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Critical Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Science

New Perspectives on Immigration Discourse

Christopher Hart



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University of Hertfordshire, UK

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

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First published 2010 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN: 978–0–230–27950–6 hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

For my parents

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Preface

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) claims to be theoretically eclectic. However, its description of language use has largely been confined to sociolinguistic frameworks and its explanation for the impact of texts has been in terms of social theory. Missing from its theoretical and analytical frameworks are cognitive descriptions of language use and cognitive explanations for the effects of texts. This book advances a model for the analysis of manipulation and ideology in political discourse which draws upon Cognitive Linguistics and Evolutionary Psychology, alongside the standard tools of CDA. It is argued that CDA must account for the cognitive construction of meaning and further psychological processes involved in immigration discourse if it is to fully investigate the links between language use and social inequality. The model that is developed is related to the socio-cognitive approach and is applied in a critical exposé of immigration discourse in the UK press. Immigration remains a contentious issue in the UK and one which is largely fuelled by the media. As a measure, between 2000 and 2006 three major bills restricting immigration and asylum and regulating the residence of foreigners were passed before parliament. Immigration was at the heart of the 2005 general election campaign, especially for the political right. And once fringe parties on the extreme right of the political spectrum have recently enjoyed unprecedented success at the local, national and European level. It is now more important than ever for CDA to harness new tools to tackle old problems.

Christopher Hart
Hertfordshire 2010

Acknowledgements

Books are not written in vacuums. They are dialogic. The views presented have been developed in discussion with various colleagues, though any errors are obviously the author's own responsibility. I hope I have not misrepresented the views of those colleagues who have been generous enough to share their ideas. Books also require the support and encouragement of people in our personal lives. It therefore behoves me to thank all of those individuals who have had an influence, in one way or another, in the writing of this book.

First and foremost I must thank my parents, to whom this book is dedicated. You have been both an inspiration and a motivation to see this project through. Secondly, I must thank Paul Chilton. Paul truly is the godfather of political linguistics and his influence on this work will be obvious. Thank you for your time and insight. I should also like to thank Veronika Koller, Piotr Cap and one anonymous reviewer for comments on various aspects of the book at its different stages. I am indebted to Juana Marín Arrese and others at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid for indulging me with so many informative conversations when this work was in its final stages of completion. I should also, of course, express thanks to all of my colleagues with whom I have been able to exchange ideas at various international conferences over the past four years. I currently enjoy a lectureship at the University of Hertfordshire. I am grateful to colleagues there for a great many practical reasons but in particular to Marjolein Groefsema for her enthusiasm towards life and linguistics. Last but certainly not least, I wish to thank Heather for her love, understanding, indulgence and especially her patience on those all too frequent occasions when the writing of this has had an inevitable impact on our lives. I crave your continued love and support.

Part I

The Scope of CDA

Introduction

The label 'Critical Discourse Analysis' or CDA has come to refer to a particular branch of applied linguistics associated with researchers such as Roger Fowler, Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. However, critical discourse analysis in a broader sense can be traced back at least as far as the Aristotelian study of rhetoric. In contemporary philosophy, the Marxist-influenced *Critical Theory* of the Frankfurt school, associated with Adorno and Horkheimer, and later Habermas, as well as Foucault's post-structuralist discourse analysis, also count as critical discourse analysis in this broader sense. Indeed, the work of Habermas and Foucault in particular has provided important social theory for CDA.

CDA, as a field of applied linguistics, was incepted as Critical Linguistics, pioneered by researchers at the University of East Anglia and inaugurated with the publication of *Language and Control* (Fowler et al. 1979) and *Language as Ideology* (Kress and Hodge 1979). Critical Linguistics later became subsumed under CDA and is now considered a particular branch of CDA (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). CDA is not a single theory, then, but is multifarious (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 12). It is made up of several identifiable strands which differ methodologically but which share a common conceptual framework and critical perspective (van Dijk 2001: 353). With the exception of the socio-cognitive approach, however, the various faces of CDA have inherited, to lesser or greater degrees, the methods and practices associated with Critical Linguistics (Chilton 2005a: 21; Wodak 2001a: 8).

At first, Critical Linguistics applied Chomsky's transformational grammar. This was then replaced with Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar (Fowler 1991). However, remnants of transformational theory remained in a model which combined key concepts – transformation

and representation – from two quite different traditions and tailored them to suit (Hodge and Kress 1993; Kress 1996). Transformations were in some sense a strange object of analysis for Critical Linguistics since they were treated by Chomsky as deriving formal equivalences. What Critical Linguists did, however, was press this formal device, transformational grammar, into functional service (Widdowson 2004: 97). Analysis was primarily concerned with representations in news texts which, it was claimed, 'mystified' responsibility for particular actions, thus encoding ideology. Critical Linguists reverse-engineered representations to reveal 'a varied history of transformations' (Hodge and Kress 1993: 21). Transformations were seen as necessarily ideological since they 'always involve suppression and/or distortion' (Hodge and Kress 1993: 35). Hodge and Kress regarded this reverse-engineering as 'hypothetical reconstructions of psychologically real processes' (ibid.). The crucial claim they made was that 'commuters on the 8.05 from Brighton' would not perform the same reconstructions (1993: 22). The transformational process performed by the writer in arriving at representations was said not to be reproduced by the reader. Thus, Critical Linguistics was required in order to demystify ideological dimensions of discourse. However, one of the criticisms levelled at CDA is that it takes for granted such a claim since it does not seriously address the role of the reader in interpretation-stage analysis (Fowler 1996; O'Halloran 2003; Widdowson 2004).

This book is an exercise in CDA. But it is largely an exercise in theoretical development, motivated by a dissatisfaction with the current state of the art. CDA claims to be theoretically eclectic and capable of analysing a wide range of linguistic phenomena (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 12). In practice, however, while CDA, since its development from Critical Linguistics, has been directed towards a great variety of text types in different domains, the linguistic theory that it has applied and the linguistic objects that it has analysed have been fairly limited in scope. As O'Halloran observes, 'while CDA has absorbed Critical Linguistics – and thus its techniques for analysing how texts can mystify the responsibility for a particular event – there has been little development of these techniques since its absorption' (2003: 15). CDA has therefore had a high mileage out of analysing transitivity and transformations (Fowler 1996: 5). CDA is still further limited in its use of these particular apparatuses. For example, Widdowson (2004: 97) notes that CDA 'does not involve the systematic application of [Systemic Functional Grammar] taken as a whole, but the expedient picking and choosing of whatever aspect of it seems useful for its purposes'.

While CDA boasts about its theoretical eclecticism, limited though it may be in practice, this position is the object of outside criticism. Widdowson, for example, further lambasts CDA for borrowing from a varied assortment of ideas besides Systemic Functional Linguistics, questioning how these ideas can be 'related and integrated into a theoretically coherent model?' (2004: 97). Inside CDA, Fowler himself warned of the danger in using 'competing and uncontrolled methodologies drawn from a scatter of different models in the social sciences' (1996: 12). We might infer from comments such as these that theoretical eclecticism is acceptable so long as (i) theories are applied systematically rather than selecting certain aspects of them while conveniently ignoring others and (ii) theories are brought together in a coherent, integrated framework.

Worse criticisms abound for CDA. Chilton (2005a) questions whether there is even any point in CDA. He argues that people are perfectly able, in fact biologically equipped, to recognise ideological processes behind text-production, thus raising the issue of what exactly it is that critical discourse analysts can bring to the table. If people are innately endowed with a 'critical' potential, as Chilton argues, then CDA, to have any efficacy, needs to demonstrate beyond the ordinary person's power of detection that discourse is ideological. The only way that CDA can do this is through systematic and sophisticated linguistic analysis which Widdowson (2004: 97) suggests is left wanting in CDA.

Indeed, it appears to me as though CDA, since its divergence from Critical Linguistics, has lost its way as a field of applied linguistics. Some critical discourse analyses seem simply to involve repeating back stretches of text and pointing out, against some loose theoretical background, instances of ideology or argumentation which any ordinary language user would be capable of spotting. In this sense, I am in agreement with Fowler (1996: 12) who states that 'nowadays it seems that anything can count as discourse analysis'. As Halliday (1994: xvi–xvii) makes clear, however, any discourse analysis that is not based on a theory of language is not, in fact, a discourse analysis at all, but simply 'a running commentary on the text'.

It is surely the task of Critical Discourse Analysts, as experts, to identify manipulation and ideology in text that is 'below the threshold of notice' (Fowler 1991: 66). The role of the Critical Discourse Analyst, who, as linguist or psychologist, is equipped with the theoretical tools required to look behind language use, is to use their expertise to bring to the level of public consciousness instances of manipulation and ideology not immediately apparent to average readers, thus empowering them with a new critical awareness.[1]

Despite some problems with transformational analysis (O'Halloran 2003; Widdowson 2004), it was Critical Linguistics which, to my mind, seemed to do this the most effectively and within a model more closely oriented to theories of language. The analytical claims of Critical Linguistics can be called into question. However, this should be possible, based on evidence, for any valid scientific model (Popper 1959). This is not always the case in CDA.

In the current CDA landscape, it is Critical Metaphor Analysis, a new and emerging model informed by a dedicated research programme in Cognitive Linguistics, which, in my view, now represents the most rigorous, linguistics-orientated approach to CDA and the one which is the most illuminatory. Like transformations, metaphors always involve suppression and distortion. And, moreover, readers are not normally aware of when they are processing metaphor, that is 'until some linguist or discourse analyst comes along' (Chilton 2005b: 24). But Critical Metaphor Analysis still only applies a single component of Cognitive Linguistics. There is much more to Cognitive Linguistics than metaphor research and, equally, much more to Cognitive Science than Cognitive Linguistics.

Cognitive Linguistics, then, like Generative Linguistics, is a discipline of Cognitive Science. However, the dominant approaches within CDA – recognised as the sociosemiotic approach and the discourse-historical approach (Titscher et al. 2000; Widdowson 2004) – although they make cursory glances towards cognitive psychology, rely almost exclusively on social science methodologies. Wodak (2006: 179) would have us believe otherwise when she claims that theories by George Lakoff have had a large influence on her work. However, I can see no real trace of Lakoff anywhere in the discourse-historical approach which she advocates. This is not at detriment to these particular approaches. They have their own, equally valid, theoretical backgrounds and methodologies. But it does highlight the need for a further, complementary, approach.

And there are good reasons why CDA requires an approach that takes serious stock of research in contemporary Cognitive Science, including Cognitive Linguistics, something which mainstream CDA does not currently seem to recognise (Chilton 2005a). Despite its rapid development, Critical Metaphor Analysis remains a marginalised, misunderstood and in some circles even maligned approach to CDA. Even more vilified is Evolutionary Psychology. However, it has recently been argued that Evolutionary Psychology can, alongside Cognitive Linguistics, inform CDA (Chilton 2005a; Hart 2005). This is the position we adopt in this book.

Chilton (2005a) and the body of work in Critical Metaphor Analysis can therefore be seen as departure points for the model presented. However, there are two fundamental differences. First and foremost, Chilton's article is intentionally polemical. He uses Evolutionary Psychology to argue that, in light of evidence for a so-called cheater-detection module hardwired in human cognition, the efficacy of CDA is cast into doubt because what critical discourse analysts do people are biologically equipped to do themselves. By contrast, I am committed to the practice of CDA but believe it needs a firmer footing in Cognitive Science so that new methodologies can be applied and existing claims can be better attested. Evolutionary Psychology is not used here to challenge CDA, then, but in service of CDA. It is used to show that discourse, on evolutionary expectations, can have manipulative properties which may be beneath the threshold of notice precisely because it can exploit evolved cognitive modules, including the cheater-detection module, which operate automatically behind the scenes. It is further used to demonstrate the possible cognitive impact of certain discursive strategies and thus the psychological, and ultimately social and political, goals behind their deployment in discourse.

Secondly, then, in the model presented here, metaphor and other textual structures are explicitly related to specific strategies identified in CDA, including reference, predication, proximisation and legitimisation (Cap 2006; Chilton 2004; Chilton and Schäffner 1997; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2001b). We organise these linguistic strategies into two types, representation and legitimisation, and all in service of a macrolevel speaker strategy, coercion. Cognitive Linguistics is used to show how these strategies are manifested in particular constructions and successfully effected in the way that those constructions are cognised. We analyse a range of semantic and grammatical categories and consider the role they play in ideological reproduction and persuasion at both ends of the communication process. In contrast to Critical Metaphor Analysis, then, which is typically conducted at the description-stage in relation to ideation, Cognitive Linguistics is applied here, in addition, beyond the scope of metaphor, at the interpretation-stage, and in relation to both the ideational and the interpersonal metafunction.

What CDA is left wanting, and what we attempt to develop in this book, then, is a broad but coherent cognitive framework systematically informed by Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Linguistics. We present a particular model which fits neatly within the overall enterprise, coheres with more general conceptual frameworks, and is

sensitive to, and in sync with, existing approaches and the theories and methodologies they espouse.

This model is applied in a critical discourse analysis of discourse on immigration and asylum within the UK press. This is by no means a novel genre or domain for CDA. However, the specific data analysed is derived from an original corpus. And this domain and genre has not before been investigated from the particular perspective promoted here.

The book is organised into three parts. Part I contains the first chapter, where we introduce CDA and identify its current limitations. In particular, we identify two 'missing links': cognitive-evolutionary explanation and cognitive-linguistic interpretation. It is proposed that to address these shortcomings a model is needed which incorporates Evolutionary Psychology on the one hand and Cognitive Linguistics on the other. Evolutionary Psychology can be used to explain why particular discursive strategies are used in political discourse and why they might be so effective. Cognitive Linguistics can be used to show some of the more subtle means by which certain discursive strategies are manifested in text and effected in cognition. In the first chapter, then, we introduce Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Linguistics and demonstrate what they can bring to CDA.

Part II contains four chapters which apply Evolutionary Psychology. In Chapter 2, we discuss, within an evolutionary framework, the cognitive abilities involved in communication. In particular, we focus on the role of representations and the human ability to form detached and meta-representations. We discuss the cooperative functions of communication and, in light of Gricean Pragmatics and Relevance Theory, the cooperative nature of the communicative process. However, we argue that once cooperation, in both of these senses, was in place, communication for manipulation was an almost inevitable evolutionary outcome. We thus justify, on evolutionary grounds, the critical significance that CDA attaches to discourse. Here we rebut the challenge raised against CDA by Chilton (2005a). We suggest that his reasoning is flawed, based on an incomplete picture of evolutionary logic and further argue that there are certain social and linguistic conditions under which the operation of any 'natural critical discourse analysis' is overcome or avoided.

In Chapter 3, we discuss referential strategies and some of the structures that realise them. Referential strategies are narrowly defined as intentions to promote dichotomous conceptualisations of social groups. We highlight the fundamental nature of referential strategies in racist discourse. We suggest that humans are 'evolutionarily ready'

to construct cognitive representations which effect referential strategies and that this might explain their psychological impact. However, we stress that in contemporary society this readiness is only engaged by certain discursive experiences and that in this respect the deconstructive agenda in CDA is both valid and invaluable. We briefly mention Sperber's (1994) metatemplates as the cognitive basis for this readiness but conclude that referential strategies in modern racist discourse are more likely to appeal to coalitional psychology. We therefore postulate that the human predilection for dichotomous conceptualisations of social groups is a product of ancestral history. In particular, the genuine threats posed by alternative coalitional groups in the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness. We further argue that humans are predisposed to the effects of predicational strategies because, for the same reasons, they are 'evolutionarily ready' to attach threat-connoting cues to non-group members. Predicational strategies involve the ascription of qualities and quantities to members of social groups. Again, though, we stress the possibility of a counter-discourse eliminating these effects. We identify four particular referential strategies, nationalisation, de-spatialisation, dissimilation and collectivisation, and some of the referential expressions that realise them, including nationyms, toponyms, xenonyms and deictic pronouns. We suggest that successful referential strategies are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the communication of prejudice. Predicational strategies must also be effected. Predicational strategies can, over time, however, cause referential expressions to realise predicational strategies through semantic prosody. Similarly, some predications – syntactic, semantic or pragmatic reflexes of predicational strategies – can simultaneously perform referential functions.

We discuss predicational strategies in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we outline the macro-strategy of coercion as involving cognitive and emotive effects. Predications are coercive when they successfully communicate representations which, in turn, activate evolved modules adapted to the ancestral environment but still available for exploitation in contemporary cognition. These modules include the cheater-detection module and emotion programs, which, when activated, guide cognition in particular directions and affect decision-making processes. We point out that predications are not necessarily restricted to predicates but may consist in a range of syntactic, semantic or pragmatic phenomena. We also point out that predications can function as first premises in argumentation schemes known as topoi. Topoi are argumentation schemes in which an implicit conclusion is presupposed by the premise

(Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Dijk 2000; Wodak 2001b). We suggest that predications in immigration discourse tend to operate as premises in ten such topoi. We argue that the effects of these topoi, in some cases through intertextual interaction, are to activate mental modules in ways which promote decisions in favour of exclusion. In this sense, we suggest that topoi in immigration discourse tap in to adapted decision-rules. We further argue that proximisation strategies, which are essentially deictic, exacerbate the effects of predicational strategies by presenting threats as close and imminent and therefore warranting immediate reaction.

Of course, referential, predicational and proximisation strategies can only be brought into effect to successfully achieve coercion when the propositions they communicate are accepted as true and accurate representations of reality. Legitimising strategies are used to ensure precisely this. We discuss legitimising strategies in Chapter 5. In this chapter, following the argument presented in Chapter 2, we suggest that discourse is imbued with devices designed to overcome text-consumers' operation of a logico-rhetorical module, a sub-module of the cheater-detection module, through displays of 'coherence' (Sperber 2001). We distinguish between 'internal coherence' and 'external coherence'. The former is coherence in Halliday and Hasan's (1976) sense. It refers to logical relations between sentences and clauses and is often expressed in cohesive devices. The latter refers to relations of commitment and support for propositions and is expressed in evidentiality and epistemic modality. We discuss cohesion and evidentiality in this chapter, leaving discussion of epistemic modality for Chapter 8.

In Part III, we apply Cognitive Linguistics to show how certain semantic categories function in strategic discourse. In particular, we focus on metaphor, force-dynamics and epistemic modality. In Chapter 6, we describe conceptualisation, the cognitive process of forming mental representations during discourse. This process, we argue, is inherently ideological since, reflecting the position taken towards representation in Critical Linguistics, conceptualisation always encodes 'construal'. Conceptualisation involves 'online' processes of meaning construction against 'offline' conceptual structures stored in long-term memory. We characterise these conceptual structures as cognitive models in the form of frames, schemas and conceptual metaphors and relate them to social cognition. We argue that temporary structures built online are structured by cognitive models but also come to constitute them, thus mirroring the dialectic relation between texts and discourses, mediated by discourse practices. In this chapter, we introduce metaphor

and highlight its significance for CDA. We illustrate the specific process of meaning construction involved in metaphor, namely conceptual blending, with a novel and infamous example. We further discuss the relation between conceptualisation and cognitive models in comparing Conceptual Blending Theory and Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

In Chapter 7, we discuss in more detail the strategic and ideological effects of metaphor. We highlight six statements made in Cognitive Linguistics which make metaphor a matter of concern for CDA. We then conduct a critical metaphor analysis of anti-immigration discourse using Conceptual Blending Theory. We focus on metaphors for Britain and metaphors for immigrants and immigration and show how they realise representational strategies. We show how metaphors for Britain mainly realise referential strategies, while metaphors for immigrants and immigration tend to realise predicational strategies and may therefore function as topoi. However, we note that any metaphor may be used in service of both reference and predication simultaneously. Under metaphors for Britain we discuss those that are structured by the CONTAINER schema and its instantiation in the cognitive frame for HOUSE. Under metaphors for immigrants and immigration we discuss those that fall within the themes of WAR and WATER. We show how metaphors for Britain and metaphors for immigrants and immigration cohere cotextually or intertextually and interact cognitively to create further inferences with ideological, argumentational or affective attachments.

In Chapter 8, we discuss force-dynamics and epistemic modality. Force-dynamics refers to a set of image schemas which underpin expressions of force and causation (Talmy 1988, 2000). We show that force-dynamics functions at the level of representation, encoding ideological conceptualisations and realising referential and predicational strategies. We also show that force-dynamics may operate at the level of legitimisation since it may metaphorically underpin expressions of epistemic modality (Johnson 1987; Sweetser 1990; Talmy 1988, 2000). We discuss epistemic modality and its inter-relation with evidentiality. We argue that both are bound up with concepts of authority but suggest that the former is used in a legitimising strategy of 'subjectification' while the latter is used in a legitimising strategy of 'objectification'. We therefore relate epistemic modality to superordinate notions of subjective stance. We show that modal markers prompt for the construction of mental spaces assigned different values on an epistemic scale, which corresponds with an authority scale. We suggest that force-dynamics operates at the level of legitimisation where epistemic evaluations

express a conceptualisation in which an 'epistemic force' is acting upon propositions, propelling them towards one's conception of reality.

Like all CDA, this book has a critical agenda. It aims to uncover instances of manipulation and ideology in discourse on immigration. However, it has a stronger theoretical agenda. This book offers a novel approach to CDA which is explanatory as well as descriptive. This perspective may allow CDA to become more revealing than it already is and some of its existing claims to be borne out by Cognitive Science.

1
Critical Discourse Analysis

1.1. Introduction

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a research enterprise which critically analyses the relationship between language and society. More specifically, CDA is a type of discourse-analytical research that studies the way in which ideology, identity and inequality are (re)enacted through texts produced in social and political contexts (van Dijk 2001: 352). Language is considered as crucial in the reproduction of ideologies, which, in turn, is seen as central in establishing and sustaining social identities and inequalities (Wodak 2001a: 10).

CDA is not critical of other theoretical or methodological approaches to discourse analysis, then, but of social relations as they are constituted through discourse (Billig 2003: 38). Critical discourse analysts openly adopt a political position and aim to detect problematic – from their own normative-ethical background – properties of discursive practices (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32). The political position of most critical discourse analysts is one which empathises with those most disadvantaged by inequality (van Dijk 1993b: 352). Racist and xenophobic discourse in particular have been extensively analysed (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Dijk 1987, 1991, 1993a; Wodak 1996, 1999). These critical discourse analysts wish to understand, expose and ultimately resist latent racist ideologies and arguments in texts with a view to achieving changes in the social structure. This kind of critique is referred to by Reisigl and Wodak as 'socio-diagnostic critique' (2001: 32). Methodologically, CDA deploys a suite of linguistic theories in service of socio-diagnostic critique where appropriate linguistic tools are said to be able bring to the surface for inspection otherwise clandestine properties of text and discourse and thus create

a greater awareness and correct a widespread underestimation of the influence of language in shaping ideology and society (Fairclough 1989: 2; Fowler 1991: 89).

1.2. Approaches to CDA

As a research enterprise, CDA is diverse and interdisciplinary, comprising a number of methodological approaches directed towards a variety of data (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 12). The methodology of CDA can therefore only be presented 'with reference to particular approaches and with regard to their specific theoretical backgrounds' (Titscher et al. 2000: 144). Four approaches in particular may be identified: Critical Linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979; Fowler 1991, 1996; Kress 1985; Kress and Hodge 1979); the socio-semiotic approach (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b); the discourse-historical approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 1996, 2001b) and the socio-cognitive approach (van Dijk 1995, 1998, 2002). We will refer to these four approaches together as 'mainstream CDA' since they are the most established and recognised. They can be distinguished from one another by the various linguistic theories they apply. However, one theory in particular is recurrent where in most studies there is a reference to Hallidayan linguistics, indicating that an understanding of Systemic Functional Grammar is essential for a proper understanding of CDA (Wodak 2001a: 8).[1] Hallidayan linguistics is a natural theoretical framework for CDA to draw upon, given that, for Halliday, 'language is as it is because of its function in the social structure' (1973: 65).

While Systemic Functional Grammar is central to CDA, CDA is theoretically eclectic (Wodak 2001a: 8). For example, in the discourse-historical and socio-cognitive approach, argumentation theory provides insights into the 'strategies' behind the structures in text.[2] 'Strategies' are understood as more or less intentional or institutionalised plans of practices, including discourse practices, aimed at achieving particular psychological, social and political goals (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44). Various strategies have been identified across the literature (see Chilton 2004; Chilton and Schäffner 1997; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2001b). These include referential, predicational and legitimising strategies which we discuss in Part II.

While the various approaches can be distinguished according to the specific methodological tools they use, given common (critical) agendas and perspectives, they are closely connected by more general conceptual frameworks (van Dijk 2001: 353). Fairclough and Wodak

(1997: 271–80) offer the following statements as the central tenets of CDA:

- CDA addresses social problems
- discourse is a form of social action
- discourse does ideological work
- power relations are discursive
- discourse constitutes society and culture
- discourse is historical
- the link between text and society is mediated

1.3. The Socio-Cognitive Model

For a lucid account of the discursive construction of social inequality a model is needed in which the link between text and society is mediated by cognition. The socio-cognitive approach developed by van Dijk presents just one such model, connecting textual, cognitive and social structures. For van Dijk (1985, 1988b, 2008, 2009), textual structure and social structure are mediated by *social cognition*. Social cognition is defined as 'the system of mental representations and processes of group members' (1995: 18). Van Dijk (1993b: 280) states that it is theoretically essential for microlevel notions such as text and macrolevel notions such as social relations to be mediated by social cognition. Indeed, to explain how texts can be socially constructive presupposes an account that relates textual structures to social cognition, and social cognition to social structures (ibid.). The model proposed in the socio-cognitive approach may be diagrammatically represented as in Figure 1.1, where



Figure 1.1 Textual-cognitive-social structure triangle

the shaded area signifies the microlevel focus of text analysis and the bidirectional arrows the dialectical relation between textual structure and social structure mediated by social cognition.

Social cognition is connected to what van Dijk (2002) terms *social memory*. For van Dijk, cognitive processes and representations are defined relative to an abstract mental structure called *memory* (2002: 207), which is broken down into *short-term memory* and *long-term memory*. Actual processing of information (discourse) occurs in short-term memory against information stored in long-term memory (discourses). Long-term memory, in turn, is further broken down into *episodic memory* and *semantic memory*. Episodic memory stores information based on personal experiences and semantic memory stores more general, abstract and socially shared information, such as our knowledge of the language or knowledge of the world (van Dijk 2002: 208). Van Dijk (2002) uses *social memory* to refer to semantic memory given the contrast between the socially shared nature of semantic memory and the idiosyncratic nature of episodic memory. Social cognitions are socially shared mental structures and representations. Although embodied in the minds of individuals, social cognitions are social 'because they are shared and presupposed by group members' (van Dijk 1993b: 257).[3] In this sense, the socio-cognitive model bridges both the individualism and social constructivism associated with text-consumption. Social cognitions can be characterised more abstractly as attitudes, ideologies, opinions, prejudices, discourses or member resources. Crucially, these socially situated cognitive structures and representations are largely acquired, used and changed through texts (van Dijk 1990: 165). This process is facilitated by the human capacity for metarepresentation (Sperber 2000). A metarepresentation is a representation of a representation. Texts are public metarepresentations which 'convey mental representations and have, at least by extension, some of the properties of the mental representations they convey' (Sperber 2000: 128). Interpreting texts involves constructing cognitive metarepresentations of the linguistic representations in text.

1.4. The Role of the Media

Knowledge of certain social and political realities is not formed from first-hand experience but rather on the basis of the texts to which we are exposed. The media is particularly important in this regard and has been widely studied in CDA (Bell 1991; Bell and Garrett 1998; Chilton 1988; Fairclough 1995b; Fowler 1991; Fowler et al. 1979; Montgomery 2007;

O'Keefe 2006; Richardson 2007; van Dijk 1988a). Some *primary* texts and thus the ideologies they express are disseminated in the main through other *secondary* texts commenting upon them (Koller 2004: 24). One such form of commentary is journalism (ibid.). So for example, representations in political speeches, parliamentary debates, Government or independent reports, are usually acquired via newspaper or other media articles. Secondary texts therefore act as a lens through which primary texts are reified but may also be recontextualised (Koller 2004: 45).

The approach developed in this book is applied in an exposé of anti-immigration and -asylum discourse in the genre of print news media. The significance of this genre for CDA can be characterised in terms of power by virtue of 'unique access to the public ear' and 'an institutionalised right of narration' (Santa Ana 2002: 50). According to the Newspaper Marketing Agency, national newspapers reach on average 45 per cent of the adult population on a daily basis, 62 per cent on a weekly basis and 81 per cent on a monthly basis.[4] The increasing availability of newspapers online may further extend their reach (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008).

The economic power of the mainstream press facilitates a distributional power, which, in turn, further contributes to its economic power, facilitating still greater distributional power. The effect of this cycle is that the voice of publications with less economic power becomes marginalised or even muted. It follows that mainstream media should, on the whole, reflect the interests of those who invest it with economic power, including other economically powerful actors, institutions and agencies, such as corporate elites, pressure groups and advertisers but also consumers. As Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 9) point out, 'the relation between the press and its readers is bi-directional and dynamic'. On the one hand, since consumers tend to read those newspapers which are generally in accord with their own perceptions, 'individual newspapers have a vested financial interest in reporting on issues within their reader's concerns, as well as reflecting their readers' views and attitudes' (ibid.). But on the other hand, 'the power of newspapers over the selection, extent, frequency and nature of their reporting' (ibid.) determines both which issues consumers become concerned with and their views and attitudes towards them. The significance of newspaper discourse as a genre of text, then, has in part to do with the distributional power of the press. But it also has to do with the power of the press to control what is featured and how. These two dimensions of control reflect what Fowler (1996) refers to as 'selection' and 'transformation' respectively. It is, of course, the 'how' that is primarily addressed in CDA through

linguistic description. Another element of media power, then, is its capacity to manipulate ideational and interpersonal information and thus communicate ideology. Or as Santa Ana (2002: 51) puts it: 'media power is constituted in the ability to characterise the events of the day and the social structure of society in a particular way'.

The relationship between the press and policy makers is also bi-directional. The press sculpt public opinion to rationalise policy decisions and thus reflect the interests of policy makers, where 'the major media ... will generally reflect the perspectives and interests of established power' (Chomsky 1989: 10). But, at the same time, the press also drive policy decisions by shaping public opinion to which policy makers in democratic societies must respond.

Our examples are taken from texts published within a seven-year period between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2006. Significantly, during this period the European Union (EU) twice expanded[5] and three major bills concerning immigration and asylum were passed before Parliament.[6] Fowler (1991: 227) points out that within newspapers can be found a set of distinct sub-genres including editorials and letters to the editor, as well as news reports. Examples from texts in these three particular sub-genres are included in our analysis since they each contribute to media discourse on immigration and asylum and editorials and letters to the editor are subject to the same processes of selection and transformation as news reports.

The majority of examples come from publications largely regarded as right-wing; namely *The Sun, The Mail, The Express* and *The Telegraph.*

Table 1.1 Sales figures for UK national newspapers

Newspaper	Average daily sales
Populars	
The Mirror	1,430,437
The Sun	2,904,002
Mid-markets	
The Express	721,538
The Mail	2,144,808
Qualities	
The Guardian	320,616
The Independent	202,184
The Telegraph	853,808
The Times	598,213

However, it is worth noting that it is this right-wing voice which is most widely heard. Table 1.1 shows the average daily sales figures, by sector, for the eight publications from where our examples are taken.[7] In each sector it is a right-wing publication that has the highest circulation.

1.5. New Directions

Fairclough (1995a: 97) identifies three stages of critical discourse analysis. Description-stage analysis concerns the text itself. At the interpretation stage, Fairclough states that one can include 'more psychological and cognitive concerns with how people arrive at interpretations' (1995a: 59). At the explanation-stage, O'Halloran (2003: 2) notes that recent developments in CDA have seen a dynamic space created for interdisciplinary work involving socio-cultural analysis in order to account for the significance of texts. Much of CDA, however, has been restricted to description-stage analysis using Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar.

Absent from the theoretical bases of CDA is biologically based explanation as to the potency of particular discursive strategies. There has also, by and large, been a vacuum of interpretation-stage analysis. These fundamental gaps represent two major theoretical holes in CDA. The first is cognitive-evolutionary explanation as to *why* particular discursive strategies are used and *why* they are so effective. The second is cognitive-linguistic interpretation of *how* certain linguistic structures manifest and effect in cognition particular discursive strategies. I propose that these gaps can be bridged by drawing on two specific areas of Cognitive Science: Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Linguistics. Despite some cursory glances towards cognitive psychology, developments in Cognitive Science have generally been neglected in CDA (Chilton 2005a: 21). From such a cognitive perspective, however, new approaches to understanding and analysing manipulation and ideology in discourse emerge, CDA perhaps becoming more revealing than it already is and some of its existing claims better attested (Hart 2005).

1.5.1. Evolutionary psychology

Evolutionary Psychology is a Darwinian approach to the study of the human mind and human behavioural patterns.[8] It is an interdisciplinary field which collates evidence from evolutionary theory, biology, cognitive psychology, behavioural psychology, neuropsychology, computational modelling, paleoanthropology and primatology (Cosmides and Tooby 2001). It seeks to explain cognitive and behavioural patterns

as adaptations evolved during the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA) in response to Darwinian selection pressures.

Evolutionary Psychology is committed to the modularity of mind hypothesis, which originates in Fodor (1983). For Fodor, the mind is made up of a relatively small number of modules and a general processor. Fodor further proposed that these modules are domain-specific and informationally encapsulated. Evolutionary Psychology views the mind in modular terms. However, in contrast to Fodor, Evolutionary Psychology views the mind as made up of a mass of domain-specific but interconnected mental modules, each of which is 'functionally responsible for solving a different adaptive problem' (Cosmides and Tooby 2000b: 91). Modern human behaviours are explained as manifestations of modules and programmes adapted for the selective advantage they conferred upon human ancestors. Human cognition is thus the product of an environment quite different from the industrialised world and contemporary society, which we negotiate with 'a Stone Age mind' (Cosmides and Tooby 1997; Pinker 1997).

Evolutionary Psychology uses a variety of research methods. In general terms, however, Evolutionary Psychology combines 'bottom up' and 'top-down' methodologies (Schmitt 2008). In bottom-up methods, researchers take a known universal psychological mechanism and 'reverse-engineer' its adaptive function (ibid.: 216). For example, fear is explained as a danger-avoidance mechanism (Pinker 1997). This involves constructing hypotheses about a trait's selection and evolution. These are not 'just-so stories' as critics sometimes suggest (e.g., Gould 1991). These hypotheses emerge from what we know about the problems faced in the ancestral environment, which comes mainly from ethnographic studies of hunter-gatherer societies. Suggestions that an attribute may be adapted are further supported by paleontological and cladistic evidence of a logical progression in phylogenetic development and homology across modern species, especially primates (Schmitt 2008: 222). In top-down methods, researchers make predictions about the existence of adapted psychological traits based on expectations derived from evolutionary theories, which act as heuristic guides (ibid.: 216). For example, the theory of reciprocal altruism leads to expectations that there exists some 'cheater-detection' mechanism adapted to redress the risk of exploitation in long-term cooperation (Cosmides 1989).

A number of innate modules have been proposed. Cosmides and Tooby (1992: 113) provide a list including a spatial relations module, a natural kinds module, a rigid objects mechanics module, and an

effort allocation and recalibration module. These modules evolved in response to natural selection pressures and function to negotiate the physical world. However, primates also live in complex social structures. Other modules, then, have evolved in response to social selection pressures and function to negotiate the social world (Dunbar 1998) and together account for 'social intelligence'.[9] Two social intelligence modules to have received comprehensive attention are theory of mind and social inference (Baron-Cohen 1995; Tomasello and Call 1997; Whiten 1991). Theory of mind is the ability to attribute beliefs (including false beliefs), emotions and intentions to others and has an obvious advantage for primates, who live in relatively large-scale social groups. Social inference is the ability to make predictions, in turn, about behaviour in others based on their beliefs, emotions and intentions. Theory of mind and social inference have an additional advantage as together they enable tactical deception. Tactical deception occurs in the behaviour of one individual which is intended to cause a belief in another individual which, it is expected, will lead them to act in a way which serves the interest of the first individual. When used in this way, this kind of social intelligence is described as 'Machiavellian intelligence' and is well-documented in primates (Byrne and Whiten 1988; de Waal 1982; Whiten and Byrne 1988).

It is this research on Machiavellian intelligence that is most significant for CDA. Where CDA is concerned with strategic discourse, this is precisely tactical deception involving Machiavellian intelligence. Evolutionary Psychology, then, may provide an explanatory framework for deception and distortion in discourse.

Other modules that have been postulated as part of social intelligence and which would seem to function in social and political discourse include a cheater-detection module (Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and Tooby 1992) and a logico-rhetorical module (Sperber 2000, 2001).[10] These modules may be related to predicational and legitimising strategies respectively. We will describe in detail these modules and how they relate to these strategies in Part II. We will also explore how other evolved cognitive systems might be activated in social and political discourse, including emotion programmes. Presently, a crude but nevertheless valid example is offered by way of illustration. Consider (1):

(1) *The Express*, 19 April 2006

The devastated family of a girl gang-raped by four immigrants have slammed Tony Blair's asylum policy…In a plea to Tony Blair, her father said: 'We let in anyone and they are **attacking our children**.'

Now, if, as seems likely, humans have evolved cognitive-affective programmes adapted to drive decisions and behaviours which will maximise the fitness of our offspring, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that examples like (1) could activate or appeal to such programmes and lead to decisions in favour of discriminatory and exclusionary actions in turn.

Some researchers in CDA, of course, do not see a place for Evolutionary Psychology. Wodak, for example, chooses to neglect the discussion recently started in CDA concerning the possible foundation of cultural concepts and practices in evolution 'because no convincing arguments or empirical results – to my knowledge – have yet been brought to light' (2006: 187). However, this view is simply born of ignorance. Evolutionary Psychology has successfully researched the psychological basis of stereotypes, prejudices and discriminatory behaviour. And many of these research programmes connect contemporary prejudices with prehistoric dangers (Cottrell and Neuberg 2005; Faulkner et al. 2004; Kurzban and Leary 2001; Neuberg and Cottrell 2006; Neuberg et al. 2000; Schaller et al. 2003, 2004; Schaller and Neuberg 2008).

To the uninitiated, Evolutionary Psychology may appear incompatible with CDA. Evolutionary Psychology is sometimes misconceived as biologically determinist and therefore irreconcilable with the social constructivist perspective in CDA. If we are innately given to racism, the objection would run, then it is inevitable and so CDA is left redundant. However, Evolutionary Psychology is not a biologically determinist theory (see Cosmides and Tooby 2005; Hagen 2005; Pinker 2002). Evolutionary Psychology does not ignore the impact of learning or socio-cultural influences on prejudice. While certain prejudices may have been functionally adaptive in the EEA, they are not inevitable. A basic feature of human cognition is functional flexibility where 'cultural environments play an important role in constructing the category of cues to which individuals respond with prejudice' (Schaller and Neuberg, in preparation). Cultural environments, of course, include texts. It is precisely this flexibility, then, that is exploited in the discursive construction of social identities and inequalities but which at the same time makes possible their deconstruction through critical linguistic analysis. Social inequality is not caused by evolved modules themselves but, rather, these modules may be utilized in discourse in order to strategically enact social inequality. Laland and Brown make a similar point in relation to war:

> Biological predispositions such as fear of strangers, aggressiveness, and a tendency to distinguish in and out groups do not cause war.

> However the predispositions do play an important role as they are exploited, for instance in the propaganda of mobilizing and abusive leaders, in ways that lead to the image of the enemy as different or evil and sanctify aggression against adversaries. (2002: 97)

Such insights can not only explain the effectiveness of certain discursive strategies already recognised as significant in CDA but may help to identify additional instances of manipulation in political discourse.

1.5.2. Cognitive linguistics

Discourse practice (the production and interpretation of text) is an essential dimension of the discourse event, which mediates between text and social practice (Fairclough 1995a: 97). Equally important therefore, is its corresponding dimension of discourse analysis at the interpretation stage. At the description stage, CDA has shown how ideology is encoded in text. But this is just the first stage in the discourse process. A complete account of the communication of prejudice must necessarily address both the production and interpretation of text. And this entails a cognitive approach to discourse, accounting for meaning construction at both ends of the discourse process.

While van Dijk has explicitly addressed the role of cognition in the socio-cognitive approach, none of the mainstream approaches to CDA, including the socio-cognitive approach, apply any cognitive theory of language *per se*.[11] Indeed, Wodak acknowledges that cognitive theories of language have on the whole been rejected and excluded from CDA, often out of unjustified reasons (Wodak 2006: 179). Cognitive Linguistics in particular is underused in mainstream CDA and does not receive representative attention in the literature (Chilton 2005a: 21). As a result, O'Halloran notes that 'much of CDA suffers from a paucity of appreciation of language cognition' (2003: 14).

What is offered by the socio-cognitive approach is a modified model of memory in which social memory consists of socially shared structures and representations, which van Dijk calls social cognitions. But the socio-cognitive approach does not describe the precise forms of these social cognitions or exactly how they may be derived from linguistic representations in text. Cognitive Linguistics is one framework which provides the systematic theory of language and cognition that CDA seems to need and can be directly aligned with the socio-cognitive approach (Koller 2005).

Research methods in Cognitive Linguistics are much less explicated than in Evolutionary Psychology. According to Gibbs, 'the remarkable

fact is that there are very few published writings on the methods in Cognitive Linguistics' (2006: 7). However, research methods have typically relied on introspection (Talmy 2006).[12] This involves deriving intuitively plausible hypotheses about conceptual structure from patterns in language and on the basis of native speaker knowledge.

Wodak (2006: 180) argues that cognitive processes (and thus ideologies) cannot be studied directly. However, it is held in Cognitive Linguistics that language 'is for the linguist and cognitive scientist a window to the mind' (Fauconnier 1999: 96). Cognitive Linguists reason that 'since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3). Cognitive Linguistics could therefore offer theoretical and analytical opportunities for the critical assessment of ideologies (Dirven et al. 2007: 1236).

Indeed, Cognitive Linguistics seems to sit quite comfortably in CDA. Cognitive Linguistics is centrally concerned with the conceptual structuring through language of precisely the transitivity phenomena that CDA is concerned with.[13] Fauconnier (2003) provides the following précis:

> Cognitive Linguistics has emerged in the last twenty-five years as a powerful approach to the study of language, conceptual systems, human cognition and general meaning construction. It addresses within language the structuring of basic conceptual categories such as space and time, scenes and events, entities and process, motion and location, force and causation. It addresses the structuring of ideational and affective categories attributed to cognitive agents, such as attention and perspective, volition and intention. In doing so, it develops a rich conception of grammar that reflects fundamental cognitive abilities: the ability to form structured conceptualizations with multiple levels of organisation, to conceive of a situation at varying levels of abstraction, to establish correspondences between facets of different structures, and to construe the same situation in alternate ways.

We can distinguish between conceptual organisation and conceptualisation. Conceptual organisation refers to 'offline' systems of conceptual knowledge stored as cognitive models such as frames, schemas and conceptual metaphors (see Chapter 6). Social cognitions, discourses, ideologies or member resources may take the form of such cognitive models

as described in Cognitive Linguistics. According to Dirven et al., 'ideology is a system of beliefs and values based on a set of cognitive models, i.e. mental representations' (2003: 1). Fairclough (1995a: 75) also states that 'it may be useful to think of ideologies in terms of content-like entities which are manifested in various formal features, and perhaps frame... and related concepts are of value in this respect'.

One area in CDA where Cognitive Linguistics has been successfully applied is in critical metaphor research using Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Charteris-Black 2004, 2006a; Chilton 1994, 1996; Chilton and Lakoff 1995; El Refaie 2001; Goatly 2007; Koller 2004, 2005; Maalej 2007; Musolff 2004, 2006; Santa Ana 1999, 2002). However, Cognitive Linguistics, like CDA, is not a single theory but is, rather, characterised as a paradigm within linguistics, subsuming a number of distinct but related research programmes (van Hoek 1999: 134).[14] Cognitive Linguistics therefore offers a spectrum of theories which can be applied in CDA beyond the scope of metaphor to analyse manipulation and ideology in discourse (see Hart and Lukeš 2007).

Where Cognitive Linguistics has been applied in CDA, then, this has largely been at the description rather than the interpretation stage, where texts and discourses have been analysed but the practice of discourse itself has not been addressed. This is because Conceptual Metaphor Theory is a theory of conceptual organisation. Cognitive Linguistic theories of conceptualisation, including Mental Spaces Theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1997), Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 1996, 2002), Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2002, 2008) and force-dynamics (Talmy 1988, 2000) have not been applied.[15]

Conceptualisation is an 'online' cognitive process of meaning construction, which takes place during discourse and results in mental representations of the situations and events described. Conceptualisation is 'a dynamic process whereby linguistic units serve as prompts for an array of conceptual operations and the recruitment of background knowledge' (Evans and Green 2006: 162).[16] The notion of conceptualisation in Cognitive Linguistics, together with that of entrenchment (see Chapter 6), provides the missing link between linguistic representations in text and ideologies or cognitive models which CDA needs in order to explain how discourse can be constitutive of society. The relation between language, conceptualisation and cognitive models described in Cognitive Linguistics mirrors the relationship described in CDA between text, discourse and discourses (see Chapter 6 for further discussion).

Cognitive Linguistics and Systemic Functional Linguistics both adopt a functionalist perspective. In Halliday, for example, language is 'a resource for reflecting on the world' (Halliday and Matthiessen 1999: 7). And similarly, for Langacker in Cognitive Linguistics, language is 'the means by which we describe our experience' (1991: 294). Further in line with CDA and Systemic Functional Linguistics, Cognitive Linguistics maintains that language always communicates a particular perspective, as perhaps best captured in Langacker's slogan 'grammar is conceptualisation'. For Langacker, conceptually, there are countless ways of construing a given event and linguistically, a variety of grammatical devices that are usually available as alternate means of coding a given conception (1991: 294). Text-producers therefore have a degree of choice in the conceptualisation they intend to elicit in text-consumers.[17] In its theory of construal, then, which, like transitivity in Halliday, makes options available, Cognitive Linguistics can offer a cognitive account of ideology in language, where, according to Haynes (1989: 119), 'ideology is made possible by the choices a language allows for representing the same material situation in different ways'. The possibility of promoting alternative construals of the same reality means that any particular choice in representation is always ideologically constrained or motivated and indicates the perspective and interests of the text-producer. Cognitive Linguistics can account for the expression of ideology in language by relating the ideological dimension of linguistic phenomena to general conceptual principles (Dirven et al. 2007: 1236).

Langacker uses an analogy with visual perception to capture the essence of construal: 'in viewing a scene, what we actually see depends on how closely we examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, and where we view it from' (2008: 55). These variables are analogous to 'construal operations' in language and cognition.

A number of construal operations have been described in Cognitive Linguistics. Attempts have also been made to classify these construal operations and alternative typologies have been proposed. We will work with the classification put forward by Croft and Cruse (2004: 46), reproduced below, which organises construal operations as manifestations of four general psychological processes: attention, judgement, perspective and constitution.

I. Attention/salience
   A. Selection
      1. Profiling
      2. Metonymy

- B. Scope (dominion)
  1. Scope of predication
  2. Search domains
  3. Accessibility
- C. Scalar adjustment
  1. Quantitative (abstraction)
  2. Qualitative (schematization)
- D. Dynamic
  1. Fictive motion
  2. Summary/sequential scanning

II. Judgement/comparison (including identity schemas)
- A. Categorisation (framing)
- B. Metaphor
- C. Figure/ground

III. Perspective/situatedness
- A. Viewpoint
  1. Vantage point
  2. Orientation
- B. Deixis
  1. Spatiotemporal (including spatial image schemas)
  2. Epistemic (common ground)
  3. Empathy
- C. Subjectivity/objectivity

IV. Constitution/Gestalt (including most other image schemas)
- A. Structural schematization
  1. Individuation (boundedness, unity/multiplicity)
  2. Topological/geometric schematisation (container etc.)
  3. Scale
- B. Force-dynamics
- C. Relationality (entity/interconnection)

One kind of construal operation described in Cognitive Linguistics, which involves the psychological process of constitution, is force-dynamics (Talmy 1988, 2000). Wolf and Polzenhagen (2003: 265) point out that force-dynamic patterns are, in some respects, equivalent to transitivity patterns. We discuss force-dynamics in detail in Chapter 8. Another kind of construal operation, which involves attention, is 'profiling' within an 'action chain' and its automatic reflex in 'backgrounding' (Langacker 2002). Profiling and backgrounding are dimensions of conventional imagery that are fundamental to semantic structure (Langacker 2002: 217–8).

This construal operation is especially important because it provides some cognitive underpinning to the key claim in CDA that the use of grammatical metaphor can 'mystify' responsibility for controversial or 'awkward' actions (Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1993; Toolan 1991). Consider the example of metonymy in (2):

(2) *Daily Mail,* 11 June 2002

An amendment to the Immigration and Asylum Bill going through Parliament will exempt such people from the 1948 National Assistance Act.

This instrument-for-agent metonymy omits any reference to the agent of the action. The claim that grammatical metaphor can completely obscure agency has recently been called into question on the grounds that the information is nearly always recoverable from context based on pragmatic principles such as relevance (O'Halloran 2003; Widdowson 2004). Van Leeuwen therefore distinguishes between 'suppression' and 'backgrounding' where agency is 'not so much excluded as de-emphasised' (1996: 39). Crucially, the claim that metonymy can keep responsible actors 'in the semantic background' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 58) finds conceptual support in Cognitive Grammar.

Langacker (2002: 217) suggests that a canonical event is made up of an action chain involving an agent (AG), instrument (INSTR) and patient (PAT). The image schema (see Chapter 6) underlying this interaction can be represented as in Figure 1.2.

The circles represent the participants which interact with one another in a situation or event. The double arrows represent these interactions and their orientation serves to indicate the direction of energy as it is transmitted between participants. The zigzagged line indicates the patient's resulting change of state.[18]



Figure 1.2 Canonical event schema



Figure 1.3 Conceptualisation in (2)

Prototypical clause structures profile the full action chain. However, instrument-for-agent metonymies, in which the instrument stands for the agent as in (2), profile the instrument and its effect on the patient while leaving the agent 'out of focus' in the 'scope of attention' (Langacker 2002) or 'periphery of consciousness' (Chafe 1994). The conceptualisation prompted by instrument-for-agent metonymies may be represented as in Figure 1.3 where the heavier lines indicate the profiled portion of the action chain designated by (2), namely the interaction between the instrument in the subject (S) of the clause and the patient in the object (O).

This kind of analysis, then, suggests that:

> although the factor of relevance is undoubtedly crucial in the omission of the agent, we may also surmise that the varied use of [mystification] strategies cognitively contributes to construct, in van Dijk's (1998) words, 'preferred models' of a situation. (Marín Arrese 2002: 7)

1.6. Summary

In this chapter we have highlighted the methodologically eclectic nature of CDA. However, we have suggested that two important areas of Cognitive Science are currently neglected in mainstream CDA. Following van Dijk, we have argued that a cognitive perspective is essential in CDA and have called specifically for a cognitive approach which draws on Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Linguistics in explanation- and interpretation-stage analysis respectively. Evolutionary Psychology can provide an explanatory framework for studying discursive strategies and their effects while Cognitive Linguistics offers a framework for modelling the interpretation of

structures in text. We are suggesting that these dimensions must be attended to in order that CDA can offer a fuller account of the discursive construction of social inequality. We show how Evolutionary Psychology can be applied in CDA in Part II and how Cognitive Linguistics can be applied in Part III.

Part II

Evolutionary Psychology

2
Communication, Cooperation and Manipulation

2.1. Introduction

Questions concerning the cognitive architectures involved in discourse and their evolution have only recently been addressed in CDA (Chilton 2004, 2005a). In this chapter we consider, within an evolutionary perspective, the cognitive abilities involved in cooperative and counter-cooperative communication. We focus on the human capacity for representation. Specifically, the unique human ability to form detached representations (Gärdenfors 2004a) and metarepresentations (Sperber 2000). Moreover, the core theoretical position that text-consumers can be duped by deception and distortion in discourse is typically taken for granted in CDA (Chilton 2005a: 41). Recently, however, this assumption has been called into question (Chilton 2005a). Again within a cognitive-evolutionary perspective, we will defend this assumption.

2.2. Representations

We will take representations to be structures with some semantic and referential content and we will assume that mental represen-tations are conceptual in nature. Gärdenfors (2004a) distinguishes between 'detached' representations and 'cued' representations. Following Gärdenfors (2004a), cued representations stand for something present in the representer's current external situation. Cued representations would include, for example, an animal's representation of a food item or predator within its immediate environment. By contrast, a detached representation may stand for something removed from the representer's current external situation (ibid.).[1] Most animals (with the exception of

primates) are capable only of forming cued representations. Humans, on the other hand, are capable of forming detached representations, which would include, for example, representations of events that happened yesterday, events that could have happened but didn't, events that might happen tomorrow or events that will happen as the consequence of another event. Humans are also unique in their ability to from metarepresentations, which are representations of representations (Sperber 2000). Metarepresentations can take different forms. For example, one can have a mental representation of another mental representation (theory of mind) or a mental representation of a public representation, for example, a text, which is itself a representation or expression of a mental representation.

Gärdenfors argues that detached representations facilitate anticipatory planning. Individuals have an 'inner world' – the collection of all detached representations and their interrelations (2004a: 238). By exploiting their inner world, individuals can simulate different scenarios and predict the consequences of actions within those scenarios (ibid.: 239). These simulations then allow the individual to evaluate different courses of action and choose the most appropriate in the external world (ibid.). Inner worlds afford certain reasoning abilities, which often form the basis of anticipatory planning. Modal, conditional, counterfactual and analogical reasoning, for example, all require the formation of detached representations.

Sperber (2000) argues for a domain-specific metarepresentation module which enables theory of mind. In particular, then, mental representations of mental representations allow individuals to recognise and react to intentional behaviour in others. Sperber states that:

> a metarepresentational, and more specifically a metapsychological ability, may be advantageous and may have evolved on its own ... The ability to interpret the behaviour of intelligent conspecifics not just as bodily movement but as action guided by beliefs and desires gives one a much enhanced predictive power. Predicting the behaviour of others helps to protect oneself from them, to compete successfully with them, to exploit them or to cooperate more profitably with them. (2000: 123)

Both detached representations and metarepresentations are necessary for communication, which relies upon cooperation but is susceptible to exploitation (Sperber 2000).

2.3. Communication and Representations

The predominant resource for human communication is language. And language permits communication about events remote in space or time from the situation of the communicator. It shows 'detachment' in Gärdenfors' terminology or 'displacement' in Hockett's (1960) terminology. In other words, language is a system of symbols removed from their referents. Most texts are made up of these symbols – words. Not only, then, are humans capable of modal, conditional, counterfactual and analogical *reasoning* but they are also capable of *communicating* about modal, conditional, counterfactual and analogical realities.

Communication, which for humans is largely achieved through language, operates on a series of intentional and metarepresentational steps. In the first instance, text-producers have an intention to communicate a mental representation P and an intention for their audience to recognise that they have this intention. In Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), this first intention is referred to as 'informative intention' and the second as 'communicative intention'. In producing a text, text-producers make manifest their communicative intention and create a public metarepresentation of P. Text-consumers, in turn, recognise the communicative intention and form a mental metarepresentation of P based on the text and its context.

Communication involves detached representations in the form of linguistic symbols and metarepresentations. Sperber (2000: 121) argues that both language and metarepresentation are 'made possible by biologically evolved mechanisms, which, it has been argued in both cases, are domain-specific'.[2] Sperber further proposes that these two dedicated mental mechanisms co-evolved in such a way that the fully developed version of each presupposes the development of the other. However, as Sperber argues, it still makes sense to ask which developed first to kick-start the co-evolutionary process. Dennett (1991) argues that metarepresentation evolved in response to new linguistic artefacts entering the environment. That is, language evolved first. Sperber, on the other hand, argues that metarepresentation evolved first. He states that 'the very development of a public language is not the cause, but an effect of the development of communication made possible by the metarepresentational module' (1994: 61). Linguistic artefacts, or texts, are themselves metarepresentations and so presuppose a metarepresentational ability. Metarepresentation and communication are therefore necessary precursors for the phylogenetic development of language, which

is adapted to meet the communicative needs of humans (Origgi and Sperber 2000: 141). The pragmatic aspects of communication, then, are more fundamental from an evolutionary perspective than semantic or syntactic dimensions of language (Gärdenfors 2004a). The position of pragmatics as more basic is also reflected in inferential as opposed to code models of communication (Grice 1975, 1978; Sperber and Wilson 1995).

If language and communication are the products of selection, then the course and cause of their evolution is of primary interest.[3] In the past, research in this area has been highly speculative and unsound.[4] However, with the emergence of Evolutionary Psychology and its more robust interdisciplinary methods, drawing as it does on paleoanthropology, computational modelling and neuropsychology for example, more sound research into the evolution of communication and human language has begun to surface (see e.g., Christiansen and Kirby 2003; Hurford et al. 1998; Hurford 2007). We will focus on only one particular strand of this research concerning the function of language and communication.

According to this argument, communication is made possible by metarepresentation and language is adapted for communication (Origgi and Sperber 2000: 141). As Sperber (2000: 126) states: 'metarepresentational sophistication allows a form of inferential communication independent of the possession of a common code. This type of inferential communication, however, can take advantage of a code'. Or as Gärdenfors (2004a: 245) states: 'hominids were communicating long before they had a language, but language makes the exchange of knowledge more efficient'. The very existence of a communicative ability drives selection for a more efficient system of communication. As a system of detached representation, language is especially productive insofar as those endowed with it are capable of communicating about events neither immediate nor definite. And communication is obviously made more efficient by a set of symbols with relatively conventionalised meaning associations within a speech community. Semantic knowledge therefore becomes of equal import to communication as pragmatic abilities.

Of course, language may have further adaptive functions, such as marking group identities. In which case, the interpersonal function of language as well as the ideational function may have an evolutionary basis. Language is manifested in different languages and varieties of language such as dialects, registers and anti-languages which serve to signal group identity and membership. If we assume, though, that

language is primarily selected for its service in communication, then we must consider what makes communication itself adaptive (Origgi and Sperber 2000: 141).

2.4. Communication for Cooperation

Communication, and thus language, can be said to confer one principal advantage insofar as it allows individuals to exchange information (Origgi and Sperber 2000). This, in turn, affords further advantages like anticipatory planning and collective action (Gärdenfors 2004a).

Sperber (1994: 54) points out that 'humans not only construct individually mental representations of information, but they also produce information for one another in the form of public representations (e.g., utterances, written texts, pictures)'. The advantage of language and communication, then, is that individuals are able to acquire knowledge without direct perception. As Origgi and Sperber point out, communication 'allows individuals to benefit from the perceptions and inferences of others and increases their knowledge well beyond that which they could acquire on their own' (2000: 2). But for one individual to acquire knowledge in this way another must be willing to share that knowledge. Information is a valuable resource and one which, on evolutionary expectations, should not be given away too freely. But most of us are, in fact, more than willing to share information. This presents a paradox, since sharing information is an act of altruism, which should not occur according to standard Darwinian theory (Ulbaek 1998: 39). So, if sharing information, like sharing food, is altruistic, then from a Darwinian perspective it requires an explanation (Desalles 1998: 135).

Two explanations in particular that can resolve this paradox are available and they depend on different models for the evolution of cooperative behaviour more generally: kin-selected altruism (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). If communication evolved through kin-selected altruism then the theory goes as follows. By sharing information with one's relatives, the individual enhances their inclusive fitness, which is a measurement of the probable success of an individual's genes and of copies of those genes found in relatives. However, as Desalles points out, 'no qualitative bias is to be found in adult speech that indicates a different pragmatic behaviour according to kinship' (1998: 137). A second, and more widely accepted account then, is that communication, like many other forms of cooperation, evolved through reciprocal altruism (Ulbaek 1998).

On this account, if an individual A shares information with another individual B, who, in return, shares further information with A, then both A and B stand to gain an ultimate net benefit. And thus, the exchange of information between group members can be adaptive. But what commits B to sharing information in return? The answer has to do with the nature of group living. If two individuals A and B live in a small-scale, consistent social group, then they are likely to encounter each other repeatedly. And indeed, our ancestors did live in complex, competing and consistent, small-scale social groups.[5] Axelrod (1984) shows that under such conditions a 'tit-for-tat' strategy emerges as an evolutionarily stable strategy.[6] If B has defected on their commitment in one information exchange, then A will not enter future exchanges with B, who therefore loses the benefit of future reciprocal arrangements, unless initiated by B. This, of course, is dependent on an ability to recall past exchanges and recognise previous exchange partners. That is, on memory and facial recognition.

Moreover, language itself enables A to exchange information concerning defectors with other individuals, who are then also unlikely to enter information exchanges with B. On the other hand, if B cooperates, then A can pass this information on and B will earn a reputation as a reciprocator. Other individuals are then more likely to be willing to share information with B. Communicating this particular kind of information serves a 'policing' function (see Chapter 4).

So the question arises, what kind of information did language primarily evolve to communicate? Pinker (1994) suggests that language is adapted for communicating practical information such as instruction in tool-making. However, as Dunbar (1996) points out, instruction in tool-making is better achieved through demonstration and, further, there is no correlation between changes in hominid brain size, upon which language depends, and changes in tool complexity.

Many researchers argue instead for the social functions of language and its origins in social cognition (see Hurford et al. 1998). Dunbar (1993, 1996) argues that the functions of language, including policing, fall under the general rubric of 'gossip', which is broadly defined as the exchange of social knowledge. This position is supported by Mithen (1996). Mithen points out, in concurrence with Cognitive Linguists like Talmy, who claim that the language used to describe physical objects metaphorically ascribes to them an intrinsic tendency towards motion, implying that they possess 'minds' as if they were social beings, that 'the structure of language arose when talking about the social world and was metaphorically extended for talking about physical objects'

(1988: 214). Indeed, Mithen notes that language uses the same underlying thematic role categories whether it is referring to intentional agents or inert objects (ibid.). Thematic role structure is geared towards the exchange of social knowledge, which is to say the communication of ideational information – who did what to whom, where, when and how. Bickerton (1998) argues that a thematic role analysis module existed as part of social intelligence prior to the development of language and communication. In other words, humans without language were able to mentally represent social information. Humans with language, however, are also able to metarepresent social information and thus share it.

The apparently altruistic nature of communication seems to be reflected in the way that discourse works, according to Gricean Pragmatics (Chilton 2004: 19; Desalles 1998: 136). Following Grice (1975, 1978, 1989), in rational conversation[7] text-producers contribute true and useful information within the context in which the discourse event occurs and text-consumers take it for granted that true and useful information is being communicated. This is captured in the so-called 'co-operative principle' and its four 'conversational maxims', which discourse participants are said to adhere to and which they are said to assume each other adhere to. The conversation maxims highlight the altruistic aspects of communication. They are formulated by Grice as follows:

Maxim of Quality

Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:

(i) do not say what you believe to be false
(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

Maxim of Quantity

(i) make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)
(ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required

Maxim of Relation

Make your contribution relevant

Maxim of Manner

Be perspicuous, specifically:

(i) avoid obscurity of expression
(ii) avoid ambiguity
(iii) be brief
(iv) be orderly

It is obvious that by maintaining these maxims the text-producer is acting in the interests of the text-consumer by providing relevant and reliable information in a way that is easy to understand.[8]

Communication further facilitates another kind of adaptive cooperation: anticipatory planning and collective action (Gärdenfors 2004a). In other words, communication makes possible cooperation for future goals (Gärdenfors 2004a: 237).[9] Such goals can be concrete as in some community project while others may be more abstract as in adopting a common attitude. The goal requires effort by group members and therefore action towards it is altruistic but may still be of net benefit for individuals. By simulating inner worlds, groups can make plans for future actions and decide on the best reactions to (possible) events and (potential) states of affairs. In fact, communication is necessary for such cooperation. As Gärdenfors states:

> cooperation about detached goals requires that the inner worlds of the individuals be coordinated. It seems hard to explain how this can be done without evoking symbolic communication. (2004a: 240)

The inner worlds of individuals, then, are synchronised through discourse.

2.5. Cooperation in Communication

The communicative act itself, discourse, is a cooperative action between text-producer and text-consumer. Not in the altruistic sense described in the previous section, however, because, of course, it is possible not to communicate cooperatively, either by not communicating at all and reneging on a reciprocal arrangement or by abandoning the maxim of quality in favour of providing distorted or just plain false information, but in the more basic sense that any linguistic representation is formulated in such a way that the text-consumer can sufficiently accurately metarepresent the information that the text-producer intends to communicate, whether or not that proposition is a true or accurate representation of reality. That humans cooperate in communication, then, does not necessarily mean that they use communication for cooperation. This lower level of cooperation in communication is a central principle in neo-Gricean Pragmatics.[10] It has perhaps been most clearly detailed in Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004) and is neatly captured in the statement 'the only purpose that a genuine communicator and a willing audience necessarily have

in common is to achieve uptake: that is, to have the communicator's informative intention recognised by the audience' (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 161).

A consequence of this simple conception of cooperation is that Grice's cooperative principle and its four maxims are reduced to principles of relevance alone, where relevance is defined in terms of a positive balance between 'cognitive effects' on the one hand and 'processing effort' on the other.[11] Two such principles are proposed – the cognitive principle of relevance and the communicative principle of relevance (Wilson and Sperber 2004). The cognitive principle of relevance states that:

> Human cognition tends to be geared toward the maximisation of relevance.

The cognitive principle is 'a result of constant selection pressures towards increasing efficiency' (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 610). It is the cognitive background against which pragmatic communication takes place (ibid.). Owing to this principle, an audience will only give their attention to relevant stimuli. Any act of intentional communication, in order for it to achieve uptake, must therefore guarantee relevance. This is captured in the communicative principle of relevance, which states that:

> 'Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.'

Any text is a piece of ostensive communication in that it makes manifest a communicative intention. The presumption of optimal relevance is the presumption that interpretation will yield the greatest cognitive return for minimal processing investment. Crucially, however, an ostensive communicative act is optimally relevant only insofar as 'it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences' (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 612).

The communicative principle of relevance differs from Grice's maxim of relation in a fundamental way. It 'applies without exception' (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 162). Any communicative act is optimally relevant regardless of whether it follows the maxim of relation. For Grice, his maxims are norms which are generally followed by text-producers but which may be overtly flouted for some communicative purpose, which the text-consumer recognises based on their (tacit) knowledge of those norms. By contrast, the communicative principle of relevance is 'a

generalisation about ostensive-inferential communication' (ibid.). Text-producers do not 'follow' the communicative principle of relevance because they could not violate it even if they wanted to (ibid.).

Given the communicative principle of relevance, text-producers construct their linguistic representations in such a way that text-consumers can reconstruct the intended conceptual representation with minimum processing effort. And since relevance varies inversely with processing effort, text-consumers follow a path of least effort in reconstructing the text-producer's intended meaning, which they recognise as first the representation that satisfies expectations of relevance. Wilson and Sperber refer to this process as the 'relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure' and maintain that a specially evolved sub-module of the overall mind-reading module is dedicated to this cognitive process (2004: 625).

So far we have suggested that communication is often used for cooperation and argued that communication itself is an inherently cooperative practice. However, significantly for CDA, cooperative communication can be used in Machiavellian ways for manipulation. It has been necessary to highlight the cooperative aspects of communication because communication for manipulation presupposes cooperation in both senses described above.

2.6. Communication for Manipulation

Communication must have evolved for cooperation initially. No system of communication like language could have evolved otherwise, for individuals would only have been willing to produce and process language if it was in their interests to do so. Text-producers would just not have been prepared to share valuable information unless, through reciprocal altruism, it served some long-term interest. And potential text-consumers would simply have refused to listen to and comprehend language if it went against their short-term interests. If language were not first used for cooperation by both parties, then linguistic communication could not have taken hold in evolution. Sperber (2001) reasons in the same way as follows:

> For communication to stabilise within a species, as it has among humans, both the production and the reception of messages should be advantageous. If communication were on the whole beneficial to producers of messages at the expense of receivers, or beneficial to receivers at the expense of producers, one of the two behaviours

> would be likely to have been selected out, and the other behaviour would have collapsed by the same token.

However, it is apparently the human condition that individuals cannot help but produce, hear and understand language. Indeed, it follows from the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance that text-consumers cannot avoid processing language. The actual act of communication, then, is necessarily cooperative, founded upon reciprocal altruism. But, the act performed in communication need not always be so, because once in place, this system of communication would have been susceptible to exploitation, giving rise to Machiavellian uses of language. That is, strategic discourse. As Origgi and Sperber state, 'communication is a form of co-operation' and 'co-operation is vulnerable to free-riding, which, in the case of communication, takes the form of manipulation and deception' (2000: 161).

Linguistic deception and manipulation occur in various forms of lying, omission, evasion and euphemism, for example, which can all be seen as violations of Grice's maxims (Chilton 2004: 46).[12] Lying clearly violates the maxim of quality. Omission violates the maxim of quantity. And evasion violates the maxim of relation. These violations can all be described as content-related. Grice's maxims can be grouped into those that concern content and those than concern expression (Levinson 2000). The maxims of quality, quantity and relation concern content and the maxim of manner concerns expression. Various forms of euphemism violate the maxim of manner. Of course, content-related violations are often reflected in violations of the maxim of manner. For example, evasions will typically not be brief. And violations of the maxim of manner can communicate content-related violations. For example, agentless passives are ambiguous and may also violate the maxim of quantity. It is violations of the maxim of manner that are the direct object of analysis in CDA.

Theory of mind plays an obvious role in these abilities (Origgi and Sperber 2000: 163). In order to communicate false information, an individual must be capable of attributing false beliefs to others. The evolution of communication, cooperation, mind-reading and manipulation, then, are intimately intertwined. Communication, cooperation and mind-reading co-evolved, with linguistic manipulation an almost inevitable evolutionary outcome. Text-producers who recognise that other individuals can have false beliefs, and acquire them through language, will soon realise that they can use language in Machiavellian ways.

And indeed, there is evidence to suggest that communication and language evolved as much for manipulation as they did for cooperation (Desalles 1998). According to Desalles, 'if we accept that language is an instance of symmetrical co-operation, we might expect some behavioural features that are not, in fact, observed' (1998: 137). In other words, there is some mismatch between the theory of communication for cooperation and empirical observations of conversation.[13] For example, the evolution of cooperative communication should lead not to conspicuous discourse but to conspiratorial whispers (Krebs and Dawkins 1984: 391). Individuals should only want to share valuable information with their interlocutors and avoid being audible to non-participants in the discourse event. Similarly, if language contains valuable information, then natural selection should have favoured a preference for consuming language over producing it (Desalles 1998: 138). However, neither of these traits are reflected in conversation (ibid.). For example, conversation analysis suggests that participants often compete for the 'floor' and strive to hold it once they obtain it. Neither, of course, are these traits characteristic of mass media discourse genres in which, unlike conversation, communication is entirely one way and the widest possible dissemination is sought. Furthermore, if communication relies on reciprocal altruism, then the prediction follows that text-producers, not text-consumers, should protect themselves from social 'cheaters' (Desalles 1998: 138). Text-producers ought to consider the credentials of text-consumers as reciprocators before sharing valuable information with them. However, it is text-consumers rather than text-producers who take precaution against social cheaters.

From the point of view of text-producers, then, communication is beneficial in that it allows them to have desirable effects on text-consumers' knowledge and attitudes in regard to people, objects, events and so on (Sperber 2001). From the point of view of text-consumers, on the other hand, communication is beneficial only to the extent that it provides genuine information (ibid.). Of course, individuals are both text-producers and text-consumers. Explaining how the benefits of communication are maximised but the risks minimised involves the fact that understanding and acceptance are two separate stages in the discourse process (Origgi and Sperber 2000: 15), the former paving the way for the latter. It follows from this that text-consumers should develop strategies for detecting and resisting deception and distortion in discourse. Indeed, Sperber (2000: 135) argues that 'the human reliance on communication is so great, the risks of deception and manipulation so ubiquitous, that it is reasonable to speculate that

all cost-effective available modes of defence are likely to have evolved'. Of course, individuals could defend against Machiavellian communication, strategic discourse, by being indiscriminately cynical but would then, by definition, lose the benefits of communication for cooperation (ibid.). Instead, it is proposed, a number of defence mechanisms have arisen, which text-consumers operate before accepting as true the propositional content of any text (Origgi and Sperber 2000; Sperber 2000, 2001). These defences have to do with ensuring the proper calibration of trust (Sperber 2000: 135).

One such means is 'paying attention to behavioural signs of sincerity or insincerity' (Sperber 2001). However, this is only possible in face-to-face conversation, the genre of communication that the mechanism is adapted to function in, and not in mass media discourse genres. This is because here participants in the discourse event are removed from one and other in space and time and so behavioural signs during text-production are not observable.[14] Print media, then, circumvents at least one natural defence against strategic discourse.

Another more significant defence from the point of view of CDA is paying attention 'to the internal coherence of the message and to its external coherence' (Sperber 2001). Internal coherence can be understood as coherence in the sense of Halliday and Hasan (1976). It refers to logical relationships between sentences and clauses, often expressed in cohesive markers. External coherence refers to commitment and evidential relationships of support. It is judged on the communicator's commitment to the truth of the message, their claim to authority, and evidence for its truth, including acknowledgements of alternative sources that are accepted as authoritative. Sperber proposes the evolution of a logico-rhetorical module whose function it is to perform this coherence checking. Both internal and external coherence checking involve metarepresentational abilities. The logico-rhetorical module 'evolved as a means of reaping the benefits of communication while limiting the costs' and 'originated as a defence against the risks of deception' (ibid.).

Based on Sperber's proposal of this innate logico-rhetorical module, Chilton argues that humans 'may already have a critical instinct, even perhaps something like a module for CDA' (2005a: 43). This claim leads him to pose the inciting (or insightful) question: 'what is CDA for if people can do it anyway?' However, there are at least three answers to this question.

First, when viewed as a research enterprise whose agenda is to contribute to our understanding of language and language use, the existence

of a logico-rhetorical module does not render CDA redundant any more than the existence of a language acquisition device does for generative linguistics. As long since pointed out by Chomsky (1968), precisely because we do something automatically we are often not aware we do it but this does not mean the phenomenon is simple or uninteresting. Understanding how and when language is attested is as relevant and revealing as understanding how and when language is acquired. At least part of this must involve identifying and analysing the linguistic structures likely to trigger the logico-rhetorical module.

Second, there may be social, political, historical or institutional circumstances in which the operation of the logico-rhetorical module is somehow hindered. Chilton recognises this and suggests that CDA does not do enough to research these circumstances. However, as linguists, critical discourse analysts are most qualified to pronounce on the language used in certain circumstances. Perhaps research into these circumstances should be left to sociologists, political scientists, historians and economists in collaboration with critical discourse analysts. And indeed, CDA does promote interdisciplinarity and collaboration across the social sciences.

Third, there may be linguistic conditions under which the operation of the logico-rhetorical module is somehow blocked or by-passed. Chilton states that 'one of CDA's claims seems to be that it is primarily something about the discourse that hampers the use of the human critical potential' (2005a: 43). An especially useful direction for CDA, then, might to be to concern itself with what exactly it is about discourse that can prevent the operation of the logico-rhetorical module. One possibility is that constraining context relevance facilitates uncooperative communication by preventing text-consumers from spotting informational inconsistencies (Maillat and Oswald forthcoming). Maillat and Oswald thus characterise manipulative communication as follows:

> on the one hand, it induces the hearer into processing the information in a very constrained context of interpretation, and that, on the other hand, it simultaneously makes sure that the hearer is prevented from expanding the context, so that further assumptions (e.g., about the utterance's tentative incompatibility with previously held beliefs, or about the speaker's motivations) are not accessed at all.

Speakers can constrain context through censorship. A linguistic means of constraining context, however, is through framing. Speakers can

increase the salience of a selected frame so that accessing assumptions in any other frame does not satisfy effort/effect relations.

Another possibility for evading the logio-rhetorical module is communicating implicitly, which may allow meanings to get through unchecked because implicatures do not necessarily arise through *perceived* flouting of conversational maxims (Chilton 2004: 35). Rather, many implicatures, as well as presuppositions, are processed automatically and unconsciously. Thus, implicature may mitigate the operation of the logico-rhetorical module. In fact, according to Cap, 'there is virtually no time for the module to operate, because once the speaker's message has been communicated, it is processed automatically' (2006: 41).

It is quite possible, then, that the logico-rhetorical module only operates on the explicit, surface-level content of text and if this is accepted as true, then so along with it and without scrutiny are implicatures and presuppositions, providing, of course, that the text-consumer possesses the contextual knowledge needed to recover them. Implicature is of particular interest in CDA because implicatures are not accidental but intentional (Fowler 1985: 74). In other words, they may be strategic. But at the same time, because they are indirect, they enable text-producers to communicate meanings without culpability. This is especially useful when performing potentially face-threatening acts (Obseng 1997: 49). Implicatures also communicate ideology. They can direct text-consumer's interpretation of events and shape their viewpoints (Wilson 1990: 21). Presupposition similarly opens up the possibility for speakers to covertly communicate ideological and persuasive propositions and, through accommodation (Lewis 1979), can result in unconscious cognitive adjustments in text-consumers' representations of reality (Chilton 2004: 64).[15]

In political discourse, it can often happen that the inferences that preserve the co-operative or accommodation principle can only arise if the hearer adopts a particular ideology or set of attitudes and values (Chilton 2004: 37).

There is a fourth and more fundamental flaw in Chilton's challenge. This is that the story so far covers only 'the first step in a persuasion-counterpersuasion arms race' (Sperber 2000: 136). According to Sperber (2001), the next move in this arms race consisted in text-producers displaying the very coherence that text-consumers might look for before accepting the message. In this case, the logico-rhetorical module is not prevented or prevaricated but penetrated. Following Sperber, communication is 'even more advantageous, if, while protected from the

deception of others without being overprotected, you can penetrate their protection and deceive them' (2000: 135).

Of course, what follows is a spiralling arms race in which more deft defence mechanisms evolve leading to more and more sophisticated strategies in discourse. We find ourselves here in an infinite regress. If we postulate a counter-counter-measure we must accept a counter-counter-counter measure, and so on. The crucial point, however, is that at any stage in the arms race, deception would always have been one step ahead of defence. Consider the biological analogy with pathogens and white blood cells or the technological analogy with computer hackers and programmers. Whatever the conclusion of the arms race, it has to be one where safeguards can be breached by effective uses of argumentation (Sperber 2000, 2001). On this account, CDA, which may be a cultural enhancement of an innate n^{th} degree of counter-measure in the logico-rhetorical module, is needed not only for its research agenda but for its critical agenda too.

2.7. Summary

In this chapter we have discussed the role of representation in communication and have suggested that linguistic communication involves both detached representations and metarepresentations. We have distinguished between and discussed communication for cooperation and cooperation in communication. We argued that both are necessary precursors for Machiavellian communication. We then discussed the evolution of communication for manipulation, including the development of a logico-rhetorical module. Hopefully, however, we rebutted Chilton's argument against CDA and concluded that communicators can, through effective argumentation, achieve strategic aims. In the rest of this book, then, we discuss some of the discourse strategies identified in the communication of prejudice and the semantic and grammatical structures that bring them into effect.

3
Referential Strategies

3.1. Introduction

In Chapter 1 we stated that social inequality is not caused by evolved cognitive capacities but that they may be exploited in strategic discourse in order to enact social inequality. The most basic strategy in the communication of prejudice is a referential strategy (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2001b). Referential strategies can be used to exploit the human capacity for categorising coalitional groups in terms of a dichotomous in-group and out-group. It is crucial to recognise, however, that in-group versus out-group distinctions are not coded in cognition a priori. The human mind is flexible and adapted to adjust to cultural cues. The construction of in-groups and out-groups is triggered by cultural inputs (texts) and where the boundary lies between them is imparted through cultural transmission (discourse). In this chapter, we focus on the role of referential strategies in the discursive construction of group boundaries and exemplify some of the structures in discourse that realise referential strategies. A key question addressed is: why are referential strategies in discourse so effective? The answer to this question has to do with the evolution of cognitive capacities adapted to be sensitive to such information.

Chilton (2005a) turns to Sperber's (1994) work on metatemplates to explain human receptiveness to referential strategies. Sperber speculates that a general metatemplate (module) for living kinds may be inherited whose 'proper' domains include zoology and botany. This metatemplate, however, may also be 'initialised' in other, cultural domains, when information meets its general input conditions (Sperber 1994: 57). Sperber's proposal is that 'racial classification might result from an ad hoc template derived from the living-kinds metatemplate, through

an initialisation triggered by a cultural input' (ibid.: 58). On this argument, humans are not innately given to racism. While the underlying competence may be innate, it need not have racial classification as its proper domain. Instead,

> the initialisation of an ad hoc template for racial classification could well be the effect of parasitic, cultural input information on the higher-level learning module the function of which is to generate ad hoc templates for genuine living-kind domains such as zoology and botany. (Sperber 1994: 58)

No racist disposition has then been selected for. Rather, 'the dispositions that have been selected for make humans all too easily susceptible to racism given minimal, innocuous-looking cultural input' (ibid.). Such cultural input, of course, comes in the form of referential strategies in discourse. Sperber states that 'the mere encounter with a nominal label used to designate a living thing is enough to tilt ... categorisation of that thing towards an essentialist construal' (1994: 59).

Metatemplates, then, may explain the reproduction of classical racism in response to certain referential strategies. But they do not explain modern racism which, in contrast to classical racism, does not seem to be based on essentialism but constructions of cultural identities and incompatibilities (van Dijk 1992: 93). It is coalitional psychology which seems more appropriate here.

3.2. Inter-Group Threats in the EEA

Ancestral humans lived in largely cooperative small-scale social groups. This practice yielded survival benefits for our ancestors, as group-living enabled individuals to better negotiate the physical world, both in terms of access to the resources and avoidance of the dangers that it presented. As Schaller and Neuberg state:

> group life provided individuals with significant fitness-relevant opportunities and benefits. For instance, it offered efficient means for finding mates and raising offspring, enabled individuals to more effectively exploit natural resources necessary for survival, and provided a powerful buffer against predators. (2008: 403)

Group-living is therefore to be considered a fundamental survival strategy (ibid.). Of course, group-living came at a cost to the

individual, who, in order to gain the long-term benefits of group-living, must sacrifice their own short-term interests for the good of the group. Members must invest time and energy in collective action and other group practices. By living in groups, our ancestors were presented with a further set of problems pertaining to group management and security (ibid.). Proto-humans would have had to develop cognitive and behavioural adaptations designed to maximise the effectiveness of their coalitional group, thus increasing their own individual fitness.[1] Of course, the corollary of group-living is group-boundaries. Banding together, as Lovaglia et al. (2002) state, also created boundaries between groups. And while intra-group relations were mostly cooperative, based on kin-selected and reciprocal altruism, inter-group relations, on the other hand, were more conflicting, based on competition over limited resources.[2] Maximising the effectiveness of one's own coalitional group, then, not only involved internal social structures and systems but also means of defending it against external threats, including those posed by other coalitional groups and their members. Internal social mechanisms for group effectiveness include reciprocal arrangements between members, cultural norms and values, an accepted organisation of authority, and socialising schemes designed to sustain these structures and systems (Schaller and Neuberg, in preparation). Protecting these internal features of social groups would have posed a significant problem for early humans and so we should expect adaptations to have arisen designed to solve them. It would have been adaptive for our ancestors to be attuned not only to dangers which directly threatened their fitness but also to dangers which, in threatening their group's territory and internal social mechanisms, did so indirectly.

Members of other groups in particular constituted a potential threat to individuals and the effectiveness of their group. Physically, for example, other coalitional groups presented a constant threat of invasion and eviction, where territory was a primary resource providing food and shelter. They may also have carried and transmitted diseases. Socio-culturally, non-group members would have been uninitiated in internal group practices and would thus have required education in order to be effectively included in coordinated collective action (Schaller and Neuberg, in preparation). Non-group members may have sought to alter the organisation of authority. They might also have entered exchanges but reneged on their commitment to reciprocate. Similarly, non-group members might have reaped the benefits of group-living without contributing to group effectiveness. So what cognitive and behavioural

adaptations arose to avoid potentially harmful encounters with other groups and their members?

3.3. Adapted Responses

A minimum adaptation would have been the capacity to categorise other individuals as either members or non-members of one's coalitional group. During our species' evolution, group-living depended on the categorisation of the social world into 'us' versus 'them' (Kurzban et al. 2001: 15387).[3] Constructing group boundaries in this way involves a binary conceptualisation. According to van der Dennen (1999), binary conceptualisations occur in many domains, where people's world view seems to be made up of a number of binary opposites or antonymies including self/other, friend/foe and familiar/alien. We especially see binary conceptualisations in the formation of group identity (Chilton 2004: 203). However,

> merely categorizing an individual as an out-group member is not sufficient to promote avoidance. There must also be some cognitive association linking that out-group, and its members, with some specific connotative or affective information that promotes behavioural avoidance. In short, it requires the activation of some sort of negative stereotype. (Schaller and Neuberg 2008: 405)

Humans may thus have evolved to be 'biologically prepared' to learn to associate coalitional out-group members with threat (ibid.). Innate psychological mechanisms may have emerged which enabled the learning of cognitive associations linking out-group status with expectations of harm or harmful intent (Schaller and Neuberg, in preparation). These cognitive categories, associations and the affective and further cognitive processes they trigger can be characterised as prejudice 'syndromes' (Schaller and Neuberg 2008, in preparation; Schaller et al. 2004). However, as mental representations, we may specifically characterise these syndromes or stereotypes as social cognitions or ideologies. According to van Dijk (1998: 69) ideologies include a

> very general polarisation schema defined by the opposition between Us and Them [which] suggests that groups and group conflicts are involved, and that groups build an ideological image of themselves and others, in such a way that (generally) We are represented positively, and They come out negatively. Positive self-presentation and

negative other-presentation seems to be a fundamental property of ideologies.

Within Evolutionary Psychology, negative emotions are viewed as designed to drive adaptive behaviour in response to threat-connoting cues (Cosmides and Tooby 2000).

It may be possible to identify relevant neural structures in the brain. The amygdala, an evolutionarily ancient brain region where the emotion modules reside, sends signals to social decision-making circuitry in the neocortex (Pinker 1997: 372).[4] In this sense, emotions guide cognition and behaviour (Damasio 1994). The implication is that specific kinds of threat perception trigger specific suites of affective and further cognitive responses, which, in turn, impel specific behaviours. For example, the emotion triggered by perceived physical threats is fear; the one triggered by perception of disease is disgust; and the perception of socio-cultural threats triggers contempt – a combination of moral disgust and anger – where the stereotypical trait associations that activate this response are not likely to connote hostility or disease, but, rather, a sort of moral wrongness (Schaller and Neuberg 2008: 410). They all drive behaviours, however, which are discriminatory or exclusionary. We discuss the activation of these and other cognitive modules in the following chapter. For now, however, let us just assume that there are neurological links between the conceptual system and the seat of emotions in the brain and that certain mental representations constructed during discourse can trigger emotion programmes.

Any act of intergroup discrimination or exclusion, then, is the product of psychological processes that govern individuals' attitudes, decisions and behaviour (Schaller and Neuberg 2008: 401). Cognitive associations of out-group members with threats or threatening intentions fulfilled an adaptive function in the EEA by causing affective and further cognitive responses which resulted in discriminatory and exclusionary behaviours. On this account, prejudice syndromes are adapted danger-avoidance mechanisms (Schaller et al. 2004).

3.4. Adaptations in the Contemporary World

Discriminatory and exclusionary behaviours may have been adaptive in the EEA. In contemporary culture, however, they are not. In fact, they are maladaptive. And yet prejudice syndromes and discriminatory practices continue to occur. This is perhaps best explained by a theoretical account that combines insights from Evolutionary Psychology and

CDA and which considers what happens when contemporary communication meets evolved cognition, that is, innate modules or templates.

From an evolutionary point of view, there are two major contributing factors. The first is that the modern mind operates with cognitive architectures built in the EEA. Prejudices are, in part, relics of human ancestral history. The evolutionary logic behind this argument is summarised by Schaller et al. as follows:

> The contemporary human mind evolved in response to the adaptive problems imposed by the environments in which ancestral populations lived; for the past several million years of this evolutionary history, ancestral populations lived in social groups; specific adaptive problems associated with group life may have given rise to specific psychological mechanisms that influenced evaluative perceptions of and reactions to individuals associated with specific sorts of groups. In other words, certain prejudicial ways of thinking and acting may have conferred adaptive benefits within ancestral environments, and now – even though contemporary environments are very different in many ways – those prejudicial ways of thinking and action may persist. (2003: 110, after Kurzban and Leary 2001)

From this perspective, then, contemporary prejudices are, partially, products of mental mechanisms that evolved as adaptations designed to protect early human populations against the particular threats posed by alternative coalitional groups (Schaller and Neuberg, in preparation). As Pinker puts it, ethnic stereotypes 'are a product of coalitional psychology' (1997: 313). Despite the fact that these threats no longer exist in reality, the evolved psychology persists when the threats are *perceived* to exist. Discriminatory responses do not require the target to pose a realistic threat, but, rather, they merely need to be associated with it (Schaller and Neuberg 2008: 407).

The second contributing factor is that evolution favoured a 'better safe than sorry' strategy. In other words, cognitive mechanisms which motivate behaviour evolved to err on the side of caution and avoid unnecessary risks. The result is that, in potentially dangerous circumstances, associations are heuristic and cognition is biased towards false positive errors (Haselton and Buss 2000; Haselton 2007). That is, cognitive associations apply to whole categories and cognitive mechanisms are imperfectly calibrated to the actual existence of threat in such a way that individuals may respond zealously to the scantest of information suggesting only the slightest hint of harm.

The principal reason that prejudice syndromes or social cognitions and thus discriminatory practices persist in contemporary culture, however, is as a result of one further, crucial, contributing factor, which is especially significant where CDA is concerned; namely, discourse.

3.5. Discourse as Input

What we have argued so far is that humans have evolved cognitive capacities to (i) categorise coalitional groups in terms of an in-group/out-group dichotomy and (ii) construct associations between out-group members and negative or threat-connoting cues. What we have not argued is that humans are biologically *determined* to fulfil this potential; only that they are biologically *prepared* to do so. This potential is only met in response to some input. It nevertheless remains the case 'that people are extraordinarily adept at this kind of social categorisation. Some forms of social categorisation are effortful, but distinguishing between "us" and "them" apparently is not' (Schaller and Neuberg 2008: 404). Once an individual has constructed an out-group and associated it and its members with negative or threat-connoting cues, innate affective, further cognitive and behavioural responses will probabilistically ensue. It is exactly these abilities and almost automatic reactions that text-producers effectively exploit in referential and predicational strategies.

Human cognition is adapted to react to novel information from the environment (Hampton 2004). Prejudice syndromes arise when information is learned which indicates (i) group boundaries and (ii) threat from out-group members. This information can be learned through direct experience or indirectly perceived through cultural transmission, namely linguistic communication, which is to say discourse.

In the EEA our ancestors lived in small-scale, close-knit communities whose unity relied on kinship and reciprocal exchanges. Group boundaries would have largely been learned through actual interaction. And the threat from out-group members would have been learned from actual encounters. In the contemporary world of nation-states and national identities, by contrast, we live in 'imagined communities' – much larger, constructed communities in which members 'will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them' (Anderson 2006: 6). Imagined communities are imagined in the sense that they are based only on a mental image of their members' unity. They are constructed in the sense that this image is the product of discourse and history. In the contemporary world, information indicating

group boundaries and perceived threats from out-group members comes from texts rather than direct interpersonal contact. It follows from this that critical analysis and counter-discourse could eradicate racism by removing its required cultural input.

Presently, however, we consider how group boundaries are constructed in discourse before, in the following chapter, considering how the out-group is, in turn, represented in texts.

The strategies involved in constructing group boundaries are, of course, referential strategies. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Van Leeuwen (1996) both adopt a broad definition of referential strategies. For Van Leeuwen, referential strategies concern 'the ways in which social actors can be represented in … discourse' (1996: 32). For example, an individual may be referred to by their name, their gender, their job, their role in society or their role in some reported scenario, etc. For Reisigl and Wodak, referential strategies are the 'strategies by which one constructs social actors: for example, ingroups and outgroups' (2001: 45). Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 48–52) identify a number of referential strategies with different referential functions – creating in-groups and out-groups being only one example. Referential strategies are more narrowly defined here, however, as just those strategies which mark membership of coalitional in-groups and out-groups. Referential strategies and the structures that realise them therefore fall within 'the rubric of social deixis' (Duszak 2002: 5).[5]

Specifically, then, we take referential strategies as constructing a dichotomous conceptualisation of an out-group defined with respect to a coalitional in-group which both text-producer and text-consumer are assumed to belong to. In this sense, the discursive construction of out-groups in relation to in-groups, 'not only reflects mental representations of people talked about …, but also the categories of participants … talked to in a communicative event' (van Dijk 2002: 226). This definition includes the particular referential strategies that Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 48–52) refer to as 'nationalisation', 'de-spatialisation', 'dissimilation' and 'collectivisation'. We discuss these strategies in detail below. As Duszak (2002: 6) points out, however, 'language has many resources to actualize the *us-them* distinction'. We only consider a selection of them. These strategies and some of the structures that may realise them are listed in Table 3.1 (partially reproduced from Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 48).

Referential strategies are most obvious in text where both the in-group and the out-group are explicitly referred to. The in-group, though, is often left implicit for the text-consumer to infer. In fact,

Table 3.1 Referential strategies

Selected strategies	Linguistic means	Examples of realisation (type)
NATIONALISATION	– nationyms	the Poles, Romanians
DE-SPATIALISATION	– nationyms – anthroponyms – actionyms – metonymic toponyms – metaphors of spatiality	the Poles, Romanians immigrants, foreigners asylum-seekers Poland, Romania insiders, outsiders
DISSIMILATION	– xenonyms – anthroponyms – metaphors of spatiality	aliens, strangers foreigners outsiders
COLLECTIVISATION	– pronouns – possessive determiners	we, they, us, them our, their

the construction of an out-group presupposes the construction of an in-group. By contrast, however, the construction of an in-group does not necessarily entail the construction of an outgroup. Linguistically, referential strategies may be realised in the form of explicit and deictic noun phrases.[6] Explicit noun phrases profile particular aspects of identity. And any one lexical item may simultaneously realise more than one referential strategy and therefore profile more than one aspect of identity. For example, nationyms realise both nationalisation and de-spatialisation strategies. Similarly, anthroponyms may realise both de-spatialisation and dissimilation strategies.

One kind of referential strategy, then, is nationalisation, which occurs where the out-group is distinguished from the in-group through categorisation according to nationality. This is usually manifested in the form of nationyms. Consider (1) where the out-group is referred to with a nationym which represents a generalising metonymy:[7]

(1) *Daily Mail,* 11 Feb. 2005

[It] isn't because the British are workshy but because **the Poles** are willing to work for less money.

A further referential strategy which nationyms also realise is de-spatialisation. De-spatialisation strategies define coalitional groups in terms of physical, that is, geographical, or metaphorical space. These strategies are referred to as '*de*-spatialisation' strategies because members of the out-group are categorised as being from a different place or space to the in-group; they are 'displaced'. This may be especially effective

where territoriality is an 'intrinsic part of the socio-political instinct' (Chilton 2004: 203). Nationyms, as well as metonymic toponyms where place stands for population, then, realise de-spatialisation strategies as they highlight the fact that members come from different countries. Actionyms like 'asylum-seekers' and anthroponyms like 'immigrants' and 'foreigners' perform the same function, distinguishing the 'non-native' from the 'native' population. Consider (2) for example:

(2) *The Express,* 11 Dec. 2004

[The latest survey on our attitudes to immigration] shows that three quarters of Britons believe there are too many **foreigners** coming into the country.

De-spatialisation may also be metaphorical, manifested in metaphors of spatiality, which 'are primarily ordered around the symbolically and evaluatively loaded binary oppositions of "internal" versus "external"' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 59). Such metaphors of spatiality categorise coalitional groups in terms of 'insiders' versus 'outsiders' as exemplified in (3):[8]

(3) *The Mirror,* 28 May 2002

The Government is going out of its way to cater to vast numbers of **outsiders** but isn't looking after our old and ill.

Another referential strategy is dissimilation, which occurs where the out-group is categorised as different from or unfamiliar to the in-group. One way in which dissimilation is realised is through xenonyms such as 'aliens' or 'strangers'. Consider, for example, (4):[9]

(4) *Daily Mail,* 13 April 2000

The British are not racists. We have a long history of toleration and acceptance of **strangers**.

All of the examples above involve explicit noun phrases. However, deictic noun phrases also realise a referential strategy, namely collectivisation. Indexicals, such as personal pronouns, identify social groups through deictic pointing (Duszak 2002: 6). Personal pronouns are usually dealt with under the category of person deixis, which Levinson (1983) sees as a superordinate category to which social deixis belongs. However, personal pronouns are often if not always involved

in managing and maintaining the social 'positioning' of discourse participants (as well as third parties).[10] Duszak (2002: 6) observes that

> the pronoun *we* is a prototypical exponent of the speaker-group, as opposed to the distance-establishing *they*. Both *we* and *they* can be skilfully managed in discourse in order to construct, redistribute or change the social values of ingroupness and outgroupness.

Person deixis might therefore be better seen as the subordinate category and personal pronouns, whose usage relies upon and reproduces knowledge of social identities and relations, as ultimately always performing social deixis (Cummings 2005; Marmaridou 2000).

Pronouns realise a referential strategy insofar as they 'can be used to induce interpreters to conceptualise group identity, coalitions ... and the like, either as insiders or as outsiders' (Chilton and Schäffner 2002: 30). Third person plural pronouns 'they' and 'them' are exclusive of both speaker and addressee. They therefore construct an out-group relative to the discourse participants, who are further inferred as belonging to the same social in-group. First person plural pronouns 'we' and 'us', on the other hand, are conventionally always inclusive of speaker. They thus construct an in-group which the text-producer at least belongs to. Text-consumers are indexed as members of the in-group when first person plural pronouns are interpreted as inclusive of addressee.[11] Consider (5) for example:

(5) *The Daily Telegraph,* 16 Jan. 2003

> Why do people come here if **they** hate **us**? And if **they** hate **us** and want to kill **us**, why do **we** let **them** come?

Possessive determiners work in the same way. Consider (6) for example:

(6) *The Sun,* 29 Oct. 2003

> Who does Blair think he is, saying we must accept people who have forced **their** way into **our** country?

'Their' is exclusive of both speaker and addressee and constructs an out-group relative to the discourse participants. 'Our' is inclusive of speaker and so constructs an in-group to which text-producer belongs but may be inferred as inclusive of addressee also and so constructs an in-group to which both text-producer and text-consumer belong.

Referential strategies do not by themselves produce prejudice syndromes and exclusionary behaviours. They are very effective in arousing positive emotions towards the in-group, where 'the sense of belonging to a group fulfils the human desire for solidarity, rapport, safety or psychological comfort that comes from sharing things with people' (Duszak 2002: 2). However, as Allport (1954) recognised, in-group attachment does not necessarily entail negative emotions towards out-groups. As we have stated above, the out-group must also be presented in a way which connotes negativity or threat. Predicational strategies are realised by ascribing, through various linguistic means, positive attributes to in-groups and negative or threatening attributes and actions to out-group members. Constructing stereotypical representations associating out-group members with negative or threat-connoting cues, then, may be achieved through predications.

Although referential and predicational strategies are often realised in noun phrases and their predicates respectively, they cannot always be analysed as distinct structures within sentences, or sentence-level structures at all. For example, presupposition and implicatures also provide predications. And predications can attribute to out-group members qualities which further distinguish them from the in-group, thus realising a referential strategy. This is often achieved through metaphorical verb phrases which de-humanise the out-group (see Chapter 7). Certain references can also serve a predicational function. This is because 'the pure referential identification very often already involves a denotatively as well as connotatively more or less deprecatory or appreciative labelling of the social actors' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 45). Denotatively, social actors are appraised when they are referred to in terms which explicitly evaluate them (Van Leeuwen 1996: 58). Connotatively, continued predicational strategies can, over time, cause certain noun phrases and binary lexemes in particular to come to cluster at opposite ends of an evaluative pole with many other antonymies. It is no surprise, therefore, that 'the tendency in much political discourse is towards antonymous lexical choices, and other lexical choices that must lead to hearers making mental models that are binary in character' (Chilton 2004: 203). This is especially evident in discourse which functions in the formation of group identity and the fear of foreigners (ibid.). The Self and, by extension, the in-group, becomes associated with what is good, clean and safe, while the Other and, by extension, the out-group, becomes associated with what is bad, dirty and dangerous (van der Dennen 1999). Lexical items referring to the out-group may then, in fact, themselves alone come to constitute threat-connoting cues.[12]

Referential strategies are intrinsically ideological. Group boundaries need not exist. There are no 'natural' boundaries between social groups. The boundaries imposed are chosen by text-producers and are products of political discourse. Accordingly, they may be removed through counter-discourses. Referential strategies, however, are a basic strategy in xenophobic discourse. The construction of an out-group is a prerequisite for negative and threat-connoting representations of the out-group. As Reisigl and Wodak put it (2001: 43), 'dissimilation is the precondition for every prejudiced discourse'. In other words, referential strategies are fundamental in the discursive construction of attitudes towards immigrants and asylum-seekers and facilitate further ideological representations realising predicational strategies.

3.6. Summary

In this chapter we have highlighted the fundamental role of referential strategies as necessary but not sufficient strategies in racist discourse. We have argued that coalitional psychology can best explain our receptiveness to referential strategies, and thus their effectiveness, in contemporary racist, or xenophobic, discourse. We have identified four referential strategies in particular and some of the structures that realise them, including various explicit and deictic noun phrases. However, we have pointed out that particular predications may also realise referential strategies. And, at the same time, that certain referential expressions can simultaneously serve a predicational function through semantic prosody. Finally, we have suggested that referential strategies, as we have defined them, are inherently ideological. In the following chapter we discuss predicational strategies, another essential move in the communication of prejudice.

4 Predication and Proximisation Strategies

4.1. Introduction

We suggested in the previous chapter that during the EEA our ancestors faced specific, realistic threats from members of other coalitional groups. According to Evolutionary Psychology, cognitive abilities would have evolved which were adapted to minimise risk in the face of these threats; namely, the ability to learn to associate the out-group and its members with threat-connoting cues. This ability was adaptive insofar as such associations automatically activated evolved modules which, in turn, would drive avoidance behaviours. These cognitive modules, moreover, remain in modern cognition to be activated when similar associations are made, even when such associations are not based in reality but are, rather, ideologically constructed through discourse. Text-producers use predicational strategies in discourse to promote representations which associate threat-connoting cues with the out-group. We focus on predicational strategies in this chapter.

Where threat-connoting attributes and actions in particular are ascribed to the out-group and its members, we can consider predicational strategies to be emotively coercive. The question we are centrally concerned with in this chapter is what kind of predications achieve what kind of emotive effects. We propose that the answer to this question has to do with the kind of information to which our social intelligence and emotion modules are adapted to respond. And we find that predicational strategies regularly associate the out-group with the very threats that would have been a genuine cause for concern during the EEA. The effectiveness of predicational strategies might therefore be explained in terms of the cognitive modules they activate and the behaviours thus promoted. In this chapter, then, we exemplify some of

the predicational strategies used in contemporary discourse to represent immigrants and asylum-seekers and elaborate on the particular modules they might activate.

4.2. Coercion

We have seen in the previous chapter that referential strategies are a fundamental move in prejudiced discourse. Predicational strategies are another 'essential aspect of self- and other-presentation' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 46). Predicational strategies involve positive presentation of the in-group and, more usually, negative presentation of the constructed out-group. More specifically, predications may frame, for example, people and processes, such as immigrants/asylum-seekers and immigration/asylum, as presenting, directly or indirectly, a threat to text-consumers' fitness. As such, not only do predicational strategies involve simple negative representations but they may also involve an emotive dimension. When this is the case, we can say that predicational strategies might achieve *emotive effects* and thus contribute to *emotive coercion*.

Coercion is a proposed strategy in political discourse (Chilton 2004; Chilton and Schäffner 1997). We can think of it as a macrolevel speaker strategy to which other microlevel linguistic strategies contribute. Coercion can be defined as an intention to affect the beliefs, emotions and behaviours of others in such a way that suits one's own interests. It is an ultimate goal for strategic text-producers and (implicitly) lies behind most political communications. In the case of discourse on immigration and asylum, of course, the (implicit) intention is very often to validate, and persuade text-consumers to support, policies designed to emplace restrictions upon immigrants and asylum-seekers (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999).

Coercion involves exerting some degree of influence over the text-consumer and their actions. It is reliant upon the position and power of the text-producer. For example, their power to determine the selection and transformation of information communicated in particular genres. That is, the text-producer's power to dictate the topics discussed and the way they are framed.

Text-producers may act coercively in discourse by presenting information in particular ways, thus influencing the representations of reality that text-consumers hold, at least for the purpose of local understanding during the discourse event, and their responses to those representations. In other words, text-producers can act coercively in

the ideational function of language. But they may also act coercively in the interpersonal function. For example, by positioning themselves, text-consumers and third parties in specific relationships with one another. Coercion can be seen in relation to speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) and in particular to the perlocutionary effects of speech acts (Chilton 2004: 118). In causing text-consumers to construct cognitive representations, text-producers are able to influence their decisions and actions. This is because decisions and behaviour are motivated by knowledge and affect. And text-producers are aware of this fact. This is precisely Machiavellian intelligence and tactical deception. The macro-strategy of coercion, then, is 'an intention to cause addressees to act in a way that otherwise they would not have chosen' (Chilton 2004: 47).

Chilton distinguishes two kinds of linguistic coercion: cognitive and emotive. They are analytically separable, but in the practice of discourse they are intimately intertwined and occur simultaneously in single text units and even smaller structures.

Cognitive coercion is propositional and involves producing 'cognitive effects' in text-consumers. We are using the term cognitive effects here roughly in the sense in which it is used in Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995). That is, cognitive effects are the modification of mental representations held by an individual, the text-consumer. Cognitive effects can be achieved by adding new representations or strengthening, weakening or deleting existing ones. Discourse achieves cognitive effects when it connects with background knowledge to provide a cognitive context against which text is interpreted. Here I understand the background knowledge which individuals hold in terms of Cognitive Linguistics. In this framework, this knowledge takes the form of cognitive frames, image schemas and conceptual metaphors, which are activated, maintained and modified in discourse.

Emotive coercion involves producing 'emotive effects' in text-consumers. Emotive coercion is related to what Aristotle referred to as pathos – appeal based on emotion. Emotive effects follow on from cognitive effects. They can be understood as the activation of emotion programs in response to certain representations. Emotive effects, however, prompt further cognitive effects, whereby the world is 'carved up into categories based partly on what emotional state an individual is in' (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 104). In this sense, emotive effects may be seen as ideological. They may also be manipulative. Emotive coercion works in political discourse, we are suggesting, in much the same way as

Dawkins (1999: 62) suggests that it works in advertising: 'the advertiser uses his knowledge of human psychology, of the hopes, fears and secret motives of his targets, and he designs an advertisement which is effective in manipulating their behaviour'. It seems reasonable to refer to emotive coercion, then, because the emotional effects induced by particular language usages and intended to elicit behavioural responses may be beyond the control of the hearer.

Referential and predicational strategies contribute to cognitive and emotive coercion. Successful referential and predicational strategies achieve cognitive effects insofar as they can construct new representations but mainly in that they reinforce existing ones. Referential strategies, for example, achieve cognitive effects by reproducing dichotomous cognitive representations of an in-group versus an out-group. Predicational strategies achieve cognitive effects by reproducing cognitive associations between the out-group and negative or threat-connoting cues. Predicational strategies can also achieve emotive effects as the cognitive associations they construct can, in turn, activate systems of affect. And referential strategies can also achieve emotive effects through semantic prosody (see Chapter 3).

Legitimising strategies are also closely linked with coercion. Their primary aim, however, is not to contribute directly to coercion as is the case for referential and predicational strategies. Rather, linguistic coercion is dependent on the legitimisation of assertions. Legitimisation facilitates coercion insofar as it establishes the right to be believed (Chilton 2004: 46). It is only in getting text-consumers to accept cognitive representations as true and retain them in long-term memory that reference and predication can achieve macro-strategies like coercion. Legitimisation can also be seen in relation to speech act theory. Legitimising strategies provide the felicity conditions that govern the illocutionary act of assertion and in particular the preparatory condition that the speaker has evidence for the truth of P (Searle 1969: 66). We discuss legitimisation in Chapters 5 and 8.

4.3. Predication

According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 46), predication is 'the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons…, objects, events, actions and social phenomena'. Predications frame people, objects, events, processes and states of affairs in terms of quality, quantity, space, time and so on. (ibid.). Predication can be more or less explicit or implicit. Linguistically, then, an array of syntactic, semantic

and pragmatic resources is available to text-producers in order to realise predicational strategies. These include, for example:

- adjectives, prepositional phrases and relative clauses that ascribe particular qualities to people
- numerals and quantifiers that ascribe particular quantities to people
- verbs and nominalisations that, literally or metaphorically, describe actions and events in particular ways and ascribe to people particular qualities and quantities
- implicatures and presuppositions which force particular inferences.

Of course, as we said in the Chapter 3, referential expressions may simultaneously realise referential and predicational strategies. Reisigl and Wodak note that 'because of the descriptive quality of such referential categorisations, linguistic identification is already related to strategic predication and thus very often involves evaluation' (2001: 46). We may add, then:

- nouns that carry particular connotations with regard to their referents.

In aiming to achieve emotive effects in predicational strategies, text-producers tend to represent the out-group in relation to particular, recurring 'topoi'. The term 'topos' has its roots in Rhetoric. It translates as a 'place' where arguments can be found. However, a 'topos' is also translated as a rule or procedure (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 38). It is this latter translation that is used in CDA where topoi are understood as standard 'argumentation schemes' which 'represent the common-sense reasoning typical for specific issues' (van Dijk 2000b: 98). Topoi are related to pragmatic presupposition, which can be defined in terms of 'assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge' (Givón 1979: 50).[1] For Reisigl and Wodak, topoi are content-related warrants which can be expressed as conditional 'conclusion rules' (2001: 74). The conclusion is not spelled out. It is implicit in the argument. An initial, explicit or inferable, premise presupposes a particular conclusion (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Dijk 2000a, 2000b; Wodak 2001b).

Wodak (2001b: 74) identifies a set of topoi in which predications in immigration discourse function as first premises. Within these topoi, typical associations are constructed which function as first premises in arguments justifying exclusionary social and political practices (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 55). Ten topoi and the typical associations formed under them are represented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Recurring topoi and typical associations

Topos	Association/premise
Burden	– The out-group need to be supported by the in-group
Character	– The out-group have certain undesirable characteristics
Crime	– The out-group are criminals
Culture	– The out-group have different norms and values to the in-group and are unable to assimilate
Danger	– The out-group are dangerous
Disadvantage	– The out-group bring no advantage/are of no use to the in-group
Disease	– The out-group are dirty and carry infectious diseases
Displacement	– The out-group will eventually outnumber and/or dominate the in-group and they get privileged access to limited socio-economic resources over and above the in-group
Exploitation	– The out-group exploit the welfare system of the in-group
Finance	– The out-group present some cost to the in-group

What these topoi all have in common is that the representations which typically occur within them construct cognitive associations between out-group members and threat-connoting cues. They all present immigrants and asylum-seekers as either a direct or indirect threat to individual in-group members, text-consumers. Moreover, the threats that immigrants and asylum-seekers are presented as posing are equivalent to precisely those that posed real problems during the EEA. These associations might therefore be expected to activate mental modules that drive behaviours which were adaptive in the EEA but which are counter-conducive to inclusion and equality in the contemporary world. Which modules, then, are candidates for activation? The answer is social intelligence modules and emotion modules. One important social intelligence module is the cheater-detection module. We discuss the cheater-detection module below, before illustrating the kind of predications that might trigger it in section 4.5.

4.4. Cheater-Detection Module

Recall from Chapter 3 that group-living is to be considered a fundamental survival strategy. The principle of reciprocal altruism states that an individual's inclusive fitness is increased through cooperative endeavours with other individuals (Trivers 1971). Put simply, our ancestors stood a better chance of surviving and reproducing if they protected

one another and pooled their resources. This can be demonstrated using game theory and in particular repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Axelrod 1984). In Prisoner's Dilemma, two prisoners are being questioned about a serious crime that they are alleged to have committed. The police can only prosecute if one of the prisoners makes a confession and incriminates the other. If neither prisoner confesses, however, the police can only convict them of some minor offence with a low penalty. The prisoners are held in separate cells and told that, if they inform on their accomplice, then they would be released without charge while their accomplice would face the maximum penalty. The dilemma is whether to remain silent (cooperate) and receive a light sentence providing that their partner also cooperates but risk a much heavier sentence if their partner implicates them, or to inform on their partner (defect) and get off scot free providing their partner doesn't also defect, in which case both parties will receive some sentence. The 'pay-off matrix' for Prisoner's Dilemma is presented in Table 4.2.

In Prisoner's Dilemma, neither party can take the risk that the other will defect and so must defect themselves in order to avoid receiving the heaviest punishment. But it is obvious that they would both do better to cooperate. In repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, however, the dynamic changes and cooperation becomes possible. This is because individuals know that they will meet again. It is therefore in their mutual long-term interest to cooperate and they can be punished for defecting in the future. Prisoner's Dilemma can be used to model any similar situation. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is considered to reflect social dilemmas in the EEA, where our ancestors encountered recurrent opportunities for social interaction with the same individuals, and is used to explain the evolution of cooperation, upon which group-living is founded.

Besides communication as discussed in Chapter 2, then, other forms of cooperation include collective action between group members and the distribution of limited resources among group members. For example, defending territory and sharing food. In other words, group-living

Table 4.2 Pay-off matrix in Prisoner's Dilemma

	B cooperates	**B defects**
A cooperates	A = 1 year imprisonment B = 1 year imprisonment	A = 10 years imprisonment B = 0 years imprisonment
A defects	A = 0 years imprisonment B = 10 years imprisonment	A = 5 years imprisonment B = 5 years imprisonment

provided security in the face of intra-specific conflict and harsh ecological conditions. Group-living requires individuals to compromise their own immediate interests for the long-term interest of the coalition. In defending territory and sharing food, for example, individuals risk harm and hunger. Individuals are willing to do this, though, for the net benefits it gains them. These practices are tantamount to a 'social contract' held between group members.

However, the principle of reciprocal altruism applies only to the extent that other individuals are likely to engage and reciprocate. That is, to fulfil their side of the contract. But there always remains the temptation not to participate and instead to pursue one's own short-term interests. In other words, to break the contract. For example, by not contributing to collective action but nevertheless reaping the rewards. Or by hording rather than sharing resources. In Evolutionary Psychology, this is known as the 'freerider problem'[2] and it constitutes 'perhaps the most serious problem faced by social organisms' (Barrett et al. 2002: 254).

The freerider problem leaves cooperators vulnerable to exploitation, where freeriders 'take the benefits of social cooperation but do not pay the costs' (ibid.: 253). In large groups of cooperators, defecting is a successful strategy for some (Enquist and Leimar 1993). And the larger the group of cooperators, the easier it is for defectors to avoid discovery. In a population of indiscriminate cooperators, freeriders would prosper and quickly come to outnumber cooperators. Cooperation could thus not be sustained. However, such are the advantages of cooperation, that there would have been significant selection pressures towards it, but which were dependent on solutions to the freerider problem.

The solution is, rather than to cooperate indiscriminately, to employ a 'tit-for-tat' strategy in series of social exchanges. Axelrod (1984) shows that a 'tit-for-tat' strategy emerges as an evolutionarily stable strategy in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. 'Tit-for-tat' is a general strategy with two rules: cooperate in first round and in all subsequent rounds repeat opponent's move in previous round. This strategy allows for cooperation to get a foothold in the first place and to continue among cooperators. But it also prevents continued cooperation with cheaters. Of course, the 'tit-for-tat' strategy itself requires certain cognitive and behavioural adaptations. A number of such pre-adaptations have been proposed (see Dunbar 1999 for a summary). Especially significant among these is a cheater-detection module, which is attuned to situations in which one is vulnerable to social cheating and adapted to react to instances of social cheating (Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and Tooby 1992).

Cosmides (1989) uses the Wason Selection Task to show that people perform poorly in solving purely logical problems but are much better able to solve the same problem when it is couched as a social contract. For example, participants are tasked with testing the conditional rule *if P then Q*. In each condition, they are presented with four cards corresponding to P, not-P, Q and not-Q. On the reverse of P cards are Q values and on the reverse of Q cards are P values. In the logical condition, participants are asked to imagine that they have an administrative job in a school and they need to check whether student documents have been properly processed. Participants must check that all students with 'D' grades have been given a code '3'. They are presented with four cards, each representing one student record. On one side of the cards is the student's grade and on the other side is the assigned code. Face up the cards read D (P), F (not-P), 3 (Q) and 7 (not-Q). The participant must turn over only those cards necessary to establish that the records are accurate. To do this, participants should turn over D and 7. In the social contract condition, participants are asked to imagine that they work in a bar and need to check that only those customers of a legal age are drinking alcohol. Again, they are presented with four cards, each representing one customer. On one side of the cards is the customer's drink and on the side their age. Face up the cards read Beer (P), Coke (not-P), 25 (Q) and 16 (not-Q). The participant must turn over only those cards necessary to establish that the law is not being broken. To do this, participants should turn over Beer and 16. Cosmides reports that when the problem is presented in the logical condition only 25 per cent of university students succeed in solving it but, by contrast, when it is presented in some social contract condition, 75 per cent succeed in solving it.

This differential is claimed as evidence for a dedicated mental module which is automatically activated in situations where the opportunity for social cheating exists.[3] Once activated, the module then checks for cheating and, if it is found, promotes particular decision-rules with regard to cooperation. Because purely logical problems do not involve social contracts, they do not activate the cheater-detection module and so performance in the task is poorer. By contrast, when the same problem is couched as a social contract, performance in the task improves as a consequence of the functional specification of the cheater-detection module.

Alongside the cheater-detection module, language may have provided a further means of keeping control over freeriders. Enquist and Leimar (1993) show that if individuals are able to communicate information about social exchange histories and individuals' reputations, then cheaters find it much harder to operate in a population of cooperators.

Since language provides precisely this ability, it might have served something like a policing function, among others. It allows individuals to warn each other of freeriders, and thus, without having to rely on firsthand experience, avoid entering costly exchanges with freeriders in the first place. This hypothesis finds further support in the argument that language evolved primarily for the exchange of social information ('gossip') (Dunbar 1993, 1999). Nettle and Dunbar (1997) also suggest that language may have played a policing role but in a different way. They argue that regional differences in language can control freeriders if individuals only enter exchanges with one another when they share similar dialects. This helps control the freerider problem because it prevents non-members, who are most likely to be freeriders, penetrating the group and taking advantage of members before word gets out. Those who share the same dialect are less likely to renege on a social contract because they rely on reciprocity among the group and would not want to risk their reputation and relations within the group.

Of course, the logic of evolution means that individuals would soon start to use language in Machiavellian ways in order to activate the cheater-detection module in situations where no social contract has been broken but it is in their interests to lead others to believe that some social contract has been broken. In the EEA, for example, it might have met individuals' interests to denounce others as cheats so as to secure social exchanges for oneself.[4] In the modern world, text-producers represent immigrants and asylum-seekers as social cheats in order to realise predicational strategies. The effectiveness of some predicational strategies, then, might be explained in terms of triggering the cheater-detection module. The policing function of language in particular lends further currency to the claim that successful predicational strategies in discourse can activate the cheater-detection module. In the following section, we consider certain predications that may activate the cheater-detection module and which it is therefore possible to describe as coercive.

4.5. Activations of the Cheater-Detection Module

Many of the cognitive associations presented in Table 4.1 evoke a violation of some social contract. The social contract is one which dictates that: if an individual has access to group resources then they should contribute to group-effectiveness. It is specifically instantiated in contemporary coalitions, namely the nation-state, as: if an individual has access to state resources then they should contribute economically to the nation. The particular representations that often occur within

some of the topoi construct cognitive associations according to which immigrants and asylum-seekers violate this social contract. These sorts of representations in text, then, are likely to activate text-consumer's cheater-detection modules. And if the proposition that immigrants and asylum-seekers are breaching the social contract is accepted as true, then certain affective and further cognitive responses may automatically follow. These responses are emotions and social decisions that can be characterised as attitudes (social cognitions) which motivate action. In other words, if individuals come to believe through the processing of political discourse that the in-group to which they belong is being exploited by immigrants and asylum-seekers, then their cheater-detection module may be activated, leading to anger (see below) and anti-immigration and -asylum attitudes and therefore affecting their social or political decisions and actions (Hart 2005: 191). For example, endorsing restrictive legislation and voting for parties who propose such legislation. Social decisions may result from adapted decision-rules, which 'can be conceptualised as 'if-then' statements, where environmental input plays a fundamental role in determining which decision-path is chosen' (Kenrick et al. 2008: 355). One example is the rule in the 'tit for tat' strategy that states something like: if an individual defects on a social contract, then do not enter exchanges with them in the future. The environmental input in contemporary culture is, of course, texts. It is quite conceivable, then, that topoi in discourse can tap into decision-rules to provide the antecedent that triggers consequent decisions and actions. On this account, the conclusion rules in topoi may not be arrived at through reason but may be automatically activated as a function of responses adapted to equivalent situations in the EEA. In this sense again, prejudice arises where communication meets cognition.

Let us consider, then, the vocabulary in text that might alert the cheater-detection module and the representations in text which predicate, spuriously, of course, that immigrants and asylum-seekers are contravening the 'citizen's social contract'.

Lexical items linked with altruism, reciprocation and exploitation, obligation and duplicity seem prime possibilities for words which would alert the cheater-detection module. There is obviously an enormous vocabulary of this nature. To give the reader a general idea, however, words closely connected with altruism, for example, would include converse antonymic verbs such as 'give/take' and abstract nouns like 'kindness' and 'generosity'. Words connected with reciprocation would include verbs like 'contribute' and 'repay', verb phrases like 'give back' and adverbial phrases such as 'in return'. Words linked with exploitation

would include verbs like 'cost', 'exploit' and 'abuse' and nouns such as 'freeloaders' or 'spongers'. Words connected with obligation would include deontic modal verbs such as 'should' and 'must'. And lastly, words associated with duplicity would include adjectives such as 'bogus', 'cheating' and 'illegal'. This vocabulary is used within the topoi of burden, character, crime, culture, disadvantage, displacement, exploitation and finance to construct immigrants and asylum-seekers as (potential) social cheats. It is the cohesive or intertextual interaction among these predications that creates cognitive representations of immigrants and asylum-seekers as social cheats.

4.5.1. Topoi of disadvantage, burden, finance and displacement

Immigrants and asylum-seekers are usually represented negatively within the topoi of disadvantage, burden and displacement. Within the topos of disadvantage, the out-group are often predicated as bringing no economic value to the in-group, which is to say that they do not contribute to group effectiveness. Consider (1) for example:

(1) *The Express,* 13 Sept. 2002

The majority of asylum-seekers **are unlikely ever to contribute to the economy.**

It is also predicated within the topos of disadvantage that members of the out-group have no useful attributes and therefore the in-group has no use for them. In the case of the former, the out-group are often predicated as 'uneducated', 'unqualified' or 'unskilled' and in the case of the latter as 'unrequired'. Consider (2) for example:

(2) *Sunday Times,* 8 Feb. 2004

[T]hey also add to the pool of **unskilled workers**, something Britain **does not need.**

The topos of disadvantage relies on a conditional conclusion rule which can be formulated as follows: if the out-group offer no advantage to the in-group, then their presence within the group is pointless and should be prevented (Wodak 2001b: 74).

The topos of burden assumes that of disadvantage. Within the topos of burden, immigrants and asylum-seekers are represented as a 'drain' or 'strain' on the members, resources and systems of the in-group.

Consider (3), in which it is presupposed that illegal immigration is a 'drain on the nation's resources':

(3) *The Sun,* 24 Oct. 2003

Government insiders say Cabinet chiefs are determined to reduce **the drain on the nation's resources from illegal immigration**.

The out-group are sometimes represented as a burden on specific socio-economic resources such as employment, housing and health services as in (4) or the welfare system more generally as in (5), which carries the implicature that Britain's welfare system is 'buckling under the strain' of immigration:

(4) *The Sun,* 17 Jan. 2003

Britain needs to rid itself of these people and in the process end the terrorism threat and **the drain on our jobs, housing, hospitals…**

(5) *Daily Mail,* 31 May 2002

Denmark's **welfare system** is not the only one **buckling under the strain of an influx of thousands of immigrants** that it was never designed to carry.

The topos of burden can be reduced to the following conditional: if a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens (Wodak 2001b: 76).

The topos of finance can be considered a particular instance of the topos of burden. Under the topos of finance, immigration and asylum is reported in monetary terms as 'costing' some particular 'price' and thus constituting a 'financial burden' on members of the electorate. Consider (6):

(6) *Daily Mail,* 28 Jan. 2005

£3bn 'price of immigration' [headline]

The **cost** of uncontrolled immigration into Britain has rocketed to **£3billion**, the equivalent of **£140** a year for every household, Michael Howard will warn today. The Tory leader will intensify his drive to put the issue at the centre of the General Election campaign by highlighting the **financial burden on the taxpayer**.

(6) is especially likely to alert text-consumers' cheater-detection module because currency constitutes a signal of some social contract. In

conjunction with the topos of disadvantage, then, the topos of finance as exemplified in (6) evokes a violation of a social contract insofar as members of the in-group have paid a cost without gaining a return. The topos of finance can be characterised by the following conclusion rule: if a situation costs too much money or causes a loss of revenue, then action ought to be taken which reduces or helps to prevent those costs and losses (Wodak 2001b: 76).

Within the topos of displacement, exemplified in (7) and (8), the out-group are predicated as having special access to socio-economic resources at the expense of the in-group.

(7) *Daily Mail,* 10 July 2000

Because of the 'postcode lottery' this means that asylum seekers almost 80 per cent of whose applications to stay are eventually rejected **could find themselves ahead of Britons in the queue for scarce NHS resources.**

(8) *The Times,* 27 Jan. 2004

Destitute and disabled asylum-seekers **can jump ahead of Britons in the housing queue** after the Law Lords dismissed an application by Lambeth Council, south London, to challenge an Appeal Court ruling that it was obliged to house a disabled Algerian asylum-seeker.

The topos of displacement can be paraphrased with the following conditional: if the out-group are given preferential access to socio-economic resources over and above the in-group, then action should be taken to redress this imbalance.

The topoi of disadvantage and uselessness and the topoi of burden, finance and displacement relate to the two sides of a social contract. On the one hand, immigrants and asylum-seekers, within the topos of disadvantage and uselessness are predicated as not contributing to the in-group's economy. While on the other hand, within the topoi of burden, finance and displacement, they are predicated as costing the in-group by utilising their socio-economic resources. The cohesive or intertextual interaction of these topoi, then, may create cognitive associations of immigrants and asylum-seekers as social cheats and are therefore candidates for activating text-consumers' cheater-detection modules.

4.5.2. Topos of exploitation

The topos of exploitation does not require interaction with other topoi to activate the cheater-detection module. The topos of exploitation involves predications which, within the same text unit, specifically

represent immigrants and asylum-seekers as social cheats. For example, as freeriders who take but give nothing in return:

(9) *The Sun,* 23 March 2000

These people will contribute nothing towards our economy and the Scottish people will find it hard to tolerate a community **which takes everything and gives nothing**.

In particular, immigrants and asylum-seekers are reported as taking socio-economic resources in the form of welfare benefits but not working. In other words, they are represented as relying on group resources but not engaging in collective action. For example, (10) carries the implicature that immigrants who come to this country do not work but prefer to live on welfare benefits:

(10) *Daily Mail,* 20 Oct. 2006

Immigrants that come to this country **are supposedly here to work**…They **are not supposed to be here to languish idly on welfare benefits.**

Moreover, relying on group resources but not engaging in collective action and thereby not contributing to group effectiveness is presented as an 'exploitation' of the in-group's 'generosity'. Take (11) and (12) for example, which are classic cases of positive-Self and negative-Other representation:

(11) *The Sun,* 29 Oct. 2003

They **will exploit our generous welfare system for every penny they can.**

(12) *Daily Mail,* 7 March 2000

[S]ome supposed asylum seekers **repay our generosity by cheating the benefit system.**

Immigrants and asylum-seekers are therefore predicated as under an obligation to contribute to the economy before being entitled to welfare benefits, thus ensuring that the social contract is upheld. Consider (13):

(13) *The Sun,* 1 Feb. 2000

[S]urely if 100,000 are coming here they **should not receive any benefits or money for five years until they have put something into the country?**

The topos of exploitation is also realised through referential expressions which simultaneously serve a predicational function. For example, biologonyms are metaphorical noun phrases that refer to immigrants and asylum-seekers as organisms that exist in a relation of parasitic rather than mutualistic symbiosis with their host.[5] Consider (14) and (15) for example:[6]

(14) *The Sun,* 24 July 2003

How is it that **this asylum sponger**, who had the audacity to rent out his free house, also receives a weekly giro of Pounds 176 when old age couples, who have paid their dues all their working lives, only receive Pounds 150 between them?

(15) *The Sun,* 24 July 2003

This must be stopped now before our country is sucked dry by **these parasites**.

Another social contract is the asylum system itself, which asylum-seekers are also predicated as exploiting. Consider (16) and (17) for example, which are further archetypal instances of positive-Self and negative-Other representation:

(16) *The Times,* 28 Feb. 2002

'The UK has a long history of providing refuge to those fleeing persecution, but we are determined to clamp down on those **trying to abuse the system**' [quoting Home Office Minister]

(17) *The Times,* 18 May 2006

And while many had sympathy for asylum-seekers fleeing persecution, more people suspected that the vast majority claiming asylum **were in fact economic migrants attempting to cheat the system**.

In (16) and (17) it is implied that the asylum system is there to provide refuge only to 'genuine' asylum-seekers.[7] But the asylum system is reported to be exploited by persons with alternative reasons for seeking refuge. In (17) these persons are referred to as 'economic migrants' rather than 'asylum-seekers'. This referential strategy simultaneously serves a predicational function by profiling profit as opposed to persecution as the motivation for migration.

The topos of exploitation is often used as a premise in calls for changes to the law, as implied by (18):

(18) *Daily Telegraph,* 25 May 2002

> Above all, Mr Duncan Smith should be tough, not only on the abuse of asylum, but on the causes of asylum abuse. The root cause is the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees: a provisional measure, now hopelessly out of date, which obliges countries to offer asylum to anybody who claims to be persecuted. Two years ago, the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, **sensibly proposed a radical overhaul of the convention to prevent its abuse by economic migrants**. Since then, however, the Government has done nothing about it.

The topos of exploitation can be captured with the following conditional, which reflects the rule in 'tit for tat': if the right to or offer of assistance is exploited, then that right should be changed or the offer withdrawn and action against the exploiters should be taken (Wodak 2001b: 77). The topos of exploitation by itself, then, can create candidate cognitive associations for activating text-consumers' cheater-detection modules.

4.5.3. Topoi of culture, character and crime

The topoi of culture, character and crime cut across and co-occur with other topoi. They are predicational strategies in their own right, with their own conclusion rules. Strategically, however, they also prove other topoi. The topos of culture, for example, is based on the argumentation scheme that 'because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise in specific situations' (Wodak 2001b: 76). The topos of culture in particular simultaneously realises a referential strategy, dissimilation. The out-group are predicated as having different norms and values to the in-group and being unwilling to assimilate. The out-group are thus also defined on the basis of this predicated difference. In particular, language is often cited as a locus of cultural difference and immigrants and asylum-seekers as loath to learn English. These cultural differences and unwillingness to assimilate suggest that the out-group are unable to engage in collective action and consequently do not contribute to group effectiveness and may even reduce it. The topos of culture, then, goes some way to proving the topoi of disadvantage and burden. In (19), for example, the antecedent in the subordinate clause contains a topos of culture and both

a topos of disadvantage and a topos of burden occur in the consequent main clause:

(19) *The Express,* 23 June 2003

And as they **cannot speak English, write English or read English, or have any knowledge of our society**, they are almost unemployable and so would be a drain on our society for many, many years.

Furthermore, following Nettle and Dunbar's (1997) argument that linguistic differences in the EEA indicated individuals' status as non-group members who are more likely to renege on reciprocal arrangements than group members, the topos of culture, as it is manifested in predications that immigrants and asylum-seekers cannot speak English, not only realises a referential strategy by distinguishing between group and non-group members on the basis of language, but might also realise a predicational strategy by implying the topos of exploitation and thus alerting the cheater-detection module.

Within the topos of character, the out-group are ascribed characteristics, such as idleness and ineptness, which confirm the topos of disadvantage. Consider (20):

(20) *The Times,* 24 Oct. 2006

[F]irst, deny welfare benefits to immigrants in order to discourage the **lazy** and the **incompetent** from seeking entry, and reduce some of the opposition to immigration by those who bear the cost of immigrants who are unwilling or unable to work.

The topos of crime involves ascribing criminal qualities to the out-group. This is most obviously achieved by referring to the out-group as 'criminals', 'illegal immigrants' as well as with the nominalisation 'illegals', as in (20):

(21) *The Sun,* 18 Aug. 2003

There is fury over the way **illegals** are finding their way on to welfare and free NHS care.

The topos of crime overlaps with that of character when asylum-seekers are predicated as deceitful and fraudulent. Take (21) for example:

(22) *Daily Mail*, 1 Jan. 2001

I came to three stark conclusions. The first is that a very large number of those seeking asylum **are cheats, quite deliberately making**

> **bogus claims and false allegations to get into the country**...The second was that the demands on scarce housing and medical care made by **dishonest 'economic migrants'** was likely to stretch the patience of voters – and I could well understand why...The third conclusion was that the problem of **phoney asylum seekers** was likely to grow as the impression spread that this country was a soft touch. [article authored by Michael Heseltine, Deputy Prime Minister of previous Government]

Predications within the topos of crime, then, can create cognitive associations of the out-groups as individuals who are breaking asylum laws thus proving the topos of exploitation and activating the cheater-detection module.

It is likely that activations of the cheater-detection module are accompanied by activations of anger. In this sense, activations of the cheater-detection module can be considered emotively coercive.

4.6. Activations of Emotion Modules: Anger and Fear

In modern cognitive science, the view of emotions is not that they are passions, separate from reason but which impede rational decision-making. Rather, they are an integral part of cognitive processing. Emotions are adaptations which guide cognition and action in important ways (Cosmides and Tooby 2000; Damasio 1994: Pinker 1997). In this view, emotions are 'just as cognitive as any other kind of perceptual image we experience, and play a much larger role in decision-making than we realise' (Barrett et al. 2002: 291). Ultimately, then, emotions bias decision-making, in response to associated stimuli, towards behavioural outcomes conducive to, and away from those detrimental to, survival and reproduction. They are superordinate programs that organise sub-programs which override, inter alia, attention, categorisation and conceptual frameworks, inference, motivational priorities and goal choice, physiological reactions, reflexes, behavioural decision rules and the affective coloration of events (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 93). The emotion programs are part of the limbic system. The fear module in particular resides in the amygdala, an evolutionarily ancient brain region. Each program is functionally specialised and evolved to solve problems encountered in the EEA. Anger, for example, is adapted for social interaction with other individuals. Fear, on the other hand, is adapted for bodily interaction with other individuals and the natural world. The negative emotions, such as anger and fear, promote avoidance behaviours.

Reciprocal altruism is probably the root of anger and the other moral emotions (Alexander 1987; Trivers 1971). Trivers' reverse-engineering of the moral emotions is summarised by Pinker (1997). Anger and contempt (Other-condemning emotions) prompt people to punish cheaters. Pinker (2002: 272) states that anger 'evolved from systems of aggression and was recruited to implement the cheater-punishment strategy demanded by reciprocal altruism'. It is a defence mechanism that protects people whose altruistic acts have been exploited once by directing decisions to sever the reciprocal relationship and avoid future altruistic acts towards that individual or group (Pinker 1997: 404).

Fear is adapted to respond to information which signals physical rather than social threat. It is 'the emotion that motivated our ancestors to cope with the dangers they were likely to face' (Pinker 1997: 386). Physical dangers during the EEA, then, included threats of corporal harm from the environment, from contracting contagious diseases, and from combat with other coalitions leading to loss of control over territory. The fear module elicits decisions and actions to avoid or otherwise deal with sources of danger (Buss 1999: 85). As Marks (1987: 3) puts it, 'fear is a legacy that leads an organism to avoid threat'.

Crucially, a representation of a stimulus can arouse as much affect as the presence of the stimulus itself. And the human capacity to form metarepresentations and detached representations means that emotive effects may be produced through communication about some stimulus even in the absence of the stimulus itself. Neurological studies, for example, suggest that threat-connoting words can cue fear responses (Isenberg et al. 1999). Moreover, the communication of threat can be Machiavellian. Once emotions had evolved, there would have been an incentive to falsely induce them in others in order to take advantage of their reactions (Trivers 1971). Emotion programs, then, may be activated by structures in strategic discourse that cause text-consumers to construct cognitive representation which associate the out-group with social or physical threat-connoting cues. Emotive coercion may be strongest when predications appeal to deep-seated emotions such as fear and, more specifically, deep-seated fears. That is, when predications appeal to innate fears of the threats that our ancestors faced. LeDoux (1998) argues that such information may be routed directly from the amygdala rather than via the cortex. This route is said to produce an automatic response as opposed to a more conscious, considered reaction. Taken together, Isenberg et al. (1999) and LeDoux (1998) offer neurological evidence for the claim that political discourse can connect with emotion modules and automatically activate adapted systems of affect.

Isenberg et al. used a neuroimaging technique to demonstrate that visually presented (i.e., in written text) vocabulary of threat valence activates the amygdala. The vocabulary they tested included words which, or synonyms of which, turn up in discourse on immigration and asylum, including 'threat', 'danger', 'damage', 'destroy', 'abuse', 'deceive', 'contaminate' and 'intrude'.[8] Presumably, other similar vocabulary would also activate the amygdala. This kind of vocabulary is used within the topoi of danger, disease and displacement.

4.6.1. Topoi of danger, displacement and disease

Within the topos of danger, present immigration policy or immigration itself is predicated as presenting some danger or dangerous scenario for the in-group and thus the text-consumer. Take (23) for example, where it is immigration policy that is predicated as presenting a danger:

(23) *The Express,* 22 Aug. 2005

Mr Hague [former leader of the Conservative Party] said: 'It must now be obvious to all concerned that some of our asylum and human rights laws are being massively abused, something that is not only wrong in principle but **is bringing actual danger to the people of Britain**.'

The topos of danger is often manifested in the metaphorical strategy of 'naturalisation' in which immigration itself is represented a natural disaster (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 59). Consider (24)

(24) *The Express,* 28 May 2003

The flood of asylum seekers entering Britain is as strong as ever.

Similarly, the topos of danger may be manifested in the metaphorical strategy of 'militarisation', whereby immigration is represented as a physical act of aggression on the part of the out-group.[9] Take (25) for example:

(25) *The Sun,* 17 May 2002

The invasion of Britain by illegal immigrants continues unabated.

The topos of danger co-occurs with the topos of displacement, where the danger is displacement. The topos of displacement occurs in several

forms. It presupposes the topos of number and predicates that the out-group will come to take the in-group's privileged position as those with preferential accesses to social resources and as the majority whereupon they will gain control over the in-group and become the new cultural norm.[10] In one form, then, the out-group are predicated as a threat to the autonomy of the in-group. (25) might therefore simultaneously manifest the topos of displacement, where invasions can lead to the subordination of the in-group. In another form, the topos of displacement presupposes the topos of culture as well as number. In this form, the out-group are predicated as a threat to the cultural identity of the in-group. Consider (26) for example:

(26) *Daily Mail,* 10 Aug. 2002

Britain is **in danger of losing its social and cultural identity.**

The topos of danger also co-occurs with the topos of disease, where disease presents a danger of contagion. According to Sontag (1991: 147), 'epidemic diseases usually elicit a call to ban the entry of foreigners, immigration. And xenophobic propaganda has always depicted immigrants as bearers of diseases'. Consider (27) in which immigration is predicated as presenting a threat from infectious diseases:

(27) *The Express*, 7 Dec. 2002

Health professionals, immigration officers and opposition politicians called for a shake-up of procedures at ports of entry after warning that Britain **has been left exposed to the danger of an epidemic of Aids and tuberculosis**.

The topoi of danger, displacement and disease, then, appeal to innate fears of physical harm, loss of territorial control and cultural identity, and infection from transmittable diseases. They are all based on the same conditional: 'if a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not perform it' (Wodak 2001b: 75). Or alternatively formulated: 'if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them' (ibid.).

4.7. Proximisation

In an alternative and innovative account of coercion, Cap (2006) develops a cognitive-pragmatic model in which 'proximisation' is identified

as a further micro-strategy contributing to the macro-strategy.[11] Proximisation strategies presuppose referential strategies and are contained in particular predications. In this sense, they also presuppose predicational strategies.

Proximisation is a cognitive and sociopsychological concept (Cap 2006: 11). It involves the general psychological process of perspective and relies specifically upon a spatiotemporal deictic construal operation. The location of the participants in the discourse event and the time at which it occurs is the 'deictic centre' of the discourse stage, the anchorage point of the text.[12] Inside the deictic centre are elements referred to as 'inside deictic centre elements' or IDCs (Cap 2006). These include the discourse participants themselves and their values. Other entities in the text may be conceptualised as outside the deictic centre and are referred to as 'outside deictic centre elements' or ODCs (ibid.). These would include immigrants and asylum-seekers and their values.

Proximisation consists in the conceptualisation of ODCs entering the deictic centre with significant and immediate material and ideological consequences for the IDCs. For Chilton, proximisation has an intrinsically spatial character (Cap 2006: 4). This is because 'political discourse that has to do with defending territory or forcefully entering someone else's will involve spatial representations' (Chilton 2004: 152). However, proximisation as described by Cap involves both spatial and temporal dimensions. Proximisation involves a spatiotemporal conceptual shift of an 'alien and normally antagonistic entity onto the addressee's own mental and physical territory in the deictic centre' (Cap 2006: 8). It is in this sense that proximisation presupposes referential and predicational strategies. The construction of an alien and antagonistic entity is precisely the realisation of referential and predicational strategies respectively.

Proximisation, then, works by 'alerting the addressee to the proximity or imminence of phenomena which can be a 'threat' to the addressee and thus require immediate reaction' (Cap 2006: 4). Spatial proximisation occurs when the threat depicted in the predication is presented as close to or approaching the text-consumer. Temporal proximisation is similarly realised by representations of the threat in the predication as already happening, having only just happened, as just about to happen, and/or as something which happens on a reoccurring basis. Spatial and temporal proximisation by themselves serve no strategic function. To take effect they must occur as part of a predication which presents ODC elements as a threat to IDC elements. Then

it is a particularly effective, or affective, feature of persuasive discourse. We saw in the previous section, for example, that predicational strategies can, through the topos of danger, yield emotional responses. One way to heighten the sense of threat, of course, is to present the danger as close.

Proximisation, then, reinforces emotive coercion. Proximisation is, of course, achieved through language constructs. However, it is not equated with any particular linguistic form (Cap 2006: 11). Rather, 'there are language constructs whose strategic combination triggers proximisation' (Cap 2006: 4). Let us be more specific about what kind of constructs these may be before exemplifying proximisation at work in the service of coercion. Cap (2006: 60) identifies six categories, the following three of which are most significant here:

- Noun phrases (NPs) conceptualised as elements of the deictic centre (IDCs);
- NPs conceptualised as elements outside the deictic centre (ODCs);
- Verb phrases (VPs) of motion and directionality conceptualised together as indicators of movement of ODCs towards the deictic centre.

To these we may add:

- VPs of location conceptualised as indicators of ODCs already inside the deictic centre or on the edge of it;
- Adverbial phrases (APs) expressing notions of time and frequency conceptualised as indicators that situations/events are occurring, have just occurred, are about to occur or regularly reoccur;
- Tense aspects taken as indicators that situations/events are occurring, have just occurred, are about to occur or regularly reoccur.

Consider the following text unit:

(28) *The Sun,* 30 Nov. 2002

Asylum-seekers are flooding into Britain at the rate of one every four minutes, it was revealed yesterday.

(28) consists of the following phrase structure: the NP 'asylum-seekers', the VP 'are flooding into Britain', which contains the NP 'Britain', and the AP 'at the rate of one every four minutes'. We find both spatial and temporal proximisation strategies in (28). Spatial proximisation

is realised as asylum-seekers are conceptualised as an element outside the deictic centre which is moving 'into Britain', the deictic centre, and thus approaching the text-consumer who is inside the deictic centre. Temporal proximisation is realised in the present progressive form of the VP, which indicates that the process is happening at the time of the discourse event, and reinforced by the AP which indicates the rapidly recurring rate at which the process continues to happen. (28) in fact represents a canonical construction realising representational strategies in media discourse on immigration as depicted in Table 4.3.

Consider another example:

(29) *The Sun,* 22 May 2006

'It is outrageous that our immigration and asylum system is so lax that **foreign terror suspects** can take advantage like this. There **are currently 250,000 failed asylum seekers in this country**'. (Quoting Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis)

The significant phrases in (29) are as follows: the NP 'foreign terror suspects' and the VP 'are currently 250,000 failed asylum seekers in this country', which contains the NPs '250,000 failed asylum seekers' and 'this country'. Again, we observe both proximisation strategies. Spatial proximisation is realised as 250,000 failed asylum-seekers are described as already 'in this country', the deictic centre, and thus close to the text-consumer.[13] And temporal proximisation is realised by the present tense verb 'are' and reinforced by the adverb 'currently'. The construction of '250,000 failed asylum seekers' as a threat is achieved through the implicature, which arises from the adjacency of the two sentences, that at least a proportion of the 250,000 failed asylum seekers are terror suspects. The proposition or scene in (29) therefore represents a close and pressing threat to Britain and the text-consumer.[14]

Table 4.3 Representation strategies in a canonical construction

Reference	**Predication**		
	Temporal proximisation	Spatial proximisation	Temporal proximisation
Asylum seekers	*are flooding*	*into Britain*	*at the rate of one every four minutes*

In examples (28) and (29) proximisation is the result of VPs of motion and location, which relate ODCs to IDCs. However, proximisation may also arise from nominalisations.[15] Consider (30) for example:

(30) *Daily Mail,* 9 Dec. 2002

The imminent arrival of so many refugees whose exact background is unknown at a time of heightened security fears has been described as a 'Doomsday scenario' by one senior police source.

Spatial proximisation is realised in the noun 'arrival', which, in its verb form, encodes movement towards deictic centre.[16] Temporal proximisation is realised in the adjective 'imminent' indicating that 'the arrival' is pending. The threat is constructed through the implicature that refugees present a possible security threat sufficient to bring Doomsday to Britain.

Successful coercion causes text-consumers to adopt certain attitudes and consequently take particular actions. Of course, coercion can only be successful when legitimisation is simultaneously achieved. That is, when text-consumer accept as true the propositions, presuppositions and implicatures carried by text.

4.8. Summary

In this chapter we have argued that predicational strategies, another necessary strategy in the construction of attitudes towards immigrants and asylum-seekers, are achieved through particular recurring topoi. We have argued that both referential and predicational strategies are involved in the macro-strategy of coercion. Cognitive coercion occurs when text-consumers construct cognitive associations intended by the text-producer. Emotive coercion occurs when these cognitive associations activate text-consumers' social intelligence and emotion modules, eliciting decisions and actions intended by the text-producer. We have suggested that the topos of exploitation and the topos of disadvantage in conjunction with the topoi of burden, finance and displacement might activate a cheater-detection module as well as the emotion of anger. We have also suggested that the topoi of danger, displacement and disease might activate the emotion of fear. We have seen that many of the predicational strategies involved are manifested in metaphorical structures, which we discuss further in Chapter 7. We have also seen that the effects of predicational strategies can be

intensified by proximisation. Of course, representation strategies, that is, reference, predication and proximisation, can only be brought into effect when the representations realising them are accepted as true. Text-producers use legitimising strategies to achieve this and thus enable coercion.

5
Legitimising Strategies

5.1. Introduction

Legitimisation is another *micro*-strategy involved in coercion. It does not contribute directly to coercion in the way that representation strategies do. Rather, as we suggested in Chapter 4, coercion is dependent on legitimisation. Referential, predication and proximisation strategies can only achieve coercion when the representations realising these strategies are accepted by text-consumers as true. Text-producers use legitimising strategies for precisely this end.

Legitimising strategies can be related to the distinction Sperber (2001) makes between testimony and argumentation. In order that testimony is accepted as true, text-producers can give reasons as to why text-consumers should accept their assertions. The cognitive and communicative principles of relevance dictate that during discourse humans cannot do otherwise than construct conceptual representations in short-term memory. However, we do not necessarily process incoming messages as true. Text-consumers are free to either accept representations as true and store them in long-term memory or to disregard them as false and discard them entirely.[1] Text-producers are thus much more in control of text-consumers' comprehension process than they are of any further cognitive processes and behavioural responses (Origgi and Sperber 2000: 153). It is nevertheless possible that text-producers can, through communication, cause text-consumers to take specific attitudes towards people, objects and so on and act in certain ways (Sperber 2001). That is, text-producers can gain some degree of control over text-consumers' cognitive processes and responses, including affective responses, for example. In order to achieve these effects though, text-producers must somehow get text-consumers to accept as

true propositions which, in turn, will cause the adoption of intended attitudes and behaviours (ibid.).

As argued in Chapter 2, we may speculate that a logico-rhetorical module has evolved in human cognition, whose function it is to counter Machiavellian communications, strategic discourse, through the checking of coherence. However, while the logico-rhetorical module originated as a defence against the risks of deception, this was just the first step in a rhetorical arms race, the next stage of which was for displays of coherence (Sperber 2001). The function of the logico-rhetorical module, then, is not only to evade strategic discourse but also to enable it. Its function is both 'to help audiences decide what messages to accept, and to help communicators produce messages that will be accepted' (Sperber 2001). As such, the logico-rhetorical module is a mechanism for persuasion as well as evaluation (ibid.). For text-consumers it is 'a means to filter communicated information' but for text-producers it is 'a means to penetrate the filters of others' (Sperber 2000: 136). Legitimising strategies involve the operation of the logico-rhetorical module by text-producers and are used in discourse to overcome text-consumers' operation of the same module through displays of 'coherence'.[2] Legitimisation in this sense can be taken as 'persuasion of the readership to accept the writer's claim' (Hunston 1993: 116). More specifically, it involves the use of linguistic expressions to imbue utterances with evidence, authority and claims to truth and/or presumptions about the felicity conditions which give the speaker the right to make an assertion.

5.2. Legitimisation

Given the cognitive capacities of humans, especially for metarepresentation, text-producers are not limited to expressing propositional content but can also express continuity between propositions, commitment towards the truth of propositions and evidence for their truth. Legitimising strategies are forms of argumentation used to endorse representations in text in precisely this way. They can also draw on knowledge of, or assertions of, the status of the speaker. They are epistemic in nature and can be related to both *logos* (appeal based on logic and reason) and *ethos* (appeal based on character) in Rhetoric.

Legitimising strategies, as they are understood here, are manifested in text through grammatical cohesion and certain semantic categories, especially evidentiality and epistemic modality. Recall from Chapter 2

that during discourse text-consumers check for internal and external coherence, which refer to logical relationships between sentences and clauses and commitment/support respectively. Following Sperber, 'persuaders addressing consistency-checkers cannot do better than displaying the very consistency – or at least the appearance of it – that their audience is likely to check for' (Sperber 2000: 136). Legitimising strategies, then, involve an intention to overcome text-consumers' logico-rhetorical module through displays of both internal and external coherence. The logical relations and reasoning processes involved might be fallacious but may overcome the logico-rhetorical module on the appearance of rationality.

Internal coherence is related to the textual metafunction of language. It is often expressed in cohesive devices, although it relies on the inferences of audiences (Brown and Yule 1983). External coherence is related to the interpersonal metafunction and is expressed in evidential and epistemic modal markers. Representation and legitimising strategies can be located with respect to Halliday's metafunctions as follows in Figure 5.1. We briefly address internal coherence below, before focussing on external coherence in section 5.2.2 of this chapter and sections 8.3–8.5 in Chapter 8.



Figure 5.1 Strategies and functions

5.2.1. Internal coherence

Coherence in text, as Halliday and Hasan (1976) suggest, can be expressed in cohesion. Halliday and Hasan specify five categories of cohesive device which establish two fundamental kinds of cohesion: lexical and grammatical cohesion.[3] It is grammatical cohesion that is of interest here. One means by which grammatical cohesion is established is explicit markers of conjunctive relations that connect text to co-text. Halliday and Hasan further categorise these cohesive devices into additive, adversative, temporal and causal conjunctions. Additives include 'and', 'or' and 'furthermore'. Adversatives include 'but', 'however' and 'nevertheless'. Temporal conjunctions include 'when', 'since' and 'after'. And causal conjunctions include 'so', 'because' and 'consequently'. We can add to the list of causal conjunctions the conditional 'if-then' construction (whereby the situation in the antecedent 'if-clause' is conventionally inferred as the cause of the situation in the consequent 'then-clause'). These conjunctions can be described as quasi-logical forms. Indeed, they are sometimes referred to as 'logical connectors' (e.g., Fairclough 1989: 109).

According to Sperber, internal coherence involves the use of logical terms (2001). And, Sperber argues, text-producers enrich their language with logical terms (*and, or, if* etc.) and words indicating inferential relationships (*therefore, since, nevertheless* etc.). It is generally assumed that this logical and para-logical vocabulary is used and emerged for reflection and reasoning. However, the alternative, and more plausible hypothesis according to Sperber, is that these terms are adaptive devices for persuasion, or legitimisation (ibid.). It is in the textual metafunction of language, of course, that text-producers are concerned with cohesion. It seems, then, that the textual function too has some basis in human evolution and cognition. The textual function of language is, at least in part, to display internal coherence so that text-consumers will accept ideational information and accommodate inferences.

Coherence is also of interest in CDA because, according to Fairclough, cohesive devices 'can cue ideological assumptions' (1989: 109). Let us consider some examples, which, following Fairclough, show that 'relationships between things which are taken to be commonsensical may be ideological' (ibid.). Take first the adversative conjunction exemplified in (1):

(1) *The Times,* 6 May 2006

Her appeal for political asylum continues, **despite** her having served jail terms for offences including obtaining property by deception using stolen credit cards and false passports.

Coherence in (1) depends on the inference that if an individual has served jail terms for obtaining property by deception then they ought not to be allowed to appeal for asylum. Similarly, consider the causal conjunction exemplified in (2):

(2) *Daily Mail,* 15 July 2003

...National Asylum Support Service decided to treat him as an adult. He was **therefore** refused any support on the basis that he had failed to make his asylum claim as soon as reasonably practicable after his arrival.

Coherence in (2) depends on the inference that adults who fail to make asylum claims as soon as possible should be refused support. Note that while the adversative in (1) indicates that the expected outcome of the antecedent has not been met, the causal conjunction in (2) signals the opposite, that the expected outcome of the antecedent has been met. The important point, though, ideologically, is that both presuppose particular consequents of antecedents and force particular inferences in order that coherence is maintained. Now consider the causal conjunction exemplified in (3):

(3) *The Times,* 13 Dec. 2002

A report last week showed that the level of TB in Britain had risen sharply in recent years, largely **because** of immigration.

Gough and Talbot (1996: 220) refer to causal conjunctions like this as 'reversed causal' conjunctions. The relation between the two clauses in (3) is such that 'the connector cues the information in the second clause as the cause of the condition in the first' (ibid.). In this case, immigration is reported as a direct cause of the recent rise in levels of tuberculosis in Britain. Coherence in (3) requires the inference that immigration can cause a rise in levels of tuberculosis and the assumption that immigrants carry and transmit the disease.

The causal relation between the two clauses in (3) is explicitly constructed by the causal conjunction *because*. However, a causal relation can also be implicitly constructed by temporal conjunctions. Consider, for example (4):

(4) *Daily Mail,* 2 March 2000

[C]rime in this area has gone up **since** they [asylum-seekers] arrived.

Explicitly, 'since' communicates only that one event happened and then another. Implicitly, however, as in (3), the connector presents the situation in the second clause as the cause of the situation in the first. Namely, that the arrival of asylum-seekers has lead to an increase in crime. This, of course, is the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. Notice also the implicature that it is the asylum-seekers who have committed these crimes. Again, coherence requires a certain assumption about asylum-seekers.

What is particularly important across each of these examples, then, is that they contain ideological assumptions and expectations. Their coherence rests on ideologies taken for granted by the text-producer, and which the text-consumer is forced to at least entertain for communicative purposes during the discourse event.[4] To interpret them coherently requires top-down processing where, precisely, 'resources drawn upon in top-down processing are assumptions and expectations' (Gough and Talbot 1996: 225). Gough and Talbot state that 'these assumptions and expectations are elements of socially/discursively constituted knowledge that are drawn upon for coherent interpretation. They are represented cognitively in frames' (ibid.).[5]

5.2.2. External coherence

Epistemic legitimising strategies involve displays of external as well as internal coherence. The principal means by which external coherence is displayed during discourse is through evidentiality and epistemic modality. These two semantic categories are closely related. They are both concerned with the reliability of assertions. They both operate outside the text at a level above the proposition and therefore belong to the interpersonal metafunction. However, they are distinct from one and other. Evidentiality is 'a term for the ways in which a speaker qualifies a statement by referring to the source of the information' (Saeed 2003: 143). It is especially important in strategic discourse because text-consumers can recognise the force of evidence, 'even if they have no confidence at all in the communicator' (Sperber 2001). Epistemic modality is 'a cover term for devices which allow speakers to express varying degrees of commitment to, or belief in, a proposition' (Saeed 2003: 135). While evidentiality concerns the speaker's indication of the *source* of their assertion, then, epistemic modality concerns the *stance* they take towards it. In this chapter we focus on evidentiality. We discuss epistemic modality and its relation to evidentiality in Chapter 8.

5.2.2.1. Evidentiality

Evidentiality is concerned with the linguistic marking of evidence. Text-producers may provide evidence for the truth of their assertions by acknowledging the basis of their assertion or by attributing the assertion to an alternative source. It has mainly been the subject of typological studies in languages other than English in which it is grammatically encoded.[6] Evidentiality is marked by 'evidentials', which serve as legitimising devices. In English, these are not grammatical but lexical and are found, for example, in evidential adverbs or idioms like 'it goes without saying'. Evidentiality is closely linked with presupposition. Many evidentials reflect common ground between discourse participants and act as presupposition triggers.

Evidentiality provides evidence for the truth of assertions by indicating how – on what basis – the speaker knows the information communicated. The various subdivisions of this semantic category are represented in Figure 5.2 (reproduced from Willett 1988: 57).

Evidentiality is particularly apparent in print news media. This is because 'the news story is a genre that is preoccupied with knowledge' (Bednarek 2006a: 639). In a corpus analysis, Bednarek (2006a) identifies four specified bases of knowledge used as evidence in British newspaper reportage: PERCEPTION, PROOF, OBVIOUSNESS and GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. These bases of knowledge provide legitimacy to propositions in different ways. They can be related to the different types of evidence identified in Figure 5.1. PERCEPTION provides directly attested sensory evidence. GENERAL KNOWLEDGE is reflected in indirect reported folklore. And PROOF



Figure 5.2 The semantic domain of evidentiality

and OBVIOUSNESS both constitute indirect evidence inferred from results and reasoning respectively.

Information based on evidence from VISUAL PERCEPTION is exemplified in (5)–(7):

(5) *The Sun,* 25 April 2003

Often it **appears** that these immigrants are looked after much better than our own people.

(6) *Daily Mail,* 27 July 2005

Britain is operating an asylum system ... **visibly** loaded in favour of any foreigner ... staying here indefinitely

(7) *Mail on Sunday,* 27 Feb. 2000

Jack Straw faced a fresh immigration crisis last night as it was **revealed** that hundreds of Kosovan refugees given temporary permits to stay in Britain now **look** set to seek asylum.

The evidential in (5) marks the information in the assertion as acquired via VISUAL PERCEPTION. The propositions in (6) and (7) are presented as something available or made available to see.

Evidence from GENERAL KNOWLEDGE is 'marked as based on what is regarded as part of the communal epistemic background' (Bednarek 2006a: 640). This form of legitimisation corresponds with what Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 105) refer to as 'conformity authorisation'. It rests on the *ad populum* fallacy that something is true if everybody believes it (van Eemeren et al. 2002: 131). Consider (8) and (9):

(8) *Independent on Sunday,* 9 Sept. 2001

Mr Blunkett confirms the **widely held view** that the UK has become a haven for people seeking asylum from around the world.

(9) *The Express,* 23 Feb. 2005

Under Labour, Britain has become a soft touch on asylum and immigration and **everybody knows it.** [quoting shadow Home Secretary, David Davis]

Information constituting PROOF relates to 'a marking of the proposition as being based on some sort of "hard proof"' (Bednarek 2006a: 640). Such proofs are found, for example, in independent 'research', 'reports', 'results', 'studies' and 'statistics' which 'show' or 'reveal' the

facts. Statistics in particular are accepted as a primary means of displaying objectivity (van Dijk 2000a: 222). The category of PROOF then, often co-occurs with that of PERCEPTION. Consider, for example, (10) and (11):

(10) *Daily Mail,* 15 March 2006

All international studies show that the benefit to the host community is very small.

(11) *The Express,* 1 March 2003

[N]ew statistics show a record 110,700 people sought refuge here last year. This once again **proves** Britain is unable to get on top of an accelerating problem.

OBVIOUSNESS is invoked as evidence in examples (12) and (13). According to Bednarek, this category is marked by evidentials which indicate 'the obviousness or self-evidence of what is modified' (2006a: 641). This form of legitimisation is linked to what Van Leeuwen and Wodak refer to as 'theoretical rationalisation' – legitimisation by reference to 'the facts of life' (1999: 105). For example, the proposition in (12) is modified by the adverb 'obviously', which lends support to the propositional claim by stating it as just simply the case. The adverb 'clearly' in (13) modifies the proposition by presenting it as logically the case, given the antecedent.

(12) *The Sun,* 12 Sept. 2001

Phoney refugees will **obviously** do a runner the minute security is taken off the gates.

(13) *Daily Mail,* 20 Feb. 2003

Clearly, British citizens are having to wait longer to be found houses because of the influx.

It is interesting to note that one evidential may be related to more than one basis of knowledge. For example, 'clearly' in (13) also relates to the category of PERCEPTION. This is because *clearly* actually belongs to the semantic domain of perception – one can 'see clearly', 'hear clearly' and so on. The use of 'clearly' in examples such as (13) is given rise to by an underlying system of conceptual metaphors which connect the domains of knowledge and perception (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).[7] In this case, the particular conceptual metaphor may be expressed as FACTS ARE VISIBLE.

Evidentials expressing OBVIOUSNESS are often used to make apparent concessions and are therefore involved in the denial of racism. Typically, denial strategies also involve an adversative conjunction followed by a negative predication. Consider, for example, (14), in which the adverb 'clearly' occurs once in the first clause, the concession, and once in the second clause, the negative predication to the right of adversative conjunction 'but':

(14) *The Daily Telegraph,* 19 April 2004

Clearly, immigration does bring economic benefits **but** there are, equally **clearly**, costs as well.

A further way in which text-producers can provide external coherence to their claims is to attribute propositions to alternative, third-party sources as evidence for their truth. For example, through direct or indirect quotation.[8] This form of legitimisation is referred to as source-tagging.

5.2.2.2. Source-tagging

Source-tagging provides information through attribution, which may be defined in contrast to 'averral'. Attribution typically invokes evidence in the form of indirect, reported HEARSAY. However, Bednarek (2006b) identifies a further form of evidence invoked in attribution: MINDSAY. The distinction depends on 'whether the attribution is said to be based on what someone said (HEARSAY) or on what someone felt, knew, or thought, etc. (MINDSAY)' (Bednarek 2006b: 61). Both HEARSAY and MINDSAY involve a source of the attributed proposition. But, as Bednarek (ibid.) points out, in the case of HEARSAY the source is a 'sayer' (Halliday 1994: 140) whereas the source in MINDSAY is a 'senser' (Halliday 1994: 117). We can represent the bases of knowledge invoked as evidence in news discourse in relation to averral and attribution as in Figure 5.3.

Text is averred when 'the writer him or herself speaks' (Hunston 2000b: 178). In contrast, text is attributed when 'it is presented as deriving from someone other than the writer' (ibid.). Attribution serves a legitimising function through the 'the use of a manifest intertextual marker to acknowledge the presence of an antecedent authorial voice' (Groom 2000: 15). Of course, any attributed text is necessarily part of a larger averred text. That is, 'every attribution is embedded within an averral' (Hunston 2000b: 179). Source-tagging, especially that based on HEARSAY, is particularly prevalent in news discourse, consisting as it does of predominantly 'embedded talk' (Bell 1991: 52). According to



Figure 5.3 Bases of knowledge as evidence in news discourse

Bednarek, 'one of the most characteristic features of newspaper language is its "embededness": much of what features in the news is actually reported speech' (2006b: 59).

It is useful to see certain evidentials, and source-tagging in particular, in relation to metarepresentation, which itself can in fact be seen, precisely, as a kind of source-tagging (Chilton 2004: 22). In attributing assertions (HEARSAY), source-tagging sentences such as 'an independent report states that P' metarepresent previous public speech acts. In attributing beliefs (MINDSAY), source-tagging sentences such as 'the Government thinks that P' metarepresent mental representations.[9] Verbs like 'said', 'stated' 'claimed', 'warned', 'thought' and 'knew' actually require source tags as arguments.

Source-tagging, then, is a specific instance of metarepresentation, an evolved cognitive ability essential for inferential communication. Cosmides and Tooby claim that source-tagging itself must have played an important role in the evolution of communication (2000: 70). It is probably part of the logico-rhetorical module proposed by Sperber and therefore evolved initially as a cognitive defence against strategic discourse. It allows text-consumers to temporarily suspend the truth of a proposition until they have enough information about the reliability of the source to decide whether or not to accept it as true. It is a kind of mental note taking. According to Cosmides and Tooby:

> Source tags are very useful, because often, with contingent information, one may not have direct evidence about its truth, but may acquire information about the reliability of a source. If the sources of pieces of information are maintained with the information, then

> subsequent information about the source can be used to change the assigned truth-status of the information either upwards or downwards. (2000: 69)

However, where we argued that text-producers would begin to use the logico-rhetorical module to display the coherence that text-consumers check for, text-producers would also start to use source-tagging to show external coherence specifically by supplying sources that they expect text-consumers to consider reliable. Not only is source-tagging a cognitive process performed by text-consumers, then, but is also a communicative practice performed by text-producers. In this light, source-tagging may be seen as another legitimising device used by text-producers to overcome text-consumers' operation of the logico-rhetorical module.

In legitimisation text-producers aim for propositions to be accepted as true. They therefore attribute assertions to objective sources of empirical authority. Such sources of authority might include 'specialists' and 'experts' as exemplified in (15) and (16):

(15) *Sunday Times,* 20 July 2003

Migration watch UK, a specialist think tank, says that in the next 20 years one new house will have to be built for every four already existing in London, the southeast and southwest of England.

(16) *The Guardian,* 6 Aug. 2004

The government policy of dispersing asylum seekers away from London and the south-east may increase HIV transmission, **medical experts warned** last night.

This particular form of legitimisation is linked to what Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) refer to as authorisation – legitimisation by reference to authority. It relies on the *ad verecundiam* fallacy in which the speaker resorts to the voice of an expert to present an argument as fact (van Eemeren et al. 2002: 131). Van Leeuwen and Wodak characterise authorisation as the answer to an implicit question 'why is it so?' The answer given in the attribution is 'because so-and-so says so' where 'so-and-so' is 'someone in whom institutionalised authority is vested' (2000: 104). They observe that the typical form in which this kind of legitimisation is expressed involves 'a saying verb with the relevant authority as subject' (ibid.).

Source-tagging not only serves legitimising strategies but may be simultaneously used by text-producers to communicate controversial or otherwise uncorroborated claims without actually being accountable for their truth. Sinclair (1988: 8) states that attributions are

> reports in the text which have the effect of transferring responsibility for what is being said. The text avers that such and such a statement was made, but is not responsible for whether or not the statement was accurate. That responsibility is passed on to the attributed speaker or writer.

Attribution to a source also makes it possible to achieve emotive effects in a predicational strategy and, for example, frighten text-consumers, while avoiding personal responsibility for the assertion. As we can see from (15) and (16), the source may be tagged to the front of the embedded proposition as in (15) or to the end of it as in (16). Where it is tagged to the front of an embedded proposition we can say that the source is 'profiled'. Where the source is tagged to the end of an embedded proposition it is the proposition that is profiled and the source 'distanced'. Text-producers may choose to profile either the source or the proposition in order to serve more strongly a legitimising strategy or a predicational strategy respectively. Thus, (15) represents a stronger legitimising strategy than (16), which represents a stronger predicational strategy than (15) and vice versa.

5.3. Summary

Legitimisation of assertions is an important element of coercion. It involves displaying internal and external coherence in order to overcome text-consumer's operation of the logico-rhetorical module. Internal coherence is displayed by logical connectors, which also cue ideological assumptions. External coherence is manifested in evidentiality and epistemic modality. In relation to evidentiality, we distinguished between averred and attributed bases of knowledge, where source-tagging provides evidentiality, and thus external coherence, through attribution rather than averral. We discuss epistemic modality in Chapter 8. In the following chapter we turn to Cognitive Linguistics to describe processes of conceptualisation which, when legitimisation is achieved, provide the link between language and ideology.

Part III
Cognitive Linguistics

6
Conceptualisation

6.1. Introduction

In Chapter 1 we called for a Cognitive Linguistic framework for CDA situated at the interpretation stage to complement cognitive-evolutionary explanation. We identified conceptualisation as an essential process in the communication of prejudice. In this chapter, then, we introduce the building blocks of conceptualisation; namely, mental spaces and cognitive models in the form of frames, image schemas and conceptual metaphors. We discuss the relation between conceptualisation and cognitive models and elaborate this discussion with specific regard to metaphor, an area in which critical applications of Cognitive Linguistics have been concentrated.

6.2. Spaces

There has been considerable work surrounding the construction of conceptual worlds or spaces during discourse (Fauconnier 1985, 1994, 1997; Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996; Gärdenfors 2004b; Werth 1999). This tradition has its roots in possible world semantics (Lewis 1973). It maintains that words do not have meaning in themselves, but rather have a meaning potential (Fauconnier 1997: 37). Words do not refer directly to things in the real world but to 'elements' in 'conceptual worlds' which are set up during discourse. Fauconnier refers to these conceptual loci as 'mental spaces'. Mental spaces are 'conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. They are interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold' (Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 113).

As discourse is initiated, a mental space is created which represents the current 'reality space' for the discourse participants. This space is

called the 'base space' and it is an 'anchor' in a complex chain of mental spaces created as discourse unfolds (Fauconnier 1997: 73). As discourse unfolds, then, new spaces, elements within them and connections between counterpart elements are established (Fauconnier 1994: 117). They may be embedded inside previously established spaces. At any time during discourse some particular space is 'in focus' (ibid.: 38). The space in focus is the space being internally structured at a particular moment in the discourse event (ibid.: 49). There is also always a 'viewpoint', which refers to the space from which others are constructed, structured or accessed (ibid.). At the beginning of any discourse event, the base space is necessarily the focus. As a second space becomes the focus, the base space necessarily becomes the viewpoint. Thereafter, as discourse unfolds, the focus and viewpoint shift through the spaces (ibid.: 38–9). New spaces are prompted by particular linguistic constructions and expressions called 'space-builders' (Fauconnier 1994: 117). These include tense, prepositional and adverbial phrases, metaphors, modal verbs, conditional conjunctions and certain subject–verb combinations. These spaces are constructed to conceptualise situations and events described in text and the objects, entities, actions, processes, places and time periods involved and the relations between them. In other words, the elements of a text's ideational meaning. Let us consider an example, highlighting prepositional and adverbial space-builders:

(1) *Daily Telegraph,* 19 Aug. 2003

Thirty years ago, the number of Commonwealth immigrants accepted for settlement was around 72,000. This fell to about 50,000 **after the 1971 Act** and remained at that level **into the early 1990s**. **Since then**, the numbers have soared.

The element at issue is 'the number of Commonwealth immigrants accepted for settlement' (a). The situations described concern the changing level of element *a* across four different time frames. The situation spaces constructed to keep track of this fluctuating state of affairs, then, are embedded inside time spaces built by the prepositional and adverbial phrases highlighted in (1). Elements *a, a′, a″* and *a** are counterpart elements copied from space to space and connected by reference. The conceptualisation of (1) can be represented as it is Figure 6.1. The dashed lines represent counterpart connectors between elements (•) representing *a*, the level of which increases and decreases over time on a quantity scale (|).



Figure 6.1 Mental spaces in (1)

Note: a: the number of Commonwealth immigrants accepted for settlement

Mental spaces are internally organised by knowledge structures in long-term memory such as frames and image schemas (Fauconnier 1997: 39). In this sense, mental spaces operate in working memory but are built up partly by activating structures available from long-term memory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 102).

Mental spaces are similar to 'text worlds', which Werth (1999: 51) characterises as follows:

> A text world is a deictic space, defined initially by the discourse itself and specifically by the deictic and referential elements in it... Deictic and referential elements are given by the discourse, and they specify such things as place and time details, the persons and objects present in this world, with their properties and interrelationships. These various elements, in their turn, activate frames: areas of memory which relate to areas of experience and knowledge encoded as complex conceptual structures. Thus a text world is specially generated *ad hoc* for its particular discourse; it activates further generalised situation-types which are stored frames.

They also seem to be similar to what van Dijk refers to as 'situation models'. These models are stored in semantic memory and

> consist of a fixed model schema, which features well-known situation categories such as Setting, Participant and Events. Besides information from the input text, models have instantiated information derived from more general knowledge, such as scripts. (van Dijk 1988b: 2, quoted in Werth 1999: 74)

6.3. Frames and Schemas

Frames and schemas provide conceptual structure to domains and spaces, sometimes via metaphorical projection. Their recruitment in conceptualisation is a matter of construal. Alternative frames can be called up to conceptualise situations, events, objects, entities, actions and processes in different ways – a construal operation referred to as 'categorisation'. Frames set up expectations concerning stereotypes, roles and circumstances. Similarly, alternative image schemas 'constitute' complex situations, events, objects, entities, actions and processes by imposing different Gestalts. They are both, alongside categories, conceptual metaphors and metonymies, examples of idealised cognitive models (Lakoff 1987).

In Artificial Intelligence, long-term knowledge has been modelled in terms of 'frames' and 'scripts' (Minsky 1975; Schank and Abelson 1977). Cognitive Linguistics also uses the term 'frame'. The basic idea is that knowledge is stored in chunks of experience. In Cognitive Linguistics, frames are open-ended, encyclopaedic knowledge structures which represent experience in cultural domains. They are idealised in the sense that they represent 'a distillation from repeated experiences (which may be first- or second-hand, the latter mediated by language, film etc.)' (Werth 1999: 111). Fillmore (1982: 111) suggests that frames should be taken to include other similar theoretical constructs such as scripts. Frames are activated by particular lexical items but, in turn, provide the cognitive backdrop, or 'base' (Langacker 1987), against which words, or rather their associated concepts, are 'profiled' (ibid.) and understood.[1] They operate to 'flesh out' discourse (Werth 1999: 20). For Fillmore, a frame is

> any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available. (1982: 111)

Of course, a single lexical item has the potential to activate any number of different frames. Which frames are activated during discourse, their salience and the salience of elements within them is a function of context, relevance and prototype effects. As an example, when the word 'front door' is introduced into a text it is likely to activate a HOUSE frame. The concept FRONT DOOR can only make sense in a network of concepts

connected to it within some frame. The HOUSE frame is probably the most immediate of those available, at least in the absence of any alternative context already supplied. This frame will remain open during discourse to provide the context in which subsequent text is interpreted.[2] The open frame affords access to all the knowledge we have relating to houses, allowing inferences to be drawn. For most people, this would include knowledge of their prototypical form and function as well as associated personal feelings. Frames can contain image-schematic as well as propositional content (Lakoff 1987). For example, the HOUSE frame is likely to include a CONTAINER schema.

If frames represent cultural experience, including cultural categories, norms, values, narratives, practices and routines, image schemas represent embodied experience (Hampe and Grady 2005; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Mandler 2004). Image schemas are abstract, holistic knowledge structures which represent experience in basic domains such as SPACE and FORCE.[3] As first described by Piaget (1952) in Developmental Psychology, they emerge from recurrent patterns in early interactions with our body and the physical environment. They include a CONTAINMENT schema, a PROXIMITY-DISTANCE schema, a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema and various FORCE-DYNAMIC schemas.

Image schemas subsequently come to constitute experience. They serve both to connect and demarcate phenomena so that we construe the world, and make sense of it, in terms of whole, discrete ideational constructs. According to Werth, image schemas are 'simplified representations of common physical experiences, which are used to classify more complex physical or mental phenomena' (1999: 66). They therefore also represent the common, skeletal structures which similar situations, events, objects, entities, actions, processes and relations can be 'boiled down' to. They are not specific images but, rather, idealised, schematic images, which represent the bare essence of all their instantiations.

The canonical situation/event described in discourse on immigration is a dynamic one involving immigrants or asylum-seekers 'entering' Britain as in (2)–(4).[4]

(2) *Sunday Telegraph,* 2 Feb. 2003

Asylum-seekers are entering Britain at the rate of 80,000 a year and few are deported.

(3) *Daily Telegraph,* 30 Aug. 2006

[I]t is clear that at least 600,000 eastern Europeans have entered Britain in the past two years.

(4) *The Times,* 30 Nov. 2002

[M]ore than 100,000 asylum-seekers and their dependants will enter Britain in 2002.

The situation/event schema underlying (2)–(4) can be represented, as a function of the verb 'enter', as in Figure 6.2 (reproduced from Langacker 2008: 33).[5] The concept ENTER can be analysed as a combination of the image schemas OBJECT, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL and CONTAINER-CONTENT (Langacker 2004: 32). The schema entails a process of transfer or movement of a 'trajector' object (immigrants and asylum-seekers) from a source-point (usually unspecified) into a 'landmark' container (Britain), which is the goal-point.[6] The result of the process designated by 'enter' is that the TR becomes part of the contents of the LM.

The image-schematic conceptualisation of (2)–(4), then, takes place in a situation or event space, embedded in a time space built initially by the tense and specified by a prepositional phrase. Figure 6.3 represents the conceptualisation in (4) for example.

The typical static situation described in immigration discourse is exemplified in (5). It profiles the result of the dynamic event depicted in Figure 6.2 and can be represented as in Figure 6.4

(5) *The Independent,* 15 June 2006

The Home Office estimates there are 430,000 illegal immigrants in the country.

Spaces are internally structured by cognitive models such as frames, schemas and conceptual metaphors. However, the relationship between spaces and cognitive models in cultural domains is mutually constitutive. Conceptual structures built online can also enter long-term memory via processes of entrenchment. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 103) state that 'mental spaces are built up dynamically in working memory,



Figure 6.2 Schema for canonical situation/event in immigration discourse

Note: Diagrams like that in the figure should not be identified as image schemas per se, which are patterns of neural activity, but are intended only to evoke them and suggest their nature (see Langacker 2008: 32).



Figure 6.3 Conceptualisation in (4)



Figure 6.4 Schema for static situation in immigration discourse

but they can also become entrenched in long-term memory'. Indeed, Fauconnier (1994, 1997) argues that frames, for example, are in fact mental spaces prompted by language which have become entrenched in long-term memory and which, in turn, can be activated all at once in conceptualisation. The same relation is seen by Werth between text worlds and frames, where 'frames are built up out of the repetition of similar text worlds' (1999: 51). Van Dijk also sees the same relation between 'particular' situation models and frames, mediated by 'general' situation models. He writes that:

> Particular models represent unique information about one specific situation, for instance the one 'now' being processed. General

> models may combine information from several particular models about the 'same' or the same 'kind' of situation... General models that appear to be socially relevant may be transformed to frames or scripts in semantic (social) memory, for example by further abstraction, generalisation and decontextualisation. Hence, we now have a gradual transition from personal, particular models, via more general models, to socially shared general frames or scripts. (van Dijk 1985: 63)

This dialectical relation constitutes a usage-based model of language acquisition and change (Barlow and Kemmer 2000; Bybee and Hopper 2001). It also reflects the relations described in CDA between texts, discourse and discourses, as illustrated in Figure 6.5 (adapted from Evans and Green 2006: 458).

Linguistic representations in text reflect (relatively) stable conceptual structures in long-term memory, cognitive models, which we can describe as discourses, recruited in conceptualisation. Linguistic representations in texts, in turn, provide cultural experience, which,



Figure 6.5 The nature of meaning construction

via conceptualisation, creates and reinforces cognitive models. Recall that van Dijk (1995) defines discourses in terms of social cognition as the system of mental representations that group members have in long-term memory. We may therefore characterise idealised cognitive models as discourses in a given domain. They are precisely systems of representations shared by members of a speech community. Moreover, these socially shared cognitive representations are both recruited in conceptualisation and, in the case of those that exist in cultural domains, constructed through texts. In other words, discourses can be formally described in Cognitive Linguistic terms as frames, schemas and conceptual metaphors. Indeed, Fairclough (1995b: 101) acknowledges that

> other terms which are roughly equivalent to 'discourses', but derive from different theoretical frameworks and traditions, are quite widely used, including schemata, frames, and scripts (from cognitive psychology), metaphors, and vocabularies.

6.4. Conceptual Metaphors and Conceptual Blends

Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) accounts for conceptualisation in a range of linguistic phenomena, including metaphor. We will focus on Conceptual Blending Theory and metaphor. Hodge and Kress' (1993: 15) contend that ideology involves 'a systematically organised presentation of reality'. Metaphor is central to critical discourse analysis, then, since it 'is concerned with forming a coherent view of reality' (Charteris-Black 2004: 28).

Metaphor has received relatively little attention in mainstream CDA (Chilton 2005a). Recent exceptions to this, though, can be found in research which aligns critical metaphor research with the socio-cognitive approach (Hart 2007, 2008; Koller 2004, 2005). Further exceptions are Charteris-Black (2004) and Maalej (2007), both of whom develop distinct approaches to CDA specifically designed to attend to metaphor and which each rely to a lesser or greater extent on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).[7] The approach proposed by Maalej, for example, 'offers a version of CDA totally reliant on Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) theory' (p.131). However, Hart (2008) and O'Halloran (2007a, 2007b) both challenge the appropriation of Conceptual Metaphor Theory in CDA. Certainly, Conceptual Metaphor Theory is discordant with interpretation-stage analysis (Hart 2008). Recall that Conceptual Metaphor Theory is a theory of conceptual organisation.

Conceptual Blending Theory, on the other hand, is a theory of conceptualisation during discourse. To analyse metaphor at the interpretation stage, then, Conceptual Blending Theory is the more appropriate because it 'lends itself very well to research on metaphor in discourse' (Koller 2004: 8).

Conceptual Metaphor Theory claims that 'metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 6). This begs the question, though, where did the conceptual metaphors come from in the first place? Conceptual Metaphor Theory suggests that the motivation for metaphorical extension is embodied (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 45–59) argue that conceptual metaphors emerge in early childhood during a conflation stage, when neural connections are established between two domains of experience that are regularly coactivated. This causes major theoretical tension between Conceptual Metaphor Theory and CDA. Charteris-Black (2004: 11) claims one of the limitations of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that 'the only explanation for metaphor motivation is with reference to an underlying experiential basis'. This view does not allow for the fact that metaphorical expressions may be chosen by text-producers during discourse to achieve particular communication goals within particular contexts rather than being predetermined by bodily experience (Charteris-Black 2004: 247). In other words, that metaphors may be used to perform strategic functions. And indeed, the overarching aim of critical metaphor research is to disclose the vested interests influencing the choice of metaphor in text (Koller 2004: 9). Worse still, one of the problems with the experientialist hypothesis is that the use of discriminatory metaphors might then be explained – and perhaps even excused – by our physical limitations (El Refaie 2001: 353). Conceptual metaphors in basic domains, then, may be derived from embodied experience. But conceptual metaphors in cultural domains must be based in discourse and have become conceptual through processes of cultural and cognitive entrenchment (see section 6.4.2). On the alternative account, then, metaphorical extension is motivated by textual choices rather than experiential connections. On this account, there is nothing deterministic about metaphor use, as Conceptual Metaphor Theory implies (Charteris-Black 2004: 249). Rather, the system 'provides wide margins of choice for which items are motivated in which ways' (Chilton 1988: 49). And this leaves scope for manipulation, especially if extensions of meaning are engineered by specific groups with strategic interests (ibid.).

6.4.1. Conceptual blending theory

In Conceptual Blending Theory, then, metaphor is a particular kind of linguistic expression which involves the construction of a number of mental spaces. Metaphor in discourse is itself a space-builder. Metaphor is treated as a conceptual projection involving four mental spaces. Specifically, during discourse these spaces undergo a conceptual blending operation whereby they are manipulated in an integrated network, producing inferential structure.[8] Blending Theory adopts a particular diagrammatic notation based in mathematical set theory to represent mental spaces and conceptual blending patterns. The 'basic diagram' is reproduced below, adapted from Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46).

In the basic diagram of a conceptual blending network, mental spaces are represented by the four large squares. Elements within mental spaces are represented by the points inside the squares. While this diagram is a 'static' illustration of the conceptual blending operation, it is important to recognise, as Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46) stress, that 'such a diagram is really just a snapshot of an imaginative and complicated process'.



Figure 6.6 Conceptual blending 'basic diagram'

Blends arise in networks of mental spaces. The basic blending network consists of four mental spaces: two input spaces, a generic space, and the blended space.[9] According to Coulson (2001: 23), 'a new space is…set up when utterances concern objects or events that require different background assumptions'. Metaphors in text are of precisely this nature; they involve spaces which contain elements belonging to two different cognitive frames with different background assumptions. In this sense, metaphors display interdiscursivity 'as their different input spaces are linked to different discourses' (Koller 2004: 19). As metaphorical discourse unfolds, then, a space is created for each frame. These spaces are 'input $space_1$' and 'input $space_2$'. In conceptual integration, the two input spaces share counterpart connections between elements, represented in the diagram by the solid lines. Counterpart connections can be of many different kinds, generally referred to as 'vital relations'. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 89–111) identify a number of vital relations including identity, role, intentionality, time, space, category and analogy. In the case of metaphor, counterpart elements are linked by 'analogical connectors'. The dashed lines connecting the elements inside the four spaces represent conceptual projections across the network. These lines correspond to neural coactivations and bindings (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 46).

In addition to the two input spaces there is the 'generic space'. The generic space contains abstract structure which is common to the counterpart elements in both of the input spaces. In other words, 'at any moment in the construction of the network, the structure that inputs seem to share is captured in a generic space' (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 47). In turn, elements in the generic space project onto the counterpart elements in the input spaces. In some cases this common structure can be captured in terms of thematic roles, categories which structure the ideational representation in text of a given scenario. In other cases, it is best captured by perceptual notions like figure and ground (Talmy 2000) or landmark and trajector (Langacker 1987, 1991).

Finally, the fourth space, the 'blended space', is arrived at via conceptual blending operations. It inherits partial structure from both the input spaces and has 'emergent structure' of its own (Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 113). The blended space also receives structure from the generic space (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 47). Emergent structure is structure unique to the blend. That is, the blended space contains structure which is not copied there directly from the input spaces but which rather is a product of blending operations. Emergent structure is

generated by three blending processes: 'composition', 'completion' and 'elaboration'.

In blending, elements from the input spaces can be composed to provide relations that do not exist in the separate inputs. Counterpart elements can be composed to produce two separate elements in the blended space. However, in the case of metaphor, a special kind of composition occurs, referred to as 'fusion'. Here, counterpart elements in the input spaces get projected into the blended space, creating a single compound element.[10]

Completion occurs as relevant structure from background knowledge associated with the elements in the input spaces is recruited into the blend. Such background knowledge may take the form of contextual information or cognitive frames, for example. According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 48):

> We rarely realise the extent of background knowledge and structure that we bring into a blend unconsciously. Blends recruit great ranges of such meaning... We see some parts of a familiar frame of meaning, and much more of the frame is recruited silently but effectively to the blend.

It should be noted, however, that not all available structure from cognitive frames necessarily gets projected into the blended space, only that which is relevant to the text-producer's intention in constructing the blend. This is known as 'selective projection' and it is guided by normal pragmatic constraints. Selective projection contributes to the ideology of metaphor whereby text-producers may choose to recruit particular structure in order to promote a certain construal of reality.

Elaboration is the most significant stage in the blending process.[11] It is the 'running of the blend'. Fauconnier (1997: 151) states that elaboration consists in cognitive work performed within the blend, according to its own emergent logic. Herein lays the fundamental importance of conceptual blending for CDA. As a function of emergent structure in the blended space, metaphor is 'cognitively real'. Metaphors in text have consequences for further cognitive processes. According to Fauconnier and Turner (1996: 115), 'blended spaces are sites for central cognitive work: reasoning..., drawing inferences..., and developing emotions'.

Conceptual blending operations are potentially open-ended. As such, the selection of elements in composition, the recruitment of frame-based knowledge in completion and the inferences that arise through elaboration must somehow be constrained. Fauconnier and Turner

(2002: 309–52) propose a number of governing principles which act as constraints on conceptual blending operations. We mention just one, relevance, since here Relevance Theory can be shown as compatible, at least in some respects, with Cognitive Linguistics.[12] Fauconnier and Turner state:

> An element in the blend can fulfil the general expectations of relevance by indicating its connections to other spaces or indicating the lines along which the blend is to develop. Speaker and listener are both aware of this fact, and it guides their construction and interpretation of the network. (2002: 333)

Let us demonstrate conceptual blending in discourse with an infamous and immediately striking example of novel metaphor from Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech:

(6) It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.

We suggested above that metaphor should be treated in terms of Conceptual Blending Theory rather than Conceptual Metaphor Theory on the grounds that the former is more congruent with interpretation-stage analysis in CDA. However, in addition to its compatibility with interpretation-stage analysis, Conceptual Blending Theory also possesses a technical capacity to account for conceptualisation in examples such as the one above, which Conceptual Metaphor Theory cannot handle. On the technical differences between Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending Theory, Grady et al. (1999: 101) note that Conceptual Metaphor Theory posits relationships between pairs of mental representations, while Conceptual Blending Theory allows for more than two, and, further, that Conceptual Metaphor Theory has defined metaphor as a strictly directional phenomenon, while Conceptual Blending Theory has not. Conceptual Metaphor Theory treats metaphor as a conceptual representation involving an asymmetrical mapping from a 'source domain' onto a 'target domain'. Conceptual Blending Theory, on the other hand, treats metaphor as a dynamic construal operation involving four mental spaces. Grady et al. (1999: 101) state that one of the motivations for Conceptual Blending Theory 'is that the four-space model can account for phenomena that are not explicitly addressed by the mechanisms of the two-domain model'.

Conceptual Blending Theory distinguishes between 'one-sided' and 'two-sided' integration networks (Coulson 2001). In a one-sided network, the blended space inherits frame-level structure from one of the input spaces and specific-level structure from the other input space (ibid.: 121). In such a network the blended space will share much of the logic of the input space that projects frame-level structure (ibid.). One-sided networks capture much of the same data as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (ibid.: 167). In a two-sided network, by contrast, the blended space can inherit frame-level structure from either input space (ibid.: 121). Consequently, emergent structure in the blended space may hold a logic unique to the blend. It is two-sided networks in particular, such as the one constructed for the text unit above, which the mechanics of Conceptual Metaphor Theory cannot account for, since the unidirectional mapping it describes does not allow for frame-level structure associated with the target domain to contribute to meaning.

In Conceptual Metaphor Theory terms, the source domain in the text unit above would be that of funerals and the target domain responsibility for a bad situation. Elements in the source domain are the funeral pyre and its builder. The builder of the funeral pyre maps onto the nation and the funeral pyre itself maps onto the situation being described by Powell. In the source domain, the builder's action produces a funeral pyre. Similarly, in the target domain, the nation's action (immigration policy) produces a bad situation. Consequently, a person building their own funeral pyre corresponds to a nation actively contributing to its own plight. At first glance, then, Conceptual Metaphor Theory does appear to be able to handle this data. However, as Coulson (2001: 169) notes of the idiom 'digging one's own grave', there are in fact a number of discrepancies between the structure in the source and target domains that argue against a Conceptual Metaphor Theory account of this text unit.[13] For example, the funeral pyre has a different significance in the source domain than it does in the target domain. In the metaphor, the funeral pyre represents its builder's plight. In the source domain however, the funeral pyre represents its builder's goal. A further mismatch concerns the role of the agent in the source domain and their role in the metaphor. In the metaphor, a causal relation between action (policy) and situation (demographics) is implied, whereby the situation is a consequence of action. However, no such relation exists in the source domain. Building a funeral pyre does not lead to death but is a result of it. So in fact, in the source domain, the action (building a funeral pyre) is a consequence of situation (death). One final problem arises with the metaphor's inference that the longer present policy remains

unchanged, the further the nation's situation will deteriorate. No such inferential structure is available to be mapped from the source domain, the equivalent of which would be that the higher the funeral pyre is heaped up, the more dead the deceased. This inference must rather be a function of structure recruited in conceptual blending from the immigration politics frame.

This metaphor, then, is better accounted for by Conceptual Blending Theory, according to which, logic from two input spaces, structured by relevant cognitive frames, is blended to produce emergent structure different from that in either of the input spaces. A blending network for (6) is represented in Figure 6.7.

In Figure 6.7 above, elements *a″*, *b″* and *c″* in situation $space_2$ are counterpart elements of *a′*, *b′* and *c′* in situation $space_1$ respectively, linked by analogical connectors. In the generic space, elements *a*, *b* and *c* capture the underlying structure common to the scenarios in



Figure 6.7 Blending network in (6)

each input space, structured by the cognitive frames for funerals and immigration politics. Through composition, counterpart elements *a′*, *b′*, *c′* and *a″*, *b″*, *c″* are fused in the blended space to create emergent structure in the form of compound elements *a**, *b** and *c**. In situation $space_1$, the logic expressed in *c′*→ *a′*,*b′* represents a relation whereby a death (*c′*) leads to (→) a funeral pyre builder (*a′*) heaping up a funeral pyre (*b′*). That is, a situation (*c*) leads to (→) an agent (*a*) engaging in action (*b*). By contrast, in situation $space_2$, *a″*, *b″*→*c″* represents a relation whereby nation (*a″*) continuing with present immigration policy (*b″*) will cause (→) a change in the nation's demographic (*c″*). That is, an agent (*a*) engaging in action (*b*) will cause (→) a situation (*c*). The logic in situation $space_2$ expressed as *a″*,+*b″*→+*c* represents a relation whereby the longer the nation (*a″*) continues present immigration policy (+*b*), the greater change to the nation's demographic (+*c*) it will cause (→).

Importantly, through completion and selective projection, it is relations that hold between elements in situation $space_2$, structured by the cognitive frame for immigration politics, rather than relations that hold between elements in situation $space_1$, structured by the cognitive frame for funerals, which get projected into the blended space, giving rise to further emergent structure.[14] In the blend then, the nation is conceptualised as a funeral pyre builder (*a**), continuing with present immigration policy as heaping up the funeral pyre (*b**), and the changing demographics of the nation is conceptualised as death (*c**). The projection of logic from situation $space_2$ gives rise to emergent logic *a**,*b**→*c** in the blend, expressing a relation whereby the nation (*a**), in continuing with present immigration policy (*b**), will ultimately cause (→) its own death (*c**). Further, projection of logic from situation $space_2$ also gives rise to emergent logic *a**,+*b**→+*c**, expressing a relation whereby the longer the nation (*a**) continues with present immigration policy (+*b**), then (→) the closer it comes to death (+*c**). However, by inference, if *a**,+*b**→+*c** holds true then so does its negative *a**,–*b**→–*c**, such that the nation's death can be prevented by discontinuing present immigration policy. Since it is within the blended situation space, then, that reasoning, drawing inferences and developing emotions takes place, the conceptualisation in *c** is particularly affective and the relation *a**,+*b**→+*c** particularly persuasive in calling for a more restrictive immigration policy advocated by the text-producer, Enoch Powell.

6.4.2. Conventional and conceptual metaphors

A major finding of Cognitive Linguistic research on metaphor pertains to the ubiquity of metaphor in language and discourse (Lakoff and

Johnson 1980, 1999). Metaphors can be novel or conventional (or somewhere in between). The example discussed above represents a novel metaphor, though CDA has primarily been interested in conventional metaphors, analysis of which may be most revealing.[15] A conventional metaphor, as defined by Charteris-Black (2004: 21), is one that is frequently used 'thereby reducing our awareness of its semantic tension' and thus concealing 'an underlying persuasive function that is often not immediately transparent' (ibid. p.9). Conventional metaphors may be described as features of a language or of some particular order of discourse.[16]

For Conceptual Blending Theory, conventional metaphors are blends that have become entrenched, 'a general possibility not just for individual mental spaces but for networks of spaces' (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 103). Here, Conceptual Blending Theory and Conceptual Metaphor Theory need not be mutually exclusive (Grady et al. 1999). As blends become entrenched, they give rise to more general conceptual connections between the domains that systematically structure their input spaces.[17] It is these conceptual connections that are described in Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The 'mapping' between domains, however, is best formulated as a conceptual association rather than a cognitive process. Then, conceptual metaphors, in addition to frames, become structures in long-term memory which originate in mental space configurations but which, in turn, can get recruited in conceptualisation. Semino obviously has the same thing in mind when she argues that:

> A proper account of the role of metaphor in language and thought needs to distinguish between two main types of cognitive structures or mental representations, namely (a) the short-term mental representations that we form while processing a particular text, and (b) the long-term mental representations ... that make up our background knowledge and worldview. These two types of mental representations interact with each other: short-term mental representations are partly formed on the basis of long-term representations, and may in turn become part of long-term memory. (2008: 87)

This view is also shared by Grady et al. (1999) who state that 'if Conceptual Metaphor Theory is primarily concerned with well-established metaphoric associations between concepts ..., then conceptual metaphors are among the stable structures available for exploitation by the blending process'. Conceptual metaphors are then counterpart connections which guide the construction and interpretation of blends (ibid.).[18] On

this account, while conceptual blends are constructed during discourse, some conceptual metaphors may be described as latent ideologies or naturalised discourses.[19] Accordingly, conceptual metaphors act as constraints on the possible blends that text-producers can create. And the systematic construction of blends with some common theme, that is, whose input spaces are structured by the same general frames or schemas, betrays underlying organisational principles in the form of conceptual metaphors.

Entrenchment is a cognitive-cultural process. In its cognitive dimension, entrenchment refers to the fact that conceptual structures built up dynamically in working memory can become entrenched in long-term memory and available to be activated all at once (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 103). In its cultural dimension, entrenchment refers to a diachronic process of normalisation:

> what started out (undoubtedly) as some individual's creative, online, conceptual achievement has become a shared, entrenched conceptualisation, presumably because the blend proved successful for some purpose, therefore arose again, and through repeated experience became conventional. (Grady et al. 1999)

A primary purpose served in the construction of blends is the promotion of particular representations of reality. According to Fauconnier (1997: 168), when blends get entrenched 'they become our new construal of reality'. The entrenchment of any construction probably depends on the four factors outlined by Fairclough (2005: 55–6) that influence which competing discourses establish themselves. First, social structures are more open to certain discourse strategies than others. Second, the scope of the discourse. For example, the discourse of globalisation may be seen as a 'nodal discourse' which articulates a number of other discourses. Third, the ability of social actors, agencies and institutions to access and control the channels and networks for the diffusion of texts. Politicians, for example, have preferential access to the major media (van Dijk 1993a) whose texts are more widely circulated than more marginal media. And fourth, the 'resonance' of discourses, that is, their capacity to mobilise people.

Stubbs (1997: 105) suggests that CDA is a theory of how things come to be taken for granted, whereby a constant argument made is that many of our beliefs and representations might seem simply natural but are in fact naturalised (ibid.). Kress (1989: 10), for example, states that discourses help to naturalise ideology 'by making what is social seem

natural'. But Stubbs (ibid.) argues that CDA 'is vague about the actual mechanisms whereby such influences operate'. The concept of entrenchment in Cognitive Linguistics may provide just one such mechanism. Furthermore, the dual cognitive-cultural nature of entrenchment may reconcile the individual mentalism often associated with Cognitive Linguistics on the one hand and the social constructivism associated with CDA on the other.[20]

6.5. Summary

In this chapter we have introduced Mental Spaces Theory and its extension in Conceptual Blending Theory to describe conceptualisation during discourse. The latter can account for conceptualisation in metaphorical discourse specifically. Conceptualisation is an online process which involves the recruitment of cognitive models including frames, image schemas and conceptual metaphors. Language and cognitive models in cultural domains exist in a dialectical relation mediated by mental spaces which mirrors the relation between text, discourse and discourses described in CDA. We have argued that discourses can in fact be formally modelled as frames, image schemas and conceptual metaphors. In the following chapter, we explore the metaphors used in immigration discourse.

7
Metaphor

7.1. Introduction

In Chapters 3 and 4 we hinted that metaphor may be an important structure in strategic discourse. Specifically, we came across metaphors of spatiality and de-humanising metaphors. In Chapter 6 we outlined the mechanics of metaphor and introduced its ideological dimension. We described metaphor in discourse as involving a conceptual blending operation, which establishes, enlists and re-establishes discourses in the form of conceptual metaphors. In this chapter we discuss in more detail the strategic and ideological effects of metaphor. Specifically, we address how they can function in discourse to realise referential and predicational strategies and disclose the ideological inferences that particular metaphors entail or encourage.

7.2. Metaphor

Reisigl and Wodak recognise that metaphor is 'important in referentially and predicationally constructing ingroups and outgroups' (2001: 58). They devote some discussion to metaphor and identify the most frequent and stereotypical metaphors employed in discourse on immigration (ibid.: 56–60). Fairclough acknowledges the ideological significance of metaphor when he states that

> any aspect of experience can be represented in terms of any number of metaphors, and it is the relationship between alternative metaphors that is of particular interest here, for different metaphors have different ideological attachments. (1989: 119)

Metaphor is also mentioned in other works within mainstream CDA (e.g., Fairclough 1992, 2001; Kress 1989; Lee 1992; van Dijk 1998).

However, mainstream CDA has not attended to metaphor in any of its cognitive detail. It is only with the more recent emergence of Critical Metaphor Analysis as a distinct approach within CDA that metaphor has received comprehensive treatment within a cognitive framework (Charteris-Black 2004, 2006a; Chilton 1996, 2005a, 2005b; Goatly 2007; Hart 2007, 2008; Koller 2004; Maalej 2007; Musolff 2004, 2006; Santa Ana 2002; Semino 2008). Critical Metaphor Analysis constitutes a cognitive framework for CDA insofar as it incorporates Cognitive Linguistic theories of metaphor.

Critical Metaphor Analysis highlights several statements made in Cognitive Linguistics which are significant for CDA. One is the assertion that 'metaphor is *understanding and experiencing* one thing in terms of another' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5, my emphasis). That is, metaphor is not a purely linguistic practice but, rather, metaphor involves underlying construal operations. In other words, metaphor is conceptualisation not colouration. It is a fundamental cognitive operation performed in order to make sense of experience. The specific construal operations involved in metaphor, then, are the processes of composition, completion and elaboration in conceptual blending. In Croft and Cruse's (2004) typology of construal operations, metaphor, along with categorisation, framing and figure-ground alignment, falls under the rubric of 'judgement/comparison'. Metaphor involves construal where 'the choice of metaphor to describe a situation in a particular domain construes the structure of that domain in a particular way that differs depending on the metaphor chosen' (Croft and Cruse 2004: 55). The second is the related observation that metaphor is not restricted to literary texts but is in fact ubiquitous in everyday language. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) show that few semantic domains can be described as totally autonomous; that is, conceptualised without inheriting input structure through metaphor. Moreover, metaphor permeates discourse across domains and genres (Semino 2008). This includes, for example, scientific discourse as it is produced both by researchers and the media and, perhaps less surprising, the discourse of advertising (ibid.). The third is that metaphors are not arbitrary. Rather, patterns are observed whereby certain kinds of domains reoccur as source domains while others more often occur as target domains. Source domains, for example, tend to be image schemas or frames for physical objects and natural phenomena. In other words, source domains tend to be concrete, known and rich in structure. Target domains, on the other hand, tend to be more abstract, unknown and under-structured. Metaphor can thus be considered a cognitive tool used to conceptualise subjective experiences

and intangible social situations.[1] Indeed, it may be that it is only possible for humans to conceptualise intrinsically intangible and unfamiliar domains by recruiting input structure from those that are more material and familiar. The fourth is that metaphors are dynamic and creative. Conceptual integration produces certain sets of inferences. The fifth is the related suggestion that metaphors display highlighting and hiding effects. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 10) point out that 'in allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept ... a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor'. And the sixth is that when conventional metaphors occur in discourse, text-consumers are not necessarily aware that they are processing metaphor. Conventional metaphors, recall, reflect and reinforce conceptual metaphors. And conceptual metaphors belong to the 'cognitive unconscious' (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 56). Text-consumers may therefore assume that certain representations are neutral, natural and accurately reflect reality when they are, in fact, metaphorical and so motivated, constructed and skewed towards certain construals. On the basis of these statements, Critical Metaphor Analysis predicts that metaphors exist as a feature of political discourse in different genres and proclaims that in this context metaphor is both strategic and ideological.

It is usually, of course, complex social situations and events which are disconnected from the text-consumer's direct experience that get described in political discourse. Metaphor is therefore an ideal cognitive resource for conceptualising these realities and communicating about them. And indeed, metaphors are an important part of political discourse as it is produced by politicians (Charteris-Black 2006b) and the press (Bednarek 2005).

Metaphors are an important part of ideology. They 'provide the cognitive framework for worldview' (Santa Ana 2002: 21). However, the worldview that they provide is partial. For example, through their highlighting feature metaphors 'privilege one understanding of reality over others' (Chilton 1996: 74). And at the same time, in their hiding feature metaphors 'have the effect of marginalising or excluding alternative conceptualisations' (Chilton 1996: 154). Ideological patterns then arise when text-producers select one set of metaphors instead of alternative ones (Wolf and Polzenhagen 2003: 263). In this sense, metaphors are also strategic. Text-producers have the choice to select certain source domains and disregard others. And the choice that text-producers make reflects their intentions and ideologies (Wolf and Polzenhagen 2003: 262).[2]

Metaphors, then, can be capitalised upon to impart particular ideas and values to a target domain (Maalej 2007: 136). Crucially, though, text-producers can always deny what metaphors imply (Beer and De Landtsheer 2004: 30).

Metaphors realise predicational strategies, as elements of the target domain are predicated as possessing particular qualities, quantities and relations from the source domain. Moreover, metaphor may be coercive as it achieves cognitive, emotive and perlocutionary effects. Metaphor is 'a process that culminates in a point of view' (Gregg 2004: 60). It therefore achieves cognitive effects by prompting construal operations which result in conceptual representations. Metaphor is also intimately bound with affect. This has long been recognised in rhetoric. For example, Locke (1690) observed that the purpose of metaphor is to move the passions. Returning to rhetoric in Critical Metaphor Analysis, Charteris-Black (2004: 11) argues that the effectiveness of metaphor in realising persuasive goals has to do with its potential for moving us. In cognitive terms, metaphors may activate emotion modules, thereby achieving emotive effects. According to Beer and De Landtsheer, 'metaphors activate conscious and unconscious, rational and emotional responses' (2004: 27). Recall, conceptual blends are cognitive associations constructed during discourse. And blended spaces are cognitive loci for reasoning, drawing inferences and developing emotions (Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 115). Metaphors in discourse use language 'to activate unconscious emotional associations' (Charteris-Black 2004: 53). They can cause text-consumers to construct cognitive associations between the target domain and social or physical threat-connoting cues which could initialise anger or fear programs. Metaphor achieves perlocutionary effects as 'it induces us to act in accord with [a] set of attitudes, feelings, values and intentions' (Gregg 2004: 60). Lakoff and Johnson state that 'metaphors create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action, such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor' (1980: 156). The view of metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics, then, corresponds with the view of emotions in cognitive psychology (De Landtsheer and De Vrij 2004: 169). Like emotions, metaphors guide cognition and direct decision-making with action consequences.

Critical Metaphor Analysis, then, predicts that metaphor will be used pervasively in political discourse to communicate ideology covertly but persuasively. The careful study of metaphor can therefore 'raise awareness of the role it plays in our conventional ways of talking and thinking, so that individuals are better able to notice metaphorical

expressions and conceptualisations, and to reflect critically on their validity' (Semino 2008: 34).

Having outlined the significance of metaphor for CDA, we can turn shortly to metaphors in discourse on immigration and asylum specifically. But first we need a qualitative method for identifying metaphor.

7.3. Defining Metaphor in Discourse

Unlike epistemic modality, for example, metaphor is more difficult to identify. This is because metaphor is not reflected in abstract grammatical categories but is, rather, reflected in whole phrases or expressions. No set of lexical items can be grouped together as expressions of the semantic category. And no single lexical item can be described as a metaphor. Instead, a metaphor is constituted in the combination of lexical items in a particular context, which we call constructions. Thus, we talk about metaphorical phrases and expressions. While we can state that a single word is being used in a metaphorical sense on a specific occasion, it is only metaphorical as a function of the other denotations and referents in the phrase or expression in which it occurs.

Charteris-Black (2004: 20–2) outlines three levels of criteria for defining metaphor. At the linguistic level, a metaphor is a word or phrase that causes semantic tension through reification, personification or depersonification. Reification is referring to an abstract entity, relation, situation, event or process with a word or phrase which in other contexts refers to something that is more concrete. Personification is referring to inanimate objects with words or phrases which in other contexts refer to human beings.[3] Depersonification is referring to human beings with words or phrases which in other contexts refer to animals, objects or substances. At the pragmatic level, the classical definition of metaphor is 'an incongruous linguistic representation that has the underlying purpose of influencing opinions and judgements' (2004: 21). At the cognitive level, a metaphor is a conceptual structure which results in and is the result of metaphor in discourse and associates the attributes of the referent of a linguistic expression in its original context with the referent of a linguistic expression in another context.

A word whose basic sense belongs to one order of discourse, then, is less likely to be used in its literal sense when it occurs in an alternative order of discourse. For example, in its basic sense, the verb *invade* denotes 'to enter by military force' and is an item of vocabulary primarily associated with discourse on war and defence. When it occurs in discourse on immigration and asylum, however, it does not normally

denote an act of military aggression, although it may connote aggression, because discourse on immigration and asylum is not concerned with reporting on war and defence matters. Rather, it more regularly refers to the demographic movement of people, when it is therefore metaphorical. It can be claimed that a given word is always metaphorical when it occurs in a particular textual context. For example, the basic sense of the verb *invade* does not allow immigrants and asylum-seekers to be coded as the agents of the action. So whenever the lexeme INVADE occurs in the context 'immigrants —' or '— by immigrants' it must be being used in a metaphorical sense. The same is true of nominalisations of the verb in the context '— of immigrants'.

We focus on metaphors for Britain on the one hand and metaphors for immigrants and immigration on the other. Metaphors for Britain appear mainly to serve a referential strategy while metaphors for immigration seem mainly to realise predicational strategies. Of course, one metaphorical expression may at the same time realise both a referential and predicational strategy. Moreover, metaphors realising referential and predicational strategies cohere, cotextually and intertextually, and interact cognitively to create more complex blends with further inferential structure.

7.4. Metaphors for Britain

One of the main metaphors running through immigration discourse seems to be one which recruits the CONTAINER schema to conceptualise the country (Charteris-Black 2006a; Chilton 1994). Charteris-Black presents evidence that metaphors construing Britain as a container are a conventional feature of discourse on immigration and can thus be described as reflecting and reinforcing an underlying conceptual metaphor.

The CONTAINER schema emerges from ubiquitous and reoccurring experiences with containment. According to Johnson (1987: 21):

> Our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive features of our bodily experience. We are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put certain things (food, water, air) and out of which other things emerge (food and water wastes, air, blood, etc.). From the beginning, we experience constant physical containment in our surroundings (those things that envelop us). We move in and out of rooms, clothes, vehicles, and numerous kinds of bounded spaces. We manipulate

objects, placing them in containers (cups, boxes, cans, bags, etc.). In each of these cases there are repeatable spatial and temporal organisations. In other words, there are typical schemata for physical containment.

The CONTAINER schema consists of three structural elements: an interior and an exterior defined by a boundary. The interior also includes a CENTRE-PERIPHERY structure, where centre can be thought of as the deictic centre. The container has, in addition, volume, which is to say a FULL-EMPTY structure. The holistic image schema can thus be represented diagrammatically as in Figure 7.1.

Johnson identifies a number of important entailments of containment, where entailments are defined as 'implications of the internal structure of image schemata' (1987: 22).[4] The two most significant of these for political discourse are that (i) it follows from the nature of the CONTAINER schema that something is either *in* or *out* of the container (ibid.: 39); and that (ii) the experience of containment typically involves protection from, or resistance to, external forces (ibid.: 22). The CONTAINER schema thus entails exclusivity where members have to be in or out and protection by means of exclusion. Chilton (1996: 64) identifies further implications of the CONTAINER schema in the context of political discourse including: (i) the container is presupposed to cover a given territory; (ii) those inside the container are presupposed to own the territory it covers; and (iii) the CONTAINER schema entails stability and permanence.

The CONTAINER schema affords two different perspectives: vantage-point-interior and vantage-point-exterior. That is, the cognisor can conceptualise themselves as either inside the container, at the deictic centre,



Figure 7.1 CONTAINER schema

looking outward or outside the container looking inward. The different perspectives have different consequences. Discourse on immigration and asylum, of course, relies upon and reinforces a vantage-point-interior perspective, which, for the text-consumer, means inclusion, ownership and protection from external threats.

It is the fact that the CONTAINER schema entails exclusivity which enables text-producers to use it in immigration discourse to realise referential strategies. That is, to distinguish social groups. De-spatialisation as a particular referential strategy defines social groups in terms of spatial division. The conceptual metaphor BRITAIN IS A CONTAINER, then, realises a de-spatialisation strategy. The entailment of exclusivity sets up a binary construal in which individuals are conceptualised as either 'insiders' or 'outsiders'. In other words, the CONTAINER schema can operate as a 'principle of division' (Chilton 1996: 147). It constructs an in-group versus an out-group defined metaphorically in terms of spatial boundaries. The self–other dichotomy may therefore be derived from representations of physical space as evidenced in grammatical and lexical items that have to do with spatial containment and those to do with movement in and out of a containing space.

The most obvious grammatical items that encode a containment construal are the prepositions *in, inside* and *into.*[5] *In* and *inside* indicate spatial containment in a static construal while *into* indicates movement in a dynamic construal from outside a containing space to inside it.

7.4.1. Prepositional prompts

Prepositions can be used to code for different scenes. Cognitive Linguistics suggests that the scenes coded by a particular preposition can be more or less prototypical (Brugman and Lakoff 1988; Lakoff 1987; Truggy 1993; Tyler and Evans 2003). The proto-scene is conceptually represented by an image schema, which constitutes the basic meaning of the preposition. Extended usages occur when an alternative scene is coded by a particular preposition because text-producers perceive some structural or functional commonality between it and the proto-scene, which they exploit for communicative purposes (Tyler and Evans 2003). Extended usages may recruit the proto-schema or elaborated versions of it derived through image schema transformations (Lakoff 1987).[6] On this account, meaning extension is conceptually motivated. But it is also pragmatically motivated. Novel situations will obviously have certain structural or functional commonalities with the proto-scenes coded by several prepositions.[7] Selecting one preposition over another therefore involves construal and may be strategic.

For example, text-producers could choose *on* instead of *in* which does not entail limited capacity.

According to Cognitive Linguistics, the mechanism by which extended uses of prepositions are produced is metaphor (Lakoff 1987). This is easy to observe when a spatial preposition is used to code for non-spatial scenes. It is less easy in cases where the preposition is used to code for spatial scenes. Here we may state that a usage is extended if it codes for a scene which has different structural properties to that of the proto-scene (Tyler and Evans 2003).

Spatial prepositions describing static situations serve to express the location of one entity (trajector) with respect to another (landmark). Spatial prepositions describing dynamic situations or events serve to express the direction in which one entity (trajector) moves relative to another (landmark). The prepositions *in* and *inside* occur with a form of *to be* in constructions describing static situations (scenes). The preposition *into* occurs with motion verbs in constructions describing dynamic situations or events (scenarios).[8] The image schema for *into* is therefore likely to undergo a transformation to include a representation of movement from outside the container to inside it.

In the proto-scene coded by prepositions *in/inside/into* the landmark has all the structural properties of the CONTAINER schema: an inside and an outside defined by a boundary. Scenes and scenarios coded by the constructions *in/inside/into Britain* have some structure in common with the proto-scene coded by the prepositions but are also structurally different. In common is the fact that Britain is a bounded LM. This probably provides the conceptual motivation for the metaphorical extension in the first place. As Charteris-Black states, 'Britain's geographical status as an island encourages perceptions of it as a container' (2006a: 575). While Britain may be a bounded LM, however, it is structurally different from the proto-scene insofar as it does not inherently possess the property of volume. Rather, it inherits this property in meaning construction. The extended usage of the prepositions in the constructions *in/inside/into Britain* imposes this structural property on text-consumers' conceptualisations of Britain during conceptual blending. Since image schemas are holistic, all the structural elements of containers are fused with the target domain when the schema is recruited in metaphorical meaning construction. Constructions involving a verb plus prepositions *in/inside* recruit the CONTAINER schema and prompt for metaphoric conceptualisations of Britain as some kind of non-specified container. When the prepositional phrase is *into Britain,* the verb at the head of the verb

phrase can specify what kind of container Britain is conceptualised as. Neutral verbs (e.g., *coming*) result in generic containers but other evaluative verbs result in specified containers.[9] The movement into Britain denoted by the construction 'VERBing into Britain' prompts for a dynamic construal in which ODCs move towards IDCs and thus realises a proximisation strategy, the effects of which are reinforced by the use of evaluative verbs.

Prepositions are not the only words which promote a conceptualisation of Britain as a container. Other vocabulary comes in the form of nouns, verbs and adjectives from encyclopaedic knowledge of containers or cognitive frames in which the CONTAINER schema is instantiated.

7.4.2. Lexical prompts

Part of one's image schematic knowledge of containers is that they possess the property of volume, as we have seen above. This further includes the fact that containers have a limited capacity. This information is recruited in the blending process so that Britain is conceptualised as having a limited capacity. Ideologically, the inference that arises in the blend immediately seems to justify a restrictive immigration policy. Lexical triggers of a containment construal, then, include 'full up' as in (1) which also makes explicit the inference that the country has a limited capacity:

(1) *The Express,* 8 Aug. 2006

[M]inisters may not have noticed but **Britain is full up** and massive inflows from alien cultures are leaving many people feeling like strangers in their own land.

In the blend behind (1), situation space$_2$ is structured by an IMMIGRATION frame and contains elements Britain and its population. Situation space$_1$ is structured by the CONTAINER schema and the counterpart elements of Britain and its population are a container and its contents. These counterpart elements are fused in the blended space giving rise to inferential structure, including the inference capitalised upon in (1) that Britain has a limited capacity. The blend is represented Figure 7.2.

A further inference encouraged by the construal of Britain as a container at its capacity is that continued immigration could cause the 'container' to 'rupture'. And again, this inference immediately justifies



Figure 7.2 BRITAIN AS CONTAINER blend

a restrictive immigration policy.[10] The country is therefore represented as at a critical point caused by an 'expanding' population within the 'container'. Consider (2):

(2) *The Observer,* 8 Dec. 2002

Britain is full to **bursting point**. The Government's own figures show that the UK has the highest levels of immigration in its history: in the last three years, over half a million was added to the UK population, and the **expansion** shows no signs of slowing.

In (1) and (2), the country itself is conceptualised as a generic container. Recall that the CONTAINER schema can be instantiated in specific cognitive frames and vocabulary from these frames is likely to trigger a containment construal. One culturally salient kind of container is buildings. A closely related metaphor, then, is one in which the country's infrastructure is construed as a building.[11] In the INFRASTRUCTURE AS BUILDING blend, public systems and services are represented as 'creaking' and about to 'collapse' caused by 'stress' or 'strain' on the 'building' from an 'overpacked' population. This metaphor thus constitutes

a topos of burden, where once more the construal calls for a restrictive immigration policy. Consider (3) and (4):

(3) *Sunday Times,* 29 Sept. 2002

[Continuing growth] will also add to the **stress** placed on the already **creaky** social services and physical infrastructure.

(4) *The Times,* 3 May 2002

Britain is already unbearably **overpacked** with people. Not only are public services **on the verge of collapse** from the massive demand, but...

The 'pressure' placed on the country's infrastructure from immigration is often reported as the source of social disruption, which is construed as an 'eruption' inside the 'container' and thus constitutes a topos of danger.[12] This topos is characterised by Wodak (2001b: 75) as follows: 'if too many immigrants or refugees enter the country, the native population will not be able to cope with the situation and become hostile to foreigners'. Ideologically, in this metaphor or argument scheme, the victims of discrimination are made responsible for the very prejudices directed against them (ibid.). Consider (5) for example:

(5) *The Sun,* 8 May 2003

Britain is **at breaking point** due to the rising tide of asylum-seekers, a damning report by MPs warns today... The report warns the situation is now so grave that 'social unrest' could **erupt** as the public's patience runs out.

Examples like (3)–(5) undermine the assumption of stability and permanency associated with containment and are likely to invoke feelings of uncertainty and insecurity. They may further achieve emotive effects where immigration is presented as threatening internal social mechanisms for group effectiveness.

The country itself can also be conceptualised as a building. However, it is often construed as a specific type of building. For example, (6) will trigger a construal of the country as a house:

(6) *The Sun,* 13 March 2000

We cannot go on playing open **house** to anyone who fancies a better life at our expense.

The HOUSE frame, as a specific instantiation of the CONTAINER schema, has also been shown to feature as a source domain in metaphorical discourse on immigration (Chilton 1994; Hart 2007, 2008). Since the HOUSE frame is an instantiation of the CONTAINER schema, this metaphor realises a referential strategy. Specifically, it realises a de-spatialisation strategy by distinguishing those who rightfully and permanently 'reside' in the 'house' from those who do not.[13] The HOUSE frame further contains the assumption that the house is a private property and therefore presupposes that 'residents' have the right to determine who they 'let in':

(7) *Sunday Times,* 27 March 2005

Peter Lilley, former Tory minister, says we have to be selective about who we **let in** if we are to benefit the economy.[14]

Further still, the HOUSE frame contains the cultural assumption that the house is a family home. The concept of home in particular is closely related to concepts of group membership (Chilton 1996). Schegloff (1972, reported in Chilton 1996: 268) points out that the use of the word 'home' in discourse is closely bound up with cultural assumptions about geography and expectations about who rightly 'belongs in' locations referred to. The lexical item 'home' may therefore realise referential strategies. Immigration discourse often describes Britain as 'our home' and suggests that immigrants and asylum-seekers should return to 'their home':

(8) *Independent on Sunday,* 9 Dec. 2001

[T]he Home Secretary says: 'We have norms of acceptability and those who come into **our home** – for that is what it is – should accept those norms.'

(9) *The Express,* 28 April 2003

An Immigration Service source said: 'Most were given temporary leave to stay in the UK while their claims were processed but the time has now come for **them** to go **back home**.'

Frames for domestic living space are, of course, culturally variable and, therefore, while the concept of container is present, the details may vary with consequences for inferential structure in metaphorical applications. If the country is represented as a house, then the activation of this construal in text-consumers and the precise conceptualisation that

they construct will be dependent on their starting conception of what a house is (ibid.). However, it is important to note that the concept of house has a default prototype image within a given culture. A number of assumptions, then, are probably present in the HOUSE frame for most UK text-consumers, including the assumptions that it is a private property and a family home. Adapted from Chilton (1996: 267) we present some of these in Table 7.1:

Given the structural elements of the HOUSE frame, (10) will also likely trigger a construal of the country as a house:

(10) *The Express,* 1 Sept. 2005

We report today that Labour's **open door** to immigrants has seen numbers in Britain soar by 1.2 million

Legal immigration is construed as a 'front door' entrance to Britain. Illegal immigration and the asylum system are construed as 'back door' entrances to Britain. Illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers are thus associated with deviousness and deceit. Consider:

(11) *The Guardian,* 12 June 2001

[I]t would be counter-intuitive if letting more people in the **front door** did not reduce the number trying to **sneak in the back**.

(12) *The Sun,* 20 Aug. 2003

If they have nothing to hide they should **come in** by the **front door**.

Table 7.1 HOUSE frame elements

Image schemas	container – exclusive inside-outside relations, centre-periphery structure, volume
Structural frame elements	walls external and internal private external entrance front and back foundations private yard, garden fence, gate security system
Additional scripts	shelter and security family home private ownership entrance/exit customs visiting and hospitality*

*When the term 'host' is used in xenophobic discourse to refer to country then it often functions as a biologism (Chilton 2005b). In the context of the HOUSE frame, however, it seems to be more related to hospitality.

Conceptualising Britain as a house has further ideological consequences that arise from the assumptions present in one's HOUSE frame. Since one would not normally leave their house doors wide open for just anyone to wander in, the inference that arises in the blend is that one should not leave the 'doors' of the country wide open allowing just anyone to enter. The metaphor therefore promotes the ideology that 'residents' of a country have the right to refuse entry to certain individuals by enforcing restrictive immigration policy. If one pursues the metaphor, implementing restrictive immigration policy can be construed within the blend as 'shutting the door'. Consider (13) for example, where the modal verb *must* presupposes the right to perform the proposed action:

(13) *The Express,* 24 Aug. 2006

Their numbers must be limited. The Government **must shut the door now**.

Examples like (9)–(13) give rise to a complex blend such as represented in Figure 7.3. In the blending network, situation space$_2$ is structured by



Figure 7.3 BRITAIN AS HOUSE blend

the IMMIGRATION frame and situation space$_1$ by the HOUSE frame. Britain and house are counterpart elements fused in the blended space. Policy is conceptualised as the walls of the container, which protects those inside it. An unrestrictive immigration policy is conceptualised as an open door and a restrictive immigration policy is conceptualised as a closed door. Crucially, emergent structure arises within the blend whereby policy makers have the right to refuse entry to certain individuals by implementing restrictive immigration policy, which is construed as closing the door.

The same sort of analysis can be applied when the protective boundary is conceptualised as a fence and policy is construed as an open or closed gate as in (14)–(15):

(14) *The Sun,* 29 Jan. 2006

Former official Steve Moxon first blew the whistle on the scandalous **open gates** immigration policy.

(15) *The Sun,* 23 Jan. 2003

The gates need closing now before there is a total shutdown of our welfare state.

A further inference that arises from the blended space is that since within the HOUSE frame an open door leaves one vulnerable to dangerous individuals entering, so an 'open-door immigration policy' leaves the nation liable to let in dangerous individuals. As Charteris-Black puts it, 'if immigrants can arrive illegally because the system is insufficient, dangerous terrorists can also arrive' (2006a: 574). This available inference is capitalised upon in (16):

(16) *The Express,* 23 April 2005

Labour laxity has meant that Britain has offered **an open door to terrorists**.

It is worth noting the metonymic link constructed between immigrants and asylum seekers on the one hand and terrorists on the other. Charteris-Black refers to this as a 'double metonymy' in which

> a particular example of an immigrant, 'the terrorist', represents a sub-category of immigrants – 'illegal immigrants' – that in turn represents the whole category of 'immigrants'. Because *some* immigrants are illegal immigrants and *some* illegal immigrants are terrorists, an

illogical link can be made between terrorists and *all* immigrants. (2006a: 574)

Metonymy, then, is the underlying construal operation responsible for social stereotypes. A stereotype occurs where one subtype of a category is selected to stand metonymically for a whole diverse category (Chilton 1996: 268). Ideological idealisations influence the particular metonymic selections that appear in discourse (ibid.). Charteris-Black (2006a) points out that the metonymy above might be motivated by the judgement/comparison construal of illegal immigrants and terrorists as members of the same superordinate 'criminal' category. This relationship of equivalence creates semantic contagion between the two categories 'immigrant' and 'terrorist'. And collocation as in (17) may further encourage this contagion:

(17) *Sunday Telegraph,* 8 May 2005

The decision to let them in without checks, which breaches the Immigration Act, left passengers fearful that the security lapse provided an open door to **terrorists, immigrants and asylum seekers**.

Similarly, since within the HOUSE frame an uninvited visitor is an intruder, if one pursues the metaphor, illegal immigrants can be construed as 'intruders'. The available inference is made explicit in (18):

(18) *The Sun,* 20 Sept. 2001

Giant X-ray scanners, sensors that detect heartbeats and thermal images are being used at ports across Britain to detect **intruders**.

References to immigrants as 'terrorists' or 'intruders' clearly carry negative connotations of threat and may therefore arouse emotional responses. They thus also realise a predicational strategy and constitute a topos of danger. Moreover, given the metonymic or connotative connection constructed between immigration and danger, examples like (19) and (20) may further realise a proximisation strategy where the prepositional phrases imply proximity as a function of frame-based knowledge:

(19) *Daily Mail,* 9 May 2003

For as long as these lenient conditions continue, large numbers of illegal immigrants will continue to arrive **on our doorstep**.

(20) *Sunday Times,* 8 Dec. 2002

Asylum seekers are still **at the gates**.

The CONTAINER schema may be emotionally linked (Chilton 2004). Certain emotions, which can be regarded as somehow basic, may be evoked by conceptualisations of one's country as a container. On the one hand, for example, a sense of security may be evoked but on the other hand, when that sense of security slides, feelings of fear may arise. This is especially pertinent when the country is construed as a house since this conceptualisation could evoke feelings of protectiveness towards one's family from external threats. Given the connection between immigration and threat, an unrestrictive immigration policy is seen as a security problem. The notion of security is particularly important because security from danger is a basic human need (Charteris-Black 2006a: 576).

Conceptualising one's country as a container means it can be sealed or penetrated. And a sealed container provides security for those inside while a penetrable container leaves those inside vulnerable and must therefore be sealed. Charteris-Black observes that in immigration discourse the country's 'walls' are 'represented as ideally strong and rigid but as under constant threat of perforation and rupture and therefore in need of continuous support and reinforcement' (2006a: 575). Within the BRITAIN AS HOUSE blend, the 'container' is 'sealed' by 'closing the door'. In the absence of structure from the HOUSE frame, the 'container' is 'sealed' by 'securing' the country's borders against immigration:

(21) *Independent on Sunday,* 2 June 2002

David Blunkett is to negotiate deals with a number of European countries for UK police and immigration officials to **secure the most vulnerable borders** against illegal immigrants.

According to Charteris-Black (2006a: 576), in this context 'the choice of the active transitive verb "secure" implies notions of security from an unspecified external threat and emotively equates immigration with invasion'.[15]

The nation rather than the country can also be construed as a container. Indeed, the CONTAINER schema is 'fundamental to the conceptualisations of groups of all sizes, from families to states' (Chilton 2004: 204). Here, the CONTAINER schema and its CENTRE-PERIPHERY structure are related to a PROXIMAL-DISTAL schema. PROXIMAL-DISTAL schema provides

the source domain in blends for both SOCIAL RELATIONS and SAMENESS.[16] Good relations and similarity are both represented in terms of proximity, while bad relations and difference are both represented in terms of distance. Now, when the BRITAIN AS CONTAINER blend interacts with the DIFFERENCE AS DISTANCE blend, then emergent structure arises in the blend of the blends such that the centre-periphery structure in the CONTAINER schema and the proximal-distal scale become fused. An inference that arises from this fusion is that those on the edge or outside of the container are conceptualised as different from those at the centre or on the inside. At the same time, 'by association through the multivalency of proximity ... relationships become similarity and according to this logic the most successful relationships will be with people who are similar to us' (Goatly 2007: 193). This complex interaction of conceptual blends, which justifies restrictive immigration policy through the topos of culture, is triggered by examples like (22):

(22) *Daily Telegraph,* 24 Aug. 2006

Not only are immigrants from **outside** Europe more likely to stay on here, but also some are from **distant cultures** that find integration more difficult.

Anti-immigration ideologies, or prejudices, then, include the view that the ideal nation contains people who are alike – by race, culture, language and shared values (Goatly 2007: 192). Different individuals entering the container thus constitute a threat to group identity conceptualised as closeness and thereby threaten to reduce group-effectiveness:

(23) *Sunday Telegraph,* 16 Nov. 2003

The government that talks only in terms of its 'economic benefits' of mass immigration is evading the real issue – which is whether several hundred thousand immigrants every year can be assimilated into British society without doing lasting, and irreparable, damage to the **fabric which holds it together**.

Conceptual associations with INSIDE-OUTSIDE and CENTRE-PERIPHERY may also realise predicational strategies where these structures correspond to a scale of morality and lawfulness. According to Chilton:

> morality and lawfulness can have a conceptual representation in spatial terms. According to this scale, what is close to self is also morally

good, and vice versa. Frequently also, such a scale is mapped onto a centre-periphery schema and container schema – what is inside is close to the self, and what is outside is also outside the law. (2004: 172)

7.5. Metaphors for Immigrants and Immigration

So far we have been concerned with metaphors for Britain. However, metaphors for Britain cohere with metaphors for immigrants and immigration. For example, in the BRITAIN AS HOUSE blend we have seen that immigrants can be construed as 'intruders'. Similarly, we have suggested that 'security' metaphors for Britain equate immigration with invasion. Critical metaphor studies of immigration discourse suggest the most conventionalised metaphors used to conceptualise immigrants and immigration recruit structure from two frames in particular: WAR and WATER (Charteris-Black 2006a; Chilton 2004; El Refaie 2001; Santa Ana 2002; Semino 2008).[17]

7.5.1. War metaphors

Text-producers sometimes employ a metaphorical strategy of militarisation and present immigration as an invasion and immigrants as invaders. In the INVASION OF IMMIGRANTS blend, represented in Figure 7.4, the WAR frame structures situation $space_1$ and the IMMIGRATION frame structures situation $space_2$. The demographic process of immigration in situation $space_2$ and the military act of invasion in situation $space_1$ are elements fused in the blended space to create a conceptualisation of immigration as invasion. Consider (24):

(24) *The Sun,* 17 May 2002

The invasion of Britain by illegal immigrants continues unabated.

This metaphor constitutes a topos of danger but it also realises a referential strategy, by setting up two opposing sides where one side enters the other side's territory.[18] The nominalisation in (24) codes immigrants as agents of invasion, namely an army as made explicit in (25):

(25) *Daily Mail,* 4 March 2003

The **army of asylum seekers** flooding into Britain every year would populate the city of Cambridge, it was admitted yesterday.[19]



Figure 7.4 INVASION OF IMMIGRANTS blend

Thus, elements 'immigrants' and 'army' are also fused in the blended space to create a conceptualisation of immigrants as invaders as in (26) or agents of other associated aggressive actions as in (27) and (28):

(26) *The Express,* 29 Jan. 2003

We're all set to take on Saddam but can't halt the **invaders to our shores**; Britain gives up fight on asylum [headline]

(27) *Sunday Mirror,* 9 Sept. 2001

A source close to the Home Secretary said: 'The current appalling situation cannot continue. We have **hundreds of people trying to storm the Channel Tunnel** or sneak on board a ferry on a nightly basis.'

(28) *The Express,* 17 Oct. 2002

Britain was braced for a fresh **onslaught of asylum-seekers** last night as smugglers exploit new routes into the country.

Such a construal, which, in constructing cognitive associations between immigrants and threat-connoting actions, constitutes a topos of danger, may clearly achieve emotive effects. The threat-connoting action of invasion is certainly one which would have posed a realistic

threat for coalitional groups in the EEA. As a result, these cognitive associations may evoke fears of loss of territory, for example, and elicit adapted, automatic decision rules. As El Refaie states, 'the logical consequence of regarding refugees as an invading army is to defend oneself and fight back' (2001: 365). Hence, Britain is conceptualised as locked in a 'battle' against immigration as in (29) and (30):

(29) *Daily Mail,* 14 Sept. 2002

As Britain **fights its own battle** to stem the influx of illegal immigrants there may be lessons here for Mr Blunkett.

(30) *Daily Mail,* 14 Dec. 2005

The committee was also told that officials in the **front line of the battle against illegal immigration** have to consider around 50 cases every day.

The equivalent in the IMMIGRATION frame of defending oneself and fighting back in the WAR frame is to implement a restrictive immigration policy. Furthermore, the metaphorical conceptualisation of Britain as locked in a battle against immigration has literal consequences for the nature of response warranted. Lakoff and Johnson state that 'we define our reality in terms of metaphors and then proceed to act on the basis of these metaphors' (1980: 158). The use of 'war' metaphors in immigration discourse, then, 'makes it conceivable to treat defenceless human beings as dangerous enemies and seems to justify a war-like reaction to them' (El Refaie 2001: 368). Consider (31) and (32):

(31) *The Times,* 10 Sept. 2001

It is the first duty of the Government, if necessary using Armed Forces, to **defend our country's borders**.

(32) *The Sun,* 11 April 2005

The Tories have pledged to set up a border control police force and have 24 hour security at ports to **combat** illegal migrants.

The 'battle' against immigration can further be seen as a 'battle' to 'defend' one's culture against its 'destruction' from immigration:

(33) *Mail on Sunday,* 19 Jan. 2003

The voters daily see the effects of illegal immigration in their communities... They begin to wonder if our rulers actively wish to

destroy the fabric and culture of this country by subjecting to a slow-motion invasion.

(34) *Daily Mail,* 10 Dec. 2001

'No one wants to be a racist but there is a world of difference between that and accepting there are differences between cultures and wanting to **defend your own culture**.' [quoting David Green, director of Civitas]

7.5.2. Water metaphors

Another set of metaphors that are often used as topoi of danger are 'water' metaphors. Water metaphors construe immigrants as water and immigration as the movement of water. They can be used to promote various inferences and with different degrees of intensity.

Intensity can be translated as 'metaphor power' (De Landtsheer and De Vrij 2004; De Landtsheer 2007). In metaphor power theory, De Landtsheer suggests that metaphor power increases in response to perceived crises.[20] She calculates metaphor power through a formula that multiplies frequency (F), conventionality (I) and content (D) to give a metaphor power coefficient or index (C). The F-value is a measure of frequency per 100 words. The I-value is weighed on a three-point conventional-novel scale where 1 is conventional, 2 is intermediate and 3 is novel. The D-value takes into account the semantic domain that structures the metaphor. Different semantic domains are assigned values on an emotive scale from 1–6 where 1–2 is least emotive, 3–4 intermediate and 5–6 most emotive. A number of problems with this formula for present purposes should be immediately apparent. For example, the F-value and the I-value seem to cancel one and other out, where conventionality is in part a function of frequency. We may therefore choose to disregard one or other of them. We are concerned with qualitative research and so can discount the F-value. The I-value is then assigned on the basis of native speaker intuition. However, in De Landtsheer's model, the I-value yields a higher metaphor power co-efficient for novel metaphors than conventional metaphors. This is in contrast to the position taken in Critical Metaphor Analysis, which holds that the power of metaphor lies partly in its covert nature. That is, conventional metaphors are more powerful than novel ones. We may therefore reverse the scale and assign higher values to conventional metaphors. Further problems concern the D-value. In the first place, and perhaps most significantly, is the fact that the criteria by which one can assess semantic domains on a scale of emotivity is not at all obvious. In the second

place, the 6-point scale seems to be reducible to a 3-point scale. And in the third place, the D-value applies across different domains. For our purposes, though, we want to apply the D-scale to lexical items in a single semantic domain, which seems to at least ease the first problem identified in assigning D-values.

When we adapt the metaphor power model in this way, we can calculate a metaphor power co-efficient as a function of content and conventionality on a 9-point scale as follows: C = D x I. Let us assume, for example, that *flood, flow* and *trickle* are all equally conventional tokens in immigration discourse. Each are therefore assigned an I-value of 3. It seems intuitive, for reasons which we will shortly explicate, to describe *flood* as more emotive than *flow* as more emotive than *trickle*. The following D-values are therefore assigned: *flood* (3), *flow* (2) and *trickle* (1). And this yields a metaphor power index as follows: *flood* (9), *flow* (6) and *trickle* (3).

The basic level of water metaphors in immigration discourse, then, construes immigration as the 'flow of water'. The verb *flow* often occurs in the construction 'VERB into Britain'. It thus coheres co-textually with the BRITAIN AS CONTAINER blend specifying Britain as a container of water. Take (35) for example:

(35) *The Sun,* 10 July 2000

Armed with little more than a passport and a ticket to Heathrow costing just over Pounds 200, his aim was to test the systems supposed to deal with the record numbers of migrants **flowing into Britain**.

The metaphors also cohere co-textually in composite noun phrases like (36):

(36) *The Express,* 17 Oct. 2002

The **flow of asylum seekers** teeming on to these shores via France has not yet been stemmed.[21]

The basic FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend is represented in Figure 7.5. Situation $space_1$ is structured by a WATER frame and situation $space_2$ by the IMMIGRATION frame. Situation $space_1$ contains elements 'water container', 'water' and 'flow' whose counterpart elements in situation $space_2$ are 'Britain', 'immigrants' and 'immigration'. The counterpart elements are fused in the blended space to produce a conceptualisation of Britain as a container



Figure 7.5 FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend

of water, into which immigrants are 'flowing'. The generic structure of this dynamic construal is captured where a trajector (b) is moving by a process (c) in a particular direction in relation to a landmark (a).

There are a number of ideological inferences made available by conceptualising immigrants as water. Most obviously, the metaphor implies that immigrants are inanimate and therefore do not have motives, intentions and volition. Rather, water metaphors in immigration discourse 'invite the reader to infer that the refugees are to be imagined as possessing some of the characteristics of water' (El Refaie 2001: 360). In other words, the metaphor dehumanises immigrants and asylum-seekers. It may thus be said to realise a referential strategy, dissimilation, where metaphorical strategies of naturalisation, including geologisation and biologisation, attribute qualities to immigrants and asylum seekers that distinguish them as essentially different from the in-group.

Another quality that may be recruited from the WATER frame is that water will continue to flow unless abated. The inference that arises in

the blend is that immigration will continue unless abated. The inference seems to be strongest in conceptualisations prompted by present progressive and composite noun phrase constructions as in (35) and (36) respectively. Recall that structure recruited from the concept of containment includes the fact that containers have a limited capacity. In the FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend, then, given the inference that immigration will naturally continue and the inference that Britain has a limited capacity, a further inference arises that Britain could 'overflow'. This inference, in turn, presupposes the conclusion that one should 'stem the flow', the counterpart of which in the blend is, of course, to enforce restrictive immigration policy. Elaboration of the blend, then, gives license to an inferential chain, the logical conclusion of which warrants a restrictive immigration policy. The conclusion is made explicit in (37):

(37) *The Express,* 23 April 2003

David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, has already accepted that Britain's status as Europe's most popular destination for asylum seekers means that radical measures need to be taken to **stem the flow.**

Another possible counterpart of enforcing a restrictive immigration policy within the FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend is to 'tighten' the boundary of the 'container' to prevent 'water' coming in:

(38) *The Observer,* 1 Oct. 2006

What is needed now is a proper **tightening up of our porous borders.**[22]

(39) *The Express*, 11 April 2006

'The Government must understand that care and attention to detail is a necessary part in achieving an effective and fair immigration system. It is long past time that the Government devised a law which deals with the problems of sham marriages in a **watertight** way.' [quoting Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis]

Other countries can also be conceptualised as containers of water, whence policy must be to prevent 'water' escaping from them into adjacent 'containers'. Consider (40):

(40) *The Independent,* 21 Jan. 2002

A team of senior British immigration officials has also been posted to Bosnia to set up controls at borders which are **leaking up to 50,000 illegal immigrants a year to Western Europe.**

Examples like (40) encode a vantage-point-exterior perspective. Thus, where self and other normally correspond to centre and periphery, the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema in this case is inverted so that centre relates to other's space and periphery is the perspective of self. According to Chilton, this gives rise to a dynamic spatial construal involving 'movement outward from a centre of a contained space in a threatening fashion for those (including self) who are outside the space' (2004: 146).

It is worth noting at this point that the FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend is not restricted in use to the genre of print news media. It is also used in the less negotiable genre of parliamentary discourse, through which bills are debated and legislation is devised. Metaphors, then, do not only provide concepts for policy communication but also policy creation (Charteris-Black 2006a: 571; Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 156). Consider the following excerpt from a parliamentary debate on asylum-seekers:

(41) *Hansard,* 29 Jan. 2002

We are aware of **a continuous stream of people** who often risk their lives and great hardship to get to this country across the channel from France ... People are conscious that **the flow has become one way**. Asylum seekers come from France to this country and they are not returned ... In all modesty, therefore, I make my proposal for the Government to renegotiate with France an agreement that will enable us to return to that country asylum seekers who arrive at our ports. People will welcome that essential step to **stem the unsustainable flow of immigrants** from the continent to this country. [Peter Lilley, Conservative MP for Hitchin and Harpenden]

Notice a further implication of 'flow', as well as 'stream', that is capitalised upon in (41). Water and streams flow in a uniquely forward direction and thus the notion of bi-directionality is not part of these metaphors (Charteris-Black 2006a: 571). The same can be said for 'flood' where once a flood subsides, it is by definition no longer a flood (ibid.). This is not the case for 'tide', however, which does imply the possibility of bi-directionality.

Further qualities that may be recruited from the WATER frame include the fact that 'water' is a mass noun rather than a count noun. In Cognitive Linguistic terms, the metaphor involves another particular construal operation which Croft and Cruse (2004) call 'individuation', for which the 'structural schematisation system' is responsible. Individuation, which includes whether or not entities are individuated, is 'manifested in the choice of a count noun, mass noun or pluralia tanta

form for nouns' (ibid.: 64). There is also a 'quantitative scalar adjustment' involved such that a mass noun encodes a more 'coarse-grained' construal than a count noun (ibid.). When this structure is projected into the blended space, the construal operation conceptualises immigrants as a single mass which masks their individuality and implies that immigration is a simple phenomenon whereby all cases can be treated in the same way (Hart 2008: 101).[23]

Another construal operation that the structural schematisation system is responsible for is that of 'scale'. Scale, primarily associated with properties of entities, imposes a scale schema which 'provides a gradable dimension to a domain' (Croft and Cruse 2004: 65). In the WATER frame, for example, lexical items related to the movement of water are conceptualised along a gradable antonymic scale something like (42):

(42) flood – pour – stream – flow – trickle – seep

The *argumentative* potential of this antonymic scale in communicating a process is that it implies the possibility of both increase and decrease (Charteris-Black 2006a: 571). Immigration is represented as having turned from a 'trickle' into something more but the metaphor also makes it conceivable to reduce immigration back to a 'trickle'. Consider (43) and (44):

(43) *Daily Mail,* 12 Feb. 2005

It is also worth pointing out that, despite Nazism, immigration to Britain in the Thirties was **a trickle** compared to the hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrant who have been **pouring into Britain** in recent years.[24]

(44) *The Independent,* 29 March 2001

I said that **a succession of immigration laws reduced immigration to a trickle**, but now they were calling themselves asylum-seekers numbers are going back up again. [quoting John Townend, Conservative MP]

The *ideological* potential of the antonymic scale lies in the fact that it affords choice in discourse. Text-producers can choose to represent immigration as a more or less excessive process and thereby achieve stronger or weaker emotive effects. The antonymic scale is organised according to intensity and can be said to correspond to a scale of emotivity when used metaphorically in relation to immigration. A 'trickle

of immigrants' is not seen as a problem but a 'flood of immigrants' in particular constitutes a threat-connoting cue.

When the demographic process of immigration is conceptualised as a flood, then the FLOOD OF IMMIGRANTS blend will have much of the same structure as the FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend. However, situation space$_1$ is structured by a more precise FLOOD frame and the counterpart element of 'immigration' is 'flooding'. This blend gives rise to a further set of inferences as a result of specific frame-based knowledge of floods. For example, 'flood' implies large quantities of water. When larger numbers of immigrants are involved (or implied), the description of immigrants 'seeping in' is replaced by the image of a 'flood' (El Refaie 2001: 361). The choice of 'flood', then, constitutes a topos of number, an argumentation scheme in which 'immigrants or refugees are typically said to come in large numbers, which results in the conclusion that immigration must be reduced or even stopped' (Wodak and Sedlak 2000: 233).

As with the FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend, the FLOOD OF IMMIGRANTS blend can be prompted by verb phrases and composite noun-phrases as in (45) and (46) but also by the compound noun 'floodgates'.

(45) *The Sun,* 21 May 2002

With illegal immigrants **flooding into Britain** this back door should have been bolted a long time ago.

(46) *Daily Mail,* 10 Feb. 2001

Tony Blair failed to win virtually any help from the French last night in the battle to stem **the flood of illegal immigrants** pouring into Britain.

The topos of number, recall, is used in conjunction with other topoi, for example danger, displacement and burden. Flood metaphors clearly constitute a topos of danger, where 'some of the negative emotional association of the concept evoked by 'flood' may also be projected onto asylum seekers and their arrival' (Semino 2008: 88). Frame-based knowledge of flooding, for example, includes the fact that it can cause lasting damage. It follows in the FLOOD OF IMMIGRANTS blend, therefore, that immigration can cause 'lasting damage'. The metaphor calls for restrictive immigration policy in order to reduce the potential 'damage'. Notice that only a conceptual blending analysis can account for this conclusion. 'Control' is not an element mapped from the FLOOD frame but is rather recruited from the IMMIGRATION frame.

The impact of the metaphor may be most significant when it interacts with other metaphors. For example, in the mixed metaphor of (45) the FLOOD OF IMMIGRANTS blend in the subordinate clause interacts cotextually with the BRITAIN AS HOUSE blend in the main clause. The interaction of these two metaphors produces a conceptualisation in which the process is of direct consequence for the text-consumer. In this sense, the metaphor may also be said to realise a spatial proximisation strategy. Charteris-Black (2006a: 570) further suggests that metaphors like those in (45) and (46) may have had a greater impact since 2001 when widespread flooding in Britain meant it became a much more familiar experience. The interaction with the INVASION OF IMMIGRANTS blend in (46) serves to reinforce the 'strength' of 'flooding water' and thus the effects it can have. One natural effect associated with flooding is erosion. The association allows immigration to be conceptualised as having 'erosive' effects, usually on culture and identity:

(47) *The Sun,* 22 May 2003

The undermanned, overstretched Customs and Immigration officials, along with the Chunnel operators, bear the brunt of the criticism for being unable to **stem the flood**. Whatever the Government does to address the long-standing threat to our sovereignty and **fast-eroding way of life**, I fear it will be too little, too late.

The topos of number may, moreover, prove the topos of displacement. The topos of displacement is manifested in water metaphors more generally where one can construe British culture and identity as well as immigrants as liquid. Crucially, though, the two elements are conceptualised as liquids of different kinds, therefore presupposing dissimilation. If sufficient quantities of immigrants 'pour into Britain' then British culture and identity may become 'diluted'. Consider (48):

(48) *The Times,* 31 March 2001

'I don't think there's any doubt that it (Anglo-Saxon culture) has been **diluted**.' [quoting Christopher Gill, Conservative MP]

Furthermore, the topos of number may prove the topos of burden. The topos of burden is manifested in water metaphors where the systems

and resources of the in-group are conceptualised as 'awash' with applicants as in (49) or as 'saturated' by asylum-seekers as in (50):

(49) *The Express,* 15 Nov. 2004

The asylum appeals system is **awash** with 22,000 cases of people whose original applications have been rejected.

(50) *Sunday Telegraph,* 2 Feb. 2002

'The council's services have been **saturated** by the number of people we are trying to support.' [quoting Neville Sanders, Conservative Leader of Peterborough City Council]

The last two metaphors we briefly mention in relation to the water theme are the WAVE OF IMMIGRANTS blend and TIDE OF IMMIGRANTS blend. They are closely connected as concepts to do with the sea and may both be motivated in the first place by the fact that most immigrants actually arrive by sea. El Refaie (2001: 359) claims 'the fact that the refugees actually came across the sea seems to have created a particularly strong sense of a 'natural' thematic link between people and water'. It is crucial to recognise, of course, that 'to characterise the movement of people as moving water might seem quite natural, but such a formulation of movement of people is not the only possible image that can be employed' (Santa Ana 2002: 72) and is therefore ideological.

In the WAVE OF IMMIGRANTS blend, situation $space_1$ is structured by a frame for waves. The counterpart element of 'immigration' is 'waves' such that in the blended space immigrants are conceptualised as coming in 'waves'. Hyperbolic representations of 'tidal waves' in particular realise predicational strategies in the topoi of number and danger. The WAVE OF IMMIGRANTS blend, though, has another important ideological dimension. Waves are recurring. They come one after the other. The metaphor may therefore realise a temporal proximisation strategy. Consider the following example in which the adverbial reinforces this strategic function:

(51) *Sunday Telegraph,* 25 Aug. 2002

Britain is facing a **nightly tidal wave of asylum seekers** from Cherbourg, France's second biggest port.

In the TIDE OF IMMIGRANTS blend, situation $space_1$ is structured by a frame for the tide and immigration is conceptualised as a 'rising tide'. Consider (52):

(52) *The Sun,* 23 April 2005

Mr Blair admitted more needs to be done to stop the **rising tide of illegal entrants**.

The TIDE OF IMMIGRANTS blend in particular has an important argumentative potential. Unlike all the other metaphors in the water theme, whereby movement is uni-directional, movement of the tide is bi-directional. Thus, the argumentative potential of the antonymic scale in (42) is that it implies the possibility of *decreasing* demographic processes. The argumentative potential of the TIDE OF IMMIGRANTS blend, however, is that it implies the possibility of *reversing* demographic processes. In other words, where the FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS, FLOOD OF IMMIGRANTS and WAVE OF IMMIGRANTS blends are used to justify restrictive immigration policy, the TIDE OF IMMIGRANTS blend can be used to present a repatriation policy in acceptable terms. Charteris-Black (2006a: 571) states that:

> Conceptually, since high and low tides constitute part of our knowledge of a natural process, they are politically persuasive in representing as legitimate highly controversial policies such as repatriation.

The available inference is not made explicit in our corpus of print news media. However, as Hart (2007) shows, it is a theme capitalised upon in the extreme right-wing discourse of the British National Party. Consider, for example, (53), taken from the British National Party general election manifesto of 2005:

(53) *BNP manifesto* 2005, paragraph 14

We will do what is required and we have firm plans as regard our policy on ending illegal immigration, and **reversing the tide of immigration** in the longer term.

What is further worth noting is the fact that 'reversing the tide' by human action is not a possibility within an individual's ordinary conceptual frame for the tide, a naturally occurring phenomenon controlled by gravitational and centrifugal forces (Hart 2007: 114). The property of agency, in the form of implementing repatriation policy, is recruited

from the frame for immigration. Crucially, emergent structure of this kind is only possible though the juxtaposition of two input spaces and cannot be accounted for by the cross-domain mapping advocated in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (ibid.).

7.6. Summary

In this chapter, we have pointed towards the importance of metaphor for CDA and presented a method for identifying metaphor in a corpus of discourse. We have disclosed the ideological and argumentative potentials of particular metaphors, focussing on metaphors for Britain which recruit the CONTAINER schema and metaphors for immigrants and immigration which recruit cognitive frames for war and water. We have shown that metaphors within these themes may realise referential strategies of de-spatialisation and dissimilation and predicational strategies functioning as topoi of number and burden but of danger in particular. In the following chapter, we consider two further semantic categories: force-dynamics and epistemic modality.

8
Force-Dynamics and Epistemic Modality

8.1. Introduction

In Chapter 7 we examined metaphor as a judgement/comparison construal operation. We saw how situations, events and the entities, actions and processes involved can be conceptualised metaphorically. In this chapter, we explore another construal operation, force-dynamics, which Croft and Cruse (2004) categorise as a 'constitutive' construal operation.[1] By 'constitutive' it is meant that these construal operations 'represent the most basic level of constituting experience and giving it structure or a Gestalt' (Croft and Cruse 2004: 63). Constitutive construal operations, then, superimpose holistic structure in the form of image schemas on complex situations and events.

Force-dynamics refers to how entities interact with respect to force. It accounts for cause and effect relations in terms of pressure and motion (Talmy 2000: 409). Force interactions include the exertion of force, resistance to force, the overcoming of such resistance, blockage of the expression of force and the removal of such blockage (ibid.). However, force-dynamics is not restricted to conceptualising physical interactions. It may also constitute the basis of our conceptualisation of social and legal interactions. Moreover, it may constitute conceptualisations of linguistic interactions, where propositions themselves and aspects of speech events in which they are communicated are subject to conceptualisation and thus metaphorical force-dynamic construals. Talmy, for example, recognises that force-dynamics 'functions extensively in the domain of discourse' (2000: 452). Force-dynamics, then, plays a constitutive role across a range of language levels, including representation and legitimisation. At each of these levels, force-dynamic construals are expressed by closed-class as well as open-class elements.

At the level of representation, for example, force-dynamic construals are expressed by subsets of conjunctions and prepositions as well as nouns and verbs. At the level of legitimisation, it is claimed in Cognitive Linguistics that force-dynamics constitutes the conceptual basis of epistemic modality (Johnson 1987; Langacker 1991; Sweetser 1990; Talmy 1988, 2000). Epistemic modality a semantic category which we suggested in Chapter 5 is used in displays of external coherence. Force-dynamic construals are therefore expressed by the grammatical category of modal verbs, which is taken as the most central signifier of this semantic category, as well as other epistemic modal markers in the form of adjectives, verbs and adverbs.

8.2. Force-Dynamics

The 'force-dynamic system' is responsible for force-dynamic conceptualisations. Unlike other image schemas, the schemas imposed by the force-dynamic system do not arise from perception but emerge from kinaesthesia (experience of muscular effort and motion) and somesthesia (experience of pressure). On the embodied basis of force schemas Johnson (1987: 13) states:

> We begin to grasp the meaning of physical force from the day we are born (or even before). We have bodies that are acted upon by 'external' and 'internal' forces such as gravity, light, heat, wind, bodily processes, and the obtrusion of other physical objects. Such interactions constitute our first encounters with forces, and they reveal patterned recurring relations between ourselves and our environment.

Let us illustrate a force-dynamic conceptualisation by comparing (1) and (2):

> (1) *The Mirror,* 10 May 2002
>
> It's estimated that between 1,000 and 1,200 asylum seekers are coming into the country every month.
>
> (2) *Sunday Telegraph,* 28 July 2002
>
> As asylum-seekers **continue to** arrive in Britain at the rate of 1,500 a week, the number of camps may eventually rise to 20.

(1) encodes a construal of the situation as force-dynamically neutral. The use of 'continue to' in (2), however, encodes one of two possible

force-dynamic construals. Either asylum-seekers have an intrinsic force tendency towards rest but keep coming *because* they are compelled towards motion by some implicit force or they have an intrinsic tendency towards motion and keep coming *despite* some implicit resistance. The latter construal is the one expressed in (3):

(3) *Daily Telegraph,* 8 Oct. 2002

But after watching asylum numbers **continue to** rise **despite** a raft of reforms, Mr Blunkett yesterday resurrected the idea ...

Examples like (3) construe situations as a 'steady-state opposition' of two force-interacting entities. Force-interacting entities are referred to in Talmy's terminology as 'Agonist' (Ago) and 'Antagonist' (Ant).[2] The Agonist is defined as 'the entity whose circumstance is at issue' (Talmy 2000: 415) and is subject to force interactions of various kinds with the Antagonist.[3] Agonists have an 'intrinsic force tendency' towards action (including motion) or rest. Depending on the relative perceived strengths of the Agonist and the Antagonist, the Agonist is represented as either realising its intrinsic force tendency or not in a 'resultant of force interaction'. Talmy uses the diagrammatic notation below to represent the various elements of force-dynamics (Figure 8.1).[4]

There are four possible steady-state patterns, two of which are of a 'causative' type (a,d) and two of which are of a 'despite' type (b,c). These are shown in Figure 8.2.



Figure 8.1 Elements of force-dynamics



Figure 8.2 Basic steady-state force-dynamic patterns

Of these four, the one that is most typical of immigration discourse is the 'despite' type represented in Figure 8.2 (c) and expressed in (3). In (3), asylum-seekers are encoded as the Agonist and legal reforms as the Antagonist. Asylum-seekers are the stronger entity whose intrinsic force tendency towards action is realised in spite of the resistance provided by the legal reforms.

There are several strategic and ideological consequences of force-dynamic construals such as expressed by (3) compared to the force-dynamically neutral construal expressed by (1). First, force-dynamic patterns draw attention to the interrelational or interactional nature of Agonist versus Antagonist (Oakley 2005). And the duality of Agonist versus Antagonist realises a referential strategy. Secondly, a force-dynamic construal immediately invokes a 'struggle' between the two opposing entities. There may therefore also be 'an ideological dimension in the text-producer's decision as to which participant a role is assigned' (Wolf and Polzenhagen 2003: 265). It is here that force-dynamics can be related to Halliday's theory of transitivity (ibid.). For example, Croft and Cruse state that 'different choices of verbs, or different voice forms, or different argument-linking constructions, express different conceptualisations of the force-dynamic structure of the event' (2004: 66). Casting immigrants and asylum-seekers in the role of Agonist in situations and events whose resultant of force interaction is one of action encodes them as agents of forceful actions and thus serves a predicational strategy.[5] And thirdly, when the Antagonist is construed as a resisting force that is overcome by the stronger Agonist, the image invoked is one of a

protective barrier being penetrated (Oakley 2005) thus effecting a proximisation strategy. The force-dynamic system encodes construal, then, through the imposition of force-dynamic schemas, the choice of one force schema over another and the assignment of participants in the situation or event to particular roles within the force-interaction.

As (3) shows, force-dynamic concepts underlie certain closed-class grammatical items. When the Agonist appears as the subject, the role of a weaker Antagonist can be expressed by the preposition *despite* as in (3) or the conjunction *(al)though*. The role of the Antagonist as the stronger entity can be expressed by the conjunction *because* as in (4) or the prepositional expression *because of*.

(4) *The Express,* 6 Nov. 2002

Critics believe they [refugees] will **continue to** attempt the journey even now, **because** they are desperate to enter the UK.

In (4), refugees are encoded as the Agonist with an intrinsic tendency towards rest but compelled towards action by a stronger psychological 'pressure', their desperation to enter the UK. The image-schematic construal for (4) is represented in Figure 8.2 (a). Force-dynamic opposition in general can be expressed by the preposition *against* as in (5).

(5) *The Express,* 13 April 2006

Gibraltar is standing firm **against** tide of immigrants [headline]

Talmy points out that perhaps the form most indicative of a force-dynamic construal is *keep* as in (6). Technically, *keep* is not a closed-class form but because of its frequency and basicness Talmy assigns it the status of 'honorary' auxiliary (2000: 417). 'Continue to' in (2)–(4) works in the same way. Certainly, the same force-dynamic indication can be seen in forms which are categorically closed-class. For example, the verb satellite *on* in (6) and the adverbial particle *still* in (7).

(6) *Daily Mail,* 11 Nov. 2002

Calais crisis as asylum seekers **keep on** coming

(7) *Daily Mail,* 1 March 2003

And from Calais, of course, they [asylum seekers] are **still** coming.

Force-dynamic concepts also underlie a number of open-class lexical items. There are obviously too many of these to list. However, the

nouns *fight* and *battle,* for example, which often occur with the collocate *against immigration,* both indicate a force-dynamic interaction. Verbs like *stem, stop* and *secure* suggest a force-dynamic interaction in which the role of the Antagonist is profiled. Verbs like *penetrate* and *infiltrate* similarly suggest a force-dynamic interaction but one in which the role of the Agonist is profiled.

Recall that in Chapter 7 we described *coming* in the construction 'VERBing into Britain' as ideologically neutral compared to, say, *flooding*. When *coming* occurs with a force-dynamic indicator, however, it becomes less neutral. We are now also in a position to say why *getting* in the same construction is not as ideologically innocuous as it first looks. The verb *getting* encodes a force-dynamic construal. It implies the presence of a physical or legal barrier (Ant) which immigrants and asylum-seekers (Ago) are able to penetrate or circumvent. Consider (8) and (9):

(8) *Daily Telegraph,* 21 May 2000

Downing Street acknowledged that illegal immigration was an issue because of growing frustrations over the stream of people **getting into Britain** from France through the Channel tunnel.

(9) *Sunday Times*, 4 Sept. 2005

Illegal immigrants are **getting into Britain** by enrolling on university degrees, obtaining visas to stay for the length of their courses and then failing to turn up to study.

In addition to the four steady-state patterns, Talmy (2000) identifies a number of shifting force-dynamic patterns. These include those that involve a shift in state of impingement and those that involve a shift in balance of strength. Of those that involve a shift in state of impingement, the most recognisable patterns encode a stronger Antagonist as the subject. The four that Talmy identifies are represented in Figure 8.3, where (e) and (f) are of an 'onset causation' type and (g) and (h) are of an 'onset letting' type.

Of the four shift in state of impingement patterns, the one that is most typical of immigration discourse is represented in Figure 8.3 (g) and expressed in (10):

(10) *The Express,* 26 July 2001

Meanwhile, experts predict an Appeal Court ruling will **let** hundreds more people into Britain.



Figure 8.3 Shift in state of impingement patterns

The schema in Figure 8.3 (g) involves a stronger Antagonist previously in position against an Agonist preventing it from realising its intrinsic tendency towards motion then leaving this state of impingement and thus allowing the Agonist to realise its intrinsic tendency. The representation in (10) implies that the law (stronger Ant) previously prevented people (Ago) from coming into Britain, but a change in precedent (shift in state of impingement) will now allow people into Britain. The shift in state of impingement schema in Figure 8.3 (g) is the one underlying the prototypical concept of permission, which seems to be integral to immigration discourse.

The converse of (10) is (11) which expresses the construal represented in Figure 8.3 (f). This schema involves a stronger Antagonist coming into position against an Agonist with an intrinsic force tendency towards motion thereby causing it to come to rest. The representation in (11) is of the law (stronger Ant) being 'tightened' (shift in state of impingement) to stop asylum claims (Ago).

(11) *The Independent,* 14 Jan. 2000

It [the Home Office] says the law has been tightened to **prevent** bogus asylum claims.

A further shift in state of impingement involves an Agonist and Antagonist continuing in mutual impingement until a shift in balance

of strength yields a resultant force of interaction. Again, there are four patterns that correspond to those in Figure 8.3, except rather than the Antagonist leaving or entering a state of impingement, the Antagonist remains in place and the shift is in its strength, such that the Agonist either realises its intrinsic tendency or is prevented from doing so. The lexical item *overpowered* in (12) represents a shift in balance of strength:

(12) *The Mirror,* 3 Sept. 2001

Up to 140 asylum seekers **overpowered** security guards at the tunnel's entrance and swarmed on to the tracks as trains passed by dangerously close.

Here, asylum-seekers (Ago) and security guards (Ant) exist in a state of mutual impingement with asylum-seekers having an intrinsic tendency towards motion but security guards being the stronger entity. However, there is a momentary shift in balance of strength such that asylum-seekers become the relatively stronger entity and are able to realise their intrinsic force tendency. The image-schematic construal of (12) is represented in Figure 8.4, where the arrow indicates the shift in relatively greater strength from Antagonist to Agonist.

The final pattern worth discussing in relation to immigration discourse is a secondary steady-state pattern that again has to do with permission. In contrast to the 'onset letting' pattern in Figure 8.3 (g), though, this 'extended letting' pattern involves a steadily disengaged Antagonist. The schema is represented in Figure 8.5 and is constitutive of the presupposition in (13) that we are currently letting asylum-seekers into our country.

(13) *The Sun,* 5 March 2003

We **can't keep letting** asylum seekers into our country when our own population is struggling to make ends meet.



Figure 8.4 Shift in balance of strength pattern in 'overpower'



Figure 8.5 Secondary steady-state pattern of 'extended letting'

From Figures 8.3 and 8.5 it is possible to characterise the concept of permission in force-dynamic terms as involving non-impingement.[6] Figure 8.3 (g) represents the cessation of impingement while Figure 8.5 represents its non-occurrence (Talmy 2000: 420). What is interesting about Figure 8.5 and the reason it is referred to as a 'secondary' steady-state pattern is that it implies a *potential* state of impingement not currently realised. That is, it must be considered as conceptually derived from the negation of Figure 8.2 (d). A force-dynamic construal inherently involves an Agonist and an Antagonist engaged in a force interaction. Any reference (explicit or implicit) to an Antagonist not so engaged presupposes its potential to be so engaged. Hence, (13) also presupposes the potential for the event schematised in Figure 8.3 (f) resulting in the state of affairs schematised in Figure 8.2 (d).

So far, we have seen that force-dynamics features in language at the level of representation. As we said at the beginning of this chapter, though, force-dynamics may constitute, via metaphorical projection, the conceptual basis of epistemic modality. We suggested in Chapter 5 that epistemic modality as well as evidentiality is involved in legitimising strategies. Force-dynamics, then, also features in discourse at the level of legitimisation.

8.3. Epistemic Modality

Epistemic modality concerns the commitment text-producers make towards the truth and probability of the propositions they communicate, where 'truth' is conceived as one hundred per cent probability or certainty (Lyons 1977; Palmer 1986). In contrast to formal philosophical and semantic traditions, truth is not understood in any objective sense but as a psychological state. It is truth as believed by the communicator, or at least as intended to be recognised as believed by the communicator. Speakers do not communicate categorical truths but claims

to categorical truth. In expressing stronger epistemic commitment the speaker is

> claiming that his belief in the truth of P is well-grounded and in his judgement at least unassailable, and that by virtue of this fact, which he should be able to substantiate, if called upon to do so, by providing the evidence, he has the right to assert P and to authorize others to subscribe to its truth. (Lyons 1977: 794)

To illustrate the category, consider the difference between (14) and (15), where in (14) the speaker makes a much stronger epistemic commitment than in (15). The cognitive-factive verb in (14) actually presupposes the truth of its proposition. It commits the speaker to the belief that P is true in a way that the non-factive in (15) obviously does not (Lyons 1977: 794).

(14) *The Daily Telegraph*, 6 Jan. 2003

Almost 110,000 asylum seekers are **known** to have entered Britain over the past 10 years.

(15) *Daily Mail,* 20 Nov. 2000

1.5 million illegal immigrants are **thought** to have entered Britain in the past 30 years.

Fowler (1985: 72) divides epistemic modality into two subordinate categories: validity and predictability. In the first, speakers express 'greater or lesser confidence in the truth of the proposition' and in the second, future events are expressed as 'more or less likely to happen'. Epistemic modality, then, is a matter of degree. It can be represented along a scale as in Figure 8.6 and assessed in relation to three reference points reflected in the modal adverbs *certainly, probably* and *possibly.*

The epistemic scale may be conceptualised metaphorically in terms of deictic distance, structured by the PROXIMITY-DISTANCE schema (Chilton 2004: 57–61; Frawley 1992: 412–15; Langacker 1991: 240–49). In this model, the individual's notion of what is CERTAIN or known



Figure 8.6 Epistemic scale

reality is conceptualised at the deictic centre. Notions of what is POSSIBLE or PROBABLE are conceptualised in terms of remoteness, at locations relative to deictic centre. Evidence for such a cognitive model comes from polysemy in prepositions which literally express distance as found, for example, in phrases such as 'close to certain' and 'far from certain'.

Epistemic modality concerns where on the epistemic scale, how close to deictic centre, text-producers place propositions. According to Langacker, modal expressions 'can be described as contrasting with one another because they situate the process [described in the predication] at varying distances from the speaker's position at immediate known reality' (1991: 246). Epistemic modality thus involves an explicit evaluation on the text-producer's part. The three points indicated on the scale in Figure 8.6 are *cardinal* points. Speakers can express evaluations at intermediate locations, qualified, for example, by prepositions or adverbs like 'almost' and 'nearly' as in (16) which seem to be connected with concepts of reaching some point.

(16) *Daily Telegraph,* 3 Feb. 2005

It is, however, **almost certain** that the vast majority of those whose asylum applications are rejected are not deported.

Although we do not normally quantify epistemic modality by means of any absolute value in natural discourse, it seems reasonable to suggest that text-consumers, in processing text, will 'situate' propositions on the epistemic scale according to relative, topological 'coordinates' indexed in text (Chilton 2004: 60–1). These coordinates are indexed by the same linguistic expressions that Fauconnier describes as space-builders (ibid.).

Epistemic modal markers, then, prompt for the construction of modal spaces which are partially structured by the cognitive model in Figure 8.6. The modal space is assigned an epistemic value which corresponds with where on the epistemic scale the text-consumer places the proposition.

It is not the case that text-consumers have to locate propositions at the same points as indexed in text; only that they may do so if they believe that the felicity conditions for assertions have been met. For example, if they have reason to believe that the epistemic evaluation is based on evidence or if they attach some authority to the source of the assertion. In epistemic modality itself, of course, text-producers imply evidence and lay claim to authority.

8.3.1. Evaluation

Epistemic modality, then, is a semantic category in which speakers communicate their assessment of the validity or predictability of propositions. Epistemic modal markers are the expression of these assessments. An epistemic assessment, however, is only one kind which text-producers can make of a proposition. One can also take an affective standpoint, for example. Epistemic modality therefore belongs to some superordinate discursive practice within the interpersonal metafunction. There has been considerable discussion surrounding some such notion which appeals to terms including 'stance' and 'evaluation' (Bednarek 2006b; Biber and Finegan 1989; Bybee and Fleischman 1995; Hunston and Thompson 2000). Here, 'evaluation' is understood as a discourse practice by means of which the speaker or writer expresses their 'attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions he or she is talking about' (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 5). The two main types of evaluation are 'epistemic' and 'attitudinal' (Conrad and Biber 2000). These can be characterised as 'proposition-focussed' and 'entity-focussed' respectively (Martin and White 2007: 39). Epistemic evaluation is indicated in epistemic modality. Attitudinal evaluation is equivalent to Martin's *appraisal*, which is further schematised as a system of resources for the expression of emotive (*affect*), moral (*judgement*) and aesthetic (*appreciation*) evaluation (Martin 2000; Martin and White 2007).[7]

Epistemic modality, then, is not part of any actual proposition but, rather, communicates the text-producer's evaluation of the proposition. Anderson and Fretheim (2000: 3) highlight the distinction between 'communicated propositional content on the one hand and communicated attitudes to that content on the other, the idea being that in interactive discourse we not only express propositions, we also express different attitudes to them'. Palmer (2003: 5) also argues that modality 'does not relate directly to the event or situation, but to the status of the proposition that describes the event or situation'. Although indicated in text, then, epistemic modality is more a matter of participation in the discourse event than text itself. For Werth, epistemic modality belongs to a 'category of interaction: the interaction between the participants and what is said' (1999: 176). That is, epistemic modality 'has to do with the relationship between the speakers and the text' (ibid.). It therefore follows that within Systemic Functional Grammar epistemic modality should be situated in the interpersonal metafunction, independently of the ideational or textual function (Halliday 1994: xiii; 2002: 200). The very nature of modality such that it lies outside the proposition



Figure 8.7 Mental spaces and strategies in discourse

itself necessarily locates it within the interpersonal metafunction. Correspondingly, in the model of strategic communication presented here, epistemic modality is said to operate at the level of legitimisation rather than representation. Its role in discourse is not to represent situations and events but to endorse representations of situations and events by providing external coherence to claims through epistemic commitment based on evidence and authority.

While the elements conceptualised inside situation or event spaces, then, are the entities, actions and process that make up the situation or event being described, and the elements conceptualised inside time and place spaces are the times and locations in which the situation or event occurs, the elements conceptualised inside modal spaces belong to the speech event itself. As represented in Figure 8.7, elements conceptualised inside modal spaces are the authority of the speaker, the evidence they provide for their assertions, and the epistemic commitment they make towards them. Situation/event spaces and time/place spaces are thus constructed at the level of representation, while modal spaces operate at the level of legitimisation.

8.3.2. Authority

According to Fowler, the significance of modality is that it 'suggests the presence of an individual subjectivity behind the printed text, who is qualified with the knowledge required to pass judgement' (1991: 64). Judgements of validity and predictability, then, 'are an important part of the practices by means of which claims to authority are articulated and legitimated authority is expressed' (Fowler 1985: 73). In judgements of predictability, for example, the choice of epistemic 'will' especially includes a claim to know what is inevitably going to happen (Fowler 1991: 64). Fairclough (1989: 107) states that it is this claim to authority,



Figure 8.8 Levels of authority on the epistemic scale

expressed in modal forms, which makes epistemic modality significant for CDA.

Werth argues that 'the truth or probability which we loosely attribute to a proposition has actually to be assessed relative to certain properties of the context it is in' (1999: 135). One such property is the authority of the text-producer (ibid.). Authority here is not to be understood in any absolute sense but rather as 'authoritativeness with respect to the topic at hand' (ibid.). Authority is also scalar and is associated with different degrees of epistemic modality. Levels of authority can therefore be represented along the epistemic scale as in Figure 8.8 (adapted from Werth 1999: 135).

The greater the authority of the speaker, then the stronger the epistemic evaluation they are licensed to make. At the same time, however, the stronger the epistemic commitment the text-producer gives, the greater the authority they claim and the more reliable their assertions therefore appear.

Epistemic modality, then, is one semantic category that can be used by text-producers to legitimise assertions and overcome the operation of text-consumers' logico-rhetorical module. It provides external coherence to claims through epistemic commitment and constructions of authority. Evidentiality, as we argued in Chapter 5, is another such category. Evidentiality provides external coherence to claims by acknowledging, as evidence for their truth, the basis on which they are known, including the statements and beliefs of alternative sources expected to be accepted as authoritative.

8.3.3. Epistemic modality versus evidentiality

Evidentiality and epistemic modality are intimately intertwined and some researchers treat one as a sub-category of the other.[8] From this point of view, most researchers have maintained that epistemic modality is the superordinate category and evidentiality is analysed as an expression of epistemic modality (e.g., Palmer 1986). However, some researchers have taken epistemic modality to be a form of evidentiality

(e.g., Chafe 1986). A further position, and the one which we will take here, is that while evidentiality and epistemic modality are obviously inter-linked (as expressions of legitimisation) they are nevertheless distinct semantic categories (de Haan 1999; Nuyts 2001). Nuyts (2001: 27) emphatically states that

> evidentiality concerns the speaker's indication of the nature (the type and quality) of the evidence invoked for (assuming the existence of) the state of affairs expressed in the utterance. This does not involve any explicit evaluation in terms of the state of affairs being true or not.

The distinction between them, then, can be captured where epistemic modality expresses an evaluation pertaining to the truth or probability of a proposition and evidentiality concerns the basis upon which that evaluation is made. The connection between them, though, is obvious. Depending on the basis of knowledge or source of information, one can be more or less confident in and committed to its truth or probability. As Chafe puts it: 'mode of knowing implies something about reliability' (1986: 266). Consequently, 'the nature of the speaker's evidence will thus no doubt also codetermine the outcome of his/her epistemic evaluation of a state of affairs' (Nuyts 2001: 27). Givón (2001: 326) expresses the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality as follows:

> Rather than pertaining directly to subjective certainty, ... evidential systems code first and foremost the *source* of the evidence to back up an assertion, and only then implicitly, its *strength*. It is that implicit connection that, in turn, links evidentiality to subjective certainty.

Degrees of evidentiality, then, can be seen to correspond roughly with degrees of epistemic modality, as represented in Figure 8.9 (adapted from Werth 1999: 134).[9]

From the text-consumer's point of view, evidential markers suggest or imply a certain degree of probability. But by the same token, epistemic markers imply that the evaluation is based on evidence that the text-producer has available to them, even if it is not explicitly acknowledged. Coates (1983: 41), for example, observes that 'epistemic MUST conveys the speaker's confidence in the truth of what he is saying, based on a deduction from facts known to him (which may or may not be specified)'.



Figure 8.9 Evidentiality on the epistemic scale

Epistemic modality serves a legitimising strategy where, according to Mushin (2001: 58), speakers are motivated to adopt a particular epistemic stance 'partially on the basis of their source of information, but also on the basis of their rhetorical intentions, on how they want their utterance to be understood and treated in the moment of interaction'. Text-producers, of course, wish for their assertions to be regarded by text-consumers as true and reliable.

There has been much discussion in semantics surrounding the notion of subjectivity in relation to evidentiality and epistemic modality (Langacker 1991; Lyons 1977; Nuyts 2001; Traugott 1989). Each researcher offers a slightly different treatment of subjectivity, although they are obviously all related to some extent. We too treat subjectivity in a particular way, in relation to legitimisation in CDA. Evidentiality and epistemic modality may be said to serve two different legitimising strategies: 'objectification' and 'subjectification' respectively.[10] Of course, the two are intimately inter-related and co-occur in text to co-construct legitimisation. Both are intended to elicit an epistemic evaluation in the text-consumer and therefore fall within the interpersonal metafunction, but only epistemic modality involves an explicit evaluation on the text-producer's part. Objectification involves the text-producer qualifying the probability of a proposition with recourse to sources of information or bases of knowledge independent of themselves. In effect, objectification involves the text-producer 'standing back' from the assertion and allowing the evidence they present to 'speak for itself'. By contrast, subjectification involves the text-producer qualifying the probability of a proposition relying on their own claim to authority and their own experience. Subjectification, then, profiles the text-producer's role in weighing up the probability of propositions. It presents text-producers themselves as qualified appraisers and is much more a matter of text-consumer's confidence in the individual or institution. Both are bound with concepts of authority, but while in evidentiality, specifically source-tagging, text-producers consult an objective authority, in epistemic modality text-producers construct themselves as an authority.

8.4. Epistemic Modal Markers

Fowler (1985: 73) points out that 'modality is signified in a range of linguistic forms'. These modal space-builders include cognitive verbs, modal adjectives and adverbs, and, paradoxically, zero-marked modality. Epistemic modality, however, is most obviously manifested in the closed-class grammatical category of modal verbs (Fowler 1985: 73; Richardson 2007: 59).

Modal verbs are a closed-class category of auxiliary verbs. However, they do more than just modify the main verb; they contribute to the 'strength' of the communicated proposition. Epistemic modal verbs include *could, can, may, might, should, must, ought* and *will*.[11] Let us focus on *could, may, must* and *will* since these are the ones used more commonly in everyday discourse and in discourse on immigration and asylum too.

In their epistemic senses, *could* and *may* are roughly synonymous in expressing possibility. Consider the following expressions of validity and predictability involving *could*:

(17) *Daily Mail,* 7 Feb. 2002

Investigators believe as many as 400,000 illegal immigrants **could** be reaching the UK each year.

(18) *Sunday Times,* 20 Feb. 2000

As many as 40,000 asylum seekers **could** have disappeared in Britain because of faulty computer systems, immigration staff said.

(19) *The Express,* 7 April 2006

What this means, in effect, is that countless numbers of jobless immigrants **could** come to this country and be given a house.

Semantically, *could* places propositions with POSSIBLE and LOW AUTHORITY at the remote end of the epistemic and authority scales (Werth 1999: 276). Pragmatically, however, *could* seems to carry, in this context, a conventional implicature of probability. In (19), for example, an expression of predictability, it does not just communicate that something 'could' happen, where, as Richardson (2007: 60) puts it, 'a great many things *could* happen', but strongly implies that something is *likely* to happen. These examples therefore express a 'probable' epistemic evaluation and so, especially in the co-presence of an evidential, prompt for the construction of 'probable' modal spaces. Figure 8.10 represents the conceptualisation of (19).



Figure 8.10 Conceptualisation in (19)

Compared to *could* and *may, must* and *will* express much stronger epistemic commitment. *Must,* for example, places propositions close to CERTAIN at deictic centre but does not quite make a categorical truth claim. Consider (20):

(20) *The Mirror,* 16 March 2000

'Asylum seekers **must** be costing Britain more than £1 billion a year' [quoting Council leader for Hillingdon, West London]

The proposition in (20) is presented as a logical deduction derived from some implicit evidence. It can be glossed as 'on the basis of the evidence, I am given to conclude that P'.[12] Langacker (1991: 246) states that this modal places the proposition 'very close to known reality – the speaker has deduced that accepting it as real seems warranted (though he has not yet taken that final step)'. The status of the modal space prompted by *must* may therefore be expressed as 'certain (–)'.

In contrast to the other modal verbs, *will* is reserved exclusively for expressions of predictability and has inherent in it a sense of certainty. Reconsider the following example given as (4) in Chapter 6.

(21) *The Times,* 30 Nov. 2002

[M]ore than 100,000 asylum-seekers and their dependants **will** enter Britain in 2002.

(21) is the polar equivalent of (19). It communicates with complete conviction the definiteness of the future event. The sense of certainty inherent in *will* operates over the proposition unless otherwise qualified by another modal marker as in (22):[13]

(22) *Daily Mail,* 2 Feb. 2003

A further 100,000 Iraqi refugees **will probably** try to reach Britain...

The complete mental space configuration prompted by (21) is represented in Figure 8.11. In contrast to Figure 8.10, the modal space in Figure 8.11 is assigned a 'certain' epistemic status.

According to Richardson (2007: 60), categorical modal truth claims (i.e., claims to 100 per cent probability or certainty) appear more authoritative than hedged claims and therefore tend to be used more frequently in the genre of print news media. Fairclough also suggests that 'reported happenings are generally presented as categorical truths' and that 'the prevalence of categorical modalities supports a view of the world as transparent' (1989: 107). Richardson points out, however, that a lower degree of commitment 'can also have striking effects on shaping our understanding of...a possible event' (ibid.). The



Figure 8.11 Conceptualisation in (21)

ambiguity of 'weaker' modal claims like (17)–(19), which arises from the conventional implicature associated with *could,* facilitates the conveyance of similar propositions to their categorical counterparts without having to fully commit to their truth. This has the effect that coercion may still be achieved but one cannot be held accountable for the truth of the claim. It is still possible for coercion to occur in this context because weaker modals can paradoxically heighten a sense of dread or threat (Richardson 2007: 60).

In expressions of validity, categorical modal truth claims are zero-marked. That is, there is no explicit modal marker present. As Fowler states, 'a straightforward truth claim does not, in fact, need any explicit modal verb' (1991: 86). Epistemic modality is obligatory in language. According to Fowler (1991: 85), 'a speaker/writer must always indicate a commitment to the truth (or otherwise) of any proposition s/he utters, or to a prediction of the degree of likelihood of an event described taking place'. The absence of an epistemic modal verb, then, does not mean that epistemic modality is not present. In fact, total commitment to truth is zero-marked in most languages (Marín Arrese 2004: 156). Paradoxically, then, an 'unmodalised' proposition is actually an expression of epistemic evaluation taken as an indicator of the speaker's claim to categorical truth. As Werth (1999: 246) states, 'for each modalised proposition, the corresponding unmodalised proposition represents a straightforward statement of the situation in question. The function of the epistemic modal is to relativise this statement along the [epistemic] scale'. Reconsider the following examples given originally as (2) and (3) in Chapter 6.

(23) *Sunday Telegraph,* 2 Feb. 2003

Asylum seekers are entering Britain at the rate of 80,000 a year and few are deported.

(24) *Daily Telegraph,* 30 Aug. 2006

[I]t is clear that at least 600,000 eastern Europeans have entered Britain in the past two years.

(23) and (24) are polar equivalents of (17) and (18) respectively. They express total epistemic commitment and are understood as straightforward statements of fact. Although it may seem counter-intuitive, (23) therefore represents a stronger epistemic claim than (20). To add a modal verb to (23) or (24), even one as strong as *must,* would, in fact, result in



Figure 8.12 Conceptualisation in (24)

a weaker modal claim than currently expressed (Richardson 2007: 61). Since modality is always present, a modal space is always constructed. Somewhat paradoxically again, then, zero-marked modality operates as a space-builder which prompts for the construction of modal spaces assigned a 'certain' epistemic status. Figure 8.12 represents the conceptualisation of (24) for example.

Let us now reconsider the construction given as (1) in Chapter 5 and described as a canonical construction realising representation strategies in immigration discourse. It is reproduced below as (25).

(25) *The Sun,* 30 Nov. 2002

Asylum-seekers are flooding into Britain at the rate of one every four minutes, it was revealed yesterday.

(25) is also a canonical display of external coherence. Thus, we can now add to our analysis a layer of legitimisation as in Figure 8.13.

The absence of any modal verb before *be* communicates a categorical truth claim in a subjectification strategy. And this epistemic evaluation is based on evidence from PERCEPTION and PROOF acknowledged in an objectification strategy by 'revealed' in the tag.

	Reference	**Predication**				
Representation		**Temporal proximisation**		**Spatial proximisation**	**Temporal proximisation**	
Legitimisation		Subjectification				Objectification
	Asylum seekers	*are*	*flooding*	*into Britain*	*at the rate of one every four minutes*	*it was revealed yesterday*

Figure 8.13 Representation and legitimisation in canonical construction

8.5. Epistemic Modality and Force-Dynamics

We stated earlier in section 8.4 that modal spaces are partially structured by the epistemic scale. The cognitive model involved, however, may be more complex, consisting of an interaction between the epistemic scale and force-dynamic schemas. In Cognitive Linguistics it has been suggested that epistemic modality is conceptualised metaphorically in terms of force-dynamics (Johnson 1987; Sweetser 1990; Talmy 1988, 2000). These researchers argue that force-dynamics constitutes the conceptual basis of deontic modality. Deontic modality is concerned with the expression of permission and obligation in the 'sociophysical' domain (Sweetser 1990). Although, it is a notable semantic characteristic of modal verbs in their basic usage that they mostly refer to a sentient Agonist in an interaction that is social rather than physical (Talmy 2000: 441).

On this view, distinctions between the deontic modal verbs can be captured by the different force-dynamic schemas which underpin them. For example, the distinction between deontic *may* and *must,* which are perhaps the most clearly force-dynamic of the modals (Sweetser 1990: 52), can be analysed as follows. *May* expresses permission and is underpinned by the schema in Figure 8.5. It indicates an Agonist with a tendency towards action which is enabled to be realised by a state of affairs in which a potential sociophysical barrier is not acting. By contrast, *must* expresses obligation and is underpinned by the schema in Figure 8.2 (a). It indicates an Antagonist in place against an Agonist acting as a sociophysical force compelling the Agonist towards some action. In each of these cases, the Agonist is the referent encoded as subject

of the modal. The Antagonist is usually left implicit but may be the text-producer themselves in directives or some institution or normative background in assertions.

Now, what these researchers maintain is that an underlying system of conceptual metaphors connects the epistemic domain with the sociophysical domain (Johnson 1987: 49). The most general metaphorical structure that establishes these connections is the BODY FOR MIND metaphor in which the mental, epistemic and rational is understood in terms of the physical (Johnson 1987: 49–50). In other words, then, conceptualisations in the epistemic domain may be metaphorically structured by schemas whose literal reflexes exist as expressions within the sociophysical domain. The meaning of modal verbs in their epistemic usage is therefore derived metaphorically from the meanings they have in their deontic sense.[14] Accordingly, epistemic modal verbs are interpreted metaphorically on the basis of the same force-dynamic schemas as their deontic counterparts. Following Johnson, 'the key to identifying the connections between the root and epistemic senses [of modal verbs] is the metaphorical interpretation of *force* and *barrier'* (1987: 53). This account assumes, then, that cause and effect event-structures 'are mapped from our understanding of social and physical causality onto our understanding of our reasoning processes' (Sweetser 1990: 60).

In the epistemic domain, Sweetser argues that it is evidence alone which acts as force and barrier, compelling the reasoner towards accepting some proposition as true or (potentially) preventing them from doing so. Thus, *could,* which in its epistemic sense is synonymous with *may,* is interpreted on the basis of Figure 8.5 as 'the speaker is not barred by any other available evidence from concluding that P'. In both the sociophysical and epistemic domains of modality, then, this schema entails that 'nothing prevents the occurrence of whatever is modally marked with *may*; the chain of events is not obstructed' (Sweetser 1990: 60). Similarly, the epistemic use of *must,* derived from its deontic sense, is interpreted on the basis of Figure 8.2 (a) as 'the speaker is compelled by the available evidence toward the conclusion that P'. Sweetser does not offer a force-dynamic explanation of epistemic *will* as it used in (21) and indeed denies that such a usage is necessarily epistemic (1990: 55). On our analysis, however, we may postulate that categorical expressions of both predictability (*will*) and validity (Ø) are also interpreted on the basis Figure 8.2 (a) but that the relative strength of the Antagonist is greater than expressed by *must*.

What we are adding to the account above, in line with Langacker (1991: 240–9), is that deixis, distance and force-dynamics may all be

involved in our conceptualisation of epistemic modality. There are two important differences between this account and Sweetser's. First, we are suggesting that the 'epistemic force' (Ant) is not restricted to evidence but authority (or lack of it) can also act as a metaphorical force or barrier in the epistemic domain. Second, and more fundamental, it is not the cognisor that is conceptualised as Agonist allowed to reach, or compelled towards, some conclusion. Rather, it is the proposition itself that is conceptualised as Agonist. In the dynamic cognitive model we are proposing, the proposition moves along the epistemic scale towards the cognisor's conception of what is certain at deictic centre. Weaker modal claims, like (17)–(19) involving *could,* imply the absence of any barrier preventing the proposition from reaching the PROBABLE point on the scale. But there is no force behind the proposition to move it any further. Stronger modal claims, as expressed by *must* in (20), reflect a construal of the proposition as propelled towards CERTAIN but with insufficient 'momentum' to reach this terminal point. Categorical modal claims, such as (21) and (23)–(24) involving *will* and zero-marked modality, communicate a conceptualisation in which the epistemic force is construed as strong enough to move the proposition all the way to CERTAIN.

8.6. Summary

In this chapter, we have introduced force-dynamics and its significance for CDA in both representation and legitimisation. At the level of representation, we have shown that force-dynamics can constitute our conceptualisation of situations and events. Situation and event spaces can thus be structured by force-dynamic schemas. We have suggested that force-dynamic construals of situations and events may be ideological and compared the force-dynamic system to transitivity. We have further argued that force-dynamic construals can effect referential, predicational and proximisation strategies. At the level of legitimisation, we have discussed the semantic category of epistemic modality. We stressed the interpersonal nature of modality. We suggested that epistemic modality provides external coherence to claims and may therefore effect legitimising strategies through displays of commitment based on evidence and authority. We distinguished between two legitimising strategies: subjectification and objectification. The former, we said, is realised in epistemic modality and the latter in evidentiality. We highlighted the implicit link between these semantic categories. We considered the epistemic evaluations expressed by modal verbs and

zero-marked modality. We returned to an earlier example and offered a more complete analysis of this canonical construction taking legitimising strategies into account. Finally, we argued that epistemic evaluations may be conceptualised metaphorically in terms of force-dynamics. We elaborated on this argument and suggested that legitimisation may involve the construction of modal spaces structured by a complex cognitive model involving deixis, distance and force-dynamics.

Concluding Remarks

The primary purpose of this book has been to promote a new perspective in CDA. We have developed a cognitive framework for CDA which incorporates Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Linguistics. Our main claim has been that these two fields of Cognitive Science can provide important insights for CDA at the explanation stage and interpretation stage respectively. The model we have developed is not intended to compete with existing approaches. Rather, it is intended to cohere with established models and the theories and methodologies they espouse. Throughout the book, we have therefore continued to locate ourselves with respect to other approaches and their theoretical frameworks. But likewise, existing approaches must take stock of emerging cognitive approaches and cross-reference the ideas that they are currently uncovering. Below, we draw out some of the propositions about discourse and manipulation that have emerged during the course of this book. Some of these represent new propositions for CDA, some restate existing ones from a fresh perspective.

Discourse is conceptualisation

Conceptualisation is the construction of mental representations. In Chapter 2, we outlined a pragmatic theory of communication built around the notion of representation. We suggested that discourse involves the production of public representations (texts) intended to prompt for the construction of mental metarepresentations in text-consumers. In Chapter 1, it was argued that any complete theory of discourse needs to account not only for the construction of texts but for the construction of mental metarepresentations by text-consumers in response to texts. We suggested that this is especially important for

CDA since it is directly concerned with the discursive formation of knowledge. However, as we pointed out in Chapter 1, CDA does not currently address the construction of cognitive representations at the receiving end of the discourse process.

Conceptualisation involves construal

CDA maintains that representation in text, through transitivity, is always representation from a particular point of view. In other words, that representations in text are necessarily ideological. We pointed out in Chapter 1 that Cognitive Linguistics, concordantly, maintains that conceptualisation always involves construal, which, we said, refers to the conceptualisation of some situation or event in one available way over another. Conceptualisation is therefore also by definition ideological.

Discourses are sets of mental representations shared by members of a given community

What are variously referred to in CDA as 'discourses', 'ideologies' or 'member resources' are ultimately grounded in the mental representations of group members. These mental representations exist in the semantic division of long-term memory. In Chapter 1, we saw that van Dijk describes these shared mental representations and processes as social cognitions.

Discourses can be formally described as idealised cognitive models

CDA has made little attempt to formally describe the structures and properties of discourses or social cognitions, though it occasionally points towards frames and scripts in Cognitive Psychology. In Chapters 1 and 6 it was argued that what CDA refers to as discourses can be formally described under the banner of 'idealised cognitive models' (Lakoff 1987). Various forms of idealised cognitive models have been proposed in Cognitive Linguistics, including frames, image schemas and conceptual metaphors.

Discourse can be constitutive of discourses

This is a key claim in CDA. However, it has been pointed out that CDA has no theory of how representations in texts can become 'naturalised'

as discourses. In Chapter 6, this claim was recast in Cognitive Linguistic terms and a theory of meaning construction was presented in which it was argued that cognitive representations constructed in working memory during discourse can enter semantic memory as idealised cognitive models via processes of 'entrenchment' – a diachronic, cognitive-cultural process invoked in Cognitive Linguistics in order to account for language change.

Discourse can be constitutive of social inequality

This is another key claim in CDA. In Chapter 1, we argued after van Dijk that in democratic societies, discourse can only be constitutive of social inequality when mediated by social cognitions. We have upheld this view throughout the book. In Chapter 4, we argued that the actions which produce social inequality are motivated by the mental representations of group members.

Discourse can be coercive

Coercion was described in Chapter 4 as a principal goal of political speakers, a macro-strategy in political discourse. It was defined as the intention to influence the beliefs, emotions and behaviours of others. We argued that coercion is achieved in cognitive, emotive and/or perlocutionary effects. Cognitive effects are the modification of the set of mental representations that an individual has of the world. Emotive effects occur when these mental representations activate emotion programs. And perlocutionary effects occur when cognitive and/or emotive effects lead to some behavioural outcome. Text-producers act coercively in discourse when they communicate representations intended to achieve some cognitive, emotive or perlocutionary effect that suits their own interests.

Discourse is expected to be used strategically on evolutionary grounds

In Chapter 2, we argued that coercion may be an inevitable evolutionary outcome of cooperative communication. It was suggested that text-producers in the EEA who recognised that other individuals could have false beliefs (theory of mind), that behavioural decisions are driven by knowledge and affect (social inference), and that discourse is a source of knowledge, would soon have started to use language to promote

representations that suited their own interests (tactical deception involving Machiavellian intelligence). We then came across the argument that text-consumers would, in turn, evolve cognitive mechanisms adapted to defend against duplicitous discourse. A logico-rhetorical module was postulated as such a mechanism. Further pursuing this evolutionary logic, however, we arrived at the conclusion in Chapter 5 that the logico-rhetorical module would then have come to be used by text-producers as a means to overcome the same module in text-consumers. Of course, here we found ourselves in an infinite regress. However, it was argued that any counter-counter-counter measure in the logico-rhetorical module would simply select for more sophisticated means of overcoming it.

Coercion involves representation and legitimising strategies

Representation and legitimising strategies are microlevel strategies by means of which coercion is achieved. Representation strategies are the intention to communicate representations of the world. In Chapters 3 and 4, we identified three representation strategies used coercively in immigration discourse: referential, predicational and proximisation strategies. In Chapter 5, we argued that cognitive effects, and thus coercion, can only be achieved when representations in text are treated by text-consumers as true and reliable and retained in semantic memory. Legitimising strategies are the intention to promote representations as true and reliable and therefore overcome the logico-rhetorical module in order to achieve cognitive effects.

Representation strategies may be most effective when they exploit evolved cognition

In Chapters 3 and 4 it was argued that the modern human mind is adapted to the ancestral environment. We suggested that evolved modules remain in contemporary cognition to be activated when cognitive representations are constructed, to which these modules are adapted to respond. In Chapter 3, we saw that referential strategies in immigration discourse promote representations which may appeal to an adapted predilection for dichotomous categorisations of coalitional groups. In Chapter 4, we saw that predication and proximisation strategies promote representations of immigrants and asylum-seekers which may activate a cheater-detection module and/or emotion programs and, in

turn, drive decisions in favour of exclusionary behaviour. We saw that predications can operate as first premises in recurrent argumentation schemes and suggested that, from an evolutionary perspective, the presupposed conclusions in the particular topoi that occur in immigration discourse could in fact be adapted decision-rules.

Semantic categories analysed in Cognitive Linguistics provide resources for the realisation of particular strategies

Throughout the book, it has been suggested that strategies in discourse are realised across language levels in grammar, lexis and pragmatics. However, we have focussed on certain semantic categories which have been extensively analysed in Cognitive Linguistics, including metaphor, force-dynamics, evidentiality and epistemic modality. What has begun to emerge is a partial plan of strategic communication as presented in Figure C.1. The boxes on the far right contain the semantic categories and grammatical functions that provide resources for the expression of, and are therefore reflexes of, the taxonomy of strategies to the left.

Chapters 3, 7 and 8 showed that representation strategies of reference, predication and proximisation may all be realised in metaphor, force-dynamics and/or deixis. It was argued that because metaphor and force-dynamics in particular are not something text-consumers are normally conscious of, metaphorical and force-dynamic expressions may provide resources for the realisation of representation strategies which are more covert than simple, sentence-level structures sometimes analysed in CDA. These categories are important ones for CDA where, as we argued in the Introduction, to have any value or validity, CDA must do more than point out nominals and predicates that obviously express ideology; it must be capable of identifying manipulation and ideology in discourse that is beneath the threshold of recognition for most text-consumers.

Legitimisation was discussed in Chapters 5 and 8 and was divided into displays of internal and external coherence. Internal coherence, it was suggested, may find expression in cohesion. External coherence is displayed through evidentiality and epistemic modality, which realise legitimising strategies of objectification and subjectification respectively.

The framework for CDA that has been developed in this book is one in which the strategies in Figure C.1 and the semantic categories and grammatical functions that may realise them are analysed under the



Figure C.1 Partial plan of strategic communication

lens of Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Linguistics, alongside existing tools in CDA. However, no claim to completeness is made. The model presented is a tentative step in the right direction, intended to illuminate the broader potential for a more general cognitive approach in CDA and pave the way for future research. There are obvious questions concerning application and theory which leave open further avenues of inquiry. We highlight some of these below.

Can the model be applied elsewhere?

It is easy to envisage how Evolutionary Psychology can be used in analysing any discourse domain in which an us/other distinction is an important feature. One obvious discourse domain where this model might be applied, then, is discourse on war and terrorism. In Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor and frame theory have already been applied in analysing the narratives used to justify the Gulf wars (Lakoff 1991, 2003). Metaphor theory has also been applied to discourse in other international contexts in Political Science and International Relations theory (Beer and De Landtsheer 2004; Chilton 1996). Cap (2006) conducts an analysis of proximisation strategies used in discourse during the second Iraq war grounded in Pragmatics. He does not use Evolutionary Psychology or Cognitive Linguistics. However, it is easy to see the potential of Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Linguistics for critical discourse analyses in this context.

What are the factors that affect entrenchment?

In Chapter 6, we came across the Cognitive Linguistics notion of entrenchment. It was suggested that entrenchment could account for the process by which mental representations constructed in working memory during discourse can enter semantic memory as idealised cognitive models. However, we were vague about the factors that influence entrenchment. One might be 'cognitive resonance'. The general idea is that mental representations may be more likely to become entrenched when they fit with current conceptual organisation. On this account, it is representations reflecting conventional discourses which reproduce themselves and it is difficult for counter-discourses to take hold. Another possibility, which was hinted at in Chapter 3 in discussing metatemplates, is that representations may be more likely to become entrenched when they meet the input conditions of innate modules. Here, further consultation with Cognitive and Evolutionary

Psychology is required. One further factor may be frequency. The more frequently representations are encountered, the more likely they may be to become entrenched. Quantitative investigations of orders of discourse could therefore provide indirect evidence for the structure of underlying discourses. Here there is scope for collaboration between cognitive and corpus approaches to CDA (Charteris-Black 2004; Koller 2004). Although, it should perhaps be noted that

> CDA presents no theory about the role of repetition in such influences ... [I]t has no theory of how our ways of seeing the world are influenced cumulatively by repeated phrasings in texts. Exactly what is the relation between frequency of use and cognition? (Stubbs 1997: 106)

To what extent are all construal operations ideologically significant?

In Chapter 1, we presented a list of construal operations and referred back to some of these throughout the book. The question that arises is: are all of these ideologically significant? It has become orthodox in CDA to assume that representation, and thus conceptualisation, is necessarily ideological. We have gone along with this assumption and it is true, of course, when one defines ideology, as CDA does, in terms of choices, and language as a system of resources which always makes options available. But some construal operations may be more important than others in a given discourse domain and some may not be significant at all. This remains an unanswered question. A related question is: how useful is such a broad and circular definition? Faced with the assumption that representation is inherently ideological, where does the Critical Discourse Analyst start to look? The standard answer given is that they take a text-first approach. However, a typology of construal operations which have been identified as theoretically interesting from the point of view of CDA could help the analyst know what to look for in the first place.

What about other semantic categories?

In the Introduction, we criticised CDA for the expedient picking of elements from selected linguistic theories and adapting them to suit, rather than systematically applying whole theoretical frameworks. We have tried to be more systematic and straightforward in our application

of Cognitive Linguistics. And we have shown that Cognitive Linguistics can account for a range of semantic phenomena beyond metaphor within a unitary framework. However, we have not had the space to address all of the semantic categories analysed in Cognitive Linguistics which may be relevant for CDA. For example, conditionals may be important ideological and persuasive devices (Cheng 2002; Harding 2007). In Cognitive Linguistics, conditionals have been extensively analysed in terms of mental spaces. However, they have not been previously addressed in mainstream CDA.

What about Cognitive Grammar?

We said in Chapter 1 that research in Cognitive Linguistics can be roughly divided into two areas: Cognitive Grammar and lexical semantics. We have primarily been concerned with research in lexical semantics, though we have hinted at the significance of Cognitive Grammar from the point of view of CDA. For example, in providing a theoretical background for claims concerning agentless passives and nominalisations. Another major contribution to the general cognitive approach we are advocating, then, would be a comprehensive application of Langacker's theory of Cognitive Grammar.

Cognitive Linguistics and Evolutionary Psychology have rapidly emerged as major fields in Cognitive Science and continue to take enormous strides. Meanwhile, CDA has been left behind, still relying heavily on social science methodologies originally espoused in Critical Linguistics. Some work is beginning to emerge which takes account of these developments. However, CDA has a long way to go before it can be said to have caught up with contemporary issues in Cognitive Science.

Notes

Introduction

1. There are obvious problems here in the meta-language that experts use, which is not easily understood outside of academia. CDA must overcome this obstacle if it is to have any emancipatory effects.

1 Critical Discourse Analysis

1. We will assume throughout the book a working knowledge of Systemic Functional Grammar. See Halliday (1994) for an introduction.
2. In fact, the socio-cognitive approach is the only approach not to draw at all on Systemic Functional Grammar.
3. Social cognitions seem similar to what Fairclough refers to as 'member resources' (MRs): 'the MRs which people draw upon to produce and interpret texts are cognitive in the sense that they are in people's heads, but they are social in the sense that they have social origins' (Fairclough 1989: 24).
4. http://www.nmauk.co.uk (accessed 6 June 2007).
5. On 1 May 2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU. On 1 January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU.
6. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill; Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Bill; Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill.
7. Audit Bureau of Circulations http://www.abc.org.uk (accessed 6 June 2007).
8. For reasons of space, we will assume that the reader is familiar with the theory of evolution by natural selection. For a primer on Evolutionary Psychology see Cosmides and Tooby (1997). For an introductory textbook see Barrett et al. (2002). And for a comprehensive overview of the discipline see Dunbar and Barrett (2007) or Buss (2005)
9. The neocortex (the outermost layer of grey matter concentrated in the frontal lobes) is the brain region where social intelligence modules function (Dunbar 1993). However, it should be pointed out that modules are not themselves discrete locations in the brain. They are functionally discrete rather than physically discrete.
10. This is not to say that these modules are exclusive to, or exhaustive of, political behaviour.
11. Although, Critical Linguistics originally drew upon Chomsky's transformational grammar (Fowler et al. 1979).
12. See Gonzalez-Marques et al. (2006) for methodological developments in Cognitive Linguistics.
13. Transitivity is 'a fundamental and powerful semantic concept in Halliday' and 'the foundation of representation' (Fowler 1991: 71). In contrast to its

syntactic distinctions, that is, whether or not a verb takes a direct object, transitivity for Halliday concerns what kind of process a verb designates, the participants involved therein and the circumstances surrounding the process. It has the facility to analyse the same situation or event in different ways, a facility which is of course significant in media discourse (Fowler ibid.).

14. These broadly fall into two areas: Cognitive Grammar and cognitive lexical semantics (Croft and Cruse 2004). However, since Cognitive Linguistics sees no decisive division between grammar and semantics much research falls across both areas.
15. Though see Chilton (2005a, 2005b), Hart (2007, 2008) and Inchaurralde (2005) for applications of Mental Spaces and Conceptual Blending Theory.
16. Cognitive Linguistics rejects any clear dividing line between semantics and pragmatics and instead views semantic and pragmatic knowledge in terms of a continuum (Evans and Green 2006: 216).
17. Of course, the choices that text-producers make may not necessarily be conscious ones but based instead on conventional communicative practices within institutions and genres, coupled with complacency (Fowler 1991; Richardson 2007).
18. See Langacker (2008) on the notation used in Cognitive Grammar.

2 Communication, Cooperation and Manipulation

1. Gärdenfors does not claim there to be a sharp line between cued and detached representations but rather that there are degrees of detachment.
2. Chomsky, of course, is the principal proponent of an innate, dedicated language faculty while Sperber is the main advocate of a metarepresentation module.
3. It must be noted that Gould (1991) argues that language is a 'spandrel' – a non-adaptive consequence of structural complexity. This view is also held by Chomsky (1975, 2000) who simultaneously argues for an innate language module. The received view, however, is that language is an adaptation.
4. In fact, only shortly after the publication of *The Origin of Species* in 1859, the topic was banned by the Linguistic Society of Paris in 1866 and the London Philological Society in 1872.
5. Group living presumably enhances the individual's ability to survive and negotiate the physical world. It provides social solutions to problems of ecology and demography.
6. One which once established among a population cannot be displaced by an alternative (see Maynard Smith 1982).
7. A particular genre of discourse but the same principles can be extended to other discourse genres.
8. It should be noted that Sperber and Wilson (1995) reject the cooperative principle (see section 2.5 for discussion).
9. Gärdenfors argues that the significant advantage of advanced cooperation for future goals was the major driving force behind the evolution of symbolic communication and, in this sense, cooperation begets language (2004a: 253).

10. Grice himself recognised this distinction when he stated that 'collaboration in achieving exchange of information ... may coexist with a high degree of reserve, hostility, and chicanery' (1989: 369).
11. A cognitive effect is the modification of the set of assumptions held by an individual and processing effort is the cost of cognitive processing invested in yielding cognitive effects.
12. Note that the communicative principle of relevance allows for this. As O'Halloran observes, the reference to 'abilities and preferences' within the definition of optimal relevance 'allows for the possibility that communicators may not want to be totally co-operative ... or may want to frame communication with particular moral and aesthetic preferences' (2003: 201). Similarly, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 43) state that the responsibility for avoiding misunderstandings rests with the text-producer. By the same token, the possibility of deliberately misleading is also open to the text-producer.
13. Conversation is assumed here to be the 'natural' genre of communication and other modes to be cultural innovations.
14. Behavioural signs may anyway be faked to a certain extent (Ekman 1985).
15. There is some psycholinguistic evidence for this effect of presupposition (see Loftus and Palmer 1974; Loftus and Zanni 1975).

3 Referential Strategies

1. Fitness refers to the relative reproductive success of an individual and their kin. Reproductive success depends upon surviving until sexual maturity, mating successfully, and then the offspring doing the same.
2. Intra-group conflict would also have existed. For example, over status within the group, which afforded access to more and better resources.
3. See also Brewer 1988; Fox 1992; Kurzban et al. 2001.
4. The amygdala is part of the limbic system, which deals with various emotions.
5. Deictic expressions can only be interpreted in relation to a presupposed reference point, the 'deictic centre', which in political discourse typically coincides with the broad socio-spatio-temporal 'coordinates' that are common to all participants in the discourse event. The term social deixis, according to Levinson, applies to 'those aspects of language structure that encode the social identities of participants ... or the social relationship between them' (1983: 89). Social deixis serves the interpersonal metafunction of language.
6. They may also be realised in the form of metaphorical verb phrases (see Chapter 7).
7. Generalising metonymies are those whereby the category as a whole stands for all its individual members; as opposed to particularising metonymies whereby one member stands for the whole category.
8. See Chapter 7 for further discussion of container metaphors.
9. For some text-consumers, it is likely that the de-spatialising anthroponym 'foreigners' and the de-spatialising metaphor 'outsiders' may also realise a dissimilation strategy.
10. This is most obvious, for example, in languages other than English which use polite and non-polite forms of second person singular pronouns.

11. First person plural pronouns can also occur exclusive of addressee. In some languages, this distinction is made explicit in different grammatical forms. In English, however, whether the pronoun is understood as inclusive of addressee or not is a matter of inference, which means that text-producers may use it strategically in ambiguous or elusive reference.
12. In Corpus Linguistics this process is called 'semantic prosody' whereby 'collocation' can give rise to connotation as the meanings associated with 'collocates' become associated with the 'node' itself, even when the node occurs in text without its collocates (Stubbs 1996). Semantic prosody is succinctly summarised by Hunston as the notion that 'a given word or phrase may occur most frequently in the context of other words or phrases which are predominantly positive or negative in their evaluative orientation…As a result, the given word takes on an association with the positive or, more usually, the negative, and this association can be exploited by speakers to express evaluative meaning covertly' (2000a: 38). In other words, semantic prosody is a relation between elements in text and intertextual context such that collocation in previous texts can, through intertextuality, affect the interpretation of nodes detached from their collocates in present texts. Such connotational meanings can become entrenched (see Chapter 6). Stubbs, for example, states that 'repeated patterns show that evaluative meanings are not merely personal or idiosyncratic, but widely shared in a discourse community. A word, phrase or construction may trigger a cultural stereotype' (2002: 215).

4 Predication and Proximisation Strategies

1. In Cognitive Linguistic terms, presupposition can be treated as an epistemic deictic construal operation where 'what we choose to express in utterances and how we express it is determined to a great extent by what we assume is or is not part of the common ground; the common ground provides us with an epistemic perspective situating the speaker and the hearer' (Croft and Cruse 2004: 60).
2. In anthropology, it is sometimes referred to as the 'collective action problem'.
3. See Sperber et al. (1995) for an alternative account of this bias based in Relevance Theory.
4. This, in turn, would have provided selection pressure for the logico-rhetorical module (see subsequent chapter).
5. Mutualistic symbiosis is a relationship between two organisms such that each gain an asymmetrical fitness benefit from the association (Ahmadjian and Paracer 2000: 6). Mutualistic symbiosis can lead to evolutionarily stable strategies of inter- and intra-specific cooperation (Dawkins 1989: 181). Parasitic symbiosis is a relationship between two organisms such that the parasite gains a fitness benefit from the association but contributes nothing to the survival of its host (Ahmadjian and Paracer 2000: 7).
6. See Chapter 7 for further discussion of metaphorical strategies.
7. 'Asylum-seekers' refers to persons displaced by violence or persecution in their home country who, as a result, seek refuge elsewhere. Persons granted

asylum are referred to as 'refugees'. Note, though, that these categories are sometimes used interchangeably by the media.

8. It should be noted that Isenberg et al. (1999) were not investigating immigration discourse.
9. See Chapter 7 for further discussion of these naturalising and militarising metaphors.
10. The topos of number predicates that immigrants are arriving in large, unsustainable numbers. This topos may have an emotive effect of arousing fear of numerical domination and displacement (Chilton 2004). It works in conjunction with other topoi and operates on the principle that 'if the numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action should be performed or not be carried out' (Wodak 2001b: 76).
11. Cap (2006) puts forward this model as a 'much-revised version' (p. 6) of theoretical insights offered by Chilton (2004). The model is developed 'to serve as a viable handle on the post-9/11 war-on-terror rhetoric' (p. 3). However, it is equally able to serve as an analytical model for alternative discourses, especially those that involve the dichotomous construction of in-groups and out-groups such as the discourse of immigration and asylum.
12. This is assuming that the text-producer and the text-consumer are in the same broad time and place. That is, for our examples, text-consumers are British newspaper readers.
13. Notice that the demonstrative determiner 'this' can only be interpreted with reference to the location in which the text is produced.
14. (28) may be described as a 'scenario' because the relation between the NPs is dynamic. That is, the VP is one of motion and directionality, where directionality is provided by the verb + preposition 'into'. In contrast, (29) may be described as a 'scene' because the relation between the NPs is static. That is, the VP is one of location, provided by the verb + preposition 'in'.
15. Nominalisation is where processes get converted into nouns, sometimes for ideological reasons (see Fairclough 1989: 103).
16. This is in contrast to its antonyms 'leave' or 'depart' which encode movement away from deictic centre.

5 Legitimising Strategies

1. In this sense, legitimisation contributes to entrenchment (see Chapter 6).
2. It should be stressed that legitimisation in this sense is a microlevel linguistic strategy of legitimising assertions rather than a macrolevel speaker strategy of legitimising actions (cf. Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Van Leeuwen 2007; Cap 2006).
3. The five categories of cohesive device are reference, ellipsis, substitution, repetition and conjunction.
4. Chilton (2004: 119) refers to 'forced inferences', the mechanisms of which include implicature and presupposition.
5. See Chapter 6 for further discussion of the role in discourse of cognitive frames and other conceptual structures.
6. In a more 'critical' context, though, see Bednarek (2006a), Hidalgo Downing (2004) and Marín Arrese (2004).

7. See Chapters 6 and 7 for discussion of metaphor.
8. In indirect quotations, in contrast with direct quotations, the new text provides a summary of what was said or written in the original text rather than the exact words used (Fairclough 2003: 49). Quotations can be considered evidentials where 'stating that the source of an utterance is not Self but Other can…be interpreted as giving information about the basis of Self's knowledge' (Bednarek 2006a: 643). The attribution of information to third-party sources, then, can itself be interpreted as evidence of the text-producer's own informedness and attribution can therefore help to legitimise speakers themselves in a wider political sense (Chilton 2004: 117).
9. Notice that the recursive properties of language allow for one proposition to be embedded within another proposition, embedded within another, and so on, resulting in sentences like 'an independent report states that the Government believes that P'. The human mind is capable of cognising up to six layers of metarepresentation (Dunbar 1996).

6 Conceptualisation

1. The term 'base' in Cognitive Grammar is equivalent to 'frame' in frame semantics (Croft and Cruse 2004: 15).
2. Context is understood in relevance-theoretic terms as the set of assumptions (mental representations) made available to the text-consumer during discourse (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 15–21). Context can be mental representations of the circumstances in which the discourse event takes place (situational context), mental representations of propositions previously communicated in discourse (co-textual or inter-textual context) or mental representations in encyclopaedic background knowledge (frame-based context).
3. Image schemas are abstract in the sense that they are schematic, not in the sense that they are divorced from physical experience.
4. Events are necessarily dynamic. Situations, which usually involve a form of the verb 'to be', can be static or dynamic.
5. The same schema would underlie equivalent NP+AUX+VERB+in(to)+NP constructions in which the verb indicates, including metaphorically, the movement of people into Britain.
6. In using the terms 'trajector' (TR) and 'landmark' (LM) we are following Langacker's framework for Cognitive Grammar (1987, 1991). TR is the entity whose circumstance is at issue. It is the entity whose location or motion is described. LM is the entity in relation to which a TR's location or motion is described. TRs are typically smaller and more mobile than LMs.
7. Within Cognitive Linguistics, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending Theory are treated as both competing (Coulson 2001) and complementary (Grady et al. 1999).
8. This blending operation is sometimes referred to as 'conceptual integration'.
9. Conceptual integration always involves at least these four spaces (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 279). However, cases of 'multiple blends' exist in which blends themselves can enter into a 'blending chain', functioning as inputs in further blending networks.

10. The basic diagram in Figure 6.6 has been adapted from Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46) to show both counterpart elements being fused in the blended space.
11. It is important to note that, although it is convenient to present it as such, elaboration is not a final stage in the blending process. Conceptual blending is a kind of parallel rather than serial processing.
12. Relevance Theory and Cognitive Linguistics are in some ways conflicting. But they can be reconciled if we take Cognitive Linguistics to describe the conceptual representations constructed during discourse and Relevance Theory to account for how text-consumers, constrained by principles of relevance, recognise which representations text-producers intend them to construct. For example, Tendhal and Gibbs (2008: 1844–5) state that 'in theory, blends can be elaborated ad infinitum. In practice, however, the process of elaboration is certainly subject to relevance considerations and therefore restricted by the goal to minimise processing effort'. For further comparisons between Relevance Theory and Cognitive Linguistics see Evans and Green (2006: 463–65) and Ungerer and Schmid (2006: 257–88).
13. This analysis is parallel to the analysis of 'digging one's own grave' given by Fauconnier (1997: 168–71) and Coulson (2001: 168–70).
14. This undermines the invariance principle proposed in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff 1993).
15. Conceptual blending patterns share the same basic appearance whether constructed for novel or more conventional metaphors.
16. The distinction between novel and conventional metaphors is a matter of degree. The extent to which a metaphor is conventional can be gauged qualitatively using native speaker intuition and evidence from mixed metaphors or quantitatively using Corpus Linguistic methodologies (Charteris-Black 2004).
17. It is in this sense that conceptual metaphors are idealised cognitive models.
18. In relevance-theoretic terms, conceptual metaphors can be thought of as part of members' shared cognitive environments and may be made mutually manifest if activated by keywords in discourse (Tendhal and Gibbs 2008: 1840).
19. Specifically, of course, conceptual metaphors are hybrid discourses in so far as they bring together elements from different domains.
20. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 331) argue that Conceptual Metaphor Theory 'shows why ... extreme forms of social constructivism are wrong'.

7 Metaphor

1. Chiappe (2000) argues that conceptual integration may be the mechanism behind what Mithen (1996) calls 'cognitive fluidity' – an important adaptation that allowed connections between cognitive domains. A 'metaphor mutation' would have afforded reason beyond the physical realm, offering significant advantages to a social species.
2. The choice that text-producers make need not necessarily be a conscious one but may reflect intuitive rhetorical and stylistic preferences in realising intentional goals (Charteris-Black 2004: 86). And importantly, social,

historical and political circumstances may influence the choice and specification of metaphors (El Refaie 2001: 368).

3. It may be more accurate to class personification as a case of metonymy rather than metaphor.
4. We reserve the term 'entailment' for inferences that arise as a function of the internal logic of image schemas. We avoid the use of 'entailment' to refer to inferences that arise from frames because it is not clear that these inferences are *necessarily* drawn. Rather, they are made available by the metaphor but depend on text-consumers' individual contextual assumptions and relevance-theoretic considerations.
5. As well as their converse antonyms *out, outside* and *out of.*
6. Extended usages can become entrenched as distinct senses stored in a radial category or semantic network. Disciplines disagree, however, on the extent to which prepositions are polysemous or vague. For example, the underspecification approach in Pragmatics argues for the latter, where extended senses are computed online from the basic meaning in conjunction with context. By contrast, the full-specification approach in Cognitive Linguistics argues for the former, where every extended usage is represented in a semantic network organised in relation to the basic meaning. The reality is probably somewhere between the two opposing positions, as articulated in the principled polysemy approach developed by Tyler and Evans (2003).
7. The fact that different semantic networks for prepositions have developed in different languages is suggestive of this.
8. The exception to this is *arrive,* which occurs with *in.* This may be because *arrive* does not denote motion *per se* but rather the result of motion.
9. Of course, if text-consumers frequently encounter evaluative verbs in the construction 'VERBing into Britain', then even a neutral verb like *coming* may come to carry evaluative connotations as a result of semantic prosodies. And indeed, a quick quantitative analysis of our corpus reveals the following statistics for the most frequent verbs that occur in this construction: *coming* 23 per cent, *flooding* 18 per cent, *sneaking* 16 per cent *getting* 15 per cent, *pouring* 12 per cent and others 16 per cent. While *coming* occurs most frequently, it is the only neutral verb. Evaluative verbs occur more than twice as often. We discuss *flooding* and *pouring* below. See Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) for discussion of *sneaking.* And see the following chapter for discussion of *getting.*
10. Notice that the inferred need to stop further immigration follows automatically from the metaphor. In this sense, metaphors constitute topoi, where those inferences that arise from them which pertain to action can be thought of as comparable to automatic conclusions in argumentation.
11. 'Britain' is sometimes used metonymically to stand for its infrastructure as seems to be the case in (5).
12. Kövecses (2000) shows that our folk understanding of anger is conceptualised as heated liquid inside a container which can cause an explosion when it reaches boiling point.
13. Indeed, the permanent population are often referred to as 'residents' while immigrants are referred to as 'visitors' or 'guests' and are thus only in the country temporarily. Those who have 'outstayed their welcome' are referred to as 'overstayers'.

14. See Chapter 8 on the force-dynamic construal encoded by 'let in'.
15. We discuss war metaphors in immigration discourse later in this chapter.
16. Goatly refers to the phenomenon whereby the same source domain is variously applied to different targets within its scope as 'multivalency' (2007: 13). The opposite of multivalency is 'diversification' whereby the same target domain is structured by a range of source domains (ibid.: 12).
17. Santa Ana (1999) further identifies the ANIMAL frame as a feature of American public discourse on immigration.
18. Goatly (2007: 195–96) further argues that given a reversal of the conceptual metaphor DISEASE AS INVASION and the conception of immigrants as invaders, we are prepared to think of immigration as the spread of disease. This metaphor is especially effective when it coheres with the BODY-POLITIC metaphor, as was seen in Nazi discourse (Musolff 2008). Charteris-Black (2006a: 577) suggests that penetration of container implies the 'them' symbolically entering the 'us' and links this image to Lakoff's (1991) discussion of INVASION AS RAPE.
19. (27) represents a 'mixed metaphor' which according to Lakoff (1993) is the result of 'simultaneous mapping'. It makes use of both WAR and WATER frames in the same text unit to conceptualise asylum seekers and immigration. Mixed metaphors in journalism indicate that the individual metaphors are highly conventionalised and thus unlikely to be recognised as metaphorical (Goatly 1997). If text-consumers were consciously aware of the metaphors in (27) then they would probably experience some degree of cognitive discomfort in processing them (El Refaie 2001: 365). However, 'the mixing of highly conventional tokens of the "war" and the "water" themes is unlikely to strike the average reader as being in any way unusual' (ibid.).
20. Anderson (2004) shows that shifts in metaphor patterns *precede* political change and argues for the causal power of metaphor.
21. Composite noun phrases like 'flow of asylum seekers' whereby the first noun is a metaphorical vehicle for the second are highly conventionalised constructions in immigration discourse such that, according to El Refaie, they 'not only look as if they form a single 'natural' unity but probably they are experienced in that way' (2001: 360). Here, El Refaie may be taken as endorsing the psychological reality of emergent structure in conceptual blending, with composite noun phrases a case in point.
22. 'Porous' denotes 'allowing air or liquid to be absorbed'. However, given the conventionality of water metaphors in immigration discourse, in this context 'porous' is likely to be interpreted as referring to liquid.
23. Notice that other available structure from the WATER frame, for example its importance in sustaining life, does not seem to get projected in the FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS blend. Selecting such structure may be one way in which text-producers can enact a counter-discourse from within the constraints imposed by the conceptual metaphor. As Semino (2008: 90) points out, it is of course possible, in principle at least, to break totally free of the constraints of a conceptual metaphor and create completely new ones. Indeed, some critical metaphor analysts actively suggest alternative metaphors as counter-discourses (e.g., Koller 2004). However, the more entrenched a conceptual metaphor is, the more difficult it is to 'uproot' it. And a novel metaphor is more likely to 'resonate' if it is consistent with already established conceptual metaphors.

24. Notice that the present perfect construction realises a temporal proximisation strategy where the frame of reference for the predication is the immediate past up until now.

8 Force-Dynamics and Epistemic Modality

1. Structural schematisation, which we came across in the last chapter, is another example of a constitutive construal operation.
2. These are entirely distinct from the participant role categories of Agent and Patient.
3. The Antagonist need not be explicitly referred to.
4. See Johnson (1987) for an alternative notation.
5. In anti-immigration discourse, of course, it is immigrants and asylum-seekers who usually take the role of Agonist and the resultant of force interaction is motion.
6. This is in contrast to the concept of causation which involves impingement.
7. Deontic modality marks attitudinal evaluations of social and legal responsibilities and obligations and therefore falls under *judgement*.
8. See Dendale and Tasmowski (2001) for discussion of conceptual problems in their classification and an overview of their treatment in relation to one and other.
9. Although, it should be noted that the match between the scale of evidentiality and the scale of subjective (speaker's) certainty is not perfect (Givón 1982: 42).
10. The way we are using these terms is not to be confused with the way that Halliday (1970) uses 'objectification' and the way that Langacker (1987, 1991) uses 'subjectification'.
11. Of course, modal verbs are polysemous and most have a deontic sense as well as an epistemic sense. The consensus in Cognitive Linguistics is that the deontic sense is more basic and that epistemic senses are derived metaphorically from their deontic counterparts (Johnson 1987; Talmy 2000; Sweetser 1991). *Could* has in addition a counterfactual sense.
12. Where *must* communicates strong possibility based on logical necessity it may also be said to involve alethic modality. However, most researchers do not distinguish between epistemic and alethic modality or see the latter as important in natural-language semantics (e.g., Nuyts 2001; Palmer 1986; Sweetser 1990).
13. In examples like (22) 'will' communicates the certainty of the predicted proposition but then a lesser level of commitment is immediately expressed by the subsequent modal adverb. Montgomery applies the terms 'push' and 'pull' to capture this kind of modal oscillation, whereby 'a speaker will first raise, then lower, the strength of an assertion in the course of making it' (2007: 226).
14. See Groefsema (1995) for a critique of the polysemy view of modal verbs grounded in Relevance Theory.

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