

THE MEMORY OF GENOCIDE IN TASMANIA, 1803-2013

SCARS ON THE ARCHIVE

JESSE SHIPWAY

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For my family and for Tasmania

Acknowledgements

I would like acknowledge everybody who's helped me research and write this book since I started in 2000. To say that it's been a rough ride would not overstate the case. At times, I questioned my own sanity, and others did too. But these were political problems as well as scholarly and personal challenges.

There were moments in this process where I felt inside the text and times when I felt outside it or around it as if it was me and I was it. Which can cause some serious problems when your topic is genocide and you're out on a limb methodologically and in disciplinary terms.

I had left Tasmania for Melbourne in 1999 and in 2000 began a post-graduate thesis at the University of Melbourne called the economic imaginary which aimed to synthesise Marx and Lacan in the context of the neoliberal turn in global politics since 1973.

The magnitude and ominous technicalities of this study quickly overcame me and with city life starting to wear us down, my partner and I decided to return to Hobart, Tasmania to buy a house and start a family. I was delighted to find the support there of Philip Mead and the school of English, Journalism and European Languages for a new research project centred initially around the idea of Tasmania occupying a position on the edge of a centre-less modernity.

Given a dark turn of mind that I have always had, and which manifests in a persistent interest in the roads less travelled through ideas, music, and life in general, it was no wonder that I was attracted to the minor tradition in philosophy and the Marxian tradition in political and economic thought. Beginning serious research into the Tasmanian archive, it didn't

take long for me to see that there was much scholarly work that needed to be done on the Tasmanian genocide both in its own right and in comparison with other genocides, with the Holocaust still demanding recognition as the paradigmatic instantiation of this baleful social logic.

All of a sudden a cosy retreat into the details of a local Tasmanian modernity became a challenge to consider a pulverisingly meaningful historical event—the Shoah—that I had never looked into in any detail before. I was forced thus to cover up, and consider my object with exactly the kind of "cool, encompassing and explanatory gaze" that Pierre Nora wants us to turn against ourselves in the form of the *ego-histoire* to gain a better understanding of our own personal imbrication in our topics of study.

It was hard with no aboriginal blood or "genetics" to allow myself the right to study their victimisation at the hands of my own Anglo-Irish ethnic group and so I resisted and refused this reflexive bending into interrogative postures or *ego-histoire*—and for the same reason I apologise to any readers who would prefer that this study read a little more personally.

I completed the PhD in 2005, graduated in 2006 and went to work for the Tasmanian government in the policy division of the Department of Premier and Cabinet. Suffice to say this didn't work out exactly as planned. And not much else did for the next ten years. I did become a poet though and managed to work when and where I could, keeping my family together, maintaining our house, making it occasionally overseas, and then out on my own, after many bipolar psychotic episodes, to peace with the cosmos, that has held now for long enough for it to feel permanent.

But my mirror phase was stubborn and bullying, I put my PhD research aside after submitting it to dozens of publishers. I quit work entirely. Moved out of home. Invested myself in poetry and the hot and cold logics of finance, money, markets, again from a Marxian perspective. Then out of the blue, in 2014, I was contacted by Tom Lawson asking if I'd be interested in submitting a book proposal for the Palgrave Studies in the History of Genocide series that he was editing with Thomas Kühne and Deborah Mayersen.

I was astounded and naturally I agreed to sign the contract I was sent from London. It was surely manna from heaven. I was finally sublating with the big leagues, in the only real meaningful and uniformly valued symbolic order currently extant. How had I turned my hubris haunted life around? And who would care to hear anything about it?

My relationships were tested by this book project. My care and love and compassion and tolerance for humanity were cracked and darkened

by exposure to and meditation upon the naturalness of genocide and the false promises of modernity and other vacuous and jejune forms of societal futures trading.

While my motives were personal and political in a quaint Tasmanian way, my intention was also always to obliterate my own subject position and produce a work more classically inclined toward the aloof and objective than the approachable, caring and compromised. But once morbid subject matter like genocide and genocide echo effects get in your head, and you end up studying your own death-world inside the larger realms, it becomes impossible to dam desire for political and textual success and even for private love or other form of salve or compensation. These thirsty revenants just keep coming back again and again as eradicable symptoms in grammar and lexicon and thematics.

Tasmania really is another country and I dearly hope this book can help her citizens to better imagine what it is that they are and what we are and what you and I both, as reader and writer, can be and do if we keep on reading, thinking, writing and praying for the unquiet graves and the atonements, expiations and penances left and demanded by genocidal action and profiteering in Tasmania. There is certainly much still to be found by anyone who begins to wonder what lies beneath the scars on the Tasmanian archive left by the clear darkness of genocide and the caliginous light of modernity.

Thank you then to Helena Shipway, Evelyn Shipway, Joseph Shipway, Kate Shipway, Andrew Shipway, Lucas Shipway and family, Lee Prince, Marc Prince, Philip Mead, Keith Jacobs, Peter Hay, Andrew Harwood, John Cash, John Docker, Helen Tiffin and Tom Lawson. I hope I've already shown my gratitude to the multitude of others who've also lent a hand, shared the burden or pointed me in the wrong direction home.

I'd also like to acknowledge the support of the many helpful librarians I did business with in Paris, London, Melbourne, Sydney and Hobart over the seventeen year preparation of this text.

The many editors who allowed me to become a poet have also earned my instant love and respect.

Contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book takes its basic impetus from the scholarly and political requirement that we articulate the conditions and properties of an equivocally textual object called the Tasmanian archive. The Tasmanian archive is the locus for the storage of utterances that concern Tasmania, but it also plays a part in ushering a discursively mediated Tasmania into being. It is both about, and constitutive of, Tasmania in a social-symbolic sense.

At various points in the preparation of this book, I felt that I was producing a work of cultural history, of historiography, of biography of place, of psychoanalytically informed social theory, of hybrid literary studies and finally of archival studies. My method places a frame around a collection of moments that carry a powerful resonance within an archival Tasmania. As a temporalised assemblage of freestanding essays, it is given thematic integration by the mirrored problematics of genocide and modernisation. Genocide here embodies, signifies and recuperates a collective despair, guilt and perverted conquest—triumphalism. Modernity, on the other hand, inverts the logos and pathos of imperial bloodshed and seems to offer a collective hope that looks earnestly forward to a future less painful than the past or the present. Throughout the history of the Tasmanian archive both genocide and modernisation have been grammatical subjects of contested, affectively charged statements, propositions and utterances.

This book stands as an attempt at a poetics of cultural studies, theory, history and philosophy cast in terms that draw on Stephen Greenblatt's framing of the project. In "Towards a Poetics of Culture", Greenblatt seems intent on cordoning off a space for subjectivity that is problematically social.

J. Shipway, *The Memory of Genocide in Tasmania, 1803–2013*,
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He criticises Fredric Jameson openly for demonising the private as a mystifying capitalist illusion:

> For the *Political Unconscious* any demarcation of the aesthetic must be aligned with the private which is in turn aligned with the psychological, the poetic, and the individual, as distinct from the public, the social, and the political. All of these interlocking distinctions […] are then laid at the door of capitalism with its power to "maim" and "paralyze" us as individual subjects.[1]

For Bakhtin, the dialogic mode resides firmly in the stylistics of the novel. The novel is social, the author of the novel thinks socially. Poetics on the other hand, and I think this is Greenblatt's point, can best be thought of as a private, but not reactionary, attempt to order the world through language. The cultural studies method, as I develop it in this book then, is a private, a personal, and, hopefully, a poetic approach. As Bakhtin writes:

> Herein lies the profound distinction between prose style and poetic style […] For the prose artist the world is full of other people's words, among which he must orient himself and whose speech characteristics he must be able to perceive with a very keen ear. He must introduce them into the plane of his own discourse, but in such a way that this plane is not destroyed.[2]

At various points in this book, I have recourse to a conception of Tasmania that is predominantly discursive, that is ideal, spiritual and non-material. At others, I reread episodes of Tasmanian history as if they refer to a concrete referent, a social totality or substantive extra-linguistic place. This should not be misunderstood as dualist compromise, retreat or subterfuge.

In the ontology of the Tasmanian archive, a principle of captivity encloses its subject matter. It has a secondary function, however, that derives from its place in Giorgio Agamben's discourse on Emile Benveniste's "The Semiology of Language" as described in *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*.[3] Here, the archive is encoded through the work of Michel Foucault so that it comes to designate "the system of relations between the unsaid and the said", or "the dark margin encircling and limiting every concrete act of speech".[4] The archive, in this sense, does not bring together the content of what has been written or said about Tasmania but, rather, marks the conditions of its sayability, the material but non-communicative dimensions that attend every act of enunciation.

Because the archive responds to the being of language, as well as to its fecundity of meaning, its location is simultaneously discursive and material. It encloses a language that is anchored to speakers, places and events: phenomena that translate matter into meaning. The Tasmanian archive trespasses into the order of things.

By drawing attention to the way archives enclose. envelop or coordinate the material conditions that make possible a given statement, Giorgio Agamben prevents the virtuality of discourse from eclipsing the objects it describes in semantic arrest. For Agamben, the archive protects the materiality of things-in-the-world, buttressing them against the gravity of linguistic reductionism. In the case of a hard matter substrate like Tasmania, the very physicality of its statement is reflected in the archive that connects the statement to its place of arrest. The archive provides us with a way to link language games to specific places even as those places are in part a product of the discourses that they anchor.

One of the goals of this book is to theorise the means by which non-linguistic experience of a given location becomes, under the influence of archival energy, a communicable matrix for the construction of place. Neither place nor discourse are collapsed into one another in this problematic. Rather, their mutually constitutive arising subtends an antinomy of place and language. The two contrapuntal problematics of genocide and modernity carry this suspension into the pragmatic unfolding of place identity in Tasmania.

My account of the story of how Tasmania came to be a place of genocide and a place of modernity is split between the two registers under examination. An analysis of the troping of genocide and modernity in the Tasmanian archive does not just reveal important truths about the particular place to which they refer. To this end, this book also looks at how large-scale, abstracted socio-cultural logics play themselves out on a local stage. How, it asks, is the universal language of modernity given a regional inflection in Tasmania? When, it poses, will it be possible to read a genocidal logic into a historical trajectory without invoking the Jewish Holocaust?[5] Or, further indeed, if we cannot avoid atrocity comparisons, can we reasonably expect to gain something from uncomfortable resemblances:

As Tom Lawson writes:

> There is no sensible comparison to be made if one works backwards from the Holocaust, that remains true. If we attempt to fit genocide in Tasmania

> and Australia in to the model of the Holocaust then we will inevitably fail. But self-evidently the crimes of settler colonialism pre-date the Holocaust. If we reverse the question, and ask whether, looking forward from the crimes of the settler-colonial era, we can usefully fit the Holocaust into a wider history of genocidal colonialism, then the answer is, of course, yes. We might well learn something about the Holocaust, by considering the history of genocide in settler societies—be that the British in Australia or, for example, the Germans in South West Africa.[6]

To the reader well-versed in *Tasmaniana*, this work proposes a reinscription and a reassessment. To the uninitiated, it serves as a general introduction. In both cases, it is interested in problematising common-sense understandings of place, culture and identity through an interrogation of the layerings of meaning that accrete around a localised history that is always unfinished.

Trenchant

I began writing this book during an intriguing moment in the history of the History of Australia. Keith Windschuttle's challenge to orthodox accounts of civilisational interaction on the Australian frontier. *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History Volume One: Van Diemen's Land 1803–1847* (2003), had just been published and a passionate, partisan debate had been set in train.[7] This debate is far from over. And it is hard to see how Indigenous land rights secured out of race-rights struggles will survive the ambitions of a (personified) global economy ostensibly growing ever greedier for scarce energy sources and mineral commodities. In short, the utilitarian and even the democratic or carrying-capacity arguments against subsidising or valorising indigenous (or hybrid indigenous) ways of life seem more compelling in a new climate of oversubscribed identity-political-rights claims directed at the neo-liberal state in the form of money requests or campaigns for legislative legitimation. We need, of course, to ask ourselves why we have a history of expecting to feel good about our histories. Do we have the sovereign right to hope that the genocide might go away, to compensate for it, to repudiate its perpetrators and so on?

At face value, the national significance of Windschuttle's book seemed to lie in its bold contention that respected, high-profile historians like Lyndall Ryan and Henry Reynolds had deliberately doctored empirical data to attempt a possibly oedipal overthrow of what they claimed was a significant national narrative—the quiet continent thesis—in the name of

a vision of the Australian colonial frontier as a site of carnage and, in the second, of organised, guerrilla resistance. At stake here was an influential, perhaps even iconic, vision of the human landscape and race-relations of early European Australia. Would Windschuttle's livid, lucid prose rewrite our black armband narratives of invasion and genocide guilt?[8]

Windschuttle's book is one of only a few that use Tasmanian history to rewrite Australian history. Volume one of *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History* is dedicated solely to an examination of the landmark events of the Tasmanian genocide—the Risdon massacre, the Cape Grim massacre and so on—but it is also clearly looking outward: to the other editions in the trilogy and to the field of Australian Aboriginal history and politics more generally. Windschuttle writes:

> Although the series starts in Tasmania, it will eventually cover the whole of the continental mainland. The colony of Van Diemen's Land, as it was originally known, comes first because it has long been regarded as the worst-case scenario. Those historians now upheld as the most reputable on the subject assure us that the Tasmanian Aborigines were subject to a 'conscious policy of genocide'. International writers routinely compare the actions of the British in Tasmania with the Spaniards in Mexico, the Belgians in the Congo, the Turks in Armenia and Pol Pot in Cambodia.[9]

Here, the telling of an Australian story takes as its initial subject matter a set of localised events. In a metonymic movement, the part comes to substitute for the whole, and Tasmania is made the first port of call in what we are led to believe will be a rigorous inquisition into national truth. This kind of substitution is nothing new in its own right, other parts of Australia have long been invoked as worthy settings for the telling of national narratives: the Victorian goldfields of *The Fortunes of Richard Mahony*, the innercity Sydney slums of *Bobbin Up* or the Melbourne bohemia of *Monkeygrip*.[10]

Tom Lawson finds a similar theory of value in his investigations into and disruption of the field of Tasmanian genocide studies. For Lawson, Tasmania is not only a central, shaping, architectonic for various strains of research contained by the discipline of Australia history, it also provides meaningful lessons for post-colonial research on a grander scale:

> I […] argue that genocide was the result of the British presence in Van Diemen's Land. This does not mean that the British government or its agents explicitly planned the physical destruction of the Indigenous Tasmanians. They did not. But genocide was the inevitable outcome of a set of British

> policies, however apparently benign they appeared to their authors. […] those policies […] ultimately envisaged no future whatsoever for the original peoples of the island.[11]

Initially, this book was directed toward a reversal of the notion that Tasmania had been left behind by modernity. My discovery of Zygmunt Bauman's influential work *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989) took me first to Henry Reynolds' *An Indelible Stain: The Question of Genocide in Australian History* (2001) and then to Bill Thorpe and Raymond Evans' thoroughgoing demolition of Windschuttle's *Quadrant* pieces from the mid-1990s, "Indigenocide and the Massacre of Aboriginal History" (2001). The modernity problematic that runs through this book was thus, almost from the outset, intimately bound up with the grammar of genocide.

This study consists of an extended introductory component followed by a set of essays that chart an uneven course through historical time from the invasion of Tasmania in 1803 to the present. The opening comments seek to familiarise the reader with a Tasmania framed through the optics of genocide and modernity. In this section, I test the use-value of modernity and genocide as ways of seeing the archival enunciations that we have traditionally filed away under the heading of Tasmanian culture.[12] The form of this interrogation is dialectical. On the one hand, genocide and modernity are thematic clusters with historical form: objects of knowledge that are contained within the Tasmanian archive. On the other, they provide the conceptual frameworks through which we read the archive. In regard to the latter sense, a brief survey is conducted of prevailing trends in the fields of modernity and genocide studies. In the case of modernity studies, the objective is to situate my reading of a non-metropolitan, peripheral modernity in the context of the increasingly large body of work interested in de-centring modernity from its traditional homelands in Europe and North America. In the case of genocide, I seek to locate my own analysis in a less specific sense by presenting a survey and typology of the terms in which the Tasmanian genocide has appeared across a range of literatures.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 comprise the detailed reading of the Tasmanian archive. Each of these chapters is given a temporal identity that performs an uneven periodisation: uneven, because this is not the kind of reconstructive monograph that purports to tell a story stretched out along a linear chronology. The past survives here as a loose collection of fragments that seek to escape the narrower bounds of unnecessarily conservative narrative. The idea of naming a time—Van Diemonian, Tasmanian, Global—emerges out of a combination of fact and feeling. The practical

division of Tasmania's cultural temporality into three parts reflects the phenomenal truth that the people of this island worked and lived in a social cosmos that was always on the way toward becoming something other than what it was and was always already something other than what it had been at the outset. The freezing over of fluid, lived temporality thus enacted is both essential and inadequate. To pay due notice to this fact, a suppleness is built into the categories in question. Chapter 3, which covers the period from colonisation in 1803 to Trukanini's death in 1876, for instance, includes work that focuses on Richard Flanagan's *Gould's Book of Fish* (2002).[13] The same principle is at work in Chaps. 4 and 5, where material crosses over time-lines on a number of occasions. Chapter 4, encloses an interval of one hundred and two years, from the death of the "last Tasmanian" Trukanini to the screening of Tom Haydon's documentary *The Last Tasmanian: A Story of Genocide* (1978). It also reaches back, however, to draw on primary material from the field diaries of George Augustus Robinson that is then resituated in a contemporary context. Again, in Chap. 5, the portion of the book that appears to gesture forward to what Gayatri Spivak calls the "vanishing present" also includes an in-depth disquisition on the Jewish Holocaust.[14] A disclaimer that needs to be added here is that my point of focus is the agglomeration of contemporary language games that invoke the Shoah, rather than the Shoah itself.

The temporalisation of the book is the first order of its organisation, but the tonal oppositions of genocide and modernity are just as important. The genocide thread moves from the moment of European settlement in Tasmania to the "extinction" of the Aborigines after Trukanini's death. It then charts a course through the forced forgetting of the Palawa people through the twentieth century to the late 1970s when the screening of Tom Haydon's influential documentary film, *The Last Man*, incited angry responses from a newly vocal Aboriginal community still coming to terms with the ontological and political implications of a restored identity.[15]

This rediscovery of identity is an instructive example of the way an archive can bear witness to a transformation in the rules governing what can and can't be said about a given place. From the time of Trukanini's death until the modern Aboriginal rights movement found its feet in the 1970s, the archive carried the place of Aboriginality as a present absence imprinted in fading ink on its invisible pages. While there were always members of a low-profile Aboriginal community identifying as indigenous Tasmanians, the publication of books like Clive Turnbull's *Black War: The Extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines* (1948) and Robert Travers' *The Tasmanians: The Story of a Doomed Race* (1968) demonstrate that the

most pervasive, and perhaps most legitimate, archival posture was one that eulogised the demise of the civilisation. The point here is a simple one. From the time of Trukanini's death in 1876, an examination of the archive as record, as mediating framework and as the unspoken in what is said, revealed, in its hegemonic testimony, the non-existence of an Aboriginal population in Tasmania. After the screening of Haydon's film, however, the archive changed irrevocably to accommodate a retrospectively reconstructed continuity of existence and a present tense being-in-the-world. The last chapter of this survey is filed under the rubric of restoration, a decision prompted by the recognition that the texts with which it engages are of an extended historical moment defined by full presence, and the awareness that the question of genocide in Tasmanian history has only been taken up properly in the wake of this rematerialisation of self-conscious, agonistic identity.[16]

The modernity stream of the book charts a course through three different entanglements with modernity and modernisation. Under the heading of Van Diemonian time, I conduct a reading of Richard Flanagan's novel, *Gould's Book of Fish*, which takes the author's representation of the modernisation of the Sarah Island penal colony on Tasmania's west coast as a redirection of hope for Tasmanian modernity as a whole. The second essay on the wilderness and industry, moves forward in time to the age of hydro-electric industry, focusing on the visual compression of wilderness and industry at two significant Tasmanian locations. The third and final part of the modernity stream focuses on the emotional and even magical or mythopoetic attachment that the Tasmanian population has formed with its state-owned electricity-generating history and infrastructure. Drawing on a theoretical model taken from Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe: Historical Difference and Postcolonial Thought* (2000), this chapter proposes a reappraisal of a consummately modern concept—rationalisation—through an examination of the "irrational" refusal of privatisation enacted by the Tasmanian electorate in the 1998 state poll. In combination with the purchase of three vessels, aptly titled Spirit of Tasmania I, II and III, for plying the Bass Strait between Tasmania and the Australian mainland, the collective decision to retain public control of the Hydro-Electric Commission marked a partial re-enchantment of the state. Not only do these developments demonstrate a civic interest in alternative value-rational ends to governance in an age of neo-liberalism, they also suggest the persistence of a political ontology that positions the Tasmanian subject as something other than a purely self-interested rational utility maximiser.

Notes

1. Stephen Greenblatt, "Towards a Poetics of Culture," in *The New Historicism*, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 3.
2. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostevsky's Poetics*, translated by, Caryl Emerson, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 200–1.
3. See Emile Benveniste, "The Semiology of Language," in *Semiotics: An Introductory* Anthology, ed. Robert E. Innis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 226–46.
4. Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* (New York: Zone, 1999), 144–5.
5. The genocides in the Belgian Congo, of the Armenians by the Ottomans and other ancient or classical cases might one day challenge the observation of the Shoah as categorically imperative.
6. Tom Lawson, *The Last Man: A British Genocide in Tasmania*, (London, I.B Tauris, 2014), 26.
7. See for instance Robert Manne, ed., *Whitewash: On Keith Windschuttle' Fabrication of Aboriginal History (*Melbourne: Black Inc Agenda, 2003). Raymond Gaita, "Bringing Home Some Genocide Truths," *The Australian*, August 4, 2003, 9; Robert Manne, "The Tragedy is Compounded by the Absurdity," *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 25, 2003; Dirk Moses, "Rendering the Past Less Unpalatable," September 30, 2003; Keith Windschuttle, "History as Travesty of Truth," September 30, 2003; Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, ed., *History Wars* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003).
8. The term "Black Armband" history was coined by Geoffrey Blainey in "Goodbye to All That?," *The Weekend Australian*, May 1–2, 1993, 16. This was an edited transcript of Blainey's Latham Memorial Lecture, which he delivered in Sydney during the same week.
9. Keith Windschuttle, *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History Volume 1: Van Diemen's Land 1803–1847*, (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2003), 4.
10. Henry Handel Richardson, *The Fortunes of Richard Mahony: Comprising Australia Felix, The Way Home, Ultima Thule* (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1954). Dorothy Hewitt, *Bobbin Up* (London: Virago, 1985). Helen Garner, *Monkeygrip* (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1977).
11. Lawson, 14.
12. Anthologies that embody the trend toward the nationalisation of place in Cultural Studies include Scott Denham, Irene Kacandes and Jonathan Petropolous, ed., *A User's Guide to German Cultural Studies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); David Palumbo and Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, ed., *Toward a Genealogy and Methodology of Italian Cultural Studies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Jose-David Saldivar,

ed., *Border Matters: Remapping American Cultural Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); John Waters, ed. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 95, 1 (1996); Houston A. Baker, Manthia Diawara and Ruth Lindeborg, ed., *Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996); Laura Benedetti, Julia Hairston and Sylvia Ross, ed., *Gendered Contexts: New Perspectives in Italian Cultural Studies* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Jill Forbes and Michael Kelly, ed., *French Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); David Forgacs and Robert Lumley, ed., *Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi, ed. *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction: The Struggle for* Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Victoria Best and Peter Collier, ed., *Powerful Bodies: Performance in French Cultural Studies* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999); Barry Jordan and Rikki Morgan, ed., *Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies* (London: Arnold, 2000). Recent Cultural Studies anthologies that propose a trans-national locatedness and application include Jeffrey Belnap and Raul Fernandez, ed., *Jose Marti's 'Our America': From National to Hemispheric Cultural Studies (*Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Henry Schwartz and Richard Dienst, ed., *Reading the Shape of the World: Toward an International Cultural Studies* (Boulder: Westview, 1996); David Palumbo and Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, ed., *Streams of Cultural Capital: Transnational Cultural Studies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

13. Trukanini was long held to be the last Tasmanian Aborigine. The spelling "Trukanini" is, to the best of my knowledge, favoured by the Palawa people in Tasmania today. Palawa, in turn, is the title that Tasmanian Aboriginals use to describe themselves as a totality. See Greg Lehman, "Will You Take the Next Step?," Unpublished paper for the Tasmanian Aboriginal Land Council, n.d. 1995.
14. Gayatri Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
15. See Robert Millikin, "Genocide Film Stirs University Press Race Row," *The National Times,* July 22, 1978, 23–6; Kay Daniels and Mary Murnane, "letter," *The National Times*, July 29, 1978, p. 9; Bobbi Sykes, "A Re-make: This Time with a Camera," *Filmnews*, January 1979, 13; Lisa Horler, "Black Survivors of White History: The Tasmanian Aboriginal Extinction Myth and the Documentary Black Man's Houses by Steve Thomas," *Metro* 94 (1993): 50–2; Jim Allen, "The Last Tasmanian: A Personal View," in *Histories of Old Ages: Essays in Honour of Rhys Jones,* ed. Atholl Anderson, Ian Lilley and Sue O'Conner (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2001), 45–7.
16. See "Aboriginality in Tasmania," Jim Everett, accessed March 10, 2004, http://www.utas.edu.au/docs/siglo/mag/s12/everett.html.

CHAPTER 2

What Is Tasmania?

Here

With its half-drawn maps, travellers' tales and warped dimensions, the medieval genre called *isolario* encircled the islands of the earth. This epistemology of small islands was compromised by what Tom Conley calls a mytho-poetic "relation to the unknown" that didn't actually want to face the truth, that wanted exuberant legends instead.[1] John Locke wrote that man can have no knowledge except by intuition, reason and "sensation, perceiving the existence of particular things". So what of the supercomputers that Alphonso Lingis has theorised? Do they perceive the existence of particular things when they "select and format the electronic pulses of which the photographs are made?" Lingis is clear on this point: they do *not* select and format the photographs, they select and format the *electronic pulses* of which the photographs are made. So is it the satellite that is sensing and perceiving the existence of particular things as it frames its series of carefree shots? Will the automata point us ultimately toward the *what* that it is pointed toward, to the *which* that we are looking at and want to look at and understand theoretically and pragmatically?

Safe and easy histories contribute to the character of a location, but their clichéd delineation can strip-mine precious qualia and local, lived humanity. We might yearn to look at Tasmania through the eyes of its European explorers, or through those of the indigenous Tasmanians looking back to meet the colonising gaze. But this certitude is akin to a barred subject. Instead, we must make do with the scars of experience preserved in the

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journals of European explorers such as Tasman, François Peron, Jacques Labilliardière and Nicholas Baudin. While we might like, also, to ascend to a repose of Archimedean singularity beyond space and time, freezing Tasmania from the imaginary vantage point that Nietzsche calls "subspecie aeterni", we must console ourselves instead with fragments and metonyms gathered at ground level using more mundane research methods.[2]

Whatever the future might hold for Tasmania, we can be sure that it will be understood in conversation with the traditions, stories and logics of cultural identification recalled from the past. Tasmania, like anywhere else, is alive with its own history. Stories, jokes, philippics, propaganda and blasphemy—often drawing on familiar themes—cast a shadow over Tasmania's wilderness, its farms, factories, towns and cities.

Tasmanianness

The Tasmanian archive is shaped by geographical estrangement from the *imagined* or *real* multi-polis or imperial core—the place from which our orders are given, our history is overdetermined, our gaze acquires its fixations or our children go once they are old enough to prefer the possibilities of fame and fortune over the same, safe comforts of small community life. Tech advances, new levels of institutional agility and cheaper travel have changed this balance of power in favour of the peripheral subaltern who watches but is not watched, who wants but is not wanted. But spatial isolation and difference continue to be imported into complexes of culture and felt subjectivity, languages and vernacular of difference and resemblance. These conversations unfold in different dialects and discourses, in the pubs and the daily papers, in the novels and the films, in public policy and popular folklore. And many of them are selfish, ignorant, prejudiced and cruel. This book offers a piecemeal peroration of the meaning of this archive.[3]

Places are met through the senses but are theorised in the mind, with the tongue and throat. Vital conditions, natural and cultural, seen, heard, felt are dwelt upon as contours of the Spinozist *substance* or, in Gilles Deleuze's terms, the "plane of immanence". This perception of the surface, this awareness of location is sown with the details of character and a place grows up in its place. The plane is redeemed from randomness and obscurity. It becomes an essential, predictable part of the archive. Geographical, geo-morphological, rocky, salty Tasmania can never be a thing-in-itself because it also exists in discursive orders of geography,

politics, economy and art. It is nourished by an exorbitant frontier privilege represented constitutionally in a begging bowl mentality, an unjustified belief in its own innocence, a dreamy kind of obsession with futurity and a schmaltzy fondness for cosy smallness, and the tariff protected industrial past that was once its spatio-temporal hinterland.

Haecceity

Being in Tasmania is being-with-the-archive because Tasmania as a place could not exist without the archive. This study proceeds from the argument that physical, material, objective locations acquire the character of place when the experience and memory of those spatial sites is energised, throughout the life-cycles and story-cycles of the archive, into acts of law and paintings of beaches and postcards and brochures and the novels and philosophy of home and homesickness and homelessness.

Coming to know and love a place through its archive is never simply an exercise in showing and understanding how the place is constructed by texts because the place has a presence anterior to those representations. But neither is it a matter of comparing the discursive framing of places with the hard physical reality of the place-in-itself or for-itself, of adjudicating the accuracy of various representations and of setting up hierarchies of veracity around those judgements: as if to say, for instance, notwithstanding matters of scale, that *Anna Karenina* is the most realistic novel of all time and that one couldn't possibly understand Russia or even late Feudalism and Manorialism, without reading it. It is also to say that one need not go to a place to know it. The Tasmanian archive is a case in point. Statements of disparate institutional and disciplinary origin, enunciations of different length, timbre, cadence and genre are all gathered within its boundaries. Archival articulations that take the island as their object augment and enrich, or undermine and detract from, eye-witness perceptions and tempered family histories. Descriptions of landscape or culture might hit the nail uncannily on its proto-postmodern head (*Blue Skies*) or spin off into gyres of vivid imagination (*The Tilted Cross*, *Gould's Book of Fish*).

But Where Are the Songs of Tasmania? (Pete Hay)

It may be Platonically true that representation is the rendering of a simulation or copy of a real world which is itself a poor imitation of a perfect world of forms, but the proposition's opposite is also compelling.

Symbolic life is creative, free, possibly even arbitrary and certainly capricious. There may well be a special something hiding behind the Tasmanian dream of self-sufficient, monadic oblivion—whales returning to once polluted rivers, black-market rough-hewn firewood for every household that needs it and an official well-paid, low-stress post for all virtuous community-minded citizens in government and governance. It is still so easy to imagine this place stripped of its flimsy European hardware, stripped of all its human history, as if going back in time, deleting the archive as we go, could take us closer to understanding the essence of our banal and sublime antipodean islands.

The idea of the archive is not, in its everyday usage, an equivocal one. The *Australian Oxford Dictionary* describes it simply as "1. a collection of esp. public or corporate documents or records. 2. the place where these are kept".[4] For historians who aim primarily to discover what "really happened" in the past, the archive sits at the centre of a "self-sufficient research paradigm" (Dominick LaCapra). The archive—as earth or dirt in Archaeology, or space and time in Cosmology, as speech act (parole) and speech system (langue) in structuralist ethnographic linguistics—remains the pre-eminent *source* of evidence needed to conduct a thoroughgoing approach to the past. It is thus also an environment of desire in which professional scholars seek glory, treasure, promotion and tenure.[5]

Proponents of the linguistic turn in the philosophy of history who began to destabilise orthodox correspondence theory of truth historiography in the mid to late 1980s problematised this common-sense orientation to the way textual fragments of the past are arranged to produce historical narratives. But for those historians who continue to privilege the value of what Robert Darnton mischievously calls "grubbing in the archives", the labour of history is still conceived primarily as a search for the magic piece of textual evidence that will make a given claim indubitable.[6]

As Frances Dolan writes:

> In a research proposal, or a dinner party conversation, or a book treatment, a bid to legitimacy as a scholar creating new knowledge can best be bolstered by claiming to have found something no one else has found—to need a trip to the archive rather than to plug away dismally and unromantically with microfilm. […] The archive, particularly when understood as a depositary of unpublished records and documents, as opposed to the broadly diffused and widely available print "culture", promises what other scholars do not have, the uniquely juicy and justifying tidbit.[7]

Orthodox archival studies, as Wim Van Mierlo points out in his work on James Joyce, knows its limits, understands its vocation and moves confidently within the parameters of a clearly defined research program:

> Archival studies [is] any kind of research that uses documentary materials other than [the author's] works, whether they are […] actual archives in libraries, facsimile reproduction of manuscripts or any other material source that is part of the general exegesis of or contributes to a contextual understanding of [the author's] writing.[8]

All of this starts to sound suspiciously like Enlightenment common sense, where the darkness of ignorance is replaced by the bright light of true, defensible knowledge. If the archive exists to preserve, it is also the object of a preservation.[9] We go to it for clarification. We seek it to quiet our doubts. Conceptual form and pragmatic function should find a neat harmonic home among the key signatures of the archive.

But what happens when this trust is betrayed? In "Truths in the Archives" Randolph Starn reminds us that delving into the archive has never been without its risks. A fact may be a fact but what are we supposed to do with the truths we discover? Or perhaps more importantly, what is to be done with us and the new knowledge we have unearthed, once we have it, in all its shining newness in our hands and stored away for historical safe-keeping in our moated institutions of learning and remembering? In government, new truths can be submitted to under-gird a policy program. In parliaments they are seized upon to demolish the reputation of opposing parties. The ideologies of anarchy, democracy and neo-liberal libertarianism are all factual even as they propose quite different views of society and emphasise different human rights and demand quite distinct freedoms, rights and responsibilities.

Louis XIV made claims on German territory based on archival misbehaviour. In pursuit of property titles to legitimate his incursions, the Sun King instructed his agents to fabricate the necessary legal documents when they couldn't be found using orthodox strategies.[10] The Benedictine scholar, Jean Mabillon, meanwhile, had to devise an ingenious defence of archival research—the diplomatic—to stave off the recriminations of church authorities angered by the exposure of the fraudulent foundations of certain official histories. Jacques Derrida is drawing an inference from a problem of pragmatics, then, when he claims that the concept of the archive threatens to fall away under the weight of

> the trouble of secrets, of plots, of clandestiness, of half-private, half-public conjurations, always at the unstable limit between public and private, between the family, the society, and the State, between the family and an intimacy even more private than the family, between oneself and oneself.[11]

Methods and Mysteries

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Michel Foucault approaches the archive through an analysis of its constituent parts: the discourse and the statement.[12] The statement is constituted out of the structural collapse of Newtonian historical narratives. Unities like the book and the *oeuvre* and conceptual categories like influence, evolution, tradition and spirit, give way, in Foucault's formulation, to liberated configurations of statements. These dispersed statements are then colligated into grids of specification and mobilised at particular institutional locations, in particular settings:

> Discursive relations are not, as we can see, internal to discourse: they do not connect concepts or words with one another; they do not establish a deductive or rhetorical structure between propositions or sentences. Yet they are not relations exterior to discourse, relations that might limit it, or impose certain forms upon it, or force it, in certain circumstances, to state certain things. They are, in a sense, at the limit of discourse: they offer it objects of which it can speak, or rather they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyse them, classify them, explain them, etc. These relations characterise not the language used by discourse, not the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice.[13]

Instinctive narratological unities such as say, the glorious histories of the Kings and Queens of Britain or the incredulous Marxian histories of neoliberal Capitalism after 1973 or the work of the various histories from below schools no longer appears unproblematically natural or tasteful or clever or politically progressive in its own self-sufficient right. The coherence of these narratives has been challenged as political gaming, as self-regarding monumentalism, as excessive scholarly grandiosity. Even as the thousand year tradition of humanities scholarship—and even deep reading itself—seems surely to have entered an ominously crepuscular phase—beyond the nightmares of Nietzsche, Spengler, Christopher Lasch, Jane Jacobs and others.

Establishment academics in the English speaking world continue to re-crown temporally and spatially distant Kings—with studies from beneath, above, inside out and laterally decentred—easy stories told about relatively risk-free, worked over topics conveyed in a plain prose that frowns at linguistic excess or complex, onanistic theory/philosophy—especially of the "continental" variety. The work of Henry Reynolds has encroached upon its own well-earned legacy after this fashion. Lynette Russell, author of *Roving Mariners: Australian Aboriginal Whalers and Sealers in the Southern Oceans, 1790–1870*, and a leading scholar of the Aboriginal Tasmanians and their links to sealing and whaling and Kangaroo Island in South Australia, calls Reynolds a "doyen of Australian History", and writes of him thus:

> Although one encounters the term *frontier* in contemporary records of the nineteenth century, its current use can really be traced to the work of Henry Reynolds, and in particular his *Aborigines and Settlers: the Australian Experience 1788–1939* (Melbourne: Cassel Australian, 1972) and his acclaimed volume *The Other Side of the Frontier* [...] Together these books can be seen to have inspired a generation of historians working in the field. (Lynette Russell, p.177)

Reynolds' contribution to political success in the reconciliation politics of Aboriginal land rights in Australia has compromised his professional solidarity in a splintered and splintering ontological environment where he is expected to play the multiple roles of public figure, political and politicised activist-patrician and esteemed and sagacious academic. Fortunately, it seems that his work is rich enough with hope and precision to sustain this public heroism and formidable scholarly reputation. While he has covered both narrow and broadly defined areas, Reynolds' writing is often structured in book form around a single idea or outrage, a body full of wounds or a single justice claim. It is also often characterised by thematic variations of stories about the repression of aboriginality and aboriginal stories and histories in Australia, which is not to say that these narratives are factually erroneous or predictable methodologically. Edward Said has attempted to cover off on this familiar predicament in his book on late style.

Reynolds' elevated scholarly and activist status has given him rights to an arsenal of tropes that tend to appear early on in many of his introductions and forewords. One of these is the problem of the status of a treaty between the Aboriginal Tasmanians and the British, one a determination

that the United Nations Convention on genocide signed in 1948 should be regarded as the true and possibly final definition of genocide. His work is also little influenced by progressive theoretical proponents of the historical method, and he thus tends to celebrate and privilege the archival unearthing of new true facts over radical re-readings of the inventory of what we already know about the Australian frontier. This prejudice can lead to a rejection or denigration of historical work that is more interested in the strong writing of properly theoretical or philosophical history or the more poetic, paratactical, hyperbolic and theoretical currents that pop up every now and then under the methodological sponsorship of Cultural or Literary Studies. Reynolds has also been known to give short shrift to disciplinary and ethnographic outsiders—non-historians and non-Tasmanians—who make Tasmania the focus of their inquiries. Take his review of Tom Lawson's book, *The Last Man: A British Genocide in Tasmania*:

> Lawson is clearly at home when discussing the contentious question of genocide, without adding all that much new to the long-running debate […] Lawson's awkward application of the concept of cultural genocide to Tasmania illustrates that his expertise in Holocaust studies far outreaches his detailed knowledge of Tasmanian history.[14]

One must ask here how Reynolds has come to be in a position to judge Lawson on the detail in both his work on the Tasmania genocide and on the Holocaust. Must we assume that Reynolds knows enough in both fields to be able to make such a judgement? At times, he seems to prefer an alternative wagering on legitimation based in endured continuity of ethnicity and the number of years one's forebears have lived in Tasmania—picking up intimate local data like Lamarckian test subjects and passing it on through the generations, and through the archive in its informal modalities. Reynolds writes on Nicholas Clements, author of *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania*:

> Nick is an eighth generation Tasmanian, descended from convicts, one of whom arrived in northern Tasmania in 1804 with the first expedition to establish the settlement on the Tamar River. His ancestors lived through and participated in the conflict of the 1820s.[15]

If Tom Lawson struggles from his English base to overcome an ignorance of Tasmanian island history—an almost impossible task when Tasmanian ancestry is held to be *de rigueur* for anyone writing about Tasmania—then

Clements might be rebuked equally for writing in a myopic environment that impedes his understanding of the relative value of the past that he researches. Here, Reynolds waxes lyrical on the promise of Clements' new book, and on the way it complements the method and focus of his own renditions of Tasmanian and Australian history and particularly his breakthrough best-seller, *Why Weren't We Told*?

> Nicholas Clements has written a book that, while reflecting upon the history wars, has transcended their angry contention and has, consequently brought them to an end.[16]

While Clements himself writes that:

> What I found shocked me. How could an event such as the Black War go so unnoticed? We can be sure that, if it had taken place in the United States, every schoolchild would learn about it, artists and filmmakers would re-create it, and it would be an integral part of the national narrative.[17]

The Left Hand Path

For Foucault, writing in the structuralist and post-structuralist traditions, particles of language operate as individuated forces, moving between discursive formations and causing an array of effects. Foucault's vocabulary gives us words to think about a Tasmanian discourse as well as a Tasmanian archive. Innumerable, scattered statements mobilise the signifier—Tasmania—and construct an object with that name. Additionally, there are certain institutional sites and privileged subject positions that hold the place of this discourse. The Premier of Tasmania, for instance, is endowed with a right to speak about the state as a unified object, looked at quite singularly from his institutionally privileged subject position. On the same note, a little magazine like *Island* serves as a legitimised, indeed, state-sponsored site for the gathering together of diverse opinions on Tasmania. In turning world into text, *Island* makes it epistemologically difficult to separate the hard, concrete being of a Tasmania out there in the real world from the textual enunciations that render it symbolisable. From another angle, however, the statements that appear in *Island* and colour the speeches of the Premier are always already discursive in so far as they are organised generically into coherent forms of expression with clear historical precedents and familiar modes of address. Articles in *Island*, for instance, tend to carry the mark of one or another academic discipline,

whether it be art history, literary studies, cultural theory or sociology, while smear campaigns, hyperbole, public lying and character assassination are all part and parcel of the time-honoured discourses of administrative oratory and fiscal prestidigitation.[18]

Statements that construct Tasmania as an economy can be removed from the context of the knowledge regime—economics—that is their disciplinary home. But if we regroup them as part of a Tasmanian discourse, we still need economics to give them meaning.

It isn't easy to distinguish between the unities that can and or should be exploded here and which should be re-constituted. Is this focus on Tasmania and Tasmanianess a distraction that interferes with a more direct engagement with the particularities of given statements? Or should it be placed at the centre of a discrete discursive formation? The positing of discourse as a new modality for the organisation of statements implies that the statements with which it deals will be pre-discursive, that the allegiance to prior unities will be allegiances to non-discursive formations like the book or the *oeuvre*. In the case of statements about Tasmania, however, discursivity is already inscribed into the texts themselves. A statement about the torrents and cataracts of Tasmania as potential resources for the generation of hydro-electricity is also part of an engineering and civil works discourse. A statement about Tasmania as wilderness getaway is also part of a tourism discourse. A statement about Tasmania as site of depopulation is also part of a social-demographic discourse:

> The systematic erasure of all given unities enable us first of all to restore to the statement the specificity of its occurrence, and to show that discontinuity is one of those great accidents that create cracks not only in the geology of history but also in the simple fact of the statement; it emerges in its historical irruption; what we try to examine is the incision that it makes, that irreducible—and often very tiny—emergence. However banal it may be, however unimportant its consequences may appear to be, however quickly it may be forgotten after its appearance, however little heard or badly deciphered we may suppose it to be, a statement is always an event that neither the language (*langue*) nor the meaning can quite exhaust.[19]

Bees

The history of the archive in Foucault scholarship is characterised by effacement and elision.[20] The archive is a complex category whose exposition is condensed into only two and half pages of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. At one level, Foucault seems to be designating an extra-discursive field

with the category, a container capable of holding an array of discrete discourses in place. Here, the ordering of terms moves by simple enumeration: statement-discourse-archive. He complicates this schema, however, by claiming that the archive actually describes the "systems of statements", the sets of rules and principles "not superposable" to discourse that enable us to deal with statements as either events or things:

> The archive is first […] the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents […] Far from being that which unifies everything that has been said in the great murmur of a discourse, far from being only that which ensures that we exist in the midst of preserved discourse, it is that which differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their own duration.[21]

The peculiar seduction of the concept of the archive for thinking about a place like Tasmania lies in its capacity to open discursive fields into regions that connect language with other dimensions of being. For a start, there are a multiplicity of archives tied to particular "cultures, societies and civilisations", archives that offer an unavoidable confrontation with a privileged region that is

> at once close to us, and different from our present existence, it is the border of time that surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, delimits us […] its threshold of existence is established by the discontinuity that separates us from what we can no longer say, and from that which falls outside our discursive practice; it begins with the outside of our own language.[22]

The outside to which Foucault is referring here remains obscure. On the one hand, the sign seems to refer to the set of rules that govern the generation of statements. Elsewhere in *The Archaeology*, though, it is made clear that the regularity of statements that enable us to bundle them into larger provisional unities is never external to the statements themselves. Alternatively, we could seek to identify an exteriority to the archive in its role as the system of enunciability and the system of functioning for concrete statements. Here a moment of pre-discursivity is inserted into the history of the emergence of statements in the process of their materialisation. In the case of genocide and the Tasmanian archive, the latter determines the very form of enunciations that seek to intervene into the

discursive field constructed out of the historical materiality of the decimation and displacement of the Tasmanian Aborigines. The archive is thus the point of translation that turns the incommensurability of historical fact and language into the differ*a*nce of historical discourse. The sufficient conditions for a diagnosis and discussion of genocide in Tasmania are the occurrence of a series of material crimes and the existence of a set of discursive principles such as the UN convention that give definitional contours to the category in its full generality. The archive captures the flow of the phenomenal reality of actually existing crimes and converts it into matter conducive to articulation in line with the UN convention when the latter is operating as a technology for classificatory capture.

On Foucault's reading, the archive operates between the *langue* and the *corpus*. Identifiable with neither the basic rules governing the construction of sentences, nor with the totality of utterances circulated through a discursive space, the archive defines "a level of practice that causes a multiplicity of statements to emerge as so many regular events, as so many things to be dealt with and manipulated."[23] Again, in the case of genocide in Tasmania, the sea-change that saw the eclipse of the extinction thesis as a legitimate speaking position can be read as reflecting a transformation in the structure of the archive in line with objective discoveries by historians of Aboriginal cultural continuity.

The Tasmanian archive as I imagine it, does act as a storehouse for cultural memory, a reservoir of narrative resources that can be drawn upon by social actors in their deliberate production of place even as that function of containment operates on a symbolic rather than a substantive level. Its materiality is thus of a phantasmatic order, becoming as Derrida puts it a "spectral *a priori*: neither present nor absent in the flesh, neither visible nor invisible, a trace always referring to another whose eyes can never be met".[24]

I disagree with Thomas Osborne when he questions the utility and coherence of the Foucauldian Archive on the grounds that it has a "completely virtual existence and none of the connotations of happy literalism that we have been considering".[25] The poles of literal materiality and spectral evanescence are not irrevocably sundered. The archive that donates its energies to the imagination of place in Tasmania, operates at one remove from the materiality of the storehouse. The substantive ontology of its objects has to be performed and enacted. The speech acts and representational ventures through which it becomes manifest rehearse the function

of the archive in its traditional sense through their implication in formative processes of multi-dimensional subjection.

In *Archive Fever*, Derrida describes a terrain in which the archive marks out not only the temporally originary, the sequentially prior, but also stands for commandment. The archive is thus a naming principle that combines with a capacity to register a housed location, the residence of the archons, "those who commanded".[26]

> Even in their guardianship or their hermeneutic tradition, the archives could do neither without substrate nor without residence. It is thus, in this domiciliation, in this house arrest, that archives take place. The dwelling, this place where they dwell permanently, marks this institutional passage from the private to the public, which does not always mean from the secret to the non-secret.[27]

Derrida sidesteps the frank intercession of language and experience that comes together in the body of the Foucauldian archive, in the name of a more direct, dualist inquiry into the behaviour of archives bound and unbound to uncontroversial places of arrest?[28,29] For Derrida, the most basic and essential function of archive derives from the literal definition of the term "consignation":

> By consignation, we do not only mean, in the ordinary sense of the word, the act of assigning residence or of entrusting so as to put into reserve […] but here the act of consigning through gathering together signs. It is not only the traditional *consignatio*, that is the written proof, but what all consignation begins by presupposing. Consignation aims to co-ordinate a single corpus, in a system or a synchrony in which all the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration. In an archive there should not be any absolute dissociation, any heterogeneity or secret which could separate or partition in an absolute manner. The archontic principle of the archive is also a principle of consignation, that is, of gathering together.[30]

The common object—literary, material, experiential—that holds this book together is Tasmania. Disparate discursive particles like the casual disparaging remark made by a tourist about the weather in Launceston or the fully developed prose *oeuvre* of James McQueen are consigned to the Tasmanian archive on the grounds that they share a constative predicate: the island and *socius* of Tasmania.

Creative Destruction

The Tasmanian archive is a metaphorical as well as a substantive repository and depository of collective significations, but it is also a nexus of productivity. The active archive is foregrounded in Foucault's formulation but it is seldom taken in this way by other scholars who remain content instead to problematise its truth status and to lay bare its imbrication in networks of organisational power. Verne Harris comes close to making the decisive move into thinking the dissemination of archival energy as a kind of language-speaking-the-subject in "The Archival Sliver: Power, Memory, and Archives in South Africa", when he challenges the orthodoxy of referential understandings of the archive. However, in emphasising the role of conscious praxis on the part of archival agents, a portion of this radicalising charge is subsumed into liberal humanist slush:

> A notion common in archival discourse is that archives reflect, or provide an image of, process, the event, the action. Stated more crudely, the idea is that archives, mirror-like, reflect reality […] if archival records [do] reflect reality [however], they do so complicitly, and in a deeply fractured and shifting way. They do not act by themselves. They act through many conduits—the people who created them, the functionaries who managed them, the archivists who selected them for preservation and make them available for use, and the researchers who use them in constructing accounts of the past.[31]

Ann Laura Stoler goes a step further than Harris in reading the archival turn in historiography as a *bildungsroman* dedicated to the description of the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of "the archive-as-subject".[32] Even though historians have long held an interest in the mechanics of the archive, the "profusion of forums in which historians are joining archivists in new conversations about documentary evidence, record keeping and archival theory" marks a decisive moment in the life-cycle of academic and professional historiography.[33]

Tasmania's partial modernity remains a persistent and powerful vector for the formulation of archival enunciations. Where, we might ask, is the apotheosis of this *idée fixe* to be found? In novels like Tom Gilling's *The Sooterkin*? In anti-Tasmanian banter to be heard at any number of Melbourne drinking holes? In public policy grand plans like the *Nixon Report* or the regular assessments of the state's economy compiled by market researchers? In sociological and demographic discourse about migration and ageing? In a generalised inferiority complex or *habitus* actualised and carried round by the citizens of the "Apple Isle".[34]

In truth it exists in all and none of these places. As Derrida writes, archives are necessitated and bulwarked by the death-drive, they serve to stave off the destruction of the past in the present. The archive in this sense recurs eternally:

> Because the archive, if this word or this figure can be stabilized so as to take on a signification, will never be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience. On the contrary: the archive takes place at the place of the originary and structural breakdown of the said memory.[35]

The archive encroaches with the force of Marx's history, it "weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living."[36]

If its contractors and agents are shaken out of solipsism by the communal character of the archive, it is important to remember that it, too, never works alone. The Tasmanian archive overlaps with a range of other archives. It is neither self-identical nor bounded by an order of exclusivity. In keeping with its dual character as law of enunciation and compendium of enunciated, the borders that surround it are porous and provisional. The act of consignation it performs is a kind of theft, or in a softer language, of exchange. Exchange for two reasons, first because the archive always looks full, and second, because a text that is taken from the archive never has to leave. Theft without deprivation, because nothing is lost and nothing is given in return, at least not now, not yet, and not necessarily by the one who has taken or benefited from the stolen goods. Archival debt can always be paid by someone else, at another time. The diaries of Baudin are a case in point.[37] Even though they contribute to the Tasmanian origin gloss of European exploration and imperialism, they are archived materially in their imperial homeland in Le Havre.

The belatedness of their translation excluded them from the Tasmanian archive even though their absence could not be felt until it became a presence, until it was no longer there to be missed, or rather, *the other way round*. The new perspective on Baudin's leadership enriches the Tasmanian archive but it does not impoverish its French equivalent. Unless you count a retrospective mourning, the loss one feels on gaining something one knows one might have gained earlier in the piece, the addition of Baudin's auto-text to the Tasmanian archive is something akin to pure plenitude.

Undoubtedly though, this study would have benefited from a more in-depth reading of the French voyages to Tasmania. It is, alas, just one territory that stretches too far beyond the nucleus of the work at hand. Even so, Shino Konishi's examination of a polarised anthropology carried

into the field by the French explorers of Tasmania—Du Fresne, Bruny d'Entrecasteaux, Baudin and others—demands examination because it offers a real historical complex that could have become a factual present, linguistically and in terms of imperial jurisdiction. Kinoshi adduces a morbid fascination with "deathways", turning bones and flesh and powdered marrow into a positive scholarly presence, accounting for a scientific hunger whose handling was simultaneously objectifying and empathetic, reflecting a grand ambition to extend the hand of enlightenment friendliness into largely uncharted territory. Konishi writes in "Francois Peron's Meditation on Death, Humanity and Savage Society", of disparate approaches taken by Baudin's men to the philosophical demands of their travels. Texts by Joseph-Marie Degerando and George Cuvier were issued to Baudin's party by the *Societe des Observateurs de l'Homme* and evince a stark difference between the former's "interest in comparing the universal natural laws which governed the development of different human societies and Cuvier's emphasis on identifying the fixed, physical differences which distinguished human groups." (109). Konishi's synthetic projection of first-hand accounts of the naturalist's collision with the cemetery furniture of Aboriginal Tasmanian, the machinery with which they "worshipped […] the dead" as well as sympathetic considerations of the respect "they paid to their 'tombs'" is mirrored by the vivid pictures we are shown of ambiguous scientistic savagery, of grave digging, a precursor to the fate of Billy Lanne and bone gathering even in the face of orders not to defile the unquiet colonial graves:

> Uncovering a pile of white ashes which to him appeared to have been "gathered together with care", Peron immediately "thrust" his hand inside to investigate. Finding "something solid", he was "filled with horror" to discover that it was a "human jaw bone, with some shreds of flesh still clinging to it".[38]

Death, as Konishi reminds us, "is the origin and centre of culture." (111). Peron's study of Palawa deathways allowed him to perceive another side of the aborigines; their shared humanity with the French student adventurers.

The Archive Is Alive

The argument being put here takes as its object the field of intercession where the Tasmanian archive meets and mingles with the archives of modernity and genocide. The rule that it follows is that the textual material shared by these institutions can be read dialectically. The events

whose narrativisation I am examining resound in two registers. They are privileged moments in the history of Tasmania, but they are also effects and component elements of abstract social logics. None of these archives cancels the others out. Overlaying one with the other produces a plane of contiguity, but the outer edges of the imaginary surfaces remain incommensurate.

In the case of modernity, I am not suggesting that Tasmania was excluded from the European world system until a renewal of faith in the human senses—the "recovery of nerve" in Peter Gay's terms—had worked itself up into a generalised social orientation, any more than I am contending that modernity could go no further until it had dealt with the "problem" of Tasmania.[39] But even if Tasmania's role in the story of the first modernity is provisional, inessential and ontologically asymmetrical—modernity was a necessary condition for the institution of Tasmania, Tasmania was not a necessary condition for the institution of modernity—it is still trussed together with the emerging conditions of the modern age by something more substantial than mere coincidence. Hypothetically speaking, Tasmania might have been discovered and settled without modernity—it was claimed by the Aboriginal people in this way after all—but the facts of history show us that it was.

If we accept that there are myriad things we aren't going to learn about modernity from the Tasmanian archive, we must also accept that the story of modernity cannot wholly contain the textual currents that flow around the sign world of Tasmania. Even as we subordinate a series of events that happened in Van Diemen's Land in the early-nineteenth century to the glittering and troubled narratives of modernity, we must remember that the Tasmanian archive, like any archive of any place, exceeds the limits of modernity studies and its key categories. Looking through the optic of modernity and modernisation highlights certain clusters of textuality within it—statements, stories and collective feelings about the Hydro-Electric Commission for example—but it leaves others in the dark.

To argue for a re-reading of Tasmanian history through the category of modernity is to respond to the contemporary state of the Tasmanian archive, particularly as it intersects with the text and talk of everyday Australian nationalism. But it is also to identify modernity and its cognate processes and objects—cultural temporality, transformational thresholds, uneven development, imperial historicist time—as overdetermining the narratives Tasmanians tell about their homeland. The *grand récit* of modernity and modernisation provide us with powerful tools

for uncovering the hidden affinity between ostensibly inimical events in the Tasmanian archive—is there any other common denominator to be extracted from the project of hydro-electrification and George Augustus Robinson's renaming of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Wybalenna, for example?—but the poetics of culture they suggest by no means exhaust the interpretive possibilities available therein. The doubled knell of genocide, the counterpoint to modernity and its inverted double in so far as it embodies despair to modernity's hope, is allowed to toll through this book precisely to make this point clear.

Places

Any project that seeks to map out the means by which a given place acquires character through the complex activation of narrative and discourse in the context of lived experience can be paired off in dialogue with Fredric Jameson's comment that "our cultural languages are totally dominated by space rather than categories of time, as in the preceding period of high modernism proper".[40] Traditionally, writing on place has tended to take one of two forms: impressionistic, literary evocations of particular places, or theoretical, abstract adumbrations of place in general.

If getting to the core of a given locale like Thomas Hardy's Wessex, John Updike's Pennsylvania or Patrick White's Australia, requires an immersion in the vivid fecundity of descriptive fiction, it would seem, *mutatis mutandis*, that a turn to purely logical philosophy is required to adequately grasp place as a concept.

But is there really anything to be gained from scouring places of their tangible characteristics in the name of attaining an arid understanding of place in the abstract? Positivist, philosophical discourse, even in its phenomenological and embodied modes, is compromised in its attempt to generate a productive discourse around place precisely because the promise of place lies in its resistance to disaffected, rinsed-out abstraction.[41]

Alongside its fascination with categories like economy, space, time, speed, truth and causation, hegemonic English-language, institutional philosophy still displays an exuberant fondness for the universality of Newtonian and Cartesian space (the Eisenhower and Einstein continuum, grid or matrix) which is why Novalis described philosophy as "homesickness […] the urge to be at home everywhere".[42]

Henri Lefebvre's social constructivist inscription of a force of production onto this void of naturalised, uniform, fungible space performs

the useful function of undermining the imperialising, matter and object-obsessed ambitions of the physical sciences.[43] If Gaston Bachelard was on the right track when he called his mercurial study *The Poetics of Space* rather than place, the contrariness of de Certeau's counter-intuitive dictum that space is practised place only confirms the complex character of philosophical discourse on the topic to hand.[44]

In the *Physics*, Aristotle breaks from Plato in making place co-terminous to space. For the latter, place or topos is located within the *chora*, the cosmological ether that holds the universe in a particular position, but for Aristotle, the two differ from each other only in trivial ways. For the latter, place is where a thing is, it is what surrounds a thing so that in Ed Casey's words "its inner surface and the outer surface of the thing contained are strictly contiguous".[45] From Aristotle's intervention onwards, Casey argues, the category of place was kidnapped by space theorists and its zone of non-local non-particular infinite extension came to be the container that surrounded objects and localities. Casey provides a useful list of the basic attributes of place, most of which, he argues, were lost to the category after its subsumption into the concept of space:

> If space and place are both utterly relational, a sheer order of co-existing points, then they will not retain any of the inherent properties ascribed to place by ancient and early modern philosophers: properties of encompassing, holding, sustaining, gathering, situating.[46]

This concept of place flensed of its intrinsic characteristics begins to resemble the category of site, which in turn denotes an empty, holding function that lacks, and can even negate identity where the latter is based on the identification of positive characteristics self-sufficient within differentiated entities and relationships between entities and institutions.

Instead of places, Casey argues, we have come to inhabit sites of regulation and discipline that produce the kinds of docile bodies catalogued by Michel Foucault. The juridical subject of Lockean justice, to take another example, is made into an entity through the derogation of local, immanent rights that derived from tight-knit belonging and the retreatment as a rights-endowed being guaranteed by a less-certain insertion into another far grander law-enforcing regime that is stripped of most of the cosy, autonomy that characterised the solidarity of the previous situation.

For Casey, the antidote to this loss of place, is to be found in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's notion of smooth space, the opposite and

pharmakon for striated or gridded space and the location of the local absolute. In addition to terms like region in Martin Heidegger's work, enclave in Jean-François Lyotard's, earth in ecology and so on, smooth space and the local absolute represent an attempt to provide a vocabulary of concreteness for thinking our situatedness and the chance to shelter outside the influence of site and time as basic organizational categories.

This focus on final definitions and frozen hypostasis takes us a long way from the very sensible and sensuous attractions of place that reveal its defining characteristics. Perhaps there is no bridge between succulent literary texts that richly evoke a place, imagined or otherwise, and desiccated philosophical discourse on place in general. Perhaps, even more forebodingly, analytic, Anglo-American philosophy (as opposed to what is called continental philosophy or more crucially, translated European academic work read by predominantly monolingual English-speaking students and faculty) and even the entire humanities and liberal arts project in *toto* seems at times as if it has become one of those vacant lots, that Casey so obviously dislikes—something akin to the flat screen, black glass environment that enables high frequency derivative traders to vanquish, limit, insure and collateralise the risk inherent in their constant wagering against and within the options, swaps and futures markets of the world.

The promise of the archive as a means of understanding how locations become places, lies in its sensitivity to the mutual imbrication of language and sensory experience. In an island the size of mainland Tasmania, the concept of geographical separation must be drawn upon in combination with the perception of coastal spaces if the experience of a single stretch of beach, cliffs and water is to be understood as part of a continuous perimeter. If that coastal space is to be understood as part of an island called Tasmania, furthermore, higher order narratives must be accessed. Tasmania as a unified object is never available to sense perception in the same way as a more confined, possibly monitored, place like a city park or a theatre of war. When we talk about Tasmanian place, we are talking about a combination of immediate physical awareness and cognitive mapping that relies upon official cartography, the hybridisation of isolated place interaction, memory and other factors for its successful production and maintenance. The geographical estrangement of Tasmania that asks to be incorporated into a cultural taxonomy depends upon the imaginary imputation of islandness, itself a condition inaccessible to the perceiving subject other than through the synthetic amalgamation of disparate fragments of experience. It is the linguistic lineaments of the archive that allow

us to weld these rough-hewn perceptions into a coherent, communicable whole. The archive tells us we are on an island even when our senses fail us.

We carry the archive around with us then, adding to it as we go. Even a book like this that purports to describe the archive takes part in its formulation. As we write about the archive, it undergoes a metamorphosis and we find the place we left when we sat down to write is not the same when we get up to leave. In Barthes' terms, the archive is a *scriptible* rather than a *lisible* web of texts.[47]

The socio-economic conditions faced by Tasmanians have not been cast from some exotic autochthonous matter found nowhere else on earth. The forms of life to be found here, can also be found across the entirety of the late-capitalist world. Fast-food franchises, shopping malls, multiplex cinemas, the military-industrial complex, the transnational education system, the internet, all feature in Tasmanian life in much the same way as they do for citizens in New Caledonia, France, England or Iowa. High-wage employment in smart industries and symbolic analysis is harder to come by in Tasmania than in larger centres, but the employment profile of the state matches the OECD world in rough symmetry. There are fund managers and internet designers and tourism consultants and architects based in Devonport, Launceston and Hobart and their position descriptions do not differ dramatically from those of their counterparts in Nottingham or Dunedin or Montgomery, Alabama. There is oldish money and new money, drug addiction and violent crime, corruption and community spirit, pride of place and generalised self-loathing, yuppie suburbs and unloved slums.

Time's Arrow

Within a field of homogeneity or Deleuzian smoothness, what we might call the world-system, or postmodern capitalism, or the West, or the developed world, singularity presents itself as an exception. But the emphasis placed by writers on the homogeneous heterogeneity of this late-capitalist world is often just nostalgic schmaltz, a reflexive reaction to the effacement of a mythologised particularity that has come to be missed even though it never really existed. Many of the cottager refugees of Raymond Williams' Wales, who left their villages to join the British industrial multitude were horrified at the sinister shapelessness of the satanic mills that would be their workplaces and, eventually but not permanently, their font of prosperity, renovated identity, nation, group and self. Tied down to the routine of a prodromal Taylorism, elegies for the lost world of difference and specificity

denoted by the sacred word—home—came easily. But even in the uniformly mutant spaces of the 1 % neo-liberal present, difference persists as brand-mediated selflessness pumped up on ominously plentiful reserve bank money. Fantasies of perfect uniformity are just that; Toyota myths of a world where texture and colour and character have been removed by some centrally planned, Corbusian architectonics. Even as the profit motive remains universally isomorphic and cute in its local incarnations.

But, how can a true Tasmanian resist being struck by the very closeness and familiarity and claustrophobia and relentless sameness of home?[48]

Views from Windows, Out on to Streets, Across Rivers, Over to Hills, Rolling, Abrupt, Steep, Wooded, Cleared, Brown, Green-Blue

Richard Flanagan has observed that Hobart is the only capital city in Australia where all the major streets in the central business district open out onto vistas of nature.[49] Mt Wellington crowns the south-west angle, its jutting, brooding, snow-capped bulk cuts off a quadrant of the sky. Its purple tone at evening is its own. The organ pipes, thrusting shafts of dolerite, cut an axis up away from the buttressing foothills. The squat cubism of city architecture, steel and glass and grey concrete, is melded with the uncertainty of natural form, the crenellated, broken, shunted shapes of Kunanyi cut a hole in the bluish sky.

Blue Sky Against Grey Rock Against the White Matchsticks of Burnt-Out Gum

Apologetics

Does anybody know anything about sorry day?

A- It is the day that all Tasmanians say sorry to……
B- Aboriginals.

Why would we say sorry to aboriginal people?

C- We wrecked some of their landscapes.
D- Because ….. Well when the first white people came they killed a lot of Aboriginals and took their land. They wanted to rule their land.

E- They trapped and killed the aboriginal people because they wanted to get a closer look because they thought they were animals.
F- They killed the aboriginal people because they just wanted to get rid of them so there were only a few aboriginals left.
C- They did not respect that the aboriginals were black instead of white.

Why is it important that we say sorry?

F- Because we made heaps of families sad by killing their family members and the Aboriginal people are getting a little annoyed by the white people so we have to say sorry.
G- Because we hurt a lot of their feelings.
D- We need to respect them … they are us! So we need to respect them how they respect us.

The debate around genocide in Tasmania that unfolded across the opinion pages of the Australian press in the wake of the publication of Keith Windschuttle's first volume of *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History* in 2002 can be re-read in the context of this book and, an even more crisply a decade later, as an argument about whether a signifier and indeed, a sign, should be allowed to circulate through an archive. From an archival perspective, the fierce debate over whether the decimation and displacement of the Tasmanian Aborigines was genocidal starts to look like a just war conducted on a slippery rhetorical field. The signifier has become active. Archival articulations are on the record and Tasmania is likely to be disputed semantic territory for some years to come. This is especially so in the case of contributions to the archive that emanate from outside the state—invasions, of both barbarian and genteel ilk. If Tasmania has a growing global reputation as a cutting-edge arts hotspot, an eco-tourism destination and a producer of gourmet foods, it also features in the top rank of places defined by their genocidal pasts. What was happening to Tasmania as a place, for instance, when students in Frank Chalk's History and Sociology of Genocide class at Concordia University were presented with a slide show about the Van Diemonian genocide?[50] Chalk's referred in his class to well-known historical knowledge: the mission of George Augustus Robinson, the Black Line and so on—but the students in attendance might have known nothing about Tasmania before this lesson. In this context, for Chalk's class, place and archive will have become both

synonymous and iconic so that Tasmania and genocide come to signify two parts of a single thing.

References to the Tasmanian genocide are legion across a range of discursive terrains emanating from all four corners of the *isolario* world. Conjoined mobilisations of the twin signifiers genocide and Tasmania can be found in the letter pages of magazines, in academic articles, in fiction, film, newspapers and in journalistic non-academic histories.[51] The questions that need to be asked about these contributions to the Tasmanian archive turn around the motivation for the deployment of the term and the work done by the term in its various contexts.

None of Us Were There

Because of the charged volatility of the signifier genocide, this stream of the book is vulnerable to an attack based on common-sense historical method. But what actually happened during the genocidal wars is not our main focus. What is at issue is whether that which happened should rightfully be communicated through the signs of genocide or whether, with Henry Reynolds and Nicholas Clements, it should be thought and discussed more properly as a war. Here the question of definition or signification is key and two scholarly camps have emerged. First, there are those who privilege the UN convention definition of genocide, while second, those who follow the Lemkinian definition and foreground the significant place that Tasmania played in Lemkin's thinking. Behind this, again, are questions about the role of scholars in late-capitalist Anglo-American neo-liberal society. If charges of genocide were ever to be applied retrospectively to any Tasmanian or Imperial authority, legal definitions would necessarily be privileged. If, however, this discussion is scholarly, the UN definition is arguably of no significance at all. This is a deeply disturbing issue for anyone who dares to look closely at these matters in the Tasmanian context, especially when we consider the morality of profiting personally from the study of genocide.

Players in the Tasmanian genocide debate already do the work of applying an abstraction to an immanent set of historical logics. The archive that operates at one remove from the material history of Tasmania is thus already accessed by the historians concerned. In the modernity problematic that structures this book, the contributions to the Tasmanian

archive do not function at the level of meta-history. In other words, in the modernity stream, I do the work of abstraction, framing a series of engagements with the problematics of modernity in the Tasmanian archive. Thus the agency of the signifier—modernity—is of quite a different character to that of the signifier—genocide. To make this clearer, we need to emphasise the splitting of event and discourse that this study is built around.

The Tasmanian archive is an imaginary materiality that recuperates and colonises a cosmos of texts. These texts represent or encode events in such a way as to influence the character of other events that follow. There is thus no clear division between event and the archive because a function of reflexivity folds the two in on each other. In a very real sense, the events do not have an ontology entirely removed from the archive but the necessity to make room for place, space and human folkways, demands that we recognise a non-archival dimension to Tasmanian history. It is also important to recognise that the archivality of enunciations is not always apparent to the voicer of the articulation. More precisely, the Tasmanianness of the articulation might only become apparent later when, for example, a biography of the subject responsible for the utterance is written to lay claim to his or her status as an exemplary and loyal contributor to the Tasmanian story.

In the case of both modernity and genocide, the actual occurrence of the events concerned was not coded in terms of the two signifiers being examined. While modernisation was a trope that government leaders, captains of industry and their factotums deployed on occasion, the connection to a world-historical tradition called modernity was seldom made. But modernity, as demonstrated by Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, is as much a narrative as a set of historico-social logics.[52] In light of this, the approach I have taken has been to connect up disparate events from the history of Tasmania in terms of the way they intersect with the tropes, logics, strategies, hopes and deformations common to modernity studies. In this sense, my account of modernity in the Tasmanian archive has really been the history of my own submission by and of modernity into that archive.

The two levels of operability here are historical actuality and synthetic theoretical discourse. The archive shuttles between these levels in carrying the traces of historical actuality into the present so that they can be re-coded in terms provided by modernity theory. But even if the historical actors who played a part in the various phases and stagings of the

modernisation of Tasmania had not read Tony Giddens, they were still possessed of the spirit of improvement and progress and the certainty that the present was superior to the past because of its privileged grammatical and ideological position at the outer edge of the sentencing structure of the here and now. Tasmanians worked self-consciously through the archive as they changed it. Operating within its confines, seeing Tasmania in the terms it allowed, they were readying their subject for experiential and epistemological rebirth. In this sense, the archive ran on ahead of history and laid the foundations for its achievement in the annals of secular life-work.

On the one hand, the signifier—modernity—scars the Tasmania archive like a surface wound. It is deployed only rarely and doesn't act as a centre of semiotic gravity in the way that signs, signifiers and signifieds like the Museum of Old and New Art (MONA), wilderness or island do. At the same time, however, many historical actors have gone about their business at the various stages of Tasmania's socio-cultural transformation with an orientation to the future that was nothing if not self-consciously modernising and even optimistic every now and then. For many Tasmanians—and this is especially so in the case of the hydro-electrification of the archipelago—becoming modern was a fully formulated if contested goal that merged archival understandings, readings of the past, and articulated premonitions of the future with humdrum historical actions and reactions.[53]

The events that have since been made to coalesce around the signifier genocide in Tasmania, on the other hand, were not enacted with genocide in mind for the simple reason that the neo-logism was not codified until Raphael Lemkin's *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* was published in 1944:

> New conceptions require new terms. By "genocide" we mean the destruction of a race or of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.[54]

The murder of Aboriginals on the Tasmanian frontier may have been perpetrated under the influence of motivations that we would now understand as genocidal but that violence-form was never articulated at the level

of the letter. The concept operates, rather, at a historiographical level, as a tool for re-reading disparate incidents and tying them together into a unified, consonant totality. Most of the incidents that feature at the heart of the genocide debate—the Risdon Massacre, the Black Line, the Roving Parties, stock keeper war crimes—were documented by historians of the nineteenth century and in most cases, the most important primary source providing us with access into those conflictual pasts remains the seventeen volumes of reports compiled by Governor Arthur in 1830 and filed as the Colonial Secretary's Office Papers in the Tasmanian Archives.[55] In other words, at various points in the past, the Tasmanian archive bore witness to a set of concrete events that were only to become epistemologically genocidal at a later date.

The Weight of Your Words

Although nineteenth-century historians like James Bonwick, John West and James Calder described the killings of Aborigines in Tasmania in terms of extirpation and extermination, perhaps the first author to explicitly mobilise the term genocide to describe the frontier experience in Tasmania was Bronwyn Desailly in her 1977 thesis *The Mechanics of Genocide: Colonial Policies and Attitudes towards the Tasmanian Aborigines, 1824–1836*.[56] Desailly's dissertation catalogues the major instances of colonial death in Van Diemen's Land and contextualises them through an examination of the racist ideologies disseminated through the newspapers at the time. But somewhere along the way she got rattled. Although the title of her thesis suggests a generalised diagnosis and study of genocide across the entirety of post-settlement Tasmania, in the body of the text she restricts her discussion of it to an indictment of Governor Arthur's refusal to act on advice given by George Augustus Robinson that the Aborigines exiled to Flinders Island seemed doomed to extinction. "Robinson's pleas were ignored", she writes, "and thus *genocide* was sanctioned. Once again the Colonial Government showed its overriding interest was to maintain peaceful British settlement even if this involved the extinction of a race".[57]

Desailly's interpolation of genocide into the Tasmanian archive is left stranded as a shipwrecked intervention into imagining place. The motivation for her deployment of the term is unclear, and its relegation from title to text suggests a case of academic cold feet. It's effect, as subtle as it might be, is to shift the crimes of the British colonisers into a more indictable register. The function of the Holocaust as what Alison Palmer calls

the "prototype" of genocide inscribes its signifier with an ominous overheated power.[58] By describing the decimation and the displacement of the Aboriginal Tasmanians as a genocide, Desailly draws down on this power of horror and builds a bridge between the two historical events that elides the difference at their respective cores.

In Desailly's *opus*, the perpetration of a genocide in Tasmania is taken as a given and does not in itself become the subject of a stepped-out elaboration. The assumption here is that mass deaths on the Tasmanian frontier were self-evidently genocidal because they were carried out by one racial grouping and directed at another racial grouping. Bernard Smith's Boyer Lectures, *The Spectre of Trugernini*, focuses on the anamnesis of colonial violence that began to work its way through the networks of the Australian public sphere by the late 1970s:

> It is this new awareness of what actually occurred that, it seems to me, constitutes a central problem for the integrity and authenticity of Australian culture today. How shall we redeem it from the guilty awareness that these acts of genocide and attempted genocide were being enacted most vigorously at that very time when white Australian culture was being conceived and born.[59]

Peter Conrad follows Smith in *Down Home: Revisiting Tasmania* when he uses the emblem of genocide to invoke the Tasmanian Gothic:

> The island has been made by a long series of alienating schisms. Tasmania first suffered disconnection from the mainland, which left its landscape buckled and eruptive; then it was singled out as a place of penance and the site for an experiment in genocide. The settlers pathetically strove to reconcile Arcady with Alcatraz; since then, the spoliation of mountains and the damming of rivers hint at a desire to punish this unyielding place into subservience.[60]

For others, genocide is not so obviously amenable to being harnessed as souvenir kitsch, no matter how noble the motivations. This group focuses on Tasmanian's past to add density to the discussion of other instances of genocide or of genocide in general. For this group, Tasmania is a cipher, an empty place marked off on the historical record by the atrocities absorbed by its indigenous inhabitants. Florence Mazian's monograph *Why Genocide?: The Armenian and Jewish Experiences in Perspective* provides a case in point. *Why Genocide?* is a work of psycho-social scholarship

that seeks to develop a theoretical framework for understanding how genocides in general come to be enacted through a practical analysis of the facts in the case of Turkish Armenia and the Shoah. As is often the case with this kind of text, the Tasmanian genocide is only mentioned in passing. In this instance, the broad type of genocide with which the Tasmanian situation complies is colonial genocide:

> A case lending support to Toynbee's thesis can be seen in the case of the island of Tasmania, where in a short span of seventy-three years the British successfully eliminated the native population. […] Genocide is not always as blatantly practiced as it was with the Nazis, nor is it always practiced as ruthlessly as in the case of the British in Tasmania […] Genocide can be executed with a certain finesse.[61]

In Ward Churchill's, *A Little Matter of Genocide*, references to the Tasmanian extermination appear twice, in the first instance in the context of a refutation of the uniqueness position in Holocaust Studies and second as specifically colonial evidence for the long durational extension of genocidal practices. Even the entry for Tasmania in the index is bound inextricably with the signifier extermination. Sven Lindqvist's *Exterminate all the Brutes*, doesn't explicitly mention the term genocide in relation to Tasmania, but it does claim that "[t]he Tasmanians were the most well known of the exterminated peoples and were often held up as symbols for them all."[62]

Carmel Schrire's elegiac essay in honour of the anthropologist and archaeologist Rhys Jones, "Betrayal as a Universal Element in the Sundering of Bass Strait", departs from the course marked out by these writers in its willingness to call the Tasmanian genocide a Holocaust. Schrire's comments are essentially secondary reproductions of Jones's own work drawn from Tom Haydon's controversial documentary *The Last Tasmanian: A Story of Genocide*. They are most notable for the way they reiterate the genocidal character of frontier conflict in Tasmania even as their author subscribes to the extinction as inevitability thesis that Jones so notoriously championed. Haydon's film, is one of the foundation stones for the reading of genocide into Tasmanian history. It was first released in 1978, only 12 or so months after Desailly's thesis was completed. As Haydon writes:

> This [Tasmanian] community was responsible for committing, in my view, the world's only case of a genocide so swift and so complete and the guilt of that, I think, has lain very strongly with the white people of Tasmania.[63]

The Tasmanian genocide is also framed in juridical terms, as a set of cases that need to be adjudged in accordance with legal definitions of genocide. The writers concerned herein, tend to be working from within the disciplinary confines of Genocide Studies more generally, or set as their target an intra-Australian analysis of genocidal logics. This commonality of purpose derives from a shared conviction that the perpetration of mass deaths is not a sufficient condition for a charge of genocide. Unlike the writers who infer the Tasmanian genocide from the frontier violence as a given, the proponents of this closer reading examine the historical facts in impressive detail. The fact that little new historical data is added to the panorama provided by nineteenth-century historians like Bonwick, Ling Roth, Calder and West remains salient. The additions to the Tasmanian archive made by these writers acquires a novel character primarily through the contextual placement of their comments. In the case of writing located within the confines of the international study of genocide, it might be more accurate to state that Tasmania is being added to the archive of genocide rather than vice versa. The comparativist orientation of these contributions, however, does supplement the Tasmanian archive if only through the notification that what transpired in Van Diemen's Land from 1803 to 1876 bears an ugly resemblance to other colonial bloodbaths.

Will and Determinism

A. Dirk Moses's "An Antipodean Genocide? The Origins of the Genocidal Moment in the Colonisation of Australia", interrogates the centrality of intention to the UN definition. Moses attempts to short-circuit the closed network of UN-defined genocide through an engagement with traditions of social scientific thought that emphasise the distinction between structure and agency. Attempts to identify a UN-defined genocide in Tasmania are impossible, Moses contends, because of the lack of deliberate policy on behalf of either the Tasmanian Colonial Governments or the Colonial Office in Britain. Rather than throwing out the term altogether, however, he proposes that we think the Tasmanian genocide as a set of glacial developments. In particular, he argues, the moves to segregate the Aborigines and ultimately to remove them from the Tasmanian mainland entirely, lead to genocide even if genocide wasn't intended by the action. Moses returns to the UN definition to demonstrate the means by which the will-to-destruction of the Aboriginal peoples of Tasmania became subjectively located within the consciousness of the colonial agents themselves,

producing a situation where specific genocidal intention of the kind described in the UN definition can be adduced.[64]

In "After the Holocaust: Consciousness of Genocide in Australia", Tony Barta refers briefly to the Tasmanian case in proposing that white Australia carries a living genocide debt owed to the Aboriginal population. Barta adopts the same approach as Churchill in "Genocide: Toward a Functional Definition" in initiating his discourse with an extended quotation from Lemkin's *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*.[65] But he departs from this course in providing an overarching genealogy of genocide, which, like the work of A. Dirk Moses, focuses on intent and intention. Churchill refers here to the way John Paul Sartre's reading of genocide in the American war in Vietnam shifted the emphasis of the definition away from intention to the effects of campaigns of occupation and colonisation:

> The proof of genocide, [Sartre] asserted lies in the results of policy, not in the intentions by which it may be undertaken. The fact of Vietnamese decimation in itself established that genocide was occurring in Indo-China, regardless of the U.S. government's oft-stated rationale that its intent was to liberate the Vietnamese and safeguard their freedom.[66]

Can the life of a group of people can be separated from the lives of the individuals that make it up? In the case of the Tasmanian genocide, the elimination of traditional hunting practices, the radical stifling of inter-tribal marriage and restrictions on seasonal migration clearly point to a case of cultural genocide.[67]

Henry Reynolds' *An Indelible Stain: The Question of Genocide in Australian History* is staunch in its opposition to applying the term genocide to the Tasmanian colony, primarily on the grounds of lack of established government intent. But Reynolds has softened his view in more recent studies, accepting, for instance, that calling a historical logic genocidal depends very much on the definition of genocide that it is filed under.

In stark contrast to Reynolds' piece is Bill Thorpe and Raymond Evans' extended essay "Indigenocide and the Massacre of Aboriginal History". Here, the authors, compare the facts in the case of Tasmania with the UN definition and come up with what they see as an irrefutable verdict:

> [The Tasmanian Aboriginal situation] is certainly genocidal if one takes the United Nations definition, and deploys several of its criteria to what occurred during the height of the conflict between the settlers and Aborigines over land (1824–1834).[68]

Thorpe and Evans' work is a classic articulation of the factor of genocide in a historical logic. It summarises the central events of the frontier history, it begins with a discussion of Lemkin's work and it reproduces the UN definition at length. Like the international genocide scholars who push the UN definition to one side, Thorpe and Evans propose an alternative nomenclature for thinking the clash of cultures in Australia—indigenocide.

In "Genocide in Australia", Colin Tatz directs our attention to article II (a) of the Convention that lays down the requirement that victims of genocide be targeted by virtue of their membership of a specific racial or ethnic grouping. After summarising some of the violent encounters between the Aborigines and the Europeans, Tatz concludes that:

> This wasn't simply a murderous outbreak of racial hatred. They were killed with intent, not solely because of their spearing of cattle or their scientific value, but rather because they were Aborigines. The Genocide Convention is very specific on this point: the victim group must be at risk because of their membership of that group.[69]

Ann Curthoys agrees with Tatz in her own inquiry into genocide in Tasmania, arriving at the conclusion that genocide occurred by way of a reading of Ward Churchill and Sven Lindqvist. Her intervention into the Tasmanian archive follows the form of those authors who take the genocide as a given, however, in so far as she only makes passing mention of the Tasmanian case. Her comments are worth repeating, though, because they segue into the final major modality of genocide in Tasmania. Adumbrating the reversal of the extinction thesis after the Tasmanian Aboriginal Rights movement became active in the late 1970s, Curthoys states that "genocide had taken place, but it had not been complete".[70] Here genocide is conceived as the total annihilation of a racial group or ethnicity.

Aside from the forced comparison with other genocidal events that is enacted through the mobilisation of this volatile signifier it is difficult to see the value of re-reading a set of historical events that is already recognised as horrific in terms of an alternative meta-theoretical category that only re-iterates that power of horror. In terms of its contribution to a politics of reconciliation, Ned Curthoys' comments on genocide discourse seem to offer a tentative way forward:

> Here in Australia the vexed question of genocide […] can be […] contextualised within an inherited European pattern of colonial expansion and mono-cultural domination requiring a response that is both urgent and

> historically "deep", removed from pedantic legalism and myopic political imperatives.[71]

In his 1987 essay "Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia" Tony Barta suggests that we "need a conception of genocide which embraces *relations* of destruction and removes from the word the emphasis on policy and intention which brought it into being."[72] Genocides are synthetic events. They involve subjects and objects, the weak and the strong, technology and ideology, victims and perpetrators, planners and executioners, and all these dualities of role and experience and ownership of action are never as distanced or clean or safe as might be intended or imagined. Genocide can be hard to forget for almost everyone involved and many others besides.

As Lemkin himself writes in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*:

> Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor's own nationals.[73]

In his essay, "A Plethora of Intentions: Genocide, Settler Colonialism in Australia and Britain", John Docker shows that he has earned the right to summarise and sum up the blow by blow dimensions of the intention debate in Tasmanian genocide studies. Indeed, he finds a way to return the *destruktion* to a place of generality amid a broad Western thought tradition. We can certainly not be far away from ending the tit for tat submission of particular frontier facts to concrete universals such as the genocide form. Docker even gives Reynolds a chance to overleap his strange attachment to British benevolence and civilisational superiority by offering the overman from Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* as a model for mapping chaos logics into sober historiography. Why, we are forced to ponder, is Reynolds so brave and so pure of heart in in his decrying of frontier violence on continental Australia but so pernickety and officious when it comes to genocide in Tasmania. Docker is right to focus on the ways in which communities can repress historical consciousness of unpleasant pasts and even to despair, at the limits of scholarly responsibility, of influencing this shameful repetition, to which the filmic answer must always be the condescending asseveration: "you can't handle the truth".

It is odd though that Docker fails to note, as I have already said, that Reynolds admits that the Tasmanian gulag can be called a genocide if we use a definition that doesn't foreground intent as the key semantic pivot. Why, Docker cannot grasp, is how Reynolds and Clements and others are not astounded by and ashamed of the brutality engendered by the collision of cultures in nineteenth century Tasmania. Is Reynolds trying to excuse his home state? Is he a fan of British culture and blinded by their overall commitment to geopolitics?

The real answer I submit is less mysterious. Reynolds is reluctant to call the Tasmanian disaster a genocide because, for him, genocide refers directly to the Holocaust. His privileging of UN-convention definitions over scholarly ones can be taken as evidence of a slippage from genocide to Holocaust, amid an ensuing problem of epistemological scale and common-sense Manichean loathing of Third Reich policies and politics. The Holocaust occurred, Lemkin wrote a book about it, coined the term genocide to describe it in relation to other like events and the UN built their convention abstract out of Lemkin's concept image. The Holocaust of course is a felt devastation because it is cast as a monstrosity of intent. The Wannsee hands that signed the proverbial paper, were capable of shackling the focused intent of a few men to the historical total war cause of millions of fatalities in a very short period of time. All Reynolds wants to find in his search for government intent in the Tasmanian case is an equivalent event to Wannsee or a document containing and betraying the same deadly instructions and desires. The affective blankness of Reynolds' work in this area that Docker seems to find confounding and complacent, is probably more a failure of imagination and a symptom of a precise, well-meaning if ungenerous and philosophically limited mind for events that need to be named with the same conceptual verisimilitude even though one made the term and the other can only lay claim to it, most excitingly, Docker suggests, in a real life twenty-first-century international court of law.

Supernova

The flux of vassalage populates the space between the imperial centre and the garrison outpost with endless ebbs and flows in the distribution and dialectics of power and prestige. This moment morphs and migrates but never gives up the ghost. The post-colonial turn in historiography and literary theory has done much to remedy and rejig this distortion, but the traces of cultural lag, the *revenants* of centres and peripheries, still fold

our imaginations into the mental architecture of hubs and spokes. In existential terms, this dis-ease manifests as a feeling of isolation, the sensation that the place we are in is at one remove from itself, immediately present and yet far-flung, near and far at the same time. Temporal coding of new world *gnosis* has long been shaped into the gratifying cynical, resignation that whatever happened in these marginal spaces was only ever an echo of what had already transpired in the imperial *omphalos* or at least within its sanctums and citadels. The time-delay between events and their mediated arrival in the colonies creates a hunger for belated news reports from the mother countries, a situation as disorientating as the knowledge that the distant stars we experience as existing in the present might actually have burnt out hundreds of millions of years ago. In Tasmania, this sense of displacement and exile produced a phenomenology of colonial isolation, a thirst for resemblance and similarity instantiated in John Glover's Eurofication of native landscapes, the imitational mode of cultural production that Jim Davidson calls Tasmanian Gothic and Hal Porter's claim that "Hobart Town was […] the Englishman's miniature of London from which no home-recalling and cherished detail had been left out […]".[74]

For Meaghan Morris, the problematic that develops around these configurations of imperial historicist time and its colonial discontents can be summed up in the contention that modernity is a known history. Likewise, for Partha Chatterjee, the attempt to theorise non-European modernities incites a politics of despair of precisely the kind that Dipesh Chakrabarty seeks to dispel in *Provincializing Europe*. On the cognate topic of nationalism in the colonial world, Chatterjee notes:

> If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined communities from certain "modular" forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? *History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity.* Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and postcolonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonised.[75]

Speaking in a different register, Richard Flanagan bemoans the existence of obstacles that inhibit the representation of the particularity of minor places when the only languages that might encase such representations are overdetermined by their imperial stamp, seal and decree:

> To grow up in Tasmania not so long ago, as I did, was to meet the world each day with wonder and with love, with fear and with terror. This experience, it must be admitted, is hardly remarkable. What was remarkable—though I hardly knew it then—was that you were not allowed to express that world in forms other than that of ephemeral stories and jokes you told and others told you.[76]

Chakrabarty tells us that modernity is generally considered to be something that happened first in Europe, then elsewhere. But the very incorporation of Tasmania into the European world-system was itself a multi-valent symptom of that dramatic set of social transformations. In other words, and in ironic contradiction to Bruno Latour's famous thesis, Tasmania has always been modern because it was modernity that prompted its discovery and modernity that prompted its settlement.[77] The topological birth of Tasmania was an effect of modernity rather than an instance of its actively willed realisation. At least until the onset of the project of hydro-electrification in the late nineteenth century, Tasmania was an object or side-effect of the modernisation of an imperial elsewhere rather than the master of its own modern experience. Tasmanian exercises in forward thinking recapitulate the efforts of inhabitants of other peripheral zones around the world, notwithstanding issues of scales of comparison and diversity of culture; between, for instance, India and Tasmania. Even so, for pioneer and frontier communities the world over, the felt and knowing apprehension of immediate and better newness continues to be riddled with temporal stress and jolting flashbacks.

Everything Will Be OK

Tasmania engages in a hide and seek game with the imaginary institution of modernity. Just as the island is safely ensconced within modernity's socio-historical horizon, the bottom falls out of the category and its subject slips into a different discursive or ideational order. According to the figurations that constitute this catalogue, Tasmania becomes, in different modalities and at different times, a virgin wilderness, an antipodean England, a home of the gothic and the grotesque and a constantly chastened economic and cultural backwater—although this last stereotype is now being contested, and may even have been rendered obsolete, by the arrival of the world attracting Museum of Old and New Art built in the post-industrial northern suburbs of Hobart and an efflorescence of valuable new Tasmanian things from food to poetry, bush-walks to car parks.

In texts that consider Tasmania as relative to the rest of Australia, it is often the absence or scarcity of certain signs of modernisation—busy (overcrowded) streets, sprawling suburbs, skyscrapers, free-ways, professional football teams, 7/11s, coal-fired power stations—that are used to bolster the argument that Tasmania has somehow escaped or been overlooked by modernity. Of course, this is a highly problematic claim. As I make clear in this book, the broader world-historical trajectories of modernisation and the cultural codings that accompany them have scarred the Tasmanian archive with elaborate tattoos and other skin-ego curiosities.[78]

But this mis-diagnosis is easily understood. Has modernity not been thought primarily through analyses of the great centres of human civilisation, the cities of Paris, London and New York and the continents of Europe and North America?[79] Tasmanian expatriate, Peter Conrad, would never dream of including his own birthplace in a history of modernity, existing as it does for him, on the very outskirts of a world that finds its centre thousands of miles away:

> Modernity is about the acceleration of time, and also the dispersal of places. This book [*Modern Times, Modern Places: Life and Art in the 20th Century*] starts by describing the modern panic about time. It goes on to identify a series of places which are the citadels of modern society in its different phases. After Vienna, Moscow, Paris, Berlin and New York, the last in this sequence is a city which allusively jumbles up the others: Tokyo.[80]

For Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire's Paris was the capital of the nineteenth century, the *locus classicus* of the great wave of social, cultural, political and aesthetic transformation that still stands as the high tide mark in cultural histories of modernity.[81] It is important to remember, however, that this newness was invested with a special aura because it was seen as a world-historical newness, a newness-for-mankind. To paraphrase Marx, Paris's present in Baudelaire's day presented itself to the less-developed cultural regions of Europe and the World as the image of their own future. Chakrabarty calls this particular kind of historicist thought a first in Europe and then elsewhere structure of time, and it has proven extremely influential in organising frameworks for thinking the dissemination of modernity.[82]

In *The Consequences of Modernity*, Tony Giddens writes that "Modernity refers to forms of life and modes of social organisation that have their origins in seventeenth century Europe and have since become more or less worldwide in their influence".[83] When Meaghan Morris tells us that

this makes modernity a known history, "something which has already happened elsewhere, and which is to be reproduced, mechanically or otherwise, with a local content", a chain of egregious ramifications is set in train.[84] Regions and nations outside the West can experience modernity, but that experience will never be quite as modern as the originary European instantiation. On this model, modernity has a putative, if rather imprecise spatio-temporal centre, and the developmental logics that it names—industrialisation, democratisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation—radiate outwards from it.

For an example of a global, universalising modernity we need go no further than Marshall Berman's opening proposition from *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*:

> There is a mode of vital experience—experience of space and time, of the self and others, of life's possibilities and perils—that is shared by men and women all over the world today. I will call this body of experience "modernity".[85]

Berman's strategy for mediating between the particular and the general is to nominate a set of archetypes, principally locations and personae, and to use them as focalising points for his reading of modernity. Giddens goes a step further than this, breaking modernity up into abstracted constituent elements or institutional contours. Through his inclusion of the nation in this catalogue, he alerts us to the way that state form functions dialectically within the plural field of modernity studies. On the one hand, the nation-state is treated as an effect or symptom of modernity, and on the other, it is treated as the horizon or organising framework along which processes of modernisation are said to occur.

To these effacements of difference achieved in the name of an ostensibly neutral universality, we might also add influential texts in the tradition by Jürgen Habermas, Conrad and Benjamin. The modernity that Habermas describes in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* as an "unfinished project" is more a generalising philosophical category than a "structure of feeling" or a socio-cultural horizon. This practical modernity—characterised by the arrival and consolidation of instrumental reason, specialisation and differentiation, bureaucratisation in each new locale—is still posited as a transferrable universal in so far as it "disassociates modernity from its modern European origins and stylizes it into a spatio-temporally neutral model for processes of social development in general."[86] Conrad's *Modern Times, Modern Places* broaches this

generality of modernity through an analysis of its exemplary instantiations. The imperialism of a generic modernity that has spread to the four corners of the world is concealed in accounts that seek to define it as culturally neutral and neutralising, but the first in Europe, then elsewhere structure of global historicity is still always already present in those narrativisations. Conrad's strategy brings that Euro-centrism to the foreground, finding the purest instances of modernity in the cosmopolitan centres of the world and relegating its peripheral manifestations to a secondary, replicative order. This approach finds an analogue in Benjamin's work on Baudelaire, *flânerie* and the phantasmagoria of the arcades, in its willing embrace of the tropology of the grand narrative to be found in its often recapitulated description of Paris as the capital of the nineteenth century.

Historically speaking, then, in instances where modernity was not characterised as an overtly European phenomenon, it was absorbed as a generic, universalising set of socio-cultural currents that presented a neutral facade to its potential proponents and detractors, all the while concealing its conditions of origin behind a screen of opaque misprision. The modern principles of convergence and uneven development hold that in the final analysis every site that falls under the spell of modernity's siren song will wind up reprising originary, undisplaceable European configurations, even if the logics that cause that transformation appear non-partisan and genuinely accommodating of cultural differences.

Unique Conformity

In recent years, a substantial body of literature has emerged that attempts to de-centre these modern stories. The battle against nebulous and reified universalism has been led by Area Studies specialists and post-colonial theorists and feminist scholars like Susan Wolff and Rita Felski.[87] But they face formidable opposition. In *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present*, Fredric Jameson questions the usefulness of theorising alternative modernities when modernity is so compelling a category precisely because of its capaciousness and the uniform trail it has left behind in its encirclement of the earth. In taking this absolute position, Jameson veers toward both postmodern or late capitalist American exceptionalism and the error of generality that Aijaz Ahmed critiqued in "Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism".[88] Jameson's book sits alongside Paul Gilroy's claim that "we need to embrace a planetary humanism", and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's suspicion of "yoking uniqueness into

a hegemonic power field" as attempts to refocus our attention towards the transnational terrain.[89] While the political urgency of this multi-faceted project is hard to resist, I also believe that the standard complaint that globalised discourse fails to account for local specificity remains salient. The task of theorising alternative modernities continues to present itself as pressing and incomplete.

A panoply of nomenclatures has been designed to carry forward our examination of this newly decentred modernity. In addition to Felski and Wolff's attempts to bring feminist theory to modernity studies, the search for a theoretical foundation upon which to construct new readings of the *parole* of site-specific modernities has welcomed its own vocabulary. This lexicon includes trans-modernities, discrepant modernities, settler modernities, plural modernities, multiple modernities, and even coeval modernities. The density and range of this work clears the way for site-based analyses of alternative, non-European modernities that do more than merely regather their subject matter in the net of orthodox modernisation theory. One of the main thrusts of this study, the charting of modernity's vicissitudes in Tasmania, is proposed in an intellectual climate that is nowhere near as intemperate as one might first have thought, and in fact, displays some of the characteristics necessary for deliberate and careful unpacking of conceptual orders. In the time before the emergence of work by Dilip Gaonkar, Paul Gilroy, Chakrabarty, Tani Barlow, Terry Eagleton, Harry Harootunian and Arjun Appadurai, for example, suggesting that an instantiative analysis of modernity's developmental trajectories might be successfully carried out through a historiographical intervention into the Tasmanian archive may well have been taken as a nice postcolonial kind of idea, but it would also have undoubtedly faced an uphill battle for recognition and acceptance.

But even in light of this challenge to Europe as the end of history, universal subject and common destiny for all human subjects, impediments to working through a radically differentiated modernity still exist. There remain important qualifiers to insert into the space between thinking about endogenous or externally enforced projects of modernisation in non-European locations as irreducibly specific sets of events and the gesture that reduces them to pale imitations of an originary European phenomenon. "Repetition", as Deleuze tells us, "is not generality".[90] The reproduction of something in a new context represents a generalisation of that thing, not its repetition. In the case of the latter, a more radical, disconcerting and paradoxical situation has to unfold. The repetition must, on the one hand, efface its initial instantiation so that no trace of what

would actually make the second event secondary and therefore generalised, remains, while on the other, some residue of the original event must be carried over in its consequent iterations in order to guarantee or even prove that iterative status.

A still more ominous spectre haunting the task of theorising alternative modernities is the centrality of the other to the colonial construction of the imperial European self. The subaltern zones allegedly being made to speak by this scholarly project are always already present in, and, in fact, are constitutive of the nascent modern cosmographies of geography, statehood and subjectivity. The subordination of the past effected by the triumph of the moderns over the ancients finds a synchronic proof in the unhappy fate that was to meet many non-European civilisations during the modern era. After all, can there be any more edifying an encounter with one's own modernity than the negative re-enforcement of first contact with the indigenes of the new world?[91] Certainly, the narrativisation of those moments of interface where space comes to stand for time in the imagination of historicity remain steadfastly European, but the non-European, the oriental in Edward Said's terms, can never be denied a place in the stories that describe the arrival of modernity.

The internally heterogeneous object of my project is Tasmania, a semi-autonomous ex-colonial member-state of a national federation. Occupying a point at the centre of the two concentric circles of the global and the national, Tasmania as region can be written into the narrative tissue of modernity in a number of ways: first, as a rather insignificant if irreducibly specific instantiation of the generalised social logics of modernity; second, as a geo-political entity whose historical origins have their source in the expansionary imperialism of the first European modernity; and third, as a footnote, or perhaps a chapter, in a story of Australian modernity.[92]

It is not difficult to imagine how Tasmania might fit onto the story-board of first modernity. A study that was to examine the relationship between naval discoveries and the disenchantment of the world could refer us to Abel Tasman's ship's log. Stumbling across a set of mysterious incisions cut into the trunks of the trees at his landing point on Bruny Island, Tasman hypothesised that Aboriginal giants had been at work, using the notches as toeholds for ascending to the higher branches. Jumping forward a couple of centuries, a study of utilitarianism of the Benthamite kind might be fleshed out through a discussion of the model prison at Port Arthur which was built to the specifications of the *panopticon*, that most exemplary site for the production

of internally policing subjectivities.[93] There can be no more doubt that Tasmania has a place in this kind of world-historical story, than there can be about the marginal, subaltern positioning of that place. Tasmania will always be a second class citizen in the body politics of global modernity, unless we can find a way to invert the narratives that constitute its flesh, turning them inside out, or back to front, so that the extremities become the body of the text and the privileged content at its heart—in all its erstwhile Europeanness—is banished finally from the core. That the establishment of Tasmania as a colonial zone, its discovery and its settlement in other words, was a sail-powered, astronomical and dietary adventure is not in question here. Neither, for that matter, is the *factum* that every locus of colonial exploration and expansion is as indelibly inscribed with the ink—blood?—of modernity as Tasmania, so that any of them might easily take its place in a coupled inquiry. Dialectical logics of internal causality and the pragmatics of representation make the Tasmanian part substitutable for the Modern Story *in toto*, while all the while honouring the primacy of the first narrative of modernity as a European story that finds some of its less savoury scenes unfolding on the colonial stage.

Within the Australian cultural imaginary, Tasmania is persistently figured as non-, anti-, or only partially modern. The mode of cultural production that Jim Davidson has called "Tasmanian Gothic", for instance, represents the island as a repository of the bizarre, the bereft, and the backward.[94] Economists, meanwhile, emphasise the relatively archaic character of the state's regime of production, while tourism campaigns promote it as a location where a rich historical past suffuses the present and vast tracts of wilderness proffer an antidote to the differentiation, specialisation and disenchantment of (post)modern life.

To adopt this position, however, is to read Tasmania's textual and cultural archive from the outside in. As compelling as the narratives of relative decline and underdevelopment might be, we cannot overlook the fact that endogenous processes of modernisation have taken place in Tasmania. As Krishnan Kumar points out, modernity is a contrast concept: it acquires its epistemological saliency by distinguishing the period or condition it names from the period or condition that went before it.[95] In Tasmania, a number of such transformational thresholds present themselves for analysis: the European invasion and the decimation of the cultures of the Aboriginal Tasmanians, the abolition of transportation, the acquisition of self-rule and the name change from Van Diemen's Land to Tasmania, and the project of hydro-electrification.

In this book, then, I read a Tasmanian modernity that is located at a provisional point of conjunction between the global, the national and the regional. In doing so, my first priority is not to rethink modernity from the fringes or, indeed, to produce a propositional response to the question: Is Tasmania modern? Rather, I intend to use modernity's contested conceptual field as a theatre in which a problematic is played out that will facilitate a reconsideration of some of the historical and cultural narratives most influential in organising the Tasmanian archive.

There is, however, a second motivation at work here. In addition to being thought as a site of modernity's absence, Tasmania has also been configured discursively as a place of absolute and irreducible specificity, as a geographically isolated, island outpost constantly under threat, externally from an encroaching wilderness and internally from a leaking population and a permanently fragile economy. Tasmania is a place of repetition and similarity, cut adrift and distant from its imperial past, but full of the yearning and flux and fire of dislocated, second-hand experience. Tasmania's perfection is an easy aim, because it is still primarily *verbatim*, after the fact, and even reactionary. Bleeding edge, capitol modernity still sets the pace in the hustle and jostle for the finish line of cultural perfection. For the Tasmanian modulation this inspiration remains negotiable, contingent, colourful and contrite.

Notes

1. Tom Conley, *The Self Made Map: Cartographic Writing in Early Modern France* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 7.
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols, and, The Anti-Christ*, trans., R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1990), 45.
3. The Tasmanian archive can also be understood as a variation on the kind of social or cultural imaginary that Cornelius Castoriadis describes in *The Imaginary Institution of Society,* trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). See also Anthony Wilden, "The Canadian Question, Why?," *Cine-Tracts* 2.2 (Spring 1979): 1–27.
4. Bruce Moore, ed., *The Australian Oxford Dictionary* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1999), 63.
5. Or as Carolyn Steedman writes in *Dust: The Archive and Cultural History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), "Scientific history of the mid nineteenth century inaugurated and consecrated the search for original documents as the means of reconstructing the truth of the past.", 9. See also Bonnie Smith, *The Gender of History: Men, Women and Historical Practice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

6. See particularly John Toews, "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience," *The American Historical Review* 92 (1987): 879–907; Hayden White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," in *History and Theory: Contemporary Readings,* ed. Brian Fay, Philip Pomper and Richard T. Vann (Malden: Blackwell, 1998), 15–33.
7. Frances Dolan, "Ashes and the Archive: The London Fires of 1666, Partisanship and Proof," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31.2 (2001): 380.
8. Wim Van Mierlo, "Reading Joyce In and Out of the Archive," *Joyce Studies Annual* 13 (Summer 2002): 33.
9. This preservation often takes the form of a defensive repudiation of "abstracted" approaches to the archive that manifests in more or less overt ways. See Yosef Yerushalmi's *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Linda Ferreira-Buckley, "Archivists with an Attitude: Rescuing the Archives from Foucault," *College English* 61.5 (May 1999): 577–83.
10. Randolph Starn, "Truths in the Archives," *Common Knowledge* 8.2 (2002): 391.
11. Derrida, *Archive Fever,* 90.
12. The history of the archive's theorisation can be plotted against the history of the linguistic turn in historiography whose modern *arché* at least, can be marked off for heuristic purposes at the publication of Hayden White's *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
13. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 46.
14. Reynolds, "Violence and Empire," review of *The Last Man: A British Genocide in Tasmania*, by Tom Lawson. *Australian Book Review*, 361. May, 2014.
15. Reynolds, foreword to *The Black War: Fear, Sex and Resistance in Tasmania,* by Nicholas Clements (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2014), xi.
16. Ibid, x.
17. Nicholas Clements, *The Black War,* xiii (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press).
18. Other specifically discursive Tasmanian publications include *40 Degrees South*, *Tasmanian Life*, *The Mercury, The Examiner, The Advocate, The Tasmanian Time*s.
19. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 28.
20. Numerous scholars who take up the task of summarising the Foucauldian theory of discourse fail entirely to deal with the concept of the archive. In her monograph, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), Michele Barrett neglects the category completely. Rudi Visker does likewise in his work, *Michel Foucault: Genealogy*

as Critique (London; New York: Verso, 1995). Jon Simons eldies it with the historical *a priori* in *Foucault and the Political* (London: Routledge, 1995). Gilles Deleuze only gives passing mention to it in his opening essay from *Foucault* (London: Athlone, 1988), which is odd given that the piece is entitled "The New Archivist". This series of omissions is continued in Dianne Macdonell's work *Theories of Discourse: An Introductio*n (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), and in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow's *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), where the authors refuse to engage with the concept on its own terms, reducing it instead to its more orthodox referential function of describing the concrete depository of a culture's texts. An exception to this rule is Sara Mills, *Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1997).

21. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 129.
22. Ibid., 130.
23. Ibid., 130.
24. Derrida, *Archive Fever*, 84.
25. Thomas Osborne, "The Ordinariness of the Archive," *History of the Human Sciences* 12.2 (1999): 53.
26. Derrida, *Archive Fever*, 2.
27. Ibid., 2–3.
28. In "Archive Trauma," *Diacritics* 28.4 (1998): 68–81, Herman Rappaport identifies the discrepancy between these two archives as proceeding from their different figurations of *anamnesis*.
29. Carolyn Steedman reads Derrida's text against the grain in *Dust*: "Many kinds of repository were strapped together […] in the portmanteau term 'the archive'", she writes, " […] as Derrida considered their limits and limitations, their denials and secrets. Indeed, the arkhé appeared to lose much of its connection to the idea of a place where official documents are stored for administrative reference, and became a metaphor capacious enough to encompass the whole of modern information technology, its storage, retrieval and communication.", 4.
30. Derrida, *Archive Fever*, 3.
31. Verne Harris, "The Archival Sliver: Power, Memory and Archives in South Africa," *Archival Science* 2 (2002): 65.
32. Ann Laura Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance," *Archival Science* 2 (2002): 93.
33. Ibid.
34. See Reynolds *Fate of a Free People*; Peter Conrad, *Down Home: Revisiting Tasmania* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988); Robert Hughes, *The Fatal Shore: A History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia* (London: Collins Harvill, 1986).
35. Derrida, *Archive Fever*, 11.

36. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *Surveys from Exile: Political Writings*, vol. 2, trans. Ben Fowkes, ed. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 15.
37. See Nicholas Baudin, *The Journal of Post-Captain Baudin Commander-in-Chief of the Corvettes Geographe and Naturaliste Assigned by Order of the Government to a Voyage of Discovery*, trans. Christine Connell (Adelaide: Libraries Board of South Australia, 1974).
38. Francois Peron's Meditation on Death, Humanity and Savage Society in Representing Humanity in the Age of Enlightenment. ed. Alexander Cook; Ned Curthoys, Shino Kinoshi. Vol 28 United Kingdom: Pickering and Chatto, 2013, p.109–122.
39. See Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation* (New York: Norton, 1977).
40. Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 16.
41. See Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
42. Quoted in Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin Press, 1971), 29.
43. See Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
44. See Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). Jeff Malpas, *Place and Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 36.
45. Ed Casey, "Smooth Spaces and Rough Edged Places," *Review of Metaphysics* 51 (1997): 273.
46. Ibid., 288.
47. Roland Barthes, *SZ*, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974).
48. See Raymond Williams, "Culture is Ordinary," in *Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism* (London: Verso, 1989), 3–4.
49. Richard Flanagan, "Introduction," in *On the Mountain*, ed. Peter Dombrovskis, Richard Flanagan and Jamie Kirkpatrick (Hobart: Westwind Press, 1996), 8–31.
50. These materials can be accessed at http://artsandscience.concordia.ca/hist359/Syllabus.html. Accessed October 3, 2003.
51. See Kurt Vonnegut's short stories; "The Trouble with Reunions," *Forbes,* October 4, 1999, 136–8, and "God Bless You, Dr Kevorkian," *Free Inquiry* 20.3 (2000): 50–1.
52. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities," in Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001), 1–24.

53. "The entire line from Hobart Town to Launceston, a distance of 120 miles, which is now in rapid progress from both extremities, will be completed as soon as the numerous gangs placed on it, *can possibly effect so great and important an undertaking* [emphasis added]." Quoted in G. Hawley Stancombe, *Highway in Van Diemen's Land* (Glendessary: Stancombe and the National Trust of Tasmania, 1969), 65. The prospect of Federation also prompted articulations replete with modernising hope. As one Tasmanian stated in support of the yes case at the 1898 plebiscite: "Gentlemen, if you vote for the Bill you will found a great and glorious nation under the bright Southern Cross, and meat will be cheaper, and you will live to see the Australian race dominate the southern seas and you will have a market for both potatoes and apples and your sons shall reap the great heritage of nationhood." Quoted in Michael Roe, *The State of Tasmania: Identity at Federation Time* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 2001), 22.
54. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.
55. An exception to this is N. J. B. Plomley's edited version of George Augustus Robinson's diaries which were first released to the public in 1966. See N.J.B. Plomley, ed., *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson 1829–1834* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966). Ian Macfarlane's examination of the Cape Grim Massacre in his thesis "Aboriginal Society in North West Tasmania: Dispossession and Genocide" (PhD diss., University of Tasmania, 2002) is a significant recent contribution to the genocide studies project.
56. Bronwyn Desailly, "The Mechanics of Genocide: Colonial Policies and Attitudes Towards the Tasmanian Aborigines, 1824–1836" (MA diss., University of Tasmania, 1977).
57. Ibid., 170, emphasis added.
58. Alison Palmer, *Colonial Genocide* (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2000), 34.
59. Bernard Smith, *The Spectre of Truganini: 1980 Boyer Lectures* (Sydney: ABC Books, 1980), 10.
60. Conrad, *Down Home,* 110.
61. Florence Mazian, *Why Genocide?: The Armenian and Jewish Experiences in Perspective* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990), xi-xii.
62. Sven Lindqvist, *Exterminate All the Brutes*, trans. Joan Tate (New York: New Press, 1996), 117.
63. Quoted in Tom O'Regan, "Documentary in Controversy: *The Last Tasmanian*," in Albert Moran and Tom O'Regan, ed., *An Australian Film Reader* (Sydney: Currency, 1985), 131. Other texts that take the genocide of the Tasmanians as a given include Carl Weisland, "Culture Clash: What Can We Learn from the Preventable Tragedy of the Tasmanian Genocide?," *Creation* 17.3 (1995): 42–4; Jared Diamond, "In Black and White," *Natural*

History (1988): 8–14; Samir Amin, "Imperialism and Globalisation," *Monthly Review* 53.2 (2001): 6–24; Payal Sampat, "Last Words," *World Watch* 14.3 (2001): 34–8; Timothy Dunne, "Colonial Encounters in International Relations: Reading Wright, Writing Australia," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51.3 (1997): 309–23; Matt Cartmill, "The Third Man" *Discover*, 18.9 (1997): 56–9; Jeff J. Corntassel and Tomas Hopkins Primeau, "Indigenous 'Sovereignty' and International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing 'Self-Determination'," *Human Rights Quarterly* 17.2 (1995): 343–65; Stuart Peterfreund, "Colonization by Means of Analogy: Metaphor, and Allusion in Darwinian Discourse," *Configurations* 2.2 (1994): 237–55; Peter Monteath, "Exploring Terra Australis," *History Today* 53.1 (2003): 48–55; Joseph Nevins, "On Justifying Intervention," *The Nation* 274.19 (2002): 32–7; Niall Ferguson, *Empire* (New York: Basic, 2002); Tony Barta, "Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia," in Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski, ed., *Genocide and the Modern Age* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2001), 237–52; "After the Holocaust: Consciousness of Genocide in Australia," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 31 (1985): 154–62; Colin Tatz, *Genocide in Australia* (Canberra: The Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Studies, 1999); Alison Palmer, "Colonial and Modern Genocide: Explanations and Categories," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21.1 (January 1998), 89–115; Tom Nairn, "Democracy and Genocide," *Arena* 16 (2000/2001), 75–84; Ian Hernon, *The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the 19th Century* (Glouchester: Sutton, 2000); Mark Cocker, *Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Conflict with Native People* (London: Jonathon Cape, 1998); Bain Attwood and S.G. Foster, ed., *Frontier Conflict: The Australian Experience* (Canberra: National Museum of Australia, 2003); Bruce Elder, *Blood on the Wattle: Massacres and Maltreatment of Australian Aborigines since 1788* (French's Forest: Child and Associates, 1988); John Docker and Ann Curthoys, *Aboriginal History*, 25 (2001); Robert Manne, ed., *Whitewash: On Keith Windschuttle's Fabrication of Aboriginal History* (Melbourne: Black Inc Agenda, 2003); Lyndall Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996); "The Struggle for Trukanini 1830–1997," *Tasmanian Historical Research Association Papers and Proceedings* 44.3 (1997): 153–73.

64. See A. Dirk Moses, "An Antipodean Genocide? The Origins of the Genocidal Moment in the Colonization of Australia," *Journal of Genocide Research* 2.1 (2000): 89–107.
65. See Tony Barta, "After the Holocaust: Consciousness of Genocide in Australia," *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 31.1 (1985): 154–161.

66. Ward Churchill, "Genocide: Toward a Functional Definition," *Alternatives* XI (1986): 415.
67. Alternative nomenclatures for reading the decimation of the Tasmanian Aborigines as genocide also include "Developmental Genocide" see Helen Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses," in Israel Charny, ed., *Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 8–9; "Ethnocide" and "Genocide directed at the acquisition of wealth," see Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, ed., *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Cases Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 36–7; "Utilitarian Genocide", see Roger W. Smith, "Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth Century as an Age of Genocide," in *Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death,* ed. Isidor Walliman and Michael Dobkowski (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 24; "Socio-Economic Genocide" and "Retributive Genocide" see Robert K. Hitchcock and Tara M. Twedt, "Physical and Cultural Genocide of Various Indigenous Peoples," in *Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views,* ed., Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons and Israel W. Charny (New York: Garland, 1989), 386; "Latent Genocide," see Vahakn N. Dadrian, "A Typology of Genocide," *International Review of Sociology* 5.2 (1975): 201–12.
68. Raymond Evans and Bill Thorpe, "The Massacre of Aboriginal History," *Overland* 163 (Winter 2001): 34.
69. Tatz, *Genocide in Australia*, 3.
70. Ann Curthoys, "Constructing National Histories," in Attwood and Foster, *Frontier Conflict*, 198.
71. Ned Curthoys, "The Politics of Holocaust Representation: The Worldy Typologies of Hannah Arendt," *Arena Journal* 16 (2001): 74.
72. Tony Barta, "Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia," in *Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death*, ed., Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), 238.
73. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1973). 79.
74. Hal Porter, *The Tilted Cross* (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 91–2.
75. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), 5, emphasis added.
76. Richard Flanagan, "Another Country: A Short Soul History of Tasmanian Writing," *Island*, 86 (Winter 2001), 90.
77. See Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

78. An exception to this is Paul Johnson's *The Birth of the Modern: World Society, 1815–1830* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 264–66. The preface to *Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society* by Stephen Crook, Malcolm Waters and Jan Pakulski, (London: Sage, 1992), vii-viii, also provides a classic instance of the writing of Tasmania as a backward location.
79. This development has seen a burgeoning of the terminologies we can mobilise for thinking non-European modernities which now include "other modernities", "multiple modernities", "coeval modernities", "trans-modernity", "discrepant modernities", "colonial modernities" and "settler modernities". In spite of this recent surge of interest in problematising metropolitan models of modernity, we need to remember that such a development may well be nothing other than a symptom of the condition it seeks to redress. Fredric Jameson's *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (New York: Verso, 2002) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), are two influential monographs that make that clear. Recent attempts to challenge this dominant paradigm in modernity studies include: Lisa Rofel, "Discrepant Modernities and their Discontents," *Positions: East Asia Critique* 9.3 (2001): 637–49; *Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after Socialism* (Berkely: University of California Press, 1999): Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of the "Other" and The Myth of Modernity*, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995); "World System and 'Trans'-Modernity," *Nepantla: Views from South* 3.2 (2002): 221–44; James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkely: University of California Press, 1999); Dipankar Gupta, *Mistaken Modernity: India between Worlds* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000); Timothy Mitchell, ed., *Questions of Modernity* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2000); Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture and Community in Inter-War Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Charles Piot, *Remotely Global: Village Modernity in West Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Tani E. Barlow, ed., *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
80. Peter Conrad, *Modern Times, Modern Places: Life and Art in the 20th Century* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1998), 9.
81. See Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: NLB, 1973); David Harvey, *The Capital of Modernity: Paris and the Second Empire* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003).
82. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 8.
83. Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 15.

84. Meaghan Morris, "Metamorphoses at Sydney Tower," *New Formations* 11 (Summer 1990): 10.
85. Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 15.
86. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press,1987), 2.
87. See Susan Wolff, "The Invisible Flaneuse," in *The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin*, ed. Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1991), 141–56. Rita Felski, *The Gender of Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
88. See Aijaz Ahmed, "Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and 'National Allegory'," in *The Postcolonial Studies Reader*, ed. Bill Ashcroft, Garth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (London: Routledge, 1995), 77–85. See also Fredric Jameson, "Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," *Social Text* 15 (1986): 65–88.
89. Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 2. See the discussion of Gilroy's claim in Melissa Gregg, "Remnants of Humanism," *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies* 16.3 (2002): 273–84.
90. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone Press, 1994), 1.
91. As Dussel writes in *The Invention of the Americas*, 25: "The experience not only of discovery, but especially of the conquest, is essential to the constitution of the modern ego, not only as subjectivity, but as subjectivity that takes itself to be the center or end of history."
92. For recent work on formations of modernity in Australia see Paula Hamilton and Lesley Johnson, ed., "Localising Modernities," *The UTS Review* 6.1 (May 2000). Peter Beilharz, "Australian Civilization and its Discontents," *Thesis Eleven* 64 (February 2001): 65–76.
93. Tasmania also serves as a site of experimentation for the empirical turn in knowledge production. Inspired by Joseph Marie Degerando's *The Observation of Savage Peoples*, François Peron, a member of Nicholas Baudin's party on his 1802 voyage, conducted experiments on the arm strength of the Aborigines with the specific intent of refuting Rousseau's "noble savage" thesis. See "The Force and the Reason of Experiment," Bruno Latour, accessed October 3, 2004, http://www.ensmp.fr/PagePerso/CSI/Bruno—Latour/Articles/41—Homer.html; Joseph-Marie Degerando, *The Observation of Savage Peoples*, trans. F.C.T. Moore (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). The process of cartographic disenchantment is another emphatically modern thematic that intersects with the history of Tasmania. See Alan Frost and Glyndwr Williams, ed., *Terra Australis to Australia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press in association with the Australian Academy of the Humanities, 1988).

94. Texts that can be included in the category of "Tasmanian Gothic" include C. J. Koch, *The Boys in the Island* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1990); *The Doubleman* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1985); Caroline Leakey, *The Broad Arrow: Being Passages from the History of Maida Gwynnham, a 'Lifer'* (London: R. Bentley, 1887); Chloe Hooper, *A Child's Book of True Crime* (Milson's Point: Knopf, 2002); Mudrooroo Narogin, *Doctor Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World* (Melbourne: Hyland House, 1983); Conrad, *Down Home*; Brian Castro, *Drift* (Port Melbourne: Minerva, 1995); Matthew Kneale, *English Passengers* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2000); Clarke, *For the Term of his Natural Life Clarke*; Louis Nowra, *The Golden Age* (Sydney: Currency Press, 1989); James McQueen, *Hook's Mountain: A Novel* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1982); Julia Leigh, *The Hunter* (Ringwood: Penguin, 1999); Tom Haydon, *The Last Tasmanian: A Story of Genocide* (North Sydney: Artis Film Productions, 1978); Robert Drewe, *The Savage Crows* (Sydney: Collins, 1976); Lord Snowdon, *Snowdon Tasmania Essay: A Collection of Photographs* (Hobart: Ronald Banks, 1981); Tom Gilling, *The Sooterkin* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999); Porter, *The Tilted Cross*; Andrew Motion, *Wainewright the Poisoner* (London: Faber, 2000); Michael Jacobson, *Windmill Hill* (Sydney: Hodder, 2002). For critical work on the topic see Davidson, "Tasmanian Gothic,"; Amanda Lohrey, "The Greens: A New Narrative," in *The Rest of the World is Watching: Tasmania and the Greens,* ed. Richard Flanagan and Cassandra Pybus (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 1990); Tim Thorne, "The Gothic Keeps Breaking Through: Amanda Lohrey's Tasmania," *Bulletin for the Centre of Tasmanian Historical Studies* 3.1 (1990–91): 119–28; Richard Flanagan, "Another Country: A Short Soul History of Tasmanian Writing," *Island* 86 (Winter 2001): 90–8.
95. Krishnan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 82.

CHAPTER 3

Van Diemonian Time

Futures Past

Scholars working in the field of modernity studies have tended to apply the concept of modernity to a set of events and orientations that is only ever replicated in non-European settings. Modernity has scarred the Tasmanian archive, however, in its full plurality. As Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar explains in *Alternative Modernities*, different time-space locations produce their own modular modernities, alike, but ultimately irreducible to, the European experience. In its common-sense application, modernity is presented as an historical promise vouchsafed along the edges of manorial, aristocratic, agrarian and religious horizons. It refers to a loosening of the late medieval dialectics of lord and bondsman, church and state, nature and culture, technology and tradition. As the European empire-form bedded down from the fifteenth century onwards, modulations of modernity sprung up in a rainbow atlas of colonial zones. The signs of modernity signify this dense process of transmission and exchange, whether it was inclined, ultimately to genocide or to its nearest opposite, the creation of new creole ethnicities to replace those that had been forgotten or destroyed or forced into false identities and cryptic double-think rituals on the margins of assimilated belonging. Modern concepts and conditions of life can include democratic governance, capitalist economy, industrial technology, state bureaucracy, renaissance self-fashioning and feminism in its various waves. These institutions and habits of mind have characterised Western civilisation since the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries and even before that if we consider

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prodromal moments such as Dante's Renaissance or Tudor England at the time of Shakespeare as proto-modern, rather than late-medieval. Van Diemen's Land, desired from afar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and subsumed decisively within the European imperial system by the mid nineteenth, fits easily within modernity's matrix. For some of its history, to be sure, Australia's island state has been emphatically modern.

Nucleus

The historiography of the invasion of Van Diemen's Land can be divided into two series of investigations. On one side are those interpretations that read the trajectory of Tasmania's colonisation as the story of a lopsided struggle between modernity and pre-modernity. James Bonwick's *The Last of the Tasmanians*, Clive Turnbull's *Black War*, Tom Haydon's *The Last Tasmanian* and a variety of works by N. J. B. Plomley construct a narrative in which an advanced European empire finds its programme for the establishment of a penal colony/pastoral station in Van Diemen's Land obstructed by the island's traditional owners.[1] While initially accommodating to the white interlopers, repeated instances of ill-treatment at the hands of the settlers finally galvanised the autochthons into action. As disease and distress ate away at their numbers, they conducted a resourceful campaign of guerrilla resistance, only to succumb, in due course, to the inexorable disaster logic set in motion by the invasion. According to this version of events, from the moment in Sydney when then Governor King signed off on the decision to build a penal colony in Van Diemen's Land, the Tasmanian Aborigines were doomed to decimation, capitulation and, in the final instance, administered extinction at the hands of a negligent, incompetent and ethically compromised British bureaucracy.

Tasmania was modern thus, from its fledgling flights into geographical and juridical specificity. Genocide was partly the result of pastoral expansion in the Midlands and the Meander Plains and elsewhere. In this formulation, clearances enabled the European invaders to become modern, to trade and export wheat and wool that would deliver a modest, sustainable prosperity. As James Boyce shows, plentiful game and fertile soil also supported an alternative economy of small farmers and trappers and fishermen who worked for cash when it was available but were adept at subsistence farming their small, often ad hoc holdings, with an added mix of hunted food, pelts and sawn timber. It wasn't long though until insouciant and clumsy administrators rationalized land use and allocations to

drive the breakaway Van Diemonians back into the hands of its mercantilist government and its cartel landholders.

In a more macabre sense, the genocide represented an objective, goal-oriented modernisation of the Aboriginal, by the European, population. In his work on Bruny Island in 1829, George Augustus Robinson attempted to convert the heathen natives to Christianity, to draw them out of their traditional spoken subjectivities and into English language games. He even encouraged them to tend small vegetable gardens, as if, perhaps, the Palawa were London East Enders, happy to have a few square metres of private allotment to tend as consolation for the vicissitudes of genocidal modernity and its merciless enclosure of the colonial commons. Robinson even attempted to bring an end to the aborigines' eternal hunter-gathering habits. The self-regarding, dishonest efforts to modernise an intractably premodern peoples—cultural revolutions of the Lamarkian and Stakhanovite kinds—were found out at Flinders Island and Oyster Cove. The Christian saviours of souls would also become the perpetrators of genocide. The aim-denying conquistadors of Van Diemen's Land were thus condemned to eternal and infinite loops of historical guilt no matter how hard they attempted to hyper-drive themselves out from the black holes of colonial crime and sun-wards to a bright, forgiven and forgiving future. Both Wybalenna and Oyster Cove were the scene of raw, reckless modernising gestures like the changing of Aboriginal names to European equivalents and the training of female subjects as domestic assistants.[2] In a sense, genocide was a by-product of modernisation. The Palawa succumbed to disease that resulted from incidental contact with the European interlopers, but the keenness of the administrators to move the Aborigines out of the areas most suitable for pastoral expansion and capitalist profit making were surely not driven by altruistic or genuinely humanitarian motives.

Before and After

Zygmunt Bauman's *Modernity and the Holocaust* and Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* renegotiate the philosophical grammar of modernity in the direction of exuberant and defensive progress. Similar work has also been undertaken by Timothy Mitchell, Tani Barlow and Charles Taylor, among many others. For Bauman, the negotiation demands a revivification of post-Enlightenment Western categories. Here, a critical European modernity described and enacted by Nietzsche, Weber and the Frankfurt School

replaces an equally European modernity that optimistically "reaffirms and reinforces the etiological myth of modern civilisation as a triumph of reason over passions".[3] Chakrabarty meanwhile swaps an "imaginary" Europe with a "political modernity" that subverts canonical logics of imperialist historicity:

> Historicism is what made modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather […] something that became global over time, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside of it. This "first in Europe, then elsewhere" structure of global historical time was historicist; different non-Western nationalisms would later produce local versions of the same narrative, replacing Europe by (sic) some locally constructed centre.[4]

Bauman's modernity is grim, post-marxist and sociological. Chakrabarty's is historical, ludic and postcolonial.[5] It is hardly surprising then that in *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Bauman proposes that an honest confrontation with the Nazi genocide must unsettle optimistic Enlightenment narratives that have made modernity easily synonymous with civilisational progress[6]:

> We can think of modernity as of a time when order—of the world, of the human habitat, of the human self, and of the connection between all three—is reflected upon; a matter of thought, of concern, of a practice that is aware of itself, conscious of being a conscious practice and wary of the void it would leave were it to halt or merely relent.[7]

Professional sociologists, Bauman argues, have rejected the Holocaust's challenge to their discipline and have adopted, instead, a number of strategies—exoticisation, marginalisation, singularisation—that confine it neatly as a problem in the object of analysis rather than assigning it to peculiarities in the subject as scholarly *cogito*:

> Having processed the facts of the Holocaust through the mill of that methodology which defines it as a scholarly discipline, orthodox sociology can only deliver a message bound more by its presuppositions than "by the facts of the case": […] the Holocaust was a failure, not a product of modernity.[8]

While acknowledging a debt to the formulation that lies at the heart of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*—"enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical […] nothing at all may remain outside because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear"—Bauman puts Adorno and Horkheimer's

project into reverse.[9] Rather than extinguishing any trace of its own self-consciousness, the Enlightenment's dialectical unfolding has actually engendered a paralysing auto-critique. The critical reason that was supposed to act as a lever for the betterment of mankind has, instead, turned back upon itself to reveal a dire legacy of "blind arrogance, high-handedness and legislative dreams."[10] This legacy is the same pile of debris that Walter Benjamin's "Angel of History" would like to "make whole again." Like the "Angelus Novus", the Enlightenment project is tossed about in a storm called progress, a storm that blows out of paradise, a storm of its own making. It has its back turned toward the future as it tries to keep its past in sight:

> Modernity is what it is—an obsessive march forward not because it always wants more, but because it never gets enough; not because it grows more ambitious and adventurous but because its adventures are bitter and frustrated.[11]

Periodisation

The Tasmanian frontier was hostile, natural and wild but its objectification at a distance and the technology and skill required to bring it under the yoke of agricultural and mineralogical control are redolent of modernity. It was claimed as a possession after the French Revolution, after the American Revolutionary War, after the industrial revolution had started, after democratic reforms in Cromwell's England and so on. Key modern events had, thus, already happened when Van Diemen's Land was invaded by Bowen and his band of criminals, soldiers, priests and chancers.

But, inserting the Holocaust into this same order of modernity is risky. Raphael Lemkin shows us that the Nazis considered many of their early victories over smaller European nations such as Czechoslovakia as colonial conquests, while an emphasis on racial hierarchies, again redolent of Nazi obsessions with race and blood memory, was mirrored in the public policies and procedures of early European Tasmania.

The basic faith that humans can improve morally over time is a hallmark of discourses of social hope (Richard Rorty not Christopher Lasch) and indeed, of Habermas's optimistic view of modernity as an incomplete project. But genocide arrives almost daily now somewhere on our downtrodden earth to shatter complacent progress-narratives of cultural self-congratulation. And if it isn't genocide it is the new barbarism of IS or Islamic State that conveniently uses high-tech information machines on

futurist architecture like the internet and seems to revel in offering a sex/death sublimation for many disaffected Western subjectivities seeking a comforting milieu of essentialised, theocratic fundamentalism.

Escape from Tomorrow

The modernity that remains isolated and immune from the ramifications of the Holocaust marks the culmination of what Richard Bernstein calls the "emancipatory narrative of dynamic reason actualising itself in history".[12] It remains immune and self-contained, however, only through an obfuscation and disavowal of what Julia Kristeva identifies as its powers of horror. Modernity continues thus to denote a period of moral progress that somehow frees itself from the lessons of the gas chambers while also signifying positive, innocent newness and clear and distinct Northern European principles. Modernity is pardoned, thus, in readings that record the attempted extermination of European Jewry as the eruption of an irrational, atavistic malice:

> If the lesson of mass murder does teach us anything it is that the prevention of similar hiccups of barbarism evidently requires still more civilising efforts. There is nothing in this lesson to cast doubt on the future effectiveness of such efforts and their ultimate results. We certainly move in the right direction perhaps we do not move fast enough.[13]

But, Bauman argues, the Holocaust was not a perversion of modernity. It was instead, "a rare yet significant and reliable test of the hidden possibilities of modern society."[14] It must be allowed to re-configure the category of modernity, he urges, so the latter can accommodate the ambiguity of events which violate its most dearly held values—in this case the sanctity of the lives of an entire *race* of peoples—even when that violation is achieved through the application of technologies, intellectual, organisational and mechanical, that it alone has made possible:

> Having emancipated purposeful action from moral constraints, modernity rendered genocide possible. Without being the sufficient cause of the genocide, modernity is its necessary condition. The ability to co-ordinate human actions on a massive scale, a technology that allows one to act effectively at a large distance from the object of action, minute division of labour which allows for spectacular progress in expertise on the one hand, accumulation of knowledge incomprehensible to the layman and the authority of science

> which grows with it, the science sponsored mental climate of instrumental rationality that allows social-engineering designs to be argued and justified […] are all integral attributes of modernity; but they also condition the displacement of the moral by the instrumental action and thus make genocide possible to accomplish—if only there are forces around determined to accomplish it.[15]

The Wannsee policies could only be realized when subsumed into the administrative field of a modern state. In the death camps, the institutional executors of this intellectual and technical will applied their competencies to a macabre new object. That this labour was so incongruous with the normal humdrum work of state bureaucracy, only highlights the universal applicability of the capacity to suspend value judgements and to work assiduously toward the achievement of an objective determined by hierarchically superior subjectivities.[16] It was in the subordination of this morbid end to its rather banal means of realisation, argues Bauman, that the Final Solution became so characteristically modern:

> In fact we know of many massacres, pogroms, mass murders indeed instances not far removed from genocide, that have been perpetrated without modern bureaucracy, the skills and technologies it commands, the scientific principles of its internal management. The Holocaust, however, was clearly unthinkable without such bureaucracy.[17]

Our modern eyes are not built for archaic visions of violence as natural power and strength. Genocides are condemned for their backwardness, their animality, their bloody, flesh reality. We continue to tell ourselves that no human party educated and discursively sheltered by rational, enlightenment humanism could organize, mobilise and murder genocidally. But, the Holocaust remains a repeatable crime unless it can be theoretically banned by future regimes of possibly robotic and computerized guardianship. That is, until we lose our animal-bound humanity both permanently and completely, at which point, of course, committing genocide would not even be a natural crime.

New Word Order

We are asked to treat modernity, then, as a contrast concept that posits a clear distinction between the social reality and subjective experience of world-historical newness and the antecedent medieval, archaic, classical

or traditional structures of feeling and orders of life that came before.[18] But what is the objective status of Tasmania's modernity in the context of its geographical estrangement from Europe? Until its colonisation in the early nineteenth century, Tasmania was home to a set of (non)modern civilisations *par excellence*.[19] Do Tasmanians have a local pre-modern history then, or is its pre-modernity to be found in Europe's past? Could we say, following Giddens, that modernity was brought here with the European colonisers? Has the Europeanness of modernity been effaced by its subsequent world-wide dissemination?

As Chakrabarty writes:

> Historicism—and even the modern, European idea of history—one might say, came to non-European peoples as somebody's way of saying "not yet" to somebody else.[20]

In *Provincializing Europe*, he argues that non-European modernities are inscribed with a symbolic and imaginary Lacanian deficit. Because they come after and are measured against originary European forms, they cannot be anything other than imitational and replicative. However, just as apparently incongruous inconsistencies like the absence of an interiorised private self as documented by confessional writing make Indian modernity non-modern and modern all at the same time, the conjunction of traditional Aboriginal lifestyles and modernising Western habitus in the nascent colony of Van Diemen's Land demarcates a social configuration that was both modern, manorial and ancient all at the same time.

The subject of Tasmanian history is indigenous, imperial and colonising. Its modernity is European and endogenous, imitational and original, externally imposed and self-actualised. The fumbling of questions of moral order and human rights that typified the British and Tasmanian government's policy positions on the Palawa was a struggle with modernity that cannot be consigned wholly to the European frame of experience. The Aborigines were targets of policies of relocation, martial law and bounty hunting that were not uniformly savage even if they were successfully genocidal.

The invasion and colonization of Van Diemen's Land can thus be read as a self-consciously modern project of engagement with an ahistorical and archaic human remnant, a false pivot that invokes Bauman's acerbic rejection of modernity as proof and guarantee of irreversible intellectual, moral and technological progress.

In what sense here could we claim that British motives and actions in Tasmania were based in the modern triumph of reason over passion?

The imperial profit motive was clearly hard to resist for the directors of the Van Diemen's Land Company, the land grant speculators, the sealers of the Bass Strait Islands and even George Augustus Robinson, who was certainly more successful as a bounty hunter than as a conciliator or brick layer.

The sealers and their industry buckled in a remarkable clash between cultures and ways of being, that while, indisputably rugged, beautiful and extraordinary must also have become a monotonous, if not particularly comfortable, lifestyle. And could there be any more modern a product than the Southern Ocean's seal and whale oil harpooned, harvested and barrelled out to light the newly luminous streets of British Empire towns and cities and other worlds besides? It is this ordering and reordering of the exotic fold within the known horizon, as a moment of epiphany, revelation or at least, a decent charge of historical electricity, that Shino Konishi skilfully demystifies in her monograph, *The Aboriginal Male in the Enlightenment World*, with its wonderful chapter forms that pick apart the part-object obsessions of explorers in the world of white science, anatomy and racial theory. Can you see, she wants to ask, the human form beneath the carapace of the banal and fork-tongued other?

But this ordinariness was always going to be a one hit wonder. Eventually the target of the hunt disappeared or was so depleted as to be uneconomical for all but the most rugged, resolute or headstrong hunter. The destruction of the Tasmanian seal colonies and whale eco-system left little sign that European and indigenous people had lived side by side in the unforgiven climes of the Bass Strait. What was left behind, in other words, was genocide:

> While it is not my intention to diminish the suffering or violence of the industry, particularly in terms of its impact on Aboriginal women, I do think the picture is more complex than other histories might suggest. This complexity was emphasised to me in conversation with a colleague who spoke as both a descendent of the sealing women and as an academic. He saw the sealing industry as ironically responsible for both the near-genocide of the Tasmanian people *and* their survival.[21]

Thanatos

Perhaps we should apply the nostrum of Raymond Williams here and say that just as culture is ordinary, so too is colonial contact, conquest and genocide. And that among those who cry and craw for peace are secret belligerents baying silently for the next cleansing onslaught to begin.

The ghost of Freud whispers us on. We are strangers to ourselves and never completely in control. Bauman might just as well have proved that we can never free ourselves of our animal spirits, our irrational urges and our genocide drive through a reading of the Cambodian genocides, British Empire famines in India, the treatment of the Hereros in South West Germany, or the massacre of the Congolese under Leopold of Belgium. It is surely impossible to hold a sun-clear disposition about our nature and our future once we accept with Bauman and others who take a similar stance that we cannot easily consign atrocious events to the past on the grounds that we are improving morally, reaching up towards God, moving forward through time to a future that is certainly more civilised, more fair, more prosperous than the one we find ourselves in at this moment.

Modernity may have arrived after the dark ages, but it itself is not all brilliant, illuminating light and unimpeachable truth. The Holocaust shows us finally that periodization has its limits and that organic continuity, big breaks in time, substantive events that make antiquity what it was, that made the British Empire a temporally specific civilization (that was in a constant state of daytime industry and country estate elegance, with a long tail dragging through infinite sweat shops drenched in eternal sun). It is not so much modernity that is ruptured by the attempted destruction of European Jewry as the epistemological speculation that attempts to assign industrial violence to an age of man, an age of world, to corral it and contain it, fatuously, within penitentiary orders of cosmic villainy and group madness or, at least, explain it away as a more or less monumental exercise in exploitation, cruelty and poor taste.

Timothy Mitchell writes:

> It is not that there are many different modernities, any more than there are many different capitalisms. Modernity like capitalism, is defined by its claim to universality, to a uniqueness, unity, and universality that represent the end (in every sense) of history. Yet this always remains an impossible unity, an incomplete universal. Each staging of the modern must be arranged to produce the unified, global history of modernity, yet each requires those forms of difference that introduce the possibility of a discrepancy, that returns to undermine its unity and identity. Modernity then becomes the unsuitable yet unavoidable name for all these discrepant histories.[22]

Chakrabarty and Mitchell depict a scene in which a diversification internal to modernity is achieved when modern logics like the public/private split and the ideal of the citizen are superimposed onto a non-modern,

non-Western cultural background. A de-centring and decentred modernity is thus made the object of a deliberate pluralization that resists a dialectical recombination of that newly uncovered variety in a sublated synthesis. For Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, on the other hand, this refurbished and paradoxical modernity might be newly expansive and heterogenous, but it is still a singular phenomenon. Gaonkar submits a series of dictums—everywhere, at every national/cultural site, modernity is not one but many; modernity is not new but old and familiar; modernity is incomplete and necessarily so—that he then suspends in the name of a narrativisation of modernity that forces plurality back into its problematic. Societal modernization, for instance, denotes the rise of instrumental reason, Baconian science and disenchantment, while cultural modernity busies itself with generating a nervous flow of aesthetic and ontological compensations, escapes, conflicts and differentiations. The cultural logic of modernity responds to the iron-cage of a farmed earth, fractured by technology and pollution, inured to cancer logics in global capitalism.

The plurality of modernities in thought, being and action, Gaonkar finally declares, can be figured best through diverse site-based analysis of particular modern scenes. Eurocentric historicity has been challenged by these modernities from other zones in space and time. In their creative adaptation, they have become the situation source for object lessons that tell us much about Europe even if they are not identifiable temporally with the first European modernity. In his attempt to valorise and even celebrate subaltern modernities, Gaonkar has still to deal conclusively with the one and the many.[23] Charles Taylor, on the other hand, argues that modernity differs from pre-modernity in the same fashion that pre-modern China differed from the pre-modern West:

> From one point of view, modernity is like a wave, flowing over and engulfing one traditional culture after another […] (but) it would be better […] to speak of alternative modernities, as the cultures that emerge in the world to carry the institutional changes turn out to differ in important ways from each other. Thus a Japanese modernity, an Indian modernity, and various modulations of Islamic modernity will probably enter alongside the gamut of Western societies, which are also far from being uniform.[24]

Taylor describes a persistently singular modernity that slips back into the space opened up for thinking its plurality. More precisely, the locations at which modernity is dressed in native costume are only allowed the poor autonomy of responding to a universal ultimatum. The institutional

changes of modernity are offered, theoretically, to everyone—in the form of World Bank loans for energy generation tied to structural adjustment programmes, for instance—but the particularity of acceptance doesn't alter the uniformity of the interpellation, or of the finer details of the deal.

Provençal Forms

Lyndall Ryan, Henry Reynolds, Nicholas Clements, Lynette Russell, Ian Macfarlane and Cassandra Pybus challenge the fatalistic narrative of the collective Aboriginal death sentence on the grounds of its misconstrued finale. As Russell writes:

> It is not my intention to diminish the horror of much of that history. Rather, in doing so I am trying to redirect the gaze slightly so as to see Aboriginal people as agents and actors in their own destiny.[25]

From this perspective, the demographic disaster, as Reynolds calls it, should be retrieved from the genre of heroic tragedy and recast as an episode in an ongoing history of relations between indigenous and non-indigenous Tasmanians. The destruction of the Aboriginal cultures of Tasmania was never a *fait accompli*. To treat it thus is to go some way toward exonerating those actions, or in the case of the colonial administrators, inaction that coalesced to produce the set of events which in hindsight appears so pre-determined.

In her book, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*, Ryan cites three moments when Aboriginal displacement and decimation might have been averted: before the agricultural phase of British occupation began in 1807, before the rapid expansion of the pastoralist phase from 1820 onwards, and in 1827, when Governor Arthur first mooted the possibility of conciliation with the indigenous inhabitants in the north-east corner of the state.[26] The outcome that Turnbull, Plomley and Bonwick read as the necessary corollary of a lopsided clash between incommensurable civilisations is thus revealed to be contingent. Just as for Bauman, modernity was the necessary but not the sufficient cause of the Jewish Holocaust, Ryan's research shows that the colonisation of Tasmania created the conditions of possibility, but did not make inevitable, the slaughter of the Tasmanian Aborigines.[27]

In counterpoint to romantic and idealised eighteenth century visions of the noble savage, writers like Robert Knox, Benjamin Kidd, Francis

Galton and Charles Darwin proposed that the lesser races of the world would inevitably be consigned to the dustbin of history as Western Europe staked its claims to the irresistible territories of the new world.[28] In Tasmania, George Augustus Robinson, the *great conciliator*, was given the job of overseeing their extradition from the Tasmanian mainland to the Wybalenna encampment on Flinders Island.[29] This clumsy modernizing mission brought a more gradual, organic interchange of customs and goods that had been developing in Tasmania since 1803 to a sudden end. Paralysed by a mysterious depression, the Wybalenna Aborigines could not adjust to the shock of their new situation and refused, or were unable, adequately to have more children. Wybalenna's long term future was soon in jeopardy. In between these two extremes, were the missionaries, the evangelists and the abolitionists represented by groups like the Aboriginal Protection Society, who adhered to the conviction that there was no intrinsic incommensurability between savages and civilisation.

Dr. K. J. Story, a Quaker humanitarian, wrote: "If left to themselves to roam as they were wont and undisturbed, they would have reared more children, and there would have been less mortality".[30] But the natives were never going to be allowed to roam free for long across terrains marked out for pastoral development. In the early years of the colony, land grants were dispensed with cavalier confidence and fire-sale urgency. The modernisation of the Aborigines may not have led to genocide with direct, billiard-ball causality, but its co-presence within the field of actions, orientations and events that constituted the final episodes of that genocide make it a metonym for the totality of which it was a part.

Settlements

Tani Barlow doesn't directly engage with the question of settler modernities in her research but she does offer a conceptual framework through which they might be considered. For colonial in her formulation, I submit we read settler:

> "Colonial modernity" can be grasped as a speculative frame for investigating the infinitely pervasive discursive powers that increasingly connect at key points to the globalising impulses of capitalism. Because it is a way of posing a historical question about how our mutual present came to take its apparent shape, colonial modernity can also suggest that historical context is not a matter of positively defined, elemental or discrete units—nation states,

> stages of development, or civilisation, for instance—but rather a complex field of relationships or threads of material that connect multiply in space-time and can be surveyed from specific sites. The historiographical formulation "colonial modernity" may prove sufficiently general to encourage ensemble-like historical writing (situated among states, perhaps, or among subnational groups across state boundaries, or among and between subjectivities and so on) rather than continuing the convention of binding historical knowledge in strictly opposed pairs (self/other, state/nation, colony/metropole).[31]

The dynamics of modernity that surrounded, informed and enabled the Palawa genocide are rendered visible only from a vantage point that eschews the obduracy of coloniser/colonised polarities, and makes permeable the spatial and legislative boundaries that separate the imperial centres from their dominions and dependencies. Modernity, is, in Barlow's terms, a patch that quilts together the Europeanness and the Tasmanianness of the colonising subjectivities with the torn and tattered but still extant traditions of the Aboriginal peoples of Tasmania. Sidney Mintz's investigation of sugar plantations in the Caribbean is a well-respected demonstration of this imbrication of colonizing and colonial zones in the first European modernity.[32] In Tasmania, small-plot, hunter-gatherer economics was favoured by dispersed convicts, stock keepers and ticket-of-leave men but this silent minority were also often in regular contact with the traditional owners of the land. And it didn't become a zero-sum relationship until the Black War began in earnest during Governor Arthur's administration.[33]

The denial of Aboriginal agency implicit in the genocidal logic of Tasmania's discovery equates to an issuance of a notice of postponement—a not yet—to antipodean, non-modern subjects seeking recognition from their European modernisers. The Aboriginal inhabitants of Tasmania were found to be incapable of looking after themselves, they needed commandants, conciliators and administrators to usher them into the common, modern era. Their traditional pre-modern, ahistorical existence was found to be anathema to a culture that could only understand civilisation in Lockean terms as the transformation of nature into utilitarian forms like fields and towns, territories and rentier fiefs. The Europeans brought modernity to Tasmania in the form of a guaranteed linearity of time marked off at its terminus by the moment of falsely proclaimed extinction.[34]

The modernisation of Van Diemen's Land, as James Boyce clearly shows, included development in its full range—pastoral, manufacturing, civil—that gave the colony material self-reliance and its pioneers a clear sense of land-bound, new world identity. Labouring convicts, hustling land-grab free-settlers, generations of new native-born subjects, forged a community that was spatially, if not technologically, cutting edge.

But Van Diemen's island was invaded for its use-value as an unescapable and brutal penal colony. It was theorized thus in progressive Enlightenment tracts written by Jeremy Bentham and even Charles Darwin as steam and steel were transforming the English countryside. The market power of the imperial mills destroyed the centuries old cottage-industries and banished a newly dispossessed *lumpenproletariat* to already swollen cities such as Engel's Manchester. The *precariat* were easy prey for judges and magistrates intent on filling boats with an occupying force. A sentence of transportation to New South Wales could be incurred for minor crimes of property such as pick pocketing or controversial political misdeeds such as revolutionary agitation. The thirteen colonies of the English-speaking new world were also suddenly hostile to convicts as the paragon struggle for modern representative democracy, independence and self-rule freed America from the British yoke.[35]

Colonising forces install and confirm settler modernities with and against indigenous groups in contexts of disjunction, absence and unfamiliarity. A settler modernity might take on some of the practices of the indigenous culture but, in cases like Tasmania, where that culture was so quickly suppressed, writing and practising a settler modernity more properly required an imaginative recasting of the orders of life left behind in Europe. But little attention is paid to the modifications forced into the structure of European modernity as it is practiced by displaced Europeans in colonial locations. Imperial European subjects were said to have gone native if they indulged too enthusiastically in the transversality of this cultural overlap. But existential adaptations are of a different order to the new values built into an institutional spectrum. How, for instance, would common law be enshrined and upheld in rough and ready Van Diemen's Land? How would problems of democracy be broached in conditions of contested land ownership? How would modern education and culture be patched over a scattered diorama of precarious pre-industrial production and vicious convict dissipation that reformers still cite as a barrier to Tasmanian progress?

Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn argue that the victims of archaic mass murder tended to be targeted "because of where they were or what they had," whereas targets of modern genocides have been eliminated "according to who they [were]."[36] On the Tasmanian frontier and in the halls of the British colonial administration, this distinction was never really honoured or observed, intentionally or by chance. The motives for murder in frontier Van Diemen's Land were seldom cut and dried, even if many of the bodies of the fallen were treated thus by medical and scientific researchers. It does seem, though, if we dampen our hunt for terror in the archive, that utilitarian and economic motives were more significant drivers of the clearances in Van Diemen's Land than vicious, salivating ideologies of evolutionary race prejudice or ethnic scapegoating. Some of the more ragged and brutal Van Diemonians might well have boasted that they would happily "kill a crow as soon as smoke a pipe", but the dull and dismal cause of the decimation and displacement of the Palawa was really the poorly considered expansion of European pastoral interests from the beginning of the Black War in the 1820s. Wool was shipped back from Van Diemen's Land, thus, to the voracious, coal-fed textile mills of a still industrialising Britain. The foreign investment upon which it was built, in combination with the revenue it attracted, facilitated an endogenous project of state-building that would eventually set Tasmanians along their own troubled course toward modernity.

The Real Person

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri describe the modernist text as a root book that flowers with brilliant psychedelic colour even as it remains heavily bound by botanical necessity, to the mimetic properties of nineteenth-century realism. The totalising thematics of character and place in James Joyce's *Ulysses* are redolent of an inhibition that was close to being abandoned by the time *Finnegan's Wake* was published in London in 1939.

In a methodological echo of Edward Soja's claim that "Prophecy now involves a geographical rather than an historical projection; it is space and not time that hides consequences from us", the schema of the root book and its antithesis, the rhizome, are steadfastly three-dimensional, as well as organic, metaphors for understanding literary production.[37] Philip Mead is persuaded by Soja when he compares the "strange narrative density of Tasmania" to the moment in Italo Calvino's *The Castle of Crossed*

Destinies, "where the narrator realises that stories don't proceed along thin, linear planes" and "the act of reading produces a dense forest of story in whichever direction the reader proceeds".[38] Even though these approaches have proven fruitful, this chapter sidelines spatialising hermeneutics and invokes the second of Kant's intuitive categories to examine the ways in which configurations of temporality are turned into fields for the actualisation of desire in *Gould's Book of Fish* and, to a lesser extent, in Flanagan's other novels as well.[39]

Paint It Black

Jim Davidson's "Tasmanian Gothic" has provided a popular vocabulary for writing, thinking and talking about Tasmania's troubled relationship with progress and futurity so that, more often than not, it is characterised as being stuck in a frieze of underdevelopment, lagging at various distances behind the times:

> Tasmania, because it is confined, can never escape the Alcatraz it once was; and part of the Island's gothic character—the adjective he is driven to use again and again—arises from the fact that the past, whether acknowledged or not, is constantly intercessed with the present particularly in those Midlands districts which contained many more people a century and a half ago than they do now.[40]

Flanagan's prose has also long been saturated in this economic despondency. He writes, first in, *The Death of a River Guide* and then, in *The Sound of One Hand Clapping*:

> Aljaz walked the streets of Hobart aimlessly, wandering through the old town's streets, past its small stolid buildings of the state which were without ambition but retained a dour intent, past its dingy shops more akin in their emaciated displays to the shops of Eastern Europe before the wall came down than to those luxurious displays of the mainland. The whole town was poor, desperately poor and he saw it in the eyes of the track-suited hordes that walked by him and he smelt it rising from the gutters.[41]

> Sonja looked out beyond the office at a concrete-block toilet, a puddle of urine spreading out from it and at the puddle's edge where the urine had mixed with the old sump oil she saw swimming all the colours of

> the rainbow, and beyond the extraordinary swirls of metallic wonder, a beaten-up country town.[42]

Aljaz Cosini, the eponymous hero of *Death of a River Guide*, is forced to accept an insulting meagre and minimum wage for the dangerous and onerous wilderness tourism work that will ultimately result in his death. In *The Sound of One Hand Clapping*, meanwhile, Sonja is regarded as a big-shot because she works at a Sydney television station. Hammet, the narrator who presides over the framing narrative to *Gould's Book of Fish*, is stuck in another chiselling rut, living from hand to mouth, furnishing false histories to cashed-up tourists.

Here, Tasmania's belated project of hydro-electrification has failed to create a thriving, optimistic, promising society. Instead, Sonja's morbid, abusive father personifies a thwarted modernity buckled by fugitive self-interest and hinged by long-held grudges. It's left to Sonja to bring a future south to her stranded, sinking father. She thus embodies the transplanted fate—the absent future, the depopulation anxiety—that has haunted and continues to haunt—Tasmania. For Flanagan, it's almost as if a modern present that was so reluctant to come to the islands in in the first instance, has also taken leave of the place at the first available opportunity.[43]

At first glance, *Gould's Book of Fish*, doesn't appear to be a book about modernity. It's predominantly set in 1820s Van Diemen's Land for one thing, and its protagonist, the convict forger, William Buelow Gould, is certainly no Renaissance man, although he does do a fine line in counterfeit water colours. Essentially, this is a counter-history of convictism focalised around the plight of a singular victim of its depredations. Sid Hammet, a twenty-first-century Tasmanian furniture restorer and local boaster discovers the *Book of Fish* in a meat safe at Hobart's Salamanca Place. From there, we are submerged into the life history of its author, William Buelow Gould—forger, convict, painter of fish—as Flanagan unwinds his biography from London to Sarah Island.

Flanagan's book is about the malleability of truth and the reliability of writing; it's about what can happen when imagination and desire slip into the gaps between *de jure* and *de facto* interpretations of history. It's also about the ways in which modalities of temporality can be inserted into an economy of longing for the future, so that a fictional past becomes the model of an alternative future for a non-fictional present. In *Gould's Book of Fish*, Richard Flanagan returns to the time of Tasmania's first modernity in order to realise his hopes and ambitions for another modernity

that is yet to come. The tragi-comic failure of that fictional modernisation reflects, after the fashion of psychoanalytic dream-work, the ambivalence he has displayed about the real history of Tasmanian modernity.

In broad terms, the temporal horizon of *Gould's Book of Fish* is split into two parts: the time of the present and the time of the past. The time of the present is the time of Sid Hammet and the discovery of the *Book of Fish* in the old meat safe at Salamanca Place. The time of the past is the time of William Buelow Gould, the Commandant, and Sarah Island. This second temporal dimension is fractured, however, by the positioning of the unreliable narrator, Gould, as intra-textual author recounting his own life history. The time of Gould's past is split into three: the principal moment of transcription, the events that preceded it, and the point at which those events coalesce with the telling of the narrative. By the end of the novel, time catches up with the narrative and a second modality of the present, a past-present, is presumed.

Flanagan's intervention into the Tasmanian archive demands a reading sensitive to problematics of truth and fiction that can also shade the more obvious temporal fitfulness of his novel. In *Gould's Book of Fish*, facticity coalesces with the treatment of truth to make a dream come true. It is impossible to nominate either of the two as conceptually prior, nor do they exert obviously unequal causal weights. Rather, time and fact become mutually constitutive, and perhaps, more accurately, mutually supportive in their capacity to bear the weight of their master's textual longing. In this regard, *Gould's Book of Fish* is an interstitial work that sits between the author's desire for transformation in the social structure of Tasmania and the set of non-fictional commentaries and interviews that he has given on the subject. To be more precise, *Gould's Book of Fish* functions as a scored and scarred response, on Flanagan's part, to the ambivalent character of Tasmanian modernity.

Here, I have chosen to borrow cold and raw from Freudian ideas on wish-fulfilment and creative writing to argue that Flanagan's principal achievement in *Gould's Book of Fish* is the sublimation of a desire for change in contemporary Tasmanian social life so that a new object for that cathexis is isolated in the fictional colonial modernity of the island. Removing Tasmania from its subaltern position in the footnotes of the history of British imperialism, Flanagan fashions a specular and spectacular "indigenous", internal modernity for the island out of the grandiloquent manifest content of the Commandant's Sarah Island. In the section of the novel entitled "Railway Fever", in particular, Flanagan engages

in a process of metonymic substitution whereby Sarah Island becomes a symbol for Tasmania in its entirety and railways become the exemplary trope of a brilliant, if doomed, modernity, which, for a variety of reasons discussed elsewhere in this book, is only now in the early stages of the twenty-first century beginning to materialise in the real Tasmania:

> It's not that I have a dream of a boom. The world will discover Tasmania and it will boom. Nor may the boom be a dream. It could be as destructive as the depression that we're in at the moment, because another problem we've got is that we'll take development at any cost.[44]

Temporary Temporalities

Writing about the temporality of modernity tends to focus on changes in the subjective and social experience of time enacted by the epochal shift away from pre-modernity. Alongside changes to the way in which structures of feeling are modified by the regular, striated clock-time of modernity, however, are the speculative orientations to temporality mobilised by the process of waiting for a period to end and for a new one to take its place. Marx's famous declaration that the countries that are more developed industrially become the image of the future for those places which lag behind encapsulates the way in which the expectation of modernity is organised, to paraphrase Julia Kristeva, around "the time of the promise".[45] Waiting for modernity involves a devaluing of the present as cathexis is withdrawn from an unsatisfactory now and redirected toward an imaginary future that may or may not actually make its feted appearance. In the case of colonial Bengal, described by Dipesh Chakrabarty, political modernity arrived as someone's way of saying "'not yet' to somebody else."[46] In Tasmania, this temporal configuration produced the unique situation in which a process of modernisation produced a modernity that was no longer modern. The establishment of heavy industry on the island was only achieved 150 years after what Phyllis Deane calls the "first industrial revolution", making it an anachronistic social form at a world-historical level even as it continued to be invested with substantial resources of local hope. The representatives of the global Green movement who directed their gaze toward Tasmania in the mid-1970s were thus confronted with a political culture stubbornly inured to the expiration of a project for social renovation that had already been shelved in the cultural centres at the leading edge of new human horizons.

"Railway Fever" is a crucial part of *Gould's Book of Fish* in this context because of the unique significance of steam locomotion to social theoretical narratives of modernisation. In perhaps the exemplary instantiation of this approach, David Harvey credits the construction of railways in Europe and North America with playing a part in the production of "time-space compression", a phenomenological effect that he sees as central to the subjective novelty of modern existence.[47] In his influential study *The Railway Journey: The Industrialisation of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century*, Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues further that rail services were a focal point for changes in the experience of time so that, in Nicholas Daly's terms, the railway became "both an agent and vehicle of modernisation."[48] The tropology of waiting for trains folds the subjective dimensions of the experience of modern time into the society-wide anticipation of cultural transformation. The figuration of the railway in texts like Michael Winterbottom's *The Claim*, where the fate of the principal location hinges on the decision of the railway engineers to include it on the line epitomises the way in which locomotives have become one of the pre-eminent *vehicles* for introducing the suspension of temporality effected by the anticipation of modernity into filmic and literary narratives. Equally, a different kind of waiting for trains played a part in the reorganisation of the subjective experience of time in the new epoch of the modern:

> For members of the Victorian middle classes, the railway was often their most direct encounter with the discipline of this new industrial technology. They learned on the station platform and in the railway carriage what the industrial worker had already learned on the factory floor. In this sense, the railway quite literally brought people up to speed.[49]

The temporality of prison life is analogous to that of the pre-modern society awaiting an invitation to the party of modernity. Just as the agrarian or colonial community anticipates a reprieve from what Fredric Jameson calls vegetal time—the same organic life-rhythm, it must be said, that is made the object of nostalgia in the romantic imagination and Van Gough's Peasant Shoes paintings—the convict disavows the present in anticipation of the moment of release. For William Buelow Gould, however, locked down in his solitary saltwater cell at the mercy of a regime that has abandoned responsible models of rehabilitation and retribution, freedom is permanently struck from the agenda of possibilities. The best he can hope for is a less draconian detail and a varied timetable to break up his days:

> At that time my life had settled into a routine that was if not pleasant, compared to most of my fellow felons, at least tolerably comfy. Though I continued to sleep with the other convicts in the Penitentiary, between the morning and evening muster I was largely free to do whatever took my fancy and go where I liked on the island. I received extra food, a rum ration and was allowed to keep a small vegetable garden for my own use next to Castlereagh's pen. I even had a woman, which in a colony full of men is no small matter.[50]

One Track Mind

Even though the transition from pre-modern to modern time is often represented as a jarring, disconcerting experience, according to a number of writers, the regularity of the railway actually operates as a reassuring presence for subjects assailed by the maelstrom of modernity. Russell McDougall, for instance, suggests that "however unpunctual and unreliable they might be in fact, trains are to the British imagination emblems of a soothing Eternity".[51] Marshall Berman adds that "the railroad ran on a fixed schedule along a prescribed route, and so, for all its demonic potentialities, became a nineteenth century paradigm of order".[52] In his study of time in the work of Emile Zola, Robert M. Viti offers a similar interpretation of the function of trains in the literary imagination:

> The railway is the best and clearest representation of systematic order in all of Zola. […] Besides expressing the methodical regularity of linear time, the precise movement of the minute hand as trains arrive at one station and leave another, the railway emphasizes also the order and coherence of recurrence, of circularity, since these exact movements are repeated everyday, on a regular, systematic, scheduled basis. The railway system is indeed the representation of the uniform and the harmonious, the ordinary and the expected.[53]

In Flanagan's novel this figural schema is inverted so that the railway becomes a symbol not of order but of the tripped-out modernising vision of the syphilitic Commandant. Gould's involvement in the construction of the Sarah Island railway disrupts the relative harmony of his life as a painter of fish and sets him on the path to destruction. We are thus exposed to a paradox inherent in the experience of train waiting. On the one hand, once they have been introduced into a community, trains take on the soothing, harmonious function described by the writers above. Their regularity and repetition situate them within a steadfastly circular temporal horizon.

On the other, however, the fact of their being introduced into a community, with all its concomitant associations of progress and change, must be plotted onto a linear temporal sequence. In this last sense the arrival of the train and the end of the wait signals the onset of a new epochal moment, a Thermidor or year zero after which things will never be the same again. At the experiential level, the bi-polar character of this temporal configuration—the time of trains, the time of no trains—produces an epistemological shock for the newly modern subject that is mirrored and amplified by the phenomenological encounter with the physicality of speed itself. The corporeal impact of this new age of mechanised travel is most emphatically demonstrated in the case of accidents like the Staplehurst derailing that numbered among its victims, a rattled, if relatively unhurt, Charles Dickens:

> Although Dickens got off lightly in the accident itself, the original jolt seems to have left its mark on his body, to have filed itself away in his nervous system; he relived the event over and over, experiencing all the anxiety that he didn't feel at the time.[54]

The flip-side of this uniquely modern form of nervousness is the thrill induced by the experience of the new. The introduction of linear time to a community traditionally organised around the regular cycles of nature and agriculture goes hand in hand with the commitment to achieving dynamic change. Modernisation is always a response to a vision for a different future that must be reached by way of linear progression so that the time to come is irreducibly different to the time of the present. In the case of Flanagan's Commandant, the goal of modernising Sarah Island is to make the penal colony, "the product of his imaginative will" after the fashion of Miss Anne, the sister of the dead major whose identity he steals to precipitate his plan for the construction of a nation.[55] In a grand misunderstanding, the Commandant interprets the descriptions of a modernising Europe in the letters sent by Miss Anne as the account of a process of *autopoesis* on her part:

> One night, when behind his gold mask his eyes had finally wearied from rereading her wondrous letters and closed in a dully pleasant anticipation of nearing sleep, he realized that all the new technological miracles in Europe had either been invented by Miss Anne or directly come into being from her good works, wise advice or kindly intervention: be these the locomotive, the steam ship, the steam press or the generation of the supernatural force of electricity—all were the creation of Miss Anne![56]

The introduction of linear time to Sarah Island is an initial success. Frustrated at the lack of interest in the affairs of the island shown by the authorities in Hobart, the Commandant rejects banal administrative cyclicality and begins to remodel the settlement according to his own linear blueprint. The following is a short passage from a section covering four pages in which Flanagan describes the arc of the colony's blossoming:

> With its profits he bought more boats and had others go back to the island upon which he had been marooned and hunt the moonbird for its flesh and the seals for their skins. He formed those convicts he trusted into an elite guard, had them shoot dead half his soldiers, and by not informing the colonial authorities, kept receiving their wages as dead-pay. He doubled the rate of felling of Huon Pine and halved the amount he sent back to the colonial authorities, then as trade grew brisk quadrupled his felling and quartered the amount he sent now only as a forlorn tribute to Hobart Town, along with letters speaking of the almost insurmountable problems of poor tools, sawyers of no experience, epidemics of unspeakable sin and weather so awful the rivers were frozen for six months of the year.[57]

Along with the cyclo-temporality of stasis and repetition, the entropic linearity of decay and disrepair is the time-state most feared by agents of modernisation. In the case of Flanagan's Sarah Island, these two figural schemas arrive hand-in-hand to signal the failure of the Commandant's exaggerated ambitions. The first sign that the dream of constructing a prosperous city-state has foundered on the rocks of reality is the unrequited laying of rail lines into the interior of the Tasmanian wilderness. In this case, the metempsychotic linearity of the time of modernisation is met with a blank refusal from its imagined interlocutors and nothing but silence resounds along the steel, blue metal and sleepers:

> When after another year, there was still no sign of any incoming rail traffic, the Commandant had four search parties sent into the interior to discover exactly from which direction the new railway lines must be inevitably advancing. No-one returned.[58]

The introduction of a new cyclical temporality embodied in the physical structure of the railway follows hard on the heels of this interruption in linear time. With his hopes of escaping the tyranny of distance dashed by

the non-appearance of incoming locomotives, the Commandant sets out to stupefy himself with interminable numbing journeys upon his circular railway. As part of the task of recruiting Gould to the job of concocting a visual accompaniment to this train-to-nowhere, he has the hapless convict strapped to the front of one of the engines. The Commandant's wish that Gould "might better experience the new aesthetick of movement" of course, results in a pathetic parody of travel that firmly ensconces the cyclical as the dominant temporal mode. If time passes, but no distance is covered, how is the future ever to be reached?

> To the growing roar of the steam engine and the rhythmic clatter of iron wheels on iron rails, I circled endlessly. Within a few minutes I was vomiting and a few minutes after that I had nothing left to retch save a foul green bile that spread like the vomit before over my clothes. On and on, round and round, and no attempt to lose myself in sleep or daydreaming or focussing on thoughts of food or women helped in any way. [....] If this was the future, thought I in one of the few moments of lucidity granted me that long evening, it was not a future that seemed worthy of the name.[59]

Gould's Book of Fish depicts an attempt to restore the locomotive to its role as the harbinger and vector of modernity, the carrier of progress, economic growth and new social values that it never managed to be in the real history of Tasmania. The willful, manifest destiny of American territorial expansion objectified and *represented* in Schopenhauer's terms, by the energetic desires of the railway barons, the cattle men and the dryland farmers are transposed into Tasmania with predictably disastrous results. Unlike the American locomotives, these trains have nowhere to go and nobody to sing songs of their passing. Suffering from third-stage syphilis, and viewing the world in delirious visions from behind his mask of gold, the Commandant retains a manic, modernist faith in the necessary link between lines and arrivals, between construction and appearance. He spreads his enterprise out into the South West in the anticipation that someone somewhere will be building from another direction, that connection will inevitably be made. But no one comes because there is no elsewhere from which they might arrive. The serpentine tracks of steel and sleepers remain unused and unwanted before being re-claimed by the wilderness that the Commandant attempts so vainly to master.[60]

Structured Like a Language

The re-emergence of cyclical time as the containing horizon for the Commandant's project of modernisation—like the Railway, the Great Mah-jong Hall also falls into a state of disrepair and ultimate collapse—also signals Flanagan's failure to satisfactorily actualise his wish for a new Tasmanian modernity metonymically embodied in the Nova Venetia of Sarah Island. Notwithstanding the circular motifs that organise the telling of *Gould's Book of Fish*—the reappearance of Mr. Hung in the final chapter, the return to the time of the now, the last gasp admission that all the novel's central characters are emanations of the same cracked, aquatic psyche—Flanagan's attempt at retroactively reorienting his desire for future change in the real Tasmania toward a fictionalised anterior object is stymied by the very cyclical character of the act of wishing itself. As Freud writes:

> The motive forces of fantasies are unsatisfied wishes, and every single fantasy is the fulfilment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality. Mental work is linked to some current impression, some provoking occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one of the subject's major wishes. *From there it harks back to a memory of an earlier experience in which the wish was fulfilled; and it now creates a situation relating to the future which represents a fulfilment of the wish.* What it thus creates is a daydream or fantasy […] past, present and future are strung together as it were on the thread of the wish that runs through them.[61]

Although undoubtedly gifted at evoking the nowness of present-day Tasmania, Flanagan also devotes much energy to fleshing out the past, busying himself, to paraphrase Terry Eagleton on Irish culture, with "back-projecting a venerable past" for the island.[62] This task is carried out so competently that its deployment often makes the old seem newer and more vivid than the images Flanagan draws from our own horizon of temporality. As Philip Mead has argued, Flanagan's artistic world is built around a vision of the moment as a period of sustained temporal extension. In this imaginary temporal topology, the present blends with the past and merges with the future in a single, indefinitely distended, window of time.

The fantasy that Freud discusses is firmly couched in the future tense, the wish is for an alteration in the present that might be achieved in a time to come. For Flanagan, however, past, present and future are all parts of

the same monadic moment, which means that the unsatisfied wish, which can be traced in his non-fictional writing to a desire for a re-organisation of Tasmanian modernity in the future, might just as well be directed at the past. In *Gould's Book of Fish*, Flanagan attempts to recreate "the memory of the earlier experience in which the wish was fulfilled" so that it becomes a prosthetic simulation of a prior fulfilment of his own longings for the future, a simulation that can be drawn upon as a psychical resource for moving forward and through the straitened conditions of the Tasmanian present. Flanagan is redirecting his imaginative energies at the modernity of Tasmania's past as a means of satisfying his desire for a change in the form of the modernity of Tasmania's present and future:

> The only way people can go forward is by walking back into the shadows of the past. At some point you have to turn around and look back into the shadows before you can go on.[63]

The bulk of Freud's theoretical writing on wish-fulfilment concentrates on the realisation of those wishes in dreams. In essays from volumes one, four, five and fifteen of the standard works, Freud outlines the major part of his theoretical corpus on night-time cognition, a corpus which has often since been represented solely by the short slogan: "dreams are the disguised fulfilment of distorted wishes". It goes without saying that the work attributed to dreams in the metapsychology is a lot more complicated than that. Freud makes room for anxiety and punishment dreams, for instance, as well as delineating three different aetiologies for the manifest content revealed in the dream-work.[64] For the most part however, it is wishing and its subsequent fulfilment that he believes sit at the basis of our (ir)rationale for dreaming:

> We have found some dreams which appear only as wish-fulfilments, and others in which the wish-fulfilment was unrecognisable and often disguised by every possible means. In the latter we have perceived the dream-censorship at work. We found the undistorted wishful dreams principally in children; though short, frankly wishful dreams seemed to occur in adults as well.[65]

Techne and Poiesis

In "Creative Writers and Daydreaming" Freud identifies another outlet for the troubling desires that the wakeful reality principle finds unpalatable, intolerable or unsustainable. Here he connects childhood play,

a third space in which fantasies may be indulged, with the (adult) act of daydreaming. He then goes on to argue that in creative writing we discover a form of daydreaming—itself a carry-over from childhood play—that is not found unsuitable for public display by the censoring forces of the reality principle. Creative writers, Freud argues, are a privileged set because they are allowed to fantasise in public. The imprimatur attached to those fantasies endorses a tolerance to the violent permutations of form. By dressing desire up in respectable attire, writers make good on the disguised and distorted end of the equation that Freud established in the case of wish fulfilment in dreams, making their desires speak in powerful and representative ways to a larger community for whom that right has been denied:

> We laymen have always been intensely curious to know from what strange sources that strange being, the creative writer, draws his material […] Might we not say that every child at play behaves like a creative writer, in that he creates a world of his own, or, rather, rearranges the things of his world in a new way that pleases him? It would be wrong to think he does not take that world seriously, on the contrary, he takes his play very seriously and expends large amount of emotion on it. The opposite of play is not what is serious but what is real. In spite of all the emotion with which he cathects his world of play, the child distinguishes it quite well from reality; and likes to link his imagined objects and situations to the tangible and visible things of the real world. This linking is all that differentiates the child's play from "fantasying".[66]

Freud can be joined to Flanagan to elucidate the latter's ambivalent position *vis-à-vis* the project of Tasmanian hydro-electrification as expressed in the following elegiac passage from *The Sound of One Hand Clapping*:

> Once this weary pastoral land had been open forest through which the blackfellas hunted and camped and of a night filled with their stories of which one had no end: that of their fierce war against the invading whitefellas. Then the surveyors came with their barefooted convict track cutters and they gave the land strange new names and by their naming and by their describing they announced the coming of a terrible revolution. Where their indian-inked maps cut the new country into neat counties with quaint reassuring English names like Cumberland and Bothwell, the surveyor's successors, the hydro-electricity engineers, made their straight lines reality in the form of the wires along which the new energy, electricity—the new god—hummed its song of promise, its seductive false prophesies that Tasmania would one day be Australia's Ruhr Valley.[67]

Flanagan's involvement with the environmental movement and his vocal antipathy for orthodox Tasmanian politics are indicative of a sensitivity to the failings of the project he describes in this passage, but when it comes to providing content for the empty form of his fictional wish, he is unable to escape completely the reservoir of future-directed optimism that Tasmanians tend to associate with this period. Flanagan avails himself of the rich resource of communal hope embodied in the project of hydro-electrification in a number of ways in *Gould's Book of Fish*. His wish for an alternative Tasmanian modernity finds an avenue for sublimation in his fiction but cannot ever remove itself completely from the influence of the real modernisation of Tasmania. Instead images and tropes drawn from this true history return again and again in condensed and displaced form to overdetermine the fictional vision, making it a kind of crazy composite of the real and the imagined; a pastiche, in other words, held together by a surplus of hope.

The social energies that Flanagan recuperates from the true history of Tasmania extend beyond the narrative of railway construction described earlier to encompass the story of hydro-electrification that contoured Tasmanian self-identity through the twentieth century. The first associated episode that Flanagan replots concerns the perennial struggle to enlarge the population of Tasmania at a faster rate than Australia as a whole, a key plank in the plan to arrest relative decline. Lloyd Robson's *A History of Tasmania*, tells us that this goal has only been attained once in modern times, during the heyday of the Hydro-Electric Commission's expansion in the early 1950s.[68] A sediment of demographic optimism thus layers the infrastructural gigantism of dam building, and Tasmania's political leaders have seldom resisted the repetition-compulsion that draws them back to pump-priming and civil works as the cure-all for Tasmania's economic ills. Flanagan allegorises this blind faith in the progress of engineering through his depiction of the monumental building projects of the Commandant.

The second episode that is re-presented in Gould's narrative is the struggle over the Gordon and Franklin rivers that ultimately spelled the end of hydro-electrification after the Australian High Court ruled in favour of the Federal Government's intervention to halt the construction of the Gordon-Below-Franklin dam in 1983. Flanagan turns history on its head in his fictional world, and has the Commandant exchange the rights to the river for foreign currency. Finally, the Commandant's decision to sell the entire South-West wilderness to Japanese loggers recuperates contemporary reservations about clear-felling old-growth forests for

wood-chips in an economic and ecological climate where downstream, value-adding is increasingly being viewed as the only justifiable rationale for the continued sanction and subsidisation of anachronistic extractive industries. Woodchipping is not in itself a product of hydro-electrification, but the instrumental orientation to nature that is its motivating force sets up an associative chain with the project of industrialisation.

As Natalie Jackson makes clear in her demographic work on Tasmania, one of the most commonly recurring tropes in the doomsaying prognostications on Tasmania's future is the problem of depopulation.[69] Here is Flanagan commenting on a proposal to construct a tourist site on the Hobart waterfront that engages with that problematic:

> That's why Rundle [the Premier of the day] will kill the goose that laid the golden egg and build that horror show down on the wharves to get in the tourists who come on cruise ships precisely because they want to look at something like Salamanca. […] What I'm saying is that there are forces abroad in the world that will lead to people coming here whether we want them or not.[70]

The similarities between the orientation of Tasmania's political leaders as observed in this statement and the construction of the Commandant's plans for the Sarah Island National Railway from *Gould's Book of Fish* make the following passage from the novel worth reproducing at some length:

> It was a huge undertaking, requiring sandstone be quarried and shipped from far up the coast, the purchase and assembly of all the machinery needed for the work-shops and smiths and factories associated with a great train station. All this in face of those who quietly expressed the timid doubt that a train station on an island in the middle of the wilderness far off the coast of a nowhere land so blighted it existed only as a gaol was unlikely ever to be either the terminus or point of departure for any traveler. Such arguments were calmly refuted by the implacable conviction of the Commandant that railway lines grew out to train stations as willows roots to a lake and that therefore before long it would be the busiest train station in the Antipodes; that soon Manchurians and Liverpudlians would enviously and covetously talk of the National Sarah Island Railway Station. In this way […] we will have traded our tyranny of isolation for the liberty of commerce.[71]

Here, the Commandant is presented as an analogue for a Tasmanian State Government still infatuated with the infrastructure-driven economic success that had its heyday during the boom-times of hydro-electrification.

Like the proponents of that dubious project, the Commandant remains myopically set on establishing his National Railway even as unmistakable evidence of its impending failure comes pouring in. In both cases, the fiction and the commentary, Flanagan describes an administrator obsessed with overcoming the isolation of Tasmania through large-scale construction. Unable to impede the course of contemporary events with which he disagrees, Flanagan redirects his antipathy toward the Commandant's grand folly. In a range of passages which represent Tasmania's own struggle to establish sustainable profitable commerce, Flanagan has the Commandant pursue his fatuous dream into the mouth of madness:

> When it was determinedly but respectfully put to the Commandant that a train station on an island in the middle of the wilderness was unlikely to attract any other traffic that might bring in income to offset its enormous cost, the Commandant placidly and unexpectedly agreed. He then revealed that he had for the last several months not been asleep at all in the revolving locomotive cabin, but in deep discussion with a Japanese trader called Magamasa Yamada, a man in whose land there was a great demand for wood and with whom the Commandant had entered into an arrangement to sell the entire Transylvanian [The South West of Tasmania, now covered by the World Heritage Area] wilderness in exchange for more rolling stock.[72]

Cut It Down, Dig It Up, Look at That

One of the social issues that has most captured Flanagan's imagination in recent years is old-growth logging, particularly where areas of natural heritage value are threatened by forestry practices. Once again, the satirical conflation of real world concerns and fictional renderings in the novel at hand conspires to reveal an ambivalence on the part of the author about Tasmania's dependency on primary industries as an avenue to modernity. Woodchips and other products from Tasmania's old growth forests have often been sold in the bulk commodities markets as a means of anchoring a solid blue-collar base for an otherwise welfare-supported, state-heavy, small business economy. Likewise, the Commandant sells off the rights to the South-West wilderness so that he can acquire the equipment he needs to actualise his grandiloquent vision for Sarah Island's future. In the final piece to this puzzle, Flanagan has the Commandant acquire currency to service his mounting debts through the sale of the Gordon River, the environmental heart of the No Dams movement that finally sealed the fate of the project of hydro-electrification in 1983.

Flanagan's desire for an alternative modernity for Tasmania, with all its condensations and displacements of Tasmania's real passage to the present social moment, cannot quite escape a repetition of the mediocre story of the Island's actual modernisation. Freud's remarks on the way a wish returns to the site of a previous satisfaction as a means of drawing the energy to posit a fulfilling future theorises Flanagan's own ambivalent relationship with the project of hydro-electrification. The compression of past, present and future, fact and fiction into one marvellous brew is not enough in this case to give succour to the vicissitudes of the author's wishing. In re-imagining Tasmanian modernity, Flanagan has no choice but to draw from the positive residues of the fleeting success of the project of hydro-electrification, allegorising its successes and failures in the Commandant's grandiose schemes for the establishment of the great trading nation of Sarah Island.

Notes

1. See James Bonwick, *The Last of the Tasmanians* (London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston, 1870); Clive Turnbull, *Black War: The Extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines* (Melbourne: Landsdowne Press, 1965); Haydon (dir.) *The Last Tasmanian*. For further nineteenth century examples of the extinction thesis see Calder, *Some Accounts of Wars, Extirpation, Habits of the Native Tribes of Tasmania*; Henry Ling-Roth, *The Aborigines of Tasmania* (Halifax West: King and Sons, 1899); James Bischoff, *Sketch of the History of Van Diemen's Land, Illustrated by a Map of the Island, and an Account of the Van Diemen's Land Company* (London: John Richardson, 1832); James Backhouse Walker, *Papers on Tasmania* (Hobart: William Grahame, Government Printer, 1884–1896); George Washington Walker, *Notes on the Aborigines of Tasmania* (Hobart: William Grahame, Jun., Govt. Printer, 1898); James Barnard, *Aborigines of Tasmania* (Melbourne: Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, 1890); William Flower, *The Aborigines of Tasmania: An Extinct Race: A Lecture Delivered in the Hulme Town Hall, Manchester, Nov. 30, 1878* (Manchester: John Heywood, 1879); Hugh Hull, *Lecture on the Aborigines of Tasmania: Read at the Mechanics' Institute, Hobart Town, 28th Oct., 1869* (Hobart Town: Mercury, 1870); R. H. Davies, "On the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land," *Tasmanian Journal of Natural Science, Agriculture, Statistics, etc.* 11 (1846): 409–20; Robert Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria: With Notes Relating to the Habits of the Natives of Other Parts of Australia and Tasmania* (Melbourne: John Currey O'Neil, 1972). For twentieth century versions see Archibald Meston, *The Problem of the Tasmanian Aborigine* (Hobart: Government Printer, 1937); Hugh Bohun, *Black Tragedy* (Sydney: Midget Masterpiece, 1933); Frederic Jones, *Tasmania's Vanished Race: National Talks Delivered from*

3AR Melbourne, on Feb 26th, 1935, March 6th, 1935 and March 12th, 1935 (Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1935); William Brydon, *The Story of the Tasmanian Aboriginals* (Hobart: Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery, 1960); William Turner, *The Aborigines of Tasmania* (Edinburgh: Robert Grant, 1908–1914); Robert Travers, *The Tasmanians: The Story of a Doomed Race* (Cassel: Melbourne, 1968).

2. See Plomley, ed., *Weep in Silence: A History of the Flinders Island Aboriginal Settlement*. James D. Faubian reads the Weberian take on the degree zero of modernity as "a certain deconstruction: of […] the ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented cosmos […]". See James D. Faubian, *Modern Greek Lessons: A Primer in Historical Constructivism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), 113. See Calder, *Some Accounts of the Wars, Extirpation, Habits of the Native Tribes of Tasmania,* 86.
3. Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, 19.
4. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 7.
5. See Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); *The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question* (Calcutta: Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, 1987); *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London: Zed Books for the United Nations University,1986); *State and Politics in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997); Gyan Prakash, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); *History at the Limit of World-History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1982); Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*.
6. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 1992), and Derrida's critique of Fukuyama in *Spectres of Marx.*
7. Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, 5.
8. Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, 5.
9. Ibid., 17.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 10.
12. Richard Bernstein, introduction to *Habermas and Modernity,* ed. Richard Bernstein (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), 6.
13. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 13.
14. Ibid., 12.
15. Ibid., 50.

16. The sheer volume of scholarly work on the Holocaust made it almost inevitable that Bauman's position *vis-à-vis* the modernity of the "Final Solution" would be seriously challenged. See especially, Daniel Jonah Goldhagan's *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, (Abacus: London, 1996).
17. Ibid., 17.
18. Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, 66. Modernity's rubric summons a host of objects; the democratic, industrial and educational revolutions, the rise of technologically directed empiricism, the split between civil society and the state, the conceptualisation of abstract human rights discourse, the institutionalised sundering of fact and value, the replacement of substantive with formal reason, the disenchantment of the world and the reliable diplomatic configuration known as the Concert of Powers with its procession of reserve currency hegemons—Portugal, Spain, France, Britain—jostling for the exorbitant privilege of controller of reserve currencies in the mercantilist, fractional reserve, newly capitalist economy.
19. See H. R. Allen, "Left Out in the Cold: Why the Tasmanians Stopped Eating Fish," *The Artefact* 4 (1979): 1–10; Sandra Bowdler, "Fish and Culture: A Tasmanian Polemic," *Mankind* 12.4 (1980): 334–40; Robert B. Edgerton, *Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Rhys Jones, "Why Did the Tasmanians Stop Eating Fish?," in *Explorations in Ethnoarchaeology*, ed. R. A. Gould (Santa Fe: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), 11–48.
20. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 8.
21. Lynette Russell *Roving Mariners: Australian Aboriginal Whalers and Sealers in the Southern Ocean, 1790–1870* (State University of New York Press: Albany, 2012), 12.
22. Timothy Mitchell, "The Stage of Modernity," in *Questions of Modernity*, ed. Timothy Mitchell (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2000), 24–5.
23. Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities," in Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities,* 18.
24. Charles Taylor, "Two Theories of Modernity," in Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities*, 182–3.
25. Russell, Roving Mariners, 13.
26. Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, 78–94.
27. See George Augustus Robinson, *Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson 1829–1834,* ed. N. J. B. Plomley (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1966), 964. As Bonwick writes in a particularly overwrought passage from *Last of the Tasmanians*:

We Europeans came upon them as evil dragons, blasting them with the breath of our presence. We broke up their home circles, the only real unit of their society. We arrested them at their corroborees, which in turn were considered evil and taken from them. Even in this one facet of their lives we destroyed their community as much as possible [...]We, the Europeans, turned their song into weeping, and their mirth into sadness. 57–8.

Or Turnbull, in his opening assay from *The Black War*:

Not, perhaps before has a race of men been utterly destroyed within seventy five years, This is the story of a race which was so destroyed, that of the aborigines of Tasmania — destroyed not only by a different manner of life but by the ill-will of the usurpers of the race's land. When that ill will was active it found expression in brutality. When passive it deplored extermination while condoning, and participating in the rewards of a system which made extermination inevitable [...] with no defences but cunning and the most primitive weapons, the natives were no match for the sophisticated individualists of knife and gun. So perished a whole people. 1.

28. See Francis Galton, *Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences* (London: MacMillan, 1925); Robert Knox, *The Races of Men: A Fragment* (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1850); Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution* (New York, Macmillan, 1894); Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species and the Descent of Man* (New York: Basic Books, n.d).
29. See N. J. B. Plomley, ed., *Weep in Silence: A History of the Flinders Island Aboriginal Settlement; with the Flinders Island Journal of George Augustus Robinson 1835–1839* (Hobart: Blubberhead Press, 1987).
30. Patrick Brantlinger, "'Dying Races': Rationalising Genocide in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Decolonisation of Imagination,* ed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhiku Parekh (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995), 52.
31. Tani E. Barlow, introduction to *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia*, 6.
32. See Sidney Mintz, *Caribbean Transformations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
33. See James Calder, *Some Accounts of Wars, Extirpation, Habits of the Native Tribes of Tasmania* (Hobart Town: Henn and Co, 1875); Peter Hay, introduction to *Van Diemonian Essays*, by Peter Hay (Hobart: Walleah Press, 2002); James Boyce, "Journeying Home: A New Look at the British Invasion of Van Diemen's Land: 1803/1823," *Island* 66 (Autumn 1996): 38–63.
34. See John Docker, "The Enlightenment, Genocide, Postmodernity," *Journal of Genocide Research* 5.3 (2003), 339–60. See also James Kaye and Bo Stråith, ed. *Enlightenment and Genocide, Contradictions of Modernity* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2000); A. Dirk Moses, "Modernity and the

Holocaust," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 43 (1997): 441–45; Judith Bokser and Gilda Waldman, "Modernity and the Holocaust: Some Critical Reflections regarding Bauman," *Acta Sociologica* 35 (2002): 31–59; Caj Schmitz, "Auschwitz: The Modern Project's Culmination or Collapse?," *Sociologisk Foskning* 36.2 (1999): 5–35.

35. This is a modification of the exact quote from Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Verso, 1983). In his essay on Guys from *Oeuvres*, edited by Yves–Gerard Le Dantec (Paris 1931–32), Baudelaire writes: "Everywhere he sought the transitory, fleeting beauty of our present life, the character of what the reader has permitted us to call *modernism*". To which Benjamin adds, "In summary form, his [Baudelaire's] doctrine reads as follows: 'A constant , unchangeable element […] and a relative limited element cooperates to produce beauty […] The latter element is supplied by the epoch, by fashion, by morality, and the passions. Without this second element […] the first would not be assimilable.'" Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire*, 82.
36. Uwe Makino, "Final Solutions, Crimes Against Mankind: On the Genesis and Criticism of the Concept of Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 3.1 (2001): 59.
37. Edward J. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989), 23.
38. Philip Mead, "A Strange Narrative Density," *Island* 87 (Spring 2001): 15.
39. See Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, 681 for a delineation of the intuitive categories and the a priori categories.
40. Jim Davidson, "Tasmanian Gothic," *Meanjin* 48.2 (Winter 1989): 318.
41. Richard Flanagan, *Death of a River Guide* (Ringwood: McPhee Gribble, 1994), 254.
42. Richard Flanagan, Sound of One Hand Clapping (Sydney: PanMacmillan, 1997), 19.
43. See Adi Wimmer, "Richard Flanagan's Novel and Film *The Sound of One Hand Clapping* and Australia's Multicultural Film Genre," *Westerly: An Annual Review* 48 (Nov. 2003): 127–43; Mirko Jurak, "Slovene Immigrants in Australia in Richard Flanagan's Novel *The Sound of One Hand Clapping*," *Acta-Neophilologica* 34.1–2 (2001): 17–29.
44. Richard Flanagan, "Does Tasmania Have a Future?," *Island* 72–73 (1997): 150.
45. Julia Kristeva, "Forgiveness: An Interview," *Papers of the Modern Language Association* 117.2 (2002): 285.
46. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 54.
47. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 264.
48. Nicholas Daly, "Blood on the Tracks: Sensation Drama, the Railway and the Dark Face of Modernity," *Victorian Studies* 41 (1998–99): 56.

49. Ibid., 57.
50. Richard Flanagan, *Gould's Book of Fish* (Sydney: Picador, 2002), 158.
51. Russel McDougall, "The Railway in Australian Literature," *World Literature Written in English* 28.1 (1988): 75.
52. Berman, *All that is Solid Melts into Air*, 159n.
53. Robert M. Viti, "The Cave the Clock and the Railway: Primitive and Modern Time in *La Bête Humaine*," *Nineteenth-Century French Studies*19.1 (1990): 115.
54. Nicholas Daly, "Railway Novels: Sensation Fiction and the Modernisation of the Senses," *English Literary History* 66 (1999): 462.
55. Flanagan, *Gould's Book of Fish*, 157.
56. Ibid., 156.
57. Ibid., 152.
58. Ibid., 169.
59. Ibid., 172.
60. See *A History of Trains and Trams in Tasmania* by Thomas Cooley (Hobart: Government Printer, 1987);
    Stefan Petrow, "Resisting the Law: Opposition to the Launceston and Western Railway rate 1872/1874," *University of Tasmania Law Review* 15.1 (1996): 77–104; Malcolm Abbbott, "The Restructuring of Australian Railways: The Case of the Tasmanian Railways," *Australian Economic History Review* 41.2 (2001): 198–212.
61. Sigmund Freud, "Creative Writers and Day Dreaming," in *20th Century Literary Criticism: A Reader*, ed. David Lodge (London: Longman, 1991), 38, emphasis added.
62. Terry Eagleton, *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture* (London: Verso, 1995), 274.
63. Flanagan quoted in Elizabeth McMahon, "Points of Origin," *Island* 75 (Winter 1998): 94.
64. Sigmund Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 5, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), 551.
65. Ibid.
66. Freud, "Creative Writers and Daydreaming," 36.
67. Flanagan, *The Sound of One Hand Clapping*, 21.
68. Lloyd Robson, *A History of Tasmania*, vol. 2 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), 514.
69. See Natalie Jackson and Rebecca Kippen, "Whither Tasmania: A Note on Tasmania's Population 'Problem'," *People and Place* 9.1 (2001): 27–37.
70. Flanagan, "Does Tasmania Have a Future?,140.
71. Flanagan, *Gould's Book of Fish*, 166.
72. Ibid., 170.

CHAPTER 4

Tasmanian Time

Death Letter Blues

The private side of the split subject of modernity is both reflected in, and produced through, particular types of writing: the diary, the intimate correspondence, the autobiographical novel.[1] We might be seen to be affirming postmodernist, or in the older language, sceptical or incredulous denials of ontological interiority in arguing that this distinction is now eroded, if it were not for the fact that the experience of modernity in colonial and post-colonial places such as Dipesh Chakrabarty's Bengal produced subjects for which this internal, non-social dimension was also conspicuously absent.[2] Different modernities, we are told, produce different modern subjects, or more properly—subjects that are differently or inconsistently modern.[3]

This chapter is an inquiry into the uses of history in a minor place. It turns around a number of questions: How do the historical narratives that circulate in a given community impact upon the lives, both collective and individual, of the members of that community? How do these stories of the past unfold into projections of what will be? How is imagined futurity bound up with a lived relationship to the discourses that construct the past? How are local histories, personal histories, connected to communal narratives of ancestry, property rights, class structures, being and belonging?[4]

J. Shipway, *The Memory of Genocide in Tasmania, 1803–2013*,
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The last of these queries responds to Jim Davidson's claim that Tom Haydon's documentary film of 1978, *The Last Tasmanian*, intimated that the modern population of Tasmania was destined to follow its indigenous predecessors into social oblivion:

> Implicit in Haydon's film, with its opening section showing how isolation led the Tasmanian Aborigines to regress—so that they ended up with simpler technology than they possessed a few thousand years earlier—was the suggestion that a gentler version of the same fate may well overtake the usurping whites. The shambling gait and inarticulateness of one or two of the interviewees reminds us that Tasmanian gothic does not mean merely picturesqueness, or a pleasing aesthetic treatment of past sorrows, but also a great deal of continuing pain, muddles and sense of defeat.[5]

The threshold separating the cultural epochs of indigenous and non-indigenous Tasmania was given definitive form by an abrupt narrative closure sutured onto the race history of the former by a loose affiliation of historians and administrators aligned with the latter. In occluding the brief period of acknowledged co-presence spanning from 1803 to Trukanini's death in 1876—and tripping a fall into a century of melancholy—the trope of total annihilation informed a discursive topography split into two parts. The autochthonous, nature-encoded ahistoricism of the indigenous culture was pushed to one side of this topography—in Freudian terms, the unconscious side—while the side of rational, self-presence was filled out with the tentative instantiation of settler modernity ground out by the displaced Europeans. The problem of race relations and narrative history in Tasmania was set up from the start as a re-run of the old Freudian saw: "Where Id was […] there Ego shall be".

Our historiographical field was thus split open by the axe-swing of the civilisational clean break but its executioners were implicated in an anachronistic fantasy that began to give up ground as soon as it had been defined. Even though it was not until the publication of Lyndall Ryan's *The Aboriginal Tasmanians* that the clean break was finally confirmed as neither clean nor a break, the authors responsible for defining its limits had, by necessity, to direct their focus toward its constitutive outside or its indefinite other: the interval of two-state co-presence. That this necessity produced a resistance, a *lapsus* and finally an ongoing cultural identity crisis, is not surprising when we consider that the period of dual occupation was itself experienced across various institutional fields as the opposite of what Chakrabarty calls the *not-yet* of imperial historicist time. The imaginary

waiting room of history into which non-Western peoples with a claim to political modernity were ushered by their colonial administrators, was replaced in the Tasmanian case with a windswept island, a set of sandy vegetable patches and a distended stay of anaesthetized execution. This was a time, in other words, that an entire phalanx of powerful people could not be rid of quickly enough.

Is There a Text in This Book?

Which is not to say that it doesn't serve also, as the locus of some of the most influential historical writings on the frontier experience in Tasmania. The imposing textual edifice built around the life of George Augustus Robinson, for instance, is set within a temporal horizon defined by co-presence. In spite of the layers of instability that problematise their truth-status, Robinson's field diaries continue to be an indispensable point of access into a diachrony of mutually imbricated, cosmopolitan human possession in Tasmania. Perhaps more accurately, they serve as a site of textual witness to a slow replacement of indigenous temporality with utilitarian, goal-orientated time. Umarrah's transformation of Robinson's pursuit of the Big River Tribe into a tragi-comic wild goose chase, for instance, is read by some historians as a cunning attempt on the part of the Aboriginal chief to impede the completion of the Friendly Mission and thus delay the concomitant inevitability of his people's exile to the Furneaux Islands.[6] Robinson's willingness to buy into Umarrah's strange bodily semiotics—for a time the Palawa warrior king and with him the mission as a whole is directionally enslaved by the semantic richness of his own fast-twitch muscle fibres—might also be taken as an enthusiastic, somatic barbarism or anti-logic. Umarrah's quivering chest is a skin-ego boundary symbolizing universal power and virility in one cultural universe that is slowly being written down into a bizarre colonial picaresque within another textual system, coloured more in the sombre and painstaking tones of genocide and its aftermath. Umarrah's pyrrhic attempts to prove the value of his culture in the field turn his body into an unreliable somatic *memento mori* of a non-linear temporality, a languid, non-quantifiable time whose own time was almost up.[7]

History has been put to many uses in Tasmania. Many Tasmanians still believe that the Aborigines were destroyed entirely and inevitably by an invincible superpower with an infinitely extendable moral right or sovereignty. Many believe the Aboriginal Tasmanias are not *real* aborigines. Some continue to argue about the geographical origins of the Aboriginal

people, their migration history, their technologies, and so on. Meanwhile, a mainstream of academic history that now includes scholars such as Henry Reynolds, Ian MacFarlane, Lyndall Ryan, Nicholas Clements and Murray Johnson all endorse archaeologo-scientific methods such as carbon dating and accept Robinson's field diaries as reliable evidence of the past. More than anything else, it seems, this group seeks to distinguish itself through extensive research, moderate hypotheses and a careful approach to linearity of historical time and basic problems of causation, reification and universals versus particulars. The combination of these attributes endows their textual corpus with a substantial and defensible truth energy.

Historical narratives circulate throughout the Tasmanian community and fill its archive with a deceptive narrative density. This source of stories, statements and lies impacts upon the lives, both collective and individual, of the members of every Tasmanian community and are sharable now, so easily, through an open archive, that finds its freedom in virtual speed and superabundant light.

Cleaving to the extinction thesis provides justificatory supply and a comforting, exculpatory determinism that reduces the volatility of the genocide as a repressed horror attached in fusion to the dilemmas of guilt and the reality of the crime. In its basic linguistic form, the constative declaration—there are no Aborigines left in Tasmania—functions as an anxiety-reducing summation, not dissimilar to the kind of polarising statements that Kleinian theorists identify with the paranoid/schizoid state.[8]

But the truth of course is both opaque and more ambiguous—European Tasmanians and Aboriginal Tasmanians co-habited the land mass of Tasmania for at least 73 years—on the old extinction logic, from colonization to the death of Trukanana—or indeed for 212 years and counting once we accept contemporary community definitions of aboriginal identity. Both groups, independently and as a totality have been subject to depopulation anxiety. On the one hand, historical sources like Robinson's field diaries, described by Ryan as the bible of Tasmanian Aboriginal culture, provide us with first hand descriptions of expressions attributed to members of a number of different indigenous tribes that alternatively bewail, protest and mourn the reduction in numbers caused by the arrival of the colonisers.[9] These present tense responses to a cultural trauma unfolding in an anterior now are buttressed on either side by remembered accounts of earlier violations and anticipations of future calamity. Take the following accounts recorded by Robinson at the Bruny Island station where he served as storekeeper from April, 1829:

> The aborigines appeared greatly affected at the dire mortality which had taken place amongst their tribe and consequently showed a reluctance to remain in this abode which they had previously occupied. They therefore requested that the position of their habitation be altered—for they were led to leave a place where sickness existed and always when there had been a death supposing it was some evil spirit had caused the malady—to which I acceded and went through the necessary labour.[10]

> My feelings were not a little harrowed to behold the truly forlorn condition in which Woorrady and Mangerner returned to the establishment. The former had been called upon during his absence from hence to witness the death of his wife and child […] with respect to MANGANA words cannot adequately paint the sympathy I felt on this man's behalf when acquainted with the pungent sorrows which unrelenting fortune had imposed upon him since his departure from hence. *He stated that his wife had been taken away by soldiers whilst he was at Recherche Bay and conducted on board a vessel and that his son, a youth about sixteen years old, had died*.[11]

A distinct group of externally situated remarks, including comments made about the Aborigines by non-Aboriginal people, on the other hand, is also extant, and can be divided into three subsets. Statements like the following made by Edward Curr, the Chief Agent of the Van Diemen's Land Company in the 1820s, betray a keenness to have the time of dual occupation expire as quickly as possible:

> If they the settlers do not abandon the island [and will not] submit to see the white inhabitants murdered one after another […] they must undertake a war of extermination on principles of which many will be disposed to question.[12]

In contrast are those statements which, while recommending very little by way of actual means of achieving their objective, declare a desire that the temporality of co-habitation be extended indefinitely:

> The great decrease which has of late years taken place in the amount of the aboriginal population, renders it not unreasonable to apprehend that the whole race of these people may, at no distant period, become extinct […] the adoption of any line of conduct having for its avowed or for its secret object, the extinction of the native race, could not fail to leave an indelible stain upon the character of the British Government.[13]

The synthesis of these two modes of speech can be found in statements that announce a desire to re-locate the indigenous population to a marginal location on the peripheries of the archipelago, to displace spatially, in other words, while remaining committed to temporal continuity:

> The subject has undergone several days of anxious deliberation and discussion in the Executive Council; and having examined all such persons as are competent to give information, I am at length convinced of the absolute necessity of separating the Aborigines altogether from the white inhabitants, and of removing the former entirely from the settled districts, until their habits shall become more civilised.[14]

Out Damn Spot

The logic of the investigations that seek to make sense of Murray's indelible stain is emphatically forensic. It too expresses depopulation anxiety amongst the imperial administrations. It is reputation and history and legacy that are the reserve currencies in this economy of long-distance double-think.

First of all, we must accept that Tom Lawson's *Last Man*, has shown that the human destruction in Tasmania left a cultural mark on Britain, a mark that might be called an indelible stain. We can then read back from the fact that this indelible stain has been codified and described to propose that the events, which are so memorialized, must have been heinous enough to fit within the objective array framed by Murray's position on the stain. The genocidal events that put paid to utopian hopes for a harmony of existence in the raw and bleeding territories of Van Diemen's Land are—on Murray's logic—impossible to remove from the minor representational architecture of Great Britain in its books, its plays, its paintings and its novels. Lawson shows how these traces disallow a simple celebration of the spread of British civilization into the virgin lands of Tasmania and remind us that a 300-generation culture and thousands of actually existing human beings had to be pushed aside to allow for the birth and growth of (post)modern, cosmopolitan Tasmania. These guilty secrets also lurk just beneath the surface of mainstream, standardized ideological narrativisations of Imperial British tolerance, humanitarian enlightenment, and holocaust innocence—and even inform triumphalist profiling and apologetics for British culture, law and colonization more generally. This, of course, is one of the clearest messages to be taken from Lawson's book:

> Genocide made a significant contribution to British cultures, and indeed British identities. The campaign of extermination in Van Diemen's Land was written and rewritten in Britain, read and reread by British audiences. The appearance of indigenous Tasmanians, usually claimed to have disappeared, in British culture were many and various—from art exhibitions to museums displaying human remains. In these representations, the genocide of indigenous Tasmanian's contributed to a sense of Britain as a preordained, advanced imperial nation. As such, genocide in Tasmania in various ways became a part of British identity.[15]

For his part, Henry Reynolds uses the *stain* as a platform to distinguish the Palawa tragedy from genocide because it appears to call for greater government humanitarianism in the context of a fierce colonial war. Reynolds has agreed that the Tasmanian disaster can be called a genocide if we define it thus, instead of levering off intent as codified in the 1948 United Nations Convention. For Reynolds, Murray's concern about a tarnished imperial reputation that could come from a mismanaged handling of the casualties of invasion, can be set next to accounts of Governor Arthur's virtuous nature and administrative genius, as strong evidence that genocide was never an official policy of any government with sway over Van Diemen's Land. Here, the stain has been freed from its original textual ecology and is grafted onto the soft tissue matter of Genocide Studies. Tom Lawson again:

> I think it important that we recognize the limits of Murray's regret. He was not arguing that the fact of the indigenous population's 'extinction' would bring opprobrium on the British, but rather that if this was discovered that this had been *the desired aim of British policy* they would be deserving of condemnation. Thus, far from providing an alibi for imperial responsibility, Murray's dispatch suggests that the British government recognized the possibility of the extermination of the original population on the island, and that the cause of that was, to use Henry Reynolds's words, the 'colonising venture itself', but could offer only regret in response, precisely because it was committed to the colony above all else.[16]

Apples

In every human community, minor or monumental, imagined stories of futurity and salvation are bound up with lived relationships to the discourses that construct and organise the past. Anthony Giddens and other theorists

of modernity have defined this modulation in cultural and social self-knowledge as a consolidation of processes of reflexivity.[17] While ostensibly mirroring the statements of the Aborigines, the institutional locatedness, technical complexity and utilisation of modern reflexive techniques and technologies such as advanced statistical protocol that inform the expressions of concern about twenty-first-century depopulation reflect a sensitivity to context lacking in the protestations of indigenous Tasmanians like Mangana or distant administrators such George Murray. Natalie Jackson's exhaustive inquiry into probable demographic outcomes for Tasmania, for instance, identifies a phobic locus, a black spot on the lung of Tasmania's human future, in the form of an apple-core-shaped representation of fertility structures in the state. This graphic display allows for the sublimation of a speculative concern about demographic devastation, so that it finds a new object in the physical lack to be seen in the readout from a knowledge instrument designed to represent reality in standardised form:

> It used to be called the Apple Isle. Over its halcyon years, Tasmania also had a rounded and fertile age structure, reflecting that large baby boom cohort born in the post war period (1945–61). More recently, Tasmania has experienced four consecutive years of net population decline, and the age structure has started to resemble an applecore, with a large bite out of the key productive and reproductive 18–38 year age groups.[18]

The traces of reflexivity are to be found, here, in the way Jackson's comments about "[the] emerging age structure which poses a massive threat to Tasmania's future", are always already positioned within a discursive field sensitive to global population changes and the radical reconstitution of human collectivities known in the professional literature as the demographic shift.

If we put this very modern characteristic to one side for a moment, though, and imagine what shape these kinds of expressions might take if they weren't couched in the very specific, specialised language of contemporary human ecology, it is difficult not to be taken by the resemblance they bear to the internally situated utterances attributed to Mangana and other Palawa witnesses to the decline of their own old world. In both cases, a particular kind of skilled, authoritative individual with leadership rights and responsibilities is charged with the task of preparing prognostications that take account of a variety of different future scenarios, each of these individuals pays attention to the range of permutations that the structure of relations between the subject population and outside groups

might take, and both display an overarching pessimism about the likelihood of the community persisting in its range of present forms. Here, a particular kind of affect, a type of collective anxiety crosses between groups who are otherwise tied together by only two, and perhaps three things: a shared, if asymmetrically recorded history, the habitation of a common environment and membership of the human community.

The grounds for comparing these modern depopulation anxieties with the externally situated expressions of concern proffered by the colonial administration and the transplanted European citizenry more generally, are at once, more and less substantial than the grounds that align them with the internally situated statements attributed to the Aborigines. On the one hand, white articulations of doubt, hope, reservation and resentment, the pragmatic disengagements with, and the inarticulate guilt-responses to, the loss of Aboriginal life in the early stages of colony building can be differentiated from concerns about contemporary depopulation, because they are not endogenous responses to a threat to the community of the one who is speaking. These are responses to a phenomenon affecting an *other* collectivity, an Aboriginal social configuration. Conversely, Jackson's social science and the "external" remarks made by Curr, Arthur and Murray are drawn together because both groups of utterances belong to white populations, are couched in forms of language that recognise and invoke Enlightenment institutions such as the nation state/empire, and make a claim to legitimacy through recourse to empirical evidence.

Depopulation anxiety is a communal feeling because its object is the community and its location is plural. While these metonymic utterances are embedded in the pre-modern and the modern discursive fields of Tasmanian collective life respectively, they share an anxiety about civilisational futurity. The common ground they describe and share and plant themselves, figuratively, in epistemological position, for instance, is quite literally, a common ground, the diggings for their foundation pit on the rich and resilient landmass of Tasmania.

Two hundred years after Lieutenant Bowen's meagre fleet rounded the Tasman Peninsula and sailed into Storm Bay, the population of modern Tasmania finds itself in a similar predicament to the civilisation its colonial forebears so unceremoniously shunted aside. In a scenario that surely has ramifications for thinking about the inter-generational transference of responsibility in the context of the stalled national project of reconciliation, the collectivity to blame for the displacement and decimation of an indigenous civilisation now finds itself confronted with premonitions of its own demise.

True Facts

How are the multifarious narratives hemmed in by the Tasmanian archive taken up, resisted, repudiated or ignored? How do these stories of the past unfold into projections of what will be? What is the difference between writing in the archive and speaking it out loud as poem and lyric, satire and idyll?

In *History and Reading: Tocqueville, Foucault and French Studies*, Dominick LaCapra offers a postscript to the sustained investigation into trauma, memory and history that informed his influential historiographical work on the Holocaust. LaCapra's return to Freud through deconstruction, which culminates in this text as a valorisation of dialogic reading at the expense of synoptic and redemptive forms, is designed to provide an alternative historical practice to conservative and hegemonic modes of investigation:

> History in accordance with a self-sufficient research paradigm gives priority if not exclusive status to accurate reconstruction, restricts exchange with other inquirers to a subordinate, instrumental status and is forced to disguise dialogic exchange as reconstruction, often in a manner that infiltrates values into a seemingly objective or value neutral account.[19]

LaCapra's approach to doing history challenges the legislative will-to-power of the orthodox "re-constructive" approach.[20] As he makes clear, proponents of the self-sufficient research methodology

> enjoin gathering and analysing (preferably archival) information about an object of study in contrast to reading and interpreting texts or textualised phenomena. (In this exclusionary sense, reading a text, especially a published text is not doing research.)[21]

I follow LaCapra in desiring a re-evaluation of this axiomatic faith in an objectivism that posits a definitive separation between the observer and the observed. A failure to take account of the instability of the signifier affects some of the most high-profile, top-quality Tasmanian history, and the question of the transferential relationships that hold between historians and their various objects of study, has rarely been examined in the local context. In fact, even the most cursory examination of the canon of Tasmanian history uncovers a rich vein of denials, repressions, and compulsive repetitions:

> The dominance of this research paradigm leads to an inability to recognise reading as a problem. All texts and documents are assimilated to a homogenous status as source or evidence that enables the determination of certain findings. Research findings are often written up rather than written in a stronger sense and an unadorned, plain style is favoured. Typically, literary or philosophical texts are reduced to the status of unreliable sources because they do not yield solid evidence or clear-cut facts about empirical states of affairs […] in any event, whatever they yield must be checked against more reliable documents, thus rendering their status redundant.[22]

This present work might primarily be a Cultural Studies of Tasmania's vanishing present, but it tries dutifully at the same time, to approach a condition of historical and historiographical adequacy. LaCapra offers us a narrow, conditional consolation:

> We should also be open to the possibility, that in the event a certain practice is not 'properly historical', a given individual may combine it with historical practices in hybridized roles or subject-positions.[23]

As disobedient, patchwork history this study is seeking recognition for its content as well as its form. LaCapra's return to Freud is welcome because it offers an alternative cultural psychoanalytics to the Lacanian turn that, in its Žižekian manifestation, in particular, has garnered much enthusiasm since the 1990s.

It is also useful, however, because it sutures that psychoanalytic facility to a detailed familiarity with more recent critical theoretical innovations—from the linguistic turn in structuralism to deconstruction and hermeneutic debates interposed by scholars such Habermas and Gadamer—to reinvigorate a historical practice that tends toward sullen, re-enactment and truth/power fetishes. LaCapra's careful refutation of textually conservative historians who misread an interest in significatory processes as an attempt to demolish the real, material object, the social world or actual cultural moment that traditional historiography has made its exclusive preserve, opens up a space for radical archival practices that seek to read the written unconscious of a culture in inventive ways. Harold Bloom's insistence that Freudianism is the only mythology shared by scholars in the contemporary humanities unwittingly endorses LaCapra's decision to install fundamental Freudian categories—in *History and Memory after Auschwitz* he nominates transference, resistance, denial, repression, acting-out and

working-through as the core—in the empty place of a now-evacuated common-sense or mimetic approach to the historical real.[24]

Ghosts and Accidents

The civilisational clean break that was inserted between the cultural epochs of indigenous and non-indigenous Tasmania by historians like James Bonwick, John West and James Calder in the nineteenth century, and Clive Turnbull, Robert Travers and N. J. B. Plomley in the twentieth, functioned as a coping mechanism designed to shut down a volatile moral and social dilemma. Putting the empirical inaccuracy of this position aside for a moment—and I think it's important to note that an argument could be made that the Aborigines did not *exist* for some part of the period between Trukanini's death and the emergence of the (post)modern political movement in the 1970s—we are left with an incomplete motivational profile, the unresolved question of why a position of this kind would be taken by so many.

Biological discourses informed by writers like Robert Knox held sway into the twentieth century and tended to emphasise a distinct origin for all races, on the one hand, and a tendency for evolutionary processes to destroy these races according to the principle of survival of the fittest. In accounts of racial composition, emphasis was placed on the full-blooded or pure racial subject. The proper object of racial science was a total indigene untouched by miscegenation. The mixing of blood was taken by imperialist racial history as the beginning of a process of assimilation that would ultimately see the backward ethnicity absorbed into the more sophisticated, invariably whiter group.

Knox's *Races of Men: A Fragment* is a haunting journey into the darker recesses of nineteenth-century biologism. Combining cosmology, natural philosophy and a protean evolutionary theory, Knox expostulates on the different capacities and destinations of races as diverse as the Sarmatians, the Gipsies and the Coptics. It is surely still remarkable that his ideas were in any way respectable at all. As he writes in his introduction:

> Men are of various Races; call them Species, if you will; call them permanent Varieties; it matters not. The fact, the simple fact, remains just as it was: men are of different races. Now the object of these lectures is to show that in human history race is everything.[25]

We can read the construction of the civilisational clean break as an action informed by the kind of racial theory contained within Knox's book.

Diffuse continuity has no place in this world-view; as cultural practices are abolished and racial purity is diluted, races become extinct, they are subsumed into the dominant group, and indigenous *habitus* becomes incorporated into a decidedly one-sided hybrid culture.

Before the epistemic shift that allowed us to view diluted cultures as distinct social groups, Knoxian theory constructed a world divided into clearly discrete units of raciality. Races were indivisible monads fighting it out in a kind of race war from which only one group could emerge triumphant. This kind of discursive environment produced the *truth* of a Tasmanian Aboriginal population becoming extinct.[26]

We can, however, identify the workings of a cultural psychoanalysis, a colonial symptomatology complete with phobic objects, repression and sublimation, operating concurrently with this foreboding scientism. As LaCapra points out, histories that recount tragic events in this fashion perform an analogous function to the work of mourning discharged by the individual in the wake of personal trauma. Invariably, the authors who mobilise the civilisational clean break do so with a heavy heart. There is little trace of racial supremacist thinking or action among them and without exception they all couch their accounts of the decimation and displacement of the Tasmanian Aboriginal population in the language of eulogy and apologia.

Without exception, the historians of the civilisational clean break belong to the dominant colonial population and their mourning takes two forms. On the one hand, it eulogises the loss of the indigenous others precisely as others; a loss made all the more tragic because of the exotic character of the objects of the genocide. At the same time, however, it undergoes an affective modulation and becomes a damning testimony to the brutality of the uncomprehending colonisers. This is a guarded, mischievous self-flagellation directed primarily towards the unenlightened past of empire and penal colony. James Bonwick, James Calder, Clive Turnbull and Robert Travers refuse to extend the guilty verdict to their own cultural moment, establishing a prophylactic border between them and the scene of the crime they describe. Although an interval of almost one hundred years separates their texts, the authors make a consonant claim to their own cleansing distance from the morbid transgressions of empire building. Retrospective remonstration is permissible in these texts, the authors would have us believe, because the statute of limitations on the crimes they describe has well and truly expired. Whether it be the 1860s in Bonwick's case, or the 1940s in Turnbull's, the historical moments from which their contributions issue are constructed as more enlightened

than the dark days towards which they reach back. The work of mourning grieves the loss of the Aborigines but the working through that follows in its wake rejects the repetition-compulsion. The authors claim that had their society had its time over again, the *telos* of total extinction would be apprehended and avoided with a fierce determination.

This is guilty writing on the one hand, then, while, with the other, it extends an accusatory finger. In the case of Turnbull's *Black War*, a specific guilt is shackled to a more over-arching post-colonial regret informed by an over-determination of biblical proportions:

> Not perhaps, before, has a race of men been destroyed so utterly within 75 years. This is the story of a race which was so destroyed, that of the Aborigines of Tasmania—destroyed not only by a different manner of life but by the ill-will of the usurpers of the race's land […] The story of the Aboriginal people of Van Diemen's Land is the story of all peoples dispossessed by conquerors more numerous and of greater technical resource.[27]

The defenders of the extinction thesis enforce the false closure of extinction to more successfully expiate a blood guilt. They attempt to expedite a working-through that could not commence until the deed to be worked through had been done. The situation in which they find themselves puts such closure out of reach, and thus a demand springs up for the construction of a phantasy that could begin the mourning process. A repression is enforced by the trope of extinction, a denial of a continuity of Aboriginal existence that allows the expulsion of guilt feelings and a working-through based on a false conclusion.

Everything Is Real

Tom Haydon's documentary film, *The Last Tasmanian*, opened to the public in 1978 and provides an account of the history of interaction between the indigenous Tasmanians and European explorers and invaders. To give motor force to its narrative, the film followed the adventures of the archaeologist Rhys Jones as he retrod the steps leading to the total demise of the first inhabitants of Tasmania. Among other sites, the film positions Jones at Recherche Bay in Tasmania's far south, where he builds catamarans to the specifications left on the historical record and on Sarah Island, on the west coast, where he reads excerpts from George Augustus Robinson's diaries that relate, in graphic terms, the miserable fate of the aborigines in his care.

Haydon's documentary is a moody, atmospheric production that makes good use of locations like these to recreate an ambiance of uncanny realism. The film's success in this regard was one of the factors leading to the phobic reaction it prompted from players in some sections of the Aboriginal rights movement in Tasmania. Quite rightly, these groups lambasted Haydon for buying into the civilisational clean break in his presentation of the race history of the Tasmanian Aboriginals as a cold case, done and dusted in the mid-nineteenth century. But the psycho-dynamic volatility of the film didn't just impact upon the Aboriginal community. Instead it spurred fears throughout the larger population frightened now by an imagined futurity coloured most iconically by guilt bound up with lived relationships to other discourses of exile and diaspora, genocide and modernity.

Wherever you look, local histories, personal histories are connected to communal narratives of ancestry, property rights, class structures, being and belonging?[28] Haydon's film can be read as an attempt to re-enforce the repression, to allow the guilt-work to continue in keeping with the self-re-enforcing truth that the Tasmanian Aborigines were dead and buried. In its filmic re-enactment of the violent interactions of the "Black War" and the peacetime practices of the Aborigines, *The Last Tasmanian* was supposed to catalogue a melancholic termination of a whole culture. As Tom O'Regan puts it:

> For the film's purposes the Tasmanian Aborigines have no existence in the present. The "Tasmanians" so called in the film are a culture and a people of the past, whose links with the present are severed. Paradoxically, they achieve new life in the documentary's own accounts of them. They are reincarnated for the viewer.[29]

Rhys Jones's scientistic argument that the Aborigines were already experiencing a narrowing of culture at the time of colonisation—"a slow strangulation of the mind" as Ryan alliteratively puts it—was supposed to take responsibility for the genocide out of the hands of the whites and restore it to the positivistic realm of the teleologically inevitable.[30] An appeal to evolutionary science was to secure the epistemological grounds of Aboriginal extinction while also clearing the way for a plea of diminished culpability on the part of a white population who could now be excused for acting without volition and in accordance with a cosmological order of things and even to have manfully and decisively truncated the misery of tribal desecration and dissipation and dissolution.

The real effects of the film's release, however, escaped this narrative *cul-de-sac*. Instead of providing closure to the story of genocide, the film stirred up the latent anger of the Aboriginal community and galvanised them into action. Their protestations provided a belated reminder to the European Tasmanians that the civilisational clean break was a self-serving fallacy. Political action in response to the film's release shattered the hundred years of melancholy—the period from Trukanini's death in 1876 to the opening of *The Last Tasmanian* in 1978—on the European side and opened up a new period of mourning and working-through, accompanied by an altogether more mature and realistic recognition of guilt and responsibility.

Logos and Progress

Working through, as Laplanche and Pontalis describe it, "is taken to be a sort of psychical work which allows the subject to accept certain repressed elements and to free himself from the grip of mechanisms of repetition".[31] In an ironic turn of events, Haydon's film allegorises the acting-out function—through the symbolic extermination of the Aborigines implicit in its plot trajectory—but also depicts a literal visual acting-out of the genocide, precipitating its dialectical, analytic opposite: the beginning of a project of working through genocide trauma that is still very much alive and ongoing.

Still, the working-through on the part of the European Tasmanians that has gathered force since the release of Haydon's film, should be understood in the context of the acting-out implicit in the production of the re-enactment. According to LaCapra, transferential relations are most dangerous in historical analysis when the dynamics of the historical object are repeated in the narrativisation of that object. In this case then, the genocide was repeated, not only literally in the case of a re-dramatisation of Aboriginal raids on white outposts and so on, but allegorically as well, in so far as the film unashamedly affirmed the civilisational clean break and the trope of total annihilation.

For the Aboriginal community, Haydon's film pinched a raw post-colonial nerve. The narrative begins with the depiction of a small group of Tasmanian Aborigines and white political representatives venturing out by ferry into the D'Entrecasteaux Channel south of Hobart to perform a belated funeral ceremony for the 'Last Tasmanian', Trukanini. The funeral is especially significant because it represented the culmination of

a long struggle to have Trukanini's remains returned to her people from the Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery. For Freud, the loss of drive, the abrupt abeyance of libidinal energies which accompanies the melancholic condition results from an inability to attain a suitable—good, reliable—object and storehouse of discharged cathexis powered by anxiety, phobia and trauma.[32] In this light, the transfer of Trukanini's bones from the white Tasmanians to the Aboriginal community is akin to the handing back of tribal lands. Rather than signifying the terminus of a culture's development, these symbolic tokens vouchsafe the right to work through trauma and to approach an orientation to the lost or damaged *thing* that revivifies it in such a way that phantasies can be reloaded, but not in a way that would threaten the reality principle, however, that is played out, communally, privately or institutionally.

With lands reinstated and bones laid to rest, the work of mourning can be substituted for the melancholia built up around the absence or disappearance of the loved object. The laying to rest of Trukanini's bones symbolised the conclusion of a narrative that recognised only full-blooded claims to Aboriginal identity and opened the way for a new story based around diffuse continuity, free of the nineteenth-century scientism of race theory and eugenics. Ironically, it marked the termination of the myth of complete extinction, rather than extinction itself. The repetition or return of the trauma of extinction that might have been enforced by the disposal of the bones was actually worked-through outside the frame of the film by the civil rights protests that followed its public release. Trukanini's ignominious fate is recovered and transformed into a story with significatory potential that verges on the heroic.

For the European Tasmanians, then, the trigger effects of *The Last Tasmanian* worked to induce a working-through of the belated trauma that had been concealed by the myth of complete extinction. For the Aboriginal Tasmanians involved, it initiated a return of the repressed. Stickers declaiming the film's racist position were slapped across the posters that marked its arrival, and Aboriginal leaders went on record to dismiss the film as factually erroneous and ethically reprehensible. For the indigenous inhabitants who were in the middle of building an activist movement, the documentary's "refusal to acknowledge that the present day Aboriginal Tasmanian community had any continuity with the past Tasmanian Aborigines" triggered a nightmarish screen memory of self and collective-dissolution, a worst-case scenario of misrecognised non-existence that must have felt something like seeing yourself disappear

before your very own eyes.[33] In addition to the ignominy of being told that they didn't exist, Aboriginal viewers of the film had also to cope with the re-presented re-memorialisation of actual almost-complete racial annihilation depicted on the big screen.

Not only was the story of the Tasmanian Aboriginals as told by *The Last Tasmanian* mired in a logical scientistic positivism run amok, it also embodied the symbolic theft of the right to self-determination implicit in the function of story-telling. This was a white story about a white occupation of black lands, a white account of white histories of a black culture. The transferential relationships present in the object of study—dispossession, asymmetrical power distribution—were thus replicated in the historical account of its occurrence. In this way, the hundred years of melancholy between Trukanini's death and the screening of *The Last Tasmanian* were also felt by the invading culture. The litany of accounts that mobilised the trope of the civilisational clean break functioned as transferential actings-out of the genocide. Their failure to acknowledge the diffuse continuity of indigenous civilisation in Tasmania mirrored and reiterated the initial decimation and displacement. To complete the argument, in the late 1970s, white historians were still doing with their pens and cameras what their military counterparts had done with their fowling pieces some one hundred and fifty years before.

Productivity

In minor places, local histories, personal histories, connect up to communal narratives of ancestry, place, class structures, being and belonging in quiet, slow insistence.[34] The loss of thousands of heavy industry, factory and production jobs in Tasmania since the 1970s and 1980s continues to drive a shared experience of mourning, melancholia and low self-esteem in the traditional blue collar suburbs of Launceston, Burnie, Hobart and elsewhere. Plants and factories and mills have acquired the oneiric mythos of fact and fixation, male production and macho quantity for many Tasmanians still attached to industrial production of the Fordist, Taylorist form.

The East Derwent highway winds its way along the river towards the northern suburbs of Hobart from the commuter suburbs and central business district to the south. Across the narrow reach of Derwent river water, rolling down toward the river's opposite edge, is the Nyrstar Electrolyte-Zinc Works. The death defying physical infrastructure of EZ

embodies the tell-tale narrative of post-industrial, Schumpeterian creative destruction, underwritten by the neo-liberal consensus on market and tax reforms which has reshaped and re-organised heavy industry across the Western world over the last sixty or seventy years. This agenda sped up and exploded exponentially through the spatial fix circumventions of growth barriers achieved by the neo-liberal off-shoring and outsourcing agreements of the late 1970s and 1980s—up to and including the global financial crises of 2007 onward towards negative interest rates, quantitative easing, debt deflation and the new mega-trade deals covered over by the ominous acronyms Ttip and TPP.

It's a modern miracle, given all this, that EZ remains operational, even as it employs only a fraction of its former workforce. Long gone too are the wood-stave acid-filled tubs that were still in use in the 1990s, presumably part of the system since the factory was first commissioned in 1917.

Attracted primarily by a cheap power deal done with the nascent Hydro-Electric Commission, this unlikely compound of smokestacks and wharfs, conveyer belts, silos and steel ducting was the first major industrial complex to be built in Tasmania and at its peak employed almost three thousand people.[35] Since then, however, the developmental trajectories of downsizing, centralisation and rationalisation, post-Fordism and technological obsolescence have all enforced themselves here on this jumbled complex slung deep into the barren, poisoned hill, glowering and twinkling unapologetically on the edge of the Derwent River. Surrounding the complex are paraphernalia typical of what Antonio Gramsci called Fordist production: company-built accommodation, a golf course for staff and suppliers, car parks, an on-site administration block and a host of affiliated businesses. The robust veneer suggested by this total factory, however, belies a more fragile actuality at its core. Even though EZ is still in commercial operation, and in spite of the fact that its levels of production are higher than they have ever been, technological advancements and a changing company policy have depleted the workforce to about three or four hundred at most. As a result, the car parks are almost entirely empty, company built housing that is now in the private realty market bounces along the bottom of the Hobart property prestige list and the emptied-out administration facility looks dourly, bitterly even, out across a field of production that no longer abides its orders or prerogatives.

Which reminds us that the history of the industrialisation of Tasmania chimes in harmony with the history of world-industrialisation. The ebbs and flows, the historical ups and downs, the changing fortunes of

labour-intensive heavy industry in the developed world—from rapid expansion in the nineteenth century, to hegemonic stability in the twentieth, to profit-crises and large scale downsizings, closures and robotisation in the twenty first—have left their traces in Tasmania just as indelibly as they have in the north east of the United States, or the midlands of England or the Ruhr Valley of Germany, even accounting for differences in scale. Likewise, the logics that have in turn provided the *raison d'être* and the encroaching decrepitude of the societies and cultures of so many of the old industrial cities of the Northern Hemisphere have also played themselves out here, in this off-shore island off the shore of an off-shore continent.

Since the late 1960s, industrial employment in Tasmania has declined by more than 70 %, and, as in other "rustbelt" areas, like Rotherham or Sheffield in England, or Detroit in the United States, growth in the services sectors and particularly insurance and finance has not really compensated for this reduction, as large numbers of blue collar workers, in particular, have struggled to find work after the recession of the 1990s.[36] As with the de-industrialisation of the developed countries of the Northern Hemisphere, the pain of economic restructuring has been felt most in vulnerable regions outside of the principal population and administrative centres. Towns peppered along the north-west coast of Tasmania, perhaps the most blessed area of the state by the measures of comparative physiocratic and physical advantage—proximity to the Australian mainland, rich soils for agriculture, high rainfall—has been the hardest hit. The victim of a series of major plant closures that seemed to threaten the very viability of the region, unemployment in the Mersey-Lyell statistical division has reduced of late but still remains high by Australian standards, incomes are low and house prices only a fraction of mainland city prices.

Perhaps the most significant point to make about these closures is that they are predicated on decisions made by companies whose investment in the regions concerned can often fail to extend very far beyond the very rudimentary functioning of the particular businesses in question. For the centrally located, or rather, centrally dis-located administrators of such organisations, the effects of closing a factory do not always extend beyond the immediate impact on balance sheets, which in cases where closure is advised, will generally be positive.

For the inhabitants of communities that have grown up around a now-obsolete industry, the impacts will be of a different nature as well as being more far-reaching. Jobs will be lost both at the sites themselves and then throughout the community more generally as the cascading withdrawal

of money, talent, will power and resources of hope becomes a treacherous whirlpool, a hostile Charybdis posing an existential threat to the area in question. Loss-making infrastructure built to service the industries will be allowed to run down and collective organisations based around the rhythms of work will cease to function. For those living around the sites, the phenomenology of perception will be fundamentally altered: smoke will no longer pour from chimneys; workers will no longer arrive at factory gates; trucks will no longer bring materials required by the production mechanism; and ships will no longer leave port bearing products for sale abroad. The psycho-social and economic impacts of a factory closure may be more commonly discussed in sociological literature and the quality press, but these alterations to the experiential fabric of a social space are often the most vividly recounted by those affected.[37] When people in Hobart, for instance, speak about the collapse of the apple industry after the United Kingdom abandoned preferential commonwealth or imperial supply chains in favour of the European common market in the 1970s, they focus on the sights, sounds and smells of the production process, the continuous convoy of trucks making the trip from the Huon Valley to the port of Hobart and the boats bound for Europe laden with the wonderful panoply of apple kinds, sizes, shapes and colours. They remember working men and women, physically labouring and understanding themselves and their social roles in terms of agricultural production and nourishing machismo and sturdy, productive femininity. They don't generally speak in terms of numbers of jobs, numbers of tonnes, or prices per bushel.[38]

Superabundance

The history of industrialisation encapsulates more than just the rise and fall of particular types of enterprises or of changes in general modalities of production. As Krishnan Kumar suggests, industrialisation also provides the material form of modernity.[39] To experience modernity is to experience a world that has been industrialised, a world that is filled with the objects and organised according to the logics of institutionalised industrial production. On the phenomenological level, this experience of industrial modernity includes the subjective perception that comes from living among major plant infrastructure like factories, their logistics facilities and networks—ports, highways, heavy vehicle repair shops—and their wholesale and retail outlets—shopping malls and the central business district, arcade project refrain.

This perceptual awareness though, need not link these various things together according to any obvious organising principle or principles. Given the spatial distribution of these different objects, in fact, the immediate perception of one branch might well preclude the perception of the other branches in the network. In a big city where retail and production are predominantly located in completely different regions, say the affluent inner-east and the industrial/commercial western suburbs of Melbourne, one group of inhabitants may well experience a world consisting principally of the apparatuses of production while the other will dwell in a world marked more by forms of domestic and commercial consumption. The hydra heads of industrial production and profiteering are problematically local with everything coming from everywhere and everyone reading universally, transmitting messages to all the distant points, stacking our web-bought goods on gigantic, silent, unsinkable container ships, monitored from space, with necessary gps instructions sufficient to get to wherever their destination is.

Distributional facilities seldom only transport products made in their vicinity or within a single political jurisdiction, which ensures that this perception of a disconnected and fragmentary system is an appropriate and inevitable condition of late-capitalist being-in-the-world, a late being-nowhere, a super-modern utopics of shiny tiles and dampened colour tones, an extension into the gestalt field of unmappable histories of commodity gluts, of the easy bliss of immediate things, cleared of the thread of time, tied to the bowed heads and bent backs of real human workers.

That much of what was once productive and functioning at Hobart's Zinc Works has now fallen into disrepair and neglect only adds to the complicated machinery of experience. What is the value of the figure in the field, the plant against the mountain behind the river's grey sheen? Nyrstar recently received a State government grant to equip the smelter to process a larger range of products including new rare earth alloys. With its output of high-tech manufactured metals, EZ is slowly becoming postmodern but is also still earth-bound to the basic circuitry of market capitalism, proudly enmeshed in the precious webs of actually existing commodity markets.[40]

Volcano

The (post)modern world consists of systems of social organisation and modalities of being but also of objects, of a formal social world. In the case at hand, the Nyrstar Zinc Works at Risdon stand as a living, breathing

monument to the will of Tasmania's political and business élites set on bringing this formal social world to their island home. The zinc works operates as a synecdoche for modernity in general, and for Tasmanian modernity more specifically.

But the experiential signature of the smelter also derives from its opposite, from that which it is not, and ironically, that which serves as its historical and epistemological antithesis. It is impossible to ignore the backdrop against which EZ is framed. Across the westward, sun-toned range, the factory functions as a figure that appears to human consciousness only through its differentiation in the field or ground behind it.[41] In this case, that field is Mt Wellington, the purple-blue, winter-snow-capped bulk that features so prominently in the cultural economy of everyday Hobart life. Mt Wellington functions as a multi-valent visual signifier. It has been considered alternatively as a picturesque and commodified backdrop to the city, as a protective bulwark against the chastening non-human spaces that lurk behind it and as a conduit for that very same presence.[42]

Ongoing debate in *The Mercury* and elsewhere reminds "Western" Tasmanians that the *Mountain* is also a favoured object in a set of Indigenous cosmologies. In 2004, the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre suggested that an indigenous appellation be restored to Mt Wellington so that diffuse continuity in nomenclature might double the diffuse continuity of culture that has been acknowledged in Tasmania since the 1970s. As Member of the House of Assembly for Denison, David Bartlett commented in State Parliament on the 26th of October, 2004:

> ["The Mountain"] obviously does hold a significant place in Tasmanian history, and in Hobart's history […] However, to suggest that the […] name […] holds some absolute significance […] is incorrect. In fact, prior to European settlement […] the Mouheneenner people, who were local here, are believed to have known the mountain also by a series of names: Unghanyahletta and Pooranetere […] Recently the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre has suggested that Kunanyi is the true name, based upon records made by early European settlers.[43]

The mountain brings the wilderness into the "Western" spaces of Hobart but it also brings with it the history of Indigenous inhabitation and cultural coding. Fabienne Bayet has commented on the complex interplay of identity and commitment politics that have accompanied her experience of being indigenous in the environmental movement:

> Seriously, as part of this identity, and in the face of many other greenies, I cannot remove humans from the landscape. Aboriginal people are an integral part of the Australian landscape. We are the land, the land is us […] How then do I deal with a common green ideology often advocated, and used as a major selling concept, by some wilderness groups. 'Wilderness', in this perspective, denotes land which is wild, uninhabited, or inhabited only by wild animals. Such conceptions of wilderness and conservation are yet another form of paternalism and dispossession if they continue to conceptually remove Aboriginal people from the Australian landscape.[44]

Bayet's remarks should remind us that we must account for histories of habitation whenever we seek to discuss wilderness. Wilderness is not the simple opposite of culture or humanity. Mt Wellington presents as a sensual remedy for ills that many of us identify in hegemonic "Western" thinking and it provides us with a visual outside to the lurid exasperation of living in modernity and post-modernity. We are supposed to be able to secure at least some measure of rest for our over-screened eyes by meditating on the blunt, beautiful Kunanyi. Wilderness pleasure discourse describes a concept rather than an ontology. Wilderness cannot be experienced in a pure way if, by that phrase, we mean an unequivocal opening up to the more-than-human world, an opening up predicated on the obliteration of a socialized subjectivity. We take tents and polar fleece and polypropylene with us when we enter the wilderness and we take our *habitus* and our acculturation too. Experiencing wilderness might be sublime but it is not a full negation or nullification of humanity or of humanist orientations.

The significance of the mountain derives from its status as a carrier of an ambiguous wilderness value. As such, to witness the zinc works as a metonym for industrial modernity is also to witness industrial modernity's dialectical opposite; nature, or more properly, the wilderness. One cannot be perceived without the other. They exist, to borrow Husserl's phrase, in a state of reciprocal envelopment.

But of course, every manufacturing plant, every factory is situated somewhere on our abused, territorialised earth. No matter where it might be located, the perception of an industrial complex will necessarily entail the perception of the environmental ground upon which it has been developed. The distinction to be made here can be seen in the photographic record. While in the case of the zinc works, Mt Wellington dominates the scene, images of industrial complexes in England suggest a nature conquered and despoiled.[45] Nature is more an absence than a presence for the

latter, an expelled refuse that has become a different kind of neo-liberal, post-industrial wilderness. Industry, and its pastoralist precursor, have transformed the physical ground upon which the former is now established. That ground has been suppressed and repressed. In the Tasmanian example, on the other hand, wilderness still threatens to overwhelm the scantier, truncated European development. The former has been momentarily forestalled but is in no way acquiescent. Recapitulating Kumar's dictum that industrialisation provides the material form of modernity, we are confronted through this physical configuration with the following questions: how should this experiential dialectic of industry and wilderness inflect our reading of Tasmanian modernity and of modernity in Tasmania? If the perception of the forms of modern life can never be uncoupled from the perception of a nature that serves as their precondition and their opposite, does this make Tasmania a pre-modern or non-modern location?

EZ provides a useful vignette of how nature and manufacturing, wilderness and culture are bound in dialectical imbrication in Tasmania. But by far the fullest expression of this logic is to be found in the project of hydro-electrification and its thwarted attempt to tame the wilderness and propel Tasmania into a bright, glorious and permanently modern future.[46]

Waterfall

While honouring their differences, many prominent theorists of modernity single out industrialisation as one of the most definitive processes of the project of modernisation. Krishnan Kumar, as I have already suggested, argues that industrialisation provided the material form for modernity, while Peter Wagner writes, "the so-called industrial and democratic revolutions are sometimes seen as the social phenomena constituting modernity".[47] In a similar vein, Jan Pakulski, Stephen Crook and Malcolm Waters note that:

> The thread that draws together the views of Habermas, Offe, Lash and Urry and Harvey is a determination to save the analytic and normative salience of elements of the idea of modernity. For these writers, whatever transformation is occurring at a social level, it ultimately cannot be postmodernisation. If modernity is associated with the rise of industrial capitalism […] then we are still […] in an advanced stage of modernity, specifically an advanced stage of capitalism.[48]

Just as world-historical capitalism, especially as theorised over the *long durée* by Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Fernand Braudel and other world-systems theorists, constitutes a meta-narrative made up of innumerable local events and permutations, industrialisation too, persists as both monolith and fractal. While the overarching historiographical focus may single out the industrial revolutions that occurred in England and then Europe in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the emblematic locus or originary site of this developmental logic, it is also true that the histories of Western habitation have been driven by the dramatic effects of the shift from agricultural to industrial and even post-industrial production. Indeed, the conflict of interests that separated the Faustian proponents of ever greater industrial expansion and their adversaries, conservationist or ecologically minded individuals and the political entities that represent them, still set the scene for significant debates about the direction and development of communities in this moment of alleged, spatially perverse neo-feudalism.[49]

The instantiation of industrial modernisation played out in Tasmania is a slang enunciation of a generalised historical logic that brings into relief the complex and dialectical relationship that always exists between an abstracted totality and its component parts. But the narrative of Tasmanian modernity also stands alone as a self-sustaining self-supporting cultural, historiographical and textual analysis.

Tasmania is a small place, relatively insignificant from a geo-political perspective, and marginal even to the goings on in the federation of which it is a part. It is also a place with a short history by European standards—neglecting of course the thousands of years of indigenous inhabitation—which makes it fair game for writers who follow the rules of centres and peripheries, who accept diachrony as a linear game of origins and destinations, of sacred originals and profane imitations. But it is also a place and a society typified by what Philip Mead has called a "strange narrative density".[50]

When we look for the origins of industrialisation, we typically look to what Phyllis Deane has called "the first industrial revolution", the transformation of the systems of commodity production, distribution and consumption that occurred in Britain around the middle of the eighteenth century and which spread quickly to continental Europe thereafter.[51] We would be mistaken, however, in conceiving of this set of events as a singularity or a big-bang modality of economic metamorphosis. As Deane points out, there have been many industrial revolutions, each taking on a

divergent form while all the while remaining true enough to the original to recall its novelty and significance.

Tasmania's industrial revolution had to wait until 1916 and the commissioning of the first hydro-electric power station at Waddamana. While occurring some one hundred and fifty years after the archetypal English event, a number of the characteristics of the great transformation to Tasmania's economic infrastructure ushered in by hydro-electrification match those nominated by Deane as typifying an economic development of the revolutionary kind.

But the first industrial revolution has impacted on Tasmanian history in ways other than as a tropological antecedent. The motives for the colonisation of Tasmania have their origins in the social turmoil triggered off in England by the first industrial revolution. The rapidly increasing urbanisation of Great Britain around the turn of the nineteenth century created overpopulation problems and increasing crime rates in cities like London, Birmingham and Manchester. An obvious solution to the riddle of housing the guilty was to ship them out to the vast, open spaces of Terra Australis, (Nullius). Once there, convict welfare became the problem of colonial governors, and the labour power of the prisoners could be more effectively put to use in the production of primary products like wool and wheat, which would make their way back to Britain for processing.

Which reminds us that the economic history of Tasmania began long before Waddamana's first cataract was channelled and harnessed, and that it stretches back, in fact, to a decidedly pre-modern point of origin at Risdon Cove in 1803. The settlement established there by Lieutenant Bowen was famously impecunious, and even after his replacement, David Collins, moved the party to Sullivan's Cove in 1804, sustenance was provided by a precarious, unreliable subsistence diet. Meagre official rations were supplemented with an *ad hoc* yield from hunting and gathering, small-scale agriculture and the irregular supply of goods shipped down from Sydney. Aside from the reliance on these last products, which themselves embodied technologies and productive practices pioneered in England and elsewhere in post-enlightenment Europe, Tasmania's early economy was hardly an industrial juggernaut. Indeed, the reliance on unpaid convict labour aligned it more closely with the pre-civil war slave economies of the southern colonies of North America than with the burgeoning factory systems of Western Europe, and it was not until the 1820s that a surplus of agricultural commodities were submitted for inclusion in the imperial economic apparatus. Wool served as the first substantial trad-

ing good when, as Lloyd Robson writes, "the British industry promoted colonial wool over that hitherto got from England itself and Spain and Germany", but whaling and sealing as Lynette Russell has shown were also successful ventures.[52]

While Tasmania's population and economy increased fivefold in the thirty years after colonisation, the productive apparatus continued to rely heavily on agriculture and pastoralism. Livestock, wool and wheat were the chief exports, while cottons, linens, apparel and hardware were all imported from outside the colony. Some small scale industry did develop in this period but it was of an insignificant size:

> In 1830 this component of the economy grew to include nine flour mills at Hobart Town, one at New Town, and four at Launceston; one distillery at Hobart Town; twelve tanneries in the capital, two at Launceston and five elsewhere; three fell mongers at Hobart Town and one at New Town. At Hobart Town there were also two parchment makers, soap, hat and rope businesses; three candle-makers; three coach manufacturers; seven makers of agricultural implements; one foundry; two cooperages; one dyer and one pipe manufacturer.[53]

This flimsy manufacturing sector left Tasmania vulnerable to external economic pressures like commodity prices and by the 1840s, the colony had fallen officially into depression for the first time. In November of 1843, the Colonial Government became embroiled in a cash-flow crisis caused by low levels of internal government revenue after the increasingly numerous and powerful free settlers argued that they should not have to pay convicts for their labour under the new probation system and demanded a return to the older assignment system of free labour. A collapse in the price of grain and wool exacerbated the economic woes and at the depth of the crisis some sixteen thousand ex-convicts found themselves surplus to requirements. A kind of proto-Keynesianism was enacted to absorb this labour power. The building of water supplies, swamp draining and other capital works were proposed and in order that government incomes might recover, taxes, mainly in the form of duties on imported products, were increased.

Such measures were largely ineffectual however. Vested interests with a strangle hold on drastically non-representative government intent on rapid-fire, under-thought land distribution resisted reforms to fiscal policy and, by the time transportation ended in 1853, Tasmania's economic

prospects appeared grim. Population concerns were extreme, the number of adult males in the colony dropped from forty-one thousand in 1852 to only twenty thousand in 1862 and it was not until a local mineral boom in the late 1870s that the colony began to recover. Population decline ceased in this period, and large scale infrastructure projects like the rail links between Hobart and Launceston were built. The capital input supplied by mining company dividends circulated through the local economy and Launceston, in particular, experienced boom-time conditions, a fact evidenced still by its extensive array of almost-lavish Victorian architecture. Still by the end of the nineteenth century, Tasmanians continued to struggle with a clunky, remote, largely pre-modern economy and their society suffered the obligatory hidden injuries of wounded pioneer shame, *lumpen proletariat* Hogarth lifestyles and chronic depopulation anxiety.

In 1891 another blow was dealt by the bankruptcy of the Bank of Van Diemen's Land and following hard on its heels came a world wide depression which was to last almost the entire decade. Once again mining came to the rescue, this time at the Mount Lyell mines near Queenstown and at nearby Zeehan and, by 1906, the Mount Lyell Road and Rail Company was one of Australia's five largest industrial entities, Zeehan had a population of eleven thousand people and Queenstown was even larger. Such bright points, however, were the exception rather than the rule; the mining boom petered out eventually and Tasmania was left once again with an under-performing economy and a hastening diaspora.

Given such an ignominious historical background, it is no wonder that the proposal put by the Launceston City Council in 1895 to construct the state's first significant hydro-electric generator was met with much fanfare. The Duck Reach plant, built in the rocky gorge of the Esk river to the east of the northern capital, supplied enough power to make Launceston the first town in the world to be illuminated entirely by electric lighting. Much grander plans for Tasmanian electricity, however, were already well under way.

Bring That Steam Drill Round

At the turn of the century, hydro-electrification was still in its infancy; the USA possessed the greatest capacity with seventy-two thousand horsepower on line, but aside from American efforts, little had been done to tap the great earthly potential of water power resources.[54] Tasmania's share of

this bounty stirred the ambition of Alfred Mault, engineering inspector to the Central Board of Health, to such a degree that, when commissioned to conduct a preliminary survey of the country around Great Lake in the Central Highlands, he felt compelled to declare that:

> Tasmania possesses capabilities that if utilised would put her in the front rank of industrial communities employing the most economical sources of motive power-water.[55]

Here was a unmissable chance for a backward colonial outpost, provided by *fiat* with fortunate topographical and meteorological patterns, to outdo the rest of the world in an undisputedly high-stakes-game of modernisation. If the hydro-electric vision could be realised, the brute forms of Tasmanian nature might finally be harnessed to modern man's ends. With its energies controlled and redirected, the society built in its midst would be thrust fully-formed into the utopian territories of industrial modernity.

An ideal location for the first large scale power plant was discovered by a Central Highlands landowner named Harold Bisdee and in 1903 he showed the site to the then professor of physics and mathematics at the University of Tasmania, Alexander McAulay. Bisdee believed that the site he had selected on the Shannon River would allow that body of water to be redirected into the Ouse gorge below, producing an almost vertical fall of over a thousand feet and a considerable potential energy source. Professor McAulay agreed that the location was ideal and provided the technical specifications for damming and redirecting the river to the proposed site of the generators.

But before this exuberant and epic pageant of construction could begin, more mundane concerns needed to be addressed. The proponents had yet to determine who was to buy the humming flow of kinetic power, who was to pay for the generators and who was to put up the capital necessary for the industrial plants that would be brought to life by the new energy. Manufacturing in Tasmania at the turn of the century was in a depressed state and if all the factories in production at the time were to have replaced their incumbent energy sources with hydro-power the sum total required would only have amounted to about two thousand horsepower. The only viable option was to encourage outside players to bring their electricity-hungry industrial appetites to Tasmania.

A metallurgist from New South Wales, J. H. Gillies had, by the early twentieth century, developed a new and potentially profitable method for treating zinc sulphide tailings, but had experienced difficulty in secur-

ing a cheap electricity source that would make the process a realistic bet. Arriving in Tasmania in 1908, Gillies met with the then Premier John Evans and outlined his plans. Evans responded positively, recognising that Gillies' proposal gave Tasmania its first real chance for delivering on its now well-known hydro-electric promise. Gillies was given the details of the Shannon river power plant put together by McAulay and Bisdee and communicated to his backers that investing in a zinc treatment plant was a wise commercial move.

The state government provided Gillies' Complex Ores Company with the rights to Great Lake's hydro power on the condition that the factory be made available for purchase by the state after twenty-one years. A new commercial entity named The Hydro-Electric Power and Metallurgical Company was formed and funds in the form of 5 % bonds were raised in London. Construction began in 1912 but two years later, and well before the plant was finished, financial difficulties resulted in the State Government's assuming ownership of the generational arm of the company. By the time the facility was completed in 1916, Gillies' zinc company was on the outer. The far larger EZ company secured a lease on land only a few kilometres to the north of Hobart and took up the contract for the lion's share of power to be produced at Waddamana. Gillies moved unsuccessfully into carbide manufacturing at Electrona, south of Hobart, and the EZ plant abandoned his patented technique for treating their zinc sulphate. He eventually left business entirely and was only saved from a penniless dotage by a government pension of three hundred pounds a year.

The era of industrial modernity had arrived in Tasmania at last and the entity that was to be its steward and champion—the Hydro-Electric Commission—had been ushered into existence, ironically enough in these days of neo-liberal, privatisation, through the acquisition, at fire-sale price, of a privately funded operation.

A Minor Place

Ways of thinking about Tasmania have tended to follow the paranoid-schizoid model of subjectivity proposed by Melanie Klein. The representational history of the island, which includes artistic figurations as much as the text and talk of everyday cultural discursivity, veers in bi-polar fashion from idealisation to denigration, from romantic utopianism to savage denunciation. Tom Lawson alerts us to this tradition of imperial utopia-

nism, and James Boyce does the same in showing the relative prosperity of Van Diemenonian life in the earliest stages of invasion and occupation:

> Van Diemen's Land emerged as a kind of English Elysium, a place that was much the same as England, only better. 'All English fruits and vegetables are much finer than in England,' claimed the *Hampshire Telegraph* in December 1823, and could be grown with neither skill nor toil: 'you turn up the ground, you put in your seed, you sleep and it grows.'[56]

And thus, in accordance with this oscillation between heaven and hell, paradise and prison, the blue sky celebration of Van Diemen's Land fertility necessitated a wholesale erasure of a three hundred generation old social system:

> The sunlit colonial future that emigrants were promised did not include the indigenous population. Where they were represented, indigenous Tasmanians were constructed as peoples without culture, 'more barbarous and uncivilized' even than the population of continental Australia.[57]

The aesthetic appeal of Jim Davidson's "Tasmanian Gothic" stands out as another signal example of this bi-polar logic. With its emphasis on an over-determining and tragic history, a chastening landscape and an always partial modernisation, Tasmanian Gothic finds a more optimistic counterpoint in the mythos of transplanted Georgian pastoralism. While drawing on the same basic attributes as its disreputable cousin, this complimentary discursive tradition ignores the intimations of a dreadful sublime so irresistible to the exponents of the Gothic, and depicts Tasmania, instead, as a bucolic repose of quaint sandstone, rolling hillsides and ruddy-cheeked propagators of superfine wool.[58]

Lacking the considerable hard-won or lovingly endowed resources of self required to sustain an ambivalent orientation toward the world, the paranoid/schizoid personality splits external reality into good and bad objects, projecting his or her own sense of unease onto the bad objects, and investing the favoured other with an unwarranted idealism. Tasmania's history of economic under-performance has generated just such a set of reactions. For some, the only response available is departure, they leave the island and join with the good object—the Australian mainland or an overseas locale.[59] For those who remain, the hope and desire that they find frustrated by the actuality of Tasmania's recalcitrant economy, is split and projected onto an imaginary agent who, equipped with the One Big

Answer, will come from a prosperous elsewhere to solve all of Tasmania's problems.

The project of hydro-industrialisation is the apotheosis of this history of utopian thinking. By building a miniaturised replica of the apparatuses of production that had escorted modernity on its passage through Western Europe and out to the imperial territories, the proponents of hydro-industrialisation were attempting to stalemate the anxiety-producing effects of an already trending culture of inferiority and insecurity. That the progress towards this Arcadia was predicated upon a transformation of the natural world was just as well, given that environmental factors and a tyranny of distance redoubled, were seen as the principal causes of Tasmania's backwardness. By damming and drowning, fording and diverting, revenge could be taken upon the brute physicality that had, for so long, consigned Tasmania to a state of perpetual economic inertia and life on the cultural littoral. The peculiarities of the island geography that had made it a natural penitentiary, suddenly became, under the transformative scientific and practical gaze of the HEC engineers, a line of flight spiralling up and away from the convict past, which, in its grimly ironic way, was still so obviously Tasmania's sole historical reason for being.

Yellow and Blue

But in the mid to late 1970s, this peculiar landscape came to form the centrepiece of another utopianism, one based around the idea that, as Cassandra Pybus puts it,

> humans do not have pre-eminence in the world, that the natural world exists and has a right to exist apart from its value to humans […] that, if this eco-centric view can challenge the anthropocentric perspective of conventional political and economic wisdom, the planet might be saved to sustain future life, including human life.[60]

Shunning the creative destruction of the hydro-electric vision, supporters of this wilderness teleology, (dis)figured Tasmania as the potential site of a bold social experiment that would redress the hubristic deformations of modernity. For these future primitive puritans and small-is-beautiful permaculture pragmatists, the slavish repetition and recapitulation of tired, anti-earth industrialisation, with all its portents of imminent environmental collapse and inequitable class relations had no place in a still safely natural, potentially perfect Tasmania. The Green colony of ecological best

practice was to be a paradise of particularity, equality and sustainability. As the former democrat Senator and erstwhile environmentalist, Norm Sanders, wrote:

> Given a restructuring of the economy, government, public service, the legal profession, the media and the scientific establishment, Tasmania could blossom forth as the only place in the world ready to face the 21st century. […] once politicians, public servants and the media are reformed. Utopia can start to take shape.[61]

This comment is a good example of the utopian strategy that Fredric Jameson calls "world-reduction".[62] Identifying the state's essential character in its vast tracts of pristine wilderness, Sanders draws a line around everything else Tasmanian and proposes that those "disposable elements" be exculpated and fashioned anew. In doing so, he fails to recognise the fact that the networks that make up this social world are not extraneous or epi-phenomenal, and that they constitute Tasmania's identity just as much as the wilderness they allegedly neglect. The nomenclature of the organisation at the vanguard of this new social movement embodies this future oriented will-to-power. The Wilderness Society was meant to name not just the group of individuals who came together to protect the Franklin River, but was also intended to gesture forward, to signify in the mode of the future perfect. Its goal and that of its political wing, the Tasmanian Greens, was to turn Tasmania itself into a wilderness society, to finally derail the faltering machinery of hydro-industrialisation, and to implement a new policy-platform based on the principles of sustainable development.[63]

When an attempt was made by the dominant political parties to squeeze the Greens out of the parliamentary process in the mid-1990s, many of their supporters justifiably cried foul. Until the resurgent victories of the 2002 state election, it looked decidedly like an unholy alliance of Liberal and Labor had, in one fell swoop, robbed the wilderness Cockaigne of what remained of its fragile plausibility. Notable figures on the fringes of official politics reacted differently. In a forum on Tasmania's future conducted by *Island* in 1997, Richard Flanagan offered this dressing down:

> The Greens are like the utopian socialists of the 1840s […] they're on about the right things, and they've identified the great issues in the next century, but they haven't been able to create a sort of coherent political practice.[64]

The utopian socialists were a loose affiliation of European writers who saw in the great possibilities offered by industrialisation an opportunity to

create a perfect society built around the principles of harmony, efficiency and equality. As one of their most eloquent representatives Claude-Henri Saint Simon wrote in 1802: "[In this new utopia] all men will work; they will regard themselves as workers attached to a workshop".[65] The utopian socialists were not luddites, nor were they sentimental traditionalists in the vein of Ruskin or Carlyle. Like their greatest critic, the scientific socialist and dialectical materialist Karl Marx, they believed that the only way to draw the perfect world back into the present from its misty repose in the distant future was through a wholesale adoption and application of the technologies of a nascent industrialisation.

If the Zinc Works at Risdon, suggest the presence in Tasmania of a visual dialectic of wilderness and industrial modernity, they also suggest a second dialectic, a utopian dialectic, based around the same two terms. The tensions between the twin utopias of development and preservation constitute an overarching logic of structuration in contemporary Tasmanian politics. Flanagan's comment merely consolidates, at the location of an otherwise theoretical link, a substantive point of conjunction between these two *topoi*. As already suggested, industrial utopics are a necessary corollary of industrialisation itself. They accompanied its development from the originary British moment of the mid-eighteenth century and they guided it to its apogee in the long capitalist expansion of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. The rich world industrial vision that had endured in the West since the eighteenth century might have reached its use-by-date after the petrodollar shocks of 1973 and 1979, but the utopian urge that had been its companion merely found itself represented somewhere else, which seems to confirm John Carey's claim that, "to count as a utopia, an imaginary place must be an expression of desire".[66]

Dammed

The road to the Gordon Dam winds its way past Mount Field National Park, through the dilapidated towns of Fitzgerald and Maydena and into the World Heritage Area of Tasmania's South West. Built to provide access to the Hydro-Electric Commission's Gordon Power scheme, its eighty-six kilometres of white concrete and black bitumen take you through a raw and beautiful landscape that is wild and human and hostile and welcoming. From the road's soft shoulder, the valley leads down toward the crowded floor of the Florentine forests which in turn foregrounds the forbidding West Coast ranges in the distance. The lavish eucalyptus are overtaken by a yellow-brown heathland dotted with hardy mountain climbing

shrubs and, at the higher reaches, crenelated outcrops of white quartz. The size of the mountains that ring the glaciation is difficult to judge, the primordial character of the landscape and the swollen waters of the twin lakes, Pedder and Gordon throw scale and perspective into revolt. But the traces of modernity are here too and reference points are common. There is the road for one, and its complement of signs and signifiers naming the mountain ranges, the rivers, and the lakes that surround it. There are the markings of forestry too, and as you get closer to the road's end, the now almost deserted hydro-village of Strathgordon. Because, after all, this is a road with a definite *telos*. At its end is the Gordon Dam, a gravity-defying concave wall of concrete. This feat of engineering is the talisman of Tasmanian conservationism, its power of refusal is the mouth that swallowed the original Lake Pedder, and its bulk is the galvanising force that steeled the will of the conservationists who would not let the Franklin go.

The Nyrstar Zinc Works is an urban development. Its backdrop gestures toward the wilderness but does so in a partial way. The Gordon Dam, on the other hand, is situated at the very edge of civilisation, temporally as well as spatially. Its presence is premised on the obliteration of wilderness, the original Lake Pedder, and yet that lake remains in memory and actuality beneath the wine-dark waters that drowned it. Similarly, the brutal human genius embodied in the dam's formal structure seems designed as much to stop the water at its back, as to stalemate the larger forces of wilderness that surround it on all sides. The purity of its geometry is jolted and teased by the irregularity of the rock face against which it has been grafted.

Indeed, one might even say that the two histories of modern nature are materialised in this structure; that the hi-tensile bulwark of the dam embodies what Klaus Eder has called industrial reason, the will to transform nature, in this case in a double sense because the product of the transformation is electricity, a phantom commodity in its own right that only acquires character by animating real technologies or service exchanges. At the Gordon Dam, industrial modernity has been given a bleeding, rusting edge and a slow-leak shadow, marked indelibly and ominously into the river cliff gap that it fills. Its other, its precondition—the wilderness—greets it, joins with it, is subsumed by it. The relationship that continually and constantly reconnects its modern methods and machines to an archaic, wilderness earth postpones a final verdict on Tasmania's claim to a modern past and a postmodern future.

Notes

1. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 35.
2. See Noel King, "Reading White Noise: Floating Remarks," *Critical Quarterly* 33.3 (1990): 66–83; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "One or Several Wolves," in *A Thousand Plateaus*: *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1988). Fredric Jameson *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Act* (London: Methuen, 1981), 22; Bret Easton Ellis, *American Psycho* (London: Picador, 1991).
3. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 35.
4. Stephen Greenblatt, *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 1.
5. Davidson, "Tasmanian Gothic,": 312.
6. See particularly Cassandra Pybus, *Community of Thieves* (Port Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 1991).
7. See Kevin Blackburn, "Imagining Aboriginal Nations: Early Nineteenth Century Evangelicals on the Australian Frontier and the "nation" Concept," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 48.2 (2002): 174–92; K. E. C. Graves, "Quamby," *Blackwood's Magazine* 311(1876): 142–54; Cassandra Pybus, "Oyster Cove 1988: Aboriginal History associated with Oyster Cove," *Meanjin* 47.4 (1988): 573–84; "History as Myth: G. A. Robinson and the Tasmanian Aborigines," *Overland* 111 (1988): 48–53; N. J. B. Plomley, *Friendly Mission*; *George Augustus Robinson and the Tasmanian Aborigines: A Paper Read Before a General Meeting of the Tasmanian Historical Research Association on 3 February, 1956* (Hobart: The Association, 1956); *Weep in Silence*; John Watt Beatties, *Historical Photographs Relating to Tasmania* (Hobart: [s.n.], 1912); Allan Drummond, *George Augustus Robinson* (Mentone: Green Barrow Publishing, 1999); Stephen Scheding, *The National Picture* (Mill's Point: Vintage, 2002); Inga Clendinnen, *Tiger's Eye: A Memoir* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2000); Vivienne Rae-Ellis, *Trucanninni: Queen or Traitor* (Hobart: O. B. M, 1976); *Black Robinson: Protector of Aborigines* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1988); Mudrooroo, *Dr Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World*. Robert Drewe, *The Savage Crows* (Sydney: Collins, 1976).
8. See John Daniel Cash "Ideology and Affect: The Case of Northern Ireland," *Political Psychology* 10.4 (December 1989): 703–24 and *Identity, Ideology and Conflict: The Structuration of Politics in Northern Ireland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
9. Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*, xxv.
10. Robinson, *Friendly Mission*, 65.
11. Ibid., 75, emphasis added.
12. Reynolds, *An Indelible Stain*, 53.

13. Sir George Murray quoted in ibid., 59.
14. Governor George Arthur quoted in ibid., 64.
15. Lawson, 127–8.
16. Lawson, 57, emphasis in original.
17. Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity*, 36.
18. Natalie Jackson and Rebecca Kippen, "Whither Tasmania?: A Note on Tasmania's Population 'Problem'," *People and Place* 9.1 (March 2001): 27. See Nicolas Rothwell, "Lost Island," *The Australian*, April 26, 1997, *Weekend Review*: 6.
19. LaCapra, *History and Reading*, 65.
20. See work by David Lowenthal, Simon Schama and Carlo Ginzburg for novel approaches to writing history that avoid such a radical rebooting of historical method.
21. Ibid., 24.
22. Ibid., 30.
23. Ibid., 28.
24. See Harold Bloom, "Different Voice: A Reading List for Bill Gates—and You: A Conversation with Literary Critic, Harold Bloom," *Harvard Business Review* 79.5 (2001): 63–71.
25. Robert Knox, *The Races of Men: A Fragment* (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1850), 2.
26. For further information on Knoxian racial science see Susan Collinson, "Robert Knox's Anatomy of Race," *History Today* (1990): 44–8; Evelleen Richards, "The "Moral Anatomy" of Robert Knox: the interplay between Biological and Social Thought in Victorian Scientific Naturalism," *Journal of the History of Biology* 22.3 (1989): 373–436.
27. Turnbull, *Black War*, 1.
28. Stephen Greenblatt, *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 1.
29. O'Regan, "Documentary in Controversy," 129.
30. Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*, 9.
31. Jean Laplanch and J. B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973), 488.
32. Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia (1917)," in *The Pelican Freud Library, 11; On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis* (London: Penguin, 1984), 245–68.
33. Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*, 255. The debate over the racist undertones in Haydon's film led to a debate between Aboriginal rights activist Michael Mansell and the director on the ABC's *Monday Conference* on September 4, 1979. See Robert Milliken, "Genocide Film Stirs Up Race Row," *National Times,* July 22, 1978, 6–9.

34. Stephen Greenblatt, *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 1.
35. See Alison Alexander, *The Zinc Works: Producing Zinc at Risdon, 1916–1991* (Risdon: Pasminco-Metals, EZ, 1992).
36. As the Australian Bureau of Statistics' *Tasmanian Year Books* show, manufacturing employment dropped from thirty-four thousand jobs out of a total of one hundred and forty-seven thousand in 1968 to twenty-three thousand jobs out of a total of one hundred and ninety-five thousand in 1998.
37. See Simon J. Charlesworth, *A Phenomenology of Working-Class Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
38. See, for instance, Catherine Watson, *Full and Plenty: An Oral History of Apple Growing in the Huon Valley* (Sandy Bay: Twelvetrees Publishing, 1987).
39. Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, 82.
40. A number of twentieth-century German photographers, in particular, provide us with the visual machinery for commencing this speculative venture. See August Sander, *August Sander: Photographs of an Epoch, 1904–1959: Man of the Twentieth Century, Rhineland Landscapes, Nature Studies, Architectural and Industrial Photographs, Images of Sardinia* (Millerton: Aperture, 1980); Kim Sichel, *Germaine Krull: Photographer of Modernity* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
41. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).
42. See Fiona Pollack, "Place and Space: Views from a Tasmanian Mountain," in *Imagining Australian Space: Cultural Studies and Spatial Inquiry*, ed. Ruth Barcan and Ian Buchanan (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1999), 145–57; Conrad, *Down Home*; Flanagan, *On the Mountain*.
43. "Kunanyi," David Bartlett, accessed October 26, 2004 http://www.david-bartlett.com.au/home/speechesandpapers/speech26octoberpm.
44. Fabienne Bayet, "Overturning the Doctrine: Indigenous People and Wilderness – Being Aboriginal in the Environmental Movement," *Social Alternatives* 13.2 (Jul. 1994): 27.
45. For a good example of this phenomenon see Bernard Stonehouse, *The Aerofilms Book of Britain from the Air* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982).
46. See particularly, R. M. H. Garvie, *A Million Horses: Tasmania's Power in the Mountains* (Hobart: Hydro-Electric Commission, Tasmania, 1962); Simon Harris, "Power, Politics and Progress: The Evolution of Tasmania's Hydro-Electric Commission, 1914–1930" (diss, University of Tasmania, 1986); Doug Lowe, *The Price of Power: The Politics Behind the Tasmanian Dams Case* (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1984); Lindsay Whitham, "The Red Gate Tramway to Waddamana," *Papers and Proceedings of the Tasmanian Historical Research Association* 46.4 (1999): 200–12.

47. Wagner, *A Sociology of Modernity,* 3.
48. Crook, Waters and Pakulski, *Postmodernization*, 30.
49. My characterisation of developers as Faustian is informed by Marshall Berman's chapter on the three metamorphoses of that classic character of German Romanticism in *All that is Solid Melts into Air*.
50. Mead, "A Strange Narrative Density," 17.
51. Phyllis Deane, *The First Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1979), 1.
52. Lloyd Robson, *A History of Tasmania,* vol. 1 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), 13.
53. Ibid., 266.
54. A. J. Gillies, *Tasmania's Struggle for Power* (Burnie: Francis and Lillas, 1984), 3.
55. Quoted in Gillies, *Tasmania's Struggle for Power*, 3.
56. Lawson, 40
57. Lawson, 41.
58. Michael Sharland, *Oddity and Elegance* (Hobart: Fullers Bookshop, 1966).
59. See Dennis Altman *The Comfort of Men* (Port Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 1993); *Defying Gravity: A Political Life* (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1997); Martin Flanagan, *In Sunshine or in Shadow* (Sydney: Picador, 2002); Flanagan, *Death of a River Guide*; *The Sound of One Hand Clapping*; C.J. Koch, *The Boys in the Island* (Sydney: Collins/ Angus and Robertson, 1987); *The Doubleman*; Heather Rose, *White Heart* (Sydney: Anchor, 1999).
60. Cassandra Pybus, "The Landscape of the Self," *Meanjin* 48.4 (1989): 797.
61. Norm Sanders, *A Time to Care: Tasmania's Endangered Wilderness* (Blackmans Bay: Chris Bell, 1980), 103.
62. Fredric Jameson, *The Seeds of Time* (New York: Columbia, 1994), 73–128.
63. Amanda Lohrey, "Groundswell: The Rise of the Greens," in *Quarterly Essay, (*Melbourne: Black Inc., 2002); "The Green Discourse," in *The Rest of the World is Watching: Tasmania and the Greens*, ed. Richard Flanagan and Cassandra Pybus (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 1990), 89–100.
64. Flanagan, "Does Tasmania Have a Future," 149.
65. In John Carey, ed., *The Faber Book of Utopias* (London: Faber and Faber, p. 1999), 184.
66. Ibid., xi.

CHAPTER 5

Global Time

All for One and One for All

In "The Rise and Fall of Metaphor: German Historians and the Uniqueness of the Holocaust", Wulf Kansteiner argues that German historians of an empiricist bent have traditionally couched their narratives in a straightforward referential language dominated by metonymic figuration. This linguistic commonplace was challenged, however, with the emergence of a metaphoric approach to thinking the uniqueness of the Holocaust championed by scholars like Martin Broszat, Hans Mommsen, Yehuda Bauer and Saul Friedlander.[1] The intrusion of metaphor into historical debates around the Holocaust found its fullest expression in the "Historian's Debate" that raged in Germany through the mid-to-late-1980s, but, according to Kansteiner its effects have since been largely absorbed into a new regime of "self-confident empiricism":

> With hindsight, the historiographically volatile 1970s and the subsequent short reign of metaphor appear just as ripples in a sea of historiographical normality and self-confidence. The notion of the Holocaust's singularity temporarily postponed this inevitable return to business as usual and gave rise to unusual and unusually productive historiographical introspection and in this way attested to the extraordinary challenge which the historicisation of events like the Holocaust pose to academic discipline.[2]

Kansteiner's claim is tested by the continuing occupation by metaphor of an emblematic position within the discursive field that gathers the

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Holocaust together with other instances of historical genocide. It is not the uniqueness of the Holocaust that is encoded through the rhetoric of negative metaphorics but its very comparability.

The spatio-temporal gap that separates the genocide of the Palawa in Tasmania from the Holocaust has been filled by the metaphorical plasticity of the "Final Solution" that stands out specifically in Mudrooroo Narogin's historical novel *Dr Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World*.[3] Mudrooroo's inscription of the "Final Solution" into the textual tissue of *Wooreddy* is the only instance of a novel-bound iteration directed squarely at and from the literary corpus of Aboriginal Tasmania and its hierophants. The deployment of this conceit, though, is not uncommon within the broader genus of academic history. Take the following four instances:

> There was no doubt that the situation had been developing towards a 'final solution' for many years, a solution made inevitable primarily because of the complete lack of communication between two people, neither understanding the language of the other.[4]

> The answer is that governments in the metropolis, under intense pressure from the periphery, were prepared to entertain "final solutions" to the Aboriginal problem.[5]

> What made the Tasmanian case special for the Victorians was partly that their final solution seemed really final, and partly that it first became apparent in the 1830s, heyday both of utilitarian belief in progress through secular industry and reform and of evangelical belief in extraworldly salvation.[6]

> The actual documentation of Truganini's death appeared irrefutable proof that the "final solution" which everyone publicly abhorred had been triumphantly attained.[7]

The writers who adopt the term "Final Solution" to describe the Van Diemonian disaster align themselves, inadvertently or not, with the loose affiliation of scholars who argue against the singularity of the Holocaust. The motive betrayed by this modality of figuration is the desire for a certification of genocide won not so much by argumentation as rhetorical flourish. If, as Alison Palmer suggests, the Holocaust is the "normative prototype of all genocides", the application of one of its nomenclatures to an alternative historical logic might well also involve the recuperation

and redistribution of its high moral seriousness.[8] The politics of such an intervention are fraught. On one side, cautionary imperatives warn against the naïve, cruel or insensitive splicing together of irreducible events that Steven Katz and Deborah Lipstadt deplore as "moral chauvinism" and crypto-fascist "relativism", respectively.[9] While on the other, the impassioned pleas of writers like Ward Churchill, Peter Novick, Norman Finkelstein and David E. Stannard implore us to acknowledge the claims of the victims of "other" genocides who feel that their suffering has not been given commensurate recognition and legitimation.[10] In the spirit of Freud's work on female sexuality and patriarchy that Juliet Mitchell famously defended on the grounds of its *de*scriptive rather than its *pre*scriptive force, ethics gives way to empiricism.[11]

Cage Fighting

The close-cropped publication of Henry Reynolds' *An Indelible Stain: The Question of Genocide in Australian History* and Ray Thorpe and Bill Evans' "Indigenocide and the Massacre of Aboriginal History" could have been a pivotal moment in the history of the project of reconciliation. Unfortunately historical amnesia of the kind prescribed by Keith Windschuttle has largely succeeded in settling its soporific vapours over the Australian mind. Even so, these texts will be remembered for their heartfelt plea that we take the idea of an Australian genocide seriously.

I examine these texts here because they stand as two high-profile examples of writing about the Tasmanian genocide in the context of a larger investigation of race-relations in the Australian nation-state as a whole. Within that emerging historiographical genre, Tasmania is often treated as the exemplary site of genocidal actions, just as the Holocaust serves as the paradigmatic case in the larger genre of international Genocide Studies. The structure of the discursive constellation into which Reynolds and Thorpe and Evans make their entrance, then, overlaps with the more expansive and more powerful complex of texts that describe and interrogate the Holocaust. That last complex, however, is not self-sufficient either, in so far as it, too, opens out into a discursive terrain that is populated by writing on genocides other than the Shoah. A byzantine network of exchange and allusion, of association and conjunction spreads itself across these discursive regimes, but even in the claustrophobic cross-currents of reference and echo, a pattern that makes Tasmania the paradigmatic site of genocide in Australia can be identified. Once this pattern is established, a consanguinity

with the Holocaust, which itself anchors the much larger field of Genocide Studies more generally, can also be delineated.

As Thorpe and Evans make clear in their essay:

> relatively few analyses of Australia's past either by indigenous or non-indigenous authors […] have examined the concept [of genocide] at any length, either in its 'theoretical dimensions' or its empirical applications.[12]

This omission, they suggest, has played into the hands of those who argue against the occurrence of widespread frontier conflict in the nascent Australian colonies. To this end, Thorpe and Evans direct their polemic most firmly at Windschuttle's essays in *Quadrant* from the mid-1990s, arguing that in those texts, Windschuttle sought to breathe new life into the tropes of "terra nullius", "the great Australian silence" and the "quiet continent thesis".[13] Thorpe and Evans identify a two-phase tactic as central to Windschuttle's approach: first, an out-of-hand denial that genocide ever occurred in Australia is issued, and second, a re-examination and reformulation of a modified definition of the term is blankly refused. Instead, statistical evidence from the period concerned is used to bolster the contrary contention that losses suffered by the settlers at the hands of the indigenous inhabitants were more severe than vice versa.[14]

Thorpe and Evans undertake a close inspection of Windschuttle's research methodology in their efforts to counter this contention, and find a rich vein of error and oversight in his work. Not only do they manage to stymie the argument from statistics, they also identify a poor use of primary sources, a highly selective consultation of recently published academic histories on the subject and a tendency to occlude relevant empirical events.[15] To their credit though, and in keeping with the sweep of their piece, Thorpe and Evans quickly shift their energies away from this tussle with Windschuttle and his *Quadrant* allies, to a confrontation of the motivations that drive the widespread suspicion of "black armband" history that circulates through the cultural centres of this country:

> It is intensely discomforting to conceive of an Australian social order where the mass murder of certain people, identifiable by their ethnicity, was a way of life, executed by a minority of perpetrators, tolerated by the settler majority, and winked at by a state which, in other settings, upheld the precepts of British culture, law and justice.[16]

In the process of working through the resistance generated by this discomfort, Thorpe and Evans reach a semantic impasse. The first major attempt to define and codify genocide was made in 1944 by the Polish-Jewish intellectual Raphael Lemkin. Conceived in direct response to the empirical realities of the German occupation policies directed at Slavs, Jews and Gypsies in Axis-controlled Europe, Lemkin's definition, which was subsequently taken as a primary source by the United Nations Convention on the issue, conceives of genocide as a "peculiarly modern phenomenon", or, more precisely, "an old practice in its modern development".[17] Dealing as they are with a historically antecedent and qualitatively distinct set of events, Evans and Thorpe propose that a narrow definition of genocide that emphasises its specifically modern character might not have room within its parameters for the Australian frontier scenario. As such, they coin a new portmanteau term that they hope will more adequately address the specificity of their object of study: indigenocide:

> Indigenocide is a means of analysing those circumstances where one, or more peoples, usually immigrants, deliberately set out to supplant a group or groups of other people whom as far as we know, represent the indigenous or Aboriginal peoples of the country that the immigrants usurp.[18]

Thorpe and Evans do not concede, however, that the use of indigenocide's antecedent is disqualified entirely by the specifically colonial character of the empirical realities that form the focus of their investigation. Rather, they propose that indigenocide might be deployed after the fashion of a Derridean *supplément*, to both augment and replace the exegetical utility of its suffix-root.[19] What happens next is that genocide comes to signify in a dual way. On the one hand it retains its concrete linkage to the Jewish Holocaust, making that moral disaster a one-event set, and on the other, it becomes a more generic rubric that can be attached to any configuration of empirical events that fits its formal criteria.

The jurisdiction of Thorpe and Evans' piece is the whole of Australia, but the first case study they turn to is the settler-colonisation of Tasmania. The "Tasmanian Aboriginal situation", they argue, "is often regarded as Australia's singular genocidal example".[20] What is happening here is akin to the phenomenon that Dipesh Chakrabarty describes in *Provincializing Europe*, whereby a "first in Europe, then elsewhere" structure of global historical time is reproduced in non-European locations so that local versions

of this same narrative replace "Europe" with some locally constructed centre.[21] For the taxonomic "class" of Lemkinian genocide, the Holocaust becomes the exemplary instantiation, the dense nucleus, of European—and therefore, Western—narratives of ethnic maltreatment and xenophobic inhumanity, while within the sub-class of Australian genocide or indigenocide, the Tasmanian extirpation is inscribed as the "locally constructed centre" of a concomitant discursive formation. The two "events" are brought together by virtue of the equivalent position they occupy within overlapping but relatively autonomous symbolic orders.

The essential gist of Thorpe and Evans' piece quickly becomes clear. Any post-Holocaust historical analysis that seeks to delineate the workings of a genocidal logic in its particular archive will necessarily do so through an intertextual matrix thoroughly overdetermined by the Holocaust itself. Discussing genocide without invoking images and cultural memories that cluster around the representational traditions of the Shoah will be wellnigh impossible. Whether these be snatches of Primo Levi's haunting prose-poem *If This is a Man?*, the macabre combination of muscle memory and moral exhaustion borne of enduring Claude Lanzmann's *Shoah*, or the anamnesis of anonymous newsreel footage, the memory traces of the Holocaust will attach themselves to the particular genocide being read and appear co-extensively on the same cognitive surface or plane of immanence. We cannot de-couple and divorce the "Final Solution" from the classificatory register established in its name, even as we find baleful the comparisons between actual *sui generis* cases of "ethnic cleansing" thereby engendered. Genocide and Holocaust become, and remain, to some extent synonymous.

Equally, Thorpe and Evans' work shows that to discuss genocide in Australian history is always to refer back, even if allusively or by association, to the colonisation of Tasmania and the depredations wrought on its indigenous inhabitants by the disjointed assemblage of Imperial British military, judiciary, legislature and private citizenry. There is a connective tissue that binds in contingent and provisional fashion the Tasmanian genocide, the Australian genocides, indigenocide, the Holocaust and all the other historical logics that we approach through this terminology.

Catachresis

Reynolds' investigation of the question of genocide in Australian history overlaps with Thorpe and Evans'. In his monograph, *An Indelible Stain: The Question of Genocide in Australia's History*, Reynolds includes a chapter entitled "Tasmania: A Clear Case of Genocide?" that engages with the

growing body of international scholarship and journalism interested in trawling through the phantasmagoria of colonial bloodshed in Tasmania. While Reynolds is able to find copious genocidal articulations that take Tasmania as their object, he also notes the reluctance of Australians to examine the presence of genocidal relations in their own country's past. Like Thorpe and Evans, he points out that a more particularised definition of genocide—colonial genocide—has been preferred in the Australian case. The exception to this rule is the historiography of Tasmania, and Reynolds lists three Australian historians, Robson, Butlin and Hughes, who have all couched their accounts of the decimation and displacement of the Palawa people in the language of extirpation.[22] For Reynolds, as for Thorpe and Evans, the Tasmanian settler-invasion stands out as the most obvious example of a genocidal action in Australian history. Reynolds actually hedges his bets when it comes to making a clear determination as to whether or not a genocide was perpetrated in nineteenth-century Tasmania, but for our purposes here, it is adequate to show that he acknowledges the seductive power that such an induction has exercised over others. If genocide did occur in Australia, Reynolds suggests, the first place to which we would turn in pursuit of its traces would be Tasmania.

Reynolds also turns his attention to the question of the Shoah. As if anticipating Thorpe and Evans' iteration of the relation of contiguity that holds the Holocaust and the Tasmanian genocide together, he paraphrases a contention made by Tony Barta in an article originally published in 1985:

> The terrible and well-known story of the Holocaust makes it difficult to discuss the general question of genocide, which for most people means only one thing: the murder of six million Jews. As a result, Australians have never seriously been confronted by the idea 'that the society in which they live is founded on genocide'.[23]

To speak semiotically, genocide in Barta's formulation, refers not to the abstract realm of the denotative—the deliberate killing of a large number of individuals of a particular race, ethnicity or national grouping—but to the more connotative particularity of the Holocaust itself. One stage in the process of meaning-manufacture has thus been foregone and the movement from the acoustic sound-image of the signifier to the hypostasised concept of the signified has been renegotiated. The idea of genocide in general has been passed over, exchanged without notice, substituted for an instance of actually existing genocide which doubles over itself to reflexively saturate the semantic field of its signifier.

To call the history of altercations between indigenous and non/indigenous Tasmanians a genocide, then, is to interweave the narratives that constitute its textuality with those of the Holocaust. The lateral relation that normally holds between members of the same class of objects is thus re-hinged, and the Holocaust becomes the setting for an unfolding story of genocide in Tasmania. Furthermore, Reynolds' recapitulation of the strategy that positions Tasmania at the centre of the spatial and temporal ordering of genocide in Australia mirrors the commonplace understanding that the Holocaust is the pre-eminent and iconic genocide to have occurred throughout the *long duree* of Western history.

The Speaking Subject

Historically, debates about Aboriginality in Tasmania have taken the form of a constellation circulating around a single radial point: the question of extinction. From James Bonwick's publication of 1870, *The Last of the Tasmanians* to Clive Turnbull's *The Black War* in 1948 to Tom Haydon's documentary *The Last Tasmanian* in 1978, the absolute obliteration of the indigenous owners of Tasmania was affirmed as historical fact.[24] However, after years of misinformation and misguided ignorance, a racial politics with real energy and determination began to make its presence felt. And there was a compelling back story behind it all. The myth of complete extinction was the touchstone for the development of a formidable Aboriginal rights movement that began to emerge in the 1970s. This group were responsible for, and bore witness to, the remarkable situation whereby a supposedly extinct peoples actually began arguing for their own existence. In linguistic terms, this was a perfect example of a performative speech act, the process of voicing making incontestable the content of the claim being voiced.[25]

This new optic of survival positioned a scene of diffuse continuity against a morbid backdrop of abrupt termination. It produced a new way of seeing, a post-colonial *volte face* as ethically reassuring as it was logically and empirically sound. It also cast a long shadow over the horizon of Aboriginal Studies in Tasmania. In a historiographical field dominated by a turning point of such basic ontological import, the impact of the discovery of a genocidal pattern in the actions and orientations of the Colonial Office, the colonial administrations of David Collins, Thomas Davey, William Sorell and George Arthur and the citizenry more generally, is made to seem less explosive than it otherwise might.

But even so, a wave of ripples—legal, political, ethical, semantic—radiate out across the textual surface of the Aboriginal Studies programme in the wake of the uncovering of this secret truth. Conceptually, what the deployment of the term does is invest the incidents it describes with a heightened load of horror. Suddenly, an irreducibly specific historical moment becomes part of a larger genus. The events which slide under the signifier of genocide—Pol Pot's Killing Fields, the destruction of the Aztec and Inca civilisations by the Spanish conquistadors, and more recently the tragedy of the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda—come to donate some of their cultural resonance to the disaster of imperialism that took place in Tasmania from 1803 onwards.

Free Association

This chapter traces some of the links in the associative chain that ties together the Jewish Holocaust and the decimation of the Aboriginal Tasmanians. At the level of empirical reality there are few points of conjunction. What these events have in common is their shared status as genocides, a synthetic quality that isn't immanent within a given historical logic but must be read into it *a posteriori*.

The writing of genocide histories follows a biased, motivated remembering. Patterns are deliberately tracked down, motives are interrogated, intent identified, objectives isolated, with the signal purpose of deriving concrete event identity from an abstract standard: the deliberate killing of a large number of individuals of a specific national or ethnic grouping (*OED*), or in the longer UN definition:

> any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
>
> Killing members of the group;
> Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
> Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
> Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
> Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.[26]

The ideational contours of the Holocaust are imbricated in general with the concept of genocide, even as the former remains only one instance of the

larger historical class of genocides-in-general. In light of this, the reading of other genocides, the Tasmanian case included, also potentially becomes a re-reading of the category-saturating narratives of the Holocaust. It is completely feasible, of course, that new students of the dispossession of the Palawa people might have no working knowledge whatsoever of the death camps of Eastern Europe. Those who do, however, are likely to be struck initially by the symmetries and disjunctions that define the relationship between the two sets of events. The cognitive migration of the Holocaust from its precise historical location to its living destination in our individual and cultural and professional memories occurs along the circuitry of an impossibly dense inter-textual network. Scenes from the Holocaust—real footage, staged re-enactments, fictionalised representations, still images, personal accounts—provide the content that fills out the empty form of the Holocaust as an idea. They are the links in the significatory chain that stretches out from the Holocaust to the Tasmanian genocide and stretches back again in the opposite direction to the position of the thinking scholar identified, institutionally, spatially and culturally, as working in the Holocaust field. How, we need to ask, does a formal remembrance, recollection of and reflection upon one discreet historical topic or *hapax* suddenly slide off in another direction toward something that is both kindred and fungible, remote, alien and incommensurable? Where might the jumping-off points that connect these disparate narrative frameworks be found?

Who Are You, Really?

In *Doctor Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World*, Mudrooroo fictionalises an encounter between George Augustus Robinson and a stock-keeper and expert on local history by the name of Punch. In the principal historical source for Mudrooroo's text, Robinson's field diaries edited by N. J. B. Plomley, there is very little detail of the conversations shared by the two men, but in *Wooreddy* an extended dialogue is extrapolated from the primary material. When he runs into Punch, Robinson is on his way to meet Governor Arthur in Launceston and has with him a number of Aboriginal companions including the famous female chief, Walyer. Keen to catch up on any information about local relations between the settlers and the Aboriginals, Robinson takes Punch with him on the journey down the Tamar from Georgetown. The fictional adjustments of history at play here are notable: Walyer was

not captured until the middle of December 1830, Punch did not join the party for travel by river and Robinson never met the Lieutenant Governor in Launceston.[27] But the historical liberties that Mudrooroo takes are not game-changers. What is significant is the actual content of the interpolation being made. The topic of the discourse between the two characters ranges from a recounting on Punch's part of a series of atrocities committed against the indigenous inhabitants in the district, to an exchange of opinions on the righteousness of Aboriginal retaliation to settler violence and the merits of the Black Line, the preparations for which were being made at the time of the men's meeting. It is at this juncture that the two words which are our focus here make their appearance. Mudrooroo has Robinson defend the Palawa's violent responses to injuries wrought against them by making recourse to the retributivist logic for righting wrongs set out in the *Bible*. He then has Punch make the following reply:

> 'That may be,' rejoined Punch, 'but you'll find blessed few people agreeing with you in these parts. They settled the trouble in this district long ago and they're going to settle it in the same ways elsewheres. Why the whole area is in an uproar with the military operations getting underway. That'll be the *final solution* that will. It's what we did here and it worked! Your crows are the first I've seen this year.'[28]

Bracketing authorial intent for a moment, the intertextual effect of this deployment of the trope of the Final Solution is the consolidation at the level of the letter of the connection between the two instances of genocide at issue. As a phrase that circulates within Holocaust historiography, *Final Solution* acts as a metonym for the events that it names. Applying the term to the genocide of the Tasmanian Aborigines brings the massive, multi-faceted orders of discourse and cultural memory built around the murder of the European Jewry into the colonial frame. The premodern genocide is re-plotted along a fundamentally modern axis and Holocaust imagery—anonymous graves, lines of blank-faced *Rasmussen*, brutal concrete encampments—crosses, incongruously, into the semiotic field of the premodern event. The Holocaust displaces the colonial genocide, the mnemonic landscape of the former is superimposed onto that of the latter. The Tasmanian genocide is pushed into the background of a fictional diorama dedicated to its exposition by a signifier that brings with it an unmanageable plague or deluge of meaning.

Stuart Stein sums up the ramifications of this effect when he argues that "the destruction of European Jewry is the paradigmatic instance of genocide, the analyses of which have significantly shaped our notion of what should be construed as genocide".[29] Calling the Tasmanian extirpation a Final Solution, threatens to drown out the fragile mnemonic echoes of the colonial event, but it also stands as an alternative means of re-enforcing its status as genocide. Mudrooroo refutes Henry Reynolds' doubts about the status of the Aboriginal decimation through figuration, rather than adversarial argumentation. By making the connection between the two events through the placing of this tiny, insubstantial pivot, this veritable hyperlink to the World Wide Web of Holocaust representation, Mudrooroo is wagering that the glowering, red dwarf star, power of horror generated can be contained by the historically antecedent event.

In light of the evocations of Wybalenna as concentration camp that come later in the novel, this apparently innocuous use of tropology is transformed into the key that unlocks the whole figural schema of the novel. Now Dr Wooreddy, already presented as an antipodean John the Divine receiving the visitations of God on the Tasmanian equivalent of the Island of Padmos, becomes a Primo Levi of the colonial period, bearing witness to the destruction of his race, concentrating on ensuring his own survival but powerless ultimately to resist the ecology of genocide in which he must make a living.[30]

Arche and *Telos*

Comparisons can be invidious but an overdone focus on particularity, innate, monadic or solipsistic aspects of identity can be worse. The problem of the Holocaust's singularity will not be resolved by outlawing certain research subjects or constantly ramping up the police actions sent out along the boundaries and borderlines of careful, friendly relativism. The parapraxical deployment of the trope of the "Final Solution" in writings on the invasion of Tasmania and the vouchsafing of equivalent positions to the two event-sets within the bounds of their particular discursive orders presses out a methodological crease in the category/plane of genocide studies so that like social logics become secondary variations on the normative Shoah. This crease, however, is never as crisply folded as it is intended to be. As Klaus Neumann writes in a recent work on the way local cultural pasts are remembered and written:

> The pasts that I am concerned with here, are, first, what is variously referred to as Auschwitz, Shoah, or Holocaust, and second, the impact of settler colonialism on Aboriginal people in Australia, something that in recent years has also come under the rubric of genocide. Little could be gained from my comparing the extermination of Jewish people in concentration camps with the large-scale theft of Aboriginal land and the murder of its owners.[31]

Inadvertently perhaps, Neumann's comments open out onto the terrain surveyed by the various contributors to the Historians' Debate. Mudrooroo's figural mobilisation of Final Solution tropology positions him firmly on the side of the debate that argues for the relative comparability of the Holocaust, while Neumann's observations on the irreducible heterogeneity of the two orders of history, Australian and German/Jewish, aligns him with scholars like Eberhard Jäckel and Stephen Katz, who argue for the ultimate singularity of the Holocaust. The *Historikerstreit*, as the debate was known in Germany, engaged this dialectic of uniqueness or comparability in the light of questions about the capacity of German historians to provide cultural narratives that would give their populations, and their children in particular, a solid foundation for positive national identity and collective actions. The proponents of this position, a neoconservative one according to Jürgen Habermas, wanted to re-write the Nazi past in order to provide a "positive or affirmative German identity in the present".[32]

Confession and Analysis

Dominick LaCapra situates his own remarks on the *Historikerstreit* within the dialectic of acting out and working through, an approach that sets the terms for a profitable reading of the figural strategy being examined here. For the task of developing more nuanced appreciations of the way historians attempt to work through collective traumas, he argues, the psychoanalytic language of transference serves as a useful tool. Essentially, he contends, relations between historians or writers and the historical scenarios they examine can be mapped out in the same terms psychoanalysis uses to describe the flows of cathexis, identification, projection and misrecognition that characterise patient/therapist encounters in the clinical setting. "How", he asks, "should one negotiate transferential relations to the object of study whereby processes active in it are repeated with more or less significant variation in the account of the Historian?".[33]

The motivation for LaCapra's observations is a concern that historians who represent a perpetrator group will recuperate the asymmetrical relations of domination that have held sway in a real-world interaction and allow them to inform the texts that document that interaction. As discussed elsewhere in this book, the extinction motif that served as the dominant trope in nineteenth-century histories of the Tasmanian Aborigines is a case in point. LaCapra's hermeneutic lays bare the ominous fact that writers like Bonwick, West, Calder and Ling Roth, using only fountain pen and ink, were actually putting the final touches to a project of extirpation whose physical component had already wrought such bitter devastation in the earliest years of European invasion.

This is a vital problematic to consider in the case of Mudrooroo because it allows us to make an inquiry into what happens when a colonial genocide is rewritten from the Aboriginal perspective. One might expect a range of approaches here. Power relations could be inverted to emphasise the valour of resistance and counter-attack. The mantle of victimhood could be interiorised into the narrative voice to lay bare the savagery of the invading Europeans. Fabulist departures from *de facto* history could be taken as avenues for the creation of an untouched indigenous fragment, somehow removed through conflict or stealth from subsumption into the invading culture. In any case, it would seem unlikely that Mudrooroo's activist membership of the broader Australian Aboriginal community, a part of whose destruction he describes, will not influence the way he reconstructs the history of that destruction.[34]

On the one hand, then, the politics of this interpolation seem easy to grasp. The allusion to the Holocaust effected by the troping of the Final Solution stands as a relatively uncomplicated claim to an increased awareness of the demographic disaster that befell Aboriginal Tasmania. The Aboriginal genocide, Mudrooroo suggests, is just as important as the Shoah, and the sensitivity with which people approach the attempted destruction of European Jewry should be applied to the Aboriginal case. The ease with which the motivations at play here might be read, however, is disrupted when we consider the variety of significatory *nexi* activated by the terminology Mudrooroo adopts to make this connection. An ambiguous transferential relationship is set up in the case of *Dr Wooreddy*, because Mudrooroo uses the perpetrators' rather than the victims' term for the genocide. Having Punch make reference to an imminent Tasmanian Holocaust would have been a more radical political intervention not merely on the grounds of its transferential ramifications but also because of

the well-nigh Brechtian estrangement that would ensue from the embedding of such language in a British colonial context. Having a reluctant participant in a colonial genocide refer to the project as a Holocaust would be akin to an SS guard puncturing the normalising bubble of policy rhetoric in a confrontation with the morbid realities of his death camp duties.

The sanitising effects of the euphemism in question make its deployment in the context of an openly political novel like Mudrooroo's rather puzzling. LaCapra asserts that even though *Holocaust* is not the perfect term to describe the Nazi pogroms it remains a better choice than *Final Solution* because the latter is tainted by bureaucratic austerity and obfuscation. In order to acknowledge that the existence of a group who have been made the object of genocide is not a problem, a repudiation of the veiling language of remedy and cure must be made.

Perhaps Mudrooroo is relying here on an audience finely attuned to postcolonial irony or perhaps he merely wants to point out that the Tasmanian genocide like the Holocaust was facilitated by lies, cover-ups, governmental acquiescence and a needy attachment to the moral absolution offered by the theory of inevitable demise. Even so, the process of working through the historical trauma of the Tasmanian genocide, and this, of course, is not the only function that writing of this kind performs, would have been aided by a reversal of the rhetorical polarities through which the events have been depicted. Using the language of the Holocaust would probably have offended the proponents of the uniqueness position, but it would also have served to refocalise the atrocities through the eyes of the victims of the Tasmanian genocide. The Brechtian estrangement of disrupted historical analogy effected by putting the words of the innocent into the mouths of the guilty, would have more fully politicised the novel. Transposing the experience of the dominant party into the language of the subaltern would surely have produced more satisfactory transferential dynamics than the repetition of the preferred terminology of the criminals, itself cheaply knocked up to conjure a massified murderous act into a ghoulish last-minute victory.

Mudrooroo's approach here is odd in the context of his more overarching representation of Wooreddy as anthropologist and normalised human centre of the novel. Generally it is white actions that are represented as aberrant in the novel, and the construction of George Augustus Robinson as a pompous martinet, in particular, seems to indicate an active attempt on Mudrooroo's part to work through a history whose traces have been left only in the language of the interloper.[35] The imagining of an interiority

for Wooreddy represents a significant attempt at stalemating a transferential relationship that might otherwise have constructed him as a textual surface rather than a possessor of a modern, depth psychology.

Eyes Wide Shut

Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub have described the Holocaust as an "event without witnesses".[36] Thinking in empirical rather than rhetorical terms, of course, witnesses to this disaster do exist and Primo Levi in particular has always maintained that he understood the obligations ceded to him through his experience in the death camps as a kind of testimonial vocation.[37] In the case immediately to hand, the impossibility of bearing witness can actually be seen as an empirical truth as well as a rhetorical one. Two of the most significant developments within the horizon of the Tasmanian genocide, the Cape Grim massacre and the Risdon massacre are only available to us by virtue of their position within documents produced and preserved by European Tasmanians. In the first case these consist of the diaries of George Augustus Robinson and Rosalie Hare, correspondence between a Van Diemen's Land Company superintendent named Goldie and the Governor of the time, George Arthur, and despatches from Edward Curr, the manager of the Van Diemen's Land Company, to the directors in England. In the second case, we have access to the journals of Reverend Robert Knopwood, a report filed by Lieutenant Moore who was temporarily in charge of the settlement, a statement by former Colonial Surgeon, Jacob Mountgarrett, and testimony given before the Committee for the Affairs of the Aborigines in 1830.[38] If witnesses to the Holocaust are locked into an *aporia* because they are forced to describe something that cannot be described, the silence with which the Aboriginal genocide in Tasmania was met must be all the more powerful. Fictional constructions like Mudrooroo's novel can thus be read as playing as significant a part in the preservation of the Aboriginal genocide as official historical texts like Lyndall Ryan's *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*.

The recourse that is made to the tropology of the Holocaust thus marks an attempt to fill out the empty form of a witness-less event with a content that has been deterritorialised from its original position in a parallel historical discourse. The Holocaust and the Tasmanian genocide thus become atemporal, co-terminous events, appearing together at the same time, emerging from the darkness of the past in contiguous coordination.

Anthropology

In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Jürgen Habermas argues that modernisation of a broadly Weberian kind tends to be stamped with a migratory mark, a difference at the margins of concept and world, that lifts it away from the places transformed by its influence:

> The theory of modernization performs two abstractions on Weber's concept of modernity. It dissociates modernity from its modern European origins and stylizes it into a spatio-temporally neutral model for processes of social development in general. Furthermore it breaks the internal connection between modernity and the historical context of Western rationalism, so that processes of modernisation can no longer be conceived as rationalisation, as the historical objectification of rational structures.[39]

The internal connection that is thus severed must, it seems to follow, be replaced by an external one linking modernity with all the minor places where its language is spoken in patois and creole, vernacular and slang. The history of a set of ideas that folded over itself to make an imprint on the social world from the time of the Enlightenment, through the formation of nation-states, industrialisation, urbanisation and onto the vanishing present, is displaced from that social world and the built-in tension between a trajectory of the ideal—Western rationality as grand narrative—and a trajectory of the material—historical context—is allowed to fizzle out.

Furthermore, a boundary line is pegged out to separate the hostile regimes of history and modernity, a boundary line that is designed to conceal the memory that modernity and modernisation were once the subjects of history, and that modernity is perhaps indistinguishable from what we call the history of modernity. The external connections that link a modernity that has become alienated from its European origins, and indeed from its European history, with the *loci* of its regional adaptation sets the scene for the identification of fragments of the modern in an inexhaustible well of empirical data and closes off the possibility of prioritising or privileging the European qualities of modernity. What is missing from this formulation, though, is a sensitivity to the generic conventions of two kinds of writing, one a historical and ethnographic form interested in the embedded placement of modernity, and the other a social scientific form more attuned to the delineation of trends, statistical models and broad

synthetic shapes. Monographs like Fernando Coronil's *The Magic State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela* and Harry Harootunian's *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture and Community in Interwar Japan* fit into the former group, in that they purport to tell the contained stories of a modernity actualised in specific places at specific times, stories whose discursive parameters, rhyme, meter and verse escape, what Saurabh Dube calls, "the limits of sociological formalism (and) the binds of *a priori* abstraction".[40] The potential irony here is that studies of this kind might actually just reiterate, in a different dialect, the provincialising of Europe supposedly achieved by the modernisation theory described by Habermas. The extrapolation of a set of deracinated logics of modernity from their origins in Enlightenment Europe and out onto the territories of the colonial world seems at first glance to complement the endeavours of the community of scholars who have sought, in recent times, to bring the pressing claims of alternative modernities to our attention. It seems thus, because an effacement of difference haunts the epistemological orientation of modernisation theorists, an effacement borne out in Lisa Rofel's original diagnosis of an ensemble of modernities "uniformly discerned".[41] In simple terms, modernities examined through the lens of modernisation theory, whether they be of settler, colonial or post-colonial stamp, lose a portion of their heterogeneity precisely because they are being looked at through the same eyes. Theorists of multiple modernities thus find themselves fighting a fire on two fronts as the dual threat of Euro-centrism and homogeneity encroaches on the conceptual space they seek to open up.

Against this methodological backdrop, the writing of empirical history with its concomitant sensitivity to taste, touch, hearing and sight, presents as a liberating alternative. But how does one challenge the place of Europe as the source and subject of every narrative of modernity when the spectre of value-free social scientific positivism refuses to go away? A happy ending to the story of modernity's secession from imperial epistemology might be found in the plotting of immanent, sensualised instead of sensible, histories if not for the fact that for such histories to be written, the category that subtends their investigation first needs to be thought. In that thinking, says Dipesh Chakrabarty, we inevitably return to a European intellectual tradition whose genealogy ties together con-sanguine concepts including

> citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality and so on.[42]

And from here the news just gets worse. Chakrabarty goes on to tell us that every attempt to write history necessarily invokes a "hyperreal" Europe at its epistemological limits and disciplinary foundations:

> Insofar as the academic discourse of history—that is, "history" as a discourse produced at the institutional site of the university is concerned, "Europe" remains the sovereign theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call "Indian" "Chinese", "Kenyan," and so on. There is a peculiar way in which all these other histories tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called "the history of Europe." In this sense, "Indian" history itself is in a position of subalternity; one can only articulate subaltern subject positions in the name of this history.[43]

Chakrabarty's insistence on this point is informed by his Marxian interpretation of historicist transition narratives. These narratives and the "first in Europe, then elsewhere" structure of global historicist time upon which they stand have been instrumental in the establishment of problematics for the writing of Third World histories. The insight here is profound. If things reveal their categorical essence only when they reach their fullest development and histories of non-European locations repeatedly emphasise the incompletion of various journeys toward developed bourgeois capitalism, fully free liberal democracy and so on, the implication must be that at the hidden core of every place looked at in this way is an unrealised entelechy of Europe. Historicist readings of non-European locations that find a stumbling block in these indigenous characteristics are railroaded into constructing their places of arrest as unrealised, inadequate, lacking and immature. The historians who have been allocated the task of writing these histories find themselves trying to catch up with a remote and receding role-model. As European modernity evolves through time, the *telos* of development edges even further away.[44]

And even if political modernity of a European kind could be achieved in these regions, it would only encourage the retrospective identification of an ersatz Europeanness made visible by a methodological approach that gathers itself around the only subject of history that is theoretically knowable. In *Provincializing Europe*, Chakrabarty catalogues an economy of aspiration circulating through two ontologically distinct networks. In the first network, hope moves out along a temporal plane where Europe becomes the modern ideal for other locations to build towards, while, in the second, empirical reality itself is prodded and poked by frustrated agents of modernisation fervently set on reconciling the actual with the

ideal. Political modernity is finally a phantasmatic dream that only appears to find its realisation in a reified Europe that is, on closer examination, just a "figure of imagination".

Ethnography

In his forward to W. A. Townsley's *Tasmania: Microcosm of the Federation or Vassal State, 1945–1983*, former hydro-electricity commissioner Allan Knight presents a potted history of the organisation he headed up from 1946 to 1977. The subject in his narrative is pushed outwards from the personal vignette that begins the piece to focalise an organisational chronicle that discretely discloses the triumphalism that authors of the competing environmentalist history traditionally associate with the Commission. Knight's subdued prose masks a declaration of *L'état ce'est moi*. Not only is the Hydro Electric Commission the engine room of the state's industries, on Knight's account, it is also the singular driving force giving impetus to Tasmania as a whole. And the defining moment in this history? Nothing other than a variation on the theme of what Chakrabarty refers to as the "greviously incomplete" scenario of a Eurocentric modernist transition narrative.[45] In the sixty-seven years spanning 1916 to 1983, the HEC commissioned and constructed a total of sixteen power stations, but with the Australian High Court decision to stop the construction of the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme, the debt-financed party was brought to a sudden halt. Knight eulogises the abrupt termination of his plan for the future with a cautionary note:

> A problem with hydro-electric schemes, unsupported by thermal or other kinds of power, is the storage of sufficient water to see the system through dry periods. The Great Lake and Gordon/Lake Pedder storages are the backbone of the Tasmanian system. The value of the latter storage would have been greatly enhanced by the construction of the Lower Gordon Scheme. It is not something to be traded for a temporary political advantage, as the people of Tasmania may well find to their cost.[46]

The signified that slides beneath the signifier—cost—connects this statement to the estimated dollar price of constructing the Lower Gordon Scheme, tagged by the HEC at over one billion AUD in October, 1979.[47] More recent readings of the economic fundamentals of the proposal are almost unanimous in their indictment of a monetary commitment that would have

come close to bankrupting the state. But Townsley seems oddly oblivious to the ramifications. Writing in 1994, he displays a remarkable willingness to endorse the linear transition narrative that Knight foreshadows:

> One of the state's greatest assets and for many years its pride, the Hydro-Electric Commission, went into a steady decline as its labour force dwindled in size and its team of engineers, second to none in Australia in its heyday, were now scattered […] Once described as a "State within the State" and indifferent to the need to create by publicity a good image of itself, the HEC was now the victim of the "image breakers" and the ogre of the greenies. Fortunately Tasmanians are a hardy breed. No people know better the meaning of the winds of change. They adapt to and do not break before adversity. Now they realised phlegmatically that for some time to come they were blown off course.[50]

Historicism is a polysemous term that is coded differently across disciplinary locations, but in Chakrabarty's lexicon it denotes a mode of thought which has proven irresistible for Third-World historians intent on describing processes of development immanent to their various archives:

> Historicism is a mode of thinking with the following characteristics. It tells us that in order to understand the nature of anything in this world we must see it as a historically developing entity, that is first as an individual and unique whole—as some kind of unity at least in *potentia*—and second as something that develops over time.[49]

Chakrabarty suggests that this idea of historicism doesn't imply a teleology, that it only requires that its object be internally unified. His contention, however, that historicism is what allowed Marx to say that the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future, confirms the value of late locations for the writing of historicist history. In Chakrabarty's own example of how the experience of political modernity in India undermines the historicist project at the same time as its narration remains inextricably tied up with it, the promise of progress came in the form of a conditional offer of national independence that was deferred on the grounds that its potential recipients were not yet civilised—or British—enough to rule themselves. To this historicist not yet, Chakrabarty juxtaposes the Third-World call for now. In the context of the process of development traced out in John Stuart Mill's "On Representative Government" that makes universal education the

necessary precondition for the granting of universal suffrage, the Indian decision to give the vote to its entire adult population upon gaining independence stands, to Chakrabarty's eyes, as an exemplary gesture of anti-European counter-historicism. Rather than marking a partial modernity, the implication of the peasant(s) in the processes of the political loosens up the European heritage of the term and provides us with the intellectual space to read modernity otherwise. Despite Chakrabarty's claim that historicism does not imply teleology, however, it remains the case that the radicalising potential of Indian entanglements with modernity operates within a horizon marked at one end by a European political form: liberal, capitalist democracy. The creative adaptation of this form to be discerned in subaltern histories of India, doesn't dislodge the benchmark case. The play of difference that Chakrabarty extracts from his archive is activated and contained by the "not yet" uttered by the imperial someone to the colonial nobody.

In the Tasmanian case, the remarks of Townsley and Knight constitute microscopic particles of a classically historicist history. The confused conclusions to their accounts bespeak a crisis in that transition narrative. Until the Australian High Court's decision to halt the construction of the Franklin Dam, Tasmania was being built and was readily readable as an internally unified entity moving on a linear path toward an industrial future, whose echoes of Europe Richard Flanagan has identified in the hope that the island would become Australia's Ruhr Valley.[50] Both the content and the form of this will-to-modernity were Eurocentric. The goal of the project was to transform Tasmania into an industrial simulation of the old world, while the terms through which it had been described rehearsed the historicism that made Europe the epicentre and sovereign subject of all histories of modernity. It is almost as if Townsley's history of Tasmania was already written in advance, and the intrusion of reality arrived as an unwelcome cause to redraft its conclusion. The metaleptic error here is summed up in his prophetic conviction that, with hindsight on their side, the Tasmanian community would finally realise the error of its ways and return the state to the historicist path marked out for it in his book.

Cultural Studies

The appearance of alternative modernities in the Western academy since the mid-1990s draws its urgency from the intellectual politics of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. The kind of site-based readings of modernity

included in anthologies like Dilip Gaonkar's *Alternative Modernities*, Tani E. Barlow's *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* and Dube's *Enduring Enchantments* are expressly interested in the way readings of non-Western encounters with modernity respond to the claims of a postcolonial politics of recognition.[51] In his introduction to *Alternative Modernities*, Gaonkar offers one version of the narrative of Western modernity. While he admits to the partiality of this narrativisation, he fails to address the epistemological problem that complicates the relations between the narrative and its subject. Is Western modernity a singular entity that can be written about in a variety of ways, or is it constituted in the telling of these modern meta-stories? When modernity is understood as something that "has travelled from the West to the rest of the world not only in terms of cultural forms, social practices and institutional arrangements, but also as a form of discourse that interrogates the present", a tacit assumption is made that some other ensemble of culture, society and self-understanding is waiting to receive the influence.[52] Colonial modernities properly attain their conceptual clarity through a simple binary that opposes the modernising imperialist with the non-modern indigene. But how do we go about addressing the struggles with modernity undertaken in a place like Tasmania where the hegemonic culture is a dislocated European one, and the voices of the indigenous inhabitants who were subject to a more typical imposition of colonial modernity are still deeply marginalised? It would be wrong in this context, to focus our analysis on the latter group, for while they form an important part of multicultural Tasmania, the history of decimation and displacement that followed European arrival translates, through the mechanisms of the modern covenant of one-vote one-value, into a permanently subaltern position within the collective subject of the Tasmanian *polis*.

In any case, the significance of the history of genocide to the formation and maintenance of the Tasmanian archive is remarked upon elsewhere in this book. The experience of modernity in a place like Tasmania which is putatively part of the West even as it is constantly assailed with the news that important things only happen at the opposite, properly Northern side of the globe, suggests that the pluralisation of Western narratives of modernity identified by Gaonkar should have alerted him to the pluralisation of processes of Western modernity.

Standard, mercantilist modernisation involves the competitive, jostling for new exports to stimulate employment in the home territory and thus offer opportunities for the renegotiation of an actor's place of wealth and

prestige in the global economy. In Tasmania, this complex of concern and desire often takes a centrally planned, state-development form and an intense interest is maintained in the statistical profile of the local community in the context of changes affecting the rest of Australia. When jobs growth exceeds the national average the champagne corks start popping.[53] We are catching up, this joy pronounces, the horizon of the present is attainable yet.

The intellectual tradition that informs our thinking about modernity only makes room for Tasmania in its implication that the cognitive and social transformations that we normally identify as modern have had an impact there. This is a weak inclusion that fails to take account of the various ways in which Tasmania is constructed as backward, non-modern, anti-modern and magical, even as it contains no constitutive outside to the processes of modernity formed by the presence of a residual indigenous tradition. Tasmania finds itself in the odd situation of trying to find a toehold to exert its own custom-built modernising plans in the face of a cultural storm blowing ceaselessly from elsewhere. On the one hand, modernity offers itself as an emulation of those elsewheres, Australian, American and so on, while on the other hand, a nativist alternative modernity is gathered together around the conviction that Tasmania is different.[54]

Tasmania is always internally modernising. As a collectivity it enacts, in different ways and at different cultural locations, the Foucauldian axiom that "to be modern is not to accept oneself as one in the flux of the passing moments; but to take oneself as the object of a complex and difficult elaboration".[55] From the perspective of self-determination and autonomy, the question is whether this elaboration is based on immanent designs or whether it steadfastly continues to quote from the traditional *entrepôts*. Surely the answer to the question is as irritating as it is obvious. Flows of culture still cascade out and from the centres of the North Atlantic social bores—witness the texts of which this book must take account for it to be timely and up-to-date—and while an anomaly like Blundstone Boots—a Tasmanian product designed and marketed in Hobart—might experience a brief period of vogue in the eyes of the transnational fashion industry, the struggle to encounter the modern through a dialectical engagement with the past as resource for the construction of the new largely takes place in the imperial elsewheres of Hollywood, London, New York and Paris. To cut a long story short, I contend that the urgency with which Gaonkar endorses non-Western site-based analyses of the discrepant careers of

modernity also applies in the case of sub-national settler-locations like Tasmania.

Just as non-Western locations like India provide an outside that is also interior to an expanded narrative of modernity, Tasmania's engagement with modernity took, and continues to take, empirical twists and turns that demand a recasting of the conceptual make-up of modernity. Indeed, a reading of Tasmanian modernity can do an analogous work to the labour of up-ending and inversion performed by Chakrabarty in his critique of historicism. Writing about alternative modernities is not just about making a claim to an invitation to the party, it is also, more crucially, a matter of changing the nature of the very idea of the modern:

> What a site-based reading decisively discredits is the inexorable logic that is assigned to each of the two strands of modernity. The proposition that societal modernity, once activated, moves inexorably toward establishing a certain type of mental outlook and a certain type of institutional order irrespective of the culture and politics of a given place is simply not true.[56]

Scientistic

In recent writings, Richard Jenkins, Jane Bennett and Saurabh Dube make the provocative suggestion that the disenchantment of the world that Max Weber positioned at the centre of his vision of the historical development of modernity has only ever been a partially complete process.[57] In his introduction to the anthology *Enduring Enchantments*, Dube argues that the "idea of modernity rests on a rupture".[58] "The advent of the epoch", he goes on to write, "insinuates the disenchantment of the world: the progressive control of nature through scientific procedures of technology, and the inexorable demystification of enchantments through powerful techniques of reason".[59] This historical unfolding, however, is not without its contrapuntal double, a reinsertion of the superstitious, the messianic and the mystical into the daily life-worlds of modern subjects and the institutions through which they operate as social actors:

> Yet processes of modernity also create their own enchantments. Enchantments that extend from the immaculately imagined origins and ends of modernity, to the dense magic of money and markets, to novel mythologies of nation and empire, to hierarchical oppositions between myth and history, ritual and rationality, East and West, and tradition and modernity.[60]

For his part, Jenkins points us in the direction of a set of ostensibly anti-modern practices, faiths, creeds and imaginations that still exert a sway over the habitual orientations of modern peoples. Jenkins refutes Weber's description of a world-historical trajectory through which

> the natural world and all areas of human experience become experienced and understood as less mysterious, defined at least in principle, as knowable, predictable and manipulable by humans; conquered by and incorporated into the interpretive schemas of science and rational government.[61]

To undergird his critique, Jenkins conducts a survey of millennial cults, astrology, new ageism, postmodern science, Disneyland, ethnicity, television and computer games; phenomena that, to his mind at least, demonstrate that non-empirically grounded knowledges and Dionysian exuberance still rebuff the arrival of Weber's infamous iron cage. Jane Bennett's *The Enchantment of Modern Life*, continues this counter-offensive with an excursus on embodiment philosophy and science studies. Recruiting Bruno Latour to her cause, Bennet uses a supple intelligence to martial the sense of wonder in modernity that was supposed to have been routed by disenchantment. As she notes:

> I […] think there is enough evidence of everyday enchantment to warrant the telling of an alter-tale. Such sites of enchantment today include, for example, the discovery of sophisticated modes of communication among nonhumans, the strange agency of physical systems at far-from-equilibrium states, and the animation of objects by video technologies—an animation whose effects are not fully captured by the idea of "commodity fetishism".[62]

Jenkins' conclusion that re-enchantment is a necessary corollary of the original disenchantment of the world effected by rationalisation is all well and good, but because it is proposed in the absence of an adequate account of the different kinds of rationalisation that Weber first diagnosed in *Economy and Society*, it needs to be supplemented by a closer examination of how the latter envisaged the unfolding of reason in the modern world.

Following Chakrabarty's lead, a site-based analysis of the clash of disenchantment and re-enchantment in a non-European modernity makes possible the decentring of Euro-centric conceptions of the modern precisely because it demonstrates that the putatively modern and the putatively non-modern can act together within a frame that is itself inescapably modern.

Just as Chakrabarty used the Indian refusal of the not-yet of imperial historicism to deconstruct the concept of the political, the Tasmanian repudiation of an updated historicism based around the tenets of neoliberal economic rationalism makes possible a renegotiation of Weberian rationalisation and a specific, located examination of the enduring enchantments of Tasmanian modernity.

Why Are You Doing This?

In his account of the rationalisation of the West, outlined in the revised version of *Economy and Society* published in 1920, Weber posited a cultural nosology that distinguished between purposive, instrumental or formal rationality and substantive, material or value rationality. Wolfgang Mommsen provides a useful *précis* of the differences between these two forms of reason:

> By 'formal' rationality is meant the strategy of adapting one's own conduct of life to the pre-determined purposes of the kind that the capitalist system has imposed on modern man. Under 'material rationality' on the other hand, he [Weber] meant the rationalisation of the conduct of the individual in respect to ultimate value positions, which could under certain conditions lead to far-reaching changes of society.[63]

The protestant ethic embodied in Calvinist responses to the doctrine of pre-destination is the pre-eminent example of the latter form. According to Weber, frugality and industry, embodied in capitalistic expansion became the accepted means toward the achievement of the soteriological goal. Repudiating the Catholic ideal of the monastic recluse, early Protestants sought to prove their spirituality through the worldly callings of work and effortful *caritas*. The important point to be made here is that the *telos* that gives meaning to the quotidian practices of labour and love is itself ultimately opaque to human reason, or as Anthony Giddens puts it: "the rationalisation of economic life characteristic of modern capitalism connects with irrational value-commitments."[64]

Agnes Heller takes a different tack to Giddens and Mommsen in her own commentary on Weber's work in *A Theory of Modernity*, drawing out the fragments produced by the splitting of the social whole into competing value-spheres and making the suggestion that these spheres become configured in a hierarchy of prominence in line with their capacity to

accommodate instrumental rationalisation. For Heller, Weber's theory of modernity explains a world where economics and science exert a stranglehold on the production of ends to which individuals can aspire. The tragedy of modernity is that unless one has taken these forms of mental life as a vocation, the dominance of science and economics will produce a meaningless world evacuated of permanent deistic Truth and filled only with an endless supply of true knowledge that is temporary and fallible.

In recent times, the doctrine of economic rationalism has been identified by critics on the left of politics as an attempt by champions of the economic value sphere to take over the value sphere of the political.[65] This diagnosis delineates a struggle at the level of knowledge formation, a battle for the right to construct the objects of social scientific inquiry. In a succinct account of these moves, Milan Zafirovski charts the attempt by economic thinkers of the rational choice school to absorb the category of the social into their own epistemological formulation. Zafirovski's essay traces the history of an academic turf war, but the place of rational choice theory in the consolidation of free-market thinking in the national bureaucracies of Canada, the USA, the UK, New Zealand and Australia among other places, testifies to the more generalised significance of his argument:

> The recent expansion of the rational choice model to sociology and other social sciences has often been an expression of the imperialistic ambitions of economists. This is indicated by attempts at making economics an 'imperial science', or a 'universal grammar of social science', in the form of economic approach to all human behaviour engaging in the 'colonisation' of social science.[66]

Zafirovski frames his catalogue of the insurgency of rational choice economics with the contention that modern sociology developed specifically out of frustration with the anti-institutional and anti-social perspectives implicit in utilitarianism. At the heart of this dissatisfaction was the theoretical modelling of human behaviour and motivation. For the rational choice theorists, he argues, this poses no problem:

> In a nutshell, the rational choice model is premised on the idea of social agents as rational utility optimisers, for it 'takes as its central core the idea that persons act rationally to satisfy preferences or to maximise utility'.[67]

From this basic building block, the delineation of social contours becomes a simple matter of addition. Society becomes the sum totality of individual economic actors mobilising to maximise utility. Left alone as a theoretical

model, rational choice theory would probably have done little harm, but the replacement of Keynesianism with neo-liberalism as the economic instrument of choice for politicians and élite public servants in the English speaking world since the mid-1970s, has unleashed the rational choice model into the world of policy and social engineering. The twin ontologies of the individual and the social proposed by rational choice theory have thus translated into specific transformations in the value-rational ends pursued by state entities. In Australia, Michael Pusey describes this shift in the title of his book, *Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes its Mind*. Possessed of a notion of the social as the sum totality of what R. Frank calls "recklessly selfish monad[s]", the élite public servants that Pusey interviewed broadly believed that the role of the state should be to dismantle itself so that market mechanisms could function untrammelled.[68] Turning their back on the project of building a nation, a process that J. R. Llobera nominates as one of the re-enchantments of modernity, the neophytes of economic rationalism sought to elide the distinctions between economy and society so that the former could subsume the latter into itself.[69] As Duncan Cameron shows in the analogous case of Canada, this translates into a generalised imperative for public service agencies to pursue economic growth at all costs:

> In effect, the [Macdonald] Commission [an entity formed by the Canadian government in 1985 to investigate potential privatisation options], identified economic growth as the national goal and attributed slow growth to diminished productivity. It saw a more competitive economy as promoting productivity, and posited that free trade combined with deregulation would force the Canadian economy to make structural adjustments that would enhance productivity and lead to higher growth.[70]

The paradigm shift in value-rationality ends that this model of political economy ushered in can be brought into relief through a comparison with the Keynesian goal of full employment. Keynes' radical re-politicisation of economics after the Great Depression of the 1930s constituted a re-enchantment of the state simply because it challenged the pre-eminence of the value sphere of economics as capable of determining the ends of the social more generally. Keynes' successful replacement of market-clearing classical economic orthodoxy with government intervention administered by a mandarin class that William Coleman calls the "wise élite", rejoined the economic and the political in the service of a good which was, in essence, social.[71]

God

The story of the disenchantment and re-enchantment of economics, however, is not an even one. For one thing, the concept of the invisible hand so central to classical economics of a Smithian kind, has been taken as the extension into the commercial realm of a beneficent world order guaranteed by the presence of a Christian god:

> Smith and [...] other theists like Condillac and Turgot ultimately sustained their belief in the ideal workings of the system on the supposition that the world had been designed by the 'designer' in a beneficent fashion. Following Hutcheson and Mandeville, they believed that the human order ultimately rested on certain passions which had been contrived by God and planted in human nature to support that order. But the Enlightenment had effected the rapid decay of the prestige of religious justifications, however remote, of human affairs. When providence could not even distantly be used to analyse economic affairs, what alternative arguments might establish the beneficence of the free market system?[72]

In this context, Keynes' lack of faith in the beneficence of the economic system looks like a gesture of disenchantment. The positing of the wise élite who could marshal the forces of the economy for the public good, however, opens out into a contiguous field of enchantment marked primarily by the Hegelian notion of World Spirit actualising itself in the state. As William Connolly has argued:

> When previous understandings of God's hand in the world wilted, early modern thinkers tried to enliven them by transplanting God into reason, or nature, or Spirit or the subject […] Hegel rationalises faith but his Spirit must be known to be believed by moderns and there is no way to demonstrate its truth.[73]

The Hegelian model of the state can be read as an attempt to enact a partial re-enchantment of the world in the context of the dialectic of transcendence and immanence that has always attended the troping of enchantment.[74] In his essay, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", Jacques Derrida suggests that the nodal point that grounds a structure must always escape the structurality of that structure. If we apply this theoretical insight to the model of theistic enchantment, God's underpinning of a totalising moral framework, cosmogony and guide to pragmatic action must necessarily emanate from a position

outside the world. Quentin Skinner, however, has argued in relation to Charles Taylor's work on disenchantment that:

> [w]e have come to believe that we ourselves are the sources and creators of the values by which we live. This vision of the modern world as disenchanted, lacking any sense of God as an immanent force or morality as objectively grounded […] owes a significant debt to Max Weber.[75]

In the disenchanted world of modernity, God is no longer immanent, and morality is no longer objectively grounded. In the Keynesian economic universe, the totality of individual actions must be supplemented with the functioning of a state which is at once constituted by the people and elevated above the people.[76] In the Hegelian model of the state, civil society must be supplemented with a view from above that manages to reconcile the interests of the whole with the interests of the individual:

> The […] substantiality of the state consists in the fact that its end is the universal interest as such and the conservation therein of particular interests since the universal interest is the substance of these […] but this very substantiality of the state is Spirit knowing and willing itself […] The state, therefore, knows what it wills and knows it in its universality […] Hence it works and acts by reference to consciously adopted ends, known principles and laws which are not merely implicit but are actually present to consciousness; and further it acts with precise knowledge of existing conditions and circumstances.[77]

Albatross

The global trend toward neo-liberal privatisation arrived in Tasmania with a bang in the lead up to the 1998 state election when the sitting Liberal government proposed a sale of the Hydro-Electric Commission that it had previously broken up into generating, distribution and retail arms.[78] Operating firmly within the horizon that holds that the market is the best available mechanism for resource allocation, the Rundle government made clear in its *Directions Statement* that the symbolic and mythological value Tasmanians have attached to the Hydro had to be sacrificed in the name of economic common-sense:

> Energy policy has been a critical part of the development of Tasmania. It was our forefathers who saw the potential for combining two of Tasmania's

> greatest assets—its high rainfall and it steep terrain—with Tasmanian ingenuity and engineering expertise to develop hydro power, but the development of our hydro power is now at an end and it is necessary to re-examine our energy policy.[79]

The will-to-privatisation on display here was justified through a purely economic rationality developed in accordance with the basic axioms that Bob Walker and Betty Con-Walker outline in *Privatisation: Sell Off or Sell Out*:

> Debt is bad
> Debt imposes costs on future generations
> Governments should reduce debt
> The Public sector is too big
> The Public sector is inefficient
> The Private sector is more efficient than the public sector
> Privatisation will lead to increases in efficiency.[80]

The Rundle government translated these *doxa* into a program for action when it proposed an elimination of state debt within eighteen months of the election through the sale of the Aurora (retail) and Transend (distribution) businesses and the ninety-nine-year lease of the HEC's generating assets. The offer being made to the Tasmanian electorate was utilitarian. It suggested that the extra funds freed up by the diminished state debt could be channelled into better health care and education. In other words, Rundle's position endorsed the model of the subject advanced by rational choice theory. The argument held that the individual voter would make substantive gains as a result of selling the Hydro because he or she would be the recipient of better-funded State-Government services. Rundle's wager rested on the assumption that the Tasmanian population would not resent the complementary diminution in intangible values deriving from the role of the Hydro in the development of Tasmania and the collectivity-generating capacities of shared ownership. This miscalculation was to prove fatal for his government. Offering a more integrated vision of economic commonsense and state ideology, the Bacon opposition was swept to power in an election day landslide.

The Bacon policy machine knew that recession-struck Tasmanians were in dire need of some government magic. Where Rundle wrongly assumed that privately motivated, atomised Tasmanians would prefer quantifiable, tangible increases in education and health spending, Bacon realised that the Hydro was more than just a potential source of income for the state.

He and his advisers tapped into the mytho-poetic aura that continues to give the Hydro schemes a preternatural glow both in and outside of the Tasmanian archive. Saving the Hydro became the objective of a campaign that mustered some of the same urgency and commitment that had led to the defeat of the HEC on the Gordon River fifteen years before. This campaign stood as a cleverly manipulated mobilisation of the past to safeguard the future and it is hardly ironic that proponents of the Hydro's sale should have criticised their opponents for taking an anachronistic stance. As Coronil states in the case of Venezuela:

> Typically the Venezuelan state astonishes through the marvels of power rather than convinces through the power of reason, as reason itself is made part of the awe-inspiring spectacle of its rule. By manufacturing dazzling development projects that engender collective fantasies of progress, it casts its spell over audience and performers alike. As a "magnanimous sorcerer," the state seizes its subjects by inducing a condition of being receptive to its illusions—a magical state.[81]

Even putting to one side the legislative arrangements that allowed the Hydro to conjure money for the construction of its power stations without Parliamentary approval, the Promethean urge to infrastructural gigantism and the industrial sublime still testified to by the popularity of the Gordon Dam as a tourist site, serve witness to the traditionally performative power of the state in Tasmania. The investment of collective pride in the achievements of the Hydro goes back to the very first project completed under its auspices. When work began on the Great Lake/Waddamana power station on December 17, 1910, Ida McCaulay, the wife of the pioneering professor of mathematics who had completed the statistical surveys for the project, stated:

> It is a great occasion. I feel that deeply, this turning of the sod which will bring the waters of the Shannon to do their great work in the Power House. It means the advancement of Tasmania, and the making of her [into] what she has never been, never would have been, but for this great power scheme.[82]

Love

Fighting to win a different kind of power in 1998, the Bacon opposition showed a shrewd feel for the needs and wants of their prospective constituency when they outlined their plan to keep the Hydro in public

hands. The setting for the speech in which Bacon declaimed his party's position couldn't have been better chosen. Braving dismal conditions at the Queenstown Motor Lodge in the energy heartland of the West Coast, Bacon delivered an address that spoke to the deep-seated attachment that Tasmanians have with the Hydro infrastructure. The Hydro is "a human asset", Bacon argued, "it is a source of pride", "the provider of generational employment" and "our best asset". In a shrewd calculation he alluded to the intimate connection between the HEC and the emergence of a multicultural Tasmania after World War II, juxtaposing this cosmopolitan celebration with the gentle xenophobic warning that privatisation would see control ceded to a financial institution in "Paris, Tokyo or Dallas". Those in attendance that day could have been in little doubt as to the register of Bacon's appeal to the Tasmanian electorate: "That is why", he stated in conclusion, "we know in our hearts that it is wrong to sell the Hydro".[83]

The historicist dimension of the plan to divest the state of its electricity generating assets transforms the not yet uttered to Indian proto-nationalists by their colonial masters into a get a move on driven by agents of exactly the kind of local centres that Chakrabarty describes in *Provincializing Europe*. In the Tasmanian case, the external lobbying for the sale of the Hydro came from Federal Government quarters, the national broadsheet press and the local media. The 21 August 1998 editorial of *The Mercury*, for instance, described an offer by the Federal government to write-off state debt to the tune of one hundred and fifty million dollars if privatisation proceeded apace. A subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, it came as no surprise that *The Mercury* supported the plan:

> Mr Howard [the Prime Minister] has made clear that this offer fits in with the spirit of the Nixon Report. It does, and in doing, gives Tasmania a chance to profit even more from the sale of the Hydro, a measure which only those with eyes fixed firmly on the past can continue to deny.[84]

Noted free-market commentator Alan Wood added his voice to the chorus calling for Tasmanians to agree to a sale of their electricity-generating assets when he wrote in *The Australian*:

> If the Tasmanians won't face up to [selling the Hydro-Electric Commission], their future is as a declining offshore craft and produce market, kept afloat by handouts from mainland taxpayers who may, one day, revolt.[85]

Wood has been one of the most high-profile Australian defenders of neo-classical, efficient market theory and a conspicuous enthusiast for the economic reforms and free trade Arcadia to which they are directed. He is, in this capacity, a fighter for the forces of a generic modernity, a campaigner for the remaking and renewal of Australia's *socius* along lines which have worked elsewhere, come from elsewhere and should, if properly implemented, refashion Australia in the image of those elsewheres. This desire is now shaping the negotiations around ocean- and continent-crossing trade deals, TPP and TTIP. For the imperial historicist time that pushes this set of logics along, places and peoples that resist the transference can only be backward provinces, sites of a vain resistance to an unstoppable force that will always have its way in the final wash-up. Wood's frustration at Tasmania's unwillingness to rid itself of the *millstone* of public electricity assets is the frustration of a man who sees the world in the kind of historicist terms that Chakrabarty so skillfully pulls apart. The time-space compression that scrunches together different centuries and lays them on top of one another in a sedimentary bed of concurrence has been replaced with a much shorter time frame in the Tasmanian case. In the form of a keenness to retain control of its electricity utilities, a public-policy position made hegemonic in the West through the 1950s, 1960s and early-1970s has been allowed to bleed into the third millennium.

Chakrabarty's reading of the conjunction of the refusal of historicism in India and its implications for thinking the category of the political folds back over itself to problematise the European tradition of the concept of the political, more specifically, as I have already noted, in terms of the conviction that universal education must necessarily precede universal suffrage. In the Tasmanian case, it is Weberian rationalisation that is loosened up by a site-based analysis of a historicist refusal to transform the particular—Tasmania—into the mirror image of the general—the neo-liberal orthodoxy.

It would be rash to make the claim that Tasmania is somehow insulated from the purposive rationalities of science and economics, or indeed to claim that the value spheres of art and religion are somehow more entrenched here than in other minor places. Even so, a refusal of privatisation and the positing of an alternative value rationality based around a more mystical, magical, well-nigh deified notion of the state stand as empirical claims to a reading of the enduring enchantments of Tasmanian modernity.[86]

If the Bacon government's intention in keeping the Hydro was to re-enchant the state through recourse to public emotion and collectivity-forming mythological narratives, the question remained as to how it was to get around William Connolly's diagnosis of the implausibility of the Hegelian notion of the state in a modern world disenchanted by empiricism. Somehow, for Bacon, this proved no problem. Refusing the colonisation of the political value sphere by the economic, the state government reprised Keynesian transcendentalism by purchasing three ferries to open up the tourist markets between Tasmania and the Australian mainland. The enchanting effects of this charismatic promotion of an unfashionable value rationality—government intervention in the free market—was compounded by the nomenclature chosen for the new vessels. Not content with making a claim for the presence of the spirit of the state in a mandarin class of public élites, the ships themselves were christened "The Spirits of Tasmania I, II and III". If seeing is believing in the positivist world order, the twenty-thousand Tasmanians who ventured out to get a glimpse of the new boats on their arrival in Hobart in September, 2002, could hardly be blamed for thinking they were living in an enchanted state.

Notes

1. See Hans Mommsen, *Der NationalSozialismus und die Deutsche Gesellschaft* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991); Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust* (Watts: Danbury, 1982); Saul Friedlander, *Memory, History and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).
2. Wulf Kansteiner, "The Rise and Fall of Metaphor: German Historians and the Uniqueness of the Holocaust," in *Is the Holocaust Unique?: Perspectives on Comparative Genocide*, ed. Alan Rosenbaum (Boulder: Westview, 2001), 238.
3. For additional examples of the deployment of the term "Final Solution" in writing about the Tasmanian genocide see Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians.* N. J. B. Plomley, ed., *Jorgen Jorgensen and the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land* (Hobart: Blubberhead Press, 1991); Moses, "An Antipodean Genocide: The Origins of the Genocidal Moment in the Colonization of Australia"; Brantlinger, "'Dying Races': Rationalizing Genocide in the Nineteenth Century"; Diamond, "In Black and White". Jan Morris, "The Final Solution Down Under," in *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, ed. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, 205–22.
4. N.J.B Plomley, *Jorgen Jorgenson and the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land: being a reconstruction of his 'lost' book on their customs and habits, and on his*

role in the Roving Parties and the Black Line (Hobart: Blubber Head Press, 1991), 17.

5. Moses, "An antipodean genocide? The origins of the genocidal moment in the colonization of Australia," 91.
6. Brantlinger, "'Dying races': rationalizing genocide in the nineteenth century," 49.
7. Ryan, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians*, 2.
8. Palmer, *Colonial Genocide*, 26.
9. Steven Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context Vol 1: Mass Death Before the Modern Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 33; Deborah Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 20, 74.
10. See Ward Churchill, *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas 1492 to the Present* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997); David E. Stannard, "Uniqueness as Denial: The Politics of Genocide Scholarship," in *Is the Holocaust Unique?*, ed. Alan Rosenbaum, 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 245–90; Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1999); Norman Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering* (London: Verso, 2000).
11. Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).
12. Evans and Thorpe, "Indigenocide and the Massacre of Aboriginal History," 33. For additional salient work on genocide in Australia see Barta, "Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia"; "After the Holocaust: Consciousness of Genocide in Australia"; Tatz, *Genocide in Australia*; Palmer, *Colonial Genocide;* "Colonial and Modern Genocide: Explanations and Categories"; Tom Nairn, "Democracy and Genocide," *Arena* 16 (2000–2001): 75–84; Ian Hernon, *The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the 19th Century* (Glouchester: Sutton 2000); Smith, *The Spectre of Truganini: 1980 Boyer Lectures*; Lindqvist, *Exterminate all the Brutes*; Mark Cocker, *Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Conflict with Native People* (London: Jonathon Cape, 1998); Desailly, *The Mechanics of Genocide: Colonial Policies and Attitudes Towards the Tasmanian Aborigines, 1824–1836*; Mazian, *Why Genocide?* in *Frontier Conflict*, ed. Attwood and Foster; Elder, *Blood on the Wattle*; Paul R. Bartrop, "The Holocaust, the Aborigines, and the Bureaucracy of Destruction: An Australian Dimension of Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 3.1 (2001): 75–87; Docker and Curthoys, ed. *Aboriginal History* 25 (2001); Windschuttle, *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History*, Manne, ed., *Whitewash*; Madley, "Patterns of Frontier Genocide 1803–1910: The Aboriginal Tasmanians, the Yuki of California and the Herero of Namibia"; Sousa, "They Will Be Hunted Down like Wild Beasts and Destroyed".

13. Thorpe and Evans, "Massacre of Aboriginal History", 21.
14. See Keith Windschuttle, "The Myths of Frontier Massacres in Australian History: Part 1: The Invention of Massacre Stories," *Quadrant* 44.10 (2000): 8–21; "The Myths of Frontier Massacres in Australian History: Part 2: The Fabrication of the Aboriginal Death Toll," *Quadrant* 44.11 (2000): 17–24; "The Myths of Frontier Massacres in Australian History: Part 3: Massacre Stories and the Policy of Separatism," *Quadrant* 44.12 (2000): 6–20.
15. Thorpe and Evans, "The Massacre of Aboriginal History," 24.
16. Ibid., 29.
17. Reynolds, *An Indelible Stain*, 13.
18. Thorpe and Evans, "The Massacre of Aboriginal History," 37.
19. See Jacques Derrida, "The Dangerous Supplement," in *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976).
20. Thorpe and Evans, "The Massacre of Aboriginal History," 49.
21. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 7
22. Hughes, *The Fatal Shore*. N. G. Butlin, *Economics and the Dreamtime: A Hypothetical History*. (Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1993). Robson, *A History of Tasmania*, vol. 1.
23. Quoted in Reynolds, *An Indelible Stain*, 29.
24. See Bonwick, *The Last of the Tasmanians*; Turnbull, *Black War;* Haydon (dir.) *The Last Tasmanian*. For further nineteenth-century examples of the extinction thesis see Calder, *Some Accounts of Wars, Extirpation, Habits of the Native Tribes of Tasmania*; Henry Ling-Roth, *The Aborigines of Tasmania* (Halifax West: F. King and Sons, 1899); James Bischoff, *Sketch of the History of Van Diemen's Land, illustrated by a map of the island, and an account of the Van Diemen's Land Company* (London: John Richardson, 1832); James Backhouse-Walker, *Papers on Tasmania* (Hobart: William Grahame, Government Printer, 1884–1896); George Washington Walker, *Notes on the Aborigines of Tasmania* (Hobart: William Grahame, Govt. Printer, 1898); James Barnard, *Aborigines of Tasmania* (Melbourne: Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, 1890); William Flower, *The Aborigines of Tasmania: An Extinct Race: a lecture delivered in the Hulme Town Hall, Manchester, Nov. 30, 1878* (Manchester: John Heywood, 1879); Hugh Hull, *Lecture on the Aborigines of Tasmania: read at the Mechanics' Institute, Hobart Town, 28th Oct. 1869* (Hobart Town: Mercury, 1870); R. H. Davies, "On the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land," *Tasmanian Journal of Natural Science, Agriculture, Statistics, etc*, 11 (1846), 409–20; Robert Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria: with Notes Relating to the Habits of the Natives of other Parts of Australia and Tasmania* (Melbourne: John Currey O'Neil, 1972). For twentieth century versions see Archibald Meston, *The Problem of the Tasmanian Aborigine* (Hobart: Government Printer, 1937); Hugh Bohun,

Black Tragedy (Sydney: Midget Masterpiece, 1933); Frederic Jones, *Tasmania's Vanished Race: National Talks Delivered from 3AR Melbourne, on Feb 26th, 1935, March 6th, 1935 and March 12th, 1935* (Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1935); William Brydon, *The Story of the Tasmanian Aboriginals* (Hobart: Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery, 1960); William Turner, *The Aborigines of Tasmania* (Edinburgh: Robert Grant, 1908–1914); Robert Travers, *The Tasmanians: The Story of a Doomed Race* (Melbourne: Cassel, 1968).

25. See "Aboriginality in Tasmania," Jim Everett, accessed September 23, 2003, http://www.utas.edu.au?docs/siglo/mag/s12/everett.html.
26. United Nations, *Treaty Series*, 78, 280.
27. Robinson, *Friendly Mission,* 435.
28. Mudrooroo, *Doctor Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World*, 123, emphasis added.
29. Stuart Stein, "Geno-and other cides: A Cautionary Note on Knowledge Accumulation," *Journal of Genocide Research*, 4.1 (2002), 46.
30. I would like to thank Philip Mead for revealing this hermeneutic approach to Mudrooroo's text.
31. Klaus Neumann, "Haunted Lands," *UTS Review* 6.1 (May 2000): 66.
32. Dominick LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Memory, Trauma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 43. One of the strategies for throwing off the burden of this "black armband" history was to reduce the influence of the Holocaust on constructions of contemporary German identity by arguing for a relation of kinship between the death camps of the Third Reich and the gulags of the Stalinist Soviet Union.
33. Ibid., 46.
34. Although there are numerous articles that deal with Mudrooroo's political activism, readers are referred, in the first instance, to Eva Rask Knudsen, "Mission Completed?: On Mudrooroo's Contribution to the Politics of Aboriginal Literature in Australia," in *Missions of Interdependence: A Literary Directory*, ed. Gerhard Slitz (Rodopi: Amsterdam, 2002), 321–32; Gerhard Fischer, "Mis-taken Identity: Mudrooroo and Gordon Matthews," in *Race, Colour and Identity in Australia and New Zealand*, ed. John Docker and Gerhard Fischer (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2000), 95–112.
35. Jodie Brown, "Unlearning Dominant Modes of Representation: Mudrooroo's *Doctor Wooreddy's Prescription for Enduring the Ending of the World* and Robert Drewe's *Savage Crows*," *Westerly*, 38 (Spring 1993), 71–8; Annalisa Oboe takes a similar position in "Doctor Wooreddy's War Against Time," in *Mongrel Signatures: Reflections on the work of Mudrooroo*, ed. Annalisa Oboe (Rodopi: Amsterdam, 2003), 83–10; Cynthia Van Den Driesen and Satendra Nandan, ed., *Austral-Asian Encounters: From*

Literature and Women's Studies to Politics and Tourism (Prestige Books: New Delhi, 2003), 204–16.

36. Quoted in Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz,* 35.
37. Ibid., 16.
38. For the Cape Grim Massacre see Inward Despatch No.1, Curr to Directors, 2nd January 1828, AOT, VDL 5/1: BR LHC VDLC, Microform Reel 33/1, 281; Inward Despatch No. 2, Curr to Directors, 14th January 1828, AOT, VDL 5/1: BR LHC VDLC, Microfilm Reel 33/1, 283; Inward Despatch No. 150. Curr to Directors, 7th October 1830, AOT, VDL, 5/1, 104–5; Letter from Curr to Colonial Secretary, 18th may 1831, AOT, VDL, 23/4, 306; Letter from Goldie to Arthur, 18th November 1830, AOT CSO 280/25, 488–9; Letter from Goldie to Arthur, 18th November 1829, AOT CSO 1/33/7578, 116–7; For the Risdon Massacre see M. Nicholls, ed., *The Diary of Reverend Robert Knopwood 1803–1838* (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1977) 51; Letter from Moore to Collins, 7 May 1804. *Historical Records of Australia*, Series III, vol. 1, pp. 242–3; Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee for the Affairs of the Aborigines, Mr Kelly, 10 March 1830, *British Parliamentary Papers*, Colonies, Australia, 4, 223; Minutes of Evidence, Edward White, 16 March 1830, *British Parliamentary Papers*, Colonies, Australia, 4, 225.
39. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 2.
40. Saurabh Dube, "Introduction: Colonialism, Modernity, Colonial Modernities," *Nepantla: Views From South* 3.2 (2002): 197
41. Lisa Rofel, "Discrepant Modernities and their Discontents," 637.
42. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 4.
43. Ibid., 27.
44. Jocelyn Alexander and Jo Ann McGregor, "Modernity and Ethnicity in a Frontier Society: Understanding Difference in Northwestern Zimbabwe," *Journal of South African Studies* 23.2 (1997): 187–201. This account of relations between the displaced but modernising Ndebele people and the "primitive" traditional inhabitants of the Shangani reserve is structured around a troping of progress even as it attempts to maintain a detached but culturally sensitive anthropological gaze.
45. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 31.
46. Alan Knight, "Forward," in W. A. Townsley, *Tasmania: Microcosm of the Federation or Vassal State 1945–1983* (Hobart: St David's Park Publishing, 1994), vi.
47. Robson, *A History of Tasmania*, vol. 2, 564.
48. Townsley, *Tasmania: Microcosm of the Federation or Vassal State,* 428.
49. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 23.
50. Flanagan, *The Sound of One Hand Clapping,* 21.

51. See Saurabh Dube, ed., "Enduring Enchantments," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101.4 (Fall 2002).
52. Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities," 14.
53. The Department of Treasury and Finances media release of 30 October, 2003 displays all these characteristics:

    Treasurer David Crean said today's record *Tasmanian Survey of Business Expectations* would not be a surprise to Tasmanians as the State is enjoying records across almost every economic indicator. […] "The TCCI/Commonwealth Bank Tasmanian Survey of Business Expectations released today shows business confidence at a record high, significantly above this time last year and any other September quarter on record. As with other economic indicators Tasmania is enjoying, the business outlook also shows the State economy to be significantly more buoyant than the national economy […] The thrust of the Bacon Government's economic strategy has been to increase demand for Tasmanian goods and services, and today's business survey result shows that is exactly what is occurring in our State […] The big record growth areas for the September quarter are general business conditions, and sales and revenue, but the outlook is for even stronger growth […] In Tasmania's local domestic market, which provides 50 per cent of demand for Tasmanian goods and services, total spending in the State is growing at the same rate *as the nation as a whole*. This is great news for small and medium sized businesses across Tasmania […] In 2001, when the business survey began to measure specific business constraints, lack of demand for goods and services consistently ranked as the second largest business constraint out of 21 constraints. It is now ranked 11th. Also in the local market, the value of work yet to be done in the building sector ($174m) is at historically high levels, a positive indication of continuing strong demand. Exports, which account for around 20 per cent of demand for goods and services, is also at record levels, with growing demand coming from Hong Kong, Spain, Japan, China, Korea and Europe. And of course all these records in the end deliver *our State the strongest job growth in the nation*, and by far the fastest reduction in the number of unemployed. "Media Release," Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance, accessed October 30, 2003, http://www.media.tas.gov.au/release.php?id=9656, emphasis added.

54. This claim to difference can be usefully read through the historical dialectic of federalist and secessionist thinking in Tasmania. As Pete Hay writes:

    I would like to find a new context for knowing Tasmania; a context that would not immediately supplant more familiar Tasmania-within-the-nation comparisons, though it might throw up some surprises—perspec-

tives that challenge more familiar contextualities. As the nation-state passes from political, economic and—though this will lag somewhat—cultural ascendancy, all sorts of knowing, it seems to me, become possible, all sorts of political, economic, and above all, imaginative constructions. "A Tale of Two Islands," *Island*, 89 (2002): 2.

Richard Flanagan adds an eloquent addendum to this statement in his essay on Tasmanian heterogeneity, "Before We Were Her People: Tasmania and Federation," *Island*, 86 (2001), 16.

Tasmania is not simply the sixth, smallest and poorest state of Australia. It is also—and to my mind far more importantly—a different country. Physically, environmentally, historically and culturally this is demonstrable. Personally it is palpable. Equally, the Kimberley is a different country, and to grow up there is a fundamentally different experience than to grow up, as I did, on the west coast of Tasmania.

55. Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–84*, vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 311.
56. Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities," 16.
57. See also Anthony Cascardi, "The Critique of Subjectivity and the Re-Enchantment of the World," *Revue Internationale de Philosophe* 2 (1996):243–63; Hans Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985); G. Ritzer, *Enchanting a Disenchanted World: Revolutionizing the Means of Consumption* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge, 1999); R. Schroeder, "Disenchantment and its Discontents: Weberian Perspectives on Science and Technology," *Sociological Review* 43 (1995): 227–50.
58. Dube, introduction to *Enduring Enchantments* by Dube, ed., "Enduring Enchantments," 729.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Richard Jenkins, "Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-enchantment: Max Weber at the Millenium," *Max Weber Studies* 1 (2000): 12.
62. Jane Bennett, *The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.
63. Wolfgang Mommsen, "Personal Conduct and Social Change," in *Max Weber: Rationality and Modernity*, ed. Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 42.
64. Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 131.
65. See, for example, Margaret Somers, "Romancing the Market, Reviling the State: Historicizing Liberalism, Privatisation and the Competing Claims to Civil Society," in *Citizenship, Markets, and the State*, ed. Colin Crouch,

Klaus Eder and Damian Tambini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23–48 and "The Privatisation of Citizenship: How to Unthink a Knowledge Culture," in V. Bonnell and L. Hunt, ed., *Beyond the Cultural Turn* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 121–61; Richard Sennett, *The Corrosion of Character*: *The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism* (New York: Norton, 1998); Zygmunt Bauman, *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1998); Graham Little, *The Public Emotions*: *From Mourning to Hope* (Sydney: ABC Books, 1999); Thomas Frank, *One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism and the End of Economic Democracy* (New York: Doubleday, 2000); David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2000); F. L. Block, *The Vampire State: And Other Myths and Fallacies about the U.S. Economy* (New York: New Press, 1996); Betty Reid Mandell, "The Privatisation of Everything," *New Politics* (Summer 2002): 83–100; Pierre Bourdieu et al, ed., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999); John Wright, *The Ethics of Economic Rationalism* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2003); Michael Wyatt, *Taming Economic Rationalism: Natural Laws and Political Strategies for an Equitable Global Future* (Croydon: Michael Wyatt, 1999); Bob Ellis, *First Abolish the Customer: 202 Arguments Against Economic Rationalism* (Ringwood: Penguin, 1998); Peter Saunders and Sara Graham, ed., *Beyond Economic Rationalism: Alternative Futures for Social Policy; Proceedings of a Joint Conference with the Department of Social Work and Social Administration, University of Western Australia, 27 November, 1992* (Kensington: Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, 1993); Stephen King and Peter Lloyd, ed., *Economic Rationalism: Dead End or Way Forward?* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993); Stuart Rees, Gordon Rodley, Frank Stilwell, ed., *Beyond the Market: Alternatives to Economic Rationalism* (Leichhardt: Pluto Press Australia, 1993); Donald Horne, ed., *The Trouble with Economic Rationalism* (Newham: Scribe Publications, 1992); John Carroll and Robert Manne, ed., *Shutdown: The Failure of Economic Rationalism and How to Rescue Australia* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1992); Peter Vintila, ed., *Markets, Morals & Manifestos: Fightback! & The Politics of Economic Rationalism in the 1990s* (Murdoch: Institute for Science and Technology Policy, Murdoch University, 1992).

66. Milan Zafirovski, "Unification of Sociological Theory by the Rational Choice Model: Conceiving the Relationship between Economics and Sociology," *Sociology* 33.3 (1999): 496.
67. Ibid.
68. R. Frank, "The Political Economy of Preference Falsification: Kuran's Private Truths, Public Lies," *Journal of Economic Literature* 34 (1996): 117.

69. For further readings of the deification of the state see J.R. Lllobera, *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 1994). Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State," J*ournal of Historical Sociology* 1.1 (1988): 58–9.
70. Duncan Cameron, "Selling the House to Pay the Mortgage: What is Behind Privatisation?," *Studies in Political Economy* 53 (Summer 1997): 16.
71. William Coleman, *Rationalism and Anti-Rationalism in the Origins of Economics: The Philosophical Roots of Eighteenth Century Economic Thought* (Aldershot: E. Elgar, 1995), 158.
72. Ibid., 156.
73. William Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 137.
74. See also, Jeannie Morefield, "Hegelian Organicism, British New Liberalism and the Return of the Family State," *History of Political Thought* 23.1 (2002): 141–70; Eric Weil, *Hegel and the State*, trans. Mark Cohen (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); A. Kaufman, "Community and Indigence: A Hegelian Perspective on Aid to the Poor," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 5.1 (1997): 69–92; R. Fine, "Civil Society Theory, Enlightenment and Critique," *Democratization* 4.1 (1997): 7–28; F. R. Christie, "Hegel's Conservative Liberalism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 22.4 (1989): 717–38; G. O. Kvistad, *Radicals and the German State: Hegel, Marx and the Political Demands on German Civil Servants* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For more general accounts of the Hegelian concept of the state see Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); George Morris, *Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History: An Exposition* (Chicago: S.C. Griggs, 1887); Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Vrajendra Raj Mehta, *Hegel and the Modern State: An Introduction to Hegel's Political Thought* (New Delhi: Associated Pub. House, 1968).
75. Quentin Skinner, "Modernity and Disenchantment: Some Historical Reflections," in *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question*, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 38.
76. R. M. O'Donnell writes, "At bottom, Keynes's prescription was that the state should act as the guardian, supervisor and promoter of civilised society. Within this general role, the nature and extent of its duties depended upon the performance of the private sector in establishing and maintaining the preconditions of goodness." *Keynes: Philosophy, Economics, and Politics: The Philosophical Foundations of Keynes's Thought and Their Influence on his*

Economics and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 299. Or, as Keynes himself noted:

> The most important agenda of the State relate not to those activities which private individuals are already fulfilling, but to those functions which fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those decisions which are made by no one if the State does not make them. The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all.

John Maynard Keynes, *Collected Works*, vol. 9 (London: Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1971), 291.

77. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 161.
78. This wasn't the first instance of privatization in Tasmania, however, as the Gray government had also sold off the Tasmanian Film Corporation and attempted to offload the Government Printers in the early 1980s.
79. Tony Rundle, *Directions Statement* (Hobart:Tasmanian Government Printers, 10 April 1996).
80. Bob Walker and Betty Con Walker, *Privatisation: Sell Off or Sell Out?: The Australian Experience* (Sydney: ABC Books, 2000), 8.
81. Fernando Coronil, *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 5.
82. Quoted in Roger Lupton, *Lifeblood: Tasmania's Hydro Power* (Edgecliff: Focus Publishing, 2000), 30.
83. Jim Bacon. " 'The Hydro' ": Keeping Our Best Asset," *Speech* (4 August 1998).
84. *The Mercury*, "Editorial," August 21, 1998, 18.
85. Alan Wood, "Get off the Green, Green Road to Penury," *The Australian*, July 21, 1998, 26.
86. Other cultural thematics that rehearse the enchantment of Tasmania include the continued faith in the existence of the thylacine or Tasmanian tiger even as repeated scientific expeditions fail to identify evidence of its persistence. See Robert Paddle, *The Last Tasmanian Tiger: The History and Extinction of the Thylacine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Eric Guiler, *Thylacine: The Tragedy of the Tasmanian Tiger* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985); Edward Duyker, ed., *The Discovery of Tasmania: Journal Extracts from the Expeditions of Abel Janszoon Tasman and Marc-Joseph Marion Du Fresne 1642 and 1772*, trans. Edward, Herman and Maryse Duyker, (Hobart: St David's Park, 1992); Edward Duyker, *Citizen Labillardière: A Naturalist's Life in Revolution and Exploration* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003). Jacques Julien Houton de Labillardière, *Voyage in Search of La Perouse: Performed by Order of the Constituent*

Assembly, During the Years 1791, 1792, 1793 and 1794 (London: Printed for John Stockdale, 1800); Kate Crowley "Imaging Pedder: Past Loss as Future Hope," *Island* 80–1 (Spring-Summer 2000): 59–69; "Lake Pedder's Loss and Failed Restoration: Ecological Politics Meets Liberal Democracy in Tasmania," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 34.3 (November 1999): 409–24.

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