Immigrant Life in the U.S.

Multi-disciplinary perspectives

Edited by Donna R. Gabaccia and Colin Wayne Leach

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Immigrant Life in the U.S. brings together scholars from across the disciplines to examine diverse examples of immigration to the paradigmatic 'nation of immigrants.' The volume covers a wide range of time periods, ethnic and national groups, and places of immigration. Contemporary Chinese children brought to the U.S. through adoption, Mexican laborers hired to work in the mid-west in the 1930s, Indian computer programmers hired to work in California, and more, are examined in a series of chapters that show the great diversity of issues facing immigrants in the past and in the present.

Divided into three sections, the book explores issues of nationality and citizenship, youth in the context of family and school, and work and economic issues. In the first section, the focus is on how migrants negotiate their nationality and sense of belonging in conjunction with 'natives' and larger national forces. In the second section, contributions deal with the special situation of migrant youth, examining the ways in which their family, school, and cultural contexts shape their developing identities. The third section looks at the all-important issue of work and the process by which immigrant status complicates employment, labor, economic relations, and immigrants' experience of themselves as people.

This book emphasizes the complex tapestry that is the everyday experience of life as an immigrant and turns a critical eye on the place of globalization in the day-to-day life of immigrants. The contrasts it draws between past and present demonstrate the continued salience of national and ethnic identities while also describing how migrants can live almost simultaneously in two countries.

This book will be of essential interest to advanced students and researchers of sociology, history, ethnic studies, and American studies.

Donna R. Gabaccia is the Mellon Professor of History at the University of Pittsburgh. Her research focuses on gender and international migration, immigrant life in the United States, and Italian migration worldwide. Recent books include *Immigration and American Diversity* (2002), *Italy's Many Diasporas* (2000), and *We Are What We Eat: Ethnic Food and the Making of Americans* (1998).

Colin Wayne Leach is Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His research examines the phenomenology and politics of status distinctions made in the U.S., Western Europe, and Australia. He is co-editor of *The Social Life of Emotions* (2004).

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Donna R. Gabaccia is the Mellon Professor of History at the University of Pittsburgh. She has written extensively on immigrant life in the United States and on Italian migration around the world. Recent publications are *Immigration and American Diversity* (2002); *Italy's Many Diasporas* (2000); *We Are What We Eat: Ethnic Food and the Making of Americans* (1998). Together with Fraser Ottanelli and with Franca Iacovetta she has edited *Italian Workers of the World* (2001) and *Women, Gender, and Transnational Lives* (2002).

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Preface and acknowledgments

Multi-disciplinary projects are necessarily complex, and they must draw on wider than average circles of scholarly collegiality and goodwill. Our project began as an initiative within the Social Science Research Council. Its Program on International Migration was created in September 1994 to encourage 'field-building' and to find ways to draw together the voluminous, rich and interdisciplinary scholarly research on international migration and immigration to the United States. This SSRC initiative brought senior scholars from anthropology, economics, education, ethnic studies, history, psychology, and sociology together in a wide variety of venues (including a series of conferences and several long-term working groups) and published the results of their collaborations in a number of volumes (DeWind, Hirschman, and Kasinitz [1997]; Rumbaut, Foner, and Gold [1999]; Hirschman, Kasinitz, and DeWind [1999]; Foner, Rumbaut, and Gold [2000]; Gerstle and Mollenkopf [2001]).

From its onset, the SSRC Program on International Migration also placed special emphasis on the training and socialization of the next generation of scholars. It hoped, in part, that by doing so it could build an interdisciplinary field of migration studies 'from the bottom up.' Between 1996 and 2002, and with the help of funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the SSRC Program on International Migration offered competitions for pre- and post-doctoral research fellowships that ultimately supported 108 individual projects by graduate students and recent PhD recipients. At the same time, the program also sponsored a series of summer workshops for 87 minority students who received an introduction to research on migration across the disciplines, to the complexities of graduate-school life, and to the nuts-and-bolts problems of writing grant proposals to support doctoral research.

Our collection of essays on immigrant life in the United States emerged from a series of fellows conferences, sponsored by the SSRC in 2001 and 2002 for recent recipients of its pre- and post-doctoral research fellowships. Most of our contributors met for the first time at a conference – organized by historian Donna Gabaccia and sociologist Mary Waters and titled 'American Identities and Transnational Lives' – that was held in San Diego in late January 2001. The considerable energy released at that southern California encounter was enough to generate a variety of plans for publication. The challenge, of course, was to take a diverse group of conference papers and to transform them into a

manuscript that could highlight the benefits of multi-disciplinary perspectives by focusing on a coherent and manageable range of issues related to international migration.

Ultimately, Donna Gabaccia and psychologist Colin Leach – who had both served on SSRC fellowship selection committees and had commented on fellows' papers at the San Diego meeting – became the editors responsible for reshaping conference energies into a coherent manuscript. They collected essays that focused on identities and on their creation through the practices of everyday immigrant and transnational life in the U.S. Because the focus and list of contributors to this endeavor evolved somewhat over two years of intensive editorial and publishing discussions, we especially want to thank those contributors who signed on to the project in San Diego. For new scholars – who typically face the ominous ticking of the 'tenure clock' – our often slow path to publication may have seemed created specifically to heighten their anxieties about having chosen a scholarly career. We especially want to acknowledge their hard work and commitment to the project and their persistence and patience with the complex editorial process needed to transform their many essays into a successful and coherent manuscript. We also want to thank Sara Dorow and Ayumi Takenaka who, after participating in the 2002 SSRC Fellows Conference in Texas, agreed to join our group of authors.

Big thanks go as well to our many wonderful colleagues at the SSRC. Josh DeWind has been a constant source of encouragement and advice. As program assistant at the council from 1999 to 2001, Veda Truesdale helped to assure that our meeting in San Diego was not only an intellectually exciting event but also an opportunity for meeting and making new friends. Since Veda has moved on to her own graduate studies, Cynthia Chang has helped to keep us on course. The Chair of the International Migration Program Committee, Charles Hirschman, has maintained a lively interest in the fellows, the fellows programs, and the fellows conferences from the beginning of the program itself, and we thank him here for that important and ongoing support.

This volume began in San Diego, where Wayne Cornelius and his Center for Comparative Immigration Studies served as ideal hosts and widened the circle of discussions to include the sizeable San Diego community of migration specialists. The initial planning for publication of this volume was subsequently undertaken with material support from the Charles Warren Center at Harvard (where Gabaccia was a fellow). In Cambridge, Mary Waters of the Harvard Sociology Department also deserves special acknowledgment for her sage advice and flexibility in rethinking publication plans – more than once. Eventually, our manuscript landed in England. We appreciate Routledge's willingness to take seriously a collection of essays by scholars at the beginning of their careers, and want to thank Joe Whiting who guided the manuscript into press.

1 Introduction

American identities in a global era

Donna R. Gabaccia and Colin Wayne Leach

According to some millenarian thinkers, the year 2001 marked much more than just the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. History, modernism, and the nation-state, along with existing political, economic, and social boundaries, were all expected to wither in the face of unprecedented transnational flows of people and products (Appadurai 1996; Rajchman 1995). This new mobility was expected to change not only where we lived but how we lived and who we thought we were.

Increased exchange across national borders was expected to transform people's sense of physical, social, and political place, so that Delhi no longer seemed so distant from Denver, Darwin, or Delft. As our understanding of the relationship between space and time adjusted, it was argued, so too fundamental changes would occur in our sense of self and identity (see Harvey 1991; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Cerulo 1997). In particular, theorists claimed, nation-states were becoming deterritorialized, and the national would no longer anchor human identities as it had in the twentieth century (Glick Schiller *et al.* 1992; Basch *et al.* 1994).

The impact of hastened rates of cultural and economic exchange across national borders during the last three decades of the twentieth century can scarcely be denied. It is true that the things we produce travel faster, farther, and in greater numbers than ever before. In some ways, at least, Delhi is literally now just around the corner from Denver. New transportation and communication technologies allow humans, too, to travel with great speed and to remain easily in touch with family, friends, and business associates over long distances. Videos, wireless telephones, cables, satellites, and the World Wide Web make sounds and images produced by people in one corner of the world readily accessible to persons living on the other side of the globe. It is also certainly true that the world is currently experiencing massive movements of people across national and regional borders: approximately 140 million persons now live outside the country of their birth.

But while millenarian theorists anticipate astonishing change ahead, historians have been more cautious about predicting the long-term consequences of recent globalization. Economic historians have pointed to earlier eras of globalization (O'Rourke and Williamson 2000) and, while undeniably significant, these earlier

periods of globalization did not introduce changes of the type currently predicted. Long-term histories of migration (e.g. Hoerder 2002) have even denied that today's international migrations are unprecedented in scale; they may actually be relatively less important numerically than the so-called mass migrations of the end of the nineteenth century (when over 125 million persons were internationally mobile throughout a world with much less than half of today's population). Significantly, these mass migrations accompanied – they did not undermine or prevent – the expansion of the power of national states; in fact historians have often referred to the era of mass migrations in the nineteenth century as an age of nationalism. That previous mass migrations across national borders did not spell the end of the nation-state cautions against such predictions now.

Rather than assuming that human migration necessarily changes human subjectivity, this book asks whether it does and how it does. The possibility that migration changes human lives and identities is best studied, we believe, with methodologies that allow comparisons of people on the move in both the past and the present. We also believe that the impact of changing technology, movement, and communications is best identified through the examination of particular places and the social (economic, political) relations within which people in these places live. As a self-proclaimed nation of immigrants, the United States can provide a firm foundation for such study. Unlike a century ago, however, scholars who choose to generalize about social and cultural dynamics related to migration by studying the U.S. must justify their choice: focusing on a single nation as paradigmatic seems increasingly problematic in a global age.

National studies in an age of globalization

Why tackle questions of how human lives change in a global era with yet another book on immigrants in the U.S.? After all, at least since the 1500s, almost every corner of the world has been touched by vast and recurring international migrations. The U.S. may be one of a very few nations worldwide that considers itself, proudly, a nation of immigrants, but it is only one of many nations formed through long-distance migrations.

Most of the migrants we study in this volume initially lived or are now living transnational lives. In other words, their lives occur simultaneously in more than one national territory. But most are also simultaneously engaged in creating new identities that link them in some way to places and territories – including national ones – both 'at home' and where they live and work abroad, even if only temporarily. Concerned to study human life as situated in particular times and places, our focus on the United States can be justified in at least three ways.

First, rightly or wrongly, the U.S. continues to be regarded throughout the world as the paradigmatic nation of immigrants and as a place where transformations of identity are a routine element of nation-building and national life. The symbolic importance of the U.S. as a nation of immigrants has persisted even during periods of reduced immigration and even during periods when other countries have received – and in some cases incorporated –

proportionately far greater numbers of newcomers than has the United States. In both the nineteenth and late twentieth centuries, furthermore, the vast size of the U.S. – facing as it does two oceans and connected historically through the slave trade and empire-building to Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America as well as Asia – has made it a popular destination for a culturally more diverse group of mobile people than most other countries.

Secondly, in an increasingly inter-connected world, the United States also functions symbolically as a hyper-present model of a culturally plural or multicultural nation of individuals with complex identities. This American embrace of what is usually called multiculturalism is relatively recent, however. In the past the United States was instead more often praised or criticized for its insistence on transforming the identities of some immigrants (supposedly making 'ethnics,' 'Americans,' or 'whites' of mobile people from Europe) while simultaneously seeking to exclude people of African and Asian descent from the American nation. It is unlikely that many nations worldwide share with the U.S. its distinctive combination of a long history of slavery and of the segregation of African-Americans with its relative openness to the admission and naturalization of large numbers of foreign-born workers and settlers. But there can be little doubt that it is the intensive study of the United States that has allowed scholars worldwide to pose questions about the determinants and typologies of multiculturalism as it is now practiced worldwide. Attention to the hyphenated, hybrid, and ethnic identities of the U.S., as well as their relationship to an American sense of national belonging, has also provided a scholarly 'other' against which studies of mobile people elsewhere have often been measured.

The third, and perhaps most important reason for again collecting a new set of essays on immigrant life in the United States, is that much of the work on globalism and transnationalism treats the U.S. as an agent of economic and cultural globalization elsewhere without taking into account how globalization may simultaneously transform the United States and its residents, too. Surely the influence of U.S. commerce and culture on the wider world is well documented? Much of this work critiques the spread of an economic, political, and social culture that – while calling itself global – is in fact rooted in local, national, and American (or Euro-American or western) cultures and values (e.g. Winant 1994; Ritzer 1993). In this literature, globalization appears as a variety of American supra-nationalism, often with imperial aims. While valid enough, this approach leaves unexamined the recursive nature of U.S. global influence on the United States itself. In the so-called American twentieth century, the foreign-born residents of the United States often represented cases of 'the empire striking back.'

In this volume, migration into, within, and out of the United States provides an opportunity to examine how globalization may be transforming human lives in the paradigmatic nation of immigrants. Are these transformations pushing newer immigrants in the direction – away from the importance of the nation – that some theorists of transnationalism have posited? In which human relationships, if any, do mobile people foreground their American or foreign national identities?

In which do transnational identities find a place? Are identities among today's transmigrants any more fluid, contested, and complex than those of the immigrants of the past? When and in which human relationships do race, gender, class, or ethnicity most matter? When and in which settings are they most likely to change?

Such questions can, of course, be posed by specialists in any one of a number of disciplines. The study of the identities of mobile people, like the study of international migration, is necessarily a multi-disciplinary undertaking. Because our contributors engage the question of immigrant life in a global age from many different disciplinary perspectives, this volume offers a more complex and a more historical, grounded, and in some ways more skeptical treatment of the vitally interesting relationship between global flows, nations, and human subjectivity than can be found in more theoretical works.

Internationalizing the interdisciplinary study of mobile lives

The chapters in this volume focus on the consequences of migration for lives lived (at least in part) in one country – the United States – but also within a globalizing world. By doing so, they also demonstrate how interdisciplinary fields such as American studies, ethnic studies, women's studies, and migration studies have changed in recent years. Almost all scholarly disciplines have in the past two decades struggled to come to terms with the impact of theories of globalization and globality on their often fundamentally national subject matter. This struggle has been particularly intense in American studies – once the academic bastion of the idea that society and culture in the U.S. were exceptional and unlike those of any other nation – but is broadly shared across disciplines, interdisciplinary fields and interdisciplinary area studies alike.

Although we take up in our Afterword the consequences of the changing mix of disciplines represented in this collection, we think it is useful to call attention to it here as a possibly unintentional consequence of the internationalization of scholarly thought. Contemporary unease about continuing to define scholarly fields around national territories or cultures seems to encourage a wider understanding of interdisciplinarity than was traditionally the case, for example, in American studies. A half century ago historians and specialists on literature collaborated to create American studies. Today the number of interdisciplinary fields or 'studies' programs has greatly increased; within these interdisciplinary fields, furthermore, historians and literature scholars now interact more frequently with scholars trained in ethnic, women's, and cultural studies, and – more occasionally – in the social sciences.

In sharp contrast, newer scholars from the social sciences actually constitute the majority in our collection of essays; collectively, they document the somewhat distinctive way interdisciplinary work on the lives of immigrants and migrants bridges work in the social sciences and humanities. The ten essays in this volume were written by recent recipients of pre-and post-doctoral fellowships in the International Migration Program of the Social Science Research Council

(SSRC). Sociology (essays by A. Aneesh, Sara Dorow, Vivian Louie, Ron Mize, and Ayumi Takenaka) and history (Linda Heidenreich, Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof and Mark Wild) are especially well represented in this volume (as they were also in the SSRC program) but authors also include an economist (Nelson Lim) and a political scientist (Kristen Maher). (We very much regret that two original collaborators from anthropology had to withdraw, as anthropology continues to make a vital contribution to migration studies, even of immigrants in the United States.) The editors, too, were an interdisciplinary team, from history (Gabaccia) and psychology (Leach).

Literature and cultural studies – the more usual mainstays of interdisciplinary studies of all kinds in the 1990s – are noticeably absent in this collection and we see this as a result of the sharp divergence of social and cultural analysis in the past decade. But we also see in this volume evidence of a new foundation for convergence. As the philosophical divergence of modernist and post-modernist scholars of the 1990s has begun to wane, a wide variety of interdisciplinary fields offer a promising intellectual site where empirical and discursive analysis of both social and ideological forms might again meet in creative new ways. Certainly, this desire to bring together the study of the social, material, and phenomenological dimensions of human life is evident among the newer generation of social scientists, and in every essay collected here. Contributors include a political scientist who has done ethnographic field work, an economist who tests with survey data the hypotheses that have emerged from qualitative research, sociologists who have critically adopted the concepts and theoretical vocabulary of cultural studies or ethnographic methods, and historians who link demographic with discursive sources. All our contributors viewed human subjectivity as relational, contextual, and in process. All analyzed the creation of identity in particular places and in particular social relationships that could modify existing narratives of identity only by invoking them.

Many of our contributors from the social sciences have also joined in the recent embrace of transnational and comparative methodologies that are internationalizing most interdisciplinary fields – with consequences that we cannot yet predict. Both comparative and transnational methods have long been common in studies of international migration; here, as in American, ethnic and area studies generally, they help us to problematize the meaning of nation, national identity, and of area or ethnic studies themselves. In this volume, a study of Indian engineers who work both in Asia and the U.S., of Chinese girls adopted by American parents, and of Mexican braceros, help to ground the sometimes abstract theories of transnationalism and to demonstrate the impact in the U.S. of its role as an economic and cultural agent of globalization worldwide. Both diverging and converging comparative methods (see Green 1994) are included, with studies of persons of one national and racial-ethnic background in two differing American locations or of differing class backgrounds, or of several immigrant and minority groups in single west coast locations.

Studies of cultural diversity became the mainstream of many interdisciplinary fields in the 1990s – in part because of burning and typically national

debates over multiculturalism and its significance for national unity. These debates occurred not only in the United States but also in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and parts of Latin America as well (Gabaccia 2002). Oddly, however, as interest in cultural diversity increased in historical, literary, and social science area studies generally, many of the main themes and concepts of scholarship on migration and immigration – notably human mobility, ethnic groups, ethnicity, generations, naturalization, and assimilation – almost disappeared. For a decade, scholars instead focused energetically and productively on the analysis of 'race' (a term most scholars reject as scientifically untenable, even as they seek to trace its social power), of racial groups, of gender and – to a much lesser degree – of class. The essays in this collection suggest that a rapprochement of social and cultural analysis and of social scientists and humanists will further redefine our understandings of race and gender with their attention to age and generation, to class, and to the meaning of national identity itself.

In short, a new and more globally informed analysis of the linkage of cultural, ethnic, and national identities seems in order – both in the United States and worldwide. We know from historical literature on immigrants in the U.S. that distinctive social practices – in families, neighborhoods, and communities – have been important sites of identity formation. Newer research on the cultural production of music, food, literature, autobiography, film, and leisure has widened our understanding of the origins of racial and gender identities. In both cases, however, communities and identities have too often been imagined as sedentary or self-enclosed. We believe that scholars can best answer the questions raised about nations by theories of postmodernity by studying the internationally mobile, their social relations, and their subjectivity. By focusing on people moving into and out of the United States, both the past and present, this collection of essays does just that.

Students of immigration to the United States have long identified important zones of contact, where natives and newcomers establish new social relationships; scholars of transnationalism have reminded us of the importance of social relationships that reach across national boundaries. Most that is distinctive and diverse in human life is created in both kinds of social relations, as people evoke, modify, and reject discursive elements of identity such as race, gender, class, and nation. For those born abroad and entering the U.S. as adults, workplaces and relations between employers and employees may well be the most important sites of identity formation, whereas for their children (including both the so-called 1.5 generation – born abroad but migrating as children – and the second generation – born in the U.S.) social relations within families and educational institutions and involving recreational and popular cultural activities may be more important. One result is the generationally diverging identities that often produce sharp intergenerational cultural conflicts – including conflicts over citizenship, national identity, and national loyalties – in mobile populations. It is around these themes – age and generation, race, ethnicity, class, and nation – that most of our contributors have tackled the study of immigrant life in the United States.

Interdisciplinary perspectives on immigrant life

Migration both binds and transforms the countries it links; it affects the collective identity of receiving and sending countries as well as the identity of migrants themselves. While migration from China to California or from the Dominican Republic to the United States strikes contemporary observers as generating global and transnational perspectives, it is often experienced by the migrants themselves as a move between two small-scale and even intimate localities. By examining how younger and older migrants create new lives and identities in specific times and places, this collection seeks new answers to important questions. Do transnational flows of people necessarily produce transnational selves, and if so under what conditions? Have new technologies of transportation and communication marked the current round of globalization as unique or particular in any way? If so, how is human subjectivity changing in the current global ecumene and what transformations seem most salient to those working, living, or studying in the United States?

Part I of *Immigrant Life in the U.S.* takes up the particularly complex issues of national identities, nation-building, and mobility in the United States, past and present. It opens with a close examination of a single California county at a critical moment in the history of American nation-building. By 1850 the United States had seized the Pacific west coast from Mexico; southerners and northerners from the U.S. poured into California just as immigration increased across the Pacific and as, first, sectional conflict and, then, Civil War raised hard questions about whether birthplace, culture, or skin color would determine American citizenship, and thus membership in the American nation. Historian Linda Heidenreich reminds readers that in California, American nation-building immediately became an effort to render invisible the considerable diversity of local populations. As Benedict Anderson might have predicted, schools and the press were key institutions in defining American identity in California's Napa Valley. The wealthiest members of Napa's so-called minority communities sometimes found social acceptance as Americans, but they did so without changing either their civil status (they remained largely ineligible for citizenship or its full rights) or the spatial and social segregation of their working-class neighbors from American or English-speaking society and institutions. Ironically, Californians of darker skin color often found themselves asserting claims to an American identity and to citizenship against powerful newcomers who sought to exclude them and to make them perpetual outsiders in their native land.

In a decidedly transnational analysis of the recent past, historian Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof examines the impact of American popular youth culture on national identity in a society deeply shaped by its ties through migration to the United States. In the late 1960s and 1970s, as the first, largely adult, residents of the Dominican Republic began migrating to the United States, the island's political elite hoped Americanization, American remittances, and returners from New York would bring progress and modernity to their Caribbean home. As migration became more common and involved ever wider and poorer segments of the Dominican population, however, concerns grew about the corruption or

'soiling' of Catholic Dominican culture through the materialism, hedonism, and individualism of chain-wearing, young Dominicanyorkers. The attraction of young Dominicans – at home and in New York – to a popular culture that in the U.S. expressed the resentment and resistance of urban and typically African-American popular artists and performers – came to be perceived as an American assault on the national culture of the Dominican Republic, creating uncomfortable choices for the young and comfortably transnational Dominicanyorkers themselves.

In a study focused on a second group of transnational migrants today, A. Aneesh offers a qualitative study of Indian computer programmers in regular transit between India and the United States. Aneesh is particularly interested in how the realities and fantasies of nationalism continue to impinge even on the lives of these highly mobile workers. Despite their transnational lives, which are clearly lived on and between two widely separated continents, these programmers continue to embrace the language of nationality – or rather two nationalities. They do not create the hyphenated or hybrid identities supposedly characteristic of earlier immigrant groups in the U.S.; they are not becoming 'Indian-Americans.' Instead of interpreting this as a decline in the importance of the nation, or nationalism, however, Aneesh describes in considerable detail what it means for highly educated workers to perceive themselves as Indian while working in the United States and Americans while working in India. These programmers often mourn missing elements of the other, far-off, national space even as they celebrate the characteristics of the place where they are currently working. Enjoying considerably more autonomy and financial power than some of the poorer and less well-educated workers described later in the volume, the Indian programmers of Aneesh's essay modify the meaning of both Indian and American national identities as they move back and forth between the two countries. But national identities remain a very central element in their experience of transnational mobility.

Ayumi Takenaka's comparison of Peruvians of Japanese descent in California and on the east coast suggests how local and regional contexts continue to shape very different identities, as they did also in the 1850s. In California, where residents and immigrants alike see Japanese immigrants in particular, and Asian immigrants in general, as of higher status than Mexicans and other Latinos, Peruvians of Japanese descent seem to be en route to hyphenated identities as Japanese- or Asian-Americans. Both their class status and human capital and the Japanese community networks they encounter in California shape employment opportunities and reinforce the evolution of group ethnic identity in this direction. In New Jersey, by contrast, Japanese-descent immigrants from Peru have less education and more often find blue-collar jobs while settling among and becoming Spanish-speaking members of the state's growing Latino community. In her essay, Takenaka both acknowledges the fluidity of ethnic and racial identities in the United States while helping readers to see that the options for becoming American remain circumscribed by understandings of race and culture that are – as Heidenreich's opening essay also suggested – the products of distinctive regional histories.

Parts II and III of *Immigrant Life in the U.S.* focus on places and social relationships that are of particular importance for cross-cultural encounters. Part II examines those of greatest salience to younger migrants and to children of the so-called 1.5 and second generations – families, educational institutions, consumption, and leisure time or recreational activities.

Sara Dorow's transnational study of American parents traveling today to China to adopt children also focuses on a very specific site, and it documents with considerable ethnographic detail the social relations that parents ponder as they consider the future identity of their adopted daughters. Girls made available for adoption by China's high rates of infant abandonment (the product of a strict policy of family planning) are not yet in a position to express their own perceptions or sense of self but Dorow asserts that the materials with which they will construct identities later begin to be established on Shamian Island, where their final papers are processed prior to return with their new parents to the United States. Dorow portrays the material culture, social relationships, and imaginaries that Chinese intermediaries, Chinese businessmen, and American parents and consular officials mobilize to assign identities to these very young girls. Their daughters will become American citizens immediately upon adoption, yet many American parents hope the girls will nevertheless understand their origins and maintain a tie to Chinese culture, whether through language, family stories, the purchase of Chinese souvenirs or clothing, or email exchanges with the Chinese intermediaries who befriend them during the adoption process. Their daughters will lack the social relations within immigrant enclaves that usually help to produce group ethnic identity, yet these American parents insist that their daughters will enter a multicultural American culture with the raw materials for creating hyphenated identities for themselves. Already on Shamian Island, however, social relations between Chinese and Americans belie the ease of the American multiculturalism that parents imagine awaiting them and their new children.

While noting the importance of both families and schools in reinforcing ethnic and racial identities among older children, historian Mark Wild's study of working-class Los Angeles neighborhoods in the years book-ending World War II argues that children seemed surprisingly indifferent to such discourses. In their playgrounds and in neighborhood playgrounds, children more readily ventured across ethnic and racial boundaries than did adults. As they grew into adolescence, however, and began dating and courtship in preparation for marriage, children seemed to internalize parental and societal definitions of personal identity and began to interact more generally with those they had been taught were 'their own kind.' Wild argues that segregation by race also sharpened noticeably in the immediate postwar years, resulting in a decline in the casual and multiethnic leisure-time groups that bonded immigrant children from Asia and Europe with native-born, working-class Anglos and blacks. Even as the Chicago School of Sociology created their theories of straight-line assimilation during the 1920s and 1930s, Wild's study of immigrant children suggests no obvious or simple route to Americanization and national identity until the war years, when

both the power of national states worldwide, and their demands for homogenous, national identities may have peaked historically. In Los Angeles, however, much like Napa County in the 1850s, nation-building during World War II again emphasized racial identities and the segregation of persons with the darkest skin color.

Turning our attention to a group of contemporary adolescents of Chinese descent, Vivian Louie also suggests how important social relations – shaped by differing socio-economic status – can be in the creation of hyphenated identities. Louie also documents the continued importance of educational institutions in shaping the identities of young Americans with foreign origins. But while the readers used in 1870s' Napa rendered invisible the cultural diversity of students, and teachers in Wild's mid-century Los Angeles tried to inculcate in their students a universalized but homogeneous 'American' identity, schools in the U.S. today more typically encourage students to embrace ethnic and racial diversity as part of their self-understandings. Louie's comparison of working-class and middle-class, second-generation college students of Chinese descent reveals how students of different class backgrounds react differently to Chinese- and Asian-American identities that have become well institutionalized – through student groups and Asian studies programs – in their colleges and universities. While she describes working-class Chinese American students as simply feeling and 'being' Chinese-American, she shows an evolution of the middle-class students from believing themselves to be 'just American' to 'becoming' Chinese-American in a college setting. In her study, Hunter College's largely working-class urban students' continued ties to their families in Chinese neighborhoods, and their continuing use of Chinese, diminish their interest and activism in Chinese-American student groups. By contrast, middle-class suburban students at Columbia University often become very involved in student ethnic organizations as they begin to think of themselves, for the first time, as Chinese-Americans. Louie's work adds ethnographic depth to surveys that also show levels of ethnic identification increasing with socio-economic status. Like Mark Wild's research on the LA of a half-century earlier, Louie's work also suggests that ethnicity may become more salient as children grow into adolescents and begin to contemplate courtship, marriage, and reproduction.

Part III takes up work and labor as critically important elements of the experience and subjectivity of most adult immigrants, especially those who enter the United States in search of work. Encounters and interactions between employers and employees, as much as the experience of transnational mobility itself, hold important clues to the transformation of migrant subjectivity over time. In his essay, sociologist Ron Mize examines the long-term impact of the transnational lives and work experiences of Mexican laborers. Using oral histories of men who were recruited to the U.S.–Mexico Bracero Program between 1942 and 1964, Mize examines an employment relationship he characterizes as particularly totalizing – one where migrants often had extremely limited control over their living and working conditions. Mize contrasts braceros' generally accepting, descriptive, and purely factual memories of these workplace relations to the more

critical narratives that other Mexican-Americans and almost all scholars have developed in remembering, describing, and analyzing the Bracero Program. While very powerful, employers may never be able to impose on workers the identity they might prefer for them – that of dehumanized chattel or 'factors of production.' Still, Mize suggests that work under the most extreme forms of labor control not only diminished worker resistance at the time but also left a long legacy in memories that submerge, rather than highlight, the braceros' agency as human beings and their willingness to resist and to escape from dehumanizing labor relations.

In a well-matched yet methodologically very diverse pair of essays on today's immigrants, political scientist Kristin Maher uses participant observation and Nelson Lim employs macro-level survey data to explore less violent and coercive yet equally formative relations between employers and the immigrants they seek to hire. According to Lim, qualitative research suggests that low-skill workers believe employers prefer foreign-born to native-born minority workers and that the resulting sense of competition is a source of differentiation and distrust between native- and foreign-born minorities in their urban homes and neighborhoods. Lim uses survey data to explore the prevalence of a racial hierarchy in employers' perceptions of these low-skill workers. Drawing on a quantitative survey of over 1,000 businesses in four metropolitan areas, he does find employers expressing some preferences for Asian workers, whom they believe to be more industrious and reliable than native-born minority workers.

Kristen Maher adds sinew and flesh to Lim's macro analysis by focusing closely on the expectations, stereotypes, and anxieties of employers hiring Latina domestic workers in Orange County, California. Drawing on field work in a placement agency for domestic servants and childcare workers, Maher is able to describe the identities employers seek to impose on the immigrant women – that of a clean, feminine, and trustworthy yet non-sexual 'mother.' For women workers, too, maternal and sexual qualities become closely tied to their identities as 'Mexican' – 'Of course I can cook,' one respondent told a prospective employer, 'I'm Mexican!' Maher's analysis describes the micro-social creation of identities more often identified at the macro level in analyses of race, class, economic segmentation, and gender differentiation. Like Lim's and Mize's contributions, furthermore, Maher reminds readers that the creation of identity for many immigrant workers occurs in relations to employers; these relations are certainly no less hierarchical than those experienced by immigrants in the past. While Maher, more than Mize, documents workers' resistance to the identities employers seek to impose on them, she and Lim both emphasize the power of employers' categories and discourses to shape significantly immigrants' working lives as well as their subjectivity. Even resistance generally requires immigrant adults to acknowledge in order to struggle against the identities that employers and natives have created for them.

In an afterword to *Immigrant Life in the U.S.*, editors Gabaccia and Leach summarize the benefits of interdisciplinary research which brings the methods of the social sciences and the questions of culture and identity closer together than

they have often been in the past decade. They take up questions about work, school, place, and nation that are raised, but not answered by, these ten essays. They discuss how the collected studies of school, locality, and workplace inform studies of consumption, family and kinship, and popular culture as alternative sites of identity construction. And they suggest how linking analysis of differing sites to the United States and within its many regions should facilitate a more systematic and analytically rigorous study of identity, allowing firmer conclusions to be made about the supposed differences between how the 'immigrants' of the past 'became American' and how the 'transmigrants' of today confront a 'de-territorialized' world.

Part I

The local and the nation in a transnational world

2 Elusive citizenship

Education, the press, and the struggle over representation in Napa, California 1848–1910

Linda Heidenreich

At his home in Sonoma, California, in 1874, Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo reflected on the many changes that had transpired in California following the U.S. Invasion (1846–8).[1] In a conversation with Enrique Cerruti, a gentleman employee of Hubert Bancroft, his comments turned quickly to the issue of education. Vallejo was concerned that Spanish was no longer taught in the schools, not even in those of San Francisco, the largest city in the north. As part of their regular education, schoolchildren were able to study European languages such as French and German but they did not have the opportunity to study Spanish, which was the native tongue of many in the area. The retired general's concern with language instruction was scarcely misplaced; it was tied to larger issues of political power, education, and the status of ethnic Mexicans in the U.S..[2]

Removing Spanish from the public school curriculum in some places in California, while failing to include it in others, was a conscious strategy of the newly arrived American invaders. Their goal was to define American citizens in ways that excluded racialized minorities both from the curriculum and from the U.S. republic. At the local level, this definition of citizenship was accomplished through a number of important institutions but primary among them were the newly established public school system and the English-language press.

Many of the issues with which California residents and people in the greater U.S. west struggle today – from language and schooling to access to American citizenship and its rights – have their roots in the mid-to-late nineteenth century when the U.S. wrested California from Mexico. Following the U.S. Invasion of 1846–8, Euro-Americans throughout the conquered territories replaced the Mexicano ranch economy with an industrial-capitalist one, displaced Mexicanos as the dominant land-holding group, and achieved political dominance in local and state governments. The U.S. Invasion and annexation of northern Mexico may have played a larger role in determining race relations in the west than did the Civil War which followed it rather quickly. In the west, racialized social structures and understandings of citizenship had already begun to take form by the time the Civil War started. During the 1860s and 1870s, white westerners' strong ties to the American south allowed a southern rhetoric of redemption from reconstruction to fuel racial inequalities in the region but this rhetoric did not substantially alter racial dynamics already set in motion in 1848; rather it continued and elaborated upon them.

This chapter examines struggles over representation and citizenship in the nineteenth-century press and public school system of one western county in northern California. Historically, the small western county of Napa was in many respects a microcosm of the larger U.S. west. Napa County lies 40 miles northeast of San Francisco and 70 miles southwest of Sacramento. Immigration trends found throughout the U.S. west are writ large in the area, from pre-colonial times when Wappo- and Patwin-speaking people dominated the county, into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when Spanish colonizers, then Mexican settlers, and later Euro-Americans came to settle and exploit the area and its peoples.[3] Following the annexation of Napa and California to the U.S., immigration patterns to Napa continued to reflect larger immigration patterns throughout the state. As Robert R. Alvarez (1975) has argued, Mexican miners continued to emigrate north to work following the U.S. Invasion (Standardt 1996). In Napa they continued to come throughout the late nineteenth century to work in newly opened quicksilver mines.[4] From the 1860s through the 1880s, Chinese immigrants also came to Napa to work in the mines, in agriculture and other industries.[5] Napa, then, is a location where trends important throughout California and the west can be studied in detail, where the impact of different waves of immigration on the west can be traced, and where national struggles over definitions of 'Americans' and 'citizens' seem particularly intense.

By focusing on a local site in relation to the larger west, I am able to map out how ordinary institutions – and particularly the local press and the education of young Americans – and the social relations of everyday life contributed to the national trend toward defining American citizens as white. Here I build on the work of Chicana/o historians and white women's historians such as Albert Camarillo (1979), Vicki Ruiz (1987a and b), and Laurel Ulrich (1990), who have demonstrated the importance of the local in creating the larger national structures within which we all live, as well as on the more recent work of John Bodnar (1992: 93–109) and Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2002), who analyze relationships between local and national constructions of citizenship.[6] As these scholars have demonstrated, even macro-level phenomena are created through everyday practices. Understanding this is crucial to grasping the significance of the local press and of public schools in creating national identities.

To demonstrate how the local press and local educational institutions constructed American citizens and the American nation, I examine local histories and demographics in Napa as microcosms of growing diversity throughout the U.S. west. I focus particularly on the ethnic Mexican, Chinese immigrant, and African American communities which flourished in Napa County in the late nineteenth century. I then describe the development of a regional and specifically western school curriculum and the ways Napa's public school curriculum in conjunction with articles printed in the local press helped to create inequalities 'from the bottom up' in Napa, in the U.S. west, and in the larger nation-state. The power and influence of the nineteenth-century local schools and press

suggests that we, as scholars in the twenty-first century, should continue to take these two institutions very seriously in our own times.

Demographics

The U.S. Invasion of northern Mexico raised anxieties among those whose image of America was of a white, northern European, and Protestant nation. The first settler-colonizers to the New England area brought with them a tradition of anti-Spanish sentiment rooted in centuries of colonial rivalries. This sentiment was further fueled by English-language travel vocabulary that portrayed the Spaniards as particularly cruel, and Mexicans as 'mongrels' carrying the worst traits of Spaniards and indigenous peoples, and by school primers that depicted the Pope as the Great Whore of Babylon (Paredes 1977).

Yet in 1846–8, despite a long history of hispanophobia, the United States staged a war to take Mexico's northern territories. The U.S. military success brought 80,000 mixed-race people, many of whom were eligible for citizenship, into the Union (Meier and Rivera 1972: 70; Acuña 1998: 12–24). Thus, as Euro-Americans moved into what was formerly Mexico, they faced the challenge of redefining formerly Mexican territories as legitimately 'American,' and of reiterating a definition of American that was rooted in their own histories and mythologies (Saxton 1990: 321–47). Prior to the invasion, in 1846, Euro-Americans in California numbered only 1,180. With U.S. victory and the discovery of gold in California, Euro-Americans swarmed into the West, and especially into California. By 1860 they numbered 323,177.[7] Upon their arrival, many Euro-Americans met a population that was more diverse than they had ever encountered before. And this diverse body of peoples, many of whom preceded the arrival of Euro-Americans by generations, also claimed as natives a right to live, labor, and prosper in the west. Some of them – including Californios such as Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo – even claimed U.S. citizenship.

Throughout the nineteenth century, as Euro-Americans continued to move west, a number of diverse communities flourished in California – among them California Indians, ethnic Mexicans, and blacks.[8] As Table 2.1 below demonstrates, the growing numbers of Euro-Americans co-existed alongside resilient minority populations. And Native American populations sharply diminished, but did not disappear.

Table 2.1 California population 1850-70

Year	*White*	*Black*	*Am. Indian*	*Asian*
1846			85,000	
1850	91,635	962		
1860	323,177	4,086	28,000	34,933
1870	499,424	4,272	23,000	49,310

Source: S.F. Cook (1943) *The California Indians and White Civilization*, vol. II, Berkeley: University of California Press, p.96; U.S. Census Bureau, Table 19: California – Race and Hispanic Origin: 1850 to 1990.

In Napa, Mexican, Chinese and African communities survived and, at times, flourished. By focusing on the specific and often class-stratified communities of the minority residents of Napa County, I can demonstrate how they influenced local developments and how the dominant Euro-American community responded by constructing themselves as citizens in discursive spaces such as the public schools and popular press. Napa's ethnic communities, and their working classes, were able to survive, in part, because they utilized resources provided by their own middle class and/or land-owning classes. More often than not, however, the visibility and relative acceptance accorded these very small business and landed classes muted the struggles of the laboring majority for inclusion in citizenship and for fair representation in local institutions.

In Napa, ethnic Mexican communities were quite diverse and comprised of land-owning families who had settled there prior to the invasion, laborers from the same time, and new arrivals who immigrated in search of labor following 1848. Of the land-owning Californios, the Júarez family was the most prominent and powerful in Napa. In the late eighteenth century, the maternal and paternal ancestors of this family arrived in Alta California. While at the time of their emigration the Higuera side of the family was classified racially as mestizo, or mixed, by the time of the invasion they identified as Spanish.[9] By the time of the invasion, as well, they were land-rich, and won favor with the Euro-American invaders, in part by donating large tracts of land to Napa town. In 1858, for example, Cayetano Júarez donated 45 acres of land for the town's use as a cemetery. As part of the deed, Júarez stipulated that Californios of Spanish descent should be buried without charge.[10] The Júarez children attended public schools in Napa, were raised to be bilingual, and to a large extent seemed assimilated into the dominant culture.[11] Dolores Júarez, the eldest son of Cayetano and María de Jesús Júarez, led several brass bands in Napa, and most of the family's children married into middle-class Euro-American families from the surrounding area.[12]

Of course, most Californios did not have the opportunities enjoyed by the Júarez family. Prior to the invasion, they labored on the land of Salvador Vallejo at the southern end of Napa, as well as alongside indigenous peoples on the ranchos of don Cartareña, and Cayetano Júarez.[13] Post invasion, many of these men continued to work on Californio-owned ranchos but, when landed Californios lost their property, they were pushed to a segregated area of Napa called 'Spanish-town.'[14] As in barrios throughout California, this segregated area was a site of contradictions, where people came together to celebrate in community centers such as García Hall and shared a common language and culture, but, at the same time, were cut off from many city and county resources.[15]

Ethnic Mexicans, with the Chinese immigrants who followed them to the area, formed the labor pool with which local capitalists successfully exploited the quicksilver mines of Napa. The 1860 census lists ethnic Mexican and Chinese immigrants all laboring at the same occupations. Although by this time the two groups were segregated into separate labor camps and neighborhoods, there were some ethnic Mexican and Chinese immigrant workers listed as living in the same boarding houses.[16]

The Chinese immigrants with whom Californios and Mexican immigrants sometimes labored were recent arrivals to California and to Napa. Yet their community, like that of their ethnic Mexican neighbors, was class stratified. Initially, only a small number of Chinese immigrants came to Napa. As of 1860, only 17 people had made the move from San Francisco, the initial destination of immigrants from the province of Canton. Labor shortages in agriculture and in the quicksilver mines soon pulled more immigrants to the area and by 1880 at least 905 Chinese immigrants resided in the southern end of Napa County (Luper 1979: 72).[17] Thus, while a Civil War raged throughout the east, cutting immigration there, a steady stream of Chinese labor continued to arrive in Napa. Most Chinese immigrants worked as laborers in agriculture, in the tanning industry, and in the mines.[18] Like other laborers, many Chinese kept gardens that made it possible for them to survive on subsistence wages: Chinese community gardens were located in the downtown area on Main Street, and on Suscol Road, on the outskirts of town.[19] Above the day laborers in socio-economic status were laundry owners, who worked long hours for low wages, yet controlled their own labor and that of the men who worked under them. Finally, there were larger-scale businessmen such as Kwong Sam Long and Chan Wah Jack.[20] Chan Wah Jack first arrived in the 1850s and his descendants continued to live in Napa through the late twentieth century.[21]

The Chans were successful merchants: shortly after his arrival, Chan Wah Jack established a dry goods store, the Lai Hing Co. The Chans' elevated socio-economic status allowed them to win the respect of many of Napa's Euro-American citizens.[22] Euro-American and Chinese residents alike came to shop in their store.[23] The social role of the Chans in the Chinese community of Napa was also understandably complex. From oral histories and English-language newspaper articles, it appears to have been very paternalistic, with the Chan family aiding less fortunate members of their communities.[24] At the same time, historically, such relationships have often been exploitative, playing a critical role in facilitating the continued oppression of minority groups (Chan 1991: 30–2). Whether or not the relationship between the Chans and the laboring Chinese immigrants of Napa was exploitative or not, we may never know. What is apparent, is that the well-being of the Chans, like other racialized elites of their times, remained tied to the other members of their racialized community. While the dry goods store was financially successful, the Chan family nevertheless lived in Chinatown, and continued to live there until the last remnants of the neighborhood were demolished in the early twentieth century. After large numbers of immigrants arrived in Napa, Chan imported an altar of Pei-ti (God of the North) to Napa and established a temple where Chinese from the surrounding area could come and worship.[25] New immigrants to the area often boarded at the Chan residence, and the dry goods store doubled as a bank where workers could deposit their earnings.[26]

The socio-economic status of the Chans was bolstered by the fact that they formed a family. When Chan Wah Jack and his spouse had a new baby, the local

newspaper ran a notice announcing his birth and noted that local ladies were visiting Mrs Chan to see the new born 'almond eyed Celestial.'[27] In contrast, most Chinese laborers could not afford to bring their families with them to Napa; employers throughout California desired single men workers, whom they viewed as temporary and migratory. Immigration patterns were dramatically different from those in Hawaii, where employers actually preferred to bring over men along with their entire families (Takaki 1989: 37–9). In California and throughout the west, restrictive legislation excluding Chinese laborers would eventually make it impossible for the wives of these workers to join their husbands; Napa's Chinese community, like most in California, remained dominated by 'bachelors.'

Like ethnic Mexicans in Napa, most Chinese immigrants worked as laborers and lived in segregated areas of the county. Napa County had three Chinatowns, one in Napa town, one in St Helena, and one in Calistoga. The Calistoga settlement was the most populous, with over 1,000 immigrants.[28] The smaller community in Napa town remained the most influential because it housed the temple of Pei-ti.[29] In addition to the Chinatowns, a number of Chinese labor camps were located near the mines and fields, and a Mexican labor camp was located not far from one of these.[30] According to local historian Charlotte Miller, harassment and threats of violence discouraged most laborers from leaving their labor camps and Chinatowns.[31] Like ethnic Mexicans, then, Chinese immigrants were members of class-stratified communities, where middle-class members of their groups were able to move in and out of the margins of white society while laborers spent most of their time working and retreated to segregated neighborhoods for rest and recreation.

While Napa's African American community held much in common with the Mexican and Chinese ones, its history was unique in being more closely intertwined with that of the dominant Euro-American community. Like the Euro-Americans of Napa County, African Americans had lived elsewhere in the United States before moving west. While 26 per cent of the Euro-Americans were from Missouri (and still more from further east had lived there for a number of years before crossing the Sierra Nevada), 11 per cent from Illinois, and 7 per cent from Tennessee, African Americans immigrating to Napa came from throughout the U.S..[32] Many came from the South; perhaps – like other black immigrants to California – they had been brought west as slaves and purchased their freedom, or fled their enslavers and built a new life for themselves far from the Mason–Dixon line (Taylor 1998: 74–94). One early study even claims that enough slaves successfully fled their masters in California that the new state legislature passed a fugitive slave act to complement federal law.[33] But other African Americans came to California from northern cities such as New York and Massachusetts where they had long been free.[34] The majority of these newcomers were laborers. Men and women alike worked as cooks and servants, although most black men, like Chinese immigrant and ethnic Mexican men, worked as day laborers. A significant minority of men – five out of 24 adult black males listed in the 1860 census – worked in

skilled professions – a blacksmith, a chain maker, a farmer, and two barbers.[35] According to an informant living in Napa at the time, even more men may have worked on their own farms, with the census undercounting the number of black farmers in the Napa area.[36]

The two barbers listed in the census – the men of the Hatton family – may have served a similar role to African Americans in Napa as did the Júarezes and the Chans in the Mexican and Chinese communities. As early as 1855, Edward Hatton, the head of the Hatton family, traveled to Sacramento to participate in the First State Convention of the Colored Citizens of the State of California, thus serving as a bridge between the black community in Napa and black communities throughout the state. In Sacramento, Hatton not only reported on the status of African Americans in Napa, but also obtained news and political strategies to bring back home.[37] It was the efforts of the men attending state conventions, in conjunction with the efforts of their larger communities, that eventually won African Americans the right to speak in California's courts, as well access to public education for their children.[38]

By 1860, the elder Hatton had not only established himself as a small businessman in Napa, he had invested in property and owned $1,000 in real estate.[39] His business was located in the downtown area, at the corner of Brown and Clay, where black and white patrons alike could find him. The central location of his business made it possible for him to act as a mediator between black residents in Napa and communities beyond county lines. Edward Hatton, and later his son, Joseph, were distributors for a San Francisco-based black newspaper, the *Pacific Appeal*, and, at times, sent letters to the editor informing the readership of the status of African Americans in Napa. Through his invitation, editors of the paper eventually came to visit Napa and stayed with the Hattons. The ties that the Hattons established and maintained with the *Pacific Appeal* would later allow the black community to actively challenge the white press.

Throughout the nineteenth century Napa's ethnic Mexican, Chinese immigrant, and African American communities remained small, yet its Euro-American population was very aware of them. Perhaps this was because Napa's racially oppressed populations lived in visible, yet segregated neighborhoods, or because they were class stratified, with propertied members of their communities interacting with the dominant majority on a daily basis. In any case, Napa's Euro-Americans responded to the presence of all three. Some wrote derogatory newspaper articles about them in the English-language press, while others attacked ethnic Mexicans and Chinese immigrants in the streets.[40] The mobilization of the public school curriculum and of the local press against these groups in the 1850s and '60s was not incidental, but a strategic move onto what Stuart Hall calls an 'ideological field' where Euro-Americans and racialized minorities struggled to define terms such as 'American' and 'citizen' through words and rhetoric (Sánchez 1993: 44). The schools and the local press became part of a struggle, at the local level, over the meaning of American citizenship.

Public schools

The public schools of Napa and other localities had an important place in state efforts to limit the right of citizenship to whites. In 1849, one year after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ending the U.S. Invasion, was signed, delegates from throughout California met in Monterey to draft a state constitution. Primary among the issues addressed was the right to vote. Who, in this new state, would be allowed to vote? All men? White men? Were Mexicans white men? The demographics of the delegates were telling and strongly influenced the convention's outcome. Of the forty-eight delegates, sixteen were originally from slave states – and their average residence in California was only two years. Nine of the delegates had been in California for less than a year. There were also eight Californios among the delegates. Initially, the convention decided that 'Every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of 21 years … shall be entitled to vote.' After much debate about the rights of the Californios under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the language was modified to include former male citizens of Mexico who became U.S. citizens. But the modifier 'white' was not removed (Almquist and Heizer 1971: 95–7).

In 1865, when the state of California passed its first laws governing public schools, it reinforced the status of white citizens and residents by establishing schools for the exclusive use of 'white children between five and twenty-one years of age.'[41] Likewise, in clear violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the statute stipulated that 'all schools shall be taught in the English language.'[42] In 1874, after challenges by black citizens for access to public schools, the state legislature amended the laws to provide for their children's education too. Yet it did so by mandating segregated schools, unless there were not enough students to open a separate school *and* the local school board agreed to allow local children of color to attend 'schools for white children.'[43]

Segregation and insistence on English-language teaching were two tools in the arsenal of Euro-Americans who would claim the public school system for themselves. Alongside these, however, was another and equally important weapon, and that was the school curriculum itself. In California, the first choice of many school districts was the *McGuffey Reader*. Written explicitly for a western audience, the volumes reflected William H. McGuffey's values as well the national anxiety that came with a rapid expansion of territory and voting rights.

While William Holmes McGuffey wrote most of the *Readers*, his brother Alexander also wrote some of the lessons and his wife Harriet most probably compiled the *Primer* (Lindberg 1976: xviii). Born on 23 September 1800, William H. McGuffey was a respected and successful school teacher and administrator. He taught school for thirty-eight years, yet he never taught girls, which may explain why the *Readers* largely ignore their existence.[44] More interesting for our purposes, however, was McGuffey's ethnic and racial bias, which can easily be attributable to his family and the values with which he grew up as a Scottish-Irish Presbyterian in the U.S. west. McGuffey's father had fought in anti-Indian campaigns in the Ohio river area. And the young McGuffey as well as his brother Alexander Hamilton probably grew up listening to their father tell of his

successful Indian campaigns, along with the racialized morality tales that went with nineteenth-century expansion into American Indian territories. Such morality tales reinforced white supremacist beliefs that Euro-Americans had a mission to fill the continent with their people and to spread their civilization from shore to shore (Saxton 1990: 321–32; Horsman 1981: 81–186). On the other hand, while William and Alexander Hamilton McGuffey grew up in the west, much of their politics and values, influenced by their Scotch-Irish Presbyterian background, were tied to the east (Minnich 1975: 10). Like the Beechers, who strongly influenced their work, the McGuffeys believed that education was the key to protecting stability from the upheavals of Jacksonian democracy (Mosier 1965: 17).

To a large extent, the *McGuffey Readers* were a product of Jacksonian Democracy and contributed to containing the dangers it seemed to threaten. If all citizens, even the poorest, were to participate in the republic, as Jacksonian Democrats insisted, then citizenship needed to be defined narrowly and all citizens needed to share a reverence for property. The *McGuffey Readers*, according to Richard Mosier, were part of a larger Republican counter-reformation which wedded property, religion and the judicial system, in part by rationalizing the poverty of the disfranchised (Mosier 1965: 98–105). In the *McGuffey Readers*, these two constructions – of Euro-Americans as peculiarly American and of a reverence for property ownership – together justified the socio-economic inequalities of the nineteenth century for young Euro-American schoolchildren. Thus the *McGuffey Readers* proved a double sword: their construction of Americans and citizens as white provided white schoolchildren with privileges at the expense of all other children. They defined narrow parameters within which white children had to behave if they wanted to be accepted and protected.

McGuffey Readers proved a formidable weapon in the campaign to narrow notions of citizenship. From the early nineteenth century through the early twentieth century, they were used throughout the greater American west, including not only what is now called the southwest, but also areas as far east as Ohio and Kentucky (Fraser 1999: 37–40; Bohning 1986: 266). First published in 1836, they sold 7,000,000 copies between 1836 and 1850. Between 1850 and 1870 following the U.S. Invasion and then the U.S. Civil War they sold 40,000,000 copies, making *McGuffey* the dominant reader in the U.S. west (Lindberg 1976: xv; Mosier 1965: 168).

The acceptance of social inequality and the dogma that Euro-Americans were peculiarly and especially 'American' were iterated and reiterated throughout the McGuffey series. At a basic level, the message that Euro-Americans were the only real Americans was reinforced through pictures. Every American depicted in the readers, from level one through level six, was white and wore standard Euro-American clothing. In fact, when people of color, or people wearing different clothing did finally appear, in the fourth reader, they were placed safely in foreign countries, with stories of far-away places. Thus, ironically, the only broad-rimmed hat that California schoolchildren ever saw in their readers, was on the head of a rider in South America,

even though broad-rimmed hats remained popular in California long after the fall of Mexican rule. (Tellingly too, in the accompanying story, this South American rider was compared to riders of horses in Arabia, rather than to those in the American southwest.)[45]

The theme of American patriotism appeared as early as the first reader, with a little white boy carrying an American flag. His older sister tells their mother, 'I went with Tom to the pond, I had my doll, and Tom had his flag.'[46] Later, in the same reader, five boys are depicted carrying a flag. They ask their father to use the flag 'to play Fourth of July.' He gives them permission to do so and then closes by saying 'Hurrah for the flag, boys.'[47] American flags and 'hurrahs' disappear for a brief while in the second reader. There instead were stories about grateful poor children, all of whom were clean and happy to work. In the first of these stories, Henry is 'a kind good boy' whose father is dead and whose mother is very poor. One day he finds a man's pocketbook and returns it to the owner without removing any of its contents. The man is so happy that he gives little Henry a one-dollar reward. Henry promptly uses the dollar to buy materials to black boots and spends the rest of his days blacking boots to raise money for his family. He goes to school in the evenings, and earns 'almost enough to support his mother and his little sister.'[48]

Similar stories of honest, laboring children appear throughout the readers. While it can be argued that the main point of these stories was to teach young children honesty and industry, it was also apparent that such stories normalized child labor and social inequalities. The poor children in these stories are never angry, and, if they are honest, they find plenty for themselves and their families to eat. In 'The Little Loaf,' in the third reader, a famine afflicts an unnamed country. A rich baker sends for twenty of the poorest children. Setting a large bread basket before them, he lets them each take one loaf. While most of the children fight for the biggest piece, one polite little girl waits until the rest are finished and then takes the smallest remaining loaf. The next day, the same thing happens, only when the little girl gets home, she finds silver coins in the small loaf. Immediately she returns to the baker to tell him of the mistake and he replies, 'No, no, my child, it was no mistake. I had the silver pieces put into the smallest loaf to reward you. Always be contented, peaceable, and grateful as you are now.'[49] The message here is at least twofold: you should always be contented with what you have, and if someone does not have what she needs, she must be doing something wrong.

Messages about social inequality were coupled not only with pictures that equated American identity with Euro-American identity, but also with patriotic lessons that trumpeted the English heritage of Americans. Thus, in their fifth readers, students read of how

> the people of the United States, descendants of the English stock, grateful for the treasures of knowledge derived from their English ancestors, acknowledge, also, with thanks and filial regard, that, among those ancestors, under the culture of Hampden and Sidney, and other assiduous

> friends, that seed of popular liberty first germinated, which on our soil, has shot up to its full height, until its branches overshadow the land.[50]

Also in the fifth readers (written by Alexander Hamilton McGuffey), students read not only of their 'English ancestors,' but of the virtues of their Puritan 'forefathers.'[51] This construction of Englishmen and Puritans as the mythic forefathers of the schoolchildren of the U.S. west existed side by side with an overtly anti-Semitic rhetoric that blamed Jews for the death of Christ and claimed that they were strangers to 'the morality found in the gospel'; the readers also referred to American Indians as 'savages' even when discussing their virtues.[52] What we have in the readers, then, is a normalizing of Euro-Americans as true Americans. In conjunction with the overtly racist language of the local press, such texts normalized the disfranchisement of the 'others' with whom Napa's white schoolchildren shared their far western town.

Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, Napa's schools and schools elsewhere in the U.S. west continued to use *McGuffey Readers* as their central, and at times only, texts. In retrospect, scholars criticize these texts for the ways in which they inculcated doctrines of manifest destiny into a generation of young white Californians by praising Americans' mission to spread liberty 'among other nations and backward peoples' (Mosier 1965: 40). At the time, however, the press criticized them only for their price tag. The rhetoric of white supremacy of which Reginald Horsman (1981: 208–48), Ronald Takaki (1990: 160–3), Tomás Almaguer (1994: 32–3) and others (see Saxton 1990) have written at the state and national levels, was produced and reproduced at the local level in the press and public schools of Napa.

From the 1860s to the close of the century, the struggle to define 'citizenship' and 'American' raged on. And the public school system, east and west, remained at the center of this war. During the latter part of the century, three significant factors continued to destabilize and challenge white supremacist notions of American and of citizenship: the Civil War, new waves of immigration to the United States, and the incorporation of large numbers of non-white peoples due to U.S. imperialism.

At the national level, Euro-Americans strove to maintain a separate place for themselves, above the other residents of the nation, controlling national trends and policies. They accomplished this through legislation, through myth-making, and through the popular press. Thus, 1882 saw the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act (Takaki 1990: 110–16 and Chan 1991: 50–1) and a journalist named David Croly coined the word miscegenation (Sollors 1994: 93). In 1890, in response to the nation's changing demographics, the descendants of British colonists dedicated the National Monument to the Forefathers, at Plymouth and just four years later the Society of the Mayflower was founded (Sollors 1994: 93–102).

On the east coast, the dominant majority in the U.S. moved quickly to contain the winds of change by dividing young people into categories of assimilable and inassimilable. Southern and eastern European immigrant children, while

portrayed as inferior to their northern European and Puritan counterparts, were deemed assimilable. Consequently, the dominant majority on the east coast quickly developed a curriculum to transform these newcomers into young citizens. By the turn of the century, many educators felt that they had been successful. For example, in 1906, when reviewing the public schools of New York, the president of Johns Hopkins University wrote of the success of the public schools in making young immigrants into American citizens:

> First in interest in this citizenship training is the work in civics and the history of the United States. In addition to the regular class work in these subjects this training includes the recitation of patriotic pieces at the morning assemblies, the singing of patriotic songs, and the daily salute to the flag. As one of the best means of rousing the patriotic sentiment, the principal of one school endeavors to make the special exercises in honor of national holidays.[53]

The writer ended his letter by concluding that, while a number of foreign languages and traditions dominated the streets outside the school, English and 'American' traditions were successfully taught at school and brought home to their parents by the children (Fischer *et al.* 1997: 8–10). Clearly, the dominant population of the United States did not feel their efforts were fully successful, for restrictive immigration acts were again passed in 1921 and 1924. Still, the quotas they imposed on peoples immigrating from southern and eastern Europe were less draconian than the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and they did not ban these immigrant groups from citizenship as earlier laws banned Asian immigrants.

The public schools in the west also stressed the importance of patriotism. At a time when public schools were attempting to standardize pedagogy and curriculum, Teacher's Institutes were one means through which California counties sought to improve and homogenize the pedagogy in their classrooms. One week each year, teachers from throughout each county came together to listen to common speeches on curriculum, pedagogy, and patriotism. In Napa, the topic of patriotism dominated annual Teacher's Institutes from the 1890s throughout the early twentieth century. Topics such as 'Civil Education,' and 'Lowell's Conception of the Duties of Citizenship' dominated.[54] Also reflective of national trends, discussions of African American schoolchildren placed them outside of the general school population of citizens. In 1903, for example, when Napa's Teacher's Institute addressed the issue of black education, they featured speeches not on citizenship but on industrial education and 'The Social Condition and Tendencies of the Negro.'[55] While the Teacher's Institute did not explicitly exclude black students from citizenship, speeches and discussions on black education were separate from discussions of citizenship suggesting that the education system had come to reflect the values of the American south, where civic education was part of white education; and manual labor was the stuff of black education. Public schools as well as privately funded institutions aimed to produce a nation of white civic leaders and laboring blacks to work for them (Harlan 1972: 63–6, 140–5).

Perhaps the role of public education is best understood as part of the constituting of modern nation-states not as groups that share a common race, religion, or language, but, as Benedict Anderson has argued, as an 'imagined community.' This imagined community became possible not only through governmental mechanisms, but through the mechanisms of culture and education – particularly newspapers (Anderson 1983: 15–16). Anderson saw both the popular press and public education as key to the imagining of national communities. Certainly in nineteenth-century Napa, what young people learned in the public schools dovetailed neatly with what they read in the popular press. Together the two created an understanding of 'American' that placed young white Protestant Americans in opposition to other citizens and residents of Napa and of the nation.[56]

White Republicanism and the local press

The local press of Napa repeatedly normalized Euro-American claims of supremacy. Like the public school rooms, the press produced and reinforced the by now familiar narrative of Euro-Americans as real Americans, while excluding all others. In Napa's press Euro-Americans claimed a superior status as Americans by valorizing the U.S. Invasion of Mexico. Immediately following the invasion, events surrounding the war were memorialized in the local paper. Euro-American participants in the war began to post notices of commemorative events in the local papers and papers adopted a language that clearly labeled Euro-American men and women as 'Americans.'[57] All other residents of the town were labeled either by broad ethnic categories or by overtly racist labels. In Napa, as in other areas of the U.S. west, these others included Californias/os, Mexican immigrants, African Americans, Chinese immigrants, and American Indians. When writers and editors for the *Napa County Reporter* wrote favorably of working-class Mexicanas/os in the 1860s and 1870s, they sometimes referred to them as 'our Mexican population.'[58] When denouncing crime and/or the people living in that same barrio, they wrote of 'the degraded men and women who live in that portion of the city.' [59] When worried about the young Euro-American men being corrupted by visiting Spanishtown, they wrote of working-class ethnic Mexican men and women as 'lousy, diseased Greasers.'[60] In August of 1868 the *Napa County Reporter* even reported that 'The residents of the savory suburb known as Spanishtown, are emulating in their way the famous strife of the Kill Kenny cats. One day this week, one of the dusky females was looking anxiously for an officer to arrest someone who had slashed a vicious cut in her head with a knife.'

By the early 1860s, the ideology of white supremacy also appeared in the local Napa press in the form of science articles by and about Louis Agassiz, the Swiss émigré to the United States, who argued that one of the primary responsibilities of scientists was to 'to settle the relative rank' among the races. Not surprisingly for this time period, Agassiz argued that northern Europeans and their descendants were at the top of the racial scale. Agassiz went so far as to embrace the theory of polygenesis, which held that 'in the beginning' God had created two unequal species of man, one white, the other black (Horsman 1981: 132–5). Agassiz also lashed out against

miscegenation, fearing the corruption of the 'white race.' Writing in 1863, he claimed that 'the production of half-breeds is as much a sin against nature, as incest in a civilized community is a sin against purity of character … . No efforts should be spared to check that which is abhorrent to our better nature, and to the progress of a higher civilization and a purer morality.'[61] In Napa, the local press ran numerous articles about and by Agassiz – at times using reprints of the articles for filler. The white townspeople of Napa even named one of their steamships after him.[62]

In the early 1860s, the battle between the Confederacy and the Union also took place in the Napa press. In this battle, the *Pacific Echo* took the side of the south, railing against 'Blackening the name of Democracy,' and Republican 'traitors' who would sell their 'birthright.'[63] The *Napa County Reporter* instead supported the Union but it did not hesitate to caricature Napa's black residents, or, for that matter, to protest strongly the possibility of black suffrage. The battle of Secession v. Union raged on in the local press until the close of the war, when the *Pacific Echo* folded. Two years later the *Napa County Reporter* itself claimed a Democratic identity and promptly began its own protests against 'Negro rule.'[64] It began to publish filler in support of the Ku Klux Klan. For example, on the fourth of July of 1868, the *Reporter* wrote, 'The Kuklux Klan are kalled upon to kastigate or kill any kullered kusses who may approve the Konstitution being konkokted by the kontemptible karpet baggers at the Kapitl.'[65] Other articles took a similar tone, calling anti-Klan townspeople 'radical' and poking fun at people who suffered violence at the hands of the Klan.[66]

In the aftermath of the Civil War, a mythology of American citizens as the descendants of a peculiarly white race made its appearance in Napa's press and the newspapers adopted an unabashed racist approach to defining American citizenship. In 1869, for example, amidst the strife surrounding the reconstruction of the American south, a poem entitled 'To the White Men of America' appeared in the *Napa County Reporter*. It read:

> Americans! Who proudly trace
> Lineage from a noble race;
> Who fill a high and honored place
> 'mong the nations of the earth:
> Where is all your freedom grand?
> See! A wretched Negro band
> Ruling o'er your southern land,
> Where white men now are slaves …
>
> Is our CHARTER now repealed,
> Which our fathers' blood has sealed? –
> Shall we, Freemen, basely yield
> The birthright of our race?
> Shall we stand where Judas stood –
> Break the bond of brotherhood –
> Force the men of our own blood
> To bow to Negro rule?[67]

While this particular poem targeted African Americans, the basic line of its argument was similar to earlier newspaper announcements and articles. Like these, it argued that Euro-Americans were the real Americans, and they were the ones who possessed the birthright called liberty.

Yet the rhetoric found in Napa's white and English-language press did not stand unchallenged. While there was no black press in Napa County itself, the *Pacific Appeal*, the black-owned and -run newspaper out of San Francisco, remained an important tool in the ideological battles over the meaning of American citizenship in Napa County. The paper covered news from throughout northern California and had representatives throughout the region. Through the *Appeal*, Napa's black business class – unlike their ethnic Mexican and Chinese counterparts – was able to actively enter onto Napa's ideological field. In May of 1862, a number of reporters and staff members from the *Appeal* visited Napa, where they were hosted by the Hattons. The *Appeal*'s initial Napa report was surprisingly positive, noting that, while black children were excluded from the public school system, there was a small number of successful farmers among the black population in Napa, and African Americans living within Napa town seemed to be treated 'civilly.'[68] Despite these positive comments, three months later the editors of the *Appeal* noted a different side to the white citizens of Napa. In an article entitled 'Negrophobia,' they addressed the racist articles that Napa's secessionist *Pacific Echo* published on a regular basis. Ironically, one of the offensive articles was a racist reaction against emancipation celebrations held in San Francisco that year – celebrations attended by the Hatton family.[69]

Lived realities

For displaced Californios, African Americans and Chinese immigrants, white supremacist ideologies and mythologies did not represent an empty fiction, but instead were reflective and constitutive of the racist society within which they lived. By 1860, the majority of people of Mexican descent in Napa lived in a barrio called Spanishtown. Over 90 per cent of Mexicano and Californio men living in this barrio appeared as laborers in the census. Census keepers listed most women living in the barrios, both married and single, as 'keeping boarders.'[70] In 1861, an ethnic Mexican man by the name of Manuel Vera was lynched while he was under custody for the shooting of a Euro-American man. Earlier in the month, the Euro-American had shot and wounded him.[71] The Euro-Americans who took Manuel Vera from the Sheriff and lynched him had blackened their faces as part of the white ritual. Chinese immigrants were similarly segregated into work camps and Chinatowns throughout the Napa Valley.[72] The local press often reported 'school boys' performing what they called 'pranks' on the residents of these areas, cutting off men's queues and knocking laundry out of their hands as they walked down the streets.[73] In the 1890s, at the height of the anti-Chinese movement in California, Napa's Euro-Americans formed a White Labor Union and drove the Chinese immigrant population from the area.[74]

While a number of scholars have noted the role of the press in creating a national identity, it is important to recognize that the American press of this era was very much a local production, as were the country's schools. National identities and claims to citizenship were as much constructed in small towns, through the local press and in public school classrooms, as at the macro level through textbooks and national political debates. When the lessons of the *McGuffey Readers* are read together with Napa's local press, their ideological messages appear even more powerful. With schoolbooks and newspapers alike telling young white children that they were better than everyone else in Napa, it was scarcely surprising that some of them took that lesson to heart, by physically attacking racialized minorities in the streets.[75] The local press in conjunction with public schools played a critical role in establishing white supremacy in the county of Napa and the greater U.S. west throughout the late nineteenth century. That local struggle over access to citizenship and representation as American continues today, as do larger macro issues of rights and citizenship, of which these struggles have long been a part.

3 The prehistory of the *Cadenú*

Dominican identity, social class, and the problem of mobility, 1965–78

Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof

In 1986 a group of Dominican businessmen from New York, owners of supermarkets, travel agencies, and small factories, organized a press conference in Santo Domingo. They announced the inauguration of a campaign to improve the image of Dominican New Yorkers in their native land. 'In the Dominican Republic,' a spokesman complained, 'there exists a widespread belief that everyone who has made his fortune [in New York] has built it on the basis of drug selling and other illegal activities.'[1] Twenty years after the first flood of Dominican migrants began settling in New York, those sojourners who returned to their native land faced emerging prejudices expressed in two newly coined words. *Dominicanyork* referred broadly to the migrant community gone bad. *Cadenú* referred to the gold chains that some migrants took to wearing in the early years of hip hop. Both had become derogatory shorthand for a new kind of Dominican, soiled by life in the United States. Both also came to express the danger that the corrosion of Dominican identity in New York might seep back across the border. Newspapers, the police, and the national government all commonly and offhandedly blamed the influence of *Dominicanyork* and *cadenuses* for an ungovernable and violent experience of urban growth in Santo Domingo (Torres-Saillant 1999).

The New Yorkers who organized to combat these stereotypes did not deny that there were corrupt Dominicans living in the United States. They sought rather to distinguish between themselves and the few bad apples. And they sought to define the migrant community at large in their own self-congratulatory image as hard-working, long-suffering, and patriotic entrepreneurs. Most of all, they wished to remove the impediment that stereotypes about New York placed in the way of their efforts to construct respectable middle-class identities in the Dominican Republic. The middle 1980s were the best of times for Dominicans who had made even modest economic gains in New York to make a triumphant return to the island. Like many Latin American countries in those years, the Dominican Republic sputtered through a tenuous transition to democracy and a series of economic catastrophes. A newly favorable exchange rate and the end of the long authoritarian regime opened up space for New Yorkers with dollars to emerge on the national economic stage. As international lenders began to shun Dominican borrowers, cash-poor politicians, bankers, and developers all began

strategically to court the migrants who had, for more than a decade, slipped below their radar screen. As one of the most important financial capitalists in Santo Domingo put it, the dollars earned by Dominicans in New York were 'one of the true riches of the country.'[2] Migrants also showed a remarkable eagerness to buy homes and businesses on the island, if not to take up full-time residence. Leading figures in the real estate industry estimated that New Yorkers accounted for between 65 and 70 percent of on-the-books new home purchases in the Dominican Republic between 1984 and 1986 (Guarnizo 1992; Murray 1996).[3]

The homecoming was, however, embittered by the emergence of prejudices that impugned the culture and integrity of migrants, casting a dark shadow over their efforts to buy homes in respectable neighborhoods and otherwise to participate in middle-class social life (Guarnizo 1997). In part, these prejudices reflected a second growing crisis, an urban crisis in New York, that overlapped uncomfortably with the debt crises in Latin America. A shift in U.S. national politics away from social spending on cities and a widespread economic restructuring in the industrial north drained resources from immigrant neighborhoods. Even as some early migrants navigated the transition to ethnic entrepreneurship or professional status, working-class Dominican migrants increasingly endured unemployment, failing schools, and substandard housing (Sassen 1990; Sugrue 1996; Waldinger 1986). In their schools and neighborhoods, Dominican youth participated in an emerging explosion of 'urban' musical and consumer styles. Young Dominicans in New York invented their ethnicities in tense negotiation with the mainstream media and the youth rebellions and racial identities of black and Puerto Rican classmates. Meanwhile a politics hostile to the poor and a boom in sensationalist Anglo-American journalism targeted Dominicans as symbols of urban decay, illegality, and drug-selling (Jackall 1997; Hartman and Golub 1999).

Given the porous nature of the borders between the Dominican Republic and the United States it is perhaps unsurprising that both the expressive styles of New York City and derogatory images of migrants would have seeped into Dominican public life, along with a handful of migrants who had actually made fortunes as drug dealers. A snapshot of relations between the Dominican Republic and its New York diaspora in 1986 would show that many young Dominicans, migrant and non-migrant, adopted an 'urban' style, perhaps to express their own marginalization in national and global social systems. There is no evidence however that these young Dominicans identified themselves as a coherent subculture, or used the term *cadenú* to describe themselves. Their styles often blended seamlessly into a more generalized trend in Dominican popular culture, to define well-being around consumer comfort and modern fashion. But Dominican elites and the non-migrant middle class cast the carriers of these styles as deviant 'folk devils,' to use Dick Hebdige's term. The invented category of the *cadenú* in particular, and migrants more generally, were 'treated at different times as threats to public order and harmless buffoons' (Hebdige 2002: 2). The caricature of young male migrants as corrupt and bizarrely adorned helped national elites and non-migrant middle classes to distance themselves from

upwardly mobile migrants, or to domesticate them as they tried to join the Dominican middle class. In response, a handful of vociferous businessmen from New York tried, for the purposes of protecting their own respectability, to distance themselves from those styles and to bleach the stains of corruption from the image of the New York community. Their efforts struck a chord with many working-class migrants, who also desired respectability even if this meant concealing the severe exploitation and social disarray that was befalling them in New York.

As in so much of Dominican history, the back and forth over class, corruption, and national identity in the middle 1980s, kept the question of race eerily obscured from view. As I have noted elsewhere at length, Dominican youth styles in the United States emerged not only in dialogue with popular culture on the island, but also with United States black and Puerto Rican subcultures in Manhattan. Central to the negotiation of Dominican identity in New York was the process of becoming a non-white ethnicity (Hoffnung-Garskof 2002). It seems reasonable, therefore, to presume that Dominicans imagined migrant youth as socially darkened by their experience abroad. But the historical record shows a strange reticence on the matter of race and the *cadenuses*. Since commentators in the Dominican Republic were hardly innocent about the relationship between urban poverty and race in the U.S., one suspects that the encounter between Dominican and United States racial systems was so disconcerting that it was simply impossible to narrate, except in the broadest outlines. Many commentators observed that white racists discriminated against Dominicans in New York. A few hopeful scholars hoped that Dominicans exposed to U.S. racial ideas were learning to recognize the latent racism in their own society (Moya Pons 1981). But if young migrants were trying, with their clothes and postures, to say something about their racial identities, the talkative members of Dominican public life chose not to listen.

Further research will surely expand this brief outline, uncovering multiple class, racial, and gendered meanings of the expressions that came to be called the *cadenú* and the angry clamor that these styles inspired. This chapter, however, seeks to connect the contention over the *cadenú* in the middle 1980s to a deeper history of ideas and debates about Dominican identity in a world of mobile people, mobile cultures, and unequal power. Particularly it asks how Dominicans began to make sense of the migrants and youth cultures that began flooding across national boundaries in the 1960s and 1970s. Historians of immigration typically ask how immigrants invented new ethnic identities in dialogue with mainstream ideas about national belonging in the United States. This chapter shifts the practice of immigration history onto Latin American terrain, showing how Dominican migrants negotiated their identity, just as crucially, through an evolving dialogue with Dominican ideas about national belonging. As part of my broader work on the historical relationship between New York and Santo Domingo, it offers a new interpretive approach to immigration history, an attempt to weave the history of Latino experience in the United States into the tapestry of Latin American society and culture in the twentieth century (Duany 2002).

This approach resonates with the attention to durable ties between immigrants and sending societies that has fully permeated the contemporary practices of immigration sociology and anthropology over the past decade. (Itzigsohn *et al.* 1999; Kivisto 2001; Portes *et al.* 1999). Historians, however, while content to imagine their subjects as transnational, themselves do not frequently construct research projects that touch down in more than one national terrain. Yet the methods and resources of history can offer a useful complement to the social scientific literature on transnationalism.

Historians can help trace the evolution of meanings, often contested and historically contingent, surrounding the fluid economic practices, family networks, international politics, and class structures that predominate in immigration sociology. And they can offer more depth to culturally rich anthropological accounts of transnationalism. It is crucial, for instance, to understand the *cadenú* from within the deep history of Dominican ideas about self and other, rather than to imagine it as one of a set of new identities created out of whole cloth by a moment of migration or 'globalization.' The problem of migration and the economic conjuncture of the 1980s merely disrupted and reshaped the older predicaments of Dominican national identity formed in the twin shadows of United States imperialism and the Haitian frontier. Long before the great boom in international migration began, and even longer before the liberalization of Dominican markets, the boundaries around this identity had never been firmly drawn. Nor had the Dominican popular sectors within national territory ever conformed to the expectations of nationalists. To the contrary, the nationalism of the state, of elites, and of intellectuals often used an imaginary line between what was Dominican and what was properly from Haiti or the U.S. as a weapon against Dominican middle classes and peasants. And upwardly mobile Dominicans often used consumer symbols imported from the United States, to escape the constrictions of social hierarchy in the Dominican Republic (Derby 1997; Turits 2002).

This chapter therefore proposes a prehistory of the *cadenú* as a window onto the history of Dominican national identity in the late twentieth century. Appadurai has suggested that the continual, simultaneous movement of people and cultures across national boundaries has reshaped the problem of belonging in the contemporary world (Appadurai 1991). A prehistory of the *cadenú* offers an opportunity to examine this proposal in historical depth, alternating between the perspective of the imperial periphery and the metropole. The analysis is presented in three parts. The first section sketches the evolution of Dominican ideas about border-crossing people. It begins, in the early 1970s, with the attempts by migrants themselves to narrate their experience to audiences in the Dominican Republic. It then considers the responses of non-migrant Dominicans, who drew on older Dominican ideas about class distinction and rural-to-urban migration in fashioning an ambivalent response to migrant class mobility. The second section traces the ways that Dominican public life has encountered border-crossing cultures, especially the Anglo-American youth subcultures that prefigured hip hop, rock and roll, hippy styles, disco dancing. It, too, looks to deep Dominican

and Ibero-American traditions of ambivalence about modernity and foreign influence as a context for the controversies of the 1960s and 1970s. Section three considers how this deep and contentious history of Dominican ideas about the national self and the imperial other permeated, not only the reactions of islanders to returning migrants, but the very process of ethnic definition in New York in the 1970s. Activist voices in Dominican New York helped to wed older ideas about migration to ideas about United States cultural influence, constructing a critique of migrant ethnicity that immediately prefigured the broader reaction to the *cadenú*.

Narrating migrant progress

Decades before the 1986 campaign to improve their image on the island, Dominican migrants initiated a dialogue with the homeland public over the meaning of migration. In their reports to friends and family they drew on rich Dominican intellectual resources about social mobility and respectability, highlighting their economic 'progress,' generosity, and deep love for the Dominican Republic (Hoffnung-Garskof 2002). Beginning in the late 1960s, they constructed these messages principally through their visits to the island. Under the Trujillo dictatorship, and during the tumultuous six years that followed his assassination, only a handful of Dominicans with permanent residence abroad had the daring to risk a visit to the Republic. But the number of Dominicans living and working in New York swelled as Santo Domingo returned to relative normalcy under the successor regime led by Joaquín Balaguer (1966–78). Migrants became the bulk of the vacationers welcomed by the new tourist industry. In 1967, 5,000 Dominicans with permanent residence abroad arrived as tourists at the Airport of the Americas. In 1971, the number was 20,000, and by 1975, 45,000.[4] These visitors filtered out of the airport into the towns and neighborhoods of the Dominican Republic, providing a form of public theater about the opportunities for progress available in New York. The image most prominently burned in the consciousness of non-migrants was the display of opulence presented by well-dressed passengers filing out of the airport burdened by teetering mounds of luggage, and then, as vacationers, joyfully buying food, beer, rum (and many times, in the case of male migrants, women) to the wonder of family and neighbors (Hendricks 1974).

Dominican New Yorkers made similar interventions in the magazines and newspapers published in Santo Domingo. The newsstands in the neighborhoods of Upper Manhattan were famous for daily gatherings of Dominicans reading and arguing about national news. *El Nacional*, the most read evening paper in Santo Domingo, and *¡Ahora!*, the capital's most prominent weekly news magazine, both circulated widely in New York beginning in the late 1960s.[5] This was, as has often been observed, a measure of the continued homeward orientation of Dominican settlers (Duany 1994). Migrants preferred news from the island to local papers. But the Santo Domingo press also gradually responded to the growing readership and market in New York by providing Dominican New

Yorkers the opportunity to present images of themselves, their politics, or the *colonia* in general in the Santo Domingo press. Dozens of activists, leaders, and would-be public figures produced a flourishing of social and political announcements. Small business-owners, migrants who had turned factory wages into investments in corner grocery stores or travel agencies, made use of national newspapers to broadcast messages about their personal triumphs.

The most impressive example of this was the creation, in 1971, of a special monthly section in *El Nacional* called 'Dominicanos en New York,' dedicated to paid messages by Dominican New Yorkers. Two enterprising Dominicans, Elías Lama and Pedro de León, offered open access to the public in Santo Domingo in the form of paid advertising. Lama and de León traveled door-to-door in Dominican business districts in New York selling space in their supplement. Since *El Nacional* had a wide readership in New York, it made perfect sense to advertise there. But Lama and de León were clear that they had another purpose as well. 'Dominicanos en New York' was a way to 'bring the readers of this newspaper, announcements and reports with photographs, of our compatriots who struggle to achieve a good future.'[6] This section offered migrants an opportunity to narrate triumphant personal stories of success to a Dominican public. In 1971 and 1972, 'Dominicanos en New York' published hundreds of advertisements for *bodegas*, furniture stores, nightclubs, and apparel factories, along Amsterdam Avenue, in Corona, and in Washington Heights. In most cases, a photograph of the migrant family behind the counter at the *bodega* or bakery was sufficient to communicate the message. But an ad for the Hoe Ave Laundry Service in the Bronx, for instance, described how 'in his 20 years of residence in the United States,' its owner, Mr Martínez, 'has managed to create a situation for himself that is quite comfortable.' The biography of Martínez described his laundromat, his supermarket, his rental properties, and also his home in Connecticut.[7]

Dominican New Yorkers also found ways, in collaboration with editors in Santo Domingo, to emphasize their patriotism and charity towards those suffering in the Dominican Republic. Sometimes this was simply a matter of the right contact with a reporter in New York, as when journalist Hector Chacón profiled the owner of the Quisqueya Exchange Corporation, with offices in Washington Heights, Queens, and Ensanche Espaillat. A photograph showed the owner, José Durán Ayala, handing out holiday bonuses to his employees.[8] But, beginning in the early 1970s, individual Dominican New Yorkers found direct access to *El Nacional*, which published scores of articles about migrants' acts of charity on behalf of helpless Dominican orphans, sick children, and desperate widows. Typically, the newspaper would report on needy cases and Dominicans in New York would send checks directly to the editors. The paper then published photographs of *El Nacional* employees (usually attractive young women) handing over the money, and printed articles about the generosity of the donors, under headlines like 'The Colony in NY Helps the Poor.'[9] These reports projected not only the relative economic power of migrants but also their generosity and their love of their homeland.

The correspondents and editors, who presided over this boom in reporting from the New York *colonia*, contributed their own generalized boosterism to these individual narratives of progress and generosity. *El Nacional*, for instance, accompanied reports of migrants' charity with statements like 'The Dominicans who live in the United States remain concerned with those of us who are still here.'[10] Likewise, Miguel Rodríguez O., author of *¡Ahora!*'s regular feature on Dominicans in New York, told his readers in Santo Domingo, 'You can be assured that all of them are working. And that thousands have progressed, owning *bodegas*, restaurants, barbershops, travel agencies, factories, etc. Many own their homes, have cars, and live comfortably.'[11] Similarly, at Christmas in 1971, *El Nacional* paid homage to Dominican professionals in New York, while publishing a full page of their paid personal messages. 'As *quisqueyanos* we feel proud of the position occupied by the Dominican colony in the Hispanic community, to which it has contributed multiple *valores*, from the hard-working factory operatives to the industrialists, the merchants, and most notably the professionals, whose holiday greetings we are publishing today.'[12]

Making sense of mobile people: migrants, class, and the Dominican national predicament

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, settlers in New York were the first, and most vocal Dominicans to articulate an idea of what migration meant for the nation. Despite a pronounced nostalgia for home and complaints about the cold, they were relentlessly positive in their outlook. Migration meant work and progress. Many Dominicans accepted, and even embellished, migrant narratives of triumph. Within a worldview where the United States was modern, wealthy, and powerful and the Dominican Republic was backwards, poor, and weak, it made sense that moving to the seat of empire would offer some trappings of modernity, wealth, and power. Migrants' economic power was evident during their visits to the island and in the money orders they sent. This evidence supported migrant narratives of progress producing the great celebrity of Dominican New Yorkers that anthropologists in the Dominican countryside began documenting in the late 1960s (Georges 1990; Hendricks 1974).

But these early and active accounts did not hold a monopoly on Dominican thinking about people crossing national borders. During the 1970s, many on the island came to regard the messages of social advancement and triumph coming from New York with suspicion. A contrary set of narratives, prefiguring the *cadenú*, portrayed migrants as hapless Dominican peasants who had managed only a shallow material improvement in New York. In the words of Monsignor Roque Adames, the Archbishop of Santiago who visited New York in the winter of 1971, 'the progress of the Dominican in New York is limited to work, food, and clothing.'[13] Migrant claims to social respectability were therefore often viewed as comical. 'People saw [the migrant],' recalled Bonaparte Gratreaux-Piñeyro, the first editor of the New York edition of *El Nacional*, 'as an ostentatious character, as a show-off, as a buffoon.'[14] Pedro Ubiera, a student leader in the

1960s and human rights activist in the 1970s, recalled laughing with his middle-class friends, 'this type of guy would come trying to project the image of what he thought was the best from over there … so people made fun of him … maybe he came with a jacket that was too warm for the climate, you know, and you said to yourself, 'Poor devil!'[15] The poor migrant devils had improved their financial circumstances, but they inevitably betrayed their humble origins despite their careful dress and posture.

The idiosyncrasy of oral histories and the diffuse documentary record make it difficult to determine exactly who deployed this notion of shallow migrant progress, and to what purpose. Traditional Dominican elites were a small, aloof clique. They may well have belittled migrants to solidify their own status. But it seems likely that they were joined by those Dominicans newly and provisionally admitted into the middle class without moving to the United States. At the same time that many migrants departed for New York, other Dominicans from non-elite origins fought their way into the secondary schools of the capital and into a newly democratic state university (Tejeda Ortíz 1969). Fafa Taveras, a radical student and political leader from the period, recalled that for the generation of Dominicans who came of age under Balaguer, 'the university was the only escape.'[16] Students on campus in the lean years of authoritarianism consoled themselves with an ideology that saw class mobility as a distant reward for education and self-cultivation under austere and difficult conditions. And, while in practice political patronage was a much more effective means than education for economic advancement, many students imagined that some day a democratic government would open the doors to their hard-won social mobility.

It was perhaps the continual postponement of these hopes that rubbed so uncomfortably against the messages of progress projected by migrants, producing stereotypes that exaggerated the speed and shallowness of the migrant road to economic success. But postponement gave way to profound disillusionment in the 1980s. After 1978, the sugar economy had collapsed and the democratically elected Partido Revolucionario Dominicano failed to bring the social transformation it had promised during twelve years of exile. The students of the 1970s found their long-awaited professional status devalued in the new democratic regime of the 1980s. In 1970 there were three medical schools in the Dominican Republic producing 2,400 doctors, and in 1983 there were thirteen medical schools producing 13,895 doctors. But their degrees offered no promise of stable income (Ortíz 1994). This disillusionment seems a likely source of energy producing the insulting stereotypes that prefigured the *cadenú*. Taveras recalled, when 'an imposter with no education could come and show you those symbols of opulence, chains, cars, booze, and money to spend on women, it produced a reaction' (from author's interview with Taveras, Santo Domingo, 1999).

Whatever its most immediate uses, the idea of migrants as 'poor devils' and of their progress as shallow and materialistic drew life from two intellectual contexts. First, it relied on a Dominican tradition of class distinction. Elite Dominicans had long understood attempts by non-elites to move across class boundaries as unfortunate appropriations of shallow, egalitarian materialism

from the United States. Second, it depended heavily on the complex of ideas that Dominicans developed after the mid-century to explain movement from the countryside to the city. In a country in rapid, often uncomfortable, transformation from a rural to an urban society, *campesino* migrants were powerful symbols of rapid change. They were also convenient markers of a national predicament of sudden and uneven modernization in the face of powerful outside influences. Each of these intellectual contexts, ways of thinking about people who moved across boundaries of class and ways of thinking about people who moved across the boundary between rural and urban, informed and shaped the ways that Dominicans talked about international migration.

When Dominicans like Monsignor Roque Adames commented that migrants had only progressed materially, he borrowed from a historical Dominican distinction between the mere economic progress of the menacingly expansive United States and the more meaningful cultural or spiritual achievement of embattled Latin America. At the turn of the twentieth century, Dominican intellectuals borrowed from the German writer Oswald Spengler and the Uruguayan thinker José Enrique Rodó to condemn North American civilization as crass and materialistic, and to warn against its spreading influence over Latin American people. Dominican elites articulated this kind of nationalism, historian Lauren Derby has shown, in response not only to the growing imperial power of the United States, but also to the growing economic might of a new Dominican social class that arose in association with foreign sugar interests. Formerly lacking in social category, newly rich Dominicans in the early 1900s demonstrated their wealth by purchasing imported products and imitating the consumption styles of the United States. In response, the old oligarchy clung not only to symbols of patriotism and anti-imperialism, but also to the notion of a spiritual and culturally refined Dominican identity that was superior to U.S. materialism. Culture, as the influential Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gassett wrote, was the opposite of democracy. Refined culture was a kind of aristocratic Dominican national identity, unavailable through economic advancement and foreign consumer goods (Derby 1998; Ortega y Gasset 1954 [14th edition]; Rodó 1988; Spengler 1923).

This contentious dynamic of cultural nationalism, upward mobility, and class distinction underwrote the contrary reaction migrant narratives received in Santo Domingo too, and prefigured the uproar over the *cadenú*. As in the early days of the twentieth century, migration offered a realignment of class and consumption through a new relationship with the United States. Migrants had the wealth to present themselves as modern consumers, and their experience of migration as progress. Since they were not members of the traditional national elite, they often relied on consumer goods to narrate their progress and assert their status. In essence they recapitulated, on a much more massive scale, an earlier strategy of mobility, which sought opportunities for social advancement in the gaps opened by the workings of empire. Those who mocked migrant visitors at the Airport of the Americas in the 1970s, or who made *cadenuses* into folk devils, condescendingly recapitulated this distinction between the culturally

elevated national self, and materialist foreign influences. Dominicans who turned to consumer goods to express their movement across class boundaries were hollow, materialist, and divorced from their national essence.[17]

Dominican traditions in understanding movement across class boundaries crucially framed the conversation about international migration. But perhaps as crucial were prevailing ideas about the movement of people from the countryside to the city. A modest town of 30,000 residents in 1920, Santo Domingo was by 1950 a city of 181,553. By 1970 its population had grown to 673,470. In that year, excluding migrants from the rural areas and towns immediately surrounding the capital city, rural migrants in Santo Domingo equaled more than half of the city's population and almost one-tenth of the national population (Duarte 1980). Yet this was only the beginning of the process. By the middle of the 1980s, the majority of the country would live in urban areas, as compared to 23 percent in 1950. And in 1993 the total population of Santo Domingo was estimated at slightly over two million, or about one quarter of the national population (Ramírez 1997; Lozano 1997). Many hundreds of thousands of the new city-dwellers lived precariously in shanty-towns in the spaces in and around the modern capital city. This massive mobilization of population, and the kinds of narratives it produced about movement, were the primary resources that Dominicans had available to make sense of international migration. 'Migrant' was a concept laden with assumptions about social class and rurality, in many ways identical to the more common appellation, *campesino* (González 1970). To move around in the world meant to be poor, desperate, and backwards.

The most basic consequence that the simultaneous and much more massive rural exodus to the cities produced for Dominican understandings of international migration was the widespread, untested assumption that Dominican New Yorkers originated in the poorest, most marginal sectors of Dominican society, that they were *campesinos*. This notion that Dominican New Yorkers were *campesinos* was shared across the political spectrum in the 1970s and early 1980s. But commentators from different political camps put the idea to differing uses. Conservatives in Santo Domingo, including the Balaguer government, saw rural migrants as the poor, ignorant, and troublemaking dregs of Dominican society. They were the primary obstacle to progress in the Dominican Republic. And it took little imagination to extend this view to international migrants (García Bonnelly 1971). The conservative newspapers *Santo Domingo News* and *El Caribe* published in the bluntest of terms the assertion that 'a great majority of the Dominican colony in New York is made up of peasants, workers without any skills, social outcasts (*marginados*), and political agitators.'[18] For left-wing sociologists, rural migrants in the Dominican Republic were, to the contrary, unfortunate symbols of misguided development projects and international economic oppression. Migrants and surplus populations were central to their overall critique of dependent capitalist development (Duarte 1980). Rural development and enclosure had produced a class of unincorporated, underfed Dominican peasants, who were forced tearfully into the abyss of Dominican

cities. This perspective was then extrapolated to explain the migration of Dominicans, displaced by imperial policies, into the unwelcoming maw of the international labor market (González 1970; Hendricks 1974; Weisz 1973).

The most striking thing about the incorporation of international migrants into models created to explain the marginal rural surplus was that it diverged radically from the underlying demographic reality of migration. In fact, a 1974 household survey of the Dominican Republic showed a strong urban 'middle-class' bias in the movement to New York. (Ugalde *et al.* 1979; Del Castillo 1987) While demographic data on Dominican migrants is still incomplete and unreliable, the sum total suggests that, during the first decades of migration, Dominican New Yorkers originated, in their majority, from an ambitious lower-middle sector. Most had some experience living in cities, especially Santo Domingo, before leaving for New York. Migrants were also wealthier and more educated than average Dominicans. They were perhaps more similar in their origins to the upwardly mobile lower, and middle-middle class in Santo Domingo, who had flooded the public high schools and university in these years. They were laborers, artisans, public employees, and owners of small stores or farms. In the eyes of Dominican elites they may have been *campesinos*. In the heterogeneous *barrios* of Santo Domingo and Santiago, and in the towns of the provinces, they were a privileged group. Living among the very poor and the desperately poor, they were middle class.

Misreading the social origins of Dominican New Yorkers helped highlight the comic and shallow nature of their claims to middle-class respectability. These were *campesinos* dressed in the consumer trappings of a distant modern society. It therefore amplified the messages of class prejudice directed at Dominican New Yorkers. But there was more than self-serving snobbery behind this maneuver. Making international migrants into *campesinos* displaced by powerful forces to the confusing modern world did not always mean seeing them as irredeemably other. It also meant making them symbols of Dominican identity in the transition to modernity. The Dominican Republic was literally a nation of migrants, and caricatures about migrants served largely as symbols for national identity.

In the 1970s, for instance, the comic sketches on a morning radio program in Santo Domingo expressed the theme of rapid displacement from comfortable backwardness to confusing modernity in person of a migrant. The figure of Don Cibaíto, portrayed by actor Julio César Matías and depicted in dozens of advertisements for modern products and appliances by cartoonist Fernando Hoepelmán, was a *campesino* from the fictional town of Nabá muy adentro, who reported his adventures 'down the "rough hewn roads" of the big city' to his *compadre* back in the village. In stylized Ciabeño dialect he explained all manner of strange modern phenomena, from airplanes, to phones, to the city itself. Often the things he described were senseless or confusing. 'But what is modern is modern, compadre, even if it is ugly, expensive, and in bad taste. You have to be up to date because if you are not they criticize you, they call you a hick, a wild man, or an illiterate.'[19] Don Cibaíto was an insulting stereotype, closely related to the negative images many Dominicans were forming about migrants to New

York. But he was also a symbol of Dominican identity laden with affectionate self-deprecation and an ambivalent attitude toward imported modernities. Like all Dominicans Don Cibaíto lived, as one commentator put it, on the 'very margin of civilization.' Like Dominicans in general he was new to the commonplaces of modernity. Yet often he was clever and modernity was crazy. And always he was virtuous and modernity was corrupt (Rodríguez Creus 1973).

Just as sociologists concluded *a fortiori* that migrants to New York were symbols of misguided rural development, in the hands of national humorists international migrants too were apt symbols for a more generalized comic view of the Dominican Republic as continually confronted by novel and supposedly superior ways of living, but not yet prepared to understand them. If these things were true about Dominicans moving to the city, they must be even more starkly true about Dominicans moving to The City. This sensibility did not require serious inquiry into the origins of Dominican migration, nor did it even require many Dominicans in New York. In the 1950s, a decade before mass migration to the United States began in earnest, Mercedes Sagredo had a hit with a merengue titled 'Del burro al subway,' about a *campesino* comically out of place among the skyscrapers and subway trains of Manhattan. 'What a great change' she wrote, 'from the mule to the subway' (Rodríguez de León 1998: 240). The contrast proved remarkably durable. Forty years later, the comedian Luisito Martí would cement this image of the loveable migrant simpleton in New York, performing the character Balbuena in television sketches and the feature film *Nueba Yol* (1996). This kind of sympathetic but condescending caricature of the migrant as representative of the nation, like the scholarly notions of migrants as obstacles to modernization or victims of capitalism, resonated with the class prejudice of middle-class and elite intellectuals. As the sense Dominicans made of people moving across the boundaries separating social classes, the city from the countryside, and the colony from the metropole blurred into each other, the mix offered resources for understanding the predicament of national identity and for the suspicious reception of migrant claims to progress in the 1970s and 1980s.

Modernity, imperialism, and corruption

The evolution of Dominican ideas about mobile people substantially framed the emergence of the *cadenú*. But *cadenuses* were not the same as migrants. They were explicitly identified on the basis of their use of clothing styles marked as modern and foreign. The prehistory of the *cadenú* therefore resides equally in the ways that Dominicans made sense of foreign styles, especially youth styles, before the middle 1980s. This section reviews the question of imported youth subcultures in Dominican public discourse, from the twist to *Saturday Night Fever* (a phenomenon Dominicans referred to as *travoltismo*). Its necessary brevity will likely leave some readers wishing for more detailed analysis of the content of each of these distinct styles, as indeed for more attention to the expressive content of the styles related to the *cadenú*. Elsewhere I have delved deeper into the shifting local meanings of hippy dress and *travoltismo* on different sides of

national and class boundaries (Hoffnung-Garskof 2002). Here the focus is on the public clamor about the spread, or supposed spread, of those styles among Dominican youth. This is an attempt to understand the historical foundation on which the idea of *cadenuses* was built. It therefore particularly traces the link that many Dominicans made between foreign or modern cultures (often without regard for the specificities of their content), threats to national integrity, and moral decay.

This particular link between the foreign, the modern, and the corrupt owes crucially to the influence of Roman Catholic critiques of modernity on Dominican nationalism. The Latin American church, and conservatives in general, inherited a Spanish colonial aversion to forms of political representation, economic organization, and social life that presented themselves as 'modern' in contrast with the 'traditions' of monarchy, mercantilism, church privilege, and social hierarchy.

Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, as liberal experiments at state-building ran aground, and as the United States began to present itself as both irrepressibly modern and threateningly expansionist, the prospect of modernization and the associated spread of U.S. cultural influences produced a profound ambivalence among Dominican intellectuals. Particularly after the rapid transformation of the eastern Dominican Republic under the guidance of the U.S. sugar trusts, Dominican elites began to imagine certain kinds of modernization as chaotic and corrupting. On the one hand, the liberal ideals of progress, defined especially by the growth of market capitalism, continued to capture the elite imagination. But Dominican thinkers blended the Catholic critiques of modernity, anti-imperialism, and cultural nationalism into their prescriptions for national progress. Carefully controlled *Dominican* modernization was to be preferred to the threatening and culturally polluting foreign modernization offered by the United States (Derby 1997; González 1993; López 1991; Turits 2003).

This nascent cultural nationalism first attached itself to popular dance styles under the U.S. military occupation of 1916 and 1924. Dominican elites from Santiago turned to rural Dominican folklore and the supposed ardent Catholicism of the *campesino*, as a resource for a national identity resistant to the occupiers. They incorporated the previously ignored merengue, forcibly redefined as the dance of the white, Catholic, rural Dominican, as a national alternative to foxtrot and jitterbug in their dance halls. Dictator Rafael Trujillo, who ruled the Dominican Republic from 1930–61, inherited this symbolic anti-imperialist nationalism from a loyal coterie of intellectuals (Austerlitz 1997). And from Catholic fascism in Europe he inherited a new language positing a strong state, allied with the church, as necessary to protect the nation from the disorder, social conflict, and cultural decline that democracy and capitalism inflicted (Payne 1961). A harsh hand was needed to steer the course of progress while preserving the national values of the Catholic, simple, well-behaved, decent, hard-working Dominicanos. Trujillo claimed to protect Dominican *valores* from both the backwards infection of Haitian influence and the broader world of modern degeneracy, 'the universal crisis that tortures humanity.' The dictator would revert

the Republic to its 'noble and ancient values.' Social order, distribution of land in the countryside, well-policed neighborhoods in the capital, strict control over foreign travel, and restrictions on foreign media would guide the Dominican people through the treacherous waters of modernization. Dipping into the store of Latin American spiritualism, Trujillo called for 'an internal purification that will move men to change their materialist and skeptical attitude, and accept a vibrant, energetic, and emotional one' (Derby 1998; García Bonnelly 1955).

This control included a state imposition of merengue as the national dance music and, in the late 1950s, prohibitions on certain foreign music and film. Rock and roll, the National Commission on Public Spectacles and Radio Broadcasts argued in its ban of *Rock around the Clock*, was 'a frenetic exaltation of spirit, which leads to a derailment of the moral character at the expense of the collective good.'[20] In the wake of Trujillo's assassination, controls on radio, movies, and television in the Dominican Republic relaxed just as Anglo-American popular cultures transformed the airwaves of the world with rock and roll. A generation of young Dominicans starved for contact with the outside world and convinced of its own backwardness turned happily to 'modern' music, 'modern' dress, 'modern' hairstyles, 'modern' ideas about female sexuality. But guardians of Dominican identity regarded these foreign cultural elements suspiciously as dangerous trappings of modernity. Cassandra Damirón, a popular singer and major cultural figure in the Balaguer regime, waged a campaign to protect merengue from the influences of morally suspect foreign dances (Ventura 1998). The opening of Dominican society had unfortunately allowed for the spread of 'exciting rhythms, full of sensuality and even madness, that like rock and roll, encourage sexual immorality with their lascivious movements.'[21] Trujillo's eventual successor, Joaquín Balaguer, attacked 'the insubordination of children against the power of their fathers, and *extremely licentious* behaviors.' The nation was suffering, he said, 'from this wave of paganism, of pathological aberration and of sensuality. Nothing is free of it in the contemporary world, and it is logical that its effects would reach even to those realms that had remained immune to these evils, which belong rightly to a culture in decadence.'[22]

Balaguer was an ardent modernizer, but his right-wing, Catholic populism portrayed the course of progress as fraught with the pitfalls of corruption. A small, traditional nation needed a strong dose of authoritarianism to prevent the virus of modern life from spreading. This not only deflected the discussion of 'corruption' from the widespread theft and bribery carried out by his regime, it also justified government repression of young people in the opposition. Balaguer's police waged a campaign of aggression against young people with 'strange' styles, long hair, or other imported symbols of youth identity. The police trained by Balaguer and his allies in the U.S. State Department, targeted 'beatniks,' 'weirdoes,' and 'long-hairs,' along with the olive drab pants, black tee shirts, beards, and berets that Dominican revolutionaries actually preferred. One man, who had been a teenager in Santo Domingo in the 1970s, remembered, 'if you had long hair you could land in jail.'[23] And migrants returning with 'strange' clothes or hairstyles fell in the same net. One young man's struggle 'so

as not to lose his long mane at the hands of the police in the Capital' after returning from Puerto Rico actually made the Santo Domingo newspapers in 1971.[24] This translated easily in the 1980s, as the transition to democracy and the increasing visibility of 'weirdoes' with hip hop flare could be read as a simultaneous breakdown of order and morality. The mere strangeness and modernity of their clothes was a sign of dubious moral contamination.

To a North American audience the idea that long hair or rock and roll would seem a threat to the right may seem logical. But that these same styles would *simultaneously* seem a moral threat to the left may seem strange. The authoritarian right, however, had no monopoly on nationalist or Catholic ideas about the corrupting dangers of modern, foreign cultural traits. Opponents of the Balaguer regime held the U.S. invasion of 1965 responsible for the failure of projects for social justice and cultural renewal in Santo Domingo. To them, cultures imported from the United States were part and parcel of the imperial project. Only a few years earlier, rock and roll had seemed a soundtrack of coming democracy and progress. After 1965, Dominican students produced a nationalist uproar of their own against new cultural influences like Nueva Ola and hippies. It was Balaguer, these critics argued, who conspired with the United States embassy to flood the Dominican Republic with U.S. advisors, investors, and products. It was he who had forged the hundreds of new millionaires and the thousands of new upper-middle-class teenagers who studied in elite American schools and who frequently traveled as tourists to New York or Miami. The new rock music and hippy hairstyles, the social democratic opposition argued, were a clear symbol of the 'servile imitation, out of snobbery, of foreign fashions and trends'[25] that defined Balaguer's constituency. In high schools and universities where anti-imperialist politics easily shouted down all opposition, the 'gringos,' as returned Dominican New Yorkers were called, and the 'hippies' were considered degenerates, drug addicts, and traitors to the revolution.[26]

Leftists, that is, also saw American influences as a source of degeneracy and delinquency among young people infected by 'cultural penetration.' They borrowed the idea of 'national values,' from Trujillo-era nationalism and from the Catholic youth movement. Rock music, hippy styles, and drug use represented modern capitalist vices, they argued, contrary to spiritual essence and traditions of the *pueblo Dominicano*. 'We are virgins,' wrote one young woman in a communist newspaper, 'above all from vices of the great capitalist societies – drug addiction, pansexuality, neurosis, etc.'[27] The perennial problems of delinquency, violence, and immorality and the new phenomenon of drug use (new only if alcohol and tobacco are not considered drugs) could be lumped safely with other kinds of 'penetration' such as investment and military advisors. The Americanization of the Balaguerista elite was inevitable, perhaps. But a generation of young Dominican leftists set out to protect the virginity, the communal spirit, and the national culture from the tentacles of empire. The idea that cultural defense against imperial 'penetration' was at the same time a moral crusade against delinquency spread quickly in schools and in *barrios* radicalized by the 1965 civil war and U.S. invasion.[28]

When the transition to democracy in the late 1970s relaxed the double restriction on youth styles – from left-wing cultural nationalists and the agents of the right-wing regime – it proved a profoundly unsettling transformation for many Dominican commentators. As television and nightclubs spread in Santo Domingo, international trends such as disco-dancing (referred to as *travoltismo*) and also Dominican recorded music, commercial television, and marketing, proliferated. Symbols of leisure consumption, especially beer, rum, cigarettes, and dancing, became the driving force behind the dissemination of merengue and Dominican television programming (Austerlitz 1997). The permeation of Dominican popular *barrios* by a commercial populism, which defined popular culture around leisure activities, drinking, and party life, immediately prefigured the *cadenú*. But this was not only because the cultural nationalists predictably raised a clamor over a few emblematic foreign styles, like *travoltismo*, and their relationship to the corruptions of consumerism, party culture, drug use, and gang violence, the same vices that were later ascribed to the styles of New Yorkers. It also shows that *cadenuses* were actually not as radically divorced from Dominican popular culture as their critics intimated. Migrants were not simply carriers of new trends in United States conspicuous consumption to the island. They used their relationship to New York to express their status within an already evolving set of ideas about leisure-time consumption and well-being.

Narrating migrant failure

Until now this chapter has presented the conversation between a Dominican diaspora and a Dominican national public as a fairly well-defined dialogue between the boosterism of the New Yorkers and the ambivalent reactions of the islanders. It has argued that those ambivalent reactions were shaped by class dynamics in the 1970s and 1980s and by deep traditions of Dominican thought about mobile people and mobile cultures. In this final section, I will begin to complicate this neat division, showing that these various ideological precursors to the *cadenú* actually first evolved into a single critique of migration, cultural mixture, corruption, and national contamination among critical voices in New York, and only later traveled back to the island. This breaks up any possibility of neatly viewing non-migrants as ambivalent about migration and migrants as relentlessly positive. It shows with even more clarity the necessity of a transnational historical approach to ethnic identity. Migrants carried Dominican ideas about the self and other with them to New York, used them to interpret the world around them, and sent messages home that helped shape public opinion in Santo Domingo in a way that eventually served prejudices against migrants. The experience of migration reshaped the predicaments of national identity, creating new predicaments of ethnic identity and diasporic identity. But this invention of Dominican ethnicity kept its footing in the Dominican history of ideas.

Particularly, by the middle of the 1970s, some Dominican intellectuals and journalists began to interpret and narrate the failure of the Dominican project in New York in terms familiar to older conversations about modernity, corruption,

and U.S. cultural influence. Dominican ethnicity in New York became a delicate balancing act between messages of progress migrants broadcast to Santo Domingo and the much more complex and troubling world that migrant neighborhoods were becoming. Incorporation into new neighborhoods and social relations in New York involved establishing local identities in relation to employers, city agencies, and black and Puerto Rican neighbors. Many Dominican New Yorkers endured the worst of urban poverty in the United States. And to their constant surprise they found themselves relegated to the status of racial minority in the highly charged ethnic politics of the city. When Dominican New Yorkers participated in their give and take with Dominicans on the island, they increasingly did so from within the confines of New York's newest ethnic ghetto.

The first change in the way migrant commentators reported on their experience in New York was an increased focus on anti-defamation. For much of the 1960s, Dominicans slipped under the radar screen of local social policy discussions and news sources. But as they became visible – a distinct ethnic entity – they contended with the ethnic stereotypes that so permeated New York City's culture. In the fall of 1971, for instance, the *New York Daily News* published a virulent series on illegal immigrants in New York. Illegal Dominicans, the authors suggested, were responsible for a range of social ills and depravity afflicting the city.[29] In response, most of the major Dominican social and political groups in New York redoubled their boosterism, both locally and in the Dominican press. Their message, summed up in 1973 by the editors of *El Dominicano*, was that Dominicans were not like other ethnic minorities in New York. Dominicans constitute, they wrote, 'the most honest and hard-working Spanish-speaking colony that has ever been seen in the north of our America … And we can proudly say that they never have traveled down the difficult and tortuous paths of crime and degeneracy; of vice or corruption.'[30]

However, many of the leading Dominican journalists in New York accepted reports of Dominican misbehavior and delinquency as unfortunate facts. They defended their own good names, the good name of the *colonia*, and the good name of the Republic, by distinguishing between the long-established, honorable Dominican settlement and the few bad apples that had recently begun tarnishing its image. In the wake of the *Daily News* series, Tirso Valdez in *¡Ahora!* explained to Santo Domingo audiences that the reputation of Dominicans in New York was declining, 'but not all are to blame.'[31] Reginaldo Atanay in *La Prensa*, whose opinions were reprinted by Valdez for his Santo Domingo readership, argued that the whole nation suffered as a result of a few illiterate peasants, car thieves, and 'self-described revolutionaries,' recently arrived in New York.[32] A *La Prensa* reader named Carlos Morel argued simply that he hoped the U.S. authorities would 'throw all of these Dominicans, who have come to discredit the country since 1960, out the back door.'[33] This position mirrored the view of conservative intellectuals in Santo Domingo, who looked down on the *incultura* of the Dominican masses. The problem was not Dominicans. It was low-class Dominicans.

But the declining *image* of Dominicans in New York was only one part of the problem facing migrants in the 1970s. Many Dominicans, in fact, lived in overcrowded buildings, worked for low pay, and suffered through the swift downturn in the New York economy. Migrants' efforts at promoting the image of the *colonia* meant that this view of Dominican New York made its way only slowly into the narratives of migration sent home to Santo Domingo. But, as small groups of Dominican political and social activists in New York turned toward local politics, especially in the form of immigrant services, they began constructing a new message for readers in Santo Domingo. New York was not a land of migrant progress. The United States, Alfredo White wrote in *¡Ahora!*, 'is not how they paint it.'[34]

Shortly after the *Daily News* skewered Dominicans in October of 1971, for instance, Father Porfirio Valdez told readers in Santo Domingo that migrants, 'live in apartments that suffocate, because the buildings are so narrow and old.' In the factories where they work, 'not infrequently they end up with a slave driver for a boss.'[35] Valdez and a small group of authors publishing in the Catholic monthly, *Amigo del Hogar*, did not bemoan the bad reputation ascribed to the bulk of honorable Dominicans as a result of a few troublemakers. To the contrary, they emphasized that the disasters of Dominican settlement were widespread, and that successes were few. They argued that the responsibility for Dominican degeneracy lay in the exploitation of an imperial system and the inaction of Dominican religious and secular authorities. 'In a few words,' another author in *Amigo del Hogar* wrote, Dominicans in New York 'have been objects of exploitation.'[36]

In an attempt to undermine the idealized image of New York as a space for social advancement, the writers at *Amigo del Hogar* showed little squeamishness in discussing what they saw as social degeneracy among Dominican migrants. Father Juan Oleaga, who worked with Dominican families, wrote to readers in Santo Domingo in 1968 describing the social 'derailment' of Dominicans in New York, including family disintegration, alcoholism, and 'gambling and all of its derivative vices.'[37] Oleaga wrote that the narratives of economic success broadcast by Dominican New Yorkers in their homeland were actually a thin patina of money covering up a hollow, desperate existence. 'You who have heard youths dressed in pretty suits and with dollars still hot-off-the-presses tell about the marvels of New York … you should know that behind all of this they are hiding many other things, many woes that they do not tell about, many ruined souls and many lives blinded by violence.'[38] Migrants' interest in consumer items became a particular target for criticism, both because objects concealed the existential and spiritual suffering of migrant life, and because they smacked of materialism. In a serialized memoir published in *Amigo del Hogar* in 1974, María Ramos mixed her tales of immigrant victimization at the hands of Jewish bosses and of overcrowded, filthy living conditions, with sharp disdain for the materialism of Dominican migrants. In New York, 'happiness means having things, surrounding yourself with things, and even turning yourself into a thing.'[39]

Humane as they were, these early formulations of a socially critical Dominican ethnicity drew on evolving Dominican presumptions about national identity and foreign influence. They also resonated with the island-based image of migrants as hapless rural people susceptible to a shallow materialism. By the end of the decade the authors at *Amigo del Hogar* found echoes among writers on the island. Island intellectuals pointed not only to the victimization of landless Dominicans, forced to migrate by the machinery of the imperial system, but also to the dangers posed to Dominican national identity by the influence of migrants. Vilma Weisz, who conducted field research in New York with the help of Porfirio Valdez and others from his circles, returned to Santo Domingo to write that migrants 'rapidly assimilate the vices and degeneracy of that society.' This, she thought, was a moral parable for the damage that close contact with United States culture wrought on the spirit of the Dominican people. And it was a hazard. In their visits to the island, Dominican New Yorkers spread their social ills to admiring friends and family, producing a 'tendency to destroy the autochthonous cultural pattern.'[40] What seemed worse, the growing fluidity of national borders made the emergence of an Americanized, materialist, and corrupt Dominican population in New York, narrated from within by well-meaning social activists, seem its own threat to national values and revolutionary projects in Santo Domingo. The complex experience of Dominican ethnic invention in New York provided Santo Domingo not only with the styles that became infamous in the 1980s, but also an emerging critique of what the styles stood for.

Conclusion

The bread and butter of Dominican reporting on the *colonia* shifted from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. Instead of advertisements about *bodegas* and announcements of migrants' charity, reporters in *El Nacional* began to turn to sensational stories of violence and crime. For the most part these projected the image of a respectable Dominican community beset by an epidemic of crime perpetrated by 'the blacks who prowl around these areas.'[41] Three reporters in *El Nacional* found a niche reporting on murders or other attacks on Dominicans in New York, as many as five per month between 1978 and 1983.[42] Then reporting shifted again, as reporting on crack reached a fever pitch in the United States, between 1984 and 1990. Accusations against Dominican drug dealers and neighborhoods began to fill the news. The return home of high-profile drug suspects targeted for extradition by Washington's drug warriors seemingly confirmed many of the suspicions that had circulated since earlier in the decade.[43] Migrant progress through honest work was a myth. Migrants who returned displaying wealth were likely drug dealers or worse. Anyone who wore the same gold chains as the famous drug suspects was a *cadenú*, a Dominican gone bad in New York.

On its own, this shift in reporting would surely have damaged the reputation of Dominican New Yorkers, even as a changed economy set the conditions for

many triumphant homecomings. In fact, messages of social distress in New York could prove especially resonant with a disillusioned island middle class, whose own bleak fortunes made migrant claims to success seem particularly grating. At the same time, migrants were a convenient scapegoat for a government that had systematically defrauded and impoverished the majority of the Dominican population. By the late 1980s, it was an easy commonplace that Dominicans from New York were the conduits by which 'modern' ills were transplanted to the Dominican Republic. 'The problem of drugs' proclaimed President Joaquín Balaguer in 1988, 'is a problem produced by modern civilization, by prostitution, by the perversion of traditional norms … It is getting worse in recent times because of the affluence of the Dominicans living in New York who have returned to take up residence in the Dominican Republic. They have brought the customs and the resources that they have acquired abroad and they are using them in the Dominican Republic, anti-patriotically, to induce the youth to consume more drugs.'[44]

But, as this chapter has shown, the emergence of controversy over the *cadenú*, and indeed the evolution of the expressive cultures that were known as *cadenú*, are best understood as part of a longer history of Dominican thinking about social class, mobile people, and mobile cultures. *Cadenuses* were the epitome of already existing stereotypes about uneducated migrants aspiring to class mobility through excessive displays of cheap materialism. They were also a foolproof example of an already presumed link between Americanization and moral corruption. The prehistory of the *cadenú* helps to unravel the history of Dominican national identity in the twentieth century, as Dominicans made sense of their evolving relationship with New York City. It offers one thread in a new historical perspective on immigration and ethnicity that ties Latino experience in the United States to the social and cultural history of Latin America.

4 Between fantasy and despair

The transnational condition and high-tech immigration[1]

A. Aneesh

Introduction

Computer programming is a major force behind the current round of globalization,[2] and programmers[3] some of its key players. A transnational organization of capital, labor, and corporations is daily imagined and realized in the electronic space of programming languages. In this ever-intensifying global – presumably post-national – economic order, I analyze the complex nationalist orientation of Indian programmers who are temporary or permanent immigrants to the United States. Combined with the economics of body shopping – a practice of bringing programmers from India to work on site in the United States through temporary work visas, the lives of these programmers carry paradoxes and ironies of transnational living within a nationalist framework. Lacking a transnational or post-nationalist mode of apprehending reality, these programmers – as this study identifies – display a continuous nostalgia for the 'other' nation: that is, they miss India while in the United States and long for American life when they go back to India.

I understand this immigrant condition, as produced by a specific discursive practice which I term 'total closure,' whose logic and grammar help constitute the world in terms of neatly divisible, bounded, and closed substances, such as nations or races. In its institutionalized form, 'total closure' expresses itself in terms of immigration restrictions, constituting these programmers as 'aliens,' whereas in its non-institutionalized or cognitive form, it speaks through the nationalist self-identification of transnational workers, who, despite unsteady identities, recognize themselves as Indians alone. With this theoretical framework, the thesis of transnational immigrant condition should achieve, I hope, a generality that goes beyond the case of Indian programmers.

The empirical ground for this discussion is a larger research project, conducted over 18 months of field work in India and the United States in 1999–2000. With 50 formal interviews (35 in India and 15 in the U.S.) and a similar number of informal conversations with software professionals and executives in India and the U.S., the larger project compares body shopping with practices of supplying information labor online. Insights for my discussion here were gathered in India and the U.S. by participating in

programmers' social gatherings, developing friendships, observing their techno-culture through their interactions with each other without making obvious the researcher's otherwise intrusive and formal presence. This project took place in three alternating research phases of six months each in India and the U.S. and India again. While in the U.S., research interactions occurred in New Jersey, which boasts one of the highest concentrations of Indian immigrants in the U.S.; in India, the specific field of inquiry was the northern hub of software development located in Delhi and its suburbs – Noida and Gurgaon.

One may question the significance of the category of programmers for a study on migration. Traditionally, migration research has focused on low-skilled labor whose importance for the U.S. economy is indisputable. In recent years, however, we see an increasing trend in the United States toward a conversion of labor into information work, especially in service industries that employ the largest section of the working population in the U.S.. In this context, the centrality of programmers[4] or information technology (IT) workers for the new economy is undeniable. Their significance can be gauged from the persistent demand and influx of IT workers that forced turn-of-the-century immigration debates to shift from low-skilled to high-skilled domains of employment (Cornelius *et al.* 2001; Saxenian 1999). The debate was torn between corporate pressures on the U.S. government to relax immigration quotas for IT workers due to an IT labor shortage, rising wage pressure, competitive advantage (Gleckman 1998; Moschella 1998), and the general fears that such immigration would deny U.S. nationals the high-tech jobs and lower their wages (Archey and Matloff 1998; Matloff 1995, 1996). Yet, the importance of programming labor for the changing economy was clear to both sides of the debate. A variety of bills were introduced, defeated, revived, passed, and rewritten between the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House, eventually raising the quota of H1-B visas[5] for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 from 65,000 to 115,000. When 115,000 visas allotted for the fiscal year 2000 were exhausted in March 2000, Congress was again forced to increase the number of H-1B visas to 195,000 a year for three years.[6] Clearly, the importance of IT workers for the new information and network-based economy could not be overstated. All computer-related and engineering occupations accounted for nearly 70 percent of total H-1B petitions in 1998–9. Immigrants from India accounted for the highest percentage of H-1B visas.

The mechanism by which programmers from India come to the U.S. on H-1B visas is generally called body shopping. Consultancy firms recruit software professionals in India in order to contract them out for short-term projects in the United States. At the end of such projects, programmers look for other projects, usually through the same contractors. Most U.S. employers find this mode of recruitment convenient since there is less time, money, and employment obligations involved. Although certain transnational forces, including U.S. corporations and the Indian software industry, were responsible through their

lobbying efforts in Congress for raising the number of visas, immigration essentially is a question that centers on the nation-state and its modes of socio-political closure.

Migration, nation-state, and total closure

It is only after the rise of the nation-state that migration has emerged as a problem (Malkki 1992, 1995). As nations are characterized by absolute boundaries, by a relentless commitment to mutual exclusivity, boundary crossing becomes an anomaly to be solved. In this context, I view 'nation' as constituted through the discursive frame of 'total closure,' which organizes a two-fold collective orientation toward reality construction: first, it helps mark a socio-cognitive space where all members are identical. For example, all citizens of India become Indians, assuming an essential Indian national identity, and ignoring internal variation within the total enclosure. Second, it creates a sharp, unbridgeable gulf from other groups, such as Pakistanis. Such rigid, unyielding boundary maintenance is characterized by an either/or logic of total closure, a logic of inclusion or exclusion, lumping supposedly homogeneous chunks of identity and splitting them off from one another as discrete entities (Zerubavel 1991), thereby partitioning the globe into total, discrete, insular national spaces.

The term 'total' here does not describe reality per se, but a particular constitution of reality. Indeed, all social closures are by nature contingent, not necessary, closures (Böröcz 1997). The adjective total should not mislead us into believing that such closure is final, that it is fully realizable, that it is not contingent. Failures to insulate national borders are common, so are failures of racial closures. Yet nations are not constructed as inclusive of each other; rather, they are *perceived and practiced* as totally separate. In fact, within the notion of social closure, we can distinguish two different schemes of contingent closure – total and relational – where relational closure expresses the logic of caste and kinship networks. Unlike national or racial identities produced by total closure, castes are not constructed as self-sufficient islands in a sea of humanity. They are constituted as relative to all other castes, and define themselves only within a web of caste relationships. Both racial and caste exclusions could be equally oppressive, but they are organized through different social grammars. Further, total closure does not mean that it is devoid of relations. In step with Bourdieu's theory of practice (Bourdieu 1976), I intend the term 'total closure' to suggest a learned misrecognition of the reality of relations, a deliberate ignorance of intrinsic ties among people, groups, cultures, and societies. And the entities emerging after this form of closure have the characteristics of boundedness, substantiveness, internal unity, and external difference. I use the term 'nation-ism' for the resulting cognitive orientation and distinguish it from 'nationalism,' a widely used term for the ideological and aesthetic commitment to one's nation. The nation-ist perception constitutes a body with some inherent essence, related with other groups on the basis of complete difference. The constitution of the 'body' is directly related with our notion of the human body as a unified closed entity

totally separate from the world, a notion that has been challenged in recent scholarship (Haraway 1991). This notion is deeply dependent on our disregard of the body *in relation to* and *as part of* the environment, where the world constantly travels in and out of us through the pores of our skin and maintains it through atmospheric pressure.

It is not surprising, as some argue, that the most important notion behind nation is the modern concept of the individual (Calhoun 1994a; Handler 1988). Modeled as a closed individual body, the construction of national frontiers seems to surpass in rigidity all previous communal boundaries. In view of constant border disputes throughout the world, there is nothing that appears more arbitrary as a national boundary; yet, there is no other boundary system that evokes a greater awe, or arouses a stronger shock. Taking territoriality as the most common element of the institutionalization of total closure, it is easier to understand the heavy investment of emotions and artillery into national borders that seem directly proportional to the level of their arbitrariness. The line of national separation between India and Pakistan is shown differently on their respective maps, as both countries display Kashmir – a thorny issue behind protracted post-independence hostility – in their possession. Around the line of control, the two nations exchange gunfire on a regular basis to give an unshakable fixity to an arbitrary boundary. The greater the arbitrariness, the stronger the need to keep it from moving.

Unlike the loose, fuzzy territorial limits of earlier communities, such as dynastic realms or empires, where borders faded indiscernibly into one another (Anderson 1991), the boundaries of nations not only rigidly demarcate one cluster of regions and populations from another; they also cut up the sky and the sea into exclusive national spaces. Border patrol, border fences, ports of entry combined with a constant vigil to guard against the slightest border violations, impart the national frontier with an immovable rigidity. The logic of total closure and its associated practices not only construct categories of inclusion, such as the citizen or the resident; they also constitute at the same stroke categories of exclusion – the alien, the immigrant, the refugee. Before the United States was a nation, it was not possible to describe its immigrants as aliens – legal or illegal – since there was no fixed national cast with which to construct a category of outcasts. Even the current transnational forces that seem to undermine the putative sovereignty of the nation-state must still negotiate national borders.

The immigrant experience of Indian programmers is shaped by the discursive practice of total closure, which, through a system of nation-states, objectively constitutes them, along with others, as immigrants or aliens in the first place, while subjectively organizing their social cognition around national identity. This nation-based closure affects immigrant programmers in many ways. Despite working for companies based in the U.S. and Europe for long periods of time, their political constitution as aliens makes their experience a battle between their fantasies of different places and disappointments, emanating from their specific situation. The reality of being transnationals within a cognitive system of nation-ist closure creates paradoxes, ironies, and unresolved dilemmas, some of which I attempt to capture in my analysis.

Fantasy

Fantasy comes in many guises – a general fascination for far-away lands, their cultures, their peoples as well as for specific places of prosperity and prestige. Indian immigrants' fascination for life in the U.S. and Europe is perhaps an aspect of *orientalism* (Said 1978) according to which colonial discourses – interlocked with the Western will to power – constituted the Oriental other in order to represent and know the colonized. Through the very desire to set boundaries for itself as a self-sustaining, autonomous, and sovereign subject, the West appears to have created a reverse desire among the colonized for everything Western. However, I would not try to stretch this dynamic of the colonial past any further. There is also an obvious general fascination for the unknown, the uncharted, and the unfamiliar (along with the fear of the unknown) that perhaps pervades life consciousness itself. This fascination for the other may exist everywhere, irrespective of colonial discourses, and cannot be captured by orientalism alone. Nation-ism maps onto this general tendency to fantasies about other places and turns them into specific fantasies about other nations such as the U.S..

For IT professionals, the first wave of fantasy tends to exist as a fascination for the countries placed higher on an economic hierarchy. The social discourse holds in higher regard those who migrate to the U.S. and Europe than those who migrate, for instance, to other parts of Asia or Africa. The latter, however, are more respected in comparison to those who have never left the country. The second wave of fantasy relates to the magical imagination of life in the U.S. through mainstream films from Hollywood and programs available through cable television in urban India. Indeed, corporate recruitment strategies explicitly stimulate such fantasies through seductive advertising aimed at programmers. Let me describe an example of how body-shopping firms, through advertising, arouse fantasy as a recruitment strategy. In the appointment section of an Indian technology magazine *Dataquest* (March 2000), there is an image with a backdrop of the towering Empire State Building in New York. The silhouette of a man in professional attire looks longingly from afar at the New York skyline bathed in an evening glow. The caption reads: 'At HCL-Perot, your skills can take you a long, long way.' This is only one example of many such advertisements.

While tempting offers for international placements are common in various Indian newspapers and magazines, the fantasies thus aroused are not necessarily false. What is important here is the appeal of the U.S. lifestyle. As one professional put it, 'It is hard to let go of swanky cars.' Many others similarly talked about the physical conditions of life. When imagined from India, life in the U.S. emerged as a series of scenes from films and TV: beautiful beaches, stunning bodies, posh cars, mesmerizing technologies in everyday life, and breathtaking visual stimulation through glittery shops and malls. When programmers come to the United States, this fantasy becomes, for a while, a lived fantasy. It does not disappear all of a sudden; parts of the fantasy do correspond with reality. These programmers are, in reality, able to buy cars that were overpriced or unavailable in India, experience the visual stimulation of the malls and beaches. The role of technologies behind

these lived fantasies is important. Having been trained as technology workers, these programmers frankly acknowledge the significance of technologies in their choices:

> Also, mainly because of technology, because if I was there [in India], I wouldn't have got exposed to so much technology. It's a big advantage, because I have, like, a computer at home, and I would have never thought of buying a computer for home there [in India] … There are a lot of facilities and a lot of things that you do here. [When] you look from there [India] and everybody talks that you have a computer at home, and this and that ….So you could be smart, but if you're not exposed to all these technologies, you can never grow. And that's the big advantage here. Because I know my father still doesn't have access to e-mail. And when I go to India, to these Internet shops, you can't even get a [phone] line to connect, getting a connection is very difficult. So, you miss all these technologies.

However, gradually the lifestyle fantasy recedes and other aspects of reality begin to appear, including experiences of cultural alienation. Sexual desires for attractive bodies stay elusive and unmet. Programmers instead come to know a populace struggling against obesity, consuming antidepressants and experiencing loneliness and homelessness, the reality of which was absent in earlier seductions and fantasies. However, the most devastating realization is one of political and social exclusion, of being constituted as the 'other.' This realization is particularly difficult because these programmers come from respected middle-class families in India and are a high-earning group even in the United States. The realization of being the 'other' – along with the struggle against cultural difference stemming from a different language of togetherness in the United States – gives rise to general despair and disappointment.

Despair

The despair emanating from this specific immigrant condition shows a variety of forms. It is not surprising that most programmers do not intend to stay permanently in the U.S.. They put forward a variety of reasons for going back to India:

> 'It feels more safe in India than here … '

> 'I miss family ties. My niece keeps growing and I can't even see her … '

> 'If I'm sick, I can always depend on my neighbors in India … '

> 'I belong to India. That's my country … '

The vast and rich literature on diasporas, and South Asian diasporas in particular, has highlighted experiences such as these of displacement, resettlement, and the invention of identities and homeland traditions along new social frameworks that

make diasporas visible (Cohen 1997; Kumar 2000; Leonard 1992; Myers 1998; Prashad 2000; Sivanandan 1982). The role of capital in migratory dislocations, both historically (Kale 1998) and currently (Sassen 1998), is also important. It would be hard to deny the effects of a restricting labor regime – namely, body shopping – on programmers' attitudes. The economics of body shopping – with its temporary and flexible approach to work – produces unsettling effects on programmers' lives in general. The flexibility of body-shopping practices goes hand-in-hand with the enormous flexibility of the United States immigration regime that tends to increase immigration flows in times of high labor demand. The U.S. government seems to follow the policy of flexibly shutting and opening access to its national space in step with the labor requirements of the business cycle. Whether it was the creation of the Bracero Program under which a few million braceros – Mexican farm laborers – came to work the fields of the United States in the post-World War II era, or the case of 'cerebreros,' Alarcón's (2001) term for high-skilled workers, immigration has been a field of governmental intervention under the systemic imperatives of the U.S. economy. With an economic boom triggered mainly by the technology sector, the United States issued the highest number of work visas to high-tech labor in the late 1990s.

The economic practice of body shopping shows how the temporization of immigration through short-term quotas goes hand in hand with the temporary nature of body shopping and with the nation-istic orientation of transnational programmers. Body shopping demonstrates with extraordinary clarity what flexible forms of post-industrial labor mean and entail. Flexibility in work and production has been discussed in recent years as an important category by economic enthusiasts (Piore and Sabel 1984) as well as social critics (Harvey 1989). As I have argued elsewhere (Aneesh 2001a), body shopping is similar to the application of flexible techniques of just-in-time (JIT) invented by several Japanese firms in the 1970s to manage inventories. By relying on careful scheduling of small, precise deliveries of parts and supplies made by vendors *just in time*, the JIT systems drastically reduced large inventories and associated overhead costs throughout the entire production system. Quite like a large inventory, body shopping helps corporations avoid a large workforce on permanent rolls. The seasonal highs and lows of business pose a costly problem, which the practice of body shopping attempts to overcome by supplying software professionals in time and for the length of time needed. One of my informants who worked for an American investment and banking company through a body-shopping firm explained, 'this company doesn't have to hire an employee. They don't have to pay for my insurance, and they can fire me. I'm not a liability for them … If they hired a full-time employee they would have to train him.' In short, 'body shopping is essentially,' as another informant pointed out, ' … sending out our talented people … [without] entering into any kind of service contract but only into contract for providing people on a temporary basis. So while those people continue to work for their local company, they're deploying their services for an overseas customer, for a foreign customer on site.' Although some contractual workers placed with different companies by their parent body-shopping firms may be earning more in the short term, they are still low-cost labor from a long-term

perspective, as they allow the receiving company to trim its workforce and economize on long-term benefits, like retirement contributions and health insurance, which are required for permanent employees.

Another form of flexibility that operates behind programming labor is the nature of the work itself. Unlike specific forms of labor, such as a surgeon's labor or a civil engineer's expertise, software professionals are not limited to any specific form of organization or industry. Software is fast becoming the medium and language of all work (Aneesh 2001b). Whether to control heavy machines or track everyday banking operations, software professionals lend their labor and expertise to an unprecedented variety of businesses. This explains the phenomenal growth of body shopping in the software business. Programmers can be quickly deployed, transferred, and redeployed in different firms.[7]

Flexibility, as reflected in contractual work as well as immigration policy quotas, produces unsettling effects on the transnational lives of programmers. The H-1B visa issued to these programmers to enter and work in the United States cannot be extended beyond six years. Although they can apply for permanent residency while working for a company, it takes many years for their application to be decided without any guarantee. It is also difficult to settle down and start a family during this period. 'While going on a H1 visa to the U.S.,' one software professional confided, 'your wife cannot work. She's restricted to home; that has also been one of the social pressures.' Pressures of flexibility also discourage these immigrants from having children. Faced with an uncertain future and two different systems of education for their children in India and the United States, most programmers tend to be relatively young and single. Thus, the immigrant experience of software professionals negotiates the combined effects of two forms of nation-istic closure: one exemplified by the bureaucratic mechanisms that control the practice of body shopping under nationalistic concerns about permanent immigration and the other reflected in the cognitive mechanisms that breed nation-istic self-recognition among transnational programmers. This nation-istic closure creates a sense of exclusion among the programmers living in the United States and makes them both explicitly and implicitly critical of the U.S. and prone to fantasize about their life in India. Without being aware of the nation-istic forces that structure their life, they express their critical stance in many ways:

> In the U.S. you're always a second-class, second-grade citizen. There will always be one incident daily or once in a month or once in six months to remind you that you're not part of them, that you're not an American.

Physical appearance also plays a major part in this feeling of exclusion. Since whiteness emerges as the dominant self-image of U.S. nationality under total closure, many Indians are highly conscious of not passing that test, a fact brought to light by an everyday nation-istic gaze that finds them deviating from white normality. 'I have this identity as a Sikh. Going around in the malls you can always see in their faces, "What's that, the funny cap you have?" Or "I like your cap," ' recalled a critical programmer.[8]

The experience of despair, for these programmers, also relates to cultural differences in how one relates to others, or what constitutes togetherness in India versus the U.S.. In the United States, in all friendships and family ties, there is a tendency to avoid taking the other for granted, for reasons that touch upon issues of freedom, privacy, and closures of individual sovereignty. In India, on the other hand, this very taken-for-grantedness defines friendships and family ties, and differentiates them from acquaintances and first-time meetings. For instance, one of my informants was struck by the fact that in the U.S. one is required to call friends before dropping by their home.

> Even if I go to my friend's place, I have to call and say I'm coming, like an appointment. You know what I mean. I couldn't just walk into my friend's place, [which] means I am intruding upon their privacy … it's like, were we expecting you here? You could be friends for six years, but you couldn't do it. Just walk in.

This immigrant experience extends to the workplace. In India, the boundary between a friend and colleague tends to blur with increased interaction. As a female software professional pointed out:

> When you work here, you don't really get to know anybody. In India when you have worked, even for, let's say, two months, you are free totally with each other, you know each other very well, you go to each other's houses, and start getting together. That doesn't happen here … Coming from India, you get used to that kind of stuff. I just think that a place where everything is just professional, though people are very nice and helpful, you don't really develop that kind of bond that you do in India.

This bond is nothing but a certain taken-for-grantedness that is assumed in friendships in India. One may argue that immigrant professionals, with their lack of cultural references or of a subtle sense of sociality in the U.S., may not have the same access to friendship at the workplace as others do. However, this doubt was dispelled in many informal conversations with Indian professionals who maintained that they did not see, even among the Americans, the kind of closeness to which they were accustomed in Indian workplaces. Another workplace complaint related to the limited opportunities for promotion, especially to managerial ranks:

> Again in the long term, it's questionable whether they will allow you to rise above a certain level. As you see the top level of management is always white Caucasian male … Wherever I have worked in the U.S., even in Japan [where] I used to work for Citibank, which is a U.S. company, even there the top management was always white Caucasian male. Not even women, not even blacks.

Some immigrant professionals blame limited opportunities on widespread prejudice in the United States: 'They are just prejudiced. Definitely. They may not

actually be fully conscious, or it's very subtle. It might not be evident directly; they might say we are an equal opportunity people.' Perhaps, this perceived prejudice was less about felt discrimination and more about a glass ceiling. Particular expressions of prejudice were also seen more on the street than in the workplace:

> It's just on the roads, shopping malls. They can be prejudiced. They're not educated, they can say anything, they're not so broad-minded. That's all. I mean people who you interact with on the road. The people you work with, the people you deal with professionally … definitely there is no problem.

The critical attitudes expressed toward the U.S. disappear, to a large degree, when professionals go back to India as they always look forward to coming back for another stint. Within a nation-ist frame, it is difficult to belong simultaneously to two places despite one's transnational attachments. Due to total closure, an either/or dilemma haunts the immigrant condition: to stay in the new nation or to go back? There is a running joke among Indian immigrants that every Indian in the United States wants to go back to India in X+1 years, where 'X' stands for the current year: that is, everyone consoles oneself that one would go back to India next year; since 'X' does not stand for any specific year, and keeps changing every year. While these immigrants are in the United States, they constantly dream of going back to their true place, their nation, their India. Yet, whenever the opportunity arises, they also apply for a Green Card (permanent residency) to extend their stay. Although their condition is stuck in the nation-ist, 'either-or' logic according to which they can belong to only one nation in the true sense, their actions suggest that they wish to belong to both places. They want to live a transnational life, visiting both India and the United States, and applying for permanent residency in the U.S. while being citizens of India. But the a priori nation-ist frame – with its cognitive and bureaucratic mechanisms such as single citizenship,[9] visa requirements, restrictions on political participation, exclusion by labeling even Indians who work for U.S. corporations as alien – allows them only one choice: either India or the United States. Total nation-ist closure – a cognitive structure that prevents their perception of themselves as belonging to both cultures along with an innate predilection for the other side – makes these programmers miss India while they are in the U.S., and long for their life in the U.S. when they are in India.

Dilemmas: longing for the other nation

Nostalgia for the other nation is at the heart of the transnational immigrant condition, which goes beyond simple nationalism. One's situation in transnational space is characterized by a longing for the other nation, as a programmer says in a moment of reflection:

> When you're there you want to be here, and when you are here you want to be there. When you are here, you start missing home a lot. Because here, life is totally different. Right. I don't know my neighbors here. In India, as soon as I go back, the neighbors come to my room and say hello. So it's like two different places. When you're here you miss that life, when you're there you miss this life. Here, it's like I can just take my car and go anywhere where I want to go. It's totally like two extreme zones.

Some of these programmers were quite aware that immigrants failed to fit in where they were. One programmer talked about how cultural distance remained a barrier despite conscious efforts to expand one's social self, to include strange others of a different world:

> The problem is that most of the people, even Indians who come here, they try to change, you try to go with this culture … but [one is] never able to get into this culture. And then, you start thinking that he is my neighbor, he doesn't even talk to me. But you even don't do the same thing. He probably thinks the same thing too. Maybe, it's also cultural.

Taking roots in new cultural soil is never easy. Although the competence in English or programming languages may be a requirement adequate for employment, it falls short of the greater objective of living a life full of meaning. Programmers, perhaps like every other category of immigrants, miss the connections, culture, and community of the other country:

> All the connections. Two different worlds … You kind of miss all those ties here [in the United States]. Like I'd know my parents are there and I end up calling them every week. You miss all that, family issues.

When these migrants – the hobos of an integrated world – go back to India, one would like to assume their life is restored to its harmony; the earth is regained under their feet. Their reincarnation as a transnational creature, however, precludes any return to the settled contentment of earlier life. There is not much solace within national enclosures for transnationally stirred souls. Instead, memories of the good life in the United States haunt all who return to India:

> You get spoiled by all the comfort that you have here [in the United States] … Here it's a consumer market; in India it doesn't work that way. Here if I don't get anything I'm so used to, if the phone bill is wrong, I can call them, saying I'm not paying for this, I didn't make this call. But in India, this thing doesn't work. You just have to pay for it; otherwise, you know what I mean. So, once you go there, you start missing this kind of stuff. Oh my God it was so easy to get it there, like planning a vacation, I could just go on vacation … everything is there, you and rental cars, you don't have to talk to

> anybody. Those comforts spoil you. Although you still think that you want to go back [to India], but once you go back you start missing all these things.

This is not to suggest that the structural and political position of the transnational programmer promotes a subjectivity that is more fraught or complex than any other. This is only to add more specificity to a particular mode of being that I term the transnational condition. Experiences of programmers belie several commonly held, though somewhat paradoxical, notions that immigrants lack attachment to the new place while living and enjoying the fruits of the affluent society, or conversely, that that they never want go back and always look for a permanent settlement in the United States. One can easily see how immigrant programmers miss being in the U.S. when they go back, and look forward to coming back for another spell to renew their attachment. This also does not mean that they never wanted to go back to India, as one can easily detect a desire to return during their stay in the United States.

The transnational condition means that one loses a single cultural or national mode of being without being aware of it; one is reborn without the memory of the past life; only those who saw the person before are struck by the change. One programmer captured this in a remarkable moment of introspection:

> The problem is, [when] you go back [to India], they just comment on you. You get mentally changed here too … the problem is when you go back, they think you have changed but you know you have not changed, [but have become] just so normal here [in the United States].

This transformation of being-in-the-world is so subtle that one does not even recognize it as change; it becomes a crucial part of one's perceptual lens. I am not asserting that immigrants' previous subjectivity was fixed and static only to be rewritten through migration experiences. In a way, all identities are hybrids. Recent work in cultural studies (Bhabha 1994; Hall 1996) has emphasized the concept of hybridity to underscore cultural fusions, ambiguities of identities, and constructed closures of race, nation, and ethnicity. Bhabha (1994), in particular, examines the liminal or interstitial space between recognized traditions, finding the 'location of culture' in the marginal, haunting, unhomely spaces between dominant social formations. Still, it is undeniable that subjectivities get constituted through dominant discursive practices. Experiences of migration stir up the settled and tranquil dust of subjectivity. Still bound up with the dominant discursive frame of total closure, the resulting subjectivity tends to orient itself, in the case of programmers, to the other enclosure, the other nation.

The forever elusive character of the transnational migrant condition is significant. It creates a consciousness that exists where it is not. It always seeks fulfillment in being elsewhere. As one systems analyst said, 'When you're here [in the U.S.] you want to go back, when you are there, you think you had a good life here.' Even those who go back to India, with a permanent commitment to a single national space, tend to display transnational orientation without being

aware of it. Many software executives who made a final decision to come back to India still maintained their U.S. permanent residency. One executive, who was 'pretty happy' with his situation in India, said: 'When I came back I thought I would go back [to the U.S.], but now I like it here [in India].' Yet, in the same interview, he said: 'I have been traveling [to the U.S.] just once in six months, once in six months just to keep my Green Card current, but the need to travel has come down.' This executive was managing a U.S. subsidiary in India with direct communication links – via e-mail, video conferencing, telephone, and intranet – to a U.S. team, diminishing the need for work-related travel. Attempts to maintain permanent residency in the U.S. while residing permanently and resolutely in India are neither mere individual eccentricities nor are they signs of simple opportunism. Individually, they are paradoxes produced by the desires to live a transnational life in a nation-ist discursive frame. Institutionally, such attempts reflect contradictions of a transnational labor regime still governed by a system of nation-states.

I am not suggesting that a true transnational order would somehow be preferable to an international one, as the problems of just-in-time labor or the harnessing and subordination of labor to dominant ends would still exist. Instead, it may be developing a transnational professional class that follows in the footsteps of what Sklair (2001) calls 'transnational capitalistic class' with its own peculiar characteristics and orientation. Dilemmas associated with the transnational condition may suggest what the programmers desire from the United States is material, while what they derive from India is more social, emotional, and relational. The resulting subjectivity of individual programmers, one may suggest, balances conflicting pulls of materialism and social dispositions. Perhaps. But we also find high-level executives such as CEOs who enjoy similar material conditions in India such as chauffeur-driven cars, plush houses, and domestic help at home, still trying to maintain their permanent residency in the United States. Clearly, there is something more than the material comforts of life that orients them to the United States while they reside in India.

One may ask why there is no development of a more substantive, even if ambivalent, identity among these immigrants. The reason is simple. In conscious moments of identity, programmers were absolutely sure of their substantive identity; they understood and identified themselves as 'Indian' with complete certainty. There was no dilemma in that respect and, therefore, no need for a new identity. Despite this self-understanding (determined partly by the discursive frame of total closure about their identity), their subjective orientation was not fixed or unambiguous in practice; it was constantly shaped and shifted by possibilities of life in other locations where they were not residing.

One may also wonder why the programmers do not see their position in the U.S. as temporary in accordance with their immigration status, and why they miss the U.S. as the other home once they return to India. In fact, the programmers do know that their situation is not permanent, even if the permanent residency status is always a possibility. They are not yet a transplanted community; they are temporary, yet transformed. They do develop, perhaps unconsciously, local

attachments, even while subjectively oriented toward the other nation. Even transplanted communities, and permanent immigrants, that tend to understand themselves in total categories such as Indian or Korean communities and presumably do not suffer from the second generation's anxiety about total identity definitions, hide from themselves their transnational orientation. The much discussed recreation of homeland traditions serves the need not only of a familiar and comfortable milieu in a new place, it is also an effort to 'be where one is not.' One needs to trace the return of immigrants to India to see their efforts at recreating certain dimensions of the American ambiance at home.

Conclusion

In the light of increasing mass migrations and transnational cultural flows, some recent works have highlighted the unhinging of place and culture, examining how identities and subjectivities are themselves affected by mobility and displacement (Appadurai 1990; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). The story told here – of the transnational condition of Indian programmers who migrate to the United States on a temporary or permanent basis – continues this line of thought. What emerges of specific importance is how the complex subjectivities of transnational programmers are not only unhinged from the place of their origin but oriented more generally to a place different from their immediate physical and cultural location. This subjectivity, I have argued, thrives on difference, as expressed in the longing for the other national space. One looks out, as if from a birdcage, to the sky of one's desired flight. The cage in question is that of national closure where institutional doors open and shut to let the immigrant subject in or out. The cage thus is also of identity closure – the consequences of which the transnational subject at once embraces and desires to escape. One embraces one's national identity as a place of safety from the ever-shifting grounds of a mobile world, reflected, for example, in the following statement of a programmer who at the time was working in the U.S.: 'The smell of Indian soil is not found anywhere else in the world.' Yet, one also wishes to escape from its consequences through attempts to keep one's permanent residency in the United States intact. The subjectivity discussed does not, when given a chance, allow persons to recognize their natural home. It is a troubled existential space that is in at least some measure the result of practices of flexible labor that are inherently wedded to temporary settlements and fleeting commitments. As the new transnational order of capital ships bodies across continents, it also helps generate in the process different souls that are forever nostalgic for the other home.

5 Asian-Latinos: Japanese-Peruvians' ethnic adaptation and social mobility in New York and Los Angeles

Ayumi Takenaka

This chapter examines the formation of immigrants' ethnic niches and its relation to their ethnic identities and social mobility, drawing upon the case of Japanese-Peruvians. Japanese-Peruvians, or Peruvian citizens of Japanese ancestry, have gained differential socio-economic status while assuming distinct ethnic identities in Los Angeles and New York – 'Asian' in Los Angeles and 'Hispanic/Latino' in New York. Although Japanese-Peruvians are mostly Spanish monolinguals and migrated as voluntary laborers around the same time (roughly during the 1980s through the 1990s), they adapt differently in the two major metropolitan areas. In Los Angeles, they have been incorporated into a descent-based ethnic niche, working for Japanese (or Japanese-American) companies and residing in neighborhoods that are, or once were, dominated by Japanese or Japanese-Americans. In New York, on the other hand, they largely reside in 'Hispanic' neighborhoods and work in factories with 'Latinos' or own Peruvian restaurants that cater to Peruvians, primarily based on linguistic affinity. Despite comparable prior socio-economic backgrounds (mostly merchants), Japanese-Peruvians in Los Angeles have, over the years, achieved higher levels of socio-economic status with a higher average income and tend to be more satisfied with life, and less likely to aspire to migrate further, than those in New York who feel that they have experienced downward economic mobility in migrating to the U.S. Why so? In order to explain these differences, I analyze the contexts in which Japanese-Peruvian migrants settled and adapted in the two metropolitan areas.

Where immigrants settle matters, as do how they establish ethnic ties, and what kinds of ethnic resources they exploit and generate. Together region and ethnic resources shape not only migrants' identities (Waldinger 1996; Tilly 1998), but also, more importantly, their upward or downward social mobility (e.g. Portes and Zhou 1993; Gans 1992; Zenner 1991). This is because newcomers always rely on networks for obtaining information, skills, and jobs, and some clusters provide more successfully than others what is needed to move up the economic ladder. As Waldinger (2001: 230) states, 'each individual is socially situated and one's location within the network of social affiliations substantially affects one's access to various resources.' Immigrants always move into an already established opportunity structure (Tilly 1998; Waldinger 1994). It is thus important to

examine the nature of ethnic clusters into which immigrants become incorporated. How do immigrants move, or become incorporated, into particular types of existing ethnic niches? What kinds of personal and ethnic ties are used in settling in a new country? Although shared nationality and alleged common culture are often assumed to lead to ethnic clustering, I argue that the contexts of reception play an important role in determining what types of ethnic ties become salient in the process of immigrants' clustering. In this paper, I focus on the patterns of Japanese-Peruvian migrants' settlement, ethnic/racial identification, and their consequences.[1]

Patterns of settlement

Although Japanese-Peruvian migrants are dispersed across the country, they are largely concentrated in two areas – the New York metropolitan area (including northern New Jersey) and Greater Los Angeles (and to a lesser extent, Miami) – the areas that have traditionally attracted a large number of Peruvian migrants. In particular, northern New Jersey in and around Paterson, known as 'Little Peru,' played a major role in attracting pioneer immigrants from Peru (Altamirano 1992, 2000). Due to its Great Falls and geographical proximity to New York City, Paterson – an important center of immigration and textile production in the early twentieth century – again grew into a major industrial city in the 1970s, concentrating initially in textiles, locomotives and Colt guns, and attracting major manufacturing firms. According to the 2000 U.S. census, there were 11,500 Peruvians residing in the city of Paterson, and Altamirano (2000) estimates the real number to be close to 30,000. The significance of the Peruvian presence is reflected in the existence of the Peruvian consulate, established in 1986, in this relatively small city of 150,000.

In 2000, the states of New York and New Jersey were home to 37,300 and 37,700 Peruvians (the Peruvian-born), respectively, and California had 44,200 Peruvian residents, again according to the U.S. Census. The Peruvian consulates in both Paterson and New York City, however, estimated that in 1996, there were roughly 100,000 Peruvians in the tri-state area (NY, NJ, CT), 20 percent of whom were illegal. In Los Angeles, the population estimate by the local Peruvian consulate was 100,000, though only 12,000 were officially registered.

It is extremely difficult to know how many of these Peruvians may be of Japanese ancestry. However, I estimate that in 1990, Japanese-Peruvians numbered between 700 and 2,000 in New York and New Jersey and between 900 and 2,000 in California, based on the following calculations.

First, cross-tabulation of 1999 census data found 257 Peruvian-born persons who claimed Japanese ancestry in the state of New York, 373 persons in New Jersey, and 781 persons in California (See Table 5.1; row 1; columns 1, 2, 3). Other combinations estimating their numbers are shown in rows 2 through 5 in Table 5.1.

Second, the 1994 population registration, conducted at the Peruvian consulate in Paterson when Peru changed its passports, showed that about 2 percent, or 280 out of 14,000 registered, carried at least one Japanese paternal or maternal surname.[2]

Applying this ratio (2 percent) to the total estimated Peruvian population in New York and New Jersey, I expect that roughly 2,000 (2 percent of 100,000) were of Japanese ancestry.

In addition, when Japanese-Peruvians around Paterson attempted to establish an association of their own in the early 1990s, organizers reported to have listed about 100 families on their member list. In Los Angeles, leaders of Japanese-Peruvian associations spoke of membership consisting of 500 families (and this was also the figure quoted in a South Bay local newspaper, in December 1995). Subsequently, in the states of New York, New Jersey, and California together, I estimate that in 1990, there were at least a few thousand Peruvians of Japanese ancestry.

The number has most likely increased since then, due to the growing migratory flows of Peruvians from Peru and more importantly, perhaps, from Japan. The secondary migration, from Peru to the U.S. via Japan, has grown as a consequence of the so-called return migration of Japanese-Peruvians from Peru to Japan. The descendants of Japanese who originally emigrated to South American countries, such as Peru and Brazil, have migrated 'back' to Japan beginning in the late 1980s in response to economic crises at home and to a new Japanese immigration policy allowing Japanese descendants to work in Japan. Though this policy specifically targeted Japanese descendants, in reality, non-Japanese-Peruvians also entered Japan in large numbers, often on forged documents. As of 2001, according to the Ministry of Justice, there were 50,000 Peruvians officially registered in Japan and mostly engaged in manual work in factories and construction. Ever since the beginning of this return migration, the volume of secondary migration, primarily destined to the U.S., has been on the increase. According to the interviews I conducted with 44 Japanese-Peruvians in Japan during 1996–7, 23 percent of them explicitly stated their intention to move to the U.S., while the same proportion of the 48 Japanese-Peruvians I interviewed later in the U.S. actually had migrated from Japan (the rest had migrated directly from Peru prior to the return-migration boom). This secondary migration has

Table 5.1 Estimated Japanese-Peruvian population in New York, New Jersey, and California

	Combination of variables	*NY*	*NJ*	*CA*
1	Peruvian-born and Japanese ancestry	257	373	781
2	Hispanic-Peruvian and Japanese ancestry	266	263	371
3	Peruvian-born and Japanese race	75	274	652
4	Hispanic-Peruvian and Japanese race	67	208	218
5	All of above plus those with Japanese language skills	283	414	906

Source: U.S. Census, 1990.

increased, in part because Japanese-Peruvians were disillusioned with Japan and with being treated as foreigners and dead-end factory workers, and in part because they can use Japan as a stepping stone to enter the U.S. (Takenaka 2001).

Patterns of racial/ethnic identification

Japanese-Peruvians tended to adapt differently in New York (and New Jersey) and Los Angeles. One indicator of this is the way they identified themselves racially and ethnically.

Among the 48 Japanese-Peruvians I interviewed in both areas, those on the east coast were more likely to identify as 'Hispanic,' instead of 'Asian,' given the two categories to choose from, while Japanese-Peruvians in California were more likely to identify as 'Asian.' The U.S. Census of 1990 also showed similar patterns in which Japanese-Peruvians responded to questions about race, and ethnicity. I focused on a number of key variables – ancestry, race, and whether Hispanic or not – to analyze the discrepancies (expressed as percentages) in the way immigrants related to these identifiers. (It should be noted that the U.S. Census treats 'Hispanic or Latino' not as a racial category, but as an ethnic category of any race: thus, 'Hispanic/Latino' and 'Asian' are officially not mutually exclusive categories.)

As Table 5.2 shows, Japanese-Peruvians (the Peruvian-born of Japanese ancestry) in New York/New Jersey were less likely than those in California to identify as 'Japanese' or 'Asian' in the census. Row 1 indicates that in New York/New Jersey, out of all the Peruvian-born, 630 people reported to be of Japanese ancestry, but only 349 of them, or 55.3 percent, considered themselves as racially Japanese (column 3 in bold). This ratio (discrepancy between ancestry and race) was significantly lower than that for California – namely, 84.6 percent (column 5 in bold). That is, the Peruvian-born of Japanese ancestry in California were more likely than those in New York/New Jersey to consider themselves as racially Japanese. This trend was consistent among those who responded that they were 'Hispanic' and specifically 'Peruvian,' although the difference was smaller (row 2). Similarly, Japanese-Peruvians in California were less likely to respond 'Hispanic,' as shown in the greater gap between the Peruvian-born and Hispanic (Peruvian) of

Table 5.2 Racial identification of Japanese-Peruvians in New York, New Jersey, and California

	NY/NJ		*CA*	
	Population	*Ratio b/a*	*Population*	*Ratio b/a*
(1) Peruvian-born				
Japanese ancestry (a)	630	**55.3%**	771	**84.6%**
Japanese race (b)	349		652	
(2) Hispanic-Peruvian				
Japanese ancestry (a)	517	53.2%	371	58.8%
Japanese race (b)	275		218	

Source: U.S. Census, 1990.

Japanese ancestry (630 versus 517 for New York/New Jersey, and 771 versus 371 for California). In both locales, however, once they responded 'Hispanic,' they tended not to relate to 'Japanese' as their race.

This pattern seemed to hold, even controlling for the degree of racial/ethnic mixing. As Table 5.3 shows, the self-reported racial backgrounds of the Peruvian-born of Japanese ancestry appeared most diverse in New York, followed by California and New Jersey, as indicated by proportions of people who identified as other racial categories, such as 'White' and 'Spanish,' and who reported on second ancestry. Thus, the degree of racial mixing alone did not explain the way people related to the categories 'Asian' and 'Hispanic' between the two coasts.

Why do Japanese-Peruvians identify differently?

Ambiguous ethnicity/race

Japanese-Peruvians' identification patterns were attributable, first and foremost, to their ambiguous position within the existing racial/ethnic categorization scheme in the U.S.. Although they were treated as 'Japanese' (or 'Chinese') in Peru and as 'Peruvian' in Japan, their racial/ethnic categories were more ambiguous and flexible in the U.S.. Sometimes seen as 'Asian,' 'Japanese,' 'Hispanic,' or 'Latino,' and other times as simultaneously both 'Asian' and 'Latino' (Asian-Latinos), Japanese-Peruvians did not quite fit into existing categories.

Table 5.3 How the Peruvian-born of Japanese ancestry responded to race and Hispanic questions

		NY	*NJ*	*CA*
Race	Japanese	32%	75%	74%
	White	15%	11%	14%
	Spanish	53%		10%
	Black		12%	
	Chinese		4%	
	All other Asian			2%
Hispanic Origin	Hispanic (Peruvian)	88%	66%	46%
	Non-Hispanic	12%	30%	50%
Ancestry 1	Japanese	88%	86%	76%
	Peruvian		14%	18%
	Chinese	6%		
	Spanish			2%
	Italian			2%
	Not reported	6%	0%	2%
Ancestry 2	Japanese	6%	8%	18%
	Peruvian	36%	9%	2%
	Spanish	27%		
	Not reported	32%	83%	80%

Officially, there are five races, defined by the Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards of the U.S. Department of Commerce as 'white,' 'black,' 'American Indian or Alaskan Native,' and 'Asian,' or 'Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander' races. These categories largely coincide with popular notions of races – white, black, red, and yellow (Potter and Knepper 1996), in addition to 'Hispanics' or 'Latinos' that are also widely considered as a separate racial category. While the elasticity and arbitrariness of these concepts have been well noted, race remains an important political tool as well as individual cultural identifier (e.g. Oboler 1995; Rodriguez 2001). Not fitting exclusively in any of these categories, Japanese-Peruvians' racial/ethnic status was ambiguous and flexible both in terms of how they are treated and how they identify with existent racial/ethnic categories themselves. At the same time, this ambiguity gave them a number of options.

How they are treated

Japanese-Peruvians were typically treated as 'Asians,' but as a new breed of 'Asians': although they looked 'Asian,' they spoke Spanish like 'Hispanics.' So reported many Japanese-Peruvians I interviewed. Non-Hispanic white Americans, they said, were particularly confused as to how to make sense of Japanese-looking Spanish-speakers. The way they were treated was primarily based on a combination of physical features, language skills, surname, and circle of personal interactions. They were treated as Japanese so long as they kept their mouths shut; but as soon as they opened their mouths, they became Latinos. By the same token, racially mixed Japanese-Peruvians who did not quite 'look' Japanese, were frequently treated as Japanese if they had a Japanese surname. Being hired with, and working among, fellow Spanish-speakers, Japanese-Peruvian factory workers in New Jersey tended to be treated as 'Hispanics' by their non-Hispanic white American employers. Depending on a combination of these factors, Japanese-Peruvians were collectively labeled as 'Asians who speak Spanish' or 'Latinos with a Japanese face' (interviews) or, to reflect their mixed backgrounds, 'Asian Latinos,'[3] or (according to the U.S. Department of Justice) 'Japanese Latin Americans.'

How they identify themselves

Even more complex were Japanese-Peruvians' own responses to U.S. racial/ethnic categories. Even though their answers tended to differ between both coasts of the country, most were confused as to how to make sense of their racial/ethnic identities. Some said they were both (some identified as 'Peruvian-born Asians' or 'Peruvians of Japanese descent'), and a few others identified as 'Okinawan,' referring to Okinawa, the southernmost islands of Japan, where many of their ancestors originated. Racial and ethnic categories were particularly arbitrary among racially mixed people, and some Japanese-Peruvians gave different answers to racial questions; an elder sister responded 'white,' while a

younger one, 'always Hispanic.' Japanese-Peruvians' self-identification was indeed flexible; depending on how they defined the 'Other' in a particular situation, they tactically used multiple racial/ethnic self-labels. Yet, they usually assessed their 'race' – 'Hispanic' or 'Asian' – in response to (a) how the questions were framed, (b) culture, and (c) choice.

Questions

Japanese-Peruvians' racial/ethnic identification, in a way, depended on the way questions were framed and how they interpreted them, basing their answers on such factors as their skin color, nationality, linguistic and cultural knowledge, and ancestry. In Peru, where race was strictly associated with skin color, Japanese-Peruvians typically identified themselves as 'white' because of their relatively fair skin. In the U.S., they tended to use other factors. Many equated race with nationality. Nationality or the place of birth became salient indicators of 'race' particularly outside Peru. Many Japanese-Peruvians in New Jersey said they identified as 'Hispanic' because of their nationality, as one of them explained, 'Questions about nationality and birth place usually follow a question about race. So, answers to these questions should be consistent.' Another Japanese-Peruvian explained that, since 'race and nationality were the same thing,' his race was 'Peruvian.' Many others held the opinion that, since they were born in Peru, their race must be Peruvian.

The way questions were asked also mattered. A racially mixed Japanese-Peruvian in New York also said that she usually responded 'Hispanic,' never 'Asian,' in filling out forms in the U.S., because the question was typically framed in such a way that if she answered 'Asian,' she would have to pick a specific Asian country from which she originated. Since she did not know anything about Japan, she decided she was not an 'Asian.' Moreover, regardless of their racial backgrounds, U.S.-raised Japanese-Peruvians were more likely to use their ancestry (nationality of their ancestors) in assessing their race/ethnicity, as they were commonly defined in the U.S. (Waters 1990).

Culture

Among those who responded 'Hispanic,' relatively young third-generation Japanese-Peruvians tended to use a cultural notion in assessing their race and ethnicity. They were culturally 'Latinos,' they said, because they were born and raised in Peru. By culture they meant two things – that they spoke Spanish and that they were unfamiliar with Japanese culture. The owner of a New Jersey liquor store said he always responded 'Hispanic' to the census question because 'If I say I'm Japanese, then, I can't speak any Japanese.' Another explained, 'Even though I have Japanese blood, I don't feel Japanese. My culture is more Latino than Japanese.' They also defined their 'culture' in opposition to others'; they were 'warm' and 'family-caring' Latinos in contrast to Americans. Some secondary migrants who came to the U.S. from Japan emphasized their 'Latino identity' in

opposition to the Japanese. One of them said that being in Japan as a factory worker, she had learned that she was different from the Japanese. 'Although I used to believe that I was Japanese, I learned in Japan that I am not. I was born in Peru and speak Spanish. So, here, I always say I am Hispanic, even if people treat me as Asian.' The notion of culture, however, was inconsistent. Although a first-generation Japanese-Peruvian immigrant in the U.S. identified firmly as 'Hispanic' because of his 'lack of Japanese culture,' his U.S.-raised children, who were even more remote from 'Japanese culture,' asserted their 'Asian,' rather than 'Hispanic,' identities.

Choices

Japanese-Peruvians' racial/ethnic identification also entailed an element of choice (Waters 1990). Those who picked 'Japanese' frequently pointed out an advantage; it was more beneficial to be Asian than Hispanic, they believed, because of stereotypes associated with each group's socio-economic status. Not only did the Japanese, on average, earn more than Peruvians, but association with Japan also granted them membership in the 'First World.' Consequently, Japanese-Peruvians felt that they were treated with more respect when they claimed to be 'Japanese.' One Japanese-Peruvian in Los Angeles said, 'Latinos have a bad reputation anyway. So, whenever I want more respect, I say I am Japanese.' Being Japanese was also beneficial for economic opportunities. As a number of Japanese-Peruvians pointed out, establishing contact with the Japanese (Japanese companies) would enhance their prospects for job hunting, especially in Los Angeles where there is a significant presence of Japanese capital.

Social interactions

But which immigrants were likely to claim to be 'Asian' or 'Hispanic'? Japanese-Peruvians did not just randomly pick their racial and ethnic identity; nor did all of them have a choice. Japanese-Peruvians' racial/ethnic self-categorization was shaped, most importantly, by their immediate social relations. How they were treated by others and how they responded depended largely on their social interactions, or with whom they interacted. Waldinger (1996: 304) states: 'Frequent interaction in a highly concentrated niche promotes a sense of group identity. Participation in the niche, one of the salient traits that group members share, helps define who they are. … The niche, in other words, identifies an "us" from a "them"' (quoted in Tilly 1998: 160).

Regardless of individual backgrounds, those immigrants exposed to Japanese social circles (such as the many Japanese-Peruvians who worked for and with Japanese or Japanese-Americans) tended to identify themselves as 'Japanese' or 'Asian'. Likewise, those who primarily moved in circles of Latin Americans were more likely to identify as 'Hispanics.' A New Jersey courier stated that he never identified himself as 'Japanese,' because, even if he wanted to, 'there was no Japanese around here,' referring to the predominantly Hispanic neighborhood around Paterson. Others spoke of their changing identities depending on their

social relations. A Japanese-Peruvian restaurant employee said that he 'usually felt more Hispanic' because he interacted with 'Latino' customers daily, but when he was with me on several interview sessions, he said, his 'Japanese part came out,' as he saw me as Japanese. A few others spoke about a resurgent Okinawan identity because of their involvement in Okinawan social circles. One Japanese-Peruvian store clerk talked about his strong identification with Okinawa. In his (Okinawan) karate classes which he called 'dojo' in Japanese, he established a close friendship with his 'sensei,' a karate teacher from Okinawa. 'Through karate, I came to appreciate my roots. Being in the U.S., I have developed an identity as an Okinawan,' said this half-Okinawan and half-Naichi (non-Okinawan Japanese) Peruvian. While he was called 'Lucho' (for Luis) by his Latin American co-workers and customers, he went by 'Hiroshi,' his Japanese middle name, in his circle of karate friends.

In this way, social interactions played a significant role in shaping racial/ethnic identification, and this, I argue, is the major explanation why Japanese-Peruvians' identificational patterns tended to differ between California and New York/New Jersey. In California where Japanese-Peruvians tended to have more frequent interactions with the Japanese, they not only developed a sense of Japanese-ness, but also cultivated a greater command over the Japanese language. In the 1990 U.S. Census, 8.3 percent of Japanese-Peruvians in California reported that they spoke Japanese, while the comparable figure was zero in New Jersey. Interaction patterns differed significantly in the two areas because of migration patterns, characteristics of each area, and the nature of the existing Peruvian and Japanese niches in each location.

Patterns of migration

Why did Japanese-Peruvians migrate to these two locations, how, and who did? In a nutshell, Japanese-Peruvians utilized different kinds of ethnic ties in migrating to New York/New Jersey and to Los Angeles. Thus, the kind of personal networks used played a key role in determining who settled where.

Those who migrated to New York and New Jersey tended to rely on their Peruvian networks. Since there was little prior migration from Japan to this area, Japanese-Peruvians migrated there as Peruvians, working as laborers together with fellow Peruvian migrants. Many others migrated for professional reasons, particularly to New York. As shown by a high percentage of professional Japanese-Peruvians in New York (according to the 1990 U.S. Census, 21 percent of the Peruvian-born of Japanese ancestry in New York state were physicians and nurses), much of this migration to New York City was professionally motivated, rather than network-driven labor migration (Altamirano 1992).

In Los Angeles, Japanese-Peruvian migrants initially relied on either Okinawan networks and ties or former Japanese-Peruvian internees. Since many Japanese-Peruvians were of Okinawan origin, some could trace familial ties to those Okinawans who had migrated earlier in large numbers to the U.S. and particularly to Hawaii, many of whom eventually settled in southern California.

These Japanese-Peruvian migrants relied on Okinawan organizations and occupational niches (e.g. gardening) in areas of high Okinawan concentration, such as Gardena. Other pioneer immigrants relied on their ties to former detainees who had been shipped from Peru to U.S. detention camps during World War II and were later relocated in Los Angeles. About 1,800 Japanese from Peru had been detained, mostly in Crystal City, Texas, together with Japanese-Americans (Takenaka 2000; Connell 1995).

Japanese-Peruvian migrants to Los Angeles also migrated using ties cultivated in Japan. Many, particularly recent migrants, have increasingly come from Japan, and the volume of this migration has grown as a consequence of the ethnicity-based reverse migration from Peru to Japan. Relatively few Japanese-Peruvian re-migrants from Japan have headed for the east coast, and then particularly to Passaic County, New Jersey, in and around Paterson.

Racial/ethnic compositions of New York/Paterson and Los Angeles

One way to explain differences between the two coasts was the differing racial/ethnic compositions of the two areas. Northern New Jersey, specifically Passaic County where Japanese-Peruvians were concentrated, was an area with a relatively high percentage (30 percent) of 'Hispanics,' according to the 2000 U.S. Census. In the city of Paterson alone, the capital of Passaic County and the heart of the Peruvian community, 'Hispanics' made up 50 percent of the city's population. By contrast, the 2000 U.S. Census showed people of 'Asian race' constituted only 3.7 percent (and Japanese, only 0.1 percent) in the entire country and only 1.9 percent in the city of Paterson. In Los Angeles County, on the other hand, there were more 'Asians' (12 percent), while 'Hispanics' also constituted 44.6 percent of the population. Los Angeles was also the mecca of 'Asian Latinos,' according to a *Los Angeles Times* article subtitled, 'Asian Immigrants from Latin America Find a Haven in L.A.'[4] Apart from Japanese-Peruvians, Asians from Latin America, often depicted by the media as 'Asian-Latinos,' were reportedly drawn to the city by its large Asian and Latino populations. According to several journalistic accounts, California was home to 100,000 Asian-Latinos, including Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese from Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere (Hong 1995; Park 1999).

Historically, California has attracted a disproportionate number of Japanese immigrants. As a result of these historical ties, there were already established Japanese communities with numerous associations and institutions. Exploiting these ethnic niches, Japanese-Peruvians in Los Angeles largely resided in neighborhoods that were once (or still) predominantly Japanese (Japanese immigrants and Japanese-Americans), such as Gardena, Torrance, and downtown Los Angeles. Japanese-Peruvians also took advantage of Japanese occupational niches. The majority (70 percent) of Japanese-Peruvians interviewed in Los Angeles were working for Japanese firms and stores (e.g. Japanese grocery stores) or Japanese-American community institutions (e.g. the Japanese-American community hospital). Alternatively, they were independent gardeners,

an occupation that was long dominated by Japanese immigrants (Tsukashima 1998), particularly in Gardena. After the 'eating and drinking' industry (16 percent), landscape was the second most popular occupation among Japanese-Peruvians in California according to the 1990 U.S. Census. As Japanese immigrants have aged and gradually left this occupation, some Japanese-Latin Americans have taken over their positions. Requiring relatively little training and capital, gardening was a convenient occupation for recent arrivals. One of the four Japanese-Peruvian gardeners I interviewed in Los Angeles said, 'Since the Japanese worked long as gardeners, they have built a reputation in gardening. I put ads in newspapers, and people call me as soon as they see my Japanese name.'

In contrast, Japanese-Peruvians in New Jersey primarily resided in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, they worked in apparel industries (22 percent) and food-related businesses (16 percent). Most of the Japanese-Peruvian interviewees in the Paterson area either worked in nearby factories or engaged in small businesses that catered to 'Latinos.' A dozen or so Japanese-Peruvian-owned restaurants in the area were all Peruvian; decorated with Peruvian national flags or pictures of Machu Pichu, these restaurants all served Peruvian dishes, except for one that also prepared 'sazimi' (or sashimi), a Japanese dish of raw fish, spelled in a Peruvian way. Among the most popular foods was Peruvian-style grilled chicken, *pollo a la braza*. Japanese-Peruvians have built a reputation as the best chicken-makers in Peru, as they dominated the major chain *pollo a la braza* restaurants in Lima; so explained one Japanese-Peruvian restaurant owner in stating why he started a chicken restaurant in New Jersey.

Because of the areas' distinct demographic compositions, Japanese-Peruvians in each location exploited different kinds of ethnic resources and opportunities in forming their social niches. In New Jersey, Japanese-Peruvian migrants lived as 'Peruvians,' utilizing the skills they cultivated in Peru. They migrated to New Jersey together with other Peruvian laborers because of the area's growing industry, not because of existing Japanese ethnic ties. Unlike in California, there was little capital or migration from Japan; there were few established ties with Japan prior to their migration. Thus, Japanese-Peruvians in California and New Jersey were exposed to different social niches and exploited different ethnic resources.

The nature of the existing niches

The difference in Japanese-Peruvians' settlement patterns was also attributable to the nature of the existing Japanese and Peruvian niches in the two geographic areas. A key to explaining differing settlement patterns was the degree of heterogeneity of ethnic niches. Namely, Peruvian niches, which tended to be closely associated with larger 'Latino' niches, were ethnically and occupationally more diverse in New York/New Jersey than in Los Angeles, while Japanese niches in Los Angeles were more diverse than those in New York/New Jersey. The degree

of within-niche heterogeneity, I argue, was an indicator of openness to incorporating newcomers and outsiders, thus playing an important role in determining Japanese-Peruvians' settlement patterns.

Peruvian niches

Peruvian migrants, in general, were closely integrated into larger 'Latino' niches in both areas. The survey I conducted as part of the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) in Los Angeles and New York/New Jersey showed that most Peruvians, particularly those with a lower level of human capital, worked in close association with other Latin Americans. In Los Angeles, 22 percent of those surveyed worked for Mexicans and 19 percent worked for Peruvians (53 percent for European-Americans), while 29 percent were supervised by Mexicans and 29 percent by Peruvians (33 percent by European-Americans). About 40 percent obtained jobs through Peruvians and 14 percent through Mexicans (another 40 percent found jobs on their own). In New York/New Jersey, most Peruvian respondents (77 percent) reported having worked for whites, though 73 percent found jobs through Peruvian friends and families. Most engaged in either unskilled work in services, such as cleaning and cashiers (56 percent), or manual work in factories (17 percent) together with 'other Latinos,' and reported that they had both limited knowledge of the English language (68 percent either spoke or understood only a little) and used relatively little English at work (36 percent, 'just a little bit,' and 44 percent, 'somewhat').

Peruvians on the east coast also tended to work and reside in largely 'Hispanic' and relatively poor neighborhoods. According to the LAMP survey, 64 percent and 71 percent of Peruvian respondents in New York/New Jersey and Los Angeles, respectively, reported that they resided in neighborhoods that required 'no' or 'a little' English to live in. In Los Angeles, Peruvians were concentrated in predominantly Mexican (or Central American), industrial, and economically modest areas in San Fernando Valley and North Hollywood, Downey and its vicinities. In the New York metropolitan area, Peruvians were also concentrated in predominantly 'Hispanic' areas in Queens, New York, and in Passaic County in and around Paterson.

The nature of 'Hispanic' neighborhoods, however, differed in both areas. In Los Angeles, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, the majority (63.4 percent) of the Hispanic population was Mexican. In Passaic County, the Hispanic population was ethnically more diverse, consisting of Puerto Ricans (28 percent of the Hispanic population), Mexicans (14 percent), Cubans (2 percent), and others (55 percent). In the city of Paterson, the comparable figures were 32.1 percent, 6.8 percent, 1.2 percent, and 60 percent, respectively. 'Hispanics' were even more diverse in New York City – Puerto Ricans (37 percent), Mexicans (8.5 percent), Cubans (1.9 percent), and others (53 percent), including large numbers of Dominicans, Central and South Americans.

Peruvian migrants, many of whom worked and resided in Hispanic-dominated areas, therefore, tended to take up similar types of jobs as fellow 'Hispanics.' Even

though most Peruvians engaged in relatively low-skill and low-rung jobs in both locations, those in New York/New Jersey tended to earn higher wages ($12 per hour) than their counterparts in Los Angeles ($10), according to my survey interviews.

Japanese niches

Meanwhile, the Japanese, as a group, also occupied an entirely different socio-economic position in Los Angeles and New York/New Jersey. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, the Japanese-born in the states of New Jersey and New York, on average, earned more than double ($24,400) the amount of the Peruvian-born, and most Japanese, unlike Peruvians, engaged in skilled, professional, and white-collar jobs.

Yet, different kinds of 'Japanese' inhabited both areas. The Japanese population in New York and New Jersey was primarily from Japan, comprising mainly company transferees and their families and students. In Los Angeles, on the other hand, there were more U.S.-born Japanese-Americans, although there were also substantial numbers of businessmen and students from Japan. Consequent upon the area's longer history of Japanese immigration and closer business and geographic ties to Japan, its Japanese population was more numerous, extensive, and diverse than in New York. The 'community' Japanese people often referred to in Los Angeles consisted of many sub-groups, such as Japanese immigrants, their multi-generational descendants, students, and company transferees from California, Hawaii, South America, Okinawa, and mainland Japan, as well as Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Peruvian secondary migrants from Japan. While these sub-groups were divided socially – with separate associations and circles of friendships – they were often united through business ties. Even though there was commonly a chasm between Japanese-speakers and English monolinguals in their social lives, many Japanese subsidiaries were located in areas that were historically occupied by Japanese immigrants. Moreover, Japanese businesses and stores, according to my interviews, often relied on ethnic ties, preferring employees and clientele of any Japanese ancestry. Thus, Japanese-Peruvians were able to enter and find their own niches within this loosely organized structure. In other words, the heterogeneous and extensive ethnic niches successfully provided newcomers, such as Peruvians of Japanese ancestry, with diverse ways and means to obtain economic opportunities. Some Japanese-Peruvians who migrated via Japan took advantage of their Japanese experience and limited Japanese knowledge in order to obtain employment with Japanese businesses. Some worked at Japanese sushi restaurants as 'cultural mediators' between Japanese restaurant owners and Mexican employees. Others secured economic opportunities through ties developed by pan-American 'Nikkei' (Overseas Japanese) institutions, which had flourished especially in Los Angeles in an attempt to cultivate mutual networks among Japanese descendants from across the Americas.

A key to explaining Japanese-Peruvians' differential patterns of ethnic adaptation, therefore, appeared to lie in the heterogeneous nature of Japanese niches in Los Angeles. If given a choice, Japanese-Peruvians often desired to associate with 'higher-status' Japanese than with 'Hispanics.' Although they have been able to find their niches within the Japanese community in Los Angeles, they have failed to do so in the New York metropolitan area due to the exclusive nature of Japanese niches. Unlike in New York, the diverse and complex Japanese community structure in Los Angeles has allowed Japanese-Peruvians to gain access to its economic opportunities.

Consequences of differential niche formation

The formation of distinct niches had a number of significant consequences for Japanese-Peruvians' adaptation in the country. Niches affected the immigrants' social mobility and their aspirations for future migrations.

Socio-economic mobility

Most Japanese-Peruvians throughout the country experienced downward economic mobility upon migrating from Peru. Except for a handful of professional workers and those who came as students to pursue their careers, Japanese-Peruvians largely engaged in unskilled work in both Los Angeles and New York/New Jersey. The type of their jobs, however, differed between the two areas. As described above, many Japanese-Peruvians in Los Angeles took advantage of Japanese occupational niches, working primarily for Japanese or Japanese-American enterprises. In New Jersey, they mostly worked in nearby factories or engaged in small businesses that catered to 'Latinos.'

This has led to differential socio-economic achievement over time, measured by income. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, Japanese-Peruvians' average individual annual wages in New Jersey ($7,400) were significantly lower than those of California ($12,600). See Table 5.4. The Japanese-Peruvian factory workers interviewed in New Jersey said that they earned $800 to $1,200 a month, which they considered a bare minimum, while gardeners in California earned 'enough to support a family of four.' Even though Japanese-Peruvians in New York and New Jersey, on average, have stayed in the U.S. longer than their

Table 5.4 Median household and per capita income

	Median HH income	*Per capita*
Paterson	35,420	13,257
Passaic	56,054	21,370
LA County	46,452	20,683
LA City	39,942	20,671
New York City	41,887	22,402

counterparts in California (80 percent of them arrived prior to 1986, compared to 49 percent in California), and tended to speak better English (77 percent of them responded to the census that they spoke English 'well' or 'very well' in New Jersey, compared with 62 percent in California), they lagged behind their California counterparts in income.

Future migratory patterns

Another significant consequence brought about by the distinct niche formation on the two coasts were differences in immigrants' levels of satisfaction with life in general. According to my ethnographic data, Japanese-Peruvians in Los Angeles, overall, appeared more content than those in New Jersey, indicated by their higher level of home ownership and lower aspiration for further migration. In California, most had no doubt about staying, as compared to their counterparts on the east coast, particularly in New Jersey, where they frequently expressed a desire to move elsewhere.

In a way, their differing levels of satisfaction had to do with their differing sense of community. Although Japanese-Peruvians in both areas frequently complained about a lack of community due to their long hours of work and geographic dispersal, those in Los Angeles, overall, were more successful than in New York/New Jersey in organizing a series of activities amongst themselves. The failure to form a community in New Jersey was, in part, attributable to the area in which they worked and resided. Since Japanese-Peruvians in New Jersey were concentrated in relatively poor Hispanic neighborhoods, the handful of economically successful ones had no incentive to form alliances with poorer Japanese-Peruvians. Those Japanese-Peruvians who resided in more affluent areas commented that they had neither a common identity nor a desire to mingle with low-income Japanese-Peruvians in Paterson. Moreover, being in a relatively poor community, Japanese-Peruvians also lacked the resources and self-esteem to form their own community. Barely making ends meet, 'how can they participate in community activities?' asked one Japanese-Peruvian in Paterson, while another explained that, 'Being too preoccupied with their work, they live for the moment without any future plans. Such people never have an interest in helping each other.' This type of expression, they interpreted, was attributable mostly to the downward socio-economic mobility they experienced upon migrating to relatively poor areas, such as Paterson.

Meanwhile, Japanese-Peruvians in Los Angeles, while also experiencing downward mobility, were at least able to derive a sense of satisfaction from their association with 'higher-status' Japanese and Japanese-American communities. They could more easily choose to identify as 'Asian' or 'Japanese' and to live as 'Asian-Latinos' than could Japanese-Peruvians in and around Paterson, as they had easier access to both 'Japanese' and 'Peruvian' communities in Los Angeles.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to argue for the importance of regional context in shaping migrants' racial/ethnic identities and socio-economic mobility in the U.S. Immigrants' socio-economic and cultural adaptation depends not only on their group traits (or human capital), but also on the ways in which they exploit particular kinds of ties (or social capital) and how host community structures allow them to do so. In other words, the process of immigrants' adaptation is, to a large extent, contingent upon the nature of host communities where they settle.

Neither does ethnicity simply reflect a group's cultural characteristics, but rather it is an important principle of social organization and a tool for immigrants' socio-economic adaptation (Waldinger 2001). We need to pay more attention to how ethnicity plays a role in immigrants' interactions with local structures. Ethnic and national groups are not homogenous entities. Neither are ethnic communities and host cities. As this chapter demonstrates, New York and Los Angeles may shape immigrant experiences differently, as they continue to attract more immigrants from Asia as well as from Latin America.

Part II

Family, school, and youth culture

6 Adopted children's identities at the China/U.S. border[1]

Sara K. Dorow

> What are the mechanisms of power that enable the mobility, as well as the localization and disciplining, of diverse populations within these transnationalized systems? How are cultural flows and human imagination conditioned and shaped within these new relations of global inequalities?
>
> (Ong 1998: 11)

On the plane from Dayang[2] to Guangzhou I sit next to Barbara, on whose lap sits Brigitte, her new one-year-old adopted Chinese daughter. Barbara and Nancy, the white American adoptive mothers with whom I am traveling, are tired after ten days of getting acquainted with their new children, shuffling between government offices, and politely warding off curious onlookers on the streets of Dayang City. Guangzhou is the last stop in China before the two families travel home to the U.S. – and more specifically, to what will become their children's new home.

The Chinese gentleman in the row behind us leans forward a bit to take us in, and then engages me in conversation. (I am along as participant observer, but have become erstwhile interpreter for our small travel group until a local facilitator in Guangzhou can take over where the guide in Dayang left off.)

'This child must be adopted,' the man says. 'I've seen families like this before.' He nods slowly and thoughtfully with neither obvious approval nor disapproval. He guesses we are from Europe and I answer no, the United States.

'Mmm, this child will have good opportunities.'

'So, what do you think about international adoption?,' I venture to ask.

He thinks for a moment and replies, 'Women juede qiguai.' (We think it's strange.) But then he adds with a quick smile, as if convincing himself as much as me, 'Aixin meiyou guojie.' (Love has no national borders.)

I ask if he thinks these children adopted abroad still count as Chinese. He glances over at Brigitte playing on her mother's lap and says, 'Well, we hope they will know where their roots are.'

I relay this conversation to Barbara, who says oh yes, of course she and her husband plan to teach their daughter about Chinese culture. A couple of days later, right before she and her new daughter depart Guangzhou for the U.S., Barbara tells me almost apologetically that she and her husband had initially decided on adoption from China not because they were particularly attracted to the culture, but because healthy infant girls were available.

It is hard to say where identities begin and end, since their characteristics shift across and can only be understood within particular social contexts. Immigrant identities might seem especially difficult to pin down, as they are shaped and reshaped amid a myriad of social relations that cross temporal and spatial boundaries. At the same time, however, immigrant identities are by no means completely fluid and undetermined. The man on the airplane, for example, read the young migrant and her mother in multiple but also very specific ways. Because Brigitte was going to the U.S. in the arms of a white mother, he assumed she would have access to better economic and social status but might lose her cultural identity. And because she was a Chinese orphan being adopted by parents who presumably had money and status and therefore choices, she represented to him the possibility of transcending borders of difference but also elicited some suspicion toward the motives of the relatively powerful.

The places where the complex possibilities of identity meet with social hierarchies are powerful junctures. And in migration processes, national borders are one such juncture – places where we might get a snapshot of the limits and possibilities of the ongoing process of identity formation. In this essay, I explore the ways in which the immigrant identities of adopted children are prefigured in the spaces, practices, and narratives found at an important border site in transnational China–U.S. migration. That site is Shamian Island, a small community that is home to the U.S. Consulate in the southern coastal city of Guangzhou. Having finished the Chinese government paperwork that initiates children into their new American families, parents like Barbara and Nancy stop on Shamian Island to complete the paperwork that will allow their children to emigrate to the U.S. In the pages that follow I take an ethnographic tour of Shamian Island that reveals the range of cultural possibilities in which adoptive parents begin to imagine the identities of their adopted children, on the cusp of an immigration that will radically transform their and their children's lives.

As recent work by and about transnationally and transracially adopted people demonstrates, the experience of difference in adoption is varied and disjointed (Yngvesson and Mahoney 2000; Register 1991; Hoffman-Riem 1990; Bishoff and Rankin 1997; Ito and Cervin 1999).[3] Adopted individuals often know little of their pre-adoption histories, are born and grow up in two different nations and families, and usually do not look like their adoptive families. Typically, they are children of color with white parents. Adoption is thus an especially good example of the assertion that identity is constructed 'in situ, in relation to symbolically and physically constructed "home", "place", voluntary and involuntary dis/locations and dis/placements of physically distinguishable and marked human bodies and subjectivities' (Luke and Luke 1998: 732). The experiences of adopted people poignantly demonstrate that identity is neither solely authored by nor unwittingly foisted upon us. Rather, it is formed by the social and historical spaces through which we move – in the relationships between different people, and between people and their different social environments.

The ongoing importance of context and difference to identity is what leads Stuart Hall (1996) to remind us that we are better off thinking not of a thing

called identity, but of a process of *identification*. The shifting contexts of the individual biography are given meaning and coherence in everyday stories and practices which themselves are never really complete (Denzin 1990; Widdershoven 1993). Individual identities can thus tell us about particular social contexts, just as those particular social contexts can tell us about the stuff of which identity is made. My story of Shamian Island emphasizes the latter, focusing on the crossroads where adoptive parents begin to give meaning to the multiple social practices and categories that inform their children's identities.

I narrate the social relations of identity construction on Shamian Island largely through the eyes and ears of white American adoptive parents, whom we can think of as mediators of their children's identification process. Even as they pull Chinese children into a white American world, adoptive parents become intimately engaged themselves (temporarily in China, and permanently with their child) in the complex world of transnational and transracial border crossing. Their experiences demonstrate how a rich interplay of individual and structural processes shapes cultural identities, creates hierarchies of migration subjects, and mutually constructs migrant and non-migrant identities (Mahler 1998; Ong 1998; Shah 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994a).

The question of choice in adoptive identity is crucial in at least two ways. First, the adopted child lacks choice in the matter of her transnational and transracial migration, further sharpening our focus on the constellations of actors and institutions – beginning with adoptive parents – that make choices about her identity as an immigrant. Barbara admitted, for example, that her desire for a Chinese child had as much to do with age and health as any cultural interest. While the adoptive families that I have studied may disagree about what aspects and how much of Chinese culture they should incorporate into their daughters' lives, almost all insist that this is a choice they make.

Adoptive parents also have the material and symbolic power it takes to choose transnational adoption to begin with, which leads to the second important point about choice: adopted children constitute a special category of immigrant that has the emotive power to melt borders and to be intimately chosen for migration. This element of choice in adoption migration focuses our attention more generally on the question of who gets to be mobile and why (Mahler 1998). The ambivalence of suspicion and desire with which our acquaintance on the plane viewed Brigitte's immigration was reminiscent of many conversations I had with Chinese observers of transnational adoption. Chinese acquaintances would sometimes indicate mistrust of the consumptive foreigner ('we wonder if they might experiment on the children'), but at the same time they would indicate envy of a migration journey to the U.S. that was largely unattainable for them ('Can *I* be adopted?' they only half-joked).

The remarks of the Chinese man on the plane, together with Barbara's response, remind us that there are multiple ways to think about Brigitte's identity, but that choices about her identity are already shaped by where she is going relative to where she has been, by the kinds of attachments she does and does not have to her home country, by whom she does and does not resemble, and by

what makes her desirable as an immigrant. In ambivalence expressed at the border, we can begin to assay what is assumed a priori about particular migrants' identities and what is taken to be undetermined or malleable. Both fixed and fluid characteristics of adopted children are understood in relation to the multiple social relations of which they are a part.

Traversing histories on Shamian

Shamian Island is not technically an island. It is a flat chunk of sandy soil about a half-mile long and 300 yards wide that hugs the banks of the Pearl River in Guangzhou. Most people get around Shamian on foot, as one can stroll the length of the main boulevard in about ten minutes. A small lighted sign at one end of this boulevard briefly tells the island's history: ceded to the British and French in 1842 following the Opium War, it was then returned to China in 1945. This innocuous sign does not convey the full symbolic weight of that history of boundary violation and resolution. It does not, for example, tell visitors that in 1925, British troops on Shamian Island fired on Chinese demonstrators who passed too close to the concession, killing 52 and wounding over 100. The crowd of students, soldiers, workers, and Boy Scouts were protesting foreign imperialism (Spence 1990: 340).

This history has been absorbed and re-written on the walls of the old colonial trading companies and homes that line the quiet boulevards on Shamian. After the island reverted to China in 1945, these structures became Chinese government offices and multi-family dwellings. Now, as the sign will tell you, the colonial villas are being restored 'for the benefit of the people' (in 1996 the island was declared a protected historical space) – or at least for the benefit of domestic and overseas tourists and those who can afford to move into the refurbished apartments. Thus there is scaffolding on many of Shamian's villas, the two little churches are active again (one of them has a bilingual service to accommodate the foreigners who stay on Shamian); there is a tennis club by the river's edge; and several upscale seafood restaurants draw wedding and business parties from the city's moneyed residents. This is genteel urban renewal, especially when compared to the twenty-three giant construction cranes I counted on the Guangzhou skyline from a vantage point on the twentieth floor of Shamian's White Swan Hotel.

My visit to Shamian Island with Barbara, Nancy and their children early in 2000 was part of an extensive ethnographic study of adoption practices and narratives in both China and the United States. The study drew on methods of global ethnography (see Burawoy 2000, 2001) to understand how children's identities are produced by local actors within the global circulations of materials, ideas, and actors that make up China–U.S. adoption. I had already traversed most other points on the path adopted children take on their journey from Chinese orphanages to American families, interviewing and/or observing more than 80 adoptive families, social workers, adoption officials, and orphanage caregivers. And now I was following American families through their two-week adoption process in China.

I was eager to get to Shamian Island – I had been there as a tourist years before, but not since the China–U.S. adoption program took off in 1994, transforming this small island into an adoption crossroads that now annually hosts about 5,000 American families and their Chinese children. While adoption takes families from across the U.S. to cities throughout China to meet and adopt their children, the immigrant visas handed out by the U.S. Consulate funnel all American adoptive parents through Shamian Island for a couple of days, and always as they are poised to head home. I suspected that it was a condensed and 'overdetermined' site, a place where one could sense the various histories that prefigure adopted children's identities.

Signs of adoption are everywhere on Shamian Island. To the uninitiated, the sight of so many white people pushing around strollers with Chinese babies in them – most of them ten months to two years of age – might indeed seem strange. In fact, less than a century ago, the scene was probably reversed, as Chinese amahs cared for the children of colonial European residents. But one quickly gets used to this quirky little island where a white parent holding a Chinese baby is more the rule than the exception. (Once during our few days on Shamian, I asked Nancy if she had seen the baby in the hotel lobby with such big blue eyes. 'She has *blue* eyes?' she asked incredulously, then laughed as she realized she had assumed the baby must be Chinese.)

In some ways this borderland full of adoptive families much like themselves was a comforting relief to the adoptive parents I met. It was also comforting for many that they could relax in the opulent White Swan Hotel and even order from Pizza Hut. 'So much for roughing it in China,' one parent said. 'We feel like we're at the Shangri-la!'

But in other ways the experience was disconcerting; some parents expressed a nagging 'neocolonial' feeling. 'What do the Chinese residents here think when they see us?' they often asked. Usually the reassuring answer from their guides was, 'They're used to it,' or 'They are happy for the babies.' The local Chinese residents I met on Shamian seemed resigned – neither curious nor cold – to this latest wave of foreigners making inroads into China. An elderly man in the waterfront park leaned over to watch me typing field notes on my laptop and, when I told him I was there studying adoption, he sighed and repeated what so many Chinese people said to me when the subject of adoption came up: '*Zhongguode renkou tai duo*' (China's population is so big).

If we are to appreciate the histories in which the immigrant identities of adopted children are embedded, the structural and cultural context in China that pushes certain Chinese children into marginalization and then pulls them into adoption cannot be divorced from the structural and cultural context in the United States that pushes certain parents into adoption and pulls them toward adopting from China. Both parents and children are then pulled into the China–U.S. adoption process through a kind of structural matching.[4]

In China, the pressures of the family planning policy (a law as of September 2002), economic and social marginalization, and patriarchy combine in various ways to explain why families abandon Chinese girls. China's social welfare

system has the double burden of many infant girls to care for and not enough resources. The Ministry of Civil Affairs in China, responsible for the social welfare of abandoned children, reports that in 1999 there were 1,677 state-run welfare facilities in urban China (Shi 2000: 138). While this number includes institutions other than those that care for orphans, it probably does not include a number of small local foundling homes and a growing but still small number of private facilities. Estimates of the number of abandoned and institutionalized children range wildly, from conservative estimates of 200,000 to over 1 million. Some of these children will be fostered or adopted domestically, and some transnationally. Boys still make up less than 5 percent of children placed into adoption proceedings from China.

In the United States, experiences with infertility, the desire for children of one's own, and sometimes also a humanitarian ethos lead parents toward adoption. Yet American parents that adopt internationally – not just from China but from other countries – usually request healthy infant girls. There are numerous and mixed explanations for this preference for adopting girls, but it remains a bit of a puzzle. My own research and evidence from adoption experts and practitioners tells us that some parents suggest that a girl might be easier to raise, or even more adaptable; others (especially mothers) vaguely assert that they always just imagined a girl (some tell me they wanted a girl to 'dress up,' others tell me they wanted to give a girl the kinds of opportunities she might not otherwise have in her patriarchal home country). Sometimes this image of a girl is intertwined with notions of Asian femininity. On the other hand, many people do adopt boys internationally, and a number of families interested in China are glad that the number of boys coming out of China is slowly increasing. American families seeking to adopt also have the resources to afford it: the adoption process costs more than $20,000, of which $3,000 is a required donation to the orphanage.

The structural alignments of Chinese and Americans are also both steeped in racial and cultural imaginings. For example, some Chinese officials told me that they imagined adoption by white rather than black parents to be a more appropriate social step for abandoned girls. Some American parents for their part told me that they thought an Asian child would be easier to raise (and/or would adjust more easily) than an African American child. On Shamian Island, histories, structural alignments, and imaginings come together, tilted toward the inevitable move away from a child's Chinese past and toward her American future. But this moment of transition is also ambivalent enough to show us the range of cultural practices, ideologies, and structures that forge and broker her social identity.

Mapping identities on Shamian

Signs of adoption on Shamian mean more than the sight of adoptive families milling about. The island has literally re-made itself in response to adoptive families. Because the U.S. Consulate has been on the island since about 1990, businesses offering translation and immigration preparation services have also

been on Shamian for a while; shops, restaurants, and hotels catering to tourists and international business people also pre-date the growth of international adoption. But now little red silk dresses and shoes entice adoptive families into storefronts; more shops sell diapers than one would otherwise imagine; the swank White Swan Hotel offers cribs and childcare services; and the photos in the window of the photo shop just down the street are mostly of adoptive families.

Inside those shops, hotels, and businesses, as well as on the streets that connect them, one finds pieces of the material and symbolic stuff out of which adopted Chinese children's American immigrant identities are being negotiated. Already in the conversations among adoptive parents on Shamian it is evident that children are not just in transition, but are being re-made within a certain range of imagined possibilities. As they ran into each other on Shamian, for example, adoptive families exchanged information about their children's ages, rashes, favorite foods, and sleeping habits – information that was compared and read as clues to the orphanages and birth families and countries from which their children came. If a one-and-a-half year-old was eating a lot of noodles, was it because she had not gotten enough to eat in the orphanage, or because she naturally liked noodles? Either way, a child's identity was being negotiated in relation to particular ways of imagining the China that produced her.

Already, and again even before leaving China, adoptive parents mediate their children's histories not only in relation to their Chinese origins but also in anticipation of their American futures. This is especially apparent in conversations about names. Much of the paperwork parents fill out in China lists children's official Chinese names along with what the forms call their English names. By the time parents get to Shamian they are usually introducing their children by the latter, sometimes with the Chinese name tacked on: 'This is Rose – and her Chinese name is Mei.' Eddie, a Chinese facilitator who guides American families through the visa and immigration process on Shamian, offered an extreme example of this kind of controlled transition in identity. A couple in one of his travel groups had once asked him to stop using their daughter's Chinese name, and even to stop speaking Chinese to her altogether, as it would only confuse her as she/they moved to the United States.

Most parents tell me that they are interested in 'doing something' with Chinese culture, but 'not too much' – although what constitutes that 'something,' or 'too much' of that something, varies considerably. Once back in the U.S., for example, some parents regularly send their children to Chinese language schools and culture camps and maybe even learn Chinese themselves, while others cautiously engage in a minimal number of China-related events (celebrating the Lunar New Year, or occasionally eating at a Chinese restaurant) as a supplement to 'normal' children's activities. Nancy told me as we sat in the White Swan Hotel that a friend of hers back home had chided her for not giving her daughter Corrine a Chinese name, but she thought some parents went too far with trying to be Chinese, excessively reinforcing difference. It was a racial thing, she suggested; they wouldn't be so obsessed with names and cultural activities if they adopted from Russia, would they? While many parents

agree with Nancy, just as many would answer her question by saying that it is precisely because their children are marked as different (as Chinese, and as adopted) that their cultural heritage should be embraced. This uncertain struggle over the identities of migrating adopted children illustrates the central dilemma of identity: how is an identity of belonging created in the midst of difference? Does difference solidify or undermine belonging, or both? Shamian Island, like its location in the trajectory of China–U.S. adoption, offers ways of doing the 'in between' of identity.

While parents are the most obvious shapers and negotiators (other than the children themselves) of their children's identities, the interesting point about Shamian is that it brings together a number of actors who are brokers in the process of identity formation. These include facilitators like Eddie, shop owners and the objects they sell, and most obviously the U.S. Consulate, a large nondescript office building that sits in one corner of the island. As the broker of migration itself, the consulate is the hub around which migration-related businesses and practices revolve on Shamian.

The paths of local and adoptive visa applicants rarely cross on Shamian except when they both enter the U.S. Consulate, and even then, they are easily distinguished. As Lana, a Chinese adoption facilitator, told her small group of weary families as they arrived in Shamian, 'Don't worry about your paperwork. It's easy to get your visa. But not for me!' The morning I accompanied a group of adoptive families to the consulate for their visa appointment, we walked right into the consulate past several hundred Chinese adults who stood in tight lines behind signs that bore the hour ('8:30–9:29,' '9:30–10:29,' etc.) in which they had their two-minute chance to make their case before a consular officer. One adoptive mother looked at this crowd of immigrant hopefuls and said that she felt guilty just marching right in; later she told me that she had been shocked by this scene. Meanwhile, we went to the consulate's special visa unit for adopted children – a pleasant room where adoptive families waited on comfortable chairs; photos of adoptive families and a quilt with an adoption motif hung on the walls; and facilitators milled about with files of paperwork.[5]

There is nothing original about asserting that not all migrants are created equal, but practices at the U.S. Consulate on Shamian bring into stark relief distinctions among migrants, the role the state and citizenship play in making such distinctions, and how those distinctions already shape the identities of immigrants to the United States prior to migration. Nancy, Barbara and I could laugh together over the wording in the immigrant paperwork they were filling out for the consulate – the immigrant applicant should not be involved in criminal activity, belong to the socialist party, nor be likely to be involved in prostitution – precisely because we knew that the identity of her migrating daughter was constituted far outside the purview of this regular bureaucratic form. This is also clear on the website for the adoption visa unit at the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou, which displays a photo of a smiling Chinese baby and the caption, 'Another happy client!'

The special character of transnational adoption is built simultaneously on the relationship of the outsider migrant child to the insider American citizen parents and on the ideals of an American national and cultural imaginary. As consular officer Ted Gong explained to me, China–U.S. adoption is a privileged form of migration because of its very large 'American citizen component:' adoptive parents can and do contact their Congressional representatives about adoption regulations and processes. But adoption also appeals to the myth of American humanitarianism. In a 7 February 2001 e-mail, Ted Gong wrote (and I quote with his permission):

> The priorities our procedures allow for [adoptees] seem out of proportion to what we allow for other regular migrants … for orphans, there are two factors to explain the priorities afforded them: 1) a very articulate, and well organized middle and upper class that advocates on their behalf; 2) the inherent humanitarian character of an orphan adoption … an immigration policy that provides for orphans expeditiously also respond to needs of Americans to demonstrate that Americans care for others … and it supports the American myth that America is the land of hope and solutions to the problems of the old worlds.

The U.S. stance on adoption migration thus meets several needs at once: those of political constituents who want children, and those of an American nation that wants to be and imagine itself as a generous nation of immigrants. Contradictions between these two sets of desires are at least partially resolved in the child herself, who is both recipient and representative of citizenship and humanitarianism jointly at work. She can thus be imagined as an American citizen because of what its citizens already imagine themselves to be.

At the same time, however, the magnanimity of adoption and the ease with which a child can be imagined as a U.S. citizen entail a necessary correlate – that of differentiation. The adopted child's flexible identity is defined in part through how it is different from other Chinese immigrants – the 'regular migrants' to which Ted Gong referred. As I left the U.S. Consulate on Shamian one day, another consular officer expressed this more directly:

> Arlissa walked me out to the gate, talking about the various kinds of immigrants they see at the consulate. Because of the family immigration act, so many of the immigrants are farmers – and while they won't really be American, she said, their children will become U.S. citizens. But *these* kids, she says, referring to adopted children, they'll be Americans almost immediately. And so she tells me she thinks adoption serves as a kind of 'nation-building' for the U.S., and a way to build relations between the U.S. and China.

That an adopted child, in contrast to a farmer, can so readily become legally and socially American is explained by that fact that she is immediately embraced by those who are already undeniably American – and not so coincidentally, who are

also mostly white and middle or upper class. Citizen parents, in turn, have embraced their adopted daughter in part because she can readily be re-made. In fact, she is already being re-made at the border.

The adopted child's flexible identity at the border also depends on differentiating her from China itself. The brochure at the local international church in Guangzhou, for example, announces that, in keeping with Chinese regulations, the church is not open to Chinese citizens except for 'Chinese engaged or married to foreigners and Chinese being adopted by foreigners.' More to the point, a good number of adoptive parents tell me one reason they chose the China program was the absence of birth parents, and thus access to children who come without 'baggage.'[6] Formal migration proceedings for adopted children hinge on this separation as well: one of the consulate's most important jobs is to ensure that children are indeed true orphans, i.e. legally severable from birth parents and birth country. Thus, Ted Gong told me, the premium service the consulate provides to adoptive parents is necessary to ensure that 'the child belongs where they should belong' – either in an American or a Chinese family and nation, but not in both.

On the other hand, I have suggested that identification is not such a clean-cut process. In border locations like Shamian Island, differentiation occurs in enough cross-cutting ways to remind even special migrants that there is no such thing as a completely new identity: at the very least their new identities are prefigured by their histories. The lobby of the White Swan Hotel, which stands right next to the consulate, is a space where the intermingling of different kinds of travelers hints at the histories that sometimes claim adopted children as insiders and sometimes differentiate them as outsiders. Regular clientele at the White Swan Hotel include international business, diplomatic, and tourist elites. But now the tall and opulent White Swan has become *the* adoption hotel on Shamian. According to Pierre, one of its foreign managers, their 'dumb luck' in being next to the consulate means a brisk business in housing more than 4,000 American adoptive families a year for several nights at a time. To their upscale shopping and dining services they have added over 100 cribs, extra supplies of baby food and diapers, a babysitting service, and a special room just for adoptive family meetings. It is not uncommon to see a waitress or clerk in the hotel carrying or playing with an adopted child while her parents eat or shop.

However, Pierre also noted that while service to adoptive families is good business for the hotel, they must also practice a kind of containment of these hotel guests to keep their other clientele happy. International business travelers, who are truly flexible migrants, have complained to hotel staff about everything from crying babies in adjoining rooms to adoptive families changing diapers or playing with their children on the floor by the front desk. Some travelers even complained about the unseemliness of Chinese children from local orphanages being delivered to their American parents right in the hotel lobby.[7] So the hotel now has rules about the use of its space: no sitting on the lobby floor is allowed; adoptive families are to be housed on particular floors if at all possible; Chinese caregivers must bring the children to a private room to meet their parents.

Even as adopted children are set apart as special migrants, the spectacle of ordinary Chinese caregivers handing over abandoned children is too much of a reminder of the world that exists outside the decorum of an opulent hotel lobby. Children can seem messy, especially when they violate taken-for-granted race, class, kinship, and national boundaries in more than a fleeting way. Pierre indicated that in some ways the children are not as problematic as the boisterous Chinese families who come as day tourists to take pictures in the hotel: the hotel tries physically to contain the activities of these local tourists, too. Yet in other ways the children are much more problematic since the local families at least leave after an hour or two.

Beyond the consul and the hotel, adoption facilitators and shopkeepers on Shamian have also created entrepreneurial spaces for the consumption and expression of the mobile identities of the adoptive families. They provide cultural objects and anecdotal tidbits that parents and children can take with them to the U.S.. Parents see Shamian Island as the last opportunity to buy gifts and to connect to China in some tangible way before their departure. As one shop owner said to me, 'All of these families want to get something special from China for their children.'

The shopkeepers that sell souvenir and art and tea on Shamian contribute to the identification of adopted children by offering objects and services that authentically represent China (and the Chinese child) *and* are simultaneously adaptable for a child moving outside of a Chinese nation and family. As indicated above, many adoptive parents feel that to make an adopted Chinese child 'ours' requires them to attend to her putative cultural heritage but not to attach it to her too firmly. To do 'too much' would preclude the kinds of choices American individuals have about who they are and/or to force an inauthentic identity on their daughters. On the other hand, to do nothing with a child's Chinese identity would be to deny her rightful racial and gendered cultural heritage. Thus, cultural consumption as an act of identity-making is made pleasant and meaningful by flexibly affirming a child's Chinese roots while solidifying her new American life.

Because more than nine of every ten adopted Chinese children, as well as the parent shopping for her, are female, gendered categories of belonging and difference matter enormously in negotiating authenticity and adaptability. A couple of upscale shops attached to the White Swan Hotel sell almost exclusively toys and clothing for little girls. China Doll, a shop just a stone's throw away from the White Swan, sells itself through a name that simultaneously represents the adopted child and the objects in the store that will make her female Chinese identity both authentic and adaptable. Inside China Doll are little embroidered shoes, calligraphy cards inscribed with various children's names in both English and Chinese, and, yes, China dolls with braided black hair wearing silk *qipao*, the traditional Chinese dress. Some of the children-size *qipao* dresses at China Doll and other nearby shops have been adapted and hybridized with taffeta ballet skirts. Nancy, for example, bought a doll-size *qipao* dress for her birth daughter back home – one that would fit her 'American Girl' doll.

Shopping on Shamian thus becomes a kind of conscious cultural play – a pleasurable but meaningful engagement with difference. Here notions of Chinese-ness and American-ness are not abstract but seal the relationship between parent and child despite their differences. Several of the shops around the White Swan Hotel, for example, sell a service whereby parents can have a photo of their new family etched onto the polished surface of a local variety of stone. Having such a service done by a local Chinese artisan adds to its meaning as a stamp of approval on the racial, cultural, and national border crossing that marks the adoptive relationship.

Some local shopkeepers and facilitators broker migrant identities by not only marketing goods but also by offering themselves as representatives of China and as supporters of adoption migration. I deliberately strolled into Sherry's Place, just across the street from China Doll, because Sherry's name had popped up several times in my conversations with adoptive families in the U.S.. I walked into this small over-stuffed shop to find Sherry tucked behind the counter, emailing one of a number of American adoptive parents she has befriended over the years. Sherry said that this kind of contact was good for business networking, but she also just liked keeping in touch with these families, serving as a Chinese godmother of sorts to children who might not otherwise have much contact with Chinese people. By contrast, some white adoptive parents tell me it feels awkward or artificial to connect with Chinese adults in the U.S.; others feel that such connections, while perhaps difficult to make, are important for their daughters' racial and cultural identities. I later noted that Sherry appeared in a number of the pictures of adoptive families hanging in the window of the photo shop around the corner. Enter Sherry's Place, and you might gain not only a silk or embroidered memento of China, but also a Chinese friend – two activities Sherry felt served the same goal of keeping adopted children connected to their homeland while blessing their radical departure from it.

In this regard, the possibilities of identity presented on Shamian Island feed (and feed off) not just the cultural imaginaries of American adoptive parents but also those of Chinese shopkeepers and facilitators. This became obvious when I accompanied a group of adoptive families waiting for the consulate to process their migration paperwork as Lana, a local facilitator, took them on a half-day tour of cultural sites in Guangzhou. As the mini-bus made its way around Guangzhou, Lana kept up a light banter about her family, Chinese customs, and local history. She told me later that she thought parents expected her to take this role, and that informing parents about China was part of her duty as a Chinese adoption facilitator. During our stop at a teashop, Lana recommended the kinds of tea parents might buy for their children. She told them, 'Chinese babies get hot inside, and since these are Chinese babies, they will also get hot. Some teas are very good for this.' Some of the parents raised their eyebrows at what seemed like folk essentializing of their children's Chinese bodies, and instead bought decorative teapots to take home. I also learned that while Lana probably received some kind of commission from the local shops to which she led her tour groups, she also found gratification in brokering connections to the homeland she and her young charges shared.

There is yet another shop a bit more of a walk down the street from the White Swan Hotel where authentic yet adaptable identity is brokered in a more consciously tasteful way, somewhere between the playful aesthetic of a China Doll *qipao*-taffeta dress and the embodied Chineseness of tea. This shop is A Gift from China, whose name again conjures both the adopted child and the objects sold in the store.[8] The unique items sold in the shop are meant to appeal to Western tastes (they are mostly designed by a woman from England) but are made by local Chinese artisans using Chinese motifs and materials. Items include silk-covered photo albums, children's clothing with brocade borders, copper rubbings of zodiac animals, handmade tea pouches, panda backpacks, and fuzzy panda costumes. These objects thus promise an authentic hybrid of Chinese material and craftsmanship and Euro-American style.

There is yet a third meaning of A Gift from China that adds to the authenticity and legitimacy of adoption migration. As a non-profit store started by European women resident in Guangzhou, its gifts are not only from but also *to* China. According to the shop brochure, profits go toward giving children living in orphanages 'the opportunity to receive surgery and rehabilitation that will increase their chances of being adopted by a local or international family.' One of its founders told me that they also wanted to help older and special-needs children who would most likely not be considered 'adoptable' (she used the term in quotes) but who could still become productive members of Chinese society. These gifts *to* children in China both encourage and rely on adoptive families consuming gifts that represent the cultural and national border crossing of their children's identities.

Thus A Gift from China gestures not only toward constructing the flexibly Chinese and permanently American identity of the adopted child, but also toward resolving the inevitable exclusions through which the child has been first abandoned, then chosen. Commerce reconstructs adopted children's Chinese identities by simultaneously distinguishing them from and connecting them to two particular groups of non-migrants: Chinese orphans who will not be adopted, and American parents who adopt. Purchasing a gift distinguishes the new identity of the migrating adopted child from those children who will remain in China, but connects her to them, and to China, through that same Western liberal generosity. Indeed, the women who run A Gift from China explicitly expressed the desire to be a model for China of both a proper business disposition and a proper ethic of care, adding further meaning to Ted Gong's remark that adoption shores up the notion that 'America is the land of hope and solutions to the problems of the old worlds.'

Migrating identities

The day before she and her daughter are scheduled to leave Shamian for New York, Barbara and I are talking about her choice to adopt from China, people's reaction to it, and how she makes sense of it to them. She tells me that adopting from Russia had scared her because it seemed the children had so many potential health problems.

'I don't understand why people do it. Maybe it's to have a child that looks like them,' she says. 'But then, some people don't understand why I'm adopting from China.'

I ask Barbara why she thinks that is, and she says she isn't sure. Maybe, she suggests, it has to do with racial difference, or that somehow adopting from China is just outside what people can imagine. She smiles ironically and says that the one explanation her acquaintances seem to accept at face value is doing it to help a child.

As Barbara moved from negotiating her child's identity in China to negotiating it in the United States, questions of difference would continue to require explanation. As practices at A Gift from China, immigration policies toward adoption, and Barbara's remarks illustrate, ideologies of charity act to resolve the contradictions of migration – contradictions around who is desirable as a migrant, who has the means to make them desirable, and the differences between them.

Adoption as a special form of migration in the American imagery is built into policies and practices not only at the cusp of exit from China but also in the manner of entry to the United States. After 27 February 2001, the Hope for Children Act legislated that most children adopted internationally automatically become legal citizens when they land on American soil. I flew back to the U.S. from my field work in China just in time to attend the celebration of this Act in the rotunda of the capitol building in my home state of Minnesota; there a substantial crowd of adoptive families was gathered around a sign that read 'International Child Citizenship Day.' Shamian Island felt far away, and Angel Island only slightly closer, as the tenor of the day's speeches was summed up in the words of one state representative: 'These children are Americans, they should be treated as such, and now they will be' – a pronouncement greeted with whoops and applause. The American-ness of the adopted child and the act of adoption itself were confirmed by another official's pronouncement that 'you have done a great thing for family, and for our nation.'

Yet the contradictions of adoption migration do not disappear as American parents and their new Chinese children head back to the United States, where, as Barbara suggested, people do not necessarily understand the formation of intimate bonds across racial and national borders of difference. As she meets new kinds of contradictions, the child migrant's identity continues to require the kinds of practices and narratives of legitimation prefigured on Shamian.

The range of possible identifications for a Chinese child in an American middle-class white home is embedded in the social hierarchies that made her a desirable migrant in the first place. The same cultural context that reads her as free to become someone she could not become in her birth country also reads her in particular ways as a Chinese female. One white adoptive couple told me, for example, that they had initially considered domestic adoption in the U.S.. Since this meant they might adopt a black or biracial child, they got cool responses from their family and friends. 'Yeah,' the father said, 'we brought back a communist baby from a communist country and that was okay, but not a biracial child in our own country!' His comment reveals two racializations – of the communist Chinese child who is nevertheless eligible for reclamation and of the un-reclaimable black child.

The point is not that the identity of the adopted Chinese child is more flexible than it would be if she were African American, but rather that the limits and possibilities of her American identity must be understood at the intersection of unequal racial, gender, and class formations. While Shamian's silk and taffeta Chinese dresses promise a mobile and multicultural Asian girl, they are an ambiguous and inadequate response to the histories of Orientalism that may fix her as an Asian princess once she is in America. One white couple shared with me anxiety that their beautiful daughter would be exoticized once she was a teenager. Another parent, who had adopted a rare boy, shared a different but related concern. This father knew it was silly but he admitted to worrying that if his son attended a local school with a large and relatively poor Vietnamese population, his education would suffer and he might get caught up in Asian gang activities. He noted this as the reason the family had moved to a white upper-class school district.

Concluding remarks

Moving from one country to another, or from one neighborhood to another, is not so much a solution to inequality as it is a lens on the shifting terrains of stratification that shape identity and to which processes of identification are a response. The complexities of Chinese children's identities after they migrate to the United States are prefigured on Shamian Island, where the multiple possibilities of identity meet inequalities and exclusions. Migration – especially for marginalized children chosen for adoption – signals a new beginning, the promise of celebrating cultural difference, and the power of love to cross borders. But it also has the effect of revealing to us the distinctions and exclusions that shape individual and broader social identities.

On Shamian Island, where both parents and children are at a crossroads, we see that adopted children's attachments to two nations, two cultures, two races, and two families are accommodated through uneasy distinctions between different kinds of migrants and different kinds of citizens. Providing an authentic sense of belonging – one that celebrates not only difference but also the generosity that makes the transcendence of difference possible – entails the realities of privilege and inequality. In other words, who migrants *are* is inevitably also about who they are *not*. Imagining their adaptation to permanent citizenship in a white American family and nation depends in part on their status as healthy young (and thus desirable) girls whose Chinese origins can be safely consumed without being fixed and imprinted on them. Adoption is particularly suited to exploring this process of migrant identity construction, not only because its subjects are given special status relative to other migrants, but also because it pulls white American citizens into a close and permanent relationship to the Otherness of immigrant identities.

Because transnational adoption is a unique form of migration intimately desired and experienced by American parents, it powerfully exemplifies how white American culture itself is made in relation to its outsiders or to its

'strangers within' (see Bauman 1999; Hall 1996). As parents figure out what to name their children, shop in Shamian's stores, and experience a relatively painless visa process, they enact the flexibility of liberal American citizenship (both theirs and their children's), but they also begin to experience the way it distinguishes among people depending on their place in social hierarchies within and across national borders. Constructing cultural belonging for the new migrant becomes a tricky business of navigating the 'both/and' promises of adaptable multicultural identity and the 'either/or' requirements of racial desires, national and class imaginaries, and gendered structures of kinship.

Immigrant identities, and the practices and stories through which they are constructed – whether it be citizenship laws, choosing names, or putting a Chinese dress on an American girl doll – tell us about more than individual migrants' adjustments as they move from there to here. They reveal the tangle of histories and social relationships that shape their migration. At the China–U.S. border, we see the range of possibilities in which to imagine and practice migrant identities taking shape even before migration is completed. We are reminded that identities travel toward migrants from the United States as much as with them toward the United States.

7 Members of many gangs

Childhood and ethno-racial identity on the streets of twentieth-century urban America

Mark Wild

As a young boy in what he described as a 'polyglot' district bordering Depression-era Los Angeles's produce markets, Kango Kunitsugo played on the streets with African American, Mexican, Chinese, and Japanese friends who lived nearby. 'I don't think we ever consciously thought of being American or Japanese,' he recalled.

> Your home was another world … I guess we formed a security island kind of thing. I remember days when there was only one non-minority family living on that block. A fellow named Thomas Stone was the only white living there. I guess because we were kids we never did have the feeling that he was a white man. In fact, we used to chase white people from the neighborhood, and Tom used to be right with us; I could never figure it out … But I think in those days we were less conscious of the thing; you weren't exposed to too many things. You went to school and came back, went to Japanese school and came back, and played football out in the streets.[1]

Kunitsugo's claim to a sheltered childhood notwithstanding, his remembrance depicts a cosmopolitan environment populated with a disparate array of neighbors and strangers. The awareness of existing racial divisions (the identification of Anglos as outsiders), an affiliation with an ethnocentric institution (the Japanese-language school), and the willingness to transcend, selectively at least, ethno-racial boundaries (the inclusion of Stone and members of other races into the gang) reveal some of the complicated ways that children wrestled with questions of identity in working-class, multiethnic neighborhoods that flourished in American cities during the early twentieth century.[2] At the same time, as Kunitsugo suggests, children were also somewhat free not to wrestle with the question of identity. Perhaps more so than today, the fluid everyday interactions between cultural groups in these neighborhoods allowed many pre-war working-class youth to postpone, for a time, the question of ethnic identity formation.

Americans have exhibited a long-standing, and often self-serving, fascination with the type of socio-cultural interaction Kunitsugo describes. Terms like melting pot, multiculturalism, and cultural hybridity have at various times become fashionable evocations of some place, whether real or imagined, where

ethnic and racial barriers become irrelevant to everyday life. Of course, a countervailing conviction that such terms mask the persistence of ethno-racial discrimination and oppositional identities, or even that the very notion of assimilation betrays a Euro-centric bias, has enjoyed almost as long a tenure. In recent years, historians have joined other scholars in exploring the environments and forces that have influenced the decisions of individual Americans to respect or transgress ethno-racial lines. In fleshing out what Gary Nash calls 'the hidden history of *mestizo* America,' their studies provide a deeper picture of the social practices by which Americans, both recent arrivals and long-term inhabitants, have sought to reconcile desires for unity and amalgamation with the ethnic, racial, and class divisions that continue to fracture the country (Nash 1995).

Historians of the twentieth century have delved into the coalitions and fissures transecting ethno-racial relations among adults, particularly in relation to workplace mobilization, coalitions of elites, and popular culture (Leonard 2001, 2000; Barrett 1992; Goldfield 1993; Gerstle 1989; Cohen 1990; Denning 1996). They have lagged behind other disciplines, however, in examining the multiethnic context in which children, particularly immigrants and African Americans, developed their own ethno-racial identities. As scholars in anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and other fields that investigate the intercultural nature of contemporary youth culture suggest, experiences in childhood and adolescence could profoundly influence the way they understood race and ethnicity as adults (Austin and Willard 1998; Lipsitz 1989). This study addresses that gap by examining some of the settings in which the youth of one of America's fastest-growing cities confronted peers of different backgrounds, and the consequences of such encounters for broader aspects of race relations and identity formation.

Immigrant children and the children of immigrants who grew up in Los Angeles in the decades before World War II inhabited different districts than those who came after them. To a degree that historians have only recently begun to acknowledge, working-class immigrants in numerous cities during the early twentieth century shared the streets with residents of varied racial and cultural backgrounds. Despite prevailing social conventions and legal restrictions against intercultural mixing, children in these districts often cultivated relationships across ethno-racial lines, creating a vital, if tenuous, tradition of interaction that played an important role in defining the American experience of immigrant children from that era. These relationships and interactions certainly encouraged more flexible, hybrid conceptions of identity formation in central city children, even if such conceptions remained inchoate and only tentatively articulated. Such a tradition did not survive, in the same form and neighborhoods at least, into the postwar years. Demographic changes and accompanying transformations in Los Angeles's social structure, underway in earnest by World War II, reconfigured the experiences of youth on the streets of immigrant neighborhoods. Increasingly isolated, geographically, economically, and (in a certain sense) culturally from the rest of the city, first-, second-, and even third-generation immigrant youth, especially those of Mexican background,

found their daily encounters confined more and more to members of their own background. The homogenization of personal contacts encouraged the types of stronger ethnic identifications that flowered in dramatic fashion during the Civil Rights era.

Streets, yards, theaters: the world of children in central Los Angeles before World War II

With early twentieth-century industrial growth fueling the migration of job seekers from around the world, numerous U.S. cities attracted an eclectic array of residents at that time. In Los Angeles, an influx of Mexicans, Asians, African Americans, Europeans, and some working-class Anglos settled within what I call the central neighborhoods, a broad swath of districts stretching east and south from downtown along the Los Angeles River (Wild 2000: 27–83).[3] Lured by blue-collar job opportunities in contiguous industrial zones and fenced in by the higher rents and racial covenants (i.e. deed restrictions that prevented the selling of property to non-whites) that shielded outlying areas, these newcomers encountered neighborhoods characterized by artificial congestion, rapid growth, constant population turnover, and ethno-racial diversity. Though predominantly working class, the central neighborhoods included a smattering of middle-class districts where comparatively prosperous non-whites lived with those white residents not intimidated by mixed neighborhoods. Central neighborhood children could count on sharing the streets, playgrounds, and schools with peers of many backgrounds. Though dwarfed by Los Angeles's all-white districts (including a substantial number of white working-class suburbs), the central neighborhoods did have counterparts in other cities, such as San Francisco's Tenderloin and South-of-Market, Seattle's Central District, Denver's Curtis Park, West Fresno, and even parts of some northeastern cities (Sanchez 1993: 71–86; Katznelson 1981: 105–10; Daniels 1980: 75–82; Taylor 1994: 106–34; Bodnar, Simon and Weber 1983: 23–4).

More than a few newcomers to Los Angeles found these districts and their denizens unfamiliar. For 1.5-generation children who arrived in the city while still quite young after living in more homogenous communities, the initial experience could be jarring. Angelita Avila, who immigrated with her parents from a small village in Mexico, recalled of entering her elementary school for the first time, 'I really believe I had never seen so many children at once and so many kinds.'[4] Kazuo Kawai, a Tokyo-born son of a Christian minister who came to Los Angeles as a young boy, was shocked at the appearance of whites – 'the strange people who had red hair, blue eyes, and white skin, just like the pictures of the ogres in Japanese fairy-tale books' – and intimidated by the 'hordes of dirty little Mexican, Negro, Italian, Greek, and Jewish children.' Kawai, however, allowed that he quickly 'learned all the ways of the east side, and very soon … became one of the regular gang.'[5] Children of the second generation, who knew no other home besides central Los Angeles, likely felt even more at ease in a place of constant multiethnic encounters.

Opportunities for such encounters confronted these children every time they left their homes. The streets and other public spaces of the central neighborhoods thronged with pedestrians, street life, and commercial attractions of all varieties, as well as with adolescents and pre-adolescents engaged in what reformers derisively referred to as 'unsupervised play.' Movie theaters, for example, served as popular meeting points for all races, despite the exclusionary or segregationist policies of certain establishments. Even children from very poor families could afford a ticket to a downtown or neighborhood showing on occasion. Congregations of children both within and outside these theaters became common by the twentieth century.[6] Other intriguing opportunities for play abounded in commercial and industrial zones. One boy enthusiastically noted the suitability of 'lots of dark alleys and stores and boxes to hide in' for youths in his neighborhood. A resident of Chinatown remembered gatherings of neighborhood kids at a nearby abandoned warehouse. Numerous youngsters frequented the produce markets along Central Avenue, prompting periodic complaints about children pilfering food from the trucks and storage bins.[7] The railroad yards bracketing the riverbed, with their abundant hiding places, meeting areas, and climbing opportunities also beckoned young central Angelenos. Children played on idle cars, and the older or more adventurous might hop rides on outgoing trains. Others used the open spaces extending north along the river and east and south of developed areas for games and exploring.[8]

As reformers ruefully acknowledged, many central city children wiled away hours in these public spaces outside the purview of their parents. Working-class mothers, particularly those of color, entered the workforce at higher rates than middle-class or elite mothers, removing them from the home for extended periods.[9] Social reformers disparaged the number of 'broken' immigrant and African American families in the central districts, and blamed elevated rates of juvenile delinquency in the area on lack of adult oversight and a dearth of child-care facilities. In the absence of other alternatives, older siblings or neighborhood children sometimes assumed responsibility for watching their little brothers and sisters. One central city school, in fact, briefly experimented with allowing students to bring younger siblings to class, until the ensuing disruption prompted them to revoke the policy in favor of a separate nursery.[10]

As a group, central city girls enjoyed less independence than boys, but still played an important role in street youth culture. Parents exhibited a proportionately greater concern for the whereabouts of their daughters, a gendered protective impulse that spiked when girls reached puberty. Julie Suski was one of many central city girls who chafed under parents' tightfisted policies about unsupervised play, and Kunitsugo, recalling the paucity of girls on the streets, joked that their parents were hiding them.[11] Nevertheless, many girls did manage to escape parental purview. One study of fifteen central city girls aged nine to thirteen calculated their weekly engagement in 'unsupervised play,' frequently with friends of different ethno-racial backgrounds, at between ten and twenty hours. Almost all of them attended movies unaccompanied by adults. In fact, a reformers' census of central city playgrounds in 1918 found no appreciable

gender imbalance. While many of these playgrounds were supervised, and perhaps therefore more acceptable to parents, they did provide spaces for young girls to play with neighborhood friends. Like the female child 'gang' members in San Francisco portrayed, and likely romanticized, by Herbert Asbury, these girls actively participated in the street life of their city.[12]

Relatively bereft of parental supervision, central neighborhood boys and girls were likewise less encumbered by the conventions of ethno-racial isolation that often circumscribed the lives of their elders. Angelenos who grew up in these areas before World War II recalled a virtual absence of racial animosity between their peers, and a substantial instance of inter-racial friendships. Leo Carillo, the son of a well-to-do Californio family who came of age in the Spanish Mexican center of Los Angeles, the Plaza, that enjoined Chinatown, cultivated a sufficient number of Chinese, Indian, and Californio 'loafers around the Plaza' to acquire a variety of language skills. He noted that 'in their relations with the other nationalities who lived around the Plaza, the Chinese were extremely friendly and constant in their friendship … It was perfectly natural for me to pick up the sing-song sibilant language of the Cantonese, and I would find myself at home switching from Spanish to Cantonese to English without any conscious effort.' Indeed, Carrillo credited the spot-on ethnic characterizations that later spring-boarded his acting career to individuals he encountered on LA's streets (Carillo 1961: 29–31).

Angelenos described similar experiences in other parts of central city. Emilia Castañeda described the section of Boyle Heights, east of the Los Angeles River, where she grew up as a 'United Nations' of Mexicans, Japanese, Chinese, African Americans, Jews, Filipinos, and Greeks in the vicinity of Malabar Street School. 'There was a mixture, and we got along fine. Of course, we kids used to tease each other, but not really get into fights. I can recall that it was a pretty happy neighborhood when I lived there.' Milton Quan likewise remembered teasing between children in the Market District, but claimed 'it was not meant to be abusive, just kid stuff.' Football star and actor Woody Strode, looking back in 1990 on his childhood in the Furlong Tract area where African Americans, Germans, Italians, and Mexicans lived together, commented '[a]ll the kids would play together on the street. We didn't have any problems like they have now … We fought some, but then we'd back off, shake hands, and go eat at the other guy's house.'[13] A number of aspiring jazz artists from the isolated, mixed ethnic community of Watts recalled harmonious relationships among the local Anglo, African American, Mexican, Asian, and Jewish children. Saxophonist William 'Brother' Woodman, for instance, admitted 'at that time, I didn't really understand about prejudice. I said, "How could this happen? Right here, we get along so beautifully, all of us together."' This conviviality did not always extend to parents and adult relations, as Ku Klux Klan activity in Watts during the 1920s demonstrated. Trombonist Britt Woodman, for example, associated with white and Mexican kids, but recalled that white friends living east of Alameda Boulevard could not invite him to their neighborhoods because of objections from parents and neighbors.[14] And yet the intrusions of racism,

however prevalent, existed alongside an alternative culture of association and friendship that flourished among the newest generation of central Angelenos.

'Crucibles of citizenship' vs. 'the street's training': playgrounds and gangs

Not everyone celebrated the mixed ethnic public spaces of central Los Angeles as an ideal environment for youth. Local reformers, like other Anglos around the country, abhorred the prospect of minors running rampant through the city's streets and industrial zones. Physical safety was a primary concern, as automobiles, street-cars, and trains presented a real threat to children in the central neighborhoods.[15] But reformers also feared for the moral well-being of central city children cavorting in the vicinity of saloons, dance halls, theaters, and pool halls. 'Some city environments, such as those associated with rooming house districts, railroad yards, and the older industrial districts, are dangerous to boys' welfare,' prominent University of Southern California sociologist Emory Bogardus intoned. 'Older boys, immoral women, dope peddlers, abound in these districts.'[16] Another social critic claimed 'undirected street play has a tendency to develop disrespect for law and cunning in social relationships. This is especially true when crowded streets permit only disorganized fooling in the place of play.' 'If … the child is crowded into the streets and left to its own resources with no opportunity for wholesome play,' a third concluded ominously, 'then we must expect the results of the street's training.'[17] It is not at all clear that central city adults agreed with such sentiments, but at least one African American Angeleno concurred that 'Los Angeles ain't no place to raise a kid. All he does is get in trouble playing around the streets.'[18]

Trouble often took the form of the gangs that congregated everywhere from street corners to public libraries. Many functioned solely as social clubs for boys (and, sometimes, girls), but others engaged in vandalism, burglary, and violence.[19] Some of this violence reflected minors' internalization of racist thought. Like the juvenile gangs that terrorized the Chinese in San Francisco, some Angeleno children targeted politically defenseless Chinese and Japanese. One Japanese doctor living in Boyle Heights, for example, claimed to have been assaulted by a group of 'European' boys, perhaps because he had married a white woman. The doctor attributed the racist nature of the attack to the perpetrators' non-native background. 'I did not know then that a large proportion of the people here are not real Americans, that so many of them are from Europe.'[20] Gang fights also sometimes erupted along ethno-racial lines. One reformer in the 1920s repeated to sociologist Emory Bogardus rumors of an impending fight between black and white gangs 'down there among the pipes' (in an industrial yard) to settle an argument that began outside a movie theater. Another central city boy of unspecified background recalled that 'we fought gangs of Mexican kids down in the river … We fought other gangs around closer if they ever bothered us any.' Chinatown resident Allan Chan likewise remembered that the neighborhood served as a popular site for inter-racial gang fights

because police there seldom disrupted the skirmishes.[21] But gang affiliation did not necessarily break down along racial and ethnic lines. Territorial ties, as Kunitsugo suggested, could trump other affiliations. One boy commented that 'the reason we formed into a club was primarily to defend ourselves against the other gangs that were on the different streets. Almost all the fellows around there were organized into gangs, and we had to be too, in order to be in things.' In such contexts gangs could blur ethno-racial boundaries as much as reinforce them, and it was not uncommon to find in early-twentieth-century Los Angeles cosmopolitan predecessors to the 'pachuco' gangs of the 1940s. A 1941 proposal for gang programs in the Custer Street neighborhood northwest of downtown recognized this heterogeneous quality, cautioning that any strategies 'will have to cross racial and religious lines' if they were to succeed.[22]

Neighborhood gangs before World War II were not involved in the sustained, predatory criminal activity that decimated the central neighborhoods in the latter twentieth century. Because they often dropped out of the gang to join the workforce around age fifteen, pre-war gang members were much younger than their Cold War counterparts.[23] Yet reformers of the period still worried about the pernicious influence of street life and gang activity, and in particular the specter of ethno-racial amalgamation. In 1941, for instance, the Los Angeles County Coordinating Council, pin-pointed 'transitional' neighborhoods where Mexicans and African Americans were integrating formerly all-white districts as trouble spots for delinquency. According to their report, Young people in these areas 'are likely to find their activities and ideas dominated by the more energetic and less inhibited newcomers (i.e. Mexicans and African Americans). The usual result is a rapid rise in the delinquency rate and the formation of a number of loosely organized groups of which some will develop into criminal groups.' Boys from these types of areas 'form their own gangs under the leadership of the worst of their group; they try to find amusement in the streets, and the sights of Main Street and skid row – and grow up to join the class of criminals that infest our 'Main Street' area.'[24]

Through the playgrounds they constructed during the early twentieth century, reformers sought to resolve ethno-racial disputes as part of their larger social project. Marshalling arguments that would maintain currency among reformers' circles through the 1960s, the middle-class and elite architects of the playground movement claimed that their 'recreative centers' could appropriate the social structure of the gang, an institution they understood as a misdirected response to social disorder, towards a more 'productive' social network. The playground, one advocate suggested, 'captures the gang spirit and sets it to interesting and diversified activity that prevents the gang and his own boy from becoming predatory.'[25] 'On the playground fair play must be constantly practiced, self-control constantly maintained,' elaborated commission director Bessie Stoddart. 'This is the very essence of democracy. For to know how to associate, how to cooperate with one's fellows is the foundation of our national form of government.'[26] After 1904, when the city established a Muncipal Playground Commission, the first of its kind

in the United States, central Los Angeles boasted a growing array of facilities.[27] The commission's task did not end, however, with the playgrounds' completion. Warning that their 'crucibles of citizenship' did not 'operate themselves,' the commission instituted a battery of supervised athletic and arts programs to indoctrinate its charges in civic responsibility. Echo Park Playground, for example, maintained a 'Playground Republic,' consisting of an elected 'government' of members who paid a monthly five-cent 'tax,' made rules, and maintained equipment. Directors segregated girls into activities – arts, crafts, and less strenuous forms of exercise – more 'suited' to their gender and designed to promote feminine characteristics and skills.[28]

The impact of the playground movement on central city children and on their ethno-racial relations is difficult to measure. On the one hand, neither delinquency nor gang activity disappeared from the central neighborhoods with the arrival of playgrounds.[29] Nor did open public playgrounds ensure equal participation or harmonious ethno-racial relations. In certain instances ethnic communities came to dominate specific facilities. Chinese children, for instance, apparently predominated in the Chinatown playground built in 1924 on an old railroad lot. One sociology student asserted that white children rejected African American playmates at the Watts playground, and associated with Mexican children only if they were 'finelooking' and well dressed.[30] Yet the centers did draw large numbers of youngsters of all races and ethnicities from the central city. One 1918 playground census testified to the diversity of attendees in most of the city-operated facilities. While the specific compositions of their patrons varied greatly, each playground catered to a number of different groups, creating an environment that was at least superficially integrated (see Table 7.1). Moreover, a number of Angelenos noted that the structured environment seemed to mitigate tensions of all sorts. The children 'come here to play together,' one playground worker enthused, 'and the narrow spirit breaks down.' Woody Strode was even more effusive. 'Our business was in the playgrounds. That's where we grew up; we were never into school … After school, during the summer and practically every night of the year, all the neighborhood kids would gather.'[31] In short, the playgrounds at least mirrored the opportunities for ethno-racial interaction in central neighborhood streets, and provided a more structured environment for those parents and children who sought it.

If central city children enjoyed opportunities to associate with peers of different backgrounds, they did not remain insulated from the broader forces of ethno-racial segregation and discrimination. The integrated environment of the playgrounds stood in contrast to Jim Crow policies enforced at other local recreation facilities. Non-whites found themselves barred from certain public beaches and swimming pools in and around the city. One ordinance, passed unanimously by the City Council in 1920, banned Japanese from public tennis courts and golf courses. The bill's authors claimed Japanese were crowding out whites.[32] A number of private institutions maintained similar policies. James Chan recalled a sign on one downtown movie theater forbidding entrance to dogs, 'Orientals,' and African Americans. Others, like the YMCA, segregated their facilities.[33]

Table 7.1 Census of selected playgrounds in Los Angeles, 1918

Nationality	*Violet*	*Salt Lake*	*Temple*	*Hazard*	*Echo*	*Rec. Center*
'American'	59	153	443	569	706	155
Mexican	829	661	54	16	5	651
Spanish*	36	129	67	66	30	12
Italian	415	33	65	237	27	438
'Jewish'	15	251	443	215	167	
Russian	15	877		8	1	
Afr-Am.	217	12		13	33	1
Japanese	18	8			14	1
Chinese	5				2	
German	1	32	5	38	20	5
French	23	13	9	49	8	11
Greek	15	17		3	1	2
Swedish	7			2	14	
English		3	27	27	27	2
Irish	5	2	5	55	8	1
Romanian		4	3			
Syrian		23				
Armenian		238	3		6	2
Polish		18		3	1	4
Hungarian					6	1
Servian		3	14			
Belgian		2	1	19		
Indian		5				
Austrian		5	26	8	6	26
Canadian		3	10		5	
Lithuanian		4		1		
Aust-Hung.		10				
Scotch		2	2	3		3
Bohemian			4	4		
Croatian			5			
Egyptian			3			
Norwegian			1	1		
Danish				4		
Portugese				2		
Dutch					4	3
Assyrian						14
Slavonian						3
Swiss			1			
Welsh	1					

Note

*May refer to Mexicans who identified or were identified as 'Spanish.'

Source: From 'Summaries of Playground Surveys,' n.a., fall 1918, 'Interchurch Movement' file, Box 102, G. Bromley Oxnam Papers.

Some facilities admitted non-whites only after they submitted to a humiliating 'health' exam and then presented an authorization card at the entrance. Walter Chung, for example, recalled that the Lincoln Park swimming pool turned him away for that reason. His white companions supported their friend by refusing to enter the establishment.[34] Not all recreational facilities practiced discrimination, and a number of inter-racial social clubs also existed, including the All Nations Club and a well-known Boy Scouts troop in Boyle Heights.[35] Yet children of color who ventured beyond the streets and playgrounds for amusement were more likely to encounter discrimination and segregation.

In addition, some children who mingled with peers of other backgrounds had to face the wrath of their parents. Anglo parents, not surprisingly, proved as a group most hostile to such relationships. Future Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley sadly recalled a childhood friend he had while growing up in the West Temple district. One day the Anglo boy told Bradley that his mother and father had forbidden him to associate with the 'colored' children on the block. The two boys continued to meet, but had to find places out of sight from his friend's parents. In an interview from the mid-1920s, a Filipino worker likewise castigated white Americans who would not let their children play with immigrant children. He felt it contributed to foreigners' sense of isolation and unwillingness to assimilate.[36] But such hostility was not limited to Anglo parents. Observing that 'the contacts children make in school may alienate them from their parents,' Bogardus identified one teacher who had endured complaints from parents of various ethnicities who were upset with the other 'nations and cultures' mingling with their children. He likewise worried that parental influence might contribute to racial friction at school. A few years later, Beatrice Griffith noted that some parents and leaders of an unnamed 'Mexican colony' had forbidden their children to associate with white and African American peers. The edict 'bewildered' their children and non-Mexican friends until a more 'alert' leader supposedly stepped in to remedy the problem.[37] Some objections voiced by central neighborhood parents suggest that class concerns motivated them as much as racial concerns. One study of the period argued that Chinese parents, especially those of the middle class, worried about the environment in the mixed-ethnic areas to which they were confined. 'The native-born Chinese imitate the bad from the two countries, because many of the Chinese here do not give the younger group a good example as they are of the laboring class,' it concluded. 'Because of the lack of contact with high-class Americans on account of the attitude of the Americans towards them, they do not have a good example there either. They imitate those who live in the neighborhood of the Chinese community who are largely immigrants and low-class Americans.' Tom Gubbins, an Anglo with long connections to the Chinese community, claimed that middle-class Chinese sometimes sent their children back to China for school after age fourteen, allegedly because 'at this age they begin to get the rough stuff of the Americans and also the Chinese community.'[38]

Of course, not all central city parents objected to inter-ethno-racial association, and at least a few actively encouraged such relationships for their children.

Archie Green, the son of Russian Jews, claimed that his parents subscribed to a principle of 'internationalism' and escorted him to various ethnic events to develop his appreciation for other cultures. Ying Wong Kwan, who grew up in the Bunker Hill and Temple Street areas, claimed her mother worked hard to develop ties with their neighbors, and told her daughter to ignore children who called her names. Internalizing these efforts, and claiming that 'being open to all nationalities was typical for Chinese,' Ying cultivated friendships with children of all nationalities.[39] Many others, if not enthusiastic about the cosmopolitan circles in which their children traveled, tolerated such relationships as an inevitable part of central city childhood.

Schools in mixed-ethnic districts championed this type of inter-racial cooperation, though they often failed to live up to their own rhetoric. 'International' days, where students celebrated different cultures, constituted the most visible facet of an educational program that today we would call ethnic studies. Yet teachers and administrators often undermined the spirit of this pedagogical effort by replicating in the classroom the same kinds of discrimination and segregation their students would encounter after they finished school. Tracking became a means to separate students into career paths 'appropriate' to their ethnicity, and by high school many young Angelenos found themselves encouraged to join ethnic-specific 'clubs.' In this strategy, school officials had the backing of those parents who feared that their adolescent sons and daughters might add a sexual dimension to their inter-ethno-racial friendships. In short, schools promoted a universalized American identity for their students without challenging the ethno-racial categories that worked against that identity. Students thus encountered a contradictory set of lessons at school that did little to resolve the dilemma of everyday inter-ethno-racial association, much less the question of ethnic, racial, and national identity (Wild 2002).

The complex environments of the street, playground, and school make it difficult to generalize about identity formation among early-twentieth-century Angeleno youth. We can begin by saying, however, that the process was much more complicated than the formulaic description of marginal men and women explicated by Chicago School-influenced sociologists of the era (Yu 2001). First- and second-generation immigrant youth may have been aware that they lay outside conventional parameters of white American identity, but they also knew they occupied this cultural space with a plethora of other ethnic and racial identities. Even the most committed ethnic nationalist had to reconcile their sense of identity with the reality that other members of their community were transcending ethnic boundaries in their everyday contacts with peers. Others, like Kunitsugo, may have subordinated ethnic identity to the larger, mixed community of neighborhood children, articulating instead a hybrid identity, however incompletely expressed. As long as they remained mixed, the central neighborhoods promoted this amalgamation of identities. It was not until the postwar period, when immigration and internal migration patterns remade the central neighborhoods, that more enhanced and essentialist expressions of ethnic identity flourished among the youth of Los Angeles.

From central neighborhood to marginal neighborhood: the ethno-racial homogenization of street culture after World War II

World War II accelerated shifts in the youth culture of the central neighborhoods already underway by the Depression. An almost instantaneous defense industry reversed across the board the flagging economic fortunes of city residents. Children who had left school during the Depression to scrounge for meager wages suddenly faced the unprecedented availability of comparatively lucrative employment and declining pressure to contribute to family incomes. Flush with wartime wages, central city minors and, increasingly, young adults, began to indulge in recreational activities and consumption practices that had once been out of the question. At the same time, a flood of new migrants (and the internment of Japanese Angelenos) transformed the demography of the central neighborhoods. African Americans quickly came to predominate in formerly mixed districts along south central from Watts to Little Tokyo, re-christened Bronzeville, near downtown. Mexican Angelenos consolidated emergent majorities in east side neighborhoods like Belvedere and parts of Boyle Heights. Anglo migrants, many of them from culturally conservative regions of the south and midwest, worked to shore up racial barriers between their districts and the central neighborhoods.

These new arrivals escalated tensions between white youths and servicemen on the one hand and black and Mexican youth on the other. Conflicts flared as early as 1941, when white Fremont High School students went on a rampage through local neighborhoods to protest the integration of their school (Bunch 1990: 118). The dam burst in 1943, when whites again rampaged through the city indiscriminately beating Mexican pachucos in zoot suits (ostentatious suits characterized by long, broad jackets, and billowing, pegged pants) because they suspected them of disloyalty and delinquency.[40] Scholars of these notorious if misnamed Zoot suit riots have correctly pointed to the cross-cultural aspects of pachuco culture, yet the racialization of the pachuco also reflected and encouraged a gradual parsing out of central city youth from a mixed-ethnic milieu to ethno-racially specific contexts. Local authorities not only manufactured a purportedly Mexican crime wave (despite the fact that the delinquency rates had not changed), they also stigmatized the zoot suit as an ethno-racial and 'Mexican' symbol of gang affiliation. The LAPD complemented this campaign by disrupting integrated gatherings and the nightclubs that catered to them, especially the vibrant jazz clubs along South Central Avenue, and by harassing mixed couples (Guero Gonzales 1981; McWilliams 1946: 318–21; Julien 2000; Bryant 1996: 177, 272–3, 299–300, 404).

In the aftermath of World War II, youth culture in the central neighborhoods reorganized itself more explicitly around race and ethnicity, a sea-change that registered in the programs and literature of social reformers. Before the war, reformers worried that excessive and improper interaction between the races would contaminate the character of central city children with unwholesome values. After the war, they tended to identify segregation as both cause and

consequence of a downward spiral into delinquency and crime, and altered their programs to 'de-isolate' gang members and other youth via intergroup activities.[41] At the same time, reform organizations that had formerly ministered to a mixed clientele of youth began either actively or passively to dispense their services along ethno-racial lines. As one organization pointed out, this trend both reflected and contributed to a balkanization of youth by race and ethnicity in the central city.[42] By the 1950s, numerous social workers issued ominous warnings that what they called race conflict was becoming the most serious social problem in east Los Angeles, and police officers labored to thwart a proliferation of gang-fighting between African American and Mexican American youth. South of downtown, others identified an escalating amount of racial tension between Anglo youth and Mexican or African American youth along the so-called Alameda curtain that separated mixed ethnic Watts and lily-white South Gate. And throughout the central districts a rise in intra-ethnic violence accompanied the increasing homogenization of residential neighborhoods.[43]

For their part, gang members and other youth joined the reformers in rendering the ethnic identities of their organization more explicit. The gradual homogenization of the central neighborhoods into an African American south central and a Mexican (or Chicano, by the 1960s) eastside cemented the ethno-racial territorialization of gang activity. This balkanization persisted into the late twentieth century, even as new patterns of immigration and settlement began to reintegrate the old central neighborhoods. Recent studies of street gangs, for instance, still locate their supposedly inward focus in the 'multiple marginality' of their members' existence, their estrangement from mainstream social and economic networks. While the reintroduction of Latinos and Asians into what had become all-black neighborhoods in south central has occasioned instances of cross-cultural contact and respect, anthropologists of youth and gangs still cite the salience of race and ethnicity in compartmentalizing social groups (Klein 1971; Vigil 1988; Moore 1991; Sides 1999; Vargas 1999; Chang and Leong 1994).

The decline of Central Avenue and the growing spatial segregation in central Los Angeles after 1950 did not mean that youth from older neighborhoods lost all opportunities for cross-cultural contact, but it did mean they had to travel outside their neighborhoods to find it. Some made their way to several dance halls and clubs in the suburbs that attracted a diverse clientele, despite the ethnic and racial tensions that wracked suburban communities. But such oases lay outside the boundaries of the central districts, and the cultural mixing that characterized them stood in stark contrast to the growing physical distances separating Mexican, African American, and white patrons (Macias 2001; Garcia 2001). From the late 1950s through the 1970s, the most fervent cultural and political activity within the central neighborhoods centered on separate ethno-racial communities. This in turn aided the flowering of ethno-racial consciousness in the central neighborhoods, culminating in the Black Power, Chicano Power, and Asian American movements. Within the postwar ghettoes and barrios (which some sociologists termed 'spaces of freedom'), many Angelenos enjoyed

an unprecedented degree of local political and cultural autonomy, gains often fueled by young adults who had grown up with a stronger sense of ethno-racial identification (Boyte 1980).

Notwithstanding the positive consequences of such movements, the postwar segregation of the central neighborhoods also exacted social costs. Geographical separation undermined the potential for face-to-face contact and coalition-building, while encouraging inter-ethno-racial conflict and suspicion. Children growing up during this period enjoyed fewer opportunities for cross-cultural interaction than those of Kango Kunitsugo's generation. Despite the loosening of legal restrictions to integration and the flowering of multiethnic cultural forms, central city youth after World War II saw their everyday social worlds increasingly circumscribed by ethno-racial boundaries, a trend that has encouraged a corresponding hardening of youth identities along similar lines. Instances of everyday inter-ethno-racial contact have not disappeared, but they have become more exceptional and thus easier to dismiss than they were before World War II. In other words, although recent scholarship has suggested that modern urban culture promotes a multiplication of possibilities for identification (Jameson 1991; Harvey 1990), the changing experiences of central city children before and after World War II suggests that in at least this limited sphere such possibilities actually contracted. The legacy of this isolation, I would argue, extends beyond a given generation. As children raised in these environments reach adulthood, they help set the context in which the next generation of urban youth comes to understand racial and ethnic identity. The tensions that have accompanied the arrival of new immigrant communities to central neighborhoods in the late twentieth century, as displayed during the Rodney King rebellion, raise troubling questions about the ability of tomorrow's immigrant children to establish flexible, productive, and supportive social networks in a multiethnic metropolis.

8 'Becoming' and 'being' Chinese American in college

A look at ethnicity, social class, and neighborhood in identity development

Vivian Louie

In the increasingly multicultural world of the United States, college has become a place where any number of identities – racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual – take shape and are contested. Along those lines, it is commonly thought that the college years are often a time of growing ethnic identification for Asian Americans: a time when their sense of who they are and who they want to become (Erikson 1968) is increasingly shaped by the belief that they share a common cultural background forged by ethnicity. The university provides a crucial venue and indeed, serves as an agent for this process, as students find themselves engaged with ethnic clubs, ethnic studies programs, and affirmative action services (Espiritu 1994; Min and Kim 1999). Reflecting the heterogeneity of the Asian American population, the identity labels that students can lay claim to are diverse, ranging from nationality-based (e.g. Chinese), ethnic-specific (e.g. Chinese American) to pan-ethnic (e.g. Asian American) (Kibria 2002).

An important, if under-explored, characteristic of this process is its class dimension. Given the economic diversity in the Asian American population, a trend fuelled by large-scale immigration, it is important to understand how class matters. Yet much of what we know about the identity development of Asian Americans derives from the experiences of the middle class. How do working-class Asian Americans experience ethnic identity in college, and in what ways are those experiences different or similar to their middle-class counterparts? In this chapter, I draw on qualitative methods to examine the complexities of ethnic identities among Chinese American college students. Specifically, I examine the processes of ethnic identity formation for two groups of college students in New York City: the largely, working-class urban students, who attend a public, commuter university and the mainly middle-class suburban students, who attend an elite, private university. Since previous studies have found ethnic identity formation to be generationally specific, I focus on 1.5- and second-generation Chinese Americans.[1]

I find that the mode of immigrant incorporation along socio-economic and neighborhood lines assumes a central role in understanding how these students experience and incorporate ethnicity in their lives. Thus, I find that the growing ethnic identification described by scholars as characteristic of Asian American college students is rather a phenomenon of suburban, middle-class Chinese Americans; urban working-class students had an entirely different experience.

The varying degrees of involvement with co-ethnic classmates and views on, as well as experiences with, campus ethnic student groups and ethnic activism reported by these students, and how such experiences compared to the ones they had growing up, speak to the effects of social class and neighborhood contexts in how their ethnic identities have developed and unfolded over time.

Theoretical perspectives

The analyses presented in this chapter lie at the intersection of two scholarly domains: namely, the literature tracing the emergence and debating the fate of the Asian American concept, and how it plays out in lived experience, and studies analyzing immigrant incorporation among the children of post-1965 immigrants.

The Asian American concept

The term 'Asian American' emerged from the Asian American Movement, a social movement born in the crucible of 1960s' Civil Rights activism that was motivated by concerns about 'racial equality, social justice, and political empowerment in a culturally pluralist America' (Wei 1993: 1). Led by predominately middle-class, American-born Asians, the movement was grounded in an ideology that rejected 'Oriental' as a pejorative term imposed on various peoples in the United States. In its place, the term Asian American was introduced within an ideological framework that maintained that all Asian persons, regardless of nationality, shared a common racial identity in the U.S. A central mission of this ideology was combating racism against all groups. Thus, the Asian American Movement united Asian groups in the United States of diverse national origins, languages, and cultures into what Espiritu (1992) describes 'as a new, enlarged panethnic group' with a common identity.

A central question posed by scholars has been whether such an identity grounded in shared political interests can actually survive and produce a self-sustaining culture, especially in light of continuing large-scale immigration that might conceivably lead to the resurgence of national identities and a concomitant decline in the pan-ethnic label (Espiritu 1992). Building on this work, Kibria (2002) argues that dual trends have emerged: ethnonational identities in fact co-exist with the Asian American identity among the second generation. In other words, both prove relevant in everyday life. Drawing on ideas advanced by Cornell and Hartmann (1998), Kibria argues that Asian America is relatively 'thin,' and therefore complementary of ethnonational identities that are 'rich' in their density and institutional ties.

Nowhere is the Asian American concept more evident than on college campuses; according to a number of studies, the process of 'becoming ethnic' among Asian American college students represents a marked departure from their earlier identification. Since many of the students in such studies have spent their childhood and adolescent years in predominately white suburbs, they have grown up with few co-ethnics and have had scant opportunities to identify with

their parents' culture of origin. The result is that they have grown up seeing themselves 'as an average American teenager' (Espiritu 1994). Thus, these children of immigrants are well on their way to assimilating into the white mainstream, as an earlier generation of sociologists might have predicted (Park 1950; Gordon 1964).

Their path to assimilation becomes complicated by ethnicity when they encounter the Asian American concept in college, not as something abstract that is externally imposed on them, but as something real that they must learn to negotiate in their lives even if they choose not to participate in ethnic clubs or engage in ethnic activism (Kibria 2002). According to developmental psychologists, the college years for Asian Americans are thus marked by two stages of ethnic-identity development, namely, ethnic emergence and ethnic-identity incorporation.[2] With the realization that continuing identification with the dominant group (e.g. whites) might not be possible, these students undergo a journey of self-exploration that ends with them joining an ethnic minority American group (Tse 1999).

Meanwhile, research focusing on post-1965 immigrants and their children has given us a compelling new set of tools with which to consider ethnic identification. Such studies have called attention to the diversity of factors that can influence ethnic identity development: namely, generational status, socioeconomic status, neighborhood, and the type of school attended (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Rumbaut 1996). Studies conducted on a wide range of groups consistently reveal the importance of such factors. Waters (1999), for example, finds a strong relationship between the type of identity adopted by second-generation West Indians and their family social-class background. Working-class West Indian children were much less likely to identify ethnically, as compared to their middle-class counterparts. Portes and MacLeod (1996:538) found that second-generation children of Latin American origin from 'better established and economically stronger groups' (e.g. Cubans) were less likely to adopt a pan-ethnic, Hispanic identity. In the work of Matute-Bianchi (1986), high school students of Mexican descent exhibit a range of ethnic-identity types. In sum, this emphasis on comparative social contexts in understanding ethnic identity is what has been missing from much of the work on Asian Americans. The purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on what ethnic-identity formation looks like for Chinese American college students when such a comparative perspective is employed.

The study

As a way of tapping into a range of class backgrounds and class trajectories, I chose as my field sites two four-year colleges in New York City: Columbia, a small private residential university, and Hunter, a large public commuter university. As befitting an Ivy League school, Columbia College[3] was highly selective and accepted only 17 percent out of more than 11,000 applicants in 1997.[4] Hunter College is part of the City University of New York (CUNY), a system of undergraduate and graduate institutions founded to provide affordable and

accessible higher education to the economically disadvantaged. Thus, Hunter is open to high school graduates who have had at least an 80 percent average, or have been in the top third of their class, or scored at least 1020 out of a possible 1600 on the SAT. Applicants who have a GED score of at least 300 are also eligible for admission (Hunter College Catalog 1995–8).

This study is based on in-depth interviews with 68 students and non-participant observations in the schools that I conducted from 1998–9. Due to constraints of access, the sample was neither random nor representative; nevertheless, I believe that the respondents included in this study proved typical of the 1.5- and second-generation Chinese Americans at the two schools in their outlooks and experiences. To increase the likelihood of obtaining the diversity I sought in my interview subjects, I relied on a number of discrete recruitment strategies such as: administrative channels (the then dean of Columbia students wrote a letter introducing the project to the Asian American undergraduate population); faculty and student contacts; and brief introductions of the project that I made personally or through email at non-ethnic and ethnic organizations[5] and in classes in various disciplines, such as economics, sociology, geography, Chinese language, and Asian American studies (specifically, English, urban studies, and history). Through such venues, I was able to introduce the project to Chinese American students in various disciplines and engage with the university in diverse ways.

The interview process was conducted in two steps. First, I administered a survey instrument, which was designed to measure class background by parental occupation, and parental educational attainment, and the family's status on these indicators back in the home country, since migration may have resulted in downward mobility. The survey also asked for information about homeownership, and neighborhood composition. Immediately thereafter, I conducted the interview, which covered a number of topics, including questions on the respondent's experiences with family, school, and peers, racial and ethnic identities, and racial and ethnic stratification. All but one of the interviews were conducted face-to-face, and all were tape-recorded and later transcribed and coded thematically. The majority of the interviews lasted between 90 minutes and two hours. As a way of complementing my interview data, I conducted observations in the classroom and in meetings of various student organizations; and drew further insights from conversations with professors and other students.

Respondent characteristics: an overview

- 68 respondents
- 73.5% female/26.5% male
- 51.5% from Columbia, and 48.5% from Hunter
- 60% second generation, and 40% 1.5 generation
- 51.5% of the Hunter respondents grew up adjacent to or within the three Chinatowns in New York City (e.g. Manhattan's Chinatown, Sunset Park in Brooklyn, and Flushing, Queens); by comparison, 14% of the Columbia students grew up in one of the city's three Chinatowns.

As indicated above, the 68 respondents were about evenly divided between the two schools. About 60 percent of the respondents were second generation, and the remainder were the 1.5 generation. Of the foreign-born, most had arrived in the United States by the age of five, with a good many during infancy, and were thus largely educated and socialized there.

That the gender breakdown for both school samples was skewed towards women deserves a brief elaboration. The 2:1 gender ratio in the Hunter sample approximated the overall gender dynamics at the former women's college, where women still represented about 72 percent of the total enrollment. On the other hand, the 4:1 ratio in my Columbia sample over-represented the women among that school's undergraduates, where they were approximately half of the population. Although that caveat must be kept in mind when discussing the findings, the views expressed by the male Columbia respondents were very similar to those of the women I spoke with. Additionally, all my respondents discussed ethnic identity in reference to their peers, male and female. Overall, there were few discernible gender differences in how respondents spoke of ethnic identification processes.[6]

The overview of respondents' characteristics also illustrates that their families corresponded to the two different worlds of Chinese immigrants as outlined by Peter Kwong (1987) and Morrison Wong (1995). The majority of families of my Columbia respondents were part of the uptown Chinese immigrant stream of highly educated professionals, who settled in the suburbs; conversely, the families of my Hunter respondents and a few of those from Columbia were part of the downtown Chinese stream of low-wage, service workers with few years of formal schooling, who ended up near or in an urban ethnic economic enclave, typically in labor-intensive jobs at garment factories and restaurants (Kwong 1987; Wong 1995; Espiritu 1997).

I should note that throughout this project I drew upon my role as an insider by virtue of my status as a second-generation Chinese American with family and educational backgrounds similar to my respondents, albeit in varying ways. I was like many of the Hunter respondents in that I was born in Manhattan's Chinatown, to which my family still has close ties, and grew up near Flushing, Queens. In addition, my parents work in Chinese-owned and -staffed restaurant and garment businesses. The fact that I was a PhD candidate necessarily set me apart from my respondents, although I found that the Columbia students did not see that as a barrier. They were more likely to find common ground between us in my Ivy League credentials.

In the next two sections, I look at how these differences along class and neighborhood lines influenced these students' ethnic identity development before and during college. The first focuses on the experiences of suburban, middle-class students at Columbia, and the subsequent one on those of urban working-class students both at Hunter and at Columbia.

The ethnic awakening of suburban, middle-class students: becoming Chinese American

Social scientists interested in ethnic identities among the children of immigrants commonly measure how much children know about the cultural practices of their parents' country of origin, how fluent they are in the ethnic language, and how many ethnic friends they have. As children and adolescents, my suburban, middle-class respondents would have ranked quite low on such measures. Growing up, they spoke little Chinese and thought of themselves as just 'like everyone else,' or in other words, just like their white, middle-class peers. This dilution of ethnic identity was due in part to their parents, who believed that learning Chinese might hinder their children's acquisition of English, and to the racial homogeneity of the neighborhoods they lived in. Thus, ethnicity, such that existed, was characteristic of the private realm of the home, where most of these students ate ethnic foods and observed ethnic holidays, without much knowledge of why, and which they mainly came to associate with ethnic food (Espiritu 1994; Min and Kim 1999) as opposed to the public sphere of the school, peer groups, and neighborhood.

In contrast to their experiences growing up, these students found themselves at Columbia, an educational setting where ethnicity was suddenly both a private *and* public matter. After so many years spent with white peers and feeling a part of the mainstream, these respondents were at an institution where 17 percent of the student population was Asian American, and the 'Asian American concept' was visible all around them – notably, in organized activities sponsored by ethnic student groups, and in Columbia's newly offered program in Asian American studies. For many, living and studying at a racially and ethnically diverse university that paid attention to matters like multiculturalism prompted what developmental psychologists have described as 'an ethnic awakening,' in many cases, one where the Chinese American and Asian American identities existed quite easily together (Kibria 2002).

Here, I find it necessary to elaborate on the differences and overlap between the terms, Asian American and Chinese American, as these students used them. If we look at only the survey data of the suburban respondents from this study, it would appear to contradict the claim that I have just made. About 69 percent of the suburban respondents self-identified in the survey as Chinese or Chinese American or as Taiwanese. By comparison, only a fifth identified as Asian or Asian American alone.

However, the students' frequently interchangeable use of the terms, Asian American and Chinese American (Kibria 2002), in the interviews speaks to the relevance of Asian pan-ethnicity in their lives. On the one hand, they acknowledged something distinctive to being Chinese. On the other, these students spoke of the bonds they shared with other Asian ethnics such as Koreans, Indians, and Filipinos and how such bonds transcended ethnicity and language. While some spoke of Koreans as being distinctively 'cool' – the Asians who wore hip, designer clothes and always looked like they were dressed for clubbing – that did not mitigate their understanding that Koreans and other Asian ethnics had experiences

similar to their own. The ethnic awakening of these students was thus also a *pan-ethnic* awakening. Their friends of other Asian ethnicities had parents who were also professionals, had grown up in the suburbs, and found themselves engaged in a similar journey of identity exploration. In other words, becoming Chinese American did not preclude one from also becoming Asian American. Instead of viewing the two identities as conflicting, these students saw them as complementary.

The process that I call 'becoming Chinese American' was very much a learning experience for these respondents, one that carried with it a public dimension. Nowhere was this more evident than at Columbia's orientation, where ethnic student groups fanned out on College Walk to greet other students; the attempts of ethnic student groups (and indeed all student groups) to recruit members and to be visible with their activities continued throughout the year with group meetings and events that brought together large numbers of not just Chinese Americans, but Asian Americans as well. Facilitating this goal were the detailed rosters kept by the student groups, listing the names and contact information of not only the more active members, but also names of people who happened to sign up but rarely attended the meetings; and their multi-faceted means of publicizing events, including websites, email lists, and recorded phone messages distributed en masse to students, ensuring that the word reached as many as possible.

By participating in such groups, these students employed their skills in support of a goal involving Chinese and/or Asian Americans often for the first time. For example, some of my respondents volunteered with social-service-oriented groups that provided direct service to Chinatown. Others wrote or illustrated for campus pan-ethnic journals. Still others assisted in the organization of large-scale pan-ethnic and ethnic events; these included panels to honor Asian American Heritage Month, a banquet and show to celebrate Chinese New Year, a fashion show highlighting Asian American designers and models, and social forums to advance understanding of Chinese cultural traditions. It is important to note that such events were not designed solely for the purposes of collective ethnic pride, although that was an important component; rather they were also designed to introduce the concerns of the ethnic group(s), whether it was political, or cultural, to the larger Columbia community.

Another factor in this process of becoming Chinese American was Columbia's Asian American studies program, which was institutionalized in the fall of 1998, the year I started my field work. A 21-year-old woman I spoke with was one of a group of students, who had pushed for the creation of an ethnic studies department that would incorporate African American, Latino American, and Asian American studies. Although the students' efforts did not result in the formation of such a department, this young woman felt an obligation to take the classes she had fought so hard for. She was different from many of the other suburban students in her activism and in that she had always sought out texts about Chinese American experiences. To borrow from Kibria (2002), this respondent subscribed to the official Asian American ideology

centered on social justice. In fact, she was aware that this commitment made her different from many of her peers, Asian and non-Asian. Nonetheless, this student believed the Asian American studies program offered a comprehensive look at topics that were not only personally and politically important to her but that she felt other people, including non-Asians, could relate to as well. Other students, who were less politically active but no less curious about the meaning of the Asian American concept, conveyed sentiments similar to those she expressed in the following:

> I'm learning more not just about Chinese Americans but all the groups that came, the diverse history of America. And the good thing about history was I always knew about the Exclusion Act,[7] but I never knew about, you know, about Japanese internment camps, we never really learned about that in high school, or you know, about Filipino American immigration to the United States, the Hawaiian sugar plantation strikes, South Asian immigration. So there is a lot of history to the Asian American history.

On another level, becoming Chinese American was an intensely private process. One did not have to wait for ethnic student club meetings or for an ethnic studies class to encounter ethnicity. Everyday social interactions with Chinese Americans, in the dorm or the dining hall, proved to be a crucial way of encountering what it meant to be Chinese American. This often led to friendships with co-ethnics, a new and wholly unexpected development for many of these respondents. It is important to note that, much as Kibria (1999) found, these middle-class students did not attribute their new friendship patterns to any 'conscious decision' to associate primarily with Chinese Americans. Rather, these friendships seemed to have an organic element to them intrinsic to shared family, cultural, and sometimes religious experiences (e.g. involvement with evangelical Christianity). As an 18-year-old Columbia female freshman observed:

> At Columbia, I sometimes feel that I can relate more to people who are Chinese American because, you know, their parents are like mine. And so you know we can sit around, and be like, yeah, you know, my mom said this, and you know, it's like, Oh my god, my mom said the same thing to me. And like a lot more relating.

Another female respondent noted that it was not the Chinese language that served as the common bond since conversations were conducted in English, which was in many cases the respondents' first and only language.

What infused these conversations with special meaning was their relational aspect. Other Chinese, and indeed, other Asians could easily grasp what these students understood to be the unique features of their growing up as 1.5- and second-generation Chinese in suburbia, that is, how their parents raised them with different rules and were often stricter. The views expressed by my respondents were consistent with what Kibria (2002: 108) has described as 'ethnic

pan-Asianism,' one seen in 'broadly ethnic terms as a community of shared culture and life experiences.' Rather than articulating the ideology of 'official pan-Asianism,' which as I noted earlier, is centered on issues of race and politics, my respondents talked about 'shared *personal* histories and outlooks produced by race' (Kibria 2002: 121). Before coming to Columbia, there were few chances to address such concerns, and so they went unvoiced. At college, however, there were numerous opportunities to give voice to their stories. As one young man, a senior at Columbia, observed: '[There] are definitely things that I can relate to with Asian Americans, you know. Especially parent things. Like I could never go up to some Caucasian guy from Alabama and speak to him about how his parents forced him to take the piano.' Ethnic language played virtually no role here because, if the other person was not Chinese, there was no common language to draw on.

For a few of these respondents, this emergence of an Asian American peer group was not an entirely uncomplicated process; they expressed guilt that their friendship circles had gone from largely white in high school to mostly Asian in college. That keeping a diverse group of friends was a significant but still unmet goal for the young man mentioned earlier is evident from the following exchange:

I: Are most of your college friends Asian American?
A: Yeah, they are.
I: Chinese?
A: No, not only Chinese. Definitely mostly Asian American, which I'm sort of sad about. I feel sort of like I'm a failure in that sense. But I was speaking to my one Jewish friend of mine, and I was like, I don't get it. How come I only have one good Jewish white friend? You know, how come it's only you? Like, where are all my other white and black friends? And he was telling me, it wasn't really a choice on my part, he thinks. He thinks like it could have been anyone I hung out with, and it sort of turned out this way. And also, like if you think of the Asian Americans you hang out with, they're really different from the really hard-core Asian American crowd.

It is important to emphasize here the role of social class background in these students' ethnic identities. While it is true that they were becoming Chinese American, it is also the case that their identities emerged from the particular social location they were from. In other words, the Chinese American identity that they were learning to become was very much specific to the fact that they were 1.5 and second generation, middle class and from predominately white suburbs. Yet the ways in which these students spoke about and made sense of this identity highlighted the ethnic dimensions with little mention of social class background. Moreover, when they did speak of class at all, it was to highlight their view that most Asian Americans were like them or at least, on the path to some kind of mobility. Said one woman:

> Obviously not all Asian Americans are going to be doctors or great, but we tend to look at the ones who have made a place for themselves. And that's a pretty good number. But then of course there are those who live in poor areas, who are still working as like busboys in Chinese restaurants and stuff like that … Still I guess if you have to put all the minorities on the same level, then you'd definitely say that Asian Americans have made the most progress. I mean, some, not all, but enough.

A minority of my suburban middle-class respondents did not actively participate in ethnic student clubs, or support ethnic studies, and in short, were not part of the 'hard-core Asian American crowd.' When asked whether she participated in Asian American student groups on campus, one young woman paused for a few moments before giving her answer. As she told me later, it was important to her that the words accurately conveyed her sentiments.

> I did go to a couple of Asian American type meetings freshman year. I didn't follow up, I didn't continue with them. I've always thought it was kind of an artificial way to meet people. It really definitely struck me that way. A lot of my friends are Asian.

Words like 'closed' and 'Asian posses' characterized these respondents' rather dim views of ethnic student clubs on campus (Kibria 1999). Ethnic studies also did not seem to be an important part of their student lives. Indeed, these students still saw themselves as being 'like everyone else,' taking that to mean like native-born whites. What is important to note, however, is that regardless of their views on ethnic clubs or ethnic activism, even these students reported having Asian friends, often for the first time. In addition, the very fact that they had to consider the role of ethnicity in their social or curricular options highlighted how the Asian American concept had moved from the margins to the mainstream of their consciousness.

Dating and courtship, as Mark Wild argues in his study of the 1930s and 1940s, assumes central importance in understanding immigrant children's changing identities. The dating partners of my middle-class suburban respondents at Columbia can be placed into two categories: (1) Asian (Chinese and Korean) and white and (2) all white partners. A few also reported dating Hispanics and African Americans. Those who dated Asians and whites were generally in the process of embracing their ethnic and pan-ethnic identities in college. And those who dated only whites had generally not experienced an 'ethnic awakening.' However, a good many students at both schools (about 25 percent overall) did not date at all.

In sum, the middle-class suburban students took different stances on the vehicles of ethnic identity at Columbia: most embraced ethnic clubs, ethnic friends, and to a lesser extent, Asian American studies courses while a minority shied away from them. But what all these students could not avoid was acknowledging the very existence of such institutions and reflecting on what that signaled for their own identities (Kibria 1999). Thus, some of these respondents guessed

(accurately as it turned out) that I would ask about their participation in ethnic extracurricular activities, and a few even brought up the subject on their own. The abstract quality of the term, Asian American, that had characterized their youth, had given way to an immediacy that required students to ponder their own situations and relationship to it.

Ethnic continuity for urban working-class students: being Chinese

The 42 urban working-class students in this study came from very different places, both spatially and culturally. As they told me, they had grown up inhabiting a Chinese cultural domain with the rather obvious understanding that they were Chinese. When asked whether she considered herself a member of an ethnic group growing up, one woman replied: 'Yes, definitely. Because I was in Chinatown. I lived in Chinatown. Everybody was Chinese.' These students, however, described themselves as Chinese, as opposed to Chinese American. Remarked one young man, another Chinatown native: 'Actually, believe it or not, most of my friends don't call themselves Chinese American. They say, oh yeah, I'm Chinese. It's like that.'

Yet, their awareness of being Chinese was not linked with their parents' homelands, since few could afford the time or the money needed to travel to Asia. Nor were their identities linked to the traditional cultural practices that their immigrant parents followed and in some measure, had tried to instill in them. The world of their parents, as seen by these students, was at once familiar and foreign, characterized by the wails of Chinese opera, journeys to the cemetery to honor the dead with boiled chicken and rice wine, folk superstitions (*don't wash your hair on a holiday*), ethnic holidays like Chinese New Year and the Moon Festival, and incense-lighting in the home along with offerings of fruit and other foods to various deities. The working-class Chinese immigrant parents generally did not think it necessary to discuss the meanings of these rituals—they were to be carried out, not discussed (as one student put it, parents gave orders, and children were supposed to obey, no questions asked). Thus, the substantive context for these traditions increasingly became lost to the 1.5 and second generations. While the children performed the rituals to appease their parents, they did not view the rituals as a part of their lives. As one woman observes: 'We were never taught the meaning behind the holidays so they lost meaning.'

The use of the ethnic language among these respondents also reflects how removed their identities were from their parents. As my respondents told me, it was their parents' hope that they would become literate in Chinese. Oral competency was not so much an issue, as these children spoke Chinese in the home to their parents, who were largely not fluent English speakers. Reading and writing Chinese, however, was supposed to be the province of the ethnic language schools that their parents sent these children to. In most cases, such expectations went unrealized as children detested having 'extra' school and ended up learning very little.

These students' strong ethnic identities were instead an American product that was uniquely situated in an urban working-class context. Their accounts called attention to an urban ethnic economic enclave, typically Chinatown, as the locus of their ethnic-identity development. These students' take on Chinatown was very much a 1.5- and second-generation one, and thus was different than the one held by their immigrant parents, for whom the enclave was a way of reconnecting with their homelands and cultural roots. For these respondents, Chinatown was important because it allowed them to congregate with fellow 1.5- and second-generation Chinese Americans, with whom they spoke a mix of Chinese and English, developing their own slang that the immigrant generation could not understand, about a shared cultural repertoire consisting of the latest Chinese films, Hong Kong actors like Jackie Chan, Hong Kong pop sensations like Andy Lau, and updates on Chinese pop concerts held at nightclubs in Atlantic City, NJ. Hence, it was not only the fact that they grew up with co-ethnics, which was of course important. It was the fact that they grew up with co-ethnics of a similar generation, and that they developed together a distinctive youth culture that was Chinese American.

This meant that even as they called themselves Chinese, these respondents were careful to distinguish themselves from immigrants who had arrived in the United States as adults (like their parents) and immigrants who came as adolescents. One woman expressed her thoughts on some of the basic cultural differences between the latter (in this case, a co-worker who came to the U.S. as a teenager) and the second generation like herself:

> Like I work with another girl, she was not born here, when we were talking about things, she would mention Cantonese terms, she would mention phrases and sayings, and I would be like, what are you talking about? Things like, let's say, relationships, we don't ever talk about relationships, we don't talk about love. It feels like there is a stop where you can't ask her to talk about stuff. They won't go there.

Unlike the suburban students at Columbia, these students did not experience an ethnic awakening when they arrived at Hunter. They entered knowing they were Chinese, and continued being Chinese in college. Despite the multiculturalism reflected in the student composition at Hunter (racial minorities were the majority,[8] and a significant percentage of the students were the children of immigrants and from working-class backgrounds), and their own sense of being Chinese, these students did not participate in ethnic clubs in large numbers, although some took courses in Asian American studies, which met a plurality diversity requirement. Their reasons for taking classes in Asian American studies were similar to those expressed by my suburban respondents at Columbia – it was a way to explore their heritage, the history of Asians in America, and the identity issues that were most salient for them.

Several factors at Hunter worked against the participation of these students in ethnic clubs. One was Hunter's very nature as a commuter school. With only one residential dormitory that had a long waiting list, and without the grassy

quadrangle that many residential colleges have, Hunter, especially in its escalators and express elevators, seemed little different to students from other modern high-rises in the city. One young woman described it as an extension of high school in that regard. Although the buildings did have several cafes and lounges with cushioned chairs where students could relax between classes (and where I conducted a few of my interviews), my respondents felt that Hunter's layout did not encourage meaningful engagement with the university or other students. That the four interlocking buildings led into a subway entrance confirmed this impression. As one 21-year-old man said, 'I go to school and go home.' He went on to note that few of his friends were at Hunter, most of them attending other universities, sentiments shared by many of these respondents.

In some cases, the distancing from Hunter could be traced to the students' desire to go away for college. Unfortunately, they either could not afford to board, even at a state college, or had filed their applications too late in the year. Rightly or wrongly, by staying home and commuting to college, they believed that they were missing out on the authentic collegiate experience. In other cases, the intense work and school schedules of students, some of whom worked full-time at the same time that they took a full courseload, necessarily made Hunter a place for just classes and little else.

A minority of my Hunter respondents did join two pan-ethnic clubs (there were no Chinese clubs with the exception of an evangelical Christian group that drew mainly immigrants, who had arrived in the United States as adolescents). Even in such groups, however, the daily process of being Chinese American remained uncomplicated, since most of their membership was Chinese American, in particular the 1.5 and second generations. Thus, in both groups, it was a generationally grounded youth culture that was important to their shared identity along with the common experience of having grown up in an urban ethnic context with parents somehow connected to the enclave economy. Members often spoke to one another in Cantonese English, and gossiped about the latest pop concerts by Hong Kong or Taiwanese singers in Atlantic City, and the latest Chinese pop CDs. One group, however, had more of an activist purpose as it was linked to the Asian American studies library; the relative calm there was disturbed twice during my time in the field due to heated debates initiated by two non-Chinese students (one a Southeast Asian American and another a Korean American) about whether the club was fulfilling its political mission, and whether it was truly inclusive of all Asian ethnicities. In other words, the debates focused on whether the club embraced official pan-Asianism (Kibria 2002: 107).

It is not surprising then that, though these students often spoke of themselves as Asian American, they really meant Chinese American, a distinction that they acknowledged. A young woman who led the more activist club reflected:

> I think Asian American and Chinese American are about the same to me. Although now I'm discovering because within the club, we have had discussions with that whole term of Asian American and maybe in my life, I think Asian American means Chinese Americans. It's just how I see myself.

Compared to the middle-class suburban students, a greater percentage, about 88 percent, of the urban working-class students self-identified in the survey as Chinese or Chinese American or provided an even more specific designation, such as the region in China their parents were from (e.g. Foochow, or Canton). In contrast to what I found with my middle-class suburban students, the interviews here confirmed the survey data. That is, the easy identification with other Asian ethnics, and the pan-ethnic identity expressed by their middle-class suburban counterparts were largely absent among these students. Unlike the Columbia students, they did not need to bond with other Asian ethnics since they could already draw from a pre-existing ethnic identity based on language use, and a Chinese youth culture specific to a Chinese enclave. Or, to draw on the useful framework articulated by Kibria (2002), my working-class respondents were more likely to find affiliation in their thick ethnonational identity, which was more immediate to them, than in a thin pan-Asian identity. For the suburban students, who grew up in neighborhoods with few Asian ethnics and sparse ethnic ties at the institutional level, the relationship was quite the reverse. In fact, my urban respondents were more likely to see the divisions between Asian ethnic groups as possibly insurmountable; for them, being Chinese American might indeed preclude being Asian American. At the very least, being Chinese would always claim their first allegiance.

This is evident from the following exchange with a 22-year-old male student at Hunter:

I: Is being Asian American the same as being Chinese American to you, or is it somehow slightly different?
A: Different, it's very different.
I: How so?
A: Cultures, Chinese people, Chinese American culture is different from like, Korean American culture or Filipino American culture. It's just different. I mean, sometimes, it's intermingled, and it don't matter that much, but there are slight differences in the culture.

In another part of the interview, this young man spoke of the contextual nature of pan-ethnic identification, and how being Chinese would still always be more important to him.

I: Do you identify more as Asian American or Chinese American, or does it depend?
A: Depends actually. Depends on the context. Like if I see a Korean American walking down the street, and I see him fall down, I might, I am naturally like that, I'm geared towards helping him, more than I would if I see a white person fall down. But if I see a Korean person getting mugged, and Chinese person getting mugged at the same time, I tend to help the Chinese person. It's just, there's like an order of things.

These urban working-class Chinese respondents were also acutely aware of the social class distinctions that distinguished them from the Chinese Americans living outside of the enclave. For example, they were sensitive to the fact that co-ethnics who grew up in the suburbs, and in the case of Chinatown natives, even their co-ethnics in Flushing, a more affluent economic enclave than Chinatown (Chen 1992; Zhou 1992) saw more of the world, were more in touch with mainstream culture and expectations, and thus less 'ghettoized.' Consequently, in contrast to the middle-class suburban students at Columbia, the Hunter students tended to see class as more salient than ethnicity. As they saw it, theirs was an urban working-class Chinese identity, one that necessarily differed from the identities of Chinese young adults of other social class locations. Deborah Ow was particularly vocal on this point: 'The media is always portraying (Asian Americans) as people who have it well-off. Always talking about people who make it to Princeton, Harvard or Yale. And if you have kids in Yale or Harvard, you must be doing well.' As Deborah, the daughter of a garment worker and restaurant worker, pointed out, such class differences existed in as small a unit as her extended family. While her relatives in Salt Lake City, Utah were not wealthy, they were nevertheless well-do-to, spoke only English, and lived in a largely white suburb. In short, their lives were worlds apart from hers, as she observed: 'My cousins, their parents are middle class. My mother works in a factory, their mother never worked in a factory. Their mother's a homemaker, they have no concept of what, you know, I am.'

The accounts of the few urban working-class students, who attended Columbia, all but one of whom self-identified as Chinese or Chinese American, were another window into the class dynamic underlying these students' ethnic identities. Since these students had also grown up in ethnic enclaves, their college years were not about highlighting the role of an ethnicity that they had been aware of since childhood. Like their middle-class suburban counterparts, a few were involved with ethnic student groups and took Asian American studies classes, but it should be noted, also as a way of discovering resources that could help their parents. Others, however, were not so keen on either phenomenon. Said Michael How:

> I'm not so big on Asian American activism. For one thing, I think pushing for an Asian American Department at every school doesn't make sense because there isn't a lot of people who are interested. That's what it seems to me. And that's why I can understand why college administrators don't want to put in money to hire three or four faculty members and have a department when five people are in the major in the department.

These Columbia students, while coming from a more privileged stratum of the ethnic economy, nevertheless highlighted the social class differences between themselves and their middle-class suburban counterparts. Some spoke disparagingly of their co-ethnics at Columbia, saying they grew up with 'a silver spoon,' and thus 'did not know the value of a dollar.' Or as one young woman, a

Chinatown native, observed: 'I feel more comfortable being around Asian Americans if they have similar backgrounds.' It was not surprising, then, that students from the New York City area told me they regularly went home to the enclave to be with their families and to return to an ethnic world that was at times more comfortable to them.

The dating patterns of my working-class urban students reflected the ethnic and class dimensions of their identities. A majority dated only Chinese partners, while some also dated Koreans. Others dated Hispanics and blacks, both immigrants and African Americans, and very few reported dating whites. It was mainly when dating whites that my respondents crossed class lines. The Asian, Hispanic, and black partners instead tended to share their social class locations.

Conclusion

This chapter offers some insights into the ways in which mode of immigrant incorporation influences the ethnic-identity development of 1.5- and second-generation Chinese Americans in college. The particular contexts for identity formation differed in terms of the neighborhood the students had grown up in and the social class backgrounds they came from (e.g. working-class urban ethnic enclave vs. middle-class predominately white suburb), and the schools they came to attend (large public commuter university vs. small elite private residential university).

The urban working-class students had grown up thinking of themselves as being Chinese and inhabiting a particularly Chinese American world. Thus, they had little need to engage with university institutions like ethnic clubs and ethnic studies to feel ethnic. Not only did they arrive at school knowing they were Chinese, but they were also deeply aware that they were inhabiting a *working-class* Chinese world. Even those who joined ethnic clubs and took Asian American studies classes found the college years to be a time of re-affirmation and extension of their ethnic identities. For them, being Chinese American had a richness that outweighed the sparseness attached to the Asian American concept. In contrast, for many of the middle-class Chinese Americans, who had grown up thinking they were little different from their white peers, college was a time of ethnic awakening. In coming to be Chinese American, they focused on the shared experiences of growing up as middle-class second-generation Chinese Americans in suburbia. However, they understood this experience in particularly ethnic terms, rather than class terms. Moreover, becoming Chinese American was just the same for them as embracing an Asian American identity, as they saw great similarities with other Asian ethnics of similar family backgrounds.

Such findings suggest directions for future research. One would be to follow the trajectories of the students as they make the transition to adulthood. We should explore whether working-class Chinese Americans like those in this study become more like their middle-class counterparts in their ethnic identities as they start working in the mainstream economy, move out of the ethnic economic enclaves, and, in general, climb the mobility ladder. If they do

continue to experience ethnicity in very different ways, then we need to examine the mechanisms that allow this to occur. Alternatively, we need to look at whether middle-class students like those in this study are able to find venues that nourish ethnic identity, as they enter a workforce less likely to offer either the diversity found in college or institutionalized supports for it. A number of studies suggest that this might be possible through pan-Asian groups, mostly professional in nature and lacking a progressive agenda, that are currently populated mostly by middle-class second-generation Asian Americans (Espiritu and Ong 1994; Kibria 2002).

Finally, it remains to be seen whether the new third generation of Chinese Americans will become like white ethnics, who can lay claim to a voluntary symbolic ethnicity that does not 'have social costs associated with it' (Waters 1990:137). Tuan's (1998) work finds that third- and later-generation middle-class Chinese and Japanese Americans from earlier waves of immigration confront higher levels of social costs with their ethnic heritages. Future research, then, should examine whether the new third generation of Chinese ethnics continue to confront a different social milieu from white ethnics, and whether there will be class differences in this process.

Part III

Immigrant labor

9 Workplace identities and collective memory

Living and remembering the effects of the Bracero total institution[1]

Ronald L. Mize

Defining who we are is not always a simple matter of self-definition. On the contrary, in the case of racialized and marginalized immigrant groups, it is often definitions imposed from above that determine how immigrants perform identity. This chapter is based on the life histories of former migrant laborers contracted to work in the U.S.–Mexico Bracero Program, which began in 1942 and ended in 1964. The focus is on the persistence of managed workplace identities in Mexican contract laborers' memories and the origins of these identities in their lived experiences. Scholars have long known that the ability of Braceros to resist their wretched working conditions in the U.S. fields was severely hampered by the high degree of control exerted by growers and their intermediaries. But the work demands placed upon the workers dictated their lived experiences in almost every realm. The role expectations growers imposed on Braceros first shaped their actions (as subservient and acquiescent) and then limited their memories of the program (to only its most agreeable aspects).

This study draws on thirteen in-depth life stories of former Braceros collected in California and Colorado from 1997 to 1998; these Braceros had worked in ten states between 1947 and 1964, mainly in agriculture (cotton, beans, fruits, etc.) or on the railroads. A separate group interview, conducted ad hoc in citizenship classes in Fresno, California, with nine Mexican immigrants of similar age introduced more general and collective Mexicano memories of the Bracero Program. I also selectively interviewed a small group of non-Braceros who had worked or lived in and around Bracero labor camps in Colorado and California. It is ironic that the major scholarly accounts of the Bracero Program (Anderson 1963, 1976; Driscoll 1999; Galarza 1956, 1964; Gamboa 1990; Garcia, J.R. 1980; Garcia, J.U. and Griego 1983; Herrera-Sobek 1979; Kirstein 1977) corroborate in the main the citizenship applicants' collective memory rather than the memories of the former Braceros. By comparing aspects of the Bracero Program common to citizenship applicants and to other non-Bracero interviews with the details elicited from the former Braceros, I am able to analyze what Braceros recalled and what they forgot. Finally, the chapter offers – from the perspective of former Braceros with specific historical experiences as 'guestworkers' – an implicit critique of what it means to be 'American.' By comparing images of Braceros in interviews with Mexican

citizenship applicants and in the scholarly literature on the program to the recollections of work by the former Braceros, the long-term impact of workplace identities imposed from above becomes obvious.

Class relations in the fields

That work is important in defining class identities is apparent in a literature on the capitalist labor process (Braverman 1974; Burawoy 1979, 1985; Marx 1976 [1880]; Peña 1998). But work is not the only element to be considered when defining class. When the work day ends and people become involved in so-called leisure activities or consumption practices, class does not cease to be relevant. While work practices are germane, they do not encompass the totality of class relations. The realm of everyday practices is also thoroughly classed and just as important as work practices to an understanding of class relations.

British cultural studies have particularly focused on the oppositional content of everyday life (Grossberg 1997; Hoggart 1957; Thompson 1968, 1971; Williams 1958, 1961, 1989; Willis 1977). In the United States, historian Robin Kelley (1994) offers an account of simultaneously raced and classed cultures of resistance in an American and black–white context. For Kelley, black working-class cultures of expression included both workplace resistance and elements of life (such as music and leisure practices) often referred to as popular culture (Fiske 1989a, 1989b; Grossberg 1997). According to Kelley, 'culture and community are essential for understanding black working-class infrapolitics. Hidden in homes, dance halls, and churches, embedded in expressive cultures, is where much of what is choked back at work or in white-dominated public space can find expression' (Kelley 1994: 51).

By characterizing working-class cultures as actively oppositional, Kelley and others challenge a dominant Marxist view of masses duped by a commodified culture they label the 'Culture Industry.' Thus, in the words of Horkheimer and Adorno (1972):

> consumers are workers and employees, the farmers and lower middle class. Capitalist production so confines them, body and soul, that they fall helpless victims to what is offered to them. As naturally as the ruled always took the morality imposed upon them more seriously than did the rulers themselves, the deceived masses are today captivated by the myth of success even more than the successful are. Immovably, they insist on the very ideology which enslaves them. The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done to them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities.
>
> (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 134)

Crude Marxist notions of false consciousness fit well with Horkheimer's and Adorno's ideas about mass culture. Both assume that the working class is so thoroughly dominated that its own collective subjectivity is a mystification or mass deception. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, lack of oppositionality or

resistance in the working class is not simply imposed from above (through the 'cunning of authorities') but rooted in working-class cultures.

Rather than assuming that all minority or working-class cultures are either expressive or dominated, this study began as an effort to uncover the 'hidden transcripts of resistance' (Scott 1990) in the life stories of former Braceros.[2] Ultimately, however, Horkheimer and Adorno's 'cunning of authorities' became central for understanding what I now call the Bracero total institution (Mize 2000). The Bracero total institution was an institution specifically distinguished by workers' lack of resistance or opposition to authority. As Goffman (1961: xiii) has written, 'a total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.' The four major characteristics of a total institution, according to Goffman (1961: 6) are that all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority, that each phase of the member's daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together, that all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials, and that the various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution. The Bracero Program shared all four of these characteristics.[3]

The total institution represents a system of domination and coercion that relies on its subjects being physically, symbolically, and even linguistically segregated from the rest of society. The managed character of the institution is designed to control the actions of those subjects twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. In a potentially much more harmful way, the total institution also seems designed to impose its own understanding of identity on inmates and workers, affecting how they view themselves and assess their prior experiences and future possibilities. For those coerced into it, the managed self may be the most potentially negative product of total institutions.

Former Braceros remember

The Braceros' memories of life in the total institution offer a unique perspective on the identities so diligently and cunningly managed by their crew bosses, farm labor contractors (FLCs), U.S.–Mexican government representatives, and growers. In the Bracero Program, the performative aspects of the self were based upon a series of role expectations between workers and bosses, much as Goffman described them, with each group tending 'to conceive of the other in terms of narrowly hostile stereotypes … Staff tend to feel superior and righteous; inmates tend, in some ways at least, to feel inferior, weak, blameworthy, and guilty' (Goffman 1961: 7). When two former Braceros were asked if they experienced racism while contracted to work in predominantly Anglo rural areas, they sought to deflect the question:

DON FRANCISCO: I didn't have problems with them. When we went into stores to buy things, they treated us fine. I have always had good foremen. If you treat yourself bad, you will be treated bad.

RM (*author*): And you?

DON JORGE: When I see someone that has a Spanish face, and I say 'You are Hispano' and they say (*in English*) 'Oh no, I don't speak Spanish,' but they are Spanish.

DON FRANCISCO: But now they act like they are from here.[4]

My effort to initiate a frank discussion of discriminatory treatment elicited statements that some Braceros acted in a manner deserving exploitation or that Mexicanos had the gall to presume they actually belonged here (e.g. were rightful citizens of the United States).

Other students of total institutions suggest that a total institution is 'destructive to individual autonomy in yet more subtle ways, for the person loses … the right to independent thoughts and actions' (Watson 1980: 183). This claim that one's thoughts as well as actions are controlled or managed requires closer documentation, which is provided by my field notes on the life story of Don Jorge.

> Hailing from a small village (*pueblo*) in Colima, where [he] had lived all his life, the land he or his parents occupy is used for the subsistence production of corn. By train or bus, he travels to the recruitment center in Irapuato, Guanajato. If he is a young man, his hands are sufficiently calloused, and he has bought the necessary papers for the local government official (in his case about 300 pesos or $25 U.S. – 1950) that enables him to register for a contract, he waits in Irapuato until his number is called. After three months of waiting and wiring his parents asking for money to live on, he is told that work is available. From there, he is bused to Calexico, California […] and given his necessary papers and identification card. To this day, he still carries his Bracero identification card in his wallet. He tells me he holds onto it for *recuerdos* (memories), yet every Bracero I interviewed […] has the card in his wallet. For this eighteen-year-old man, his first contract is in the San Jose Valley where he works in the broccoli harvest for six months. He is truly lucky on this contract because, even though he has no idea how much is deducted from his paycheck for mandatory non-occupational insurance, food, housing, and the buses for 'entertainment' that take him into nearby Santa Clara to buy toiletries, he still brings home about $200 every two weeks. [Later on, he contacts me and apologizes for his memory not serving him well and informs me that the amount is most likely an overestimate.] The forty other Braceros he works with stay in army barracks that the company converted […] On subsequent trips to Michigan, Ohio, and Texas he works with *el cortito* (short-handled hoe) that most likely led to his current unemployment due to back problems. He sharecropped cucumbers in Ohio and drove a tractor along with all the other tasks of picking cotton

> in Texas. The work was hard but 'he endured.' He witnessed a few strikes over wages, deductions, or rotten food but was never an instigator. He notes that the rebel rousers were noticeably absent after a food or wage strike and assumes they were deported. The reason he gives for continuing to migrate north is his remittances were paying for his brothers to go to school. In his recollection, he skims over the unpleasant details and focuses on his 'day-on-the-town' stories. He recalls the good bosses, the contracts that went well, acknowledges that things often went bad but is reluctant to elaborate. Moving on to happier topics, he talks about his children never working the fields and even though he is currently residing in Fresno, where his sons and daughters are working in factories, his home is Colima, his heart and loyalty are Mexicano. A few offspring have escaped to the factories of Los Angeles. His wife passed away four years ago. During the time he migrated as a Bracero and later as an undocumented worker, his contacts in the United States were with other Mexican immigrants in similar circumstances. He speaks only Spanish […] has always lived in rural communities with Spanish-speaking neighborhoods.[5]

Don Jorge relayed his sense of self through stories of his past experiences. Long after his work as a Bracero ceased, he continued to present himself in the imposed role expectation of the Bracero Program – that is, content, docile, and thankful. If, as Goffman states, the subordinate members of the total institution feel 'inferior, weak, blameworthy, and guilty,' the Braceros' life stories suggest that they then carry this set of role expectations well beyond the period of initial confinement within the total institution.

Excerpts from the life story of Don Antonio demonstrate how the recollection of memories is related to the acquiescent and subservient role expectations of the Bracero Program.

RM: The houses, how were they?

DON ANTONIO: The beds were like sacks, one on top of the other … That's where we were all at, all 45 of us were there …

RM: And the food?

DON ANTONIO: The food, we had to buy it ourselves … We cooked it ourselves. To some they would give, to others no … More people were arriving but when they had enough it was over. Many were accepted, many were not. And we would just take it, that's how it was.

RM: How were the conditions?

DON ANTONIO: Well the houses were pretty much like they were here. It was summertime, not wintertime, if it got too hot we would open the windows. Many of us endured, we stayed.

RM: And the bathrooms?

DON ANTONIO: They were like they are here.

RM: The work in the fields, what was work like?

DON ANTONIO: We would wake up about five and make lunch. And then we would go to work. They would pay us by the weight or whatever we did.

RM: How many hours?

DON ANTONIO: Well, we would arrive and we would work all day and they would pay us about three dollars. It was by contract for how much work we did. I don't remember what was per pound [again]. We would get our lunch halfway through the day, we wouldn't take too much time because we were doing contract work. Sometimes they put us in some pretty bad places. Like cotton for example. Places where cotton was very small and those that were from here (*arm gesture to knee-height*), they would put them in better places. So there were still locals working here and they got the better jobs. We don't know how much they paid them. They had restrooms. Water wasn't very good, it was kinda salty. They didn't have fresh water but where could we get better water from? We would take soda… (*In response to a question regarding transportation*). The rancher would pick us up and take us where the work would be and when the work was done then the rancher would take us back. Each rancher was distinct and some were good and some were bad. I was lucky. I … with a good rancher. He was German. He saw that I didn't have nice clothes and he gave me good clothes – Army clothes. So I put it on because he gave it to me. And if I had known to speak English, I would have requested to stay with him but I didn't know. And I still don't know nothing.

RM: Why not renew?

DON ANTONIO: Because it was kinda bad, bad, bad. Times got bad. Things were getting bad for them and us and it was time to leave.

RM: Why didn't you apply the following year?

DON ANTONIO: Because one suffered much trying to get the same contract. It took a lot of effort and money to come over here again. It took a lot of effort to buy a contract to come. It's like today, we had coyotes. The government wouldn't give us a card. They would pocket the money … The last time they gave me this card (*he removes his Bracero identification card from his wallet*). Yeah, but the problem here is they put the wrong date.

RM: Can we make a copy?

DON ANTONIO: Will this affect me in any way?[6]

In this interview, as in the others, enormous effort was required to elicit information on the negative aspects of the Bracero Program. Even with repeated follow-up questions, Don Antonio never willingly elaborated on negative conditions. He acknowledged that housing was cramped and poorly ventilated; pay was barely enough to subsist; working conditions were substandard; potable water was tainted; the recruitment process was fraught with deceit and graft; overall things were very 'bad.' Generally, however, he presented himself as one who endured, one who was willing to sacrifice for the chance to work. His concern over sharing his 39-year-old and expired Bracero identification card reminds us of his very real and sustained fear of retribution, of being perceived as recalcitrant, and of paying a price for that.

Braceros discussed housing, food, and wages as 'the luck of the draw,' describing some places as good and others bad. They insisted it was purely by chance that they personally enjoyed favorable conditions. The major complaint registered by the Braceros was about the lack of work or about particular camps where food was rotten. In North Carolina, Don Liberio reported that the food served in the camp was occasionally rancid. When workers banded together and complained, the quality of food temporarily improved. A few days later, workers again received spoiled food, and this cycle continued for the month Liberio worked there.

Interviews with former Braceros usually confirmed findings of the established scholarly literature on the Bracero Program only when the interviewer pressed for such information. When asked about the food, housing, and other living conditions, Don Emilio, for example, initially told me '*esta bien*' (it was fine). Instead of settling for this initial response, I further questioned:

RM: All the time? You never had problems? I've heard from others that everything was fine. Most of the time it was? What was it like when it wasn't fine?
DON EMILIO: Well, they had no beds for us. We slept on the concrete floor. We were given one meal a day. There were no bathrooms.

Other former Braceros, when pressed, provided details about racial segregation, their insertion and maintenance into the bottom levels of the capitalist agricultural labor process and attendant deplorable working conditions – which scholars also concur were the worst aspects of the program. But it also seems necessary to interpret the Braceros' silences. For example, no respondent, even when specifically asked, talked of the coercive labor practices of crew bosses, FLCs, or growers. They remained completely silent about wages and deductions, the batch-handling of Braceros at processing centers, and labor camp conditions. Braceros often stated that they did not remember how much was deducted out of their paychecks. They rarely talked in depth about medical exams or delousing procedures. At most, they simply confirmed details when asked.

Social isolation

As Goffman insisted, the total institution was partially defined by its physical enclosure and isolation. Bracero labor camps were spatially isolated (see Figure 9.1). This farm camp outside of Yuba City, California, was far from town and from other farms; it was fully encased in fencing and resembled a prison compound more than a place of employment. In addition to spatial isolation, another component of the Bracero total institution was the high degree of linguistic isolation. Finally, while living spatially and linguistically apart, most Braceros were limited to a one-day-a-week trip to town in order to shop, send back remittances or mingle socially, incorporating even leisure time into the strict formal and informal rules of the program.

Figure 9.1 The Bracero total institution

Source: Ernesto Galarza Papers. Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries Archives.

In most communities outside the southwest, Braceros were cut off linguistically as well as spatially from the wider community. Of the Braceros contacted for this study, only one considered himself bilingual. Others listed Spanish as the only language they spoke. The one bilingual respondent was, not coincidentally, the only Bracero who eventually integrated into the town where he was originally contracted. In Michigan, Ohio, and North Carolina the only other Spanish-speakers were the Braceros' immediate supervisors and sometimes a few local Mexican American merchants who specialized in supplying Braceros as consumers. Even in the San Luis Valley of Colorado, where a sizable Mexican American population resides, Braceros found themselves cut off linguistically. The unique history of the San Luis Valley – isolated from the rest of the Spanish empire and from Anglo intrusions – meant that its residents spoke more like sixteenth-century Spaniards than like Bracero Mexican nationals.[7]

Braceros were allowed to interact in local communities only in their leisure time, which usually meant Saturday afternoon or – if workers had six full-day schedules and the nearby town was large enough – Sundays. The large distances between towns and labor camps (often a direct result of locals not wanting foreign workers near town) meant that Braceros had to be transported. Growers and crew bosses sometimes offered this service for free, but a few Braceros noted bus rides deducted from their wages. While Don Antonio (much like other Braceros) provided little detail about his job in the fields, he expounded at greater length about the day in town. In doing so, he offered unintentional insights into his social isolation:

> Our days off were only on Sundays. Or if the cotton picking wasn't very good, we wouldn't work. On those days we would stay in the barracks. Some people would go out – they'd leave. The barracks were in the camps. The ranchers had their own homes. We would be at the camps and if the ranchers needed eight or ten, they would come and get them. The association is where all the buses come, where all the people are.[8]

Don Antonio was not able to recall if transportation was deducted from his paycheck but he did state that he elected to stay in the barracks on his leisure time. The Sunday trip was one of the few topics that Don Antonio spoke about at any length. Don Jorge also devoted a great deal of time to discussing the Sunday trip on the town.

DON JORGE: On Sundays, they would ask us if we wanted to go to Church. Many would say 'yes' and many would say 'no.' They would even take us downtown. They would pick us up at a certain time and whoever was not there would have to find their own way back. They would take us downtown to allow us to walk so that we don't get bored, because we worked all week. I, in reality, have nothing to complain about because they treated us good. Sometime during the contract there was a period of fifteen days with no work because it was raining really bad. The company would send someone to bring us money, usually about ten dollars to buy sodas, or things like that. We were not working, we had our checks, but they would give us money anyway.

RM: Did they deduct that amount from later paychecks?

DON JORGE: I don't remember if they deducted that from our paychecks, but they did give us money. They also told us that if someone had an urge to go home, that they would lend us money. They did give some loans but they [would] be deducted from their checks. I did not ask but it [the loan] was available.

For the sake of comparison, note how Don Jorge and Don Antonio's fairly detailed responses differ from the brief testimony of one Bracero who claimed he was not given days off:

RM: What did you do when you weren't working?

DON FRANCISCO: There was no time when we weren't working. We worked all the time. From morning until night. No holidays, *dias de las santas* (holy days recognizing patron saints), nothing.

RM: Every day?

DON FRANCISCO: All of the day. Yes, even if it was raining. We would work in the rain and they'd call us *mojados* (wetbacks) but we kept on working.[9]

Having no time off was a frequent complaint of former Braceros. In one camp visited by Ernesto Galarza in California, a high degree of control was exercised:

Braceros told him they 'need a permit to [go] anywhere out of the area on 'off-day'. Usually, they were told that they can't go.'[10]

Even in their leisure time in town, Braceros socialized mainly with other Braceros. Local community members did not typically form relationships with Braceros. A postal worker in Colorado noted

> The only contact I had with them was strictly on Saturdays. That's when they came in from the fields or their encampments and that's when they transacted their business … . I wasn't really involved in their all-day activities but I assume that's the day they came in and did their personal shopping and make personal contacts and I understand that quite frequently they would have a gathering and maybe a celebration of sorts where they roasted a pig or a goat or something. I mean it was their day on the town, it was. From what I was able to observe time and again they had some real good times.'[11]

Although this man suggests that he personally wanted to socialize with the Braceros, the practice was explicitly forbidden by the growers and implicitly discouraged by local communities. (The Alamosa, Colorado community of this postal worker had resisted when it was suggested that Bracero housing be erected on the south side of town: it was erected instead in smaller towns and on the growers' property.)

The growers completely managed the remaining six days of the Braceros' work week. The work day ran according to the food schedule since all workers were fed at the same time. The work schedule was enforced by the crew boss who responded to the wishes of the grower. At harvest time, the hours worked could be pushed up to the limits of the day-time hours in order to pick fresh produce. When this was not enough, some growers (particularly in the cotton industry) used 'swampers' – often teenage boys – who were paid to illuminate the harvesters' paths with flashlights, car headlights, and flood lamps to enable them to work in the dark. Payment by piece rates was extremely common and it encouraged workers to make their lunch as short as possible and to work as many hours as possible in order to maximize their earnings. Braceros accepted changes between hourly and piece rates as inevitable. And since the pay schedule could change from day to day and even from morning to afternoon, there were added incentives to work harder, exacerbating the workers' social isolation and putting them into competition even with each other.

Mexicano collective memory

That Braceros continued to perform the identities imposed on them from above during their years as contract laborers seems strikingly apparent when their interviews are compared to interviews with Mexicans of similar age who had never worked as Braceros. I fortuitously happened upon such a group when I sat in on a class preparing immigrants for U.S. naturalization in 1997. I was able to

listen passively as this group revealed how the Bracero Program resonated in their own minds and memories. A number of sources – mass media, education, and oral traditions – provided raw material for the collective Mexicano memory revealed in this citizenship class. George Sanchez (1993: 27) argues that many towns in Mexico were 'largely dependent on word-of-mouth communication' about the program and the United States. Knowledge about and memories of the Bracero Program were thus not limited to the Braceros themselves. While there are certainly points of congruence between the memories of Braceros and other Mexicanos, the naturalization class discussion made even more obvious what Braceros had omitted from their accounts.

The Bracero Program has particular salience in the collective memory of Mexicans in major sending areas (Massey *et al.* 1987; Massey and Liang 1989). In many small communities in rural Mexico, most individuals had immediate relatives working in the United States under Bracero contract or knew people who did. Of the ten Mexican citizens in the Fresno U.S. citizenship class, only one was a former Bracero. All were legal immigrants (resident aliens in INS terminology) yet many were concerned enough about recent changes in U.S. immigration and welfare law to seek citizenship through naturalization. Their social network ties and hearts were rooted squarely in Mexico, however: most traveled back and forth from Fresno to their Mexican hometowns; all had family in Mexico; all spoke Spanish almost exclusively.

Members of the citizenship class told Bracero Program stories of horror, degradation, and humiliation. Their stories focused on medical examinations at processing centers, consistent short-changing of workers' wages, deplorable housing conditions, inedible food, and the poor treatment of Mexican citizens in the United States. As they discussed the medical exam, one of the older gentlemen in the class gestured and the men were whistled at to spread their legs so the medic would thrust his hand into the men's anuses. When asked if he knew anyone who was treated in this exact manner, the man answered 'no.' Still, the affirming nods and familiar laughs of the class suggest that such stories abounded and that Mexican citizens were well aware of the large-batch exams for TB, STDs, and other infectious diseases performed at the border. They also knew about the practice of spraying DDT on contractees to delouse them.

Braceros' wages were another major source of the class's horror stories. Class members told of men not getting paid, of outrageous deductions for housing and food while workers slept in tents or bought and made their own food, and of ever-shifting wage rates that always favored the grower. They reported that Braceros lived in army barracks, tents, chicken coops, barns, and stockyards. According to the class, Bracero food was often spoiled or foreign to Mexican tastes (e.g. bologna or peanut butter and jelly sandwiches for dinner).

No one in the class could prove but everyone had nevertheless heard stories about U.S. citizens mistreating Braceros. They reported rumors of Braceros being killed (by whom, however, was never specified) in order to collect their non-occupational health insurance. They claimed that agitators and those who complained about their treatment in labor camps most often suffered this fate.

(Only one of the Braceros had told such a story, reporting more vaguely that 'There was a man, he was protesting and complaining about the food. The next day he was gone, nobody told us what happened to him and we didn't ask. Later we heard that they killed him.')[12] I could find no evidence during my research that confirmed this popular myth.

The collective Mexicano memory which informed the naturalization class's impromptu conversation about the Bracero Program is just one of the numerous components that together form a community identity and common base of reference. Regardless of whether or not the memory is a true representation of past events, the fact that such stories about Braceros are shared throughout the Mexican community is important in and of itself. While the interviews with Braceros corroborated some of the details found in the citizenship class discussion, the Braceros nevertheless evaluated the program in favorable terms. Perhaps this was because immigrants who were not directly involved in it were free from the identities imposed from above by the program.

The origins of Bracero silences: scholarship on the Bracero Program

The collective memory of the Bracero Program shared by Mexican immigrants who were not Braceros more closely resembles scholarly accounts – such as those by Anderson (1963, 1976), Driscoll (1999), Galarza (1956, 1964), Gamboa (1990), Garcia (1980), Garcia y Griego (1983), Herrera-Sobek (1979), and Kirstein (1977) – than do the memories of the Braceros themselves. Barring only the class's stories about Braceros killed for financial gain, the themes of their discussion – medical examinations, poor wages, and harsh living conditions – are all prominent themes in the academic literature on the Bracero Program. In the scholarly literature and in contemporary sources and in recent interviews with Mexicanos who knew the Bracero Program but were not part of it, we can begin to understand the origins of Braceros' silences in the lived experience of and identities imposed by the Bracero total institution.

Scholars who have studied Braceros' lives report that they were in the hands of others from the moment they entered a recruitment center in Mexico. Officials there determined whether they were worthy to work in U.S. agricultural fields. If they stood out at the recruitment center in either style of dress, mannerisms, or demeanor, their chances of being contracted declined sharply. Ernesto Galarza characterized the selection of candidates in the Hermosillo recruitment center, noting 'Nationals learned to dress strictly ranchero … They will turn you off the line right off if they see you wearing a bit of American clothing.'[13] The identities of those contracted were prescribed by a selection process that placed a premium on rural, acquiescent, agriculturally experienced, and unattached men. Often potential contractees would live in the streets for a few months, hoping to present themselves as such men (see Figure 9.2).

The migration and contracting processes stripped Mexican workers of any sense of control over their individual fates. Their choice to migrate required

Figure 9.2 Braceros, waiting to be contracted

Source: Ernesto Galarza Papers. Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries Archives.

them to leave their families for the vague promise of better wages. The recruitment centers in Mexico were designed to assemble a qualified labor force of experienced, male workers en masse. Workers were assigned numbers and then handled bureaucratically by number (see Figures 9.3 and 9.4), adding to the men's sense of degradation and dehumanization. Thus individual workers became nameless, faceless, and interchangeable Braceros.

Finally, the Mexican government began to hammer the role expectations of the Bracero total institution into the psyches of recruits even before they left for the United States. Galarza noted the beginning of indoctrination by Mexican government officials where workers at contracting centers were told:

> You are going to be representatives of Mexico in the U.S.. Be an example of honesty and show what good workmen you are. Do not spend your money there but send it home. Don't go on strikes or make trouble for your *patrones*. Remember if you make good you will be wanted again and again in the future.[14]

At the American border, processing centers run by the U.S. continued the mass handling of workers by conducting medical examinations and delousing in groups. At the American border, representatives of growers' associations chose which men they would employ as workers and decided what kind of work they would do. Decisions were already made as to where the Braceros would live

Figure 9.3 Braceros, contracts in hand

Source: Ernesto Galarza Papers. Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries Archives.

Figure 9.4 Braceros, waiting for their numbers to be called

Source: Ernesto Galarza Papers. Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries Archives.

(whether in labor camps or on growers' ranches), who they would come into contact with, what they would eat, and what tasks they would be doing.

Mass- or batch-handling of Braceros thus continued in the U.S.. When Ernesto Galarza visited the Central Valley of California in 1952, he interviewed a Bracero living in the major grower association camp who stated 'we have no names, we are known by numbers.'[15]

The mass transportation, housing, and boarding of Braceros was an extension of the batch-handling. Scholars confirm that living conditions for Braceros were very close to military specifications. Braceros most often lived in barracks complete with a mess hall that served institutionally prepared meals. But these men were not soldiers; they were guest laborers hired to do a job. Unlike other workers in the U.S., Braceros were not allowed a private life, apart from work and under their own control. If Braceros lodged a complaint about negative treatment, they had to fear reprisal in the form of deportation. They were not allowed to shift to another job because contracts stated that they could be deported for doing so. Scholars describe the Braceros as essentially powerless to negotiate with their employers.

Scholars emphasize that the everyday lives of Braceros were so dominated that there was almost no room to resist while remaining employed. This is not to say that resistance did not occur, especially when workers felt that they were being overworked, underpaid, malnourished, or treated poorly. As Gamboa (1990: 75) notes in his study of Braceros in the Pacific northwest, 'This prevailing stereotype of Braceros as docile, undemanding and incapable of organizing themselves to press for better working conditions does not hold true in the Northwest, where Braceros were constantly on strikes and this made the region unique from other parts of the country.' (Of the life stories I collected, none were from the northwest, although they did represent every other major region of the country – southwest, south, east coast, and midwest.)

Already in 1944, Ernesto Galarza noted that Braceros in Illinois, Colorado, New Mexico, Michigan, and California rarely spoke critically in the presence of camp managers or labor officials. In each of these states, Galarza found that workers who voiced complaints were told to 'shut up or go back.' Ten years later in the Salinas area of California, Galarza found that the situation had not changed. Of the 181 Braceros he interviewed, none of them reported 'instances of intimidation, any form.' Despite miserable working conditions – 26 of the workers earned as little as $20 or less in some weeks; 37 workers described the quality of food as 'fair or poor;' 50 workers lived in housing they deemed 'fair or poor;' and 105 of the 181 respondents were charged $3–7 for 'complimentary' blankets – Galarza found no threats or intimidation reported.[16] A government report from the 1950s noted the particular problems of guest workers in confronting intimidation and exploitation:

> To expect the Mexican contract worker to locate one of the nine United States Employment Service inspectors or to relay his complaint to them through the State employment service is to expect much more than is within

> his capability. Consequently, if he can get in touch with the Mexican consulate, that is about the best he can do. This cumbersome and complicated procedure, involving several government agencies in general and none in particular, encourages desertion in the place of making a complaint because every complaint has the potentiality of being lost or ignored.[17]

Even if Braceros wanted to complain – for example, about housing conditions in Colorado – they had to locate either of the two state housing inspectors who were responsible for investigating complaints in the entire rural Colorado area. Worse still, complaints led to loss of a job, deportation, or listing as an undesirable who would not receive a future contract.

Given limited options for active protest, Braceros' main form of resistance was through exercise of the so-called exit option. Low wages, bad food, excessive deductions, too little work, too much work, poor housing, domineering supervisors, or on-the-job injuries could all spark Braceros to abandon their contracts. Those who left work were called deserters or skips in government documents and in the academic literature. According to government reports, the exit option was frequently used:

> In one region in which we have information, desertions from contract were 20.8 percent in 1948 and 20.2 percent in 1949. Of the Mexican nationals under contract in the United States on August 31, 1950, one-third were in illegal status, primarily by deserting their contracts. Desertions from individual contracting employers range from as low as 4 percent to as high as 50 percent. Moreover, it is noted that there is a tendency for those employers having a high desertion rate in one year also to have a high desertion rate the next. We interpret this to mean that desertions from contract vary with individual management and working conditions. Where these are good, the desertions are low.[18]

In addition to those who exited, a significant (but uncounted) number of Braceros simply refused to return to the United States again. (None of the Braceros interviewed for this study admitted deserting on a contract but one noted obliquely that times 'got bad' and then 'it took a lot of effort and money to come over here again.')

Growers also deterred protest by making an example of their treatment of individual malcontents who expressed dissatisfaction. For those few Braceros fortunate enough to remain working after making a complaint, Galarza noted the forms of punishment used by contractors as 'deprivation of work for one or more days; scheduling the same crew to leave camp last in the morning; keeping men waiting an entire day for their pay.'[19] Elsewhere in Galarza's field notes, he describes what happened to three active resisters. One '[s]poke up for group and got ten days in jail,' another died in a fall from a truck, and the third was deported.[20]

Deportation was the commonest fate for agitators who attempted to convince others to strike or participate in work stoppages. A man who provided food to

Braceros in Colorado remembered in an interview what Braceros failed to mention and what the citizenship class participants recalled in more gruesome tales of murder:

SEÑOR PALMAS: Any infraction by any one of those individuals would constitute immediate deportation in terms of conduct, insubordination, or this type of thing. They weren't mistreated or anything, they simply … you're gone. You violated the terms of the contract … and you were gone. It was as simple as that. At some point there was guys that were kind of chow-hall lawyers type of people, you know what I mean? and I got to see plenty of this. These guys says 'You know these conditions aren't going to work,' he says, 'this, this and this'. And I see him standing on the table … if you want to call it inciting these guys to go on strike and call for better conditions. Well this guy would be immediately deported simply because he was upsetting the balance of the whole operation. Now how much there was in fact a reason for him to do that I don't know. Maybe the conditions that they lived under and this, that, and the other would come to bear on this particular guy's mind and he'd start pointing it out to all these individuals who were his comrades. He says you know, 'we can demand better conditions than this' and most of those guys would sit there and listen then just walk off. Of course there are always those people that would follow anything that pops up. But anybody like that would immediately be deported and that's the end of that. His contract, in other words, would be ended.

RM: Did this happen a lot?

SEÑOR PALMAS: There's only two camps that I saw this actually happen. Now I heard about it in other camps. … Normally they were guys with a little bit of educational background, a little bit well maybe a little bit more ambitious than the run of the mill Bracero who was up here, who was up here simply to fulfill a contract to make enough money to maybe carry over the rest of the year in Mexico, and that's the end of that.[21]

Whether the method of deterrence was deportation, punitive working conditions, jail time, or even death, it was almost irrelevant that one agitator was punished. What really mattered was the symbolic value of what happened to those who rocked the boat or placed increased demands to improve conditions. It is scarcely surprising that instead those with complaints—perhaps 20 to 33 percent—simply exited from the Bracero Program. And those who wanted to continue working under contract met the role expectation to remain silent about their complaints. Braceros were expected to tolerate conditions not of their own making. As they reported in their own interviews, they 'endured.' Rather than criticize the Bracero Program, they remained silent. For one Bracero who voiced what most knew but were not saying, how workers were treated was of little concern to them. After all, as Don Daniel told me, 'we were here to work.'[22]

Conclusion

The social relations of contracted workers in the Bracero Program articulates closely to what Goffman (1961) defined as a total institution. From their first point of contact with the Bracero Program at reception centers in Mexico, men lost their individual identities, acquired numbers, and began to perform the group characteristics of Braceros – complacent workers and 'guests.' Batch-handling of workers was designed to meet the labor needs of large-scale agribusiness. The costs associated with maintaining the labor force were shared through the grower associations and food-processing companies. Batch-handling helped to isolate Braceros from local U.S. communities, from non-Bracero workers in the fields, and even from the Mexican American population. The linguistic isolation that Braceros suffered was symbolic of their more general isolation. The only contacts that most Braceros had with local communities was the 'Sunday on the town' trips that brought the workers in contact as shoppers with local merchants. For the most part, the Braceros kept to themselves because they were expected to do so. The Sunday shopping trips represented their only time that was not managed by growers or their intermediaries. Even though this freedom was confined to a prescribed set of acceptable consumer practices, it was nonetheless one of the few activities that went relatively unsupervised.

Braceros who challenged the prescribed role of the complacent worker/consumer/guest faced swift, harsh punishment – generally in the form of deportation. The role expectations imposed on Braceros from above, during both work and leisure time, limited any counter-hegemonic responses to domination. In every relevant aspect of the managed class cultures of Braceros, the ability to actively resist oppressive conditions was countered by the cunning of authorities to further debase workers' relative position.

The collective memory of the Mexican citizenship class attests to the continued alienation of former Braceros from both Mexico and the United States. The shared memories of humiliation, degradation, and the managed character of life that accompany the Bracero Program are not the memories of the former Braceros I interviewed. The imposed role expectations placed upon workers during the program still – some 32 to 50 years later – affect former Braceros' ways of remembering. They take a certain pride in having endured rather than remembering being humiliated and consistently degraded. Their silences also attest to the recognition of the unpleasant circumstances they endured. It is only by consulting scholars' work on the Bracero Program and the word-of-mouth communication about the program that survives in the memories of Mexicanos generally that we are able to read into the silences of the Braceros. The lives of former Braceros are a testament to the long-term effects of the first U.S. government program that attempted to arrange for the employment of guest workers. It is a sad comment on the growers' political power that they succeeded in expanding a wartime labor relief measure into a system that persisted for 21 years after World War II ended.

The fraught process of becoming American was summed up by Braceros Don Daniel and Don Francisco. Don Daniel noted that the Braceros were here to work, while Don Francisco criticized those Mexicanos who acted as if they actually belonged in the United States. Never fully accepted as Americans yet unable to share the collective Mexicano memory of the Bracero Program, Mexican Braceros truly occupy a place between two worlds.

10 The significance of race in the urban labor market

A study of employers

Nelson Lim

Hiring decisions are essentially subjective and risky. The main problem employers[1] face is a lack of high-quality information about applicants' on-the-job productivity (Stinchcombe 1990: 240–50). They attempt to overcome the problem by using available indicators such as educational background, training, and past work experience. An increasing number of employers also use aptitude tests to screen applicants (Marsden 1996). Even so, employers cannot ascertain the level of applicants' actual productivity on the job through these tests.

High-skill job applicants tend to have good records of their work habits and ability in the form of formal certificates or established work histories (Stinchcombe 1990: 240–73) but employers have little such information in hiring low-skill workers. As a result, they resort to a variety of informal sorting criteria, which may be inaccurate and unreliable because they may depend on an employer's assumptions about work ethic, reliability, and dependability. Moss and Tilly (1995, 1996) have termed these subjective requisites for employment as 'soft skills,' which they define 'as skills, abilities, and traits that pertain to personality, attitude, and behavior rather than to formal or technical knowledge' (Moss and Tilly 2001: 44).

Many employers believe that soft skills vary with ascribed characteristics such as socioeconomic background, gender, nativity, race, and ethnicity of applicants (Moss and Tilly 2001: 85–155). Sometimes their perceptions of ascribed groups are based on their experience of dealing with employees of these groups. In a racially conscious society, however, we cannot rule out the possibility that employers also draw on racial and ethnic stereotypes that, for example, portray 'African-Americans as hostile' or 'immigrants as industrious' (Tilly and Tilly 1998: 100). Employers' dependence on ascribed characteristics in hiring may help create and sustain social inequalities along racial or ethnic lines or privilege recent immigrant arrivals over native racial minorities. While employers are under certain legal constraints (Osterman 1988; Tilly and Tilly 1998: 103) in hiring, their control is nearly complete when dealing with workers with limited schooling and few on-the-job skills.

Treating workers differently based on their ascribed characteristics is, by definition, discrimination. An important element in any theory of discrimination is the employers – their needs, their preferences, and their behavior. In economics,

'the neoclassical theory of discrimination is almost entirely a demand side theory' (Cain 1986: 709). Gary Becker's theory of discrimination, a well-known example of this paradigm, begins with the main assumption that employers have a 'taste for discrimination' based on their racial prejudice (1957). Similarly, a so-called theory of statistical discrimination suggests that employers' beliefs about the distribution of skills across different groups determine whom they tend to hire (Aigner and Cain 1972).

Sociological theories of discrimination are even more explicit about the role of employers' 'culture-bound' perceptions in labor processes (Tilly and Tilly 1998: 95–112; Granovetter and Tilly 1988). Conceptualizing 'labor markets as queues,' sociologists link group differences in labor market outcomes to group positions in the queue (Hodge 1973; Lieberson 1980; Reskin and Roos 1990). Custom and employers' beliefs about group productivity determine which groups are at the top of the labor queue (Reskin and Roos 1990: 36; Tilly and Tilly 1998: 99–100).

Sidanius and Pratto go further and suggest that stereotypes about work qualities are an integral part of a social system that produces and sustains a group-based social hierarchy (1999: 40). They categorize negative stereotypes as part of legitimizing myths, which 'consist of attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute social value within the social system' (Sidanius and Pratto 1999: 45). Understanding what employers think about different racial and ethnic groups is therefore essential in explaining observed group differences in labor markets.

Despite its theoretical significance, direct analyses of employers' attitudes are rare, and the few existing studies use qualitative data, small samples, and a case-study approach. This study instead uses newly collected attitudinal data from probability samples of employers from four urban regions; it intends to estimate empirically the racial and ethnic hierarchy in employers' preconceptions about workers with limited school credentials. The study encompasses two central research questions: Is it possible to uncover the racial and ethnic hierarchy reported in the qualitative studies? And, if such a hierarchy exists, can it be explained through factors such as employers' own racial and ethnic characteristics, the characteristics of business establishments, or regional location?

Existing studies on soft skills

Few studies concentrate on employers' beliefs and their consequences for social inequalities: Kirschenman and Neckerman (1991); Moss and Tilly (1995, 1996, 2001); Waldinger and Lichter (2002). But their results are quite consistent and describe a distinct racial and ethnic hierarchy. Employers consistently rank whites at the top of the hierarchy and African-Americans at the bottom. While employers consider Hispanics better workers than African-Americans, their place in the racial/ethnic hierarchy is not consistent. It is less certain where Asian-Americans fit, since most studies do not ask employers to rank Asian-

Americans. However, Moss and Tilly (2001) found few employers critical of Asian-Americans' soft skills; employers ranked them higher than African-Americans. While not a single racial or ethnic group, another prominent group in this literature is immigrants, perhaps because researchers regard them as a source of displacement for native low-skilled African-Americans. Researchers find that immigrants consistently rank higher than African-Americans, and sometimes even above whites.

The cumulative body of evidence is thus highly suggestive. The consistency across studies conducted in different urban areas supports the hypothesis that employers believe some groups of workers possess better work qualities than others. Even so, we cannot make inferences about the prevalence of such attitudes among employers based on small samples and qualitative methods. This study aims to overcome both limitations by using statistical models to estimate the prevailing racial and ethnic hierarchy based on large probability samples of employers.

Data

This study uses data from a 1997 organizational survey conducted in Los Angeles, New York, Atlanta, and Philadelphia. The number of business establishments that participated in the study was 1,069. All had hired someone in the previous two years to do a 'low-skill job' – defined as a job requiring no college education. The screening requirements of the survey aimed to ensure the positions these establishments recently filled approximated jobs that workers with limited formal education generally encounter in the labor market. Having recruited workers recently, the survey information was timely and accurate (Kalleberg *et al.* 1996).

The resulting sample[2] contained 230 establishments from Atlanta, 314 from Los Angeles, 310 from New York, and 215 from Philadelphia. Refusal rates were relatively low (around 30 percent).[3] The survey contained extensive batteries of questions[4] on every step of the hiring process. It also collected indicators of organizational structure by soliciting detailed breakdowns of the workforce by race, ethnicity, and gender.[5]

Depending on the type of information gathered and the organizational structure of an establishment, several respondents from each establishment participated in the survey. For example, in a large bureaucratic organization, administrative staff answered questions related to the establishment as a whole while questions related to decision-making processes for hiring low-skill workers were asked of an actual decision-maker in the hiring process. The decision-maker could have been a supervisor, a small business owner, or a human resource manager. This paper analyzes how decision-makers – referred to here as employers – rate the intangible work qualities of low-skill workers.

Employers' ratings of group work qualities

The main outcome variables of the study were employers' ratings of work qualities – or 'soft skills' – of different racial/ethnic groups. The survey asked employers to rate five groups of workers along three dimensions: work habits, reliability, and attitudes. Each employer rated the qualities of each group on a scale of 1 being the best, 7 being the worst, and 4 as average.

The questions began with the following statement: 'In this next statement, for each group I read I want to know whether you think they tend to (be hard workers or not hard workers / have a bad attitude at their workplace, or tend to have a good attitude at their workplace / be reliable or unreliable).' Then, an interviewer explained the meanings of each score on the scale and concluded with the following statement: 'Where would you rate (Whites / Asian-Americans / Blacks / Hispanics / Immigrants) on this scale?'

The structure of the questions is quite similar to racial attitude questions used in both qualitative studies and major social surveys such as the General Social Survey and Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (Moss and Tilly 2001; O'Connor, Tilly, and Bobo 2001). Still, these questions have several disadvantages. The groups rated are not mutually exclusive; immigrants, for example, can be members of any racial group, thus creating ambiguity about the place of immigrants in the racial/ethnic hierarchy. By asking respondents for group ratings rather than rankings, the questions encourage employers to pick a midpoint, which is the socially, politically, and legally correct response (Krosnick 1999: 547–9). But one advantage of asking for ratings is that employers were willing to respond: only 15 to 17 percent of respondents declined to answer the questions.

The most striking aspect of the employers' ratings of racial/ethnic groups is a strong tendency for employers to rate them as 'average' in all dimensions (see Table 10.1). In fact, close to 90 percent of employers rated groups positively – either average or above average. This finding is consistent with the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality. Moss and Tilly report that employers' ratings describe workers 'like the children of Garrison Keillor's mythical Lake Wobegon, all race and gender groups perform above average' (2001: 91).

Perhaps employers rate many groups as average because they believe that, in general, every worker is equally capable of doing a job requiring limited skills. But the wording of survey questions may have also encouraged some employers to choose values considered reasonable or 'politically correct.' If most employers avoid giving differential ratings in order to be socially acceptable, then the racial and ethnic hierarchy we found is a conservative estimate of employers' beliefs, especially about African-American workers.

Deviations from the average also provide clues to the prevailing racial/ethnic hierarchy. For instance, by aggregating the proportions of negative responses reported in Table 10.1, we see that African-Americans, as a group, have the highest number of negative responses (see Figure 10.1). In all dimensions, 6–7

percent of employers rate African-Americans below average but no more than 3 percent of the respondents rate Asian-Americans and immigrants as below average. A slightly higher proportion of respondents give negative ratings to whites for their work habits, but whites are also rated as the most reliable and receive high ratings for their work attitude. A similar pattern emerges from the positive ratings: Asian-Americans, whites, and immigrants receive top ratings, while Hispanics and African-Americans receive smaller percentages of above-average ratings. These quantitative data are all quite consistent with the findings of qualitative studies.

Table 10.1 Distribution of employers' work quality ratings of worker groups

	Groups				
Qualities	*Asians*	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Hispanics*	*Immigrants*
Work habit					
1 (Best)	16.7	11.0	10.3	12.4	13.9
2	10.4	8.1	5.9	8.9	10.0
3	7.6	12.2	11.5	9.9	9.6
4 (Average)	62.2	64.7	66.4	65.5	63.7
5	1.7	2.8	3.8	2.5	2.1
6	1.1	0.9	1.4	0.5	0.3
7 (Worst)	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
[Observations]	[909]	[891]	[905]	[898]	[890]
Reliability					
1 (Best)	14.2	11.4	8.9	11.3	12.3
2	12.0	11.1	8.7	8.3	9.8
3	7.8	11.3	10.0	11.0	9.8
4 (Average)	63.4	63.6	65.9	66.0	64.2
5	1.6	1.3	4.0	2.4	2.6
6	0.6	0.7	1.6	0.7	0.7
7 (Worst)	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.5	0.6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
[Observations]	[902]	[887]	[901]	[895]	[886]
Attitude					
1 (Best)	13.0	10.2	8.4	9.9	11.4
2	10.6	10.4	7.0	10.0	10.3
3	8.5	11.3	10.7	8.9	10.4
4 (Average)	65.5	65.5	67.7	68.4	65.4
5	1.5	2.0	4.3	1.7	1.7
6	0.6	0.2	1.1	0.7	0.5
7 (Worst)	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
[Observations]	[903]	[887]	[900]	[892]	[885]

Source: The 1997 business establishment survey.



Figure 10.1 Percent below and above average ratings of employers by racial and ethnic groups

Source: The 1997 business establishment survey.

Are these differences statistically significant? To answer that question, a non-parametric test, the Wilcoxon signed rank test (Conover 1999: 352–64) was utilized.[6] The summaries of the test statistics are reported in Table 10.2, which suggests that the results are significant.

Following the direction of the ratings, the lower the group score, the better the rating for the group. Table 10.2 indicates that scores for Asian-Americans are consistently lower than (or less than) all the other groups; thus they are rated higher than all other groups, and the differences are highly significant. Results are mixed for whites. Immigrants are rated higher than whites for work attitude, and they also receive better ratings than either Hispanics or African-Americans, who are consistently ranked lower than the other groups in all dimensions. Again, the results clearly indicate a racial/ethnic hierarchy in employers' perceptions that is statistically significant.

Sources of the racial/ethnic hierarchy

Results from qualitative and quantitative studies thus suggest that employers believe workers with different ascribed characteristics have different levels of work qualities. Where does this belief come from? Existing studies offer three

Table 10.2 Results from the Wilcoxon signed ranks test for employers' ratings of work qualities of worker groups

	Asians	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Hispanics*	*Immigrants*
Work habit					
Asians					
Whites	A < W ***				
Blacks	A < B ***	W < B ***			
Hispanics	A < H ***	W H	B > H ***		
Immigrants	A < I ***	W > I ***	B > I ***	H > I ***	
Reliability					
Asians					
Whites	A < W ***				
Blacks	A < B ***	W < B ***			
Hispanics	A < H ***	W < H ***	B > H ***		
Immigrants	A < I ***	W I	B > I ***	H > I ***	
Attitude					
Asians					
Whites	A < W ***				
Blacks	A < B ***	W < B ***			
Hispanics	A < H ***	W < H **	B > H ***		
Immigrants	A < I *	W < I **	B > I ***	H > I ***	

Source: The 1997 business establishment survey.

Notes: * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; *** significant at 0.01% level.

possible sources: (1) racial and ethnic prejudices, (2) actual experience on the job, and (3) overall self-presentation of job applicants (Moss and Tilly 1996: 264). Unfortunately, the survey does not contain information on how job applicants presented themselves but the effects of prejudices and experience can be explored from limited information in the survey.

Given the racial history of the United States and placement of each racial and ethnic group in the observed hierarchy, societal prejudices are likely sources of employers' beliefs. Stereotypes of African-Americans, reported in social psychological studies, are consistently negative, especially for qualities related to work – they are regarded as lazy, ignorant, loud, poor, stupid, dirty, militant, violent, criminal, and hostile, but physically skilled (Fiske 1998: 379; Devine 1989; Devine and Elliott 1995; Duckitt 1992; Krueger 1996). Similarly, Hispanics are viewed as aggressive, poor, lazy, ignorant, loud, unreliable, emotional, unambitious, uneducated, inefficient, rude, messy, and unindustrious (Fiske 1998: 379; Marin 1984). In contrast, whites are perceived more positively. While Americans may regard whites as deceitful, treacherous, cruel, and selfish, they also believe that whites are intelligent, industrious, ambitious, and efficient (Fiske 1998: 379; Krueger 1996; Stephan and Rosenfield 1982). Although historically Asian-Americans were viewed as strange, dirty, and tricky, in recent years they are perceived as Model Minorities – quiet, law-abiding, hard-working, and intelligent (Fiske 1998: 379; Hurh and Kim 1989; Kitano and Sue 1973; Sue and Kitano 1973). From such research one might deduce that Asian-Americans and whites would rank higher in Americans' racial consciousness, Hispanics and African-Americans would rank lower – an order that coincided with the employers' ratings.

The consistency of employers' group ratings across urban regions also suggests that racial hierarchy is rooted in societal prejudices rather than in employers' individual characteristics or local cultures. A critical indicator here is the placement of Asian-Americans in the hierarchy. Compared to their counterparts in Los Angeles and New York, employers from Philadelphia and Atlanta have little opportunity to interact with low-skilled Asian-Americans. Since all employers gave high ratings to Asian-Americans, societal stereotypes seem the most probable source for employers' ratings.

A more direct test for prejudice as the main source of the observed hierarchy is the 'in-group' bias displayed by employers. For some employers, the right group may simply be 'my group.' This in-group bias may be an extension of a universal phenomenon of ethnocentrism (Sidanius and Pratto 1999: 228). Living in a racially conscious society, employers' self-image may also be 'grounded in part on … [their] image of the social categories of which he or she is a member. Since people prefer to see themselves positively, they will tend to view their own group positively relative to other groups – translating into prejudice against the other groups' (Moss and Tilly 2001: 87; Fiske 1998: 361; Tajfel and Turner 1986). The in-group bias in evaluations of performance is well known to industrial psychologists. In a review of the existing literature, Kariger and Ford conclude, 'in general, ratees tend to receive higher ratings

from raters of the same race' (1985: 56). If the in-group bias is driving the observed ethnic hierarchy, then employers should be rating their co-ethnic workers higher in the labor queue.

Qualitative studies also report an additional source of the observed hierarchy – employers' beliefs based on actual contact with each group (Moss and Tilly 2001: 130; Waldinger and Lichter 2002). Researchers report that employers repeatedly referred to their experiences dealing with workers from different groups to justify their – especially negative – beliefs about work qualities of certain groups. Such assessments cannot be automatically deemed objective. An employer may claim that his/her opinions about the poor work qualities of African-Americans are based on personal experience, but that employer may have dealt with only a handful of African-Americans. A few negative experiences amplify societal racial stereotypes, reinforcing an employer's prejudices.

Employers do not deal with a random sample of the labor force and so are unable to make objective judgments about their work qualities. Because social networks drive labor processes, employers deal with workers who are part of a social network that may exclude African-Americans as a group. Finally, in many situations individual workers depend on co-workers to get their jobs done. Employers may find that African-Americans do not perform well because of their reception by other workers. In short, a small and biased sample and the social embedding of work may distort employers' assessment of African-Americans' work qualities.[7]

The impact of a small and biased sample of experiences with workers from differing groups may be smaller for employers from bigger establishments. Larger employers are more likely to have contact with a greater number of workers from different groups. This contact could be a cure for prejudices. The so-called contact hypothesis, proposed by Gordon Allport (1954), suggests that, within four key conditions, inter-group contact can effectively reduce prejudices and dispel stereotypes among groups (Fiske 1998: 361; Brewer and Brown 1998: 576–9; Pettigrew 1998). The four key conditions are equal group status within the situation, common goal, inter-group cooperation, and the support of authorities, law, or custom (Pettigrew 1998: 66).

While the relationship between employer and employee does not constitute a relationship of equal status, when members of different racial and ethnic groups work together in a work unit to produce certain goods and services, they have 'instrumental reasons to develop friendlier relationships with each other' (Brewer and Brown 1998: 578). These ongoing relationships effectively function as elements of dissonance between one's negative stereotypes about certain groups and actual experience. According to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), these relationships result in the changing of attitudes to justify the new experience.

For an employer with a well-diversified workforce, racial and ethnic demarcations become increasingly blurred and the effects of racial and ethnic stereotypes

on his or her decisions lessen. On the other hand, for an employer with a mono-ethnic workforce, judgment will be colored by his or her current social relationship at the workplace. The contact hypothesis suggests that the inter-group relationship reduces social prejudices, especially when the interaction occurs under explicit social sanction. 'Authority support establishes norms of acceptance' (Pettigrew 1998: 67). Thus, employers of business establishments with rules and regulations on employment practices are more likely to be racially tolerant and learn to accept that workers from various groups are more or less similar on the job.

Figure 10.2 summarizes possible sources for the racial and ethnic hierarchy of group work qualities reported by employers. While the in-group bias of employers may be directly represented by a variable derived from the employers' characteristics, societal prejudices and organizational context are latent theoretical factors. One may indirectly infer the influence of societal prejudices on employers' attitudes by the degree of consistency across urban regions – especially the ratings of Asian-Americans' work qualities. The organizational context is represented by three variables from the survey – an index of procedural formality, the total number of employees, and an index of racial and ethnic diversity of the establishment. The first measures the level of an establishment's organizational formality while the last two denote demographic characteristics of the establishment.



Figure 10.2 Pictorial summary of theoretical consideration on sources of employers' ratings of group work qualities

Note: Latent variables (societal prejudice and organizational context) are depicted in shaded boxes with dotted lines.

Table 10.3 shows the summary statistics for these explanatory variables. The distribution of the characteristics of employers suggests that non-Hispanic whites have a firm control on hiring decisions – they represent 80 percent of sampled employers. Three indicators represent organizational characteristics of the establishments. The racial diversity of the establishment is measured by an index of diversity proposed by Agresti and Agresti (1978).[8] (A higher value denotes a more racially diverse establishment.) Following Marsden (1996), an index of procedural formality is constructed by counting all the procedures related to labor processes in the establishment. The final measure of organizational characteristics is the total number of employees in the establishment.

Multivariate analysis

Given the distributions of the dependent variables presented in Table 10.1, multivariate analyses proceed in two steps. The first step of the analysis used logit regression models for the likelihood of getting differential ratings from an employer.[9] After examining which employers are more likely to give differential ratings among the groups, the manner by which these 'discriminating' employers placed each group on a racial hierarchy was examined. In order to accomplish this, the ratings reported in Table 10.1 were converted into rankings, and a statistical model called 'exploded logit' was used to analyze the data.[10]

Table 10.3 Summary statistics of explanatory variables

	Mean	S.D.	*Min-max*
Characteristic of employers			
Race and ethnicity			
White	80%		
Black	8		
Hispanic	8		
Asian	3		
Others	1		
Immigrants	12%		
Organizational characteristics			
Firm racial diversity index	0.37	0.23	0 – 0.75
Organizational formality	0.54	0.28	0 – 8
Total number of employees	83	184	1 – 3,400

Source: The 1997 four-city business establishment survey.

Results

Since a majority of the employers tended to give equal ratings for all the groups it is difficult to ascertain the reason behind the differentiated ratings. Nonetheless, we may obtain clues from analyses of what types of employers are willing to break the norm and give differential ratings among the groups. Theoretically, we can expect that the explanatory variables will include more than just individual characteristics of employers. In fact, the contact hypothesis suggests that contextual factors – local culture, racial diversity of the establishment, and organizational formality – will be important explanatory variables.

Table 10.4 reports the exponentiated coefficients eß from the logit regression models, predicting which employers are 'discriminating' for each dimension of work qualities.[11] Test statistics indicate that the ascribed characteristics of the employers do not have statistically significant effects on whether or not they give differential ratings. Even though these regression coefficients are not statistically significant, their direction is sociologically interesting. The positive coefficients for employers' ascribed characteristics suggest that minority employers are more willing to give discriminating responses than white employers. The odds of an African-American employer giving differential ratings of groups' work habits are 1.39 times greater than the odds of a white employer giving a similar response. The same is true for other minority employers as well. There is a 115 percent chance that minority employers are more likely to express differential ratings than their white counterparts. Controlling for other explanatory variables, minority employers seem less constrained in expressing critical attitudes toward minority workers.

In contrast, contextual variables are statistically as well as sociologically significant. Regression results suggest that east coast employers – such as New Yorkers and Philadelphians – are less likely to give discriminating responses about the groups' work qualities, while Atlantans are more likely to do so, compared to Los Angelenos. One may speculate about how New Yorkers (or Philadelphians) are different from Atlantans by beginning with the different levels of ethnic diversity in the two cities, the diverse history of these places, or the distinct personalities of New Yorkers (or Philadelphians). But there is no obvious way to investigate these speculations without additional data.[12]

To capture fully the effect of organizational diversity, a non-linear effect was tested in the model – the squared term of the racial diversity index (D). The effect is statistically significant.[13] The effect is easiest to see by plotting the expected probabilities as in Figure 10.3.

Figure 10.3 demonstrates that, in general, the more diverse the establishment, the less likely it is for an employer to give discriminating responses. (The magnitudes of the decreases vary across regions, reflecting the non-linear and interactive nature of the logit regression model.) Holding all other explanatory variables constant, when comparing two employers from Atlanta – one from the most diverse organization and another from the least – the probability of expressing discriminating responses declines from 0.40 to 0.13, while the decline

Table 10.4 Exponentiated coefficients from logit regression models predicting likelihood of getting differential ratings among the groups by an employer

	Work habit		*Reliability*		*'Work attitude'*	
City						
Los Angeles						
New York	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.24	0.23
	[5.47]**	[5.65]**	[5.43]**	[5.50]**	[6.01]**	[6.08]**
Philadelphia	0.58	0.53	0.70	0.63	0.57	0.51
	[2.34]*	[2.86]**	[1.48]	[2.07]*	[2.40]*	[2.99]**
Atlanta	1.57	1.47	1.57	1.44	1.77	1.62
	[2.10]*	[1.89]	[2.05]*	[1.73]	[2.66]**	[2.37]*
Context						
Firm racial diversity index	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.08
	[3.17]**	[3.14]**	[2.39]*	[2.32]*	[1.87]	[1.79]
Diversity index squared	25.30	23.64	14.14	12.64	7.87	7.03
	[2.94]**	[2.89]**	[2.32]*	[2.23]*	[1.84]	[1.74]
Procedural formality	0.94	0.94	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.92
	[1.82]	[1.79]	[2.52]*	[2.47]*	[2.43]*	[2.39]*
Total number of employees	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00
	[2.62]**	[2.67]**	[2.27]*	[2.28]*	[2.68]**	[2.69]**
Racial characteristics of employer						
White						
Black	1.38		1.56		1.50	
	[1.16]		[1.53]		[1.41]	
Hispanic	1.17		1.53		1.38	
	[0.51]		[1.34]		[0.99]	
Asian	1.51		1.28		1.52	
	[0.91]		[0.50]		[0.89]	
Other	1.54		1.99		1.77	
	[0.48]		[0.74]		[0.60]	
Immigrant	1.18		1.18		1.16	
	[0.61]		[0.53]		[0.50]	
Observations	940	940	940	940	940	940
Log-likelihood	487.9	470.8	470.8	467.9	476.9	474.4
Change in log-likelihood		2.9		2.9		2.6

Source: The 1997 four-city business establishment survey.

Notes: Robust z-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.



Figure 10.3 Effects of demographic diversity in a business establishment on probability of getting differential ratings of worker groups by an employer

Source: The 1997 four-city business establishment survey.

is much smaller for employers in Philadelphia. The effect of diversity is most pronounced at the lower end of its distribution; the effect disappears around 0.40 of the diversity index.

Other organizational factors are significant as well. Employers from establishments with a higher level of procedural formality and a larger workforce are less likely to give differential ratings. Each additional unit of formality index reduces the probability by about 10 percent (=1.0–0.9)*100). A cumulative difference between the most informal and the most formal establishment is quite substantial – the index ranges from zero to eight.[14]

Even though the sincerity of employers in giving non-differential ratings cannot be directly examined, the analyses of the types of employers who express beliefs in differential work qualities among racial and ethnic groups yield intriguing results. On the one hand, individual characteristics do not have significant associations with the outcomes; yet, consistent with the contact hypothesis, the contextual variables show sociological as well as statistical significance.

Since employers gave differential ratings for different groups of workers, which group are they most likely to rate as the best workers? In order to answer this question, ratings were transformed into ranks and then the exploded logit model again applied.

It is important to keep in mind some unique features of the exploded logit model when interpreting the results. The results from the exploded logit differ from regular regression results, since the model is designed to capture the intra-person variations. As a result, variables that do not vary within each respondent are not included directly, but rather are included by interacting with 'group' indicators (Gould 1999; Allison 1999). All the contextual variables are invariant within each person; they are included in the model interacting with group indicators. This interaction makes interpretation difficult, and the number of explanatory variables included in the model is limited, given that relatively few employers give differential ratings. To facilitate discussion, we need to rely on charts reporting simulated probabilities based on estimated regression results.

Table 10.5 reports results from the exploded logit models. The first set of variables represents the complete list of groups that employers were asked to evaluate. White workers were chosen as the primary reference group in the analysis and Los Angeles as the reference region.

The results are consistent with results from qualitative studies (and the descriptive and non-parametric analyses reported above). In general, employers have very strong negative views about the work qualities of African-Americans, while employers' preferences for other groups vary across regions. For instance, regarding work habits, Los Angeles employers are more likely to rank immigrants highest among the groups, while employers from other regions do not seem to share their view. In Los Angeles, the likelihood of immigrants being preferred by employers is 5.63 times as high as the probability for whites. In Philadelphia, the chances for immigrants being preferred are 0.15 times as high as their counterparts in Los Angeles. Similarly, Hispanics fare better in Los Angeles than in any other region.

Table 10.5 Exponentiated coefficients from exploded logit regression model predicting rankings of worker groups by an employer

	Work habit	*Reliability*	*Attitude*
Groups			
White workers	-	-	-
Asian workers	3.104	2.109	1.392
	[2.878]**	[1.680]	[0.833]
Black workers	0.715	0.303	0.319
	[0.895]	[2.852]**	[2.644]**
Hispanic workers	4.446	0.869	1.256
	[3.971]**	[0.354]	[0.580]
Immigrant workers	5.631	0.844	1.433
	[4.477]**	[0.432]	[0.950]
Asian* diversity	2.303	0.997	2.259
	[1.128]	[0.004]	[1.099]
Black* diversity	1.01	1.547	0.907
	[0.014]	[0.552]	[0.122]
Hispanic* diversity	0.678	2.095	1.545
	[0.560]	[0.960]	[0.583]
Immigrants* diversity	1.632	2.403	2.378
	[0.683]	[1.143]	[1.209]
In-group respondent	1.395	1.131	1.209
	[1.990]*	[0.710]	[1.107]
Rankings for Asians in NY	1.49	1.718	1.391
	[0.782]	[0.973]	[0.657]
Rankings for Blacks in NY	0.975	0.75	0.967
	[0.052]	[0.497]	[0.061]
Rankings for Hispanics in NY	0.191	0.399	0.246
	[3.431]**	[1.688]	[2.691]**
Rankings for Immigrants in NY	0.312	1.22	0.588
	[2.305]*	[0.373]	[1.085]
Rankings for Asians in Philadelphia	1.141	0.769	0.708
	[0.273]	[0.529]	[0.698]
Rankings for Blacks in Philadelphia	0.611	0.666	0.878
	[1.106]	[0.809]	[0.247]
Rankings for Hispanics in Philadelphia	0.097	0.23	0.221
	[5.085]**	[2.942]**	[2.994]**
Rankings for Immigrants in Philadelphia	0.153	0.442	0.405
	[4.042]**	[1.691]	[1.876]
Rankings for Asians in Atlanta	1.058	1.148	1.326
	[0.136]	[0.309]	[0.695]
Rankings for Blacks in Atlanta	1.142	1.268	1.564
	[0.350]	[0.579]	[1.080]
Rankings for Hispanics in Atlanta	0.448	0.698	0.831
	[2.072]*	[0.869]	[0.475]
Rankings for Immigrants in Atlanta	0.31	1.12	1.182
	[2.892]**	[0.274]	[0.428]
Observations	268	236	251

Source: The 1997 four-city business establishment survey.

Notes: Robust z-statistics in brackets. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.

Hispanics and immigrants generally do not fare as well in New York as in Los Angeles. This result may reflect differences in the Latino population in these two regions. In Los Angeles, Hispanics are most likely to be Mexicans and immigrants, while in New York they are more ethnically diverse and include a significant number of Puerto Ricans, who are not immigrants and who bear many of the negative stereotypes attached to African-Americans. Interestingly, employers do not seem to distinguish between Asian-American, Latino, and immigrant workers in Los Angeles. However, they are less likely to prefer whites and African-Americans. This finding is consistent with qualitative studies of employers who hire low-skill workers in Los Angeles (Waldinger and Lichter 2002).

Industrial psychologists have shown that people tend to give higher ratings to those with racial and ethnic backgrounds similar to their own, and such in-group bias may be reflected in the observed employers' ratings from this study sample. But it is quite unlikely that the whole racial and ethnic hierarchy is driven by the in-group bias, since there are relatively few Asian employers (only 4 percent) in the sample. Nonetheless, the hypothesis may hold true for the higher ratings of other groups, especially whites.

To investigate this possibility, the key variable is an indicator variable indicating cases in which the employer's ethnicity and the ethnicity of the group he/she is rating are the same. The results seem to support the hypothesis: The likelihood of being preferred by an employer increases 1.40 times if the employer is ranking his/her co-ethnic workers' work habits. Given the fact that whites are most likely to be employers (80 percent in this study sample), clearly there is an additive advantage of being white in the labor market.

Even though none of the coefficients related to organizational diversity was statistically significant, magnitudes of some of the coefficients were impressive, even if the directions were difficult to interpret. For example, one unit increase in organizational diversity increases the probability of employers preferring Asian-Americans for their work habits by about 130 percent (=00x(2.303–1)). An increase in diversity has a positive impact on ratings of African-Americans as well; one unit increase in diversity increases the odds of being preferred for their reliability by 54 percent. And yet this occurrence is not consistent across work qualities. The same increase in diversity reduces the probability of African-Americans being preferred by employers asked to rate their work attitude.

One way to summarize all of these findings is through simulations. Adjusting for explanatory variables, are there any changes to the observed rankings?[15] The results are plotted in Figure 10.4.

Figure 10.4 shows simulated results (adjusted and unadjusted) for Los Angeles employers. The unadjusted panel shows probabilities computed from an exploded logit model with only the group indicators – essentially reproducing the observed differences in rankings without any control. The adjusted panel shows probabilities and simulated probabilities using the model reported in Table 10.5.

Once again in this analysis, African-Americans are least likely to be ranked highest by employers. Asian-Americans are the most likely to be ranked highest in all work qualities, except work habits. Immigrants, who follow close behind



Figure 10.4 Probabilities of being ranked the highest among all groups by racial and ethnic groups in Los Angeles

Source: The 1997 business establishment survey.

Asian-Americans in all other work qualities, overtake them in work habit. Whites and Hispanics are ranked next, with African-Americans at the bottom of the queue. The adjusted results show that Asian-Americans and immigrants are still at the top, but Hispanics are more likely to be ranked highest than are whites. African-Americans remain the least preferred group.

The racial and ethnic hierarchy observed in Figure 10.4 is repeated in all regions. Figure 10.5 shows the adjusted probabilities of being ranked the highest for all the groups in all four regions of the study. The results are quite robust: Asian-Americans are consistently ranked higher in the hierarchy, even if they are not the top-rated group, while African-Americans are consistently ranked the lowest in all regions.

Conclusions and implications

This chapter has aimed to answer two research questions. First, is it possible to replicate results of qualitative studies by uncovering the same racial and ethnic hierarchy of intangible work qualities shared among employers who hire low-skill workers? The answer to this question is a resounding yes. Consistent with qualitative studies, we find that a majority of the employers in the sample do not show any overt racial/ethnic preferences. They rate workers from all groups as 'average' in their work ethic, reliability, and attitude on the job. At the same time, there are some employers who do believe certain groups are better than others; these employers rate Asians above all other groups. Whites, Hispanics, and immigrants are ranked somewhere behind Asians depending on which work quality employers have considered. Unfortunately, employers do not seem to prefer African-Americans under any circumstance.

Based on the results, we cannot attribute the observed racial and ethnic hierarchy to employers' actual experiences with different groups of workers on the job. Employers are not rationally discriminating among groups based on their interactions with members of the groups. If they were, it would be quite unlikely that employers from Philadelphia and Atlanta would rate Asians as a group with the best work qualities, for these regions have relatively few low-skill Asian workers.

The second question addressed – is the hierarchy essentially driven by employers' individual characteristics or structural factors such as racial diversity of the business establishments? – cannot be answered so easily. The answer differs for the employers' decision to give differential ratings among the groups and to rate one group higher than the others. Results from multivariate logit models show that employers' ascribed characteristics do not have significant effects on whether employers would give differential ratings among the groups. But structural factors also have sociologically and statistically significant influence on the likelihood of getting differential ratings from employers. Employers within highly formalized organizations with large and diverse workforces are less likely to give differential ratings of groups than others.

With a few exceptions, explanatory variables do not have much measurable influence on the ranking of the racial/ethnic groups. One exception is that high



Figure 10.5 Regional differences in *adjusted* probabilities of being ranked the highest among all groups by racial and ethnic groups

Source: The 1997 business establishment survey.

rankings, especially of whites, may stem from the 'in-group bias' of white employers. Actual local contexts have very little effect on employers' perception of the groups: despite few changes in ranking order of the groups across urban regions, adjusting for differences in explanatory variables does not alter the ranking order.

Based on the consistency of group rankings across regions and contexts, I therefore conjecture that the racial and ethnic hierarchy observed here is rooted in societal racial consciousness. This conjecture suggests a pessimistic future for low-skill African-Americans in the labor market. It may also explain why racial inequalities in the labor market are difficult to eradicate.

Despite the robustness of the findings, much research remains to be done. First, a study needs to show that employers' subjective rankings actually lead to employers' decisions about hiring. Thirty years ago, Robert Merton (1970) contended that not all prejudiced individuals discriminate, and not all discriminators are prejudiced. Second, any future research on this subject should improve the survey questions used. The survey asked employers to rate each group individually, and the rank order was derived from the ratings. While this transformation is a common practice in social surveys (ratings are less time-consuming and respondents seem to prefer doing ratings to rankings – see Krosnick (1999: 555)) – the use of ratings encourages respondents to 'satisfice,' or to provide answers that they hope are 'good enough' to the surveyors, if not necessarily the best possible answers. As a result, we cannot determine how many of the employers who rate all groups as average really mean all workers are the same. Some of them may have taken an easy way out. A future study may try asking employers to rank the groups instead. Krosnick reports that a number of studies on survey research report that 'rankings yield higher-quality data than ratings' (1999: 556). Asking respondents to rank groups with or without ties will not only prevent shirking from the respondents, but also increase the numbers of cases included in the exploded logit analyses. This would allow researchers to test out more complex relationships among exploratory variables. On the other hand, researchers must prepare to get higher non-response rates from the respondents.

Finally, we need more than three dimensions to assess the subjective perceptions of employers. There are good studies that should be emulated. Besides Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* (1944), Henry Bullock's half-century-old study of racial attitudes and the employment of African-Americans included 11 different measures of employers' perceptions of African-Americans (1951). It is about time that quantitative survey researchers of social inequalities bring racial prejudice back into the study of racial and ethnic inequalities in the labor market and concentrate squarely on the powerful social agents, employers, who have been a missing link in our explanations of social inequalities.

11 'Natural mothers' for sale

The construction of Latina immigrant identity in domestic service labor markets

Kristen Hill Maher

In southern California, as in many other coastal and metropolitan areas of the United States, immigrant women have become ubiquitous as nannies and housekeepers, and not only among the rich. So many middle-class households now hire immigrants to clean their houses, care for their children and elderly parents, do laundry, and cook dinner that people in some suburban social circles consider immigrant workers a 'normal household convenience' like a dishwasher or a microwave (Maher 1999). The simplest and most common explanation for this phenomenon is that immigrants are the cheapest workers available. While it is true that immigrant domestic workers often earn less than minimum wage, a cheap labor argument misses many important labor market dynamics. This chapter examines the particular ways that identity also determines who is hired for domestic service jobs in southern California.

The domestic service market is shaped in part by the social construction of the work itself: paid domestic work is widely viewed as labor without social value. In the United States, it has most often been performed by women who are socially or legally marginal – women of color and immigrants without citizenship. This history continues to shape employers' expectations. In southern California today, most domestic workers are Latina immigrants from Mexico and other Central American countries. Accompanying this pattern is a popular discourse that defines Latina immigrants as particularly well suited for domestic work.

In a field study conducted in a southern California agency placing Latina immigrant domestic workers with employers, I found that employers commonly expected these women to be 'natural mothers' who would be content with a subservient household role. This expectation surely informed their hiring choices. It also informed the sales strategies of the placement agency personnel, who drew on these stereotypes in promoting their 'wares.' Both employers and the agency personnel had a strong hand in constructing Latina immigrants as appropriate household workers and in controlling the terms of their employment. Workers needed to negotiate these constructions in their own efforts to obtain jobs, negotiate work conditions, and build relationships with their employers. While job-seekers occasionally played up to employers' expectations, they also stressed how their individual training and personal qualities (rather

than their Latina identity) qualified them for jobs. Some workers also challenged the demeaning and abusive practices of the agency and asserted a right to fair wages and respect from their employers.

Domestic service and identity

Historically, domestic service work has been performed by slaves, indentured servants, serfs, colonial subjects, 'inferior' races, immigrants, and the poor. It is hard to know whether paid domestic work became stigmatized because despised peoples performed it, or whether these groups were despised for doing stigmatized work (Katzman 1978). In either case, domestic service has been associated historically with discourses that assert household workers' biological or 'natural' inferiority by sex, lineage, national origin, class, and/or race.

Domestic service relationships play an important role in establishing social hierarchies and constructing social identities (Adams and Dickey 2000: 9–11; Tinsman 1992; Palmer 1989). The daily rituals of domestic work mark both the subservience of the workers and the higher status of those served. For instance, servants may be expected to eat separately from (and after) their employers, to use a separate service entrance, to listen to personal stories their employers tell but never tell anything personal in return, to wear clothes chosen by their employer, and to accept as gifts unwanted leftovers or used merchandise – sometimes in lieu of salary or raises (Anderson 2000; Constable 1997; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Rollins 1985; Romero 1992). These kinds of markers of subservience and dominance shape not only the identities of particular workers and employers, but also – to some extent – the identities of the social groups to which they belong (Rollins 1989).

Domestic service in the U.S. grew along with slavery and industrial development, with racial divisions of labor differing by region. For almost a full century after emancipation in the south, domestic work remained the most common occupation among African-American women. In the west, Chinese and Japanese menservants were eventually replaced by female Japanese household workers (Glenn 1992: 9). In the southwest, Mexican and Chicana women were channeled into domestic work (Romero 1992; Gonzalez 1989), while in the east, urban middle-class households through the turn of the twentieth century hired European immigrant women (Irish, Poles) considered to be racially inferior (Gabaccia 1994). With immigration restriction in the mid-1920s, domestic service in the northeast too 'became increasingly the specialty of minority-race women' (Glenn 1992: 11, citing Palmer 1989: 12). These kinds of historical precedents have some bearing on the current labor market, such as in the continuing beliefs in the southwest that Latinas are particularly appropriate for service.

Domestic service nearly disappeared in middle-class homes between the 1920s and the 1970s but surged again thereafter, especially in areas with significant immigrant populations. In Orange County, California, the number of domestic workers more than doubled between 1980 and 1990.[1] There are no reliable, comprehensive national statistics on the size, structure, or salaries of the

domestic service industry (in part because much domestic employment is unreported and many workers undocumented); however, grounded, regional studies of domestic service provide insight into contemporary patterns (see Colen 1986, 1990; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Glenn 1980, 1986, 1992; Mattingly 2001; Romero 1988, 1992; Rollins 1985, 1989; Ruiz 1987; Solorzano-Torres 1988; and Wrigley 1995.)[2]

These studies suggest that the labor market for domestic workers is racially stratified. White European or American workers tend to occupy well-paid, professionalized nanny positions. In contrast, 'racial-ethnic' women more often hold lower-status and lower-pay jobs that combine childcare with housework and/or elder care (Glenn 1992; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). Racial-ethnic women can achieve some mobility from less desirable 'live-in' to more desirable 'live-out' or 'job work' positions (Romero 1992); however, even those with relevant education or training have a hard time defining themselves as high-status childcare experts. This is particularly true of racial-ethnic immigrant women, who are commonly defined as 'unskilled' regardless of their qualifications.

The stratifications among workers are matched by hierarchies among the commercial agencies that place them in jobs.[3] At the high end, placement agencies charge sizeable fees to employers for carefully screened employees; at lower levels, they screen both employers and job applicants less carefully and charge less. In the lowest tier of the market, immigrant-owned agencies with a fly-by-night, entrepreneurial process charge employers nothing and instead make their profit from immigrant job applicants who lack the social connections or resources to find work on their own. This chapter is based on a study of one of these lower-tier agencies.

Field site and methods

Between May 1996 and April 1997, I conducted weekly ethnographic observations in a placement agency located in the heart of a Latino immigrant neighborhood in Santa Ana, California. Unlike many placement agencies, this one brought both employers and women seeking work into the agency itself in order to meet and to interview. There, I conducted some taped interviews but relied primarily on field notes recorded during or immediately after observation.[4]

This field site gave me access to a particular range of employers and job-seekers in the most racially segregated and exploitative tier of the domestic service industry. Predictably, job-seekers were recent immigrants or women with limited social networks. They generally lacked some of the resources – fluency in English, legal authorization to work, consistent address or phone number, reliable transportation, or good references – that would have allowed them to choose an agency where employers paid fees.[5]

Beyond this, however, they were a surprisingly diverse group. About 70 percent of the job-seekers were immigrants of Mexican origin and another 25 percent were Latinas from Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.[6] The remaining 5 percent were either non-Latina immigrants (from Sri Lanka,

India, Sweden, the Czech Republic) or native-born Latin-Americans, whites, or African-Americans. Of the Latina immigrants, most had been in the U.S. from six months to five years. Like the domestic workers studied by Mattingly (1996) in San Diego, the majority appeared to be in their twenties and thirties. While many had fewer than eight years of education, some had completed high school or college and a few were teachers, nurses, or business owners before migrating. Most lived in Santa Ana or in neighboring towns.

Employers using the agency were also demographically diverse.[7] The vast majority were of European, Middle Eastern, or Asian ancestry; about 20 percent were themselves immigrants. In addition to middle-class professionals, a minority of employers held blue- or pink-collar occupations: plumbers, dock loaders at the shipping yard, check-out clerks from Costco. In Orange County, the hiring of domestic labor is no longer limited to the wealthy.

The agency owners, Frank and Charo,[8] were Mexican immigrants, a married couple in their forties. In addition to running the agency, they sold used cars, produced Spanish-English language tapes for sale, and ran a small mail-order operation. In the back of the agency building was a large waiting room with chairs lining the walls. There, six days a week, between fifteen and fifty women job-seekers waited for interviews. The atmosphere could be festive and social, but more often it was tense or lethargic, the atmosphere of long lines, of waiting. When business was good, there was a steady stream of job announcements: 'Listen up, girls (*niñas* or *mijas*) – here's a job for a live-in in Cerritos, needs someone with some English. Who's got English?' Announcements often provoked confusion among those who didn't hear them well: Was that live-in or live-out? Where's Cerritos? How much are they paying? Is anyone coming in who lives closer? The women waiting often discussed wages or supported each other prior to interviews – 'you can do it!' 'don't let them take advantage!' (*no te dejas*), and 'no less than $200!' (per week). Most waiting for jobs arrived before 9:00 a.m. and left late in the afternoon.

Job interviews took place in four interview rooms. Typically, staff members sat with an employer while job applicants entered individually or in groups. There was considerable turnover among agency staff, who worked on commission plus a small base salary. While staff members generally treated the job-seekers as social inferiors, many had also first come to the agency looking for domestic work. With a few exceptions, they were Mexican immigrants with comparable resources and income to the women they placed in jobs.

Between the employers, the staff, and the women seeking work, there were very clear spatial and role divisions, which complicated my presence there as a person without an obvious space or category. I told those who asked what I was doing, but many employers and job applicants assumed I was a staff member. Over time I was increasingly asked to help out instead of just watching. This allowed me to speak freely with employers but reduced my ease in entering the back room to talk with women seeking work.[9] For this reason, two undergraduate research assistants occasionally spent the day in the back room with the job applicants, taking field notes. In addition, we conducted informal group discussions

and taped twelve in-depth interviews with domestic workers. Sources such as census statistics, placement agency advertisements, and supplementary interviews with other employers and heads of other placement agencies allowed me to situate this agency in the larger domestic service industry.

Employers' desire – a 'traditional' woman

The common assumption that employers want immigrant workers only because their labor is cheap does not capture the full range of factors that mattered in the hiring decisions occurring at this agency. Employers apparently did hope to hire someone at a low salary and without paying fees for the placement; however, they also cared a great deal about workers' identities. Employers wanted not only affordable help, but also someone they saw as appropriate for the job.

Most obviously, the sex of the workers mattered in hiring. No employer requested a male worker, and no men applied for these jobs, even though many men in Orange County willingly worked for low wages. Even in an age of legal gendered equality in the public sphere, household work is still structured around an unequal gendered division of labor. When asked, employers reported they would not trust a man to know how to clean or what to do with children.

This gendered division of labor was quite apparent even among employers who came to the agency. The vast majority of employers were themselves women, many of whom seemed to want a domestic worker to become their functional replacement, taking on household tasks they saw as their own responsibility. For example, a woman in her mid-thirties named Karen (who worked full-time as a night dispatch agent for a shipping company) and her husband Scott had an eight-month-old baby at the time that they came to hire a nanny at the placement agency. They initially intended to hire someone for 20 hours a week to help Karen care for the baby. But agency staff convinced them they could hire a full-time, live-in worker for not much more than they intended to pay. Hiring a live-in worker appealed to Karen for it would permit her finally to catch up on her sleep. When this couple defined the job as a part-time babysitter, they limited the job description to childcare. When they decided to hire someone full-time, the job description expanded to include what Karen articulated as 'all the things I would do' – dishes, laundry, cleaning the bathroom, and cooking. Karen and Scott apparently saw household tasks as a woman's job and a full-time domestic worker as a replacement for Karen. This framing of the domestic worker's job was not unusual: other female employers explained that what they really needed was a *wife*, in essence, someone to do all the work traditionally allocated to women.

Gendered norms attached to the private or domestic sphere stand in contrast to the public, or civil sphere, complicating the identities of those who earn wages in domestic service. Whereas the public sphere in a liberal society is governed by law and by contracts among supposed equals, the private sphere is understood as a space governed by mutual love and obligation, dependency, and inequality (Pateman 1988). Paid domestic workers may be contracted

employees – a relationship typically found in the public sphere – but employers hiring full-time workers at this agency appeared to think of the domestic worker's position more as a private, feminine, familial role. This perception was most apparent among employers who rejected job applicants whom they perceived to 'just be in it for the money.' This phrase is remarkable for what it implies about employers' views of paid domestic labor: that even a *total stranger* who is hired to do particular tasks such as house-cleaning should do this work not out of her own financial interests, but out of maternal instinct, love of the employer's children, or domestic devotion. Insofar as the domestic servant is perceived as a wife-substitute, her labor, skills, and devotion to caring for others is expected to be a natural part of her femininity rather than labor for a wage.

This view of the worker was most apparent when employers sought full-time, live-in workers. In contrast, employers saw part-time work as labor performed for a standard hourly wage. Thus Karen and Scott planned to pay a babysitter $100 per week for twenty hours of work – the amount they could afford based on an hourly wage of $5.00. When they considered hiring a full-time, live-in worker, they no longer thought in terms of a standard wage or hourly wages but planned to pay a $135 per week for an undefined number of work hours and a broader, less defined set of tasks. The consequences of this kind of thinking for domestic workers' wages and hours are obvious in Table 11.1.

Employers who saw domestic workers as substitutes for traditional housewives also tended to assume that household chores do not involve learned skills but rather instincts natural to women. Job-seekers at this agency differed greatly in their training and experience yet few employers ever asked about either. Instead, they more often evaluated job candidates on the basis of whether they appeared to be appropriately feminine to fill a traditional woman's role. The particular feminine appearances they desired differed somewhat among employers. One

Table 11.1 Average salaries for domestic jobs

	Number of positions	*Hours per week*	*Weekly salary ($)*	*Hourly salary ** ($)*
Full-time				
Live-in	39	66 (1 undefined	151.71	2.29
Live-out	16	47 (1 undefined)	179.29	3.81
Either *	7	50	141.67	2.83
Part-time				
Live-out	16	-	-	5.14

Notes:

* These figures were compiled from the original job descriptions, such that a position could defined as either live-in or live-out.

** Hourly salaries were calculated using only those positions that specified the number hours/week.

young Latino couple favored someone 'grandmotherly.' Others evaluated whether applicants seemed physically able to do demanding work or keep up with young children.

Overall, however, employers' preferences reflected dimensions of femininity that reflected class and race. Women quickly hired at the highest salaries were those with a conservative and feminine appearance that both the agency personnel and some employers described as 'clean.' For instance, after she had been hired as a nanny for a family with three active blonde boys, Aurora Gomez was filling out an employment contract and chatting with the agency owner, Frank, and another staff member, Luordes. Aurora was a small, wispy young woman of about nineteen. As Aurora signed her name to the form, Luordes noted in a loud voice, 'You look very clean. (*Te miras muy limpia.*) I told you if you came nice and clean you'd get hired right away.' Frank affirmed, 'Yes, look at her. She's very well presented, and she's dressed very decently.' This commentary surely was aimed more at other job applicants sitting within earshot than at Aurora. For me, it raised the question: what made Aurora appear 'cleaner' than others applying for work? Her hair was pulled back in a bun, and she wore a long-sleeved blouse with ruffles at the neck and wrists and an ankle-length flower-print skirt. The overall effect was both old-fashioned and schoolmarmish – feminine but not sexual – a look that suited middle-class tastes for a working-class nanny.

Class issues regularly plague relations between domestic workers and employers, who can easily find themselves in a conundrum. That is, middle-class employers want to pay a low wage (at this agency, averaging $160 per week); at the same time, they may not trust people willing to work for such wages. As T.H. Marshall observes, 'The more you look on wealth as conclusive proof of merit, the more you incline to regard poverty as evidence of failure' (1998: 104). For this reason, employers were more likely to trust people who looked and acted like those in their own social circles, while suspecting the lower classes of failings – such as laziness, dishonesty, sloppy or tasteless domestic habits, or excesses in relation to sex, food, drink, or drugs – that kept them poor. Foreign women who put on a 'clean,' feminine appearance solved employers' conundrum by looking modest, moral and middle-class while also accepting low salaries.

Workers' sexuality was a particularly touchy issue for many employers. On the one hand, most preferred a feminine-looking worker, and some expressed preferences for someone 'pretty.' On the other hand, employers rejected job applicants they thought looked 'sexy' or '*too* pretty.' In some cases, a 'sexy' look may have signaled working-class status because employers saw certain colors or cuts of clothing as cheap or immodest. In other cases, female employers seemed concerned about the competition of a 'sexy' woman. As one employer told me, 'I need someone to take care of the kids without also taking care of my husband.' Finally, some employers felt that a woman who appeared sexy might be unwilling to do dirty work – long, polished nails, for example, suggested a worker unaccustomed to hard physical labor. One employer told me, 'I don't like the ones with the jewelry, the gold. They would clean like this' (imitating an

unenthusiastic wiping of a counter). Similarly, another employer who expressed a desire for someone 'pretty' rejected one of the women interviewed because – although she was 'very pretty' – it would be too hard to ask her to clean the bathtub. In short, employers wanted a worker who looked enough like an equal to be trustworthy but who was sufficiently subordinate to accept degrading work.

Employers also linked acceptable forms of femininity to race and ethnicity. In particular, most employers appeared to believe that Latina immigrants were especially appropriate for the role of domestic worker. Of course employers preferring Latinas had special reasons to choose this particular agency, located as it was in the heart of a widely known Latino immigrant enclave in Santa Ana and bearing a clear Mexican cue in its name. (Other local domestic service agencies were ethnically more ambiguous or advertised European workers.) Some employers also articulated out loud why they preferred a Latina as a domestic worker. One woman named Margot, who called multiple references for the woman she wanted to hire as a nanny for her two young children, was concerned that Marisela was a 'complete stranger.' And yet, Margot added, she knew she wanted someone Latin because, she said, 'Latins know naturally what to do with babies.' Margot was the head of an obstetrics ward and she supported this generalization by saying that she had observed many new mothers, with Latinas adjusting most easily to motherhood.[10] Of course, stories like this are not invented in obstetrics wards, but rather reflect more general social stereotypes about Latina immigrants as prolific mothers with a traditional Catholic devotion to family. 'Employers at the Santa Ana agency even extended stereotypes about Latinas' 'natural' skills with children to other domestic tasks, distinguishing them from women of other ethnicities. Thus an Iranian immigrant employer explained that she would not hire a fellow Persian because, unlike Latinas, they are 'no good for cleaning.'

Such racialized narratives undergird general patterns of immigrant employment in Los Angeles. Immigrant women from Mexico or Central America work in domestic service in much higher proportions than Filipina, Chinese, or Korean immigrants, who more often work in industry or other services (Wright and Ellis 2000). Some scholars see this division of labor as the product of social networks creating occupational niches (Portes 1987; Light and Bonacich 1988; Waldinger 1993). Others note it as a product of the colonial history of the southwest, where Chicana and Mexican women have been domestic servants since the end of the Mexican–American war (Romero 1992). No matter how it was produced, the division of labor along ethnic-racial lines takes on a certain reality in popular discourses that offer post hoc rationalizations about which races are 'best' at various types of work and that praise a racial ethnic group's superior aptitude for dirty, difficult, or dangerous work.

Southern Californian employers' narratives about Latinas' 'natural motherhood' and superior skills at domestic tasks probably also reflect these women's relative powerlessness. While employers hiring at the Santa Ana agency did not state directly that they wanted undocumented or disempowered Latinas because they would be willingly subordinate or undemanding, this was an implicit theme

in the hiring process. One employer from Las Vegas simply dismissed women who said that they would spend their salary on their own needs rather than sending it all as remittances to their families. This employer wanted a worker who would be in the house and available seven days a week, 24 hours a day, and she insisted on finding someone who 'really needed the money' – evidently to ensure her control over her employee. Other employers were more subtle. One explained, 'I always try to watch the body language – usually they try to please you, to sell themselves when you first meet.' In other words, she looked for workers willing to demonstrate subordination by adopting an ingratiating approach, by smiling or by expressing enthusiasm for the job. Other employers quickly dismissed women they judged as too 'aggressive' or confident.

Overall, then, the hiring decisions occurring at this agency reflected employers' preconceived notions about women from Latin America as natural mothers, skilled in domestic tasks, and sufficiently powerless and deferential to willingly assume a subordinated position. The placement agency they visited, in turn, worked hard to convince employers that it could supply or 'sell' them exactly such traditional women.

Commodifying Latinas as traditional women

The placement agency that brokered domestic workers to potential employers drew upon many of the same beliefs and desires as employers, in effect 'packaging' immigrant women as ideal domestic workers. In their sales strategies and language, agency staff presented job applicants as a unified commodity for sale rather than as a diverse group of women seeking to find appropriate positions with their varying skills. The agency structured most interviews to prevent workers from asserting any individuating characteristics or making demands, thus ensuring a process of commodification that served both the agency's profits and employers' desires for a relatively disempowered employee.

Agency personnel regularly represented the Latina immigrants applying for work as women naturally skilled with children and household chores. During one interview, a staff member named Raul made a sales pitch to an employer by claiming that 'many people want to hire these ladies because they have good experience and are good people for babies.' Later, I heard him say that the women who sought jobs at this agency were basically 'the same thing' – 'all mothers, all experienced' – in order to convince a potential employer that there would be no use in returning on a different day to interview other workers. This kind of statement served not only to reinforce narrow, essentialized stereotypes about Latina immigrants, but also represented the diverse collection of women seeking jobs as a uniform group. These claims were patently inaccurate descriptions of the women applying for work at the agency. Not all were mothers, and many had no experience with paid domestic work. Even those with paid work experience had very specific kinds of experience: some had done babysitting, elder care or house-cleaning, tasks that are not interchangeable in the skills they require. However, the agency operated as if acknowledging idiosyncrasies and

differences between job applicants would be bad for business because it might encourage comparison shopping.

Other local agencies chose a different sales strategy that emphasized the range of goods available and the personal service they provided employers in selecting the right person. One, run by a powerful Chicana named Rita Lee, marketed workers as 'specialty products.' In an interview, Mrs Lee explained that rather than bringing employers to the agency to meet and select potential employees, her job was to identify carefully what each family said it wanted and then to send the woman she selected as the best fit to the employer's home. This placement strategy made Mrs Lee an expert and a matchmaker whose services cost the employer a tidy fee. It did not commodify the women working as domestics any less – they were still packaged as a particular kind of object to be bought and sold, a package that rested in great part on essentialized aspects of the workers' identities – but it represented women as specialty commodities instead of interchangeable ones. At Frank and Charo's agency, by contrast, the hiring was organized more like a self-service warehouse, where the 'goods' (the workers) were cheaper and where the employer was assumed to know what she wanted such that she did not require or have to pay for expert service.

In training new staff employees to handle phone calls, Frank made his business strategy explicit. Telephone workers were instructed to say 'We have lots of good women,' 'hard workers' who are 'ready to go.' 'They will take care of everything in your house, your kids, the laundry, the cooking, the ironing, the cleaning.' Then, Frank added, 'when employers ask how much they will need to pay, you tell them, "What do you want to pay? You're the boss!" ' This sales pitch constructed the domestic worker as a miracle household appliance – it slices, it dices! – rather than as a waged laborer with choices, agency, or rights. Little wonder, then, that many employers talked about 'picking one [domestic worker] up,' as if they were purchasing an object.

Commodification of labor is not unusual in a capitalist system, where people regularly 'learn to treat human activity – labor – as a marketable commodity' (Gates 1989: 799). However, the commodification of labor occurring at this agency also rested upon an essentialization of the workers' identities as Latina women. The particular ways that Raul represented the workers as being 'the same thing' – 'all mothers, all experienced' – seemed based on his estimation that employers wanted someone who would be good with their children, and that personal motherhood experiences, not education or training, foster that quality. Given popular notions of childcare skills flowing naturally from a woman's femininity or reproductive capacity, as well as popular representations of Latinas as inevitable and prolific mothers (see Hondagneu-Sotelo 1995), Raul's sales pitch was perceptive. It used available cultural discourses about motherhood and Latina femininity to frame the agency product as superior, and in so doing, reproduced these discourses in a way that contributed to their popularity among employers.

The commodification of the job applicants occurred despite the fact that the agency made its profit from fees paid by domestic workers and not from employers.

In fact, many of the practices at the agency made it clear that employers, not job applicants, were the key clients. The very structure of the interview process transformed women from a diverse group of individuals seeking work into a homogeneous and endlessly available mass of undifferentiated workers. Single employers waited in a room to which groups of women expressing interest in any given position were brought. When many women were interested, they stood lined up against the wall, in what looked like a police line-up or an auction. A staff member named Luci also expressed distaste with this practice, pointing directly to how it objectified the women: 'it's like picking fruit: I want this one and that one. I don't like that.' Her metaphor of selecting fruit at the market suggested how much the agency's display of its 'goods' resembles other kinds of commodity sales. Structuring the contact between employers and workers in this way encouraged employers to select a household employee based largely on her appearance and to think of what they were doing as purchasing a whole woman rather than a contractual number of her labor hours. For this reason, the experience of choosing an employee by 'picking fruit' may have contributed to the tendency for employers of live-in domestic workers to try later to regulate all of their workers' time and social contacts. Finally, having only one employer per interview room while applicants entered en masse emphasized the plentitude of labor and the scarcity of jobs and hence who could afford to be choosy or to make demands.

Practices like these empowered employers, and made some understand the act of employing a woman looking for work as a favor or an act of compassion. A number of employers expressed remorse to me that they could only hire one woman, saying they felt sorry for the rest of them. Another told me that to enter the agency without actually hiring someone would be too painful – a sentiment that one might feel upon visiting an animal shelter without adopting a pet. Employers' perceptions of desperation among the women seeking work were exaggerated by agency practices. While some of the women seeking work through this agency in fact badly needed work for their families' or their own immediate sustenance, most found work within a week or two. Some expressed a fairly casual attitude toward finding work, saying they would work if the right situation arose. Women seeking work at this agency were not always desperate, but they appeared that way to employers.

The same interview process obscured and understated the occasional sense of desperation among employers. Given high turnover among nannies, employers were vulnerable to being suddenly left without childcare. Many employers came to the agency on Saturday to hire someone to start on Monday. In one case, a woman in her thirties with four young boys came to the agency looking for a nanny to start immediately. While she clearly had more financial resources than the women she interviewed, she also reported feeling at the end of her rope. She had recently separated from her husband and did not yet have child support. Her nanny had left suddenly and without explanation, and the replacement she found also abruptly left because of a family emergency in Mexico. This employer held a nine-to-five administrative job in a local company and could not

afford to miss work on Monday. Like a number of other potential employers, she interviewed only one worker and then hired her at once. In cases such as this one, the worker who accepted the job could have felt she was doing the employer a favor, but the agency's interview process was designed to discourage this sentiment. Instead, it set up a subsequent employment relationship based on worker indebtedness and dependency, blocking opportunities for workers to assert labor rights or to negotiate their own demands.

Agency practices such as the line-up, which highlighted labor surpluses and kept workers pliable and disempowered, were not only a matter of supplying employers with the kind of worker they wanted; they also facilitated fast, easy placements and higher profits for the agency. Staff members regularly undercut workers who approached interviews with a sense of entitlement or independence; they pointed out that there were many others who would like this job (e.g. '*hay muchas niñas,*' or 'there are many girls'). In this way, the agency's construction of workers as submissive, 'traditional women' served as a behavioral prescription for workers during interviews in addition to being a marketing strategy. Such constructions made hires more likely among employers who preferred this kind of household worker, and simultaneously ensured that workers' own demands did not get in the way of efficient sales.

Reframing and resistance

To a considerable degree, employers and brokers were successful in enforcing a script of interactions at the agency and in structuring a later work relationship grounded in inequalities of gender, class, race, and migrant status. Nevertheless, workers varied in their responses to these constructions of their identities and, in some cases, they found ways to reject them overtly.

Workers seeking employment did not rely solely upon agency personnel to represent them, particularly when they had English-language skills adequate to express themselves independently. In some cases, their self-presentation acknowledged, replicated, and performed the qualities both desired by employers and promoted by agency personnel. For instance, some women made reference to their ethnicity or nationality rather than any individuating characteristics or skills. One woman who did not have children explained that she was qualified for the job even without personal motherhood experience because 'we Hispanic people are always around our nieces and nephews.' In another interview, a young woman who was dressed very professionally in a suit and pumps responded glibly to the question of whether she could cook by saying, 'Cook? Of course I cook – I'm Mexican!' While it is possible that these women had internalized the discourse of the agency brokers, it seems more likely that these applicants – who were some of the most assertive and skilled of those interviewing – had decided this strategy would be an effective means to get a job.

In other cases it was clear that workers who played into employers' expectations of traditional womanhood did so strategically. Gabi, a woman in her late

twenties who came to an interview in a suit and with her hair pulled back in a bun, told me privately afterwards that she hated conservative clothes: 'I don't always look this way,' she confided. 'I like jeans that hold me "like this" [indicating that they are tight] or short skirts, but know I can't get a job like that.' Gabi was aware of the femininity employers saw as appropriate for household workers and she presented herself accordingly.

However, not all workers played on employers' desires and stereotypes in their self-presentation. The women seeking work at this agency were a diverse group who represented themselves in varied ways during interviews. In trying to get a job, many tried hard to make a personal connection with employers or their children. Maria Eugenia spoke directly with the three young girls she would be caring for, asking them what kinds of things they liked to do and what words they knew in Spanish. Other women adopted an intimate, almost disarmingly honest approach. After describing their needs for someone to provide housekeeping and babysitting, an employing couple asked a young woman named Claudia what she expected of them. Claudia replied quite frankly: 'A bed! And I would rather not get in between your arguments.' Similarly, Ernestina brought up in conversation (through translation) that she was a grandmother, that she wished her sons would get married, and that it was very important to her to work with a family that was 'nice,' where she would not have to feel tense or nervous. Both these women developed a sense of intimacy during the interview that surely contributed to their hires.

Contrary to agency messages about the uniform and natural qualities of its female 'commodities,' some women seeking domestic work instead emphasized their individual training and experience. When one employer sought to hire someone to care full-time for her elderly mother, all but one of the job-seekers expressing interest in the job accentuated their special training or experience in elder care. One had taken a three-month course on elder care and had worked as a medical aide; another had worked in a local retirement center; a third had worked for 15 years in Mexico caring for the elderly; a fourth had done some university coursework on geriatric care. While the employer in this case did not ask further about these experiences or weigh them strongly in making her choice, the women job-seekers had defined their work as skilled, emphasizing their professional, not their 'natural,' qualifications.

Individual women also undercut some of the stereotypes upon which the domestic service labor market rested. Some stated outright that they did not know how to cook or iron; others refused to play the role of a submissive and smiling domestic helper. Still others presented an overt sexuality and rejected agency exhortations to embody a traditional or wholesome femininity. However, self-marketing strategies that did not draw upon employers' notions of what they could expect from a Latina domestic had fairly limited success. Additionally, workers who represented themselves as anything other than a generic Latina had to be able to communicate independently in English. Translation by agency personnel was selective and sporadic, making many Spanish-speakers say only what the staff wanted.

Women interviewed privately (in their homes or in mine) after they were placed in jobs typically offered sharp critiques of the treatment they received at Frank and Charo's agency, and particularly of the fee for placement that cost them their first week's salary. Several days after our first interview, Ada called me to get the agency's phone number in order to see whether she could get the money for her first week of work. She had accepted a job the previous week but had not actually signed a contract, so felt that she might have a reasonable argument for being compensated. I was skeptical about her chances of getting the money simply by asking for it, and suggested other legal means. In the course of the conversation, Ada started to analyze the ways that this arrangement exploited workers:

A: Listen, I have a question. If the lady didn't like me, who pays the girl? I mean, did I work this week for free?
K (*author*): Yes.
A: What about if I don't like the job – I still would work for free?
K: Yes.
A: That's not fair!
K: No, it's not. I wish I could say it was different …
A: No, it's OK. I just wanted to ask about it. The woman and I like each other, so it's OK. But when I got a job through an agency before, they never charged me.

In a later conversation, Ada added, 'that first week I worked so hard, cleaned the whole house, got home so late … and I did it all for free.' About the agency, she said, 'How are they doing me a service? They just took my first week's money! … People like that are just greedy. They'll do anything for the money.' Ada's irritation with the agency remained palpable, and no doubt would have been even stronger had she found herself out of work right away. The agency's poor treatment of workers did not prevent Ada from feeling entitled to respect and honest business practices.

Another young woman in her early twenties, Karla, told me in an interview that she was angry with the interview process at the agency and that her employers had been shocked by the line-up of job applicants. According to Karla, her employers said the process treated workers like 'you were like animals, like they are going to choose the better one [by looking them over].' They also agreed with Karla that it was unfair to have her give up her first week's salary, so they paid the agency at the time of hire and then paid her after her first week of work. Karla was very happy with her new employers: 'We are like friends,' she said, and they paid her one of the highest salaries I saw at this agency ($250 weekly for a live-out position). This good outcome probably reflected the fact that Karla had been in the U.S. for several years, spoke nearly fluent English, and had been raised in a middle-class household in Mexico.[11] When she had first arrived, however, Karla had also accepted a live-in position for $120/week that 'was like a jail' even though the family had treated her reasonably well. She had

been so scared during the first interview that she hardly spoke even though she knew some English, and she had accepted a wage and a work situation that she would no longer consider. Karla's situation illustrates the extent to which workers' ability to shape their work circumstances rests in part on their resources and experience.

Women with the most resources found ways to negotiate with their employers as professionals even when they found work through Frank and Charo's agency. Like Karla, Ada spoke excellent English. She had taken college courses in child development and had a household income high enough that her family lived quite comfortably in a large, single-family apartment in Santa Ana. Now in her early thirties, she had originally come to the U.S. from Mexico when she was twenty, and had started work as a live-in, a situation that she too described as being 'incarcerated' (the family lived in a remote suburban neighborhood and she had had no car). Ada met her Guatemalan husband during that time and, after marrying and having her first child, she began working in live-out jobs. Several times, she left one of these jobs because she felt unappreciated or unduly criticized when she felt she was doing good work. At the time we began our interviews, Ada had just accepted a live-out job for $225 per week, with the understanding that it would be raised to $250 after a short trial period. Ada liked these employers so far, in part because they had made it clear how happy they were with her work. This kind of appreciation is really 'uplifting,' Ada told me, 'because it is not a very nice job. People say, "oh, a housekeeper?" … [but] if someone treats you right you won't mind going an extra mile.'

Ada felt confident enough to approach her employer after the first week of work to ask for the raise early:

> When I talked to her after the first week, I told her, 'Well, have you thought about giving me the raise to $250?' And she said, 'Yes, I told you that I was going to give it to you in two months.' And I said, 'Well, because I really see that there is a lot to do in this house, plus taking care of the kids, and I appreciate my job, and I appreciate my time … plus I don't want to be making less than five dollars an hour for the jobs that I do.' … And then she said, 'Well, I never have taken into consideration how much it comes to be per hour.'

Once she and her employer started talking about wages on an hourly basis, she was given not only the raise, but also a slightly shorter work day, to ensure that the wage would not fall below the $5 hourly minimum that Ada established.

Domestic workers who may not have directly negotiated with their employers still found ways to make social connections, act independently, and enjoy ordinary pleasures. Estela had been in the U.S. only about a year when we met; she was working without documentation as a live-in nanny and housekeeper for a family of relatively modest means in Irvine. Having come from a small city in central Mexico where her family's businesses struggled to survive after a sharp devaluation of the peso, Estela still had four of her five children in school

(ranging from high school to medical school) and faced expensive tuition charges. Estela's work in the U.S. departed sharply from her middle-class life in Mexico, where she herself had hired household workers and had been active in local politics. Her temporary solution was to develop extensive social networks from Irvine to Santa Ana and Anaheim, and to enjoy her days off shopping, eating out, and having adventures with friends, using the local bus system. Although she spoke very little English, Estela had a good relationship with her employers, who allowed her space to make independent decisions and praised her work. Estela told me that she did not feel 'stuck' or incarcerated but rather saw this period in her life as a temporary necessity until she could return home to her family, whom she missed terribly.

Estela's relative freedom and sense of empowerment may have been rooted in part in the nature of her life prior to migration, which was middle class and not gender-traditional. She and her daughter had migrated without any of the men in her family and, once her daughter returned to Mexico, Estela had no daily obligations to family in the U.S.. Isabel and Alba, by contrast, had much less freedom in their daily lives in part because they had migrated and lived within patriarchal households. Isabel's salary as a live-out domestic worker was a primary source of income for her family (a disabled husband, brother, and four sons), and yet she spent her evening and weekend hours doing all the domestic labor in her own household after her paid shift was over. Alba's hours outside work were tightly controlled by her husband, and she rarely left the house without him. Alba and her young husband had lived in the U.S. for several years after migrating without documentation from Guatemala. Although she had a high school education, Alba's life in the States divided between home and ten-hour days doing elder care, with her husband driving her back and forth. Paradoxically, Estela, the live-in worker, had more freedom of movement and a wider social network than either Alba or Isabel, who had more desirable live-out jobs.

Even domestic workers with little control over their daily lives and with little human or social capital could sometimes improve their working conditions over time. All the migrant domestic workers I interviewed had left previous jobs they found unacceptable. Evidence from the placement agency suggested that most domestic workers kept an eye open for new opportunities and changed jobs whenever better options presented themselves. Some changes involved trading one live-in job for a better-paying or less abusive one; some changes meant exchanging a live-in for a live-out job or moving into independent contracting as a housecleaner.[12]

Domestic workers' capacity to improve their work status and conditions over time depended upon their information networks (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994b) and competition among employers in an unregulated, capricious market. Information networks are a critical resource among domestic workers who are otherwise isolated from each other during their work day in order to locate jobs that pay more or involve better work conditions. Wages for domestic workers vary widely among neighborhoods because standards develop idiosyncratically rather than through state regulation. While variation by locale meant that some

employers paid very little for very long hours of work, it also created competition among employers, allowing workers with good information to improve their position by changing jobs. Even in the back room of the placement agency, there was active discussion about who paid what salaries for which kinds of work, allowing workers to differentiate better from worse jobs.[13]

By using informal information networks and taking advantage of the idiosyncrasies of the labor market, domestic workers in southern California could sometimes make the best of a situation they did not control. The result was high turnover, as workers changed jobs to 'move up.' Although information about the differences in turnover rates among various classes of employers is not available, it is fair to surmise that turnover rates are highest among the least wealthy employers. Certainly, at the agency, employers of limited means expressed the most frustration at the salaries required to hire the women they liked best; they also frequently complained about workers who disappeared without notice. Like the indigenous Aymara domestic workers studied in Bolivia by Leslie Gill (1994), immigrant domestic workers in Orange County quickly become 'street smart.'

In short, employers cannot always hope to get the 'traditional' Latina woman they seek, despite placement agencies' efforts to deliver just that commodity. Although domestic workers in southern California scarcely control the labor market or many of the circumstances of their own employment, they did enjoy some degree of agency. Women working as domestics defined some of the daily conditions of their lives; selected and rejected specific jobs; improved their personal position through remaining vigilant to other opportunities; and marketed and conducted themselves in ways that rejected narrow and stereotypical labels of Latinas as willingly subordinated 'natural mothers.'

Conclusions

The domestic service market in southern California is shaped by much more than a search for cheap household labor. Both employers and placement agency personnel draw upon broad social stereotypes of Latina immigrants as 'natural mothers' and as social subordinates – qualities that supposedly render them appropriate to fill a traditional feminine role in the household. The hiring process further reinforces such stereotypes by treating job applicants as powerless, identical commodities rather than as workers with choices, rights, and individualized skills.

While domestic workers did not appear to adopt or internalize these constructions in their own self-perceptions, they had little choice but to acknowledge and negotiate with them, both in interviewing for jobs and in their later relationships with employers. Domestic workers accomplished this in a wide range of ways. They engaged in self-marketing efforts that asserted their individual qualities and their skills. In some cases, they asserted their rights and the value of their work to employers or developed relationships outside their work environment that permitted them to express an identity beyond that of a domestic worker. They framed their position as waged labor (in contrast to the expectation that they

might happily and naturally dedicate their lives to serving others) and sought to improve their work conditions by making active choices about which jobs they were willing to accept, both at the time of hire and later.

Of course, these examples are not the only ways that foreign domestic workers challenge stereotypes and work to improve their conditions. A number of other studies (e.g. Gill 1994; Rollins 1985; Dill 1994) have shown workers engaging in daily forms of subversion and resistance in the workplace. Despite significant obstacles, domestic workers in a number of cities have also begun to organize collectively. In Los Angeles, the Domestic Workers' Association holds workshops and seminars aimed at improving work conditions and developing strategies to solve problems and defend rights (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001: 219–29). Growing numbers of workers use the legal system to gain compensation for withheld wages. As the numbers of foreign domestic workers grow, so do opportunities for greater visibility, thicker networks of support, and more collective action.

12 An afterword

The work and the wonder in studying immigrant life across the disciplines

Colin Wayne Leach and Donna R. Gabaccia

Migrations, great and small, have been central to the human experience. Indeed, without migration human life would not exist in the great variety and across the great expanse that it does today. Our global diversity is a direct result of the fact that some of us have always left our places of birth to move elsewhere. In the past 500 years especially, improved systems of transport have made long-distance moves over oceans and continents quite common. This fact is most apparent in countries such as the U.S. where the nation-state itself is mythologized as a product of immigration. Yet, economically, socially, culturally, and demographically, most countries of the world today are multicultural products of long-distance migrations sparked by conquest, empire-building, war, or the search for refuge or resources. Thus, immigration to the U.S. and its role in the continuing development of the state is only one example of a broader process that has touched nearly every human life around the globe.

Despite the central role that mobility has played in human history, much scholarship – including the millenarian predictions of radical transformations of life through large-scale international migration we discussed in the introduction – seems to assume that human beings have a natural tie to their place of birth and thus prefer to be sedentary. As a result of this assumption, human movement is seen as something that requires explanation. Most often, human mobility is seen as resulting from people's desire to avoid (such as war, famine, persecution, or poverty) or to achieve (economic stability, political freedom) specific outcomes. When tied with the widespread belief that people have a natural desire to settle in their place of birth, human mobility is posed as a problem that must be explained and then remedied. We see this framing of human mobility again and again as institutions work to 're-settle' refugees and migrants, sometimes to places that they have not considered their home for some time.

This volume offers a different perspective. Rather than posing migration as a problem to be explained and solved, the contributions here take as a starting point the normalcy of human mobility. Most of the contributors to *Immigrant Life in the U.S.* portray migrants as people, engaged in a natural, if sometimes difficult or troubling, human activity. For the migrants studied here, as for most mobile people past and present, moving from one place to another is a natural part of their everyday life. At the same time, this volume acknowledges the transformative

potential of human migration. The coming together of natives and newcomers *is* typically fraught for all participants, no matter how ordinary it may be. But despite the ambivalent mixture of worst fears and best hopes, such encounters are everywhere generators of social, economic, and personal transformation; in a very real sense these encounters help to create the future.

Although their proclamations of the end of the nation may have been overstated, the millenarian globalization theorists of the 1990s highlighted the transformative potential of contemporary migration. For example, they reminded scholars that migration may be an especially important form of connection in a world composed – as is today's world – of hundreds of national states. Through efforts that we have come to accept as normative and natural, states seek to fix and to freeze human movement and human identities in order to 'embrace' them (Torpey 2000). Thus, states patrol their borders to select who among the mobile will – and will not – be admitted to their territories, thereby creating increasingly complex schemas that distinguish aliens from citizens and try to regulate relations between them. By imagining migration as a challenge to national states, millenarians have helped us to see national states, and their attempts to regulate immigration and immigrant life, as creations of human history, and as subject to historical change, rather than as natural and universal forces in human life. Those who first called attention to the transformative potential of globalization also made it clear that contemporary migration operates at a different pace than in the past. As Nancy Foner (2000) has pointed out, the newer technologies of transportation and communication open possibilities for transnational practices that were developed or maintained only with great difficulty and limited success in the past. For example, while today's international body shopping of computer programmers (described by Aneesh) certainly has some parallels in the recruitment of contract laborers for vast construction projects in the nineteenth-century U.S., illiterate 'coolies' and 'padrone slaves' experienced a much stronger sense of separation and disconnection. Those recruited to build railroads and tunnels in the nineteenth century simply could not travel or receive and send news as quickly as today's technicians.

For these reasons it still makes sense to study immigrants in the U.S. and to ponder their lives as 'Americans' in a globalizing world. But it also makes sense to study them not only as aliens or as outsiders, not only as members of American ethnic or racial groups, and not only as problems in need of solutions (ranging from assimilation to immigration restriction), but as ordinary people living full, complex lives every day that they move through time and space. It is this everyday experience of mobility that connects the otherwise very diverse people documented in this volume. We believe the rather wide-ranging approach adopted here allows us think about immigrant life in the U.S. in new ways. This Afterword aims to highlight what we have learned from the diversity of immigrant life in the U.S. and to discuss what recurring themes in these divergent studies can tell us about a transition now underway in how scholars study international migration.

Divergence

Immigrant Life in the U.S. covers a great diversity of immigrations and a great diversity of immigrants. It ranges far more widely – temporally, geographically, and ethnically – than do many scholarly collections. Temporally, our contributors cover each important era of immigration into the U.S., from the mid-nineteenth century, through the early twentieth century, to the beginning of the twenty-first century. Both historians (Wild, Heidenreich) and sociologists (Mize) examine earlier immigrations while historian Hoffnung-Garskoff joins the social scientists in addressing post-1965 immigrations. We believe that attention to immigrant life over the *longue durée* of American history is a useful antidote to the more usual disciplinary divide that allots the past to historians and the present to social scientists. This divide is destructive because it discourages our understanding of how past and present are connected through families, communities, regions, and nations. We find it particularly striking that many of the same themes emerged in analyses of all three eras, regardless of the sources or methods employed by individual contributors. We turn to these convergences below.

Geographically, the range of *Immigrant Life in the U.S.* is equally broad. Contributors take up immigration to Atlanta, Colorado, Los Angeles, Napa Valley, New York and New Jersey, Philadelphia, and the Santa Clara valley. Although long-standing centers of immigration like California and New York are well represented here, our contributors nevertheless provide an analysis of immigration that is truly national in scope (although the upper midwest and the southeast are not given attention). This eclectic approach demonstrates the *persistence* of regionalism as an element of national life over the *longue durée*. The racial practices of European Americans moving into Napa County in the 1850s reflected the fact that many white southerners settled there, while the impact of the Civil War was considerably less determinative of race relations on the west coast than it was in the east. The mix of immigrants and racial minorities in the Los Angeles described by Mark Wild would have been considerably different in a city like Paterson, New Jersey in the 1930s and 1940s. The legacy of regional variation in immigration even becomes determinative of contemporary identity formation in Takenaka's comparative analysis of Peruvian Japanese in New Jersey/New York and California. How recent immigrants identify themselves reflects the differing mix of Japanese and Latino immigrants who settled before them in these two regions. Although the influx of Mexicans and Central Americans into southern California may, as Kristin Maher suggests, have allowed pink- and blue-collar workers to hire domestic servants, this pattern is less likely in other parts of the country with a different history of recent migration. In fact, it is only when people from the U.S. move outside the country – as they do in Sara Dorow's analysis of international adoption – that national origins seem to trump regional roots. For Aneesh's programmers, too, 'Americanness' is acquired – in the eyes of their neighbors – only when they return to India.

Regardless of method used or time period studied, regionalism emerges as a central theme in the contributors' analyses of the U.S. as a national state and as a 'nation of immigrants.' The ways in which immigration has, over time, reinforced and transformed U.S. regionalism and the formation of ethnic group identities and politics is a topic that deserves much more attention than it has received in analyses of the U.S. At the same time, we must emphasize (as we did also in our Introduction) that the persistence of regionalism is no more a harbinger of the declining power, salience, or influence of national states than is globalization itself. In his analysis of the very transnationally mobile computer programmers of India, Aneesh makes a particularly vigorous argument for the persistence of the nation as an organizer of human perception and human identity in an era of globalization. For Mexican Braceros, for undocumented Mexican women seeking work as domestic servants in San Diego, and for Peruvians who migrate to Japan because they believe it will help them to migrate again to the United States, the power of national states to regulate their borders and to squeeze their lives into national categories – 'legal' or 'illegal' alien, 'immigrant' or 'refugee' – seems more powerful than it was when Chinese, African Americans, Mexicans, and European Americans all converged in California in the 1850s.

The geographic reach of contributors to *Immigrant Life in the U.S.* goes even further, of course, because of the wide-ranging trajectories of immigration traced in these chapters. Just as theorists of globalization insist, international migration inevitably connects the U.S. to the places immigrants left and to the places to which they often return. Our contributors show how Santo Domingo, Mexico, Guangzhou, and Delhi become part and parcel of immigrant life in the U.S. The migratory connection is, however, not always one between two national states but rather between two very specific regions that shape the identities, imaginaries, and social networks of immigrants in very specific ways. The middle class of Santo Domingo, as described by Hoffnung-Garskof, understand the popular youth culture of New York to symbolize corrupt U.S. materialism without knowing of the religious revivals of the American south or of the intense and Catholic familialism also attributed to Mexican and Italian Americans. Ron Mize suggests that areas of Mexico that sent many Braceros to the U.S. in the middle years of the century may have preserved more extensive – and more accurate – memories of the program than did the mobile Braceros themselves. In both these cases, migrations connecting the United States to other countries become a key element in nation-building projects in the lands migrants leave. Certainly both Mexican and Dominican notions of cultural nationalism are defined, at least in part, through rejection of the United States as filtered through the lens of migratory encounters.

Obviously, too, the immigrants studied in this volume represent a wide range of ethnic, regional, and national cultures, including Dominican, Japanese Peruvian, Indian, Mexican, Central American, Chinese, and African American. In a scholarly field generally characterized by sharp ethnic and racial segmentation, with elaborate, multi-disciplinary, and typically completely separate scholarly literatures on almost every immigrant group, the gathering of such a

diversity of essays between the covers of a single book may seem incredibly wrong-headed. What, after all, can an understanding of the Chinese in Napa County in the 1850s tell a specialist about the Japanese-Peruvians of Paterson, New Jersey in the 1990s or a scholar seeking to understand the Jewish immigrant children of Los Angeles in the 1930s? We must acknowledge that scholars generally want to address other specialists within their own disciplines, and most often imagine their typical reader as someone with expertise on one particular immigrant group.

Nevertheless, we believe this broader and more inclusive collection opens new possibilities for students beginning to think about immigration as a dimension of life in the U.S. Comparison is one analytical possibility opened by diversity, although it is not one pursued systematically here. Instead, we emphasize how the many divergences of *Immigrant Life in the U.S.* allow us better to problematize the meaning of several key terms that are invoked – often without much reflection – in the study of international migration. We have already noted how analysis of many juxtaposed regions problematizes the notion of the United States as a homogeneous nation (by pointing to the persistence of regionalism). Here we can note further how the juxtaposition of specific cases of migration in specific times and places problematizes the very meaning of the term immigrant. As both Heidenreich and Dorow point out in their studies, English-speaking and black and white Americans, and citizens of the U.S., are also mobile people. Moving in the 1850s to California, the European Americans Heidenreich describes nevertheless managed to cast the natives, along with black newcomers, as racial-ethnic outsiders: neither white nor black newcomers in Napa would have considered themselves as immigrants in the 1850s, and neither do we consider them that today. Like immigrants, however, they had traveled long distances and found themselves involved in complex cross-cultural encounters. Similarly, the European Americans traveling to China with Sara Dorow can quickly and easily transform infant natives of China into U.S. citizens before they return home with them. These parents must also fear that their daughters will confront racial and gender stereotypes that make them appear as immigrants, regardless of the native parentage they so quickly and easily acquire. Ron Mize's analysis of Braceros reminds us that traveling to work in the U.S. is not enough to transform every mobile person or migrant into an immigrant. While Mize labels Braceros 'guest workers,' others might term them 'denizens' – as are the many undocumented workers who replaced Mexican Braceros after the official end of the program. Apparently, many in the U.S. also limit the term 'immigrant' to those they welcome as potential citizens. Finally, Nelson Lim's analysis of employers' attitudes toward diversity reminds us how uncomfortably contemporary racial-ethnic categories fit with distinctions between newcomer immigrants and foreigners on the one hand, and natives or citizens of the U.S. on the other. In fact, immigrants can be found throughout the racial-ethnic 'pentagon' of categories – they are white, African American, Hispanic, and Asian Americans, too. This diversity complicates any analysis of which newcomer workers may seem more desirable as unskilled labor in the eyes of their potential employers.

We have already noted repeatedly the diversity of approaches represented in *Immigrant Life in the U.S.*, but it is worth commenting on another dimension of divergence that constitutes an important strength of this collection. One could hardly glance at this volume without taking notice of the variety of methods employed to support authors' arguments about the immigrants they study. The research reported here includes the interpretation of archival materials like newspapers and government documents, qualitative interviews with individual people, ethnographic participant-observation, large-scale quantitative surveys, small-scale questionnaires, and the analysis of societal level data and records. In some ways the diversity of methodological approaches represents the diversity of disciplines from which the contributors come. Indeed, the historians were more likely to cite archival materials, the sociologists more likely to cite trends in state-level immigration data. Because this volume represents the full range of work within the human sciences – including the textual, the qualitative, and the quantitative – we are forced to recognize just how disciplinary and diverse our scholarly practices remain. Even seemingly simple and uncomplicated matters – such as the choice of a system of citation, the dispensability (or necessity) of either a literature review or a historiographical section, or the purpose and formats of footnotes and lists of 'works cited' – becomes complicated when contributors come from many disciplines.[1]

Of course, ours is not the first effort to bring together a diverse group of scholars to ponder the complexities of immigrant life in the U.S.. Already twenty years ago, social scientists interested in women and gender had produced such a collection (Simon and Brettell 1986); in the early 1990s, a collection of essays and a bibliography on immigrant women in the U.S. self-consciously described their approach as 'multi-disciplinary' because it collected separate entries from history, literature, and the social sciences (Gabaccia 1989; Gabaccia 1992). The International Migration Program of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) also adopted a rigorously multi-disciplinary approach in planning and publishing the research it supported (see Foner, Rumbaut, and Gold 2000). Most recently, anthropologist Caroline Brettell and political scientist James Hollifeld urged contributors to and readers of yet another collection of essays by migration specialists to think 'across the disciplines' without abandoning the distinctive, if often creatively diverging methods, questions, and insights of each (Brettell and Hollifeld 2000).

Immigrant Life in the U.S., we believe, begins to move us beyond these precedents with their acceptance of disciplinary divergence and separation under the rubric of 'multi-disciplinarity.' In part, this may reflect the fact that most contributors are scholars early in their academic careers. Or it may reflect changes in graduate education; certainly the International Program of the SSRC has pursued a strategy of interdisciplinary field-building in recent years, and this aim has drawn on the existing strength of a wide variety of interdisciplinary area and 'studies' programs created in the 1970s and 1980s. Even within disciplinary groups, contributors exhibited considerable divergences in methods, sources, and theoretical frameworks. Some sociologists, for example, grounded their analyses

in culture and discourse, history or everyday practice while others were rooted in institutional practice and aggregate trends. Part of this intradisciplinary divergence may also reflect the fact that a number of the contributors are affiliated with interdisciplinary programs, including women's studies, Latin American studies, Latino studies, a department of history and social sciences, a program in Science, Technology and Society, a school of education, and a private research cluster on labor and population. As we noted in the Introduction, many contributors took up questions of identity – that have been central to the humanities and cultural studies in the past decade – but chose to examine these issues with the sources and methods of history and the social sciences. These contributors literally crossed disciplinary boundaries by mixing questions and methods of more than one field. This approach is better considered an emerging interdisciplinarity, rather than yet another multi-disciplinary experiment.

So what does this dizzying array of multiple perspectives offer when brought together between two covers? Do we have chaos or convergence? We think that part of what this volume achieves is an integrative convergence of approaches, summed up in our contributors' focus on immigrant life. Looking across the ten chapters, readers can see and explore immigrant life in all its rich, yet integrated, complexity – just as the many immigrant subjects who appear in these pages perceived and lived it. We believe this was accomplished in part because each contribution did not rely solely on its individual part in the whole to achieve an aggregate convergence. In fact, most of the individual contributions offered an integration of different perspectives, methods, or disciplines.

Convergences

By titling this collection *Immigrant Life in the U.S.*, we were not grasping for a meaningless and vague generality that might paper over the diversity and specificity of its main parts. Given how central immigration is to human living, we thought it important to examine the ways in which immigration to the U.S. shapes people's *lives* and how mobility can be a way of human *life*. Immigrant *life*, as we understand it, encompasses identity, work, conflict, education, group attachment, politics, belonging and exclusion, love, hate, economics, relationships, structural inequality, power, sexuality, and more. Like all life, immigrant life is a complex constellation of forces that comes to bear on one person's, one group's, one city's, or one state's experience of immigration. It is a concept that is perhaps more holistic than the usual analytical concepts of the social sciences, yet it promises to provide the common ground on which philosophers can meet scholars of the human sciences (i.e. humanities and social sciences). Precisely because human life is complex, it must be examined across times, places, and groups, and with the insights, questions, methods, and sources of many disciplines.

Many of the chapters in this volume examine multiple facets of immigrant life by attempting to integrate them into the complex, yet coherent gestalt of everyday life and social practice. This involves more than 'thick description' (Geertz 1973), the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966),

the presentation of self in everyday life (Goffman 1959), Marxist class struggle or Gramscian hegemony, or the analysis of social practices (Bourdieu 1976), because it also incorporates many insights of postmodernist philosophers from Sartre to Foucault and Derrida. Our contributors provide readers with a series of efforts to integrate one or more of these ways of understanding human life as simultaneously lived, mediated, presented, interpreted, and represented. For most contributors this meant an active resistance to separating the different forces playing a role in their particular phenomenon of interest. As Heidenreich put it in her chapter on citizenship for Mexicanos in northern California, 'even macro-level phenomena are created through everyday practices.' And as Maher points out in her chapter on the political and cultural economy of Latina domestic work in southern California, individual people can sometimes resist, redirect, or rebuff the macro-level forces pushing against them.

We suspect that it was this focus on 'life' that made the human life cycle, and its separate stages, such a central theme in this volume. With contributions focusing either on children and youth or on adults, this collection emphasizes the significance of these two very different phases in the lifespan of immigrants. In fact, taken together, the contributions suggest how the timing of immigration may be as just as important in shaping its long-term consequences as its direction or duration. Dorow, for example, begins her analysis at birth by examining what it means to be born, orphaned, or abandoned in China only to be taken to the U.S. by adoptive parents. Others, like Wild, Hoffnung-Garskof, and Louie focus on the experiences of immigrant youth – experiences that will make their lives fundamentally different from their parents. For Wild and Louie, concern for immigrant youth translates into examination of school as a context for development and a site of institutional engagement. Not surprisingly, for adults, labor and wage-earning is a far more central experience. In numerous chapters it is labor that places immigrants geographically (Aneesh, Mize, Takenaka) and positions them politically, economically, and socially (Aneesh, Heidenreich, Lim, Maher, Mize, Takenaka). Mark Wild attends specifically to the inter-generational and familial conflicts that can emerge as a result of children's and adults' different experience of the meaning and significance of racial and ethnic identities.

While scholarship on immigration has scarcely ignored work, schooling, or intergenerational conflict, it has tended to address each as a 'problem' that requires solutions. Here, by contrast, schools and other educational institutions, workplaces, and intergenerational conflict are presented as sites of change and contestation. Rather than portraying immigrants as either victims, 'heroes of their own lives,' or 'makers' of the national state, the contributors focus on social relations in youth and adulthood to direct our attention to struggles over power as a source of individual and societal change. Whether as children or adults, immigrants, like other humans, make their own lives but rarely under conditions of their own choosing, and often in struggle with people – teachers, parents, employers, rulers – who can mobilize much more power than they can.

This volume thus serves as an example of how scholars might come to view the macro and the micro, the structural and the phenomenological, the global and the local, as mutually constitutive in everyday life and practice. For example, Aneesh's discussion of Indian programmers integrates concern for the political and cultural side of immigration for the purpose of high-tech work with concern for the existential experience of those asked to exist 'between' two places, two cultures, and perhaps two selves. From his point of view, the experience of Indian programmers in the U.S. tells us something about culture, the politics of the state, and the economics of high-tech work, but it tells us just as much about human subjectivity itself.

It is this willingness to mix metaphors, move across analytical levels and disciplinary boundaries, and to generally 'mix it up' that this otherwise diverse collection of essays shares. The historical contributions of Heidenreich, Hoffnung-Garskof, Mize, and Wild, look back at political events and popular representations of them, but with a keen eye for the folk psychology and cultural identity at their heart. The same ecumenical approach is apparent in Lim's melding of a quantitative survey of employers with abiding concern for the social psychology of their views regarding different immigrant groups' skills and abilities.

The contributors' willingness to engage multiplicity is especially clear in the contributions focused on immigrant identity. These chapters delved into the shifting, complex, sometimes contradictory ways in which immigrants experience themselves as people. For example, Louie's examination of working-class and middle-class Chinese American college students illustrated the ways in which the identities 'Chinese' and 'American' play off each other during young adults' negotiation of selfhood. So too did Takenaka's attention to the context-dependent delineation of a Japanese Peruvian identity in New York and Los Angeles show how identity is lived in a world that is sometimes ill equipped to handle its complex contours.

Although *Immigrant Life in the U.S.* as a whole represents a wide variety of methods that seem to converge when considered together, we think it is especially important that many of the individual contributions integrated vastly different types of evidence. Indeed, many of the self-consciously qualitative studies cited quantitative data (such as census figures) to bolster their claims (e.g. Takenaka, Maher, Aneesh). In a somewhat different twist, Lim used survey data to corroborate previous qualitative findings and to establish their prevalence and generality. There is little question that the long-standing dominance of demography and other quantitative sociology in the study of U.S. immigration encouraged many authors to engage this kind of data, but in their hands the figures take a different form. The figures serve to frame actual lives and the social processes that shape them and are shaped by them.

There can be little doubt that the complex disciplinary attachments of the contributors have played a part in their ability, and their willingness, to move across conceptual, methodological, and disciplinary borders. That many of them are located in interdisciplinary programs and organizations must provide some

incentive and some freedom to do so. But that can't be the whole story. Among these scholars we find a genuine commitment to using whatever tools seem useful to the complex task of understanding human life as a whole. This commitment to integrating the fragmented knowledges of many scholarly traditions suggests a deeper concern for understanding the phenomena of human life than for advancing the aims of any one disciplinary corner of the human sciences. Like the mobile, border-crossing people they study, scholars in international migration are very much 'on the move.'

Notes

2 Elusive citizenship

1 Here, I use the term U.S. Invasion as a variant of the term (North American Invasion) preferred by Mexican and Chicana/o historians because it emphasizes the unequal power dynamic of the conflict and the land-greed of the U.S. administration in provoking the conflict (Meier and Rivera 1999: 64–70).

2 Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo, 'Recuerdos Históricos y Personales Tocante a la Alta California,' in *CRÍTICA*, 1994, p. 142.

3 Early works such as Yolande S. Beard's *The Wappo: A Report* (St Helena, California: 1977), and Sheila Skjeie, 'Edward Turner Bale: A Pioneer in the Napa Valley' (written and produced for the California Department of Parks and Recreations Interpretive Services Section, August 1976, photocopy), begin to explore portions of Napa's long, early history.

4 Bureau of the Census, 1860 Census of Napa County; William James Ketteringham, 'The Settlement Geography of the Napa Valley,' (master's thesis, Stanford University, 1961).

5 Charlotte T. Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' (Napa, California, Napa County Library, 1966, mimeographed).

6 Bodnar's work, while groundbreaking, remains problematic because he failed to account for race as a force and variable in the construction of communities and nation in the U.S.. In his approach to racially diverse communities, he subsumed the category of race under that of ethnicity, thus ignoring the variability of ethnic groups within racialized minorities, and erasing the differences between ethnic and racial inequality.

7 U.S. Census Bureau, 'Table 19, California – Race and Hispanic Origin: 1850 to 1990,' www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0056/tab19.pdf. Accessed 17 January 2003. See also Weber 1982: 206.

8 As with any history, the task of finding accurate labels with which to describe both the dominant majority and racially oppressed groups is difficult. In this essay I use the term ethnic Mexican to describe all peoples who share ethnic origins in Mexico. I follow David Gutiérrez (1995) who argued that people of Mexican descent comprise such diverse communities that an umbrella term is necessary when writing about their communities. When I discuss only those ethnic Mexican communities which preceded Euro-Americans to Napa, I use the specific term Californias/os. For Chinese immigrants I follow the lead of Sucheng Chan (1986). Finally, when writing about African Americans in Napa and California, I sometimes use the label African American, as is most common in the early twenty-first century. At other times, especially when today's labels are clearly anachronistic or inappropriate, I follow the lead of John W. Ravage (1997).

9 'Padrón de los vecinos del Presidio de San Francisco, 1790' MSS CA 50 vol. 1: 85–91, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, CA; XX (1974) See also Júarez Rose 1974: 2.
10 Júarez Rose (1974: 19). See also Louis Ezettie, 'Napa's Past and Present,' *Napa Register*, 19 July 1975, p. 11A.
11 'Cayetano Júarez Documents,' MSS C-B 584 vol. I, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, CA. This volume contains a small collection of correspondence between public school administrators and the Júarez family, as well as family correspondence regarding the education of the males in the family.
12 Júarez Rose 1974: 40–1. For a complete family tree including their marriages in Napa, see MSS C-B 584 vol. II at the Bancroft Library.
13 Harry Lawrence Gunn, History of Solano County and Napa County (Chicago: S.J. Clark Publishing Company, 1926); Júarez Rose 1974; 'Old Timer Recalls Napa,' *Napa Recorder*, 6 October 1915; Enrique Cerruti, 'Rambling in California' MSS C-E 115: 25, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California. Vallejo, Cartareña, and Júarez were all noted for employing others; it is unclear how many other landed families did so.
14 Louis Ezettie, 'Napa's Past and Present,' *Napa Register*, 19 July 1985, p. 11A: Louis Ezettie, 'Looking into Napa's Past and Present,' *Napa Register*, 9 July 1983, n.p.
15 Lyman Palmer, *History of Napa and Lake Counties*, California (San Francisco: Slocum, Bowen, and Co., 1881), 147–9; Louis Ezettie, 'Napa's Past and Present,' Napa Register, 19 July 1985, 11A: Louis Ezettie, 'Looking into Napa's Past and Present,' *Napa Register*, 9 July, 1983, n.p.
16 Bureau of the Census, 1860 Census of Napa County.
17 Luper took her statistics from the Chinese Historical Society in San Francisco.
18 Charlotte T. Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' 1–28, mimeographed.
19 Lynn Penny, 'Napa's Chinese Community,' *Napa Register Vintage* 2000, in box 22, Napa County Historical Society.
20 Newspaper business advertisement, *Napa Register*, 18 April 1874, 4; Lynn Penny, 'Napa's Chinese Community.'
21 'Sam Brannon, E Clampus Vitus, Chinatown Plaque Dedication,' pamphlet 18 August 1979, Napa County Historical Society, box 22.
22 Rebecca Yerger, 'Dimension of Napa's Old Chinatown Revisited,' *Napa Valley Register*, 1 September 1996, p. 7C.
23 Carolee M. Luper, 'The Chinese in the Napa Valley,' 71; Norton L. King, Napa County: An Historical Overview, Office of the Napa County Superintendent of Schools, 1967, mimeographed, p. 67.
24 Louis Ezettie, 'Looking to Napa's Past and Present,' *Napa Register*, 25 August, 1979, 14A; Rebecca Yerger, 'Dimension of Napa's Old Chinatown Revisited, *Napa Register*, 1 September, 1991, p. 7C; 'Chinese in Napa,' *Chinese Historical Society of America Bulletin* 6 no. 1, January 1970, pp. 7–8.
25 'Chinese in Napa,' *Chinese Historical Society of America Bulletin*, p. 7.
26 Yerger, 'Dimension of Napa's Old Chinatown Revisited,' p. 7C.
27 *Napa County Register*, 16 February 1867, p. 3.
28 Lynn Penny, 'Chinatown Is Gone, But Trees Still There,' *Napa Register*, March 1975, p. 13V.
29 'Chinese in Napa,' *Chinese Historical Society of America Bulletin*.
30 Penny, 'Chinatown Is Gone'; Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' pp. 56–9.
31 Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' pp. 102–18.
32 Bureau of the Census, 1850 Census of Napa County.
33 A. Odell Thurman, 'The Negro in California before 1890' (master's thesis, College of the Pacific, 1945), pp. 32–7.
34 Bureau of the Census, 1860 Census of Napa County; Napa County Register of Deaths, 1873–1903, Napa County Records Office, Napa County, California.
35 Bureau of the Census, 1860 Census of Napa County.
36 Den Nota, Letter to the Editor, *Pacific Appeal*, 6 September 1862, p. 3.

37 *Proceedings of the First State Convention of the Colored Citizens of the State of California* (Sacramento: Democratic State Journal Print, 1855), p. 16.
38 *Proceedings of the First State Convention of the Colored Citizens of the State of California*, 1855; *Proceedings of the California State Convention of Colored Citizens* (San Francisco: The Elevator, 1865). See also Taylor 1998: 109–11, 202–10.
39 The 1860 Census of Napa County; *Pacific Coast Business Directory* (San Francisco: Henry and Largely, 1867), pp. 71–3.
40 Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' 102–118; *Napa County Reporter*, 9 May 1863, p. 2.
41 *Statutes of California*, Sixteenth Session, 1865–1866 (Sacramento: O.M. Clays, State Printer, 1866), p. 397, section 53 'Of Schools'.
42 *Statutes of California*, Sixteenth Session, 398. For a detailed discussion of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and its protection of the Spanish language in conquered territories, see Griswold del Castillo 1990.
43 *Statutes of California*, 1873–1874 (Sacramento: State Printer, 1874), p. 211.
44 For example, the second reader (1838) has thirty-three lessons about boys and only seven about girls (Minnich 1975: 1–19, 53–114).
45 *McGuffey's Fourth Eclectic Reader*, rev. ed. (New York: American Book Company, 1879), pp. 128–32.
46 *McGuffey's First Eclectic Reader*, rev. ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1879), p. 29.
47 *McGuffey's First Eclectic Reader*, pp. 44–5.
48 *McGuffey's Second Eclectic Reader*, rev. ed. (New York: American Book Company, 1879), pp. 35–7.
49 *McGuffey's Third Eclectic Reader*, rev. ed. (New York: American Books Company, 1879), pp. 172–4.
50 'Europe and America' in *McGuffey's New Fifth Eclectic Reader: Selected and Original Exercises for Schools* (New York: Cincinnati, Winthrop B. Smith and Co., 1857), p. 271.
51 'Character of the Puritan Fathers of New England' in *McGuffey's New Fifth Eclectic Reader: Selected and Original Exercises for Schools* (New York: Cincinnati, Winthrop B. Smith and Co., 1857), p. 249.
52 Skipp Porteous, 'Anti-Semitism: Its Prevalence within the Christian Right,' *Freedom Writer*, May 1994: Porteous was referring to passages in the fourth reader. See Bohning 1986 for a discussion of the authorship of the readers.
53 *New York Tribune*, 16 September 1906, cited in Fischer *et al.* 1997: 7–8
54 Programs, Teacher's Institute of Napa County, 1897–1906, Microfilm, California State Archives, Sacramento, California. Programs are not available for earlier years.
55 Program, Teacher's Institute of Napa, 1903.
56 Today, analysts of McGuffey's readers often note their application of Protestant ideas of industry and morality. See Parker and Parker 1995: 279; Lindberg 1979: xvi; Mosier 1999: 32–45, 84
57 See, for example, 'The Death of Captain Grenville P. Swift,' *Napa Reporter*, 1 May 1875, 3; 'Another Pioneer Gone,' *Napa Reporter*, 18 March 1876, 3; 'Meeting of Pioneers,' *Napa Reporter*, 14 March 1874.
58 See *Napa County Reporter*, 11 May 1872, 3; 6 May 1871, p. 2.
59 See *Napa County Reporter*, for example 22 August 1874, p. 2.
60 *Napa County Reporter*, 9 February 1867, p. 3.
61 Correspondence, cited in Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man*, rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1981), p. 80.
62 See, for example 'Louis Agassiz, Teacher,' *Napa Recorder*, 11 April 1874, 1; 'Letter from Calistoga,' *Napa Recorder*, 17 January 1874, p. 3; 'The Agassiz,' *Napa Recorder*, 21 March 1874, p. 1; 'Admixture of Races,' *Napa County Reporter*, 19 April 1872, p. 1.

63 See, for example, 'More Nigger,' *Pacific Echo*, 11 April 1863 and 'Hit One of the Wrong Kind,' *Pacific Echo*, 21 February 1863, p. 2.
64 'A Few Words,' *Napa County Reporter*, 10 August 1867; 'Monkey Suffrage,' *Napa County Reporter*, 8 May 1869, p. 4.
65 'The Kluklux Klan (sic),' *Napa County Reporter*, 4 July 1868, p. 4.
66 See, for example, 'Ku Klux Outrage,' *Napa County Reporter*, 26 December 1868, p. 8.
67 'To the White Men of America,' *Napa County Reporter*, 18 July 1868. Italics in the original.
68 'A Visit to Napa,' *Pacific Appeal*, 31 May 1862, p. 3.
69 'Negrophobia,' and 'Emancipation,' *Pacific Appeal*, 2 August 1862; 'Visitors,' *Pacific Appeal*, 2 August 1862, p. 2.
70 U.S. Manuscript Census, Napa County, 1860.
71 *Napa County Reporter*, 9 May 1863, p. 2.
72 Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' pp. 56–63.
73 Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' pp. 88–97.
74 Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' pp. 146–8.
75 Miller, 'Grapes, Queues and Quicksilver,' pp. 88–97.

3 The prehistory of the *Cadenú*

1 Bolívar Díaz Gómez, 'Preocupa Imagen Tienen en RD de Dominicanos Radicados NY,' *El Nacional* , 9 December 1986.
2 The massive, piecemeal subsidy New Yorkers sent to the island maintained individual families, and also helped to moderate chronic balance of payments crises. 'Pondera Valor Remesas Exterior,' *Listín Diario*, 12 December 1984.
3 José Romero, 'Ausentes Compran Mayoría Viviendas,' *Listín Diario*, 31 January 1985. See also 'Dominicanos Radicados en Nueva York Son Mayores Adquirentes Viviendas RD,' *Listín Diario*, 4 December 1986. Author's interview with Maria Mora, Santo Domingo, 2000.
4 Infotur. Banco Central de la República Dominicana. The actual number of returning migrants was probably higher. Since many Dominicans lived and worked in New York with only tourist visas, their visits to the island were simply recorded as tourists returning home from the United States.
5 *El Nacional* was distributed in a commercial venture by now Vice President Milagros Ortíz Bosch. Author's interview with Moya Pons, Frank (PhD), Santo Domingo, February 2000.
6 See announcement in *El Nacional*, 20 October 1971, p. 12.
7 'Dominicanos en New York,' *El Nacional*, 22 December 1971, p. 12.
8 Héctor V. Chacón, 'Entregan regalía pascual en Nueva York,' *El Nacional*, 4 January 1978.
9 'Colonia en NY ayuda pobres,' *El Nacional*, 3 February 1972, p. 6.
10 'Aportando,' *El Nacional*, 14 August 1971, pp. 1, 6.
11 Miguel Rodríguez O, 'En serio y en broma … dominicanos en New York,' *¡Ahora!*, 15 July 1968, p. 72.
12 The Reformista Consuls frequently celebrated the honesty and cultural achievements of the *colonia*; Consul Federico Antún, for instance, said that when migrants come to New York 'their aim is to progress,' Luis A. Rojas Durán, 'Cónsul de RD Trata Evitar Repatriación,' *El Nacional*, 30 October 1971, pp. 1, 6. 'Los Quisqueyanos en EU y las navidades,' *El Nacional*, 23 December 1971.
13 'La Vida en Nueva York Desajusta a Criollos,' *El Nacional*, 1 February 1972, pp. 1, 2.
14 Author's interview with Bonaparte Gratereaux-Piñyero, Santo Domingo, 2000.
15 Author's interview with Pedro Ubiera, Santo Domingo, 2000.
16 *Ibid.*

17 This disdain could be applied equally to the local middle class created by the immense patronage system of the Balaguer government. Melvin Mañón, 'El Festival de la Calse Media Dominicana,' *¡Ahora!* 2 December 1974, pp. 2–10. The new middle class, he wrote, lived by the dictum 'first buy a thing, then figure out what it is used for.'
18 See reference to both articles in *¡Ahora!*, 15 November 1971, pp. 38–9.
19 'Pero lo modeino e modeino, compadre,' he wrote in resignation, 'manqué sea feo, caro y de mai guto. Har que tai a la moda poique si no lo acretiquean a uno o lo ñaman campuno, hombre aizao o anaifabetia.'
20 Foreign Service Dispatch, American Embassy, Ciudad Trujillo, 'Censorship of Foreign Films,' 11 June 1957, State Department Record Group 59, National Archives.
21 Miguel Angel Brito Mata, 'Una Sociedad en decadencia,' *¡Ahora!* 14 July 1969, pp. 57–8.
22 Discurso de Joaquín Balaguer ante el Congreso Nacional, 16 de Agosto, 1970. (Balaguer 1979).
23 Author's interview with anonymous resident of Cristo Rey, Santo Domingo, 2000.
24 'Hippie Defiende su Melena,' *El Nacional*, 25 April 1971, p. 24.
25 Mario Emilio Pérez, 'Una Juventud Frustrada,' *El Nacional*, 27 November 1968, p. 10.
26 Author's interview with Pedro Rodriguez, Philadelphia, 2001.
27 'Movimiento liberación de la mujer, entrevista con Altagracia Coiscou-Guzmán,' *¿Que? La revista del pueblo*, October 1971, pp. 38–42.
28 For insight into the ways cultural activists imagined their role in the popular *barrios* of Santo Domingo, see Bolívar A. Reynoso, 'Club Deportivo-Cultural Mauricio Baez,' *¿Que? La revista del pueblo*, November 1971, pp. 8–10. Author's interview with Diputado Isidro Torres, Santo Domingo, 2000.
29 See for instance Frank Faso, Edward Benes, and Henry Lee, 'Illegal Aliens: a Stopover in Puerto Rico,' *Daily News*, 28 September 1971, p. 30.
30 'Dominicanos en esta Ciudad de New York Orgullo para el Pueblo Dominicano,' *El Dominicano*, June 1973.
31 Tirso Valdez, 'Mosaicos de Nueva York,' *¡Ahora!*, 15 November 1971, pp. 38–9.
32 Atanay quoted in Tirso Valdez, 'Mosaicos de Nueva York,' *¡Ahora!*, 17 January 1972.
33 Carlos F. Morel in *Diario La Prensa*, 22 October 1971, quoted in Tirso Valdez, 'Mosaicos de Nueva York,' *¡Ahora!*, 15 November 1971.
34 Alfredo White, 'El Inmigrante Dominicano ante las Próximas Elecciones,' *¡Ahora!* 20 May 1974, pp. 14–16.
35 Porfirio Ml. Valdez, 'Dominicanos en New York,' *Amigo del Hogar*, 16 September and 17 October 1971, pp. 22–3.
36 Melquíades, 'New York: Micro Noticias y Comentarios,' *Amigo del Hogar*, November 1971, p. 40.
37 Padre Juan Oleaga, 'Ametrallan 5 Dominicanos,' *Amigo del Hogar*, July–August 1968, pp. 24–5.
38 *Ibid.*
39 María Ramos, 'Historia de una Familia que Emigró a New York, Séptima Parte,' *Amigo del Hogar*, May 1974, pp. 34–5.
40 Vilma Weisz, 'Causas de las Migraciones Dominicanas Al Exterior,' Licenciatura, Universidad Nacional Pedro Henriquez Ureña, 1973. See also Victor Grimaldi, 'La vida de los Dominicanos en Nueva York,' *El Dominicano*, June 1973; Antonio Hugo Ysalguez, 'Nueva York No Es un Paraíso (Los Dominicanos Lo Han Comprabado),' *¡Ahora!*, 29 September 1975, pp. 66–7. Juan De Frank Canelo, *Dónde, por Qué, de Qué, Cómo Viven los Domincanos en el Extranjero* (Santo Domingo: Editora Alfa y Omega, 1982).
41 Héctor V. Chacón, 'Vistazos de Nueva York,' *El Nacional*, 26 November 1978, p. 29.
42 Héctor V. Chacón, 'Acusan a Oficial de NY Negligencia en Saqueo de Negocio Dominicano,' *El Nacional*, 2 May 1979, p. 11.

43 Arnold H. Lubasch, 'U.S. Breaks up Major Crack Ring in New York,' *New York Times*, 31 July 1987, p. B1; Michael Massing, 'Crack's Destructive Sprint across America,' *New York Times*, 1 October 1989 6: 38; Barbara Whitaker, 'D'Amato Targeting Dominican Aid; Angered by Refusal to Extradite Suspect in Slaying of a City Cop,' *New York Newsday*, 20 June 1989, p. 31.
44 Rafael Ovalles, 'JB: Regreso Criollos EU Agrava Drogadicción,' *El Nacional*, 4 September 1988.

4 Between fantasy and despair

1 I thank Erica Bornstein and the editors, Colin Wayne Leach and Donna Gabaccia for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. I also wish to thank the Social Science Research Council's International Migration Program for funding the larger research project that informs this study.
2 Although globalization is a much debated term (Held 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1996), I use it for the sake of convenience, referring primarily to the quickening processes of transnational integration through data networks.
3 By calling programmers key players, I do not merely mean those who became successful entrepreneurs, like Bill Gates and many others; my analysis focuses on the regular unknown everyday programmer whose labor is changing the very structure of work in terms of both local organizational structures as well as global networking.
4 I use the term programmer in the widest possible sense, including systems analysts and various database, web, e-commerce, and other software developers.
5 The H-1B is a non-immigrant classification used for a foreign worker who is employed temporarily in a specialty occupation. A specialty occupation requires theoretical or practical application of a body of specialized knowledge along with at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent.
6 The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000.
7 The universality of programming is not like the universality of secretarial work in diverse organizations. Unlike secretaries, software professionals are systems-level workers, that is, they can potentially transform how organizations function from within, reconfiguring various departments and hierarchies and their workflow through such systems as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP).
8 This interview was conducted much before the 11 September attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Many cases of harassment of Sikhs, including one death and a stabbing, were reported in its aftermath, corroborating some of the truth behind this statement.
9 Currently, India does not allow dual citizenship.

5 Asian-Latinos

1 The data used for the paper are drawn from the field work I conducted in New York (1998, 2000) and Los Angeles (1997, 2001). During these periods, I interviewed over 48 Japanese-Peruvians. I also collected additional data by conducting survey research among 25 and 24 households headed by Peruvians in New York (and Passaic County, New Jersey) and Los Angeles, respectively. The survey was carried out as part of the Latin American Migration Project at the University of Pennsylvania, co-directed by Drs Douglas Massey and Jorge Durand.
2 This is based on my own calculation going over randomly selected portions of the entire registry.
3 *Los Angeles Times*, 5 February 1995.
4 *Ibid.*

6 Adopted children's identities at the China/U.S. border

1 The research project on which this article is based was supported by the Social Science Research Council's International Migration Fellowship; the MacArthur Scholars Fellowship provided through the MacArthur Interdisciplinary Program on Global Change, Sustainability, and Justice at the University of Minnesota; the University of Minnesota Graduate School's Grant for Research Abroad; the University of Minnesota Sociology Department's Anna Welsch Bright Memorial Award; and a Race, Ethnicity, and Migration Grant from the University of Minnesota.
2 Names of adoptive families and facilitators have been changed. There is no point, however, in disguising the one-of-a kind places otherwise described here: Guangzhou, Shamian Island, names of hotels and businesses on Shamian Island, the U.S. Consulate. I use the names of officers at the U.S. Consulate with their permission.
3 See also a special issue of *Social Text* (Spring 2003), guest-edited by Toby Alice Volkman and Cindi Katz, devoted to some of the best recent scholarship on transnational adoption.
4 Here I deliberately play off of the migration theory of 'push–pull' factors, most associated with demographer Everett Lee (1966) 'A Theory of Migration,' *Demography* 3: 47–57, in order to suggest that the factors that lead to migration are both material and symbolic, and move in several directions at once.
5 According to the 'The Triennial Comprehensive Report on Immigration' issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 2002, the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou is one of very few in the world with a special adoption visa unit, and it issues more adoption visas than any other post worldwide. (*http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/repsstudies/addition.html*, p. 242).
6 I have found that a number of parents start the China adoption process with this comfortable sense of distance from birth families, but that, as their children get older and wrestle with their identities, parents sometimes wish they did know more about birth families or could even try to contact them (although this is a very slim possibility in China–U.S. adoption).
7 Parents who have been matched with a child from the province of Guangdong, where Guangzhou (and thus Shamian Island) is located, sometimes spend their entire 10–12-day trip to China in the White Swan.
8 The Chinese name of the store, *Qinziyuan*, means something like 'Garden of Family Generations.' One of the shop's staff told me that they had asked a Chinese American businesswoman, someone who understood both Western and Chinese cultures, to help them pick the Chinese name.

7 Members of many gangs

1 Kango Kunitsugo, interviewed by Sherry Turner and David Binaisz, 28 November 1973, Oral History Program, California State University Fullerton (hereafter CSUFOHP), 10.
2 In general, I use ethno-racial categories (Japanese, Mexican, Jewish) to refer to people of that ethnic ancestry regardless of citizenship status. They reflect the terms used at the time. Anglo, which was not used at the time, refers primarily to native-born white Protestants of western European ancestry. Generally, I use 'white' only when the sources do not distinguish between Anglos and non-Anglos, or when sources specifically referred to race. I employ all of these terms for the convenience they lend to my argument, and am aware that they constitute no essentialized categories of identity formation.
3 I have conceived the term 'central neighborhoods,' which was not used at the time, to refer to those working-class parts of Los Angeles, generally (though not always)

located within or around the central manufacturing district, where working-class residents of any background could settle.

4 'Life history of Angelita Avila,' #B-262, Box 36, Survey of Race Relations, Hoover Library, Stanford University (hereafter SRR). Angelita Avila is a fictitious name.

5 Kazuo Kawai, 'Life history of Kazuo Kawai,' 2 March 1925, #296, Box 31, SRR.

6 One USC student reported that 99 per cent of a sample of members in the mixed-ethnic All Nations Boys Club attended the movies at least once a week. Spanish-language theaters also provided alternatives for some non-English speakers. Paul J. Crawford, 'Movie Habits and Attitudes of the Underprivileged Boys of the All Nations Area in Los Angeles,' Master's Thesis, USC, 1934, pp. 17, 41.

7 Emory Bogardus, *The City Boy and His Problems: A Survey of Boy Life in Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: Rotary Club, 1926), 89; William Chew Chan, interview with S. Chong and Beverly Chan, 7 and 12 January 1980, #39, Southern California Chinese American Oral History Program, Department of Special Collections, UCLA (hereafter SCCAOHP); Homer K. Watson, ' A Study of the Causes of Delinquency among Fifty Negro Boys Assigned to Special Schools in Los Angeles,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1923, p. 41; Isabel Americanian, 'An Educational and Psychological Study of Vagabonds,' Master's Thesis, USC, 1932; Adler 1997: 241.

8 Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 68–70; Archie Green, interview with author, 18 March 1999; Hettie Peary French, 'A Study of Juvenile Delinquency in a Selected Area of Los Angeles,' Master's Thesis, USC, 1934.

9 Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 30–1; Lillian Sokoloff, 'The Russians in Los Angeles,' *Studies in Sociology: Sociological Monograph* n.11 p. 3 (March 1918): 5; *Linking Our Lives: Chinese American Women of Los Angeles* (Los Angeles: Asian-American Studies Center/UCLA/Chinese Historical Society of Southern California, 1984), pp. 7, 18; Odem 1995: 170; Alice Mary Fesler, 'A Study of the Relationship of Inadequate Parental Control to Truancy among Girls,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1922.

10 Nora Sterry, 'The Sociological Basis for the Reorganization of the Macy Street School,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1924, pp. 90–3; Sokoloff, 'Russians in Los Angeles,' p. 11; Gertrude Ruhnka, 'The Church of All Nations: a Study of the Religious and Social Significance of the Church of All Nations as a Social Institution,' unpublished manuscript, 1927, in 'CAN miscellaneous, 1917–1927' file, G. Bromley Oxnam Papers (GBOP), Library of Congress, Washington DC (no pagination).

11 William C. Smith, 'Interview with Julia Suski,' 13 August 1924, #B-64, Box 35, SRR; Kango Kunitsugo interview, 10. Of course, such parental concerns were not limited to central city residents. On the broader issues of daughters' behavior in Los Angeles during this period, see Odem 1995. See also Ruiz 1993.

12 'Summaries of Playground Surveys,' fall 1918, 'Interchurch Movement' file, Box 102, G. Bromley Oxnam Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC (GBOP); Edna Fern Gano, 'A Study of the Behavior and Ideas of Certain Children of the Church of All Nations in the Light of their Home Background,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1923; Herbert Asbury, *The Barbary Coast* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1933), p. 154.

13 Emilia Castañeda de Valenciana Oral History, interviewed by Christine Valenciana, 8 September 1971, CSUFOHP, 9–10; Milton Quon, interview with Beverly Chan, 27 October and 1 December 1979, #30, hereafter SCCAOHP; Strode and Young 1990: 7.

14 Bryant 1998: 3–4, 115–16, 135, 179, 181, 234, 264. See also Bette Yarborough Cox, *Central Avenue – Its Rise and Fall, 1890–c.1955* (reprint, Los Angeles: BEEM, 1996), p. 123.

15 *Los Angeles School Journal*, 16 January 1925, pp. 13–14. See also Sitton 1990; Stilgoe 1983: 167–88.

16 Bogardus, *City Boy*, p. 31. See also Dana Bartlett, *The Better City: A Sociological Study of a Modern City* (Los Angeles: Reune, 1907), p. 142; J. J. Maut, 'Causes and Prevention of Crime,' in August Vollmer, ed., *Law Enforcement in Los Angeles* (1924, reprint: New York:

Arno Press, 1974), pp. 116–17; H.C. Tracy, 'The School Boy, His Home,' *Los Angeles School Journal*, 13 November 1920, pp. 16–17; H. Loren Mitchell, 'Our School Playgrounds,' *Los Angeles School Journal*, 26 January 1925, pp. 13–14; Gano, 'A Study of the Behavior and Ideas of Certain Children,' pp. 4–6; Gertrude Agnes Stephens, 'A Study of the Leisure Time Activities of a Group of Fifty Fifth and Sixth Grade Boys of Los Angeles,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1935, p. 78.

17 James E. Rogers, *The Child at Play* (New York: Century, 1932), p. 98; Louise Demody, 'The Leisure Home of the Child,' *Los Angeles School Journal*, 27 April 1923, pp. 19–20. For the study of efforts to curb urban children's street-based activities, see Baldwin 1999: 147–76.

18 Archie Green, Morris Kadish, Michio Kunitani, interviews with author. African-American resident quoted in Bond, 'Negro in Los Angeles,' p. 63. On attitudes of working-class parents towards street play more generally, see Jacobs 1989: 76–88.

19 Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 89–98, 113. See also Lopez 1992: 32–9.

20 Asbury, *Barbary Coast*, pp. 152–6; Catherine Holt, 'Interview with Dr. F.T. Nakaya,' 21 and 28 September 1924, Box 29, SRR.

21 Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 91–3; Allan Chan, interviewed by George Yee, 22 February 1980, #77, SCCAOHP.

22 Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 91–3; Los Angeles County Coordinating Council, ' "Last Chance Areas" in the City of Los Angeles,' February 1941, 45, Box 2, Los Angeles County Coordinating Council Collection (LACCC), California Social Welfare Archives, University of Southern California (hereafter CSWA). See also Coney Woodman's account of gang fighting in *Central Avenue Sounds*, p. 95. Beatrice Griffith, *American Me* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 51; Lopez, 'A gang of angels,' pp. 32–9.

23 Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 89–98; Ruhnka, 'Church of All Nations'; 'Phi Gamma Frat. List,' n.d., in 'CAN II,' Box 57, GBOP.

24 ' "Last Chance" Areas,' pp. 6, 20.

25 Ryland Boorman, *Developing Personality in Boys* (New York: MacMillan, 1929), p. 37; Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 34, 140–2. For World War II era and postwar analyses that employ the same logic, see 'Program Suggestions to Los Angeles County Coordinating Committee for 1943–44,' [1944], Box 2, LACCC; 'Study of Recreation Needs and Services: South Central Los Angeles,' Recreation and Youth Services Planning Council, August 1966, in Recreation and Youth Services Planning Council Collection, CSWA.

26 Bessie D. Stoddart, 'Recreative Centers of Los Angeles, California,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 35 (March 1910): 218; Los Angeles Playground Commission, *Annual Report – Dec. 1, 1908 to June 30, 1910*, p. 3.

27 Los Angeles Playground Commission, *Annual Report – Nov. 30, 1907*, Los Angeles City Archives, pp. 3–21; Stoddart, 'Recreative Centers,' pp. 210–19.

28 See Raftery 1992: 30–2. Stoddart, 'Recreative Centers of Los Angeles,' pp. 210–19; C.L. Glenn, 'The Playground – the Kingdom of the Child,' *Los Angeles School Journal*, 29–24 September, pp. 17–18; Mitchell, 'Our School Playgrounds'; Bogardus, *City Boy*, pp. 100, 110; Adelina Bland, 'The Girl on the Playground,' *Los Angeles School Journal*, 5 October 1925, pp. 13–14; Playground Commission Report, 30 November 1906, p. 4.

29 On the perpetuation of juvenile delinquency, see Virgil D. Dahl, 'Geographical Concentration of Juvenile Delinquency in Los Angeles County' (Master's Thesis: USC, 1932); Lopez, 'A Gang of Angels.' On Custer Street playground, see [Miss] Wrottenberg, 'Field Agent's Report and Recommendations on Organization of Custer Center,' p. 2, in 'Los Angeles Community Service' file, Box 4, California Commission of Immigration and Housing Records (hereafter CIH), Bancroft Library.

30 Kit King Louis, 'A Study of American-born and American-reared Chinese in Los Angeles,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1931, 22; Clara

Gertrude Smith, 'The Development of the Mexican People in the Community of Watts, California,' Master's Thesis, USC, 1933, p. 53.

31 Bogardus, *City Boy*, p. 100; Strode and Young 1990: 18. See also Stoddart, 'Recreative Centers'; Gretchen Tuthill, 'Japanese in the City of Los Angeles,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1924, p. 25.

32 Bruce Wallace, 'Recreation for the Japanese in Los Angeles,' 29 May 1924, #B-189, Box 35, SRR.

33 Material collected in #315, Box 31, SRR; James Chan interview, SCCAOHP.

34 Walter Chung, interview by George Yee, 20 January 1980, #76, SCCAOHP.

35 The Boyle Heights troop may have been an exception, given that most troops organized around church groups. Bogardus, *City Boy*, p. 114; Archie Green, interview with author. Of course, racial tension sometimes flared in these integrated groups. One boys' club comprised mostly of Mexicans, for example, turned down the application of an African-American boy. Supervisors at the club protested and eventually the boy was voted in with only one dissenting vote. See Ruhnka, 'Church of All Nations.'

36 J. Gregory Payne and Scott C. Ratzan, *Tom Bradley: The Impossible Dream* (Santa Monica, CA: Roundtable, 1986), pp. 10–11; Santiago L. Campos, 'I Am Only a Foreigner – So This Is America,' n.d., #113, Box 26, SRR. See also 'And Who is My Neighbor?,' 1924 (reprinted from *Christian Advocate*), Box 4, SRR.

37 Bogardus, *City Boy*, p. 38; Griffith, *American Me*, pp. 51, 188.

38 Louis, 'Study of American-born,' p. 47; William C. Smith, 'Interview with Tom Gubbins,' 13 August 1924, #B-61, Box 35, SRR.

39 Archie Green, interview with author; Ying Wong Kwon, interview by Elaine You, 16 and 22 May 1979, #13, SCCAOHP.

40 Griffith, *American Me*, pp. 15–28; see also Mazon 1984; Escobar 1999.

41 On this postwar approach, see for example Special Services for Groups, 'A Study of the Roles Which Voluntary Community Chest Funds Have in the Support of These Services in the Los Angeles Area,' October 1962, esp. pp. 3–11, Special Services for Groups Collection (SSG), CSWA. Special Services for Groups, a subset of the Los Angeles Youth Project, was one of a myriad of postwar reform institutions created to address gang/delinquency problems in the central neighborhoods.

42 American Council on Race Relations, 'The Problem of Violence: Observations on Race Conflict in Los Angeles,' 1947.

43 Willard 2001: 96–107; Nicolaides 2002: 302. See also Jesse Ranker, 'A study of juvenile gangs in the Hollenbeck area of Los Angeles,' Master's Thesis, University of Southern California, 1957, esp. pp. 34, 66–7; 'Findings and Recommendations of the Grand Jury of Los Angeles County for 1943, Based upon Its Inquiry into Juvenile Crime and Delinquency in that County,' [1943], pp. 2, 5, 'Youth Delinquency Prevention, 1938–1945' file, Box 2, LACCC.

8 'Becoming' and 'being' Chinese American in college

1 In this study, the 1.5 generation are defined as foreign-born children who arrived in the United States by the age of 11, and were educated and socialized there, and the second generation are the American-born children of immigrants.

2 Phinney (1989, 2000) has written extensively on the role of culture and ethnicity in development among ethnic minority children and adolescents in the United States.

3 My research drew mainly on interview respondents from Columbia College, but included three respondents from Barnard and four from the Engineering School. Barnard and the Engineering School maintain their own faculty, curriculum, administration, operating budget, and admissions. Both Barnard and engineering students, however, can take classes at Columbia College, and participate in the same undergraduate organizations.

4 The total mean SAT score for matriculated students entering that year was 1,346 out of a possible 1,600, and fees and tuition were approximately $30,000.
5 I contacted the following organizations at Columbia: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, American Society of Civil Engineers, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Asian American Society of Engineers, Economics Society, Institute of Electrical and Electronical Engineers, Society of Women Engineers, Women in Public and International Affairs, Biological Society, Chandler Society for Undergraduate Chemistry, Premedical Society, Cantonese Christian Fellowship, Chinese Bible Study, Sounds of China, Chinese Students Club, East Asian Journal, and the Asian American Alliance. Only students from the last four groups expressed interest and were qualified for the research. At Hunter, student groups did not have email, and did not have regularly scheduled meetings. Thus, I only contacted the ethnic organizations: Asian American Students Collective, Asians in Action, and the Chinese Christian Fellowship.
6 Gender, however, was important in how many of my working-class female respondents were socialized by their parents. For further discussion, see Louie (2000).
7 The first Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) suspended immigration of all Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled, for ten years. The only exceptions were diplomatic officers, scholars, students, merchants, and short-term travellers. A decade later, in 1892, the Act was extended to further prohibit entry of all Chinese laborers.
8 The student population at Hunter was as follows: 39.1 percent white, 20.1 percent black, 23.3 percent Hispanic, and 17.3 percent Asian or Pacific Islanders.

9 Workplace identities and collective memory

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2001 Social Science Research Council International Migration Program's 'American Identities, Transnational Lives' Conference, La Jolla, University of California San Diego and was partially funded by the Social Science Research Council Committee on International Migration and the CIC Predoctoral Fellowship Program.
2 James Scott describes the uncovering of the hidden transcripts of resistance as investigating 'what may lie beneath the surface' of official public discourse between elites and the oppressed (Scott 1990: 70). Unfortunately, Scott never addresses the major problematic for researchers: how do we uncover hidden transcripts, how do we access off-stage thoughts and actions, or how do we make the research act accessible to the hidden, off-stage when research is almost invariably public? Regardless of our talents as researchers, it requires a great deal of time, presence, and commitment to the aggrieved communities we hope to understand if we truly wish to move beyond existing power relations and understand how domination is internalized, performed, covertly resisted, and/or directly resisted.
3 Studies of total institutions have been limited, even up to today, to observing prisons, mental hospitals, and the military (Brisset and Edgeley 1994; Goffman 1961; Watson 1980). Elkins's (1959) application of the total institution framework to slavery resulted in an uncritical acceptance of the public transcripts of domination as evidence of the slave mentality as 'infantilized,' incapable of rebellion, and psychologically dependent upon the master.
4 'The Life Story of Don Jorge,' 6 January 1997, Fresno, California; 'The Life Story of Don Francisco,' 1997, Fresno, California.
5 'The Life Story of Don Jorge,' 6 January 1997, Fresno, California.
6 'The Life Story of Don Antonio,' 1997, Fresno, California.
7 Interviews with Mr Allen, Former Colorado State Housing Inspector, Colorado Department of Health, 1997, Alamosa, Colorado and with Señor Freemont, 'Former' Postal Worker, 1997, Alamosa, Colorado.
8 'The Life Story of Don Antonio,' 1997, Fresno, California.

9 'The Life Story of Don Francisco,' 1997. Fresno, California.
10 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California, Box 3, folder 1.
11 Interview with Señor Freemont, Former Postal Worker, 1997, Alamosa, Colorado.
12 'The Life Story of Don Liberio,' 1997, Fresno, California.
13 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California, Box 3, folder 1.
14 *Ibid.*
15 *Ibid.*
16 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California., Box 9, folder 2.
17 U.S. President's Commission on Migratory Labor, *Migratory Labor in American Agriculture* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 45.
18 President's Commission on Migratory Labor, *Migratory Labor in American Agriculture,* 46.
19 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California., Box 3, folder 1.
20 Ernesto Galarza Papers, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California., Box 18, folder 1.
21 Interview with Señor Palmas, Former Food Provider, 1997, Alamosa, Colorado.
22 'The Life Story of Don Daniel,' 1997, Fresno, California.

10 The significance of race in the urban labor market

1 The term 'employer' refers to any individual who makes critical decisions in labor processes on behalf of a business establishment; the individual may be a human resource staff member, a manager, a supervisor, or an owner of a small business. Anyone who makes decisions to hire, fire, and promote people within a business establishment is an employer.
2 One of the main problems in conducting an organizational survey is the absence of a complete sampling frame (Kalleberg *et al.* 1996: 23–9; Kalleberg *et al.* 1990). What is even more difficult is to get a comprehensive list of establishments that hired low-skill workers in the last two years. To get a reliable probability sample of establishments, the study has adopted a sample design with multiple stages.

   First, the study draws a stratified random sample of business establishments from telephone directories (provided by GENESYS) based on two strata: (1) employment size and (2) industrial sectors. The telephone directories certainly do not list all the establishments in the areas; hence using the phone directories as sampling frames potentially brings biases to the resulting sample. Fortunately, biases are not as severe as one may have expected at first. For example, comparing alternative organizational sampling frames, Kalleberg *et al.* (1990) found that telephone directories do provide the highest coverage of all the firms in the area under study and most of the biases – such as duration of existence and size – are negligible.

   The next step is to select a sample of establishments that had recruited an employee for a position that did not require college education within the last two years. This process is accomplished in two steps. First, the study screens for the establishments that had hired an employee for a low-skill position in the last two years. Then, it randomly picks a low-skill position from broad occupational categories to ask detailed questions about the decision-making process in hiring a low-skill worker.
3 The resulting sample does resemble the distributions of business establishments from official U.S. Census bureau publications.
4 The content of the survey is based on Holzer's pioneering study on employers (1996). The subjective ratings of demographic groups are one novel aspect of the study in the field.

5 We were unable to get the breakdown of workforce by nativity.

6 Two one-sided hypotheses are tested for a pair of groups, i and j, where $i \neq j$:

H0: median of group i – group $j = 0$ vs. Ha: median of group i – group $j > 0$
H0: median of group i – group $j = 0$ vs. Ha: median of group i – group $j < 0$

7 We cannot a priori rule out a possibility that in fact there are systematic differences among groups' work qualities. It is possible, for example, if inadequacy is so widespread among members of the group. In this case, it does not matter that each employer has a small and biased sample. But, I contend, employers are not equipped to discern such differences. And these differences are more likely to be rooted in structural sources and cannot be attributed to socially constructed characteristics such as race and ethnicity.

8 The index,

$$D = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{k} P_i^2$$

is computed for each establishment and workplace; pi representing the percent of group i in the organization. The value of the index expresses the probability of getting workers from different racial and ethnic groups, if randomly picking two workers at a time.

9 The dependent variable for the logit regression model is a dichotomous variable indicating whether an employer rated differently across the groups of workers on each work quality. That is,

$$\Pr(y = 1 \mid x) = \frac{\exp(x\beta)}{1 + \exp(x\beta)}$$

where a vector x represents a set of independent variables, including regional indicators, organizational characteristics, and individual characteristics of employers.

10 The exploded logit is a member of the family of discrete choice models (McFadden 1974; Allison 1999: 161–78). Its well-known siblings include multinomial logistic regression and conditional logistic regression (Long 1997: 151–5, 178–81). The main reason for using the exploded logit model is its design, which allows a researcher to *partial* out individual differences. This quality is especially attractive for the dependent variables of the study. The seven-point scale that employers used to rate ethnic groups is not based on an objective observable metric. The ratings are mixed expressions of employers' personalities and their beliefs about the quality of the groups. Suppose there are two employers who believe that African-Americans are better than average, and their assessment of the quality of the group is in fact identical on an unobservable metric. However, one is more expressive than the other: The expressive respondent uses the whole scale, while his/her counterpart is somewhat conservative in his/her rating. The result is that the expressive employer rates African-Americans six on the scale, while his/her counterpart rates them as a five. Two different ratings are obtained for the same group from two employers, even though the assessments of the quality of African-Americans are essentially the same. The method of the exploded logit can partial out these biases due to interpersonal differences, since it uses what is known as the partial likelihood method.

Allison provides the most intuitive way to describe the exploded logit model (1999: 176). By adopting his explanation in to this study, the exploded logit model suggests that how employers rank a group may be a function of the ascriptive and organizational characteristics of their business establishment. Each ranking is expressed as a conditional logit model. For instance, the probability of group j being ranked the highest by employer i is expressed as a conditional logit model:

$$\Pr(r_{ij}=1)=\frac{\exp(\beta x_{ij})}{\exp(\beta x_{i1})+\exp(\beta x_{i1})+L+\exp(\beta x_{15})}$$

Once the highest-ranking group was chosen, each employer then chose the most attractive group from the remaining groups. The process continues until the last pair of groups is ranked, resulting in four equations total to account for all the possible rankings. The likelihood for each employer's set of rankings was formed as the product of all of these equations. The overall likelihood was the product of all the employers' likelihoods. (For a formal exposition of this process, see Allison and Christakis 1994: 206–8).

The above description of the model highlights certain important features of the exploded logit model. Being a conditional logit model, it does not contain a constant term, and all the independent variables in the model must vary within each respondent. The employers who rated every group the same were automatically dropped from the exploded logit analyses because they provided no information for the estimation procedure. Second, at each step, the sum of the probabilities that each group is ranked highest is equal to one:

$$\sum_{j} \Pr(r_{ij})=1$$

It is helpful to keep these features of the model when interpreting the results from multivariate regression models.

11 The exponentiated coefficients indicate the change in odds associated with change in value of the explanatory variables. Any coefficient less than one indicates a negative effect of the variable on the likelihood. Two nested regression models are estimated for each work quality. The likelihood ratio tests comparing the overall fits of the models are reported at the bottom of Table 10.4.

12 One may wonder that regional indicators are picking up effects of some structural variables such as industrial and occupational structure of different cities. I did experiment with variables related to other structural variables measured in the survey. I did not find any discernible effects for them.

13 The total effect of racial diversity should be expressed as $\beta_D^1+\beta_D^2 D$, where β_D^1 represents the main effect of the diversity index ($\boldsymbol{D}$) and β_D^2 the coefficient of the squared term of the diversity index. Hence, the effect of racial diversity on the dependent variable varies with the value of the index.

14 At first glance, the coefficients for the total number of employees in the establishment seem quite small – around 0.2 percent reduction for each additional employee. Given the distribution of the variable, however, the effect is consequential. For instance, with one standard deviation increase in the size of the establishment (184 workers), the probability is cut by a third.

15 Using the estimated coefficients, the probabilities of being ranked the highest by an employer for each group are computed. And equation (2) and fixed values of explanatory variables at their sample means are used.

11 'Natural mothers' for sale

1 U.S. Census, California: Social and Economic Characteristics; Table 177, 1980; Table 145, 1990. The raw numbers of household employees in the census undercount not only undocumented immigrants but also workers who live with their employers, but these statistics can still be useful for charting trends over time.

2 This study has also been influenced by an excellent literature on domestic service internationally, e.g. Constable 1997; Bakan and Stasiulis 1997; Stiell and England 1997; Pratt 1997; Chin 1997; Gill 1994; Chaney and Castro 1989; Heyzer *et al.* 1994; Cock 1989.

3 Job placement agencies are not necessary for all domestic workers to find jobs (or for employers to find household employees). Social networks remain a critical alternative, particularly among those who do contract work for multiple employers (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994a, 1994b). Live-in jobs, which are most popular among employers but least popular among workers, are the most likely to require the intermediary role of a commercial agency.

4 I reserve quotation marks for direct quotes; all other materials are paraphrased.

5 Of course there were exceptions to this general pattern among the hundreds I observed. Some job-seekers had an American high school degree or education in child development or elderly care. When asked why they worked with an agency that charged them their first week's salary, answers varied. Some said that using the agency was easier than advertising or finding clients on one's own. Others chose the agency because it was nearby. Others did not understand the fee structure or know there were alternatives. One woman had found a job through this agency when she had first arrived in the U.S. and returned because it was familiar and easy.

6 I could not gather comprehensive data on workers' socio-economic characteristics. My records of worker demographics come largely from the workers' interviews with employers, who sometimes asked about things like national origin, education, time in the U.S., current city of residence, marital status, or immediate family. Occasionally, I also had access to the workers' application forms, which listed addresses, education, work experience, and age.

7 I observed 85 employers seeking household employees in interactions that lasted between fifteen minutes and four hours.

8 All names have been changed.

9 My default role as a staff member posed a number of ethical dilemmas for me. First, it linked me to practices I found blatantly exploitative and demeaning to the women seeking work, which I could counter in subtle ways but not openly contest without losing permission to continue observations. The issue of when and where to intervene was a constant struggle. In addition, my presence may have affected the outcomes of placement processes. Frank and Charo perceived me (as a middle-class white woman) as a business asset who could reassure employers hostile to or mistrustful of an immigrant-run business. Finally, my informal role as a staff member and similarity to employers at times posed an obstacle to developing trusting relationships with workers. I dealt with the mistrust and social distance during worker interviews primarily by conducting them as 'ordinary' two-way conversations as people do when getting to know one another (see Briggs 1986). When possible, I scheduled a second or third meeting that tended to permit a more trusting, relaxed exchange.

10 At the same time, Margot criticized immigrant women who left children in 'Mexico or Bolivia' as aberrations from their otherwise admirable motherhood 'instincts.' In indirect response, the immigrant domestic workers in this study and in others (e.g. Hondagneu-Sotelo 1997) criticized employer women who left their children to work outside the home.

11 In fact, Karla's first trips to the U.S. were as a tourist visiting places like Disneyland.

12 See Romero (1992) regarding the mobility possible among domestic workers, based on a study of Chicanas in Colorado, in which women gradually gained independence, autonomy, and greater income doing contract housecleaning for multiple employers.

13 The women who came to the agency tended to be those lacking good social networks to find work, so the back room connections were not as useful as independent networks. But these discussions – about salaries, work conditions, CPR classes, English classes, healthcare resources, or even which neighborhoods the INS had

recently targeted – were surely useful for new immigrants. Bringing workers together in a single room was the only real service the agency provided them.

12 An afterword

1 Thus, although our publisher's guidelines urged contributors to use either notes *or* a system of in-text citations of 'works cited,' we decided to allow our historian contributors to include citations to their 'primary' sources (sources produced at the time period under consideration) in notes while referring to secondary sources (monographic and interpretive studies by other historians about the past) with in-text citations of 'works cited' (the system most familiar to those in the social sciences). And we are happy to report that our publisher was willing to indulge us in this 'interdisciplinary' – if also completely idiosyncratic scholarly practice!

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