. The expellees' eager efforts to cooperate in postwar economic reconstruction were interpreted as 'no decision in the sense of commitment to stick around or a justification of holding back the expelles'.

Where assimilation of the expellees (especially among the younger generation) was undeniable, it was downplayed by Nahm in its quantitative dimension and denigrated as a failure of weak characters.³⁰ Nevertheless, the attempt of the FRG expellee policy to interpret the process of integration as a 'detour to the expected recovery of the homeland' became less and less credible.³¹

Yet, not all enemies of assimilation were blind towards empirical evidence. In 1959, Boehm, a veritable *Kulturpessimist* (cultural pessimist), observed that a 'not only material but also psychological acclimatization to the changing environment' was taking place among the expellees, a process of 're-rooting' (*Wiederverwurzelung*) that necessarily led to a 'Verzwitterung [formation of a hermaphrodite identity] of homeland consciousness'. During that process the old homeland in Boehm's eyes was 'in danger of falling more and more into the emotional background'.³² At the same time, the sociologist Eugen Lemberg – a native of Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, who had been a member of the Nazi Party and also had been excluded by it³³ – noticed a significant 'tension between home policy and inclusion', being a 'tragic contrast' in each individual identity. Lemberg criticized the official rhetorics of 'inclusion by reservation' as insufficient. According to him, a deeper understanding of the destiny of German expellees needed an international 'supra-ethnic' dimension, and it had to 'involve a dissolution of its various ethnic groups into the *Gesamtdeuschtum* [pan-Germanhood]'. There was to be considered 'the emergence of a younger generation with a different experience base'.³⁴

By 1960, the organic inclusionist approach seemed to have lost its social basis. Reality offered 'a mixed picture'. While the expellees' organizations still had significant political influence 'as an important stakeholder in public life', suggesting a strong cohesion of the group, many expellees already considered themselves 'as settled down in their new homeland again'. Thus, many expellees withdrew from the expellees' organizations after their successful social integration, and many of their children alienated themselves from the cultural origins of their parents.³⁵ The expellee youth distanced itself from the vulnerable displaced identity of the older generations to an extent, 'as is usual otherwise only among emigrant families or in periods of revolutionary upheaval', as one ethnologist put it in 1959.³⁶

The heritability of the expellee and refugee status, fixed in 1953 by law in West Germany (*Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz*), was unable to stop this process. In the 1980s this heritability paragraph was still valid, but it appeared as 'a politically important statistical oddity'.³⁷

Although the anti-communist (former Nazi) West German economist Peter-Heinz Seraphim³⁸ stated in 1954 that there was still an 'expellee problem' in East Germany despite all official denials of the communist regime, he had to admit that expellee identities were changing in the GDR. 'Even expellees had become SED activists for convenience'; and, even more serious, 'the Soviet zone regime had succeeded in some burglaries' to win over some parts of the expellee youth.³⁹

In the mid-1960s, a younger generation of sociologists offered new perspectives on the expellee problem in Germany.⁴⁰ The Dutch sociologist Hiddo M. Jolles noticed strong 'integrative tendencies' not only in the economic, but also in the cultural field.⁴¹ According to him, the 'Wanderer Ideology' that was still maintained by some politicians and the expellee organizations was a 'static view of man and society', denying not only the social dynamics of West German society, but also the individual freedom to change identities. Jolles observed that most of the expellees no longer wanted a 'full restoration of former homeland states'. From this point of view, the incorporation policy was a 'mistake', being 'politicization', 'but not political management'.⁴² Likewise, the young sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf illustrated his liberal critique of West German social policy, which he understood as a systematic attempt to 'immobilize' people on a once given social status by permanent group-specific subventions, by referring to the expellee policy of the Federal Republic as one that tried to 'preserve the refugee as a refugee', even twenty years after the end of the war.⁴³

By contrast former Federal Minister for Expellees Hans Krüger (CDU) – also the founding president of the German Expellee Federation (Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV)), who had been forced to resign both positions in 1964 because of Polish and GDR accusations about his Nazi past⁴⁴ – criticized the purely economic notion of integration policy. In a memorandum of 1967, he argued that 'a true integration mainly depended on mental and emotional factors, such as the preservation and continuation of cultural heritage', and thus could not be decided by material support which merely facilitated it.⁴⁵ This may have been a common view among conservative politicians of that time, but they were unable to change the pragmatic socio-economic trend of West German integration policy and the following social-liberal turn of German politics.

Although leading Social Democrats such as SPD chairman Kurt Schumacher (born in the East German expulsion territories) and his later successor Willy Brandt (influenced by Nazi exile experience) had publicly condemned the expulsion of millions of Germans after 1945

for a long time and thus had contributed to the West German policy of 'leaving open' the return question, many Social Democrats preferred a more pragmatic approach regarding integration.

In 1951, during a West German Social Science Congress on 'Refugees', the sociologist Theodor Geiger (a socialist of Jewish origin who had been – like Brandt – forced into Scandinavian exile in 1933 by the Nazi regime) claimed that the success or failure of integration did not only depend on economic, but also on psychological factors; he considered the latter to retard integration and thus condemned them as irrational. Geiger demanded that the German refugee policy should turn to the future, stating 'Against the romanticism of the old home you should directly go into battle, because the clustering into homeland groups insulated the displaced and prevented them almost from assimilation.' Equally provocative was Geiger's demand for scientific comparisons between the fate of German expellees and the Palestinian refugee problem, or the more than two million Polish people who had been resettled in former German territories in the East.⁴⁶

In a similar way, in 1950 the Social Democrat Heinrich Albertz, Minister for Expellees of Lower Saxony who had been displaced from Silesia himself, wrote an angry letter to the CDU Federal Minister of Labour Anton Storch (a non-expellee German from Hesse), in which he demanded a halt to promising the expellees that they could return one day to their old homelands. In Albertz' opinion these promises just raised unrealistic hopes among the expellees, maintaining 'the psychological situation of sitting on the packed suitcase' and therefore weakening the 'will to work'. Facing the dilemma of West German expellee policy, this Social Democrat made a clear choice: 'Although the demand for a revision of the German East must be never abandoned by us, we in the West have to speak and to act, as if not a single German expellee would come home again.'⁴⁷ With this priority for labor market integration, Social Democrats like Albertz were much closer to SED politicians from GDR (who used the same metaphor of 'packed suitcases' to describe the mental obstacles to integration⁴⁸) than to their competing Western Christian Democrats.

As time went by, expellee policy slowly adapted to the priority of integration. Even before the political shift to a Social Democratic and Liberal government under Chancellor Willy Brandt since 1969, politicians in Bonn tended to declare that the expellees had been integrated successfully; a new myth of 'integration ideology' now became common for both German states and societies.⁴⁹ In 1969, the Brandt government's abolition of an independent Ministry for Expellees (being integrated on

a low level into the Ministry of the Interior) sanctioned this change. The failure of the revisionist CDU/CSU campaign against Brandt's 'New Eastern Policy' during the Federal elections of 1972 confirmed that shift, demonstrating that even many expellees no longer supported the traditional 'homeland policy'.⁵⁰ The previously significant influence of the expellee organizations in West German policy has since been broken and did not even regenerate after the 1982 'turning point' of a new government led by the Christian Democrats under Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

During reunification of the FRG and the GDR, when the territorial issue really was at stake, Kohl and his chief negotiator Wolfgang Schäuble – then Federal Minister of the Interior – pragmatically refused to fight for theoretical East German territories lost many decades before. The Federation of Expellees had to realize that it had been marginalized even within the conservative part of German society.⁵¹ Shortly before, the communist SED regime had considerably relaxed towards West German integration policy. In July of 1989, a report of the GDR Ministry for State Security stated that the vast majority of 16 million expellees and expellee descendants did not consider themselves represented by the BdV because they did not search for their homeland in the East anymore, but regarded the FRG as their final homeland.⁵²

A major difference between the West German inclusion policy and its GDR counterpart of assimilatory 'resettler policy' was its much longer duration. This discrepancy can be explained by the different political systems. While the political pluralism of the Federal Republic in 1950 increased the influence of competing interest groups in the political system and awarded 'an entirely new dynamic' of self-organization among the expellees,⁵³ offering procedures for political compromise,⁵⁴ the establishment of the SED dictatorship did not only prevent institutionalized pluralism, but also destroyed the leeways that had existed during the first postwar years.

In order to prevent border revisionism in the East, the Allied Powers and especially the Soviets had promoted assimilation policy since 1945 and ordered the legal emancipation of the expellees and the implementation of the first social aid programs. In contrast to the conservative governments in West Germany, Ulbricht's SED dictatorship stuck to a path of authoritarian assimilationist policy. During the 1960s and 1970s, West German scientists came to believe that this mixture of political repression and socio-economic integration had accelerated the integration of the expellees in the GDR in comparison to the early Federal Republic.

Whereas in 1954 Peter-Heinz Seraphim had still maintained that ‘the vast majority’ of expellees was opposed to the political attempt to enforce the ‘self-surrendering [of] their spiritual and traditional autonomy’,⁵⁵ only one decade later West German sociologist Dietrich Storbeck observed ‘a largely effected integration of expellees’ in GDR society. He explained this alleged success not only in socio-economic terms but also mentioned the successful repression of expellee identity and self organization by the communist regime. In this view, because the expellees had not been allowed to make use of their ‘own rights or opportunities’ in contrast to West Germany, they had been unable to perceive themselves ‘as a particular population group’ in the GDR and thus had been integrated much better.⁵⁶

Strangely enough, the SED regime was rather shocked in 1965 by a survey that had been undertaken by its own Central Committee Institute for Opinion Research. Despite twenty years of ideological re-education, the question whether the German ‘boundaries from 1937 should be restored’ had been answered in the affirmative by 22 percent of GDR citizens. It must have been little comfort that one could refer to a parallel Allensbach survey according to which only 46 percent of West German citizens surveyed declared that the former German territories would never be German again. The SED pollsters thought their GDR results to be ‘a serious signal’.⁵⁷

Whereas West German observers of the 1950s still had a lot to say about GDR integration policy, their successors in the 1960s would not mention that policy with a single word. This oblivion reflected the relatively short period of special social aid policy for expellees in communist East Germany, whereas this policy approach was continued until 1991 in West Germany – and would be criticized, as mentioned above, by young liberals like Ralf Dahrendorf as ‘immobilizing’ and non-integrating the refugees in Western society.

Demands for the redistribution of property from non-expelled to expelled Germans (who mostly had lost nearly all of their material possessions) were as old as the expulsion itself. The Western Allies, especially the Americans, had regarded such redistribution policy (soon covered under the term of ‘burden sharing’) as a dangerous socialist approach that might favor hidden Soviet policy to establish communist rule even over Western Germany, while the Soviets had blocked such redistribution policy in their own zone of occupation out of fears that this policy might re-establish or strengthen a capitalist social structure. Moreover, in both political postwar systems only as much redistribution policy could be practiced as the majority of the

population tolerated. That this limit proved ultimately more generous in the Federal Republic than in the GDR, although the rigorous Soviet 'land reform' of 1945 seemed to indicate that a rigorous policy of redistribution seemed to be easier in the latter, can be explained with the different political participation leeways of organized group interests.

Yet, even in West Germany the enforcement of expellee interests was limited. Not only did the Western 'land reform' never gain momentum, but also the 'Burden Sharing Law' of 1952 did not include any redistribution of existing private property, but only of a small portion of capital gains. In the Soviet Zone and GDR, communist resettler policy only touched private asset holdings in the early land reform of 1945, but later conditioned any further redistribution to growth and surpluses or government debts. However, the West German Burden Sharing Law effected, within four decades, a socio-political redistribution of DM134 billion – a volume that the GDR never wanted to achieve and never could. It seems clear that this huge investment helped to turn the heavy social 'foundation crisis' of the young Federal Republic into a successful 'Integration of Society'.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, one must see that only a small fraction of the Compensation Act went to Monetary Compensation, and only a very limited and long-term elongated redistribution of domestic assets had taken place. West German burden sharing always pursued the goal of consideration for interests of business and the (local) wealthy, and only beyond that target it tried simultaneously to assist displaced persons by promoting economic development aid (through numerous loan programs). This reflects significant similarities of the otherwise very different burden sharing laws (West) and resettler legislation (East). Despite all this, the West German burden sharing compromise caused the 'biggest redistribution of wealth' of German history on an indemnity basis,⁵⁹ while East German resettler policy was strictly limited to credit supports and tax-funded subventions.⁶⁰

The competing integration policies of the Federal Republic and the GDR both had a common foundation on economic integration and thus on credit support for the working sections of the expellee population. Furthermore, both focused on a grant for the refurbishment of the displaced with furniture and household equipment; the FRG offered a partial compensation, the GDR only a loan offer. Another convergence of both policies consisted of considerations for the future. This emphasis on future is evident in the assimilation policy of the SBZ/GDR, but it can also be found in the ambiguous integration policy of the

Federal Republic, which also included the backward-looking 'right to the homeland'.

As we have seen, the option of returning soon became an implausible part of official political discourse, and the compensation dimension of burden sharing remained clearly subordinated to an inclusive future component. Thus, it was not completely fair that critics of the 1960s, such as Ralf Dahrendorf, attacked the expellee policy of the Federal Republic as a 'syndrome of immaturity' adverse to social modernization.⁶¹ Expellee policy had to concentrate on socio-economic change and economic growth and thus to affirm social mobility – independent from whatever may have been declared in Sunday speeches. Therefore, despite all the talk of 'Status Restoration', expellee policy could never be just 'restorative' in the Federal Republic; thus, both German integration policies basically had to affirm social progress and were in this regard 'revolutionary'.⁶² Or, as the conservative former Federal Minister for Expellees Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (CDU) put it frankly in 1971, the participation of the expellees in the process of reconstruction after 1945 had never been about restoration, but about progression.⁶³ In both postwar societies these policies were dominated ultimately by the same constraint on future.

Regarding its socio-political aims and results, GDR resettler policy between 1945 and 1953 in certain respects has been even more restorative and anti-modernistic than the rhetorically anti-modernist West German refugee or expellee policy. This is especially true for the agricultural policy dimension that triggered in 1945 a veritable structural revolution by means of wide-range 'land reform' expropriation, only to operate since then a costly and economically harmful subsidy policy with a focus on the primary sector and an unprofitable small business framework. In the case of small farms, 91,000 of 210,000 were redistributed into the hands of 'resettler farmers' (*Umsiedler-Neubauern*), but despite this integrational success, that agricultural policy was a devastating anachronism. Soon this uneconomical small business structure had to be cancelled between 1952 and 1960, returning to large-scale management policy of forced collectivization and simultaneous redirection of state subsidies into the industrial sector.⁶⁴

Similarly, the subsidy policy for craftsmen in the Soviet Zone and GDR, in particular its restriction in 1950 to small businesses by the exclusion of cooperatives, clearly showed such social restorative elements.⁶⁵ This subsidy policy refers – not only in West Germany, but also in the SED state – to the close relationship between the 'help people to help themselves' approach and property ownership. Just as the

West German burden sharing policy was adapted to its context of social market economy and subordinated to the socio-political core objective of securing private property,⁶⁶ GDR resettler policy converged with massive expropriation of private property-owning upper classes on the one hand, and with respect for small-ownership of the majority population on the other. This was the context of the 'law to further improve the situation of the former resettlers in the German Democratic Republic', issued in 1950.

For several years the SED regime tried to change the structure of society by a social policy privileging expellees. The privileges were granted in an even more exclusive way than in West German expellee policy, whose burden sharing project would always include other – local – groups of war-damaged people. At the same time the GDR 'resettler law' (*Umsiedlergesetz*) denied any compensation for lost expellee property because the social restorative sub-goal of such compensation was incompatible with the socio-political transformation objectives of the SED; moreover, the inclusion of the state-owned economic sector (created by expropriations) in any compensation taxes was strictly denied. This led to fierce resistance among the remaining private economy and its representants in the GDR Bloc parties like the Eastern CDU – and thus the whole project was quickly rendered impossible.⁶⁷

The special offers for material assistance included in the resettler law were deemed forward-looking integration assistance, and were not designed as socially restorative compensation, even if they might have worked this way in the view of some new farmers or small craftsmen. By linking certain assistance programs with economic group affiliations,⁶⁸ the Resettler Law also avoided the second characteristic of West German burden sharing – social aid for socially needy expellees – in favor of the dominant principle of individual economical utility. Thus, there was no special aid for the needy, old generation of expellees in GDR policy – in diametrical contrast to West German policy which has included such a program in its burden sharing measures since 1952.

Conclusion

Summarizing the brief survey of two German expellee policies and their societal effects, the systemic political differences of parliamentary democracy in the FRG versus party dictatorship in the GDR were significant. In the FRG institutionalized lobbyism with its pluralism of interests resulted in a long-term influence of expellee organizations and politicians regarding social policy (burden sharing), but also

'homeland policy' (border questions, revision of expulsion). This lobbyist participation, which also exceeded the political influence of *pied-noir* associations in France, had rather ambivalent consequences – expellees could act as advocates of social change by means of institutionalizing innovative social policies, but also as veto players against a 'New Eastern Policy' (*Neue Ostpolitik*). Paradoxically, when the second BDV president Wenzel Jaksch, a Sudeten German Social Democrat with strong anti-fascist credentials who had succeeded the failed ex-Nazi Hans Krüger, began to establish transnational cooperative contacts even to French right-wing politicians like Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour (who at that time tried to mobilize the Pieds-Noirs in his presidential campaign against de Gaulle) in the middle of the 1960s, the influence of expellee lobby organizations on West German politics was already significantly in decline.⁶⁹

Both German postwar states developed different, even diametrical concepts of policy – an incorporation policy in the West versus an assimilation policy in the East. This contrast can be even grasped in terminology – 'expellees' in the FRG versus 'resettlers' in the GDR. While both policies were following similar paths in social integration, their principle contrast developed about the question of acknowledging the postwar borders in the East. The GDR made this crucial step as early as 1950, while the FRG needed much more time until it was prepared for reluctant acknowledgment in 1970–2 (by leaving formally open a binding recognition) and final acceptance in the early 1990s.

While there were common assimilationist tendencies in both societies, owing to pressure of the majority against the expellee minority, there have been trends for group preservation in both social policies – even in the GDR, especially in its ambivalent agricultural policy of 'land reform'. However, as in East Germany, any special social policy for 'resettlers' was abandoned much earlier than in the FRG, this preservationist trend showed much more viability in West Germany, especially because of long-term policies of 'burden sharing' and of cultural subventions.

The difference of time is striking. Regarding special authorities for expellees, a central department in the Soviet zone (*Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler*) existed only between 1945 and 1948, while in West Germany it was created (as a Federal Ministry) in 1949, existing until 1969. Similarly, a special 'Resettler Law' was inaugurated in the GDR in 1950, with its measures lasting until 1953, while a special 'Burden Sharing Law' was inaugurated in 1952, lasting until after German reunification. The legal provisions for subventions in order to sustain the cultural identity (or identities) of expellees that were created in West Germany in 1952 are still in force in united Germany today – with

considerable effects on scientific research, on public memory, and, not least, on life extension of organized expellee lobbyism.

Thus, after the initial phases of creating parallel expellee or resettler policies between 1945 and 1950, there were three essential turning points. In the years 1952–3 GDR social policy was abandoned, while West German social policy was completely established. In the 1970s, a first generational change in societies was combined with a new FRG Foreign Policy toward East European countries, abandoning any serious ‘homeland policy’ and downsizing the political veto power of expellee organizations. Finally, in the years around 1989–91 the formal settlement of territorial border questions coincided with the end of Western burden sharing, transforming the remaining cultural subsidies more and more into a new historicizing approach of a ‘policy of remembrance’.

Notes

1. Alina Laura Tiewes, “‘Wie lange fahren wir noch?’ – ‘Bis wir zu Hause sind’”. Die Inszenierung von Flucht und Vertreibung als Heimkehr im DDR-Fernsehfilm “Wege übers Land”, in Lars Karl, ed., *Der lange Weg nach Hause. Konstruktionen von Heimat im europäischen Spielfilm* (Berlin, 2014), 60–86.
2. Michael Schwartz, *Ethnische ‘Säuberungen’ in der Moderne. Globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2013), 510.
3. For a general survey, see Michael Schwartz, *Vertriebene und ‘Umsiedlerpolitik’: Integrationskonflikte in den deutschen Nachkriegs-Gesellschaften und die Assimilationsstrategien in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1961* (Munich, 2004).
4. See this differentiation in Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, ‘Privilegierte Migration: Deutsche aus Ostmittel- und Osteuropa’, *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte*, 27 (1998): 401–44.
5. Michael Schwartz, ‘Ausgleich von Kriegs- und Diktaturfolgen, Soziales Entschädigungsrecht. 1. Einleitung’, in Udo Wengst, ed., *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945*, 11 vols, vol. 2.1, 1945–1949. *Die Zeit der Besatzungszonen*, edited by the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung and by the Bundesarchiv (Baden-Baden, 2001), 736–44, esp. 738.
6. Matthias Stickler, *‘Ostdeutsch heißt gesamtdeutsch’: Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949–1972* (Düsseldorf, 2004), 136–48.
7. See Yann Scioldo-Zürcher’s chapter in this volume.
8. See the contributions of Marita Krauss and Peter Exner in Dierk Hoffmann and Michael Schwartz, eds, *Geglückte Integration? Spezifika und Vergleichbarkeiten der Vertriebenen-Integration in der SBZ/DDR* (Munich, 1999).
9. See the discussion of these views of Alexander von Plato in Schwartz, *Vertriebene und ‘Umsiedlerpolitik’*, 22–3.
10. Cf. Schwartz, *Vertriebene und ‘Umsiedlerpolitik’*, 643; Arnd Bauerkämper, *Ländliche Gesellschaft in der kommunistischen Diktatur: Zwangsmodernisierung und Tradition in Brandenburg 1945–1963* (Cologne, 2002).

11. Michael Schwartz, ‘“Zwangsheimat Deutschland”: Vertriebene und Kernbevölkerung zwischen Gesellschaftskonflikt und Integrationspolitik’, in Klaus Naumann, ed., *Nachkrieg in Deutschland* (Hamburg, 2001), 114–48.
12. Utz Jeggle, ‘Kaldaunen und Elche: Kulturelle Sicherungssysteme bei Heimatvertriebenen’, in Dierk Hoffmann, Marita Krauss, and Michael Schwartz, eds, *Vertriebene in Deutschland: Interdisziplinäre Ergebnisse und Forschungsperspektiven* (Munich, 2000), 395–407, esp. 400.
13. Albrecht Lehmann, *Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Westdeutschland 1945–1990* (Munich, 2nd edn, 1993), 69.
14. Max Hildebert Boehm, ‘Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen’, in Eugen Lemberg, ed., *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland: Ihre Eingliederung und ihr Einfluß auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik und Geistesleben*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Kiel, 1959), 521–605, esp. 532.
15. Peter-Heinz Seraphim, *Die Heimatvertriebenen in der Sowjetzone* (Berlin, 1954), 159.
16. Everhard Holtmann, ‘Politische Interessenvertretung von Vertriebenen: Handlungsmuster, Organisationsvarianten und Folgen für das politische System der Bundesrepublik’, in Hoffmann, Krauss, and Schwartz, *Vertriebene in Deutschland*, 187–202. After initial electoral success in several West German federal states, the BHE could only secure its entrance to the Federal parliament between 1953 and 1957; the lobby organization BvD, founded in 1949, had to unite with diverse *Landmannschaften* in the new BvD in 1957–8.
17. For the classical triad of social integration, see Marion Frantziach, *Die Vertriebenen: Hemmnisse und Wege ihrer Integration* (Berlin, 1987).
18. Friedrich Spiegel-Schmidt, ‘Zusammenfassung’, in Arbeitskreis für Ostfragen Hannover, ed., *Der geistige und politische Standort der Heimatvertriebenen: Ein Tagungsbericht* (Leer, 1958), 70–85, esp. 81.
19. Heinrich Freiherr Senfft von Pilsach, ‘Die Heimatvertriebenen in der Bundesrepublik. Ein ungelöstes Wirtschaftsproblem’, in Göttingen Arbeitskreis, ed., *Das östliche Deutschland: Ein Handbuch* (Würzburg, 1959), 711–56, esp. 752–3.
20. Arnd Bauerkämper, ‘Die vorgetäuschte Integration: Die Auswirkungen der Bodenreform und Flüchtlingssiedlung auf die berufliche Eingliederung von Vertriebenen in die Landwirtschaft in Deutschland 1945–1960’, in Hoffmann and Schwartz, *Geglückte Integration*, 193–214, here 208.
21. Paul Lüttinger, ‘Der Mythos der schnellen Integration. Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Integration der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1971’, *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 15(1) (1986): 20–36.
22. Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1955* (Göttingen, 4th edn, 1989), 40–1.
23. See Philipp-Christian Wachs, *Der Fall Oberländer (1905–1998): Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte* (Frankfurt, 2000).
24. Schwartz, *Vertriebene und ‘Umsiedlerpolitik’*, 512.
25. Pascal Maeder, *Forging a New Heimat: Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada* (Göttingen, 2011), 183; but Krüger was a member of the first Erhard cabinet, not of an Adenauer cabinet as stated in that book.
26. See Ulrich Prehn, *Max Hildebert Boehm: Radikales Ordnungsdenken vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis in die Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen, 2013).

27. Cited from Paul Nolte, *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft: Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2000), 228.
28. Boehm, 'Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen', 590.
29. That Nahm had been a victim of Nazi repression did not impact on his organicist style of thought which was easily compatible with that of conservative former National Socialists like Boehm.
30. Peter Paul Nahm, 'Der Wille zur Eingliederung und seine Förderung', in Lemberg, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, vol. 1, 145–55, esp. 151–4.
31. Friedrich Edding and Eugen Lemberg, 'Eingliederung und Gesellschaftswandel', in Lemberg, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, vol. 1, 156–73, esp. 158.
32. Boehm, 'Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen', 596–7.
33. See Karin Pohl, 'Die Soziologen Eugen Lemberg und Emerich K. Francis: Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu den Biographien zweier "Staffelsteiner" im "Volkstumskampf" und im Nachkriegsdeutschland', *Bohemia*, 45(1) (2004): 24–76.
34. Eugen Lemberg, 'Der Wandel des politischen Denkens', in Lemberg, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, vol. 3, 435–74, esp. 451, 474.
35. Heinrich Rogge, 'Vertreibung und Eingliederung im Spiegel des Rechts', in Lemberg, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, vol. 1, 174–245, esp. 224.
36. Alfred Karasek-Langer, 'Volkstum im Umbruch', in Lemberg, *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, vol. 1, 606–94, esp. 686.
37. Christoph Kleßmann, *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation: Deutschland 1955–1970* (Bonn, 2nd edn, 1997), 138.
38. Katrin Hirte, 'Persilschein-Netzwerke. Bruchlosigkeit in Umbruchzeiten', in Michael Schönhuth, ed., *Visuelle Netzwerkforschung. Qualitative, quantitative und partizipative Zugänge* (Bielefeld, 2013), 331–54.
39. Seraphim, *Die Heimatvertriebenen in der Sowjetzone*, 180–1.
40. Nolte, *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft*, 228.
41. Hiddo M. Jolles, *Zur Soziologie der Heimatvertriebenen und Flüchtlinge* (Cologne, 1965), 347.
42. *Ibid.*, 392, 394.
43. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich, 2nd edn, 1968), 60, 466.
44. Michael Schwartz, *Funktionäre mit Vergangenheit: Das Gründungspräsidium des Bundes der Vertriebenen und das 'Dritte Reich'* (Munich, 2013), 43–68, 420–47.
45. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 106/22480, Hans Krüger, 'Welche Faktoren haben sich für die Eingliederung der Heimatvertriebenen als hemmend und welche als fördernd erwiesen?', Memorandum of June 1967, 103–4.
46. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 150/536, vol. 1, 'Protokoll der Sitzung der Deutschen Sektion der Europäischen Forschungsgruppe für Flüchtlingsfragen am 14.4.[1951] in Hannover', 3; on the other hand Geiger's approach could be also characterized as an example of authoritarian social technology, disregarding individual dispositions, like he had done before 1933 in advocating eugenicist repression against those afflicted by hereditary diseases.
47. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 150/1150, Staatsminister Albertz, Hannover, an Bundesminister Storch, Bonn, 16 January 1950.
48. See Schwartz, *Vertriebene und 'Umsiedlerpolitik'*, 103, 599, 1182.
49. Lehmann, *Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus*, 69.

50. Matthias Müller, *Die SPD und die Vertriebenenverbände 1949–1977: Eintracht, Entfremdung, Zwietracht* (Berlin, 2012), 501–2.
51. Stickler, 'Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch', 435.
52. Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, Archiv der Zentralstelle, MfS HA XX – ZMA 663, Bl. 80f., MfS, HVA, Abt. II, 'Objektauskunft zum revanchistischen Dachverband "Bund der Vertriebenen"', 1 July 1989, 75–6.
53. Philipp Ther, *Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene: Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen 1945–1956* (Göttingen, 1998), 332.
54. See Holtmann, 'Politische Interessenvertretung von Vertriebenen'.
55. Seraphim, *Die Heimatvertriebenen in der Sowjetzone*, 180–1.
56. Dietrich Storbeck, *Soziale Strukturen in Mitteldeutschland: Eine sozialstatistische Bevölkerungsanalyse im gesamtdeutschen Vergleich* (Berlin, 1964), 228–9.
57. Heinz Niemann, *Meinungsforschung in der DDR: Die geheimen Berichte des Instituts für Meinungsforschung an das Politbüro der SED* (Cologne, 1993), Dokument I, esp. 24, 29–30.
58. Hans Günter Hockerts, 'Integration der Gesellschaft: Gründungskrise und Sozialpolitik in der frühen Bundesrepublik', *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform*, 32(1) (1986): 25–41.
59. Adolf M. Birke, *Nation ohne Haus: Deutschland 1945–1961* (Berlin, 1989), 348.
60. See Michael Schwartz, 'Lastenausgleich: Ein Problem der Vertriebenenpolitik im doppelten Deutschland', in Marita Krauss, ed., *Integrationen: Vertriebene in den deutschen Ländern nach 1945* (Göttingen, 2008), 167–93.
61. Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*, 466–7.
62. Edding and Lemberg, 'Eingliederung und Gesellschaftswandel', 159.
63. See Michael Schwartz, 'Antikommunismus und Vertriebenenverbände: Ein differenzierter Blick auf scheinbar Eindeutiges in der frühen Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Stefan Creuzberger and Dierk Hoffmann, eds, *'Geistige Gefahr' und 'Immunsierung der Gesellschaft': Antikommunismus und politische Kultur in der frühen Bundesrepublik* (Munich, 2014), 161–76, esp. 162.
64. See Schwartz, *Vertriebene und 'Umsiedlerpolitik'*, 637–892; Bauerkämper, *Ländliche Gesellschaft in der kommunistischen Diktatur*.
65. See Schwartz, *Vertriebene und 'Umsiedlerpolitik'*, 572–611 and Michael Schwartz, 'Ausgleich von Kriegs- und Diktaturfolgen, Soziales Entschädigungsrecht: Vertriebene, Evakuierte, Bombengeschädigte, Kriegsheimkehrer sowie Kriegsbeschädigte und Kriegshinterbliebene', in Dierk Hoffmann and Michael Schwartz, eds, *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland nach 1945*, 11 vols., vol. 8 (Baden-Baden, 2004), 589–641, esp. 618f.
66. Michael L. Hughes, *Shouldering the Burden of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice* (Chapel Hill, 1999), 185.
67. Schwartz, 'Lastenausgleich'.
68. See Schwartz, 'Ausgleich von Kriegs- und Diktaturfolgen', in Hoffman and Schwartz, *Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland nach 1945*, vol. 8, 599–623.
69. See Schwartz, *Funktionäre mit Vergangenheit*, 367f.; regarding Tixier-Vignancour's political profile, cf. David Art, *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe* (Cambridge, 2011), 122.

5

The Postcolonial Repatriations of the French of Algeria in 1962: An Emblematic Case of a Public Integration Policy

Yann Scioldo-Zürcher

The singular place of French ‘repatriates’ (*rapatriés*) from Algeria in a general history of immigration to France lies in the link that formed between the host country and those who, as migrants, were both nationals and citizens of the country they were moving to.¹ These ‘national migrants’, who in the legal sense were neither immigrants (while experiencing a similar form of migration) nor refugees (as designated by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), and various international organizations), but most certainly repatriates, came under the provisions of a proliferating mass of legislation and innovative administrative practices.² And despite a collective memory of trauma and victimhood in which the French government was accused of ‘abandoning them to their fate’, we find, on the contrary, the rapid creation of a policy of integration into mainland France and a readiness on the part of the authorities to meet the needs involved quickly and appropriately.

It is, then, by examining the ‘long-distance relations’³ that sprang up between the repatriates from Algeria, the French parliament, and the administrative bodies concerned, that we can reach an understanding of their prompt integration into French society. Official policy consisted not only in providing assistance and giving the newcomers a place in the social structure, but also, so as not to generate friction with the metropolitan population, in implementing a major social regulation strategy that would preserve a social contract already undermined by massive and often unsought arrivals.

The aim of this chapter, then, is to demonstrate that the history of the million French people repatriated from the colonies into mainland France in the second half of the twentieth century – most of them from Algeria – is a paradigmatic example of a contemporary policy developed with ‘national migrants’ in mind that resembles the expellee integration policies of the two German states after 1945 in many regards.⁴ With the legislation of 26 December 1961, ‘relating to the reception and resettlement of French people from overseas’, Michel Debré’s government (1959–62) radically recast public action on behalf of repatriates by providing considerable funding.⁵ And examination of the three-part entity, ‘legislation specially designed for them’, ‘innovative administrative practices’, and ‘ongoing adaptation of overall administration to particular situations’, offers an understanding of how the state very pragmatically succeeded in turning repatriates from the former overseas territories into thoroughgoing metropolitans.

Towards a redefinition of the concept of repatriation in a postcolonial context

The Algerian census of 1 June 1960 gave the number of ‘French’ residents as 1.024 million.⁶ A year and a half later, on 31 December 1961, according to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the figure was down to 860,000. While this drop in numbers cannot be taken *prima facie* as indicating individual transfers to France, prefectures on the mainland were uneasily pointing out that definitive moves by the French of Algeria were increasing exponentially. Aware of the danger to law and order inherent in the political bewilderment of this group – opposed to Algerian independence and perceived by officialdom as potential assassins in the service of the terrorist Organization of the Secret Army (OAS)⁷ – and as a means of guarding against the risk of pauperization among this sudden wave of immigrants, on 6 May 1961 the government set up a State Secretariat for Repatriates, responsible to the Minister for the Interior.⁸

With Robert Boulin in charge, the secretariat’s official aim was to weigh up the possibility of massive emigration by the French of Algeria – which already seemed more than likely – and above all to reform the legal status of repatriates. The law as it stood had provided insufficient protection for French people previously forced to leave the colonies they had been living in.⁹ The strategy was no longer the disbursing of temporary means of assistance, but large-scale state intervention involving jobs, housing, and social security benefits. Barely six months later

the legislation 'relating to the reception and resettlement of French people from overseas' went through Parliament.¹⁰ The bill made no specific mention of the French of Algeria. What it did do, though, was extend the definition of repatriate to all overseas French people 'obliged, or who had felt themselves obliged, by political events to leave a territory where they had been settled and which had formerly been under the sovereignty, protection or guardianship of France'. The status of repatriate was now determined by the colonial experience.

Furthermore – and this was a major legal step forward – the personal judgment of potential repatriates was taken into account: they could request repatriate status at any time, before or long after the independence of the territory they were living in, depending on the circumstances of their everyday existence and not just the international political situation. In contrast to the West German case, in September 1962 the French government abandoned the return option for the repatriates. After the Algerian policy of nationalization of French goods, and facing the budget devoted to the integration of the returnees, the government made no further mention of any possibility to return. Being repatriated now meant to have a future in France.

The legislation instituted interim support measures intended to 'integrate them [...] into the nation's economic and social structures'. Thus they received a 'Repatriation Package' covering their travel and moving expenses. The legislation's major innovation, however, was a 'Provisional Subsistence Benefit'. Once in the metropole, repatriates working in the civil service were immediately incorporated into equivalent posts, while to facilitate integration of those from the private sector, the state would provide a 'Monthly Subsistence Allowance'; the aim here was to avoid the risk of people being professionally downgraded by having to take 'the first job that came along', and thus to enable them to return to their former line of work. On 24 October 1961, Robert Boulin outlined the concept to the Senate:

Experience has shown that when repatriates arrived [...] despite the provisional indemnities they might be given, they were immediately obliged to look for work to meet everyday living costs, and this under the worst possible conditions. Thus it seemed necessary that for a relatively long period they should receive a daily indemnity [...] allowing them – calmly and without pressure from the time factor – to look for work within their particular fields or to take a job we have proposed to them personally.¹¹

Following the same principle of assistance in the transition from one country to another, the right to social welfare benefits was immediate, and no longer dependent on a specified minimum period of residence in the metropole. The moving-in process was further facilitated by the introduction of public housing quotas,¹² followed by major building programs and priority attribution of up to 30 percent of new housing. The government did not want to see repatriates moving into the shantytowns where migrant numbers were steadily rising. During the waiting period they were given access to existing shelters – with further facilities being set up in boarding schools and holiday camps – or lodged in ‘prefecture’ hotels.

At the same time the government defined just who, among the repatriates, was covered by the legislation of 26 December 1961. To fit into this legal category and be eligible for the allowances that came with it, the individual concerned had to have come to France from Algeria within a specific time frame. Those who made the move before 1 August 1961 could claim no state aid whatsoever, being simply considered as regional migrants who had left one part of France for another. Those who had arrived in France between 1 August 1961 and 10 March 1962, when the decree specifying the new forms of assistance was published, were considered repatriates.¹³

What they received, however, was the financial and other help made available to colonial repatriates as earlier defined by the official circular of 1 March 1958. These measures, intended for French people coming from Tunisia and Morocco, included reimbursement of transport costs, the possibility of ‘special financial help’ and a voucher for two weeks’ free accommodation.¹⁴ The last group, the French who had reached the metropole on or after 11 March 1962, were the beneficiaries of the new legislation and the assistance it provided, on condition that on arrival they signed on with the Ministry of Repatriates. These different date-based forms of assistance now clearly defined the repatriate category. It was not simply a matter of having come from Algeria; one also had to have left at the time of the ceasefire agreement – an approach radically different from the broad definition and hereditary character of the legal status of the expellee in West Germany.

The Monthly Subsistence Allowance was set at FF350. Slightly higher than the ‘SMIG’ – the guaranteed minimum wage – this was paid to all private-sector employed repatriates for a maximum of one year. In the same spirit, ‘setting-up facilities’ were provided for self-employed repatriates looking for appropriate working premises. According to a system of percentages still to be laid down, the decree gave repatriates

priority over other French residents in terms of acquiring managerships, professional and business premises, and farmland. These resettlement operations were financed by low-interest 'Reclassification Loans', and 'Additional Grants' could take the place of initial financial input.

The government was aware that not all the repatriates' overseas jobs, which included countless small trades, still had their place in the mainland economy; so when repatriates 'voluntarily or otherwise' gave up their former occupations in favor of a salaried post, they received a 'Retraining Payment' or could benefit from paid training in specially created centers. In addition, previously salaried repatriates whose income had not been more than four times the minimum wage and who had found a permanent job, were offered 'Resettlement Grants,' the equivalent of the civil servants' 'Resettlement Indemnities'. These grants were intended for the fitting-out of unfurnished personal housing. Provision was also made for 'special help' in 'grave or urgent' circumstances not foreseen in the legislation.

It was now up to the administration to implement these measures and to remain alert to the unanticipated situations that could arise, so that the executive wing could be rapidly informed and take appropriate measures. In this respect the arrival of some 600,000 former French residents of Algeria in the course of 1962 was a far from orderly affair: French collective memory has retained images of seething ports and truly shocking scenes of destitute migrants; but at the same time it should be said that the state showed real responsiveness, and in the interests of greater efficiency a Ministry for Repatriates under Alain Peyrefitte was set up on 12 September 1962 to coordinate the relevant activities.

Innovative administrative practices for repatriates

Once the legal framework had been established, the administration had to address the situation by initiating liaison practices between its departments and repatriate households – no easy matter given the number of arrivals. To ensure that none of them 'slipped through the net', administrative personnel were dispatched to the disembarkation sites to 'pick them up' as they emerged from customs and before they could start moving about freely on French soil. This gave rise to interminable waiting periods, but at least each new arrival was issued with an official file that would guarantee regular payment of the benefits he or she was entitled to.¹⁵

This 'individual file' included multiple copies of identity papers to be shared out among the Fichier Central des Rapatriés (Central Repatriates

Data Office), a Paris-based body tasked with an overview of all arrivals and the situations they encountered, and the prefecture departments in charge of benefit payments. Also in the file was a 'professional project' document on which repatriates specified their professions in Algeria. The files of civil servants and public sector administrative personnel were forwarded to their head offices in France with a view to finding them a post immediately, even in instances of employee surplus. Thus French civil servants from Algeria were very quickly given posts in the metropole and continued to be paid during the interim period.

The files of private sector repatriates were subjected to a separate, specially devised procedure. The professional project document ensured payment of the Monthly Subsistence Allowance, access to Social Security, and a process of recovery of lost professional situations. In addition, eight regional delegations were set up to organize the professional and social integration of self-employed repatriates. In accordance with the interdepartmental decree of 14 March 1963, any repatriate who had been self-employed in Algeria for three years – subject to verification by the French embassy in Algiers, which assessed the financial status of the venture in question – was listed by the delegations; conditional on renouncing the right to reclassification, he or she could then claim start-up assistance, a subsidized loan, and 'Retraining Subsidy and Capital'.¹⁶ As members of the professions had carried out a number of training courses during their studies, one year's self-employment sufficed to earn them a place on the professional lists. On 3 January 1964 it was finally accepted that surviving spouses, in many cases widows who had worked – unofficially – with their self-employed husbands, and children who had followed their parents' occupation in Algeria for at least six months, were also eligible for a place on the lists.¹⁷

As Figure 5.1 shows, a major administrative machine grew out of this, one that allowed the Ministry for Repatriates to maintain pace with the changing situation almost in real time. By keeping count of the files being created in France's ports and airports, the Service Central des Rapatriés was able to keep the government informed, on a week to week basis, of the number of arrivals from Algeria. The Prefectures, meanwhile, were paying out the planned monthly benefits. To be paid, repatriates had to go to specially created offices, which meant that the government knew, month by month, their movements from one *département* to another and where they had settled more or less permanently; this facilitated the application of its integration program, in particular in terms of building accommodations.




Figure 5.1 Distribution of responsibility between the Ministry for Repatriates and the prefectures after the administrative reorganizations of August 1962 (compiled by Yann Scioldo-Zürcher)

There were, too, other skills specific to each of the two administrative bodies: the prefectures dealt with the implementation of the return to work policy, as designed by the government. The work and manpower divisions of the nation's *départements* offered jobs, guidance and training courses. A temporary organization regrouping job offers from all over France was set up, and the prefectures also distributed social welfare. The regional delegations oversaw the functioning of the regional classification commissions, which themselves decided on the granting of benefits.

The Central Economic Commission, which consolidated and examined the files of self-employed repatriates asking for loans and 'Resettlement Subsidies', was so swamped by the number of applications that the system almost collapsed. To speed up processing, a memorandum from the Ministry for Repatriates dated 25 July 1962 required repatriates to appear personally when called on by the various regional economic commissions so that their applications could be presented directly – another example of an interesting synergy between officialdom and users. The regional social commissions were also modified by the decree of 27 November.¹⁸ Under less pressure from demand than the regional economic commissions, they acted as consultants for the regional delegates, who were responsible for allocating assistance to those in highly vulnerable situations.

At national level the traditionally centralized system left it up to the Ministry for Repatriates to create and adapt integration policy, in accord with the other ministries. Each ministry was required to organize regular statistical surveys that would shape its decision-making on repatriates' situations. Thus, on 18 July 1962 the Ministry of Labor demanded that its *département* directors provide a list of official repatriate jobseekers every two weeks.¹⁹ These statistics also had to cover refusals of jobs and internships as indicators of repatriate attitudes. And on 18 October 1962 the Ministry for Repatriates asked prefects to provide a monthly statistical report on relocations by repatriate households and returns to employment.²⁰ These reports became quarterly on 20 April 1964.

This attention to the functioning of the 'administration of repatriates' demonstrates the state's real and ongoing determination to establish close relations with the people in its care: a determination, too, to respond to specific situations and thus constructively adapt the legislation of 26 December 1961. The upshot, between 1961 and 2005, was over 800 different laws intended to facilitate the integration of repatriates. This coordination between administrative bodies and

lawmakers makes the history of the repatriations remarkable in terms of public management of a mass migration episode.

Innovative administrative practices and ongoing administrative adaptation to special situations

At the same time as it was stressing innovation, the French administrative system was striving to adapt as closely as possible to the needs to be met, in particular by not 'blocking' applications for which certain documents were missing. One reason for this was the difficulties repatriates faced in obtaining official documents from Algerian administrative departments – among them attestations of civil and marital status, identity papers, and family record booklets, often lost in the haste of departure or through the shortcomings of Algeria's post-independence civil service. These difficulties were overcome by waiving the requirement of official papers as proof of identity. Instead, civil status registers were reconstructed from microfilm, a process backed up by whatever rectifications, and sometimes additions, proved necessary. This took time, however, and the Directorate-General of National Security at the Ministry of the Interior, aware of the considerable obstacle represented by lack of papers in France, informed the prefects on 21 June 1962, that in the case of repatriates 'who because of their departure were unable to provide the civil status evidence needed to prove their identity', there were grounds for issuing provisional six-month identity cards.²¹

These cards were based on passports, expired identity cards, driving licenses, military service booklets, or, failing all of these, simple declarations by those concerned. Not long afterwards, on 16 July 1962, the Ministry of Justice authorized repatriates to use their family record booklet, civil status papers, or an affidavit for all administrative and official procedures.²² To cite one instance, Rabbi E., who had to prove French nationality in order to be paid by the Ministry of the Interior and exercise his office in Alsace, had never been registered as a resident of the Oasis *département* where he lived in Algeria. When he asked the Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs how he should go about obtaining proof of nationality, he was simply told that his local trial judge would issue him with the necessary certificate.²³ This simplified approach demonstrated that the French administrative system, preoccupied since the mid-nineteenth century with matters of personal identification, had taken steps to ensure that lack of official documentation should not penalize repatriates and impede their integration.

The government also had to deal with specific cases not provided for in the legislation, in particular those of single women and the aged. According to the civil code, which condemned married women to lifetime status as minors, only heads of families could receive state assistance. During the 1962 repatriations, however, women often left ahead of their husbands, who were to join them later. So as not to exclude them from the reception process, the government temporarily authorized them to receive the benefits in question. Under the terms of the circular of 30 May 1962, separated wives, women divorcing, women married to prisoners or psychiatric hospital internees, the wives of missing persons whose death had not been established, and women with no documented permission from their husbands to receive benefits, were all accepted as entitled to 'Resettlement Grants' without having to seek legal empowerment through the courts, as the law then required.²⁴ Moreover, the directive of 23 June 1962 considered the situation of civil servants' wives who lacked proof of their status and so could not receive the allowances intended for them.²⁵ They were awarded a one-month Monthly Subsistence Allowance to enable them to obtain the necessary documents.

As a further step towards facilitating reception, the government instituted special customs and taxation measures for all direct and indirect payments. On 10 May 1962 a telex from the Ministry of Finance instructed French customs officials to be swift and – as had already been urged – 'considerate' with regard to the importing of personal possessions by repatriates from Algeria.²⁶ Duty exemptions were granted for total or partial transfers of equipment belonging to tradesmen, industrialists, retailers, and small farmers who had 'valid' reasons for being unable to provide the necessary proofs of ownership;²⁷ this also applied to household furnishings. The 'validity' of the reasons was left to the discretion of the officials concerned, who are known to have been extremely indulgent. Duty exemptions, total or partial according to customs officers' decisions, were also granted for the equipment of big companies. This ruling, however, pertained only to equipment that had already been in use. The stocks of businesses and retail outlets were duty-exempt when they had not been repatriated in toto. A special lower duty applied in the contrary case, but was not payable until the goods in question had been sold.

This benign approach was not limited to customs duties. Although no reductions were made, income tax owing was freshly codified and organized. On 16 June 1962 the Ministry of Finance granted postponement of payment 'until employment had been found enabling [the taxpayer]

to adequately meet his or her family's needs'.²⁸ The matter of payment hung fire until 21 February 1963, when the Ministry of Finance decided to exclude from the tax base income earned in Algeria before repatriates' move to France.²⁹ French repatriates thus had to declare only any income they might have earned in Algeria after their departure. In other words, an amnesty was declared regarding the strike undertaken by numerous French taxpayers in Algeria in 1962, in protest against Algerian independence. France, then, did not call in the sums already owing; and given the lack of a tax agreement between the two countries, no effort was made to organize payment of taxes due in Algeria.

Repatriates paid no taxes on property they no longer possessed, even when they had, theoretically, earned income and other benefits from it for a certain time. Other taxes were similarly adapted: on 23 November 1963 the Ministry of Finance authorized repatriates buying a farm, a building or business assets with the help of their reclassification loans, to pay the transfer fees in installments.³⁰ On 22 January 1964, because of the small sums involved, the question of the land tax and the taxes due on apartments bought or rented at the time of repatriation was settled.³¹ These taxes were not annulled, but households in extreme financial difficulty could apply to the director of taxation of their *département* for a rebate. The relevant circular called on social welfare offices to publicize this measure widely.

A similar administrative energy was evident in the application of the resettlement policy. To avoid even more pronounced impoverishment among repatriates, the government adapted the assistance measures outlined in the decree of 10 March 1962. The Monthly Subsistence Allowance was paid for a single year, and ceased if the repatriate found a job; however, it was renewed by a circular from the Secretary of State for Repatriates on 2 July 1962, which stipulated that in the case of loss of employment the repatriate would be entitled to the allowance until the end of the twelve-month period.³² It was also renewed for a further six months for repatriates who, as the ministry put it, 'were doing their best to reclassify'. Established by the decree of 2 March 1962, this measure concerned repatriates who had requested professional training courses but who, because not enough courses were available, had been unable to undertake one during their first year in the metropole. Furthermore, on 2 February 1964, the Monthly Subsistence Allowance was extended to repatriates who had fulfilled their military service obligations and were waiting to find employment.³³ Repatriates who had not found work when their allowance period ran out were then allowed to draw unemployment benefit.

The 'Resettlement Subsidy' – between FF500 and FF3,000 for each household for the purchase of furnishings and other equipment – was initially restricted to previously wage-earning repatriates and retired people who had been given accommodation. It was then extended – on 10 March 1962, retirees under sixty became eligible, as did also, after the circular of 26 November 1962, repatriates who had arrived from Algeria between 1 July 1961 and 10 March 1962.³⁴ Subsequent circulars – of 6 March, 3 April, and 12 November 1963 – broadened its scope to include certain professions and special (although not clearly defined) cases.³⁵

Repatriates who had not been wage earners in Algeria, or whose exercising of their profession did not qualify them for the professional lists – and who thus had no entitlement to a subsidized loan – could now receive the subsidy, as could repatriates ineligible for the 'Retraining Capital', and former wage earners now setting up as tradesmen. It was also made available to conscripted wage earners, self-employed taxi drivers receiving no reclassification loan and owning at least two vehicles, fatherless people, married people over eighteen, wage-earning minors not living with their parents, hospital interns, boarding-school supervisors without permanent status in Algeria, and civil servants on special leave at the time of their departure. On 25 October 1962 the Permanent Interdepartmental Council dropped possession of accommodation as a prerequisite: henceforth the subsidy was also paid when the applicant was living under someone else's roof, or in a hotel or furnished room, provided that he or she 'could prove the intention of renting or buying personal accommodation, either with evidence of a firm offer from a landlord or real estate agency, or a document acknowledging personal registration at a social housing office'.³⁶

Thus the eligibility requirements for all forms of assistance for repatriates very quickly became more flexible. To cite one example, the decree of 20 July 1963 offered aged repatriates in social difficulty 'special assistance' in addition to their retirement pension. The circular of 24 July 1963 extended the same benefit to repatriates over fifty-five and female heads of families.³⁷ The awarding of the 'special indemnities' based on real estate left behind in Algeria, hitherto restricted to invalids or people over fifty-five with no resources in France, could now be combined with the other forms of assistance, including the Resettlement Subsidy.³⁸ And with the coming of the circular of 28 February 1963, the category of persons without resources was broadened to cover those whose retirement pension was up to three times the minimum wage.³⁹

The other repatriates to be considered were those in the most vulnerable categories: single women, invalids, and the aged. Those with retirement, invalid, or other pensions were covered by the appropriate social services departments in France: for the first six months they received the Monthly Subsistence Allowance, after which, in theory, the standard allowances they were entitled to took over. There were, however, numerous administrative delays, the result being the decree of 15 January 1963, stipulating a special monthly payment of FF90 for an individual and FF110 for a household, for three months, when applications for assistance in France had not yet been processed and those concerned were without resources.⁴⁰

While seeking to protect aged repatriates on the waiting list from an abrupt loss of income, the government also examined the situations of the most vulnerable of them. On 5 April 1963 the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee decided to introduce a minimum pension for all former wage earners over sixty and people over sixty-five who had never worked. Providing FF170 a month for a single person and FF250 for a household, this pension was described as 'a relocation indemnity intended to boost beneficiaries' resources'.⁴¹ The amending legislation of 2 July 1963 created a 'Lifetime Allowance', also of FF170 a month for a single person and FF250 for a household, to complement the minimum old-age allowance.⁴² When entitlement to the Monthly Subsistence Allowance ran out, the decree of 20 July 1963 provided, in addition to existing unemployment benefit, a further assistance of FF60 for a single person and FF120 for a head of a family.⁴³ This single complementary payment was restricted to repatriates seeking work, those over fifty-five and under sixty, and single women with families to support. It was renewable once until January 1966.

As the Monthly Subsistence Allowance came to its end for many working repatriates, the Ministry of Health informed prefects, on 9 August 1963, that 'families in extremely difficult situations, especially when they no longer have a head of the family, or when he or she is unable to work, or when a member of the family is ill or an invalid', should receive social welfare payments.⁴⁴ On 4 December 1963 the Ministry repeated this stipulation and sent telegrams to the prefects to the effect that students in difficulty should receive emergency assistance.⁴⁵ The circular of 9 August 1963, from the Ministry for Repatriates, had established two forms of assistance called 'extreme urgency' and 'interim aid'.⁴⁶

The first of these involved a single payment of between FF100 and FF200 as a solution to a temporary problem, while the second, valid for six months, picked up where the Monthly Subsistence Allowance left

off when repatriates were still waiting for the standard social welfare payments they were entitled to. The payment was FF158 for a single person and FF238 for a head of a family. This instance illustrates the gender issues that arose in respect of repatriation problems. Although the 'interim aid' naturally applied to all repatriates, the circular only gave examples of women's situations in its profiles of those supposedly entitled to it. Nonetheless, the 'extreme urgency' system was renewed unchanged for 1964 and clearly did not involve only single women.

This outline of social welfare payments and their increasing generosity is a particularly good illustration of the government's determination not to see the situation of these 'national migrants' rendered even more precarious. The goals were to assist with settlement, to tide repatriates over the difficult periods of the settlement process, and ultimately to give those capable of it the possibility of re-starting their working life quickly and under optimal social circumstances. In the same spirit, socially marginal groups were to be helped with the geographical transition in addition to being provided with the same welfare benefits as their mainland equivalents.

Conclusion

The shaping of repatriation policy was a clear reflection of one definition of the French state of the postwar 'Glorious Thirty'. First and foremost mutualist, by allocating a substantial budget to the French coming from Algeria, the state spread the cost of the dangers entailed by threats to Republican order. Repatriation policy is estimated to have cost over FF16 billion between 1962 and 1970. The Ministry of Finance did not have full control here and its budget decisions were not always adhered to: thus the social welfare ministries – habitually considered spendthrift – were able to act free of practically all budgetary constraints, or at least without the financial arbitration that was the usual Ministry of Finance prerogative.

Balance sheet matters aside, this policy was also clearly driven by the value attached to the bond of citizenship. If we look at the contrast between officialdom's handling of the 'national migrants' issue and, at the same period, its more or less total inaction regarding foreign migrants – only foreigners from Algeria who had joined the Resistance during World War II were eligible for social welfare – and repatriates considered culturally marginal (members of those Algerian auxiliary forces designated by the blanket term *harkis*),⁴⁷ we see a French state which, while socially conscious, interventionist, and protective, was far

removed from any universalism in its dealings with actual or supposed non-nationals within its territory. The sole bond was with 'European repatriates' whose migration process it felt obliged to render as smooth as possible. Similarly, its image here is marked by the force of its capacity to regulate.⁴⁸ The integration policy it pursued clearly sought to organize France's return to peace. Not all of its decisions were implemented as planned – notably its wish to see repatriates evenly distributed across the country as a whole – but this was out of the question in a democracy where the right to freedom of movement was a given the state could not ignore; at the same time, however, the administrative system was at great pains to ensure that the most difficult social situations were nipped in the bud.

The remaining segment of state policy towards the repatriates had to do with insurance. The principle of indemnification for property lost in Algeria was embodied in article 4 of the law of 26 December 1961.⁴⁹ The definition of this indemnification, however, remained vague and was reshaped in 1970 in the wake of Georges Pompidou's electoral promises. With the passing of the new indemnification legislation, the 1970s thus saw a significant change 'in the spirit of the laws' regarding colonial repatriates.

For the government indemnification no longer meant, as had previously been the case, organizing the protection of repatriates, not all of whom had been property owners in Algeria; it did not mean, either, helping to pacify French society, as by 1970 there was no longer any need to protect the Republic from OAS activists; and the question of national solidarity did not arise, as from the legal point of view only war justified full state indemnification, and the conflict in Algeria was not recognized as a war until 1999. In fact, counter to the spirit of national solidarity, the government was now bent on channeling the repatriate vote with measures which, while urgently needed, betrayed a spirit quite different from that of the resettlement process. The sovereign ministries, including the Ministry of Finance, were out to 'take the matter in hand' and ensure that budget-wise, things would run smoothly and efficiently.

The administrative *modus operandi* set up for the reception and integration of the colonial repatriates continued to function until the fall of 1964, when France's first administrative decentralization measures came into force. Barely a year and a half after the creation of the Ministry for Repatriates, the government was obviously keen to shut down this too vivid reminder of an abnormal period. Transferred to the Ministry for the Interior, its administrative responsibilities nonetheless

persisted until 1990 – a sure sign that the government was still working at effective integration of the repatriates, while it no longer saw the need to bring the whole weight of the state to bear; and that, in the final analysis, the exit from the Algerian War had been very speedily achieved.

Regarding the comparison with the German case, the French policy was in many respects similar since it also aimed for a rapid economic integration of the returnees. French and German repatriation policies mark a characteristic type of ‘privileged immigration’. However, France, being more advanced in 1962 in its economic development than postwar Germany, was more likely to integrate returnees in key economic and industrial sectors. The government quickly stopped the relocation of farmers to smallholdings. The European Common Agricultural Policy which started in early 1962, when arrivals from Algeria increased hugely, tended to reward larger agricultural producers rather than those engaged in farming smaller units that might not survive independently in the future.

Similarly, following the Republican model that disregards emphasis of cultural differences within the national population, France made no public reference to identities, let alone ethnic identities, of the repatriates. At least until the late twentieth century, the state left it to the repatriate associations to manage their cultural heritage. While, faced with their ‘national migrants’, France and Germany developed similar socio-economic integration policies, they pursued very different policies of memory and recognition of past suffering. When it comes to officially facing history – World War II and the colonial wars – an important difference between the two countries becomes apparent. While the French state often tends to adopt silence as the guarantor of national unity, Germany does not hesitate, in its turn, to emphasize distinctions between the groups that make up the German population without fear of dividing societal structure.⁵⁰

Notes

1. In France’s colonial history the ‘French of Algeria’, classified by the colonial administration during the Algerian War as ‘French people of European origin’ – a category embracing population groups of European background and Algerian Jews – enjoyed French nationality *and* citizenship. ‘French people of North African origin’ – the other inhabitants of Algeria, also administratively designated as ‘Muslims’ – possessed French nationality but not, until 1958, equal status in voting terms. In seeking to understand the significance of the ‘bond of citizenship’ between French repatriates from Algeria

- and their country, I shall draw in particular on the work of Marie-Paule Couto, 'L'intégration socio-économique des Pieds-Noirs en France métropolitaine: le lien de citoyenneté à l'épreuve', *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, 29(3) (2013): 93–119.
2. Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris, 2010).
 3. Gérard Noiriel, *Introduction à la socio-histoire* (Paris, 2006), 8 and *passim*. Dear to the hearts of socio-historians, Durkheim's concept of 'long-distance relations' enables an analysis of the propinquities arising between a state and a particular group of migrants, and, in the present instance, a clarification of the specific integration policy established for French repatriates from Algeria.
 4. See, among others, Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, 2008). On the two German cases, see Michael Schwartz's chapter in this volume.
 5. Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, 'La discrète mais réelle anticipation du rapatriement des Français d'Algérie: la construction de la loi du 26 décembre 1961', in Abderrahmane Bouchène, Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, Quanassa Siari Tengour, and Sylvie Thénault, eds, *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale 1830–1962* (Paris, 2012), 564–9.
 6. Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 135 and *passim*.
 7. Sylvie Thénault, 'L'OAS à Alger en 1962', *Annales. Histoire, sciences sociales*, 63(5) (2008): 977–1001.
 8. 'Repatriates' literally meant those 'moving back to their home country', people collectively displaced by war and 'returning', as well as those who, pauperized abroad, asked for assistance for their return. With the end of the colonial empire the term was extended to cover the resettling of French people from the colonies.
 9. Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 161 and *passim*.
 10. Law 61-1439 of 26 December 1961, *Journal Officiel de la République Française [JORF], Lois et Décrets*, 28 December 1961: 11996.
 11. *JORF, Débats du Sénat*, second session of 24 October 1961: 1227.
 12. Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, 'Paris, tu les as pris dans tes bras! L'installation des rapatriés d'Algérie dans les départements de la Seine', in Sylvie Thénault and Raphaëlle Branche, eds, *La guerre d'Algérie en France* (Paris, 2008), 454–62.
 13. Decree no. 62-261, relating to the reception and professional and social reclassification of the beneficiaries of Law 61-1439 of 26 December 1961. *JORF, Lois et décrets*, 11 March 1962: 2523.
 14. *Ibid.*
 15. To my knowledge only one household arrived in the Seine *département* without going through this administrative process. Its file was nonetheless put together very quickly.
 16. Archives départementales de la Seine [ADS], 1023/68/1-15.
 17. Archives départementales du Puy-de-Dôme [ADPD], 465 W 2.
 18. *JORF, Lois et Décrets*, 8 December 1962: 12042.
 19. ADS, 1023/68/1-7.
 20. ADS, 1023/68/1-2.
 21. ADS, 1023/68/1-5.
 22. *Ibid.*

23. Archives nationales d'outre-mer, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères, secrétariat d'État chargé aux Affaires algériennes [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretariat of State in Charge of Algerian Affairs], carton 120 *bis*.
24. ADPdD, 465 W 2.
25. *Ibid.*
26. ADS, 1023/68/1-3.
27. *Ibid.*
28. ADS, 1023/68/1-8.
29. Archives Nationales, centre des archives contemporaines [National Archives; Center for Contemporary Archives (CAC)], 19770097/35.
30. ADS, 1023/68/1-8.
31. ADS, 1023/68/1-16.
32. ADS, 1023/68/1-7.
33. ADS, 1023/68/1-16.
34. ADS, 1023/68/1-6.
35. ADS, 1023/68/1-8.
36. ADS, 1023/68/1-18.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. ADS, 1023/68/1-6.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. ADS, 1023/68/1-21.
45. *Ibid.*
46. ADS, 1023/68/1-16.
47. See, in particular, Abderahmen Moumen, 'La notion d'abandon des harkis par les autorités françaises', in Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, Benoit Falaize, and Gilles Manceron, eds, *Les Harkis: histoire, mémoire et transmission* (Paris, 2010), 47–62; Élise Langelier, *La situation juridique des Harkis, 1962–2007* (Poitiers, 2009).
48. Jean-Marie Fecteau and Janice Harvey, eds, *La régulation sociale entre l'acteur et l'institution, pour une problématique historique de l'interaction* (Sainte-Foy, Quebec, 2005).
49. Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, 'The Cost of Decolonisation: Compensating the Repatriates', in Émile Chabal, ed., *France since the 1970s: History, Politics and Memory in an Age of Uncertainty* (London, 2014), 99–114.
50. The author gratefully acknowledges John Tittensor for his work in translating this chapter from the French.

Part III

Self-Organization and Representation

6

The German Expellee Organizations: Unity, Division, and Function

Pertti Ahonen

In the early twenty first century, the German expellee organizations (*Vertriebenenverbände*) are typically portrayed as a united entity, at least in the wider public realm. The dominance of the umbrella group Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV) tends to foster the perception that the German expellee lobby is a homogeneous and cohesive bloc, focused on promoting shared political goals. This has been evident, for instance, in the media coverage of the prolonged controversy about the proposed establishment of a Center Against Expulsions in Berlin, in which the BdV's statements have generally been taken to represent the expellee movement as a whole.¹

But how correct is that interpretation, particularly in a longer historical perspective, stretching back to the rise of the expellee organizations from the late 1940s? What principal organizations emerged among the German expellees? How united or divided have these organizations been? How representative have they been, *vis-à-vis* their presumed followers? What broader functions have they served, among the expellees and in wider society? These are the questions that this chapter addresses. It starts with a concise overview of the main German expellee organizations and their development, and proceeds to wider observations about the unity, divisions, representativeness, and functions of these organizations. It also attempts to highlight some parallels and contrasts between these groups and the *pied-noir* organizations in France.

The development of the main expellee organizations

The roots of the German expellee lobby lie in a setting very different from that of France's *pied-noir* organizations: the immediate aftermath

of World War II and the problems posed by the arrival into what became the Federal Republic of roughly eight million so-called expellees (*Vertriebene*), Germans who had been uprooted from their homes in Central and Eastern Europe. Their very presence in devastated post-World War II Germany was a highly divisive issue, not least because of the additional strains that they imposed on the extremely limited material resources of a postwar society. There was widespread fear among the victorious Allies and local German elites that impoverished expellees could form a base for renewed anti-democratic radicalism, from the left or the right. The emergence of autonomous expellee organizations was seen as a particularly threatening prospect. As a result, the American and British occupation authorities at first banned such organizations, stressing assimilation instead. The expellees were to be treated not as a distinct minority but as citizens with equal rights and obligations who now resided permanently in western Germany.

From the outset, this strict policy of non-toleration of separate expellee organizations proved impossible to enforce, however. Particularly on the local and regional levels, organized groups persevered despite the formal ban, and by 1947–8 the proscriptions were lifted, in good part because rising Cold War tension caused Western priorities to shift. In the increasingly polarized international setting, German expellee organizations acquired new usefulness. They possessed considerable potential as tools of anti-communist mobilization among population groups hard hit by forced migrations that could be blamed on the Soviets and their East European vassals. They could also serve as beacons of the presumed superiority of Western freedoms, given the fact that autonomous expellee representation was soon prohibited in the Soviet occupation zone and the subsequent East German state.²

As a result, a complicated network of expellee organizations arose in the Federal Republic by the late 1940s and early 1950s. The various groups can be divided into three categories. The first – and least significant – were organizations formed to represent specific professional or vocational interests. A wide variety of such groups emerged in the early postwar period, as expellees sought to capitalize on old connections in their struggle to find a new footing in western Germany. Although a few of these organizations, such as the Representation of Expelled Industry and Commerce, gained some prominence, most remained obscure. However, some of the occupational and vocational organizations assumed additional weight through their close association with the second main type of West German expellee representation – the Central Association of Expelled Germans (*Zentralverband vertriebener*

Deutscher (ZvD)), which was founded in April 1949 and renamed the League of Expelled Germans (Bund der vertriebenen Deutschen (BvD)) in 1954.

The BvD/ZvD, a major force in West German politics during the 1950s, presented itself as a non-partisan interest group whose declared aim was to unite and represent all expellees on the basis of their current places of residence. It consisted of a hierarchy of member associations, which rose in a pyramid-like structure from the local and regional levels to that of the Federal Republic's constituent states (*Länder*). The organization's key decision-making bodies were located in Bonn, where an Executive Committee brought together the chairmen of the state associations and a smaller Presidium served as the de facto ruling organ. In addition, a largely ceremonial Federal Assembly convened annually. The BvD/ZvD claimed about 1.7 million members in the mid-1950s, although only about one million apparently paid regular membership dues.³

The third main force among the German expellees was that of the homeland societies (*Landsmannschaften*).⁴ It consisted of individual organizations formed on the basis of their members' pre-1945 origins, twenty of which had emerged by the 1950s. In their organizational structure, the various homeland societies were very similar, each being headed by a Speaker, who presided over a small Federal Executive Committee, which, in turn, was elected by a Federal Assembly. Despite these structural similarities, however, the homeland societies varied greatly in size and political weight. The least influential were the eleven organizations that claimed to represent uprooted ethnic Germans from parts of Eastern Europe that had never been part of Germany. These groups were plagued by particularism and, more fundamentally, by their small size. Even the largest, the Homeland Society of Germans from Yugoslavia (*Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien*), could claim only an estimated 35,000 members. None of these organizations became a significant political force.⁵

Much more importance accrued to larger homeland societies that purported to speak for expellees from regions that *had* belonged to the pre-1945 German Reich. Here, too, heterogeneity remained a problem, however, as different groups faced diverging fortunes, largely depending on when and how their areas of origin had been incorporated into Germany. The five homeland societies whose members stemmed from within Germany's 1937 borders were technically in the strongest position because the Western Allies had repeatedly stated that, in a legal sense at least, Germany continued to exist in these pre-Nazi aggression borders, pending a final peace settlement. Of the

individual homeland societies within this category, three became relatively prominent. The Silesian Homeland Society (*Landsmannschaft Schlesien*), which had an estimated membership of 300,000 in the 1950s, was the strongest force, but the East Prussian Homeland Society (*Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen*) and the Pomeranian Homeland Society (*Pommersche Landsmannschaft*), with approximately 140,000 and 60,000 members respectively, also featured in the political arena.⁶

The second grouping of homeland societies from within the Reich's former boundaries represented territories that had been taken from Germany after World War I and then re-annexed by the Nazis. None of the three relevant organizations acquired particular political weight, but the largest, the West Prussian Homeland Society (*Landsmannschaft Westpreussen*), at least boasted a membership of 50,000. However, it was eclipsed in every respect by the one homeland society whose claims of belonging to Germany as a political entity were traceable purely to the brutal power politics of the Nazi regime: the *Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft*. The Sudetenland had never been part of Germany until the annexation enforced through the notorious Munich Accords of 1938; yet the Sudeten German Homeland Society managed to turn itself into the best-organized and most influential of all the *Landsmannschaften*, with a membership of some 350,000 and a regional concentration in Bavaria, which significantly boosted its power.⁷

On the federal level, all twenty homeland societies joined forces in an umbrella group intended to coordinate their interests and policies. Baptized the United East German Homeland Societies (*Vereinigte Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften (VOL)*) upon its founding in August 1949 and renamed the Association of Homeland Societies (*Verband der Landsmannschaften (VdL)*) three years later, the central organization had two executive organs: the Speakers' Assembly (*Sprecherversammlung*), composed of each homeland society's top leader, and a smaller Presidium, which in practice ran the organization. The estimated aggregate membership of the twenty *Landsmannschaften* amounted to 1.3 million in the mid-1950s, but the VdL/VOL – like its rival umbrella organization, the BvD/ZvD – typically claimed to represent all the Federal Republic's eight million expellees.⁸

Given their sweeping representational claims and conflicting organizational principles, it was predictable that the BvD/ZvD and the VdL/VOL frequently locked horns. Although a 1949 agreement stipulated a division of labor, according to which the BvD/ZvD was to focus on social issues and the VdL/VOL on cultural and foreign affairs, rivalries nevertheless raged across most policy fields. This was

obviously problematic and, following protracted negotiations, in 1958 the two groups finally agreed to merge, establishing a united federal-level umbrella organization, the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV)), an achievement that has persistently eluded the splintered French *pied-noir* community.⁹ The new organization, which was run by a Federal Executive and a small Presidium chaired by a President, claimed a total membership of two million, making it the country's 'strongest pressure group after the labor unions', as Bonn's politicians quickly noted.¹⁰ With this newly found organizational unity, expellee activists acquired enhanced credibility as spokesmen for the more than eight million people whom they claimed to represent.

As the years passed, the BdV increasingly established itself as the pre-eminent representative of the West German expellee movement. To be sure, the most powerful homeland societies, especially the Landsmannschaft Schlesien and the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, still maintained an independent profile and organized various campaigns of their own, particularly in reaction to the new *Ostpolitik* introduced by Willy Brandt's government in the early 1970s, which the main expellee organizations resisted ferociously – albeit unsuccessfully. But in subsequent years the expellee lobby grew increasingly adept at channeling its actions through the BdV, thereby avoiding public displays of internal strife much more successfully than its *pied-noir* counterparts. The result was the impression of unity highlighted in the recent controversies about the Center Against Expulsions.

Unity versus division in the expellee organizations

When the history and evolution of the expellee lobby is viewed in a longer-term perspective stretching back to the late 1940s, however, unity becomes largely a surface phenomenon, a presentational strategy aimed primarily at external observers, much as it has been among the French *pied-noir* groups too. Internally, diversity and division rather than unity and homogeneity tended to characterize the West German expellee organizations throughout this period. The most obvious dividing lines ran between particular organizations, with the two competing umbrella groups of the 1950s providing the classic case of intense inter-group rivalry. But discord was also rife between various other *Vertriebenenverbände*.

The Silesian Homeland Society, for instance, repeatedly locked horns with the Upper Silesian Homeland Society (Landsmannschaft Oberschlesien), largely because both claimed to speak for many former

residents of Upper Silesia. The homeland societies that purported to represent ethnic Germans from beyond the Reich's pre-1945 borders often had difficulty finding a shared agenda with the more powerful groups that claimed to speak for former *Reichsdeutsche*. Sudeten German activists repeatedly crossed swords with their counterparts from other organizations. Nor were conflicts confined just to the inter-group level. Multiple dividing lines also ran within organizations, pitting particular individuals and collectives against others, with homeland societies frequently exhibiting a particular propensity for internecine feuding. However, these conflicts never reached the level of physical assault and even assassination that buffeted France's *pied-noir* organizations during the 1990s.

The internal conflicts within the expellee lobby were fueled by various issues. Confessional differences caused friction, usually across the Catholic versus Protestant divide, but generally more as a background force than an explicit trigger. Personality clashes played a more prominent contributory role, most notably at high levels in the organizational hierarchies, where ambitious personalities vied with each other over leadership posts. Particularly divisive figures, such as Linus Kather, the egocentric East Prussian who headed the umbrella group BvD/ZvD, kept numerous bitter feuds simmering for years, with the result that he was shunted from top-level roles in the united BdV. However, his exclusion did not prevent the BdV's other leadership cadres from continuing to quarrel throughout the following decades.¹¹

More distinctively, the far-reaching heterogeneity of the various expellee groups perpetuated deep-seated divisions that proved difficult to overcome, even on issues that the expellee lobby regarded as vital. To be sure, internal discord remained limited in the first of the two policy areas prioritized by the expellee organizations: social policies aimed at providing assistance for their followers. Although there were disagreements about details, by and large the main expellee organizations managed to unite on a set of demands that remained central to their social policy agenda for decades, including government-funded housing and employment schemes, special credit programs, and legislative measures to compensate the expellees for their heavy material losses.¹²

Divisions prevailed, however, in the policy field that the expellee movement in general and the homeland societies in particular viewed as their top priority and that lacks a direct equivalent among the *pied-noir* groups: the so-called *Heimatpolitik* – all areas of foreign and cultural policy related to the lost homelands and an anticipated return to them.

A revision of the postwar territorial status quo that would have enabled a mass return to the old homelands was the key goal of many homeland societies, especially those that claimed to speak for expellees from areas that had been part of Germany at some point before the end of World War II. But this nevertheless remained a conflictual issue. It was obviously problematic on the wider international level, given the Cold War status quo. It was also divisive within the expellee lobby.

Some organizations – particularly homeland societies that claimed to represent *Volksdeutsche*, expellees from beyond the borders of the German state – made clear early on, behind the scenes, that they had no wish to return to their old homelands.¹³ More importantly, demands for territorial revisions also caused strife among the more influential homeland societies. Tactical statements issued by the Western Allies during the early Cold War had suggested that, in the absence of a peace treaty, Germany continued to exist within its 1937 borders, legally at least. This meant that organizations such as the Silesian Homeland Society, whose members came from within these borders, were in a much better position than, say, the Sudeten German Homeland Society, whose members did not.

To paper over these rifts, the expellee organizations began by the mid-1950s to couch their demands in abstract, legalistic terms, such as their claim to a ‘right to the homeland’ (*Heimatrecht*) and to self-determination in that homeland. Ultimately, these legalistic constructs were attempts to maintain revisionist demands, in terms that sounded abstract enough to be potentially acceptable to both the various wings of the expellee movement and potential political backers at home and even abroad. Under the seemingly high-minded legal phraseology, expellee leaders were promoting the idea that they and their followers would first return to their old homelands and then exercise their right to self-determination, deciding about the national affiliation of the territories in question.¹⁴

This strategy worked well in the West German political arena, where *Heimatrecht* became a kind of political mantra of the 1950s and 1960s, endorsed by all the main political parties, primarily for instrumental, electoral reasons. But the strategy could not eradicate persistent divisions among the expellee organizations. The powerful Sudeten German Homeland Society, for instance, remained skeptical of whether its interest in eventually reclaiming the Sudetenland could really be served within the wider expellee lobby’s collective strategy. As a result, Sudeten German activists repeatedly struck out on their own in ways that undermined the expellee lobby’s united external front.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s they developed independent foreign policy initiatives, including propaganda publications for international audiences and attempts to establish direct ties to conservative American politicians. In the 1960s, Sudeten German leaders often seemed fixated on defending the continued validity of parts of the notorious Munich Agreement, without which they feared that their claims against Czechoslovakia would lose their legal basis.¹⁵ And in the 1990s they made headlines with their provocative interventions during the negotiations that culminated in the Declaration of Principles between the Federal Republic and the Czech Republic in 1997.¹⁶

The Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft can also illustrate a second area of internal divisions within the expellee organizations: the prevalence of ideological differences within their ranks. The main expellee organizations were 'broad churches' in the sense that their leadership cadres included people with widely varying political backgrounds, often from prominent former Nazis to committed Social Democrats. But in the Sudeten German Homeland Society these differences were also institutionalized early on through the so-called ideological communities (*Gesinnungsgemeinschaften*), three sub-organizations that brought together like-minded activists on the basis of interwar traditions. The Ackermann-Gemeinde was a Catholic group rooted in the Christian workers' movement; the Seliger-Gemeinde represented social democrats; and the Witiko-Bund drew on right-wing *völkisch* traditions and included several prominent Nazis. Predictably, representatives of these groups frequently clashed in internal deliberations, and although most of the confrontations could be shielded from external observers, occasionally word did leak out to the media, undermining the façade of expellee unity. Even when that did not occur, internal tensions weakened the expellee leaders' ability to cooperate effectively.¹⁷

Although the particular conflicts inherent in the Sudeten German ideological communities lost significance as the years passed and allegiances to prewar political traditions faded, ideological and political differences in the expellee lobby persisted. In the context of the Federal Republic's new *Ostpolitik* of the early 1970s, for example, the obstructionist stances of the mainstream expellee lobby were opposed by less prominent splinter groups that endorsed the government's new policies. At the other extreme, the so-called *Preussische Treuhand*, or Prussian Claims Society, which between 2006 and 2008 unsuccessfully sought to get European courts to force Poland to pay compensation to Germans who had lost their possessions in present-day Poland during the expulsions, consisted, in part, of prominent BdV members, even as the BdV as

an organization sought to distance itself from the Claims Society.¹⁸ Here, too, surface appearances of unity in the expellee lobby clashed with the underlying realities of competing and conflicting objectives.

Unity and division in key terminology

Ultimately, the divisions among the German expellees reach much deeper still, as reflected in the very concept of 'expellee'. As Mathias Beer has demonstrated, the term was a highly politicized Cold War construct that played an important role in the Federal Republic's public relations war against the German Democratic Republic (GDR).¹⁹ It highlighted the violent arbitrariness of the expulsions and pointed the finger at the USSR and its East European allies as the primary culprits behind them. It also contrasted with the GDR's refusal to address the issue of millions of its citizens mistreated and forcibly uprooted with the support of its main ally, except in extremely cautious and euphemistic terms.²⁰

Even more significantly, the category *Vertriebene* elided differences and fostered an impression of seeming national homogeneity amongst a population group that was in fact highly diverse and divided, broadly paralleling the similar function served by the term *Pied-Noir* in France. In part, the terminology had this effect with reference to the notion of 'expulsion' as such. The word is suggestive of a planned, unitary process, an organized, forced removal of a population group from a particular region on the initiative of hostile, presumably foreign authorities. When applied to the German 'expellees', it cultivated the impression of unity within a massive population group whose members had supposedly suffered very similar fates in the hands of external enemies while being forcibly resettled westwards during or after World War II.

That impression was not entirely wrong, of course. Millions of Germans were indeed subjected to more or less systematic expulsions organized by foreign authorities, particularly from former German territories that became part of postwar Poland or Czechoslovakia, but also from Hungary, Yugoslavia, and other areas during the war's final stages and its early aftermath. But large numbers of the so-called 'expellees' had left their homes under very different circumstances. Nearly a million had first come to the Reich as a result of mass resettlements and population exchanges carried out by the Nazis under the auspices of the *Heim ins Reich* (Back into the Reich) program, often with expectations of personal gain.²¹ Additional hundreds of thousands had been evacuated by Nazi authorities as the Red Army marched into areas of German settlement in 1944 and 1945, and millions of

others had chosen to flee from the advancing Soviet offensive, enduring a forced migration of sorts, but technically not an 'expulsion'.²² Upon closer inspection, the seeming unity of experiences among the German expellees during the 'expulsion' thus becomes an artificial construct that masked far-ranging differences in their forced migration experiences.

The wartime fortunes of the 'expellees' had also varied widely. By the end of the conflict, millions had been forcibly removed from territories in which their ancestors had lived for generations. This applied with particular force to many of the so-called *Reichsdeutsche* (citizens of the German Reich) among the expellees, who had been kicked out of areas that in most cases had been populated fully – or at least overwhelmingly – by Germans and had belonged to the Reich in many cases ever since its creation in 1870. It also held true for large numbers of *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans), many of whom had belonged to German minority settlements in Eastern Europe that had existed for centuries. But others had entered areas of expulsion only during the war, sometimes as direct beneficiaries of the Third Reich's policies of demographic re-engineering and exploitation.

Prime examples included settlers brought into the parts of interwar Poland annexed by the Nazis, to serve as colonizers of sorts in place of the Jews, ethnic Poles, and others previously expelled from these areas; or Germans who had entered annexed or occupied territories as the Third Reich's functionaries.²³ Such differences and more were submerged under the general rubric of 'expellees', pushing aside important differences among the affected population groups and helping to elide distinctions in the degree to which particular groups and individuals could be regarded not merely as victims of 'expulsions', but possibly also as agents and beneficiaries of National Socialist rule.

The use of the blanket term 'expellee' also clouded realities in the setting of post-1945 West Germany. It created seeming anti-communist unity among population groups that often had little in common, except for the experience of having had to desert their places of origin because of the war. The people lumped together as 'expellees' came from a wide variety of regions across the European continent, from the Balkans to the Baltic, with a strong *Reichsdeutsche* majority and a significant *Volksdeutsche* minority. The differences between the various groups of expellees were often much greater than any unifying features, given the geographic, cultural and linguistic contrasts between them. An urban professional from Breslau/Wrocław, a highly developed Silesian city that had been an integral part of the German state, would have had very little

in common with a peasant farmer who had lived in the remote Banat region of interwar Yugoslavia, for instance.

Much like the French *Pieds-Noirs*, the expellees in the Federal Republic were thus not only a highly diverse but also in many ways a very internally divided population group, a fact that was reflected both at the grassroots level and in the organizations that purported to represent the expellee 'masses'.

The representativeness and legitimacy of the expellee organizations

Another key question still remains: how representative were the expellee organizations? Could they legitimately claim to possess a mandate to act on behalf of the population groups whose spokesmen they purported to be?

On balance, the representativeness and legitimacy of the main West German expellee organizations has always been dubious. From the beginning, the leading organizations made far-reaching claims in this regard. The main homeland societies presented themselves as the sole legitimate representatives of their respective population groups, and the federal-level umbrella organizations claimed to speak for all of the expellees in the land. The organizations also reported high membership figures, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, with the two largest homeland societies, those of the Sudeten Germans and the Silesians, claiming some 350,000 and 300,000 members respectively, and the umbrella group BdV insisting on a membership of two million, as we have seen. Although the groups have grown more reticent about their membership numbers since the 1970s, they typically continue to react aggressively to any allegations of diminishing support. As recently as 2010, the BdV officially denied press reports according to which its total membership had declined to some 500,000, insisting on a figure of 'around two million'.²⁴

As with the *pied-noir* organizations in France, the membership data have been – and continue to be – highly problematic, however. The official figures have always been shrouded in secrecy, as public pronouncements without further evidence, and it is likely that most have been overestimates. There is also little doubt that the membership levels of the expellee groups have declined significantly since the 1950s, all official denials notwithstanding. In 1962, internal BdV records indicated that the total membership of the expellee organizations had slipped to 1.25 million at most, and by the mid-1960s the official newspaper of

the *Landsmannschaft Schlesien* attracted only 25,800 subscriptions from among the more than 1.5 million people that the group claimed to represent.²⁵ The downward trend has almost certainly continued since then, and the press reports of the BdV's 500,000 members in the new millennium could well be accurate.

However, even if one were to give the official data the benefit of the doubt, at least in the Federal Republic's early years, the fact would still remain that the expellee organizations have never managed to attract more than relatively small minorities of their purported followers. The two million members claimed by the BdV at its founding in 1958, for instance, equaled less than a quarter of all the expellees in West Germany at the time. The two largest homeland societies were even less successful in percentage terms with their roughly 300,000 claimed members, given the fact that some 1.55 million Silesians and 1.9 million Sudeten Germans had resettled in the Federal Republic.²⁶

There is also reason to be skeptical about the expellee leaders' claims regarding the motivations of the followers who joined the organizations and attended their events. The most notable such events were the annual summer rallies of the various *Landsmannschaften*, which often drew crowds of hundreds of thousands, at least in the Federal Republic's early years. Expellee leaders routinely portrayed the high turnouts as living proof of their followers' enthusiastic support for the expellee lobby's political agenda on issues such as *Heimatpolitik*. But the available evidence suggests that the majority of rank and file expellees came to the rallies primarily for more personal, largely apolitical reasons: to meet family and friends, to reminisce, to maintain cultural traditions and connections.²⁷ The degree to which the expellee organizations could claim genuine popular backing for their particular policies has therefore always been questionable.

The lack of wider popular legitimacy and representativeness has been particularly striking in the composition and behavior of the expellee lobby's top leadership cadres. Particularly during the first two postwar decades or so, the main expellee organizations were characterized by a kind of dignitary politics. The groups were directed in a top-heavy fashion by narrow, self-perpetuating elites that existed in a political bubble, with no direct popular legitimization and little in the way of feedback mechanisms from their members. Almost without exception, the leaders had occupied elite positions in the old homelands, typically as high-level civil servants, large-scale landowners, or salient members of the free professions, and many knew each other from the old days. The majority had engaged in right-wing politics during the Weimar era; many had become active National Socialist German Workers' Party

(NSDAP) members in the Third Reich; and considerable numbers had actively participated in the formulation or implementation of Nazi policies. Of the thirteen members of the first BdV Presidium that took office in 1958, for instance, eleven had been active contributors to the Nazi regime, as Michael Schwartz has shown.²⁸

While conservative-minded, even reactionary, leaders set the tone in the early expellee movement, left-liberal voices remained sidelined, a trend that has largely continued to the present day. Another notable feature of the top leadership structure of the early expellee movement was the nearly total absence of women. The severe gender imbalance began to change somewhat only recently, most visibly through the elevation of the CDU politician Erika Steinbach to the post of the BdV president, which she held between 1998 and late 2014. In the post-Steinbach area the organization is again led by a man, however, a conservative member of the Bundestag by the name of Bernd Fabritius, and in 2015 its fifteen-member Presidium contains only two women.

In recent years, the BdV – as indeed most of the expellee lobby – has sought to appear more modern, partly by introducing younger faces to key leadership positions, most of which had continued to be occupied by increasingly octogenarian figures of the founding generation well into the 1990s. In mid-2015, six of the BdV's current Presidium members, for instance, were born in the 1960s or the early 1970s.²⁹ However, such changes have been more cosmetic than substantive. The expellee lobby's exclusive, non-consultative leadership practices have continued, and the gulf between the leaders and the rank and file has remained wide.

The expellee lobby's wider societal role and functions

What can be said about the wider societal role of the German expellee lobby? How closely have the organizations been able to meet their goals, and what functions have they served among the expellees and in broader society? The overall objectives of the main expellee groups, as laid out in internal deliberations from early on, were ambitious. The most fundamental goal was the development and maintenance of a separate expellee identity, with particular long-term objectives. In the short term, the expellees were to establish a secure basis of existence in West Germany, through self-help and governmental assistance. But the material improvements were to be the means to a much more far-reaching end – an eventual return to the old *Heimat*. The expellees were supposed to retain a close affiliation with the lost homelands and be prepared to reclaim them when a suitable opportunity presented itself, by exercising

their self-proclaimed *Heimatrecht*. In other words, societal integration in West Germany was supposed to be only an interim stage that enabled the expellees to re-establish themselves in the present in order to prepare for their ultimate goal: an eventual return to the territories from which they had been forcibly uprooted.

These ambitious long-term objectives proved to be a pipe dream. The expellee lobby's efforts to cultivate a lasting, separate identity among its presumed followers failed dramatically. By the mid-1960s at the latest it had become obvious that visions of the old *Heimat* were fading fast in most expellees' minds. Opinion polls showed that a steadily growing majority of the expellees in West Germany had no desire to return to their former homelands.³⁰ Instead of obsessing about their presumed separate identities and continuing ties to the 'lost German East', most expellees were increasingly integrated into the Federal Republic and preferred to focus on their lives in the realities of the present.

To be sure, the integration process was far from complete. Expellees still typically lagged behind longer-standing residents of western Germany in their living standards, but the gap was closing, particularly for the younger generations, whose members had experienced the old *Heimat* only as small children, or not at all. In the stability of postwar West Germany, everyday routines were taking over, and the process of adjustment to the new circumstances kept advancing a bit further each year.³¹ Strong proof of this state of affairs emerged in the early 1970s, when the expellee organizations' attempts to mobilize the expellee 'millions' against the Brandt government's new *Ostpolitik* failed decisively, with the vast majority refusing to heed the call to protest and resist. The long-term result was the relative political marginalization of the expellee groups, broadly similar to that of the *pied-noir* organizations in France, a situation from which they have never really recovered.

The causes of the expellee lobby's failure to meet their ambitious objectives were manifold – and mostly external to the expellee groups themselves. The Federal Republic's singular economic and social trajectory, as embodied in the so-called Economic Miracle and its far-reaching integrative and legitimizing effects, was undoubtedly the most important factor. A variety of other external forces also made significant contributions – policies pursued by the Allied occupiers and native West German elites; social, generational and attitudinal changes in West German society; the efforts and adjustments of individual expellees; even the simple passage of time. But, paradoxically, the expellee organizations themselves played a major role in undermining their own wider project. In two different contexts, their actions helped

to defang the separatist, revisionist potential of their own presumed followers, thereby significantly facilitating the long-term societal integration of rank and file expellees. In the final analysis, the West German expellee lobby therefore made its most far-reaching societal contribution by unwittingly subverting its own underlying objectives, giving rise to unanticipated consequences.

The first of these contexts was the early postwar period, a time when the emerging West German state still lacked sovereignty and concerns about a mass radicalization of the expellees were widespread. As millions of impoverished, demoralized and homesick expellees eked out a precarious existence, typically facing prejudice and discrimination from the native population, the expellee lobby's rhetoric provided psychological succor for the uprooted newcomers. The prospect of an eventual return to the old homelands, fostered by the expellee lobby's revisionist proclamations, provided a source of hope and motivation for large numbers of expellees. A Silesian woman gave apt expression to the inspiration which this vision of a better future could provide: 'One day we'll return to our land,' she assured an interviewer. 'We all firmly believe that. Until then we don't let ourselves get down-hearted.'³²

As the hope of a mass expellee exodus also appealed to many native West Germans, who would have been happy to see the backs of unloved strangers amidst overcrowded conditions of scarcity, the rhetoric of the expellee activists helped to defuse social tensions and thereby served the broader interests of postwar reconstruction in western Germany. In the longer term that rhetoric also undermined the revisionist long-term objectives that it was supposed to promote. By building the lost *Heimat* into an idealized, mythical entity and the return to it into a near-millenarian solution that would fix all imaginable ills, expellee functionaries helped to create a dualistic mindset among their followers. The increasingly distant paradise of the lost homeland contrasted sharply with the realities of daily life in the Federal Republic, and as the years passed, a compartmentalized outlook grew ever more evident among the expellees. While many, at least among the old and middle generations, continued to pay limited, highly ritualized homage to the beloved old *Heimat* at expellee rallies and other in-group events, in their everyday lives a growing majority increasingly accommodated themselves to their surroundings, accepting West Germany as their de facto new *Heimat*.³³ The unrealistic rhetoric of the expellee elites contributed significantly to that outcome.

The second context in which the oratory and actions of the expellee functionaries backfired with similar consequences was the late 1960s.

By this time, West German public debates and attitudes about the Nazi past, World War II and its consequences, including the expulsions and the accompanying border changes, had changed significantly. There was a growing willingness among mainstream political and opinion-making elites, as well as among the population at large, including a rising majority of the expellees, to accept the postwar realities and to view the recent past through an increasingly self-critical lens. However, the main expellee organizations still refused to budge from their hardline stances. In the face of rising public challenges to their established doctrines, they instead added radical-sounding accents to their political repertoire, typically attacking journalists, politicians and other critics with derogatory epithets reminiscent of the destructively polarized political debates of the Weimar era. The ominous-sounding term *Verzichtpolitiker* (abandonment politician) gained particular notoriety as a pejorative employed by expellee activists against politicians deemed hostile to their cause.³⁴

Through their inability to adjust to the social, political and attitudinal changes of the 1960s, the expellee organizations again made a positive contribution to expellee integration and broader social stability in West Germany, albeit in a paradoxical fashion: by alienating the majority of the people whom they purported to represent. After having proclaimed for years that a governmental recognition of the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe would provoke massive expellee protests and risk large-scale political radicalization, expellee leaders were now forced to recognize that the bulk of their supposed followers refused to conform to such stereotypes. Far from rushing to the barricades to demand continued hardline policies, growing numbers of expellees explicitly rejected the popular legitimacy of their self-proclaimed representatives, publicly accusing them of 'fanaticism' and 'dangerous illusions'.³⁵

Many others backed away from the organized expellee movement with less fanfare. This trend was evident within the organizations from the mid-1960s. By that time, ranking Silesian leaders admitted in private that 'the mass of the Silesians [did] not belong or no longer belong[ed] to the Homeland Society' and that the level of interest among youth was 'minimal'.³⁶ Internal Sudeten German records told a similar story, and the general picture within the expellee lobby was one of steady shrinkage, funneled around a hard core of aging and increasingly embittered devotees.³⁷ The broader impact of these developments became clear as Willy Brandt's Social-Liberal coalition began to implement its new *Ostpolitik* in the early 1970s. Although expellee activists continued to protest vociferously, most of the public supported the government's Eastern policy, and political radicalism remained confined to small fringe groups, even among the expellees.

Early postwar fears about the dangerous, destabilizing potential of the expellees had proved unfounded, thanks to a combination of fortuitous factors, one of which had been the unintended long-term societal consequences of the *Vertriebenenverbände* and their political activities. Despite all their internal divisions, hidden agendas, and problems of legitimacy and representativeness, the expellee organizations' most far-reaching and lasting societal function had been to undermine the potential dangers inherent in the millions of German expellees, albeit unwittingly and even unwillingly.

Notes

1. See, for instance, *Spiegel Online*, including 'Einigung mit Vertriebenenverband: Sieg der Unvernunft', 11 February 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/einigung-mit-vertriebenenverband-sieg-der-unvernunft-a-677350.html> (accessed 30 April 2015).
2. Sylvia Schraut, 'Die westlichen Besatzungsmächte und die deutschen Flüchtlinge', in Dierk Hoffmann and Michael Schwartz, eds, *Geglückte Integration? Spezifika und Vergleichbarkeit der Vertriebenen-Eingliederung in der SBZ/DDR* (Munich, 1999), 33–46.
3. Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945–1990* (Oxford, 2003), 28–9; Matthias Stickler, 'Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch': *Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949–1972* (Düsseldorf, 2004), 33–69.
4. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion*, 29–37; Stickler, 'Ostdeutsch heißt gesamtdeutsch', 33–69.
5. See Hans W. Schoenberg, *Germans from the East: A Study of Their Migration, Resettlement and Subsequent Group History since 1945* (The Hague, 1970), 37.
6. The estimates are from Schoenberg, *Germans from the East*, 94–5, 316.
7. *Ibid.*, 316–17.
8. *Ibid.*, 318.
9. Stickler, 'Ostdeutsch heißt gesamtdeutsch', 69–97.
10. Minutes of the SPD's Arbeitsausschuss für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 5 December 1957, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (AdsD), Bonn: BT-Fraktion, 4. WP, 327.
11. Linus Kather, *Die Entmachtung der Vertriebenen*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1964–5).
12. Reinhold Schillinger, *Der Entscheidungsprozess beim Lastenausgleich, 1945–1952* (St Katharinen, 1985).
13. Rat der Südostdeutschen, 'Bericht über die Tagung der Delegierten am 23./24. Juli 1955', Sudetendeutsches Archiv (SDA), Munich: NL Lodgman, xi–93.
14. 'Die außenpolitische Linie der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft', *VdL-Informationen*, 10 May 1954: 3.
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16. Pertti Ahonen, 'German Expellee Organizations: Between Revisionism and Reconciliation', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 45 (2005): 353–72, here 364.
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7

Unity above all? Relationships and Rivalries within the Pied-Noir Community

Claire Eldridge

The conclusion of the Algerian War of Independence was accompanied by one of the largest post-1945 population movements as almost all of Algeria's one million European residents left their homes and crossed the Mediterranean to metropolitan France.¹ Aside from its scale, one of the most notable features of the *pied-noir* migration was the speed with which a highly diverse group of individuals came to be constructed as a cohesive and broadly homogeneous community possessed of a shared set of attributes and goals. Key to this transformation were associations that served as the creators of and vehicles for this collective identity which, in turn, became the basis for the articulation of a range of grievances and demands addressed to the French state. Operating as 'instrument(s) of identity', associations therefore enabled Pieds-Noirs to 'recognize [themselves] and to be recognized' as a community.² In all of this, unity, or at least the external appearance of unity, was paramount. The more the Pieds-Noirs were seen as a coherent bloc, the more likely it was that those in power would take their demands seriously.

Yet beneath an apparently harmonious surface lurked a range of acrimonious divisions and conflicts. This chapter will consider the strategies employed by *pied-noir* associations as they sought to maintain cohesion in spite of the heterogeneity of a population with diverse, often competing agendas, priorities, and ideologies. Focusing on the tensions between unity and division provides an insight into the relationships and rivalries that structure this complex and still relatively understudied community.

Early *pied-noir* mobilization

The size and suddenness of the 1962 'exodus' meant that both departure from Algeria and arrival in France were chaotic and stressful experiences. Even though the French state put in place extensive and, ultimately, highly successful measures to facilitate the rapid integration of the former settlers, these initiatives took time to take effect and, inevitably, there were shortcomings.³ The limits of the ability of the state to process the massive number of Pieds-Noirs, especially in the summer and autumn of 1962, as well as the enormous disruption created by the arrival of so many additional citizens generated considerable tensions and hostility, particularly in places such as Marseille, which bore the brunt of the repatriate disembarkations. This was compounded by metropolitan suspicions regarding a community closely linked in the media and popular imagination with the terrorism of the Organisation armée secrète (OAS). All of which meant that the 'welcome' the Pieds-Noirs received in France fell far short of what they were expecting and hoping for.⁴

Into the gap between what the state promised and what it was immediately able to deliver stepped a number of associations that sought to represent and defend the legal rights and material interests of the former settlers. Several of these associations were initially formed in response to the earlier displacement of French citizens from other parts of the empire such as Indochina, Morocco, Tunisia, and Guinea as decolonization gathered pace. However, the numerical size and political importance of Algeria's settlers meant that this community quickly came to dominate the agenda of bodies such as the Front national des rapatriés (FNR) and the Groupement national pour l'indemnisation des biens spoliés ou perdus outre-mer (GNPI). The largest and most influential organization at the time was the Association nationale des français d'Afrique du Nord et d'outre-mer et de leurs amis (ANFANOMA).

Initially formed in 1956 in support of the *Algérie française* cause, in the post-1962 period ANFANOMA turned its attention to lobbying the French government. Echoing the materially-driven focus of German expellee associations like the BdV, ANFANOMA initially prioritized securing adequate levels of housing, employment and compensation for the Pieds-Noirs. The association also ensured that new arrivals were informed about what state assistance was available to them and how to claim this. A jump in ANFANOMA's membership from 62,000 in April 1960, to a quarter of a million by 1962, according to their own records, enabled the association to position itself as

the voice of the *piéd-noir* community and to hold sway over the early association-based landscape.⁵ By articulating a central set of practical needs and concerns common to the majority of Pieds-Noirs in these initial years, ANFANOMA encouraged the disparate and individual settlers to think of themselves as part of a socially and culturally cohesive community. In this way, the association helped lay the foundations for the kinds of collective mobilization witnessed in the following two decades.

As state integration policies took effect, rendering the immediate material needs of the Pieds-Noirs less acute, new and more diverse types of associations emerged. In particular, the mid-1970s onwards witnessed a 'cultural turn' as *piéd-noir* associations focused increasingly on moral and commemorative issues. Spearheading this change in direction was the Cercle Algérieniste. Founded in 1973, the association's mission was to preserve what they regarded as the unique culture and heritage of the Pieds-Noirs which they felt was being imperiled by the assimilationist pressures of French society. Central to the Cercle Algérieniste's mission was collating, organizing and synthesizing individual *piéd-noir* experiences in order to create a collective memory store which could be deployed for internally and externally facing purposes.⁶ As the association's 1978 manifesto proclaimed, they aimed to be 'the expression of the collective conscience of our scorned, exiled, and dispersed community in order to save from oblivion and nothingness the little that remains to us of our magnificent and cruel past'.⁷ Designating themselves as the embodiment of this 'collective conscience' enabled the Cercle Algérieniste to define their positions and objectives as common to all Pieds-Noirs and thus to claim to speak on behalf of the broader community.⁸

Astutely positioning itself within a post-1968 political landscape that afforded greater space to minority identities and cultures, the Cercle Algérieniste not only grew rapidly, establishing multiple regional branches across France, but inspired a wealth of other culturally oriented organizations.⁹ These included *amicales*, social societies bringing together Pieds-Noirs on the basis of shared geographical origins, professions, or other facets of identity. Although primarily local rather than national in their reach, *amicales* shared with organizations like the Cercle Algérieniste an emphasis on recreating a sense of community through the preservation and valorization of their collective past. To this end, both types of associations regularly organized social and commemorative events where their members could come together and reminisce, while their magazines and newsletters created virtual

communities through photographs, autobiographical recollections and historical articles evoking the common elements that bound them together. By creating a safe space in which to assert an identity and sense of belonging that French society was often perceived as hostile towards, such activities helped individual Pieds-Noirs to 'reweave the social fabric' torn asunder in 1962.¹⁰ In response to the popularity of such initiatives, even ANFANOMA adjusted its resolutely practical and material focus to include an increasing array of cultural components. This was a conscious strategic decision to help ensure that the association remained relevant to a community with changing priorities and interests.

Culturally-based entities and their members have often lent their support to campaigns waged by issue, event, or group-specific associations. Many of these endeavors were commemoratively oriented with organizations such as the Collectif des familles de disparus en Algérie, or the Association des familles des victimes du 26 mars 1962 et de leurs alliés, attempting to locate and remember civilians who died or disappeared during the Algerian War.¹¹ Other causes that attracted significant *pied-noir* support included the efforts of the Association pour la sauvegarde des cimetières d'Algérie (ASCA) to preserve European graveyards and tombs in Algeria, both from natural deterioration over time and deliberate vandalism. Other associations focused on coordinating collective action to prevent 19 March, the date of the Evian ceasefire accords, becoming part of the national commemorative calendar.¹² A further issue that received a lot of attention was the fate of the *harkis*, those Algerians who served in civilian and military capacities with the French forces during the War of Independence. Much of the activism on behalf of the *harkis*, certainly in the 1980s and 1990s, was channeled via the association Jeune Pied-Noir (JPN), run by Bernard Coll and his spouse, Taouès Titraoui, herself the daughter of a *harki*.¹³

Support for other *pied-noir* endeavors demonstrated that although each association had its own particular constituency and remit, they did not operate in isolation. Instead, they formed a dense network whose relations, so their spokespeople claimed, were characterized by principles of mutual assistance and support that replicated the close communal ties of French Algeria. Association newspapers, magazines and bulletins regularly devoted space to the activities of other groups, while article bylines indicated a pool of regular contributors who rotated between different publications. Television programs relating to the Pieds-Noirs furthermore revealed a core cast of recurring association representatives, notably Jacques Roseau of the Rassemblement et

coordination des rapatriés et spoilés d'outre-mer (RECOURS) and JPN's Bernard Coll.

Finally, there has always been considerable movement between associations with activists gaining experience in one organization before launching their own. Maurice Calmein's time as a militant in the FNR in the 1960s, for example, served him well when he came to found the Cercle Algérieniste in 1973, while in 2007, Nicole Ferrandis was simultaneously vice president of ANFANOMA and head of the Association des familles des victimes du 26 mars 1962 et de leurs alliés.¹⁴ Therefore, although some associations are more prominent and influential than others, the situation is less hierarchical and more fluid than among the German Vertriebene.

Most *piéd-noir* associations vehemently proclaimed themselves to be apolitical. This did not mean that they were indifferent to politics; indeed most had political dimensions to their activism in the sense of seeking to influence government policy – whether economic, social or cultural – in favor of the Pieds-Noirs. Rather, being apolitical denoted a refusal to definitively ally with any one party or individual politician, instead retaining the independence to decide whom to support based on the incentives being offered.¹⁵ Particularly during the early years of the *piéd-noir* presence in France when there were important material issues that could only be resolved through legislative measures, such as the question of compensation, associations like ANFANOMA engaged in detailed debates concerning the merits of different politicians and parties with respect to *piéd-noir* needs. This included allowing those standing in municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections to use the pages of its newspaper, *France Horizon*, to explain how their platforms would benefit the *piéd-noir* community.

The organization most closely associated with political activism is RECOURS whose charismatic founder, Jacques Roseau, developed an explicit lobbying strategy that consisted of mobilizing Pieds-Noirs to vote tactically in areas where they were numerically significant in order to pressure incumbent governments into acceding to their demands.¹⁶ First put into practice in the 1977 municipal elections, this tactic produced several shock results in the form of majority candidates in the south losing their seats to the left. RECOURS' most high-profile scalp was Montpellier's incumbent mayor, François Delmas, who had been in post since 1959. Delmas was unseated by the socialist candidate, Georges Frêche, in large part because of the latter's close alliance with Roseau which helped him 'steal' the *piéd-noir* vote, as the press described it.¹⁷ Continuing these lobbying practices for the next decade and at

both ends of the political spectrum, by the 1986 legislative elections RECOURS had lined up behind Jacques Chirac, the leader of the right-wing Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). In 1987, following Chirac's appointment as prime minister, the Pieds-Noirs were rewarded with a range of favorable measures including a substantive compensation law demonstrating, in the eyes of many Pieds-Noirs, the utility of RECOURS' tactics.

Headline-grabbing early successes, such as Frêche's victory, greatly raised the profile of RECOURS. Media coverage combined with Roseau's political acumen and carefully cultivated connections meant RECOURS rapidly gained institutional legitimacy. Dubbed the 'voice of the *Pieds-Noirs*' by the press, Roseau managed to make his organization and himself the main point of reference for the *pied-noir* community as far as those in power were concerned.¹⁸ Being able to claim to represent not just the views of their own members, but those of the wider *pied-noir* community and, as a result of this, to exert influence at the national level, meant that RECOURS attained a status that most large *pied-noir* associations aspired to. In so doing, the organization attracted many supporters, but it also aroused jealousy and hostility among other associations.

The question of representativeness

How accurate was the press' assessment of RECOURS as the 'voice' of the Pieds-Noirs? While it is relatively simple to ascertain what associations do, and to discern the rationales behind this, it is much harder to assess the impact of their activities and the extent to which they are representative of the views of the wider *pied-noir* population. Especially as the 'community' of Pieds-Noirs being invoked is not a naturally occurring phenomenon, but rather an artificial entity that needs to be continually constructed and defined by associations, both to their own members and in the wider public sphere. There clearly has to be some degree of common ground and sense of connection among Pieds-Noirs for the associational movement to have remained in existence for more than five decades. As Eric Savarese argues, 'No identity can be woven without the existence of sentiments shared collectively by the individuals involved.'¹⁹

Nonetheless, it is equally clear that not all Pieds-Noirs subscribe to the discourses and positions of associations, not least because associations have different agendas, memberships and target audiences. A distinction also needs to be made between 'activists', those who create and

direct associations, and 'members', those who belong to and participate in the activities of associations with varying degrees of commitment and consistency. As in the case of the annual summer rallies of the various *Landsmannschaften* highlighted by Pertti Ahonen, attendance at *pied-noir* events was motivated by a broad range of factors and cannot be taken as proof of support for the political agenda of the groups organizing them, in spite of what the associations themselves claimed. The term 'community' must therefore be used with the awareness that by no means all Pieds-Noirs identify with this entity as it is labeled and characterized by associations and their spokespeople.

These issues are compounded by the fact that there is almost no quantitative data concerning the number and size of *pied-noir* associations. Considerably lower than the percentages reported for expellee associations, the most widely cited statistics relate to the 1990s and put the number of associations somewhere between four hundred and eight hundred, with 15 percent of the total *pied-noir* population deemed to belong to one or more organization.²⁰ However, the source of the data on which these estimate rests is not clear. There is also no sense of how these figures compare to previous years and the situation has undoubtedly evolved over the two decades since these calculations were made. More recently, Jean-Jacques Jordi stated that approximately five percent of Pieds-Noirs belong to an association. Although Jordi gives no indication of where this figure comes from, his assertion appears to support the idea of progressive decline in membership similar to that witnessed in the German case.²¹

Aside from such holistic assessments, all that exists are discrete and isolated snapshots of the size and strength of individual associations in particular regions at certain moments. In 1992, for example, Jordi claimed that the Cercle Algérieniste had 33 local branches and 5,000 members overall. Two years previously, Joëlle Hureau reported that the same association possessed 3,500 adherents, in comparison to membership figures of 200,000 and 50,000 for ANFANOMA and RECOURS respectively.²² Such assessments sit alongside a limited number of small-scale case studies, usually based on a single association, such as Andrea Smith's excellent anthropological investigation of the Amicale France-Malte in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône.²³

Associations therefore represent the visible tip of the *rapatrié* iceberg, but it is hard to gauge how large the area below the surface actually is. Yet it is precisely because it is so difficult to measure the size and influence of associations that their *perceived* significance, whether among Pieds-Noirs, the general public, or government officials, becomes so

important. In light of the lack of concrete data, perception acquires a disproportionate weight. Hence why so much emphasis has been placed by associations upon the concept of unity, or at least on maintaining a unified front in public to give credence to the idea of the Pieds-Noirs as a cohesive and numerically strong body whose demands deserve due attention. As in the German case, maintaining the impression of harmony and homogeneity is therefore a deliberate tactic. Primarily for external consumption, such claims are designed to strengthen the hand of associations in their campaigns for material restitution and moral recognition.

Unity and division

Unity is therefore something that has been consciously and actively promoted by *pied-noir* associations from the outset. In 1977, the first edition of *L'Algérianiste*, the monthly magazine of the Cercle Algérianiste, opened with the declaration: 'We want to maintain our identity, living as we want to, proud of our past and strong because of our fraternal links.'²⁴ A decade previously, another *pied-noir* publication, *L'Echo d'Oran*, placed a similar stress on the twin themes of 'solidarity' and 'friendship' in 1965 when it reminded readers of the proverb: 'Defeated, divided, a country dies. / Defeated, united, a country is reborn.'²⁵ Believing that there were plenty of outside forces who would seek to sow disunity for their own gains, maintaining internal unity was advocated by associations as the best way to guarantee the survival of the Pieds-Noirs as a collective entity and the most effective means of ensuring that their demands were taken seriously by the French state.

It was therefore important, as Cercle Algérianiste President Maurice Calmein stressed, that Pieds-Noirs behaved in a 'dignified' manner which demonstrated that 'for us, moral values like a sense of honor [and] of fraternity remain fundamental'.²⁶ As the attention of the nation turned increasingly towards groups connected to the Algerian War in the 1990s, such imperatives acquired greater significance. Acknowledging, however, that no community was perfect, strategies were proposed for dealing with the occasional 'black sheep' whose behavior risked 'harming others in the group'.²⁷ Self-policing was thus advocated to bring any rogue elements back into line before they could tarnish the image projected to the outside world.

Yet behind this rhetoric, unity in a practical sense has proven difficult to achieve. Although their experience of 'expulsion' from Algeria was more homogeneous than in the German case, the former settlers

nonetheless constituted a highly diverse population socio-economically, politically and culturally. In the postcolonial period, this heterogeneity led to differences of opinion concerning how to interpret and represent the past, as well as how best to define the present-day community and what its objectives should be.²⁸ As a result, *piéd-noir* associations have been plagued from their inception by rivalries, divisions and schisms. These have primarily revolved around internal competitions for control over the image and voice of the Pieds-Noirs and for the right to represent the community to the outside world, particularly to those in power.

As early as November 1956, the Union des français d'outre-mer fused with the Association des français d'Afrique du Nord et d'outre-mer to form ANFANOM. A final 'A', standing for 'et leurs Amis' (and their friends) was added in 1958 to give the association its current acronym of ANFANOMA. But only a few months later at the association's annual conference in February 1957, disagreements were so severe that a faction broke away to form the Fédération nationale des Français d'Afrique du Nord et d'outre-mer (FNFANOM). This was on top of a long-standing rivalry between ANFANOMA and the Rassemblement des Français d'Afrique du Nord (RANFRAN).²⁹

In addition to a bewildering array of fusions and splits, there have also been a series of attempts to federate *piéd-noir* associations into larger blocs. Yet, in contrast to the German case, none of these have endured. One of the more successful was the FNR, which debuted in 1965 promising to 'energetically' pursue the material and moral goals of the community. The FNR included representatives from all the key associations of the day, including ANFANOMA. Its creation demonstrated, in the opinion of Valérie Esclangon-Morin, recognition by *piéd-noir* associations of 'the need to form themselves into a lobby in order to speak with one voice and force politicians to support the *rapatrié* cause'.³⁰ However, acknowledging the need to unify in order to optimize their efficacy was not sufficient to transcend rivalries between member associations and to hold the FNR, or the various federative bodies that succeeded it, together in the long term.

Another interesting example in this regard was that of the Conseil national supérieur des rapatriés (CNSR). This particular unifying attempt was driven by Eugène Ibagnes of Union syndicale de défense des intérêts des Français réplés d'Algérie (USDIFRA), an association noted for its strong-arm tactics, murky connections to the far right and deep-seated hostility to RECOURS and Roseau. It was no coincidence that the CNSR emerged publicly at the height of RECOURS' influence, but also at a

point where opposition within the *pied-noir* community to Roseau's political lobbying tactics was mounting. In addition to the considerable personal animosity between Ibagnes and Roseau, the rivalry between USDIFRA and RECOURS was further accentuated by the broader political context, which, since Chirac's appointment as Prime Minister, had been growing increasingly favorable towards the *pied-noir* community and to their reading of the Franco-Algerian past. This considerably raised the stakes in terms of which associations or individuals could claim to speak on behalf of the community and thus secure the ear of the newly attentive state, particularly with the fast approaching thirtieth anniversary of the end of the War of Independence.

Relationships, rivalries and RECOURS

In light of this animosity, in June 1991, when Roseau appeared on an episode of the weekly television show *Ciel, mon mardi!* alongside Roland Di Costanzo of USDIFRA, it was reasonable to assume that sparks might fly between the two men, especially as the host, Christian Dechavanne, had a reputation for putting together panels comprising guests unlikely to see eye to eye. Indeed, joining various *pied-noir* figures that day, including the author Robert Castel and Bernard Coll of JPN, was Arlette Laguiller of the Trotskyiste Lutte ouvrière party, an organization with a very different understanding of colonialism to the one normally advanced by *pied-noir* associations.³¹ The presence of the Constantine-born historian Benjamin Stora, something of a *bête noire* within the *pied-noir* community given his critical stance toward the French colonial past and left-wing political leanings, added further potential frisson to the line-up. However, what actually unfolded during the episode and in the following months was more complex, providing a useful encapsulation of the conflict within the *pied-noir* associational movement between the rhetorical imperative to unify and the actual state of tension and competition that existed between different groups.

The *Ciel, mon mardi!* broadcast began amidst an atmosphere of bonhomie. To enthusiastic applause from the audience, Dechavanne was presented with a series of *pied-noir* gifts including a badge, a t-shirt, a copy of the magazine *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, which, Roseau informed viewers, all *rapatriés* should read, and a bottle of anisette. As Coll assured the host, the assembled were 'true *Pieds-Noirs*' who had known each other for a long time.³² This friendly atmosphere was not, however, to last. The tone of the program changed radically as Di Costanzo took possession of the microphone on behalf of USDIFRA and

embarked upon an impassioned denunciation of a variety of figures connected to the *pied-noir* community.

Beginning by asserting that USDIFRA was the only organization to defend Pieds-Noirs of all backgrounds and convictions, he went on to outline the association's demands which included the rehabilitation of the memory of those who defended the *Algérie française* cause – a coded reference to the OAS – recognition for Pieds-Noirs and *harkis* killed during the Algerian War, and the defense of the moral and material interests of both communities. Di Costanzo then turned his attention to Maurice Benassayag, the incumbent Minister for *Rapatriés*, who had been due to appear on the program, but who had had to cancel, it emerged, due to family reasons. This explanation did not satisfy the increasingly irate Di Costanzo who, in between attacking Benassayag for having 'let down' and 'misled' the *pied-noir* population, repeatedly demanded that Dechavanne bring him a phone so that he might call Benassayag and air his grievances to him personally, although at no point did Di Costanzo specify what these grievances were. Di Costanzo also found time to criticize Roseau and RECOURS, accusing Roseau of selling out by cozying up to a political elite that did not truly represent the interests of all Pieds-Noirs; a swipe very much in keeping with the kind of hostile rhetoric regularly proffered by USDIFRA and the CNSR.

As his speech progressed, Di Costanzo's emotional state heightened. Attempts by the other guests to calm or interrupt him were rebuffed in an increasingly aggressive manner, including demands to 'ferme ta gueule!' ('shut your face!'). Amplifying the impact of Di Costanzo's increasingly incoherent rant was his considerable size and imposing physical presence, especially as he was seated next to the small and spry Coll over whom he towered menacingly. The fact that Dechavanne had lost control of his own show was highlighted by the camera panning across at various points to reveal the host with his head in his hands, while Stora looked on, first with bemusement and then with scarcely concealed mirth, at this unforeseen turn of events. In the face of Dechavanne's passivity, it was the other *pied-noir* guests, particularly the association representatives, Roseau and Coll, who stepped in.

Rather than disassociate themselves from the deeply embarrassing spectacle unfolding before them and from the negative portrayal of their community being shown to the viewing public, Roseau and Coll instead sought to diffuse the situation by defending and justifying Di Costanzo's behavior. 'Roland, we're all friends', Roseau repeatedly asserted as he tried to point that out that that RECOURS' lobbying strategy, although not perfect, had at least brought some gains to the wider community.

Coll similarly referred to Di Costanzo as 'my friend' several times during his attempts to calm him. Furthermore, in seeking to explain the 'anger' of his co-panelist to the audience, Coll argued that this was the product of a media that consistently ignored the *pied-noir* community, leaving them with few opportunities to express their views, hence the inevitable buildup and explosion of frustrations that they were all witnessing. This point was supported by Roseau who described Di Costanzo as someone who 'sincerely expresses the suffering of a great part of the [*pied-noir*] community'.³³

After the *Ciel, mon mardi!* credits had rolled, the defense of Di Costanzo carried on into the pages of *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, the same magazine that had been given as a gift to Dechavanne at the start of the program and a publication known for its close ties to USDIFRA. In the double-page autopsy of the controversial broadcast, Roseau and Coll maintained their supportive stance. Far from damaging public perceptions of the Pieds-Noirs, they claimed that through his 'moving and robust intervention' their 'friend' Di Costanzo had enabled the community to 'give a stronger, united, and even more powerful image of itself'.³⁴ Epitomizing the principle of *pied-noir* unity through their words and actions, Roseau and Coll put aside their own association agendas and ambitions in order to rebuild the image of a unified community after it had so spectacularly and publicly fallen apart.

Roseau was not to be accorded the same solidarity that he offered Di Costanzo. In fact, the treatment of Roseau and RECOURS serves as a clear exception to the supposed cardinal rule of downplaying tensions and differences of opinion between associations. Instead, Roseau was treated as a rogue element within the community who, it was deemed by other associations, needed to be brought back into line. For example, at the moment when Roseau's tactical voting strategy first began to pay off, ANFANOMA, the self-styled dominant *pied-noir* association at the time, responded by denouncing what they saw as an obsession with unity at any price, as well as the media frenzy surrounding the newly ascendant RECOURS; and in October 1992, *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* ran a campaign asking readers to send in statements denying that Roseau represented their views in order, the magazine claimed, to stop his 'monopoly of speech' which had 'excessively politicized the voice of the *pieds-noirs*'.³⁵ Tied into these criticisms were accusations that RECOURS was elitist and out of touch, simply a 'personal tribune' for Roseau. Although allegations that association leaders were using their positions to further their own careers rather than the interests of the wider *pied-noir* community were not uncommon, the high profile of

RECOURS and the close relationship Roseau enjoyed with a variety of political figures gave an extra edge to these particular assertions.³⁶

Reprimands of Roseau began in print, but ended in physical censure. On 7 November 1991, while attending a conference in Nice, a group of men beat and tried to strangle Roseau as he left the venue. Two months previously, he had been the victim of a failed kidnap attempt in Paris. It was widely believed that USDIFRA were behind both aggressions. Taking these attacks seriously, Roseau requested protection from the government, briefly employed a personal bodyguard and was also rumored to carry a gun at all times.³⁷ In spite of these protective measures, on 5 March 1993, Roseau was assassinated by three Pieds-Noirs, all of whom were members of USDIFRA.³⁸ The combination of Roseau's high profile – Chirac was only one of several major political figures to offer their public condolences upon his death – and the dramatic circumstances of his murder focused media attention on the Pieds-Noirs in an unprecedented way. The ensuing press coverage, which was particularly intense during the 1996 trial and conviction of the three killers, placed the *pied-noir* community under a great deal of scrutiny, revealing in a highly public manner the deep-seated rivalries that associations normally sought to keep hidden.

What was it that made Roseau such an exception to the rule of solidarity? The overtly political tactics of RECOURS represented a clear break with previous styles of *pied-noir* activism and, as such, challenged the authority of established associations like ANFANOMA. RECOURS' policies also proved controversial for certain Pieds-Noirs. In light of the strong hatred of Charles de Gaulle, who most Pieds-Noirs blame for abandoning French Algeria in 1962, RECOURS' call to support former Gaullist Jacques Chirac represented an unacceptable ideological compromise to many and a betrayal of the past. This was in spite of the clear material benefits of this strategy which, in addition to a major compensation law in 1987, included a new Secretary of State for Repatriates, the cancellation of outstanding but frozen *pied-noir* debts, 500 million francs worth of aid for the *harkis*, and the creation of a steering committee for an (ultimately unrealized) national memorial dedicated to the 'civilizing work' of the French overseas.³⁹

Denounced for similar historical reasons was Roseau's advocacy of cooperation between the *pied-noir* community and the Algerian government in order to aid development and combat the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. For Roseau, defending the interests of the displaced settlers did not entail renouncing his attachment to the land from which they had been exiled, nor his desire to see an independent Algeria prosper.

Such opinions were not widely shared within the *pied-noir* community who accused Roseau of being a 'pro-Arab traitor'.⁴⁰ This was a particular issue for Roseau's killers with one of them, Jean-Claude Lozano, stating 'We reproached Roseau for his *rapprochement* with Algeria and the FLN government, when I say "we", I mean 85 percent of repatriates.'⁴¹

But more than this, it was the success of RECOURS and, by extension, of Roseau that aroused the ire of other *pied-noir* groups. By proving that it was possible for the Pieds-Noirs to have an influential voice and by embodying that voice in themselves, RECOURS attained a privileged status that many other groups coveted and resented anyone else possessing. Timing and context were also important. Roseau was assassinated at a moment when the *pied-noir* community was enjoying high levels of visibility. This was undoubtedly due, in part, to the successes of Roseau and RECOURS in gaining the attention of key politicians, notably Chirac, who proved particularly sympathetic to *pied-noir* causes.

It was also connected to broader political and cultural processes, namely the 'return' of the War of Independence to the public gaze, particularly in the period surrounding the thirtieth anniversary of the conflict in 1992.⁴² As the state became more willing to engage with the war and its legacies, this helped legitimate and give greater prominence to the campaigns of *pied-noir* associations, as well as those of other activist groups connected to the war. In turn, this created 'institutional relays' and 'frameworks of memory' that gave the narratives being championed points of anchorage at the national level.⁴³ This new situation provided opportunities for the various communities connected to the war to make their voices heard nationally in ways that had not previously been possible. It seems no coincidence that the tensions within the *pied-noir* community showed most visibly when the spotlight was strongly upon them and the stakes, in terms of claiming part of the newly opened up discursive space, were so high.

Conclusion

Over the course of the 1990s the situation with regard to both the Algerian War and the *pied-noir* community changed considerably. By 1993, Roseau was dead and, despite the ambitions of the CNSR and others, no figurehead of his stature and influence has subsequently emerged from within the *pied-noir* community. More significantly, the focus of debates surrounding the Algerian War has evolved with issues such as torture and the place of postcolonial minorities in France coming to dominate the agenda. While the Pieds-Noirs have plenty to say

on these subjects, they have found themselves forced to share platforms with an increasingly diverse array of actors and, consequently, have seen less attention devoted specifically to them.

The internal rivalries within the community and the competitions for control over the way in which the past is represented have not ceased, but it is now much harder to find traces of these within the public realm. Although the lack of quantitative data makes it difficult to give precise figures, evidence within *piéd-noir* association publications suggests that age and infirmity have taken a considerable toll on activists in recent years.⁴⁴ This, in combination with a general failure to engage subsequent generations in *piéd-noir* culture and causes, has occasioned much debate regarding how to halt the decline in membership that has affected all the major associations and led to the closure of many smaller bodies. In 2010, for example, the editors of *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* attributed their ongoing trouble securing sufficient subscription renewals to the 'the departure of our friends, in every increasing numbers alas, to the *piéd-noir* paradise'; by October 2011, the magazine claimed it had lost more than 500 readers.⁴⁵

Mirroring the German case, those activists still going are the ones who hold increasingly radical views that are considerably out of step with mainstream opinions and discourse. As a result, a defensive siege mentality has developed among activists who see themselves as one of the last bastions against a rising tide of leftist-inspired political correctness that is driving a destructive discourse of 'repentance' over France's colonial past.⁴⁶ Consequently, the perception of a unified, albeit diminishing community, has been reinforced by the fact that remaining *piéd-noir* activists and associations have largely been visible in the context of vigorously contesting external events and discourses that cast aspersions on their own community or on France's colonial past. For example, defending the military in the wake of the 2000 *Le Monde* torture controversy; protesting the 2001 decision by Mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, to commemorate 17 October 1961; or their campaigns to protect Article Four of the controversial 23 February 2005 law which stipulated that schools teach the 'positive' aspects of French colonialism, particularly in North Africa.

As the history and memory of the Algerian War and of French colonialism in the public space has become increasingly plural, Pieds-Noirs and the associations who still seek to represent them have found sufficient incentives and occasions to adhere to their precepts concerning the importance of projecting unity. This has helped to ensure that the management of internal divisions and disagreements are once more relegated to the private realm.

Notes

1. Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris, 2010), 15; Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'L'été 62 à Marseille: tensions et incompréhensions', in Jean-Jacques Jordi and Emile Temime, eds, *Marseille et le choc des décolonisations* (Aix-en-Provence, 1996), 66–74, here 66.
2. Joëlle Hureau, 'Associations et souvenir chez les français rapatriés d'Algérie', in Jean-Pierre Rioux, ed., *La guerre d'Algérie et les Français* (Paris, 1990), 517–25, here 517.
3. The most detailed and comprehensive account of the response of the French state to the *rapatriés* from Algeria is Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*.
4. The OAS was a clandestine paramilitary group formed in 1961 that used extreme violence in a bid to derail the ongoing independence negotiations between France and the provisional Algerian government. Their most high profile acts included the blinding of five-year-old Delphine Renard who was caught in the blast from a bomb intended for the Gaullist Minister of Culture, André Malraux, in February 1962 and a failed assassination attempt on President Charles de Gaulle at Petit Clamart in August 1962.
5. Valérie Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours* (Paris, 2007), 155.
6. Clarisse Bueno, *Pieds-Noirs de père en fils* (Paris, 2004), 75.
7. 'Le Cercle Algérieniste', 1978, quoted in Joëlle Hureau, *La mémoire des Pieds-Noirs de 1830 à nos jours* (Paris, 2001), 254.
8. Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'Les Pieds-Noirs: constructions identitaires et réinvention des origines', *Hommes et Migrations*, 1236 (2002): 14–25, here 21.
9. Still going today, the *Cercle Algérieniste* currently has 40 regional branches. See <http://www.cerclealgerianiste.fr> (accessed 2 September 2014).
10. Victoria Phaneuf, 'Negotiating Culture, Performing Identities: North African and Pied-Noir Associations in France', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 17(4) (2012): 671–86, 673–4; Andrea L. Smith, *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France* (Bloomington, 2006), 188.
11. See <http://www.algerie-disparus.org>; <http://www.isly.pagesperso-orange.fr> (accessed 2 September 2014).
12. Pieds-Noirs object to commemorating 19 March on the grounds that the ceasefire did not end the war in Algeria, but rather signified an intensification of the violence. Indeed, associations claim that more Europeans, and certainly more *harkis*, were killed after this date than in all previous years of fighting. In light of these casualties, 'celebrating' 19 March is seen as disrespectful towards those killed after that point. See http://www.babelouedstory.com/thema_les/cimetieres/919/919.html; http://www.babelouedstory.com/thema_les/communiquer/5908/5908.html (accessed 2 September 2014).
13. <http://www.jeunepiednoir.pagesperso-orange.fr/jpn.wst> (accessed 2 September 2014).
14. Maurice Calmein, 'L'Algérianisme: une radio libre!', *L'Algérieniste*, 20 (1982): 3.
15. 'Le réfugié Pied-Noir, "Apolitisme"', *France Horizon*, 1 (1957): 1–2.

16. Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés*, 239–41.
17. Émile Chabal, 'Managing the Postcolony: Minority Politics in Montpellier, c.1960–c.2010', *Contemporary European History*, 23(2) (2014): 237–58, here 240–9.
18. Alain Rollat, 'La préparation des élections législatives', *Le Monde*, 12 February 1993.
19. Eric Savarese, *L'invention des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris, 2002), 121.
20. Maurice Calmein, *Les associations pieds-noirs* (Carcassonne, 1994), 15; Jean-Jacques Jordi, *De l'exode à l'exil: rapatriés et Pieds-Noirs en France. L'exemple marseillais, 1954–1992* (Paris, 1993), 179; Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'Archéologie et structure du réseau de sociabilité rapatrié et pied-noir', *Provence Historique*, 47(187) (1997): 177–88, here 177.
21. Jean-Jacques Jordi, *Idées reçus: les Pieds-Noirs* (Paris, 2009), 138.
22. Jordi, 'Archéologie et structure', 185; Hureau, 'Associations et souvenir', 520.
23. Smith, *Colonial Memory*.
24. Maurice Calmein, 'L'Algérianisme an V', *L'Algérianiste*, 1 (1977): 3.
25. 'Éditorial', *L'Echo d'Oran*, 10 May 1965: 1.
26. Maurice Calmein, 'L'union avant tout', *L'Algérianiste*, 12 (1980): 5.
27. *Ibid.*, 3.
28. Smith, *Colonial Memory*, 25.
29. Jordi, 'Archéologie et structure', 180.
30. Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés*, 165.
31. 'Arlette Laguiller', *Ciel, mon mardi!* [television program] produced by Massimo Manganaro, TF1, France, 22.38, 4 June 1991, Channel 1. 134 mins.
32. Coll, Roseau, Castel, and Stora were all regular guests on the increasing number of programs relating to the Algerian War that were being broadcast in the run-up to the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the conflict.
33. 'Arlette Laguiller', 4 June 1991.
34. 'Les pieds-noirs: Dechavanne sur TF1', *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, 17 (1991): 46.
35. Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés*, 363.
36. René Blanchot, 'CNSR: l'après Roseau', *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, 36 (1993): 43; Louis Pelloux quoted in Ysabel Saïah, *Pieds-noirs et fiers de l'être* (Paris, 1987), 153.
37. Jacques Molénat, *Le Marigot des pouvoirs: systèmes, réseaux, communautés, notables et francs-maçons en Languedoc-Roussillon* (Castelnau-le-Lez, 2004), 226; Émilien Jubineau, *L'enigme Roseau: la parole pied-noir assassinée* (St Georges d'Orques, 1997), 24, 32, 50.
38. *Ibid.*, 23–4.
39. Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés*, 298.
40. Benjamin Stora, 'Guerre d'Algérie: 1999–2003, les accélérations de la mémoire', *Hommes et migrations*, 1244 (2003): 83–95, here 84.
41. Jubineau, *L'enigme Roseau*, 127.
42. In addition to the measures Chirac oversaw when prime minister (1986–8), he also made several important commemorative gestures in relation to the Pieds-Noirs and the Algerian War more generally during his two presidential terms (1995–2002; 2002–7). For a detailed discussion of these initiatives, see Jan C. Jansen, 'Politics of Remembrance, Colonialism and the Algerian War of Independence in France', in Matgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth, eds,

- A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance* (New York, 2010), 275–91.
43. Jim House and Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror and Memory* (Oxford, 2006), 309. Although they are referring specifically to memories of 17 October 1961, their points are applicable to other memories of the War of Independence.
 44. Jean-Marie Avelin, 'Mot du Président: Ultime arrimage', *La lettre de Véritas*, 153 (2010): 2–3.
 45. 'Vous aimez votre magazine... vous aidez-le développer', *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, 188 (2010): 4; *Pieds-noirs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, 200 (2014): 4.
 46. A key text of the anti-repentance movement in which Pieds-Noirs have figured prominently is Daniel Lefeuvre, *Pour en finir avec la repentance coloniale* (Paris, 2006).

Part IV

Political Impact and Participation

8

The Political Integration of the Expellees in Postwar West Germany

Frank Bösch

The political integration of German expellees from former eastern territories and those annexed during the war seems to have been a success. Many contemporary observers had expected a political radicalization of these 12 million expellees after 1945. It was feared that they would turn to communist or populist right-wing parties. The founding of their own party, the 'League of Expellees and Disenfranchised' (Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE)), and its rapid success at many regional elections suggested that their integration would be difficult. But the BHE was voted into the Bundestag only once, in 1953, and rapidly lost importance. It seems therefore that the ruling Christian Democrats successfully managed to integrate the expellees in German politics. The leading figures in the League of Expelled Germans (Bund der vertriebenen Deutschen (BvD)) were almost always Christian Democratic politicians, and the expellee organizations (*Vertriebenenverbände*) were thought to have close ties to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

The general conclusion among historians is that this successful integration was mainly due to the anti-communist consensus of the 1950s, to the successful policies of Adenauer's government on the whole, including the 'Economic Miracle' (*Wirtschaftswunder*), and to the support shown by Christian Democrats for expellees' demands. Additional factors promoting integration were the financial compensation or 'burden sharing' (*Lastenausgleich*) policy of 1952 and the CDU's resistance to the *Ostpolitik* of Social Democrats. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) is seen by many as having ignored the plight of expellees, addressing it, if at all, only during election campaigns. Thus, a recent study on expulsion argues that only during a 1999 speech by Minister of the Interior Otto Schily did a 'late realization' emerge that the political left had ignored the plight of expellees.¹

This chapter offers a different interpretation. First, it will argue that the political integration of the expellees was – similar to the political integration of the repatriates in France – a protracted and ambivalent process. Though the feared radicalization did not materialize, political integration was slow in coming. It was the result of a conjunction of successful interest-driven politics and a marginalization of expellees. Second, it will show that expellees' integration in the Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) was no natural and inevitable process but a long and arduous road, involving a strategic struggle with the expellee organizations. The third hypothesis is that in many regions the political integration of expellees at the grass-roots level developed even faster within the SPD. This initially close relationship between Social Democrats and expellees has often been overlooked due to the close ties between leading Christian Democrats and representatives of expellee organizations that developed starting in the 1970s.² This chapter does not focus on legislation, but on the social and party history of expellees' political participation. It also attempts to link regional and national perspectives. A new research perspective is gained by looking at the parties themselves, in contrast to previous research with its focus on political agitation by expellee organizations.³

The formative power of religious denomination: expellees and political parties in the postwar period

All parties experienced a rapid growth in membership in the first years after the war. The newly founded CDU, often referred to as the party of notables, grew by leaps and bounds. The initial postwar years can be described as a period in which expellees made a great effort to become politically integrated but were indirectly marginalized. One important, though indirect, stimulus came in 1945, when the Allies permitted only four parties in the first postwar elections: the Social Democrats (SPD), the Christian Democrats (CDU; CSU in Bavaria), the Liberals (FDP), and the Communists (KPD). Thus, expellees had no opportunity to found their own party, their only option being to join one of the four classic ideological parties. Their chances of integrating through these newly founded or refounded parties did in fact seem promising. Joining one of them could promote career advancement, but also lent them a voice in the administration of refugees. Refugee committees were formed in the state administration with proportional representation for each of the political parties.⁴

It is remarkable, however, how few expellees joined the CDU/CSU. Their proportional membership in the Catholic parts of Germany was exceptionally low. One reason for this was the CDU/CSU's being well connected in Catholic circles and among traditional Catholic elites, which were not particularly welcoming to newcomers. The influence of religion in political culture is obvious here. With the exception of Silesians, most of those expelled from the East were Protestants. Expellees were therefore excluded whenever the CDU drew on political Catholicism, reactivating denominational prejudices.

In more Catholic states such as North Rhine–Westphalia and Rhineland–Palatinate, or in Catholic regions such as southern Baden or southern Oldenburg, the CDU was clearly the party of the locals. Thus, for instance, only 1.5 percent of members in the Rhineland chapter of the CDU were ‘refugees’.⁵ The same went for the CSU in Catholic Bavaria. In 1950, expellees made up 23 percent of the population there, but only 8.6 percent of CSU members.⁶ Whereas the CSU later became an advocate of expellees, in the immediate postwar years it barely addressed their concerns politically or nominated expellees for party positions and political offices.⁷ In Catholic regions, the Christian Democrats tended to draw on the traditions and pre-existing structures of the Center Party, which meant that they had a firm base not long after the party's founding. The CDU/CSU had recourse not only to members but also to politicians from the Weimar period, reinforcing the status of expellees as political outsiders. Only church-affiliated Catholic refugees had relatively good chances of gradually gaining access to the CDU.

Protestant expellees in Catholic regions reactivated long-standing denominational prejudices, further diminishing their chances of integration in the CDU. In Rhineland–Palatinate, for example, later CDU Minister-President Peter Altmeier asked that the military government stop the flow of refugees, as ‘the Catholic character of Rhineland is being strongly diluted by the influx of mostly Protestant eastern Germans’. His CDU district administrators likewise conjured up the danger of ‘foreign infiltration [*Überfremdung*] through the influx of people of a wholly alien stock and nature [*stammes- und wesensfremd*]’.⁸

Integration took a different form in Protestant regions. In states such as Schleswig–Holstein and parts of Lower Saxony and Hesse, the CDU was much stronger in adopting the role of a party of refugees. Memoirs, membership lists, and annual reports from individual district associations indicate rather clearly that often more than half of CDU members were refugees.⁹ Several CDU district associations in Schleswig–Holstein reported that about two-thirds of their members

were refugees.¹⁰ In isolated cases, CDU district associations, especially those near the inner-German border, were run exclusively by expellees. The Soltau district association, for instance, reported that it was 'comprised of up to 90 percent refugees',¹¹ and in many cities in northern Lower Saxony the local CDU developed directly out of an expellee interest group.¹²

How did this happen? First, not only refugees were outsiders here, but the CDU as a party as well. The local Protestant population had little sympathy for the CDU at that time, since the party seemed to be 'too Catholic' for them.¹³ The locals in Protestant regions of Baden-Württemberg and Hesse preferred the liberal FDP, and in Lower Saxony they tended to join and vote for the Lower Saxony Regional Party (Niedersächsische Landespartei), renamed the German Party (Deutsche Partei (DP)) in 1947. Since expellees from Silesia were often the only Catholics in these regions, it was only natural that they acted as founders of the local chapters of the Catholic CDU. Second, the CDU was a new and weak party with few members, which made it easier for refugees to 'infiltrate' it on behalf of their interests. Third, even in Protestant regions the churches were the most important party-affiliated grass-roots organizations of the CDU. Compared to the small-business and agricultural organizations which the FDP and the DP recruited from, the church milieu was the most likely to offer an open structure for newcomers to participate in the political process.

In this respect, expellees helped the CDU at an early stage to gain a broad membership base in Protestant regions and bolster its claim to be a 'people's party' (*Volkspartei*). Expellees often formed the bridgehead for subsequent expansion of the CDU. The fact that many of the expellees in rural Protestant northern Germany came from conservative, tradition-rich East Elbia facilitated their integration in the CDU. For one thing, they often retained their political world views, despite their loss of status and material welfare. For another, the loss of their homeland, with the blame placed squarely on the Soviet Union, only strengthened their anti-socialist views.

That said, the expellees were a problematic base for the CDU. Their low prestige and their lack of integration in the world of local organizations often made expellees seem unsuitable for party work, especially if they were Catholic. In other words, refugees reinforced the outsider status of the CDU. The relatively high fluctuation of refugees meant that local chapters were hard to establish. Moreover, refugee members, who were hardly in a position to pay membership dues or make donations, posed a constant financial problem to district associations.

On the other hand, expellees in rural Catholic areas in particular tended to join the Social Democratic Party (SPD). An estimated 100,000 did so.¹⁴ Remarkably, the Social Democrats did not keep statistics on which of their members were expellees, apparently to avoid dividing their members into two different classes.¹⁵ Refugees were a welcome reinforcement for the SPD, which had a weak base in these areas. This was especially true of Catholic states with many refugees, such as Bavaria. What's more, many expellees in these areas could bring to bear their political experience from Sudeten German social democracy.¹⁶ By the end of 1946, the SPD had already founded 151 refugee committees and had an estimated 35,000 refugees as members.¹⁷ Traditional Social Democratic elites, however, still occupied the key positions. Nevertheless, one expellee, Richard Reitzner, became Bavaria's party chairman in 1947, and nine out of sixty-three SPD delegates were expellees in the state elections of 1950, whereas the CSU had only two.¹⁸ These results helped the Social Democrats on their way to becoming a major party, a people's party, while promoting integration. Yet they also imply the marginalization of expellees because of their commitment to a social democracy whose influence was minimal in rural areas.

Expellees likewise played a visible role in the SPD in many Protestant regions. Refugees were prominent in Schleswig-Holstein's SPD in the North, prompting some locals to take it for a refugee party, even though refugees were soon dissatisfied by the measures taken by the first Social Democratic state government there.¹⁹ The SPD became a 'refugee party' in many parts of Lower Saxony, too, the conservative rural population there shunning it just like the CDU, similarly perceiving it as being 'too Catholic'.²⁰

The integration of refugees went well in badly damaged cities like Hamburg, where scarce housing had prompted the military government to exempt the local population from taking in refugees. These cities could essentially pick and choose the refugees they needed when allocating jobs – usually young, skilled males, who were quick to adapt.²¹ This worked to the advantage of the SPD, a party already strong in urban areas.

Though many contemporaries had expected the plight of refugees to drive them into the arms of the communists, these fears turned out to be unfounded. Rather, in contrast to the French repatriates, the Communist Party (KPD) was the party least likely to have refugees as its members. Kurt Müller, its deputy chairman in the western zone, was head of the party's refugee committee even though he was not an expellee himself.²² Member data from 1951 show that only 0.3 percent

of members claimed to belong to a refugee organization.²³ The Red Army and the GDR's recognition of the new eastern border had evidently discredited communism.

Agrarian reform in the Soviet Occupation Zone did little to change this, despite providing land to many 'new citizens', allowing them to be self-sufficient. The impact of denominational structures could be felt even in the first elections. Whereas local notables in the CDU entered the municipal councils and state parliaments in Catholic areas, the party had trouble even finding enough candidates in rural Protestant regions. A conspicuous number of expellees took advantage of this vacuum and ran as candidates for the CDU prior to 1949. In the postwar elections of 1948, more than three-quarters of the candidates were refugees in some northeastern rural districts of Lower Saxony. The conservative DP, by contrast, was clearly a party of locals there.²⁴ In other words, the rift between a party of expellees and a party of locals existed even before the founding of the expellee party BHE. Expellees voted for parties with expellee members.²⁵

The expellees most successful in rapidly building political careers were the ones who had gained political experience in the Weimar Republic and could now reactivate their former contacts in the West. In Schleswig-Holstein, for example, the former Reich minister Hans Schlange-Schöninghen, a native Pomeranian, rallied like-minded aristocrats from East Elbia; formerly sympathetic to the now defunct German National People's Party (DNVP), they forged ties to displaced, and for the most part, aristocratic CDU founders in the West. Günther Gereke, a former DNVP representative, and Reich commissioner who had fled from East Germany, became chairman of the CDU in Lower Saxony and deputy minister-president shortly after joining the party.²⁶ These old, agrarian elites did not rise to power as the explicit advocates of refugee interests but because of their considerable political experience. That said, they were nonetheless important figureheads for addressing expellees.

Outwardly, however, the CDU primarily endeavored to appeal to local voters in the interest of winning a majority. In state parliamentary elections, expellees were generally put on the party list, whereas the more publicity-oriented direct mandates were left to the locals, who had ties to regional organizations. With regard to more delicate issues such as land reform, the CDU likewise tended to support the local rural population and uphold established property relations. Expellees who explicitly defined themselves through the representation of their interests had considerably worse career opportunities in the CDU and in ministerial

positions. They were left for the most part with a niche area – the Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims.

In an effort to nonetheless push through their agenda, expellees established their own groups in the CDU – the refugee committees. There were of course many alliances and subgroups within the people's party of the CDU, but none were as active as the refugee committees. They continuously passed resolutions alluding to their plight, and demanded rapid compensation as well as adequate representation in parliamentary bodies. Linus Kather, chairman of the refugee committee in Schleswig–Holstein, became their most adamant spokesman, and did not shy away from conflict with fellow party members. It was clear even before the first federal parliamentary election in 1949 that the majority of expellees were not politically integrated; their status as social outsiders still evident within the political parties. In the first CDU/CSU parliamentary group, only nine percent of representatives were expellees; in the SPD the figure was just under ten percent.²⁷

The exclusion of expellees and the rise of their party in the early 1950s

The Adenauer era – the 1950s – marks a second period of political integration for expellees. One major feature of this phase was the independent political organization of expellees who were dissatisfied with the amount of attention they were receiving from the existing political parties. In particular their demand to nominate their own candidates for election in proportion to their share of the population was not even close to being fulfilled.²⁸ Expellees began to make their presence felt in the community by banding together into 'emergency associations' (*Notgemeinschaften*) with their own candidate lists or by running for elections as independent candidates in Germany's first federal elections in 1949. They eventually founded their own party, the BHE, which quickly gained popularity in the early 1950s.

In federal states close to the Soviet Occupation Zone, such as Schleswig–Holstein, the BHE ultimately captured 23 percent of the vote, four percent more than the CDU, and in Hesse even took 31 percent in a coalition with the FDP, while the CDU had a mere 18.8 percent. More than half of expellees opted for the new refugee party in these elections.²⁹ In 1953 the expellee party was voted into the Bundestag and the government coalition, and adopted the new name GB/BHE (GB for Gesamtdeutscher Block) with the intention of underlining that it was not only the party of refugees, but a nationalist party as well. Expellees'

associations were established, becoming powerful lobbies. From this perspective, there was a clear difference to the Pieds-Noirs in France, who did not have such a powerful political representation.³⁰

The membership structure of the parties also changed completely from 1949 on. Expellees began leaving the CDU in droves. In the case of the SPD, 70 percent of those leaving were expellees.³¹ On the one hand, expellees were following a general trend that began with the currency reform. The initial phase of opportunism had passed and few were prepared to pay membership dues in hard currency, the new Deutsche Mark (DM). As a consequence, the political representation of expellees sank drastically in the CDU and SPD. Rising unemployment as of 1949 tended to affect refugees in particular, with the result that most of them turned away from traditional parties. In a state such as Lower Saxony with its many refugees, almost half of all jobless were expellees, a figure that was even higher in agricultural areas. The CDU and SPD therefore lost many voters in rural Protestant constituencies with a high number of refugees, as the expellees in these regions usually voted for their independent candidates, and sometimes for the radical right-wing Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP).³²

Moreover, Adenauer's coalition policy was not very popular among Christian Democratic expellee politicians. Adenauer's policy called for strict dissociation from the SPD. He wanted to form a close alliance with all parties to the right of the SPD, merging with them in the long run. As of 1950, he made sure that pre-election agreements were made and coalitions formed in all federal states with the 'anti-refugee' FDP and DP. Prominent refugees from the eastern territories and the GDR – such as Schlange-Schöninggen and Gereke – opposed this policy line and advocated cooperating with the Social Democrats to win back the eastern territories. Yet, subsequently, Adenauer managed to exclude them from party leadership: Schlange-Schöninggen became ambassador in London and Gereke settled in the GDR. The new electoral blocs were dominated instead by domestic politicians like Heinrich Hellwege who had closer ties to the middle-class milieu, what was viewed as yet another negative signal to expellees.³³

At the same time, the SPD succeeded in better integrating expellees in some federal states. The BHE remained relatively weak in North Rhine-Westphalia, as integration was more successful in industrial areas, at the workplace, and in trade unions than it was in the countryside. Another reason for the BHE's limited success seems to be the organizational linkage of refugee committees. The SPD set the tone in Lower Saxony, especially with its popular refugee minister, the expellee pastor Heinrich Albertz. Moreover, in late May 1949, the SPD

refugee committee presented a 'Refugee Program for West Germany' that denounced the failure of German solidarity and demanded concrete material aid from federal funds.³⁴

The remaining refugee representatives in the CDU were strongly opposed to incorporating the BHE. They argued that coalitions with the refugee party would give them too much importance. At the same time they realized that a coalition with the BHE would reduce their own chances of being represented in the cabinet. Adenauer's inclusion of BHE politicians in his cabinet in 1953 only frustrated them more. Unlike women and young people, refugees did not succeed – despite their vocal protests – in getting 'adequate' consideration in party committees in the federal statute of the CDU, formulated in 1950.

Adenauer's domestic and foreign policies were not popular among Christian Democratic expellees either. They suspected that his program of integration with the West would neglect German reunification and the aim of recovering the country's lost eastern territories. Another source of dissatisfaction was the much delayed Equalization of Burdens Act – the redistribution of wealth to compensate for war-related losses. Though originally linked to the currency reform, it was not passed (despite protests) until 1952. Even after the law was passed, it was criticized as insufficient not only by expellee organizations but by the CDU expellee committees as well, which demanded the resignation of their own expellee minister, Schütz.³⁵

The success of the BHE expellee party put enormous pressure on Adenauer's government, the CDU/CSU, and the SPD to take the concerns of refugees more seriously. The BHE became a much sought-after partner in forming governments, and took advantage of its power. It occupied key positions in the expellee ministries at the federal and state levels.

A strong state party for expellees had ambivalent consequences, however. Politically, expellees became isolated in special interest groups. They defined themselves as such in the political sphere. They were seen as representatives of their own interests and not as an integral part of society. Their low social prestige is evidenced by the fact that, although expellees were elected to parliament relatively often, they were hardly if ever promoted to leadership positions.³⁶

Generous offers: integrating the BHE expellee party into the CDU

So how did the CDU/CSU manage to integrate expellees politically? It was not only the prospect of economic success and the socio-political

benefits of the Christian Democratic politics, although these were very important. Just as crucial were the CDU's and CSU's active endeavors to win back expellees as voters and party members.

To this end they relied on an intensification of symbolic political gestures and organizational efforts. In the early 1950s, all parties used election posters depicting Germany with its 1937 borders, underlining the fact that they supported efforts to reclaim former German territories, and that expellees would be able to return to them. CDU party conferences likewise reflected this aim. Its 1950 national conference took place in Goslar, a border town near the Soviet Occupation Zone – a reminder of the aim of German unity – and had flags of former German eastern territories hanging at the event. In 1952, the conference was held in Berlin, where Adenauer visited a refugee transit camp and caught the eye of the media by handing out chocolates to children.³⁷ And during the 1953 election campaign Adenauer made an appearance at the pilgrimage church in Werl, where 50,000 Silesians had gathered.

Political integration was supported by reforms within the party. In fact, both the CDU and the SPD established special organizations for expellees within their parties, such as the 'Exile CDU' for Christian Democrats from the GDR, or the 'Oder-Neisse State Association' for refugees from the East. Thus, though remaining a special interest group, expellees were nonetheless able to be active in both major parties. A key slogan of the Federation of Expellees, that the 'right to the homeland is a human right [*Heimatrecht ist Menschenrecht*]', was picked up by both parties. The struggle for the votes of expellees thus hindered the process of reconciliation with neighboring countries to the east.³⁸ Nevertheless, by the 1950s the appeal to *Heimatrecht* hardly ever implied the demand anymore to actually return to the eastern territories; it was more about a symbolic recognition of the sense of belonging and the suffering arising from the experience of expulsion, coupled with demands for material compensation.³⁹

Expellees were also integrated in the political administration in Bonn. A survey from 1950 showed that a quarter of the officials in all federal ministries were expellees, and even 32 percent of the salaried employees there.⁴⁰ Even though they were less present in leadership positions and especially prominent in the Ministry for Expellees, this was nonetheless a confirmation of the extent to which expellees could play an active role in Bonn politics. In 1966 expellees still made up a quarter of the employees in federal ministries. The fact that such figures were routinely recorded as statistics also points to the efforts made to integrate them.

Even more important was the integration policy pursued by the CDU towards the BHE refugee party. The Christian Democrats tried to keep the expellee party within its reach by making generous concessions. Since the summer of 1952, talks had been underway in Bonn proposing that BHE chairman Waldemar Kraft should serve as 'federal minister for expellee affairs' in an effort to steer the BHE towards the CDU at the federal and state levels.⁴¹ Adenauer managed to override inner-party opposition after the federal elections of 1953 and include the BHE in his government coalition, awarding it two cabinet positions. He was well aware that both BHE ministers, Oberländer and Kraft, had a Nazi past.⁴² By outsourcing its authority in expellee affairs to a small coalition partner, however, the CDU effectively deprived the BHE of its ability to distinguish itself as an independent protest party.

Just two years later this strategy paid off on the federal level. Kraft and Oberländer, through their ministerial posts, had become so loyal to Adenauer that they voted against their own party in the controversy over the Saar Statute, firmly backing Adenauer's position. They left the BHE in July 1955 together with seven other Bundestag members. The deciding factor here was probably the long-term career opportunities available to them in the CDU.⁴³

The BHE expellee party had thus lost its most prominent politicians. Their move to the CDU was to be an example not only for BHE members but for its sympathizers as well. Once in the CDU, the defectors took over expellee work, published their own information bulletins, and provided contacts to CDU headquarters for promoting the merger of the two parties. Former BHE chairman Theodor Oberländer remained in power as expellee minister for the CDU until 1960, before being forced to resign because of his previous Nazi association.

The CDU proceeded in like manner in certain federal states. In Schleswig-Holstein, CDU Minister-President von Hassel managed to persuade individual state parliament members and ultimately both BHE ministers Schaefer and Ohnesorge to defect to the CDU. They also were taken on as CDU ministers after the 1958 elections, serving as symbolic figures for the integration of the 'expelled and disenfranchised'. In Baden-Württemberg, too, the strategy of keeping the BHE in the government even though it wasn't needed to build a majority paid off for the Christian Democrats. In 1960 they negotiated the transfer of large parts of the BHE to the CDU. Good positions on the party list and promising electoral districts for BHE politicians, as well as the continuation of certain expellee lists at the local level were guaranteed as a condition of changing parties.⁴⁴ It was likewise thanks to Adenauer's

insistence that the BHE was treated just as graciously in Lower Saxony, ensuring their involvement in forming the government there in 1955.⁴⁵ Four years later the CDU failed to form a government in Lower Saxony. The SPD had offered more generous conditions to the GB/BHE with the aim of forming a government, prompting many BHE members to join the Social Democrats.

Ultimately the political integration of BHE politicians at the federal and state level was furthered through financial incentives. In the 1950s the non-socialist parties rarely financed themselves through member fees and state funding but almost exclusively through donations from business and industry, distributed by so-called 'supporting agencies' (*Fördergesellschaften*). The GB/BHE had received this donation money since 1953, too, albeit under the condition that it did not collaborate with the Social Democrats. Apart from these regular payments to the party's federal organization, state politicians received special payments for agreeing to cooperate with the CDU. The BHE state chairman in Schleswig-Holstein, Asbach, for instance, was offered DM60,000 a year if he agreed to stick to the policy of CDU coalition.⁴⁶ GB/BHE politicians took such money, but held fast to their opportunist position.

Asbach threatened in 1958, before state parliamentary elections in Schleswig-Holstein: 'If the CDU does not fulfill its promise to him before the elections, and the BDI [Federation of German Industries] abstains from supporting the BHE financially in Schleswig-Holstein, he says he will seek a coalition with the SPD after the Landtag [state parliamentary] elections.'⁴⁷ The BHE proved to be just as venal in Lower Saxony, where it formed a government coalition with the SPD as late as 1954. In informal talks its state chairman, Kessel, said 'that if the BHE got money he would be prepared to promptly cooperate in the rightist bloc yet to be founded and would also vote for an amendment to electoral law'.⁴⁸

The four non-socialist parties (CDU, FDP, DP, GB/BHE) did in fact team up the following year, achieving a change of government in Hanover in 1955. As in the negotiations over ministerial posts, the BHE proved to be a special interest party on issues of self-financing as well, ultimately going for the highest bidder. These financial concessions were effectively one more way of turning the expelled party into a hanger-on of the CDU with less and less of an independent profile. In this manner the BHE was gradually divided at the federal, state, and local levels, in essence becoming a right-wing splinter group supporting former Nazis.⁴⁹

The Social Democrats had no positions to offer in the federal government, but they did have some in the federal parliament, the Bundestag.

They too offered career opportunities to expellees in this context. Apart from the BHE, the party with the biggest share of expellees was the SPD. Between 12 and 17 percent of its delegates originated from the eastern territories.⁵⁰ It even had a special working group for expellees within its parliamentary group. Even during the Brandt administration, when the CDU/CSU was fighting against the *Ostpolitik* treaties, the SPD had the highest number of delegates with an expellee background. Of crucial importance, however, is that these politicians did not primarily define themselves as expellees, and hardly ever referred to themselves as such in their political speeches. Rather, they tended to see themselves as Social Democrats and as advocates of social rights. This would support the notion that integration had been visibly achieved here. The 'collective special awareness', much emphasized in a more recent study by Wolfgang Fischer with regard to expellees in the Bundestag, seems to be limited here. The expellees in the Bundestag did not develop a shared, party-wide awareness of their role as expellees.⁵¹

It is therefore very difficult to determine who should be labeled an expellee. Many prominent Social Democratic politicians, including the SPD first postwar leader Kurt Schumacher, grew up in East Prussia but had been involved in Berlin politics even before their expulsion. Other expellee politicians, by contrast, such as BHE and CDU politician Theodor Oberländer, grew up in western or central Germany and came to the eastern territories only because of their Nazi careers. Being an expellee thus meant being very adaptable and increasingly indistinct. There was the expectation, however, that minister positions in expellee political organizations should be exclusively occupied by expellees. Yet expellees and their organizations lost hold of this office in the late 1960s. This change went hand in hand with a professionalization of politics in general, which limited the opportunities for leading lobbyists to attain the position of federal minister.

The political integration of expellee organizations

The integration of expellees as CDU party members was only partly successful. By the mid-1970s, only five percent were expellees.⁵² The incorporation of the BHE with the CDU helped win back many expellees in rural Protestant regions who had previously belonged to the CDU during the years of occupation, but expellees in Catholic regions were still clearly under-represented, comprising just one or two per cent of the membership. An intact Catholic milieu effectively barred newcomers from joining the CDU. In Protestant regions such as Schleswig-Holstein

and Hanover, by contrast, about 10 to 15 percent of the members in CDU state organizations were expellees in the 1960s.

Compared to their earlier involvement and their share of the population, however, even these figures are low, so that one can speak of an increasing political disinterest among expellees. Once the equalization of burdens and full employment had given them initial, albeit modest, access to the benefits of the economic miracle, most of them steered clear of politics. Their nationwide membership in the CDU in the mid-1960s – when the first reliable statistics of this sort became available – was a mere six percent, even though they made up 15 percent of the population.

A key component of their integration was therefore surely the merging of various expellee organizations. Trade unions, affiliated with the Social Democrats, were a better stepping stone than the world of bourgeois associations and institutions, which acted as an interface to the CDU in rural areas. Trade unions offered expellees in the Ruhr area a path to social democracy, giving the latter a lease on life, whereas the ostensibly apolitical board positions in rifle associations, fire departments, tennis clubs, and church groups remained off limits to expellees. This exclusion from the local establishment might be one reason why many expellees in rural areas had little contact with the CDU for so many years.⁵³

The CDU thus bolstered its efforts to win leading individuals in close consultation with expellee organizations. When the first expellee minister, Hans Lukaschek, lost the confidence of expellee organizations, Adenauer asked them to recommend a suitable successor.⁵⁴ They chose Theodor Oberländer, a man heavily incriminated by his Nazi past. The CDU henceforth left the relevant department to be run by representatives of the interest group itself, hoping to bring more members of the expellee organizations into the CDU. Expellee organizations also received millions of DMs from the government to politically integrate them. The BdV alone received DM15.5 million in 1957–9 in an effort to buy its good will.⁵⁵

The Social Democrats actively courted expellees in the 1960s, just like the CDU, and Social Democrats were still represented on the executive boards of some expellee associations. East Prussian Reinhold Rehs was speaker of the East Prussia homeland society and the first and only Social Democrat to serve as chairman of the Federation of Expellees (1967–70).⁵⁶ The voting behavior of expellees reflected this situation. Expellee organizations throughout Germany had adherents of social democracy in their ranks, which is why it would be wrong to assert that

they unilaterally supported the CDU by the early 1960s. Not until the Social-Liberal government of 1969 were representatives of the expellee organizations pressured to leave the SPD and join the CDU.

As of the 1960s, the SPD launched its own campaign to win the votes of expellees. It competed with the CDU/CSU to be the BHE's successor, engaged a prominent expellee, Wenzel Jaksch, in Brandt's election campaign, and sought closer contacts to the Federation of Expellees.⁵⁷ Its party conference of 1964 took place, quite demonstrably, against the backdrop of a map of Germany depicting the borders of 1937, under the motto 'Heritage and Mission' (*Erbe und Auftrag*). As of the mid-1960s, however, the SPD and FDP increasingly began to support a policy of reconciliation with Germany's eastern neighbors, while the CDU/CSU continued to back the demands of expellee organizations.⁵⁸ Demands to return to the country's 1937 borders were dwindling among the general population. But expellee organizations stayed their course, leading to an estrangement between organized expellees and the SPD as of 1966. By 1969, with formation of a new government, there was no mistaking the policy shift of the SPD. The Federal Ministry for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims was abolished and integrated mainly into the Federal Interior Ministry. This was tantamount to a declaration that the institutional integration of expellees had been completed, and redefined relations with the GDR.

The CDU/CSU, which fashioned its rejection of the social-liberal *Ostpolitik* as an either/or issue, could now become the representative of organized expellees. The Christian Democrats called *Ostpolitik* 'betrayal'. They came close to an absolute majority in the Bundestag, as expellee representatives (such as Herbert Hupka) defected from the FDP and SPD parliamentary group to the CDU in protest against *Ostpolitik*. A similar pattern was discernable among voters. Particularly in rural Protestant constituencies with a high share of refugees the CDU now received all-time highs of around fifty percent.⁵⁹ At the same time, however, the question arose as to whether the policy of the CDU was productive in the long run. It did not help them win a majority, having lost the votes of the younger generation. The party's rejection of *Ostpolitik* had also cost it its liberal coalition partner, which otherwise had little in common with the Social Democrats. The fact that the CDU continued the social-liberal policy of *Ostpolitik* under Kohl's new government in 1982 no longer did the party any harm. By this time the social and, above all, political integration of expellees had progressed to such an extent that party loyalties could no longer be influenced by the now rather anemic protests of expellee organizations.

Conclusions

Expellees were politically active from early on. Similar to the Pieds-Noirs in France, there was the perception of a specific (right-wing) voting tendency of the German expellees, but the issues were much more complicated.⁶⁰ In the immediate postwar years, they tended to join the parties without much of a local tradition, thus limiting their integration. Expellees had a strong presence in the SPD and CDU in the first postwar years wherever these parties tended to play the role of an outsider. Religious denomination proved to be an important factor. Protestant expellees, in particular, had little or no access to the CDU in Catholic areas and therefore often joined the SPD. Conversely, the CDU was the party of refugees in rural Protestant regions of the North, because locals viewed the SPD with suspicion and perceived them as being too Catholic. In 1949, expellees left the 'people's parties' – the CDU/CSU and SPD – in droves and supported, mostly as voters, their newly founded own special interest party, the BHE. Instead of organizing themselves in political parties, they did so in expellee organizations. In the 1950s their persistently interest-driven politics were successful precisely because they did not commit themselves to one major party. At the same time this impeded their integration, underscoring their interests as expellees and not as ordinary Germans.

The political integration of these active expellees in the BHE and expellee organizations was not just due to the 'Economic Miracle'. The CDU had many successful strategies for integrating BHE leaders. It offered positions as ministers, generous coalition deals with their party, and funding to steer their political aims. And it long fueled unrealistic expectations regarding the eastern territories to avoid conflict with expellee organizations.⁶¹

While many leading expellee politicians returned to the CDU, it seems that their commitment to the party as of the 1970s limited their influence. The SPD was successful in promoting the political integration of expellees, too. In the 1960s it became a party in which they could be active, without referring to themselves as expellees. This, more than anything, was evidence of increasing political integration.

Notes

1. Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Munich, 2008), 9.
2. Some exceptions, albeit with a very specific focus, are Matthias Müller, *Die SPD und die Vertriebenenverbände 1949–1977: Eintracht, Entfremdung,*

- Zwietracht (Berlin, 2012); Hans-Werner Martin, '...nicht spurlos aus der Geschichte verschwinden': Wenzel Jaksch und die Integration der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten in die SPD nach dem II. Weltkrieg (1945–1949) (Frankfurt, 1996); Helga Grebing, *Flüchtlinge und Parteien in Niedersachsen: Eine Untersuchung der politischen Meinungs- und Willensbildungsprozesse während der ersten Nachkriegszeit 1945–1952/53* (Hanover, 1990).
3. See, for example, Anna Jakubowska, *Der Bund der Vertriebenen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen (1957–2004): Selbst- und Fremddarstellung eines Vertriebenenverbandes* (Marburg, 2012).
 4. Everhard Holtmann, 'Politische Interessenvertretung von Vertriebenen: Handlungsmuster, Organisationsvarianten und Folgen für das politische System der Bundesrepublik', in Dirk Hoffmann, Marita Krauss, and Michael Schwartz, eds, *Vertriebene in Deutschland: Interdisziplinäre Ergebnisse und Forschungsperspektiven* (Munich, 2000), 187–202, here 193.
 5. See 'Statistik CDU Rheinland 5.10.1947', Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP) VII-004-0400/1; for southern Oldenburg: Grundei an Militärregierung, 2 July 1946, ACDP II-067-001/6; for southern Baden: ACDP III-018-004; see also Anne Martin, *Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz* (Mainz, 1995), 213.
 6. See Alf Mintzel, *Die CSU: Anatomie einer konservativen Partei 1945–1972* (Opladen, 1975), 175.
 7. The state most investigated here is Bavaria: Marita Krauss, 'Die Integration von Flüchtlingen in Bayern', in Marita Krauss, ed., *Integrationen: Vertriebene in den deutschen Ländern nach 1945* (Göttingen, 2008), 70–92, here 86; Jaromír Balcar, *Politik auf dem Land: Studien zur bayerischen Provinz 1945–1972* (Munich, 2004), 153; Franz J. Bauer, *Flüchtlinge und Flüchtlingspolitik in Bayern 1945–1950* (Stuttgart, 1982), 273.
 8. Both quotes taken from Martin, *Die Entstehung*, 209–10.
 9. Apart from member statistics in the ACDP, see the memoirs of the founders, according to which two-thirds of the members were expellees; for example, for Flensburg, in Lübeck and Steinburg, all in ACDP III-006-104; for Lower Saxony: Arnold Fratzscher, *Die CDU in Niedersachsen* (Hanover, 1971), 89. For Protestant circles of Hesse: Heinrich Rüschemschmidt, *Gründung und Anfänge der CDU in Hessen* (Darmstadt, 1981), 82, 170.
 10. Ian Connor does not agree with this figure, pointing out the many refugees in the SPD. The two positions are not mutually exclusive, however, and may simply reflect low party membership on the part of locals. Ian Connor, 'German Refugees and the SPD in Schleswig-Holstein, 1945–50', *European History Quarterly*, 36(2) (2006): 173–99.
 11. See 'KV Soltau an Gereke', 2 August 1949, Hauptstaatsarchiv Hanover (HStAH) VVP 3, no. 41 II.
 12. See *Die CDU im Oldenburger Land*, Chronik des CDU-Landesverbandes Oldenburg (Oldenburg, 1986), 75; Dirk Stegmann, ed., *Der Landkreis Harburg 1918–1949: Gesellschaft und Politik in Demokratie und nationalsozialistischer Diktatur* (Hamburg, 1994), 556; Dietmar Reeken, *Ostfriesland zwischen Weimar und Bonn: Eine Fallstudie zum Problem der historischen Kontinuität am Beispiel der Städte Aurich und Emden* (Hildesheim, 1991), 257.
 13. See Frank Bösch, *Die Adenauer-CDU: Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei 1945–1969* (Stuttgart, 2001), 21–72.

14. According to Martin, *Wenzel Jaksch*, 295; Martin emphasizes, however, that the SPD was not a fervent supporter of refugee causes.
15. *Handbuch zur Statistik der Parlamente und Parteien in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 4 vols., vol. 4, Josef Boyer and Till Kössler, eds, *SPD, KPD und kleinere Parteien des linken Spektrums sowie Die Grünen: Mitgliedschaft und Sozialstruktur 1945–1990* (Düsseldorf, 2005), 31–735, 1048–9.
16. See the regional research in Dietmar Süss, *Kumpel und Genossen: Arbeiterschaft, Betrieb und Sozialdemokratie in der bayrischen Montanindustrie 1945–1976* (Munich, 2003), 250, 63; Balcar, *Politik auf dem Land*, 63, 153.
17. These are the figures, probably somewhat optimistic, contained in Bauer, *Flüchtlinge und Flüchtlingspolitik*, 271.
18. Krauss, 'Integration von Flüchtlingen', 78.
19. Connor, 'German Refugees and the SPD', 192.
20. Grebing, *Flüchtlinge und Parteien*.
21. See Evelyn Glensk, *Die Aufnahme und Eingliederung der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in Hamburg 1945–1953* (Hamburg, 1994).
22. He later told Helga Grebing that no one else had wanted the job; see her essay 'Politischer Radikalismus und Parteiensystem. Die Flüchtlinge in der niedersächsischen Nachkriegspolitik', in Bernd Weisbrod, ed., *Rechtsradikalismus und politische Kultur. Die verzögerte Normalisierung in Niedersachsen in der Nachkriegszeit* (Göttingen, 1995), 259–68, here 261.
23. Till Kössler, *Abschied von der Revolution. Kommunisten und Gesellschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1968* (Düsseldorf, 2004), 80; more statistics in Boyer and Kössler, *SPD, KPD und kleinere Parteien*.
24. See, for example, the share of refugees with seats for the CDU in 1948, in Soltau 80% (DP 7.1%), Lüneburg-Land 75% (DP 0%), Dannenberg 75% (DP 0%), Harburg/Winsen 60% (DP 0%); see Grebing, *Flüchtlinge und Parteien*, 105. On the anti-refugee course of the DP, see Ingo Nathusius, *Am rechten Rand der Union: Der Weg der Deutschen Partei bis 1953* (Mainz, 1992), 149–50.
25. See Lüneberg and Harburg; *Statistisches Jahrbuch für Niedersachsen: Veröffentlichungen des Niedersächsischen Amtes für Landesplanung und Statistik* (Hanover, 1952), 257–8.
26. See Friedrich Winterhager, *Günther Gereke: Ein Minister im Spannungsfeld des Kalten Krieges: Biografischer Essay* (Ludwigsfelde, 2003).
27. See the statistics in ACDP I-009-001/1; Wolfgang Fischer, *Heimat-Politiker? Selbstverständnis und politisches Handeln von Vertriebenen als Abgeordnete im Deutschen Bundestag 1949 bis 1974* (Düsseldorf, 2010), 70.
28. Holtmann, 'Politische Interessenvertretung von Vertriebenen', 194–5.
29. Figures in Franz Neumann, *Der Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten 1950–1960: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur einer politischen Interessenpartei* (Meisenheim, 1968), 305–6.
30. See Eric Savarese's chapter in this volume.
31. Dieter Steinert, *Vertriebenenverbände in Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Schwann, 1986), 28–9.
32. See, for example, the considerable CDU losses in districts with a high concentration of refugees such as Gandersheim, Soltau, Helmstedt, Wolfenbüttel and rural Celle, where 'independents' and the DRP won many votes.

33. See 'Protokoll CDU-Bundesvorstand, July 7, 1951', in Günter Buchstab, ed., *Konrad Adenauer, 'Es musste alles neu gemacht werden': Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstandes 1950–1953* (Düsseldorf, 1986), 51.
34. Reprinted in Willy Albrecht, ed., *Die SPD unter Kurt Schumacher und Erich Ollenhauer 1946–1963*, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Bonn, 2003), 225–35.
35. On the inner-party discussion, see, for example, Lukaschek to Adenauer 14 December 1951, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (StBkAH) III-21/1; and Lenz to Adenauer 10 October 1952, ACDP I-172-058/2.
36. Balcar, *Politik auf dem Land*, 61, 122.
37. See CDU Deutschland, ed., *Dritter Parteitag der CDU Deutschlands* (Bonn, 1952), 8.
38. Pertti Ahonen, 'Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era', in *Central European History*, 31(1–2) (1998): 31–63, here 37, 41–3.
39. Andrew Demshuk, 'What was the "Right to the Heimat"? West German Expellees and the Many Meanings of *Heimkehr*', *Central European History*, 45(3) (2013): 523–56, here 553.
40. Mathias Beer, 'Die Vertreibung und die politisch-administrative Elite der Bundesrepublik: Ein Problemaufriss', in Günther Schulz, ed., *Vertriebene Eliten: Vertreibung und Verfolgung von Führungsschichten im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2001), 199–227, here 218–19.
41. See Lenz to Adenauer, 4 August 1952, ACDP I-172-058/2; and Vorlage Lenz to Adenauer, 3 September 1952 and 20 February 1953, ACDP I-172-058/1.
42. Kraft played a key role in organizing the 'ethnic German resistance' in Poland. Oberländer, who took part in Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch on 9 November 1923, joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and was Reich leader of the 'League of the German East' (BDO) from 1939 to 1945; see Philipp-Christian Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998): Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte* (Frankfurt, 2000).
43. Notice, Adenauer, 20 January 1955, StBkAH, III-23; Notice, Globke, 18 March 1955, ACDP I-070-017/2; Auszug 84, Kabinettsitzung, 2 June 1955, BA N 1267/20; Notice, 5 March 1956, Bundesarchiv N 1267/39.
44. Karl Schmitt, 'Die CDU in Nordwürttemberg (1952–1972)', in Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, ed., *Die CDU in Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte* (Stuttgart, 1978), 137–62, here 230–1.
45. Minutes, Bundesparteivorstand, 2 May 1955, 464–5.
46. See Notice, Globke, 10 December 1955 and 12 December 1955, ACDP I-070-017/1 and -017/2.
47. Notice, Globke or Adenauer, 26 April 1958, ACDP I-070-017/2.
48. Fratzscher to Cillien u.a., 3 July 1954, ACDP I-369-001/3 and to Fricke, 15 September 1954, ACDP I-248-027/1.
49. On the subsequent development of the BHE, see Richard Stöss, 'Der Gesamtdeutsche Block/BHE' and 'Die Gesamtdeutsche Partei', in Richard Stöss, ed., *Parteien-Handbuch: Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1980* (Opladen, 1983), 1424–77.
50. Figures taken from 'Biographische Handbücher des Bundestages', in Matthias Stickler, *'Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch': Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949–1972* (Düsseldorf, 2004), 211.

51. Fischer, *Heimat-Politiker?*, 393.
52. *Handbuch zur Statistik der Parlamente und Parteien in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 4 vols., vol. 2, Corinna Franz and Oliver Gnad, eds, *CDU und CSU: Mitgliedschaft und Sozialstruktur 1945–1990* (Düsseldorf, 2005), 305.
53. On the exclusion of expellees in conservative rural Protestant regions, see Frank Bösch, *Das konservative Milieu: Vereinskultur und lokale Sammlungspolitik in ost- und westdeutschen Regionen (1900–1960)* (Göttingen, 2002), 185–215.
54. Lenz to Adenauer, 3 September 1952, ACDP I-172-058/1.
55. Ahonen, 'Domestic Constraints', 43.
56. According to Stickler this was the result of a horse-trade, too – the SPD allegedly had threatened to limit the funds for the expellees' associations, Stickler, '*Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch*', 256.
57. See Müller, *Die SPD und die Vertriebenenverbände*, 536–8.
58. On the political positioning of expellee organizations, see Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945–1990* (Oxford, 2003).
59. See, for example, the election results in the rural districts of Celle, Lüneburg, Lüchow-Dannenberg, Uelzen, Soltau, Gifhorn, and Bad Segeberg.
60. See Eric Savarese's chapter in this volume.
61. See also Ahonen, *After the Expulsion*, 278.

9

The Pieds-Noirs and French Political Life, 1962–2015

Eric Savarese

In the period 1961–2, as Algeria was moving towards independence, almost a million Pieds-Noirs left the country for metropolitan France. The swiftness of this migration process¹ led the authorities to take emergency measures for the integration of Algeria's former French population.² The imperative need for 'metropolitanization' of the Pieds-Noirs also brought with it new administrative classification procedures: until the legislation of 26 December 1961, 'repatriation' was defined under French law as 'return to one's country of origin'; subsequently it was interpreted as concerning 'all French people forced, as the result of political events, to leave territories formerly under French sovereignty'.³ With the advent of independence, then, repatriation became a tool for dealing with the consequences of the colonial question. As a response to the political circumstances of the time, this legal reinterpretation of repatriation can be seen as something purely artificial. Nonetheless it had indisputable effects in practice: it enabled exact designation of those potentially eligible for help in moving to France, while the *pied-noir* category had no legal existence as such,⁴ being associated rather with the 'colonial situation' and Algerian independence.⁵

Algeria's French residents only became Pieds-Noirs when they left the colony for the metropole, that is when they were legally reclassified as 'repatriates'; thus the negotiation of their place in French society acknowledged a role in the nation's political life. My intention here is to address the process of politicization⁶ of the Pieds-Noirs in the light of the situation created by their relocation to metropolitan France. This involves, firstly, defining the contribution of community association activists to the group's integration;⁷ and secondly, examining in detail the different forms of electoral participation observed within the

group. This will enable a focus on the extent to which French political life has been partially reconfigured by the 'invention' of the Pieds-Noirs.

The invention of the Pieds-Noirs as an outcome of political mobilization

France's move into Algeria in 1830 was immediately followed by a decree dividing the population into two parts: Europeans (either French by virtue of the Napoleonic Code's birthright, or foreigners) and natives (Jews and Muslims). Given that the Jews were declared French en masse in 1870, that up until World War I non-French Europeans were gradually naturalized, and that Muslims were assigned permanent status as non-citizen French subjects,⁸ there were two principal categories in colonial Algeria from the late nineteenth century onwards. The first was that of 'French citizens', a composite category embracing those who already held French nationality when they arrived in Algeria and those who were granted it over time: the Jews – longtime pre-colonial residents – and the other Europeans who had helped populate the colony. The second was that of 'non-citizen French subjects', holders of 'nationality on paper': until the war came along Algeria's Muslims remained French nationals without the rights associated with citizenship, in spite of the fact that they paid taxes and contributed substantially to the 'blood tax' in the course of two world wars.

Algerian independence brought the emergence of the Pieds-Noirs and their subsequent incorporation into French society and politics. Their definition hinged on two criteria:⁹ the first was the legal one of repatriation, which enabled the distinction between the French from Algeria who left the former colony, and the very small number – the famous Pieds-Verts – who chose to remain.¹⁰ But repatriation on its own was not enough: *harkis* – Algerians who had fought on the French side during the Algerian War – were also among the repatriates, but this did not make them Pieds-Noirs. The upshot was a second criterion: that of one's status in the former colony where French citizens and non-citizen French subjects had long lived side by side. Thus 'former French citizens of the colony of Algeria', repatriated with the coming of independence, could *objectively* be considered Pieds-Noirs.

Nonetheless the presence from 1962 onwards of a million Pieds-Noirs in the metropole did not mean the existence of a specific group of individuals. Nor could the *pied-noir* category be totally objectivized: certain individuals theoretically not falling within the proposed definition – for example, Spanish Republicans who had taken refuge in Algeria after

the civil war of 1936, and had come to France in 1961–2 – considered themselves Pieds-Noirs while objectively remaining outside this category if they were foreign nationals, that is to say if they had not been nationalized in Algeria. In other words, the socio-historical definition of Pieds-Noirs put forward here is crucial to demarcating a specific group; at the same time this does not entail abandoning attempts at explaining different *pied-noir* political trajectories and behaviors.

Appraisal of the incorporation of Pieds-Noirs into French political life – given the difficulty of establishing a political party dedicated to their cause – first of all calls for close examination of the forms of participation adopted, notably within *pied-noir* and repatriate community associations. The creation in 1999 of the Parti des Pieds-Noirs (PPN), which claimed the community's right to a political voice, occurred much later than in the case of the expellees in West Germany.¹¹ Furthermore, the PPN failed to make any electoral impact, even in the cities and towns of Southern France with large *pied-noir* populations. PPN leaders worked hard at finding places on existing electoral tickets, putting the emphasis – unsuccessfully, as it turned out – on a pro-European stance: they saw the French republican model's recognition of individual rights as less favorable to the party's advancement than a Europe more concerned with minority rights.

It was, then, mainly through community associations that the Pieds-Noirs – and other groups – played a part in revitalizing forms of political participation.¹² Their initial claims were largely practical, bearing on indemnities for property left behind in Algeria and amnesties for former *Algérie française* activists involved in the conflict. However, it was their successful economic and social integration in a context of strong economic growth and a dynamic labor market that partially explained the emergence of fresh claims.¹³ One notable example was the founding in 1973 of the Cercle Algérieniste, whose goal from the outset was 'to save an endangered culture'. The upshot was that, given the presence in France of groups of individuals with specific experiences of colonial history and the Algerian War, psychological wounds gradually began to find expression as remembrance issues.¹⁴

If, as Maurice Halbwachs¹⁵ has stressed, collective memories are accounts of individual – and rational – processes of memory-situation rooted in collectively shaped mindsets, it is readily understandable firstly, that memories, like forgetting, vary from Pieds-Noirs to war veterans, *harkis*, conscripts, and immigrants; and secondly, that remembrance issues can be many and varied within each group, according to individual trajectories before and during the conflict, and to any

'traumas' suffered.¹⁶ To cite one example, the Association nationale des Pieds Noirs progressistes et leurs amis (National Association of Progressive Pieds-Noirs and their Friends (ANPNPA)), like the Harkis et Droits de l'Homme (Harkis and Human Rights) association, opposed the legislation of 23 February 2005 and its proviso that 'school curricula acknowledge the positive role of France's overseas presence',¹⁷ while many *pied-noir*, *harki* and repatriate associations have actively supported this rehabilitation of a 'colonial achievement' consonant with the narratives of the Third Republic.¹⁸

The existence of these pressure groups, however, is not enough to turn a million people into a classificatory or circumstantial group: the fewer than ten percent of Pieds-Noirs active in repatriate associations¹⁹ do not justify an assumption of influence, and the wealth of literature of exile makes it clear that opinions on the subject are markedly divided. How are we to compare Jean Brune, whose writings exemplify the internalization of a 'colonial imaginary', the development of a racist standpoint, and political commitment to the Organization of the Secret Army (OAS), with Marie Cardinal, who condemns the colonial discrimination credo in Algeria. To postulate a specifically *pied-noir* memory, vote, or identity is thus to contribute – like the spokesmen involved in the memory wars waged over French Algeria – to the conversion of a memory shaped by minority associations into that of a million Pieds-Noirs; to transform a tendentious militant discourse into an analytical category, and so help shape the fiction of an organized, politically influential faction.

It remains the case, however, that while the invention of the Pieds-Noirs can be put down in part to a politicization of community association activists, their mobilization has continued, despite all the subsequent measures: the amnesties of 1968 and 1981, the indemnity laws of 1970, 1978, 1982, and 1987, the creation of various local museums and monuments,²⁰ and more recently the 'Memory Act' of 2005 – even if that highly controversial Article 4 concerning the 'positive role of France's overseas presence' was later abrogated as unconstitutional. This ongoing activity points up possession by Pieds-Noirs of at least one of the characteristics of 'circumstantial groups':²¹ insofar as the combination of memory and suffering given expression by 'victim mobilization'²² is the sole factor capable of unifying a disparate group of individuals, an end to mobilization would signify the end of the Pieds-Noirs, whose visibility depends on confrontation with the state. Hence the repeated attempts at fostering a different narrative, one justified by the experience of those who, as direct witnesses, are

considered the sole legitimate sources of the facts. This is the invention of a tradition²³ – in this instance the ‘pioneer tradition’.²⁴ Like all heroic narratives this one proceeds via cathartic amnesia,²⁵ stripping the narrative of everything contradicting the group’s instinctual economy as the settler, transforming a swampy wilderness into a land of plenty, and becomes the personification of an Algeria that is a pure French creation.

Understanding the varieties of electoral behavior

Just as the victim mobilizations of pressure groups point not to the existence of a self-aware group, but rather to an active strategy of construction of such a group, the co-opting of the ‘*pied-noir* vote’ – notably by politicians in southern French *départements* with substantial repatriate populations – was no proof of its actual existence. Not all Pieds-Noirs saw themselves as such: some were overtly indifferent to the ‘community issue’, while those who did identify with it were apt to do so for reasons leading to all sorts of different electoral choices.²⁶ There was plenty of room for variation within a spectrum running from ‘politically nostalgic’ believers in the *Algérie française* cause – which gradually morphed into a vision of a French France where immigration, especially from Algeria, ought to be banned²⁷ – to the Pied-Noir consciously subscribing to the republican principle of equality that had not been applied to Algeria.

Insofar as carefully targeted electoral analyses have shown that there was no such thing as a *pied-noir* vote,²⁸ the situation remained highly paradoxical. Metaphorically speaking the ‘*pied-noir* vote’ was everywhere: in the speeches of politicians out to capture it and in the statements of community association activists harping on the *pied-noir* capacity to influence election results. At the same time it was radically absent from the statistics.²⁹ The activists represented only ten percent of Pieds-Noirs and a number of the associations comprised only ‘nostalgic exoticizers’,³⁰ relatively unpoliticized and mainly interested in symbolically and materially recreating the lost homeland by organizing meals together, exchanging photos and indulging in transplanted ritual practices.³¹ This kind of situation makes it difficult to overestimate the influence of voting instructions affecting only a small minority of the faithful, even if a few politicians like Georges Frêche, to the nostalgia-inducing strains of the ‘Song of the Africans’ – the unofficial *pied-noir* anthem – had the knack of implying that outcomes in their electorates depended largely on the choices of repatriates.³²

While a homogeneous *pied-noir* vote might never have existed, the effects of this illusion cannot be so easily dismissed, for they represented the political version of what Pierre Bourdieu has called 'the objectivity of the subjective':³³ belief in the existence of a *pied-noir* vote partially accounted for the way some politicians set out to court the repatriates. Certain political situations helped flesh out this belief, as when the Rassemblement et coordination des rapatriés et spoliés d'outre-mer (RECOURS), an association founded by Jacques Roseau in 1976 to defend the interests of overseas 'repatriates' and 'the despoiled', immediately called on Pieds-Noirs to use their votes against politicians associated with the national Gaullist majority and thus work towards indemnity legislation for repatriates.

At the next municipal elections, on 13 and 20 March 1977, several Gaullist mayors were ousted in southern cities with large *pied-noir* populations, among them Béziers and Montpellier. The RECOURS leadership promptly called attention to the Pieds-Noirs' 'electoral leverage', stressing that their voting instructions had even outweighed repatriates' pronounced anti-communist leanings, and threatened to resort to similar tactics for the parliamentary elections of 1978. The shared reaction of the government led by Prime Minister Raymond Barre and of President Giscard d'Estaing left no doubt as to top-level concern with *pied-noir* electoral behavior. Although the dispute was between the Pieds-Noirs and the government, the president himself took things directly in hand, declaring the issue a public action category and appointing Jacques Dominati secretary of state for repatriates.³⁴ On 8 July 1977, he announced to an assembly of repatriates in Carpentras that appropriate indemnity legislation would be drawn up in the fall in consultation with representatives of their associations.³⁵

Nonetheless, the influence of RECOURS voting instructions was never quantified or clearly established: the 1977 municipal elections saw a historic, nationwide victory for the Left, two decades after the establishment of the Fifth Republic, with the union of leftist parties obtaining 50.8 percent of the vote as against 41.9 percent for the parliamentary majority. In these circumstances the defeat of a number of rightist mayors in municipalities with large *pied-noir* communities, Béziers and Montpellier among them, could not simply be put down to repatriates obeying instructions: all over France other cities without a strong *pied-noir* presence – Brest, Reims, Bourges, Saint Etienne, and others – were taken by the opposition. This makes it difficult to identify the electoral weight of the repatriates in the leftist landslide,³⁶ but ever since politicians have been tempted to strive for a *pied-noir* vote whose existence cannot actually be proved.

Analyses of *pied-noir* electoral behavior point up, on the one hand, that the fit between Pieds-Noirs and the Front National (FN), while often mentioned, has never been established, even if their opting for the Front National requires an explanation; and on the other hand, that the series of repatriations found expression in certain electoral shifts. In Algeria a majority of the French population traditionally voted for the Left, especially in big cities like Algiers and Oran; but according to Emmanuelle Comtat's study of the 'pieds-noirs 2000' report, they are now largely voting to the Right (49 percent) and the Centre (23 percent), and significantly less to the Left (9 percent). At odds with national trends, this change in voting behavior requires investigation.

Hostility to the parties of the Left may be explicable in terms of memories of the Communist Party providing active support for the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) during the war, and, more generally, of leftist support for the cause of independence. The low vote for the Communists – and for the Gaullists – can be seen as a rejection of political groups which supported the decolonization process. Similarly, the presence on the Socialist side of leaders like Pierre Joxe, Michel Rocard, and Lionel Jospin, who had made their start in politics as part of the anti-colonialist mobilization, caused some Pieds-Noirs to keep their distance. Overall, the link between memories of the war and electoral behavior marked by rejection of the parties of the Left can be partly explained, says Comtat, by an *historical trauma* – in other words by the repercussions of an event that had a lasting influence on forms of political behavior.³⁷ Rejection of the Left by Pieds-Noirs is all the more pronounced because of their statistically elevated *historical trauma index*.

This explanation remains incomplete, however, since Pieds-Noirs are also defined by social characteristics. Those who vote Left belong essentially to the social categories which, in other contexts, are home to most left-wing voters: the intellectual professions, blue-collar occupations, and the nonexecutive public sector. Moreover, since the left-wing vote drops with age among Pieds-Noirs and other groups, and especially in the case of practicing Catholics, it is understandable that most Pieds-Noirs do not have a leftist profile: fifty years after repatriation they belong overwhelmingly to the 'elderly Catholics' category. In addition, Jewish and Protestant Pieds-Noirs are more likely to vote to the Right than Catholics, which emphasizes the fact that religion cannot be excluded from the factors underlying their electoral behavior.³⁸ This reduced propensity to vote Left, then, cannot be explained *solely* in terms of trauma. Thus the variables of classical analysis combine with historical aftereffects to account for repatriates' electoral orientations;

and the major variables – age, religion, social class – only become significant when associated with other contextual factors capable of acting explicitly on *pied-noir* electoral choices.

However, the statistically marked rejection of leftist political parties – except in local elections and specifically local situations – is not a sufficient explanation of the *pied-noir* leaning to the Right and Centre at the ballot box. Here, too, the classical variables combine with other effects, since in the case of the Pieds-Noirs, as with the rest of the French population, Catholic religious practice remains associated with the likelihood of voting to the Right. In addition, there was a violent rejection of Gaullism in the immediate aftermath of Algerian independence; many French from Algeria saw de Gaulle as having betrayed them with his shift from ‘I have understood you’ to the formalization of independence.

In contrast to the expellees in West Germany, then, the *pieds-noirs*’ political integration was marked by a vigorous rejection of one of the major conservative options. This explains, on the one hand, why Pieds-Noirs had been able to orient their votes towards the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and then the Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP) only via a gradual distancing from the Gaullist-affiliated parties; and on the other hand, why many of them opted for the Union pour la démocratie Française (UDF), led by former president Giscard d’Estaing, and, more generally, for a Centre-Right orientation.

A number of the classical analysis variables remain valid – Pieds-Noirs belonging to the professions logically vote more often to the Right than do nonexecutive employees and blue-collar workers – but their explanatory value is often distorted by such contextual effects as an aversion to Gaullism. Socio-democratic profiles – relatively elderly, mainly Catholic, often retired after successfully restarting a career during the postwar ‘Glorious Thirty’ – clearly play their part in explaining this largely rightist voting orientation, as do the ‘traumatic’ effects: rejection of Communists and other active supporters of Algerian nationalism, and an initial aversion to Gaullism followed by realignment with the dissenting parties of the Right.

Thus sociology and history now combine to explain this tendency, even if another set of statistical data eludes the classical division between Republican Right and Left: these data have to do with the choice made by some Pieds-Noirs in favor of a party of the extreme right, the Front National (FN). One particular figure may not only help to explain the probably rightwards shift of *pied-noir* voting choices, but also serve to set this group apart from other electors: 44 percent of Pieds-Noirs responding to the 2002 survey said they had voted Front National at least once.³⁹

As the electoral rise of the FN had begun with the European Elections of 1984 – when its share of the vote moved for the first time into double figures – it is likely that in the 1960s and 1970s only repatriates with ideological ties to the OAS⁴⁰ would have found an electoral – and activist – outlet in the FN. Seen in this light, the repatriates' choice of Jean-Marie Le Pen's FN, apart from the simplifications identifying the latter as the *pied-noir* party, needs to be analyzed in terms of multiple variants.

I shall begin with the lessons to be drawn from electoral geographics: as Benjamin Stora has so pertinently observed, the map of FN voters offers nothing like a perfect match with that of France's *pied-noir* communities.⁴¹ The FN has attained sizable electoral support in the heavily *pied-noir* départements on the periphery of the Mediterranean, but significant votes – up to 20 percent – have also been notched up in areas where the proportion of repatriates is negligible: Alsace, for instance. In other words, even if the *pied-noir* vote in favor of the FN is largely concentrated in Mediterranean départements with substantial repatriate populations, it would be a mistake to see this cluster effect as pointing to the FN as the party of the Pieds-Noirs. Moreover, the sharpest increases in the extreme right vote are mainly to be found in depressed former industrial areas where jobs are disappearing,⁴² while many of these areas are home to few repatriates. So the Front National is not *simply* a receptacle for repatriate resentment, and not all Pieds-Noirs vote FN: many of them – those of Jewish origin, for example – see the equating of Pieds-Noirs and the pro-FN vote as ignoring their resolute hostility to fascism.⁴³

How, then, do we explain the fact that Pieds-Noirs are more likely to opt for the FN than other voters? While the combination of economic and social gloom – mass unemployment, job insecurity, low incomes – are long-term characteristics of certain *pied-noir* areas of Southern France, and while the economic slump and loss of jobs in industry and the service sector are likely to reinforce repatriates' tendency to look to the extreme right, the classical socio-demographic variables are not enough on their own to explain the *pied-noir* FN vote: as Emmanuelle Comtat stresses, in the case of the Pieds-Noirs low education levels and a sense of social exclusion cannot be seen as major explanatory factors in this electoral choice, whereas they are known to play a large part in the FN vote among other electors.⁴⁴ Hence the significance – hypothetically more marked here than for classical right- or left-wing voters – of the traumatism factor.

As Paul Bois has emphasized, the possibility exists that a traumatic historical event can gradually evolve into an enduring influence on political behavior: just as the Catholic peasants of Western France

are described as having permanently repudiated the French Revolution because the new state refused to sell them land confiscated from the Church, Pieds-Noirs lastingly affected by the consequences of the Algerian War and repatriation, and never really having come to terms with the loss of their homeland, are prone to express their frustration by voting FN.⁴⁵ This is the conclusion reached by Comtat, who uses a 'statistical index of historical trauma' to show how repatriates who have been personally subjected to violence, war, and bereavement are more likely than other people to vote FN. Nonetheless, just as Paul Bois stresses that the correlation between Catholicism and voting for the Right is not self-explanatory, the connection between trauma relating to the Algerian War and voting FN needs to be made more explicit.

This need is all the more urgent in that, in contrast with the situation addressed by Bois, witnesses of the traumatic event are still alive, and transmission of the trauma involves their children. Among Pieds-Noirs, however, there is no single, unified approach to the transmission of memories or trauma. This explains why, independently of their troubled family history, the children of Pieds-Noirs tend to vote like other French citizens. For the second generation, then, the explanatory voting variables are overall the same as for citizens generally, which underscores the dilution of the traumatic event. On the other hand, those who had to cross the Mediterranean – the former French citizens of colonial Algeria – were witnesses to a historical episode potentially laden with consequences. What consequences, exactly?

The application of analytical induction to detailed reconstructions of the biographies of *pied-noir* FN voters makes it possible to establish what they have in common.⁴⁶ Prima facie it is hardly surprising that they are all frankly hostile to immigration, particularly from the Maghreb and even more so from Algeria. Attributing the loss of Algeria to the commitment of the 'Arabs', *pied-noir* FN voters are overtly opposed to the fact that since 1962, some Algerians, despite having opted for independence, still have freedom of movement on French soil. This attitude is one necessary factor, but is not sufficient on its own: many repatriates who spoke of their hostility to immigration had never voted FN, choosing rather to express themselves by voting for one of the Republican right-wing parties. In this kind of context we need to know more about the memory of trauma if we are to understand what, apart from an open hostility to immigration, accounts for the *pied-noir* FN vote.

This hostility, in fact, tends not to be rooted, as it is for other French people, in a xenophobic or 'anti-universalist' mindset, but in the arcana of everyday colonial life. Historian Pierre Nora quotes French general

Jacques Massu's testimony that when the 'Battle of Algiers' was at its height in 1957, and the French residents of Algeria were demanding the toughest possible line against the rebels, every arrest of a Muslim led to a French person from Algeria speaking up on his behalf.⁴⁷ The literature of exile is full of such cases: even in a war situation it was impossible to distinguish, within the category of the 'Arabs' with whom one had played football, and who had been friends and neighbors, those who were among the 'rebels' or *fellagha* ('peasants') as they were also termed.

It was, however, this problematic duality of the Arab – he was at once part of one's social circle and a possible threat to the social order – that shaped a traumatic memory entailing, for some Pieds-Noirs, the belief that Algerian immigrants were the very same *fellagha*, or their children, and now free to live in France.⁴⁸ In other words this was no stereotypically xenophobic opposition to immigration, but a real sense of repulsion at the idea that the enemies of the French of Algeria during the war could now be living in the former metropole. There is no lack of events capable of rekindling this traumatic memory, among them the riots in French suburbs of November 2005 and their metaphorical reconstruction of the link between Algerian immigration and the Algerian War through the supposed presence of former *fellagha* and their children in France. Among those Pieds-Noirs who are subject to this repeatedly reactivated, imaginary association, the outcome is a more or less systematic turn towards the Front National.

The explanation I propose is this: the Pieds-Noirs who vote Front National are those who associate the former *fellagha* with today's immigrants. For these voters the same causes are continuing to produce the same effects: just as the leniency of the French authorities is believed to have caused the loss of Algeria, the laxness of today's governments enables the former *fellagha* to continue violently defying France in the nation's working-class suburbs. Their choice of the Front National is thus explicable in terms of an urge to put an end to an Algerian War transplanted into France by *fellagha* living on French soil.

There remains the question of how the political field itself – the terrain where professional politicians confront each other – came to be transformed by the claims of repatriates and the alleged emergence of a *ped-noir* vote.

Repatriation and political shifts

Beginning with the municipal elections in 1977, belief in the existence of a *ped-noir* vote had concrete effects, despite the fact that the matter

seemed to have been settled when the secretariat for repatriates was shut down in 1964, and despite the amnesty legislation of 1968. The consequences of the Algerian War included, moreover, splits among professional politicians. This was initially the case on the Gaullist side, as Michel Debré, de Gaulle's prime minister during the Algerian conflict, had been opposed to independence and only accepted it out of duty. France under de Gaulle had had to swallow the massacre of Algerians in Paris by a militarized police force: prefect of police Maurice Papon was determined to win the 'Battle of Paris' (1961 and 1962) against the FLN, just as General Massu had won the Battle of Algiers in 1957.

The bloody repression of several demonstrations, notably on 17 October 1961, the most brutal example in recent European history of the crushing of a peaceful, unarmed protest,⁴⁹ illustrated the quandary the state was in: deprived of the support of a section of the army which had gone over to the OAS, it could not afford to lose that of the police.⁵⁰ The repression also pointed up the divisions within the Right: a wing of the Gaullist camp, most of the police force, and those who had come into politics under the banner of a refusal to 'sell off the empire' – among them Gérard Longuet and Alain Madelin, former activists within the militant right-wing faction Occident – remained uncompromisingly hostile to the loss of Algeria even when the independence process was well underway. Such splits were not limited to the Gaullists, however: they continued to afflict a number of political parties, including the Socialists, long after Algeria had become independent.

To cite one instance, shortly after François Mitterrand's election as president of France in 1981 – as minister of the interior under the Fourth Republic, Mitterrand had taken repressive measures against the outbreak of the Algerian insurrection in 1954 – a final, sweeping amnesty law was passed by the National Assembly under the terms of Article 49, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution, which allowed adoption of a law without a vote.⁵¹ Within the Socialist majority the old guard of the Fourth Republic had to come to terms with the opposition to this law on the part of parliamentarians who, like future minister Pierre Joxe, had entered politics on an anti-colonial platform.

Here I should like to clarify the way Algerian independence and successive repatriations contributed to a reconfiguration of French political life; and to do so by examining the circumstances behind the right-wing UMP's controversial law of 23 February 2005. Apart from the content of the legislation, which reflects the old, well-known claims of *pied-noir* and repatriate association activists, its adoption opens a window onto the various recompositions of French political life. Under the terms

of Article 13, it became legally possible to financially indemnify individuals – including former OAS activists – who had taken part in the operations carried out in the months immediately preceding Algeria's accession to independence, that is to say between the signing of the Evian Accords and the proclamation of independence. There was no question that the adoption of a law like this one signaled the marginalizing, within the UMP, of the 'Gaullist barons' – the stock epithet for Gaullists with a firm political base – and the rise of a new category of politicians to positions of dominance. How could Gaullists have adopted legislation enabling indemnification of former activists from an organization – the OAS – that had tried to assassinate de Gaulle?

Policy shifts within the Gaullist parliamentary Right were many – support for the European Union, the move from a planned to a market-driven economy, France's return to Nato's military command – but some of them can be addressed via the repatriation issue. This was the case of the law of 23 February 2005, which raised the issue of ideological realignment on the part of numerous UMP parliamentarians. As Romain Bertrand has emphasized, they are now free to help rehabilitate the memory of French Algeria, and even of the OAS – a switch that would have created a furor in the 'Gaullist baron' days.⁵² Thus the networks of influence set up by such repatriate associations as RECOURS, ADIMAD (Association pour la défense des intérêts moraux et matériels des anciens détenus de l'Algérie française/Association for the Moral and Material Interests of the Former Prisoners of French Algeria), and Cercle Algérieniste do not, in spite of their staunch links with politicians and the success of local memorial projects,⁵³ provide a full explanation of the changes within the Republican Right in France. If politicians have come to see helping to 'lift the ban' on the OAS as profitable career-wise, this is primarily because of their specific attributes in the political sphere.

Having come to national politics after local careers, none of the few parliamentarians who contributed to the adoption of the 2005 legislation had been a minister or had consistent access to UMP resources. They were, rather, new arrivals, subalterns within the organization who succeeded in exploiting the French–Algeria issue at national level so as to undermine the rules of partisan competition for their own benefit and reinforce their local electoral base. At the same time this interpretation does not exclude the need to analyze repatriate associations' lobbying of politicians: in the absence of strong potential support for their parliamentary venture, the newcomers who played a part in the passing of the law would probably have come up with another controversial issue as a means of benefiting from their party's divisions.

Conclusions

The scope of the memory wars on France's colonial past cannot absolve social scientists from a comprehensive consideration of the changes in French society and politics that followed the repatriations. These conflicts not only reflect identitarian strategies aimed at the invention of social groups like the Pieds-Noirs; they are also necessary aspects of the analysis of other political behaviors. They contribute, to varying degrees, to a clarification of the repatriates' electoral behavior and, among other factors, represent a key to the analysis of the changes in French political life and the reconfiguration of relationships of power within partisan structures – political parties within which it is usually the outsiders who can capitalize on a shift in the limits to what can acceptably be said in political debate. In addition to the stands taken by activists and politicians, these kinds of switches are also associated with the emergence of colonialist memory systems⁵⁴ and a move towards particularist memorial policies⁵⁵ which do not stop at merely fueling controversy: they also impose strain on the Republican model of citizenship, in which only universally equal individuals – and not 'groups of individuals' like Pieds-Noirs and *harkis* – are allowed recognition as holders of rights.⁵⁶

The implications are clear: where the Algerian War is concerned, 'taboo' and 'amnesia' have become activist arguments dismissed by historians;⁵⁷ and while arguments with such meager explanatory power allow little more than the escape-hatch transformation of a political problem into a psychoanalytical one, analysis of Pieds-Noirs first of all entails letting the subjects have their say – these subjects being far less resistant to investigation than is claimed by those still resorting to the thesis of the taboo.⁵⁸

Notes

1. Bruno Etienne, *Les problèmes juridiques des minorités au Maghreb* (Paris, 1965).
2. See Yann Scioldo-Zücher's chapter in this volume; Yann Scioldo-Zücher, *Devenir métropolitain: politiques d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris, 2010).
3. *Journal Officiel de la République Française [JORF]*, *Lois et décrets*, 28 December 1961: 11996.
4. Jean-Robert Henry, 'Rapatriés, réfugiés, repliés: le poids des mots', in Jean-Jacques Jordi and Emile Temime, eds, *Marseille et le choc des décolonisations* (Aix-en-Provence, 1996).
5. Georges Balandier, 'La situation coloniale: approche théorique', *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 11 (1951): 44–79.

6. 'Politicization' in the dual sense of the transformation of various activities into political issues and the process of moving into politics via various forms of participation, cf. Jacques Lagroye, ed., *La politisation* (Paris, 2003).
7. Interviewed in conjunction with the publication of my book *L'invention des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris, 2002).
8. Laure Blévis, 'La citoyenneté française au miroir de la colonisation: étude des demandes de naturalisation des "sujets français" en Algérie coloniale', *Genèses*, 53 (2003): 25–47.
9. Savarese, *L'invention*.
10. Under the provisions of the Evian Accords of 19 March 1962, they could remain French citizens or take Algerian nationality. Regarding the 'Pieds-Verts', see Hélène Bracco, *L'autre face: Européens en Algérie indépendante* (Paris, 1999).
11. Marie Muyl, 'Le parti pied-noir: une opportunité européenne', *Pôle Sud*, 24 (2006): 59–73. On the expelled party, see Frank Bösch's chapter in this volume.
12. See also Claire Eldridge's and Michèle Baussant's chapters in this volume; Martine Barthelemy, *Associations: un nouvel âge de la participation?* (Paris, 2000).
13. See Jennifer Hunt, 'The Impact of the 1962 Repatriates from Algeria and the French Labor Market', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 45 (1992): 556–72; Anthony Rowley, 'La réinsertion économique des rapatriés', in Jean-Pierre Rioux, ed., *La guerre d'Algérie et les Français* (Paris, 1990), 348–52.
14. Martin Evans, *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954–1962)* (Oxford, 1997).
15. Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris, 1994).
16. Nancy Wood, *Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe* (New York, 1999).
17. See Claude Liauzu and Gilles Manceron, eds, *La colonisation, la loi et l'histoire* (Paris, 2006); Romain Bertrand, *Mémoires d'empire: la controverse autour du 'fait colonial'* (Belleville-en-Bauges, 2006).
18. Eric Savarese, *L'ordre colonial et sa légitimation en France métropolitaine: oublier l'autre* (Paris, 1998).
19. Jean-Jacques Jordi, *De l'exode à l'exil: rapatriés et Pieds-Noirs en France. L'exemple marseillais, 1954–1992* (Paris, 1993).
20. In, for example, Perpignan as well as Béziers, Montpellier, Marignane, and Toulon. Cf. Eric Savarese, ed., *L'Algérie dépassionnée : au-delà du tumulte des mémoires* (Paris, 2008).
21. In this instance the term designates groups which, over and above the social qualities that define 'category groups', share a memory of suffering. See Cyril Lemieux and Jean-Paul Vilain, 'La mobilisation des victimes d'accidents collectifs: vers la notion de groupe circonstanciel', *Politix*, 11 (1998): 135–60.
22. Eric Savarese, 'Mobilisations politiques et posture victimaire chez les militants associatifs pieds-noirs', *Raisons Politiques*, 30 (2008): 41–58.
23. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983).
24. An excerpt from an interview illustrates the invention of this pioneer tradition: 'I've been told I was born in a colony. That's not true. I was born in a French département. Algeria was never a colony; at the beginning it was a

- military territory, then the settlers arrived; this is a source of pride for us – not being a colony. What’s a colony? It’s when you replace the legal government of a country with another one, organized by a foreign power. In this case it’s different, there was nothing there. A Dey, some towns, a Spanish trading post. Algeria didn’t exist. Algeria – the word was created by France... it was a pure creation from scratch, by France, with pacification and the creation of a new country. The only ones who might hold it against us are the Turks, and they’re not saying a word. So... In the constitution of 1958, as far as I know, it says the integrity of the territory had to be guaranteed. In legal terms that meant obeying the Constitution and keeping Algeria, not abandoning it. And that’s what we’re asking for now, for all [France’s] territories – except Algeria’ (male repatriate, born in 1952, *pied-noir* activist; reprinted in Savarese, *L’invention*, 169).
25. Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Le syncrétisme stratégique et la construction de l’identité nationale hindoue’, *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 42 (1992): 594–617.
 26. Clarisse Bueno, *Pieds-Noirs de père en fils* (Paris, 2004).
 27. Benjamin Stora, *Le transfert d’une mémoire: de l’Algérie française au racisme anti-arabe* (Paris, 1999).
 28. Emmanuelle Comtat, *Les Pieds-Noirs et la politique quarante ans après le retour* (Paris, 2009).
 29. *Ibid.*
 30. Bueno, *Pieds-Noirs*.
 31. Michelle Baussant, *Pieds-Noirs: mémoires d’exil* (Paris, 2002).
 32. *Le Monde*, 1 December 2005.
 33. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford, 1980).
 34. A post that had not existed since 1964.
 35. Valérie Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés d’Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours* (Paris, 2007).
 36. *Le Monde*, 22 March 1977.
 37. Paul Bois, *Paysans de l’Ouest* (Paris, 2010).
 38. Emmanuelle Comtat, ‘La question du vote pied-noir’, *Pôle Sud*, 24 (2006): 76–88.
 39. Comtat, *Les Pieds-Noirs*.
 40. The question of *pied-noir* adhesion to the OAS, which was founded in January 1961, is a complex one. Apart from those active members with fascist, nationalist and traditionalist tendencies who went on to join organizations like Occident, Jeune Nation, and then the Front National, the great majority of the French from Algeria who supported the OAS in the final months before independence did not actually subscribe to its values: rather, they saw it as their last chance not to have to leave Algeria. See Evelyn Lever, ‘L’OAS et les Pieds-Noirs’, in Charles-Robert Ageron, ed., *L’Algérie des Français* (Paris, 1993), 223–47.
 41. Stora, *Le transfert*.
 42. Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau, eds, *Le Front National à découvert* (Paris, 1996).
 43. Comtat, ‘La question’.
 44. Comtat, *Les Pieds-Noirs*; Mayer and Perrineau, *Le Front National*.
 45. Bois, *Paysans*.

46. Eric Savarese, 'Un regard compréhensif sur le traumatisme historique: a propos du vote Front National chez les Pieds-Noirs', *Pôle Sud*, 34 (2011): 91–104.
47. Pierre Nora, *Les Français d'Algérie* (Paris, 1961), 182.
48. The connection was sometimes stated very baldly: 'You know, we made a mess of things with the Arabs. We sent back the ones who were shouting "Vive la France" – the *harkis*, the auxiliaries – and they got their throats cut. And the ones we let in were the ones who'd been shooting at us.' Quoted in Savarese, *L'invention*, 214.
49. Jim House and Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror and Memory* (Oxford, 2006).
50. Emmanuel Blanchard, *La police parisienne et les Algériens (1944–1962)* (Paris, 2011).
51. The law of 3 December 1982 included full reinstatement – career, rank, seniority – of the generals involved in the failed putsch of April 1961. Cf. *JORF, Lois et Décrets*, 4 December 1982: 3660.
52. Bertrand, *Mémoires d'empire*.
53. Savarese, *L'Algérie dépassionnée*.
54. Johann Michel, *Gouverner les mémoires: les politiques mémorielles en France* (Paris, 2010).
55. Eric Savarese, *Algérie: la guerre des mémoires* (Paris, 2007).
56. Sarah Gensburger, *Les justes de France: politiques publiques de la mémoire* (Paris, 2010).
57. Mohamed Harbi and Benjamin Stora, eds, *La guerre d'Algérie 1954–2002: la fin de l'amnésie* (Paris, 2002).
58. The author gratefully acknowledges John Tittensor for his work in translating this chapter from the French.

Part V

Commemorative Practices and Emotions

10

Homeland Corners: Memories, Objects, and Emotions of Expellees in Postwar West Germany

Tobias Weger

The movie *Grün ist die Heide* (The Heath is Green, 1951) is a paradigmatic creation of post-World War II popular culture in West Germany, showing an idyllic world with no reminder of the previous Nazi period. In a famous scene from that movie, filmmaker Hans Deppe (1897–1969) portrays a hunter who meets a group of Silesian expellees during a local feast on the *Lüneburger Heide* (Lüneburg Heath). When he starts singing the *Riesengebirglers Heimatlied* (Homeland Song of the Giant Mountains), suddenly the whole group accompanies him – an expellee group caught in its ambiguity between integration and homesickness.

The commemorative practices of the German expellees have been neglected by political historians for a long time. Yet the analysis of these practices helps to understand the complicated integration processes of expellees in postwar Germany.¹ This chapter examines the symbolic communication and memory of German expellees from Central, South-east and East Europe who had to leave their homelands during or after World War II.² It focuses on West Germany and on the postwar period, when memories of resettlement, flight, and expulsion were still fresh and constituted an essential experience of a large part of society. The symbolic communication of the expellees, however, was closely related to cultural codes of their homeland society. Therefore many cultural patterns and practices recognized among German expellee organizations after 1945 can be retraced to the interwar period. Which symbols and media were used in this communication; how were they embedded within practices of remembrance and grievance, but also within the politics of history? How did they enter the ‘official’ sphere and the private life of expellees? How were they adjusted to the specific situation

of postwar West German society? Was the expellees' use of a symbolic language (dys)functional for their integration? In order to answer these questions the commemorative practices, imagined spaces and real places, as well as everyday objects, and emotions of the expellees will be examined.

Manufacturing memories

The integration of approximately ten million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe was a fundamental issue for postwar West Germany. Culture played a crucial role within this process. In 1953 the *Bundestag* passed a bill which the Federal Government had designed in cooperation with some expellee organizations. Article 96 of this *Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz* (BVFG) states that the Federal Government and the state governments should safeguard the expellees' cultural heritage, collect its material and immaterial traces, support scholarly research and preserve the expellee heritage for future generations in Germany and abroad – an approach to heritage that differs radically from the rather private or associational conception in the case of the repatriates in France.³

This guideline gave birth to a virtual memory industry, where the Federal Government, the expellee organizations, and regional ministers on the state level have been working together ever since. These vast activities included the construction of state-supported museums, research institutions, historical societies, magazines, conferences, and publications. At the state level, this process led to the conception of school syllabuses and textbooks for what has later been called 'Expertise of the East' (*Ostkunde*).⁴ Ever since the expellee organizations have taken great advantage of the 1953 legislation. Since they were co-opted to many advisory boards or steering committees of newly created institutions, they had considerable influence over the allocation of finances and were able to produce a large variety of commemorative media such as booklets, newspaper articles, history textbooks, popular accounts of their lost 'homeland', political speeches, visual sources such as postcards, illustrations and films.

This process of manufacturing memories of the expulsion changed over time. During the 'hot period' of the Cold War in the 1950s, negative images of Eastern European governments and peoples were very common in West Germany. Within the interior communications of the expellee organizations, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II was often compared to very remote

wars and invasions. In the case of the Hungarians, historians made allusion to the Huns. For many Sudeten German expellee politicians, their group had been expelled from Czechoslovakia as a consequence of the Czech Hussite tradition. These interpretations delivered collective characterologies often adopted from the mental world of pan-German nationalism or Nazi ideology.

Wilhelm Pleyer (1901–1974), for instance, a Sudeten German politician and writer, compared the physiognomy of Czechoslovakia's president Edvard Beneš to a 'Eurasian Avar's head' (*'Awarenschädel'*), explaining Beneš' treatment of Czechoslovakia's German population through racial criteria.⁵ This is similar to collective characterologies brought forward by other expellee politicians. They stated that from the very beginning of German–Slavic interactions and continuing even after 1945, the ethnic character of the Slavs, their supposed cultural inferiority and lack of moral and intellectual leadership, were responsible for the racial discrimination they practiced against ethnic German minorities. When the hot period of the Cold War started to cool down as a result of *détente* policies from the mid-1960s, these racial and ethnic interpretations became less important.⁶

Commemorative interventions took place on various levels. Since the 1950s expellee organizations have tried to institutionalize an official holiday remembering the flight and expulsion of the Germans from the East. For diplomatic reasons all Federal Governments and Parliaments resisted establishing such a public holiday until as recently as August 2014, when the Federal Government decided that from 2015 on, 20 June will be recognized as the 'Memorial Day for the Victims of Flight and Expulsion' (*Gedenktag für die Opfer von Flucht und Vertreibung*).⁷ The government's long-running reluctance to formalize commemorative recognition can be explained by the obvious similarity to anti-Versailles revisionism during the Weimar period. Indeed, bringing the 'Day of the Homeland' (*Tag der Heimat*) into the rank of a public holiday gives the organizations' anti-Potsdam revisionism the role of an official statement of German politics against the Allied Powers of World War II.

During the reunions of early ethno-regional organizations, the continuation of rituals and symbols from the Nazi period was quite strong. The singing of the three verses of the *Deutschlandlied*, the national anthem, could be observed regularly, even though this was not unusual in postwar Germany, until the third verse (*Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit* – Unity and Right and Freedom) was finally declared the new anthem of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952.⁸ These nationalist practices

were opposed by some Catholic expellee organizations who boycotted a number of mass meetings.⁹

Another way of forging the collective recollection of the expulsion was to embed memories in the context of the growing human rights discourse. In the immediate postwar period, a parallel was drawn between the expulsion of the Germans from the East and the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise.¹⁰ Later on the expulsion was related to other phenomena of forced migration and, by extreme right-wing authors, even to the Holocaust.¹¹ Since the concept of 'ethnic cleansing' has been brought into sharp focus after the civil war in Yugoslavia,¹² the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV) argued that they had also suffered a kind of 'ethnic cleansing', excluding other forms of World War II migrations of Germans from the East (for example, resettlement, flight, and 'orderly transfer'). Nowadays several scholars likewise apply the concept of 'ethnic cleansing' in order to implement European Memory Politics.¹³

Beyond these political interventions, commemorative narratives of flight and expulsion were also generated in print media, documentary and feature films, permanent and temporary exhibitions, in literary fiction, and later on the Internet.¹⁴ Popular literary productions for a broader public often propagated the image of the expulsion as an action of revenge, hatred, and genuine anti-German convictions.¹⁵ They tend often to correspond with popular artistic representations of the expulsion.¹⁶ These commemorative practices were a frequent reminder of nationalist performances of the interwar period, and sometimes these traditional anniversaries were continually observed. The Sudeten German homeland organizations regularly celebrated their 'March commemoration' (*Märzgedenken*) on 4 March, remembering the victims of Sudeten German–Czech clashes that resulted in 54 dead on that date in 1919.¹⁷ For Upper Silesians, the 'Plebiscite Day' (*Abstimmungstag*), the day of the referendum in Upper Silesia on 20 March 1921, on whether the region should remain German or become Polish, was a similar representational event.¹⁸

Imagined spaces and real places

In contrast to experts of medieval culture for whom emblematic phenomena are a daily occurrence, heraldry or vexillology (the knowledge of flags) are rather of secondary interest for most scholars of contemporary history. This omission is a mistake in the case of the German refugees and expellees, as actually the signs and colors used by their

organizations can furnish crucial information for the understanding of their beliefs and their behavior.

Immediately after their foundation in West Germany the new expellee organizations looked for symbols that could be applied as 'logotypes' and bearers of collective identity. The organizations had a strong self-perception of being exclusive representations of the former inhabitants of a given region or a German ethnic group. The traditional Pomeranian griffin, for instance, could be found on the armories of the Pomeranian Homeland Society (Pommersche Landsmannschaft); the Danzig double cross on those of the group of former inhabitants of the town of Danzig/Gdańsk (Bund der Danziger); and the Silesian eagle on those of the Silesian Homeland Society (Landsmannschaft Schlesien).¹⁹ Other symbols were newly created, as illustrated by the case of the East Prussian Homeland Society (Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen). Its armories show moose antlers, whereas before 1945 the provincial symbol of East Prussia had been a variety of the Prussian eagle.

The moose, a very popular and common animal in all riparian countries of the Baltic Sea, has always seduced artists. As a symbol, the moose antlers were first used at the insistence of the royal stud at Trakehnen at the end of the eighteenth century. Later, various military units from East Prussia adopted it. When the East Prussian Homeland Organization launched its newspaper, the *Ostpreußenblatt*, in 1950, its title on the front page was accompanied on the right side by the traditional East Prussian eagle, and on the left by moose antlers, which then became the official heraldic sign of the organization. In 1957 it was even declared a registered trademark of the East Prussian Homeland Organization at Munich's patent office.²⁰

After World War II the Sudeten German Homeland Society (Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft) reinstated the tricolor in red, black, and red, which had been in use among German nationalist associations in Czechoslovakia since 1919, and in 1950 the Sudeten German Homeland Organization officially adopted these colors as its ensign. At the same time, the association presented its new armories: on the right side, the half imperial eagle represented the historical roots of Bohemia as part of the Holy Roman Empire. On the left side, the half cross of the Teutonic Order stood for the 'impact of the colonization in the German East'. The little *herb* in the center displayed the 'fence' taken from the town symbol of Eger/Cheb, above which are three horizontal lines in the already mentioned 'Sudeten colors' – black, red, and black.²¹ This heraldic design was initially in competition with another symbol – that of the Reichsgau Sudetenland, an artificial administrative entity of

the Nazi Empire shaped after the Munich Agreement of 1938. Many examples from official publications confirm that the Nazi emblem was still used by segments of the Sudeten German Homeland Organization until the end of the 1950s.²²

From a modern perspective the establishment of these armories could appear as a quasi-natural act, but the case of the Sudeten Germans is not unique. Numerous German ethnic organizations invented new heraldic symbols in the 1940s and 1950s. This was true particularly for those groups whose original settlement areas lay outside the historical borders of Germany. One of those groups is the so-called Danube Swabians (*Donauschwaben*) who from the start of the eighteenth century colonized parts of Central Hungary. After the Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920) the Danube Swabians found themselves within the boundaries of the territorially reduced Hungary, and of Yugoslavia and Romania.

Despite this their cultural and political elites successfully imagined a collective identity and by as early as 1922 invented the denomination Danube Swabians.²³ This common identity prevailed over the arrival of numerous ethnic Germans from Southeast Europe in West Germany after 1945. The writer and ethnologist Hans Diplich (1909–1990), who originated from the Romanian Banat, designed their emblem in 1950. The coats of arms are divided horizontally by blue waves symbolizing the course of the Danube on which the first German colonists arrived in Hungary in the eighteenth century. A black eagle occupies the upper part on gold ground with widespread wings. If we take into consideration the eagle's red beak, we recognize the German national colors – black, red and gold. At the beginning of the twentieth century this tricolor symbolized, within the Habsburg Monarchy, the activists of the 'pan-German movement' (*Alldeutsche Bewegung*).

The lower part of the armory was taken from the emblem of the biggest town and cultural center in the Romanian Banat, the city of Temeswar/Timișoara – a rural landscape and the silhouette of Temeswar. Diplich replaced the blue waves with a white sky and obtained a dominance of white and green color in the coat of arms. The white was usually interpreted as a sign of a peaceful attitude, the green as the color of the cultivated soil. Other included elements are the sun and the moon. According to a local legend, the sun stood for Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663–1736), a Habsburg general who liberated the Banat from Ottoman dominance; the half-moon implied the declining power of the Ottoman Empire (with its Turkish half-moon). The emblem of the Danube Swabians therefore visually

reflected a contemporary intellectual and political trend, the 'Occidental Movement' (Abendland-Bewegung) which had been popular in West Germany since 1945 among certain Christian-conservative, anti-communist, and anti-Eastern circles.

Another important sector of symbolic communication was cartography. Since the late 1940s, the expellee organizations had printed numerous regional maps showing the principal tourist attractions, the industrial or agricultural richness and customary dresses of their 'homeland', but also indicated its waterways and railway communications. These maps were displayed in the so-called 'homeland corners' (*Heimatecken*) of private flats, used as small-format postcards, or introduced into popular publications. They kept alive a certain nostalgic feeling among the homeland fellows, but also elucidated the cultural and economic losses due to the expulsion of the Germans from the East. Other maps illustrating textbooks, newspaper articles, TV spots, information leaflets or political posters revealed the areas of German settlement (*deutsche Siedlungsgebiete*) in Eastern Europe, very often without any differentiation of their real density or numeric importance. This view favored the perception of most of Eastern Europe as a rather infinite 'German East' (*Deutscher Osten*).²⁴

At the same time, 'homeland books' (*Heimatbücher*) edited by various organizations and publishing houses showed the beauty and the stability of the lost homelands in the East. Their perspective was a rather romantic one: neither the pictures nor the legends or the descriptive texts gave any information about the Nazi period, about war destructions or possible ecological problems. The 'homeland' should appear as an innocent, 'pure' landscape styled thanks to German cultural impact and German workforce.²⁵ The publishing house Rautenberg, for instance, specialized in the production of picture books containing exactly 144 historical illustrations from a big town or a special region.²⁶ In a way these books romanticized the visual perception of faraway landscapes in the East – black-and-white photographs (rather than color) were reminiscent of old times, unspoiled by any traces of the advances of modernization.

German expellee associations are often identified with their great yearly reunions, including political rallies and parades of people dressed in folk costumes. For the most part, as in most German areas, these traditional outfits had died out long before World War II, as they echoed a certain social order that had disappeared during the nineteenth century. Around 1900 they had been partly 'reactivated' for tourist purposes in some vacation areas like the Bohemian

Thermal Triangle (Karlsbad/Karlovy Vary, Franzensbad/Františkovy Lázně and Marienbad/Marianské Lázně) or the Giant Mountains in Silesia.

However, most folk costumes worn in the West German context after 1945 were new creations, often based on ancient iconographic material.²⁷ Their aim was to give an idea of the presumed 'vitality' of the expellee groups and the maintenance of regional traditions in the new life context. This was also the case for songs and dialects. The vernaculars of the Germans from the East have been documented in sound recordings in various archives such as the Institute for German Language (Institut für Deutsche Sprache) at Mannheim, or the Johannes Künzig Institute for East German Ethnography (Johannes-Künzig-Institut für ostdeutsche Volkskunde) in Freiburg.²⁸ To keep these idioms alive the homeland organizations coached professional 'dialect speakers' (*Mundartsprecher*) whose duty was to prolong spoken traditions previously condemned to extinction. Their success was very small, as a regional idiom cannot exist without its relevant social and cultural dimensions.

On another level, the expellee organizations encountered a bigger success. They managed to shape the onomastic identity of thousands of West German villages and towns. In December 1953 the Federal Association of Municipalities in the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesverband der kommunalen Spitzenverbände) and the Confederation of Homeland Societies (Verband der Landsmannschaften) agreed that West German municipalities should function as 'godparents' (*Patenstädte*) for towns situated in former East German provinces. One paragraph of this agreement concerned the construction of expellee monuments, another the denomination of streets which would evoke memories of towns, landscapes and personalities in the East.²⁹ Street names mark and organize public space in a symbolic way – living or working at an address containing the names of individuals, companies or institutions can reinforce belonging and provide an identity, even though recent empirical studies indicate residents show little interest in the origin of their respective street name.³⁰

However, this naming practice had not been considered immediately post-1945 when suburbs were being rebuilt and expanded, although the places or regions of origin of the first residents were occasionally referred to. For those people, the street names functioned as emotional points of reference or *lieux de mémoire* as Pierre Nora or Etienne François might describe them.³¹ The 'lost topography' was reborn within the communal topography in West Germany. Nowadays, they can be considered as part

of the 'stored memory' (*Speichergedächtnis*), according to the definition given by Aleida Assmann.³²

In terms of the 1953 agreement, many German towns facilitated the construction of expellee monuments all over the country. A publication of the BdV lists more than 1,500 monuments erected throughout West Germany in the following six decades.³³ In all likelihood, this number is probably a significant underestimate. In 1950, for example, the Central Association of Expelled Germans (*Zentralverband vertriebener Deutscher (ZvD)*), a precursor of the BdV, erected a massive 'Cross of the German East' (*Kreuz des deutschen Ostens*) on the Uhlenklippen near Bad Harzburg in the Harz Mountains.³⁴ In the same year, a 'Cross of the Eastern lands' (*Ostlandkreuz*) was built above Geislingen an der Steige, half way between Stuttgart and Munich. In this context, I should also mention lookout towers with a memorial function, such as the replica of the former *Altvaterturm* (originally built in 1905 on the *Altwater Mountain/Praděd*) on the *Wetzstein Mountain* in the Thuringian Forest, which was finally completed in 2008.³⁵

In flat areas of Germany the expulsion memorials are mainly found in villages and towns, in public squares, in parks, cemeteries, and similar places.³⁶ Political groups such as the BdV or regional homeland associations often initiated them. In West German politics, the commemoration of the expulsion has always been on the agenda, ever since the early postwar years. As a result of six decades of memory politics, the expellee organizations largely contributed to the symbolic occupation of space in West Germany. The country is peppered with expellee monuments as well as street and place names remembering the lost Eastern *Heimat*.³⁷

An intriguing example of an expellee memorial is the *Leobschütz Monument*, erected in the Northwest German town of Oldenburg in 1957. Numerous expellees from the Upper Silesian town of *Leobschütz/Głubczyce* had found their way to Oldenburg after World War II and formed a small homeland group there. In response to a petition from the Association of Expellees from the East and Refugees (*Verband der Ostvertriebenen und Flüchtlinge*), the Oldenburg municipal council decided on 24 August 1951, to assume 'godparenthood' (*Patenschaft*) for the town of *Leobschütz*.

The official document exudes the atmosphere of the Cold War, during which many of the expellee politicians still upheld the expellees' right to return to their former homes: 'The town of Oldenburg would like to be a place where the expelled citizens of *Leobschütz* can maintain and practice their culture and their traditions, in order to be prepared for a

time when they can once again return to the German land East of the Oder–Neisse line.³⁸

Several days later, at a public rally on 2 September 1951, Oldenburg's mayor Gustav Lienemann (1880–1964) declared, 'In response to a proposal from the Association of Expellees from the East and Refugees as well as the Silesian Homeland Society, the town of Oldenburg will assume godparenthood for the town of Leobschütz. At the first opportunity a new street will be named after the town of Leobschütz.'³⁹ Indeed, a street was created in that same year, 1951. As a 'sign of solidarity' a bell from the Leobschütz Town Hall tower found a new home in the inner courtyard of the Oldenburg Municipal Museum; it had previously been recovered from the 'bell cemetery' (*Glockenfriedhof*) in the port of Hamburg, which had been a metal collecting point for the Nazi war industry.⁴⁰

During the second Leobschütz 'Homeland meeting' (*Heimattreffen*) held at Oldenburg in September 1957, a memorial was inaugurated in a public place in the town center. In a letter to the municipality, the renowned historian and History teacher, Enno Meyer (1913–1996), expressed his reservations about a monument on a site in close vicinity to Oldenburg's former synagogue, which had been destroyed in November 1938 during the 'Crystal Night' Nazi Pogrom.⁴¹ However, a senior town official wrote in his answer to Meyer:

I have read your letter of September 27 with special interest about the memorial for the town of Leobschütz and the former German Eastern territories. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with you that the site for this monument was chosen tactlessly. [...] Quite separate from the fact that both the expulsion of German people from the East of Germany and the injustices against the Jews are each totally deplorable, all the same, I cannot agree with your viewpoint when you declare that the Leobschütz monument's right to exist is itself doubtful.⁴²

The memorial is 2.2 meters high and takes the form of an irregular pillar. Its front bears the words: 'Unforgotten German town in the East – Leobschütz'. On the right-hand side, the stone is decorated with the coat of arms of Oldenburg and a note on the town's godparenthood for Leobschütz. On the back one finds the Leobschütz coat of arms and the date '1945' symbolizing the end of World War II. Over the heraldic symbol of Leobschütz, an inscription lists regions in Central Eastern Europe from which people had come to Oldenburg: 'Danzig – Memel – Pomerania – Silesia – Sudetenland – East Prussia – West Prussia'.

This inscription does not distinguish those areas that had been part of Germany prior to 1945 and other areas belonging to different countries in which German minorities had been living. The list shaped the mental map of a virtual 'German East', without any historical dimension or explanation.⁴³ A newspaper article referring to the inauguration of the monument quoted a senior representative of the municipality with the words that 'no German government should ever have the right to renounce Germany's Eastern provinces'.⁴⁴ The relocation of the German population after World War II was seen as the fulfillment of a Pan-Slavic conspiracy against the Germans. The monument has quite a 'modern' esthetic shape, but the ideological continuity of its relationship to the interwar period is evident.

Everyday objects and emotions

The history of emotions is a relatively young field of research with an ongoing discussion on methodological approaches. This branch of cultural history gives a constructivist interpretation of feelings, ideas, medical aspects, religious orientations, group belongings, and possible sanctions of emotions by law.⁴⁵ Emotions therefore require a broad interdisciplinary competence. Historians working in this field of research need an awareness of objects, text sources and psychological processes.

How can the history of emotions be applied to the research on ethnic German expellees in postwar and present Germany? In our case study, emotions can be retraced in a rather 'natural' form in a private context. Objects of memorial significance that expellees have taken with their luggage are often conserved in a respectful and almost devout way. In many flats and houses of expellees, ethnologists revealed special 'homeland corners' arranged with great care.⁴⁶ One might find there private photographs, showing members of the family or the house inhabited before 1945, a school diploma, attestations of the first communion (for Catholics) or the confirmation (for Protestants), a 'family cross' or the 'family bible', the coats of arms of the hometown as well as tourist souvenirs.

Some people brought old postcards or etchings showing views of their birthplaces; others possess paintings or other artifacts. Those who had been able to visit their original home after 1950 brought back symbolic objects from their journeys:⁴⁷ rocks from the Giant Mountains in Silesia and Bohemia, little bits of coal from Upper Silesia, pottery produced according to old patterns in the Lower Silesian town of Bolesławiec (formerly Bunzlau) or crystal glass of the famous craft industry of Bohemia.

Among Silesians little wood statues from the Giant Mountains are quite popular. They represent *Rübezahl*, a legendary figure of a giant from old tales that have been adapted by the new Polish inhabitants of that area. Most of those objects are of little material value, but they have a great symbolic importance for those who own them. The 'homeland corner' can be of modest proportions or even take the size of a small, private museum. In any case, it is a substitute for the lost area, the lost years of youth and a highly emotional place.

As is well-known, culinary traditions occupy a very important place in the emotional life of migrants.⁴⁸ In the past ethnic Germans living in close contact with their neighbors from other cultural backgrounds often adopted their traditions and customs. After their arrival in Germany they experienced a crucial cultural clash, as their use of garlic and paprika resulted in the local population referring to them as 'Romanians', 'Hungarians', 'Russians', or even 'gypsies' (*Zigeuner*). This kind of rejection could impede the integration process into German society and strengthen the return to homeland traditions. The expellees noticed that they had come to a country of the same language, but with distinct cultural habits. In many cases, even the same verbal expressions could have different meanings.

A popular anecdote from postwar Bavaria tells the story of a young woman from Bohemia who had married a local farmer. One day the Bavarian stepmother asked the woman to cook *Knödel* (dumplings) for the meal. According to the Bavarian tradition, dumplings are round balls made of flour or potatoes. The young Bohemian woman, though, only knew her traditional way of production – *Knödel* in the basic form of a long steamed roll, from which thick slices are cut. In this particular situation of cultural clash, each woman felt confident about what was meant, but there was a different result. For the young woman from Bohemia, her particular *Knödel* were also a symbol of her country of origin.⁴⁹

Other culinary products had less importance for everyday life, but their particular character and their exotic names were reminiscent for the expellees of their former well-being in their homelands. Prior inhabitants of Danzig/Gdańsk appreciated their 'Golden Water from Danzig' (*Danziger Goldwasser*). People from the famous spa town of Karlsbad/Karlovy Vary loved their *Becherbitter*, herbal liquor, but also the *Karlsbader Oblaten*, huge wafers filled with nuts, chocolate or sugar. For expellees from Königsberg/Kaliningrad, the ancient capital of East Prussia, the *Königsberger Marzipan*, a slightly burnt march pane, had a strong emotional importance and was often presented for Christmas. Drinking a glass of familiar alcohol or eating a specialty from the

regional kitchen had for many expellees the same effect as that described by the French author Marcel Proust in his novel *A la recherche du temps perdu* – its leading character is inspired by the smell and the taste of a madeleine to recapture the years of his childhood, when this pastry had been of grand importance. Many ethnic Germans experienced a revival of their homeland or of their youth through olfactory effects in the same way.

For elderly expellees one of their basic regrets was that they could not be buried in their home country after they died. Many of them had taken with them, before fleeing or being resettled, a bin filled with 'homeland earth' (*Heimaterde*) from their own garden, the local cemetery or their schoolyard.⁵⁰ This box was often kept in the above mentioned 'homeland corner', and a handful of its content was poured into the open grave at the time of the funeral, the relatives fulfilling a last wish of the deceased. In a symbolic way the expellees were reminded of what they had left behind – they were buried in 'native earth'.⁵¹ On many headstones in German cemeteries specific symbols can be found to distinguish them from graves of the locals: added to the date of birth is often found the place where the deceased person was actually born – names like 'Beuthen OS' (nowadays Bytom, Silesia), 'Königsberg i.Pr.', or 'Niederschwedeldorf' indicate a past geography with which average Germans are not at all familiar in the 21st century. This is also true for pictorial symbols like coats of arms and other regional emblems, which are recognizable on many expellee graves.

Symbolism could be found throughout the private life of a displaced person. Even just the sound of certain music could stimulate emotions and cause memories to surface, generating a feeling of homesickness for many. Kurt Nelhiebel is an expellee from a German family from North Bohemia with a socialist political orientation. For all of his life he has been one of the most ardent critics of the Sudeten German homeland organizations and their insensitive continuation of nationalist politics.

In a personal essay he described the following anecdote: when listening to the Czech national anthem before the radio coverage of a football match in which a Czech team was participating, he remembered the German words of this hymn which he had learnt as a little boy attending school in pre-war Czechoslovakia.⁵² For Kurt Nelhiebel the sound of this anthem symbolized the democratic Czechoslovak Republic destroyed in 1938–9 by the Nazi aggression in Central Europe. This example illustrates an important and often neglected phenomenon: even though the experiences during the expulsion had been often fierce and painful, many expellees preserved in their hearts a nostalgic feeling,

an awareness of still belonging to the country they had been raised in, even though many of them, despite being loyal citizens and opposed to any pan-German propaganda and discrimination, had been forced from their homes.

Conclusion

The symbols, places, objects, sounds and practices used by expellees have very different functions. Those used by the expellee organizations express political claims and could even be, in the earlier years, signs of revisionism and revanchism. One of the best-known examples is the slogan 'Silesia remains ours' (*Schlesien bleibt unser*) which the Silesian Homeland Organization had chosen for its 1985 federal rally. Helmut Kohl, then federal chancellor, had previously agreed to give the key speech at that rally, but after it had been made apparent that the slogan was going to be displayed, he declared that his participation was uncertain. It was only after the wording was altered to 'Silesia remains our future, in a Europe of free peoples' (*Schlesien bleibt unsere Zukunft, in einem Europa freier Völker*), that he attended the event.⁵³ Political messages of this kind were sensitive and could be divisive.

However, even at the yearly expellee rallies, one could observe private or 'semi-official' remembrance practices, especially at the meetings of local communities where for a short time memory entities were reconstructed by the displaced former inhabitants of particular towns, villages or school groups. Future historical research could place greater emphasis on a study of the interdependence of private and official forms of symbolic communication and memory.

In conclusion, two considerations should be attempted – firstly, how significant an impact has there been regarding the manufacturing of memories provided by German expellee organizations; and secondly, have they resulted in an ability to implement an ongoing narrative of the expulsion?

Most former *Ostforschung* (Research of the East) institutions have taken up the serious research of Eastern European history and culture. *Ostkunde* by contrast has disappeared from the school curricula of most German states – it seems that it was altered to the teaching of *Flucht und Vertreibung* (Flight and Expulsion) in the history curriculum.⁵⁴

This has resulted in the average German pupil of the 21st century believing that Eastern Europe was composed of 'badlands' where people hated and mistreated each other; the geography, centuries-old history and cultural heritage of this part of the European continent remaining a closed book to them.

As in the case of the Pieds-Noirs, the public commemoration of flight and expulsion has recently transcended the narrow sphere of expellee organizations, receiving broader public attention through, for example, the foundation of the government organization Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung (Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation),⁵⁵ or by television films like *March of Millions (Die Flucht)* in 2007. Memories of the expulsion can only be based on the personal experiences of the millions of expellees and therefore will disappear, unless they have been recorded or written down. Individual memories will eventually be replaced by practices of memory, such as political commemoration. The crucial question for the future is whether these will be able to reflect accurately and completely the wide range of authentic experiences connected to the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe.

Notes

1. See, for instance, Elisabeth Fendl, ed., *Zur Ikonographie des Heimwehs: Erinnerungskultur von Heimatvertriebenen: Referate einer Tagung des Johannes-Künzig-Instituts für ostdeutsche Volkskunde, 4. bis 6. Juli 2001* (Freiburg, 2001); Elisabeth Fendl, ed., *Zur Ästhetik des Verlusts: Bilder von Heimat, Flucht und Vertreibung. Referate der Tagung des Johannes-Künzig-Instituts für ostdeutsche Volkskunde, 8. bis 10. Juli 2009* (Marburg, 2010); Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn, *Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythen, Geschichte* (Paderborn, 2010); Andrew Demshuk, *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970* (New York, 2010); Cornelia Eisler, *Verwaltete Erinnerung – symbolische Politik: Die Heimatsammlungen der deutschen Flüchtlinge, Vertriebenen und Aussiedler* (Munich, 2015); Stephan Scholz, *Vertriebenenendenkmäler – Topographie einer deutschen Erinnerungslandschaft* (Paderborn, 2015).
2. See especially Hahn and Hahn, *Vertreibung*.
3. ‘Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge (Bundesvertriebenengesetz – BVFG)’, *Bundesgesetzblatt I*, 19 (May 1953): 201–21, here 219. See Michèle Baussant’s chapter in this volume for ‘heritage’ in the case of the Pieds-Noirs in France.
4. See Britta Weichers, *Der deutsche Osten in der Schule: Institutionalisierung und Konzeption der Ostkunde in der Bundesrepublik in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren* (Frankfurt, 2013).
5. Wilhelm Pleyer, *Die unbekannte Mitte: Ein politisches Lesebuch* (Munich, 1957), 145.
6. Susanne Greiter, *Flucht und Vertreibung im Familiengedächtnis: Geschichte und Narrativ* (Munich, 2014), 217.
7. ‘20. Juni wird Gedenktag für Opfer von Flucht und Vertreibung. Bundeskabinett beschließt Einführung eines jährlichen Gedenktages ab dem Jahre 2015’, news release, 27 August 2014, <http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/2014/08/gedenktag-fuer-die-opfer-von-flucht-und-vertreibung.html> (accessed 10 October 2014).

8. Jost Hermand, 'On the History of the "Deutschlandlied"', in Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, eds, *Music and German National Identity* (Chicago, 2002), 251–68, here 263.
9. Sabine Voßkamp, *Katholische Kirche und Vertriebene in Westdeutschland: Integration, Identität und ostpolitische Diskurse 1945–1972* (Stuttgart, 1972), 190. See Michèle Baussant's chapter in this volume for a different role of organizations in the case of the Pieds-Noirs.
10. Louis Ferdinand Helbig, *Der ungeheure Verlust: Flucht und Vertreibung in der deutschsprachigen Belletristik der Nachkriegszeit* (Wiesbaden, 3rd edn, 1996), 134.
11. See for instance, Rolf-Josef Eibicht and Anne Hipp, eds, *Der Vertreibungsholocaust: Politik zur Wiedergutmachung eines Jahrtausendverbrechens* (Riesa, 2000).
12. See Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Norman Naimark, 'Die Killing Fields des Ostens und Europas geteilte Erinnerung', *Transit Europäische Revue*, 30 (2006): 57–69; for a critical review of this concept see Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn, 'Alte Legenden und neue Besuche im Osten: Über Norman Naimarks Geschichtsbilder', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 54(7–8) (2006): 687–700.
13. This view is supported by Stiftung Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen, ed., *Erzwungene Wege. Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ausstellung im Kronprinzenpalais, Berlin* (Berlin, 2006).
14. See Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn, 'Flucht und Vertreibung', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, eds, *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte: Eine Auswahl* (Munich, 2006), 332–50, here 336.
15. Helbig, *Der ungeheure Verlust*. For the GDR literature see Bill Niven's inspiring book *Representations of Flight and Expulsion in East German Prose Works* (Rochester, 2014), which illustrates that the widespread idea of a 'taboo' of the expulsion in the GDR is rather a myth than reality.
16. Elisabeth Fendl, 'In Szene gesetzt: Populäre Darstellungen von Flucht und Vertreibung', in Fendl, *Zur Ästhetik des Verlusts*, 45–70.
17. Tobias Weger, '*Volkstumskampf*' ohne Ende? *Sudetendeutsche Organisationen, 1945–1955* (Frankfurt, 2008), 360–74.
18. Juliane Haubold-Stolle, *Mythos Oberschlesien. Der Kampf um die Erinnerung in Deutschland und in Polen 1919–1956* (Osnabrück, 2008).
19. Tobias Weger, 'Von Adlern, Elchen und Greifen. Die "verlorene" Heimat auf öffentlichen Denkmälern und in Straßennamen sowie auf privaten Grabstätten in Nordwestdeutschland', in Fendl, *Zur Ästhetik des Verlusts*, 193–220.
20. Benno Dilba, *Der Elch und die Elchschaufel: Symbole Ostpreußens* (Hamburg, 1995), 53.
21. Tobias Weger, '*Volkstumskampf*' ohne Ende?, 387–401.
22. Tobias Weger, "'Tracht" und "Uniform", Fahne und Wappen: Konstruktion und Tradition sudetendeutscher Symbolik nach 1945', in Fendl, *Zur Ikonographie des Heimwehs*, 101–25, here 116–24.
23. Felicitas Fabian, *Donauschwaben Saga* (Berlin, 2013), 5.
24. Tobias Weger, 'Vom "Alldeutschen Atlas" zu den "Erzwungenen Wegen": Der "Deutsche Osten" im Kartenbild', in Jörn Happel and Christophe von Werdt, eds, *Mapping Eastern Europe/Osteuropa kartiert* (Göttingen, 2010), 241–64.

25. See Jutta Faehndrich, *Eine endliche Geschichte: Die Heimatbücher der deutschen Vertriebenen* (Cologne, 2011).
26. See, for instance, Georg Vollbrecht, *Stettin in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1957); Walter Hawel, *Oberschlesien in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1957); Ernst Birke, *Das Riesengebirge und Isergebirge in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1958); Ernst Birke, *Niederschlesien in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1962); Ernst Birke, *Mittelschlesien in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1960); Martin Kakies, *Das Ermland in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1958); Hans Bernhard Meyer, *Danzig in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1958); Jan Bakker, *Pommern in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1988); Erhard J. Knobloch, *Sudetenland in 144 Bildern* (Leer, 1969).
27. For instance, Helga Palmer and Ingeborg Bansleben, eds, *Ostdeutsche Trachten aus Ost- und Westpreußen, Pommern, Ober- und Niederschlesien, aus dem Egerland, dem Böhmerwald und aus Südmähren: Vorlagen für zeitgemäße und echte Tracht: Zusammengetragen, ausgewählt und erneuert* (Stuttgart, c.1975).
28. The JKI is now called 'Institute for Ethnography of the Germans in Eastern Europe' (*Institut für Volkskunde der Deutschen im östlichen Europa*). Its archives include interviews with German expellees.
29. Weger, 'Volkstumskampf' ohne Ende?, 483–4.
30. Rudolf Jaworski and Peter Stachel, eds, *Die Besetzung des öffentlichen Raumes: Politische Plätze, Denkmäler und Straßennamen im europäischen Vergleich* (Berlin, 2007); Rainer Pöppinghege, *Wege des Erinnerns: Was Straßennamen über das deutsche Geschichtsbewusstsein aussagen* (Münster, 2007); Michael Maurer, *Kulturgeschichte: Eine Einführung* (Cologne, 2008), 63–5; Matthias Martens, 'Straßennamen – Lesezeichen im kulturellen Gedächtnis', in Sabine Horn and Michael Sauer, eds, *Geschichte und Öffentlichkeit: Orte – Medien – Institutionen* (Göttingen, 2009), 61–9.
31. Pierre Nora, 'Entre mémoire et histoire: la problématique des lieux', in Pierre Nora, ed., *Les lieux de mémoire*, 7 vols., vol. 1 (Paris, 1984), xv–xlii; Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, 'Einführung', in Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, eds, *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte: Eine Auswahl* (Munich, 2005), 7–12.
32. Aleida Assmann, *Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses* (Munich, 1999), 130–42.
33. See Bund der Vertriebenen, ed., *Mahn- und Gedenkstätten der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen* (Bonn, 2008). Stephan Scholz, *Vertriebenen Denkmäler: Topographie einer deutschen Erinnerungslandschaft* (Paderborn, 2015).
34. 'Kreuz des deutschen Ostens', in Annette Kaminsky, ed., *Orte der Erinnerung: Gedenkzeichen, Gedenkstätten und Museen zur Diktatur in SBZ und DDR* (Berlin, 2007), 280.
35. <http://www.altvaterturm.de> (accessed 11 August 2014). See Stephan Scholz, "'Ernst-erhaben in der Mittagssonne" – Vertreibungsgedenken in der Landschaft', in Andrew Demshuk and Tobias Weger, eds, *Cultural Landscapes: Transatlantische Perspektiven auf Wirkungen und Auswirkungen deutscher Kultur und Geschichte im östlichen Europa* (Munich, 2015), 265–86.
36. Hans-Werner Retterath, 'Gedenkstein und Wegweiser. Zur Symbolik von zwei Vertriebenen Denkmälern in Lörrach/Südbaden', *Jahrbuch für deutsche und osteuropäische Volkskunde*, 48 (2006): 1–34; Stephan Scholz, "'Heute erinnert nichts mehr daran"? – Vertriebenen Denkmäler und Denkmalinitiativen in Oldenburg 1951–2008', *Oldenburger Jahrbuch*, 109 (2009): 167–99.
37. Driving on the highway from Frankfurt to Cologne one can make a stop at a service area in the Westerwald which still bears the name of *Landsberg an*

- der Warthe*. It would be an interesting experiment to find out how many car drivers actually identify this name with a town in former East Brandenburg, which is now called Gorzów Wielkopolski, in Western Poland.
38. Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv Oldenburg, Bestand 262-1, Nr. 0-264a.
 39. *Ibid.*
 40. The Oldenburg Municipal Museum's website, http://www.oldenburg.de/stadtmuseum/geschichte/museumsgarten_03.html (accessed 21 June 2014); Andrew Demshuk, 'The Voice of the Lost German East: Heimat Bells as Memory Soundscapes', in Demshuk and Weger, *Cultural Landscapes*, 209–28.
 41. Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv Oldenburg, Bestand 262-1, Nr. 0-264a; for biographical information see Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, *Enno Meyer a Polska i Polacy (1939–1990): Z badań nad początkami Wspólnej Komisji Podręcznikowej PRL-RFN* (Wrocław, 1994).
 42. Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv Oldenburg, Bestand 262-1, Nr. 0-264a.
 43. Weger, 'Vom "Alldeutschen Atlas" zu den "Erzwungenen Wegen"'.
 44. 'Mahnmal für das Schicksal des Ostens. Gedenkstein in der Peterstraße geweiht – Die Leobschützer in ihrer Patenstadt', *Nordwest-Zeitung*, 23 September 1957.
 45. 'About the Centre', <http://www.qmul.ac.uk/emotions> (accessed 14 October 2014). Ute Frevert et al., *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000* (Oxford, 2014). On recent trends of the history of emotions, see Jan Plamper, *Geschichte und Gefühl. Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte* (Munich, 2012); Susan J. Matt, 'Current Emotion Research in History: Or, Doing History from the Inside Out', *Emotion Review*, 3 (2011): 117–24; Bettina Hitzer: 'Emotionsgeschichte – ein Anfang mit Folgen', *HSoz-u-Kult*, 23 November 2011, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2011-11-001>. See Michèle Baussant's chapter in this volume for the impact of emotions in the case of the Pieds-Noirs.
 46. Dietmar Saueremann, 'Erinnern und Zeichensetzen: Zur Erinnerungskultur von Vertriebenenfamilien', in Fendl, *Zur Ikonographie des Heimwehs*, 79–100.
 47. Demshuk, *The Lost German East*, 185–231, examines the case of Silesians' journey to their homeland.
 48. Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Munich, 2008), 317–22. See Michèle Baussant's chapter in this volume for similar phenomena in the case of the Pieds-Noirs.
 49. Prague-born ethnologist Georg R. Schroubek (1922–2008) quoted this anecdote in Munich, December 1997.
 50. Albrecht Lehmann, *Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Westdeutschland 1945–1990* (Munich, 2nd edn, 1993), 102–5; Heidrun Alzheimer-Haller, 'Gedenkmythos Erde: Formen und Funktionen einer Erinnerungskultur', in Arnold Bartetzky, Marina Dimitrieva, and Stefan Troebst, eds, *Neue Staaten – neue Bilder? Visuelle Kultur im Dienst staatlicher Selbstdarstellung in Zentral- und Osteuropa seit 1918* (Cologne, 2005), 309–22, here 314.
 51. Alzheimer-Haller, 'Gedenkmythos Erde', 322.
 52. Kurt Nelhiebel, 'Die Vertreibung aus der Tschechoslowakei: Persönliche Erinnerungen und Reflexionen', in Hans Henning Hahn, ed., *Hundert Jahre sudetendeutsche Geschichte. Eine völkische Bewegung in drei Staaten* (Frankfurt, 2007), 15–32, here 18–19.

53. Silke Hahn, 'Vom zerrissenen Deutschland zur vereinigten Republik: Zur Sprachgeschichte der "deutschen Frage"', in Georg Stölzel and Martin Wengeler, eds, *Kontroverse Begriffe: Geschichte des öffentlichen Sprachgebrauchs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin, 1995), 285–353, here 291.
54. For instance the federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation (Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung) founded at Berlin in 2005 addresses its activities very much to pupils and students. See 'Conceptual framework for the Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation and guidelines for the planned permanent exhibition', http://www.sfvv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/conceptual_framework_sfvv_2012.pdf (accessed 30 April 2014). The topic 'flight and expulsion' is part of the history curricula in almost all German federal states.
55. See Stefan Troebst's chapter in this volume.

11

Pied-Noir Pilgrimages, Commemorative Spaces, and Counter-Memory

Michèle Baussant

The individuals now generally referred to as Pieds-Noirs – a term ‘in search of its roots’¹ – represent a host of different groups, some of them with no common ancestry or territory apart from those forged in Algeria.² These are people of French and foreign immigrant stock; those in the latter category were from different European and Mediterranean countries and it was in Algeria that many of them acquired French nationality, even if they continued to identify both with the places they settled in and those associated with their origins. On leaving Algeria they found themselves lumped together according to their links with the past and labeled Pieds-Noirs – a category not acceptable to all of them.

Following decolonization, however, this unifying past became totally anachronistic and was regarded as morally indefensible.³ Since then the social sciences have often reduced the *ped-noir* experience to a nostalgia for the colonial system as a whole, an idealization that supposedly found expression in a deliberate, collective falsification of history.⁴ This critique draws on the utterances and practices of certain community association leaders, the representativeness of which remain unproven and which sometimes differ from the narratives and practices observed – especially in the private sphere – among Pieds-Noirs generally and their descendants.⁵ It thus reduces the myriad individual *ped-noir* stances to certain clichés, especially those of the public arena. Nonetheless, the occasions for the public exercise of remembrance are not always ‘those where these voices are raised [...] but rather those that surface unexpectedly’: witness the popularity of certain religious events,

where memory is given free rein and which serve as opportunities to get together and recreate a social space associated with France's Algerian past.⁶

This chapter sets out to examine these religious manifestations of memory as shaped by those involved, together with the social circumstances in which they crystallize, as seen from a collective point of view.⁷ The question of a specific *pied-noir* memory was addressed by numerous authors in the 1980s, but its interconnection with ritual and religion – harking back to the role of the Church during the colonial era – has drawn little attention from researchers up until the present.⁸ This is despite the fact that the religious framework clearly played an important part in structuring the *pied-noir* imaginative realm and sense of belonging both in Algeria and, later, in exile.

I shall begin by looking at various associations whose work involves, among other things, embedding aspects of the Algerian past in France, in particular by reterritorializing a European community of Algerian origin. I shall then go on to consider the role of Marian pilgrimages in France as a normative model for remembrance in social venues conducive to interaction between lived experience and public evocation of the past. Organizing this kind of public gathering, with its capacity for 'memorialization', has often been a major concern for the *pied-noir* population. My intention is to show how clearly this embedding in an institutional Catholic context reveals the still-constitutive role of religious affiliation as an identity marker, and the simultaneously commemorative, patrimonial, and relational implications of such a context. Lastly I shall emphasize the importance of rituals and the places associated with them in the development of an individual and collective counter-memory, and the way these factors enable expression of diverse, and sometimes divergent, representations, interests, and emotions. This approach thus combines an analysis of the remembering of past experience, mainly as revealed in different forms of discourse, with an analysis of the present experience of a collective memory, as notably revealed during pilgrimages.

The role of community associations

In France, Europeans from Algeria seem not – or not often – to find social settings propitious to expression of their memories outside community associations. Mostly identity-oriented, these associations represent a vigorous wellspring of shared memory that ties in with

the identity of those concerned and their descendants. They organize group events on differing scales, take part in ad hoc get-togethers, sometimes issue their own newspapers and magazines, and have numerous websites.⁹

Their existence, however, should not blind us to the fact that not all Pieds-Noirs are members of such associations and that the latter are extremely diverse in character. Some of them strive to create a cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, revolving around elements like cuisine and 'Pataouète', a pidgin whose sources include French, Arabic, Italian, and Spanish.¹⁰ They gather the historical background from before and after 1962, as well as accumulations of images, movies, documentaries, radio and TV broadcasts, writings about colonization and the war, and autobiographies.¹¹ The resultant body of knowledge is not always notable as a critique of the colonial system: often it broadly epitomizes the official narrative once used to defend colonization, or focuses on everyday trivia.¹²

Analysis of these associations points up a certain shift in interest away from political and moral justifications, even if these persist, towards history, roots, and other identity-related areas of concern. Notable in this respect is the rise of genealogical research on the part of individuals or the associations themselves.¹³ In the 1980s, in addition to group trips to Algeria, some associations began organizing visits to countries that had been sources of earlier migration to the colony.¹⁴ They also, as one means of establishing a public presence in France, arranged regular or ad hoc commemorative activities centering on monuments or other concrete reminders of the Algerian past, the war, and the colonization process.¹⁵

As early as 1962, in some French cities and towns, monuments had been erected¹⁶ to the memory of the European and/or *harki* populations, of the struggle for *Algérie française*, and even of leading members of the terrorist Organisation armée secrète (OAS). Hundreds of (often religious) objects and monuments had been brought back by the French army, the Secours Catholique charitable organization, and private individuals.¹⁷ In addition, streets and municipal buildings were named after people and events historically associated with either the war of independence or the period of the French presence in Algeria. In many cases the emphasis on the cultural also helped preserve an ostensible depoliticization, which contrasts with the frank *Heimatpolitik* (homeland policy) of the German expellees; yet the Pieds-Noirs' depoliticization was, perhaps, less 'revelatory of an end to the influence of politics on their activities than of a specific structuring of their discourse'.¹⁸

Extraterritorial sites

While the associations have succeeded in building up a form of heritage aimed, in part, at implanting a certain version of the past in various public spaces, it is not always easy to infer a common discourse or a shared adhesion on the part of Europeans from Algeria. This heritage tells us more about association leaders' concrete expectations and intentions and the kind of mobilization and experience they were hoping to foster. As Gabriel,¹⁹ very involved at the time in a *pied-noir* association, put it: 'We have friends from here who come along for the ceremony. They watch and they ask questions, and that's how things get handed on ... When the kids see the monument they'll wonder what it's about, and they'll ask their parents and grandparents, "What does this mean?" And the parents will tell them, and with one thing leading to another, things will live on.'²⁰

On a larger scale, certain places have been taken over as symbols of a now extraterritorial French Algeria. One notable example is Château de Julhans, at Roquefort-la-Bédoule, a few kilometers from Aubagne and Cassis. Since the late 1980s the château has been the scene of a battle between Union syndicale de défense des intérêts des Français repliés d'Algérie (USDIFRA), a *pied-noir* rights association,²¹ and the Algerian government. In 1959 the property was acquired as a holiday camp by Caisse d'assurances sociales du commerce de la région de Constantine (CASOC), a social security agency serving the Constantine region in Algeria; after independence it was taken over, although without title deeds, by the Algerian state, which tried to sell it in 1988. USDIFRA responded by installing two *pied-noir* families and mounting a legal challenge to Algeria's ownership and sale of the château.²² Since then the case has continued to drag on.²³ In 1996 USDIFRA restored the château's chapel, renaming it Notre Dame des Pieds-Noirs, while the property became a focal point for various *pied-noir* association events. It also became home to a commune with 'its own flag, anthem, government, and identity card'.²⁴

Carnoux-en-Provence, near Marseille, is a quite different instance of reterritorialization in France: a municipality created in 1957 by and for a population of Europeans from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Until the 1980s, Carnoux-en-Provence was unique in that it had the only cemetery in France where Pieds-Noirs not resident in the municipality could be buried. The cemetery is like its European equivalents in Algeria, with graves resembling chapels in which up to eight bodies can be superposed; there are also numerous statues and a

memorial with urns containing soil from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and other countries. The town's architecture is equally distinctive – houses with roof terraces – and its street names and monuments recall the history of its residents. The church is dedicated to Notre Dame d'Afrique and its bells were brought in from Saint-Denis-du-Sig in Algeria. As in Algiers in the old days, a pilgrimage takes place every 15 August.

Today, places like these crystallize an idealized memory of togetherness rooted in specific forms of socializing and the notion of a space created by and for oneself. Indeed, Carnoux-en-Provence often looks like this to outsiders:

Entering the village, a feeling of being in Morocco. The inhabitants take a real pleasure in breathing the local air, in sharing a way of life [...]. Here people have rediscovered their roots, free of nostalgia and hatred. They have recreated their roots, laid out their streets, and settled in. They are citizens of Carnoux.²⁵

These same spaces, though, also reflect different experiences and practices, divergent individual and collective life paths, and sometimes conflictual social relationships: 'There was this hostility coming from the Moroccans, who say they aren't pieds-noirs. [...] When we arrived [...] we felt a real animosity. They said we were acting tough, and why hadn't we gone to America.'²⁶

Nonetheless, neither the associations nor these reterritorialized localities have the same power as certain religious objects and places²⁷ – with their specific events, the pilgrimages – to mobilize Pieds-Noirs, whether more or less active members of associations, or just occasional participants. In France the pilgrimages – recreations of events which, in Algeria, brought together believers with their roots in the same diocese – now draw on a host of different networks based on social ties and kinship and are often grounded in the past. Their distinct character also lies in belonging to at least two settings – France and Algeria – in which the shrines and pilgrimages still exist, even if in other forms. Since their transfer to France the way they are organized seems to have changed very little. And even given a certain decline in attendances, due to the aging of the Algerian-born population and a relative lack of interest on the part of the young, they remain a powerful rallying force, especially in the case of the pilgrimage of Notre Dame de Santa Cruz in Nîmes. They enable the recomposition of an ephemeral 'collectiveness' with its own, temporarily relocated social spaces. In this way they contribute,

on a provisional but recurrent basis, to the structuring of a *pied-noir* community in France in a social setting conducive to the sharing of memories.²⁸

Pilgrimages: Notre Dame d’Afrique and Notre Dame de Santa Cruz

The first of these pilgrimages harks back to 1846 and two women who set up a shrine to the Virgin Mary near the Catholic boys’ school in Algiers. This led to the building of an oratory and in turn, during the period 1855–72, a basilica on the promontory overlooking the sea.²⁹ No miracle attaches to the founding of this place of worship, which went on to become a place of pilgrimage dedicated to Notre Dame d’Afrique, but it was very soon linked to the story of the freeing of a number of Christian slaves through the intercession of the Virgin.

In France the cult of Notre Dame d’Afrique underwent several ‘transplantations’ after 1962, two of them of special interest: the pilgrimages of Carnoux-en-Provence and Théoule-sur-Mer. The church in Carnoux was built in 1964 and dedicated to Notre Dame d’Afrique in 1965. The first national pilgrimage took place in 1972,³⁰ and 1984 saw the founding of the Carnoux Racines association – *racines* means roots – whose duties included ongoing organization of the event.

The number of pilgrims is hard to estimate, yet the number of participants has probably never been high. Several hundred people – perhaps up to one or two thousand – arrive on 15 August 1997. At 9 a.m. a dozen or so stands open on the main square near the church, selling photos, souvenirs of Algeria, and food. The pilgrimage begins at 10 a.m. with a ceremony at the war memorial, the pilgrims forming a semicircle to the sound of military music. The director of the event³¹ recounts its background and calls on the participants not to forget their own. The speech closes with a roll call of the fallen, followed by a minute’s silence and the ‘Song of the Africans’, the unofficial *pied-noir* anthem. The crowd breaks up, some going to the church for Mass, which is followed by a communal meal, Benediction at 2:30 p.m., and a ceremony and procession in honor of the Virgin.

The pilgrimage at Théoule-sur-Mer, near Cannes, was founded in 1990 by Joseph Ortiz, born in Algeria and considered one of the instigators of the ‘week of the barricades’ in Algiers in 1960. A leading figure in the OAS, he was condemned to death in absentia in 1961, and amnestied in 1968. The pilgrimage is supported by the Federation for the Unity of Refugees and Repatriates (FURR). A smaller-scale event, it is held on a

morning in May or June³² and comprises a procession, a speech, and a Mass followed by lunch. Over the years it has grown to include vending stands and entertainment. It takes place at a memorial representing 'the memory of the Pieds-Noirs', built in 1990 on an isolated site outside the village.

The work of an association, the memorial is explicitly intended as a site for commemoration, coming together, and identification. This role is further underscored by ceramic plaques bearing the names of subscribers and other associations, set into a low wall according to links of kinship or affinity; and by two urns, one containing Joseph Ortiz' ashes and the other earth collected from various cemeteries in Algeria by ASCA, the Algerian Cemeteries Protection Association. The religious items brought from Algeria, among them two bells from Constantine, perform a similar function. The aim, too, is to provide a counter-version of Franco-Algerian history: some subscribers to the memorial describe themselves as refugees from Africa and/or Algeria and there are plaques dedicated to executed OAS members or making reference to events – the shoot-out of 26 March 1960 and the barricades – that remain matters of dispute with France. The site's commemorative aspect aside, then, the purpose is also a historical and political rehabilitation of personages and events closely but conflictually associated with the Algerian War.

The pilgrimage comprises a procession with flags and a statue of the Virgin to the shrine-memorial; there are three halts, during which prayers are offered for the dead, the missing, *pied-noir* civilian victims, and the *harkis*. The arrival of the procession at the memorial is followed by a ceremony of homage to the flags and those who died in Algeria; it includes specific mention of Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry, Albert Dovecar, Claude Piegts, and Roger Degueldre, all of whom were executed for their clandestine activities in the OAS. In addition to the pilgrims those present include representatives of the municipality, the military, the Church, and *pied-noir* associations. A speech by a colonel, formerly in charge of an engineering battalion in Algeria offers a counter-history, beginning with the conquest of Algeria as a civilizing exercise and concluding with an invocation of the Algerian War dead, whose place in memory must be restored.³³ The ceremony closes with the laying of a wreath and a further tribute to those who lost their lives, followed by a communal meal.

The pilgrimage of Notre Dame de Santa Cruz in Nîmes is somewhat different, notably in respect of its extent and the absence of any ceremony for the dead or official reference to the Algerian War.³⁴ This event

recreates the great pilgrimage of Oran, in Algeria, which took place on the feast of the Ascension at a shrine built in 1851.³⁵ The shrine had its origin in a miracle – the Virgin is said to have interceded on behalf of the inhabitants of Oran in 1849, when rain put an end to a cholera epidemic.³⁶

The shrine came into being in the wake of the building of emergency housing in Nîmes for some of Algeria's Europeans in September 1963. It is home to a statue of Notre Dame de Santa Cruz brought from Oran and officially handed over to the bishop of Nîmes in June 1965. The first pilgrimage took place in 1966 and the building of the shrine began in 1968. The number of pilgrims who attended in 1989 was estimated at 100,000–130,000,³⁷ a pointer to the vitality of the networks generated by their links with the past.

Practically deserted during the rest of the year, apart from Sundays and one-day pilgrimages organized by associations,³⁸ at the Ascension the shrine becomes the focus for the devotion of Europeans from Algeria. This central role is experienced and acted out by an unending flow of visitors from France and abroad, for whom Nîmes becomes the *piéd-noir* capital for a day. Most of these men and women were born in Algeria before 1962 and almost all are from the Oran region; the shrine, whose museum contains statues of Notre Dame d'Afrique and St Augustine, attempts to attract Pieds-Noirs from Algiers and Constantine, but with only moderate success. Most of the visitors are Catholics, but there are also Muslims and Jews, as well as distinct groups such as the 'Gypsies'.³⁹ Some, but not all of them, are members of associations. In recent years pilgrims with no ties to Algeria have swelled the numbers, but those from Oran and its region remain the majority.

The event begins on Wednesday evening with a vigil at the shrine. This, however, draws relatively few of the faithful compared to the tens of thousands who will begin arriving for the one-day pilgrimage at 5 a.m. the next morning. 'Oranîmes', as the site is called at pilgrimage time, now overflows the shrine and spreads through the whole of the surrounding neighborhood. As already mentioned, and despite the talk of Nîmes as the '*piéd-noir* capital for a day', this is very largely an Oran affair, as indicated by the numerous references to Spain.⁴⁰

The neighborhood is divided up into three zones, each an integral part of the pilgrimage: the shrine itself; a second area extending from the shrine to the main street; and a third given over to the sale of food, clothes, and music often 'branded' *piéd-noir* or Algerian. The first two zones include a 'recreation' of towns and villages in the Oran region and neighborhoods in Oran itself, indicated by placards bearing the names

given to them during the colonial period. The third zone, by contrast, is basically commercial.

The range of individual activities is varied, including shopping, celebrating, and meeting old friends. The day of the pilgrimage is spent coming and going between the shrine, the 'village' symbolized by its placard and given concrete form by the presence of some of its former inhabitants, the retail streets, and the Jean Paulhan cultural center, with its stands. The latter feature associations, writers who have come to sell their books, and sometimes exhibitions devoted to the sights of colonial Algeria. Masses are celebrated alternately at the parish church and the shrine, and the procession that begins at 2 p.m. is followed by High Mass and the distribution of flowers and ribbons in the colors of the Virgin.

Setting up networks

The highlighting of objects from Algeria – or from France but referencing Algeria – helps to get people actively interested. A statue of the little Virgin of Oran; a statuette in Carnoux supposedly from the basilica of Notre Dame d'Afrique in Algeria; a replica of the statue of Notre Dame d'Afrique; church bells; a Way of the Cross; banners: their presence seems essential to conferring physical existence on those bygone days. They reveal, too, the still fundamental role of Christianity, not only as a religion, but also as an identity marker in respect of the different populations that coexisted in Algeria. They also give the sites a commemorative aspect, linking them to the lost cemeteries in Algeria. Nonetheless this past is above all accessible to those who actually experienced it: objects, surviving artifacts, and buildings, all from different periods⁴¹ are brought together in a single space, often when there is no way of relating them to either their original or present-day historical and social context.

This rallying process depends not only on objects but on networks too; on a set of social relationships that reveals forms of inclusion and exclusion. Take for example the actual shaping of the commemorative and devotional spaces in Nîmes: those who are not Europeans from Algeria are in the minority and are taking part in a staging of the self and others which is negatively perceived by some locals. The absence of Nîmes residents reinforces the split between the values embodied and represented by the pilgrimage and those attributed to the 'metropolitan French'. The languages spoken – among them Spanish, Pataouète and Arabic – together with the gestures, the sense of familiarity among pilgrims and their degrees of receptiveness towards some of those

regarded as outsiders, are all part of this staging and of the seeming homogeneity of those attending, notably in respect of their ages and (often informal) dress codes. At the same time the divisions are equally public – away from the Masses and the processions the pilgrims have various ways of venting their grudges against France or Algeria, and expressing more recent discord between Oranese repatriates from Toulouse, Paris, and Nice. And sometimes there are clashes with the locals.

In most of the cases studied, these pilgrimages constitute on the one hand an annual framework and backdrop for fresh expression of more or less shared approaches to the past and the present, while on the other they tend to exacerbate certain contrasts. One of these has to do with those who were born in Algeria before 1962, and the later generations, born in other countries and very much in the minority at the pilgrimages.

Varying registers of expectation

The staging of the pilgrimages is in the hands of organizers working within a cultural or religious association, although sometimes the pilgrims themselves are in charge. It is not controlled by the civil or religious authorities, whose active presence, while indispensable, is often simply tolerated and even, in some cases, rejected. The running of the pilgrimages by the associations adheres to a more or less standard pattern, with rituals that appear carefully orchestrated and reflect detailed preparation on the part of those involved. Overall the situation is marked by a mix between a certain level of control by those bent on maintaining the memory of crucial aspects of a shared history and emotional outpourings in which the sufferings of the past fuse with the joys of reunion.

In contrast to the often overtly political rallies of German expellees, politicians are not always welcome at these *pied-noir* pilgrimages and ecclesiastics even less so – conflict with the Church seems more marked. In Nîmes the bishop of the diocese attends but treads carefully. The concern of the pilgrims is the European past in Algeria and, more explicitly in Carnoux and Théoule, war and exile. Thus certain pilgrims tend to subsume, when they do not subordinate it, the specifically religious and devotional aspect into the commemorative side which is, for the most part, opposed by the clergy.

Claims to organizational control are based on the history of the founding of the venues, often built entirely with subscriptions and gifts from Europeans from Algeria in places seen as pristine and open to

appropriation. It is this notion of a space considered ‘virgin’ and thus without a history of its own that legitimizes the kind of reverse colonization that took place at Carnoux. Conducive to a ‘memorialization’ whose commemorative function embodies a form of social belonging, this brings meaning to the space in question and helps establish its existence for a group.⁴²

For many Europeans from Algeria this commemorative, heritage-inflected aspect is a driving force for their creation of these sites and their participation in the events that take place at them. The religious framework is seen as a means for rendering memory enduring within a specific institutional setting. Europeans from Algeria do not place their hopes – not to say their belief in protection or recognition of their history and its concrete traces – in state or political institutions, but in the Church. In Nîmes, ‘The only thing that will live on is Santa Cruz, because it’s part of the Church’;⁴³ while in Carnoux, ‘The pilgrimage exists to perpetuate a tradition, to ensure that it will be something that lives on. And live on it will.’⁴⁴

This religious devotion is overlaid with other kinds of expectations: commemoration, of course, but also the reunions made possible by the combination of a specific place, artifacts and the chance to get together. The pilgrimage is the occasion for these reunions between habitually separated relatives, friends and former neighbors, and for informal spreading of news about the members of a now dispersed group. In Carnoux and Nîmes at least, the initial circumstances and choice of locality have enabled a transposition, notably through street names and architecture, of distinctive geographical settings reminiscent of other spaces. The pilgrimages also allow individuals to talk about their present-day existences and their urge as a group to honor a shared space they were once bound to; to commemorate specific events and personages; and to defend values they hold in common.⁴⁵ Thus does a collective venture, with its expression and sharing of emotion and memories, put forward – especially in Nîmes – an irenic vision of life in colonial Algeria.

Rituals, commitment, and expression of emotion

Pilgrimage organizers tend to embed the event in religious practice rather than in any politically symbolic form, even if the political aspect is not totally absent and can be – especially in Théoule – overtly present. The upshot of this opting for an identity in exile whose roots in religion transcend divisions and differences, is often a relative depoliticization

which can be interpreted in several ways: as avoidance of a political stance perceived as critical; as adoption of a supposedly consensual, anti-political register; or as a bypassing of representative and official bodies.

However, it is this conversion of political themes – such as the Algerian War, Algerian independence, and the circumstances of their arrival in France – into commemorative and religious ones which, paradoxically, has enabled a collective preservation of a form of protest against the neglect of the history of French Algeria and the construction of a counter-history. The existence of these places and their embedding in the landscape are seen by their promoters – and their detractors – as likely to fuel debate about Franco-Algerian history. For some church and municipal authorities, and some local residents, these events are signs of a nostalgia for the colonial system, a conflictual form of memory, or a way of replaying the war. These critics thus pronounce unfavorable judgments on the venting of suffering the events involve, speculate as to the intensity of the pilgrims' faith, and censure the excesses. I have rarely heard this kind of criticism from Pieds-Noirs themselves, including those who do not take part in pilgrimages. The nostalgic element may indeed be present, but the Pieds-Noirs have nonetheless adopted these pilgrimages as a 'legitimate' outlet for expression of emotions and memories which in other places and circumstances would find no audience or would generally be considered highly inappropriate.

This commemorative and devotional space is a divided one, marked by a mix of issues and antagonisms – political, ideological, and social – having to do with group definition and self-assertion.⁴⁶ For the representatives of the Church I met in Nîmes, the model of Christ as the exemplar of forgiveness and mercy provides the interpretive framework for the pilgrims' motivation. Some of them, who have officiated and/or been born in Algeria, also stress the importance of understanding this approach as a religious and devotional linking of individuals to the present and the future in France, and of not dismissing it as a mere 'Day of Remembrance' entirely focused on the Algerian past.

The lay organizers of the Nîmes pilgrimage have a stated policy of freedom of expression. As they see it, any attempt to impose a set framework and direction, as in Théoule, results in a small turnout. Nevertheless, in the conduct of the pilgrimages factors like the time frames and venues, commemorative plaques, inscriptions on rock faces, funeral urns, and the Oran village and neighborhood signs in Nîmes, all contribute in their different ways to structuring the pilgrims' experience

and fostering identification with a common history. On pilgrimage day in Nîmes, against the backdrop of the objects, photos, and statues in the shrine's museum, visitors tell personally-revealing stories which often trigger outbursts of emotion in their listeners. These reactions seem to be rendered even more intense by the war memorial, the grotto with its ex-votos and concealed funeral urns, and the nearby walls on which the hand-inscribed names of pilgrims are sometimes accompanied by a date, place of birth, and adoptive home in France. In the early days candles were lit, too.

While these inscriptions do not give an exact idea of how many families were forced into an exile clearly associated here with a real or symbolic death, they nonetheless link pilgrims 'concretely' to a place. At the same time they engender a sense of proximity with the people and families whose names are there and with whom one can readily identify – especially in the case of a shared surname. This sense of proximity seems to reach its apogee on pilgrimage days, when the inscriptions – discussed and sometimes added to – suddenly spring to life. Thus the pilgrimages give rise to an experience in which emotion is a vital aspect of the commitment of believers and non-believers alike.

Even so, the release of emotions and memories which in other places or contexts might cause unease or hostility is often channeled here in socially recognized and accepted ways. Through the pilgrimage and devotion to the Virgin as a symbol of the past and of a social, local, regional, and even national space, individuals are able to turn their affective reactions and pent-up feelings into shared views of their history and even a common cause.

At the same time the many expectations associated with this recognition and the content of this history as perceived by those taking part in the pilgrimage remain hard to pin down. They may include motives ranging from a simple need for contact with relatives and friends, to more political stances involving idealization of French Algeria or the verbalizing of grudges against France. The event itself reveals such partially contradictory feelings among the participants as attachment to and disengagement from Algeria combined with a love/hate relationship with France. While focused on the Algerian past, all these events also foreground the ambiguity of the relationship with France as a homeland; Algeria is invoked rather as the motherland, a locus of shared roots and a common history inextricably tied to France.

Conclusion

In their bringing together of commemoration and heritage as a touchstone, these various symbolic and concrete forms of memory give rise to practices of spatial appropriation and performative expression of social bonds founded on ties with both past and present. These ties have to do not only with war and experiences of exile, but also with trajectories, lives lived, social relationships, and family trees with roots in Algeria – in short everything (and everybody) definitively left behind. They also reflect the variety of origins of the Pieds-Noirs, which remains an important element for understanding the differences in the process of manufacturing memories between the German and the French cases. The interest of this history, of personal references to it, and of elements with potential heritage significance, also lies in the people who embody it. Individually and collectively they are proof that the discrediting and condemnation of colonialism have not put an end to an intimately experienced relationship with Algeria's past, one which remains a motor or a leaven for social bonds. This does not mean, however, that those concerned are lamenting the passing of a once prized colonial political system.

Incorporation into a Catholic religious framework is significant at several levels over and above the purely devotional, faith-led expectations and motives whose importance should not be underestimated. The pilgrimages are also the source of collective emotional release, channeled through a religious medium, and of a relationship with their localities. The religious framework is also perceived as the only means of perpetuating memories in a non-state context, given that in both France and Algeria the concrete physical underpinning of the pilgrims' history no longer exists.

In Algeria, it should be remembered, the Catholic past, in parallel with an anti-clericalism tempered by the ideological and political imperatives of colonization,⁴⁷ was one of the formative elements in the national heritage discourse. It found expression in 'patrimonialization' and cultural activity centering on social and religious sites and contexts of particular significance to Europeans from Algeria, themselves often marked by an ambivalent mix of rejection and commonality where the country's other confessions were concerned. Their enduring commitment to this context, while it does not justify any assumption of uniform religious practice – or even of unquestioning loyalty to a shared faith – invites a fresh approach to the role of Catholicism in colonial Algeria in

terms of identity construction and negotiation, and to the way the shift is effected from religious habitus to cultural heritage. It also backs up other, already classical analyses of the ability of religious frameworks to 'reinvent an ethos of continuity from which a group draws new reasons for believing in its own capacity to endure'.⁴⁸ It proves, furthermore, that incorporation into a religious setting cannot be dismissed as pure exploitation of ritual for profane ends or a simple expression of religious devotion, both of these interpretations failing signally to embrace the totality of the collective experiences involved.

Comparative analysis of these pilgrimages, with their similarities – among them territorial embedding, recourse to ritual, organization, the devotional aspect, emphasis on reunion, shaping of a counter-history – and such divergences as the numbers they attract and their political and historical stances, stated either explicitly or as footnotes to the principal activity, is enlightening in this respect. It points up the gap existing in France between different forms of relationship with the past and with Algeria. For many French people the image of Algeria is often tied to the war, as the number of academic and literary publications on the subject indicates; the war is even, in some cases, taken as the overall interpretive filter for colonization and its ultimate outcome. However, it is at once in this Algeria and in another – the human social space of the generations who lived there – that the life of the Pieds-Noirs takes on its meaning. Their history in Algeria is not concentrated in the seven years of conflict to which their existence is so often, not to say systematically, consigned. When the topic of the war is raised, in particular during the pilgrimages, the reference is also to a set of events that put an end to this human social space – whatever one's moral judgments on the subject may be.

Although some find this Algerian past 'wrongful' or reprehensible, it remains an integral part of the *pied-noir* narrative identity, of those 'stories individuals tell themselves to give meaning to their lives and actions, and collective histories that are formed in a relational context'.⁴⁹ To take this into account is to integrate into our analysis the fact that the memory of colonial Algeria covers a field much broader than the one focused on in political and academic controversy. It involves 'memories, adjustments of historical relationships, more or less discounted narratives, and most of all ways of being attesting to the current state of social relations'.⁵⁰

Pilgrimages, rituals, and their shrines are frames of reference, islands on which a part of this shared memory of Algeria is concentrated. They represent recurring temporalities and contexts in which unity is reshaped out of dispersion and change is masked by maintenance of

continuity. They are part of this zone of exile which has seen the construction of a body of knowledge of a past now considered an unfit subject for reflection and evocation. This corpus references not only the major structural events of the history of France in Algeria, but also the historical biographies of all concerned. As memories recede and those who lived in Algeria become less numerous, these biographies continue to revivify their identity as both Europeans from Algeria and as exiles.⁵¹

Notes

1. Michèle Assante, 'Pied-Noir: une expression en quête d'origine', *Cahiers d'anthropologie et de biométrie humaine*, 3 (1987): 219–30.
2. Michèle Baussant, *Pieds-Noirs: mémoires d'exils* (Paris, 2002); Fanny Colonna, 'Algérie 1830–1962: quand l'exil efface jusqu'au nom de l'ancêtre', *Ethnologie Française*, 37 (2007): 501–7.
3. Andrea L. Smith, *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France* (Bloomington, 2006); Vincent Crapanzano, *Les Harkis: mémoires sans issue* (Paris, 2012), 21.
4. Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, 'Existe-t-il une vision pied-noir des rapports Franco-Algériens?', in Frédéric Abécassis, Gilles Boyer, Benoît Falaize, Gilbert Meynier, and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, eds, *La France et l'Algérie: leçons d'histoire* (Lyon, 2007), 171–85; Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954–2005)* (Paris, 2010).
5. Clarisse Buono, *Pieds-Noirs de père en fils* (Paris, 2004).
6. See, for another case, Christine Chivallon, *L'esclavage, du souvenir à la mémoire: contribution à une anthropologie de la Caraïbe* (Paris, 2012), 72.
7. This contribution is the outcome of a number of long-term field surveys carried out between 1996 and 2006. It is based on observation and ethnographic information-gathering in locations that are home to Algeria-related places of worship in France, among them Nîmes, Nice, La Seyne-sur-Mer, Antibes, Roquefort-la-Bédoule, Poitiers, Carnoux-en-Provence, Théoule-sur-Mer, and La Ciotat. It also includes the results of over a hundred interviews with Europeans from Algeria, some participating in the pilgrimages, others not; consultation of community association, *département*, and state archives; and books of academic or literary interest.
8. Joelle Hureau, *La mémoire des Pieds-Noirs de 1830 à nos jours* (Paris, 1987); Chantal Cazottes-Cuillé, *La religion des Pieds-Noirs de 1930 à 1962* (PhD dissertation, University of Montpellier, 1989); Baussant, *Pieds-Noirs*.
9. Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'Les Pieds-Noirs: constructions identitaires et réinvention des origines', *Hommes et migrations*, 1236 (2002): 14–25.
10. André Lanly, *Le Français d'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1970).
11. Lucienne Martini, *Racines de papier: essai sur l'expression littéraire de l'identité pieds-noirs* (Aix-en-Provence, 1997).
12. For a similar phenomenon in the case of the German expellees, see various examples in Tobias Weger's chapter in this volume.
13. See, in particular, <http://www.genealogie-gamt.org> (accessed 30 April 2014).

14. Smith, *Colonial Memory*; Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*.
15. See Claire Eldridge's and Jan C. Jansen's chapters in this volume.
16. See especially, Valérie Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours* (Paris, 2007).
17. Alain Amato, *Monuments en exil* (Versailles, 1979).
18. Laurent Gayer, 'Oublier la politique? L'entreprise victimaire du mouvement pour le Kalistan', in Sandrine Lefranc and Lilian Mathieu, eds, *Mobilisations de victimes* (Rennes, 2010), 191–204, here 192. On the expellees' *Heimatpolitik*, see Pertti Ahonen's and Tobias Weger's contributions in this volume.
19. A building contractor born in Algeria in 1944 and living in the Var *département* in Southern France.
20. A senior manager, born in the Constantine *département* in 1942 and living in the Bouches-du-Rhône *département*. Interviewed in 1997, in the Bouches-du-Rhône *département*.
21. Founded in Marseille in 1965.
22. See <http://www.pied-noir.eu/index.php/navigation/ja-moo-menu> (accessed 20 January 2011).
23. In 2011 the property was fenced off, with a security guard posted at the entrance.
24. Esclangon-Morin, *Les rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord*, 359.
25. Claude Courchay, 'Les enracinés de Carnoux', *Le Monde*, 3 August 1980. Carnoux was bought by Europeans from Morocco in 1957 and the Pieds-Noirs from Algeria arrived later.
26. A male civil servant born in 1927 in Boghar, Algeria, and living in the Bouches-du-Rhône *département*.
27. Notable among these places are the shrines whose pilgrimages have been transplanted to France: Notre Dame de Stora (Stora); Saint Augustine (Annaba); Saint Michael (Mers-el-Kebir); Dame de Santa Cruz (Oran); and Notre Dame d'Afrique (Algiers).
28. Anselm L. Strauss, *Miroirs et masques: une introduction à l'interactionnisme* (Paris, 1992).
29. The basilica was initially a temporary chapel. Notre Dame d'Afrique was given basilica status by the Vatican on 30 April 1876.
30. It was not repeated until 1984.
31. The deputy mayor in charge of cultural affairs, who is also one of the town's founders.
32. A 'Commemoration Ceremony' is also held on 1 November.
33. Speech held in 1997, between the procession in honor of Notre Dame d'Afrique and the Mass.
34. This is, at least, the clearly stated principle and intention of the organizers.
35. Baussant, *Pieds-Noirs*.
36. As in Algiers, the image of the Blessed Virgin is often considered the enduring symbol of Christianity in Algeria and the ties with France. See Baussant, *Pieds-Noirs*.
37. According to the leaders of the association and the media.
38. The feast of the Ascension apart, every year the shrine is visited by some 10,000 one-day pilgrims from all over France.
39. Some of whom lived in the Oran region.

40. This reflects the predominantly Spanish origins of the European population of the Oran region. This was not the case elsewhere in Algeria. See Jean-Jacques Jordi, *Espagnol en Oranie: histoire d'une migration 1830-1914* (Calvisson, 1996).
41. Some, for instance, date from the Roman Christian era in Algeria.
42. Denis Peschanski, ed., *Mémoire et mémorialisation: nouveaux chantiers, nouveaux objets*, vol. 1/1, *De l'absence à la représentation* (Paris, 2013).
43. Man born in Oran in 1925, now a retired civil servant living in Nîmes.
44. Man born in Boghar.
45. Michel Rautenberg, *La rupture patrimoniale* (Grenoble, 2003).
46. Stéphane Latté, 'Vous ne respectez pas les morts d'AZF: ordonner l'émotion dans les situations commémoratives', in Lefranc and Mathieu, *Mobilisations de victimes*, 205-20.
47. The concept of 'laïcité', i.e. the separation of state and religious affairs, was only partially applied or adjusted to the context of Algeria, being both an expression and a factor of the significance of Catholicism for European social, cultural, and political life in French Algeria.
48. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *La religion pour mémoire* (Paris, 1993), 235-6.
49. Florence Haegel and Marie-Claire Lavabre, *Destins ordinaires: mémoire partagée et identité singulière* (Paris, 2010).
50. Chivallon, *L'esclavage*, 20.
51. The author gratefully acknowledges John Tittensor for his work in translating this chapter from the French.

Part VI

Politics of Remembrance

12

Towards a European Memory of Forced Migration? Processes of Institutionalization and Musealization in Germany and Poland

Stefan Troebst

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Polish-(West)German relations were severely strained by two issues: first, the contested Oder–Neisse border established in 1945 and confirmed by the GDR in 1950, and second, the expulsion of several millions of Germans from what again in 1945 had become the western parts of Poland. The *Ostpolitik* by West German chancellor Willy Brandt from 1969 to 1974 towards communist Poland, the USSR and the GDR, as well as two bilateral treaties between reunited Germany and now democratic Poland (on the Oder–Neisse border in 1990 and on good neighborhood and friendly cooperation in 1991) fundamentally improved relations between Warsaw and Bonn.

The 1990s thus can be considered a honeymoon of reconciliation through a fair and open dialogue between German and Polish politicians, intellectuals, journalists, writers, church representatives and, in particular, historians on painful periods in the long common history: the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, in which Prussia actively participated; repressive politics by Prussia and Germany towards its Poles in the 19th century; the German invasion of Poland in 1939 followed by the terror of occupation until 1944 which included mass killings, ethnic cleansing, deportation, forced labor, imprisonment and the Holocaust; ‘wild’ expulsions of Germans by Polish militia, military and civilians from the ‘regained territories’ in 1945; the internment of Germans in Polish camps – with high death rates; and mass deportations of Germans by Polish and Soviet authorities to the British Zone of

Occupation in Germany from 1945 to 1948. By the end of the 1990s, it seemed as if reunited Germans and Poles freed from communism had found common ground in interpreting their closely and tragically interwoven national histories.

In 2000, however, things changed rapidly for the worse: the project of a 'Center Against Expulsions' proposed by the German Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV)) in order to commemorate the fate of some 12 million Germans who fled or were expelled from east central Europe in and after 1945 caused a fierce Polish–German media controversy which spilled over into the two societies and the political realm. On the national, bilateral and European level this had a four-fold result: first, the governments in Warsaw and Berlin, together with those in Bratislava and Budapest, agreed in 2004 to found a 'European Network of Remembrance and Solidarity' to deal with the tragic history of Europe in the twentieth century in a manner that fostered some consensus; second, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe proposed to set up a 'European Remembrance Center of Victims of Forced Population Movements and Ethnic Cleansing' in 2005; third, in 2007, the Polish government decided to found a 'Museum of World War II' in Gdańsk (the former Danzig) with the aim of placing the Polish view of recent history into a European context; and fourth, in 2008 the German government launched a 'Federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation' in Berlin which was given the task of designing a permanent exhibition on the fate of the expelled Germans, again in the context of the history of twentieth-century Europe.¹

Despite more often than not that the national memories of Germans, Poles, and other Europeans clash over World War II and its consequences, the very fact that in central Europe bilateral and even multilateral discourses on these sensitive topics are feasible is a remarkable post-1989 improvement, and differs considerably from the lack of international consensus in the Franco-Algerian case. However, the first constructive East–West debates had taken place already among Polish and (West) German historians during the Cold War. While the Prague Spring of 1968 had interrupted for two decades the activity of a German–Czechoslovak committee on history textbooks established the year before, a German–Polish committee on textbooks founded in 1972 developed more promisingly. Again in the late phase of the East–West conflict, civil society actors such as human rights activists, dissidents and clergymen in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland discussed sensitive issues of bilateral relations not only among themselves and with

their West German partners, but also with spokespersons of the citizens' movement in the GDR.

The intense and temporarily heated transnational debate on forced migration which central European actors initiated during the first five years of the twenty-first century did not grow into a Europe-wide debate for three reasons: first, for most Northern, Western and Southern European societies, forced migration was not an issue; second, Poles and Czechs, and to a much lesser degree also Slovaks and Hungarians, tried to limit the debate on this topic to relations with (now reunited) Germans; and third, the eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004 triggered fierce discussions in the European Parliament on two rather different topics: should the memory of communist mass crimes be part of a pan-European culture of remembrance? And should the memory of the Holocaust become part of the politics of history and culture of remembrance of the eight new EU member states in east central Europe? Despite this, however, the transnational debate by central Europeans on forced migration resulted not, as one could have expected, in institutions narrowly focused on a regional basis, but amongst those with a considerable impact at the Europe-wide level. This holds true, in particular, for new history museums in Poland and Germany, as will be demonstrated.

That the delicate topic of forced migrations at all proved suitable to provide common ground for transnational dialogue and even reconciliation among 'expellee societies' and 'expeller societies' was due to a profound change in the moral evaluation of state-driven expulsion of 'unwanted' ethnic groups during the late twentieth century. Whereas up to the end of the Cold War 'population exchange' was considered a deplorable, yet somehow legitimate mode of operation of nation-states, the collapse of state-socialism and the wars in a disintegrating Yugoslavia of the 1990s – here in particular due to the media coverage of ethnic cleansing by expulsion as well as by genocide – changed public opinion in most of Europe. And in the specific Polish–German case, the fact that after 1989 the deportation of Poles to Siberia during the Soviet occupation of 1939–41 and the expulsion of Poles from now Soviet Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Lithuania to the People's Republic of Poland (itself shifted westward post World War II), became a topic of public debate, and made things easier regarding Germany – Poles were not only expellers, but themselves to a large degree victims of expulsions.

The Polish–German case is unique in at least two regards: first, in comparable cases of mass forced migration involving neighboring states

like Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan, or Turkey and Armenia, transnational dialogue even among historians is still in its early stages – if it has started at all. Also, public debates there are thoroughly dominated by ethnocentric and nationalist patterns of interpretation. And secondly, no institutionalization has taken place, either in the form of bi- or multilateral initiatives to overcome a conflictual past, or in the form of museums applying the principle of multiperspectivity.

However, the global change of paradigm concerning state-driven forced migration during the twentieth century – from acceptance to criminalization – as well as a trend towards a European memory, promoted top-down by pan-European actors like the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the European Union and by some national governments, but also bottom-up by civic society and transnational NGOs, have produced early results. They are most visible in Polish, German and Czech plans for new museums dealing exclusively, predominantly, or partly with twentieth-century flight, expulsion, ethnic cleansing and other forms of forced migration. And a European-wide litmus test will be the ‘House of European History’ founded by the European Parliament, due to be opened in Brussels in 2016.

In the following, I will cover the post-Cold War global change of paradigm concerning forced population exchange followed by an overview of national, mesoregional, and European initiatives to include the memory on forced migration in cultures of remembrance, this predominantly via new institutions including museums. And finally, I will examine three Europeanizing effects in the European-wide debate on the place of forced migration in cultures of remembrance – in the inner-German discourse, in the Polish–German dialogue, and on the ‘European level’ where the Polish–German case serves as a role model.

A new global paradigm: the outlawing of ethnic cleansing

In their 2011 book *No Return, No Refuge: Rites and Rights in Minority Repatriation*, Howard Adelman and Elazar Barkan propose a new periodization of the twentieth century based on legal and public definitions and perceptions of forced migration: 1900–45 when ‘the right to expel’ was considered an international norm; 1945–92 when under Cold War conditions ethnic cleansing was outlawed; and 1992 to the present, when reversing ethnic cleansing was declared a duty of the international community.² In doing so, Adelman and Barkan underline a striking shift of paradigm in the moral evaluation of ethno-politically motivated and state-induced forced migration. What up to 1945 was euphemistically

labeled 'population transfer' and was perceived as a legal means with which to homogenize a nation-state ethnically, was condemned now as a crime against humanity, even as genocide.³

'The strange triumph of human rights' identified by Mark Mazower⁴ had, however, no immediate impact on the new political realities in postwar Europe. In 1945 and the years to follow, Germans were expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia; Poles from the Soviet Union; and Macedonians from Greece. Ukrainians were resettled by force within Poland; Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were deported to Siberia, and so on. The foundation of India, Pakistan and Israel as independent states in 1948 had similar and numerically even larger consequences. In 1974, Cyprus was divided along ethnic lines under the eyes of the United Nations. In the following year, the postwar ethnic separation of the inhabitants of Trieste and its hinterland was legalized by the Italian–Yugoslav Treaty of Osimo. And as late as 1989, the communist regime of Bulgaria succeeded in driving more than 300,000 Turkish-speaking citizens out of the country without facing major international protest.⁵

According to Adelman and Barkan, however, the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s represented a turning point. Not only was ethnic cleansing condemned, but it was declared a duty of the international community to reverse it (see the Dayton Accord of 1995 on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Rambouillet Agreement of 1999 on Kosovo).⁶ The paradigm shift was complete. Its most visible result was the concept of a Responsibility to Protect, which legalizes under strict conditions humanitarian intervention, even in its military form,⁷ a new doctrine in international public law that experienced a breathtaking ascent within the span of a mere decade, as marked, for instance, by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) on a no-fly zone over Libya, which was based on this principle.

A bone of contention: the expellees' proposal of a 'Center Against Expulsions'

The prompt reversal by military means of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 had a profound impact on reunited Germany. In party politics, the social-democratic/green coalition government of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer now faced at least two dilemmas. They had to explain to their own supporters Germany's active participation in NATO's air raid campaign against Slobodan Milošević's rump-Yugoslavia and they had to come up with an explanation as to why in their view the expulsion

of more than 900,000 Kosovar Albanians in 1999 was not comparable to the expulsion of some 12 million Germans from east central Europe in the second half of the 1940s.

This was the hour of the Christian-democratic backbencher and newly elected president of the German Federation of Expellees, Erika Steinbach. Together with her social-democratic ally Peter Glotz she set up a foundation called 'Center Against Expulsions' (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen) and demanded the support – including financial contributions – of the federal government and parliament. Steinbach proposed to found the center in the form of a museum in Berlin, 'in the historical and geographical vicinity' of the 'Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe' then still under construction.⁸

What was intended as a provocation of the Schröder-Fischer government and as a purposeful violation of the rules of German political correctness had a twofold effect. On the national level, it triggered a public debate on Germans not solely as perpetrators but now also as victims. On the bilateral level it started a bitter controversy with Polish politicians and media representatives, and also was met with harsh criticism in the Czech Republic, where the new German victims' perspective was interpreted as means of relativizing German war crimes. This is not the place to discuss these national and bilateral polemics and the fears and suspicions that lay behind them, a task that has been undertaken with diligent thoroughness in recent years.⁹ Instead I will examine the institutional consequences of inner-German and Polish–German discussions and their spillover effects on actors on the European level.

Initiatives of the German state: from the 'visible sign' in Berlin to the federal German Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation

In Germany, the institutionalization process initiated by the private foundation 'Center Against Expulsions' in 2000 resulted in 2008 in the creation of a state-funded institution under the federal roof – Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation (Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung). The first step in this direction was a resolution by the federal parliament of July 2002 entitled 'For a European-Oriented Center against Expulsions'.¹⁰ By trying to hijack the Steinbach–Glotz initiative, and at the same time by 'Europeanizing' it, the red-green government attempted to defuse what was perceived as a bombshell planted by the expellees' organization beneath the foundations of reunited Germany's relations with its eastern neighbors. Steinbach's and the

BdV's activities were considered particularly detrimental to Berlin's relations with Warsaw, since in 2000 leading German expellee representatives had founded the 'Prussian Claims Society, Inc.' (*Preussische Treuhand*), modeled on the Jewish Claims Conference. It aimed at restitution of and compensation for property lost by German expellees in what was now Poland.¹¹

Notwithstanding German governmental and parliamentary countermeasures, the appearance of the 'Center Against Expulsions' and the 'Prussian Claims Society, Inc.' on the political scene and their material demands caused a massive wave of public outrage in Poland in 2003. Polish–German media polemics now reached a level which led the two presidents of state, the post-communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski in Poland and the social democrat Johannes Rau in Germany, to take common action. In October 2003 they released in Gdańsk a joint declaration calling for 'a sincere European dialogue' on 'all cases of resettlement, flight and expulsion'. The declaration emphasized the importance of the 'spirit of reconciliation and friendship' and enjoined participants to avoid 'claims on compensation, mutual accusations and presenting the other side with balance sheets of crimes and losses'.¹²

The result of their initiative was the German–Polish foundation of a Central European-wide cooperation network dealing with the delicate topic of expulsions and ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe, as the *Bundestag* had demanded in 2002. This network was negotiated in 2004, and in the following year its form was fixed in a quadrilateral agreement by the ministers of culture of Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia.¹³ The rationale of Berlin and Warsaw was that this network would provide a counterweight to the negative effects of the national – and nationalist – 'Center Against Expulsions'.

However, federal elections in Germany in 2005 led to a replacement of the red-green government by a coalition of Christian democrats and social democrats under the conservative Angela Merkel. Similarly in Poland in 2004, the ruling party of socialists and peasants had been replaced by a national conservative government under Jarosław Kaczyński as a result of the elections to the Sejm. Both developments changed things considerably. The network project now was politically downgraded in both Berlin and Warsaw. Under Merkel's coalition agreement the foundation of another institution, alongside the network, was mentioned: 'A visible sign in Berlin in order to remember the wrongs of expulsions and to outlaw expulsion forever.'¹⁴

In combination with the coming to power of the government of the Kaczyński brothers' Law and Justice Party, this new German initiative

led to a standstill in Polish–German relations. The result was that both projects, the European network and the cryptic ‘visible sign’, stagnated. Yet even with the new liberal Tusk government in place in Poland in 2007, little progress was made. While Warsaw reluctantly agreed to a revitalization of the European network, it refused to participate in any way in the ‘visible sign’.¹⁵ Thus, Christian as well as social democrats in Berlin decided to pursue it as a national project of Germany, without the participation of neighboring states. In March 2008, the coalition partners agreed to turn ‘the visible sign against flight and expulsion’ into a federal foundation attached to the ‘German Historical Museum’ (Deutsches Historisches Museum) in the capital of united Germany.¹⁶ The new institution was tasked to set up a permanent exhibition in the *Deutschlandhaus* building in downtown Berlin, as well as a documentation and information center. By a special law on 30 December 2008 the Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation was inaugurated.¹⁷

In late 2009, still during the foundation’s build-up phase, a massive conflict broke out between the Federation of Expellees on one side and the new Christian–liberal government on the other. The apple of discord was the personal participation of Steinbach on the new foundation’s board of trustees. This resulted in June 2010 in an amendment of the law on the foundation, and it was only in 2011 that the process of founding the new institution, at least in legal and organizational terms, was completed, without Steinbach on the board of trustees.¹⁸

According to this law, the purpose of the Federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, and Reconciliation is ‘to preserve the memory of flight and expulsion in the twentieth century in the spirit of reconciliation’. Its focus is on ‘flight and expulsion in the historical context of World War II and the National Socialists’ policies of expansion and extermination and their consequences’. Thereby, ‘flight and expulsions of the Germans shall be presented within the general context of forced migration in twentieth-century Europe’.¹⁹ The following modes of operation are listed: a permanent exhibition; temporary exhibitions; documentation, in particular personal records and oral history sources; popularization of research; and cooperation with national and international institutions.²⁰

Up to 2011, the foundation had been riddled by political and structural problems which resurfaced in 2014. The decision-making body is the 21-member Board of Trustees, which draws on the expertise of a 15-member Advisory Council; while alongside these, 36 mandate holders, a director, and an academic staff consisting of only two people (plus librarians, curators, archivists and administrators) is in place. Also, the

reconstruction of the *Deutschlandhaus* building began only in 2014, as did the systematic acquisition of objects for the exhibition. And finally, the all-German Board of Trustees with its six seats for representatives of the Federation of Expellees on the one hand, and the international Advisory Council with members from Poland, the US, Hungary and Switzerland on the other, hold occasionally divergent views on how the wording of the law on the foundation should be interpreted and turned into practice. This is particularly apparent in the areas regarding the causal link between Nazi aggression and the expulsion of Germans, as well as for the percentages of a German versus European dimension in the planned permanent exhibition.

On the other hand, the new foundation has a budget of some four million euros annually (plus some 30 million euros for reconstruction works), from 2018 on it will possess an attractive high-tech museum building in the very center of Berlin, and it is entitled to organize international conferences, grant fellowships, build up a specialized library, publish books, and so on. Thus it has the potential one day to become a renowned center of research and scholarly exchange on forced migration processes of European and perhaps even global significance.

However, when in June 2015 the strong BdV representation on the Board of Trustees pushed through its own candidate for the post of the foundation's director, several German members and the Polish and Hungarian representatives of the Advisory Council (including the author of this chapter) immediately resigned.²¹ Thereby, a twofold structural problem became obvious. On the one hand, the Board of Trustees and the Advisory Council favor diametrically opposed approaches, and on the other, most of the non-BdV members on the Board of Trustees do not question the leadership opinions of their BdV colleagues regarding the future direction of the foundation. The BdV ideal is a memorial by expellees for expellees, not an internationally recognized research center on forced migration with a European perspective.²²

A failed Polish initiative: the project for a center for remembrance of forced migration in Europe

In September 2003, at the peak of open German–Polish polemics over the BdV's 'Center Against Expulsions' and shortly before the Gdańsk Declaration by presidents Kwaśniewski and Rau, the oppositional liberal Sejm deputy Bogdan Klich succeeded in winning over central European and British members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the

Council of Europe to file a motion for a recommendation on the establishment of a Center for European Nations' Remembrance under the council's auspices.²³ This motion was explicitly formulated as an alternative to the Steinbach–Glotz project, with its focus on German expellees. It opted instead for 'a wide-reaching, multinational character' aiming 'at commemorating the tragic experience of Europeans in the twentieth century'.²⁴ In November 2003, a majority of deputies of the Polish Sejm supported Klich's initiative,²⁵ and in July 2004 the Council of Europe's Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population began to deal with the Polish proposal.

However, in December 2004, when the committee's rapporteur on the issue, the Swedish left-socialist Mats Einarsson, presented his report, it came as an unpleasant surprise for the Polish side. Not only did Einarsson shift the focus to 'deportation, expulsion, transfer and forced resettlement', he even changed the name of the proposed institution to 'European Remembrance Center of Victims of Forced Population Movements and Ethnic Cleansing'.²⁶ Moreover, when in January 2005 the Parliamentary Assembly debated the recommendation, supporters could not achieve the two-thirds majority necessary to task the Committee of Ministers with the founding of the proposed center.

The reasons for this failure were not so much Polish-Swedish differences concerning profile and name, as they were further divisions amongst the parliamentarians in Strasbourg. The French and the Russian delegations in the Parliamentary Assembly teamed up against the word 'deportation' in the proposal. While from the French perspective, this term should be used exclusively for victims of the Shoah, the Russian deputies were strictly against any critical reassessment of mass deportations of Soviet citizens ordered by Stalin.²⁷ That was the end of the Polish initiative in its modified Swedish form. Attempts to revitalize it in 2005 and 2006 failed.

The quadrilateral European Network Remembrance and Solidarity

In late 2003, parallel to the Klich foray in the Council of Europe, the red-green government in Berlin and the socialist-peasant one in Warsaw agreed in principle on a bilateral initiative to counter the negative effects of the Steinbach–Glotz project on Polish–German relations. The new German Minister of Culture Christina Weiss and her Polish counterpart Waldemar Dąbrowski took the lead and came up with a design called 'Visegrád + 2'. Visegrád stood, of course, for the four states of the Visegrád Group – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary,

and '+ 2' meant Germany and Austria. The six agreed on a German proposal to discuss the establishment of what according to the German side was to be called the European Network on Forced Migration and Expulsions.

Yet even in the first round of negotiations in April 2004 in Warsaw two major problems arose. First, the Czech side openly tried to sabotage the project, and Austria retreated to the position of a mere observer. And second, the Polish side refused categorically to accept any reference to forced migration, ethnic cleansing, expulsion, and so on in the name of the institution about to be founded. It instead insisted that *all* tragic events of the twentieth century affecting Europeans should be dealt with, including the Second Boer War of 1899–1902 in British South Africa, and that the two totalitarianisms of Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union should be the focus.²⁸ In February 2005, finally, the four ministers of culture still participating in the process, that is the German, Polish, Slovak and Hungarian representatives, signed a letter of intent to found what now was to be called the 'European Network Remembrance and Solidarity',²⁹ and in the summer of the same year the legal foundations were laid. However, that was it since, as mentioned above, the election results and ensuing political changes in Berlin and Warsaw put the network project on ice for years. Only in 2011 did the quadrilateral project revive, with working bodies, a head office in Warsaw, a staff, conferences, publications, and so on.

Today, forced migration is one among many topics with which the network is preoccupied. According to its mission statement, the network deals with the

history of the twentieth century and popularization of historical knowledge in trans-national, European context. [It] wants to contribute to [the] creation of [a] community of memory which will take into consideration [the] different experiences of nations and countries of Europe. This kind of community of memory can be established only when all its members will accept the principle of solidarity as [a] basic and common rule for thinking and acting. Application of this principle means [acquainting] oneself with experiences of the others and [respecting] those who see and feel the past differently.³⁰

In 2014, Romania joined the network, and in 2015 Albania indicated that it was thinking about joining. However, no Northern, Western or Southern European minister of culture so far has done the same.

Two sidetracks: initiatives from Prague and Brussels

As mentioned, the Czech Republic stayed out of all of the projects described above, and even tried to thwart their realization. The expulsion of the Germans from the Sudeten regions, in Czech *odsun* (meaning literally, and euphemistically, 'removal'), so far has been considered by all post-1989 governments in Prague as too sensitive a subject to deal with on bilateral, sub-regional or European levels. Accordingly, the topic is only addressed in local contexts. For instance, the Municipal Museum of Ústí nad Labem in Northern Bohemia plans to open a permanent exhibition on the history and culture of the Germans in the Czech lands that will also cover their expulsion,³¹ including the brutal killing of several dozens, if not hundreds of Germans in Ústí (formerly Aussig), on 31 July 1945.

In order to counterbalance German and other initiatives focused of forced migration, the Czech Republic promoted another sensitive topic of European twentieth-century history. Accordingly, a new 'Platform of European Memory and Conscience' set up in 2011 in Prague with support from the Visegrád Four does not mention forced migration or ethnic cleansing in its program.³² It concentrates exclusively on what are called 'totalitarian crimes' committed by 'Nazism, Stalinism, fascist and communist regimes' and thus resembles the Klich initiative in the Council of Europe of 2003. The platform by now has broadened its membership and is active particularly in Brussels. Due to its single-topic focus on establishing an International Court on Communist Crimes its achievements are so far modest.

Another initiative is the project of the European Parliament to build a 'House of European History' in Brussels to be opened in 2016. The programmatic outline for this museum, which was written in 2008 by a group of historians and museum experts from all over Europe, states: 'The end [of World War II] triggered mass migrations on the European continent. With 12 to 14 million refugees and displaced persons – primarily from areas in what had been eastern Germany – Germany provided the largest group.'³³ However, in referring only in general terms to 'the chaos of expulsions and actions of retribution' the revised concept of the exhibition of 2013 is much less explicit,³⁴ and the founding director, the Slovene expert on museums Taja Vovk van Gal, has made only cryptic statements, such as the following: '[The House of European History] is not about exhibiting a European mosaic of countries, but about displaying a reflexive European history, also including dark chapters such as colonialism and armed conflicts'.³⁵ It will be interesting to see at

the museum's opening whether the 'dark chapter' of forced migration will also be included.

Conclusions: the great convergence?

The EU's eastern enlargement of 2004 by ten new member states, among them eight from east central Europe, had one immediate effect which came as a considerable surprise to the members of the European Parliament of the 15 West European states – now 'history' and 'memory' became heatedly discussed topics in the parliament. Within a short time, long and occasionally loud debates on the legacy of Stalinism; on the comparability of Gulag and Holocaust; or how to deal with the memory of the Franco dictatorship in Spain took place, and resolutions on a broad variety of historical issues such as the genocide of Serbs against Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995; the Holocaust; the Holodomor (the hunger catastrophe in Soviet Ukraine in 1932–3); and on 'European Conscience and Totalitarianism' were adopted.³⁶ The latter resolution tried to bridge the gap between the 'new' members of parliament and the 'old' ones – with German MEPs as go-betweens.

While French, British, and other Western European MEPs insisted that the Holocaust should be the focal point of European memory, Polish, Estonian, Hungarian and other new MEPs demanded that the memory of Soviet oppression and communist mass crimes should be attributed the same weight. Ultimately, the rejection of totalitarianism in whichever form, be it Stalinist, Communist, Nazi or Fascist, turned out to be the smallest common denominator. In 2008, this compromise was cast into the proclamation of 23 August – the day when in 1939 the Hitler–Stalin-formulated Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact plus a Secret Protocol on dividing up east central Europe was signed in Moscow – as a new European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism.³⁷

The effect was two-fold: on the one hand, the parliamentary debates of the years 2004 to 2009 resulted in a state of exhaustion, if not of weariness of 'history' for the parliamentarians, and on the other is the new day of remembrance, commemorated, however, by only a few EU member states. East central European countries mark the occasion, as do Sweden and Ireland, but not France, Italy, Spain, or Great Britain. Significantly, neither do Germany or Austria (two successor states of one of the signatories of the 1939 pact). In short, it seems that top-down politico-historical EU initiatives relating to a European-wide culture of remembrance are (a) tedious and (b) produce mixed results.

The same holds true obviously at the mesoregional and bilateral level as the various attempts to institutionalize the memory of forced

migration demonstrate. Here also, too many divergent, even conflicting national narratives and perspectives on one and the same forced migration process, not to mention the urge to forget other, similar processes, seem to prevail. Still, next to the effect of the global paradigm change concerning forced migration from a generally accepted state practice to an internationally sanctioned crime against humanity, three 'Europeanizing' phenomena in the protracted and intertwined debates and attempts at institutionalization outlined above should not be underestimated. All these aspects clearly distinguish the German–Polish setting from the French and Algerian debates about the shared colonial past, decolonization, and the 'repatriation' of the European population.³⁸ They help, at least partly, to explain the minimal degree of transnationalization and institutional outcome of these debates in the Franco-Algerian, or even circum-Mediterranean, context.

First, the inner-German discourse on how a national institution devoted to the memory of the victims of expulsion led within a few years to the adoption of a European perspective, even on the side of organizations representing expellees. This may initially have been a tactical move, but by now it would be impossible to retreat behind this line. An important turning point in this development was the exhibition 'Forced Paths: Flight and Expulsion in Twentieth-Century Europe' (*Erzwungene Wege: Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*) by Steinbach's 'Center Against Expulsions' in Berlin in 2006.³⁹ Here the expulsion of Germans from east central Europe was put into the context of nation-state-driven ethnic purification in Europe from World War I to NATO's intervention in Serbia on behalf of the Albanians of Kosovo.

Second, the debate on the expulsion of the Germans from Europe's eastern half has initiated something of a discursive chain reaction, at least in Germany and Poland. The Polish *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* argument, according to which the expulsion was the consequence of the German attack of 1939 and five years of occupation, terror, mass killings, forced resettlement and enslavement, led in Germany to broader knowledge of German crimes in World War II and put Poland on the map of German culture of remembrance. Now next to Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Majdanek (as focal points of the Holocaust) and the massacres of Lidice, Oradour, Distomo, and Marzabotto, the murder of millions of Poles in annexed and occupied Poland has also become part of collective memory.

In parallel, the perception in Poland that rabid and lethal anti-Semitism was something exclusively German waned in light of

publications on the pogroms led by Poles against Jews in Jedwabne in 1941, and Kielce in 1946. One example of this is the Polish historical atlas *Resettlements, Expulsions and Flight Movements 1939–59. Poles, Jews, Germans, Ukrainians. Atlas of the Polish Lands*, published in Warsaw in 2008.⁴⁰ The decision to set the fate of occupied Poles, murdered Jews, expelled Germans, and forcibly resettled Ukrainians in one and the same historical context constituted a minor sensation in Poland, and accordingly the atlas sold extremely well. Yet even more surprising was the positive reaction by German readers, among them many expellees and even their representatives, when a German translation of the Polish atlas was published by a Catholic German publishing house in 2009.⁴¹ Obviously, Germans and Poles by now have realized that their recent histories are not only closely interconnected, but that there are, in the words of a Polish journalist, ‘baffling parallels, despite all differences, between both countries’.⁴²

Third, notwithstanding ethnocentrism and nationalism in Polish–German debates, and occasionally even jingoism, ethnic slander and hate-speech on either side, the mere fact that two national societies in central Europe engaged in an intense public transnational discussion of one of the most sensitive and painful topics of their recent history is remarkable in itself.⁴³ This hardly has Anglo-Irish, Greco-Macedonian, or Russo-Latvian parallels, and probably not even a Franco-German one. At the same time, this exceptional central European debate is followed with interest in a number of other European societies, which also have endured experiences of forced migration, including Finland, Italy, or Bosnia and Hercegovina, for example.

The institutionalization of the memory of forced migrations is still in progress, and the German Federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation in Berlin, as well as the quadrilateral European Network Remembrance and Solidarity in Warsaw, no doubt have their organizational flaws and structural weaknesses. At the same time, both new institutions like the Museum of World War II in Gdańsk have at least in principle a decidedly ‘European’ design, deal occasionally boldly with the historic burden of long-standing conflict, and have solid budgets. This in and of itself represents a remarkable achievement in a Europe which, in the process of eastern enlargement, has discovered the need for a common memory as an important element of its identity policy. Also, the current focus on forced migration has the potential to stimulate productive competition with other conflictual realms of memory, such as genocide or colonialism, but also positive ones, for instance human rights, multiculturalism, or the process of European integration.

Notes

1. For a striking parallel of a victims' project turned into a governmental and academic one see the case of the 'Museum for the History of France and Algeria', described in Jan C. Jansen's chapter in this volume.
2. Howard Adelman and Elazar Barkan, *No Return, No Refuge: Rites and Rights in Minority Repatriation* (New York, 2011), vii.
3. Stefan Troebst, 'Vom Bevölkerungstransfer zum Vertreibungsverbot – eine europäische Erfolgsgeschichte?', *Transit: Europäische Revue*, 36 (2008): 158–82.
4. Mark Mazower, 'The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950', *The Historical Journal*, 47 (2004): 379–98. Cf. also Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 2011).
5. For balanced overviews cf. Michael Schwartz, *Ethnische 'Säuberungen' in der Moderne: Globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2013); Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe* (Oxford, 2014); and Piotr Madajczyk, *Czystki etniczne i klasowe w Europie XX wieku: Szkice do problemu [Ethnic and Class-based Cleansings in Twentieth Century Europe: Problem Outlines]* (Warsaw, 2010). See also Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhaussen, and Stefan Troebst, in cooperation with Kristina Kaiserová and Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, eds, *Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 2010).
6. Adelman and Barkan, *No Return, No Refuge*, 74–96. Cf. also Troebst, 'Vom Bevölkerungstransfer zum Vertreibungsverbot'; Holm Sundhaussen, 'Von "Lausanne" nach "Dayton": Ein Paradigmenwechsel bei der Lösung ethnonationaler Konflikte', in Rüdiger Hohls, Iris Schröder, and Hannes Siegrist, eds, *Europa und die Europäer: Quellen und Essays zur modernen europäischen Geschichte: Festschrift für Hartmut Kaelble zum 65. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart, 2005), 409–14; and Rainer Münz, 'Das Jahrhundert der Vertreibungen', *Transit: Europäische Revue*, 23 (2002): 132–54.
7. Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All* (Washington, 2008); James Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* (Oxford, 2010).
8. Philipp Ther, 'Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen', in Brandes, Sundhaussen, and Troebst, *Lexikon der Vertreibungen*, 736–9 (736). The *Deutschlandhaus* building which will house the 'Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation' is indeed just one kilometer from the Memorial, yet it is immediately adjacent to the 'Topography of Terror' Documentation Center on the historical compound where the headquarters of the Gestapo and SS as well as *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* were located.
9. Paweł Lutomski, 'The Debate about a Centre against Expulsions: An Unexpected Crisis in German–Polish Relations?', *German Studies Review*, 27 (2004): 449–68; K. Erik Franzen, 'Diskurs als Ziel? Anmerkungen zur deutschen Erinnerungspolitik am Beispiel der Debatte um ein "Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen" 1999–2005', in Peter Haslinger, Franzen K. Erik, and Martin Schulze Wessel, eds, *Diskurse über Zwangsmigrationen in Zentraleuropa: Geschichtspolitik, Fachdebatten, literarisches und lokales Erinnern seit 1989* (Munich, 2008), 1–29; Maren Röger, *Flucht, Vertreibung und Umsiedlung: Mediale Erinnerung und Debatten in Deutschland und Polen seit 1989* (Marburg,

- 2011); Manuel Becker, *Geschichtspolitik in der 'Berliner Republik': Konzeptionen und Kontroversen* (Wiesbaden, 2013), here chapter 5.
10. Resolution by the German Bundestag 'Für ein europäisch ausgerichtetes Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen', Berlin, 4 July 2002, in Stefan Troebst, ed., *Vertreibungsdiskurs und europäische Erinnerungskultur: Deutsch-polnische Initiativen zur Institutionalisierung: Eine Dokumentation* (Osnabrück, 2006), doc. no. 10, 67.
 11. Cf. the English-language website, <http://www.preussische-treuhand.org/en/index.html> (accessed 26 September 2015).
 12. Press release of the Bundespräsidialamt, 29 October 2003, 'Bundespräsident Johannes Rau und der Präsident der Republik Polen, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, haben heute in Danzig eine gemeinsame Erklärung abgegeben', in Troebst, *Vertreibungsdiskurs*, doc. no. 22, 99–100.
 13. Stefan Troebst, 'Das Europäische Netzwerk Erinnerung und Solidarität: Eine zentraleuropäische Initiative zur Institutionalisierung des Vertreibungsgedenkens 2002–2006', *Zeitgeschichte*, 34 (2007): 43–57. Cf. also Troebst, *Vertreibungsdiskurs*, doc. nos. 21–58, 95–242.
 14. "'Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit": Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD, Berlin, 11 November 2005', in Troebst, *Vertreibungsdiskurs*, doc. no. 51, 228.
 15. Instead, Tusk promoted his own project of founding a Museum of World War II in his home town of Gdańsk. See Paweł Machcewicz, "'Museum statt Stacheldrahtverhaue": Das Museum des Zweiten Weltkriegs in Danzig', in Włodzimierz Borodziej and Joachim von Puttkamer, eds, *Europa und sein Osten: Geschichtskulturelle Herausforderungen* (Munich, 2012), 81–103. Cf. also Paweł Machcewicz, 'Muzeum zamiast zasieków' ['A museum instead of barbed wire'], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 8 November 2007.
 16. Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien, "'Sichtbares Zeichen gegen Flucht und Vertreibung": Ausstellungs-, Dokumentations- und Informationszentrum in Berlin', news release, 19 March 2008, http://www.sfvv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/konzeption_bundesregierung_2008_sfvv.pdf (accessed 30 April 2015).
 17. Section 2, Unselbständige Stiftung 'Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung', Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung 'Deutsches Historisches Museum' (DHMG), 30 December 2008, 4–7, <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/dhmg/gesamt.pdf> (accessed 26 September 2015).
 18. See the foundation's website, <http://www.sfvv.de> (accessed 26 September 2015).
 19. Website 'Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung/Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation', <http://www.sfvv.de> (accessed 19 March 2015).
 20. Ibid.
 21. 'Vertriebenen-Stiftung: Wenig versöhnlich. Personalquerelen gehen weiter', *Das Parlament*, 6 July 2015.
 22. Stefan Troebst, 'Rettet die Vertriebenenstiftung vor der Provinz!', *Die Welt online*, <http://www.welt.de/geschichte/article143832676/Rettet-die-Vertriebenenstiftung-vor-der-Provinz.html> (accessed 17 July 2015).
 23. Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 'Establishment of the Centre for European Nations' Remembrance under the auspices of the Council of Europe', doc. 9945, 30 September 2003, Motion for a recommendation

- presented by Mr Klich and others, <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=10303&Language=EN> (accessed 17 December 2012).
24. *Ibid.*
 25. Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 27 listopada 2003 r. w sprawie ustanowienia Centrum Pamięci Narodów Europy pod auspicjami Rady Europy (M. P. z dnia 15 grudnia 2003 r.) [Decision of the Polish Parliament of 27 November 2003, on the Establishment of a 'Center for European Nations' Remembrance under the auspices of the Council of Europe'], <http://dokumenty.rcl.gov.pl/MP/rok/2003/wydanie/56/pozycja/867> (accessed 26 September 2015).
 26. Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 'Establishment of a European remembrance center for victims of forced population movements and ethnic cleansing', doc. 10378, 20 December 2004, Report by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population. Rapporteur Mr Mats Einarsson, Sweden, Group of the Unified European Left, <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=10741&Language=EN> (accessed 17 December 2012).
 27. Délégation française à l'assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, '60. Jahrestag der Befreiung des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz-Birkenau – Zentrum des Gedenkens oder Entstellung des Gedenkens', Strasbourg, 24 January 2005 (Übersetzung PB 1/0170-05), in Troebst, *Vertreibungsdiskurs*, doc. no. 41, 209–11, here 211.
 28. For the heated debates during the negotiations on the founding of the network in 2004, see my own reports on these meetings in Troebst, *Vertreibungsdiskurs*, doc. nos. 29, 122–39; 35, 147–61, and 39, 169–85.
 29. 'Absichtserklärung der Kulturminister Deutschlands, Polens, der Slowakei und Ungarns über die Gründung des Europäischen Netzwerks Erinnerung und Solidarität, Warschau, 2. Februar 2005', in Troebst, *Vertreibungsdiskurs*, doc. no. 45, 216–18.
 30. The website of the European Network Remembrance and Solidarity: Idea, <http://enrs.eu/en/about-us/> (accessed 26 September 2015).
 31. 'In Ústí nad Labem entsteht das erste Museum der Geschichte und Kultur der Deutschen in den böhmischen Ländern', no date [2011], <http://www.collegiumbohemicum.cz/de/clanek/238-in-Usti-nad-labem-entsteht-das-erste-museum-der-geschichte-und-kultur-der-deutschen-in-den-bohmischen-landern> (accessed 26 September 2015).
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 33. Committee of Experts, House of European History, 'Conceptual Basis for a House of European History', last modified 19 October 2008, <http://www>.

- europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/745/745721/745721_en.pdf (accessed 26 September 2015).
34. Europäisches Parlament, *Aufbau eines Hauses der Europäischen Geschichte: Ein Projekt des Europäischen Parlaments* (Brussels, 2013), 14.
 35. Bodil Axelsson, 'Museums between National and European Identities', *eunamus. European National Museums*, last modified 30 January 2012, <http://unfoldingeunamus.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/museums-between-national-and-european-identities> (accessed 17 December 2012); cf. also Wolfram Kaiser, Stefan Krankenhagen, and Kerstin Poehls, *Europa ausstellen: Das Museum als Praxisfeld der Europäisierung* (Cologne, 2012), 35–8, 58–9, 80–4, 147–51; Claus Leggewie, *Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung: Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt* (Munich, 2011), 46–8, 72, 182–8, 216–19; and Stefan Troebst, 'Eckstein einer EU-Geschichtspolitik? Das Museumsprojekt "Haus der Europäischen Geschichte" in Brüssel', *Deutschland Archiv*, 45 (2012): 746–52.
 36. Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, *The EU Politics of Remembrance* (Geneva, 2011), http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/international_history_politics/shared/working_papers/WPIH_9_Littoz-Monnet.pdf (accessed 30 April 2014); Stefan Troebst, 'Gemeinschaftsbildung durch Geschichtspolitik? Anläufe der Europäischen Union zur Stiftung einer erinnerungsbasierten Bürgeridentität', *Jahrbuch für Politik und Geschichte*, 5 (2014): 15–42.
 37. Stefan Troebst, 'Der 23. August als euroatlantischer Gedenktag? Eine analytische Dokumentation', in Anna Kaminsky, Dietmar Müller, and Stefan Troebst, eds, *Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939 in den Erinnerungskulturen der Europäer* (Göttingen, 2011), 85–121.
 38. On these debates, see Jan C. Jansen's chapter in this volume.
 39. Cf. the catalog *Erzwungene Wege: Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Ausstellung der Stiftung Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen* (Potsdam, 2006); as well as Michael Wildt, "'Erzwungene Wege: Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts": Kronprinzenpalais Berlin: Bilder einer Ausstellung', *Historische Anthropologie*, 15 (2007): 281–95; Joachim von Puttkamer, 'Irrwege des Erinnerns: Die Ausstellung "Erzwungene Wege" im Berliner Kronprinzenpalais', in Monika Gibas, Rüdiger Stutz, and Justus H. Ulbricht, eds, *Couragierte Wissenschaft: Eine Festschrift für Jürgen John zum 65. Geburtstag* (Jena, 2007), 174–90; and Tim Völker, *Flucht und Vertreibung im Museum: Zwei aktuelle Ausstellungen und ihre geschichtskulturellen Hintergründe im Vergleich* (Münster, 2008).
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 41. Grzegorz Hryciuk and Witold Sienkiewicz, eds, *Illustrierte Geschichte der Flucht und Vertreibung: Ost- und Mitteleuropa 1939 bis 1959* (Augsburg, 2009).
 42. Adam Krzemiński, 'Deutsch-polnische Tage', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 March 2012.
 43. Stefan Troebst, 'The Discourse on Forced Migration and European Culture of Remembrance', *Hungarian Historical Review*, 1 (2012): 397–417.

13

Memory Lobbying and the Shaping of 'Colonial Memories' in France since the 1990s: The Local, the National, and the International

Jan C. Jansen

At the turn of the century, scholars, journalists, and other public figures commented rather optimistically on the way the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) appeared in the public sphere. Many historians and public observers saw the dawn of a new age in French attitudes toward the nation's Algerian heritage. In the late 1990s, the French state had stopped denying its bloodiest war of decolonization and started to actively commemorate it; academic research had made considerable progress in understanding the war, including some of its most sensitive aspects; public media and the cinema had begun to address the Franco-Algerian colonial past; and in 2000 the French public had just started to engage in an intense debate about the systematic use of torture as part of French warfare in Algeria. Many commentators used expressions such as the return of a 'repressed' past, an 'end of amnesia', or an intense collective 'work of mourning' (*travail de deuil*), a difficult but also healing process of coming to terms, of confronting a deliberately 'forgotten' past that would finally become less emotionally charged.¹ Some even saw the beginning of France's general emotional disengagement and reconciliation with its conflict-ridden colonial past as a whole.

To date, the colonial past and especially the Franco-Algerian case have continued to garner more and more attention in the public sphere. In 2005 alone, one of the peak times of French 'colonial memories', almost every month saw new elements and developments: the emergence of an association named the 'Natives of the Republic' (*Indigènes de la République*) denouncing the continuation of colonial racism; a law

aimed, among others, at emphasizing the 'positive role' of colonialism; a West Indian, Guyanese, and Reunionese association in France filing a lawsuit against a French historian who specialized in the history of the slave trade; a general boom in academic, semi-academic, and popular publications; and heated debates about several monument and museum projects that referred to the colonial past.² Yet, the healing, reconciling effect, anticipated in the early 2000s, has failed to appear. Quite the opposite seems to be the case, the term 'war of memories' now being the prevalent metaphor for describing the current situation.³ In fact, the colonial past – and again, with the Franco-Algerian case at its very center – has become a field of increasing and sometimes hurried, disputed, and often antagonistic activities of commemoration, carried out by different state and non-state actors.

This chapter examines the driving forces behind this recent boom in French 'colonial memories' and the Pieds-Noirs' place in it. In doing so, it carves out four general features that distinguish the French debates from the situation of the German and European debates on post-1945 expulsions. First, the discursive field in which the Pieds-Noirs' case is being debated appears to be less focused and less clearly defined than the German discussions. The Pieds-Noirs' commemorative activities merge seamlessly into much larger struggles surrounding decolonization as a whole, the Franco-Algerian past before repatriation, and even the colonial empire in its entirety.⁴ Thus, in the following we need to put the Pieds-Noirs' activities into the larger context of the recent 'resurgence' of 'colonial memories' in France.

Second, these 'colonial memories' have become a public arena in which an increasing number of social groups interact, often in a conflicting way: along with the Pieds-Noirs, the general public and state actors, we encounter veterans, former anti-colonial activists, and migrant societies, to name only the most important ones. Third, the colonial past and its remembrance in France have become a sort of frame of reference, a background against which present social and political problems and conflicts are described and carried out. And fourth, the international arena has a substantial role in the controversies about French colonialism, although it does not involve a growing international collaboration or 'transnationalization', but the shape of a conflict-ridden bilateral diplomacy of remembrance between former colonial power and colony.⁵

Against this backdrop, the chapter focuses on key elements of French memory politics with regard to the colonial past. An initial critique of the very idea that the Algerian War had been 'forgotten' or 'repressed'

in post-1962 France sets the stage for a discussion of the increased public debates on the colonial past since the 1990s. Since the most dramatic dynamics of the change stem from the state's involvement in the shaping of public 'colonial memories', the analysis focuses on the interactions between the highest levels of state and different memory lobbies, but still seeks to hint at the similarly complicated dynamics in local and regional politics, and at the interactions between the different levels of political and public life. In doing so, the chapter touches upon three points: first, the complex and controversial interactions between an increasing number of actors and memory lobbies, ranging from the repatriates and veterans of the Algerian War to immigration societies and representatives of the state; second, the increasing tendency to use the war and the colonial past as a means to frame present-day conflicts, especially struggles over everyday racism and xenophobia; and third, the international dimension, that is, the use of the colonial past in Franco-Algerian inter-state relations.

A 'repressed' past, a 'traumatized' nation?

It is often said that colonialism and the Algerian War had been 'forgotten' in France after 1962.⁶ And, focusing on forms of official commemoration, it is true that the French state aimed at pushing back the highly conflict-ridden, divisive, and somehow humiliating aspects of decolonization and especially Algerian independence. The latter event did indeed trigger a process we might characterize as a withdrawal to the 'Hexagon' (a byname of metropolitan France) and a silent 'deterritorialization' of the colonial past, relegating it to remote places disconnected from metropolitan France.⁷ Colonialism was no longer considered important to France's metropolitan history and national glory, and the state abruptly abandoned the efforts it had made to keep the colonial empire present in the French metropole. Under Charles de Gaulle (1959–69), two elements were essential in preventing official remembrance or public debate on Algerian decolonization: control of official language denying that the 'events' or 'operations' in Algeria had been a real war, and several amnesty laws for crimes committed during the war that prevent any judicial aftermath.⁸

The time of official concealment has often been characterized – in public as well as in academic discourse – as a period of collective 'forgetting' or even 'repression' in a Freudian sense, following a tradition of collective psychoanalysis in the social sciences reaching back to the 1960s.⁹ From this point of view, the loss of the colonial empire and

especially the conflict-ridden Algerian War constitute a sort of historical 'trauma' that produced a kind of collective 'syndrome'. Against this backdrop, the current upsurge of remembrance appears to be a sort of collective therapy, leading – after a painful process of confrontation – to a reconciliatory and less emotionally charged official memory of the events. Though it may have some heuristic value, this way of describing the situation in France is problematic in at least three respects.

First, it relies on the idea that active remembrance of past conflicts, crimes, wars and so on, is essential for a society to be 'healthy' – an idea which, from a comparative and long-term point of view, can hardly be considered compelling. In fact, in European history (and probably also in world history) its exact opposite, that is, a policy of concealment and of granting amnesty has prevailed during most periods.¹⁰ The idea that nations have to face the 'dark sides' of their past, that they have a 'duty to remember' (*devoir de mémoire*) as it is often called in France, turns out to be a rather recent phenomenon. In the beginning almost exclusively applied to the Holocaust, it has become, since the 1980s, a general trend, as can be seen, for example, in the considerable number of truth and reconciliation commissions established all over the world. Rather than seeing the 'repression' vocabulary and the 'duty to remember' as tools of explanation, we have to consider them as modes of self-description and normative elements within the ongoing debates, being used by different actors on the public and political stage.

Second, conceiving of the 'colonial memories' in France in this way assimilates a complex society into a unified, collective 'psyche' that is often equated with official state commemoration. Yet, if it is appropriate at all to speak of 'collective remembrance', it manifests itself in public communication and social interaction. So instead of imagining one collective 'psyche' represented by the state, we need to turn to the concrete social actors, their relations, their strategies, their forms of expression, lobbying, and interaction. Among them, the state is but one actor, albeit a powerful one.

The third objection is more concrete. That is, if we do not focus on the French state alone but take the different non-state actors into account, we discover that neither the Algerian War nor the colonial past had been completely absent, 'forgotten' or even 'repressed' in French society after 1962, despite the state policy of concealment. For example, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch recently pointed out the huge amount of academic research that continued to be conducted on colonial issues after the end of empire.¹¹ About two thousand books, including many non-academic publications such as novels, memoirs, and biographies,

about French Algeria and the Algerian War alone were published during the period of official concealment.¹² Two groups of historical actors, for different reasons and in different ways, were particularly active in keeping memories of French Algeria and Algerian decolonization alive: the repatriates and the veterans of the Algerian War. These are both groups that were initially heterogeneous and became important political and social actors and lobbies after 1962 acting through associations and (often self-proclaimed) 'representatives'.¹³

The reference to shared experience was a means certain associations used to constitute themselves as clearly definable political and social actors. On a local scale, both groups gained visibility from the 1960s through commemorative activities placing memories of colonial Algeria and the Algerian War in the public space of many French *communes*. For example, the veterans' most important association, the Fédération nationale des anciens combattants en Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie (FNACA), flanked their struggle for official recognition of their status as real war veterans with a campaign for naming streets and squares after 19 March 1962, and for constructing local war memorials.

Likewise, *pied-noir* memories were not just cultivated within families and associations but also quickly entered the public space of many French towns, especially those with concentrated repatriate populations.¹⁴ Rituals dating back to the time of *Algérie française* have played an important part in these commemorations.¹⁵ Another central medium was public monuments, many of them transferred from Algeria.¹⁶ At least one hundred monuments, statues, or parts of monuments were repatriated through official or private initiatives in the years following Algerian independence, accompanied by a huge number of other symbolic objects such as religious items and church bells, for example. Once representing colonial presence in North Africa, their transplantation into French cityscapes made them sites of mourning for the lost homeland but also symbols of incorporation into local communities in the metropole.

The repatriates' monuments unveiled during the period of official concealment also include several memorials (such as in Nice in 1973) dedicated to members of the Organisation armée secrète (OAS), a terrorist organization that combated Algerian independence in 1961–2.¹⁷ Former OAS members presided over some of the inauguration ceremonies (such as in Toulon in 1972). With the notable exception of one monument in Toulon being blown up right before its unveiling in 1980, none of these cases, to my knowledge, provoked serious reactions beyond the local or regional arena. There are no definite numbers

of local repatriates' monuments which could help us to examine the extent and intensity of these local commemorations. In any case, the recent initiatives – sometimes leading to heated debate in the national press – do not constitute the only intense period of commemoration since 1962.

This being said, I do not mean to call into question that there has been a fundamental change since the 1990s, but aim to specify the exact nature of this change. The main transformation to be explained is thus not the sudden remembering of something forgotten, or the return of something that had been completely absent. It is better described as a change of scale, a movement from the local or regional into the national sphere, the transformation of rather localized acts into a political 'football', a high-ranking issue in the national political and public sphere.

From the local to the national? Politics of state recognition

Since the mid-1990s, the French state and a broader society have become more involved in public efforts to address the colonial past and especially the Algerian War of Independence. It is often said that the decline of debates and struggles about the Vichy past made it possible for the Algerian and colonial memories to come to the fore.¹⁸ While there is no compelling reason that public debate should always have just one focus, the argument holds true in at least one respect: the public, political, and judicial ways of dealing with the Nazi past and the Holocaust remain important points of reference in the recent debates on colonialism. This can be seen, for instance, in the fact that the moral 'duty to remember' or the category of 'crimes against humanity' is regularly evoked by different actors. Likewise, different groups often employ certain strategies of self-victimization in reaction or in reference to Holocaust commemoration.¹⁹ Along with the vague 'duty to remember', generational changes at the head of the state in the 1990s played their part in the state's engagement with its Algerian past, especially the emergence of political leaders, such as Lionel Jospin and Jacques Chirac, whose biographies, but not their political careers, intersected with the war in Algeria. Jacques Chirac appeared to be particularly committed to issues of evolving state commemoration during his presidency (1995–2007).

The decades-long official deterritorialization of the colonial past has had a fundamental impact on the recent processes of remembrance. Once the state and a broader national public became more involved

in the debate, they entered a multi-structured, occupied, and embattled territory. This not only curtailed the state's scope for action. The lobbies of remembrance, most notably the veterans and the repatriates, also increased their commemorative activities and pressure in view of their incorporation into what would become official forms of national commemoration. The quest for formal recognition on a national level led to some alliances but more often to rivalry and conflicts between the different groups, as two cases prior to the 1990s show. First, the FNACA veterans organization's struggle to make 19 March an official national holiday in commemoration of the end of the Algerian War encountered massive, sometimes even physical, resistance not only among the political class, but also from rival associations of veterans, *harkis*, and Pieds-Noirs, which considered it a date of defeat and loss.²⁰ Similarly, the project to erect a national French Overseas memorial (*Mémorial national de la France outre-mer*), which has been discussed since the 1980s, has been marked by serious conflicts between different repatriate associations, academics, and politicians.²¹ Both issues have been hotly debated until very recently.

Entering the already embattled territory of Algerian memories, the French state under President Chirac adopted a line one might call a politics of state recognition. Official acts of state remembrance, as could be observed since the mid-1990s, were often rather cautious and reactive, in many cases trying to meet the different, sometimes antagonistic, claims for recognition by various groups of historical actors. President Chirac tended in these cases to remember different aspects of the Algerian War in the categories of national honor, dignity, and duty. Such a politics of official recognition, by definition, left out certain aspects, notably the dimension of colonial violence. Yet, it also led to sometimes contradictory acts, an uneasy 'ecumenism' of remembrance.

To illustrate this, let me briefly mention some of the main events of commemoration during the Chirac era.²² From the very beginning, the official acts of remembrance were aimed at recognizing those who had fought and worked for the French colonial empire, first and foremost the veterans of the Algerian War. For example, in 1999 the French National Assembly officially accepted the term 'war' to describe Algerian decolonization; in 2002, a national monument in the heart of Paris (at the Quai Branly) was unveiled, dedicated to the fallen soldiers of the Algerian War. It deliberately included the *harkis*, Algerian auxiliaries who in 1962 had been abandoned by the French state. In 2001, a national day of commemoration (25 September) was established to honor and acknowledge the *harkis'* efforts for France. In 2003, 5 December was declared

the date for an annual commemoration of the fallen soldiers during North African decolonization. As a cautious attempt to meet the veterans' desire to have a national holiday, it was immediately rejected by FNACA, which saw no historical connection between the date and the event to be commemorated.

In a similar logic of late recognition, the French government in 2006 started to address the unequal treatment of colonial veterans who served in the French army. These policies of national recognition towards the different categories of veterans were generally couched in terms of national *grandeur* and patriotic duty, coupled with references to France's 'colonial achievements'. Yet, Chirac tried at the same time to stage symbolic acts of Franco-Algerian reconciliation, most notably during his visit to Algeria in 2003 and the announcement of a Franco-Algerian friendship treaty.

This project came into conflict with the law of 23 February 2005, probably the best known and most controversial event in the processes of remembrance during the Chirac era. As Romain Bertrand has pointed out, a group of deputies relatively new to the national political stage who based their mandates on their close ties to regional and local politics and their relations to repatriate communities were the principle proponents of the law.²³ Focusing mainly on aspects of material compensation for *harkis*, its first draft was already designed as a symbolic act of recognition. During its initial reading in the National Assembly in June 2004, several amendments were made. These led among other things to Article 4, which called for university research and especially school programs to highlight the 'positive role of the French overseas presence, especially in North Africa'.²⁴ Without any serious resistance, the law passed the Senate and the National Assembly and was signed by Chirac on 23 February 2005. After a group of six prominent historians submitted a petition against Article 4, a huge public controversy arose surrounding the law in mid-2005.

Under public pressure, Chirac asked the Parliament to remove the controversial article, but his own Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) faction refused to follow him. Only a request before the Constitutional Council in January 2006 brought a way out of the political blockade by allowing Article 4 to be removed by government decree. This almost desperate step did not stop public controversies about the law. Other elements have continued to draw criticism. Thus, the official foundation for the memory of the Algerian War, established in Article 3, and the prominent role memory lobbies play in it have been severely criticized by academics.²⁵ Moreover, the controversy has given rise to heated

and still ongoing debates about the relation between legislation and history, namely, the so-called memory laws, and about the degree of self-criticism in official national remembrance, often under the polemical term of 'repentance'.²⁶

The law's genesis and the controversy it produced show again how highly embattled and chaotic the state's efforts to create official forms of remembrance had become within a couple of years. Ever since, lawsuits, court action, and appeals to the Constitutional Council have developed into a recurrent element of French 'colonial memories'. Instead of appeasing or even ending the conflicts around the colonial past, the politics of official recognition have contributed to increasing and multiplying them. In light of the struggles around common and official forms of remembrance, the local level no longer serves as a refuge for certain non-official commemorations. Projects that nostalgically celebrate French Algeria, such as recent monuments in Marignane and Perpignan, no longer appear to be localized expressions of group identity but have become acts within the national arena, and as such they have provoked nationwide reactions and resistance, including from newly founded critical *pied-noir* and *harki* associations. For example, a memorial to the 'fallen fighters for the life of French Algeria', including OAS members, in the Marignane cemetery in 2005 triggered a series of polemics and court actions: after the inauguration ceremony was prohibited, the monument was removed by a court decision in 2008; in 2011, a refashioned version of the monument was restored, followed by further court actions.²⁷ Pro-OAS monuments have been countered by monuments to the victims of OAS in other places (such as in Paris in 2011).²⁸

In this context, French politics – from the local to the national level – has continued to address the colonial past beyond the Chirac era. In view of the (often overstated) role of the different groups as voting blocs and the alleged inclination among nostalgics of French Algeria to vote for the extreme-right Front National (FN), French 'colonial memories' have become a recurrent topic in election campaigns, from municipal elections to the presidential selection.²⁹ The presidents after Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–12) and François Hollande (since 2012), have sought to distance themselves from their predecessors and to develop their own approach to the colonial past. Yet, their own room to maneuver has been limited by the politics of official recognition and its hardly controllable dynamics.

Hence, both presidents have elaborated new signs of state recognition towards different historical actors: the alignment of the pensions for colonial veterans in 2010; the recognition of the French state's

responsibility for the 'abandonment' of the *harkis* in 2012 (by Sarkozy); or the declaration of 19 March as a national day of commemoration for the 'civil and military victims of the Algerian War and the combats in Tunisia and Morocco' later that year (under Hollande).³⁰ Like Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande have had to manage different publics with conflicting visions of how to deal with the colonial past, generating often contradictory and ambiguous signs. This is not least due to the fact that the commemorative–political stage of 'colonial memories' has become even more complicated by the appearance of new topics and new actors.

Violence, victims and the 'colonial continuum'

The politics of remembrance in the categories of national honor and dignity, as pursued by Chirac, has tended to exclude the aspect of colonial violence. Yet, in France as in several other Western European countries, most notably in Great Britain, Italy, Germany, and Belgium, public debates have focused on some of the most violent expressions or moments of the colonial past.³¹ Yet, in none of these cases has sudden media interest produced any lasting forms of official commemoration. In France, the use of torture during the Algerian War received considerable public attention beginning in 2000, before receding into the background in 2002 and once again becoming a topic for low-scale or private remembrance and history books. Moreover, the French 'torture debate' – similar to other Western European debates on colonial violence – was more about its European perpetrators than on the victims of colonial violence. This changed when other actors stepped into the limelight: groups of immigrants, as well as anti-racist and human rights activists.

'Colonial memories' have been increasingly shaped by the struggles around racism and immigration in France, due in large part to the close historical connection between the French colonial empire and its immigration policies. One event of the Algerian War has received particular attention among anti-racist activists since the 1980s – the Paris massacre of 17 October 1961, when the French authorities repressed a peaceful FLN demonstration with violence.³² Becoming the subject of systematic commemoration, the events of that day were remembered less as a historical fact in the context of the Algerian struggle for independence than as a symbol for a longstanding tradition of anti-Maghreb racism and police violence against immigrants.

This use of the colonial past was radicalized in January 2005, only a couple of weeks before the law on colonialism was signed, when

the so-called 'Natives of the Republic' (*Indigènes de la République*) appeared on the political and commemorative stage, a rather heterogeneous association of different migrant societies, members of alter-globalization and Third World movements, and groups on the Radical Left. Their manifesto, written against the background of the conflicts relating to the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious signs – such as Muslim headscarves – from public schools, addressed these current political issues in historical terms.³³ Claiming the colonial category of 'natives' for themselves, they drew a direct parallel between the colonial situation and the public treatment of immigrants in present-day France. Putting forth the idea of a colonial continuum, they did not aim in their public interventions so much to remember the colonial past in itself but to use it as a kind of frame of reference, a medium to describe and criticize the allegedly colonial present. Anti-racist movements of the 1980s had made similar references to the colonial past, while pursuing a universalist and egalitarian (republican) strategy. The *Indigènes* have been trying to break with this approach.

According to the *Indigènes*, the Republic itself and its universalism are deeply rooted in colonialism and colonial racism. In this respect, the association accords with a trend in academic and semi-academic discourse that gained public attention in the mid-2000s. Based on a particular reading of postcolonial theory, some scholars have stressed the interconnectedness of national metropolitan and imperial history, claiming in particular that there is a constitutive connection between the Third French Republic and colonial rule.³⁴ Closely linked to present-day political conflicts, the idea of a colonial continuum has several shortcomings from a historical point of view. Above all, it reduces racism to its colonial manifestation, while colonialism can hardly be seen as the only source of racism and xenophobia in European societies.³⁵ Furthermore, French imperial expansion and colonial rule were not created by the Republican regime alone – even though, of course, the Third Republic played a major role in building France's second colonial empire.

Nonetheless, the discussions about colonial racism and immigration are characteristic of two important tendencies shaping French 'colonial memories'. First, they stand for the spread of victim-based identity politics with reference to the colonial past.³⁶ The *Indigènes*, with their equation of present-day discrimination of immigrants with the status of the colonized, have not been the only actors to employ this strategy. Some of them have even taken legal action, as with the previously

mentioned lawsuit against a French historian who had criticized the 2001 'memory law' on slavery.

Likewise, certain *pied-noir* associations have increasingly couched their political struggle for recognition in categories of victimization. According to its initiators, the law of 23 February 2005, was meant to reinstate the *Pieds-Noirs* ' status as the primary victims of decolonization, as victims of Algerian nationalism and of French state policies alike. Projects like the memorial in Perpignan (inaugurated in 2007) or a bill aiming at 'recognizing the massacre of the French population in Oran on 5 July 1962' (introduced in the National Assembly in 2013) focus on European and *harki* victims of violence in the course of Algerian independence, including OAS terrorists, while excluding all Algerian victims of colonial violence.³⁷ Self-victimization as a mode of political expression has led to a rivalry among victims, which appears to be the domestic complement to increasing international awareness of the 'dark sides' of national histories.³⁸

The second major tendency is the use of the colonial past for framing current political and social conflicts. Grounded in the idea of fundamental continuities between the past and the present, colonialism, in this view, ceases to be the object to be explained and remembered, but becomes a medium, or, in Eric Savarese's words, an 'explanatory variable' for present-day conflicts.³⁹ This tendency was particularly manifested in late 2005 when riots, mainly with younger immigrants participating, broke out in French suburbs. Public and political debates at that time tended to link the riots to the controversial law on colonialism and French modes of dealing with the colonial past. This brought forward a de-politicized interpretation of the events that ruled out social factors like marginalization, unemployment, everyday police violence, and so on, as triggers for the disturbances. In return, the perception of the riots increasingly influenced the discussions on the law of 23 February 2005. In view of the rebellious youth, the supporters of the law insisted on the need for a self-assertive and proud national memory, while its critics saw the integration of colonial violence and racism into the official remembrance of colonialism as a means to foster social cohesion.

French 'colonial memories' in the international arena

Struggles concerning the remembrance of colonial violence in Algeria are not confined to the different levels of French public and political life. In fact, French debates on the colonial past have also been shaped in the international arena. Significantly, Chirac flanked his

commemorative initiatives in the early 2000s with reconciliatory gestures towards Algeria.⁴⁰ While he avoided any sign of 'apology' for the 'tragic' common past of the two countries, his project of a Franco-Algerian friendship treaty was considered part of France's 'coming to terms' with its colonial past. With growing controversies in France, the 'colonial memories' have played an ever larger role in the relations between the two countries, mainly as an object of contention. It is worth noting that diverging memories are not the only (and probably not the most important) conflict inherited from the colonial past and that rising tensions around this past would not necessarily interfere or even obstruct other forms of cooperation between France and Algeria (for example, on economic or security issues). Yet, since the law of 23 February 2005 became publicly known, the question of how to cope with the shared colonial past has grown into a diplomatic affair. Even though French diplomats have tried to downplay its significance, the law led to public outrage in Algeria, with major political parties, the president, and the parliament following suit.

While it was not the only point of contention, the law became the official reason for postponing and, in 2007, abandoning the Franco-Algerian friendship treaty.⁴¹ Under domestic public pressure, Algerian President Abdel al-Aziz Bouteflika took a tougher line against the former colonial power, denouncing the 'genocidal' character of French massacres in Algeria and issuing regular calls for an official 'apology' from France. Since 2005, the Algerian press has regularly reported on nostalgic projects in French cities, and the Algerian parliament in 2010 even threatened to pass a law 'criminalizing' French colonialism in Algeria.⁴² The bill linked longstanding points of contention (such as the restitution of archives) to the establishment of a special court for 'colonial crimes' committed under colonial rule, and a request for official 'apologies' and reparations. In the end, the bill was not introduced in parliament, showing that the Algerian political establishment has been no less divided in this matter.

These public conflicts between the two countries point at yet another arena in which French 'colonial memories' have been shaped in recent years. In Algiers and Paris, such disputes may appear simply to stem from diverging official and public interpretations of a shared past that is of particular importance for both countries. As in most formerly colonized countries, official state commemoration in Algeria has focused to a large extent on the colonial era, notably on the war of independence and important moments of colonial violence. Seen in the larger picture, the increasing interaction between France and Algeria in the area of public

remembrance is also part of general shifts in the international arena. As mentioned before, the period since the 1990s has been marked by a rising international interest in colonial violence as part of the 'dark sides' of national histories.⁴³

While most former metropolises have witnessed public debates on colonial violence, postcolonial states (former colonies) have regularly raised demands for official 'apologies' or 'reparations' for colonial rule. The growing remembrance of colonialism on an international scale, however, has not generated transnational forms of commemoration as can be found in the cases of the Holocaust, the World Wars, or the twentieth-century expulsions.⁴⁴ Like the Franco-Algerian disputes, most cross-border debates on the colonial past are confined to a bilateral framework. Even limited to its modern form, colonialism as a historical phenomenon was multiform and multifaceted, stretching over all continents and roughly five centuries.

While certain aspects, such as slavery (which does not restrict itself to its colonial type), have been recently subject to some degree of internationalization, a globally concerted remembrance of 'colonialism' as a whole seems highly unlikely.⁴⁵ Nor is it likely that countries in bilateral colonial contexts would jointly commemorate their entangled pasts. In general, it is questionable whether the quest for a settlement of diverging visions of the past is the main driving force behind such disputes. In fact, demands for recognition of victimhood, apologies, and reparations for historical wrongdoings appear to work as a weapon of the weak within the 'soft diplomacy' across the global North-South divide.⁴⁶

The emergence of new actors inside and outside of France has further complicated the field of French 'colonial memories'. As a consequence, Chirac's successors have not had the option of avoiding the topic of colonial violence. Already as a candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy openly rejected a self-critical approach to national history and put emphasis on the topic of national identity, often correlated with his later project of a national 'Maison de l'histoire de France'. However, official remembrance under his presidency appeared to be less homogeneous than was to be expected from such general statements. On the one hand, his speech in Dakar in July 2007, in particular, seemed to confirm his 'anti-repentance' discourse.⁴⁷ In this speech, he refused to acknowledge any serious impact of colonialism on present-day Africa and drew upon nineteenth-century stereotypes of Africa's ahistorical and 'mysterious' character. On the other hand, Sarkozy also took a clearer stand on 'dark' aspects of colonialism than Chirac had, for example, in condemning the injustice and violence of the colonial system

in a speech in Constantine later that year.⁴⁸ While Sarkozy tended to restrict the self-critical discourse to an international (that is Algerian) audience, François Hollande seems to be seeking to bridge the gap between official discourse aimed at a domestic and international public. More than his predecessors, Hollande appears to open the politics of official recognition towards the victims of colonial violence, for example, by officially recognizing the French state's responsibility for the massacre of 17 October (in 2013).⁴⁹ At the same time, however, he clearly rejects any form of 'apology' or 'repentance', instead claiming to speak out and admit the clear 'truth' about the past, which, in and of itself, is supposed to 'repair' and 'bring together' the two nations.⁵⁰

After more than two decades of intense public debate and three presidents bringing in different agendas, as well as an ever-growing number of participating actors and lobbies, the current state of official remembrance regarding the French colonial past is quite complex. This is not just due to the occasionally contradictory signs aimed at different, sometimes antagonistic, constituencies, but to at least three tendencies. First, efforts to incorporate competing claims for recognition have blurred the meaning of some of the most visible sites of commemoration, as can be seen in the increasing inclusion of civil victims in the list of the national monument at Quai Branly, which was originally exclusively dedicated to the fallen soldiers.⁵¹ The most radical proposition along these lines came from two scholars who advocated incorporating all types of victims (military, civil, French, Algerian, and others) in an official act of recognition.⁵² In view of the massive protest by several veterans' associations against the misappropriation of the Quai Branly monument, it is not very likely that such an act of abstract recognition would in any way ameliorate the ongoing struggles.

Second, there has been a multiplication of official symbols with similar meaning. For example, since 2013 there have been two national days commemorating the (military) victims of the Algerian War, 19 March and 5 December. The fact that each of these dates is recognized by some veterans', *harki*, and *pied-noir* associations and rejected by others cements this peculiar coexistence. Third, in contrast to the ongoing institutionalization of the memory of forced migration in Europe, many ambitious projects regarding the colonial (and national) past in France have been doomed to failure, attesting to the extremely limited scope of action. This was the case with the national Overseas Memorial (discussed since the 1980s) and Sarkozy's 'Maison de l'histoire de France'. After tremendous public criticism of their allegedly

apologetic and state-imposed version of history emerged, both projects were abandoned.⁵³ The case of a failed 'Museum for the History of France and Algeria' in Montpellier demonstrates how different layers of public life (from local to national) interact and how different groups with divergent agendas can produce a stalemate.⁵⁴ Initiated in 2002 as a museum designed to be ideologically and empathetically close to local repatriates' organizations, the project was thrust into the maelstrom of the 'wars of memories' in the national arena. Criticized for its nostalgic approach by a growing public both inside and outside of academia, the project was gradually detached from the *pied-noir* lobby and transformed into an ambitious academic project under the supervision of an international scholarly board determined to bring in multiple perspectives. With its growing distance from the supposedly influential *pied-noir* electorate, however, the project became less interesting for local politicians and was abandoned in June 2014, one year before its scheduled opening, by the new mayor of the city.

Conclusions

During the last two decades, France has experienced a virtual boom in public memories concerning the Algerian War and the colonial past as a whole. It seems problematic to describe these developments as the return of a formerly 'forgotten' or 'repressed' past, as several groups of actors, since 1962, have lobbied against the state policy of concealment. The repatriates and the veterans of the Algerian War were by far the most important of these lobbies. While their forms of commemoration had mainly been restricted to local or regional public spheres, the current 'wars of memories' are about the shaping of official forms of remembrance on a national scale. Efforts on the part of the French state to actively commemorate the Algerian War since the mid-1990s have been accompanied by increasing activities on the part of non-state lobbies and entrepreneurs of remembrance.

The *pied-noir* associations have turned out to be only one of the lobbies seeking to impose their vision of how to deal with the colonial past on everyone else. With an ever increasing number of actors doing the same, these visions often come into conflict or antagonize other lobbies. Along with, and interacting with, the fierce domestic conflicts, a no less complicated diplomacy of remembrance has emerged between France and Algeria. In recent years, colonialism even appears to have become an arena for fighting about current political and social conflicts – especially

surrounding issues of immigration and national cohesion – a means of framing present-day issues in historical terms.

Given the many unforeseen twists and turns in recent debates, it would be naïve to attempt to provide any serious outlook on the developments. Calls for a reconciliatory, common memory, as far as I can see, have not brought an end to the debates. They even appear to have contributed to intensifying rivalries and conflicts. As things are now, one option is to think more in terms of a *modus vivendi* that would allow several rival memories to coexist without necessarily merging into one new master narrative – while at the same time letting scholars do their historical research without expecting them to function as pacifiers between conflicting groups in society.

Notes

1. See, for instance, David L. Schalk, 'Has France's Marrying Her Century Cured the Algerian Syndrome?', *Historical Reflections*, 25 (1999): 149–64; Benjamin Stora, 'Guerre d'Algérie: les instruments de la mémoire', *Historiens et Géographes*, 96(388) (2004): 247–54; Neil MacMaster, 'The Torture Controversy (1998–2002): Towards a "New History" of the Algerian War?', *Modern and Contemporary France*, 10(4) (2002): 449–59.
2. The best analysis of these events is provided by Romain Bertrand, *Mémoires d'empire: la controverse autour du 'fait colonial'* (Bellecombe-en-Bauges, 2006).
3. Cf. Pascal Blanchard and Isabelle Veyrat-Masson, eds, *Les guerres de mémoires: la France et son histoire* (Paris, 2008); Benjamin Stora, *La guerre des mémoires: la France face à son passé colonial: entretiens avec Thierry Leclère* (La Tour d'Aigues, 2007); Eric Savarese, *Algérie, la guerre des mémoires* (Paris, 2007).
4. On the place of post-Algerian memories within the French post-colonial 'encounter', see Eric Savarese, *La rencontre postcoloniale* (Bellecombe-en-Bauges, 2014).
5. On transnational patterns in the European commemoration of forced migration, see Stefan Troebst's chapter in this volume.
6. See, for example, Antoine Raybaud, 'Deuil sans travail, travail sans deuil: la France a-t-elle une mémoire coloniale?', *Dédale*, 5–6 (1997): 87–104; Gilles Manceron, *Marianne et ses colonies: une introduction à l'histoire coloniale de la France* (Paris, 2003), 267–82.
7. On this aspect, see Todd Shepard's chapter in this volume. On the term of 'detritorialization', see Jan C. Jansen, 'Politics of Remembrance, Colonialism, and the Algerian War in France', in Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth, eds, *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance* (New York, 2010), 275–93, here 275.
8. A good overview on this period is provided by Frank Renken, *Frankreich im Schatten des Algerienkrieges: Die Fünfte Republik und die Erinnerung an den letzten großen Kolonialkonflikt* (Göttingen, 2006).
9. Classical interpretations are Benjamin Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris, 1991); Schalk, 'Syndrome'. For a critique, see

- William B. Cohen, 'The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory', *Historical Reflections*, 28 (2002): 219–39.
10. For the big picture, see Christian Meier, *Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns: Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit* (Munich, 2010), chapter 1.
 11. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Enjeux politiques de l'histoire coloniale* (Marseille, 2009), 24–35.
 12. Cf. Benjamin Stora, *Le dictionnaire des livres de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris, 1996).
 13. On the 'representation' via associations and their representativeness, see Claire Eldridge's chapter in this volume. On the constitution of these groups as social actors via mobilization, see Eric Savarese, *L'invention des Pieds-Noirs* (Paris, 2002).
 14. For a survey of different forms and media, see Andrea L. Smith, 'Settler Sites of Memory and the Work of Mourning', *French Politics, Culture & Society*, 31(3) (2013): 65–92.
 15. On this aspect, see Michèle Baussant's chapter in this volume.
 16. Jan C. Jansen, *Erobern und Erinnern: Symbolpolitik, öffentlicher Raum und französischer Kolonialismus in Algerien, 1830–1950* (Munich, 2013), 1–2, 477–80; Alain Amato, *Monuments en exil* (Paris, 1979).
 17. Raphaëlle Branche, *La guerre d'Algérie: une histoire apaisée?* (Paris, 2005), 25–7.
 18. See, for example, Cohen, 'Algerian War', 229–31; MacMaster, 'Controversy', 450–1.
 19. On such synergetic interactions between Holocaust and decolonization memories, see Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, 2009).
 20. Frédéric Rouyaud, 'La bataille du 19 mars', in Jean-Pierre Rioux, ed., *La guerre d'Algérie et les Français* (Paris, 1990), 545–52.
 21. Robert Aldrich, 'Le musée colonial impossible', in Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire, eds, *Culture post-coloniale, 1961–2006: traces et mémoires coloniales en France* (Paris, 2005), 83–101, here 98–9.
 22. For a short overview on the following events, see Branche, *Guerre*; Jansen, 'Politics of Remembrance'; Robert Aldrich, *Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France* (Basingstoke, 2005), 328–34.
 23. Bertrand, *Mémoires d'empire*, 61–84. On the law, see also Gilles Manceron, ed., *La colonisation, la loi et l'histoire* (Paris, 2006); Claude Liauzu, 'Les historiens saisis par les guerres de mémoire coloniale', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 52(4) (2005): 99–109.
 24. *Journal officiel de la République Française [JORF]*, *Lois et décrets*, 24 February 2005: 1328–30.
 25. This is a striking parallel to the clashes, in mid-2015, around the directorship of the German 'Federal Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation'. See Stefan Troebst's chapter in this volume.
 26. On recent French 'memory laws' in a European context, see Stiina Löytömäki, *Law and the Politics of Memory: Confronting the Past* (Abingdon, 2014).
 27. *La Provence*, 12 March 2011.
 28. *L'Humanité*, 7 October 2011.
 29. On this aspect, see also Eric Savarese's chapter in this volume.

30. *Le Monde*, 15 July 2010 and 17 April 2012; *JORF, Lois et décrets*, 7 December 2012: 19161.
31. For an overview, see Olivier Dard and Daniel Lefeuvre, eds, *L'Europe face à son passé colonial* (Paris, 2008); Stephen Howe, 'Colonising and Exterminating? Memories of Imperial Violence in Britain and France', *Histoire@Politique*, 11 (2010), <http://www.histoire-politique.fr/index.php?numero=11&rub=pistes&item=17> (accessed 30 April 2015).
32. On the event and its commemoration, see Jim House and Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror and Postcolonial Memories* (Oxford, 2006).
33. *Le Monde*, 22 February 2005.
34. Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, and Françoise Vergès, *La république coloniale: essai sur une utopie* (Paris, 2003); Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire, eds, *La fracture coloniale: la société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial* (Paris, 2005); Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *La république impériale: politique et racisme d'état* (Paris, 2009).
35. Gérard Noiriel, 'Itinéraire d'un engagement dans l'histoire: entretien avec Gérard Noiriel', interview by Smaïn Laacher and Patrick Simon, *Mouvements*, 45–6(3) (2006): 209–19, here 217–18.
36. Daniel Mollenhauer, 'Erinnerungspolitik in der postkolonialen Republik – Frankreich und das koloniale Erbe', in Claudia Kraft, Alf Lüdtke, and Jürgen Martschukat, eds, *Kolonialgeschichten: Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen* (Frankfurt, 2010), 119–41.
37. *Libération*, 26 November 2007, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion1258.asp> (accessed 30 April 2014).
38. On the competitive dynamics of self-victimization, see Martha Minow, 'Surviving Victim Talk', *UCLA Law Review*, 40 (1992–3): 1411–45. For overviews of the US and France, see Jean-Michel Chaumont, *La concurrence des victimes: génocide, identité, reconnaissance* (Paris, 1997); Johann Michel, *Gouverner les mémoires: les politiques mémorielles en France* (Paris, 2010).
39. Savarese, *Algérie*, 18, 127.
40. For a short account, see Renken, *Frankreich*, 146–52. French colonial memories are also debated between France and other former (or still) existing colonies. For the remainder of this chapter I will focus on the Franco-Algerian relation.
41. A fundamental issue was the recognition of the *harkis'* fate.
42. See, for example, *Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 26 November 2007; *El Watan*, 3 March 2010 and 25 September 2010.
43. Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation: Das Ende der Imperien* (Munich, 2013), 125–6.
44. On the transnationalization processes in the case of expulsions, see Stefan Troebst's chapter in this volume.
45. On the international commemoration of slavery, see Ana Lucia Araujo, ed., *Politics of Memory: Making Slavery Visible in the Public Space* (New York, 2012).
46. Bertrand, *Mémoires d'empire*, 90–2.
47. On reactions to the speech, see Makhily Gassama, Mamoussé Diagne, Dialo Diop, and Koulsy Lamko, eds, *L'Afrique répond à Sarkozy: contre le discours de Dakar* (Paris, 2007); Jean-Pierre Chrétien, ed., *L'Afrique de Sarkozy: un déni d'histoire* (Paris, 2008).
48. *Le Monde*, 6 December 2007.

49. *Le Monde*, 18 October 2012.
50. See Hollande's speech at the Algerian parliament (*Le Monde*, 21 December 2012). Hollande's emphasis on the historical 'truth' recalls a strategy used by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin during the torture debate.
51. *El Watan*, 6 March 2012.
52. *L'Humanité*, 25 September 2007.
53. *Libération*, 11 December 2008; *JORF, Lois et décrets*, 26 December 2012: 20437.
54. *Le Monde*, 29 May and 20 June 2014.

14

Comparison – the Way to Understanding: Conclusions

Etienne François

For most Algerians, Germans, French people and Poles, the memory of the massive population transfers that marked World War II and the Algerian War remains, even today, abiding, conflictual and often painful. For me personally this memory is at once that of my mother, born in 1917 in an Algeria where she spent her early childhood; of my godfather, who taught philosophy at the *lycée* in Algiers from 1958 to 1962; of my father-in-law and his entire family, from Silesia; and lastly of my wife, born in Breslau late in the World War and forced to flee the city with her mother and sister in the panic of February 1945. This dual dimension – personal and family roots on the one hand, powerful collective memories on the other – is a summons to a comparative scrutiny of these two events and, even more so, of the memory of the flight and expulsion (*Flucht und Vertreibung* in the hallowed term) of Germans from the eastern provinces and of the ‘repatriation’ of the French of Algeria.

Different events, similar memories

For all its imperativeness, the comparison nonetheless represents a formidable challenge, given the extent to which the differences outweigh the similarities when the two seminal events are juxtaposed on a like for like basis and in their factuality. Repatriates made up between two and three percent of the French population in the early 1960s, whereas the number of Germans from the former eastern provinces represented some 20 percent of the overall German population at the end of World War II. Most of these Germans, moreover, originated from totally German provinces and regions – Eastern Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and the Sudetenland – inhabited by German-speakers for centuries; by contrast the repatriates, even if the families of some of them had been in

Algeria for a century, came from *départements* where the French population was in the minority and, furthermore, enjoyed privileged legal status.

In the French context the ‘return’ of the repatriates to France was a painful, traumatic episode, coming as it did after eight years of war, but the number of victims was limited; in the German context, however, the departures after an infinitely more lethal war were accompanied by much greater human losses and traumata, not to speak of the rapes and other harrowing events occasioned by exile and expulsion. The arrival of German refugees took place under extreme circumstances – they were fleeing to a conquered, ruined, and occupied country in a state of advanced social breakdown – whereas the repatriates were entering the booming France of the postwar ‘Glorious Thirty’, with a stable, structured society and a political and administrative system in good working order. If we also take into account the fact that the exile and expulsion of the Germans of the eastern provinces dates back seventy years, as against fractionally more than fifty for the repatriation of the French of Algeria, we see that from one event to another the differences far outweigh the similarities, thus making any comparison difficult.

The situation is utterly changed, however, if we reverse our perspective and take as a starting point not the events as such, but rather the memorializing configurations and constructs they have given rise to; or, to put it another way, if we start with memory and not with history. In this approach, the resemblances and similarities outnumber the differences.

Four elements emerge particularly sharply from a comparison of the memories of exile and expulsion of the Germans of the eastern provinces and those of the French of Algeria. The first is that behind the factors brought together by the singular, apparently simple term ‘memory’, we are dealing with social and cultural processes of a complex, diverse, and dynamic nature. The chapters in this volume offer a clear – and salutary – reminder that far from being reducible to the public memorial policies and political uses of the past (as is too often imagined to be the case by historians and political scientists), memory has many other, no less important dimensions, whether the memories in question be individual and familial, group and generation related, or affective and cultural.

The second element, equally present in the chapters and in both the German and French memory contexts, relates to the fact that while in both instances there have been periods of public silence, as if the two events no longer existed, these periods have never been synonymous

with forgetting or repression of memory; just as, on the contrary, periods of intense public debate seemingly taking place center stage do not necessarily coincide with any thoroughgoing mobilization of public opinion.

The third common element lies in the observable fact that memory, far from being ossified or static, is in a state of permanent reconstruction, and that this reconstruction always has its roots in the present; which means that if we are to understand it, it is essential, as has been done in this volume, to start out not from the founding event, but from contemporary debate about the remembering of it, and thus to adopt a retrospective approach and method.

The fourth and last element relates to the salutary reminder (confirmed by numerous case studies) that in memories, emotions and images loom larger in the final analysis than words and discourse – images referring in the broad sense to ‘iconic’ photos, and forms of visual expression and representation.¹

Structurally overlapping memories

Over and above these four common elements, this kind of comparison has the advantage of foregrounding two other aspects more clearly than would have been possible using a purely monographic approach: namely, the constitutive plurality of memories on the one hand and their structural imbrication on the other. Plurality of memories finds expression not solely in the routinely simultaneous existence of several interpretations of the same event, all competing for dominant, canonic status, but also in the fact that this plurality itself reflects the plurality of memory places, of interested parties and of what can only be called the memory lobbies and ‘memory entrepreneurs’.²

In both France and Germany it is always these latter who monopolize the spotlight and fill the starring roles, while, contrary to what one might expect, the state plays only a supporting part. Admittedly, the political context is decisive in that this is where the intensity of debate about memorial matters is most readily assessable; but looking at the German and French examples, and at least partly at that of Poland, in all the debate about the presence of the past the primary initiative is taken by the memory stakeholders and entrepreneurs; the state, by contrast, appears as an often weak, uncertain participant, reactive rather than active, hostage or toy to the different lobbies, and struggling to formulate a potentially shared, consensual interpretation of the past.

In this respect Algeria is an exception: the state looms very large and has a quasi-monopoly on what can be said publicly about the past.³ What, though, is going on behind the scenes? However powerful the state, Algerian society is not reducible to the government, the FLN, or parliament; and there are excellent grounds for thinking that lurking behind or beneath the orthodox, official discourse, is a reality at once more complex and more shifting – not only, perhaps, because of different individual and family trajectories, but also because of the many ties between Algerians living in Algeria and Algerians living in France; not to speak of the powerful impact of French media, notably television, on Algerian society, and its consequences in terms of socio-cultural interaction and change that go well beyond the posturings and programs of the powers that be.

The imbrication of memory systems is attributable to the fact that none of those examined in this volume exists in a state of isolation or self-absorption, however marked the temptation for their advocates to proclaim their uniqueness and incomparability. Each of them is, actually, part of a broader memory field that accommodates not only the ties that often bind the bearers of memory, but also the imbrication of levels and scales – from local to national, from bilateral to international – and of models dominant or considered universal, together with transnational paradigms. It is also important to mention the mirror effects and interactions between different memorialist organizations, which spend their time keeping close tabs on each other in the interests of better self-definition and mutual differentiation, as well as the full-time static generated by the intersection of self-defining processes and external perceptions.

Complex, dialectical memory issues

The constitutive plurality of memory systems, together with their structural imbrication, enables in turn a better understanding of the dynamic dialectical complexity of the issues involved. In all the countries here concerned debate apparently bears on the past. But in reality, to the extent to which it bears on the present form of the past, it relates equally to debate about the present and the future. In France, deliberation about the Algerian War and repatriate memory is more generally part of the fundamental debate about the place of the colonial past in French history and identity. How, in France today, is one to perceive the Republic and its values and future when that Republic played such a crucial part in colonization? How, in France today, is one to envisage and

construct an authentically postcolonial form of citizenship? Similarly, current debate about the expulsion of Poland's Germans is also a dialogue about the relationship between Poland and Germany now and in the future, as well as involving a critique of Polish identity and Poland's self-definition as a martyr-nation.

This dialectical complexity is also to be found in the chain reactions triggered at bilateral and international level by memory debates that were initially purely national. We all remember the public opinion backlash in Poland when, after long domestic wrangling, Germany's Grand Coalition decided, in 2005, to install in Berlin a 'visible sign' devoted to the history and memory of expulsions, and more precisely the expulsion of German populations from the former eastern provinces. Similarly, the paragraph on the 'positive role of the French overseas presence' in French school books stealthily slipped into France's memory legislation the same year, had the effect of unleashing, in both France and Algeria, controversies totally out of proportion to the original issue, and thus of halting the development of a peace and friendship treaty already well under way between the two countries.

In more general terms, what is striking about all these debates is the interplay of tension, polarization, and even opposition between two fundamentally, mutually exclusive memory paradigms: that of the martyr and hero on the one hand and that of the victim on the other. The latter is itself an offshoot of the Holocaust paradigm, urged as universal in the last quarter of the twentieth century.⁴ In all the countries concerned, these two paradigms function either interdependently or, more often, in (sometimes reciprocally exclusive) competition. In today's Germany the heroic paradigm has all but vanished, while the victim paradigm rules supreme, complete with the ensuing exaggerated claims and 'inter-victim competition'.

Also notable here is the skill Erika Steinbach has brought to making this paradigm work for expellees and giving their cause fresh legitimacy and a new lease of life.⁵ At the official level in Algeria, the heroic model vaunting the memory of combatants and martyrs is largely dominant; here, too, in the background is the issue of who is entitled to first place in the hierarchy of heroes and martyrs. At the same time, in its relationship with France, Algeria frequently falls back on the victim model.⁶ In Poland the two models have found a mode of more or less peaceful coexistence: the museum devoted to the 1944 Warsaw uprising fits mainly with the heroic-memory-of-the-martyred-nation model, while the new Jewish museum and the debate sparked by Jan Gross' book on *Jedwabne* are closer to the victim version.⁷ In France the defenders

of the Pieds-Noirs and the *harkis* waver between the two registers, presenting them now as heroes of French civilization and progress, now as innocent victims still awaiting full public recognition after an unjust expulsion.

Words, things, and practices

Memory, even if historians sometimes have trouble admitting the fact, is a matter not only of discourse, but also, and even primarily, of images and words, objects and practices. The image field is so vast that to address it here would be to shatter the framework of these brief concluding remarks. And so I shall immediately get down to the question of words – all the more important in that they themselves carry a very strong emotional charge.

Two examples will suffice to make my point: the first is that of *Flucht und Vertreibung*, terms now accepted as canonical in debate in Germany, in spite of being the very opposite of analytical. Whence the wise decision on the part of those coordinating the dialogue between German and Polish historians in the 1970s and 1980s to replace them with *Umsiedlung* (resettlement), a word less highly charged and more acceptable to the authorities in socialist Poland – until Włodzimierz Borodziej summoned both sides to ‘call a spade a spade’ and forget their misgivings about *Vertreibung*.⁸

The other example comes from the Algerian War: for perfectly logical reasons the French state refused to use the term ‘war’ throughout the duration of the conflict, and it was not until 1999 that the war was officially recognized as such. Despite this step in the right direction, a word truly acceptable to both French and Algerians is still proving elusive, if only because what was a war for one side, was a revolution and a struggle for national liberation for the other.

The same applies in the even vaster and highly sensitive field of place names: when was it that in each of the countries concerned public reminders began to be issued that the city now called Gdansk was, until 1945, called Danzig, and is now de facto both? And when was it that public reminders began to be issued that today’s city of Annaba was called Bône during the French colonial period and Hippo in antiquity, and is now de facto all three? And what about those countless streets and neighborhoods which, in Germany as in France, bear names still perpetuating the memory of the ‘lost territories’?

With regard to objects and visible vestiges, I think in particular about everything to do with heritage. Archives and libraries, of course, but

equally so towns and villages, buildings and monuments that preserve the memory of a former, abolished presence – with, according to epochs and circumstances, the attendant destructions, appropriations, preservations, and even reconstructions. Where destruction is concerned, one example is the numerous desecrations of German cemeteries in the former German provinces after their assignment to Poland; but this is only one aspect of much larger processes.⁹ Among the appropriations I think of the transformation in Poland of many former German Protestant churches into Catholic ones; but also, in Algeria, of Catholic and Protestant churches – and synagogues – into mosques.¹⁰ But we should not forget, either, especially in the case of Poland, all the work of preservation and reconstruction of the German architectural heritage, from the restoration of Marienburg Castle near Malbork to the reconstruction of the Old Town in Gdansk as a perfect replica of a German-speaking Hanseatic city during the Renaissance.

Lastly, in practical, everyday terms, I think of the package tours organized by and for the one-time inhabitants (and their descendants) of the former German eastern provinces and former French Algeria; the double aim being, in the form of semi-secular pilgrimages, a rediscovery of the localities of the past and the tombs of the ancestors, and a discovery of the present-day reality of these regions.¹¹ For in addition to the trips that are primarily nostalgic and commemorative in intent, there are many others whose primary concern is insight into the new life of the villages and towns of contemporary Poland and independent Algeria – their inhabitants, their history, their appropriation of the past – and ultimately the creation of binational and transnational communities of memory.

From dividedness to sharing?

Must we hope for, one day, a common memory of the expulsion of the Germans and the repatriation of the French of Algeria? In its utopian naïveté the question contains its own answer. The idea of a common memory runs so directly counter to the reality of memory as a complex, dynamic, dialectical socio-cultural process, borne along by its internal differences and its divisions, that there is no point in lingering over it. It is quite simply meaningless. The real question is, rather, whether or not the transition is feasible from a conflictual divided memory to a shared one; and of how the transition might be effected from just such a divided memory to what Italian historian Luisa Passerini has called a 'shareable' one.¹²

To return to the two examples compared in this volume, everything suggests that in the case of Germany and Poland we are witnessing the transition from a divided to a shareable – if not shared – memory of the flight and expulsion of the German populations. The debate on the issue has long since ceased to be purely national and is now taking place in an increasingly cross-border, binational and international context. On both sides the dominant feeling is that the two countries' pasts are structurally interlinked and can only be understood from a joint point of view. All this is the outcome of a long-drawn-out process and has become possible only in the wake of Germany's full and complete recognition of Nazism's primary responsibility in precipitating World War II and its concomitant crimes; of the transformation of the international and geopolitical state of affairs (full German acceptance of Poland's borders, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, enlargement of the European Union); of generational change and ongoing cooperation between historians; and of the acknowledgment by large segments of the Polish population that their forebears could have been both victims and perpetrators during World War II – and by extension that overall, the history and memory of Germany and Poland are a matter of shared responsibility.

In the case of Algeria and France, though, there seems not to have been the same progress, and the path ahead remains long. In France it is beginning to be known that 8 May 1945 was the date not only of the victory over Nazi Germany, but also of the Sétif massacres in Algeria. The teaching of colonial history and the Algerian War has changed radically over recent decades, with many French and Algerian historians striving for closer study and understanding of their countries' pasts. The fact remains, however, that official France is still somewhat reluctant to acknowledge its primary responsibilities in the history of its interdependent relationship with Algeria since 1830. And while it is true that, as in the case of Poland and Germany, the two countries have a shared responsibility in respect of their common history, the French state and French society cannot afford to forgo thorough public recognition of the realities of colonialism. This is the essential precondition for the beginnings of a shared Franco-Algerian memory.

Memory itself is a reality so complex and so far-reaching that it eludes all attempts at control and guidance by politicians and historians. But to the extent that it is a living reality, it never ceases to surprise us. Rather than yielding to doubt or skepticism, let us in all confidence recall the words of St Augustine, bishop of Hippo, who wrote so luminously, '*Magna vis est memoriae*' – 'Great is the power of memory'.¹³

Notes

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Note: As terms such as 'expelles', 'France', 'FRG', 'Germany', 'state' and others appear so often throughout the text, they have been omitted here.

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