Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

Satō, America and the Cold War

US–Japanese Relations, 1964–72

FINTAN HOEY

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

Edited by **Effie G. H. Pedaliu**, LSE-Ideas and **John W. Young**, University of Nottingham

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To my parents, James and Catherine

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Note on Asian Names and Romanisation

Names are rendered according to the Asian custom of family name first, given name second. Macrons are used to indicate a long vowel sound in Japanese, hence Satō Eisaku, not Eisaku Sato. Common place names are excepted, hence Tokyo, not Tōkyō.

Chinese words are romanised according to the Pinyin system. Thus, Zhou En-lai and Jiang Jieshi rather than Chou En-lai and Chiang Kai-shek.

Introduction

Satō Eisaku was a visionary statesman and leader. However, he has generally been regarded, both during and after his tenure, as an obstinate, drab technocrat.[1] His background as a Railway Ministry bureaucrat, together with his manner, which could appear aloof and unfeeling, accounts for this image. He was also noted for his taciturnity and his often confusingly indirect mode of speaking.[2] However, he successfully led his country through a particularly testing time. While the Vietnam War and the Chinese Cultural Revolution convulsed Asia, Japan was a beacon of peace, stability and prosperity. His signal achievements were the reversion of Okinawa and, after almost a decade of both personal and national soul-searching, the rejection of an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent. Satō can also be credited with laying the groundwork for the swift normalisation of relations with China following his departure from office in 1972.

Satō Eisaku was born in 1901 in Yamaguchi prefecture, on the southern tip of Japan's main island, Honshu. At their mother's instigation his older brother Nobusuke, who became prime minister from 1957 to 1960, was adopted into the related Kishi family. This was a common practice in Japan when a family had no male heir to carry on the family line. Indeed, Satō was himself adopted into the main branch of the Satō family for the same reason, again at the matriarch's behest. His marriage to his cousin Satō Hiroko in 1926 cemented the bond.

Satō graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and joined the Railway Ministry in 1924, rapidly rising through the ranks.[3] Kishi also advanced through the bureaucracy, serving as minister for commerce and industry in the wartime cabinet of Tōjō Hideki, for which he was later arrested as a suspected war criminal. In the context of rising Cold War tensions, the occupation authorities saw him as a reliable anti-communist, and

the charges were dropped. Kishi then resumed his political rise.[4] For his part, by the war's end Satō had been placed in charge of the Osaka main railway line, managing to keep it open despite heavy US bombing.[5] Following Japan's surrender his abilities caught the attention of Yoshida Shigeru, Japan's occupation-era prime minister and arguably the most important influence on Satō's political career. A former Foreign Ministry official and ambassador, Yoshida mined the bureaucracy for talent, which was badly needed for the reconstruction of Japan. Satō was the star pupil of the so-called Yoshida school. He was first elected to the Diet in 1949 and was made general secretary of Yoshida's Liberal Party the following year, entering the cabinet in 1951. His steady rise was almost interrupted when he was implicated in a campaign finance controversy, though he managed to avoid arrest. He held the key appointments of finance minister and minister of international trade and industry between 1958 and 1961. In 1964 he ran against Ikeda Hayato for leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party, and although he narrowly failed, he was named by Ikeda as his successor when he stepped down a few months later for health reasons.[6]

Satō's upbringing, education and early experiences (what the French term *formation*) are crucial to understanding his later attitudes and outlook.[7] His bureaucratic background gave him a cautious nature. He arrived at a decision only after a long period of consultation and deliberation. The strongest influence on Satō's career was Yoshida, who articulated a grand strategy for Japan in the aftermath of war, defeat and occupation. By eschewing military power Japan could find success through economic development and a close alliance with the United States.[8] Satō also drew inspiration from Japan's recent history and closely identified with the leaders and statesmen of the Meiji era, who led the process of centralisation and modernisation in the nineteenth century.[9] He believed that the measure of Japan's success was articulated by the Meiji-era slogan of *fukoku* (rich country). However, given the more recent history of war and defeat, this slogan's corollary of *kyōhei* (strong army) was sidelined. He profoundly disagreed with the pacifist and neutralist inclinations of the Socialist and Communist opposition parties and saw a need for Japan to develop its own capacity for defence. This was always articulated in the context of the alliance with the United States.

Fostering close links with the United States was deemed especially crucial in the context of securing the reversion to Japan of territories which remained under American control following the end of the post-war occupation. For Satō, this was closely linked with the pursuit of national recovery. The most important of these territories was the island

of Okinawa, part of the Ryukyu archipelago, which extends south-west from Kyushu to Taiwan. This was the site of a bloody battle at the close of the Pacific War and also housed an immense US military presence, including nuclear weapons.[10] Also under American control were the unpopulated Ogasawara Islands, off the coast of Tokyo. This chain, known in English as the Bonin Islands, included Iwo Jima, the site of another battle in 1945. Satō dedicated his premiership to securing the return of these territories to the homeland. Persuading the United States to do this, particularly the strategically important Okinawa (known as the 'keystone of the Pacific'), was a major accomplishment.

Furthermore, given the prevailing tensions in East Asia throughout much of his tenure, Satō took a close interest in matters of security and the defence of Japan. This interest has been sidelined in much of the literature to date, and this book addresses this imbalance.[11] Ōta Masakatsu's notion that Satō was in some ways a traitor for facilitating the US nuclear umbrella is also challenged.[12] Satō was a patriot; his overriding concerns were the defence and safety of his country.

Two major works on the history of post-war US-Japanese relations are Michael Schaller's *Altered States* (1997) and John Welfield *An Empire in Eclipse* (1988).[13] Both are meticulously researched and excellently written accounts. Welfield relies primarily on Japanese media reports, while Schaller had access to a considerable amount of recently declassified material from the US National Archives when he researched his study. In the years since these two works were published, there has been a huge increase in the amount of archival material, especially from Japan, opened to researchers. Over the last ten years the Diplomatic Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to make its holdings on this period available. Of particular importance are those items, released in late 2010 and early 2011, relating to negotiations with the United States on the reversion of Okinawa. This book is the first to incorporate these items and makes full use of them.

While there has not yet been a similar process undertaken with regard to defence-related material, the Dōba Hajime papers at the Research Institute for Peace and Security fill this void to a significant extent. Dōba was the *Yomiuri Shinbun*'s security correspondent, and he was supplied with a vast amount of internal policy documents by his sources in the Japanese Defence Agency. Satō's diary, published in several volumes in the late 1990s, gives invaluable insight into his thoughts and concerns.[14] The diary of Kusuda Minoru, who served as a close aide and adviser to Satō, was published in 2001.[15] This too provides important evidence of Satō's activities and concerns. There has also been a surge in oral

history projects recording the recollections of former midlevel Japanese officials. Of note is the Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, conducted by the Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies.[16]

In addition, there have been significant releases of American material in recent years. The *Foreign Relations* volume on US-Japanese relations published in 2006 included some previously classified material.[17] The National Archives have steadily released Richard Nixon's personal recordings. Access to these has been facilitated by the website nixontapes.org.[18] Listening to these recordings, one is almost in the room with Nixon and Kissinger as decisions are made.

In the historiography of US-Japanese relations, three broad schools of thought can be discerned. The first characterises Japan as a modern colony of an imperialist America. Bruce Cummings and John Dower, in addition to Lee Jong Won, advance a view of Japan as the 'axle' or 'linchpin' of American strategy. In this view Japan is a thoroughly subordinated and integrated part of the US military and financial framework of containment in Asia.[19] In his study of Japanese diplomacy during the Satō era, Nakajima Shingo adapts this metaphor slightly. Nakajima states that Washington reacted with uncertainty to the rise in Japanese power caused by its high-speed economic growth in the 1960s. If such power could be used to advance American interests in Asia, such as the containment of China, this was to be welcomed. However, the possibility of Japan opting for nuclear-armed neutrality or even forging a rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc was a cause for great concern. Japan, therefore, needed to be restrained. In this view US policy sought to restrain Japan in addition to using it as its linchpin in Asia. Nakajima adapts the 'linchpin' or 'axle' analogy in his work and suggests that in this period America put a figurative stopper into the Japanese bottle.[20]

Although Masaya Shiraishi acknowledges the increasingly important role played by Japan in Asia in this period, he too regards Japan as acting as a tool of US strategy. He concludes that Japan had 'an implicit intention to contribute to the consolidation of the US political and strategic framework' in Asia.[21] Warren I. Cohen writes in much the same vein, though in less strident tones, regarding Japan's China policy. He puts forth the view that Japan was forced into a policy of containment by the United States and that this was a nuisance which Japan attempted to skirt.[22] However, there is evidence to suggest that the United States hoped that Japan's trade with China would exert a moderating influence and draw China away from isolation and belligerency.[23] This was pursued alongside the US policy of military deterrence. Furthermore, while the revelations of Nixon and Kissinger's secret diplomacy with

Beijing came as a shock to Tokyo, in the long term it served Japan's interests in that it freed Japan to normalise its own relations with China.

While some historians acknowledge that in this period Japan came to have an increasingly greater international role, they still characterise it as a passive player in world affairs. Akira Iriye, in his study of post-war Japanese diplomacy, noted that while Japan did not blindly follow the United States, it played only a minor role.[24] While Iriye recognises that Japan sought to use its power to assist its neighbours, he bemoans the lack of an ideological basis for this largesse. However, this should be seen as part of Japan's policy, in line with America, of keeping South-East Asia free of uncertainty and instability and open for trade. Satō's tour of South-East Asia in autumn 1967 underlined this approach. In addition, while Hiroshi Fujimoto sees Japan as expanding its international role in cooperation with the United States, he tends to overascribe responsibility for this policy to US inducements.[25] For example, Japanese economic support for South Korea and development aid in South-East Asia are portrayed not as the results of Japan's own evaluation of its international role and regional interests but as stemming from US pressure.

In the second school of thought, the US-Japanese relationship is seen as a dysfunctional partnership to varying degrees. Roger Buckley, for example, contends that Japan was an ungrateful ally in that it readily accepted the protection afforded by the presence of US troops and bases in Japan but was unwilling to shoulder its fair share of the security burden once it became a major economic power.[26] Thomas Havens makes a similar criticism in his work on Japanese attitudes towards the Vietnam War.[27] In his view Japan satisfied its purse and its conscience by staying out of the conflict while simultaneously profiting by supplying the US war effort. However, these viewpoints overlook several important factors. Firstly, Buckley and Havens ignore the constraints placed on Japanese policymakers in this period: A major increase in defence spending or a dispatch of troops to a war zone would not only verge on unconstitutional but, given the pacifistic outlook of the Japanese public, would have constituted electoral suicide.

A third school of thought pictures US-Japanese relations as constituting an enduring rivalry. William Nestor and Walter LaFeber make intriguing arguments on the long-term development of US-Japanese relations from the opening of an enclosed Japan in the mid-nineteenth century by an American naval flotilla to the more recent era of military alliance and economic competition.[28] For LaFeber, there was hardly any relationship to speak of at all. Instead, there was a continual 'clash'

of opposing cultures and world views throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[29] Nestor posits the view that the relationship can be divided into two periods of cooperation and competition, 'one geopolitical (1853–1945) and the other geo-economic (1945 to the present)'.[30] By this calculus the 1960s saw the end of the post-war partnership and the renewal of rivalry and mutual animosity, or as Nestor states, 'a sense of inferiority turns to superiority and an increasingly haughty nationalism'.[31] These conclusions are not readily borne out by the evidence of Satō's cooperation with the United States. While writing history in such broad strokes can be revelatory, in this case it comes with the loss of balance.

By making full use of the newly available material, this book forms a more complete and nuanced picture of Satō and his relationship with the Unites States. Of particular importance is his attitude towards Japanese sovereignty. The reversion of Okinawa within the framework of the US-Japanese alliance was the goal for Satō. It was tied to the restoration of what the international relations theorist Richard Lebow would call Japan's spirit: its pride, honour and influence.[32] In this Satō differed from the Foreign Ministry, which wanted an unambiguous recognition of Japan's sovereignty vis-à-vis America's bases on Okinawa. Satō was cautious and deliberate in making decisions.[33] It was only over a considerable period of time that Satō came to the view that Japan should not develop nuclear weapons. This long process of decision making forms a thread throughout this book. However, the main contribution of this work is in describing Japan's changing security relationship with the United States. Japan was not in a secondary position. Satō's government was, if not necessarily an equal partner, an important player in this alliance diplomacy. This policy was far from universally popular in Japan, and the Nixon shocks of the summer of 1971 were seen as undermining his judgement. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that, as Satō recognised, Japan would not have enjoyed the security of the US nuclear umbrella nor have achieved the reversion of Okinawa without this close association with Washington.

1
Satō's First Year in Power, 1964–1965

A world in turmoil

Satō's elevation to prime minister in November 1964 came at a time of great changes in international relations in Asia. A month prior to his assuming office China detonated a nuclear device. Grappling with security, particularly with the question of nuclear weapons, characterised Satō's relations with the United States over the course of his tenure, as did the broader question of diplomatic recognition of China and its representation at the United Nations. Vietnam would become another item of pressing concern between Japan and the United States. A month after President Lyndon Baines Johnson assumed office following John F. Kennedy's assassination, he was warned by his Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, that 'the situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2–3 months, will lead to neutralisation at best and more likely to a communist-controlled state'.[1] The Johnson administration steadily escalated its commitment to South Vietnam. In August 1964 the United States used what was portrayed as an unprovoked attack by North Vietnam on its warships in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin as a casus belli. This prompted Congress to pass the South East Asia Resolution, which approved the use of force. That the attack in question may not have happened and that North Vietnamese actions in the Gulf of Tonkin were far from unprovoked only came to light years after the event.[2] In February the United States began bombing North Vietnam and in March US Marines were deployed to protect the B-52 bases.[3] These were the first American combat troops in Vietnam (previous troops had officially been advisers), and their numbers would grow to half a million by 1968 as the United States was sucked into a destructive and unwinnable stalemate.[4] This massive escalation lay

ahead; for the moment America's war in Vietnam was still at an early stage. Satō would support America's efforts to keep South Vietnam out of the communist camp but advised the United States not to rely solely on military force but to draw popular support away from the communists. Unfortunately this advice was not heeded.

This chapter analyses Satō's first year in office and explores three key events: his meeting with President Johnson, his careful and skilful handling of the use of Japanese ports by American nuclear submarines and his groundbreaking trip to Okinawa. In all cases Satō walked a delicate line between ensuring the defence of Japan through enhancing the alliance with the United States and the consequently difficult and politically dangerous decisions that this entailed.

Satō in Washington

Shortly after coming to office Satō took US Ambassador Edwin Reischauer aside at an imperial garden party for a private conversation. Satō hoped to maintain close touch with the ambassador and, in the short term, wanted to meet with US President Lyndon B. Johnson.[5] Unfortunately for Satō there was little enthusiasm for a visit in Washington, where officials were occupied with preparations for Johnson's inauguration. Satō persuaded Reischauer that an early meeting was mutually desirable given that major developments with regard to the Vietnam War and China's nuclear programme were looming. Satō also wanted to establish a personal rapport with Johnson. No doubt he also wanted to enhance his credentials as a statesman at home with a high-level visit. Reischauer managed to persuade his superiors of the merits of the summit, reminding them that three and a half years had past since the last such high-level meeting. Satō, who later acknowledged the ambassador's role in his trip's success, journeyed to Washington for talks from 11 to 13 January 1965.[6]

Two weeks before his departure Satō had another private meeting with Reischauer and alarmed the ambassador by voicing his support for an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent, given China's recent development in this regard. As he stated frankly, 'if the other fellow had nuclears it was only common sense to have them oneself'. Reischauer reported to Washington that Satō 'more than lives up to [his] reputation of being less judiciously cautious' than his predecessor and needed 'more guidance and education by us…to keep him out of dangerous courses'.[7] An independent Japanese nuclear deterrent would wreak havoc on the administration's global non-proliferation efforts. More nuclear weapons

and more states armed with them would, it was felt, result in a more dangerous world. With China and France having already developed independent deterrents the focus shifted to preventing the countries thought to be next in line. Japan and India, judged to be both capable and sufficiently threatened by China's development, became the focus of America's non-proliferation efforts. Opinion was split over the best way to accomplish this. Among the options explored was extended nuclear deterrence, or the 'nuclear umbrella'. If that proved insufficient or unworkable then the United States should enter into a nuclear sharing arrangement involving deploying weapons on the country's territory, training local personnel in their use and placing them under joint control. In this way proliferation would occur under America's 'guidance and influence'.[8] With regard to this sharing approach Vice President Hubert Humphrey told Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Chairman Miki Takeo in January 1965 that, 'it would have a good effect in Communist China if you had a hand on the umbrella to be sure the rain doesn't come down on you.'[9] These plans were akin to the proposal for a Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO countries in an attempt to satisfy West German nuclear ambitions without alarming the USSR. However Soviet and Warsaw Pact objections as well as French opposition later buried the proposal. Instead Washington and Moscow worked towards an international treaty forbidding further proliferation while locking in their privileged status as nuclear weapons states.[10] Royama Michio and Miki Kase question Satō's motives by suggesting that he was purposefully putting forth the outrageous and unrealistic notion that Japan would develop nuclear weapons purely as a gambit to induce further security guarantees from the United States.[11] However the development of nuclear weapons was a realistic choice which Satō and Japan seriously considered though ultimately rejected.[12] What is more likely is that Satō wished to keep his options open and manoeuvred to induce the United States to provide a nuclear umbrella while keeping the alternative of developing an independent deterrent further down the road.

Despite Satō's preoccupation with security matters he was initially unenthusiastic about conducting substantive meetings with McNamara or with Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon. He felt that two ten-minute conversations with these two cabinet secretaries before and after a meal was adequate and did not think it necessary to schedule anything longer.[13] Secretary of State Dean Rusk had stressed to Japan's Ambassador Takeuchi Ryuji the importance of Satō meeting with other cabinet secretaries during his time in Washington.[14] Since such a ten-minute meeting would amount to little more than an introduction, the

US side pushed for more substantive talks. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green, who was in charge of organising the summit at the American end, pressed the Japanese embassy in Washington to persuade Satō to agree to more concrete talks. Green made the point that defence relations with Japan were of sufficient importance to warrant Satō spending more time with McNamara. Takeuchi conveyed these concerns to Tokyo along with his own recommendation that Satō agree to the American suggestion, noting the importance of defence-related issues such as Vietnam and Okinawa.[15] Satō followed this advice.[16] Green also made a push for Satō to meet with Dillon, and the two men met for 25 minutes prior to Satō's lunch with Rusk on 13 January 1965.[17]

This episode is far from a mundane matter of scheduling and tells us much about Satō's thinking with regard to the summit. He did not want to get into substantive talks with cabinet secretaries other than Rusk. This undermines Michael Schaller's conclusion that Satō was in some ways snubbed as LBJ did not want to talk about economic issues (Satō was happy to have these matters dealt with by his finance minister).[18] Why then did Satō want to avoid detailed discussions with McNamara? This is puzzling given that his conversation with Reischauer on the eve of the summit clearly shows that security concerns were paramount in his mind. An answer lies in Satō's diary, where he noted how he was impressed and pleasantly surprised with McNamara, who sought to engage with him as an equal rather than lecture him on the question of Japan's future military role.[19] Perhaps, then, a lecture from McNamara is precisely what he feared.

Other elements of the visit did not go as well for Satō. Dean Rusk emphasised the increased importance of America's military bases on Okinawa in light of China's nuclear development. Satō readily agreed but suggested that some of the sparsely inhabited and less strategically important islands of the Ryukyus be reverted to Japan. This, however, was met with stony silence.[20] Relations with China presented other troubles for Satō beyond these security concerns. He was faced with a strong domestic constituency – the business community, the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and elements of the LDP – who favoured expansion of trade with the mainland. On this, as on many issues Satō would face, he was required to walk a delicate line. In this case he had to manoeuvre between continued support for Taiwan and close coordination with the United States on keeping the Republic of China regime in the United Nations on the one hand and the demands of the domestic business lobby on the other. By the start of Satō's tenure it had

become more and more difficult to maintain that economic ties were 'private' given government export credits and the expenditure of public funds on a Japanese trade office in Beijing.[21] Despite US apprehensions regarding China, many policymakers in Washington generally recognised that Japan needed to trade with mainland China. Vice President Hubert Humphrey told Miki Takeo in January 1965 that, 'Japan had an economic interest in Communist China and…he imagined that Japan would develop this trade even if we didn't like it.' Humphrey was more concerned that Japan not grant China better terms than it gave to the United States.[22] President Johnson for his part signalled no objection to the Japanese policy of separating politics and economics.[23]

One area where agreement was not forthcoming was in relation to Japanese cotton textile exports to the United States. This particular difficulty over textiles was dwarfed in importance and rancour by the later textile dispute during the Nixon administration. Johnson was unfazed by Satō's point that Japan was a major trading partner of the United States and bought plenty of American goods; he was surprised when Satō hoped that since Johnson's native Texas was not a major textile state, the issue would not be given too much importance. In the end Satō acknowledged Japan's interest in continued American prosperity, and the issue was put aside. It did make one more light-hearted reappearance: In a show of friendliness and southern hospitality, Johnson had Stetsons ordered for the members of Satō's entourage. Satō joked that the gifts increased American textile exports to Japan.[24]

In most areas Satō's first summit in the United States was a success for the prime minister. He managed to enhance his standing with high-level meetings and establish a rapport with Johnson and members of the US administration. He had little trouble in endorsing America's containment policies in Asia, particularly with regard to China and Vietnam, though the question of Okinawa would continue to present difficulties. Most importantly of all he secured a commitment from Johnson and McNamara to defend Japan against nuclear attack, thus initiating the US nuclear umbrella. This was a signal achievement.

US nuclear submarines

On coming to office Satō inherited an agreement with the United States allowing for nuclear-powered US submarines to enter Japanese ports. The United States sought such access to allow these vessels to operate normally throughout the Pacific and also sought to push back against Japan's nuclear taboo.[25] Japan's conservative leadership accepted that

the port calls were a necessary feature of the alliance. They were also alert to their potential as an issue that the left-wing opposition (composed of the Japanese Socialist Party, the Japanese Communist Party and Sōhyō, the General Council of Trade Unions) could exploit to rally support.[26] Popular revulsion with nuclear weapons and concern regarding the dangers of fallout ran deep in Japan given the experience of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the *Daigo Fukuryū Maru* (Lucky Dragon) incident. The contamination of this fishing vessel in 1954 from a US nuclear test alerted the Japanese people to the danger of nuclear contamination, particularly of the fish stocks which constituted their primary source of food.[27] The conflation of the nuclear allergy with the security treaty, whose passage through the Diet had been met with ferocious protest, concentrated the minds of US and Japanese officials. The agreement and the management of the issue by Washington and Tokyo provide an interesting insight into the conduct of US-Japanese relations during this period. However it has received little scholarly attention, which is surprising given the considerable success alliance managers had in facilitating the calls and in outfoxing the opposition.[28] This lack of attention is perhaps accounted for by the prominence given to the controversy in May 1968 surrounding suspected radioactive contamination by one such nuclear submarine, the *Swordfish*. This incident, which occurred in an atmosphere of heightened tension due to the growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War, has tended to obscure the whole picture of what was a largely successful exercise by Washington and Tokyo in deepening the alliance.

The United States convinced the Japanese government that these submarines posed no threat of radioactive contamination, and American officials cooperated with Japanese government radiation testing so as to allay public concerns.[29] To assuage fears on the ground Tokyo despatched two senior bureaucrats, Kaihara Osamu of the Defence Agency and Yasukawa Takeshi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the port city of Sasebo, on Kyushu. In order to lessen the opposition's ability to stage a mass rally it was decided that the more remote and less populous Sasebo would be chosen over the larger naval base of Yokosuka, near Tokyo. Kaihara and Yasukawa engaged with the local community and stressed the safety of the vessels, noting that if nuclear-powered submarines could enter New York harbour without incident, then they were safe enough for Japan. He also pointed out that such vessels were becoming more and more widespread and commonplace and were also operated by the UK, the USSR and France.[30] Kaihara was impressed by the local mayor, whose only concern was his town's welfare and safety; once these were

satisfied he had no objection to a visit by the ship to what was after all a major naval base.[31]

Aside from the issue of safety, the opposition also sought to play up the suggestion that the United States was secretly introducing nuclear weapons into Japan aboard these subs. On this question the US and Japanese governments had worked out a complex and not altogether transparent modus operandi. The renegotiated Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 included a commitment by the United States to consult with Tokyo before making significant changes to the weapons it deployed in Japan. This was widely interpreted to mean that the United States needed Tokyo's permission to deploy nuclear weapons in Japan. Since the US government had not initiated such 'prior consultation', the Japanese government consistently maintained that the United States did not deploy nuclear weapons in Japan. Moreover, as successive governments publicly maintained, it remained official policy to refuse any such request and thus bar the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. This was not, however, the full picture. A secret understanding reached at the time the treaty was renegotiated – it was reaffirmed subsequently – allowed US vessels armed with nuclear weapons to dock in Japanese ports without such prior consultation, the rationale being that this did not constitute 'introduction', which was translated into Japanese as *mochi-komu* and which contains a sense of inward motion.[32] Since these weapons were not on land they were 'a legal inch' away from Japanese soil.[33] In light of these facts, America's assurance that it had 'no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government' can be looked upon in a different light.[34] Despite these murky waters the Japanese government repeatedly claimed that America was not bringing nuclear weapons into Japan. This may well have been based on a narrow reading of the meaning of introduction and on the conclusion of Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) officials that it was unlikely the US submarines would be armed with nuclear warheads in peacetime.[35]

Despite all of these assurances it would take almost a year before Japan would green-light the first port call of a nuclear submarine. In addition to allaying fears over reactor safety and the presence (or absence) of nuclear weapons, Japanese officials were keen to make sure that a port call did not occur during a sensitive period when the opposition could be expected to make trouble for the government. As a result the call by the *Sea Dragon* was postponed to avoid detracting from the Tokyo Olympic Games, an international showcase for a new peaceful Japan recovered from the horrors of war and militarism.[36] It was also put off

on the advice of the US embassy so as not to colour Satō's assumption of office.[37] Tokyo's caution and America's patient efforts to win trust paid dividends when the *Sea Dragon* became the first nuclear-powered submarine to enter Japanese waters, docking at Sasebo from 12 to 14 November 1964. It was greeted with an official welcome, popular acquiescence and a small desultory protest at the water's edge. The feared mass protests throughout the country simply did not occur.

Ambassador Reischauer in Tokyo concluded that this represented a major turning point in Japanese popular attitudes towards 'things nuclear'. Above all it showed that

> [an] increasingly mature and sophisticated Japanese public [is] no longer willing [to] respond willy nilly to leftist and extremist alarmism and demands for show of mass force and even violence in demonstrating opposition even though this has admittedly been a major public issue over past twenty months.[38]

Japan's Ambassador to the United States, Takeuchi Ryuji, told Averell Harriman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, that the visit's success arose from the many months of preparation and efforts to persuade the public of the submarine's safety as well as to the divisions in the left-wing camp over the Sino-Soviet split that weakened the opposition. In response to Harriman's suggestion that the visit would reassure the Japanese people that they had a nuclear-armed ally given the recent successful nuclear test by China, Takeuchi noted that the visit could energise a debate in Japan over security issues but that Japan was not likely to develop nuclear weapons.[39]

US officials on the ground credited the success of the port calls to the divided opposition and the many months of 'slow-paced, patient and well-publicised' assurances by both governments of the vessel's safety. Japanese popular acceptance of assurances on the question of nuclear weapons also served to take the wind out of the opposition's sails. However, this last factor set up a hostage to fortune given the unequivocal nature of official Japanese assurances and the altogether more complicated reality. The same US officials warned that should Tokyo and Washington lose this fragile popular trust, which was based on a considerable stretching of the facts, this 'could seriously weaken the effectiveness of our Security Treaty relationship with Japan'.[40] Despite these clear-eyed reservations, it is important to recognise that the smooth operation of the *Sea Dragon*'s call on Sasebo and the lack of

significant opposition was a success for Washington and Tokyo. The *Sea Dragon* returned to Sasebo the following February, and its sister ship, the *Snook*, called in May.[41] Each port call was arranged by the US embassy and the US Pacific Fleet with authorities in Tokyo and, as with the first port call, was carefully scheduled. The *Sea Dragon*'s return was timed so as not to coincide with a particularly stormy Diet session, and the *Snook* called well before the upper house election campaign of June 1965. These tactics worked, and again opposition to the visit was both weak and ill prepared.

Despite these setbacks, the opposition sought to make use of the visit of the *Permit* in August 1965. The *Permit* belonged to a class of nuclear-powered submarines which could be equipped with recently developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (known as subrocs). It was also the same class of submarine as the *Thresher*, which had been lost with all hands in an accident. The opposition sought to cast doubt on the submarine's safety and raise the prospect that the United States would seek to bring nuclear weapons into Japanese waters. Shimoda Takesō of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the press that under agreements with the United States, any attempt to dock a ship in Japanese ports with nuclear weapons would trigger prior consultation. Since no such consultation had been entered into there was no danger of nuclear weapons being introduced. This was not, strictly speaking, the true state of agreements reached with the United States. Once again the Foreign Ministry had overstepped the mark. Reischauer's comment to the press that the United States would abide by its agreements with Japan was assumed to mean that no subrocs would be aboard the ship.[42] Nevertheless, the deployment of subrocs was not enough to breathe new life into the protest movement, and this port call proceeded as calmly as those before. By December the US embassy in Japan reported to Washington that visits by nuclear submarines had become routine and that opposition forces, having failed to link the vessels with nuclear weapons in the public mind, were no longer able to muster anything approaching a decent protest.[43]

The success of Washington and Tokyo in gaining popular acceptance for use of Japanese ports by US nuclear-powered submarines stands out as a notable achievement given that it was the first significant test of the alliance since the protests that greeted the revised mutual security. Popular acceptance of the port calls showed a significant change in attitudes towards nuclear power and military issues. This owed much to the patient efforts of both governments and to US accommodation and understanding of Japanese concerns. However the fact that Tokyo felt it

necessary to occlude the nuclear 'introduction' loophole while loudly trumpeting the assurances it had received from the United States was unfortunate.

Satō goes to Okinawa

Prior to his unsuccessful run for the LDP presidency in February 1964, Satō established a 'brain trust', known as the 'S. Op' (Satō Operation), to formulate policies for his bid. Composed of journalists, university professors and politicians, it was chaired by Kusuda Minoru, a journalist from the *Sankei Shinbun* who would later become Satō's *hishokan*, or private secretary. The S. Op. participants noted that no Japanese official had ever asked for reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration despite regular discussions between the United States and Japan over its status. One of the S. Op.'s main policy planks was to push for reversion.[44] Though Satō lost this bid by four votes he established himself as Ikeda Hayato's likely heir, and when Ikeda resigned shortly afterwards due to ill health, Satō was chosen to replace him. The status of Okinawa was then pushed to the foreground, and early in his tenure Satō moved to become the first Japanese prime minister to visit the island.

Satō was fortunate that he took office following the departure of Paul Carraway from the post of US high commissioner for the Ryukyus. Carraway and Reischauer had regular clashes over policy towards the Ryukyus, which Carraway, as the man on the ground, usually won. Despite agreement between Ikeda and President John F. Kennedy to gradually increase local autonomy and allow Tokyo a greater role in Ryukyuan affairs (such as providing economic aid), Carraway had dug in his heels and allowed for no progress. Equally patronising and paternalistic, Carraway felt that the Ryukyuan people were in some ways underdeveloped and not capable of self-government. Nor did he regard Okinawan irredentist aspirations as valid.[45] His successor, Albert Watson, shared none of these views and took a far more enlightened approach. Watson's purpose was to govern the Ryukyus with a light touch and allow for increased Japanese aid but only 'to so administer the Ryukyu islands as to maintain a climate of acceptability for the military bases and to ensure the so-called "Okinawa Problems" do not become a serious issue between the governments of Japan and the United States'.[46] As enlightened as he was, Watson was no proponent of reversion; still it is difficult to imagine anyone as irascible as Carraway being so welcoming to Satō.

Washington and Tokyo had very different ideas about the aims of the visit. For Tokyo this was a chance to highlight an area of the country which had been neglected and to look forward to the day when it would return to the homeland. American policymakers, on the other hand, hoped the visit would convey a positive impression of the contribution made to the security of Japan and the rest of East Asia by US forces. The trip was not to signal any expansion of Tokyo's limited consultative role in the administration of Okinawa.[47]

Tokyo annoyed Washington by proceeding with a unilateral announcement of Satō's trip pre-empting a planned joint statement with the United States. This was done to make political capital out of the trip on the eve of elections for the upper house of the Diet, which were to be Satō's first test at the polls as prime minister. It also played down the fact that Satō was travelling to the islands as a guest of the American high commissioner.[48] The State Department took a dim view of this politicking and instructed its embassy in Tokyo to hammer out an agreed joint statement with Tokyo which clearly reflected Satō's having been invited.[49] The Gaimushō (the Japanese Foreign Ministry) rejected any draft statement which referred to Watson as the 'host', noting, in a fabulous bureaucratic understatement, that such language 'would not be conducive to creating a favourable public impression in Japan'.[50] In the end the agreed statement referred to Watson's invitation of Satō, but this was couched in the face-saving language of being 'consonant with the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands to maintain close ties with the mainland'. No reference was made to a host-guest relationship.[51]

Another area where policymakers worked to reach agreement was mutually acceptable language for the various speeches Satō was scheduled to deliver to a variety of military and civic functions. The draft speeches produced by Kasumigaseki (Japan's Whitehall) dwelt on Satō's satisfaction at being in Okinawa, his appreciation for his warm welcome, pride at seeing so many Japanese flags waved by well-wishers and his remorse at Okinawa's wartime losses.[52] The State Department felt that the drafts in some way denigrated America's administrative record. The US embassy did not share these views but did secure the addition of references to the important role played by the US-Japanese alliance and by US bases on Okinawa in the defence of the 'Free World'.[53]

Satō's emotionally charged trip was a major turning point for post-war Japan and was one of the defining moments of his tenure. It was the occasion for a great deal of press attention, with 80 journalists packed onto Satō's plane.[54] It was also the occasion for much national soul-searching. The centre-right *Yomiuri Shinbun* noted the great responsibility

which the nation had towards the people of Okinawa for their sacrifices in wartime and for their continued foreign military domination. While mainland Japan had enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, Okinawa had been left behind. There was a broad consensus in Japan that this gap should be closed and that Okinawa should be reunited with the rest of Japan.[55] Yokoyama Taizō, the editorial cartoonist for the left-wing *Asahi*, caught the mood of the day by portraying Satō as a human bridge linking Okinawa with the main islands, as though his very presence in Okinawa unified the country. Never one to heap too much praise on those in power, Yokoyama humorously drew Satō completely naked.[56]

Satō's plane departed for Naha, Okinawa's capital, on 19 August 1965. His diary entries for his time in Okinawa show a concern for matters of a symbolic nature. He noted that his plane's fighter jet escort was provided by the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force while flying over the Japanese main islands and then by US military jets over Okinawa. Though Satō appreciated the gesture, it was a less than subtle reminder of who retained control of the islands. Satō was also keen that his arrival at Naha be without the usual military pomp associated with a visiting dignitary. He wanted to land at a civilian airport and be greeted by local representatives, not the customary troop review.[57] Upon arrival he was deeply moved on seeing the many Japanese flags waved by the crowds of people who had come to greet him.[58] Normally taciturn and enigmatic, Sato reportedly wept when he saw schoolchildren wave banners that read 'Please Don't Forget, We are Japanese, too.'[59] Satō made a powerful impact with his remarks on disembarking at Naha. He memorably declared that 'until Okinawa is reunited with the fatherland, the post-war era will not be over'. The speech made the front pages of the following day's newspapers. Yara Chōbyō, a stalwart of the Okinawa Teachers' Association and the pro-reversion movement and later the first directly elected chief executive of the Ryukyus, was present and among the many who cried on hearing the prime minister's words.[60] With this speech and the visit as a whole, Satō placed Okinawa reversion at the centre of political life in Japan and US-Japanese relations for the duration of his term of office.[61]

If the schoolchildren on the tarmac at Naha brought a tear to his eye, Satō was decidedly less than impressed with the protesters who surrounded his hotel that night, preventing him from returning after a dinner hosted by High Commissioner Watson. This protest was organised by the *Okinawa ken sokoku fukki kyōgikai* (Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland). This was an umbrella organisation comprising a variety of civic groups and left-wing political parties.

Their demands included increased local autonomy for the territory, direct election of the chief executive, unrestricted travel between Okinawa and the main islands, and the retrocession of Okinawa to Japan. They also sought an end to the US-Japan Security Treaty and particularly an end to America's bases in Japan. They were therefore vehemently opposed to Satō's policy of continuing the US-Japanese alliance. Satō wanted to talk to the protesters directly, but this was refused. Instead he sent Yasui Ken, the director general of the prime minister's office. While Yasui received a petition from the protesters outlining their demands, the crowds began to disperse. Satō overruled any use of force against the protesters by the police. Such an action would have turned a politically successful trip into a complete disaster. However, negotiations came to naught, and Satō was forced into the embarrassing position of relying on the hospitality of the high commissioner, who lodged him in the base's guest house. In the following day's editorials Satō came under criticism for staying on the base, though given the ferocity of the protests and the danger to his person, he was right to put himself out of harm's way. Though the protest was dominated by an extremist communist front organisation called the *Jinsei* (Pure Battle Formation) and resulted in confrontational behaviour, there was no doubting the depth of feeling on the part of ordinary Okinawans who wanted two decades of foreign military rule to end.[62]

Though Satō worried that the media on the home islands were not reporting the protests accurately, the press was generally negative in its coverage of the protesters. Even the left-leaning *Asahi Shinbun* was unsympathetic to the lack of respect shown to Satō, though its editorial acknowledged that the protesters had the right to complain at having lived for so long under US rule.[63] Indeed the centrist *Mainichi Shinbun* praised Satō for overlooking the excesses of the protesters and felt that this showed his government's appreciation for popular sentiment on Okinawa.[64]

Satō spent the remainder of his time in Okinawa touring military bases and battlefield commemorations. Watson arranged for Satō to be taken by helicopter to view the US military installations across the south of the island, no doubt to impress upon his guest the importance and magnitude of these bases. However, Satō was more concerned with the security of these bases against civil disturbances, no doubt with the previous night's events fresh in his mind. He was also struck by the sad and lonely sight of farmers forced to eke out a living on the hill-sides; the arable land below having been taken for military bases. On the whole Satō received a much friendlier reception in the outlying islands

of the Ryukyu archipelago, and he was once more touched by the great number of Japanese flags waved at him in welcome.[65]

Though the trip was judged a success by both sides, it is important to note in the planning of the trip the undercurrent of discord between the two countries that highlighted conflicting aims. The Japanese side felt that their prime minister was visiting a part of Japan, albeit one administered by a foreign country. The United States, on the other hand, was keen to stress that Satō was present at the invitation of Watson and was anxious that he play up the positive regional security role played by US forces on the island. Satō's experiences in Okinawa, particularly the depth of feeling displayed by ordinary people and their low standard of living, made a deep impression on him. On his return to Tokyo the Japanese government accelerated programmes to deal with income disparity and economic development in Okinawa. Given the protests on the night of 19 August it was imperative that Satō not allow the opposition to capitalise on the Okinawa issue, and he felt it was vital that the gap between Okinawa and the main islands be closed.[66] These, however, were medium-term solutions. The real prize was reversion, and Satō would devote the remainder of his premiership to achieving this.

Christopher Aldous concludes that Okinawa's 'final reunification with Japan was *primarily* an Okinawan achievement'.[67] This asserts the primacy of local agency, specifically the popular protest movement, as the main driving force behind the achievement of reversion. In doing so he seeks to redress what he regards as an imbalance in scholarship which has focused too heavily upon high politics of intergovernmental diplomacy. While Aldous is right to give voice to the masses who pressed reversion high on the agenda, it is just as important not to underplay the efforts made by senior diplomats and politicians, above all Satō himself, whose contributions towards reversion were equally significant, as is outlined in later chapters.

Vietnam begins to loom large

By the end of 1965 growing public anxiety over America's activities in Vietnam, and its use of bases in Japan in support of these activities, began to manifest itself. The American consulate in Fukuoka, in western Japan, noted that 'the local press and Opposition have combined' and created a 'mood of mounting popular apprehension as the "smell of war" – a favourite journalistic phrase – becomes stronger'. The consulate bemoaned the fact that America's traditional allies in the region, local LDP politicians and businessmen, preferred to leave the job of

countering such opposition and the resultant political fallout to the central government.[68] For its part the central government was not too keen to deal with the issue either. In any case Vietnam continued to be a headache for Japan's conservative leadership.

Schaller concludes that the Japanese sent mixed messages to the Americans on Vietnam.[69] There is some truth in this, but the views of Japanese leaders on Vietnam were more consistent than they are given credit for. They were anxious that South Vietnam not fall to the communist north but saw that the solution to the problem was not simply a military one. Japan, having after all occupied Vietnam during the Pacific War, was familiar with the nationalist ambitions of the Vietnamese people. Japanese conservatives understood from local experience that to beat communism you had to offer a better system in its stead. It is true that they were anxious not to be too closely associated with American policy before an increasingly sceptical and hostile electorate. This does not mean that they wanted America's policy of containment to fail; Japan was after all part of the American containment system in Asia. In any event, America's involvement in Vietnam dominated relations between the United States and Japan for the remainder of Satō's years in power.

Satō's first year was filled with tumult. Early in his tenure several issues emerged that would come to mark the remainder of his time in office. These included the future status of Okinawa, the relationship with mainland China, nuclear weapons policy, and the imperatives of balancing the alliance with the United States with a public that wavered between indifference and hostility. In all Satō was able to skilfully navigate the ship of state during his first year at the *Kantei* (the prime minister's official residence in Tokyo). However, these issues would continue to loom large for the remainder of his time in office.

2
Maturity, Reversion and a Year of Crises: 1966–1968

By 1966 Edwin Reischauer wanted to return to the United States. The Japan-born son of American missionaries and Harvard professor had been appointed US ambassador to Japan by John F. Kennedy in 1961. He had been sent to smooth relations between the two countries following the severe protests that greeted the passage of the revised Mutual Security Treaty in 1960. Reischauer felt that his task of fixing the 'broken dialogue' was complete. This had involved reaching out to a wide spectrum of Japanese political and cultural life and in presenting the United States as Japan's partner. It also meant downplaying military ties, something that was becoming increasingly harder to do as the United States expanded its intervention in Vietnam.[1] Reischauer's successor, Alex Johnson, was a markedly different character. Born Ural Alexis Johnson in 1908, he was one of the first US career diplomats to master Japanese. He was serving as American consul in Japanese-occupied Manchuria when the Pacific War broke out, and he was interned as an enemy alien. Following the war his experience and expertise in North-East Asia, as well as his ability and competence, led to his assuming greater responsibility during the Korean War in a Washington-based role. A stint as ambassador to Czechoslovakia rounded out his expertise and also confirmed in him a strongly held anti-communism. This was followed by a spell as deputy ambassador in Saigon (a new title of his own creation; he and Ambassador Maxwell Taylor were sent to the embassy in South Vietnam since it was felt two ambassadors were required).[2] His reward for this hazardous mission – he survived several assassination attempts, including one in which a grenade (thankfully faulty) hidden in a loaf of bread was thrown in his path – was the embassy in Tokyo, which he took up in October 1966.[3]

Upon his appointment he regarded US-Japanese relations as being 'at an immature and unequal stage'. For Johnson this inequality and immaturity arose from the Japanese view that the United States bore responsibility for Japan's security and prosperity. America provided both defence and a large open market for Japan's exports. This relationship, Johnson believed, needed to mature.[4] Johnson was confident that the Japanese would come to see the treaty as vital to their interests and that such a realisation in itself was vital to its continued viability.[5] While patronising, this sentiment was also held by a significant portion of Japan's political elite. Satō felt that continuation of the alliance was not only the best way to provide for Japan's defence but was also the least destabilising option both at home and in East Asia. It was by no means the only course open to Japan. Rather, it was the path chosen because of a realist interpretation of Japan's abilities and the threats it faced.

Though Johnson lauded Edwin Reischauer for his success in presenting a positive image of America to Japanese society, he also subtly criticised Reischauer's discomfort in engaging his hosts on issues of defence and security. Johnson decided that he needed to take a firmer line regarding the security which the United States provided and on which Japan depended. He also wanted to behave in a less 'splashy' manner. Rather than the cultural diplomacy of his predecessor, Johnson preferred 'quiet diplomacy', avoiding public occasions, speeches and press conferences in favour of closed-door meetings with Japanese officials.[6] He defined quiet diplomacy as 'discussing and working out between the two governments solutions to problems while they are still small and not permitting them to get large and doing so in as quiet a manner as possible'.[7]

The issue of Okinawa (and the related issue of the Ogasawara Islands) gave Johnson the perfect pretext in encouraging such a maturation of attitudes. Satō had publicly called for Okinawa's return on visiting the island in 1965 (see Chapter 1), placing himself at the head of popular sentiment on the matter but also taking a large political risk.[8] As Johnson saw it, if Japanese leaders wanted to see these territories returned they would need to persuade Washington of Japan's long-term reliability as a security partner and that the utility of America's military bases would not be hindered.[9] Okinawa, known as the 'keystone of the Pacific', was home to a vast array of US military installations and was deemed vital for America's ability to project power in the western Pacific, and they were a strategic bridgehead for American intervention in Vietnam.

Johnson has received some scholarly attention from Nicholas Sarantakes and Nathaniel Thayer; however the success or otherwise of

'quiet diplomacy' has not been addressed.[10] Indeed, it can be judged only a limited success. It led to progress on negotiations leading to the reversion of the Ryukyu and Ogasawara islands and to a more pro-US line being taken in public by Japanese political leaders. However, it failed to fundamentally alter the Japanese public's fears regarding nuclear weapons and military matters more generally. Perhaps more importantly, quiet diplomacy failed to fundamentally alter the outlook of Japanese officialdom, which was tested in a series of security crises in 1968. It was also counterproductive in the long term. As it continued a trend in US-Japanese relations of operating in the shadows, away from public view and parliamentary scrutiny, it served to further delegitimise what most Japanese people regarded as an unwelcome and tarnished military relationship.

One of Johnson's earliest encounters with Japanese officials regarding the reversion issue and wider questions of security was the very essence of quiet diplomacy. In July 1967 he met in secret with Foreign Minister Miki Takeo and senior Gaimushō officials in a room at the New Otani Hotel in Tokyo – a setting perhaps better suited to furtive lovers. Miki was keen to establish whether the United States wished to maintain nuclear weapons on Okinawa in the aftermath of reversion to Japan. Given the strongly felt aversion to nuclear weapons held by the Japanese public the issue was a potentially destabilising one. However, Johnson was evasive and used the occasion to turn the question around. Much to Miki's discomfort he asked what the Japanese government wanted from the bases and what it felt Japan's requirements were. In a despatch to Washington reporting on this meeting, Johnson stated:

> I pressed [Miki] hard to [the] effect that [the] heart of [the] problem was [the] necessity of [the Government of Japan] making decisions on what kind of U.S. military presence it wanted in the area and facing up to increased responsibilities [the Government of Japan] would have to assume if Okinawa administration [was] returned.[11]

Johnson maintained this line in his meetings with Japanese officials over the next several months, much to their frustration.[12] However, he was also playing for time. Throughout the summer of 1967 he was a key participant in forging a consensus in Washington on the need to give some signal to the Japanese that reversion was on the way. He emerged as an important conduit for communicating not only his own government's views to Tokyo but also Japanese concerns to Washington. He faced significant opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though

Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara was supportive. The chiefs objected to any diminution in their freedom of operation in Okinawa. McNamara, by contrast, agreed with the thrust of Alex Johnson's argument. As Johnson warned at a meeting of the National Security Council in August 1967, foot-dragging on Okinawa could mean the United States would find itself with a hostile government in Tokyo.[13] His views were also reflected in a State Department memo prepared for President Johnson which tellingly stated, 'we want Japan as a partner – not as a rival – in Asia, but as a partner sharing the political and economic burdens of regional responsibility.'[14]

Satō's tour of Asia

American hopes for the assumption by Japan of some form of 'regional responsibility' grew as it found itself in an increasingly intractable position in Vietnam. By the autumn of 1967 over two years had passed since Lyndon Johnson 'Americanised' the war by bombing North Vietnam and deploying US combat troops. Despite this, Hanoi would not yield in its determination to reunite the country. United States efforts to build a viable South Vietnamese state were also falling short. The Johnson administration was keen that its allies, especially those in Asia, assume part of its burden, as much to demonstrate to global opinion that it was acting in the interests of the 'Free World'.[15] Japan was not expected to follow the example of South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand in despatching combat troops, but Washington did look to Tokyo to throw its weight behind the war. Satō for his part followed American policy in containing China and made support for Taiwan and South Vietnam a key element of his regional policy. This was a divisive and controversial move and caused considerable protest in Japan. However, Satō calculated that visible backing for American policy would translate into progress on the status of Okinawa.

Satō's tour of East Asia and the Pacific in September–October 1967 was initially designed to underline Japan's emergence as an economic power and major aid donor in the region. It was also intended to further the process of rehabilitating Japan's image, since Satō was to visit many areas which had been conquered by Japan in the Second World War. Initially at least, Satō's itinerary steered clear of potential controversy by omitting Taiwan and South Vietnam. However, both were later added to the tour as a result of back-room pressures by officials (including the influential Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru) keen that the trip highlight Japan's support for the Western camp in the Cold War. These changes

caused much annoyance to Satō's private secretaries, Motono Moriyuki and Kusuda Minoru. Kusuda, a former journalist, worried about negative press coverage given the intense unpopularity of the Vietnam War. Motono, on secondment from the Foreign Ministry, felt that the additions would undermine the purpose of the tour, which was to establish Japan's position and reputation as an aid donor and 'good neighbour' in the region.[16] He argued that a visit by the prime minister to Taiwan and Vietnam would be too divisive. However, this was precisely Satō's reasoning behind his decision. Impressing on the United States Japan's commitment to the Western alliance was worth the risk of short-term unpopularity at home and abroad, particularly if that could be parlayed into concessions on the status of Okinawa.

Satō departed for Taiwan on 7 September. He was received the following day by Jiang Jieshi, who, even after almost two decades of exile, still sought to return to and reconquer the mainland. Jiang took heart from the chaos in China caused by the Cultural Revolution and the disadvantageous position in which the People's Republic found itself because of the Sino-Soviet split. On the other hand he noted that he could not trust Moscow since he felt it had designs on Chinese territory. He conceded Satō's point that were he to invade the mainland with US support, such foreign intervention would immediately alienate the Chinese people. Satō noted in his diary that 'he clearly has the will to invade, but lacks the ability'. Jiang asked Satō to convey his ideas to the leadership in the United States[17] Interestingly Premier Zhang Qun, Jiang's long-time associate and a fellow graduate of the Tokyo Jinbu Military Academy, asked Satō (in Japanese) to convey Jiang's thoughts to the United States but to do so with discretion.[18] Zhang, who later played a role in Japan's reconfiguration of its policy towards China as a result of the first 'Nixon shock' of 1971, saw that Jiang's dreams of returning to the mainland were unrealistic. Satō did not discuss Jiang's ambitions while in Washington. Satō may have made support for Taiwan's position a key element of his regional policy, but he was not prepared to indulge the old man's fantasies, which could result in a general, perhaps thermonuclear, conflict.

The first leg of Satō's tour of South-East Asia began on 20 September. Over the following ten days he visited Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Laos.[19] On 8 October Satō departed on the second leg of the tour, which included Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and South Vietnam.[20] An editorial in the *Asahi Shinbun* that day noted that all the countries on Satō's itinerary, save Indonesia, were involved in the war in South-East Asia. While not directly criticising Satō for visiting

Saigon, it observed that the entire trip was done with an eye to the reaction in Washington and that it would be far better for the government to articulate a policy towards South-East Asia which was not a secondary concern to Japan's policy towards the United States.[21] Not all of Satō's opponents were as even-handed; 2,500 protesters drawn from the Zengakuren students' union and the Socialist Party turned out in force at Haneda Airport in an attempt to halt his departure. In his diary Satō noted that as a result of careful planning by the authorities, he was not impeded and there were only two or three skirmishes between the police and the demonstrators. However, following his plane's departure clashes continued between the students and the police, including the use of tear gas and fire hoses. A 19-year-old student was killed when he was caught between two riot police vehicles.[22] Satō was shocked when he heard this, but his initial reaction was that the excesses of the demonstrators were likely to blame.[23] Press comment largely agreed and assigned responsibility for the tragedy to the student movement. This came as a great relief to Satō, who was also pleased that the Socialist Party had received bad publicity in light of their association with the protest.[24]

On both parts of his tour Satō was keen to stress to the leaders with whom he met a number of themes related to Japan's place in East Asia. The first and most important was highlighting that Japan had turned its back on the militarism and imperialism of the past and that its economic resurgence did not foreshadow a renewal of the threat which it had posed to all of these countries just over two decades before. Underlining this was Japan's reliance on the United States and the American nuclear umbrella and Japan's disavowal of producing an independent nuclear deterrent.[25] He was also keen to draw attention to the great successes of Japanese companies, including Panasonic, Bridgestone, Hino and Mazda, in exporting automobiles, tyres and consumer electronic goods to the region, as well as to Japan's emergence as a major aid donor.[26] For example, one of the signature projects Satō observed was the Japan-Philippines Friendship Highway in Manila.[27] This approach had drawbacks, however, as when Souvanna Phouma of Laos spent his time in conversation with Satō outlining a veritable shopping list of demands for support for various infrastructure projects. An exasperated Satō referred Phouma to Japan's ambassador in Vientiane.[28]

Satō was also keen to ascertain his counterparts' attitudes towards the Vietnam War and towards China, two areas which weighed heavily in all his conversations and on which there was little in the way of consensus. Harold Holt of Australia and Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand spoke of the grave threat posed by China to the region and the importance

of checking the communist advance in South-East Asia.[29] Indeed, in a display of insensitivity towards Asian (and indeed Japanese) concerns regarding a possible revival of Japanese militarism, Holt criticised Satō for Japan's failure to despatch troops in support of the American-led effort in Vietnam. Satō was taken aback by this and pointed to the constitutional limits placed on Japan with regard to developing full-scale military capabilities.[30] Ne Win of Burma expressed his desire to see an end to the conflict in the near future; he noted his own efforts and those of his fellow countryman U Thant, the Secretary General of the UN, in brokering a compromise between all interested parties. He noted that differing ideologies would have to coexist much as different religions had done. Peace was possible. 'Where there's a will there's a way,' he observed. All that was required was the necessary will.[31]

Neither Ferdinand Marcos, the president of the Philippines, nor Lee Kwan Yew, prime minister of Singapore, were as optimistic. Marcos noted that the regime in Saigon was failing to win the 'war for the hearts of the people'. When Satō observed to Lee how American society was divided between 'hawks' and 'doves', Lee stated that what the United States required were wise 'owls' who could figure out a solution to this intractable problem.[32] There was general agreement that China was headed towards isolationism, though the leaders felt that Beijing continued to enjoy a large measure of influence over Hanoi in spite of this, in large part to counter Moscow's growing sway in the region.[33]

For his own part Satō stressed the pragmatic nature of Japan's own policy of 'the separation of politics and economics', whereby Tokyo officially recognised the Chinese Nationalist regime but cultivated economic relations with the mainland. The door, Satō observed, was not closed. However, China's internal chaos, its turn towards international isolation (both associated with the Cultural Revolution) and its condemnation of his own government meant that no accommodation was possible.[34] With regard to Vietnam, Satō recognised the almost impossible situation with which the United States was faced: It could neither escalate, lest it invite a massive Chinese intervention (as had happened in the Korean War), nor could it simply withdraw and endure a massive defeat for the western camp in the region. He paid tribute to the US efforts and forbearance in waging a limited war.[35]

Towards the end of his tour Satō received some distressing news from Tokyo: Yoshida Shigeru, the 89-year-old former prime minister and his friend, mentor and counsel, had died. This was a great blow to Satō both personally and politically. In a statement to the press Satō stressed that there were no words to express his personal feelings at the loss of Yoshida

and noted that every Japanese person was aware of Yoshida's immense contribution to the reconstruction of Japan. Following this sincere and heartfelt tribute the press corps fell into silent prayer.[36] The news complicated Satō's itinerary: he was determined to get back to Japan as quickly as possible to extend his condolences to Yoshida's family, but he also wanted to complete his tour.[37] He was in Manila when he received the news, and it was decided that he would cut short his stay there and fly to Saigon, the last stop on his tour, the following day. He would meet with President Nguyen Van Thieu and Deputy President and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and then fly back to Japan, all on the same day. In one way this upheaval was a boon to Satō, whose wife, Hiroko, observed that Yoshida's final act had helped Satō. In dying when he did Yoshida distracted attention from the trip to Saigon, the tour's most controversial element.[38]

Satō was depressed by his meetings with the two South Vietnamese leaders since neither one expressed any enthusiasm for finding a peaceful solution to the war. Thieu noted that there was no way for the North and South to peacefully coexist since they had totally different political and economic systems. He had no time for the peaceful coexistence of which Ne Win of Burma had spoken so passionately.[39] For his part Ky observed that Saigon was open to negotiations. However, a bombing halt (which Hanoi demanded as a precondition) would give the North Vietnamese Army the opportunity to occupy the demilitarised zone with three or four divisions and hundreds of weapons. Ky rejected Satō's suggestion of a truce around the Tet New Year festivities, noting that this would serve only to give the NVA a chance to resupply its forces in the south.[40] Both men thanked Satō for the aid that Japan had provided and promptly asked for more. Satō, discouraged by their attitude towards ending the conflict, noted in his diary that they had given up on peace. Given his truncated visit to South Vietnam, Satō had no opportunity to tour the country and see for himself conditions on the ground. However, the sight of the American commander's official residence, which was guarded by a large detachment of troops and fortified with sandbags, told its own story about the precarious position of the South Vietnamese and the Americans in the war.[41]

So ended Satō's tour of South-East Asia and the Pacific. On the plane back to Tokyo there was a sense among the Japanese journalists who had travelled with Satō that the opening part of a 'grand operation' was concluded. The next phase was to be Satō's visit to the United States the following month. The assembled press men felt that Japan, as the only industrialised country in East Asia, had assumed a mantle of leadership

and that Satō deserved credit for this achievement.[42] These sentiments came across in an editorial in the *Yomiuri Shinbun* published a few days after Satō's return. It noted that the tour of Asia and Australasia encapsulated a new 'modernity and diversity' in Japan's relations with its neighbours and was a sign of Japan's growing influence in the region. The visit to Vietnam was seen as a powerful symbol that Japan stood with the United States in that conflict. With regard to criticism that had been levelled against Satō for doing nothing to advance peace in the region, the editorial noted that the prime minister's tour highlighted how Japan's success was based on peace and economic development and how this was a model for the other countries of Asia, something which Japan was promoting in a concrete way through the provision of economic aid to the region.[43]

As soon as Satō arrived back in Tokyo late at night on 21 October, he and his wife went immediately to pay their respects to Yoshida's family.[44] It was decided that in addition to a requiem mass (Yoshida was Roman Catholic), there would also be a national memorial service presided over by Satō and held at the Budōkan in Tokyo on 31 October.[45] Satō's eulogy, which was written by Kusuda, is of interest since it gives us an insight not only into the high regard Satō had for Yoshida but also Satō's view of his own place in history. He extolled the virtues of the late prime minister, who had steered Japan through its most difficult years in the aftermath of the defeat and destruction of the Second World War. For Satō, Yoshida was a great statesman, patriot, and a true representative of the Meiji era; he set Japan on a course towards peace and prosperity, though he had not been able to achieve the reversion of Okinawa. With this speech Satō presented himself as Yoshida's natural successor, who would continue along his mentor's path and accomplish what Yoshida had not been able to achieve.[46] Satō was well aware of how difficult this would be. Flying back to Tokyo from Saigon on the night of 21 October, he told Kusuda how large Yoshida loomed in his life. 'With Yoshida's death I have lost a great spiritual supporter. Yoshida had such a huge presence. I must try harder.'[47] Where Satō felt he needed to try harder was with regard to Okinawa.

Satō's summit with Lyndon Johnson, November 1967

The next phase of Satō's 'grand operation' in late 1967 was his summit meeting with US President Lyndon Johnson. As stated, one of Satō's calculations in making his tour of East Asia and Australasia (especially the inclusion of Taiwan and South Vietnam) was with an eye to official

reaction in Washington. This gamble – and given the intensity of the protests which marked Satō's departure, it was indeed a gamble – seemed to have paid off. Robert McNamara praised Satō to the president, noting, 'That guy put his political future in his hands when he went to Vietnam.'[48] This was part of a wider strategy of persuading the United States that since Japan, at least the Satō administration, was sympathetic to America's broad security concerns in East Asia, movement towards reversion of Okinawa would not limit America's freedom of action. Another part of this strategy was Satō's attempts to 'raise the defence consciousness' in order to encourage greater understanding of defence issues amongst the Japanese people – for example, by encouraging debate in Japan on the merits of accepting the continued use by America of Okinawa as a nuclear base so as to accelerate the reversion of the island.[49] However, as will be shown, in the context of the visit to Japan of the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, this was only a limited success.

So as to further smooth agreement on reversion, Satō despatched a personal envoy to Washington, Wakaizumi Kei, a professor of international relations at Kyoto Sangyō University, public intellectual, and adviser to the Japanese government. He was also on friendly terms with Walt Rostow, his fellow international relations scholar and Lyndon Johnson's National Security Adviser. Satō could not completely trust the Foreign Ministry since Minister for Foreign Affairs Miki Takeo was the leader of a rival faction within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (following the common practice of dividing the spoils of power among competing elements within the party). Satō then preferred to conduct his own backchannel diplomacy in parallel with official contacts. Wakaizumi met with Rostow on 27 October and delivered a presentation on the merits of reversion. He stressed that though the American bases on Okinawa were important, the alliance was more important still. So as to continue to nurture the cooperative relationship with Japan, it was in the interest of the United States to retrocede the island and maintain its military presence there.[50]

By this time the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not moved from opposition to reversion. They particularly opposed the likely reversion of the Ogasawara (or Bonin) Islands. This island chain was separate from Okinawa and contained limited storage facilities for nuclear weapons, though these were not in use at the time. The JCS made the outrageous claim that these islands would be essential for American naval strength in the Pacific should all other bases be destroyed by a nuclear strike. Experts on Japan at the State Department knew that while Satō

could return with a signal that the reversion of Okinawa was a likely prospect in the long term, they also understood that if he failed to show his supporters and opponents alike that he was able to deliver the reversion of these relatively unimportant islands, he was likely to lose office.[51] Both Rusk and McNamara were confident that the islands could be retroceded without causing any damage to America's military position in East Asia. What really troubled the Joint Chiefs was the precedent this could set down the line for the reversion of Okinawa with the consequent loss of nuclear storage rights there. However, as Rostow noted to President Johnson, this represented an outdated viewpoint more suited to the immediate post-war period. He further observed that 'Our objective can only now be a gradual and judicious transition to a new relationship in which the Japanese take increased responsibility as a partner as we alter the essential occupation status of these islands.'[52] In this context Alex Johnson criticised the military for the propensity to sacrifice a reliable friend for so little. Ultimately the viewpoint of Lyndon Johnson's civilian advisers won out, largely, as Alex Johnson observed acidly, because their arguments 'had the advantage of being logical'.[53]

With the summit drawing near, Washington and Tokyo made their final preparations. A memorandum written by a member of Rostow's National Security Council staff praised Japan for the steps it had taken to assert a leadership position in non-communist Asia and noted its support for the Vietnam War in providing the use of bases and repair facilities.[54] It also included a wish list of items that Japan could provide the United States. This had been personally requested by President Johnson who, at the close of a meeting of the National Security Council on 30 August, said, 'we had a good idea of what the Japanese want, but he wanted to know what we want.'[55] These included an increased foreign aid budget and steps to alleviate America's balance-of-payments deficit.[56]

In a final series of meetings before their respective leaders were due to meet, Wakaizumi outlined Satō's position to Rostow. He conveyed Satō's appreciation for the considerable movement which had been made on the issue of the Ogasawara Islands. He further noted that he had strongly advised the prime minister to be prepared to unequivocally state Japan's support for America's position on the Vietnam War and to assist with US balance-of-payments problems and agree to provide more regional development assistance. Though Wakaizumi stressed his understanding of America's difficulties with compromise on the reversion of Okinawa, particularly while it remained involved in Vietnam, he underscored the importance of this for Satō's political survival. Satō desired the following

to be inserted into the joint communiqué that was to be issued at the close of the summit.

> As a result of their discussion, the President and Prime Minister agreed that the two governments, guided by the aim of returning the administrative right over the Ryukyu islands to Japan [~~at an earliest possible date~~] [*sic*] should hold consultations through diplomatic channels to examine matters pertaining to reversion *with a view to reaching within a few years, an agreement on a date satisfactory to the two governments for the reversion of these islands*. [*sic*]

The main addition, underlined in the original, was the 'within a few years' formulation. Such an agreement to agree would satisfy Satō's domestic audience and also, it was felt, be politically feasible for Johnson. For his part Rostow noted how the situation in Asia remained in flux. In addition to the Vietnam War, China was becoming increasingly unpredictable. It was unwise to raise expectations amongst the Japanese people as to when reversion might occur.[57] Following a second meeting between the two men two days later, Wakaizumi made an impassioned plea: 'Mr Satō feels that now President Johnson can alone deliver such a decision [he] badly needs at home. In return … he is determined to do everything possible to help the president in spite of a certain political price he has to pay.'[58]

Satō departed for the United States on 12 November; once again left-wing student demonstrators gathered at Haneda Airport in an effort to halt his departure. They also protested the war in Vietnam, the US-Japanese alliance and America's continuing presence on Okinawa. Some 1,500 protesters turned out in force and were met by 500 right-wing counterprotesters. Three hundred were arrested. Though the clashes were violent, the only loss of life was an act of self-immolation in front of the *Kantei* by a 73-year-old man. However, neither this dramatic act nor the protests were enough to sway public opinion against Satō. They did, however, serve to underscore the heightened atmosphere in Japan with regard to the coming summit.[59]

Meanwhile in Washington, Alex Johnson, who had been excluded from the Wakaizumi-Rostow backchannel, learned of the 'within a few years' formula from the Japanese side. This struck him as more than his superiors were likely to agree to. As a result he flew to Seattle to meet the prime minister who was *en route* to Washington. Johnson, expressing significant doubts regarding this formula during his impromptu meeting with Satō and alerted him to the significant gulf between the

two sides that remained right up to the beginning of the summit. Satō also received word from Wakaizumi that matters remained undecided. This was most unwelcome news for Satō, who began to worry that the whole enterprise might end in failure.[60]

Satō had the first of two meetings with President Johnson on 14 November, the day following his arrival in Washington. He was tense and nervous and did not sleep well the previous night despite having taken two sleeping tablets.[61] Johnson announced his desire to listen to Satō and hear what he had to say, but he also wanted to hear back from Rusk and McNamara (who were also to have meetings with Satō), before fully engaging with Satō at their second and final conversation. Satō spoke of the necessity of fixing a date for a decision on the reversion of Okinawa. Alluding to Japan's recent success in staging the Olympic Summer Games in 1964 (for which he had been the coordinating minister), he noted that the key to this triumph was the fact that those involved had a date to work towards. By the same token Japan needed to make the appropriate preparations for the return of Okinawa. Satō also pleaded that the one million Japanese living on Okinawa 'be reunited with their brothers in the homeland' but was also sure to note that he was not arguing that America should lose its bases there. He stressed that while Japan would do its best to alleviate America's balance-of-payments crisis, it could not do all that was requested. Japan would assist the American deficit to the order of $300 million, not the $500 million desired.[62] Due to Johnson's decision not to engage, Satō felt that the conversation had been 'meagre'.

In any case Satō had a far more involved meeting with McNamara later that afternoon. Though they were joined by their respective aides and officials (in contrast to his private one-on-one with President Johnson), Satō felt that this conversation was more like a personal exchange of views.[63] In a sign that his gamble had paid off, McNamara heaped praise on Satō for visiting Vietnam and expressing solidarity with the United States. It was, McNamara observed, 'a courageous act, which served to begin to convince the American people that Japan associated itself with the U.S. effort.' What was necessary in the long term, McNamara argued, was a deeper partnership between Japan and the United States. Japan should assume more and more of the burden for guaranteeing the security of East Asia, initially through the provision of economic aid and development assistance but ultimately by playing a military role. This was linked to the reversion of Okinawa, on which the question was reframed:

> The Ryukyus were bound to revert to Japan. The question was not one of reversion but of bases and the Mutual Security Treaty. … These

> all carried unwritten assumptions that Japan would act in a way which would permit the use of bases. Reversion was certain, but what was uncertain was the role of bases. We could not leave U.S. forces exposed and unable to operate effectively. Japan must permit the U.S. to operate militarily in the Ryukyus in ways which might ultimately involve operations requiring nuclear weapons to be placed there and combat operations to be conducted from there.

For his part Satō agreed with McNamara's sentiments; he noted he had no desire to see America's conventional and nuclear deterrent weakened in any way. This was vital for Japan's own security, especially since, as Satō also told McNamara, Japan would trust in the US nuclear umbrella and not develop its own nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Satō recognised the regional importance of America's presence on Okinawa, which had been stressed to him by Jiang Jieshi. However, he also underlined the difficult political position he was in, with a rising clamour for reversion coupled with a general distaste for nuclear weapons. It was therefore too early to speak of the relationship between the MST, American nuclear weapons and the reversion of Okinawa. What he was looking for at that moment was agreement that a date for reversion would be arrived at in the near future.[64] Since all decisions rested with the president, McNamara could not give Satō an indication of the final result of the summit. In any case Satō felt that he had adequately made his point.[65]

In contrast to McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, with whom Satō met the following day, was far less constructive in his comments on reversion. Rusk preferred to stress the difficulties this posed to the United States at a time when it was fighting a war in Vietnam and was also dealing with China and its nuclear ambitions. Congress would not countenance any diminution of America's military position, he said. Satō hoped that the United States would be able to take a small step forward on reversion and noted that this would not affect America's bases. Rusk rejected Satō's proposed wording for the communiqué on Okinawa, the 'within a few years' formula, as raising expectations too high. He pointed out that the communiqué already included agreement on reversion of the Ogasawara Islands, as well as interim measures designed to promote the economy and welfare of the people of Okinawa. He then proposed the following language for the joint communiqué:

> [the Prime Minister] emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two Governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of [the Ryukyu] Islands. The President

> stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these Islands.

This contained the 'within a few years' wording preferred by Japan but with the addition that the president 'fully understands' rather than accepts this. After reviewing the proposal Satō pronounced it 'taihen kekko' – 'excellent'. However, the final decision on issuing the communiqué rested with President Johnson, with whom Satō was to have a final conversation immediately following his meeting with Rusk.[66]

In marked contrast to the earlier 'meagre' conversation with President Johnson, at their second meeting Satō was subjected to what the American interpreter James Wickel termed a 'high pressure sales job'.[67] Johnson wrangled commitments from him on matters as diverse as increasing aid to the Asian Development Bank and to Indonesia, providing assistance to America's payments deficit (through the purchase of securities) and developing an educational television system for rural South Vietnam. In Johnson's eyes Japan, as the producer of thousands of televisions and transistor radios, was in a perfect position to assist in this regard. Johnson was himself a former elementary school teacher and the owner of several local television stations in his native Texas. He had been impressed with the success of a similar programme he had seen in Samoa.[68] Though Johnson ultimately agreed to issue the communiqué, Satō was flabbergasted by Johnson's tough approach and noted in his diary that Johnson 'delved deeply into the question of international aid and would not move'.[69] This was a signature tactic by Johnson and came to be known as 'the Treatment', part of which was having a guest sit in a lower chair. It was best described by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak:

> The Treatment could last ten minutes or four hours. … Its tone could be supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, scorn, tears, complaint, the hint of threat. … Its velocity was breathtaking. … Interjections from the target were rare. Johnson anticipated them before they could be spoken. … Mimicry, humour, and the genius of analogy made The Treatment an almost hypnotic experience and rendered the target stunned and helpless.[70]

Satō was not entirely helpless after his experience of 'the Treatment', but he was certainly stunned. Following the private meeting Johnson announced to the assembled American and Japanese officials waiting in the cabinet room next to the Oval Office that he had secured agreement from Satō on increasing aid to Indonesia. For his part Satō stayed

silent. Alex Johnson, who believed that Satō had not in fact agreed to anything, later recalled that any time he brought the matter up with Satō the Prime Minister 'winced'.[71]

In any case Satō was able to return to Japan with what he needed: significant forward movement on the reversion issue. Not only would the Ogasawara Islands revert within a year, but the question of Okinawa reversion had been reframed. Previously US-Japanese summit communiqués had concluded that any change to the status of Okinawa was unthinkable until the security situation in East Asia improved. Following the November 1967 summit such language was dropped – a significant concession to the Japanese position.[72] Worries were expressed within the Japanese delegation over different translations of the 'within a few years' clause, which was rendered in Japanese as 'two to three years'.[73] However, Walt Rostow assured Wakaizumi that as far as he was concerned, 'within a few years' meant that a decision on reversion would be made by 1970. The president, Rusk and McNamara all felt the same way. Should Johnson win re-election the following November, it was his intention that an agreement would be reached during 1969. In the meantime, Rostow observed, the Japanese people had to be persuaded of the merit of engaging in a partnership with the United States for the peace and security of East Asia and the essential importance of the bases on Okinawa to the accomplishment of this. Rostow also made clear to Wakaizumi that Satō's Asian tour and his firm support for America's Vietnam policy were key to establishing a friendly rapport between the two leaders and to the successful outcome of the summit.[74] It should be noted that by autumn 1967, Johnson had begun to come under increasing domestic pressure over his handling of the war.[75] The month prior to Satō's arrival, over 100,000 demonstrators marched on Washington to protest the Vietnam War.[76] In this context, firm support from America's main ally in the region was most welcome, and Satō can be judged to have made a well-calculated risk in including South Vietnam on his tour.

The year 1967 thus ended on a high note for US-Japanese relations, but 1968 would see the alliance severely tested.

The year from hell

The year 1968 was an annus horribilis for Lyndon Johnson. At the end of January, North Vietnam launched what became known as the Tet Offensive, named after the Vietnamese New Year, against the South. Though the offensive was ultimately a military defeat for the North, the

initial success of the communist forces – who were able to penetrate the US embassy compound in Saigon – pointed to the severe shortcomings of America's efforts in South-East Asia.[77] A week after the offensive a US signals intelligence ship, the USS *Pueblo*, and its crew were captured by North Korea.[78] On 31 March Johnson announced his decision not to seek re-election and concentrate instead on negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. Internally the United States was wracked by inner-city riots, which grew worse following the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. in April and Robert Kennedy in June. The year 1968 also proved to be a low point in US-Japanese relations. Just as the year dawned Lyndon Johnson announced a series of restrictive measures designed to prevent international speculation on the dollar. This was followed later that month by a firestorm of trade union and student protests when the USS *Enterprise*, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, made a long-planned port call to Japan. The need to safeguard the besieged American garrison at Khe Sanh in Vietnam resulted in a marked increase in B-52 bombing sorties from Okinawa, which also led to public protest and official complaints. By the time the *Pueblo* was seized, the atmosphere in Japan had become so hostile to the United States that even Satō was reluctant to assert boldly his support for it. Johnson's announcement of 31 March was interpreted in Japan as an admission of the failure of his Vietnam policy. This reversal sparked fears among Japan's conservative leadership that America was embarking on a withdrawal from its military commitments in Asia – to the likely detriment of Japan.

The *Enterprise* visit crystallised public opposition to nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War and particularly the US-Japanese alliance, since it became a potent symbol of all three. Satō's previous efforts at raising defence issues added fuel to these flames and put Japanese officials on notice that domestic pacifism remained a potent force. Satō himself was particularly alarmed at the violence and vehemence of the protests which took place both in the port city of Sasebo and in Tokyo. He saw the events as dashing his hopes of raising defence consciousness and elevating the defence portfolio to a full ministry.[79] The radicalising effect of the *Enterprise* visit was apparent with the rise in Japanese objections, including those of some senior Japanese leaders, to the use of Okinawa as a base for B-52 bombing raids on Vietnam in support of the beleaguered garrison at Khe Sanh.

In addition, in an attempt to quell public disquiet, Kimura Takeo, Satō's chief cabinet secretary and press spokesman, stated that the government would 'respect' popular views on the *Enterprise* issue. The statement troubled Satō and other leading conservatives. Fukuda Takeo,

LDP chairman exclaimed, 'He said what?!' Shimoinaba Kōkichi, one of Satō's private secretaries and a former Interior Ministry bureaucrat, felt it would cause difficulties for the police who were attempting to keep order on the streets of Sasebo and Tokyo.[80] Satō was right to worry that Kimura's statement would sour relations with the United States and stressed that this line needed to be corrected.[81] Later that day Fukuda publicly stated that there was no need for 'consideration of national sentiment' on future port calls by nuclear-powered US vessels. Fukuda also echoed Satō's earlier attempts to raise defence issues by calling for a national debate on providing for Japan's defence. Kimura, acting under orders from Satō, then strained credulity by claiming there was no divergence between Fukuda's views and his own.[82]

By this stage however American officials had greater worries. On the afternoon of 23 January 1968, as Kimura was tying himself in knots before the press, the US intelligence-gathering ship *Pueblo*, which was moored 32 kilometres off the coast of the North Korean port of Wonsan, was seized by the North Korean military, and its crew was incarcerated.[83] In a show of force designed to deter any further acts of aggression by Pyongyang, the *Enterprise* was sent from Sasebo towards the Japan Sea, where it joined a fleet of American battleships. Voices on the left in Japan claimed this was merely a pretext and that it was their protests which had caused the carrier's departure.[84] American policy aims in response to the crisis were threefold. First, to ensure the prompt and safe return of the 83 captured sailors; second, to placate South Korea and ensure that President Park Chung-Hee did not withdraw his country's troops from Vietnam or escalate tensions; third, to avoid being drawn into a confrontation on the Korean peninsula.[85] Naturally the United States turned to Japan, its main ally in the region, but found the response to what it regarded as a direct provocation frustratingly lukewarm and equivocal. Satō was under increasing pressure both at home and abroad for his support of America's actions in Vietnam, so Tokyo initially maintained official neutrality on the rights and wrongs of the case. Washington and Pyongyang disagreed on whether or not the *Pueblo* had been in international waters at the time of its seizure. Under pressure from the United States the Japanese government announced that it accepted the US version of events but stopped short of full support for American policy.[86]

Satō's dilemma was that he could not simply ignore the tide of public anger directed against the United States, particularly since he had associated himself so closely with American policy, nor could he completely repudiate Washington and thus dash all hopes of securing reversion,

to say nothing of wrecking the alliance on which Japan relied for its defence. Satō felt obliged to have Tōgō Fumihiko, a senior Gaimushō bureaucrat in the America section, deliver an oral protest to the United States, calling on Washington to take Japanese sentiment into account with regard to B-52 flights from Okinawa.[87] Though Alex Johnson and his fellow American diplomats recognised the bind that Satō was in, this protest aroused the ire of Secretary of State Dean Rusk.[88] Rusk, who did not share his subordinates' nuanced view of Satō's political difficulties, declared in a missive to Alex Johnson, 'It is almost more than the flesh and spirit can bear to have Japan whining about Okinawa while we are losing several hundred killed each month in behalf of our common security in the Pacific.'[89]

A few days after this blistering cable Ambassador Shimoda was called in for a meeting with William Bundy, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. The meeting was recommended by Alex Johnson, who felt it would have a knock-on effect in Tokyo and assist the Gaimushō's efforts at bringing policy around to a more pro-American line – or in Johnson's phrase, 'pull up the [Government of Japan's] socks'.[90] America's two main areas of concern were Japanese opposition to the B-52 missions operating from Okinawa and Tokyo's 'mincing in their words of support for [South Korea] or criticism of the *Pueblo* incident'. Japan's security was tied to Korea's, and although Tokyo had been helpful with discreet support for Korea, the effect of its public pronouncements meant that the impression was given that 'despite its large and acknowledged stake in Korea, [Japan] has had its head in the sand, fearful of military involvement and putting all the pressure on [the U.S.]'. Though Johnson understood Satō's difficulties, as he outlined in a letter to Richard Sneider, the State Department's country director for Japan, it was time for pressure to be put on Japan.[91] For Johnson the question was whether or not placing B-52s on Okinawa and enlisting Japanese political support on Korea was worth potentially jeopardising Satō's position. As he outlined to Sneider,

> I feel that the stakes for us in Vietnam and Korea are so high and so urgent that we should no longer hold back our punches with the GOJ [Government of Japan] in the hope that by continuing to be overly solicitous of GOJ domestic sensitivities we will be able to nurture the Japanese to the point that they will be able to better stand with us in some future crisis. Frankly I feel that the crisis is here and that we should have no hesitancy in seeking to 'cash some of the checks' against the long line of deposits we have made with the Japanese.[92]

The gloves, then, were decidedly off. In parallel with Shimoda's briefing, Johnson made strong representations to Satō and Miki. This dual-pronged approach brought forth more frank public support for America's actions in Vietnam.[93] Such arm-twisting, conducted behind closed doors, was the very essence of quiet diplomacy. However, the very fact that such strong representations were seen as necessary shows that Alex Johnson's attempts to induce Japan to 'mature' in its attitudes towards defence issues had yet to make a breakthrough.

Such public support, however, could not impact on military realities in Vietnam or on the political situation in the United States. An increasingly intractable stalemate in Vietnam and a poor showing in early Democratic Party primaries (as well as his wife's concerns for his health) led Lyndon Johnson to withdraw from the presidential election. He also felt that by removing himself from the political fray he could do more to bring about an end to the war.[94] This act was widely interpreted in Japan as an admission of failure on LBJ's part. It also exposed Satō to intense criticism for having associated Japan so closely with a costly and bloody war and a failed policy.[95] Privately Satō welcomed what he read as a change from attempting to impose a solution through military means towards a quest for a peaceful conclusion through diplomacy.[96] However, he also fretted that Johnson's decision not to seek re-election would be a setback for his goal of securing the reversion of Okinawa, given his agreement with Johnson at the November 1967 summit that a decision on reversion would be reached within two or three years. Wakaizumi reassured him that US policy on Japan and Okinawa would continue along non-partisan lines.[97] Besides the issue of Okinawa, Johnson's announcement represented a major policy reversal, and it was now the turn of Japan to question the reliability of a shaky ally. In a move illustrative both of Satō's preferred style and the disparities of power between the two countries, Satō despatched Wakaizumi to discreetly sound out officials in Washington rather than call in the US ambassador for a dressing-down, as had happened to Shimoda. Wakaizumi met with Bundy and Sneider on 10 May, played down the importance of the left-wing protests against the *Enterprise* port call and concentrated on the 'larger issue of growing misunderstanding and distrust of the United States on the part not only of the left but important conservative elements' – Satō and his political allies.[98] Wakaizumi also outlined how the Tet Offensive and Lyndon Johnson's speech, which had become known in Japan as the 'Johnson shock', and the seizure of the *Pueblo* were 'misinterpreted' in Japan. The impression arose that the United States had been defeated

and was withdrawing from Asia and embracing a new form of isolationism. Within this context, anxiety was developing among conservative elites that the United States was no longer a reliable or credible ally. Furthermore, fears were developing that the United States would soon bypass Japan and come to an accommodation with China, just as it was circumventing Saigon in negotiating directly with North Vietnam. It was therefore felt that Japan should come to its own rapprochement with Beijing. Bundy for his part assured Wakaizumi that the United States would be negotiating with the North Vietnamese at Paris from a position of strength and that the reaction to the *Pueblo* incident showed US determination to defend its interests, including Japan, in North-East Asia.

Bundy's upbeat conclusions were not shared across the Pacific. In a commentary written at the beginning of 1969, Tōgō re-examined US-Japanese relations. He saw the crises of 1968 as temporary phenomena whose impact would be short term, but they were symptomatic of a larger problem. In an echo of Alex Johnson he bemoaned the utopian bent of pacifism then current in Japanese public discourse. This, he felt, was completely divorced from prevailing international realities. He was also critical of the failure of political leaders to publicly articulate their privately held views on the necessity of an American security guarantee.[99] However, he differed from Johnson in doubting that the Japanese people would ever see the advantages of the US-Japanese alliance. He noted that there were two central problems with longer-term impact: the expectation that the Japanese people would eventually see the advantages of the US-Japanese alliance coupled with the great unlikelihood of that ever happening.[100]

Tōgō offered no solution to the difficulties he diagnosed. However, they showed that 'quiet diplomacy' was only a limited success. It did result in significant compromise being made on the issue of reversion and saw Japan take some tentative steps towards more 'mature' defence and regional policies. However, such moves were largely superficial and were exposed as such during a series of crises in early 1968. Moreover, Alex Johnson's expectation that the Japanese people would someday shed their ingrained pacifism and become less suspicious of the exercise of military power was a miscalculation, to say the least. This problem in US-Japanese relations would play a significant role in the negotiations that led to agreement on the reversion of Okinawa, which took place in 1969. However, before turning to that issue it is first necessary to examine a separate but related topic: official Japanese attitudes towards nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons policy

On 11 December 1967 Satō made a statement to the Lower House Budget Committee on defence appropriations. Satō had just returned from the United States, having been left in no doubt that a 'mature' attitude to defence issues was vital if the reversion of Okinawa was to be agreed to. He was also faced with a socialist opposition which questioned the very need for (and indeed the constitutionality of) even limited defence capabilities. In this context Satō made a clear argument that as prime minister he had responsibility for the security of the Japanese people. In his view the Japanese Self-Defence Forces and the Mutual Security Treaty were essential to the nation. This was, he declared, fully in line with Japan's 'peace' constitution, which denied the right of belligerency or the maintenance of offensive military forces. Satō then observed that Japan's nuclear policy was also informed by the constitution and thus stated that 'We will not possess nuclear [weapons], nor will we produce them, nor will we allow nuclear [weapons] to be introduced [into Japan]. These are the three principles with respect to nuclear weapons.'[101] Importantly Satō also noted that following his discussions with President Johnson in 1965, he had been assured the United States would defend Japan against *any* attack. This 'nuclear umbrella', or extended deterrent, was not, in Satō's view, a contravention of Japan's constitution.[102] For Satō these two elements, the Three Non-nuclear Principles and the reliance on the extended US deterrent, went together. However, the opposition parties seized on the Three Non-nuclear Principles and sought to have them passed as a Diet resolution. Doing so would not only have copper-fastened them as official policy but would also have tied the hands of Japan's negotiators looking for the reversion of Okinawa. As will be seen in Chapter 3, Satō maintained for as long as was feasible his 'blank slate' policy with regard to accepting the continuing presence of US nuclear weapons on Okinawa following reversion.

Wakaizumi attempted to find a solution to this dilemma. He was charged by Satō with writing the prime minister's annual policy speech to the Diet for January 1968. Since this was the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Meiji era (and the start of Japan's modernisation), the traditional format of seeking input from government ministries was abandoned in favour of producing a more visionary address to the nation. The initial title, 'Living in the Nuclear Age', was dropped for being too lofty, but its central premise was retained. Wakaizumi articulated the Four Pillars of Nuclear Policy. The Three Non-nuclear Principles formed one of the pillars, along with reliance on the US nuclear

deterrent, the promotion of nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear power. In this way it was hoped that the idealism of Japan's anti-nuclear sentiment could be married with the pragmatism of relying on the extended US deterrent.[103]

Wakaizumi's draft was forwarded to Satō for approval and then edited by Kusuda.[104] It was then sent to the LDP's General Affairs Committee for its endorsement. Satō had wanted to excise the section on non-introduction of nuclear weapons from the speech, but one of the members of the committee, Ikeda Masanosuke, objected and insisted on its retention. He was supported by a group of cabinet ministers led by Nakasone Yasuhiro.[105] Kusunoki Ayako concludes that Satō could not override his party's wishes, and so the non-introduction principle was retained. She also suggests that Satō may well have welcomed the retention of the non-introduction clause on the grounds that he felt it would give him greater scope to persuade the United States to remove its nuclear weapons from Okinawa prior to its reversion to Japan.[106] This conclusion ignores Satō's desire that the non-introduction principle be removed prior to delivering his speech in January and, indeed, Wakaizumi's conclusion that it would hamper negotiations on Okinawa. Satō remained unhappy with this clause. He told Alex Johnson a year later that he thought the Three Non-nuclear Principles were 'nonsense', much to the consternation of the two Japanese officials present (Hori Shigeru and Tōgō Fumihiko). He was quick to assure Johnson that Japan would not develop nuclear weapons, a clear sign that it was the non-introduction clause that was the problem.[107] Why then did Satō include a non-introduction pledge when he first articulated the Three Non-nuclear Principles in December 1967? The answer is that, for once, Satō faltered in his efforts at walking a narrow line between ensuring Japan's defence whilst paying due regard to popular pacifism and anti-nuclear sentiment. He may also have belatedly come to realise the importance of 'nuclear introduction' for the maintenance of the nuclear umbrella.

The question of Satō's attitude towards the development of an independent Japanese deterrent is more difficult to answer. On the one hand he was quite clear on coming to office that he felt it only natural that Japan should have its own deterrent since China had developed one. As outlined in Chapter 1, this may well have simply been a ploy to induce the United States to extend its deterrent to Japan. In September 1967 he privately told Kusuda that he despaired of the Japanese people ever approaching security issues seriously. 'I should just come out and say that nuclear weapons are necessary and then resign,' he declared. A surprised Kusuda responded that it was far too soon for such an action.[108] Kurosaki

Akira concludes from Satō's exchange with Kusuda in September 1967 that Satō had a blind spot with regard to the Johnson administration's firm policy on non-proliferation. There was no way the United States would have tolerated the development by Japan of an independent deterrent.[109] The judgement is quite harsh and prioritises the contents of a private conversation in a railway carriage as carrying more significance than it ought. On his first visit to the United States as prime minister in 1965, Satō had noted the desirability of Japan developing its own deterrent to counter the threat from China. However, this may well have been a ploy to induce the United States to extend its nuclear umbrella over Japan. In any case between then and late 1967, Satō assumed a very different line. On his tour of Asian capitals (which started the same month as his conversation with Kusuda) and in his meetings with US officials in November 1967, he was unequivocal in stating that Japan would not develop its own nuclear weapons and would instead rely on America's extended deterrent.

What is more likely is that this episode illustrates how conflicted Satō was on nuclear weapons with regard to both the US nuclear umbrella and an independent Japanese deterrent. It seems that Satō was intent on keeping his options as open as possible. However, the negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa would expose these issues to heavy scrutiny.

3
The Reversion of Okinawa, 1969, Part 1

On 26 November 1969 Satō returned to Tokyo following a meeting with American President Richard M. Nixon in Washington. In an emotional and heartfelt address to the nation, he announced that he had reached agreement on his long-cherished goal of securing the return of Okinawa to Japan. He also declared that nuclear weapons would be removed prior to reversion and that US military bases there would operate under the same restrictions as those in the rest of Japan.[1] It was Satō's greatest achievement; however, it was marred by Nixon's linkage of the Okinawa agreement with a backroom deal on reducing the volume of Japanese textile imports into the United States and on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons should an emergency require it. Despite Satō's achievement, historians, loath to give him the credit he deserves, have focused on the shortcoming of the deal. Michael Schaller and Walter LaFeber, for example, fail to give adequate praise to Satō but are on firmer ground when they condemn Nixon for his woefully misjudged attempt to link agreement on Okinawa with a deal on textile imports.[2] John Welfield gives credit to the Satō administration for securing the return of Okinawa without incurring any new overseas defence obligations but argues that had the Japanese negotiated more firmly and been prepared to wait two years longer, they could have received more favourable terms, particularly with regard to the nuclear question.[3] This is an unfair conclusion given the immense pressure on Satō to secure reversion and the equally powerful opposition of the US Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the loss of nuclear storage rights on Okinawa. In these circumstances Satō negotiated the best possible deal for Japan, one that bowed to popular feeling on nuclear weapons but also managed to preserve the essential security relationship, including, most importantly, the

nuclear umbrella. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes's *Keystone* is an excellently researched and well-written account of the role of Okinawa in US-Japanese relations from the conquest of the island in 1945 by the US Marines to its retrocession to Japan in 1972.[4] With regard to the agreement on reversion he correctly underlines the fact that this was a significant achievement for both Japan and the United States.[5] However, it was published 15 years ago, and much new archival material has been released during the intervening years, particularly in Tokyo. This chapter and the following two chapters make full use of this new material and offer new insights into the reversion negotiations. Christopher Aldous emphasises the role played by the pro-reversion movement on Okinawa itself as being central to agreement being reached.[6] While this was important (especially in persuading US policymakers of the merits of reversion), it was the high politics and international diplomacy conducted between Washington and Tokyo, described here, which brought about the breakthrough. Komine Yukinori's recent article explores the linkage between the base and the nuclear issues in the US-Japanese negotiations.[7] Perhaps Satō's strongest critic is Ōta Masakatsu, who excoriates him for turning his back on the Three Non-nuclear Principles and betraying his people by coming to a secret agreement with Nixon on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons.[8] Ōta's criticisms stand in contrast to more recent works which stress Satō's pragmatism and good faith.[9] This book follows a similar line of argument and, drawing on recently released material from the Diplomatic Archives in Tokyo, puts forth the view that Satō obtained the best possible outcome for Japan in securing the return of Okinawa, preserving the American security guarantee and, insofar as was practical, taking popular views into account.

At the outset of Satō's tenure as minister for foreign affairs, his close ally Aichi Kiichi declared 1969 to be the year of Okinawa, signalling the start of a major push for the return of administrative rights to Tokyo.[10] Richard Nixon, the newly inaugurated president, advocated a new approach to foreign policy which stressed improved superpower relations, greater multilateralism and the assumption by allies of a greater defence burden.[11] Nixon had a great deal of experience with Japan, having visited it during his tenure as vice president and during his wilderness years in the 1960s. During one such trip to Japan as vice president, Nixon called for the abandonment of the 'no-war' clause in the Japanese constitution.[12] In common with many US officials, he felt that Japan's abandonment of its rights to declare war and to maintain armed forces was informed by the unrealistic utopianism which characterised

the early years of the American-led occupation of Japan. It was a theme that Nixon returned to during his presidency.

Beyond Japan, Nixon held a deep interest in international relations and decided at the outset of his administration that he would play an active role in the arena of foreign policy. His chief collaborator in centralising foreign policymaking within the White House was Henry A. Kissinger, whom he appointed as his special assistant for national security affairs, more commonly known as national security advisor (NSA), and later as Secretary of State. Alex Johnson, the US ambassador in Tokyo, was promoted to under-secretary of state for political affairs, essentially the most senior post for a career diplomat in the State Department. His main responsibility was the supervision and coordination of the department's functions, though he retained a strong interest in relations with Japan. His appointment coincided with Kissinger's dismantling of the foreign policymaking structures which Johnson had helped create in 1966. Essentially Kissinger stripped the State Department of its dominant role in crafting foreign policy and transferred those functions to his own National Security Council (NSC) staff. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger valued the State Department, seeing it as slow moving and unyielding.[13] As Johnson later wrote, 'Kissinger certainly enjoyed putting the boot in State whenever possible, I never doubted that Nixon was ultimately behind him.'[14] This centralisation of power in the White House also undermined the influence of the Defence Department, the Joint Chief of Staff and the CIA. Kissinger rapidly consolidated his central position and came to dominate policymaking and execution through bureaucratic manoeuvring and by making himself indispensable to Nixon. However, at the outset of the Nixon administration he felt himself to be in a precarious position vis-à-vis the State Department.[15]

For the most part Kissinger did not regard Japan as a priority area. On the few occasions when Japan commanded his attention, his dealings were marked by misunderstanding and a degree of acrimony. As he later acknowledged, he failed to appreciate the validity and, indeed, success of Japan's post-war strategy of concentrating on economic growth over the more traditional acquisition of military and political power.[16] Moreover he was irked by the bureaucratic style of the Japanese leaders and officials with whom he dealt and their attempts to cultivate contact with him. He was particularly annoyed that Ushiba Nobuhiko, the Japanese ambassador, would always serve Wiener schnitzel when he was asked to the embassy for lunch.[17] He found this an awkward attempt at ingratiation and was not mollified when told by a State Department expert that the schnitzel was a favourite of Ushiba, who had advanced through the Gaimushō's German stream.[18] (This episode

has been widely cited by historians of US-Japanese relations to show Kissinger's ill will towards Japan.) Walter LaFeber goes so far as to use it to illustrate a lack of cultural sensitivity on Ushiba's part.[19] However it speaks more to Kissinger's self-centredness and preoccupation with status. Other attempts by embassy officials to get close to Kissinger fared no better.[20] Unfortunately for America's relations with Japan, Kissinger's positive reassessment of Japan did not occur while he was in office.

Armin Meyer was appointed to replace Johnson as ambassador in Tokyo and took up his post in June 1969.[21] Meyer was a Middle East specialist who had been ambassador to Iran, and his appointment was part of an effort against 'localitis', the phenomenon of foreign service officers tending to argue the case for the country or region of their speciality rather than the country they represent.[22] Though irked by lacking the same entrée in Tokyo as he had had in Tehran, he was ably assisted by Richard Sneider and other career Japan-specialists.[23] At the outset of the Nixon administration Sneider was seconded from the State Department to Kissinger's NSC staff. He was soon transferred or secured a transfer to the Tokyo embassy, where he conducted the reversion negotiations, largely with Tōgō Fumihiko, the director of the America Section of the Gaimushō. Sneider disliked Kissinger's desire for secrecy and penchant for keeping close aides in the dark even in their respective areas of responsibility.[24] John Holdridge, a colleague of both men, observed that their 'personalities were hardly compatible'.[25] In contrast, Alex Johnson felt that Meyer and Sneider formed a good team and worked exceedingly well together.[26] All of these officials from the United States and Japan played a central role in the successful conclusion of the Okinawa reversion negotiations. However, it was to be a difficult journey.

The point of no return

As Americans went to the polls in the presidential election in November 1968, Okinawans voted for a chief executive for the first time. The local Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidate, Nishime Junji, who had argued for a gradualist approach to reversion, lost to Yara Chobyo, who demanded immediate reunification. Yara was a stalwart of the antibase protest movement on the island and was supported by the socialist and communist parties. His election augured ill for Satō's quest to secure reversion through agreement with Washington.[27] The situation in Japan and Okinawa was made clear to policymakers in Washington (and, most importantly, to the incoming Nixon administration) by Sneider, then the country director for Japan in the State Department, who on

Christmas Eve 1968 wrote of his impressions following a short stay in Japan. He stated in part,

> The overwhelming impression I have after ten days in Japan and Okinawa is that we have reached the point of no return on the reversion issue. The pressures have built up in both Japan and Okinawa to the point where I can see virtually no hope of stalling off beyond the end of next year a decision on the timing of reversion, although the actual return would take place later.

He also underlined how important a successful conclusion to this issue was to continued conservative rule in Japan and how it would be a test of whether or not the United States was prepared to treat Japan 'on more equal terms'.[28]

The issue that dominated the Okinawa negotiations was the nature of the island's military role after reversion. The US military maintained a huge footprint on this strategically placed island off the coast of the Asian mainland. It allowed America to project military power in support of its defence guarantees not only to Japan but also to South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam. Though the United States also maintained a large military presence on the Japanese home islands (i.e., the four main Japanese islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu), the military operated with several restrictions under the revised Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. The United States had to initiate 'prior consultations' with Tokyo and secure permission from the Japanese government to use its bases in Japan for offensive operations or to introduce nuclear weapons. Though it is important to add that a secret understanding was reached at that time which allowed the United States to respond immediately in the event of a renewed attack on South Korea.[29] Satō was unhappy with this state of affairs. He had no objection to facilitating an American response to a crisis in the Korean peninsula but feared the political repercussions should the secret understanding come to light. He hoped that the reversion of Okinawa would provide an opportunity to supersede this with a public statement of intent.[30] No such restrictions applied to Okinawa, and US bases there played a major part in America's war effort in Vietnam – particularly as the places from which the giant US B-52 bombers flew to bomb targets in Southeast Asia. Given the deep unpopularity of the Vietnam War in Japan and in Okinawa, it was hoped that reversion would bring these missions to an end.[31] However both the Nixon administration and Congress were adamant that reversion would not interfere with America's prosecution of the war in Southeast Asia.

On the question of the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, Tokyo consistently maintained that no prior consultations had been entered into and that therefore nuclear weapons were not present in the Japanese home islands. However, a blind eye was turned to the presence of nuclear weapons aboard US ships in port.[32] Since no such restriction operated with respect to Okinawa, it was widely and accurately assumed that the United States had deployed nuclear weapons there.[33] The US 313th Air Division, of which the 498th Tactical Nuclear Group was part, was headquartered at Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. The group's mission was secret, but Satō publicly stated that it was 'common knowledge' that Mace-B tactical nuclear missiles were on Okinawa.[34] On 17 May he told the Diet that it was 'international common knowledge' that nuclear weapons were on Okinawa.[35]

Official efforts aimed at steering public opinion on this issue (outlined in Chapter 2) had failed, and the national 'nuclear allergy' remained as strong as ever, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. The difficulty then lay in either persuading the United States to relinquish its freedom of action and its nuclear arsenal or in convincing the Japanese people to allow a special arrangement to be made whereby Okinawa would revert but the United States would retain exceptional rights. An idea floated by Tokyo in the last days of 1968 was the possibility of the United States and Japan coming to an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa and setting a date and then working out the terms of reversion. The plan was not warmly received by American officials and was soon dropped by Tokyo.[36] There would be no putting off of hard decisions.

In advance of the beginning of serious negotiations, the Gaimushō maintained that a special exemption should be made whereby the United States would be permitted to retain its nuclear arsenal on Okinawa. For months Satō maintained a 'blank slate' policy on the issue so as to keep his negotiating options open for as long as possible. Caught in a quandary, Satō had the Okinawa Base Study Council, which was affiliated to his faction in the LDP, undertake an examination of the issue in the hopes of finding a solution. The council created a special subcommittee, the Okinawa Base Problems Research Council, under the chairmanship of Kusumi Tadao (a former Imperial Japanese Navy captain). It concluded in November 1968 that, given advances in technology, the United States could remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa and continue to maintain an adequate nuclear deterrent in the region.[37] A conference of Japanese and American political scientists and defence analysts was organised by the research council and held in January 1969 in Kyoto. Wakaizumi Kei, Satō's private emissary to Washington, addressed the conference and

noted the political dangers inherent in 'discriminating' against Okinawa by making a special exception on nuclear weapons. This could leave the Japanese government open to accusations that it was using Okinawa as 'a bridgehead for bringing nuclear weapons into Japan proper' and serve to undermine the LDP's political hegemony. Washington could avoid this if it compromised on the nuclear question.[38]

An early draft of the conference report took a firm line on the need for a 'homeland-level' solution and noted how this was possible to do without sacrificing US deterrent power because of advances in military technology (i.e., the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles). These sentiments were removed from the final report; no doubt to avoid hopes for nuclear-free reversion being raised unduly. However, they were made available to the US embassy in Tokyo so as to underline the domestic difficulties related to the issue.[39]

An agreement along these lines would be difficult to accomplish. On a visit to Tokyo to brief his superiors, Japan's ambassador to the United States, Shimoda Takesō, warned of the troubled road ahead. Shimoda met with Satō in the *Kantei*. Also present were Aichi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori Shigeru and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura Toshio. Shimoda told those assembled that there were positive signs emanating from Washington. The incoming Republican administration was likely to be less focused on Vietnam than the outgoing Johnson administration, and agreement on homeland-level reversion in the near future was a distinct possibility. However, he warned that it would be difficult to secure nuclear-free reversion, especially in the short term.[40] Satō wrote in his diary that Shimoda's briefing had focused on the tough stance America was likely to take in the negotiations. However, Satō took comfort from the fact that Alex Johnson, who was well acquainted with the situation in Japan, had been promoted to a key position in Washington.[41] Shimoda's comments, reported in the press, gave rise to uproar from opposition leaders and newspaper editorial writers, who charged that he was attempting to lead public opinion to accept the presence of nuclear weapons on Okinawa following reversion at Satō's direction.[42] In light of the ferment Satō privately concluded that as a result of this uproar more public discussion on Okinawa and the security implications of reversion were required.[43]

'Free use' and the end of the 'blank slate'

Shortly after Shimoda's briefing, Aichi met with Alex Johnson, who described this meeting as 'most interesting and represented a great

advance in GOJ's [Government of Japan's] coming to grips with hard realities of Okinawa situation'.[44] Aichi suggested that should the United States agree to expedite reversion, then it could continue to exercise its rights regarding the free use of bases and nuclear storage, though with the expectation that these rights would lapse when prevailing conditions allowed. Satō was deeply conflicted at this time regarding reversion and the related problem of nuclear weapons. On 13 January he met separately with Shimoda and Johnson, both of whom were soon to depart for Washington.[45] Shimoda once again underlined the difficulty in securing non-nuclear reversion.[46] Satō responded with one of the long contemplative silences for which he was known.[47] This lasted until Hori Shigeru entered the room and broke the silence. Satō then implored the ambassador to make his best efforts to secure non-nuclear reversion despite the expected resistance. In marked contrast, when Satō met with Johnson later the same day, he took a very different line. He agreed with Johnson that both China and North Korea presented a threat in the region and lamented the lack of understanding in Japan in this regard, observing that 'even the JDA [Japanese Defence Agency] and "his own officer" lacked sophistication in military matters'. To the shock and horror of Hori and Tōgō, who were also present, he also dismissed the non-introduction pledge in the Three Non-nuclear Principles as 'nonsense', though he was quick to add that this did not mean that Japan would develop nuclear weapons.[48] Satō noted in his diary the most urgent problem was reconciling the gap between public opinion in the United States and Japan. Americans expected Japan to bear a greater burden in providing security; yet Satō recognised that the Japanese public was firmly against this.[49]

In his memoir Shimoda notes that his meeting with Satō on 13 January marked the historic moment when Satō made a definite decision to pursue non-nuclear reversion.[50] However, given the position taken by both Satō and Aichi in their separate meetings with Johnson, it is more likely that Satō was keeping his options open and had not as yet made up his mind. He may very well have been edging closer to the realisation that the Japanese public would not accept an agreement on reversion that did not deal with the nuclear issue in a satisfactory manner. Nevertheless, he was also well aware that American objections and indeed Japan's own security needs presented significant obstacles to this.

Satō received further indications of how difficult this was to be. Returning to the Kusumi report at this point, on the eve of its publication in March 1969 the US embassy reported to Washington that the

consensus within the Base Problems Council had for months favoured 'homeland-level' reversion. The Japanese government felt compelled to despatch a number of 'high-ranking emissaries' to persuade the members of the council to tone down their conclusions and maximise leeway. However, 'homeland-level' with a measure of flexibility on prior consultation was the line ultimately taken by the report.[51] If Satō had hoped that the advisory committee could provide some sort of cover for pursuing a special arrangement for Okinawa, he was disappointed. In addition, opinion within the LDP leadership also began to coalesce around the need for 'homeland-level' reversion. Miki Takeo and Nakasone Yasuhiro, two faction leaders within the party, publicly called for this line to be taken.[52] Satō seemed to abandon his 'blank slate' on 10 March while responding to questions in the Diet. Asked by Maekawa Tan of the Socialist Party about the relationship between the prior consultation clauses of the Mutual Security Treaty and Okinawa following reversion, Satō responded that

> treating bases on Okinawa at reversion in a different way from the mainland was a difficult problem. If special arrangements were to be made, the Security Treaty would have to be revised, failing that the prior consultation sections of the treaty would apply to Okinawa, and hence there would be no difference in the treatment of Okinawa.[53]

Satō's statement can be taken as simply an *iteration* of the facts; any special status for Okinawa *would have* required a special codicil to the Mutual Security Treaty, which would have been difficult to obtain. However, in the climate of the time it was reported as marking a significant shift in policy.[54] Hori, who as chief cabinet secretary acted as the main government spokesman, told the press that the premier definitely wished to pursue 'homeland-level, nuclear free' reversion. This was not subsequently contradicted, the die at that stage having been cast.[55] Kusuda Minoru later wondered whether or not Satō had actually intended to announce a major policy shift with this statement.[56] Tōgō Fumihiko noted in his memoir that Satō had unwisely and possibly accidentally moved away from the 'blank slate' approach and that his adoption of a more uncompromising stance would make the negotiations more difficult.[57] On 17 March Satō sought to regain some freedom of movement and reaffirmed the 'blank slate', noting that this remained the government's position but that any agreement should neither undermine Japanese security nor run contrary to the public's wishes. On the question of nuclear weapons, he noted that for the bases on Okinawa to

remain effective, they had to have local support, while on prior consultation he declared that the government would make a decision on the basis of Japan's national interest.[58] However, given the concessions to public opinion in both his statements, it is clear that Satō had not been able to bring public opinion around to adopting a flexible attitude on this issue and his hand had been forced. He had, however, managed to highlight to American observers in both the State Department and in academic circles the intensity with which the popular mood regarded nuclear weapons and any question of discriminating against Okinawa.

Satō soon had an opportunity to despatch a high-level envoy to Washington to sound out the US leadership on these matters. Following the death of former President Eisenhower on 28 March 1969, Satō decided to send his elder brother Kishi Nobusuke, who had been Prime Minister of Japan when Eisenhower was president, to Washington to represent Japan at the funeral.[59] He had already planned to send his brother to Washington to sound Nixon out regarding the prospects for reversion.[60] Kishi's status as a former Prime Minister who had made Nixon's acquaintance when the latter was vice president coupled with his well-placed political and family connections in Tokyo ensured his access to the highest levels in Washington. However, he was something of a loose cannon on the issue of Okinawa reversion. Though well aware of his brother's shifting stance on 'nuclear-free, homeland-level' reversion, Kishi publicly called for a solution whereby America would withdraw its nuclear weapons but would retain unfettered rights regarding the use of its bases. This was a climb down from his previous call for the continuation of the status quo but still deviated from government policy. Satō was forced to repudiate these comments in the Diet and reaffirm the government's stance on 'homeland-level' reversion.[61]

Despite his public statements, when Kishi met privately with Nixon, he stated that 'Japan would not deny Okinawa bases to the U.S. after reversion but felt that if Okinawa was to be part of Japan, then Japanese laws and treaties should apply to it.' He also underlined the importance of dealing with the question 'with proper emphasis on the political situation in Japan so as not to harm our good relations'.[62] Was this a further change of heart on Kishi's part over the course of a matter of days? It is likely that Kishi was floating a series of trial balloons on Satō's behalf to ascertain if there was any change of public opinion softening on the issue. At the same time he was indicating to the United States that there was some room for compromise on these issues. Indeed, Oka Takeshi, the *New York Times*' Tokyo bureau chief, told Kusuda that he felt Kishi's statements had had a wide impact in the United States and would serve

to improve US-Japanese relations, presumably by highlighting Tokyo's potential for flexibility on these issues.[63]

The Byrd Amendment: US domestic political concerns

A complicating factor in the reversion negotiations was the attitude of the US Senate. Senator Robert Byrd, a Democrat, asserted in May that 'so long as the United States maintains its significant role in the Far East, the continued unrestricted use of our bases in Okinawa is vital and fundamental.'[64] Everett Dirksen, the leader of the minority Republican Party in the Senate, echoed these sentiments when he warned against the loss of Okinawa in his newspaper column. He noted that 'To dilute our control of Okinawa in any way whatsoever might be inimical to American security.'[65]

Dirksen's death in September 1969 meant that the Senate lost a leading opponent to reversion, but he was by no means alone in his concerns. Senator Charles Percy warned Aichi that any agreement on reversion which prevented the United States from providing support to 'our boys in combat' in Vietnam would never receive public or Congressional support. Aichi assured him that Tokyo had no wish to impair America's military capabilities in Asia. The problem was finding appropriate language to express this without inflaming public sentiment in either the United States or Japan.[66] Such guarantees did not go far enough; on 4 November, just days before Satō's arrival for the summit, 63 senators supported a resolution tabled by Byrd calling for any agreement on reversion to be referred to it for approval. Only 14 opposed. Sarantakes argues that this was more a reassertion by the Senate of its constitutional role in formulating foreign policy by giving the president its 'advice and consent' to treaties.[67] However, the concerns over reversion were real and genuinely felt. Though they added greater complexity to the process, as the US embassy reported, the Senate's attitude had 'not been without some benefit' in that it showed how difficult it was for the administration to come to an agreement and had been useful in extracting concessions.[68]

Regional implications of reversion

One of the major elements pertaining to the Okinawa reversion process, one largely ignored in the secondary literature, was the regional implication of reversion, particularly on South Korea and Taiwan, which relied on US forces based on Okinawa for their defence.[69] (The strong reaction

by Beijing and Pyongyang *against* the Okinawa reversion settlement and the assurances given by Tokyo regarding America's defence commitments in the region are discussed in Chapter 5). Seoul was particularly concerned that reversion would undermine South Korean security. Prime Minister Chung Il-Kwon called for US troops leaving Okinawa to be redeployed to Korea.[70] In response the United States sought to undertake what was patronisingly termed a 'handholding operation' to alleviate such concerns.[71] A senior official at the US embassy in Seoul assured a counterpart from the Korean Foreign Ministry that the United States would take Korea's security interests into account in its negotiations over Okinawa but that Korea did not have a veto.[72] This 'handholding' was not enough, however, and on 9 April 1969 Korean Foreign Minister Choi Kyu-hah presented an aide-memoire to the US ambassador William Porter which noted, 'the question of the Ryukyu Islands is more than a matter of bilateral implications only for the United States and Japan'.[73] Similar South Korean representations in Tokyo were given an even chillier reception and were publicly rejected by a Gaimushō spokesman.[74] However, despite these objections both Japan and the United States took such concerns into account during the reversion of Okinawa; indeed just as such annoyance was beginning to grow, an incident occurred that highlighted the importance of America's military position in North-East Asia.

On 14 April 1969 North Korea shot down a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft flying over international waters close to its territory, and all 31 crewmen were killed. The exact motivations behind the attack remain opaque. The limited available evidence points to it having been an action taken by local commanders without clear authorisation from Pyongyang. The possibility remains that Pyongyang sought to rally support from Moscow and Beijing and to avoid the unwelcome pressure from both to take a side in their ongoing dispute. The Nixon administration responded with a show of force in the form of a naval flotilla in the Sea of Japan. This was gradually scaled back and then disbanded since no further incidents occurred and also in light of the firm support the Soviet Union gave to North Korea.[75] The incident did not stall progress in relation to the reversion of Okinawa, but it did serve to underline the importance of Okinawa as a base of operations, particularly with regard to the Korean peninsula.

The Gaimushō's position paper

Tokyo's next step to advance the Okinawa reversion process was the finalisation of its position paper. The Gaimushō had for some months

sought to gauge the mood in Washington. It was especially concerned with the prospects for reversion and the nature of assurances or agreements Washington would demand regarding nuclear weapons and the use of bases as part of an overall accord. During his time as ambassador to Japan, Alex Johnson had consistently taken the line when pressed on these issues that Tokyo had to work out for itself what sort of security relationship it wanted from the United States. No sustainable security structure would emerge if the Japanese, the policymakers and the public alike saw the MST as an imposition rather than something that served their interests.[76] In light of this and so as to get the process moving, the Gaimushō handed an English-language draft position paper on the reversion issue to the US embassy in April.[77] This paper represented Tokyo's initial bargaining position in a long process of negotiation and is worth examining in some detail. It begins with a clear answer to Johnson's earlier cajoling:

> The Japanese Government will firmly adhere to [the Mutual Security] treaty, which enjoys the support of the vast majority of the Japanese people, well beyond 1970 and it hopes the American Government shares its views.[78]

Such a high level of support for the treaty was not based on opinion poll data but on the consistent electoral victories of the LDP, which was not quite the same thing. This was obliquely acknowledged in the paper, which noted that there remained 'a latent feeling of "being imposed upon"' in Japanese society – something that needed to be countered by the Japanese government through firm leadership. Turning to Okinawa, the paper underlined how it was the 'only and last great residue of the war in the Pacific.' This was quite overblown and ignored not only Japan's own Northern Territories dispute with the Soviet Union but also the partition of the Korean peninsula. It did, however, bring forth the seriousness and pressing nature of the issue. The document also aimed to persuade by flattery, noting how, as a result of American 'wisdom and courage', agreement had been reached during Satō's summit meeting with Lyndon Johnson in November 1967 to place the status of Okinawa under 'joint and continuous review'. Satō was due to visit Washington in November 1969, and at that meeting, the paper asserted, 'firm and detailed decisions must be made to put Okinawa reversion on a practicable timetable' with reversion occurring in 1972. Interestingly, for a document produced by the independent civil service, it struck a partisan

note by observing how such a decision would 'contribute greatly to bringing about stable political conditions in Japan under conservative party rule, as well as ensuring the future of Japan-U.S. relations'. Acknowledging the important role played by US bases on Okinawa, the paper argued that those bases should remain. On the question of limitations over the use of these bases, however, the paper noted:

> Since reversion of administrative rights will place Okinawa on the same footing as the Japanese mainland under Japanese sovereignty, the [Mutual] Security Treaty and related agreements should be applied without change.

There could be no perception of discrimination since this would alienate the people of Okinawa, whose support or at least acquiescence was required for the bases to remain operational. The paper took an equally firm line on nuclear weapons, given the 'strong and unique national feeling' on this question:

> The Japanese Government cannot but conclude that it is extremely difficult to accept [the] permanent stationing of nuclear weapons in post-reversion Okinawa. Therefore if nuclear weapons are currently stationed there, the removal of such weapons will be required by the time of reversion, and the introduction of nuclear weapons should be subject to prior consultation after reversion.

There were some points in the paper designed to appeal to the American side. It declared that the Japanese government was beginning to examine the logistics involved in assuming responsibility for the local defence of Okinawa following reversion. The government also accepted the 'political responsibility' for ensuring that US facilities would be able to function following reversion, a reference to Tokyo's commitment not to allow protesters to undermine the bases' utility. Perhaps the most significant concession to American reservations regarding reversion was the declaration that Tokyo placed 'special importance' on the use of bases in Okinawa 'for the security of the Korean peninsula and other areas adjacent to Japan'. However, the position paper was quite clear that there could be no 'free use' of bases; the prior consultation system under the MST would have to apply. There could be no nuclear weapons on Okinawa, nor could Okinawa be treated any differently from the rest of Japan.[79]

Tōgō's mission to Washington

In advance of the official start of the negotiations, Tōgō Fumihiko was despatched to Washington at the end of April 1969 to sound out the opinions of senior policymakers from the State and Defence departments and the NSC staff on Japan's draft position paper. In advance of his trip Ambassador Shimoda reported to Tokyo that these officials were preoccupied with the EC-121 incident, which had delayed the formulation of a coherent strategy on Okinawa. This was not necessarily a bad thing, the ambassador observed, since it meant that the issue of Okinawa's reversion and attendant problems would be discussed in an environment of calm. Furthermore, it meant that Tōgō had a chance to sound out the various shades of opinion prior to a unified policy prescription being decided upon. Shimoda correctly ascertained that the strongest opponents to reversion in the administration were from the Defence Department; they were looking for some sort of advance assurance that reversion would not undermine the ability of the United States to respond to a regional crisis, an assurance which would in itself undermine Japan's sovereignty. Tōgō should, Shimoda advised, stress in all of his meetings, especially those with Deputy Defence Secretary David Packard, that 'homeland-level' reversion was essential for the continuation in office of pro-American conservatives in Tokyo. Unfortunately, Shimoda noted, Packard was more familiar with Korea than with Japan; so patience would be required.[80]

Tōgō's mission allowed for the first concrete exchanges on Okinawa reversion between Japanese and American officials, including Johnson, Packard and Kissinger. Tōgō was told over the course of several meetings how difficult it would be for the United States to relinquish the 'free-use' of its bases and its nuclear storage rights on Okinawa. Any diminution of America's deterrent power would send the wrong signal to both America's allies and its potential adversaries. The example of North Korea's recent provocations was invoked.[81] Packard stressed the importance of America's security guarantees to other countries in the region and that reversion had to be accomplished within this regional security framework. He further noted that Japan failed to recognise the essential role played by America's nuclear arsenal on Okinawa in support of regional defence.[82]

In an effort to find a compromise on the question of 'free use', Tōgō noted the possibility of coming to an agreement whereby US forces would be pre-approved for dispatch overseas from Okinawa in case of a specific crisis or crises, which would be outlined in an agreed-upon

list of 'foreseeable cases'. Such a 'special arrangement' had been mooted by Satō in the Diet.[83] Both Satō and Aichi had publicly stressed that any change to the 'prior consultation' system that went beyond such a 'special arrangement' would require an amendment to the MST, which was politically unfeasible. A draft list of these 'foreseeable cases' shows the preoccupations of policymakers on both sides of the Pacific and the types of security crises which were felt possible, the first three of which had precedents:

1) Invasion of South Korea;
2) Defence against air attack in and around Korea (EC-121);
3) Defence against naval attack around Korea (*Pueblo*);
4) Defence against air or naval attack around Taiwan or Pescadores;
5) Defence against attack in Philippines or Southeast Asia where US treaty commitment is involved.[84]

This 'foreseeable cases' approach to the problem of assurances on prior consultation was later rejected by the US negotiators since they considered it too restrictive.[85] Though the five cases are broadly defined, cover all conceivable eventualities in the region and offer the United States a large degree of freedom of action, it was felt that any definitive list would preclude the United States from making a timely response to an unexpected event.

On the nuclear issue Tōgō emphasised the strength of popular antinuclear sentiment in Japan, which was impossible for the government to 'uproot'.[86] Both Alex Johnson and Richard Finn acknowledged Japan's difficulties on the domestic political front but pointed out that the United States had its own domestic problems. Johnson noted that the Japanese Draft Position Paper did not adequately take US concerns into account, particularly with regard to the use of bases. He noted that the US administration also faced opposition to reversion from the public and from sections of Congress. Tōgō's attention was also drawn to Senator Robert Byrd's comment that without an agreement on 'free-use' there would be no reversion.[87]

On the whole, as would befit the early stages of a process of negotiations, Tōgō was presented with an uncompromising attitude by his American counterparts. To be sure, Shimoda had warned him to expect this at the outset of the usual rounds of bargaining and compromise. However, one ray of light came from his discussion with Henry Kissinger. Though initially Kissinger had bluntly asked why the Japanese provided no assistance to the United States in Vietnam, Tōgō recalled

that Kissinger soon changed tack and listened to what he had to say.[88] Kissinger pleaded ignorance of Japanese affairs and the intricacies of US-Japanese relations and his reliance on Richard Sneider's expertise in this regard. He did, however, broach the concept of reserving the introduction of nuclear weapons on Okinawa to emergency situations, something that would play an important (though secret) part in the final agreement.[89]

Tōgō's mission had not resulted in any meeting of minds, but that had not been its purpose. It did, however, serve to highlight the main differences which separated the two governments on this issue and on which a compromise settlement was required. Not surprisingly, in his report to Aichi on his mission, Tōgō noted that the main stumbling blocks were the nuclear and prior consultation issues.[90] He later recalled in his memoir that despite the rigidity of their position, 'the Americans were clearly prepared to begin specific discussions concerning the reversion issue, and it was my impression that they intended to address the matter of nuclear weapons once a satisfactory understanding on the wartime use of bases had been reached'.[91]

Hopes raised, slightly: Shimoda's meeting with Kissinger

On 21 May 1969 Ambassador Shimoda met with Kissinger to discuss overall US-Japanese relations and the issues of Okinawa and the Mutual Security Treaty in particular. Rather than focus on the minutiae of the negotiations, Shimoda engaged with Kissinger on wide-ranging, conceptual and geopolitical terms, territory on which the former Harvard professor of international relations was more comfortable. Firstly, Shimoda compared Japan's post-war experiences to West Germany's. He noted that, unlike Germany, Japan had been fortunate in escaping partition. On the other hand, the West German Social Democratic Party (SDP) supported the Western alliance, while in Japan no such loyal opposition existed; both the socialist and communist parties vehemently contested the validity of the US-Japanese alliance. Any delay in resolving the Okinawa issue would play into the opposition's hand, as was apparent with Yara's victory in the election for chief executive of Okinawa, and would endanger the alliance. This was particularly important given that the treaty was coming to the end of its initial ten-year term, after which it could be abrogated by either party after one year's notice.

Kissinger questioned why the Japanese people had not been properly informed of the benefits of the MST and why Tokyo did not seem to expend as much energy seeking the return of the Northern Territories

from the USSR as it did seeking the return of Okinawa from the United States. Shimoda countered by pointing out that successive governments *had* continuously raised the Northern Territories issue with Moscow and had always sought to raise the 'defence consciousness' among the Japanese public. At the end of their conversation Kissinger gave Shimoda some encouragement on the prospects for a deal on Okinawa, which was underlined in the Japanese memo of the conversation. He noted the importance of Japan to the United States and how a resolution of the question of Okinawa reversion that year was essential to the continuing partnership between the two countries and to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Importantly, he also emphasised that Nixon shared this view. Kissinger also noted that '*reconciling Japanese requirements and the ability of the U.S. to meet its defence commitments does not present a great difficulty*.'[92]

Despite such encouraging signs from Kissinger, the US military voiced its opposition to the loss of its rights in Okinawa. 'If we move out of here, that's the beginning of World War III,' exclaimed an anonymous American general to the *New York Times*.[93] The rationale, if it can be so termed, for such hyperbole being that overly onerous restrictions on US bases would lead to their being rendered useless. This would prompt a US withdrawal which would in turn result in communist adventurism. Shimoda heard similar arguments in his private meetings with senior Defence Department officials.[94] Though they may have been made in less alarmist terms, it showed that reversion was by no means a foregone conclusion and many more months of negotiation and give-and-take lay ahead.

Preparations for Aichi's visit

By this time the battle lines in the negotiations had been drawn, and both sides focused on Aichi's trip to the United States at the beginning of June for progress to be made. The Gaimushō's briefing paper for Aichi gives an insight into official Japanese thinking on Okinawa. It plays up the need to find a solution within the framework of a close and cooperative US-Japanese relationship and acknowledges the importance of the bases. However, it also states categorically that popular feeling on nuclear weapons and on Japanese sovereignty meant that the MST had to be extended in all of its provisions to Okinawa. An early draft of the paper goes much further and advises Aichi to ask for this to be implemented as soon as reversion had been agreed upon (which it was hoped would happen at the Nixon-Satō summit in November) rather than when

reversion actually occurred following a three-year transition period. This section of the document was crossed out by hand in the draft and was excluded from the completed briefing paper. No doubt it was judged to have been too ambitious and unrealistic. Furthermore, a somewhat strident reference to the 'completely unnatural' (*kiwamete fushizen*) control by a foreign government of one million Japanese people on Okinawa for a quarter of a century was toned down to stress how it was in America's interests to end its responsibility for the administration of Okinawa.[95] Interestingly, in a sign of differences of opinion within the Foreign Ministry, a handwritten draft of the joint communiqué (which was to be issued after the conclusion of Satō's talks with Nixon) includes the possibility of nuclear weapons remaining on Okinawa. Aichi's talking points for his meeting with Rogers included draft wording on a 'Korea' clause in the Joint Communiqué which attempted to meet American concerns over prior consultation:

> The Prime Minister also made clear the basic recognition of his government that, in particular, an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, if it occurred, would seriously affect the security of Japan. The Prime Minister further stated that such recognition would form the basis on which the Government of Japan would form its position vis-à-vis prior consultation ... on the use by United States forces of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations from Japan to meet the armed attack against the Republic of Korea.

Aichi was advised to raise this on 'background', or behind the scenes, due to its sensitive nature.[96] This did not go as far as to promise a positive response, nor did it include any assurances on Japan's likely stance were a crisis to occur elsewhere, such as in the Taiwan Strait or the Philippines, or in case of continued hostilities in Vietnam. However, it did represent a significant step towards meeting American concerns. The Japanese embassy in Washington advised Aichi that though the State Department was becoming somewhat more constructive on the issue of prior consultation and free use, it believed the United States would want Japan to make clear its likely response to every case of prior consultation. Aichi was counselled to tell Rogers what he had told Alex Johnson that January; namely, that a formula could be devised whereby the Japanese government would give a public assurance that US forces on Okinawa would be granted 'free use' of bases in the event of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. This would supersede the secret understanding on the dispatch of forces to Korea in the event of a reoccurrence of hostilities

there which had been concluded when the MST was negotiated in 1960.[97] Satō was known to be dissatisfied with this secret agreement and was anxious that the agreement on Okinawa not involve any such backroom deals.[98] As Aichi was receiving this counsel from his aides, in Washington the Nixon administration was busy formulating its own strategy on Okinawa.

America's position: NSDM 13

On the eve of Aichi's arrival, Nixon approved National Security Decision Memorandum 13 (NSDM 13), which outlined official US policy towards Japan and its stance regarding the reversion of Okinawa.[99] Broadly speaking, the document looked to the continuation of the current relationship while seeking a greater Japanese role in Asia and the assumption by Japan of a greater share of its domestic defence obligations. It also signalled a willingness to negotiate the reversion of Okinawa. The creation of NSDM 13 was not without controversy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were particularly reluctant to give up their prized 'Keystone of the Pacific', taking, as Sarantakes argues, 'a pessimistic and legalistic' view of the issue.[100] They also displayed a distrust of Japan which belonged to a bygone era. Playing on emerging criticisms of Japan's international trade and economic policies, the chairman of the JCS, General Earle Wheeler, faulted Japan for taking advantage of American largesse in helping to rebuild the country during the occupation and then proceeding to undercut American business. In this climate there was no need for 'unnecessary haste' in returning Okinawa to Japanese control.[101] His recommendation to Deputy Defence Secretary David Packard that the November summit be delayed for six months was ignored.[102] The Joint Chiefs persisted in their view that Japan had not yet proven itself to be a reliable friend and ally of the United States right up to Satō's visit.[103] They never subscribed to the State Department's argument that agreement on the reversion of Okinawa was the best way to ensure that Japan retain and renew the Mutual Security Treaty. Defence Secretary Melvin R. Laird was also unhappy at the prospect of Okinawa reverting to Japan and shared the apprehension of the JCS that it would lead to a diminution of America's ability to project force and discharge its commitments in the region. Furthermore, he was also ill at ease with what he felt were Alex Johnson's attempts to push reversion through the NSC. Given that Laird, as defence supremo, had responsibility for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands, his concerns were listened to. NSDM 13 included the caveat that reversion

would occur in 1972 'provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing U.S. military use and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time'. This was added so as to satisfy Laird's concerns and gave the Defence Department, as Laird later told the author, 'veto power over the whole thing'.[104] The document also stressed the 'desire for the maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam', as well as the retention of nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but added that 'the President is prepared to consider, at the final stages of the negotiation, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights provided, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement are satisfactory'. The top secret document indicated how far the United States was prepared to go to meet Japanese desires, but it also showed that Japan would need to compromise on nuclear storage rights and free use in order to secure reversion.

Aichi in Washington, June 1969

Upon his arrival in Washington on 2 June, Aichi met with Nixon at the White House in what was intended to be a short courtesy call.[105] Instead, in a sign by Nixon of the importance he attached to the settlement of the Okinawa issue, the two men engaged in a wide-ranging conversation for forty minutes.[106] For his part Aichi stressed that he had given up cigarettes until Okinawa reverted to Japanese control. In this he was emulating Yoshida Shigeru who had renounced cigars until the Japanese peace treaty was concluded.[107] Both Nixon and Aichi agreed on the importance of finding a solution to Okinawa that enhanced US-Japanese relations and ensured the security of the region. Beyond these platitudes their conversation highlighted different approaches and preoccupations. Aichi stressed the constraints placed on Tokyo's freedom of action by public opinion. He noted 'Japan's unique views on nuclear weapons' and that his government 'wished to put to rest any question of defence matters by the flexible application of the Security Treaty'. Nixon for his part recalled that in 1953, shortly after the end of the US occupation, he called for the end of the 'no-war' clause in the Japanese constitution. He reiterated the view, which he was to stress repeatedly during his presidency, that a strong Japan was necessary for peace in the Asia-Pacific. He declared, 'We needed, and welcomed, the development of a new policy, whereby Japan, the only major industrial power in the area, could play a larger role, not just economically, but a diplomatic role based on conventional strength.' In advance of his trip, Aichi had

been advised by his officials to stress Tokyo's plans to increase Japan's defence capabilities; indeed, the US embassy in Tokyo had been told to expect such a pronouncement.[108] However, what Nixon was arguing in favour of was far beyond what Japan was prepared to countenance, and Aichi avoided any mention of Japan's moderate military expansion. In an obscure response to Nixon's entreaty he played down the prospect of Japan playing any such role and focused instead on facilitating the US military presence in the region. He remarked that 'the effective presence of the United States was essential in the broadest terms to the security of the area as a whole, and Japan felt that it was essential to create an environment which would make possible effective cooperation to that purpose'.[109] The conversation on the one hand showed the considerable importance that Nixon attached to finding a resolution to the Okinawa issue but also highlighted the gulf between Japan and the United States over the kind of bilateral relationship which was desired. Such a divergence would dog US-Japanese relations during the remainder of Satō's term of office.

During Aichi's visit to Washington the *New York Times* published an exclusive on the progress of the Okinawa negotiations. Citing unnamed 'well placed informants', Hedrick Smith reported that 'President Nixon has decided to remove American nuclear weapons from Okinawa once an over-all plan for turning the island back to Japanese rule has been agreed upon.' This decision reflected 'the judgement of the President's civilian advisors that maintenance of sound long-term relations with Japan is more important than the military advantage of retaining complete freedom of operation on Okinawa'.[110] Both Nixon and Kissinger reacted furiously to this breach in security. Nixon ordered an immediate investigation into the leak which ultimately resulted in wiretaps being placed by the FBI on the phones of NSC staff members.[111] In his memoir *White House Years*, Kissinger criticised this leak, noting, 'Our fallback position was thus in print before the negotiations had begun.'[112] Nixon also denounced the leak in equally strident terms in his own memoir.[113] Suspicion fell on Laird; it was suggested that because of the concerns he had raised regarding reversion, he may have leaked the information to members of Congress so as to drum up opposition. Nixon sent him a handwritten note which tersely stated, 'That leak on Okinawa was a real blow – as far as our bargaining position with Japan is concerned.' Laird flatly denied the accusations.[114] The other possibility was that a member of Kissinger's NSC staff was the source of the leak. The National Security Agency (charged with the collection of signals intelligence) intercepted a cable from the Japanese embassy in Washington in which

a conversation between embassy officials and Morton Halperin was described. Halperin and Richard Sneider had been the main advocates on the NSC staff of negotiating the return of Okinawa. He reportedly told the Japanese that agreement on the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa was possible if enough concessions were made. Alexander Haig, one of Halperin's rivals on the NSC staff, believed a criminal case could be made against him for giving secrets to a foreign government. Halperin defended his actions and Smith's *New York Times* piece (for which he was the likely source) as having made a positive contribution to the negotiations since otherwise the whole process could have been bogged down. He later noted that '[n]obody authorised me to say anything, but the question of what you say to foreign diplomats is a matter of discretion; and the question of what I had authority to say is a matter of judgement.'[115] In any case such broad hints fell on deaf ears since the Japanese side continued to hear from the highest levels in Washington that compromise on the nuclear question would be particularly difficult for the United States.[116] This included Secretary of State Rogers, who told Aichi that such newspaper reports should not be taken to reflect official thinking and that no official position had been finalised.[117] An exception to this was Kissinger, which is ironic given his condemnation of the 'leak.' Kissinger had conceded to Tōgō in April that the nuclear question was a difficult one for Japan and he had opened the door to compromise by asking what the Japanese government's attitude was towards the stationing of nuclear weapons in Okinawa in case of an emergency situation.[118]

Following his conversation with Nixon, Aichi held substantive talks with Secretary of State William Rogers who was joined by Marshall Green, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and Alex Johnson. Aichi had been buoyed up following his meeting with Nixon.[119] However, in these meetings the US side took a hard line on the questions of prior consultation and the presence of nuclear weapons. Johnson, to whom Rogers gave the lead in these conversations, bluntly told Aichi that the United States could not undermine the credibility of its security commitments to the region by ceding a 'veto' to Japan. Aichi repeated that Tokyo recognised the importance of America's bases on Okinawa to regional security. He also noted that following reversion the MST would naturally apply to Okinawa and that under the treaty there could be a positive and a negative answer to prior consultation. The automatic extension of the treaty after 1970 would not have to be referred to the Diet, but any exemption to the prior consultation rule would have to be. This raised the prospect of a stormy and divisive

stand-off between proponents and opponents to any such change reminiscent of the disturbances (both inside and outside the Diet) which greeted the original ratification of the treaty in 1960. Johnson noted that a special arrangement could be worked out within the framework of the MST; Aichi replied that Japan had to retain its sovereign right to say yes or no. Attempting to transcend this stand-off, Johnson noted that any arrangement would have to be grounded in mutual trust for it to work.

On nuclear weapons Johnson was even less compromising. He noted that for nuclear weapons to retain their deterrent power, they had to remain usable; he expressed 'much concern and strong reservations' about Japan's position. Johnson's phrase was deemed important enough for it to be quoted in English in the Japanese memo of this conversation.[120] Elements of this conversation were considered so delicate that they were left out of this memo (which was cabled to Tokyo from the Japanese embassy in Washington) and were instead recorded in a handwritten addendum prepared by Tōgō, who accompanied Aichi to Washington.[121] By way of an assurance on the use of bases, Aichi proposed the inclusion in the joint communiqué, which was to be released following Satō's meetings with Nixon, of a general statement on the importance of the peace and security of the region to Japan. He once again noted the importance of Japan retaining the ability to answer yes or no but noted that there could be some manner of unofficial 'arrangement' or 'formula'. Johnson felt a public commitment was preferable so as to indicate intent to neighbouring countries, be they friend or potential foe. On the nuclear question Johnson held that it was 'vital' that tactical nuclear weapons remain on Okinawa but that an 'Ogasawara arrangement' could be used with regard to strategic nuclear weapons. Johnson was referring to the secret formula which he had negotiated the previous year when the Ogasawara Islands (also known as the Bonin Islands) were retroceded to Japan. Under this formula the United States removed its nuclear weapons from storage sites on the islands but stated that in an emergency situation they would expect Japan to allow their reintroduction.[122] This agreement was so sensitive and secret that even within the Foreign Ministry knowledge was restricted to a few key diplomats. In his memo of the meeting Tōgō wrote an explanatory paragraph on the agreement, noting that it provided for the removal of nuclear weapons from the Ogasawara Islands at the time of their retrocession but gave Tokyo the option of having them re-introduced in an emergency.[123] This was at variance with the American interpretation, which stressed American control of nuclear deployment and an expectation

of Japanese cooperation. Indeed, in a conversation in August 1969 Alex Johnson got the impression that Shimoda did not fully understand the nature of this agreement.[124] The differing conceptions of sovereignty and military rights showed the unsuitability of using the precedent of the Ogasawara Agreement for Okinawa. However, despite such a divergence the Japanese side was left in no doubt about America's stance on nuclear weapons. Tōgō observed that 'the U.S. will inevitably demand some sort of prior agreement on the introduction of nuclear weapons in an emergency.'[125]

Johnson also stressed the importance of coming to an agreement to compensate the United States for its infrastructural investments in Okinawa over the years of its administration of the island. He was also keen to ensure that the United States suffered no balance of payments loss when Okinawa's economy went from dollars to yen. Achieving a favourable outcome on these matters, Johnson stressed, was a 'sine qua non' for the United States. Although Johnson had bargained hard in his meetings with Aichi, he closed on an optimistic note, stating, 'If all the difficult and complicated problems could be resolved by that time [Satō's visit to Washington in November], a communiqué announcing the administrative reversion of Okinawa might be possible providing it had language adequately responsive to American requirements.'[126] However, many more months of patient negotiation on the wording of the communiqué would be required to reach that point.

While Aichi was in the United States a Democratic Socialist member of the Okinawa legislature was wounded by a US soldier's bayonet during a protest against the American military presence on the island. The wound was not serious, and the incident was quickly defused by the speedy issuance of an apology by the United States. It did serve to underline the precarious nature of America's position on the island and the need for reversion to become a reality.[127]

Following Aichi's return to Japan, policymakers in Washington planned America's next moves. The basic lines which were articulated in NSDM 13 remained the same. It was decided that the United States should continue to bargain hard to secure its nuclear and conventional military rights in Okinawa. It was also determined that Japan should be induced to assume the financial burden for reversion and responsibility for the local defence of Okinawa following reversion. While the United States held 'considerable bargaining leverage', Japan also had 'some good cards': It would not be in America's interests to alienate the 'only major non-communist power in Asia'. However, the United States held the strongest card: namely, the nuclear question. NSDM 13 had

asserted that this issue would be decided upon only by Nixon himself during his talks with Satō. Given the absolute necessity of Satō securing non-nuclear reversion, this gave the United States an incredibly strong negotiating position and enabled it to secure its other priorities.[128]

Nerve gas

In late July 1969 Okinawa was once again convulsed in crisis by an unexpected incident. On 18 July 1969 the *Wall Street Journal* reported that earlier that month there had been a leak of deadly nerve gas at a military base on Okinawa. The US government refused to confirm or deny the presence of chemical or biological weapons (CBW), but its acknowledgement that an incident took place lent credence to the *Journal*'s story.[129] Combined with the visits of nuclear-powered submarines to ports in Okinawa and the regular bombing raids on North Vietnam by B-52s based on the island (one of which had crashed in January), the gas leak highlighted the deadly nature of the US military presence on the island. The immediate reaction of the public, opposition leaders and newspaper editorials in both Okinawa and Japan proper was one of shock and consternation. Newspapers led with the story, relegating the *Apollo 11* moon landing to second place. The Japanese government, which was unaware of the leak or even of the presence of such chemical and biological weapons (CBW) on Okinawa, scrambled to make a response.[130] The Diet met in emergency session, and Satō faced tough questioning.[131] Laird publicly announced his intention to remove the CBW as soon as was practical, a process he had instigated before the incident occurred. They were eventually moved from Okinawa to Johnson Island in the Pacific in September 1971, disagreement over an appropriate site having caused the delay.[132] Throughout the crises Tokyo was kept well informed, and the unilateral decision to remove the weapons came as a great relief.[133] Nevertheless, the government came under intense criticism in the press and in the Diet for its lack of knowledge on the presence of such weapons on Okinawa. The affair was also felt to have hardened public attitudes towards the free use of bases and the presence of nuclear weapons on Okinawa following reversion.[134]

This placed Satō under further pressure to reach a favourable agreement with the United States. At the same time it gave policymakers in the United States further evidence of the importance of coming to an accord on Okinawa. The battle lines over nuclear weapons and the free use of bases had been drawn. However, these were preliminary in nature. The subsequent negotiations would take on a more pressing nature.

4
The Reversion of Okinawa, 1969, Part 2

The 'ninja'

At this point it is necessary to reintroduce one of the main architects of the Okinawa agreement; Wakaizumi Kei. Wakaizumi played a crucial role as a behind-the-scenes facilitator and intermediary between Satō and Lyndon Johnson's White House in the run-up to and during Satō's meeting with Johnson in November 1967 (see Chapter 2). He undertook a similar function in advance of Satō's meeting with Nixon in 1969, which culminated in the conclusion of a secret agreement between Satō and Nixon on nuclear weapons and on textile exports. This role was shrouded in secrecy with the full story emerging over time. During the negotiations the Gaimushō knew that Satō was using a clandestine operator but were unaware of the identity of this 'ninja', as he became known.[1] In his memoir *White House Years*, Kissinger refers to Wakaizumi by the code name 'Mr. Yoshida', which he had adopted so as to leave the White House switchboard operators in the dark.[2] Wakaizumi's own account, published in 1994 (an English translation edited by John Swenson-Wright appeared in 2002), gives an exhaustively detailed account of his activities that is equal parts memoir, confession and self-vindication.[3] Wakaizumi was keen that his motives in negotiating the secret agreements would be looked upon as necessary and justified in the context of realising the reversion of Okinawa.[4] Satō's and Kusuda Minoru's diaries, which were published in 1998 and 2001, respectively, corroborate Wakaizumi's deep involvement in brokering the accords.[5] Successive releases and declassification of secret material by the US National Archives also support Wakaizumi's account.[6] In 2009 the newly installed Democratic Party of Japan administration initiated an official investigation into this and other secret agreements from the

Cold War. The investigation was double pronged, and two committees of inquiry were established; one composed of historians, the other of senior Foreign Ministry diplomats. The historians' committee had a broad remit and made use of memoirs and US archival material as well as recently declassified material from the Foreign Ministry's archive. Its conclusions supported Wakaizumi's account.[7] The Foreign Ministry committee, by contrast, took a much narrower approach and examined only its own records. It concluded that there was no evidence of Wakaizumi's involvement. Since Wakaizumi's actions were not officially known to ministry bureaucrats and since his name would never have appeared in connection with the negotiations in any government document, this should not have been surprising.[8] Despite this official recalcitrance, the historians' committee's conclusions should be taken as the final word on Wakaizumi's involvement and testifies to the veracity of his account.

Following the conclusion of the Satō-Johnson summit in November 1967, Wakaizumi withdrew from his role as an intermediary. As an academic and leading thinker on international and geostrategic affairs he naturally maintained an active interest in the question. He played a significant part in the Japan-US Conference held in Kyoto in January 1969. He also stayed in touch with Walt Rostow, who highlighted the central role his successor, Henry Kissinger, was cultivating, and Morton Halperin, who kept him generally informed of the progress of the negotiations. Ultimately, it was the impasse over nuclear weapons, apparent to Wakaizumi from following press reports, that spurred him on to get involved once more. As he explained,

> The political value of the entire negotiations on Okinawa would, I felt, be determined by how clearly this matter featured in the joint declaration that would probably emerge from the talks. My view was that if Okinawa reverted to Japanese rule without a clear understanding that reversion would be 'nuclear free', even though reversion would remove the main outstanding problem between Japan and the United States, residual anti-U.S. sentiment might persist in Japan and the original aim of creating foundations for a firm friendship would not be realised.[9]

Wakaizumi broached the subject of playing a role in the negotiations when he met with Satō on 21 June.[10] Wakaizumi had access to the prime minister since he was part of a task force on restoring order to university campuses beset by student unrest. Wakaizumi outlined what Rostow

had told him and suggested he should go to Washington to establish contact with Kissinger with a view to facilitating the negotiations. Satō was non-committal and was not completely convinced that one White House aide could have accrued so much influence. Satō seems to have spent some time mulling the question over and shortly after their meeting sent word to Wakaizumi to confer with Aichi regarding his suggestion. At their meeting, the only one Aichi and Wakaizumi were to have in the run-up to the November summit, Aichi expressed support for his proposal. Wakaizumi got the impression that Aichi was less than impressed at the progress of negotiations through traditional channels.[11] Later that day Wakaizumi contacted Halperin at the White House and asked if a meeting with Kissinger could be arranged. He was then approached by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura Toshio, who was also supportive of Wakaizumi's plan. In addition, Kimura was worried that Aichi had given the public too much hope regarding the prospect of non-nuclear reversion after his successful meeting with Nixon. He also doubted the ability of the Gaimushō, particularly Tōgō and Ushiba, feeling they acceded too readily to American demands.[12] Despite Aichi's and Kimura's support, they were completely excluded from Wakaizumi's diplomacy due to American concerns over secrecy.[13] On 10 July Wakaizumi met once more with Satō, and he persuaded the premier that his mission should go further than 'fact-finding' and that he should also engage in 'consultations', that is, negotiations, with Kissinger.[14] From this time onwards the Okinawa negotiations would operate along two tracks.

Wakaizumi's first meeting with Kissinger

Wakaizumi met with Kissinger on 18 July and suggested forming a political hotline between the *Kantei* and the White House.[15] This was readily accepted by Nixon, who told Kissinger, 'Let's try to get it done and not fool around with the State Department.'[16] Despite this, Kissinger informed Alex Johnson and therefore, by extension, the State Department about his contact with Wakaizumi. Johnson later noted he and Kissinger cooperated and coordinated their actions: 'we worked out replies that reinforced what I was telling Shimoda and what Meyer was telling Aichi.'[17] However, it is more likely, given Kissinger's secretive approach, that he was highly selective in what he revealed to Johnson.

Wakaizumi heard some discouraging news from Kissinger: The Defence Department and the Joint Chiefs were wary of reversion and were demanding a clear undertaking from Japan on the use of bases

and the reintroduction of nuclear weapons in emergency situations. Kissinger also observed that should Japan give acceptable guarantees on the use of bases, the United States could withdraw its nuclear arsenal from Okinawa provided it retained the right to reintroduce them in an emergency. Such an agreement on reintroduction could take the form of a secret understanding between Satō and Nixon.[18] Thus at this early stage Kissinger broadly outlined what was to be the eventual outcome of the negotiations.

A separate and unrelated issue came to be entangled in the negotiations. During his campaign for the presidency, Nixon promised political leaders and voters from the American South that if elected president, he would ensure that their troubled textile industry would receive special protection from cheaper, foreign imports. Once in office, he set out to persuade Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, all textile-producing countries, to agree to 'voluntary' limits on their exports. Nixon behaved with an uncharacteristic lack of statesman-like grace in pushing for a deal on textiles which, through many fits and starts, was eventually finalised in October 1971. The textiles morass received a prominence in the relationship completely out of proportion to its actual importance. The sorry history of these negotiations is one that caused immense frustration and heartache for the participants. Kissinger's conclusion, 'Where the Okinawa negotiations exemplified high policy, the textile problem proved a case of low comedy, frustration and near fiasco,' does not go nearly far enough.[19] It is a tale characterised by missed opportunities, lack of imagination, repeated misunderstandings and a level of acrimony not seen in the relationship since the end of the Pacific war. The most frustrating aspect of the affair is the fact that the Japanese textile industry was not even the main threat to American producers. Like the Americans, the Japanese were also in the process of being undercut by manufacturers from lower-cost economies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. In the end the quotas negotiated for Japanese producers, fought over at such length and with such bitterness, were not even filled.[20] The standout study of the textile dispute is *The Textile Wrangle*, written by a trans-Pacific team of political scientists, I. M. Destler, Fukui Haruhiro and Satō Hideo.[21] Though published in 1979, its narrative and conclusions remain persuasive. It draws on interviews with over 90 American and Japanese participants in the affair. The authors were also aided in no small part by the tendency of the Japanese Ministry for International Trade and Industry and the Japanese textile industry federation to repeatedly leak sensitive information about the negotiations to the press. One area of the negotiations where Destler, Fukui and Satō had only limited

knowledge was the Wakaizumi-Kissinger connection since their book was written prior to the publication of either Wakaizumi's or Kissinger's memoirs. This connection is examined here. Initially Kissinger had hoped to stay aloof from the textile fray, correctly seeing it as politically motivated and therefore unworthy of his attention. However, Nixon left him in no doubt that as a presidential assistant he was expected to deliver.[22] He would be only the first in a long line of envoys, advisors and roving ambassadors appointed to the thankless task of negotiating with Japan a voluntary export-restraint agreement on textile products.[23]

Following his meeting with Kissinger, Wakaizumi returned to Tokyo and reported back to Satō, who was pleased that agreement on non-nuclear reversion was possible; less convinced of the necessity of coming to a secret deal on nuclear re-entry rights, Satō vented his displeasure with the secret codicil to the MST regarding the dispatch of US forces from their bases in Japan to Korea. Wakaizumi found this frustrating and recognised that the United States held the advantage. He noted, 'Unlike Satō, I was increasingly coming around to the view that if the United States president insisted on special provisions, we would be forced to concede in the interests of achieving a nuclear-free reversion of Okinawa.'[24] It would be some time before the prime minister came to share this view.

ECONCOM VII

Before exploring this clandestine diplomatic channel any further, it is necessary to return to the official path. At the end of July 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers came to Japan for the seventh US-Japan joint cabinet committee on economic relations, known as ECONCOM. He was accompanied by Maurice Stans, the combative secretary of commerce, who was pushing hard for a textiles deal. Rogers's visit would give Satō his first opportunity to personally sound out a high-ranking member of the Nixon administration on Okinawa. Although he intended to listen to what Rogers had to say, he found himself doing most of the talking.[25] Reading the memorandum of Satō's conversation with Rogers, it is apparent that he had not yet fully grasped what Wakaizumi had been telling him regarding the need to accede to the White House's demand for the conclusion of some sort of arrangement, secret or otherwise, on nuclear re-entry rights.[26] It is also clear that he was taking a very different line on Okinawa and nuclear weapons from his conversation with Alex Johnson in January.[27] In addition, he seems to have persisted in linking a commitment from Japan to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

(NPT) with a US pledge to 'denuclearise' its bases in Okinawa. This was a connection that the Gaimushō had explored but had abandoned in the face of American resistance. The logic, at least from the Japanese point of view, was sound. Since the Kennedy administration the United States (along with the Soviet Union) had sought international agreement on freezing the number of nuclear-armed countries. After the failure to persuade China and France to abandon their weapons programmes, the main targets of the non-proliferation campaign were West Germany and Japan, two countries with the financial and industrial capacity to develop nuclear weapons should they so decide. Since the United States sought to denuclearise Japan, then it should not object to removing its own weapons from the archipelago. However, for the United States the rationale for its support of the NPT framework was the maintenance of its nuclear near monopoly for strategic concerns.[28] Satō told Rogers that his government 'did not oppose NPT since many of its suggestions already incorporated into text.' He continued, 'As only nation to suffer Atom bombing, Japan firmly committed against arming self with nuclear weapons. Strong attitude of Japanese against nukes not restricted only to main islands, but also would apply to Okinawa, which issue must be solved to satisfaction of Japanese people.' Lest that not be clear enough, the drafter of the American memo of this conversation helpfully appended 'i.e., no nukes' to the prime minister's comments. In his diary Satō noted that 'I wanted to entangle the Okinawa problem and the non-proliferation treaty, I am sure I was able to deepen [Rogers's] understanding.'[29] Satō also expounded on this theme at a press conference on 6 August when he noted that 'the bottom line is that the existence of a nuclear capability within Japanese territory would mean that Japan could not be described as a non-nuclear nation'.[30] Unfortunately for Satō, he was very much mistaken, and this gambit of linking the non-proliferation treaty with Okinawa failed to excite the interest of Rogers or anyone else in Washington.

On the question of prior consultation versus the free use of bases, Satō was more forthcoming and stated to Rogers that he

> recognised relation of Okinawa to security ROK [Republic of Korea] and Taiwan. Neither has directly approached him re Okinawa reversion, but if either does, Sato said he intended to reply that they would be supported not just from bases in Okinawa but from bases in both Japan and Okinawa after reversion. ROK, Taiwan and Japan have deep common concern in security. Anything which took place in ROK would have direct and immediate effect on Japan and despite

> arguments about Japan's peace constitution and Japan-US Security Treaty, GOJ could not stand by idly.[31]

This was a significant statement of intent by the prime minister; however, he did not propose any legally binding framework or public statement. The United States would push for this over the coming months.

Shimoda's meeting with Johnson, August 1969

The ECONCOM meeting highlighted the growing divergence between US and Japanese economic interests. Officials from the US Treasury and the Commerce Department pushed for a liberalisation of Japan's economy to allow for greater American investment and imports but were for the most part stonewalled. America's hypocritical desire for protection of their textile industry was received in a similar fashion. Alex Johnson met with Shimoda following the end of the joint cabinet committee meeting and expressed his disappointment that Japan had not seen fit to take a 'bold step' on economic liberalisation during the talks.[32] While he assured Shimoda that the USA would treat Okinawa and bilateral issues separately, he also observed that Japan's 'image' in the United States and on Capitol Hill was linked to its cooperation on economic relations. Johnson felt he had 'painted a dark and bleak picture of Congressional attitudes on Okinawa.' However, Shimoda retorted that powerful Democratic senators, including Mike Mansfield, Edmund Muskie and Edward Kennedy, were supporters of reversion. The conversation then turned to the question of nuclear-storage rights and the unrestricted use of bases. Johnson warned that the Defence Department and the Congress remained sceptical regarding reversion. He also noted how Nixon could not simply ignore these concerns. In Johnson's memorandum of this conversation, he reports Shimoda as saying that the 'Shimoda formula' and the 'UN Charter formula' were gaining in support among government and official circles.

The 'Shimoda formula' refers to a series of pronouncements that Shimoda made over the first half of 1967 when he was vice-minister for foreign affairs in which he argued that Japan should agree to allow the United States to continue to hold unrestricted military rights in Okinawa following reversion. The resultant uproar in the press and from the opposition benches led Satō and then Foreign Minister Miki Takeo to disavow these statements. However, it was widely interpreted that Shimoda was launching a trial balloon on the prime minister's behalf, and his appointment as ambassador to the United States in June 1967 seemed to

confirm these suspicions.[33] Shimoda's account of the meeting, which he cabled to Tokyo, is markedly different to Johnson's. He stated that while in Tokyo he explained the 'Shimoda formula' to his colleagues: It would not grant the United States an automatic right to reintroduce nuclear weapons but rather set out the conditions under which such an action would be acceptable. These conditions guaranteed that Japan was fully informed in advance and that its security and that of the region were gravely endangered. On the issue of prior consultation the 'Shimoda formula' envisaged a more flexible response from Tokyo if the principles of the UN Charter were at risk, since the public would more readily accept such an action in such a circumstance. However, he also noted that the 'Shimoda formula' as outlined did *not* receive support from his colleagues in the Gaimushō, which was regarded as problematic, and that opinion currently favoured a 'case-by-case' approach to the question of prior consultation.

That the two memos differ so strikingly on this crucial point is fascinating, and while it is impossible to know which of the two is most accurate, it does give an insight into the gulf that remained between American and Japanese thinking on this most important of issues affecting reversion. This was further underlined when Johnson observed that the United States would 'need something much stronger and better' than the Ogasawara agreement on emergency rights for the storage of nuclear weapons. He also warned that were the two countries unable to come to an arrangement on this issue, Satō's visit might have to be postponed. Shimoda replied that this would cause a nightmare scenario in which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) would lose power and be replaced by an anti-American left-wing government that would render the bases unusable. The two men parted by agreeing that much more work was required to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement on these outstanding issues.

The Sneider–Tōgō talks

Richard Sneider and Tōgō Fumihiko in Tokyo were tasked with drawing an acceptable joint communiqué which was to be issued following Satō's meeting with Nixon that coming November as well as a 'unilateral statement' which Satō was to make to the press. The Gaimushō formulated a draft communiqué in May in advance of Aichi's trip to the United States the following month to which the State Department responded with a counterdraft.[34] Though the Japanese draft had noted the importance of Korea's security to Japan, the US draft went further and laid particular

emphasis on the UN mandate governing its forces' presence in Korea and underlined the importance of Korean security to Japan. The US draft also stressed the importance of Taiwan and Vietnam to Japan's peace and security, whereas the Japanese draft had made no mention of either. Furthermore, it provided for a substantial Japanese commitment to compensate the United States for its loss of property on the island. The Gaimushō was taken aback by the forceful and uncompromising language of the American draft.[35]

In response, Tōgō composed a fresh draft, which he handed to Sneider on 9 August. This incorporated the references to Taiwan and Vietnam but made no firm promises with regard to prior consultations and only vague sentiments in support of US treaty commitments to Japan and other countries of East Asia. On the nuclear question, paragraph 7 of the draft outlines that reversion would 'be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government' on nuclear weapons; that is, they would be removed prior to Okinawa's retrocession to Japan.[36] This was difficult for the United States to accept, and it is significant that just three days after this latest meeting with Tōgō, Sneider asked Wakaizumi to dinner on 12 August. Knowing that Sneider was aware of Wakaizumi's regular contact with Satō and his role during the 1967 summit (but not his more recent contacts with Kissinger), Wakaizumi got the impression that Sneider was trying to open up his own back-channel to the *Kantei*. Given the line taken by Tōgō with regard to nuclear weapons and prior consultation, Sneider may well have hoped to establish contact directly with Satō to arrive at a compromise. Though Wakaizumi kept his assignment confidential, Sneider impressed upon him the importance the United States attached to freedom of action with regard to Vietnam and Taiwan.[37]

At his next meeting with Tōgō on 15 August, Sneider asked if Satō could give Nixon an assurance that Japan would give 'favourable consideration' to a request by the United States to reintroduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa in an emergency.[38] Meeting again the following week, Sneider reiterated to Tōgō that the non-nuclear clause in Japan's draft communiqué was problematic for the United States. Sneider also presented a draft communiqué, which included much firmer Japanese guarantees regarding prior consultation. It also included the following assertion on Vietnam:

> The Prime Minister expressed understanding for U.S. efforts to restore peace in Vietnam and stated that if hostilities have not been concluded there by the time reversion is scheduled to take place, the Japanese

> Government would assure that the military effort in Vietnam would not be impeded because of reversion.[39]

This went much further than the Gaimushō had been prepared to countenance since it amounted to granting the United States advance permission for the use of bases. The Gaimushō preferred to either delay reversion or have the United States seek permission to continue to use their bases on Okinawa in support of the war in Vietnam through prior consultation at the time of reversion.[40]

Having thus reached an impasse on the use of bases and on nuclear weapons, Tōgō sought Satō's guidance.[41] With regard to the US draft paragraph on Vietnam, Satō differed from the Foreign Ministry in that he was unhappy with the wording but not the sentiment.[42] Agreement on this would have to wait until Aichi's second trip to Washington in September. On the wider question of prior consultation, Satō told Tōgō in late August that compromise was possible so long as it was done within the framework of the Mutual Security Treaty. However, he warned that given the depth of popular antagonism towards nuclear weapons, which was based neither on reason nor on military necessity, there could be no accommodation on this.[43]

At this stage Satō was still under the impression that he had neutralised the nuclear issue in his meeting with Rogers by entwining it with the question of Japan's acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty. Furthermore, while he was in favour of offering the United States assurances on the use of bases in case of hostilities in Korea, Taiwan or Vietnam, he clung to the hope that the United States would accept an agreement based upon mutual trust, not on secret codicils. He was mindful of their potential to do political damage to him and his party were they discovered. He also questioned their necessity since, as he observed to Wakaizumi, 'during times of crisis written agreements did not always remain valid. (Future) politicians would, in his estimation, probably accept the nuclear-related conditions if the situation were explained to them in sufficient detail'.[44] It is clear from these exchanges with Tōgō and Wakaizumi that despite what these two envoys, independently of each other, were telling him, Satō still clung stubbornly to the view that an agreement on Okinawa could be finalised largely on Japan's terms.

As a result, Tōgō was able only to propose to Sneider changes to Satō's unilateral statement. These gave a very strong indication of Japan's likely response should tensions develop on the Korean peninsula.[45] The draft statement notes the importance of the security of the wider region to Japan's own security and then states that

> if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.[46]

With regard to Taiwan the draft statement was less forthcoming and simply recognised America's treaty commitment to the Republic of China, observing that while a conflict in the Taiwan Strait was unlikely, were it to occur, it would have a negative impact on Japan's own security. On the question of Vietnam, an inoffensive paragraph referred to the mutually held desire for peace in the region. This was hardly what the United States was looking for but understandable in the context of the fierce opposition to the war in Japan.[47]

On the question of the Taiwan and Korea clauses, there are several reasons for the differing approaches taken by Japanese officialdom. Firstly, the People's Republic of China refused to accept the validity of the Republic of China regime on Taiwan, regarding it as a renegade province which was part of Chinese territory and not a matter for outside interference. Any reference to America's military commitment to Taiwan was likely to enrage Beijing; so Tokyo was keen to keep such statements as anodyne as possible.[48] Secondly, US forces in Korea were covered by a UN mandate, a fact which lent their mission a measure of respectability in Japanese eyes. Thirdly, we have seen how the prospect of Okinawa reversion had unsettled South Korea, and though Tokyo was not prepared to concede to Seoul a part in the negotiations, it was keen to assuage its legitimate security concerns. However, the main reason for such an untypically frank admission of official Japanese attitudes towards regional security was to find a formula which would supplant the secret understanding on the dispatch of US forces from Japan to Korea agreed in 1960, when the revised Mutual Security Treaty came into operation.[49] Despite such candid draft language on Korea, Sneider responded that this did not go far enough and that if the language in the communiqué and the unilateral statement dealing with Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and nuclear issues were left vague, a secret agreement containing firm assurances on these matters would be necessary. Given that Meyer had expressed similar sentiments to Aichi, Tōgō was taken aback at the firm and consistent line being taken on this matter by all sections of the US government.[50]

Searching for compromise on nuclear storage and 'free use'

Returning once more to the backchannel negotiations, Wakaizumi had a second meeting with Kissinger on 28 August at Nixon's 'Western White House' in San Clemente, California. At this meeting Wakaizumi presented a memo to Kissinger outlining Satō's hopes for the summit. This included a proposal to have the summit in San Francisco. Yoshida Shigeru had signed the treaty ending the occupation of Japan at the peace conference, which had been held at the San Francisco Opera House. Satō was attempting to further identify his own (expected) achievement of securing the reversion of Okinawa with his mentor's success in bringing the occupation to a close. It was also felt that since California was Nixon's home state, it would be acceptable to the president. This suggestion was later politely declined, Nixon having had no desire to conduct international diplomacy in a city which had become a hotbed of 1960s counterculture, student radicalism and opposition to the Vietnam War. Wakaizumi's memo stressed the nuclear issue, noting, 'On one issue Mr. Satō really does need a real understanding and help from Mr. Nixon: the removal of nuclear weapons…from the Islands by the time of the actual reversion.' Wakaizumi's memo also noted that Satō was open to the give and take demanded in a negotiation, a point that Wakaizumi would come to regret making since he later speculated that this statement was the germ for the trade-off Nixon was to demand on textile export limitations.[51]

Ambassador Shimoda in Washington was to experience the same uncompromising approach that Tōgō had complained of when he met with Johnson on 8 September. Joining Johnson were Meyer and Sneider (back in Washington for consultations) and Richard Finn the State Department's country director for Japan. On the question of Korea and Taiwan, Shimoda noted, 'Both of these countries are important to Japan and Japan would willingly say yes if U.S. needed to undertake combat operations to carry out its commitments. But for Japan to say this beforehand is difficult.' He also firmly ruled out coming to a secret agreement and once again underlined the risks involved in alienating public opinion. Pointing to the fact that an election was expected after the November summit, Shimoda noted the possibility of the LDP losing power should the terms of the agreement fail to satisfy the Japanese public and the consequent damage that would do to the alliance. This was especially relevant given that the MST's initial term was due to end in 1970 and the election would be seen as a public referendum on Satō's

handling of the issue of Okinawa and related security concerns. Shimoda noted that Japan would not interfere with America's use of its bases on Okinawa in the event that the war in Vietnam continued after reversion. However, it would be difficult to find a way of indicating this without seeming to compromise Japan's sovereignty. With regard to nuclear weapons, Shimoda observed that his government 'can only ask U.S. to give favourable consideration for the accommodation of Japan's special feeling'. Johnson made it clear that the language of the communiqué had to be clear and unambiguous so as to avoid differing interpretations being presented to the Diet and to Congress. On the nuclear issue he noted that the final decision on this would be taken by Nixon in his meeting with Satō and that the decision would be based on Nixon's satisfaction with the overall package.[52] Here Johnson was staying close to the negotiation strategy of leveraging Japan's desire for nuclear-free reversion to extract concessions on the other points at issue. Sneider noted how the two sides were close to a 'meeting of minds' on Korea but were quite far apart on Vietnam and Taiwan.[53] Johnson made the point that though Taiwan and Korea were different issues for Japan, they were substantially the same for the United States. Contradicting Sneider, Johnson said Japan's proposed wording for the communiqué on Korea did not go far enough to replace the 1960 secret agreement. Two days later it was Tōgō's turn once again to hear bad news. In spite of his assertion that it would be 'extremely difficult' for Japan to accede to a secret understanding on nuclear weapons, Sneider made clear Johnson's view that there had to be a clear and unambiguous Japanese assurance on this matter and it would be helpful if Japan dropped its opposition in this regard.[54] These meetings served to highlight the protracted and painstakingly slow nature of these negotiations. Given the high stakes, though, essentially recrafting America's and Japan's strategic posture in the region as well as their overall bilateral relationship, it is no wonder the diplomats involved spent a considerable amount of time negotiating and refining each point.

Aichi's second visit to Washington, September 1969

Such detailed negotiations were by no means over. Shimoda's meeting had served as a testing of the waters in advance of Aichi's second trip to the United States in mid-September. The foreign minister's final meetings with Rogers were designed to bridge the gap between the two sides' positions in advance of Satō's visit in November. The main outstanding issues remained finding mutually acceptable language for the joint communiqué and Satō's statement with reference to Korea, Taiwan

and Vietnam. Though the two sides were close on Korea, differences remained on Taiwan and Vietnam. Rogers warned that anything agreed upon was *ad referendum* to the president. Furthermore, Rogers was even less forthcoming with regard to nuclear weapons and was completely unwilling to deal with the issue. This was in light of the fact that National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13 had reserved to Nixon any decision on this matter. However, Rogers's flippant remark during the meeting that 'the future of Jerusalem and nuclear weapons on Okinawa are subjects I always avoid' must have especially rankled his Japanese guests.[55] With regard to this issue, the Gaimushō's Treaties Section had produced an imaginative addition to the Japanese draft communiqué, which attempted to balance Japan's desire for non-nuclear reversion with the American view on preserving its right to reintroduction:

> The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese government reflecting such sentiment. The President assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure, *without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*, the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.[56]

With this addition, underlined in the original, the United States would give a commitment to withdraw its nuclear weapons while reserving the right to request that they be reintroduced. Although this did not assure an affirmative answer would be forthcoming, it at least left such a possibility open. The US wording of this paragraph remained as uncompromising as before and assured them carte blanche: 'The Prime Minister agreed that it was in the interests of Japan that the deterrent capability of the U.S. military forces in the islands should in no way be diminished by reversion.'[57] A meeting on the nuclear issue remained a long way off.

More progress towards agreement was made on the other issues. On Vietnam the US-proposed wording for the communiqué noted both Nixon's and Satō's hope that war would be over by the time reversion actually occurred but 'that there are fully adequate provisions for consultation between the two Governments' should the war still be in progress that would ensure that 'the return of Okinawa will not affect US military activities.'[58] Aichi observed that this was difficult for his government to accept. The Japanese-proposed phrasing that had Satō

noting that 'U.S. military activities relating to the conflict should not be affected by reversion' was welcomed by Rogers, but he was less satisfied with the subsequent vague and evasive references to the consultation mechanisms.[59] Back in Tokyo, Ushiba Nobuhiko briefed Satō on the progress of the negotiations.[60] Faced with an impasse on nuclear weapons and Vietnam, Satō favoured compromise on these points for the sake of the overarching importance of close relations with the United States. He also struck an upbeat tone in his diary entry for that day, noting that on the negotiations, 'all seems satisfactory'. Ushiba advised Aichi's delegation accordingly.[61] As a result, at his second meeting with Rogers on 15 September, Aichi was able to agree with the inclusion of the following in the communiqué on Vietnam: 'the two governments would fully consult each other so that the U.S. efforts to assure that the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference would not be affected by reversion'.[62] Though the new phrase gave the United States much greater freedom of action, the removal of references to military action and the allusions to self-determination would, it was hoped, lend it a more agreeable flavour, particularly with regard to the Japanese public.

With regard to Korea and Taiwan, the United States sought the following included in the joint communiqué: 'The Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. should be in a position to discharge effectively its international obligations for the defence of the Far East including Japan.' The United States also wanted Satō's unilateral statement to confirm that Tokyo would give its 'prompt and favourable consideration' should the US request the dispatch of its forces from Japan for the defence of Korea and Taiwan.[63] In connection with Korea, Aichi approved the 'prompt and favourable' wording but wished to reserve his position on whether this ought to go in the joint communiqué or in Satō's unilateral statement. He also resisted linking Korea and Taiwan and preferred they be dealt with separately.[64] To this end the Japanese delegation proposed a new wording on Taiwan for the joint communiqué. American modifications to this were then accepted by the Japanese. The agreed sentence stated, 'The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan.'[65] Such language was similar to but at the same time distinct from the phrase on Korea. This declared that 'the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security'.[66] Such a distinction was important for Tokyo, given the wish not to alarm Chinese sensitivities over Taiwan's status, as has been discussed above. However, the United States was able to drive a hard bargain and secure a strong assertion by Japan of its strategic interests in the region. In any case Aichi's visit

resulted in much progress being made on an agreed joint communiqué and unilateral statement, with the notable exception of the nuclear issue.

Though Rogers refused to deal with this issue with Aichi, lower-level diplomats were able to sound out their counterparts over America's likely approach to nuclear weapons. Following the talks, Tōgō recorded his impression that the US position on nuclear weapons would be a product of negotiations between the State and Defence departments. He felt that Rogers probably favoured the removal of the weapons and would advise Nixon accordingly. However, the expected price for this would be Japanese agreement to emergency reintroduction rights for the United States.[67] Chiba Kazuo, a senior Gaimushō diplomat in the America Section, also noted the strong demand from the US military and the State Department for a private agreement covering nuclear weapons and Vietnam.[68] On 21 September, Richard Finn confirmed these impressions to Tanaka Hirota and stressed that the Defence Department was opposed to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and that the State Department was offering emergency reintroduction rights as a compromise, which, given Japanese concerns, would have to be a secret addition to the communiqué.[69]

Aichi's visit also touched on economic matters. Following his meetings with Rogers, Aichi met with Nixon's Commerce Secretary, Maurice Stans. Stans had an aggressive manner and directed his energies to securing the international agreement on textile imports which his boss longed for. To that end he had toured East Asian textile-producing countries in April to demand export-restraint and was met with polite but definite refusal by both Japanese industry leaders and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) bureaucrats.[70] In this they were supported by a unanimous resolution of the Diet, passed on the eve of Stans'' visit, which expressed opposition to the US demands for an export limitation agreement.[71] Stans's meeting with Aichi, while cordial and friendly, produced no outcome since Aichi declined to negotiate and stressed that with regard to textiles his was merely a 'fact-finding' mission.[72] Stans soon resumed his abrasive public posture and effectively sought agreement through bullying and threats of unilateral action rather than by persuasion or traditional give and take negotiations. In these efforts he was assisted by Stanley Nehmer, the textile expert in the Commerce Department. Nehmer, according to Alex Johnson,

> persuaded…Stans that the best way to handle the matter was to keep the 'softies' in the State Department and the Special Trade Representative's White House office out of the subject, and that he,

> Stans, together with Nehmer should go to Japan and 'lay down the law' to the Japanese, and in good World War II fashion, demand their 'unconditional surrender' on the issue.[73]

Such tactics were far from universally accepted. Philip Tresize, of the State Department's Economic Section, in a memo entitled 'How Do We Live with Japan?,' warned that such an approach would be counterproductive. He noted that 'we make a grievous and unrecoverable mistake if we suppose that the Japanese are less sensitive than anyone else to public heavy-handedness'.[74] Unfortunately, given the political imperative of securing such a deal, Tresize's wise counsel fell on deaf ears.

Japanese press reports following Aichi's second round of talks in Washington were on the whole optimistic about the prospect for agreement on reversion and a satisfactory outcome on related issues. They stressed public statements by former US ambassador Edwin Reischauer and Senators Stuart Symington and Mike Mansfield which were sympathetic to Japanese concerns.[75] However, in a press briefing following his return to Japan, Tōgō sought to downplay this optimism by noting that the nuclear question would not be dealt with until Satō's meeting with Nixon and that significant differences still existed regarding prior consultations.[76] A considerable gulf remained, and Tōgō was right to dampen the high expectations of his fellow Japanese.

Wakaizumi in Washington

Following Aichi's trip to the United States, Wakaizumi made his own way there at the end of September. His first meeting was with his old friend Morton Halperin, who had just resigned from the NSA staff. Like Sneider, he was uncomfortable with Kissinger's penchant for control and secrecy.[77] Despite his departure, he remained a well-informed observer and told Wakaizumi that in his judgement Nixon would need some sort of confidential agreement regarding the reintroduction of nuclear weapons. 'The knowledge that such a record existed,' Halperin said, 'even if it were shown to no one, would enable the president confidently to explain his actions and persuade both Congress and the military. Winning over congressional hardliners and the chairman of the JCS is still a major problem'. Though he also noted that given the changes in the international system, not least US-USSR strategic parity and the Sino-Soviet split, it was unlikely that such a request for reintroduction would ever actually be made. Wakaizumi took some comfort from this and from the knowledge that such a request would be made only in

the most pressing of emergency situations, in which case it would be in Japan's interest to allow the weapons to return.[78] However, he was also perturbed by the fact that no progress had been made on the official track with regard to the nuclear question. (Satō had shown him Aichi's report on his conversation with Rogers, which included Rogers's frivolous remark on the future of Jerusalem and the question of nuclear weapons on Okinawa). Wakaizumi had been under the impression from his last meeting with Kissinger in San Clemente that this issue would be handled at the official level.

The following day Kissinger told Wakaizumi, with his 'unmistakable and forceful intensity', that the 'most important issue is textiles'. This actually meant that it was the most important issue for Nixon. Kissinger was evasive with Wakaizumi on the nuclear question.[79] Refusing to back off, Wakaizumi broached the possibility of Satō and Nixon agreeing to a private note on nuclear reintroduction in addition to the inclusion in the joint communiqué of the Gaimushō's wording for paragraph 7. Kissinger, remaining elusive on this, asserted that the nuclear issue would be dealt with in private by Nixon and Satō during the summit and merely reconfirmed that Nixon was not planning on doing anything to humiliate or embarrass Satō at their talks. When Wakaizumi voiced his concern over Rogers's complete avoidance of the issue in his meetings with Aichi, Kissinger noted with relish that this meant Rogers had clearly got the message that this was an issue beyond his purview. It is easy to sympathise with Wakaizumi's concern at the way in which Kissinger treated such a vital issue as a signifier of his own power and prestige relative to the secretary of state.[80]

Wakaizumi met once more with Kissinger on 30 September. This meeting was a decidedly one-sided affair. Kissinger presented him with two reports detailing America's needs with regard to nuclear weapons and textiles based on information he had received from General Wheeler and Maurice Stans. Wheeler had made clear that in addition to emergency re-entry rights, the United States would need the retention of nuclear weapons storage sites on Okinawa. Stans required a comprehensive agreement covering all manner of garments which limited Japanese exporters to levels of market penetration for the year ending 30 June 1969. This amounted to a severe and almost punitive demand. It was clear to Wakaizumi from the manner of Kissinger's delivery and the nature of the notes passed to him that Nixon's wish for a resolution of the textiles question had become a demand.[81] The negotiations were heading for the final and most difficult stage.

Satō Eisaku, prime minister of Japan, 1964–1972 (© Bettman/CORBIS)

Satō (front, centre) with members of his newly formed second cabinet, November 1967. Miki Takeo is on Sato's right; Nakasone Yasuhiro is behind Sato on his left (© Bettman/CORBIS)

Lyndon Johnson confers with senior aides aboard Air Force One. Left to right: Robert McNamara, Hubert Humphrey, Dean Rusk, John Gardner, Alex Johnson, Maxwell Taylor (obscured) and Walt Rostow (© Bettman/CORBIS)

Nixon makes a point to Aichi Kiichi and Shimoda Takesō (© Wally McNamee/ CORBIS)

Satō and Nixon at the Oval Office (© Bettman/CORBIS)

5
The Reversion of Okinawa, 1969, Part 3

Briefings for the prime minister

Satō was briefed on the unresolved nuclear question by Ushiba and Tōgō on 7 October. They could not give him a clear or definitive indication of the likely approach that the United States would take with regard to removing nuclear weapons from Okinawa. What they knew for sure was that the decision on this matter would be taken by the two leaders in private. Satō once more stressed the connection between the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Japan's declared policy on the non-introduction of nuclear weapons. In particular he queried why the United States sought the right to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan if at the same time it wanted Japan to sign the NPT and disavow the development of an independent deterrent. Tōgō pointed out that under the Three Non-nuclear Principles, Japan had already announced its intention not to produce nuclear weapons, so the United States would find it puzzling that Japan would also rule out the option of America's extended deterrence. Satō conceded that this had been a mistake in the Three Non-nuclear Principles.[1] At this stage senior Japanese diplomats such as Tōgō, Tanaka and Chiba were aware from their contacts with State Department officials that the United States would likely insist on an agreement covering the reintroduction of nuclear weapons and that this matter would be handled between Nixon and Satō. Around this time Satō told Wakaizumi that several representatives from the Gaimushō had been to see him, wondering how to respond to a likely demand for emergency reintroduction rights since Satō had previously expressed his opposition to concluding a secret deal.[2]

Despite the prime minister's reluctance the Gaimushō went ahead and drew up the following 'Draft Record of Conversation' in both English

and Japanese. Originating in the America Section, it was most likely composed by Tōgō for use during the late stages of the negotiations or perhaps during the summit itself:

> U.S. Representative: Need [*sic*] might arise in the future for the United States to introduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa after reversion. Under such circumstances the U.S. Government would expect from the Japanese Government an affirmative reply to prior consultation to which [*sic*] would be undertaken in accordance with the Exchange of Notes concerning the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security [i.e., the prior consultation clause]. In view of the policy of the Japanese Government on nuclear weapons, the U.S. Government will not seek the consent of the Japanese Government to the introduction of nuclear weapons into post-reversion Okinawa unless such action is required to deal with a situation of utmost urgency. I would like to state further that the actual introduction, if consented to, will be subject to such terms and conditions as will be agreed upon between the two Governments.
>
> Japanese Representative: It is the intention of the Japanese Government to adhere firmly to its present policy on nuclear weapons throughout the territories under Japanese administration, including Okinawa after reversion. It is only natural, however, that this policy will be subject to review when Japan's national security is at stake. The reply of the Japanese Government to U.S. prior consultation on the introduction of nuclear weapons into post-reversion Okinawa will be made in light of the situation then prevailing together with the results of such review.[3]

This document, only recently released by the Diplomatic Archives in Tokyo, offers a fascinating insight into what the Gaimushō was prepared to offer the United States so as to secure reversion. It was not a blanket guarantee of the right to reintroduction, since this would have compromised Japanese sovereignty. It does, however, go very far towards making such an assurance and sends a strong signal that Japan's professed policy on nuclear weapons could be adapted in light of changed circumstances particularly if Japan's national security were threatened. However, Nixon's desire to come to a private understanding with Satō on nuclear weapons (and Satō's own wish that any such understanding be kept as secret as possible) meant that both the State Department and the Gaimushō were completely excluded from the agreement on nuclear reintroduction. As a result this draft record of conversation never came

to be used. Despite this it is an important historical record and points to the pragmatic and flexible approach Japanese officialdom displayed on this issue.

Following his return from Washington, Wakaizumi briefed Satō on the progress of his clandestine diplomacy. Time was running out, and the negotiations were becoming more and more pressing. In spite of this, Wakaizumi was annoyed by Satō's apparent lack of urgency. After unobtrusively slipping into the *Kantei* on 23 October, Wakaizumi reported on his latest meetings with Kissinger. Satō was optimistic for the upcoming summit, now less than a month away, noting that agreement had been reached on all items with the exception of the nuclear question. Satō wanted to wait and see if the official diplomatic track would produce a breakthrough on this matter before responding to Kissinger's demands. Wakaizumi later recounted, much to his embarrassment, the frustration he felt at the time over Satō's failure to grasp the point that Nixon wished to come to a private arrangement on the nuclear question with him.[4] His frustration with Satō was unfair, as unknown to Wakaizumi, Gaimushō diplomats were quite well informed that the price for the removal of nuclear weapons would likely be an agreement on reintroduction in an emergency. In light of this it was not inconceivable that the official track could produce a settlement.

The following day Wakaizumi met with Sneider, who impressed upon him the importance Washington attached to economic issues, particularly textiles. This was a political problem for the president, and he hoped Satō, a fellow politician, would be able to help him with this matter. On the nuclear question Sneider attempted to mine Wakaizumi for information as to how flexible Satō could be with regard to the application of the Three Non-nuclear Principles to Okinawa. Wakaizumi remained silent and revealed nothing.[5]

Satō met again with Wakaizumi on 27 October and handed him the latest Gaimushō draft of the joint communiqué. Satō declared that he was happy enough with the statement on nuclear weapons (which, to be sure, had yet to be agreed) but noted that he preferred a less ambiguous declaration that the weapons were to be removed. Wakaizumi suggested that Satō draft his own wording and propose its inclusion in the communiqué during his meeting with Nixon. He also broached the question of Nixon's demand for a secret codicil to their communiqué (known as the 'Agreed Minute') on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons. On this matter Satō remained averse to the conclusion of any sort of written agreement. He observed that 'Signing a written agreement will be meaningless unless our two countries trust one another. I really would like to

avoid any special arrangements.' He also struck a fatalistic tone, noting the huge disparity in power between the two countries:

> The matter depends ultimately on the relative distribution of power between the two countries. The United States could, in effect, act as it wishes. In any crisis situation, it should easily enough push through any prior notification, and we wouldn't have a choice in the matter.

For Satō such an act would not constitute an 'invasion' since it would be in Japan's interests to facilitate the nuclear umbrella on which it relied for its security. As far as he was concerned, so long as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remained in power (an alternative to which Satō found unthinkable) and the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) remained the cornerstone of Japan's security policy, no Japanese government would refuse to facilitate US efforts to uphold the security of the region. As a result, secret agreements of this kind were unnecessary and dangerous since should their contents become generally known, they would engender a massive political controversy. As with the section of the communiqué on Vietnam, Satō was far less concerned with a perceived diminution of Japanese sovereignty than with ensuring that Japan's security interests were served by the continuing presence of US military power in the region.

With regard to the textiles he was anxious that there be no obvious trade-off between this and Okinawa, since the public mood was decidedly against making concessions on trade in exchange for the return of Japanese territory.[6] In the Japanese language 'Okinawa' means 'rope on the open seas', alluding to the archipelago's elongated geography. The popular expression 'rope [Okinawa] should not be traded for thread [textiles]' articulated this strongly held sentiment.[7] Moreover, on 10 November, just a week before his departure to Washington, Satō had been cautioned by the leaders of the opposition Democratic Socialist and Kōmeitō parties of the dangers of such a trade-off.[8] Satō was thus caught in the middle. On the one hand he recognised the urgency and importance of the situation to the United States.[9] On the other he was all too aware of powerful forces within Japan, the textile industry and their supporters in the LDP and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), as well as the centrist opposition parties, which rejected any compromise. Satō needed time to build some measure of support for taking action, and yet Nixon wanted an agreement to be concluded in the short term. Moreover only a multilateral deal through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had any prospect

of commanding Japanese support, whereas Nixon was pushing for a personal deal with Satō.[10]

No indication on the nuclear question

Throughout October, Aichi pressed Meyer for a signal on the likely approach that the United States would take towards Okinawa's nuclear weapons during the summit. Meyer was constrained to repeat, almost like a mantra, that he could reveal nothing regarding the American position and that this was a matter Nixon would decide on personally in light of his conversations with Satō.[11] On 1 November, Shimoda appealed to Alex Johnson for some 'indication', hoping that since the United States had not made a counterproposal to Japan's draft paragraph, the two sides would not be forced to engage in detailed negotiations over appropriate wording at such a late stage. Johnson demurred and noted that Nixon's attention had, of late, been directed towards Vietnam and that the US government would finalise its position in the coming week. In the meantime, Johnson suggested, Tokyo should consider its attitude towards reintroduction of nuclear weapons in an emergency.[12] On 4 November, Rogers sent Nixon a memo outlining progress in negotiating the communiqué. On the nuclear question the memo stressed that Satō was 'nervous about coming here without a resolution of this issue and through both official and private channels has been pressing us hard for an indication of our position'.[13] The following day Meyer was finally able to tell Aichi that he would be in a position to give an answer to Satō on 10 November.[14] Before Satō met with Meyer, he had one more consultation with Wakaizumi before his envoy departed for Washington so as to make final preparations for the summit.

Once more Wakaizumi emphasised Nixon's demand for a written undertaking on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons. Satō remained uneasy about this and unsure of its necessity. Wakaizumi assured him this was essential and that Nixon would keep the agreement confidential. Asking what Satō intended to suggest regarding how nuclear weapons were to be dealt with in the communiqué, Satō handed him three draft paragraphs. They were as follows:

> Draft 1. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister

> that there would be no nuclear weapons on Okinawa at the time of reversion of administrative rights to Japan
>
> Draft 2. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out, without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.
>
> Draft 3. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government. The President expressed his deep understanding and stated the policy of the U.S. Government would ensure that, without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa tobe carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.[15]

Wakaizumi recognised that draft 2 was substantially the same as the draft that the Gaimushō had suggested to the United States during Aichi's Washington visit in September and that drafts 1 and 3 also had much in common with it. In light of this, Wakaizumi wondered if Satō had composed these himself or had consulted with one of the diplomats involved in the negotiations.[16] The authors of the historians' committee report into clandestine agreements between the United States and Japan have left open the question of who was responsible for the three drafts.[17] However, the available evidence makes it highly likely they were Satō's own work. Wakaizumi recognised the handwriting of the drafts as Kusuda's and concluded that Satō's private secretary had transcribed the prime minister's notes, which Kusuda later confirmed to him.[18] What the drafts show is the premium Satō placed on securing an unambiguous statement by the United States that it would withdraw its nuclear weapons. Indeed, he emphatically told Wakaizumi to 'press for *as clear a statement as possible*'. Wakaizumi was far from optimistic regarding the prospect for success, especially since the Gaimushō had already made a proposal to the United States on this matter. Satō asked him to make his best efforts, and though he wanted a clearer communiqué, he indicated

that he would be happy with any signal by the United States that it intended to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa.[19]

Final preparations for the summit

As Wakaizumi was making arrangements to depart to the United States, Japanese diplomats on both sides of the Pacific were finally making some headway in their efforts to ascertain the likely American stance on nuclear weapons. On 5 November, Yoshino Bunroku reported from Washington that Meyer had been instructed to seek a meeting with Satō at which he would say, 'Nuclear weapons can be removed from Okinawa, but what is Japan's policy in an emergency?' The answer to this question, Yoshino stressed, was crucial. A secret accord on emergency reintroduction was a possible, though not the preferred, solution for the United States. Once again it was stressed that the final decision would be Nixon's.[20] The following day Yoshino despatched a more detailed cable to Tokyo. Richard Finn told him in detail of the final preparations being made within the US government in advance of the summit. Rogers was to see Nixon and request the clearance of four papers: instructions for Meyer's meeting with Satō, the draft communiqué, a paper on the nuclear question and Nixon's briefing for congressional leaders. In addition to sounding out Satō on the nuclear question, Meyer was to underscore the importance of bilateral trade relations, especially the need for an agreeable solution on textiles. Satō's attitudes on these issues and on Japan's stance on the NPT and the MST would be of particular interest to Nixon and inform the outcome of the summit. Yoshino was also able to report that Alex Johnson, who had up to that point felt the United States would table its own draft paragraph for the communiqué on nuclear weapons, now maintained that should a satisfactory understanding be reached on reintroduction, the Japanese draft would be accepted.[21] On 10 November, Sneider told Tōgō of the likelihood of an arrangement on nuclear weapons, along the lines of that concluded at the time of the reversion of the Ogasawara Islands (i.e., emergency reintroduction), that would not be part of the communiqué.[22]

Meyer duly met with Satō on 11 November. Their meeting, at which Aichi was also present, was dominated by the nuclear question and by textiles. Satō noted the problem of accommodating the American wish for emergency storage rights with Japan's Three Non-nuclear Principles. Satō said he was 'wracking his brains on this question, which was so hard to reconcile.' Aichi then observed, while Satō nodded in agreement, that the Japanese proposal for paragraph 7 of the joint communiqué

went as far as Japan could on this matter and asked that Meyer inform his superiors that it had been specially formulated to meet America's needs. On the textile question Satō made what Meyer described as a 'most interesting proposal' suggesting secret bilateral talks between the United States and Japan at which a common approach for later multilateral talks would be thrashed out.[23] Satō made only a perfunctory note of the ambassador's call in his diary.[24] Kusuda Minoru's diary records that following the meeting Satō, with uncharacteristic profanity, ordered that the three draft paragraphs, which he had shown to Wakaizumi some days before, be sent to Tōgō.[25] The revelation from the US ambassador that Nixon would seek an agreement on nuclear re-entry rights had obviously rankled with him, despite the fact that Wakaizumi and Gaimushō diplomats had been pointing to the likelihood of such an eventuality over the past month. In response Satō seems to have decided to redouble his efforts for a more clear statement on the removal of nuclear weapons in the communiqué by enlisting Tōgō's services.

Choreographing the summit

As Satō was getting this disappointing news, Wakaizumi was in Washington preparing for his final meetings with Kissinger prior to Satō's visit. The two aides would plan the summit in some detail. In advance of his meetings with Kissinger, Wakaizumi made detailed preparations. Locking himself in his room at the Statler Hilton, near the White House, he spent his first few days composing the various memos in which he set out Satō's position on nuclear weapons and textiles. He then had two short and focused meetings with Kissinger on 10 and 11 November before flying back to Tokyo to brief Satō.

On the nuclear issue Wakaizumi, expanding on Satō's three draft paragraphs for the communiqué, added two more of his own. Satō's drafts 1 to 3 became drafts 1, 3 and 5, respectively, and Wakaizumi's additions became drafts 2 and 4. From 1 to 5, each draft moved progressively closer to the US position. Wakaizumi's additions are as follows:

> Draft 2. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

> Draft 4. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the United States to ensure, without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

Draft 2 was the same as Satō's second draft with the removal of references to prior consultation, while draft 4 was the same as Satō's third draft with the removal of 'and stated the policy of the U.S. government on this matter' and its replacement with the underlined 'the intention of.' This was also in the draft submitted to the United States by the Gaimushō during Aichi's visit to Washington in September.[26] When shown these, Kissinger rejected draft 1 and noted that draft 2 was promising but that draft 3 was closest to his side's preferred outcome. Immediately Wakaizumi recognised the error of showing Kissinger all five drafts at once, literally revealing his hand in one stroke, rather than engaging in back-and-forth and coming to an agreement. Such were the pitfalls for the amateur diplomat. Wakaizumi stressed that draft 2 was the maximum Satō could give and that the 'without prejudice to' phrase was most problematic for him.[27] This was bizarre since this very phrase originated in the Gaimushō. On the Agreed Minute, Wakaizumi was less clumsy, making sure that the United States would need to engage in 'prior consultation' with Japan if it intended to reintroduce nuclear weapons rather than serve 'prior notification', as had been suggested. Wakaizumi assured Kissinger that in a grave emergency, so long as the LDP remained in office and the MST continued, the answer would be yes. However, the term 'notification' was injurious to Japanese notions of sovereignty. Kissinger accepted this without demur but noted the nuclear-related matters would have to be cleared with General Wheeler.[28] With regard to textiles Wakaizumi wrote a memo for Kissinger, attempting to assure him that Satō wanted to be cooperative but also stressing the limitations placed on him. It would be necessary to deal on a multilateral basis through GATT, though secret bilateral talks were possible in the initial stages, which would lead to a general settlement along the lines favoured by the United States. The most important point was that there could be no appearance of a trade-off between reversion and textiles. Wakaizumi also requested that the United States withdraw its

Mace-B surface-to-air missiles from Okinawa. These obsolete weapons had already been removed from West Germany, and their presence on Okinawa was a visible reminder that nuclear weapons remained on the island. Though they could be fitted with a conventional warhead, their elimination would have strong resonance in Japan and redound to Satō's electoral advantage.[29] Wakaizumi also indicated that Satō would sign the NPT and conveyed Satō's suggestion that there ought to be a 'hotline' between Tokyo and Washington, both to facilitate the Agreed Minute and as a symbol of the importance of the relationship. Kissinger saw no problem with installing a hotline and arranged to meet with Wakaizumi once more after consulting with Nixon, Stans and Wheeler regarding Wakaizumi's presentation.

Meeting again the following day, Kissinger asked that Satō raise the textile issue in his talks with Nixon and also suggest secret negotiations which would lead to an agreement desired by the United States. Both countries would then take a common line at a multilateral GATT conference, with a final agreement envisaged before the end of the year.[30] Wakaizumi was puzzled as to why Satō should be the one to broach an issue that was clearly Nixon's main concern but agreed to discuss the matter with Satō. On the nuclear issue Kissinger reported that draft 2, which lacked the 'without prejudice' phrase, was not acceptable. He then showed Wakaizumi the State Department's draft for a secret agreement on reintroduction.[31] Though he snatched only a glance, it was apparent to Wakaizumi that this gave a completely free hand to the United States, with no regard to Japanese sovereignty. What Wakaizumi did not know was that just before their meeting that day, Kissinger called Alex Johnson and told him of Nixon's wish to end the State Department's involvement in negotiating the secret understanding. Nixon, Kissinger told Johnson, was 'a little edgy on the confidential business. He didn't want that all over State and would like Johnson to kill that – take Green off of it'. According to Kissinger, Nixon was concerned that word of the agreement would leak from the Gaimushō if it became general knowledge at the State Department.[32]

Kissinger also broached with Wakaizumi the possibility of informing the State Department of their channel of communication. Aghast, Wakaizumi protested that this was unthinkable since it would increase the chances of their clandestine diplomacy becoming known; Kissinger dropped the matter.[33] Kissinger's suggestion, on the face of it, is out of character, as he was not one to share information willingly. It is far more likely that he was checking to see if Wakaizumi would attempt to contact the State Department himself, and by showing him the State

Department's harsh demands, Kissinger was seeking to head off such an outcome. Revealing the State Department's less compromising position also served Kissinger's purpose in persuading Wakaizumi to accept draft 3 in addition to the Agreed Minute.

Having agreed the broad outline of a settlement, the next task was to choreograph the summit. It was agreed that draft 3 would be used in the final communiqué; however, Kissinger and Wakaizumi drew up an elaborate scenario wherein Nixon and Satō 'negotiated' over this clause. First Nixon was to ask for Satō's proposal. Satō would offer draft 2 (renamed by the two conspirators draft A in an attempt to avoid confusion). Nixon would reject this and propose his own wording (the State Department's draft). Satō would reject this, whereupon Nixon would stress the need for a reference to the prior consultation system. Satō would then offer draft 3 (renamed draft B; this was Satō's original draft 2 and was substantially the same as what the Gaimushō had proposed in September). Nixon would then accept this.[34] This left the issue of the Agreed Minute, to which Kissinger had inserted the phrase, 'The United States Government would anticipate a favourable response' to nuclear reintroduction.[35] Neither side wanted their respective bureaucracies involved, but this raised problems of translation. Both the State Department and the Gaimushō were to provide translators for Nixon's and Satō's conversation and would therefore be able to report to their respective departments. Kissinger proposed a ruse wherein Nixon would invite Satō into an anteroom beside the Oval Office, ostensibly to view some of Nixon's collection of objets d'art but in actuality to initial the Agreed Minute in privacy.[36] With the nuclear issue having been resolved at their first meeting, the two leaders' second meeting would deal with textiles. Here the script was largely written by Kissinger. Satō was to raise the issue, proposing secret bilateral talks which would lead to a multilateral GATT agreement favourable to the United States. There was to be no publicity regarding this until after Japan's general election, expected before the end of the year.[37]

Final briefing for Satō

Wakaizumi's next task was to explain all of this to Satō, on whom he called on 15 November, shortly after his return to Tokyo. Satō was generally happy with the fruits of Wakaizumi's labours, particularly with regard to the statement on the removal of nuclear weapons in the communiqué, even wondering if this could be placed at the beginning of the text. He expressed no qualms about the Agreed Minute and

the elaborate stage directions which had been worked out. On textiles, however, he paid scant attention to the American demands, which Wakaizumi had translated into Japanese. He was obviously uncomfortable dealing with this issue. Wakaizumi implored the prime minister to give the matter his full consideration. Kissinger was waiting for a telephone call from Wakaizumi with Satō's response to the arrangements the two had agreed. Wakaizumi stressed the importance of textiles to Nixon and that it was a deal-breaker. He told Satō that 'unless you agree to their proposal, the entire negotiations will not succeed'. Satō's response was anything but resounding one way or another. '"Fine. In any case, since they've agreed to a nuclear-free reversion, I ought to try and do what I can."'[38] Wakaizumi called Kissinger and reported that Satō had accepted the arrangements they had worked out.[39] However, the problem, which would become manifest in the aftermath of the summit, was that neither Satō nor Wakaizumi fully comprehended at this stage that they had blindly committed Japan to a course of action for which they had neither a mandate nor the means of carrying through.

In advance of Satō's arrival Rogers forwarded a report to Nixon outlining progress thus far in negotiating the communiqué and other items relevant to the reversion of Okinawa. All in all the communiqué and Satō's unilateral statement were judged to be in 'good shape'. Indeed, Rogers was able to report that the 'Japanese have gone somewhat further than we originally expected in the public assurances that they will give on our ability to use Okinawa bases, as well as those in Japan proper, for the defence of Korea and Taiwan and for prosecution of the war in Viet-Nam.' They had also agreed to the payment of a lump sum of $600 million in compensation for expenses the United States incurred during their control of Okinawa and to the retention of a Voice of America radio transmitter. On the issue of liberalisation of trade and investment barriers and on textiles, the United States had agreed that there would be no direct linkage with Okinawa. Satō had been told that a resolution of these issues would create a 'more favourable public and Congressional climate' towards the reversion of Okinawa.[40]

Due to concerns over leaks to Congress, the Defence Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not informed until the eve of Satō's visit of Nixon's intention to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa prior to its retrocession to Japan. Alex Johnson recalled that Kissinger 'said he would take care of it; he would tell Wheeler to "pipe down" and Laird to "keep quiet." Whatever he said to them, they never raised a fuss.'[41] It is likely that Laird and Wheeler were informed of the secret Agreed Minute that had been negotiated by Kissinger and Wakaizumi. (It is also highly

unlikely that Kissinger used such language with these two men, whatever he told Johnson). Laird's biographer Dale Van Atta concludes that Laird's objections to the return of Okinawa were undercut by the crisis caused by the release of nerve gas on Okinawa and the consequent furore.[42] There is certainly an element of truth to this, but it is more likely that awareness of the existence of the Agreed Minute was the decisive factor in bringing the Defence Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on board.

Two Japans

In the run-up to his departure to the United States, Satō appeared on national television; looking tired and tense, he spoke of his good faith in seeking nuclear-free homeland-level reversion.[43] This did not mollify his critics, primarily the left-wing students and activists who mounted demonstrations in an effort to delay or stop his departure. The police confined these protesters to Kamata railway station, on the main line to Haneda airport (from which Satō was to depart) though still some distance from it. Despite some 'truly spectacular disturbances', which included exchanges of Molotov cocktails and tear gas between students and police, the US embassy confidently predicted that 'unless students have talents of Houdini they will not impede Sato's departure.' At a separate, peaceful rally organised by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and Sōhyō (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), Narita Tomomi, leader of the JSP, told the assembled crowds that Satō was conspiring to bring nuclear weapons into Japan.[44]

On 17 November, the day of Satō's scheduled departure, student protesters barricaded themselves around the *Kantei* in an attempt to stop him. In light of this, Satō was taken to Haneda by helicopter, arriving there safely. The media focused on the historic nature of Satō's mission rather than the protesters. As the US embassy pithily noted, 'unlike Satō their efforts never got off the ground'.[45] Despite this, Satō left behind a divided country – at least a deeply ambivalent one. On the one hand there was a heightened sense of popular expectation that he would return with agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. On the other hand there was trepidation that the US side would extract concessions on the restraint of Japanese textile exports and nuclear storage rights on US bases in Okinawa. Newspaper editorials warned that at a minimum Satō should secure non-nuclear homeland-level reversion and there should be absolutely no trade-off of securing the return of Japanese territory for a textile export restraint deal.[46] Yokoyama Taizō's cartoon 'Two Japans', published in the *Asahi Shinbun* on the day of Satō's

departure, captures this conflicted mood in Japan. It shows the country (often portrayed in visual shorthand as Mount Fuji) as two, one hopeful, one apprehensive.[47]

Just prior to his departure to the United States, Satō made an unplanned trip to pay his respects at Yoshida Shigeru's grave. This act of almost filial piety, well received by older and rural voters, was far from a cynical piece of political theatre.[48] Satō had a profound attachment to and admiration for Yoshida; indeed, he carried a photograph of his mentor in his breast pocket as a good luck charm.[49] Satō was poised on a vital mission to the United States to finish, as he saw it, Yoshida's work in securing the return of Japanese sovereignty.

Last-minute details

Even though Satō had arrived in the United States, Wakaizumi and Kissinger continued to hammer out the final details for the summit in a series of international phone calls. On the evening of 17 November, Kissinger called Wakaizumi just hours after Satō's arrival. Satō and Nixon were to have two private meetings, on 19 and 20 November, during which the main business of the summit was to be dealt with; a shorter meeting was also scheduled for 21 November, the day of Satō's departure from Washington. Kissinger confirmed that the nuclear issues were to be dealt with during their first meeting, with textiles taken up on the second day. Obviously under pressure (presumably from Stans), Kissinger suggested the inclusion of a reference to textiles in the joint communiqué. Wakaizumi stood firm; he was quite clear that textiles could not be mentioned and stressed that the matter had been dealt with previously.[50] Wakaizumi then called Satō (Kusuda acted as intermediary between the two) and reported his latest conversation with Kissinger. Satō was in an upbeat mood and noted that the Gaimushō people with him had settled on draft B (as Wakaizumi and Kissinger had come to term it) on the language for the nuclear-free clause of the communiqué. On textiles Satō favoured continuing talks in Geneva between Japanese and American negotiators; this had been done to separate the two issues of textiles and Okinawa, both geographically and in the public mind. The United States had no objection to this schema, though as Kissinger stressed in a follow-up phone call that evening, Satō should instruct the Japanese delegation to come to an agreement in line with America's demands. Kissinger also noted that Nixon wanted Satō to bring up the issue of the hotline and the Mace-B missiles when the communiqué language had been agreed to.[51]

Kissinger phoned Wakaizumi again at 11 a.m. on 18 November. For Wakaizumi in Japan it was already 1 a.m. on the 19th; the large time difference and the importance of the summit meant he did not get much sleep during these days of intense activity. Kissinger noted that Nixon was anxious to know how the 'without prejudice' clause would work in practice; that is, how would the United States engage in prior consultations with Japan on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons? Wakaizumi proposed that Satō's suggestion of a hotline between the two capitals would cover this practicality.[52] On 18 November Satō's party moved into Blair House, where Satō met with his aides to discuss the upcoming talks. At roughly the same time Nixon convened a meeting of the National Security Council to finalise the US position in advance of the talks.[53]

Wakaizumi called Satō in Washington, where it was 6.30 p.m. on 18 November, on the eve of the first of his meetings with Nixon. He informed the prime minister of the arrangements made on the nuclear question. This presented no problems for Satō, who noted that the diplomats from the two sides had also settled on draft B. On the textile matter Satō displayed what to Wakaizumi was an alarming failure to grasp the nature of the problem. Satō was aware of the working-level talks in Washington, which were proceeding at a different pace from the clandestine channel. Wakaizumi, once again stressing that Nixon was demanding a firm commitment that Japan would meet America's demands, asked if he was authorised to give such a commitment. To this Satō responded hesitantly, 'I suppose I have no choice.' Taken aback that Satō remained cagey at this late stage, Wakaizumi sought reconfirmation and stressed that if Satō was unsure of his ability to follow through he, Wakaizumi, would make that clear to Kissinger. Satō's reply is telling: 'That's true, but if you were to do that, surely everything would fall apart? At this stage, I think I ought to say we'll go along with their wishes.' Naturally Wakaizumi was uneasy that Satō was refusing to be direct on this matter but felt events had progressed beyond the point of no return.[54] Later that evening Wakaizumi told Kissinger, somewhat vaguely, that Satō understood the US requirements. Kissinger asked that Satō mention that the settlement ought to be 'comprehensive' in nature. This word was key and would prove a major stumbling block. A selective agreement could give Japanese manufacturers an opening to expand their sales of other garments as and when fashions changed. The US textile industry was therefore adamant that any agreement be comprehensive in nature. Wakaizumi again stressed the necessity that there be no mention of textiles in the communiqué since this would leave Satō open to accusations that he had done a 'dirty deal' while in

Washington. Kissinger noted that this would be difficult; there would need to be a reference to the liberalisation of trade and capital markets in the communiqué. Wakaizumi reported back to Satō late that evening and ran through the scenario once more for the following day's meeting with Nixon. With regard to the second day's meeting – that is, textiles – Wakaizumi was troubled to learn that Satō had not yet issued clear instructions to the delegation in Geneva and was operating with his customary caution and reticence.[55]

The summit

Satō and Nixon had their first meeting on the morning of 19 November, their schedule having been delayed 30 minutes. Through the early hours of that morning, the *Apollo 12* lunar mission had successfully landed on the moon, and once again American astronauts walked on its surface. These dramatic events delayed the two leaders' meeting. Satō, who along with much of the rest of the world was particularly impressed by the achievements of America's space programme, felt in no way inconvenienced. Nixon and Satō met in the Oval Office and were joined by the translators James Wickel and Akatani Genichi. The two men began with a general tour d'horizon of the prevailing trends in international relations. Satō stated clearly that he desired the extension of the MST for a 'considerably long period', noting that in the current climate 'Japan had no choice but to rely on a continuing relationship of trust with the United States.' Nixon welcomed these assertions and sought the 'closest possible relationship' between their two countries. More generally he stated that he sought to improve relations with communist countries in the region, though a precondition to this was a 'strong free Asia'. To this end he noted that the 'world would be healthier if Japan were to develop a significant military capability'. The official memorandum of conversation notes that Nixon did not mean that Japan should develop an independent nuclear deterrent.[56] However, according to Richard Sneider, during this conversation Nixon hinted to Satō that should Japan wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal the United States would 'understand'. This left Satō puzzled, as the whole tenor of US policy on nuclear weapons laid emphasis on non-proliferation. Nixon's move alarmed Wickel (the translator), who passed word to his superiors at the State Department. Sneider killed the initiative. He later recalled:

> These guys [Nixon and Kissinger] thought they were being cute. Satō and his aides walked away confused. We had to go cleaning up the

> mess and had to tell the Japanese they'd misunderstood what Nixon and Kissinger were saying. We just quietly sabotaged the whole thing.[57]

On this question Michael Schaller concludes that since Satō shortly thereafter signed the NPT, he fully understood Nixon's meaning and intended to send a message of his own that Japan would not develop nuclear weapons.[58] This is a somewhat simplistic conclusion and fails to fully encapsulate Satō's changing views on this matter, from favouring Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons to an acceptance that neither Japanese public opinion nor the bulk of Washington opinion would accept a nuclear-armed Japan.[59] Moreover, Satō came to believe, erroneously as it turned out, during the reversion negotiations that there was a direct link between the removal by the United States of its nuclear arsenal from Okinawa and Japan's adherence to the NPT.[60] Indeed, there is no record of Satō mentioning this matter to any of his aides, nor did he record it in his diary.

The rest of their meeting was taken up with the question of American nuclear weapons and Okinawa. The back-and-forth between the two men on alternate drafts for the nuclear-free paragraph of the joint communiqué went just as Kissinger and Wakaizumi had orchestrated. To Nixon's question of how prior consultation would be effected, Satō began his answer by referring to 'introduction in an emergency', whereupon he stopped and spoke about how a hotline could best expedite such consultations. Nixon thought this an excellent idea, though Satō argued that it should be left out of the communiqué. The two men then shook hands to confirm their agreement on draft B for the communiqué. The State Department memorandum of conversation notes that at this point Nixon brought Satō into his private office to look at some photographs of Nixon's house in San Clemente, California, and that neither translator was present. Whether or not Satō got to see the photos of Nixon's refurbished 'Casa Pacifica' or the objets d'art of which Kissinger spoke is unknown. We do know that the two men signed the Agreed Minute on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons, a copy of which was later found in Satō's private papers.[61] Press reports casually noted that during the talks by the two principals, Kissinger slipped out of a meeting of officials, which, as we know from Wakaizumi's memoir, was to facilitate the signing of the Agreed Minute.[62]

Satō called Wakaizumi that evening and enthusiastically told his envoy, 'It was as you had promised. Everything went well, thank you.'[63] At the close of their meeting Nixon and Satō agreed that no announcement

would be made on the progress of their talks until the conclusion of the summit and the issuance of the joint communiqué.[64] Nonetheless, word of the agreement on Okinawa leaked to the press, no doubt to Nixon's annoyance.[65] This did not dampen Satō's enthusiasm, and his diary entry records his satisfaction at having achieved agreement on his long-cherished goal:

> The main topic was the question of nuclear weapons in Okinawa. Everything went according to plan, and we reached an agreement before noon. Everyone was very pleased – a great success. I am exceptionally delighted that the reversion will take place according to the same conditions as the homeland and with Okinawa free of nuclear weapons.[66]

After so many years of patient effort, Satō was entitled to bask in the warm glow of success. However, his work in Washington was far from over. Despite the best efforts of those involved on the Japanese side, the US economic demands had become entwined with Okinawa, and the rest of the summit would see those issues brought to the fore.

Elusive agreement on textiles

Satō's next meeting was with Rogers and Johnson, who wanted a reference to textiles to be included in the communiqué. This naturally troubled Satō, who asked Wakaizumi to contact Kissinger to see if the demand could be dropped.[67] Wakaizumi duly called Kissinger in Washington, where it was the evening of 19 November. Kissinger proceeded to launch into a detailed scenario for the next day's meeting on textiles, the salient points of which were that Satō was to broach the subject of textiles, he was to give assurances that an agreement was to be reached before the end of the year and it was to be comprehensive in nature. Wakaizumi was annoyed and affronted at the demand that Satō 'volunteer' his cooperation but felt it was better to proceed so as to ensure the reversion of Okinawa. He once again stressed to Kissinger the importance of textiles not being mentioned in the joint communiqué.[68] Satō, however, continued vacillating; at this stage Wakaizumi found it 'irritating and exhausting.' All he could do was once again stress the importance of adhering to the script lest the summit end in failure. In response to this vacillation Kissinger pointedly told Wakaizumi that 'it would really shake our confidence if now that we did something that was so difficult for us, it turned out that something [that] was agreed

and understood on many occasions, were changed'.[69] To be fair to Satō, not only was he under intense domestic pressure not to buckle to the American demands on textiles, but he was also receiving mixed signals in Washington. Philip Tresize of the State Department had responded favourably to Satō's latest instructions to the Japanese delegation in Geneva; however, as Wakaizumi stressed to Satō, it was the hard-line Commerce Department under Stans that represented Nixon on this matter. Nor, in Wakaizumi's opinion, did Satō understand the significance of the word 'comprehensive'.[70]

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in light of the confusion and misunderstanding that reigned, Satō and Nixon's second meeting on 20 November did not go at all well. As Satō noted in his diary,

> With the nuclear issue settled, today we talked about economic problems. We'd made some arrangements beforehand and proceeded as planned. However, the president did not express himself clearly enough and some things remained unresolved. On the economic issue – must be most careful to avoid impression that we've 'made a deal' on Okinawa, which ought to be addressed as an entirely separate issue. The president doesn't seem very interested in the more general problem of liberalisation, but just as I predicted, he's extremely sensitive and fastidious on textiles. I was very pleased that we were able to dispose of the issues without any complications at all. ... Still there's a chance that something might happen, and I won't be able to rest until we issue the communiqué. For the moment though, I'm relieved. ... Differences resolved.[71]

Despite the generally upbeat tone of this entry, Satō had Kusuda contact Wakaizumi and deliver the following message: 'The second day did not go as planned, but overall it went well. I think the other side was satisfied, but I would like you to ask your friend [Kissinger] for his impressions regarding this.' Kissinger bluntly told Wakaizumi that Nixon was 'not satisfied at all'. Though the conversation had gone along the general lines that had been agreed upon in advance – that is, on the need for secret bilateral talks to work out a common position before convening a multilateral GATT conference – Satō did not use the word 'comprehensive' in describing the agreement, nor did he mention December as the date by which an agreement was to be reached. Satō was taken aback at this, noting that the American delegation at Geneva had not yet demanded a comprehensive settlement and he could hardly be expected to be the one to bring it up.[72] Indeed, it is clear from the memorandum

of conversation that Satō encouraged Nixon to state his case on textiles; in his diary entry Satō observed that Nixon, though 'sensitive and fastidious' on textiles, did not express himself clearly enough.[73] With only one day of the summit remaining, Wakaizumi and Kissinger agreed that the exact terminology was less important than eventual follow-through. Wakaizumi informed Satō that Kissinger said the American side had 'no choice but to trust the prime minister'. 'So he understood' was Satō's relieved response when Wakaizumi relayed the news. Wakaizumi, almost to the point of rudeness, reminded Satō of the obligation to Nixon into which he had entered. 'Since you've made a commitment as Japan's prime minister, it's important that you fulfil it as quickly as possible.' Satō agreed, and Wakaizumi called Kissinger later that night to confirm Satō's acceptance of Nixon's demands.[74]

Satō had a final meeting with Nixon on the morning of 21 November, the day he was due to depart. In light of his conversation with Wakaizumi the previous evening, Satō was much more forthcoming on the question of textiles, noting that he 'felt deeply his own responsibility with respect to textiles' and 'pledged to the President to bear the full responsibility for reaching a solution' by the end of December.[75] There is something of a discrepancy between the American and Japanese memoranda of this conversation. In the American version Satō is recorded as having stated that he wants a comprehensive settlement, though he would prefer that that term not be used, while in the Japanese version Satō asks that America not insist on a comprehensive deal.[76] However, both memoranda note that Nixon, in a show of uncharacteristic compromise (at least on textiles), offered that 'comprehensive' was open to interpretation and that the agreement needed to be as 'broad-ranging' as possible.

Following their meeting the two leaders spoke to the assembled journalists in the Rose Garden. They were flanked by the men who had, over the past months, negotiated the joint communiqué, which was about to be released. Nixon spoke warmly of the beginning of a new era in US-Japanese relations with the resolution of the last major issue of the Second World War.[77] Before Aichi's departure from the White House, Nixon surprised him by giving him a packet of Japanese cigarettes, since now he was free to smoke.

Satō's next task was to issue his 'unilateral statement', which had been negotiated as a package with the joint communiqué. This took the form of a speech at the National Press Club, and his address underlined the importance Japan attached to the security of the East Asia region and its agreement to facilitate America's defence commitments to the area.[78]

Regional reactions

One country where the communiqué was greeted with intense interest was Korea. As outlined in Chapter 3, Seoul viewed the possible reversion of Okinawa with trepidation, and both the United States and Japan sought to alleviate such concerns, though without going as far as to grant Korea a say in the negotiations. In advance of his departure to Washington, Satō met with Japan's ambassadors to Seoul and Taipei.[79] Upon returning to his post, Ambassador Kaneyama Masahide delivered a message to President Park Chung-hee from Satō to the effect that he fully understood Korea's security concerns and asked that Park trust in Satō's 'good faith' on the matter.[80] Following the summit William Porter, the US ambassador to Korea, reported that 'It is obvious that Japanese making major effort to demonstrate their understanding of Korean concern over Okinawa issue and to obtain reaction to Communiqué.'[81] Kaneyama briefed Park at the Blue House (his official residence) on the contents of the communiqué the day it was issued. He noted that while the joint communiqué took into account the feelings of the Japanese people with regard to nuclear weapons, it did not mean that they could not be reintroduced in response to a 'prior consultation' request.[82] It is clear that Satō took Korean concerns into account, and this adds a new dimension to understanding the reversion agreement. If Park felt relief at the results of the summit, the reaction in Pyongyang and Beijing was rage. Both China and North Korea reacted furiously to the communiqué, which seemed to suggest that America and Japan were conspiring to reignite Japanese militarism in the region.[83] Such an attitude was to have important consequences, particularly in the context of Nixon's new approach to China.

Aftermath

The summit was a great personal and political success for Satō. He returned in triumph and called an election. Buoyed up by the agreement on reversion, the LDP won in a landslide in an election framed as a referendum on the Okinawa agreement and the continuation of the MST.[84]

Satō's diary entry immediately after the summit conveys his relief after a tiring and difficult and yet no doubt exhilarating three days.

> Finally, the day of departure has arrived. We made some new changes in the communiqué; there were no problems, and we accepted the version prepared by the working officials. I'm more than satisfied – for

> me it's a 120 percent success. From ten o'clock this morning, I had my final talk with President Nixon. Naturally, we didn't debate the communiqué. Today the biggest problem in this country is the textile problem. But talks have got under way in Geneva, and there is nothing we can do except hope for a resolution. I can only wish that a deal will be reached. ... I made a farewell address, shook hands with the president and others, and departed for Japan.[85]

It shows that he had finally come to see the importance of the textile question but also that he was more hopeful that a deal would emerge from the talks in Geneva than committed to ensuring that a solution be found. The authors of the *Textile Wrangle* were careful not to draw definite conclusions regarding Satō's and Wakaizumi's clandestine diplomacy, about which they lacked definite information. However, their contention that Satō 'knew he was endorsing a quite stringent type of textile agreement, felt he had no choice but to do so, but never focused very carefully on its substantive details' is one which is supported by the evidence, Kissinger's telcons and Wakaizumi's memoir, that have since come to light.[86]

In his memoir Wakaizumi freely acknowledges his naivety and inexperience with regard to complex international trade negotiations.[87] Satō can claim no such luxury. He was, after all, prime minister and had held several senior cabinet posts, including the Finance and MITI portfolios. However, the prize of attaining the return of Okinawa to the homeland, with its US military bases placed on the same footing as those on the main islands, was too great. Thus Satō felt he owed Nixon and agreed to meet his demands or, at least, to make his best effort. The repercussions of this were severe and contributed in no small part to US-Japanese relations suffering a prolonged period of unnecessary rancour. Nixon and his inner circle also share a large measure of blame for essentially ambushing Satō. Nixon sought a quick fix for his political problem by linking the return of Okinawa with an agreement on textiles. In accomplishing this, he was keen that the State Department be excluded. Had he sought the advice of Alex Johnson or Richard Sneider or any number of senior foreign service officers with experience of Japan, he would have been told that the Japanese prime minister was more chairman than chief. As such, even without the political climate in Japan being firmly opposed to any concessions on textiles, it would be impossible for any premier to agree to such a radical policy change and implement it by fiat. Nixon, though, told Kissinger, 'Let's try to get it done and not fool around with the State Department.'[88] In seeking to cut corners Nixon undermined the realisation of his own political goal.

Shortly after the end of the summit Alex Johnson gave a briefing to journalists 'on background' (i.e., off the record) on the salient points of the joint communiqué as well as Satō's statement, which he advised was also part of the summit's package of agreements. With regard to prior consultation he noted, 'It is quite clear from the whole context of the communiqué that Japan is saying that consultation does not necessarily mean that its attitude is going to be negative in these particular situations.' Tokyo could still say no, but the communiqué 'sets forth the standards the Japanese will use and apply in determining what their answer is going to be. That is the importance of this document.'[89] On his return to Tokyo, Satō stressed that though Japan would take a 'forward-looking manner', with regard to prior consultation Japan would not necessarily 'cooperate at all times.'[90] Aichi stated that the Japanese government's decision, were prior consultation procedures initiated by the United States in the event of a crisis in the region, would be on a case-by-case basis.[91] Given the differences in emphasis in Johnson's statement and in Satō's and Aichi's remarks, John Welfield concludes that the Japanese and the Americans had a different conception of what the Korea and Taiwan clauses constituted. While the Americans perceived that they had a blank cheque, the Japanese felt they retained a veto.[92] However, this is stretching things too far.

To be sure the Japanese Embassy did ask NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, the Japanese state broadcasting corporation) not to play up Johnson's remarks.[93] However, all through the negotiations the Gaimushō had stressed that Japanese sovereignty could not be compromised by giving the United States blanket pre-approval to use its bases on Japanese soil. What the communiqué and Satō's press club speech did was elucidate Japan's security priorities and its likely future response to prior consultation. There was no difference of interpretation. Indeed, throughout the process Satō was far less concerned with the question of sovereignty than was the Gaimushō. This was apparent when Satō readily acceded to the US proposal for communiqué language on Vietnam which the Gaimushō had found problematic. For Satō the bigger picture of the overall relationship with the United States was more important.

This was also true with regard to the nuclear weapons question. For Satō the priority was ensuring their removal, but he had no qualms about signalling that they could be reintroduced in an emergency. Here he was also at variance with opinion in the Foreign Ministry. Although Tōgō Fumihiko was excluded from the negotiations conducted by Wakaizumi and Kissinger leading to the Agreed Minute, he was well aware that the United States was keen to receive some sort of guarantee

or indication on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to storage facilities on Okinawa following reversion. A few days before the summit he penned a think piece that invoked the precedent of other American allies and their approaches to this question. He noted that Prime Minister Lester Pearson of Canada had at one time been opposed to the introduction of nuclear weapons into Canada. Pearson later acknowledged that deployment of US nuclear air-defence weapons in Newfoundland might be required in order to defend North America from a missile strike. Tōgō also pointed out that the NATO Council had decided in 1957 that nuclear warheads be placed at the disposal of the alliance 'in agreement with the states directly concerned'. In both cases sovereignty had not been impinged, and the consent of the individual state was required for the deployment and/or storage of US nuclear weapons. Through this memo Tōgō laid down a clear argument that Japan's prior approval, based on Tokyo's own reading of the prevailing situation, was essential before nuclear weapons could be reintroduced. That is, Japan retained a veto.[94]

This begs the question, Did Satō give too much away when he signed the Agreed Minute? Did he undermine Japanese sovereignty? The answer is no. He recognised that only in a grave emergency would the US request such storage rights and that in such a situation it would be in Japan's interests to facilitate the US nuclear umbrella. Indeed, when ruminating on this problem he said as much to Wakaizumi.[95] Moreover, he did not deposit his copy of the Agreed Minute with the *Kantei*, as had been agreed with Nixon; rather, he kept it with his private papers.[96] This demonstrably indicates that he did not regard the Agreed Minute as an official agreement between two governments but a personal understanding between leaders. As he had often stated to Wakaizumi, he strongly held the conviction that any Japanese prime minister would agree to the introduction of nuclear weapons if Japan's security depended on it. Wakaizumi's own thoughts when, alone in a hotel room in Washington on a cold November afternoon, he drafted the Agreed Minute are enlightening,

> [T]he very rationale, it seemed to me, of the existing U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was the maintenance of Japan's security. The minute I was drafting represented the basic quid pro quo required to realise the aspirations of the Japanese people. Without it, the Japanese government would have to accept that there was no possibility of the territory (or its one million inhabitants) being reunited (free of nuclear weapons) with Japan.[97]

The Agreed Minute was absolutely necessary not only to secure the reversion of Okinawa but also to facilitate the alliance on which Japan depended for its security. Satō's greatest achievement, the reversion of Okinawa, was not marred in dishonour because of this understanding on nuclear weapons. Rather, it should be seen as a necessary corollary to an accord which reconfirmed Japan's partnership with the United States and its security posture in the region.

The agreement on Okinawa came at a time when Washington was fundamentally reassessing its position in Asia. This new departure, which became known as the Nixon Doctrine, would have deep implications for Japan. It is to this re-evaluation and its effects on Japan that we now turn.

6
The Nixon Doctrine and Japan's Defence Policy, 1969–1971

In July 1969, just six months into his presidency, Richard Nixon made an extensive world tour. While on a stopover in the US Pacific territory of Guam, he gave an off-the-cuff address to assembled journalists in which he outlined his vision for the future of US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. In light of the quagmire of Vietnam the United States would no longer commit ground troops to wars on the Asian mainland.[1] Instead, Nixon looked to America's Asian allies to enhance their own military power. The United States would continue to provide air and naval support, as well as the all-important extended nuclear deterrent. However, US troops would no longer fight battles on behalf of Asians. This 'Guam Doctrine' (later renamed the Nixon Doctrine) was an early example of Nixon's push to limit America's commitments and conserve its strength. The policy rethink and the realignment of forces would have a deep impact upon Japan, America's main ally in the region. US officials repeatedly assured their Japanese counterparts both publicly and privately that the policy was a way of ensuring that America retained a stake in Asia by heading off domestic isolationist sentiment. In spite of such assurances the departure, coupled with the Nixon administration's goal of withdrawing from Vietnam, caused considerable unease among Japanese elites concerned that they were being abandoned to their fate by their ally. Japan had depended on the United States for security since the end of the Second World and had adapted this reliance into a grand strategy known as the Yoshida Doctrine.[2] As a result any reduction in America's regional military posture was bound to give rise to such disquiet.[3] These fears were reflected in Japanese defence policy planning over the subsequent two years. Another factor in Japanese policy was the arrival of Nakasone Yasuhiro as director general of the Defence Agency (Japan's de facto defence minister). This chapter argues that Nakasone

played a key but not a decisive role in these policy changes on both sides of the Pacific.

The change in focus and approach has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention, much of it focusing on one side alone. Kusunoki Ayako and Sadō Akihiro have examined the changes in Tokyo, while Liang Pan has focused on shifts in American policy.[4] Kurosaki Akira made an excellent examination of alliance diplomacy in this period though he focused exclusively on Japan's nuclear policy.[5] Nakashima Takuma's article on Nakasone Yasuhiro's tenure at the Defence Agency puts forward the view that 'Nakasone-ism' (*Nakasone shûgi*) lies at the heart of these changes in Japan's military policy and alliance diplomacy.[6] However, this underestimates other factors, including Satō Eisaku's own motivations and changes in policy emanating from Washington. Moreover, Michael Green's suggestion that Satō had little interest in defence issues is disputed here.[7] Building on these previous works, this chapter develops a more coherent picture of how these changes in defence policy on both sides of the Pacific were interlinked.

The Nixon Doctrine

Following Nixon's announcement a consensus emerged in US policy-making circles that this military realignment in Asia should not result in a remilitarised Japan. There was, however, little agreement regarding how this was to be accomplished or what America's interests in the region were. A State Department conference of its chiefs of mission in East Asia held in July 1970 attempted to sketch out the general lines of policy towards the region. With 'diminishing US resources' and the possibility that doubts would emerge as to its deterrent capabilities it was deemed vital that the United States simultaneously assure its allies while proceeding with an orderly drawback, all the while stressing 'modesty, mutuality and multilateralism'.[8] While the conferees hoped Japan would begin to assume a greater share of the economic aid burden, they noted that it was too soon to think of Japan playing a regional defence role. Their concerns were echoed in a Defence Department *Strategy Guidance Memorandum*. To be sure, some of its conclusions were overblown – so thought U. Alexis Johnson, who peppered his copy with incredulous question marks. Johnson, a seasoned diplomat who had served as ambassador to Japan from 1966 to 1968, was at this time undersecretary of state, the most senior career official in the State Department. For him, the suggestions that the reversion of Okinawa would diminish US capabilities in the region, that Japan was poised to develop nuclear

weapons and that the United States must prepare for the possibility of being told to evacuate all of its bases were too much. As a long-time and intimate observer of the Japanese political scene, Johnson knew how fanciful these ideas were. On the issue at hand there was agreement between the State and Defence departments on the difficult but necessary task of undertaking an orderly reduction in US commitments, the most important and pressing of which was withdrawal of combat forces from Vietnam, while at the same time making explicit to 'both friend and foe' that America stood by its allies.[9]

Such agreement was not present in every corner of Washington. Winston Lord, a member of Henry Kissinger's National Security Council (NSC) staff, produced a wide-ranging discussion paper on US policy towards Asia that Kissinger thought 'first class'. Whereas the State and Defence departments looked for gradual change in the context of the prevailing US-Japanese relationship, Kissinger demanded a global grand strategy and abandonment of outmoded or unsustainable assessments.[10] Lord's paper, 'The Nixon Doctrine for Asia – Some Hard Issues', explored the possibility of Japan's assuming a more independent line from the United States, acquiring nuclear weapons and asserting a leadership role in the region. In this at least Lord's thinking paralleled the Defence Department's, though Lord went further in questioning whether or not these developments would be in America's interests. Though it was a discussion paper that drew no conclusions, it betrays a vastly different outlook to prevailing thinking in the government by questioning the general drift of US policy towards Japan and America's view of Japan's place in Asia. Rather than maintain Japan in the exalted position of America's chief ally in the region, what was required was a way to place Japan, China and the Soviet Union in balance with each other. Hence the task for US policymakers was to ease away from Japan without alarming it into drastic action. As he stated in a rhetorical question, 'Are we – and the rest of Asia – not too close to World War II to contemplate easily a remilitarised Japan?' Despite a good deal of agreement among the various sections of the US foreign policymaking apparatus regarding the importance of preventing a remilitarised Japan by reassuring Tokyo, there were also important areas of difference, particularly between the State Department and Kissinger's NSC. All were agreed that the re-emergence of Japan as a military power was not in America's interest, though they differed on how this was to be prevented. Where the State and Defence departments stressed reassurance and mutuality, Kissinger's NSC sought to balance a resurgent Japan in the international system of great powers. However, as Japan was low in

Kissinger's priorities, no clear, overarching policy prescription emerged to guide US policy towards Japan.

Nakasone: 'Volunteer' defence chief

The prospect of America drastically scaling down its military presence in East Asia produced anxiety in Japan's defence establishment regarding the future ability of the United States to uphold its commitments to Japan. Lieutenant General Uemura Eichi of the Air Self-Defence Force shared these concerns with Admiral John McCain, the commander-in-chief of US forces in the Pacific (and the father of the Arizona Senator). Uemura questioned 'future U.S. intentions in the Western Pacific and S[outh] E[ast] A[sia] ... [and] ultimate U.S. intentions in the defence of South Korea'.[11] As the US Defense Department observed, 'there is a spreading uneasiness in Japan about how long the United States will have the power and will to act as Japan's protector, particularly outside the arena of nuclear conflict'.[12]

In marked contrast to these fears, for Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served as Director General of the Defence Agency from January 1970 to July 1971, the Nixon Doctrine represented an opportunity. Nakasone was a definite nonconformist in Japanese politics. He was described in the *New York Times* as 'something of a maverick, a man of flamboyant style in a land where individuality is still discouraged and politicians are expected to be a comfortable grey'.[13] By the time of his appointment he was known as an opponent of the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) with the United States, feeling that it impinged on Japanese sovereignty.[14] A member of the Kōno Ichirō faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, he became one of its senior members following Kōno's death in 1965. Kōno's rivalry with Satō made Nakasone an 'opposition' figure within the party. However, in order to co-opt opposition and unify the party, Satō brought him into the cabinet as transport minister in 1967.[15] He lost this job in a regular reshuffle, but in the run-up to the subsequent reshuffle, when Nakasone knew he was under consideration for a cabinet post once again, he let it be known that he desired the defence brief. This puzzled Satō since defence was not considered a plum job. Nakasone explained that he felt that the dispute between Japan and the United States over Japanese textile imports into the United States was becoming increasingly fractious. He was anxious to explore the military relationship, what he called the 'basic axis of relations' between the two countries.[16]

In a recently published volume of recollections Nakasone claimed that Satō held him in high regard from the time he requested the defence brief and saw him as a possible future prime minister. According to Nakasone, Satō mentioned this to his son Shinji.[17] Satō may well have seen the advantage in having a defence chief who actively sought to expand Japan's military capabilities at a time when the United States was looking for its Asian allies to do just that. Nakasone was duly appointed in January 1970 and quickly made a mark as an outgoing activist. He styled himself 'volunteer' director general – a notable departure from the staid and steady administrators who had preceded him. However, Satō kept a tight rein on his new defence chief. Nakasone's dislike of the MST has already been mentioned. In this he stood apart from Satō and from the majority view in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

By the time of his appointment the MST had become embedded in Japan's strategic posture with two important additions: Japan's espousal of a non-nuclear weapons policy and reliance on America's extended deterrent, known as the nuclear umbrella.[18] These greatly expanded the importance of the US-Japanese security relationship.[19] Furthermore, the reversion of Okinawa was contingent on Tokyo's acceptance of US military bases there and acknowledgement of their role in the defence of Japan and the surrounding region. By the time of Nakasone's appointment a consensus had been reached in the LDP to extend the treaty indefinitely when its initial ten-year duration expired in June 1970, after which either party could terminate the treaty with one year's notice.[20] The importance of the treaty to Satō's ambition to secure the reversion of Okinawa has been somewhat underplayed in the literature on this subject, but it is of crucial importance in understanding Satō's motivations and his actions in restraining Nakasone.

Nakasone accepted his new brief with gusto and sought to shine a spotlight on a facet of national life that had hitherto been largely ignored. One of his earliest steps was to form an advisory committee composed of non-specialists so as to bring in new ideas. The committee's report led to the creation of a Defence Medical College and pointed to the necessity of improving pay and conditions for members of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF).[21] Nakasone also worked to raise morale in the ranks by going on manoeuvres with troops and conducting an inspection of SDF facilities in a fighter jet.[22] Such headline-grabbing behaviour may have boosted the spirits of Japan's troops, but it did not endear him to his officials.[23] Beyond these exercises in public relations, the bulk of Nakasone's tenure focused on issues of policy. He had three main aims: revising Japan's

'Basic Policy of National Defence' (BPND), producing Japan's first Defence White Paper and drawing up a new five-year Defence Build-up Plan to run from 1972 to 1977. At a time when the United States was reducing its presence in Asia, Nakasone pushed his concept of 'autonomous defence'. However, this met with reserve from above and resistance from long-serving officials in the Defence Agency.

Nakasone's main problem with the BPND, which had been adopted in 1957, was its fourth clause, which stated,

> Concerning invasion from abroad, until such time in the future that the United Nations shall have the ability to effectively prevent this from occurring, we shall deal with this on the basis of the security system set up with America.[24]

This, he felt, amounted to servile reliance on the United States. As he thought Japan ought to have the capacity to defend itself, he set about redrafting the BPND accordingly. However, Satō had already ruled out any major changes to Japan's strategic posture. He told the Diet that while he felt it was important that Japan rely on its own strengths to defend itself, his government would hold fast to the MST.[25] Despite this Nakasone pushed ahead. He records that Satō was noncommittal about the idea but that he faced stiff opposition from Hori Shigeru, the chief cabinet secretary and also a key ally and close confidante of Satō's. Nakasone had instituted a new cabinet subcommittee, the Three Ministers' Conference, composed of himself, the foreign minister and the chief cabinet secretary – ostensibly, as he later put it, to 'bring together diplomacy and defence'.[26] Nakasone's redraft was supported by Foreign Minister Aichi and Finance Minister Fukuda. However, Hori bluntly told Nakasone that such a change would not pass the cabinet and in any event would give rise to fierce hostility from the opposition benches.[27]

That Nakasone should have been checked here is somewhat ironic given the likelihood that he had established the conference as a way of circumventing bureaucratic resistance to his plans. Kaihara Osamu, a senior government official and secretary general of the National Defence Council (NDC), thought it 'mad' that Nakasone bypassed the NDC. This was a committee of senior officials from the Finance and Foreign Ministries and the Defence Agency, where defence plans were approved before being submitted to the cabinet for final authorisation – exactly the sort of committee Nakasone had hoped to circumvent. Yasukawa Takeshi, director of the America Bureau in the Foreign Ministry and a

former ambassador to the United States, also opposed what was seen as Nakasone's attempt to ram his proposals through.[28] Kaihara recently recalled an interesting exchange with Yasukawa on this subject.

> 'What do you make of this [draft]?' he asked.
>
> 'Who wrote it? And in such strange Japanese?' replied Yasukawa.
>
> 'The Defence Agency,' answered Kaihara.
>
> 'They certainly did not,' retorted Yasukawa.[29]

The implication was that Nakasone had authored the report himself in an attempt to bypass his own officials. Kaihara brought his and Yasukawa's reservations to Hori and recommended that the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) redraft Nakasone's proposals. Kaihara felt that Hori was sympathetic to his concerns. This certainly fits with Hori's actions at the Three Ministers' Conference. However, despite this resistance Nakasone's ideas on 'autonomous defence' came to be entangled with the JDA's policy-making processes during his tenure as defence chiefy.[30]

As Nakasone fought these bureaucratic battles officials in the United States pushed ahead with a realignment of forces in the region. In the summer of 1970, 20,000 US troops were withdrawn from South Korea. This significant reduction prompted a panicked Seoul to look to Tokyo for security guarantees. Such entreaties were treated cautiously by Japan, whose actions confirmed the State Department's estimation that Japan was not likely to assume the role of a regional military power. Though Tokyo reaffirmed the commitment given in the Nixon-Satō communiqué, noting that the 'security and prosperity of the two nations are extremely closely related', it stopped short of extending a security guarantee. Nakasone noted in the Diet that in any future Korean conflict Japan would provide 'logistic and moral' support but not military aid.[31] This affair highlighted the regional implications of the MST. During the negotiations which led up to agreement on the reversion of Okinawa, Satō was keen to show Seoul that the return of this territory to Japan would not restrict America's freedom of action in the region nor compromise America's security guarantee to South Korea.[32] As it withdrew troops from Korea, the United States was also working out how the troop reductions in East Asia envisioned under the Nixon Doctrine would affect Japan. In a joint message to Armin Meyer, the ambassador in Tokyo, the State and Defence departments outlined their vision for America's military presence in the region in the near term. They instructed Meyer to communicate this plan to the

Japanese government and ask for input. Though the plan projected a substantial reduction in the number of personnel based in Japan, it also stressed that the United States would seek to retain a range of capabilities, including the ability

(a) to provide emergency air reinforcement to Korea,
(b) to maintain Seventh Fleet carrier and other units in the northwestern Pacific,
(c) to provide surface and [anti-submarine] air surveillance ... and to continue intelligence coverage of critical Soviet, North Korean and PRC targets.[33]

The State Department was clearly keen to assure Japanese leaders that implementation of the Nixon Doctrine would not result in a security vacuum in the region: The United States would continue to be the single most important player, while Japan would be crucial to US strategy. At the same time a less sanguine view, not intended to be communicated to Japanese leaders, was prepared by Winston Lord of the NSC staff. He noted that implementation of the Nixon Doctrine amounted to a gamble, 'albeit a sensible and conscious one. We judge conventional aggression in Asia to be both unlikely and containable by our allies, including in Korea where the threat is most plausible.'[34]

Armed with these instructions Meyer called on Aichi to set out Washington's preliminary thinking on base closures, noting that no final decisions had been taken and calling on the participation of the Japanese. Aichi welcomed the 'mutuality' of the approach, but he also had another matter to raise. In spite of his earlier setbacks Nakasone had made a number of assertions that the MST ought to be downgraded to 'supplementary status'. Aichi was forced to clarify that the Japanese government stood by the Nixon-Satō communiqué and that the treaty remained the cornerstone of Japanese defence policy. He also emphasised that Nakasone's statements were by no means a reflection of cabinet policy and that he had been taken to task by both Satō and Aichi. He reiterated his government's commitment to article VI of the treaty (which stressed the treaty's role in the maintenance of peace and security in East Asia) and reconfirmed that should hostilities break out on the Korean peninsula, Tokyo would consent to the dispatch of Japan-based US forces to the region. Indeed, he stressed that a positive response had 'never been in doubt'.[35] Satō clearly saw the importance of the MST in regional as well as national terms, and he would not tolerate Nakasone's drive to lessen its importance.

Such remonstrations had the desired effect. The same month Aichi gave these assurances to Meyer, Nakasone went to Washington for talks with his counterpart, Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird. He also met with Secretary of State William Rogers and with Alex Johnson. Laird and Nakasone, who had both served as junior naval officers during the Second World War, soon established a friendly rapport.[36] Nakasone stressed in all of his meetings that while Japan would increase its own capacity for self-defence, the US-Japanese alliance would continue to form the cornerstone of Japan's security.[37] In conversation with Johnson, Nakasone pointedly back-pedalled on his comments regarding the security treaty, noting that he had been misquoted and simply meant that the treaty ought to be reviewed with the intention of maintaining its credibility and relevance. However, the basic principles of the alliance should remain 'quasi-eternal'. Johnson observed that if the treaty were to be renegotiated Washington would insist upon true mutuality and require Japan to defend US territory if it came under attack. This was a reminder that Japan had received a very good deal for its defence from the United States and would be best served by sticking to the treaty. Any change would likely see it assuming *greater* responsibilities. Johnson also looked for Japan to reassure Korea in light of America's troop withdrawals. Nakasone responded that Japan would not dispatch any form of military aid to Korea; however, it could increase its economic aid and further exchanges of military personnel between the two countries.[38]

Laird also called for greater reciprocity in the defence relationship between the two countries. Nakasone gave assurances that he would push for a larger defence budget. In addition, the men were of the same mind as to the need for a reduction in the number of US military personnel in Japan and for some US military bases in Japan to be turned over to the SDF.[39] They also discussed the thorny issue of nuclear weapons. Nakasone had previously been an advocate of Japan acquiring its own deterrent but had by this time concluded that such a move would be too politically divisive.[40] In addition, a JDA study had concluded that no suitable test site was available in the densely populated Japanese islands.[41] Nakasone made it clear that Japan would facilitate US maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent posture over Japan, stating that Japan would be amenable to the United States introducing nuclear weapons into Japan in an emergency.[42] Nakasone reiterated this point in his separate meetings with Rogers and Johnson.[43] This went against both the spirit and letter of repeated public statements by successive Japanese governments on its opposition to the introduction onto Japanese territory of nuclear weapons. It did, however, follow in a long

line of private assurances by Japanese officials that America's extended deterrent would be facilitated covertly.[44]

Nakasone's reception by high-level Washington officials played well at home and received favourable comment in the Japanese press. However, a request he made for cooperation on uranium enrichment for civilian use was seen as undermining his efforts to persuade Japan's neighbours that it would not acquire nuclear weapons and that its increased defence capabilities would not threaten them.[45] Despite the positive coverage in the press, Nakasone's discussions in Washington on Japan's enlarged military role seem to have gone further than the political situation in Tokyo would allow. Though preliminary drafting for the next five-year Defence Build-up Plan was nearing completion, crucial input from the Finance Ministry, which jealously guarded its control of the national purse strings, had yet to be received. Kaihara, who was branded uncooperative for pointing out the necessity of coordinating with Finance, later criticised Nakasone for talking up the plan with Laird despite the fact that it had not yet been fully approved.[46] According to Ushiba Nobuhiko, who took up his post in Washington as Japan's ambassador to the United States two months after the visit, the 'concrete' discussions on defence matters between Nakasone and Laird were not acceptable in Tokyo. This caused bitter disappointment in Washington, and Ushiba felt that Laird and his colleagues were dissatisfied with him personally, which led to a difficult start at his new posting.[47]

Despite his assurances to senior US officials and opponents at home, Nakasone had not completely given up on 'autonomous defence'. Though he had been taken to task for his statements regarding the US-Japan MST and was unsuccessful in his attempt to reform the basic policy on national defence, he pushed to have a Defence White Paper published in October 1970. Its main significance was that it was released at all. Japanese government ministries had regularly produced White Papers, but this was a first for the JDA. The taboo on defence issues had stymied all previous attempts as recently as a year earlier. Nakasone argued strongly for the White Paper to be approved by the cabinet before an upcoming reshuffle, which he felt could put him out of office. As the US embassy in Tokyo noted, there was nothing significantly groundbreaking in the paper: it was more a codification of established policy.[48] Indeed, it had taken one official only three days and nights working alone at the Defence Agency to produce two of the paper's three chapters.[49] The paper made clear that the MST was a vital pillar of Japan's defence; it noted that the treaty should become 'quasi-eternal' and emphasised the importance of the US nuclear deterrent.

However, it departed from established policy with regard to the relationship between the MST and the SDF. As stated, since 1957 the SDF were officially regarded as a supplement to the US forces based in Japan. In contrast, the White Paper held that in case of external aggression, both the SDF and the US garrison would defend Japan. This was a compromise, since Nakasone would have preferred to reverse the situation and have US forces act in support of Japan's own forces.[50] All the same, Nakasone managed to achieve a measure of success for 'autonomous defence'. However, in a taste of what was to come with the Defence Build-up Plan being drawn up, the Finance Ministry raised numerous objections to the White Paper, baulking at the prospect of paying for even this small measure of autonomous defence.[51]

The Mishima incident

A month after the release of the Defence White Paper, an incident occurred which threatened to halt Japan's limited rearmament. On 25 November 1970 the internationally acclaimed novelist and literary critic Mishima Yukio broke into the office of Lieutenant General Mashita Kanetoshi at the Ground Self-Defence Force headquarters in Ichigaya, Tokyo. He was accompanied by members of his private militia, the Shield Society, brandishing traditional Japanese short swords. Taking the general hostage, Mishima made an impassioned speech from the office's balcony to the assembled troops to end Japan's 'peace' constitution and revive the bushido values prevalent before Japan's defeat in 1945. His actions were in conscious imitation of the February 22 Incident of 1936, when a group of junior army officers led a failed coup attempt which nonetheless precipitated a more militaristic and expansionist foreign policy. As Karl Marx noted, history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.[52] This was true with regard to Mishima's misadventure. The assembled troops laughed at and jeered him. He returned to the general's office, whereupon he committed suicide by means of the traditional hara-kiri method of disembowelment.[53] As his biographer John Nathan argues, Mishima's actions had far less to do with politics than with his own desire to die before the ravages of age affected him (he was 45) and also to achieve a dramatic and artistic death. Indeed, one of his most celebrated short stories, 'Patriotism' (which Mishima later turned into a film), centres on both the February 22 Incident and ritual suicide.[54]

Mishima's actions set off a media circus, with extended television coverage on the day of the events. In the following days newspaper

publishers struggled to meet demand, bookshops were emptied of their stocks of Mishima's works, and news magazines produced special editions, all attempting to understand his actions and motives. Editorial comment was quick to denounce this attack on democracy.[55] The *Asahi Shinbun* lampooned the affair in a cartoon published the following day.[56] An ordinary salary-man buys a toy sword and then boards his busy commuter train. Our hero brandishes his sword to force a uniformed man to give his seat up for an old woman. It is then that we see the salary-man is wearing a sash emblazoned with the words *Tate no Kai*, which translates as 'Stand-up Society', a play on Mishima's Shield Society, which uses different characters but is also read as *Tate no Kai*. The cartoon points to the childish nature of Mishima's actions and also perhaps that there were more deserving causes than the resurrection of bygone extremism.

Satō's immediate reaction to the press was, 'he must have gone mad'.[57] In his diary he noted that although Mishima had sought an honourable death, his violent actions were inexcusable.[58] Mishima did not succeed in fomenting revolution, even if that had been his aim. What he managed to do was put in jeopardy the Satō government's modest levels of rearmament and its efforts to persuade the international community that such rearmament did not constitute a return to pre-war Japanese expansionism. Hori Shigeru's first words to the press on the subject revealed his 'anxiety over its effects abroad', and the Japanese press paid close attention to international press treatment.[59] The Chinese *Xinhua* news agency noted that the incident was the 'iron proof' of a return of Japanese militarism.[60] Takagi Takeo of the *Yomiuri Shinbun* warned that 'Mishima's hara-kiri may well do no more than confirm foreign suspicion of the ineradicable "innateness" of Japanese savagery and primitiveness.'[61] In the end such heightened fears, though understandable, were unfounded. Mishima's actions gave Moscow and Beijing a stick with which to beat Tokyo but did not derail the limited military expansion being planned at the time. Indeed, at a press conference touting the recently issued Defence White Paper, Nakasone noted, in a short speech in English, that Mishima's action, 'while tragic, was a criminal act that neither represented Japan nor would influence her future'.[62]

The new defence plan

Neither did the Mishima incident delay America's plan to make major reductions in the number of its forces in Japan. Aichi and Nakasone

met with Ambassador Meyer and Admiral McCain in December 1970 for the 12th meeting of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee. Meyer described the meeting, with a touch of hyperbole, as 'one of the most significant high-level meetings on security matters held between Japan and the U.S. since [the] security treaty [was] revised in 1960'.[63] Following the meeting a major realignment of US bases in Japan was announced; the ambassador described it as the product of 'an intensive review…consonant with the Nixon Doctrine, designed to streamline operational capabilities and enable maximum use of existing resources without significantly affecting the capability of the U.S. to meet its security commitments to Japan and elsewhere'. The move amounted to the withdrawal of 12,000 US military personnel and the transfer of four air bases and port facilities to Japan. Though 'budgetary stringencies' were given as one reason for the move, the press release from the meeting also noted that it was made in light of the increased abilities of America's regional allies and the 'generally improved security in the area'.[64] Absent from the ambassador's report were any of the clear-eyed concerns expressed by Lord of the gamble that such withdrawals represented.[65] For this gamble to pay off, America's partners in the Pacific, particularly Japan, would need to increase defence spending and enhance their ability to head off military threats.

In April 1971 Nakasone released the Defence Agency's draft of the New Defence Plan. Knowing he would definitely be removed from the cabinet at the next reshuffle (scheduled for the coming summer), Nakasone took the unusual step of releasing the plan before it had been cleared by cabinet. In addition, rather than follow convention and call this latest five-year expansion plan the Fourth Defence Build-up Plan, Nakasone named it the New Defence Plan. Explaining his reasoning, he observed that given the extension of the MST and US troop withdrawals under the Nixon Doctrine, 'it is about time we pondered national defence from a fresh viewpoint'.[66] The plan once again sought to push autonomous defence at the expense of the MST. It advocated that Japan

> build up steadily genuinely defence-oriented defence capability to effectively cope with conventional local wars of aggression or wars below that level, *with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements in the background*.

The final phrase of the above passage was underlined by a State Department diplomat who noted 'Policy Reversal' in the margin.[67] Nakasone was still pushing 'autonomous defence', if only rhetorically. Several former

JDA officials have noted that Nakasone's public pronouncements and his close identification in the public mind with a more robust stance on national defence belie the importance and influence of the Defence Agency. They note that far from heralding a new era, the policymaking processes of the JDA during Nakasone's tenure continued much as before. Nakasone's much-trumpeted vow that Japan would defend its sea lanes, a key component of his new approach, was a product of internal JDA planning, not the brainchild of the director general.[68] Furthermore, the influential thinking of Kubo Takuya, the chief of the agency's Defence Bureau, was at variance with Nakasone's approach. Kubo advocated holding to the security treaty and gearing Japan's defence forces to deal with and deter likely threats rather than build up Japan's capacity to repel a large-scale invasion.[69] Interestingly the US Institute for Defense Analysis, a non-profit think tank which operated government-funded research centres, concluded in a wide-ranging report prepared for the Defence Department that even with these expansion plans Japan would not possess the ability to repel even a small-scale invasion without US assistance.[70] While the US embassy welcomed the plan in general terms it noted several flaws, including a dearth of transport and logistic capabilities and an overreliance on expensive, domestically produced weaponry. Nor was it impressed by the proposed expenditure of 5.8 trillion yen (US$16 billion) over the five years of the plan. Despite being two and a half times the cost of the previous plan, this was only a tiny fraction (0.9%) of Japan's gross national product – one of the lowest rates of defence expenditure in the world. However, even this 'low' rate of expenditure came under threat. The Finance Ministry was annoyed that the draft expenditure plan had been published before it had been given the opportunity to examine the draft in detail. The ministry vowed to cut the plan to 5 trillion yen, and Finance Minister Fukuda Takeo publicly criticised the document.[71]

Nakasone also managed to further alienate the prime minister with this latest foray. Despite having been taken to task by Satō for casting doubt on Japan's commitment to the security treaty, Nakasone continued to push autonomous defence and alter Japan's basic policy on national defence. His memoirs record that in this he had secured a measure of support from the prime minister.[72] However, Satō's many actions; his statement to the Diet, the opposition of Hori Shigeru (acting on Satō's behalf) at the Three Ministers' Conference and Aichi's and Satō's dressing-down of Nakasone prior to his journey to the United States in September 1970 point to a different conclusion. Indeed, the final blow to Nakasone's

plans came from Satō himself: he explicitly halted Nakasone's plan. Satō noted in his diary entry for 16 April 1971 the following:

> At cabinet I cautioned Nakasone to tread carefully with regard to his wish to rewrite the basic policy on national defence. It might seem appropriate in conjunction with the Fourth Defence Build-up Plan but it would give rise to controversy which would not be worth it.[73]

Sadō Akihiro has noted that this toning down on Satō's part arose out of concern over the negative implications for Japan's international reputation of seeming to be re-embarking on a militarist course and over electoral fallout in the upcoming Upper House elections.[74] However, the importance to Satō of the reversion of Okinawa and the link between this and the MST must be stressed. As explored earlier, Satō had staked his political career and legacy on securing reversion. The United States agreed to reversion only in the context of continued use of military bases there under terms of the MST, which both parties agreed to renew indefinitely. Moreover, as we have seen, Satō had to agree to two secret codicils to the agreement, one on the reintroduction of nuclear weapons, the other on 'voluntary' textile export restraint. Satō was unable to honour this textile agreement, a fact that caused him much anguish and caused unnecessary bitterness to enter US-Japanese bilateral relations.[75] Given his failure on textiles as well as his own attachment to the alliance and the importance of the MST to the reversion of Okinawa, Satō found it necessary to resist and restrain Nakasone's efforts to downplay the alliance.

Laird in Tokyo

In an effort to sell the Nixon Doctrine to America's allies in North-East Asia, Defence Secretary Melvin Laird visited Japan and South Korea in July 1971. In Tokyo he met with his Japanese counterparts as well as with Satō and emphasised his concept of a 'total force strategy', which followed on from the Nixon Doctrine. This idea arose from the fact that the United States and the USSR had reached strategic parity. There was also a recognition that neither the 'massive retaliation' of the Eisenhower era nor the 'flexible response' of the Kennedy-Johnson years was appropriate any longer. Instead, America's allies would be expected to increase their conventional military capabilities. This would augment and offset reductions in the number of US troops stationed abroad. This aggregate

or 'total force' would provide adequate deterrence against communist attacks on the Western alliance.

Laird's presence focused unwelcome attention on the delicate balance that policymakers on both sides of the Pacific were forced to make between increasing Japan's defence capabilities without giving rise to charges that Washington was seeking to reawaken the sleeping beast of Japanese militarism. He was also keen to stress that the Nixon Doctrine, rather than a way for America to withdraw from Asia, was the only way for it to remain involved by heading off any domestic isolationist sentiment arising from America's involvement in Vietnam.

By coincidence, Laird was in Japan during a government reshuffle, and so his opposite number, Nakasone, had only minutes left in office when they met. Nakasone had to leave in the middle of their meeting following a summons from Satō to come to the *Kantei*. Here he received the expected news that he was to be dropped from cabinet.[76] In any case Laird, who also had a chance to meet Nakasone's successor, Masuhara Keikichi, recognised that Nakasone would remain an influential faction leader within the LDP and a possible future prime minister. Laird was impressed with and gratified by Nakasone's forthright statement that in an emergency, Japan would permit the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States onto Japanese territory. This feeling was not shared by US embassy officials, who pointed out that such assurances had been made previously. Brushing aside these flippant remarks, Laird noted that whatever their vintage, a promise of this nature was always welcome.[77] Though Laird was somewhat uncertain as to its exact meaning, he also welcomed Satō's statement that in a war the full resources of Japan's industrial might would be at America's disposal. It is likely that Satō was effectively ruling out any military contribution to regional defence. Rather, he saw Japan's future role in any conflict as providing equipment and maintenance facilities, as it had done during the Korean War and was then doing for the Vietnam War. While these statements inspired a degree of confidence in Laird, he had little faith in Japan's military capabilities and even its relatively ambitious rearmament plans. He reported to Nixon his disappointment with the Japanese plans.[78] Moreover, at a review of Japanese Self-Defence Force troops, he was impressed by the well-trained and disciplined ranks of Japan's fighting men but even more impressed that their antiquated equipment had held together.[79] When Nakasone assured Laird that Japan's armament plans under the New Defence Plan did not amount to a return by Japan to the militarism of the pre-war period, Laird pointedly replied that Japan's spending only 1% of its gross national product on defence

could not in any respect amount to a return to militarism and that much more could easily be afforded.[80] The fears expressed by Winston Lord and the Defence Department the previous year – that implementation of the Nixon Doctrine would result in a remilitarised Japan – had proved unfounded. Not only was Japan prepared to facilitate America's strategic position in the region (by hosting nuclear weapons if necessary and placing Japan's industrial might behind the US war machine), but it remained stubbornly reluctant to undertake the kind of rearmament that Washington thought necessary and desirable. The *Yomiuri Shinbun* reflected this perception of inequality with a cartoon by Kondō Hidezō depicting Laird walking through a rainstorm (apt, since Japan was then in its annual rainy season) with Nakasone's successor at the Defence Agency, Masuhara. While Masuhara is kept dry by Laird's immense 'nuclear' umbrella, Laird is soaked due to the inadequacy of Masuhara's puny 'conventional' umbrella.[81] Such a divergence of views went to the heart of Japan's security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, America cajoled and pressured Japan to assume more of the regional defence burden; on the other, Japanese elites, including Satō, wisely resisted such pressure due to fears of alienating and alarming both Japan's neighbours and the Japanese public.

Such concerns were heightened when a remark by a member of Laird's entourage was misinterpreted. Speaking at a press conference in Tokyo, Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim stated that one area where Japan could increase its defence capabilities was in the strength of its naval forces. This statement was blown out of proportion in the Japanese press and portrayed as an attempt to push Japan towards acquiring nuclear weapons in addition to increasing its conventional weaponry.[82] Furthermore, the *Yomiuri Shinbun* newspaper reported on a top secret meeting between Armistead Selden, deputy assistant secretary of defence for International Security Affairs, and Kubo Takuya. According to its sources the *Yomiuri* reported that at the meeting the question of Japan shouldering some of the US tactical nuclear burden was discussed.[83] *Time* magazine reported that such stories came about as a result of Japanese Defence Agency hawks, who believed that Japan needed nuclear weapons and wished to use Laird's visit to spark public debate on the issue.[84] In response to these reports a chorus of denials rose up: from the US State Department, from Japan's ambassador in Washington, Ushiba Nobuhiko, and from Laird himself. They all strenuously rejected any suggestion that Japan might become involved in nuclear strategy. Ushiba told a group of graduate students at Georgetown University that Japan had no plans for developing nuclear weapons.[85] In addition, the

State Department was quick to reject any notion that the United States had any role in prodding Japan towards acquiring nuclear weapons: 'We know of no responsible body of opinion in Japan or in the United States, that advocates the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan or even foresees such a necessity or possibility.' For good measure it added, 'Japan need have no concern regarding the validity of our nuclear deterrent.' In spite of such denials by Ushiba, Laird and the State Department the rumours were enough to cause Hubert Humphrey, the former vice president and Nixon's opponent in the 1968 election, to enter the fray. Warning against Japan joining the nuclear club, he stated that it would neither improve Japan's strategic standing nor contribute to the peace and stability of the region.[86] Humphrey and later historians need not have been so exercised: in private, Laird was just as vehemently opposed to Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons. He wrote to Nixon that for Japan to follow that path would be a 'gross political, economic, and military mistake'.[87]

Furthermore, the Japanese government at this time carried out at least two studies into the feasibility of Japan's developing an independent deterrent; both rejected the notion, albeit for different reasons. Satō's cabinet research bureau commissioned a study from a committee of four academics: three social scientists and a nuclear chemist. The panel-concluded that while it was technically feasible for Japan to develop its own nuclear arsenal, such a move would be counterproductive. It would greatly alarm China and the USSR about Japan's intentions and give rise to increased tension in the region. Doubts were also cast over the effectiveness of a Japanese deterrent. Given Japan's high population density, it would not be possible to adequately deter a Chinese and/or Soviet attack, since they could easily deliver a knockout blow to Japan's population and industrial centres that would make a Japanese counter-strike less likely. This would undermine the basic condition for mutual deterrence. The panel concluded that it would be worthwhile for Japan to develop an independent nuclear force only if it could absolutely guarantee Japan's safety. Since it could not, for the reasons just outlined, such a project was an unnecessary waste of resources and international goodwill. It would alarm not only Japan's possible adversaries but also its main ally, the United States. The report recommended that Japan's security be pursued through the holistic application of political and economic power, not full-scale militarisation.[88]

Independently of this process Nakasone commissioned the JDA to investigate the matter in 1970. Once again Japan's limited area and high population density were seen as prohibitive, though for different

reasons. While the JDA concluded that it would be possible for Japan to develop a device over five years at a cost of 200 billion yen, the lack of a suitable testing ground in Japan's densely populated territory made the plan unworkable.[89] Nonetheless Japan's top naval officers pushed for an independent deterrent but their hopes to thereby augment their ships were dismissed as needlessly imperilling Japan's cities.[90]

Conclusion

On 15 July 1971, just a few days after Nakasone's departure from the Defence Agency and Laird's trip to Japan, Nixon made the surprise announcement of his diplomatic opening to the People's Republic of China. This far-reaching change in Washington's approach to the region, which was a bitter blow to Satō, radically and abruptly altered the strategic landscape in East Asia.[91] It also undermined the need for the increase in defence expenditure by US allies envisaged in the Nixon Doctrine.

Despite this, the period saw an attempt to institute great changes in US-Japanese military relations, an attempt that was ultimately unsuccessful. The Nixon Doctrine heralded a new approach, wherein the United States sought to limit military commitments, particularly with regard to its manpower resources, in Asia. This departure was seized on by Nakasone Yasuhiro as an opportunity to push for autonomous defence. Satō supported Nakasone in his quest to augment Japan's Self-Defence Forces, but he was wary of Nakasone's efforts to see the MST downgraded. For Satō the MST was the cornerstone of Japan's relationship with the United States, it had a vital role in the security of Japan and North-East Asia, and was essential to the reversion of Okinawa. Furthermore, Nakasone was effectively restrained by officials in his own agency. Despite significant progress on updating the SDF's equipment, US policymakers, though relieved that Japan would not become a military power, were disappointed with what they saw as paltry efforts to rearm and fill the void left by the departed GIs. The Nixon Doctrine and Nakasone's ideas on autonomous defence posed a major challenge to the post-war defence consensus and to Japan's security ties to the United States. Ultimately they were not able to undermine this consensus, which lasted long after the end of the Cold War.

7
The Nixon China Shock, 1971

Over the summer of 1971 Richard Nixon announced two major departures in international policy which directly impacted Japan and its relations with the United States. The first was the announcement on 15 July 1971 that his National Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, had been in Beijing for highly secret talks with Zhou En-Lai, the premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the wake of these talks Nixon declared that he intended to visit Beijing for discussions aimed at reaching a Sino-American rapprochement. This was to have immense repercussions for Japan, both politically and diplomatically. It would also come as a great blow to Satō, in that he had consistently sought to closely coordinate his government's foreign policy with that of the United States, particularly on the question of relations with China, but had received only a few minutes' warning prior to Nixon's announcement. Although Satō was ultimately able turn this setback to his advantage and begin the process of forging Japan's own rapprochement with its neighbour, there is no doubt that it came as a severe and unnecessary blow from the Nixon administration. The second shock came exactly a month later, on 15 August 1971 (by unfortunate timing, the anniversary of Japan's surrender in 1945), Nixon proclaimed a New Economic Policy, essentially a series of protectionist measures designed to shore up America's faltering economy. Such a policy was to have serious implications for Japan's economy. This chapter explores the effects of the Nixon China shock on US-Japanese relations. The second shock is dealt with in Chapter 8.

Both of these policy departures were part of a new approach to international policy in the 1970s which took account of the relative decline of American power and sought new paradigms upon which to advance American interests.[1] Reaching out to China and erecting trade barriers were two facets of this approach. A common factor was that they

showed scant regard for long-time American allies, including Japan. Lost to Satō was one of the main certainties of the international system: the constant, benign and predictable nature of American power. What is remarkable is how quickly Satō was able to adapt to this changed international environment.

US Cold War policy in Asia and Sino-Japanese relations

Japan's relationship with China in the post-war period was closely intertwined with American preoccupations and policies. Following Mao's victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the US State Department had hoped it would be able to conduct relations with the newly declared People's Republic. However, such entreaties were rebuffed by Mao, who saw the very presence of US diplomats in China as a threat. The United States had favoured Mao's Nationalist opponents, led by Jiang Jieshi, during the course of the civil war. When it became obvious that Jiang would lose, the United States adopted a policy of non-intervention and even hoped that Mao might become an 'Asian Tito' and break with the Soviet Union. The Korean War changed this. On 25 June 1950 communist North Korea invaded South Korea in a bid to bring the entire peninsula under its control. US President Harry Truman ordered an armed response to this aggression and also sent the US Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait in order to neutralise the area. In a lightning advance General Douglas MacArthur's forces managed to push North Korean troops out of South Korea and pushed all the way to the Korean-Chinese border. MacArthur ignored several warnings not to proceed further, with the result that Mao intervened in the conflict and sent hundreds of thousands of troops, officially volunteers, into Korea, pushing MacArthur's troops south once again to prevent what he saw as an imminent and existential threat to his nascent revolution. This action was not seen as defensive in Washington, and Mao's regime was branded a dangerous aggressor. Jiang Jieshi was able to consolidate his position on Taiwan and managed to retain US recognition of his Republic of China (ROC) regime as the legitimate government of China.[2] It was against the backdrop of these events in China and Korea that John Foster Dulles and Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru negotiated the Japanese Peace Treaty. Towards the end of the negotiations Dulles let it be known that such was the animosity towards Communist China in the Senate that Tokyo would be required to give an assurance that it would not recognise Mao's regime in Beijing but would conclude a peace treaty and establish full diplomatic relations with the ROC regime on Taiwan. Yoshida released

the so-called Yoshida letter, which agreed to these terms and satisfied the senators, who had veto power over the peace treaty.[3] Successive Japanese governments followed this line while increasing trade with the mainland. This was known as *seikei bunri*, or 'the separation of politics and economics'.[4] As mentioned, on coming to power in 1964 Satō faced a potential threat from China in the form of its recently developed nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Satō felt that Japan's domestic political scene was threatened by subversion emanating from China.[5] These factors, as well as the chaos and introspection in China associated with the Cultural Revolution, prevented Satō from any new departure on China policy until the way was opened by the beginning of the US-Chinese rapprochement in 1971.

Divisions in the Gaimushō on China

Within the Gaimushō deep divisions on China policy developed during Satō's tenure. The China Affairs Bureau and the Asia Section were keen to see Japan normalise its relations with China sooner rather than later. In contrast the America Section, the United Nations Section and the Research and Investigation Section wanted to see Taiwan's status maintained. Despite the opposition arrayed against them, diplomats from the China Bureau, from at least as early as 1966, repeatedly put forth the case that geographical propinquity and the need to reduce tensions in the region made the development of good relations with the mainland a priority.[6] Furthermore, it stated that Japan could and should help to maintain the international position of Taiwan by keeping and strengthening economic ties.[7] By January 1971 the China Bureau argued that there were signs of a relaxation of tensions between China and the United States. The resumption of ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, for instance, provided encouragement for Japan to seek to improve its own relations with China. Interestingly in light of Nixon's and Kissinger's secret diplomacy and their failure to give advance notice to Tokyo, the China Bureau recommended undertaking similar confidential contact but also that Japan should quietly notify Washington at an early stage. The memo noted that an improvement in relations with the PRC need not automatically lead to estrangement between the United States and Japan. The United States would simply need to accommodate itself to a change in Japan's position. Nor would it necessarily mean a diminution of the Mutual Security Treaty (MST).

The China Bureau showed a considerable amount of creative thinking on this issue – namely, how to improve relations with China while also

maintaining the US-Japanese alliance, an alliance designed in large part to deter China and protect Taiwan. Firstly it noted the decreased likelihood of a military clash between China and the United States, since there had been a marked decrease in tension in the region, particularly since the United States had recently ended its patrols of the Taiwan Strait. It also conjectured, with a degree of accuracy, that the United States in its contacts with Beijing would call for an agreement on the non-use of force in the area. It also noted the possibility, suggested by Marshall Green in October 1970, that the United States would withdraw its forces from Taiwan. It was confident, however, that the United States would retain sufficient deterrent capacity to prevent an invasion by the PRC. Secondly, in the unlikely event that the United States requested permission from Tokyo to dispatch its forces based on Okinawa (due to revert to Japanese administration in 1972) to deter or counter an invasion of Taiwan from the mainland, Japan could refuse such a request. This was closer to wishful thinking. Refusing permission for the dispatch of forces garrisoned on Okinawa, especially with regard to the protection of Taiwan, went completely against the spirit and letter of the MST and the 'Korea and Taiwan' clauses of the Nixon-Satō communiqué of November 1969. Nor would this have been lost on the leadership in Beijing, which was incredibly antagonistic to the US-Japanese alliance, noting that it was the enemy of the peoples of Asia, including the Japanese people.[8] Such a strategy would likely backfire and alienate the United States whilst failing to satisfy China.[9]

Ultimately the memo appealed for a change in policy based on a hard-headed analysis of Japan's interests. It pointed out that it was essential for Japan, the most important country in Asia, to have good relations with China. Such a rapprochement would lead to better Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations and a consequent easing of international tensions. Timing was also crucial since the China Bureau hoped for what it called a 'Canada-plus' deal. This referred to the fact that both Canada and Italy (which normalised relations with the PRC in 1970) had been able merely to 'take note' of Beijing's claim to Taiwan rather than recognise its sovereignty over the island.[10] What was desired, then, were the same terms Ottawa and Rome secured but with the addition of a commitment to the non-use of force in the strait. Such good terms would be possible only were Japan to take the initiative in the short term. If, as was becoming increasingly likely, the PRC entered the UN the resultant popular clamour in Japan for instant normalisation would play into Beijing's hands and limit Tokyo's negotiating strength. The authors of this memo were incredibly prescient on this point.

Prescient or not, no new diplomatic initiative of the sort advocated by the China Bureau was undertaken. In a memo produced at the same time the American Bureau countered the arguments of the China Bureau; it was nonplussed about the prospects for any 'concrete' breakthrough in US-Chinese relations. It insisted that Washington would remain focused on Vietnam, the Middle East and the Strategic Arms Limitations talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union for at least two to three years. The subtext was that there was no urgency in making an overture to Beijing.[11] It is highly ironic, then, that it was the China Bureau that correctly read the signs noting that China was assuming greater importance in Washington: For example, it was thought highly suggestive that in the 'President's Annual Review of US Foreign Policy', also known as the State of the World report, the PRC was afforded its own chapter, while the Taiwan was discussed as part of a chapter on the Asia-Pacific.[12]

Such divisions in the Foreign Ministry were the cause of much disagreement and debate. Okazaki Hisahiko, head of the Research and Investigation Bureau (and a firm supporter of Taiwan), later recalled having regular arguments with Hashimoto Hiroshi, then head of the China Affairs Section on this issue, which sometimes continued after working hours had ended:

> When we were talking in Akasaka, we started to argue again. While he went to the bathroom, geishas came around me and said that I should not talk like that to my superior and that I should apologise to him. He is older than I am, but he joined the ministry a year later. Anyway, we resumed our fighting when he returned from the bathroom. However, we were on good terms with each other despite our differences.[13]

These differences within the Gaimushō would not be fully resolved until Nixon's dramatic announcement in July 1971 brought matters to a head.

Strategy for the UN China vote

In the months prior to the Nixon China shock there was a significant level of bilateral cooperation between Washington and Tokyo on the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations. Indeed, one of the main reasons that the diplomats of the America Section of the Gaimushō underestimated the likelihood of a major change in Sino-American relations was that they were closely cooperating with colleagues in

the US State Department in attempting to defend Taiwan's seat at the UN.[14] Despite losing the civil war in 1949 Jiang's rump ROC regime on Taiwan continued, with the support of the United States and others in the Western camp, to represent China on a variety of international fora, including, most importantly, the United Nations. Over the following two decades several unsuccessful attempts were made to change this situation by countries friendly towards the PRC; however, these all came to nought. In 1961 a resolution, co-sponsored by the United States and Japan and passed by the General Assembly, made any attempt to seat the PRC an 'Important Question', thus requiring a two-thirds supermajority to pass. From 1963 this procedural formula was successful in blocking such attempts by Albania – which almost alone among the countries of the Eastern Bloc maintained good relations with Beijing throughout the Sino-Soviet split – to pass a resolution calling for the seating of the PRC delegation in the China seat. However, the United States and Japan successfully passed an Important Question resolution each year from 1963 to 1970.[15] In 1970 the 'Albanian resolution' achieved a simple majority.[16] Though this did not reach the required threshold it was a watershed moment, since for the first time a majority of the UN's members favoured seating the People's Republic over the Taiwan regime. It was apparent that the ground was shifting, and the result cast doubts over Washington's and Tokyo's ability to continue to block Beijing's entry into the UN by means of this technique. The US delegation to the UN advised the State Department that a new formula would be required at the following year's General Assembly. It suggested that the entry of the PRC was very likely, and a 'dual representation' formula that would allow Taipei to retain its seat and command sufficient support was required.[17]

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger held complex and unorthodox views on this issue, views that were to have a deep impact upon the result of the next General Assembly vote. As early as July 1970 Kissinger noted that it was not necessarily against American interests to see the PRC enter the UN, though it was important that the ROC continue to be represented.[18] Following the achievement of a simple majority for the Albanian resolution, Nixon recognised that the PRC would enter the UN sooner or later. It was, he said, 'inevitable', but he felt that Beijing should fight its own battle on this since a victory for the PRC would be seen as a defeat for the United States. 'Let them do it, don't let us do it,' he said privately.[19] Such attitudes put the United States in the somewhat absurd position of expending effort and leaning on allies for support in that effort so as to try to prevent what was felt to be inevitable. Even Don Quixote *thought* he could defeat his windmill adversaries.

Almost as soon as the Albanian resolution achieved a simple majority in November 1970, the State Department began to search for the best possible method to keep the ROC's seat at the UN.[20] In doing so it closely coordinated policy with Taipei and Tokyo. From an early stage Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomats advocated an alternative approach to previous years' by taking advantage of the widely held view at the UN that no member be expelled. In November 1970 (directly after that year's General Assembly vote) Yoshida Nagao of the Japanese mission to the UN advocated the tabling of a simple resolution making no mention of the PRC but expressing the view that the ROC not be expelled.[21] This would later morph into the so-called Reverse Important Question (RIQ) resolution which would require a two-thirds majority for the expulsion of a member state.[22]

Recognising then that the PRC was likely to be admitted, various dual representation (DR) formulae were examined by US diplomats at the UN in consultation with other delegations, including Australia's and Japan's. The main problem with any form of dual representation was that since both Beijing and Taipei claimed to be the legitimate government of all of China, neither was likely to accept such an outcome. At best the ROC might lend tacit support to a dual representation formula, but only as a way of excluding the PRC. This was hardly the best way to win support from the international community, many of whose members, it was feared, would dismiss the strategy as a gimmick.[23] Moreover, Yoshida noted that the Chinese representation issue posed 'serious problems' for his government, given the growing mood within Japanese society in favour of a more conciliatory approach to China.[24] Though leading Japanese dismissed the change in mood as resulting from Zhou En-lai's attempts to drive a wedge between the Japanese people and their government, it was a potent and rising force.[25] At the same time Japanese officialdom was not keen to see Taiwan fall under Beijing's control and felt that the preservation of the ROC seat at the UN was one way of heading this off.[26]

Following on from these earlier soundings with friendly states, the Nixon administration began to formulate policy options with regard to this issue. A meeting of the Senior Review Group of the National Security Council on 9 March thrashed out the various possibilities and approaches. The question of dual representation was raised once more. Marshall Green was seconded by Alex Johnson when he noted the importance of stressing that the option did not take a 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' stance but rather a 'one China, two states' approach. Such semantics were important: the principle of 'one China'

was vital to the very raison d'être of both competing regimes. Green further emphasised that 'one China' was important to Satō, who sought to keep his options open with regard to the development of Japan's relations with mainland China. He wanted to avoid unnecessarily alienating either regime.[27]

By the end of May 1971, the State Department had secured the support of Japan and Australia for a dual representation formula and looked for Nixon's approval to begin a drive to secure support from other countries for this strategy.[28] However, Nixon was wary about coming out strongly for dual representation; he told Rogers that he feared that this would leave him open to accusations from the right wing and members of the pro-ROC 'China lobby' in the United States that he was selling out Taiwan. Delaying an announcement on policy would prevent potential critics, including powerful members of Congress and influential columnists, from attempting to marshal public opinion against the administration. Instead, he instructed Rogers to sound out views on this strategy in the course of his forthcoming European trip and relay the message that Washington was 'seriously considering' dual representation. Nixon privately told Kissinger that some sort of dual representation formula was the most likely eventuality, but he was irritated with the State Department's efforts to force him to take a position. Nixon and Kissinger were at that very moment awaiting word from Beijing on whether the Chinese government would accept a visit from an envoy of Nixon's. In light of the fact that this highly delicate and secret diplomacy was reaching a decisive moment, Nixon was in no mood to risk harming it by throwing his support behind DR. Doing so might not only incite potential right-wing domestic critics but also alienate Beijing. In the following exchange (captured by Nixon's Oval Office taping system), Kissinger, ever the realist, put it bluntly:

> Kissinger: But Taiwan, except for the sentimental thing, is really least significant for America [unclear].
>
> Nixon: I'm afraid it is. I'm sorry.
>
> Kissinger: It's a heartbreaking thing. They're a lovely people.
>
> Nixon: I hate to do it, I hate to do it, I hate to do it, I know. And they've been my friends.[29]

However, this overture was so secret that the State Department (with the exception of Rogers himself) was totally unaware of it. As a result US officials continued to sound out support for DR and found their strongest

potential supporters in the Japanese. Satō told Ambassador Armin Meyer in Tokyo that he placed the 'highest importance' on retaining the ROC in the UN. He also expressed the view that time was slipping away and a push needed to be made so as to secure support at the next General Assembly. Satō hoped – in vain, given Nixon's mood – that at the forthcoming meeting between Rogers and Aichi at the OECD conference at Paris, a clear course could be agreed following which Japan would lobby Southeast Asian states.[30] However, through the remainder of May and into June 1971 the State Department grew increasingly frustrated with the lack of a 'go' signal from the White House.[31] Such a delay, inexplicable to the press and to friendly states (especially Japan) was felt to effectively throw away any chance of saving the ROC seat.[32]

All became clear with Nixon's announcement on 15 July 1971. With it Nixon scored a diplomatic triumph, but he also opened a can of worms for Satō.

Nixon shocks Japan

In the summer of 1971 US Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird visited Japan and South Korea in order to highlight and win support for America's policy of reducing its international military commitments and calling upon allies to assume a greater share of the defence burden (see Chapter 6). Upon completing his trip to North-East Asia, Laird made his way back to Washington via Hawaii, landing there on the night of 14 July 1971.[33] It was here that Laird received a call from Henry Kissinger with a startling revelation: President Nixon was about to publicly announce his acceptance of an invitation to Beijing for talks with the Chinese leadership with the ultimate aim of normalising relations between the United States and the People's ROC. This followed months of secret talks between the two governments, culminating in Kissinger's covert expedition to Beijing, which took place while Laird was in Tokyo. Though Laird had been kept out of the loop with regard to this initiative by Nixon and Kissinger, he was not surprised. Such an endeavour would have been impossible without access to military planes and logistics. Moreover, communications between the White House and Beijing regarding this scheme were intercepted by the US National Security Agency and reported to Laird. Therefore, by the time he was officially informed by Kissinger he was fully aware of what was about to transpire. Knowing the effect such an announcement would have in Japan, Laird requested that he be allowed to inform Nakasone. As Laird later recounted, this was done out of courtesy to his host of

just a few days past and in light of the fact that all those he spoke to in Japan were sensitive to any change in American policy towards the PRC. Moreover, given the relatively short time frame involved, the information could not be leaked, as it might jeopardise the initiative.[34] No one else in Japan, Satō included, received such a courtesy.

Through the 1960s the following story entered the folklore of the Japanese Foreign Ministry: Asakai Kōichirō, a senior diplomat and former Japanese ambassador to the United States, had a nightmare to the effect that the United States had recognised the PRC without informing Tokyo. Official policy on China had become increasingly unpopular in Japan as it became apparent that the communist government in Beijing was there to stay; calls for reconciliation with Japan's wartime enemy grew louder. In spite of such calls, Satō's government stayed in line with the United States with regard to China and expected to be informed of and consulted about any major policy departures. In light of this it is clear why 'Asakai's nightmare' was a dreaded scenario.

The US State Department was distrusted and disdained by both Nixon and Kissinger, and though Secretary of State William Rogers was told of the overture to China, he was under orders to keep the matter to himself. No one else at the State Department was informed of what was coming.[35] While Nixon and his party flew from Nixon's western White House in San Clemente, California, to the television studios to make his address, Rogers, left behind, began to call as many foreign ambassadors as he could with news of the upcoming announcement. This task was rendered more difficult by the fact that it was then after working hours on the East Coast. Indeed Ushiba Nobuhiko, the Japanese ambassador, was at a reception for the US Marine Corps, and so the news was further delayed.[36] When he was eventually reached, Ushiba frantically tried to contact Alex Johnson. Johnson, who had only just heard the news himself, tried to assure Ushiba that the main outlines of US policy remained the same. Ushiba, however, exclaimed, 'Alex, the Asakai nightmare has happened.'[37]

When word reached Tokyo, where it was late morning on Friday 16 July, Satō was in a cabinet meeting. By the time a note relaying the news had been drawn up, the cabinet meeting had adjourned.[38] Kusuda Minoru relayed the news from the Foreign Ministry minutes before Nixon made his televised address. Kusuda later recounted Satō's reaction:

> The Prime Minister's instantaneous expression was very hard to describe. It seemed as if he were fighting a thousand emotions in one frozen minute in time. His verbal reaction was only one word of

> acknowledgment, 'Soka?' or literally translated, 'Is that so?' He fell silent afterwards.[39]

It is impossible to overstate the magnitude of the shock that Nixon's announcement engendered in Japan and the crippling effect it had on Satō. Alex Johnson concluded that it 'threw a devastating wrench' into US-Japanese relations.[40] Kusuda noted how the announcement spread a 'sense of astonishment and consternation among the government, the business world, the academia, and the media'.[41] The announcement unleashed a torrent of criticism from the opposition parties, the media and even from within Satō's own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). An editorial in the leftist *Asahi Shinbun* heaped praise on Nixon for his bold departure and taunted Satō by declaring his pro-American and supposedly anti-Chinese policy bankrupt since it was clear that the United States and China were building a new relationship while Japan stood on the sidelines.[42] In the immediate aftermath Satō suffered a political defeat when a long-time supporter lost what would under other circumstances have been a routine bid for re-election as speaker of the House of Councillors (the Diet's upper chamber).[43]

The question of why the shock occurred is one which has vexed historians. Why did Nixon and Kissinger do this to an ally, and why was it that such a change was not anticipated by Tokyo. Michael Schaller concludes that Nixon and Kissinger wished to punish Satō for his failure to deliver on a promise to limit Japanese textile exports to the United States.[44] Horikoshi Sakuji concludes that had Satō been able to come through on the textile deal, Nixon would have informed him the day before the announcement by using the hotline between the two countries.[45] In addition, in a biography of Henry Kissinger, brothers Marvin and Bernard Kalb suggest that Nixon 'seemed to enjoy the idea that Tokyo would be shocked.'[46] Nixon certainly felt aggrieved because of Satō's failure to deliver on a textile deal; the White House taping system captured him bitterly remarking that Satō 'has his personal thing on the textiles which he broke. Right, straight, flat out'.[47] However, both he and Kissinger were keen that relations between the two countries remained on a sound footing. When Peter Peterson, a senior economic aide, suggested in June 1971 that the United States delay signing the reversion treaty with Japan so as to extract concessions on textiles, Kissinger voiced his opposition and Nixon vetoed the proposal, stating 'I don't think we can go back on Okinawa' given the symbolic nature of the agreement. While he gave Peterson a free hand in pursuing a more confrontational trade and tariff policy towards Tokyo, even going

so far as to exhort Peterson to 'kick the Japanese in the butt', the new US-Japanese politico-military relationship, of which the Okinawa agreement was the cornerstone, was to remain untouched.[48]

The reason for Nixon and Kissinger's shabby treatment of Satō is less conspiratorial and more prosaic; it resulted from fear that news of their initiative would leak out. As the State Department had been excluded from this scheme and with the lack of expertise on Japan on Kissinger's NSC staff, there was a failure to appreciate the damage that this bolt from the blue would cause. This illustrates how ill informed the Nixon administration was concerning Japan. The main criticism to levy against the two men is that in their quest to pursue a grand geopolitical strategy and avoid getting bogged down in detail or forced to take into account every special interest, an important ally of the United States was sidelined at a critical juncture.

In their memoirs both Nixon and Kissinger stressed the need to maintain secrecy as the paramount reason for not informing the Japanese ahead of time. Naturally enough, no mention is made of any ulterior motive behind this. This is hardly conclusive either way; even if the allegations that they purposely sought to undermine Satō were true, they would hardly wish to sully their moment of statesmanlike triumph with revelations of underhand dealings. In his 1,090-page memoir, Nixon devoted four lines to this incident in US-Japanese relations. With regard to what he described as Japanese 'resentment' at not being informed, he invoked the need for secrecy so as to keep the entire enterprise from being ruined.[49] Kissinger echoed these concerns in his own memoir, *White House Years*; however, he expresses regret at the 'embarrassment' caused to Satō and ponders whether this could have been avoided if a high-level envoy had been despatched to brief Satō in advance, as had been discussed at the time.[50] However, Kissinger stood by the decision to maintain secrecy, given the 'delicacy' and 'uniqueness' of the initiative, and was at pains to point out the necessity of controlling its presentation to the public so as to remain in charge of the course the policy took – in other words, to prevent the emergence of domestic critics on the right. He even went so far as to invoke Dag Hammarskjöld's remark that the ultimate moral dilemma occurs when one is forced to conceal a truth so that a higher truth could survive.[51] The reader is left in the dark as to what this 'higher truth' is.

Was all this secrecy really necessary? Was the risk of a leak from Japan so high? William Bundy, who served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs in the Lyndon Johnson administration (and remained in that role in a caretaker capacity for the first few months of the Nixon

administration) criticised Nixon's and Kissinger's failure to inform Tokyo for the harm it did to US-Japanese relations. Bundy dismisses the secrecy excuse, noting that Japan was given several hours' notice of Lyndon Johnson's major address of 31 March 1968, where he announced his intention not to seek re-election so as to concentrate on negotiating a peace agreement with North Vietnam.[52] In addition, Alex Johnson, who of all American officials had had most contact with Satō, noted that that he was 'entirely confident that Satō would never have leaked a development of this kind'.[53] However, Winston Lord, a member of Kissinger's staff and one of his most trusted aides in preparing the overture to China, has stated in an oral history interview that while Kissinger had a 'certain suspicion' of Japan, 'surely he did not wish to hurt our ties with Tokyo or send a message'. Lord supports Kissinger's argument on the necessity of secrecy, stating that even if Alex Johnson had been dispatched to Tokyo to inform Satō in confidence 24 hours before the announcement, Satō may have felt compelled to inform his cabinet; this would have increased the risk of a leak.[54] Ōkawara Yoshio, a Japanese diplomat who was then serving at the embassy in Washington, acknowledges that the Japanese bureaucracy was as leak-prone as any other (if not more so).[55] Indeed, as recently as May 1971 the State Department had expressed its annoyance when details of US-Japanese discussions on Chinese representation at the UN were leaked to the press. The department pithily advised Armin Meyer, the US ambassador in Tokyo, 'You may wish to inform [the] GOJ [government of Japan] that leaks of this kind make candid consultation very difficult.'[56]

The question also arises as to why Nakasone, who of all Japanese received the most notice, failed to inform the prime minister. Nakasone does not deal with this matter in his memoirs, nor did he make himself available for interview.[57] However, it is worth remembering that he had just left the cabinet and that at this time Satō was widely seen as a lame duck, since he had already acknowledged that he would not seek re-election as head of the LDP at the end of his fourth term in 1972.[58] Nakasone later observed that when Satō formed his final cabinet he ushered in his administration's period of twilight.[59] In view of this Nakasone, who was leader of a rival faction within the LDP, had no interest in helping Satō, particularly when the latter was in his final days in power.

Why then did Tokyo not see this change coming? With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to see in Nixon's public utterances, going as far back as his 1967 article in *Foreign Affairs* and in his speeches as president, most notably his speech in Kansas on 6 July 1971, the emergence of a new line of thinking on China.[60] Why was this not noticed by the

Japanese Foreign Ministry? Not only were these signs too subtle, but the attention of Japanese diplomats and policymakers was elsewhere. Okazaki Hisahiko, a Japanese diplomat, was informed by John Holdridge, a member of Kissinger's staff, to read a speech that Nixon had given in the run-up to the announcement for clues as to a change in US thinking. Okazaki thought that this tip-off concerned the section of the speech on South-East Asia and the possibility of movement on negotiations with North Vietnam. He has also noted that at this time the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Research Bureau monitored the actions of so-called enemy countries (e.g., China and the Soviet Union). As he later recalled, 'we did not think of analyzing our allies'.[61] Ushiba Nobuhiko stressed in his memoir how the Foreign Ministry was completely blindsided by Nixon's declaration and had not been at all attentive to the rapprochement the United States was building with China.[62] Kusuda Minoru echoed this view by noting that the Foreign Ministry concentrated on the issue of Okinawa to the exclusion of other elements of America's relations with Asia.[63] Furthermore, Ōkawara notes, the most important factor in the Japanese leadership's remaining blind to these changes was US-Japanese cooperation on the issue of Chinese representation at the UN.[64] This more than anything else convinced the Japanese that no major change in America's policy towards China was imminent. In this environment Nixon's announcement came from nowhere and was perceived as a radical departure in US policy that directly affected Japanese interests and had been done over Satō's head.

Satō's reaction

Following his initial shocked silence upon hearing the news, Satō recovered enough to hope that by the following year things might improve and to issue instructions. He had Kusuda rework a previously planned major policy speech to take Nixon's announcement into account. He also had Kusuda draft a magnanimous message of congratulations to Nixon for his diplomatic triumph. Making the best of the situation, Satō, in both the speech and the message to Nixon, hoped that Beijing's invitation to the American president was evidence of a more outward-looking and conciliatory diplomatic approach which held out the possibility of a Sino-Japanese reconciliation. Satō's own diary entry for the day of the announcement is particularly interesting. He dealt with the 'big news' at the end of the entry, presumably after the initial shock described by Kusuda had worn off and he had had a chance to collect his thoughts. He wrote admiringly of Washington's diplomatic coup, stating

that it 'deserved congratulations', and expressed the hope, echoing his public statements, that a Sino-Japanese rapprochement might be on the horizon. He also noted, presciently as it turned out, that Taiwan would be a major stumbling block in improving relations between Beijing and Tokyo.[65]

Midori Yoshii has interpreted this diary entry to mean that Satō welcomed Nixon's initiative and that contemporary Japanese media reports of a Nixon shock have set the tone for the subsequent erroneous historical conclusion that Satō's position was fatally undermined by Nixon's announcement.[66] However, Yoshii's conclusions are based in part on a misreading of Satō's diary entry.[67] While Satō was prepared to concede that Nixon had scored a diplomatic triumph and recognised that the development might open the way for Japan to normalise its relations with China, this does not alter the fact that Satō's position was undercut by Nixon. Neither does it obscure the fact that Satō was deeply troubled by the nature of the move. While he was willing to admit that it deserved congratulations, he was not of a mind to celebrate it. Four days after the announcement he met with Gough Whitlam, the leader of the Australian Labour Party, who had just been in Beijing and had met with Zhou. Now he was in Tokyo on his way back to Australia. Satō and Whitlam talked for two hours, and Satō was impressed by Whitlam's command of the current situation.[68] According to Whitlam, Satō became emotional when recounting, with tears in his eyes, how the Americans had let him down despite his having done everything they asked of him.[69] Indeed, when Satō next met with Nixon (January 1972), Nixon acknowledged the embarrassment that the announcement had caused Satō. For his part, Satō was careful to once again congratulate the president on his diplomatic success, but he also stressed the immensity of the shock and how it had affected Japan: 'the shock of the announcement on Asian countries ran much deeper than the President could even imagine'.[70]

While there can be no doubt that Satō reacted to the news with dignity and poise, there is also no doubt that the Nixon China shock was a bitter blow. His reaction, as recorded by Kusuda, his encounter with Whitlam and his own conversation with Nixon are testament to this.

Dangers and opportunites

In the Japanese language the word 'crisis' is composed of two ideograms, one representing 'danger', the other 'opportunity'. As Satō recognised, the crisis caused by the dramatic events of 15 July 1971 presented both

dangers and opportunities. Japan's pride and prestige, not to mention his own domestic and international standing, were deeply affected by the shock. As Sadako Ogata concluded,

> The shock was devastating to the Satō cabinet and the mainstream leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party. They had staunchly defended the policy of close alignment with the United States, had restrained the domestic political demands to normalize relations with China, and now found themselves left behind by unilateral U.S. action.[71]

However, the upheaval caused by Nixon's diplomatic departure had freed Japan from the restrictions of the Yoshida letter and opened a chance for Satō to normalise Japan's relations with mainland China. Complicating matters was the intense public mood for rapid normalisation, which jarred with Satō's predisposition for caution and his desire not to alienate Washington or Taipei by moving too quickly.[72] As he had immediately recognised, the main stumbling block was the question of Taiwan. Another challenge was how to make contact with Beijing. Satō preferred to use a trusted intermediary, as when he used Wakaizumi Kei in conducting negotiations with Washington. The problem for Satō was that though there was no shortage of Japanese with access to the Chinese leadership, very few of them had any desire to be of assistance to him. A case in point was Tagawa Seiichi, an LDP Diet member and once a close associate of fellow LDP Diet member Matsumura Kenzō, who had been an outspoken advocate for normalisation with China throughout Satō's tenure. His calls went unheeded by Satō. Matsumura had led a number of delegations of like-minded LDP members, which included Tagawa, to China to negotiate a series of quasi-official trade agreements with Beijing. Somewhat poignantly, Matsumura died shortly after the Nixon shock, when normalisation with China surged to the top of the political agenda in Japan. As a token of his regard for Matsumura, Zhou dispatched Wang Guofeng, the deputy director of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association (the quasi-official body charged with overseeing relations with Japan) to Tokyo for Matsumura's memorial service. Satō wanted to meet with Wang while he was present in Tokyo; Satō hoped Tagawa could act as intermediary. Unfortunately for Satō, Tagawa was in no mood to be of help. Tagawa characterised Kishi Nobusuke, prime minister from 1957 to 1960, as having pursued an 'outspokenly anti-Chinese policy' and felt that Satō had followed his elder brother's 'unfriendly policy' towards the mainland.[73] John Welfield regards Tagawa's uncompromising position as a principled

stand, though it could more accurately be described as a political master stroke.[74] In refusing to hand a political coup to Satō, then in the waning days of his premiership, Tagawa could leverage his own position in the party. However politically astute Tagawa's actions were, they do call into question his commitment to Sino-Japanese friendship.

Tagawa Seichi's obstinacy did not deter Satō from trying to make contact with Beijing. He pursued a range of other channels, including Okada Akira, the Japanese consul general in Hong Kong, Watanabe Yaeji of the quasi-official Sino-Japanese Trade Office and Hori Shigeru, the secretary general of the LDP. Before detailing these efforts, it is first necessary to explore an issue that complicated Satō's quest to improve relations with China while simultaneously maintaining good relations with the United States. This was the matter of Chinese representation at the United Nations and Washington's desire that Tokyo join it in its strategy of retaining a seat for Taiwan.

We have seen how the Gaimushō was divided on the question of relations with China between those who advocated the retention of ties with Taiwan and those who put forward the view that it was necessary for Japan to normalise relations with the mainland. Disagreements came to a head with the Nixon China shock. Nakae Yosuke, chief of the Asian Affairs Section, described the atmosphere within the ministry as 'incredible':

> It was a feeling like there was an exaggerated opposition between those who expressed their strong opinion that 'well, if this happened, we should normalize relations with China' and those whose opinion was 'why should we hurry and normalize with a communist country like the PRC?' We in the Asia bureau naturally felt that we should normalize while the America bureau and the UN bureau felt that the issue wasn't so simple.[75]

These divisions were thrashed out at a heated meeting of senior bureaucrats on 30 August 1971. Vice-Minister Mori Haruki and Deputy Vice-Ministers Hōgen Shigenobu and Yasukawa Takeshi were joined by the chiefs of the UN, Asia and America sections. Also attending were the ambassadors to Moscow, Washington and Taipei and the consul general in Hong Kong, Okada Akira.[76] Most of those present stressed the need for caution and counselled a wait-and-see approach to ascertain the results of Nixon's visit to Beijing, which was to take place early the following year. They were not convinced that Nixon's trip would lead to normalisation between the United States and the PRC. Hashimoto (of the Asia

Section) and Okada took the opposing view, stressing that Japan should take the opportunity to normalise its relations with its neighbour, but they were in the minority. Representatives of the UN Section, especially the chief of the Political Bureau, Amau Tamio, strongly resisted any move in this direction; they were supported by Hōgen, whose opinion carried great weight within the ministry.[77] The prevalent mood in the Foreign Ministry, then, with some exceptions, was one of caution and conservatism.

Indeed, despite pursuing a new policy on relations with the PRC, Nixon remained keen to maintain – or at least be seen to make efforts to maintain – Taiwan's seat at the UN. Still fearing a backlash from domestic right-wing supporters of the Jiang regime, Nixon calculated that pursuing a strategy of protecting Taiwan's seat would satisfy critics and not alienate Beijing. In a sure sign of the venture's position in Nixon's priorities, the State Department was given the lead role in coordinating policy; Nixon took a back-seat role. The US delegation at the UN, led by Ambassador (and future President) George H. W. Bush, worked closely with the Japanese delegation on formulating a common approach. In August the United States finally released a proposed strategy (which Nixon had held up in the run-up to Kissinger's secret trip to China), which involved a Reverse Important Question resolution (RIQ) and a dual representation resolution (DR). The RIQ resolution proposed to make the expulsion of a UN member state an 'important question', requiring a two-thirds supermajority to pass. This, it hoped, would capitalise on the general reluctance in the General Assembly to force Taiwan out. The appellation 'reverse' comes from the fact that the previous important question resolutions made the *admittance* of the PRC an important question. The DR resolution provided for the entry of the PRC *alongside* the ROC.[78]

As the US delegation to the UN noted, there was only a slim prospect for success and Japan's co-sponsorship of both resolutions was deemed essential. This placed Satō in an incredibly difficult position. In the wake of the Nixon China shock, the public mood in Japan had turned decidedly in favour of rapprochement with Beijing, a mood Chalmers Johnson described as 'panda-mania'.[79] For example, between June and October 1971 every one of the 46 prefectural assemblies in Japan passed a resolution or recommendation calling for establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC.[80] Indeed even the business community – usually reliable supporters of conservatives like Satō – grew nervous that they would lose out to American exporters in building trade ties in *their* backyard. However, Satō was loath to damage relations with the United States further. The textile dispute had been a running sore in bilateral relations,

and Nixon's New Economic Policy (announced in August) had placed restrictions on Japanese imports to the United States as a bargaining tool to bring about currency realignment (see Chapter 8). Satō's government was desperately trying to come to an agreeable compromise with the United States on these issues. Indeed, Ushiba Nobuhiko, the ambassador to Washington, clashing with Yoshimi Furui of the 'China school' in the Gaimushō, made a strong case for the necessity of not breaking with the United States on this issue given the myriad other economic irritants in bilateral relations.[81] Michael Schaller views these considerations as having been paramount for Satō.[82] However, there is strong evidence to conclude that concern for Taiwan's position was at least as important. As Kusuda Minoru put it, 'I felt that if we acted with humanity and justice toward Taiwan, it would have life into the future and it would turn out to be a positive result for Japan-Taiwan relations.'[83]

The LDP leadership was also divided on this question. Elder statesmen in the party like Kishi Nobusuke and Kaya Okinori were strongly in favour of co-sponsoring the resolution in order to safeguard Taiwan's seat. However, they were yesterday's men; those other leading members of the LDP who aspired to succeed Satō distanced themselves from any stand that was likely to be regarded as anti-PRC and consequently political suicide. On 8 September 1971 Satō met with senior members of his cabinet and the LDP hierarchy to weigh up Japan's options and formulate a coherent strategy on the interrelated issues of relations with China, Chinese representation at the UN and how to respond to the New Economic Policy. On the question of China, Satō reported to the gathering that following a meeting of the top three members of the party plus the foreign minister, a majority favoured admitting the PRC but also attempting to retain a seat for Taiwan. Satō declared that he was not advocating a 'two Chinas' solution, noting that even Jiang 'crouching on Taiwan' acknowledged that there is 'one China', but responding to the reality that two governments existed and that it was unfair to expel a member state which had been a firm and loyal supporter of the UN Charter. The assembled leaders largely supported these points, with Miki Takeo, the former foreign minister and a candidate to succeed Satō, noting that however popular the notion of normalisation with the PRC was, the expulsion of Taiwan would not be greeted enthusiastically by the Japanese public. Despite such support, there was no approval for co-sponsoring the RIQ and DR resolutions at the UN. Satō may well have taken some small comfort from the fact that several speakers called for senior members to refrain from airing their differences on China in the press.[84]

On 12 September, however, Nakasone Yasuhiro, the former director general of the Defence Agency and a member of the LDP's executive, told the *New York Times* that he recognised that the PRC was the legitimate government of China, that Taiwan was part of China and that the PRC should be seated at the UN, thereby accepting China's conditions for the normalisation of relations. He also publicly opposed Japan's co-sponsorship of the two US resolutions.[85] Satō was furious and demanded that senior party figures be more circumspect. Nakasone pleaded that he had spoken in a personal capacity, but by that stage it was clear to Satō that he would not be able to build a consensus on the issue in the party. Even usually reliable allies such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori Shigeru and Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo were opposed to co-sponsorship.[86]

Satō asked Fukuda to sound out opinion on the US side when Fukuda led a delegation to the US-Japanese Trade and Economic Conference (ECONCOM VIII) on 8–9 September. Rogers asked for Japanese co-sponsorship of the UN resolutions; however, Fukuda was instructed not to commit one way or another. Satō told Fukuda that he would inform him of his decision upon his return to Japan.[87] Either decision would have had negative domestic and international repercussions. In a departure from the usual consensus approach to decision making, Satō was advised by several cabinet members to take the decision (and the opprobrium) himself and to insulate the rest of the LDP, including his hoped-for successor Fukuda, from the fallout. Later that day Satō summoned senior officials from the Gaimushō for advice. However, Nishibori Masahiro, the head of the UN Section, felt that Satō had by that stage already made up his mind.[88] Indeed, the same evening, Kaya Okinori came to see Satō with 'a worried look on his face', but the conservative, hard-line supporter of Taiwan left reassured.[89] It was beginning to look clear to those around Satō which way he was inclining. Indeed, from his diary we see that he had already quietly informed the United States of his decision to co-sponsor the resolutions on 17 September.[90]

Using his position as a lame duck prime minister, Satō was able to make this tough choice; he announced on 22 September that Japan would co-sponsor the RIQ and DR resolutions at the UN. In doing so he also insulated Fukuda from responsibility, hoping thereby to ensure that he would succeed him. Satō tried to minimise the political and diplomatic fallout from this decision by stressing how in backing the resolutions, Japanese policy on China was undergoing a massive shift. No longer did Japan seek to exclude the PRC from the UN; now it was actively promoting its admission. Satō also stressed, in a point intended as much for Taipei as for Beijing, that the DR resolution recognised the

reality of the existence of two governments as a 'transitional' measure and made no mention of 'two Chinas'. In an effort to provide additional political cover, he noted that the result of the resolutions depended on the international community's vote and that the question of 'political responsibility' applied neither to a single leader nor to the cabinet.[91]

Despite Japan's support for the US strategy, the Reverse Important Question failed to pass, and the Albanian resolution assigning the China seat to the PRC was carried. This led to a walkout by the ROC delegation. In light of this defeat the Dual Representation motion was not even tabled. As Ogata observed, 'Satō was fully aware that a defeat in the United Nations voting was possible and that this might turn into a movement to topple' him.[92] Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the loss the opposition parties in the Diet tabled motions of no confidence in Fukuda and in Tanaka Kakuei (the minister for international trade and industry), the latter for his handling of the textile dispute with the United States. The motions failed, but 12 anti-mainstream, pro-PRC members of the LDP, including Tagawa Seichi, abstained, thus showing their support for the opposition.[93]

However, the change in Chinese representation at the UN, though it represented a political setback for Satō and his allies in the LDP, was crucial for Japanese policymaking in two important respects. Firstly there was sense that Japan had discharged its obligations to Taiwan and now had a freer hand with regard to the mainland.[94] Secondly, given the centrality of the UN to Japan's foreign policy, the PRC's membership in the UN added impetus to Sino-Japanese normalisation. As early as March 1971 Nishibori Masahiro, who was the director of the UN Affairs Section in the Gaimushō and a strong supporter of Taiwan's position, told US diplomat Richard Sneider that Taiwan's loss of a seat at the UN would have deep domestic political implications in Japan.[95] Moreover, when Satō and Nixon met in early 1972, Nixon warned him not to rush into normalisation. For his part Satō highlighted the importance of the UN vote in informing Japanese policy.[96] The change also impacted upon opinion within the Foreign Ministry. Nakae Yusuke, who became councillor of the Asian Affairs Section in 1971, described how, following the vote, 'there was the thought that the voices of the groups opposing normalization with China could be quieted through linking it to the idea that because one of Japan's three pillars [of its foreign policy] was working through the UN, if Taiwan lost its seat to the PRC, Japan's policy toward the PRC had to change'.[97] Tōgō Fumihiko later recalled that the result of the UN vote 'meant that movement towards normalisation was assured.'[98]

Reaching out to China

In the aftermath of the China vote at the UN, Satō continued in his quest to find some way to connect with the Chinese leadership. He authorised Okada Akira to make contact and also attempted to make contact through the Sino-Japanese Trade Office.[99] These channels were, unfortunately, fruitless. The most significant attempt to make contact with Beijing was the so-called Hori letter, a message sent in the name of Hori Shigeru, the secretary general of the LDP, at Satō's direction. Indeed, the letter was drafted by Satō's private secretary, Kusuda Minoru, and Nakajima Mineo, Kusuda's adviser on Chinese affairs.[100]

The letter, drafted before but sent after the UN vote, is a remarkable document. It shows just how far Japanese officialdom had come in its attitudes towards China in a short period of time. Given the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Beijing, the letter was sent from one political party to another – from the LDP to the Chinese Communist Party. Astonishingly it compares the two parties, both having been in power for most of the post-war period and having brought peace, stability and progress to their respective countries. It notes how delegations from other Japanese political parties have been to Beijing for high-level talks and it was therefore appropriate for an LDP delegation to do the same. The letter was delivered by Minobe Ryukichi, the governor of Tokyo, who was one of a series of left-wing and progressive politicians who trod a well-worn path to Beijing during this period. (Minobe was later dubbed *Minobenjā* by the Japanese press, as he was seen as Japan's *Kissenjā*.)[101] Zhou's reply to Satō's entreaties was resolute and caustic. Responding specifically to the Hori letter, he publicly rejected the olive branch, declaring that rapprochement could be established only on the basis of Japanese recognition that the PRC was the only legitimate government of all of China and that Taiwan was part of the PRC's territory. He also ruled out any contact with Satō, baldly stating, 'I have no trust in Satō and will not negotiate with him,' but that the 'next' Japanese prime minister would be welcome in China.[102]

This effectively ended any chance of Satō presiding over rapprochement with China. In spite of this, Satō would continue his efforts to build the basis for such a rapprochement in the remaining few months of his premiership. Satō built the groundwork for swift Sino-Japanese normalisation to take place under his successor by agreeing to Beijing's terms.[103] Essentially this saw a continuation of the earlier policy of *seikei bunri*, the separation of politics and economics, only now Tokyo had full political and economic relations with Beijing and only economic ties

with Taipei. Satō's action in seeking to defend Taiwan's seat at the UN meant that the fallout from this switch was not as severe as it could have been. Japan continues to maintain close, albeit unofficial, relations with its southern neighbour.

In conclusion, Satō's stance on China and the whole thrust of Japan's post-war foreign policy were severely tested by the Nixon shocks. Though doubts have been raised about the effects of Nixon's China shock on Satō, it is clear that he was deeply affected by the surprise announcement. All the same, he was able to capitalise on the shifts in the international system and in domestic public opinion to manoeuvre Japan towards normalisation with China. Furthermore, he was able to do it in such a way as to minimise the effects on Taiwan and uphold the centrality of the UN in Japanese foreign policy. For this he deserves credit, especially when one considers the pressures and limitations under which he was operating. America's Cold War stance on China had been a key plank of his foreign policy, and it had been unceremoniously removed. He also had to contend with growing public disquiet towards anything perceived to be anti-PRC and a party that was moving away from his position and looking to a post-Satō future. That Satō was able to navigate these currents speaks to his immense diplomatic skill and political nous.

8
Economic Woes, 1971–1972

The second Nixon shock was delivered on Sunday, 15 August 1971, which in a piece of unfortunate timing was the 26th anniversary of Japan's surrender. Speaking in a live television broadcast, Nixon announced measures to protect the dollar and to shore up the US economy. These included an end to the convertibility of the dollar to gold, a 10% import surcharge and domestic wage and price controls.[1] This so-called New Economic Policy effectively ended the period of American leadership of the world economic and financial system which had been in place since the end of the Second World War. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the economies of western Europe and Japan had recovered from the devastation of war and were now threatening the US economy with cheaper imports. As a result, America's trade balance, long in surplus, slipped into deeper and deeper deficit. In removing the peg to gold, Nixon effectively devalued the dollar against other currencies and therefore made American goods cheaper to sell and foreign goods more expensive to import. The surcharge, which further added to these prices, was a temporary measure. It would, Nixon outlined, be removed once a new currency arrangement between the major industrialised nations was agreed upon.

In Tokyo, where it was the morning of Monday, 16 August, Satō got slightly more notice of this policy change than he had of the announcement on China a month before. Kusuda received a call from Vice Foreign Minister Mori to say that William Rogers needed to speak with Satō urgently. The prime minister was in a meeting with prefectural governors and could not be contacted straight away. Organising a translator also added to the hold-up. By the time the call was eventually connected, Rogers was able to give Satō only a few minutes' warning. The Americans had wanted to give Satō more notice, but as the head of

the *Kantei* secretariat pointed out to Kusuda, they should have used the hotline. Kusuda felt that the measures announced by Nixon jettisoned American pride and self-confidence and were an election stunt unbecoming of a superpower.[2] How the United States got to this point and the impact this had on US-Japanese relations are the subject of this chapter. It also deals with Satō's last year in office and the tumultuous effects of the Nixon shocks. As Michael Schaller concluded, these 'strained but never severed' the relationship.[3] This chapter goes further and notes the series of confidence-building measures; Emperor Hirohito's stopover in Anchorage, Alaska, where he was greeted by Nixon; and the finalisation of the Okinawa agreement, which imparted some measure of harmony back into the relationship.

Background

Upon coming to power in January 1969, the Nixon administration assumed responsibility for the ongoing problem of America's increasingly lopsided international trade balance. The Johnson administration had come under criticism during the presidential campaign of 1968 for adopting a piecemeal approach. This found expression in the REDCOSTE (Reduction of Costs in Europe) programme, whereby the United States sought the support of its allies in western Europe for maintaining its troops there. There was also an effort to have friendly governments invest in Wall Street; witness Johnson's arm-twisting Satō in 1967 to purchase American securities (see Chapter 2).[4] Fred Bergsten, an NSA staff member in the Nixon White House with responsibility for international economic affairs, criticised this microeconomic approach as seeking a sustainable balance rather than the elimination of the deficit. Another effort taken during the Johnson administration was the creation of Special Drawing Rights, a 'basket' of major currencies (the dollar, the UK pound, the French franc, the German mark and the Japanese yen) as an alternative reserve currency to the dollar.[5] Throughout the first half of 1969 the Nixon administration sought a way to relax selective controls and implement a comprehensive solution to the trade deficit which would not retard global economic growth.[6] However, after months of bureaucratic infighting over the optimal course to take, it was eventually decided to relax controls on overseas investments in developing countries.[7] Such a drift in policy was largely a result of the low priority both Nixon and Kissinger gave to economic matters, particularly at the outset of the administration.[8]

Ignoring problems did not make them go away, and America's trade balance continued to worsen through 1970 and into 1971. By the end

of 1971, the US balance of payments deficit was almost $29 billion; furthermore, the United States ran its first merchandise deficit in over a century: $2.27 billion. In a bilateral US-Japanese trade of $11.5 billion, the US deficit was $3.2 billion.[9] A senior member of Nixon's cabinet was quoted by *Time* magazine in May 1971 as saying, 'The Japanese are still fighting the war, only now instead of a shooting war it is an economic war. Their immediate intention is to try to dominate the Pacific and then perhaps the world.' This was clearly unfounded hyperbole, but it showed the depth of feeling on the issue within Nixon's inner circle. In addition to being inundated with 'Sony TVs, Nikon cameras, Panasonic radios, Toyota and Datsun cars, and Honda and Yamaha motorbikes', America was still searching for a solution to the textile imbroglio.[10]

Textiles redux

The textile deal which had been hammered out by Henry Kissinger and Wakaizumi Kei in October and November 1969 in advance of the Nixon-Satō summit was never put into effect. The major reason for this was that Satō did not have the ability, either in terms of legally held authority or political capital, to force such an unpopular agreement on the Japanese textile industry. In the opening months of 1970, separate plans were put forward by Kissinger and by Donald Kendal, a Pepsi Cola executive of Nixon's acquaintance who acted on his own initiative. Neither of these plans succeeded.[11] A meeting in June 1970 between Miyazawa Kiichi (whom Satō appointed as Minister for International Trade and Industry (MITI)in January 1970) and US Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans also failed to produce an agreement.[12] As the crisis dragged on without solution, an embarrassed Satō apologised to Nixon in October 1970 for not having been able to reach a solution.[13] Such statements did not placate Nixon, who wanted action.[14] He also felt betrayed by Satō for not sticking with his side of the bargain that had been made in November 1969; Satō had, Nixon mused, 'his personal thing on the textiles which he broke. Right, straight, flat out'.[15] This was unfair to Satō, who had in good faith done all he could to reach a deal, a deal it should be remembered which was forced on him as a quid pro quo for the reversion of Okinawa. At the same time Satō did make a commitment – one he was unable to keep – to find a solution at the summit in November 1969 and again when he met Nixon in October 1970.[16]

Dissatisfied with the lack of progress and spying a political opportunity, one of Nixon's political opponents in Congress stepped in and attempted to legislate a solution. Wilbur Mills, a Democrat and the chairman of

the House of Representatives Ways and Means (i.e., budget) Committee, put forward a trade bill which included restrictions on Japanese textile imports. While the House debated the bill, Ambassador Ushiba Nobuhiko and presidential aide Peter Flanigan held talks in an effort to come to a solution. The House passed the bill on 19 November 1970. Though recommended by the Senate Finance Committee, the bill failed to come to a vote on the floor of the Senate and was dropped. In any case, with the threat of legislative action looming, Stans had toughened the US negotiating position and, when the bill failed, postponed the Ushiba-Flanigan talks. In March 1971 the Japanese Textile Federation proposed its own unilateral restraint plan, which was endorsed by Mills. Satō's government welcomed the plan and announced that it was calling off intergovernmental talks. Nixon was furious that his campaign promise was being fulfilled by a political rival from the opposition party.[17] The day after this plan was announced, Marshall Green mentioned Satō's name during a Senior Review Group (SRG) meeting on the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations. In reply Kissinger spoke of Nixon's anger at the prime minister: 'Let me tell you his name is a dirty word around here. We had such an explosion around here this morning [on textiles] that I thought the pictures would be blown off the wall.'[18] In a strongly worded letter to Satō, Nixon criticised the Japanese government's acceptance of this deal and rejected the terms as insufficient. He also pointedly noted the agreement's endorsement by Mills 'a member of the Democratic Party'.[19]

Between April and July, David Kennedy, formerly Nixon's treasury secretary and at this time a roving ambassador, travelled to Asian capitals in an attempt to find agreement. He was backed up by a president increasingly willing to use extreme measures to get his way. This took the form of threatening to impose import quotas, even suggesting that the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 be invoked, if a deal were not concluded by 1 October. Such talk angered Mills, who retorted that this was not an appropriate use of such legislation. It also infuriated the Japanese, who, quite reasonably, questioned why they were to be treated as an enemy.[20] As Thomas Zeiler concluded, 'This unprecedentedly belligerent move, taken not only in peacetime but directed against a friendly nation, initiated the most miserable period in bilateral relations since the end the American occupation of Japan. Nixon slapped aside years of Cold War cooperation for narrow domestic concerns.'[21]

In the meantime, Satō appointed two leading figures from within his faction to senior ministries in order to achieve a settlement. Tanaka

Kakuei received the MITI brief, while Fukuda Takeo was appointed to the Gaimushō. The two men were also jockeying to succeed Satō. Nixon's deadline had the effect of concentrating minds, and Tanaka and Kennedy managed to reach an agreement on 15 October, just before quotas were to be imposed. It was substantially the same as Nixon's and Stans's initial demand but used a different base year which was more generous to Japan.[22] The deal was condemned in the American press as undermining an important bilateral relationship for the sake of Nixon's narrow political interests. The *New York Times* denounced the deal as a 'a victory on the part of President Nixon and the Southern textile industry, but at a cost of America's long-range international political and economic interests that has yet to be calculated'.[23] The *Washington Post* judged that it had given rise to a 'maximum of rancour and distrust abroad with a minimum of benefit at home'.[24] In the end, the quotas stipulated for the Japanese textile industry were not filled. Just like their American competitors, the Japanese textile mills began to suffer competition from lower-cost economies in the rest of Asia.[25] In the end, the sorry textile debacle benefitted no one except Nixon, who pocketed some $430,000 in campaign contributions from the American textile industry.[26] However, the resolution of the long-running issue removed a significant irritant from US-Japanese relations.

NSSM 122: the missed opportunity

Over the summer of 1971, as Nixon and his closest aides were pushing for a resolution of the textile issue, the formal policymaking apparatus in Washington was engaged in revising America's approach towards Japan. The last such exercise had taken place in 1969 at the outset of the Nixon administration and in the context of coming to an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. The upcoming US-Japanese joint cabinet committee on economic relations (ECONCOM VIII), which was to be held in September, was the stated reason for this policy reappraisal, or to give it its official appellation, National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 122. Furthermore, the immense changes to the international system and the upheaval in US-Japanese relations caused by the Nixon shocks gave the process added urgency. This urgency, however, was not readily translated into a coherent prescription for the future. Discord between Kissinger's National Security Council Staff, the State Department's Japan specialists and the economic agencies of the government, led by the Treasury Department, meant that no consistent course of action emerged. This failure can be ascribed to Kissinger's

undisguised disdain for Foggy Bottom (the rather unfortunately named locale in Washington, DC where the State Department's headquarters are located), his overcentralised foreign policymaking apparatus and his belief, not shared by State Department experts, that Japan would remilitarise and emerge as one of the five poles of a new multipolar world order. Added to this mix was the Treasury's view that correcting the trade imbalance was the one and only priority in US-Japanese relations. Such discord resulted in a missed opportunity to plot the future of US-Japanese relations during this period of flux in the international system.

The foreign policymaking process engineered by Kissinger for the Nixon administration was centred around the president and his special assistant for national security affairs, namely Kissinger. Ideas and opinions, in the form of pros and cons, were sought from relevant agencies of the government. However, before any options were sent to the president for approval or otherwise, they were vetted by Kissinger. While the State Department and other government agencies had expertise and experience in particular areas, their preferences and recommendations were subordinate to Kissinger's vision. It was problematic for American diplomacy when an area such as Japan did not fit neatly into the Kissingerian grand strategy.

With NSSM 122 an Interagency Group was formed with members drawn from the State and Defence departments and from a number of economic agencies, including the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture and the Council of Economic Advisors. Its task was to formulate a coherent set of approaches to Japan combined with their respective pros and cons. However, far from producing a coherent response, the Interagency Group, as a result of its composition and disagreement between its members, produced a mishmash of conflicting priorities and contradictory conclusions. This was expressed by the fact that each agency submitted its own draft rather than agree to a common position. The State Department advocated the preservation of a positive and mutually beneficial partnership with Japan above all other concerns. It examined the pros and cons of either continuing the current US-Japanese relationship or progressively shifting America's defence burden onto Japan and was forthright in pointing out how disastrous the latter course would be. As its contribution, it succinctly proclaimed its view of what US interests were; namely, the maintenance of a 'friendly and constructive relationship between the U.S. and Japan'. Furthermore, the paper laid out 'inducements', which deviated from the National Security Council (NSC)-preferred pros and cons approach.

These inducements were related to 'Japan's own interest in preserving the alliance and its need for reassurance that we do regard Japan as an ally, an equal and a major power in its own right.' Such inducements included an acknowledgement that Japan had achieved great power status by supporting its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, by including it in any future peace conference for South-East Asia and by coordinating policy with Tokyo rather than simply engaging in consultations. It was also vital that Japan's confidence in America's security guarantee be upheld; this was best ensured by the maintenance of forces in the region and by the undertaking of joint planning and training exercises with the Self-Defence Forces.[27]

In marked contrast, the Treasury challenged the basic assumptions of the State Department's contribution and asserted that the challenge for the United States was not to bend over backwards to ensure the continuation of friendly relations but to ascertain what was affordable in terms of military outlays and in light of America's payments difficulties. Furthermore, the Treasury criticised the State Department for failing to point out the significant Japanese contribution to these balance of payments difficulties and to America's international monetary problems. By way of riposte, the diplomats at Foggy Bottom noted that Japan was not entirely to blame for America's economic predicament. Inflation, on which imports were an important brake, was undoubtedly a cause of America's payments difficulties; moreover, US imports from Japan constituted only 0.6% of US production, hardly injurious to American industry. They also pointed out that Japan was not a low-wage country and its programme of relaxing import controls had begun only in 1968; so its effects would not yet have been apparent. Such arguments were not taken on board by the Treasury, which, along with the other economic agencies, continued to hold that Japan was the font of a substantial part of America's international trading difficulties.

The State Department's paper came in for criticism from John Holdridge of Kissinger's NSC staff. While Holdridge had been a China specialist at the State Department, by this time he was the NSC's 'Mr. Far East' and was unflatteringly described as 'a Kissinger man as soon as he came into the [NSC]' by one of his former colleagues.[28] He was eager to see his superior's views reflected in policy and dismissed the State Department's recommendations as nothing more than seeking the maintenance of the status quo. In his report to Kissinger he noted that the interagency paper suffered from 'parochialism and lack of integration' due to the 'enormous contention between State, which fears damage which several economic agencies…will inflict on our relationship if they have their

way and these economic agencies which are inclined towards heavy pressure on Japan as the only way of bringing Japan around on trade and investment matters'. Holdridge railed against the 'conservatism of old Japan hands' of the State Department who 'refused to consider any basic options other than to maintain the present Japan policy even though events may move either US or Japanaway from relationship which now exists.'[29] While he was certainly no advocate of a complete break with Japan, he felt that given Japan's growing power and uncertainly as to its future direction as well as Nixon's decisive shifts in policy, it would be desirable for the United States to plan for any eventuality.[30] Holdridge's ire was not reserved only for his former colleagues at the State Department; he also criticised the economic agencies of government for failing to appreciate the political cost of adopting a confrontational approach to Japan.[31] Kissinger himself was frustrated by the State Department's style, writing, 'But what is likely to happen' across the top of its submission where it listed the potential courses Japan could take in the future.[32] Rather than being told what was in US interests and what was necessary to ensure that this came about, he wanted a crystal ball to predict the future.

The Interagency Group's initial draft response was discussed by the SRG on 6 August 1971. Kissinger chaired the meeting, and he was joined by representatives from the State and Defence departments and the Treasury. Kissinger began by noting his impression from the draft was that 'there is great pressure to strengthen the existing relationship'. However, he asked, 'Do we want Japan to depend entirely on us? Or should we consider what U.S. policy would be if Japan, over the next five years, takes a more autonomous stance. I am no expert on Japan ... with or without China and considering the economic potential of Japan we should look at whether this will happen anyway. Is this one reality we should plan for?' Alex Johnson noted that while it was entirely likely that Japan would take a more independent line in the future, it would remain reliant on the United States, particularly for the nuclear umbrella and the conventional security guarantee. As such, Tokyo was 'anxious to preserve relations' with the United States. Indeed, it was out of concern that the United States might transfer its 'affections' to the Chinese that caused such an anxious response to the US initiative on China. Furthermore, voices at the SRG suggested that the United States seek to induce Japan to bear more of the defence burden in the region by pulling back from some of its military commitments to the region. Johnson warned that either outcome would present Japan with a difficult situation. Neither the Soviet Union (with whom Japan had

an ongoing territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands) nor China (which had expressed hostility towards rapprochement with Japan) were viable replacements for Japan's strategic partnership with the United States. Should Japan find itself so isolated, it might, Johnson warned, see distinct benefits in acquiring its own nuclear deterrent – an outcome inimical to US interests. Recalling the experience of the 1930s, when Japan was not only isolated politically but also economically, Johnson warned gravely that the Japanese should be 'treated in such a way that they don't feel compelled to get nuclear weapons.'

Kissinger ended the meeting with a call for the Interagency Group to get back to work and figure out where Japan was going, what the United States wanted Japan to do, how Japan could be induced to do it and what the relevant political and economic costs were. Kissinger's repeated question during the meeting – were there political aspects of the relationship with Japan that could be sacrificed for the sake of economic concessions? – was never addressed by any of the participants. This went to the core of what he was attempting to do with this NSSM process: form a coherent policy out of these two distinct aspects. As will be seen, his goal was never realised.[33]

By the end of August the US embassy in Tokyo reported that the Japanese government did not want to discuss the surcharge, revaluation or liberalisation of trade at the ECONCOM but wanted private clarification on these matters. The Gaimushō was offering the full implementation of Japan's Eight Point Programme, which included the liberalisation of import and investment restrictions, tariff reductions, the removal of non-tariff barriers, stimulation of the domestic economy and 'orderly marketing' (i.e., a managed reduction in the export of certain products). In addition, the Gaimushō was offering a revaluation of the yen of approximately 10%, half a billion dollars in aid to South-East Asia and $100 million in military procurement from the United States. The Gaimushō was anxious to know what America's requirements were as it was in a bureaucratic stand-off with the Ministry of Finance and MITI, who were less enthusiastic about coming to an agreement on these matters with the United States.[34]

By this time the Interagency Group had reported back to the NSC for a second time. The State Department's redraft took the form of a retort to the attitude of Kissinger and Holdridge and boldly asserted that a 'cooperative, close and friendly relationship' with Japan was in America's interests. Within this context the United States should encourage Japan to gradually increase its aid to developing countries and maintain cooperation on economic and monetary problems. Furthermore,

echoing Johnson's concerns, the United States should preserve the security relationship and so discourage Japan from developing a major military capability which would serve to raise regional tensions. The paper pointed out that Washington had limited leverage in achieving these aims but that the best way of enhancing US influence would be to convince the Japanese of America's commitment to the relationship. This could be achieved by engaging in close consultation on matters of mutual interest, including the US overture to China and international monetary policy. Failure to do so could 'adversely affect Japan's internal political structure, its role in Asia and its view of the utility of the U.S. relationship in terms of cooperation in political and economic and security matters'. Alienating Japan by failing to inform it in advance of a major policy shift on China and by adopting an aggressive posture on international economic affairs had a cost. On the other hand the redraft stated that the maintenance of the US nuclear umbrella and US troops in North-East Asia, which would serve to calm Japanese nerves about the future of its relationship with the United States, were not 'chargeable to Japan' since they were in US interests. Conversely, the failure to maintain close relations with Japan was laid out as a nightmare scenario that would lead to the emergence of a remilitarised Japan which in turn would destabilise the region to the extent that the chances for Sino-American rapprochement would be drastically diminished.[35]

One gets the distinct impression from reading the redrafted report that its authors were overstating their case just a tad in order to hammer their point home, particularly in targeting Nixon and Kissinger's China initiative. Though Holdridge accepted that it was 'headed in the right direction' he still recoiled from what he saw as 'a brief for doing everything we can to maintain and strengthen the *status quo*' with the focus on reassuring Japan rather than compelling it to follow America's course.[36] However, this unfairly characterises the State Department's approach, which was in fact far more nuanced and grounded in prevailing realities than it was given credit for. In addition, it bears highlighting that the authors of the State Department's redraft as well as their eloquent and effective spokesman, Alex Johnson, were students of Japanese history who had long-established relationships with senior Japanese bureaucrats and politicians. They recognised that moving to loosen the bonds with Japan, as Holdridge called for, would be inviting difficulty for the United States and its other allies in the region.

The second meeting of the SRG to discuss the redraft, held on 27 August, was characterised by a divergence of views between Kissinger and Johnson. Kissinger wondered if there was something to be gained

from 'dangling looser Japan-ties in front of China'. Though he conceded that this could not be done in a 'blatant way', he stressed the importance of finding the right balance between China and Japan. Johnson warned of the perils of such an approach and stressed the need to maintain sufficient confidence in the relationship so that a nuclear-armed Japan inimical to America's interests would not emerge. Johnson also underlined the limits of America's influence, saying that it was not in America's power to force Japan along a certain path; rather, America could point Japan in a certain direction but could not expect that Japan would take this route. As the State Department's redrafted submission set forth, America could not expect to 'control to our own satisfaction the degree to which ties might be loosened. What might be intended as a gradual or partial loosening could rapidly gain momentum if Japanese fears of isolation or nationalistic feelings were aroused in this process'. Consequently, it was far wiser not to play with fire.[37]

However, such views fell on deaf ears with Kissinger, who was scathing in his criticism of the State Department's efforts, telling Nixon that despite having 'thousands over there', they 'waffle around, and give you "On the one hand" and "On the other hand" ... and write reams of stuff that evaporates under your fingers.' In marked contrast, he went so far as to compare himself to the legendary American football coach Vince Lombardi and proudly asserted that he was a 'slave driver' who worked his people hard and, as a consequence, got results. For its part the State Department was under no illusion as to where it stood in Kissinger's estimation.[38] Richard Ericson, who worked on the State Department's response, later remarked that Kissinger's NSC 'didn't ever intend to do anything about it because they had their own ideas' with respect to Japan.[39]

The final meeting of the SRG on NSSM 122 was held on 7 September just prior to the opening of the ECONCOM. In light of this, the meeting was dominated by working out the line the US delegation would take with their Japanese counterparts. Kissinger noted that the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) (the result of this policy-making process) would bar the representatives of the economic agencies from discussing political matters and prevent the State and Defence departments from dealing with economic matters. His hope of joining these two areas into a consistent policy line had come to nought. On the question of reassuring the Japanese with regard to the US policy departure on China, Kissinger noted the difficulties involved. 'We must strike a delicate balance of friendship with Japan and not give the impression that they have veto power over our China policy.'[40] What this meant

in practice was keeping all but the most superficial details regarding the overture to China from Tokyo, including the fact that Nixon and Kissinger played on Chinese fears of Japan and sought to portray the US-Japanese alliance as in Beijing's interests since it restrained Japan from threatening China.[41]

Largely as a result of Kissinger's disagreements with State and his general disinterest in Japan, no clear policy consensus emerged from this exercise. NSDM 130 was almost exclusively concerned with short-term strategy for the upcoming bilateral economic summit and was decidedly vague when it came to the future of Japan and of America's relationship with Japan in a larger sense. Kissinger's and Holdridge's criticism of the State Department's approach as parochial and short-sighted is unfair. The State Department presented a compelling argument for the importance of maintaining close US-Japanese ties which would both enhance stability and give Washington a degree of leverage in Tokyo it would otherwise lose. However, since the State Department's views did not fit neatly into Kissinger's prescription for Japan as one of the five poles in the emerging international system, they were discounted. The process therefore amounts to a missed opportunity to fully work out a policy with regard to Japan for a period of intense change in the international system, and the fault for this rests in large part with Kissinger.

An encounter at Anchorage

Meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, the American and Japanese delegations to ECONCOM VIII 'talked along parallel lines but never met' as one Japanese official phrased it. The meeting produced no clear solutions to US-Japanese bilateral economic problems. Fukuda Takeo and Mizuta Mikio, Japan's foreign and finance ministers, respectively, rejected American arguments that it was incumbent on Japan to act. Rather, they maintained, it was for America to devalue the dollar and to correct its trade imbalance.[42] At this gathering Rogers pressured Fukuda to agree to Japan's co-sponsorship of the Reverse Important Question / Dual Representation formula on Chinese representation at the UN, discussed in Chapter 7. Moreover, the meeting was somewhat overshadowed by the leaking of Rogers's opening statement on the eve of the meeting. An advance copy of the speech had been distributed to the Japanese delegation en route to the United States. Somehow a copy had found its way to Japanese journalists aboard the plane.[43] Moreover, when Mizuta mentioned a point from Rogers's speech, John Connally, whom Nixon

had appointed treasury secretary in February 1971, pointedly remarked that 'one should not believe what one reads in the public press.'[44]

By the end of September, there was finally some good news in US-Japanese relations. Even though Nixon was threatening to invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act in order to force a conclusion to the textile negotiations, he sent the Okinawa Reversion agreement to the Senate for ratification. He consistently refused to use Okinawa as a way of extracting economic concessions from Tokyo. Nixon also travelled to Anchorage, Alaska, in order to welcome Emperor Hirohito, who was making his way to Europe for an official tour and whose plane was refuelling. This was Hirohito's first foreign trip since ascending to the throne in 1926 and was also the first ever by a reigning Japanese emperor. Kissinger played down the meeting between the two heads of state with the Chinese. He assured Huang Shen, Beijing's ambassador in Paris, that Nixon was going to Anchorage in order to pre-empt a full state visit by either Nixon to Japan or Hirohito to the United States.[45] Speaking the following month with Zhou En-Lai, Kissinger poked fun at the protocol which attended the imperial stopover. Regarding the meeting between Nixon and Hirohito, he observed; 'Not a very profound conversation.'[46] This criticism may well have been heavily embellished to ease Chinese discomfort with this former symbol of Japanese aggression in Asia. All the same, it was uncalled for since the emperor had been stripped of any political role by the post-war constitution. His remarks at Elmendorf Air Force Base, while appropriately safe and uncontroversial, pointed to the need for America and Japan to transcend their differences: 'I have no doubt whatsoever that the friendly relations between our two countries, cultivated during the past quarter of a century, will be increasingly strengthened by close contact between our governments and people.'[47] Indeed, before his departure Hirohito had been briefed on the China issue and on international affairs more generally by Satō and Fukuda.[48] However, the real value of the short stopover was the symbolism of the event. Satō and many of his fellow Japanese watched the live television coverage of the event, relayed via Intelsat, with avid interest.[49] It was another indication that Japan was both moving on from the legacy of the war and regaining international respect and prestige. This was particularly important given the recent blows to the Japanese psyche caused by the Nixon shocks. Indeed, when, over the coming months, Satō and Kishi had separate meetings with Nixon, the first point they raised was their gratitude to Nixon for having travelled to Anchorage to greet the emperor.[50]

Typhoon Connally

Such warm feelings were dispelled by the visit of John Connally, one of Nixon's closest lieutenant's in waging his economic offensive, to Japan in November 1971. Connally was a tough-talking Texan Democrat (soon to cross the aisle to the Republican Party), a former governor of Texas and a longtime associate of Lyndon Johnson. Upon his appointment as treasury secretary, he was asked by the press what his qualifications were; he replied, 'I can add.'[51] In his view America's problems were caused by its falling behind its more successful competitors; he stated, 'The simple fact is that in many areas others are outproducing us, outthinking us, outworking us and outtrading us.'[52] In private he was less circumspect, telling Nixon that 'foreigners are out to screw us, our job is to screw them first'.[53] His swagger so appealed to Nixon that he asked his aides to find a way for him to sack Vice President Spiro Agnew and replace him with Connally.[54] Ushiba Nobuhiko, Japan's ambassador to Washington, met with Connally a few days after Nixon's announcement of his New Economic Policy. While Ushiba found him charming, he concluded that Connally's idea of a fair system of currency rates was in fact one which was beneficial to the United States.[55]

Given his reputation, the Japanese media dubbed him 'Typhoon Connally'. However, when he arrived in Japan, he declared he was just a 'cool Spring breeze'.[56] Feeling that the Japanese would be desperate to see the import surcharge removed, Nixon concluded that tough guy Connally could ride in and lay down the law. He was told not to agree to the removal of the surcharge but to outline the conditions for its removal; namely, a substantial upward revaluation of the yen and the end to import restrictions. The Japanese were to be allowed some 'titbits', including the lifting of the surcharge from textile imports and perhaps the removal of the Voice of America (VOA) transmitter from Okinawa, but no more.[57]

Japan had asked for the removal of the transmitter in advance of reversion so as to ensure that ratification of the reversion agreement received cross-party support. Neither the Socialists nor the Communists would accept the retention of US military bases on the islands and therefore opposed the agreement. The more moderate elements of the opposition, the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeitō, were more amenable. However, they sought further concessions from the US, including a reduction in the US military's footprint on Okinawa, the removal of the transmitter and a stronger assurance that nuclear weapons would be removed following reversion.[58] Satō desired non-partisan support, given

the importance of the return of Okinawa. In addition, he wished to avoid a repeat of Kishi's mistake of 1960 in forcing the Mutual Security Treaty through the Diet, an action which resulted in his early departure from office. Moreover, Satō was in a weak political position; not only was he coming to the end of his tenure but Zhou En-lai's very public rebuke of his overture to China coupled with the currency crisis had greatly weakened his authority.[59]

In reporting these new Japanese requests to Nixon, Kissinger was scathing in his criticism: 'Of course these Japanese are incredible: The deal you gave them [on the reversion of Okinawa went] so far beyond anything that anyone thought possible.' This was hardly an accurate reading of the recent history; Nixon had bargained hard over Okinawa in 1969, especially with regard to nuclear weapons and textiles. Despite such ill feeling neither man saw the necessity of retaining the transmitter. As Nixon said, 'It doesn't mean a thing to us.' Kissinger saw advantage in removing what was becoming an irritant in the nascent Sino-American relationship. They also favoured some token gesture on military land use in Okinawa.[60]

In any case, John Connally's 'charms' were lost on Satō, who found him tiresome and too fond of the sound of his own voice. Satō endured a two-and-a-half hour conversation with him on everything from the development of supersonic passenger aircraft to the situation in China. On the question of currency changes Satō noted in his diary that Connally's demand of a 12% upward revaluation of the yen would be impossible to do, especially all at once.[61] Connally had a more substantive and tense meeting with Fukuda. The foreign minister requested that the United States make a token gesture on Okinawa bases and give a public assurance on the removal of nuclear weapons. In response, Connally made it clear that any concession on these issues would be linked with economic matters. Fukuda countered that since Japan had recently conceded agreement on textiles, it was up to the United States to make the next move. This did not impress Connally, who observed how America's trading partners had for too long been abusing its largesse. What was required was a 'fair shake for American exports'.[62]

No agreement was forthcoming from these talks, but Tokyo was left in no doubt of the strength of American opinion. A conference of the Group of Ten industrialised nations was convened in December at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington to reach a general accord on currency rates. The so-called Smithsonian Agreement included a 9% devaluation of the dollar and a revaluation of the other currencies with the yen increasing 16.9%. Currencies were permitted to fluctuate within

a tight band. By 1973 the agreement was in tatters, and currencies rose and fell according to demand. Initially, Japan's trade surplus slowed in growth, but the change to free-floating currencies did not result in a healthier American balance of payments in the long term.[63]

As with textiles, the Nixon administration had successfully brow-beaten concessions from Japan. Just as with textiles such concessions were, in the end, largely unnecessary.

From San Clemente to Shanghai

Satō had one final summit with Nixon before leaving office, at the 'Western White House' in San Clemente, California. This was where three years earlier Kissinger and Wakaizumi had had one of their early meetings on the reversion of Okinawa. Despite the relatively short passage of time, the Nixon shocks of the previous summer had vastly changed relations between the two countries. The following month Nixon was to make his groundbreaking visit to the People's Republic of China, and Nixon was at pains to assure Satō that any new relationship with Beijing would not come at a cost to America's traditional friendships. Satō, however, noted how Nixon's announcement on China the previous summer had been a severe shock to Asian countries, one that 'ran much deeper than the President could even imagine'. Nixon warned Japan not to 'crawl' to Beijing but to be firm in negotiations on rapprochement. He had no desire to see Japan beat him to normalisation with the PRC. Satō, on the other hand, stressed the primacy of the United Nations in Japanese foreign policy and that, since the PRC was now a member, it was only natural for Tokyo to pursue a much delayed normalisation of relations with its important neighbour.[64]

As he had done in November 1969, Nixon pushed Satō to consider the development of an independent deterrent. For Satō this was out of the question. Not only had Japan signed the non-proliferation treaty, but the Diet had passed a resolution on the Three Non-nuclear Principles as part of the ratification of the Okinawa agreement. Even so, Nixon advised that Japan should keep 'its enemies guessing' on whether or not it would ratify the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). This was part of Nixon's strategy of using the prospect of a remilitarised Japan to alarm the Chinese into accepting the continuation of the US-Japanese alliance and, by extension, the ongoing presence of US military power in North-East Asia.[65] Satō blankly refused, saying 'all Japanese abhor nuclear weapons.'[66] This was a huge change from seven years before, when Satō called Edwin Reischauer aside and spoke of the need for

Japan to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Political and strategic realities had by this time convinced Satō that Japan's future would not include the production or the possession of nuclear weapons.[67]

There was more agreement on Okinawa. Nixon agreed that reversion day would be 15 May. The Japanese had pushed for an earlier date but were pleased that Nixon also agreed to return a piece of land from a military base (which had been used as a golf course) along with a written assurance that all chemical and biological weapons had been removed.[68] The following month Nixon travelled to Beijing for his historic summit with the Chinese leadership. The resultant joint announcement, known as the Shanghai Communiqué, included a Chinese condemnation of Japanese militarism. Though it also included an American assertion of its desire to maintain close relations with Japan, this was a further blow to Satō.[69] Satō limped on as prime minister until reversion had been accomplished. By the time the Rising Sun replaced the Star and Stripes, the fact of reversion came as something of an anticlimax. It had been almost three years since agreement had been reached. Now the public was clamouring for normalisation with China. Satō failed to get Fukuda to succeed him. Instead, Tanaka Kakuei, who placed a premium on normalisation, emerged triumphant.

Satō's behaviour at his resignation press conference on 17 June 1972 is evidence of the strain he was under. Looking glum, tired and irritated, he repeatedly asked where the television cameras were. He wanted to speak to the Japanese people directly and told the journalists to leave. The assembled members of the press were incredulous and responded with nervous laughter. However, the soon-to-be ex-prime minister only grew more irate and with a wave of his hand towards the door told the journalists to leave once again. The tension in the room was palpable, and even when viewing the footage decades later, one gets a sense of the high drama unfolding. Instead of waiting for the press to go, Satō himself left and returned a few moments later to an empty room. He then delivered his statement of resignation to the nation. In the broadcast, rather than focus on Satō, the camera zoomed out to show the empty chairs before him. This image seemed to encapsulate a leader at the end of the road: alone, aloof and very much yesterday's man.[70]

Conclusion

Satō cared deeply about his place in history. On reaching agreement with Nixon on the reversion of Okinawa – the standout success of his career – he confided the following anxious thought to his diary: 'All I can do is await the judgement of future historians.'[1] For the most part, his diary entries are dominated by the quotidian and the mundane, but here we are afforded a glimpse into his mindset. Satō was aware that history would judge him, particularly over his handling of Okinawa. Two related frames through which he can be judged are his worthiness as a recipient of the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize and his position as a 'post' post-war prime minister.

Satō was a far-sighted leader who successfully pursued Japan's national interests and was neither a dull technocrat nor the craven stooge of US imperialism as has been suggested elsewhere. In accomplishing the reversion of Okinawa, he saw himself as having fulfilled Yoshida Shigeru's goal of restoring Japanese sovereignty and unity. As the recently opened Japanese archival material shows, Satō himself was crucial to the success of the negotiations. On several occasions the negotiations were kept on course due to a prime ministerial intervention. Other aspects of this agreement have been brought to light in this book: The importance that Satō and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached to the regional implications of the reversion, particularly with regard to South Korea, has largely been sidelined in the literature to date but is fully explored here. In addition, Satō differed from his diplomats in that he was less concerned with the legalities of Japanese sovereignty and placed far more emphasis on securing the reality of reversion. This book also examines in detail his unease over the prospect of a secret agreement with the United States on the emergency reintroduction of

nuclear weapons into Okinawa. Ultimately, he accepted the agreement as necessary to secure reversion. This again highlights his flexibility and his belief that since the US-Japanese alliance was in Japan's interests, such an undertaking would not amount to a diminution of sovereignty but rather would further Japan's interests.

Satō's other principal achievement was securing the US nuclear umbrella over Japan at a time when China was actively developing nuclear weapons. He did this whilst also ensuring, at least for the short term, Japan's own freedom of action regarding the development of an independent deterrent. Along with the bulk of Japan's policymaking elite, he ultimately concluded that it would not be in Japan's interests to develop an independent deterrent. Such a programme would serve only to alarm the United States, Japan's neighbours and indeed the Japanese people. The decision, as with so many others, was based on a hard-nosed, realistic calculation of Japan's interests. Another significant achievement, one which has been largely ignored in the historiography, is the series of successful port calls by US nuclear submarines over which Satō presided at the outset of his tenure. These amounted to the first significant test for the US-Japanese alliance since the conclusion of the revised Mutual Security Treaty in 1960.

While Satō was certainly a crucial figure in guiding and maintaining Japan in a close post-war alliance with the United States, whether he was a successful figure in Japan's 'post' post-war period is a more difficult question to answer. In one of the first acts of his premiership, he linked the end to US control of Okinawa with bringing the post-war era to an end. By the time this had been achieved, at the end of his tenure, the international order had drastically changed. The verities of Cold War divisions with clearly defined friends and enemies no longer held true. Nixon's new departures on triangular superpower diplomacy and economic nationalism heralded the arrival of a less certain age. One of the early harbingers of this change in approach was Nixon's blunt economic nationalism and crass politicking in his effort to limit Japanese textile imports to the American market. Satō made a grave error of judgement in failing to fully appreciate the importance of textiles to Nixon. This issue soon became a running sore in US-Japanese relations, one for which Satō bears a large amount of responsibility. He was clearly ambushed by Nixon and Kissinger, who linked the textile issue with the reversion of Okinawa. However, his determination to secure reversion blinded him to the adverse consequences which reneging on this deal would cause.

Moreover, Satō completely failed to anticipate the change in US policy towards mainland China. In this regard he deserves less opprobrium, as Nixon's major policy departure was designed to make a splash, both to outflank his Democratic opponents and catch right-wing supporters of Taiwan off guard. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry was busy coordinating policy on saving Taiwan's UN seat with the State Department at the time, so a major change in policy was not anticipated in Tokyo. Satō does deserve credit for trying to make the best of this adverse situation by attempting to make his own opening to China. Though these entreaties were rebuffed, he managed to lay the groundwork for a swift normalisation of relations between the two Asian giants by his successor. As he came of age in the post-war world and followed the grand strategy of his mentor, Yoshida Shigeru, it might be tempting to conclude that Satō was not cut out for these changes in the international system. However, despite this background, Satō was able to respond with agility to these changes, particularly in relation to Nixon's China shock, and for that he deserves credit.

Satō was the first – and, to date, is the only – Japanese recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. This was greeted with a furore of controversy from his opponents, who questioned how a strong supporter of US military actions in Asia was deserving of such an honour. Such controversy has continued to dog his legacy. The award was primarily in recognition of Japan's anti-nuclear policy, which Satō had articulated.[2] As his more complex personal views on nuclear weapons become widely known – especially his dismissal of the non-introduction pledge as 'nonsense' – the controversy has increased.[3] Indeed, a 2001 official history of the Peace Prize noted that the award was the Nobel Committee's 'greatest mistake'.[4] Such outlandish criticism is far from justified. Satō was certainly no militant or hawkish figure, but neither was he a utopian dreamer. His Nobel lecture serves as his response to this criticism, past and present. Reading through the high-flown rhetoric appropriate to such an occasion, Satō made a clear and compelling case for his legacy and his and Japan's contributions to world peace. He was quite clear that Japan had rejected the option of an independent deterrent and strongly backed Japan's ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty non-proliferation treaty (NPT). He also made a strong appeal for the superpowers to follow through on the implicit assumption that the NPT would lead to their making deep cuts in their arsenals, and he noted his disappointment and frustration that their strategic arms talks had served only to freeze nuclear stockpiles at existing levels. For Satō the

bedrock of Japan's security and the key to peace and stability in North-East Asia was the alliance with the United States, an implicit acknowledgement of the importance of America's extended nuclear deterrent. He pointed to Japan's emergence as a stable, peaceful and prosperous nation, a stark contrast to the Japan of the 1930s and 1940s.[5] In highlighting these aspects, Satō was of course burnishing his own legacy; however, they do stand as a convincing retort to his critics. Japan had come a long way since 1945, and Satō does deserve a share of the credit for such a profound transformation. Indeed, despite setbacks along the way, he pursued a successful diplomatic strategy towards Japan's main security and trade partner and showed himself capable of responding to changes in the international environment. In so doing he greatly furthered Japan's interests. Satō was not only one of the great leaders of modern Japan but also a major statesman of the twentieth century.

Notes

Introduction

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94. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 66, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Okinawa Henkan Kōshō' [Okinawa Reversion Negotiations], 22 May 1969, 1015.
95. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 67, America Kyoku (Gaimudaijin Hōbeiyō Shiryō), Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Kaidan Hatsugen Yōryō (An) [America Section (Materials for Use by Minister for Foreign Affairs on US Visit), Talking Points for Minister for Foreign Affairs' Meeting with the Secretary of State (Draft)], 24 May 1969; ibid., 68, America Kyoku (Gaimudaijin Hōbeiyō Shiryō), Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Kaidan Hatsugen Yōryō (An) [America Section (Materials for Use by Minister for Foreign Affairs on US Visit), Talking Points for Minister for Foreign Affairs' Meeting with the Secretary of State (Draft)], 26 May 1969.
96. The handwritten draft prepared for Aichi is in DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 67 (Gaimudaijin Hōbeiyō Shiryō) Kyōdō Seimei Suian [Materials for Use by Minister for Foreign Affairs on US Visit, Draft Joint Communiqué], 23 May 1969. This quotation is from the Gaimushō's English translation, which is in ibid, 68, America Kyoku, Gaimudaijin Hōbeiyō Shiryō, Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Kaidan Hatsugen Yōryō (An) [America Section, Materials for Use by Minister for Foreign Affairs on US Visit, Talking Points for Minister for Foreign Affairs' Meeting with the Secretary of State (Draft)], 26 May 1969.
97. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 69, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Okinawa Issue (Forwarding [Embassy Staff's] Opinion),' 28 May 1969; Johnson to Department of State, 11 Jan. 1969, in *FRUS, 1964–68, Japan*, doc. no. 140, 314–316.
98. See his instructions to Ambassador-at-Large Tanaka Hiroto, 'Satō Sōri, Tanaka Taishi Kaidan Oboe' [Memorandum of Conversation, PM Satō, Ambassador Tanaka], 13 May 1969 (Kanren Bunsho 3–63), quoted in Kitaoka Shinichi et al., 'Iwayuru "Mitsuyaku" Mondai Ni Kansuru Yūshikisha Iinkai Chōsa Hōkokusho,' [Report of the Expert Committee into the Prob

lem of the So-Called 'Secret Agreements'], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (9 March 2010). http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf, 27 June 2011, 61. See also Osborn to Secretary of State, 'Aichi Visit: Japanese Negotiating Position,' 30 May 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1077.

99. Richard M. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA, (RNL), NSC Files, VIP Visits, box 925, National Security Decision Memorandum 13, Policy toward Japan, 28 May 1969.
100. Sarantakes, *Keystone*, 169.
101. Wheeler to Packard, 'Okinawa Negotiating Strategy,' 24 July 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1116.
102. Packard to Wheeler, 'Okinawa Negotiating Strategy,' 3 Sep. 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1116.
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104. Interview with Melvin R. Laird, 7 Aug. 2007. Dale Van Atta, *With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace and Politics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 291.
105. Kissinger to Nixon, 'Meeting with Foreign Minister Aichi,' 29 May 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1076.
106. RNL, Presidential Daily Diary, Entry of 2 June 1969, http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/PDD/1969/008%20June%201969.pdf, 6 Aug. 2011.
107. Tōgō, *Nichibei Gaikō Sanjū Nen*, 161–162.
108. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 67, America Kyoku (Gaimudaijin Hōbeiyō Shiryō), Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Kaidan Hatsugen Yōryō (An), [America Section (Materials for Use by Minister for Foreign Affairs on US Visit), Talking Points for Minister for Foreign Affairs' Meeting with the Secretary of State (Draft)], 24 May 1969; Osborn to Secretary of State, 'Aichi Visit: Japanese Negotiating Position,' 30 May 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1077.
109. Memorandum of Conversation, 'Aichi Call on the President,' 2 June 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1080.
110. Hedrick Smith, 'U.S. Said to Plan an Okinawa Deal Barring A-Bombs: Nixon Decision Reported – Timing Hinges on Terms for Isle's Return to Japan,' *New York Times*, 3 June 1969.
111. Entry of 3 June 1969, H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1994), 62.
112. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 329.
113. Richard M. Nixon, *R.N.: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Warner Books, 1978), 389.
114. Van Atta, *Melvin Laird*, 292.
115. Hersh, *Price of Power*, 101–102; see also Schaller, *Altered States*, 290.
116. See, e.g., Tōgō's conversation with US officials (including Morton Halperin) during his fact-finding mission in April 1969; DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 58, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Memorandum of Conversation, America Section Chief [Tōgō] and Sneider,' 28 Apr. 1969. DAJ, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 59, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Okinawa Problem –

Conversation with Undersecretary Johnson,' 29 Apr. 1969.
117. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 71, Shimoda to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Dai Ichiji Kaidan' [Minister's First Meeting with the Secretary of State] 3 June 1969.
118. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 60, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Okinawa Problem Conversation with [Special] Assistant [to the President for National Security Affairs] Kissinger and Deputy Secretary [of Defense] Packard,' 30 Apr. 1969.
119. Tōgō, *Nichibei Gaikō Sanjū Nen*, 162–163.
120. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 72, Shimoda to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Dai Niji Kaidan' [Minister's Second Meeting with the Secretary of State] 4 June 1969.
121. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 73, Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Dai Niji Kaidan (Tsuika) [Minister's Second Meeting with the Secretary of State (Addendum)], 5 June 1969.
122. Bundy to Rusk, 'Agreement to Return the Bonin Islands to Japan: Final Review prior to Signature by Ambassador Johnson,' 23 Mar. 1968, in *FRUS, 1964–68, Japan*, doc. no. 1118, 268–270. See also 'Bonin Islands to be Returned to Japanese Administration,' *Department of State Bulletin* 63, no. 1505 (1968): 570–571.
123. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 73, Daijin, Kokumuchōkan Dai Niji Kaidan (Tsuika) [Minister's Second Meeting with the Secretary of State (Addendum)], 5 June 1969.
124. Department of State to the American Embassy in Tokyo, 'Eyes Only for the Ambassador (Meyer) from Alexis Johnson,' 9 Aug. 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1111.
125. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 75, Bei Kyokyuchō (America Section Chief), 'Gaimudaijin Hōbei Zuikō Hōkoku' [Report of the Delegation on the Foreign Minister's Visit to the United States], 7 June 1969.
126. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, POL 19 RYU IS, box 2459, Memorandum of Conversation, Aichi, Johnson et al., 'Approaches to Settlement of Okinawa Problem,' 5 June 1969.
127. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, POL 19 RYU IS, box 2459, Memorandum of Conversation, Aichi, Johnson et al., 'Approaches to Settlement of Okinawa Problem,' 5 June 1969.
128. Elliot L. Richardson to NSC Undersecretaries Committee, 'Okinawa Negotiating Strategy,' 3 July 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1092.
129. Van Atta, *Melvin Laird*, 292–293.
130. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, DEF 15 RYU IS, box 1617, Meyer to Secretary of State, 'Okinawa – Reaction to CBW Incident Reports,' 19 July 1969.
131. See, e.g., Entries of 22–24 July 1969, Kusuda Minoru, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki*, 366–367; see also Satō to Upper House, 22 July 1969, *Kokkai Kiroku* (Record of the National Diet), http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/, 12 Aug. 2011.
132. Van Atta, *Melvin Laird*, 294–295.
133. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, DEF 15 RYU IS, box 1617, Meyer to Secretary of State, 'Okinawa Chemical Munitions Incident,' 26 July 1969; Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 120–121; DAJ, Rekishi Shiryō Toshiteno Kachi ga Mitomereraru Kaiji [Historical Materials of Recognised

Value (RSTKMK)], CD 1, 01–529, Satō Sōri to Rogers Kokumuchōkan tono Kaidan Yōshi [Summary of Conversation between PM Satō and Secretary of State Rogers], 31 July 1969.

134. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, DEF 15 RYU IS, box 1617, Thomas L. Hughes to the Acting Secretary, 'Intelligence Note, Okinawa/Japan: Nerve Gas Incident Causes Furor,' 25 July 1969; entry of 24 July 1969, Kusuda Minoru, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki*, 367.

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2. Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 333–338. Kissinger's own code name was Dr. Jones.
3. Wakaizumi Kei, *Tasaku Nakarishi Wo Shinzemuto Hossu* [I Should Like to Think This Was the Best Course Available] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1994); Kei Wakaizumi and John Swenson-Wright, *The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002).
4. The book's title, 'I should like to think that this was the best course available,' testifies to this. It is taken from the memoir of Mutsu Munemitsu, who was the foreign minister in the cabinet of Itō Hirobumi during and following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Mutsu was criticised for caving in to Western pressure that circumscribed Japan's wartime gains, an action that came to be known as the Triple Intervention. Mutsu's response to his critics was that he took the only realistic option open to him; see Sydney Giffard, *Japan among the Powers, 1890–1990* (London: Blackwell, 1994), 16–17. The phrase continues to have purchase. Koizumi Junichirō (prime minister, 2001–2006) invoked Mutsu's axiom when justifying his policy of pursuing the normalisation of relations with North Korea. See Koizumi Junichirō, 'Raion Haato: Koizumi Sōri no Message' [Lion Heart: Message from PM Koizumi], *Koizumi Naikaku M⊠ru Magajin* [Koizumi Cabinet Mail Magazine] 67, 24 Oct. 2002, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/m-magazine/backnumber/2002/1024.html, 15 Aug. 2011.
5. Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki* [Diary of Satō Eisaku], ed. Itō Takeshi, 6 vols., vol. 3 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1998); Kusuda Minoru, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki: Satō Eisaku Sōri Shuseki Hishokan No 2000 Nichi* [Diary of Kusuda Minoru: 2000 Days as Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's Private Secretary], ed. Makoto Iokibe and Wada Jun (Tokyo: 2001).
6. See esp. Kissinger's 'telcons,' his transcribed telephone conversations with 'Mr. Yoshida', in Richard M. Nixon Library, Yorba Linda, CA, (RNL), National Security Council (NSC) Files, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), and ibid., Presidential/HAK Memcons, box 1030, Textile Telcons, as well as Kissinger's briefing memos for Nixon in advance of Satō's visit, in ibid., box 924, Visit of PM Sato, 19–21 Nov.
7. Kitaoka Shinichi, Hatano Sumimo, Konō Yasuko, Sakamoto Kazuya, Sasaki Takuya and Haruna Mikio. 'Iwayuru "Mitsuyaku" Mondai Ni Kansuru

Yūshikisha Iinkai Chōsa Hōkokusho' [Report of the Expert Committee into the Problem of the So-Called 'Secret Agreements']. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (9 March 2010), accessed 27 June 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf

8. Gaimushō Chōsa Team [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Investigative Team], 'Iwayuru "Mitsuyaku" Mondai Ni Kansuru Chōsa Hōkokusho' [Report of the Investigation into the Problem of the So-Called 'Secret Agreements'], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (5 March 2010), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_naibu.pdf, 29 June 2011.
9. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 94.
10. Entry of 21 June 1969, Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki 3*, 461; Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 95–97.
11. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 97–98.
12. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 100–101.
13. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 122.
14. Entry of 10 July 1969, Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki 3*, 470; Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 102–103.
15. RNL, NSC Files, VIP Visits, box 924, Halperin to Kissinger, 'Appointment, Friday, 18 July, 4.30 pm,' 17 July 1969.
16. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 331.
17. U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), 544.
18. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 111–112.
19. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 329.
20. Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),, 239–241.
21. I. M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969–1971* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979).
22. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 330.
23. These would include Maurice Stans, Philip Trezise, Peter Peterson, Peter Flanigan, John Connally and David Kennedy.
24. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 121.
25. Entry of 31 July 1969, Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki 3*, 481–482.
26. Two memoranda, in fact, since both the American and Japanese versions are open to researchers. Gaikō Shiryōkan [Diplomatic Archives of Japan], Tokyo, (DAJ), Rekishi Shiryō Toshiteno Kachi ga Mitomereraru Kaiji [Historical Materials of Recognised Value (RSTKMK)],, CD 1, 01–529. Satō Sōri to Rogers Kokumuchōkan tono Kaidan Yōshi [Summary of Conversation between PM Satō and Secretary of State Rogers], 31 July 1969; Secretary of State, Washington to American Embassy Bucharest, 'Secretary's Call on PriMin Sato,' 2 Aug. 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1108.
27. U. A. Johnson to Department of State, 11 Jan. 1968, *FRUS, 1964–68, Japan*, doc. no. 140, 314, n. 2. See Chapter 2.
28. Shane J. Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

29. Entry of 31 July 1969, Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki 3*, 481 'Okinawa mondai to kaku fukaksan jōyaku to wo karamasete hanashiatta tsumoride, rikai wo fukumeru koto ga dekita to kakushinsuru.'
30. Quoted in Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 130.
31. DAJ, RSTKMK, CD 1, 01–529. Satō Sōri to Rogers Kokumuchōkan tono Kaidan Yōshi [Summary of Conversation between PM Satō and Secretary of State Rogers], 31 July 1969; Secretary of State, Washington to American Embassy Bucharest, 'Secretary's Call on PriMin Sato,' 2 Aug. 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1108. Given Satō's extreme forthrightness on Japan's role regarding regional security, it is interesting to note that this section of the Japanese memorandum is redacted.
32. Department of State to the American Embassy in Tokyo, 'Eyes Only for the Ambassador (Meyer) from Alexis Johnson,' 9 Aug. 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1111; DAJ, Okinawa Henkan Kōshō [Okinawa Reversion Negotiations (OHK)],, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 81, Shimoda to Aichi, Okinawa Mondai (Johnson Jikan tono Kaidan) [Okinawa Issue (Conversation with Undersecretary of State Johnson)], 10 Aug. 1969.
33. Hong N. Kim, 'The Sato Government and the Okinawa Problem,' *World Affairs* 134, no. 3 (1971). Shimoda does not deal with his statements and the ensuing controversy in his memoir but does note repeatedly that though many senior US officials, including Rusk, McNamara and Alex Johnson, were well disposed toward reversion, the overriding concern for US policymakers at this time was the worsening situation in Vietnam and the importance that US bases on Okinawa assumed as a result. *Sengo Nihon Gaikō No Shōgen: Nihon wa koushite saiseishita* [Testimony of Japan's Post-war Diplomacy: Japan's Rebirth] (Tokyo: Gyōsei Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1984), 164–168.
34. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 64, Jōyaku Kyoku [Treaties Section], 'Gaimu Daijin Hōbei Shiryō I (2), Jizen Kyōgi Kankei Shiryō' [Materials for Foreign Minister's Visit to US I (2), Material on Prior Consultation], 17 May 1969; ibid., 77, Draft Joint Communiqué, 23 July 1969. The US embassy's 'OKNEG' (Okinawa negotiations) cables are in National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, (NARA), Record Group 59, Subject Numeric Files, 1967–1969, POL 19 RYU IS, box 2459, and also in RNL, NSC Files, VIP Visits, box 924 (since they were forwarded to Kissinger's NSC staff at the White House). In an interesting example of the inconsistencies in the application of rules on declassification, those cables of most relevance to this study, including 'OKNEG no. 3 – Explanatory tel on Unilateral Statement,' 'OKNEG no. 4 – Text of Joint Communique' and 'OKNEG no. 5 – Explanatory tel on Joint Communique,' have been withdrawn from the NARA files on the grounds that they contain 'national security information.' However, with the exception of OKNEG no. 3, these cables are open to researchers, albeit in sanitised form, at the Nixon Library, despite the fact that the same criteria governing declassification ought to have been applied in both instances. Such are the idiosyncrasies when researching US foreign policy in the twentieth century.
35. Department of State to the American Embassy in Tokyo, 'Eyes Only for the Ambassador (Meyer) from Alexis Johnson,' 9 Aug. 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1111.

36. Tōgō, *Nichibei Gaikō Sanjū Nen*, 164–165; DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 80, America Section Chief, Kyōdō Seimei An [Draft Joint Communiqué], 9 Aug. 1969.
37. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 127–129.
38. 'Beikyochō Sakusei Kaidan Roku, Sneider Kōshi tono Kaidan no Ken' [America Section Chief's Record of Conversation with Minister Sneider], 15 Aug. 1969 [Hōkoku Taishō Bunso 1–6], quoted in Kitaoka Shinichi et al., 'Iwayuru "Mitsuyaku" Mondai Ni Kansuru Yūshikisha Iinkai Chōsa Hōkokusho,' 63.
39. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 84, Tōgō-Sneider Kaidan [Tōgō-Sneider Conversation], 21 Aug. 1969.
40. RNL, NSC Files, VIP Visits, box 924, Meyer to Secretary of State, 'OKNEG no. 5 – Explanatory Tel on Draft Communiqué,' 23 Aug. 1969.
41. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 85, Tōgō-Sneider Kaidan [Tōgō-Sneider Conversation], 27 Aug. 1969.
42. RNL, NSC Files, VIP Visits, box 924, Meyer to Secretary of State, 'OKNEG no. 5 – Explanatory Tel on Draft Communiqué,' 23 Aug. 1969.
43. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 85, Tōgō-Sneider Kaidan [Tōgō-Sneider Conversation], 27 Aug. 1969.
44. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 132–135.
45. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 85, Tōgō-Sneider Kaidan [Tōgō-Sneider Conversation], 27 Aug. 1969.
46. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 85, Draft Statement by the Prime Minister, 27 Aug. 1969.
47. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 85, Draft Statement by the Prime Minister, 27 Aug. 1969.
48. RNL, NSC Files, VIP Visits, box 924, Meyer to Secretary of State, 23 Aug. 1969.
49. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 85, Tōgō-Sneider Kaidan [Tōgō-Sneider Conversation], 27 Aug. 1969.
50. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 87, Tōgō-Sneider Kaidan [Tōgō-Sneider Conversation], 29 Aug. 1969.
51. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 138–141; 150. Wakaizumi's memo to Kissinger is in RNL, NSC Files, VIP Visits, box 924, Memo for Dr. Kissinger, 28 Aug. 1969.
52. Department of State to American Embassy, Tokyo, 'Okinawa Negotiations,' 9 Sep. 1969, in NSA, *Japan and the United States*, doc. no. 1119.
53. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 91, Shimoda to Aichi, Okinawa Henkan Kōshō [Okinawa Reversion Negotiations], 8 Sep. 1969. Unlike the differing memoranda of Johnson's and Shimoda's previous conversation, the American memorandum of this conversation is substantially the same as the Japanese; however, the 'meeting of minds' quotation is from the Japanese memo.
54. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 94, Yoshino to Aichi, 'Okinawa Henkan Mondai ni Kansuru America Kyokuchō to Sneider Kōshi no Kaidan' [Conversation between the Chief of the America Section [Tōgō] and Minister Sneider on the Okinawa Reversion Issue], 10 Sep. 1969.
55. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 97, Shimoda to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Daijin Kokumuchōkan Kaidan' [Conversation between

Minister and Secretary of State], 12 Sep. 1969 'Yerusaremu no shōrai to Okinawa no kakuheiki ha jibun toshite itsumo kaihi suru wadai dearu.'

56. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 97, Shimoda to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Daijin Kokumuchōkan Kaidan (Kaku)' [Conversation between Minister and Secretary of State (Nuclear [Issue])], 13 Sep. 1969 (emphasis of the addition in original). In his memoir Shimoda Takesō gives the credit for coming up with this phrase to Tōgō and Satō Shōji (the chief of the Treaties Section), while Konō Yasuko concludes that Kuriyama Shōichi of the Treaties Section deserves the credit. Shimoda Takesō, *Sengo Nihon Gaikō No Shōgen*, 183; Konō Yasuko, 'Okinawa Henkan to Yūji no Kaku no Saimochikomi' [Okinawa Reversion and Emergency Nuclear Reintroduction], in Kitaoka Shinichi et al. 'Iwayuru "Mitsuyaku" Mondai Ni Kansuru Yūshikisha Iinkai Chōsa Hōkokusho,' 64.
57. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 96, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Okinawa Henkan Mondai (Beisoku Shin Teian) [Okinawa Reversion Issue (New American Proposal)], 12 Sep. 1969.
58. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 96, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Okinawa Henkan Mondai (Beisoku Shin Teian) [Okinawa Reversion Issue (New American Proposal)], 12 Sep. 1969.
59. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 97, Shimoda to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Daijin Kokumuchōkan Kaidan' [Conversation between Minister and Secretary of State], 12 Sep. 1969.
60. Entry of 16 Sep. 1969 Satō Eisaku, *Satō Eisaku Nikki 3*, 504, 'subete ga junchō ka.'
61. 'Honshō Hatsu Denpō 1861, Okinawa Henkan Kōshō Kunrei' [Outgoing Telegram 1861, Instructions for Okinawa Reversion Negotiations], 16 Sep. 1969 (Kanren Bunsho 3–100), quoted in Kitaoka Shinichi et al. 'Iwayuru "Mitsuyaku" Mondai Ni Kansuru Yūshikisha Iinkai Chōsa Hōkokusho,' 66.
62. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, POL 19 RYU IS, box 2460, Rogers to American Embassy, Tokyo, 'Meeting 15 Sept with Aichi on Okinawa Negotiations,' 16 Sep. 1969; see also ibid., Rogers to American Embassy, Tokyo, 'Texts of Draft Joint Communiqué and Unilateral GOJ Statement on Okinawa,' 17 Sep. 1969.
63. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 96, Shimoda to Aichi, 'Okinawa Henkan Mondai (Beisoku Shin Teian) [Okinawa Reversion Issue (New American Proposal)], 12 Sep. 1969.
64. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 97, Shimoda to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Daijin Kokumuchōkan Kaidan' [Conversation between Minister and Secretary of State], 12 Sep. 1969.
65. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, POL 19 RYU IS, box 2460, Rogers to American Embassy, Tokyo, 'Meeting 15 Sept with Aichi on Okinawa Negotiations,' 16 Sep. 1969.
66. NARA, RG 59, SNF, 1967–1969, POL 19 RYU IS, box 2460, Rogers to American Embassy, Tokyo, 'Texts of Draft Joint Communiqué and Unilateral GOJ Statement on Okinawa,' 17 Sep. 1969.
67. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 98, Bei Kyokychō (America Section Chief), 'Gaimudaijin Hōbei Hōkoku' [Report on the Foreign Minister's Visit to the United States], 15 Sep. 1969.

68. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 99, Kitabei Ichi Chō (North America Section, First Bureau Chief), 'Okinawa Henkan Mondai-Aichi Gaimudaijin Dainiji Hōbei Nitsuite' [Okinawa Reversion Issue – On Foreign Minister Aichi's Second Visit to the United States], 16 Sep. 1969.
69. DAJ, OHK, H-22, CD 13, 0611–2010–00794_02, 101, Tanaka to Aichi, 'Okinawa Henkan Kōshō' [Okinawa Reversion Negotiations], 22 Sep. 1969.
70. Destler, Fukui, and Sato, *The Textile Wrangle*, 79–83.
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34. Wakaizumi and Swenson-Wright, *Best Course Available*, 235; Kissinger later explained this scenario in detail to Nixon; RNL, National Security Council (NSC) Files, VIP Visits, box 924. Memorandum for the President from Kissinger, 'Meeting with Prime Minister Sato,' 18 Nov. 1969.
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7 The Nixon China Shock, 1971

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47. RNL, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon, Kissinger and Peterson, 7 June 1971, 3:26–4:10 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation no. 513–4 (also available from http://nixontapes.org, 7 June 2011).
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