

THE MODERN MUSLIM WORLD


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MUSLIM HISTORY AND SOCIAL THEORY

A Global Sociology
of Modernity

Dietrich Jung



The Modern Muslim World

Series Editor

Dietrich Jung

Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies

University of Southern Denmark

Odense, Denmark

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Dietrich Jung

Muslim History and Social Theory

A Global Sociology of Modernity

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Odense, Denmark

The Modern Muslim World

ISBN 978-3-319-52607-2

ISBN 978-3-319-52608-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52608-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017936655

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The book is the result of intensive research efforts in the years 2013–2016. It is my personal contribution to the “Modern Muslim Subjectivities Project”, whose two subprojects have been supported by grants from the Danish Research Council for the Humanities (FKK) and the private VELUX Foundation, respectively. In the grant applications, I promised to combine theoretical work with research on Islamic reform movements. I redeem this promise with the publication of this book. I am very grateful for the financial support of these two funding organizations, without which this book would unlikely have appeared. In addition to them, I must thank four other institutions. In August and September 2014, I was able to ponder on the structure and argument of this book at the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society at University of Victoria and at Green College at University of British Columbia in Vancouver. I am in particular grateful to the Centre’s director, Paul Bramadat, and to the Principal of Green College, Mark Vessey, for arranging these research stays. It was not the first time they had offered me a fruitful and hospital working environment. The first draft of the whole book manuscript, then, was written at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich. There I had the pleasure of being given an office at the Department of Global Politics and Conflict Studies at the Institute of Political Science. The department is headed by Prof. Stephan Stetter – he and his colleagues deserve my special thanks for giving me an ideal personal and institutional framework for writing the final draft manuscript of this book. Finally, in the past three years I have had the pleasure of discussing some of the theoretical ideas for this book in seminars with a number of colleagues at the Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC) at the University of Copenhagen.

Being the eventual outcome of two specific research projects, this book nevertheless is deeply rooted in my previous work and broader scholarly discussions. To a certain extent, it represents a short synthesis of my research in recent decades and the discussions I have had with a large number of colleagues in both the Social Sciences and in Islamic and Middle East Studies. It is not possible to do justice to all of them in these acknowledgments. Yet, I would like to thank in particular Lutz Berger, Peter Beyer, Pinar Bilgin, Jan Busse, Thomas Eich, Mervat Hatem, Sinisa Malesevic, Richard C. Martin, Götz Nordbruch, Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Umar Ryad, Klaus Schlichte, Mark Sedgwick, Kirstine Sinclair, George Thomas, and Morten Valbjørn. In the past years, all of them – in one way or another – have shared with me their thoughts on some of the subjects at issue in this book. Without any doubt these thoughts have left their imprints on its content. Last but not least, I would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers, Martin Ledstrup, Catherine Schwerin, and Alina Yurova. Martin read the whole manuscript, and his critical comments contributed much to developing the version in which it appears here. Catherine Schwerin again helped me in coping with the uncertainties of the English language which each nonnative speaker has to face. Alina Yurova, finally, fully supported this book project in her capacity as editor for regional politics and development studies at Palgrave Macmillan in New York. It goes without saying that any remaining flaws and mistakes are the sole responsibility of the author.

I dedicate this book to Marianne Holm Pedersen and Oskar Jung Pedersen. They invested a lot in this comparatively small book. Thank you for giving your consent to do without me while I was putting together its content.

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Remaining Modern: An Introduction

Abstract We are all modern. That is the core message of this book. Yet, what does it mean to be modern? How do we understand the modern condition in light of a multiplicity of concepts of modernity in contemporary social theory? The introduction will show the way in which these questions will be answered in the subsequent chapters of this book. Moreover, it will put the argumentation of the book into both a scholarly context with respect to Islamic studies and social theory as well as a biographical context.

Keywords Modernity · Modernization theory · Orientalism · Islamic studies · Muslim history

We are all modern. That is the core message of this book. Yet, what does it mean to be modern? How do we understand the modern condition in light of a multiplicity of concepts of modernity in contemporary social theory? If we look back into the late 1950s, the world of modernity still seemed to be in order. In a widely read and then positively acclaimed book on the modernization of the Middle East, Daniel Lerner (1958), for instance, suggested that the modern transformation is a systemic process, an almost natural process of social change, in which all contemporary societies are more or less involved. In *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Lerner claimed that a basic model of modernization is at the heart of this

social transformation, leading on a straight path from traditional to modern society. In the widely shared understanding of his time, this model was supposed to reappear in all modernizing societies regardless of their cultural differences. Locating the historical origin of this model in the so-called West, Lerner metaphorically concluded that the West is what “the Middle East seeks to become” (Lerner 1958, 47).¹

In the 1950s and early 1960s, many scholars perceived modernization as a more or less linear, historical process of the transformation and convergence of societies toward one institutional, organizational, and cultural model. They derived this model eclectically from the writings of classical sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, and Max Weber, from the scientist synthesization of the classics by Talcott Parsons, and from their own observations taken from a decolonizing world. Whereas the West had basically arrived in modernity, as was their core argument, the decolonizing South was still on its way. This confidence in a secure path toward a mutually shared form of modernity meanwhile represents the modernist dream of a bygone time. The probably too simplistic academic representations of modernity in these theories, that is to say their supposition of a linear and rather uniform social transformation from tradition to modernity, have been deconstructed by postcolonial, postmodern, and poststructuralist thinking. Yet despite this deconstruction, modernity as a dominant category in the mind of academics and of society at large has not disappeared. The brief hype of postmodernity did not “kill off” modernity as an analytical and normative concept. On the contrary, rather the contested discourse of postmodernity eventually gave “a new lease of life” to the idea that we still live in modern times (Lee 2006, 358–59). Apparently, we remain to be modern.

In contemporary discussions in social theory, modernity returned in multiple forms. It is widely acknowledged that we remain modern, but we are modern in different ways. Contemporary scholarship has meanwhile been flooded by terms such as alternative, connected, entangled, multiple, successive, or variations of modernities. These new approaches, which put modernity into the plural, share the desire to overcome the notions of linearity, irreversibility, and universalism that largely characterized the core assumptions of modernization theories such as presented in Lerner’s book on the modernization of the Middle East (Lee 2013, 419). Furthermore, they aim to do away with the often not questioned equation of modernization with Westernization. In short, it should be possible to become modern without emulating the West. However, is there any generic

meaning of modernity left in light of these pluralistic conceptualizations of modernities? Do we still know what it means to remain modern?

In addressing these essential questions of contemporary theories of modernity, this book draws on and combines various strands of scholarly literature about modernity. It aims to sustain one of the central claims of classical modernization theory, that is to say perceiving modernity as an inherently global condition, without repeating its flaws in predicting the very nature and direction of historical paths of modernization. Indeed, today we have to conceive modernization in historical terms as a multifaceted, contingent process leading to a broad variety of realizations of modernity (Joas 2000, 83). Moreover, this book argues against the still very widespread assumption that the origin of modernity as such is in the so-called West. In theorizing modernity, it stresses its global interconnectedness and wants to support the argument that the global is not the consequence but the very condition of modernity (Bhambra 2011, 662). Yet how does modernity as a global condition then relate to its different historical realizations?

My theoretical answer to this question is both selective and synthetic. The selection results firstly from the abovementioned questions related to the delegitimization of classical modernization theory. The relevant theories must help to theoretically grasp the simultaneity of unity and difference in modernity, its global nature and its local manifestations. In constructing my theoretical frame of reference, I make the search for similarities among different kinds of modernities my point of departure. With this focus on similarities, I do not want to discard differences. On the contrary, I argue that the understanding of differences has to be grounded in more precise knowledge about similarities. The exploration of the simultaneity of unity and difference in modernity needs a heuristic concept of global modernity against which we can interpret differences resulting from historically contingent paths of social change. Secondly, my selection of theoretical references is due to more accidental causes that are of an essentially biographical nature. This book engages with theories that I simply happened to have read during my scholarly career.

The crucial starting point for my theoretical interest was my first encounter with three German classics on social theory. Reading Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Norbert Elias as an undergraduate was a revelation. These classical authors gave me access to an entirely new world of thought. Most importantly, the reading of classical sociology set me free from the taken-for-granted conceptual premises of everyday life. The next step took place in

the context of the Luhmann/Habermas debate in Germany which characterized my graduate studies. Not really sitting with any of the two camps, in the end, I might have learnt more from the intellectual encounter with Niklas Luhmann's modern systems theory than from Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action. In particular, two of Luhmann's ideas made a lasting impression on me: the retrospect abstraction of social history in terms of sociocultural evolution and perceiving modernity as the emergence of world society. As a result, the concept of world society became one of the guiding principles in my research. However, I do not employ world society in terms of a normative cosmopolitan perspective of "our one world." In my own work I employ the concept of world society first and foremost as a heuristic frame of reference for observing the advancement of global modernity such as has been developed by Niklas Luhmann's modern systems theory or by the Stanford school of sociological institutionalism around John W. Meyer.

In writing this book, my attitude to social theory very much resembles the positions of the historian William H. Sewell JR and the sociologist Bryan Turner. In Sewell's understanding, historians use social theory critically in adjusting, combining, and recombining elements of different theories according to their needs (Sewell 2005, 5). It is this needs-driven non-exegetic use of social theory that I apply in the following chapters. In doing so, I am equally motivated by Bryan Turner's critique of the widespread "mentality of sectarianism" in sociology. Against sticking to mutually hostile schools of thoughts, Turner once advocated a synthetic strategy of combining elements of competing paradigms, as they often only address "very different issues at rather different levels" (Turner 1992, 235–36). Consequently, this book represents an attempt to synthesize the insights of both Sewell and Turner. To make it clear right from the beginning, this is not a book for theoretical purists, I am not interested in the exegetic handling of social theories; instead, I will use them selectively and empirically in order to better understand the world around me.

From this position, my approach to the social theory of modernity is inseparably knitted into empirical observations. The interpretation and observation of social phenomena and theoretical and empirical research are inherently connected in a circular relationship. The theoretical elaborations of this book, therefore, must be accompanied by substantial empirical illustrations. As a scholar of the Middle East and the wider Muslim world, I will choose my illustrative examples predominantly from contemporary research about and the history of Muslim peoples and not from the

European experience.² The reason for these references to Muslim history is twofold. On the one hand, these examples from Muslim history are intended to support my theoretical argument of not confusing modernization with Westernization. I want to present an alternative empirical corroboration of theoretical arguments, which usually have been underpinned by drawing illustrations from the histories of Europe and North America. On the other hand, this turn toward the Muslim world is intimately linked to the way in which the Middle East and Islam became the core fields of my empirical research interest.

After having read Edward Said's *Orientalism* during my undergraduate studies I became aware that my career path was initially paved by the "romanticist Orientalist leanings" of my youth. I still remember the happy days when I was able to stay at home from school with the flu. This relief from school gave me the opportunity to read the fiction stories of Karl May (1842–1912). Karl May was a German teacher who turned novelist while serving prison sentences for minor thefts and accusations of fraud. I was particularly fascinated by the adventurous stories of Kara Ben Nemsî Effendi and his local guide Hadshi Halef Omar. Together with them, I traveled through the imagined deserts of North Africa and the wild mountains of Kurdistan. When I actually set foot on North African soil for the first time in 1978, I was full of both adventurist and romanticist expectations. In the jargon of contemporary postcolonial theories, I was looking for difference and otherness. Yet the intense engagement with both social theory and Islamic history fundamentally changed my attitude toward the Middle East. Borrowing from the words of Max Weber, I would call this change a quick and lasting process of disenchantment. I was no longer looking for differences, but discovering similarities. The Middle Eastern "other" became increasingly familiar and therewith akin. Let me illustrate what I mean.

From August 1995 to July 1996, I spent one year in Damascus. I received a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service to improve my knowledge of Arabic. In the 1990s, Syria was firmly in the iron grip of the late President Hafiz al-Assad. The puritanical, Arab-nationalist Syrian security state did not leave room for many distractions. Apart from the outdoor dinners at the *Nadi Umal*, the so-called worker's club, I often spent the evenings at home, reading German novels. The living conditions in Syria's nonentertainment society gave me ample room for both brushing up my Arabic and filling the gaps in my knowledge of German literature. This literature was easily available at the library of the German

Goethe Institute close to the Abu Rummaneh street. While reading these novels, I made Damascus the backdrop of their stories.

For instance, I met Franz Biberkopf, the central protagonist in Alfred Döblin's *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (Berlin Alexanderplatz – The Story of Franz Biberkopf) on Damascus' Merjeh Square. Set in Berlin during the 1920s, the novel paints a rather bleak picture of the life of Germany's lower classes (Döblin 1929). In the social milieu of *Alexanderplatz*, Biberkopf was struggling to regain his feet after having served four years in prison. Similar struggles among immigrants, street vendors, handymen, petty criminals, and prostitutes were taking place at Merjeh. To be sure, the Damascus of the 1990s was not the Berlin of the 1920s. Yet, comparable structures of economic hardship, rampant unemployment, social uprootedness, and an arbitrary state security system made Damascus for me into a then contemporary stage for Alfred Döblin's novel. The Syrian and the German Franz Biberkopf were different individuals, but of a similar type. Since then, this understanding of differences by searching for the similarities that are underlying them has driven my academic work.

In this search for similarities, I have necessarily drawn on established bodies of knowledge and theoretical assumptions which themselves have been derived from different historical experiences. Using analytical tools of contemporary social theory, I apply a conceptual apparatus that is informed by previous research predominately taking the historical experiences of Europe and North America as its empirical source for abstractions. My focus on illustrative examples from Muslim history will thus add a critical and comparative angle to these concepts and categories of social theory. In my own understanding, this combination of social theory with Muslim history is a certain contribution to the attempt at "provincializing Europe" (Chakrabarty 2000). However, my contribution will go in quite a different direction. Rather than sharing Chakrabarty's wholesale critique of the "Eurocentric character of the social sciences," I want to show that there are, in principle, concepts of rather universal character due to the global and emergent character of modernity.³

In methodological terms, I will employ in my conceptual proposal of global modernity an approach which Dietrich Rueschemeyer once called "analytical induction" (Rueschemeyer 1991). According to this approach, our initial theoretical reflections and the development of an analytical framework is necessarily based on previous research. Pure empirical observation without analytical tools and theoretical assumptions in mind is impossible. Despite knowing of their Eurocentric bias, I nevertheless

employ concepts of so-called Western social theory in making sense of individual instances of Muslim history. The results of my analysis of these “new cases,” then, feed back into the analytical and theoretical framework from which I started. In this way, my empirical illustrations may contribute to the confirmation, contestation, and revision of contemporary social theory and its alleged or real Eurocentric character. Furthermore, this combination of social theory with Muslim history aims at questioning the notion of the fundamental alterity of Islam that ironically has so often characterized the otherwise mutually incompatible work of both orientalist and postcolonialist scholars. While being utterly critical with respect to the orientalist tradition, contemporary research on Islam inspired by postcolonial perspectives often regards Muslims as being engaged with modernity as an external force colonizing their lives (cf. Soares and Ossella 2009). In this way, outspoken critics of orientalist scholarship often maintain one of its core claims: the idea of a principal dichotomy between Islam and (Western) modernity. Against this exclusivist consensus of otherwise strictly opposing scholarly views, I will argue for perceiving Islamic modernities, this is to say the explicit reference to Islamic traditions in the cultural construction of “authentic” Muslim modernities, to be an inherent part of global modernity.

In light of the above-described personal and methodological background, this book is just another step in my search for a certain kind of unity in a world of differences. It is an attempt to drive forward this search for similarities in a theoretical way. In doing so, I hope to make a contribution to what Peter Wagner once called the “development of a world sociology of modernity” (Wagner 2012, xi). This global sociology of modernity should enable us to observe and analyze forms of modernity in both a universal but non-Eurocentric way. It rejects the equation of European history with modernization as such and considers European modernity as nothing more than a particular historical case among others. However, multiple cases of modernity that nevertheless share universal elements of a global social condition.

In this endeavor, I will proceed in this book in four chapters. Each of these chapters takes up a different strand of theoretical literature on modernity, moving from a discussion of the current state of the art in the sociology of modernity to the macro, micro, and finally meso levels of social theory. In this way, the chapters sketch out a heuristic theoretical framework of global modernity that makes the necessary linkage between different levels of social reality. These theoretical discussions I will historically contextualize with

illustrations from Muslim history. Taking the four chapters together, I try to answer a number of consecutive and closely connected questions at different levels of abstraction.

The second chapter sets out with a critique of recent studies on Islamic modernities, which tend to construct these alternatives to Western modernity with the help of a rather strict dichotomy between Islam and the West. I will link this critique to current debates in social theory, which are characterized by a variety of pluralistic conceptualizations of modernities. In doing so I pose the following questions: in which ways do these theories of modernity in the plural add new perspectives to the sociology of modernity? How can we make use of their new theoretical concepts in building a more general analytical framework? Do these approaches compete with each other, or should we see them rather as complementary ways to further our understanding of the modern condition? I will answer these questions by dealing with three different ways to think modernity as a plurality: theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities. In my opinion, these three theoretical suggestions for handling the empirical reality of difference within modernity offer a number of complementary elements to remedy some of the flaws in classical modernization theories. At the same time, they allow me to sustain the idea that modernization refers to a global process of social change. With my selection of conceptual elements from these three approaches, I attempt to reorganize modernity as a concept in terms of culture, time, and space, while maintaining the intrinsic relatedness of these different dimensions of modernity. In the course of the chapter I briefly apply these three theoretical approaches to the history of modern Islamic reform movements.

The third chapter will address the issue of similarities more directly by elaborating on a general and necessarily very abstract concept of global modernity on the macro level. In light of the previous discussion of multiple modernities, it is guided by the question as to the ways in which we still can conceptualize modernity in the singular. Is there something we can consider to be a common denominator among these modernities in the plural? Do they share mutual conceptual points of reference? Can we still construct a concept of modernity with a generic meaning? The chapter will argue: yes. Theoretically, I will combine insights from two different strands of theoretical literature. On the one hand, I derive my conceptualization of global modernity from a critical engagement with the traditional narrative of modernization as differentiation. In particular, I will make conceptual use of elements of Niklas Luhmann's modern systems theory and its core

category of functional differentiation. The borrowing of conceptual tools from modern systems theory will serve me to develop a generic concept of modernity as world society at the most abstract macro level. In my heuristic framework, this generic concept of modernity represents the “syntax” of modernity, this is to say a complex collection of formal structures to which the historical constructions of multiple modernities relate. On the other hand, I will put this generic concept of modernity as world society in a metatheoretical framework for which I take inspiration in the discussion about theories of emergence. Theories of emergence help me to think modernity in terms of a multilayered social reality resulting from a historically contingent process of sociocultural evolution. The empirical examples in this chapter will show how this syntax of modernity has also been visible in the historical developments in the Muslim world before, under, and after colonial domination. In doing so, I put the ongoing discussion about the relation of Islam and politics at the center of my historical argument. In light of the theoretical elaborations of this chapter, I fundamentally challenge the position that religion and politics in the Muslim world are inseparably joined together.

The fourth chapter will lead us from the macro to the micro level, from the perspective of society to the levels of the individual and of social actors. While the analysis of world society provides us with the syntax of modernity, it is the applied semantics of collective and individual actors that transform this syntax in meaningful forms of modern life. More precisely, with the issue of modern subjectivity formation as my central theme, [Chapter 4](#) will deal with the inherent linkage between modern individuals and society. With reference to Baudelaire, Michel Foucault once defined the invention of the subject, the subjectivation of individuals, as a key feature of modernity (Foucault 1984). This dictum of Foucault inspires my theoretical elaborations in [Chapter 4](#), which will combine Foucault with Weber and some elements of poststructuralist theories. Moreover, the chapter argues that Luhmann’s systems theory and Foucault’s double nature of the subject are in conceptual terms not incompatible at all. The theoretical discussion of the chapter is accompanied by snapshots from the history of modern Muslim subjectivity formation. I will take the experience and articulation of contingency by Islamic intellectuals in the nineteenth century as my point of departure. In particular, interpretative approaches to modernity that conceptually emphasize the explicative role of culture declared social contingency to be a core feature of modernity. I will pose the question as to how we construct ourselves as subjects

in light of all-penetrating social contingency. In what ways are the experience of contingency and the construction of individual and collective identities linked to the macrostructures of modernity? How do social actors deal with contingency in the construction of historically different cultural semantics of modernity? These questions relate to the narrative of individualization that has accompanied the sociological tradition of modernization as social differentiation. In its liberal mainstream version, this narrative tells us the story of the rise of autonomous but mutually dependent individuals who address questions of modern contingency by their rational actions. This chapter, however, will substantially challenge this liberal narrative. Instead of retelling the familiar story of the emancipation of a reflexive, rational, self-interested, and expressive individual, I will emphasize the hybrid nature of modern subjects basing their identity constructions on competing orders of discursive knowledge and social practices (cf. Reckwitz 2006).

The fifth chapter, then, will put its focus on the meso level of social institutions, organizations, and movements. It is not only functional differentiation that characterizes world society but also formal organizations and shared cultural models, which play the role of mediators between the macro and micro levels of modernity. Introducing the empirical dimension of this intermediate level with a brief examination of the Ottoman reform process in the nineteenth century, I will extend my heuristic framework of global modernity with elements of the world society approach of the Stanford school of sociological institutionalism. The research group around John W. Meyer has developed a distinct concept of world society that revolves around the diffusion of a variety of cultural models based on the principles rationalization, theorization, universalism, and individualization. These models and principles serve me as a toolbox in bridging the gap between the macro and meso levels, analyzing global modernity at the intermediate levels of organizations, institutions, and collective actors. The chapter will critically examine these analytical tools against the background of Muslim history and replace the Stanford school's rather vague category of "the diffusion of cultural models" by an understanding of their global dissemination within the context of historical power relations.

The concluding remarks sum up my conceptual apparatus and point to the ways in which this approach might lead to the elaboration of a more comprehensive theory of global modernity. I will critically reflect upon theoretical concepts in light of my illustrative historical examples in order

to demonstrate their empirical feedback from the perspective of “analytical inductivism.” I am fully aware that this book only gives very short answers to enormously large questions. Moreover, in some parts it will not be easy to digest for readers not familiar with sociological theories. This book is both ambitious and modest at the same time. It is ambitious in its interpretation of various theoretical traditions in light of Muslim historical experiences, and it is modest in its anticipated achievements, fully aware of remaining nothing more than to be critically read first steps. Yet in order to keep pace with these ambitions, it makes sense to present only a sketch of my theoretical thoughts instead of getting lost in detail. The theoretical considerations of this book therefore have, first and foremost, a paradigmatic quality (cf. Merton 1968, 70–71). They represent a heuristic framework for qualitative research into the puzzling simultaneity of unity and difference in global modernity.

NOTES

1. In scholarly literature critical of modernization theory, you will very often find Lerner’s work reduced to this metaphorical phrase. Vivienne Jabri, for instance, emphasized that in particular realist and liberalist international relations theories suggest that postcolonial states are “somehow lagging behind European counterparts” (Jabri 2013, 106). While this indeed reflects the position expressed by Lerner, he did not mean that therefore modernity has been following an exclusively Western model. At least for Lerner the appearance of the modern model in Europe was a matter of historical coincidence and in this way not a necessary evolutionary result of European culture (Lerner 1958). Much of the critique of classical modernization theory unfortunately has a tendency to simplify its propositions and to disregard its principal openness for historical complexities and experiences beyond the West by some of its authors (cf. Schmidt 2010).
2. It goes without saying that the usage of terms such as Muslim world, Muslim history, and Muslim people risks to be read in a reifying way contradicting the very argument of this book. When using these terms, I do this without any analytical purpose. Like the notions of Islam and the West, we should not understand them in a homogenizing way, but their application takes place for the sake of linguistic convenience. They refer to a very superficial common denominator for a broad social diversity. Still, it seems almost impossible to write a book like this without using these questionable terms as residual categories and for descriptive purposes. In doing so, I use the term Muslim in a nominal sense, without any specific religious content, while I apply Islamic when religious traditions, discourses, practices, etc., are involved. In this application, the secularist ideology of Turkey represents a

form of Muslim but not of Islamic modernity. For the latter, instead, the political ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be an example.

3. Related to this critique of the Eurocentric character of the social sciences see also Timothy Mitchell's suggestion that area studies' scholars should critically examine the European historical specificity of their analytical categories (Mitchell 2003). For my own position in the so-called area studies controversy, see Jung (2014).

Multiple, Entangled, and Successive Modernities: Putting Modernity in the Plural

Abstract The chapter deals with three theoretical approaches to putting modernity in the plural. It will discuss theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities as complementary analytical strategies to further our understanding of social and cultural diversity in modernity. The key assumptions of these theories remedy some of the major flaws of classical modernization theories and they can contribute to new interpretations of Muslim history. Together, I consider these three theories as complementary sources for building a nuanced heuristic framework for a global sociology of modernity.

Keywords Modernity · Multiple modernities · Entangled modernities · Successive modernities · Islamic piety studies

The chapter deals with three theoretical approaches to putting modernity in the plural. It will discuss theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities as complementary analytical strategies to further our understanding of social and cultural diversity in modernity. In the scholarly debate about “multiple modernities,” contemporary studies of the Muslim world play a significant role.¹ Since the foundational phase of the academic discipline of Islamic studies in the late nineteenth century, the relationship of Islam and modernity has been one of its core themes. Those scholars who have not focused on premodern history and canonical texts alone have often

analyzed the Muslim world in at least implicitly applying some of the core assumptions of classical modernization theories. A paradigmatic example for this kind of scholarship is Bernard Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Lewis 1961), which is permeated by these assumptions of classical modernization theory.² More recent scholarship on Islam, however, has increasingly been informed by the conceptual debates in social theory. This renewal and pluralization of theoretical and methodological perspectives in the field of Islamic studies is clearly reflected by scholars who conduct research on religious discourses and social practices connected with the everyday life of Muslims. Today, exploration of individual and collective Muslim identity constructions in relation to ritual practices, forms of religious body politics, Islamic practice in Western Muslim minority communities, and contemporary Islamic purity movements mark popular fields of research.³ Before delving into the conceptual discussion of theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities, let me give some examples of this voice of Islamic studies in the current debate about pluralistic modernities.

The publication of *Politics of Piety* by Saba Mahmood (2005), for instance, initiated a series of studies about Islamic modernities in terms of female Islamic piety movements. In addressing both Muslim majority and Muslim minority societies, research on contemporary piety movements became a distinctive field of Islamic studies. Scholars interpret these religious movements as forms of modern actorhood and critically revise some of the core assumptions of classical modernization theories. In her study of a group of female pietists in Cairo, Mahmood explicitly wanted to challenge both Western feminist theories and key concepts of secular-liberal thought by juxtaposing them with the movement's social and religious practices. In taking her theoretical inspiration from poststructuralist authors such as Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, Mahmood showed how Islamic ethics challenge "secular-liberal understandings of agency, body, and authority" in constructing modern everyday lives (Mahmood 2005, 191). To a certain extent, the Egyptian mosque movement in her study represents an Islamic alternative to the liberal model of Western modernity.

In *An Enchanted Modern*, Lara Deeb (2006) stressed further this argument of the existence of specifically Islamic modernities that represent modern imaginations that are alternative to Western liberalism. Deeb introduced her readers to a Shiite women's movement in Lebanon whose members combine religious, political, and social responsibilities in a religiously defined type of modern actorhood. In analyzing the discourse, symbolic representation, and social practices of these "pious modern,"

Deeb emphasized the women's desire to live an authentic form of Islam. In this, in Deeb's wording, "authenticated Islam," the women perceive themselves practicing a religious way of life which is an alternative to what they consider to be the moral emptiness of Western modernity. Moreover, they distance themselves from inherited religious practices and derive their pious status from their own independent interpretations of the Islamic traditions. As the title of Deeb's book clearly indicates, trying to paraphrase Max Weber's dictum of the disenchantment of the modern world, these women claim to represent a kind of modernity in which religion is at the core of their modern self-representation.⁴

These ethnographic studies on contemporary Muslim pietism resonate well with the attempt by Samira Haj, to take a final example, to "approach Islam on its own terms" (Haj 2009, 5). This was the declared aim of her book on the nineteenth-century reformer Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). In taking the example of Abduh – a representative of the religious learned (*ulama*), a social and religious reformer, and the later *mufti* (the state-appointed highest representative of the *ulama*) of the Egyptian realm – Haj wanted to display a specific kind of Islamic modernity whose proponents explicitly understood it as a modern alternative to the hegemonic representation of modernity by the so-called secular West. In reconfiguring Islam by consciously drawing on traditional religious authorities such as Hamid Abu al-Ghazali (1058–1111) or Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (1320–1388), according to Haj, Abduh developed an indigenous form of modern rationalism distinct from the secular liberal model of the West. Both Haj's reinterpretation of the life and work of Muhammad Abduh and the aforementioned anthropological studies on contemporary piety movements in Islam make a strong argument for the existence of distinct forms of specifically Islamic modernities side by side with the hegemonic liberal culture in the West.

In this respect, studies on Islamic modernities are clear refutations of both the secular bias of classical modernization theories and their concomitant premise of global social and cultural convergence. They present empirically substantiated cases of modern imaginations that challenge the liberal master-narrative of the West. They are convincing examples of pluralism within modernity. However, they often do so by basing their critique of the hegemonic liberal imagination of modernity on the idea of a fundamental alterity between Muslim and Western cultures. Theoretically, many of these studies rest on rigid binaries such as between Western and non-Western or religious (cum Islamic) and secular cultures.⁵ In this way, they confuse the hegemonic modern narrative of liberalism with European

modernity as such. In sharp contrast to this homogenization of Western modernity, Europe and the Americans have themselves experienced alternatives to the modern model of liberalism. There also exists historical pluralism within Western modernity. The more general role of religious traditions in shaping these different trajectories of modernity marks the core assumption behind the concept of multiple modernities once coined by the late Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000).

In the following, I take up Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities and combine it with theories of entangled and of successive modernities. The key assumptions of these theories remedy some of the major flaws of classical modernization theories, as well as of the abovementioned studies on Islamic piety. They point to the role of religious and other traditions in shaping modern imaginaries, address the factual entanglement of different cultures in the formation of multiple modernities, and provide conceptual tools to break with the classical notion of modernization as a linear process of the convergence of societies. Moreover, they serve as theoretical correctives to the idea of a principal alterity of Islamic modernities to the culture of the modern West, as demonstrated in the introduction to this chapter. I start with a brief discussion of theories of multiple modernities as derived by Eisenstadt and Arnason. Then, I move on to the paradigm of entanglement, which offers an analytical strategy for historically observing the evolution of different forms of modernity as a complex and often conflictual process of mutual social construction. The third step introduces theories of successive modernities. In particularly drawing on Peter Wagner's work, I will present three ideal types of social order that he abstracted from European history. These three types constitute subsequent historical phases of hegemonic approaches to dealing with questions of the conscious establishment of modern social orders. Together, I consider these three theories as complementary sources for building a nuanced heuristic framework for a global sociology of modernity.

MULTIPLE MODERNITIES: BRINGING RELIGION AND TRADITION BACK IN

Contrary to classical modernization theory, the concept of multiple modernities assigns religious and other premodern traditions a general role in shaping different forms of modernity. In his approach, Eisenstadt suggested making religion a key variable in the explanation of the factual varieties of

social orders that we can observe in modern life. However, he maintains the claim that modernity as a generic “program” had its origin in the West, from which it expanded around the globe. Against the background of his understanding of premodern civilizations, Eisenstadt described modernity as being a distinct, cultural, political, and institutional program. He defined this modern program by structural features such as capitalism, urbanization, industrialization, and the rise of the modern national state. In cultural terms, Eisenstadt perceived modernity as being a radical vision of human autonomy with respect to both the establishment of social order and the control of nature. However, while the expansion of these features of modernity have characterized the modern epoch on a global level, different cultures have responded to this general program of modernity in a multiplicity of historically path-dependent ways. According to Eisenstadt, modernity does not converge toward one universal model, but it achieves global relevance through its dissemination in different cultural contexts. The program of modernity has not been accepted in its “original” Western form, but the expansion of modernity has been subject to continuous selections, reinterpretations, and reformulations. Modernization has proceeded in varying patterns of different cultural and institutional forms. Consequently, through Eisenstadt’s lenses we can observe multiple modernities as historically contingent variations on the same theme (Eisenstadt 2001, 321–330).

Johan Arnason further elaborated on Eisenstadt’s approach by showing the ways in which these multiple modernities were molded by the legacies of the religious and/or imperial traditions of premodern civilizations. More specifically, Arnason posed the question as to the kind of historical connections we can make “between the internal pluralism of modernity and the civilizational pluralism of its prehistory” (Arnason 2003, 13). In their references to premodern traditions, Eisenstadt and Arnason took up some essential elements of civilizational theory as developed in the axial age thesis by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969). According to Jaspers, the axial age (700–200 B.C.) experienced a fundamental transformation in the discovery of an outer-worldly realm of transcendence. This transformation initiated both the concept of humanity and the idea of a global history that has molded our understanding of the world until today (Jaspers 1956).

The axial age, in Arnason’s interpretation, marks the emergence of the formative traditions of “civilizational complexes” such as Confucianism, Hellenism, Judaism, Hinduism, and, as historical latecomers, Christianity and Islam. These civilizational complexes, according to Arnason, share at

least three foundational ideas. First of all, in the axial age an ontological difference between two levels of reality appeared, dividing the world into transcendental and mundane spheres. Second, in this dichotomy of reality, the mundane world only achieves a derivative status from the transcendental ideal order. Third, comparing these two levels of reality with each other leads to a continuous struggle, to the “axial tension,” for reform and revival. Groups of new intellectual elites and their claims concerning the accountability of worldly leaders became the most fundamental innovations arising from this tension of the axial age. The ways to solve these tensions, however, define the cultural differences between civilizations. Yet through the sacred status of rulers, the axial civilizations maintained a form of mutual, although often conflicting, embeddedness of worldly and transcendental orders (Arnason 2003, 160–167). The rise of modernity, then, transforms this tension between the mundane and the transcendental order toward the idea of human autonomy. The mundane world is losing its derivative status, giving way to a “thoroughly this-worldly, anthropocentric and activist turn to traditional frames of meaning” (Arnason 2003, 173).

In this way, Eisenstadt and Arnason brought religion and tradition back in without giving up a certain distinction between traditional and modern worlds. They contributed to the “cultural turn” in sociological theory, elevating culture and religion from dependent into relatively independent variables in the analysis of historical modernization processes. Instead of understanding modernization as the subsequent retreat of tradition, in Lerner’s words, the “passing of traditional society,” they conceptualize the multiple forms of modern cultures as a combination of the “program of modernity” with distinct historical and religious traditions. Consequently, traditions can set in motion very different historical trajectories of modernization (Lee 2013, 411). In empirical terms, the abovementioned studies on contemporary Islamic piety movements and Samira Haj’s interpretation of the Islamic reform movement as carriers of specific Islamic alternatives to Western modernity can confirm these assumptions of the theory of multiple modernities. These studies on Islam are examples for the attempt of modern social actors to create forms of life employing new interpretations of religious traditions. Yet, in almost exclusively focusing on Islamically defined modernities as authentic Muslim alternatives to an alleged homogenous Western culture of secular liberalism, they have a tendency to produce scholarly forms of “Orientalism in reverse,” predicated on the fundamental alterity of modern Muslim imaginations.⁶ Moreover, many of these studies on Islamic

modernities suffer from a rather distorted representation of historical processes in the so-called West.

On closer inspection, the history of modernity in Europe has itself experienced alternative responses to modernity in which references to religious traditions played an important role. In particular in the history of Catholicism, we can observe an extended struggle between proponents of traditionalist and modernist attitudes. In 1864, Pope Pius IX promulgated a syllabus condemning the errors of modernism, which was later confirmed by his successor, Pius X, in 1907. It took the Vatican until the Second Vatican Council in 1962 to move from this traditionalist position to an official acknowledgment of modern political and social institutions, accompanied by conscious attempts to construct Catholic versions of modernity (Schatz 1992). In the USA, therefore, Catholicism was viewed for a long time as being a kind of “inner Orient,” a “primitive atavistic residue within Western civilization.” Only after the Second World War was the idea of the USA as a “Judeo-Christian” nation of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews invented (Casanova 2009, 27). Modern Catholic reformers opposed the traditionalist rejection of modern norms, values, and institutions by advocating specifically Catholic forms of modernity. In early twentieth-century Germany, to take just one example, Catholic movements aimed to become a part in the modernization of German national culture. This integration into modern German national culture they tried to achieve through constructing modern cultural associations under the primacy of religion (Weiss 2014). When it comes to Protestantism, Europe has seen a variety of modern pietistic movements quite similar to those Islamic ones described in the works of Deeb or Mahmood. These religious movements rose in critique of established religious institutions and advocated the independent reading of the Holy Scriptures, turning Protestantism into a particular individually chosen way of life (Jung 2000, 64–74; 2005). In addition, a number of Protestant theologians, such as for instance William Robertson Smith (1846–1894), tried hard to reconcile modern scientific culture with their Christian beliefs (Jung 2015). Like Muhammad Abduh, they constructed authentic forms of modernity not characterized by secularism, but inseparably connected to specific religious cultures.

Theories of multiple modernities provide a theoretical framework that enables us to comparatively analyze this simultaneous and often conflictual existence of Islamic, Christian, and secular-liberal modernities. These theories essentially break with two fundamental assumptions of classical modernization theory: the interpretation of modernity as a linear history

of progress toward one institutional model and the equation of modernization with cultural homogenization, disregarding the influence of pre-modern traditions (Knöbl 2007, 59). Moreover, they correct the secular bias of classical theories of modernization by emphasizing the continuing relevance of religion in the modern world. At the same time, the theoretical position of Eisenstadt and Arnason maintains the idea of a more general structural foundation of modernity in a specifically “modern program.” At the heart of this theory of multiple modernities is still a notion of difference as unity. However, what is the precise conceptual nature of this unity in the modern program? Is modernity in Eisenstadt’s approach a civilization “in its own right” (Knöbl 2007, 41)?

Regarding this question about the generic nature of modernity, theories of multiple modernities remain rather vague. Is modernity a civilizational complex in itself or is it rather a set of infrastructural innovations from which different civilizations have drawn? To what extent does modernity have its roots in Western civilization? And if this is so, does modernization, then, in the end not mean the Western imposition of specific norms and institution on other civilizations (Arnason 2003, 34–35)? In addition, building on the premises of the axial age thesis, Eisenstadt’s theory has a tendency to deal with civilizations as coherent and bounded “cultural containers” (Wagner 2008, 12). Theories of multiple modernities suggest cultural homogeneity within civilizations, whereas classical modernization theories were predicated on the development of this homogeneity across civilizations (cf. Schmidt 2008, 88). Yet how should pluralism within and between distinct civilizational contexts be dealt with? The briefly described Islamic and Christian alternatives to the liberal imagination of modernity are cases in point. Although sharing references to Islamic traditions, the modern imaginaries of female piety movements in Cairo, of Shiite women activists in Beirut, of the intellectual reformers of the nineteenth century such as Abduh, of the political ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood in the twentieth century, or of contemporary representatives of “liberal Islam” such as Tariq Ramadan, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, or Abdulkarim Soroush are of a very different kind.⁷ The idea of an authentically Islamic modern has evolved into a plurality of modern Islamic social imaginations. Moreover, these different trajectories of Islamic modernities developed in close contact with cultural elements of other civilizational complexes in Africa, Asia, and Europe. How should this historical reality of intra- and inter-civilizational encounters in our understanding of the rise of multiple modernities be accommodated?

I suggest finding answers to this question by combining Eisenstadt's and Arnason's insights into the role of premodern traditions in shaping multiple trajectories of modernity with selective reference to other pluralistic theories of modernities. Regarding the intra- and inter-civilizational varieties of shaping multiple modernities, I will draw on theories of entangled and theories of successive modernities. The first offers me an opportunity to bridge Eisenstadt's theory in space, transcending his concept of relatively bounded civilizational entities. The second reorganizes the rise of multiple modernities in time, conceptualizing modernization as a process with ruptures, blind alleys, and breaks. The combination of these three approaches to modernity in the plural – multiple, entangled, and successive modernities – I will lay out in the following pages of this chapter. The question about the nature of the “modern program,” the generic concept of modernity in the singular, then, will be the core theme of the third chapter, employing elements from the sociological tradition of differentiation theory.

ENTANGLED MODERNITIES AND COLONIAL HISTORY

Similar to theories of multiple modernities, the concept of entangled modernities stipulates modernity to be a global and therewith a multifaceted rather than a universal phenomenon. However, the concept of entanglement emphasizes the interdependence of the relationship among these forms of modernity. Multiple modernities do not simply coexist, but are the result of a relational process of mutual construction, cooperation, and contestation. In short, the formation of multiple modernities has been a global process of cultural entanglement (Therborn 2003). In this global process, religious and other traditions are not residual traces of the past, but constitutive elements of the present (Randeria 2002, 308). This constitutive function of premodern traditions, however, has taken place through complex processes of interaction and intermixture with other historical traditions, as well as with specifically modern ideas. Premodern traditions are just one part of a pool of cultural resources from which social actors draw (Swidler 2001, 5). Through the theoretical prism of entangled modernities, the rise of multiple modernities has been a relational construction of a multiplicity of modern cultures and institutions. World history appears as the history of entangled and uneven modernities

(Randeria 2002, 287). Moreover, this entanglement of multiple modernities has been permeated by power relations and characterized by both cooperation and conflict.

From a historical perspective, there is ample evidence that in this global entanglement colonial power structures played a supreme role. To a certain extent, these colonial power structures, the historical dominance of European states, find their mirror image in the relative absence of the non-Western world in social theory. Many social theorists have developed their “own disciplinary self-understandings separate from any consideration” of the imperial entanglements of colonial centers and peripheries (Bhambra 2014b, 418). Consequently, the construction of European modernities often appears to be an intrinsic development of the center. Theories of entangled modernities, instead, draw our attention to the involvement of the periphery in shaping the modernities of the center. They make the asymmetric power relations of colonialism part of a mutual process for the construction of modern identities and institutions. Moreover, they make us aware of the ways in which “subaltern actors” played an important part in the making of modern universals based on a reflection upon their own problems (Getachew 2016, 1–2).

For Great Britain, for instance, India became “a laboratory of new administrative practices,” where modern state institutions were developed and later exported to the UK (Metcalf and Metcalf 2011, 44 and 83). Recent studies on Evangelical Protestant missionaries in the Middle East have shown the influence of their comprehensive strategies of conversion on the ideological and religious formation of the Islamic reform movement and the Muslim Brotherhood (Baron 2014; Ryad 2009). The missionaries’ strategy of “indirect conversion through schooling” met with local demands for knowledge and education, generating unexpected results on both sides. The missionary activities contributed to transforming the “epistemological communities of Ottoman society,” but they did not succeed in converting the local population to Protestant Christianity. On the contrary, while for parts of Ottoman society science turned out to be “the true gospel,” many missionaries underwent fundamental changes themselves regarding the very nature of their own Christian faith and its relationship to the modern sciences and to Islam (Elsharky 2011, 172, 188 and 196). Consequently, these nineteenth-century missionary encounters played a decisive role in shaping the modern images of both Christianity and Islam.

In a similar way we can read the rise of pan-Islamic ideologies and the redefinition of Islam by the concept of a distinct civilization as the result of

intellectual entanglements between Muslims and European intellectuals in the era of high imperialism. According to Cemil Aydin, pan-Islamic and pan-Asian visions emerged in the second part of the nineteenth century as a response of non-European intellectuals to the racist and Orientalist discourses of their Western counterparts. At the beginning of their modern reform efforts, following Aydin's core argument, Muslim and Japanese thinkers adopted elements of nineteenth-century scientific theories such as historicism, evolutionism, and philosophies of religious rationalization with the aim of joining the universal modern civilization. In this way, they imagined modernity within the trajectory that the European Enlightenment tradition had taken. Only gradually did non-European intellectuals replace this universalistic frame of reference with the concepts of distinct Islamic and Japanese civilizations due to the exclusionary politics of European imperialism and the rising nationalist ideologies in the formation of modern national states. In this way, not only did non-European intellectuals construct civilizational complexes based on their own traditions, but their reflections on the civilizational discourse of Europe also contributed strongly to the self-representation and the evolution of the distinct idea of the West (Aydin 2007). In conclusion, the conceptual construction of a world characterized by a number of relatively distinct civilizations is the result of colonial entanglements.

In the Muslim world, Muhammad Abduh was an important figure in this transformation of civilizational discourse. While strongly versed in Islamic traditions, Abduh also immersed himself in the reading of European philosophy. In his zeal for religious, political, and social reform, he was deeply impressed by Françoise Guizot's *Histoire de la civilisation en Europe* (The History of Civilization in Europe) (Arafat 2001, 376). In this book, the committed French Calvinist developed a philosophy of history by narrating the evolution of European civilization as a continuing process of social progress toward an ordered totality, a comprehensive way of life (Weintraub 1966, 14). In the dynamic and diverse nature of European civilization, Guizot discovered an intrinsic aim for humanity as a whole, the realization of a divine plan, distinct from the stagnant character of previous civilizations such as Egypt, Greece, or India (Guizot 1828, Chapter II, 12). Guizot's lectures on European civilization were published in 20 editions in France alone, and Muhammad Abduh most likely came across it in its Arabic translation (Weintraub 1966, 83). Given the religious inspiration in his reform efforts, Abduh was sympathetic to Guizot's apologetic mission. Moreover, he shared his emphasis on the civilizing

function of education. Through his reading of Guizot, Abduh became acquainted with ideas that influenced him later in his endeavor to reform the educational structures at the al-Azhar in Cairo and the Egyptian education system more generally (Arafat 2001, 377).

Muhammad Abduh's engagement in both the Islamic discourse of the Muslim religious learned and nineteenth-century philosophical discourse molded the lectures published in *Risalat al-Tawhid* (translated into English as "The Theology of Unity"). In these lectures, Abduh referred to Islamic traditions in an evolutionary perspective, framing his ideas through the then contemporary theories of religious rationalization. Already at the beginning of the book, Abduh described the Quran as the first holy book in which "revelation and reason merge through the voice of the messenger of God" (Abduh 1965, 8). Combining the religious concept of the unity of God (*tawhid*) with the holistic concept of civilization, Islamic reformers such as Abduh began to construct Islam anew. They interpreted Islamic traditions through conceptual lenses of cultural unity and constructed the ideal of a totality of Islamic institutions and walks of life. The complex interplay of religious reform, scientific discourse, international politics, and modern state formation gave birth to the idea of a specifically Islamic form of modernity with its normative foundations in the revealed sources of the *sharia*. Building on the Quran and the *sunna* (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), Islamic reformers gradually turned the *sharia* (Islamic law) into a central symbolic reference for the achievement of moral integrity, cultural authenticity, and national self-determination (cf. Dallal 2000, 347; Krämer 2010, 114).

Against this background, we have to analyze the development of the Islamic reform movement as part of this global cultural entanglement in constructing autochthonous representation of the modern world in the nineteenth century. In order to understand Abduh's role in this process, it is therefore not sufficient to interpret his teachings according to Samira Haj's dictum of "Islam on its own terms." The reinterpretation of Islamic traditions and the evolution of Islam as a modern religion has not been an intrinsic process of the "Islamic civilizational complex." Rather it was the complex and contingent result of historical processes of intense entanglement among different religious traditions, new modern thoughts, and a multiplicity of other local, national, and regional cultural forms. The analysis of the Islamic reform movement as well as the European responses to it needs the perspective of "connected sociologies," a perspective that takes colonial and postcolonial histories into account (Bhambra 2014a, 2).

Furthermore, since its outset in the nineteenth century, the ideas of Islamic reform have undergone different phases due to changing historical contexts. While Abduh's revision of Islamic traditions was the project of an intellectual elite, ideas of Islamic reform later became a property of larger segments of Muslim societies during the twentieth century. Instrumental in moving them from the intellectual sphere to the public at large was the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1928. The idea of Islamic modernity then attained a more precise organizational and ideological form. In our understanding of this temporal transformation of Islamic and other modernities, theories of successive modernities seem to offer complementary analytical insights into the theories of multiple and entangled modernities discussed so far.

SUCCESSIVE MODERNITIES AS IDEAL TYPES

Theories of successive modernities put an end to the assumption of a linear path of development in classical modernization theories. They conceptualize modernization as an uneven process with ruptures and breaks. From their perspective, modernity resembles a fragmented and patterned sequence of different social orders. Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, for instance, divided modernity into two stages. First, modernity appeared as the well-ordered world of organized society whose major pillars were a firm belief in linear progress, instrumental rationality, and the informed organization of society. This stage of organized society became gradually replaced by "risk society" (Beck) leading to a phase of "high modernity" after the Second World War. This reflexive stage of high modernity Giddens and Beck declared to be in itself a consequence of the erosion of the major pillars of organized modernity. In their eyes, the stage of high modernity is characterized by a separation of time and space, the disembedding of social institutions from their local contexts, institutional and individual reflexivity, and continuous experiences of doubt and multiple choices. Reflexivity, here, Giddens and Beck understood as a transformative process through which modern rationality in its systemic consequences has undermined the very same foundations on which it previously rested (Beck 1986, 1992; Giddens 1991). Zygmunt Baumann described this shift of two historically subsequent forms of modernity as a turn toward "endemic uncertainty." In his reading, these two successive forms of modernities mark a passage from a solid to a "liquid" phase of modernity in which social forms no longer have time to solidify (Baumann 2007, 1). Liquid modernity, then, is characterized

by self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing patterns of fear, by a society that has replaced ordered schemes of social life with persistent “sentiments of existential insecurity” (Baumann 2007, 57). Evidently, Baumann’s liquid modernity represents something like “the other” of organized modernity.

The most elaborated version of successive modernities we find in the work of Peter Wagner. For Wagner, the ambivalence of modernity lies in the specifically modern relationship between autonomy and mastery (Wagner 2001, 118), between claims of individuality and social order. Historically different forms of social order struggle with these two imperatives and, therefore, questions about individual freedoms, collective self-determination, and social justice only can find preliminary solutions (Wagner 2012, 120). Based on this general assumption of a continuing contestation between autonomy and mastery in modernity, Wagner extended the previously mentioned dichotomy between two phases of modernity with an additional stage. Wagner distinguished among three successive stages of modernity: restricted liberal modernity, organized modernity, and pluralistic modernity (Wagner 1994, 2010). Different combinations of the conflictual modern social imperatives of autonomy and mastery characterize these three subsequent stages of modernity. A number of elements of these successive modernities are clearly discernible in the intellectual history of the modern Islamic reform movement.

The first form, restricted liberal modernity, is characterized by an elitist application of morally and rationally grounded liberal rules to a distinguished bourgeois minority. The bourgeois elite of society claim individual autonomy while the excluded masses are subject to the elite’s mastery. Elements of this kind of social order we can detect among the nineteenth-century Islamic reformers, Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898), for instance, the founder of India’s Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh. With the establishment of Aligarh College, Khan aimed at lifting the status of Muslims in India by the advancement of learning. In perceiving religion “as a source of social discipline,” he was working for the construction of a new form of Muslim consciousness. At Aligarh, Ahmed Khan and the first generation of the college built an institution designed for “men of the respectable class.” Aligarh was a planned community excluding women and the lower classes (Lelyveld 1996, 122–124). Like Ahmed Khan’s educational vision for a restricted group of Indian Muslim elite, Muhammad Abduh’s reform agenda resembled the specific composition of autonomy and mastery of restricted liberalism. Abduh combined his call upon Muslims to return to Islamic principles with the bourgeois ideal of the educated, socially active,

and morally grounded individual. The personal autonomy of Abduh's modern Muslim subject was characterized by a combination of work discipline with reflected-upon religious observance. This concept of a modern Muslim, however, did not apply to ordinary Egyptians. The Egyptian masses first had to be educated by this moral, modern elite through a religiously conscious and state-governed system of education. Abduh's ideal of an Islamic modernity was a rather elitist construction. The liberal elements of his Islamic reform agenda were basically restricted to the well-educated class, which should rule over a nonautonomous population (Jung 2012).

In this nineteenth-century liberal order of the excluded masses, the majority of the population was confronted with massive social inequalities and impoverishment. In Europe, these inherent contradictions of restricted liberalism led to a social crisis eventually giving way to forms of organized modernity in the early twentieth century. This new vision of an organized society was dominated by the idea of a state-centered social order of the organized masses and the informed management of society. In institutional terms, the territorially demarcated national state contained the dynamics of mass society. Consequently, the concept of organized modernity privileged the rights of the collective over the rights of the individual. Organized modernity included the masses, however, without granting them the same individual rights that restricted liberalism assigned to the bourgeois minority. In modern Islamic history, we find this ideal of a top-down organization and control of society in the political worldview of both the state elite of the late Ottoman Empire and the vanguard leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jung and Sinclair 2015).

Since assuming power in the Ottoman Empire after the so-called Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the ruling Committee of Union and Progress tried to "exercised control over every organization in Ottoman society and scrupulously inculcated its doctrine of Turkism" (Hanioglu 2011, 93). This top-down approach to rule by complete social control and ideological domination was later continued in the newly founded Turkish Republic (1923) under its first two presidents, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1838) and Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1884–1973). Replacing the Islamic and dynastic political legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire by republican nationalism, the leaders of the early Turkish Republic engaged in a conscious process of national Turkish identity construction by the state (Jung and Piccoli 2001). While in the political ideology of the Turkish Republic the ideal of organized society was combined with a very rigid version of secularism, the Muslim Brotherhood movement advocated a

specifically Islamic model of organized society at the same time. Founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood moved from being a benevolent society to becoming a transnational religiopolitical movement with distinct national branches in various Muslim countries. The Muslim Brothers combined the idea of Islamic authenticity with the bureaucratic institutions, organizational templates, and forms of mass mobilization that characterized the popular political movements of the interwar period in a global dimension. Hasan al-Banna constructed a model of Islamic modernity in which state authorities organize society according to Islamic norms and principles (Krämer 2010; Mitchell 1969).

In the second part of the twentieth century, then, this form of state-centered organized modernity was increasingly challenged by more pluralistic versions of modernity. These pluralistic forms of modernity emphasize the autonomy of the individual and are characterized by multiple choices, entrepreneurial strategies, and an increasing pluralization of social practices. Pluralistic forms of modernity replace the ideal of mastery of society with the liberal concept of autonomous individuals who, in principle, are not controlled from above, but mastering themselves. In looking at the history of Europe since the end of the Second World War, we can observe this shift between two successive forms of modernity, whereas in the decolonization of the Muslim world, the predominant establishment of authoritarian political regimes indicates the continuing prevalence of models of organized societies there. In the process of decolonization, the new state elite of the independent states of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East applied elements of organized society in a stereotypical and often unconscious way in the institutional and discursive framing of their own national modernization processes (Bhaba 1997). Until today, the ideal of organized society, the prevalence of mastery over individual autonomy, has prevailed in the social orders of the Global South.

However, Asef Bayat convincingly argued with respect to the Muslim world that visions of Islamic modernities also increasingly acknowledge ambiguity, multiplicity, and compromise in the performance of religious practices and the desired reformation of society (Bayat 2007, 13). This pluralization of Islamic modernities is often represented by religious lay people who clearly differ from both the bourgeois intellectuals of the elitist nineteenth-century Islamic reform movement and the collectivist and state-centered representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood or the authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes. Their message combines social awareness

with faith and allows for the assertion of individuality and values of extended liberal modernity (cf. Bayat 2007; van Nieuwkerk 2008). To a certain extent, the popular unrest in the Arab world (2010–2012), the so-called Arab spring, was part of this critique of the prevalence of forms of organized modernity in the Muslim world.

In my reading, these successive orders of restricted liberalism, organized society, and pluralistic modernity are ideal types. They do not directly portray social reality, but they are sociological constructs abstracting from concrete, significant historical phenomena. They have been constructed in light of observable social horizons to which collective and individual processes of identification relate. Consequently, I employ these types of successive modernities in the Weberian sense as heuristic instruments to order the complexity of social reality (Weber 1904, 85–95). Moreover, they do not mark radical breaks with the past according to which one type would have been replaced by another in a linear way. Their temporal succession stands rather for three distinguishable phases of modern history. In each phase, we can observe a certain type playing the role of a relatively hegemonic social order. Thus, forms of successive modernities constitute competing options in the historical realization of modernity. In principle they can exist parallel to each other and the relative hegemony of one type is continuously subject to social contestations.

CONCLUSION

The chapter has presented an inquiry into the conceptual potential of pluralistic theories of modernities to add new perspectives to a global sociology of modernity that allows us to analyze the histories of Europe and the Muslim world in one heuristic framework. I have chosen theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities as they break with some core assumptions of classical modernization theories such as the linearity, homogeneity, and universality of the modernization process. Theories of multiple modernities, as developed by Eisenstadt and Arnason, help us to understand the historical path dependency of specific modernization processes. They convincingly prove wrong the crude distinction between tradition and modernity on which so many previous understandings of modernization relied. In emphasizing the role of religious and other traditions in shaping contemporary forms of modernity, theories of multiple modernities remind us that traditions have not simply been replaced by modernity. On the contrary, the cultural heritage of different cultural

traditions is clearly visible in the varieties in which global modernity has appeared. This is what illustrative examples from the history of the Islamic reform movement in this chapter have shown. In the modern history of Muslim people, the idea of an authentically Islamic modernity has even achieved a certain hegemony. Theories of multiple modernities direct our research to explore the different ways in which traditions live on and play a part in shaping the concrete formation of modern institutions, cultures, and individuals.

In bringing religion and traditions back in, multiple modernities tend to conceptualize historical transformations as internal processes of what Eisenstadt called “civilizational complexes.” They treat civilizations as relatively bounded entities, as historically developed cultural wholes. In sharp contrast to this holistic view of culture, theories of entangled modernities inform us about the complex make-up on which modern cultures rest. The varieties of modernities are not only due to their incorporation of different religious and imperial legacies, but also result from complex processes of historical interaction among and between different cultures. The multiple forms of global modernity have been shaped by social encounters, cultural fusions, and cooperation and conflicts among social actors from different “civilizational complexes.” We must analyze historically concrete forms of modernity as products of the entanglement of a multiplicity of cultural forms. The Islamic reform movement’s construction of Islam as a distinct civilization is just one example of this process of entanglement. The mutual constitution of concepts of Islamic and Western civilizations even shows that Eisenstadt’s and Arnason’s theory of civilizational complexes itself is a historically developed conceptual construct of the nineteenth century.

Finally, I introduced theories of successive modernities that add a temporal dimension to the rise of global modernity and conflicting general patterns of modern social orders. They point to specific varieties of social imaginations within modernity. The modern task of autonomously constructing legitimate identities and social orders has been solved in at least three different ways. While scholars such as Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Zygmunt Baumann provide us with two ideal types for this task, representing the outer poles of rigid organization and pluralistic fluidity, Peter Wagner added a third type, restricted liberalism, which basically combines these two outer poles in a socially stratified version. For a limited class of bourgeois people, the idea of individualistic autonomy exists, whereas the social masses are put under control with no claim to autonomy. Putting

theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities together, we get a set of analytical tools that can contribute a lot to the development of a more general theory of global modernity. In this endeavor, the three theories are of a complementary nature, rather than competing with each other. Each of them sheds light on particular lacunae of classical modernization theories. A combination of these three theories, therefore, offers a more analytically varied set of concepts for research. With this combination we come a long way in solving the puzzle of diversity in modernity. Furthermore, none of them completely does away with the general idea of unity in modernity, with the notion that all these observable differences are somehow linked to a mutually shared social condition. The nature of this more general condition, of modernity in the singular, however, remains in all three cases rather blurred. In order to provide us with a solid fundament to think modernity as unity, we must therefore turn to other theories in the following chapters.

NOTES

1. In the current debate, the application of the term “multiple modernities” has been largely detached from the theoretical premises on which it once was developed by Eisenstadt. In addition, in Islamic studies it serves as an unreflected-upon catchall term for cultural diversity (Thomassen 2010, 338). Later in this chapter, I will elaborate on the core assumptions of Eisenstadt that were behind the coining of this concept.
2. This does not mean that Lewis’ book has not its merits. For me it represents a classic on Turkish modernization that is well-worth to read.
3. For examples for this trend in research on contemporary Muslims, see Caeiro (2010), Cevik (2016), Cooke and Lawrence (2005), Deeb (2006) Dessing (2012), Fadil (2009), Furseth (2011), Haenni (2005), Hefner and Zaman (2007), Hirschkind (2006), Jacobsen (2011), Mahmood (2005), Mohamed Nasir (2016), Lewis (2007), Otterbeck (2011), Peterson (2011), Pieri (2015), Salvatore and Eickelman (2004), Schmidt (2002, 2004), Shehabuddin (2008), Soares and Otayek (2007), Sunier (2009), and Winchester (2008).
4. In my understanding, Deeb’s title expresses a clear misunderstanding of Weber’s metaphorical term of the disenchantment of the modern world. Weber tells us that the directions of religiosity lead from ritualism to ethical absolutism, from magic belief to sublimation by knowledge and from social embeddedness to individualization. He judged the level of rationality of religions according to which degree they have divested themselves of magic and systematically rationalized their ethics (Weber 1968, 226). The

disenchantment of the world is thus not the disappearance of religion. Rather, it represents a rationalization of religious beliefs and the disempowerment of magic (Breuer 2006, 13–23). Ironically, precisely elements of this tendency are visible in the interpretation of Shiite traditions by Deeb's interlocutors. Rather than enchanted, her interlocutors resemble Weber's disenchanted modern believers, increasingly rationalizing their interpretation of religious traditions.

5. In this sense they are, in particular the work of Saba Mahmood, influenced by the thinking of Talal Asad and his critique of Western liberalism. For a critique of this Asadian approach, see Bangstad (2009).
6. The term "Orientalism in reverse" originally comes from Sadiq al-Azm who criticized Edward Said for not taking into account that Islamist and Arab nationalist thinkers have constructed similar representations of Muslim and Middle Eastern people to the Orientalist scholars in the West (Al-Azm 1981).
7. A compilation of texts from these representatives of "liberal Islam" is found in Kurzman (1998).

Functional Differentiation, Theories of Emergence, and World Society: The Macro Level of Modernity

Abstract The chapter presents a rough sketch of a generic concept of modernity. I consider it to be a very first step to constructing an abstract frame of reference for the integration of the pluralistic concepts of modernities discussed in Chapter 2. I develop this generic concept of modernity by inscribing myself in one of the most central sociological narratives of modernity, the narrative of increasing social differentiation. First, I will define the macrostructures of modernity in relation to a specific theoretical position within the tradition of social differentiation. I will draw on elements from Niklas Luhmann's modern systems theory, specifically on his concepts of functional differentiation and world society. In a second step, I put this concept of modernity, combining functional differentiation with the rise of world society, in the metatheoretical framework of social emergence. The theoretical discussion will be illustrated by historical examples from the Muslim world.

Keywords Social differentiation · Functional differentiation · World society · Emergence · Islam and politics

The chapter presents a rough sketch of a generic concept of modernity. I consider it to be a very first step to constructing an abstract frame of reference for the integration of the pluralistic concepts of modernities discussed in [Chapter 2](#). I develop this concept of modernity in the singular by

inscribing myself in one of the most central sociological narratives of modernity, the narrative of increasing social differentiation. Classical sociologists such as Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, Elias, and Parsons have made social differentiation a core concept in social theory. While conceptualizing modernization in different ways, they shared the basic idea of an evolutionary process in which we can observe both the increase in social complexity and the internal pluralization of society through the functional separation of social realms (Tyrell 1978, 175). The exclusion of Muslim history from this narrative of differentiation, epitomized in public debate in the claim that there is no separation between religion and politics in Islam, has been the theoretical core assumption behind the discourse of Middle Eastern and Islamic exceptionalism.¹ While Orientalist scholars have reserved the property rights to this modern narrative for the West, Islamist thinkers interpret instances of the separation of social realms in Muslim societies as a cultural assault by the West. Based on its theoretical assumptions, this chapter makes a strong argument against this exclusivist representation of the Muslim world. The following brief examples will demonstrate this shared narrative of Islamic exclusivism by orientalists and Islamist thinkers.

In an erudite book on the cultural history of Islam, Johann Christoph Bürgel, for instance, defined the experience of the almightiness of God to be the essence of both the Islamic worldview and the fundamental life experience of all Muslims (Bürgel 1991, 43). Bürgel, from 1970 to 1995 director of Islamic studies at the University of Basel in Switzerland, asserted that for the analysis of Islamic history, sociological or economic explanations necessarily remain on the surface. In his opinion, only the exegesis of classical (revealed) texts is able to disclose the real deep structures on which the history of Islamic civilization has rested (Bürgel 1991, 361). In making religion the independent variable in our understanding of Islamic history, Bürgel's book is clearly animated by the scholarly spirit of "neo-Orientalism" (Sadowski 1993). Rooted in the academic tradition of classical Orientalism, neo-Orientalist scholarship has perceived social developments in Muslim countries as inseparably linked to the normative power of the model of the Prophet and the revealed scriptures of Islam. This applies in particular to the neo-Orientalist thesis that a separation between the modern state and religion would be incompatible with Islamic culture. For politically rather outspoken neo-Orientalist scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, or Bassam Tibi, only a radical farewell to the heritage of Islamic traditions would offer Muslims an entrance ticket to the modern world.

Turning toward Muslim intellectual traditions, we find strong parallels to this essentialist image of Islam in Western Orientalist scholarship among the broad range of so-called Islamist or neo-fundamentalist ideologies.² Both have reinterpreted Islamic traditions based on the specifically modern concept of holistic civilizations, whose evolution in the nineteenth century was briefly discussed in the preceding chapter. Since the early twentieth century, the development of Islamist ideologies has revolved around the very same theme of a fundamental difference to the West. Parallel to the Western tradition of Orientalist scholarship, Islamist intellectuals have framed Islam as being more than a mere religion, representing a holistic way of life in which religion and politics constitute an intrinsic unity. The Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), for instance, defined Islam to be an unquestionable unity of “worship and work, of political and economic theory, legal demands and spiritual exhortations” (Qutb 2000). In his theory of the *vilayet-e faqih* (the rule of Islamic jurists), Ayatollah Khomeini, to cite another example, combined this holistic unity of religion, politics, and social order with some specifically Shiite ideas of divinely sanctioned leadership, as well as modern theories of the republican state. Like the Sunni Islamist Qutb, the leader of the Islamic revolution in Shiite Iran declared Islam to be a comprehensive and all-encompassing way of life, a systematic order that has to be implemented by an Islamic government (Khomeini 1981).

This chapter will essentially challenge these assumptions from a distinctively theoretical perspective. I will argue against this exclusion of Muslim history from one of the master narratives of modernity. The chapter will underpin this argument by developing a generic perspective on modernity. First, I will define the macrostructures of modernity in relation to a specific theoretical position within the tradition of social differentiation. I will draw on elements from Niklas Luhmann’s modern systems theory, specifically on his concepts of functional differentiation and world society. In a second step, I put this concept of modernity, combining functional differentiation with the rise of world society, in the metatheoretical framework of social emergence. Thinking modernity in terms of emergence liberalizes it from historical origins and provides a theoretical perspective to refute the simplistic equation of modernization with Westernization. Moreover, theories of emergence can play a key role in solving ongoing questions regarding the micro and the macro levels of society (Heintz 2004). To be sure, my application of these two theories is both selective and pragmatic. I remain therefore necessarily on the very surface of the respective

complexities of these theories. I only claim that the combination of elements of modern systems theory with the paradigm of emergence opens our eyes to a heuristic perspective of modernity as world society that allows us to address a number of burgeoning questions for empirical research. Again, I will illustrate the theoretical elaborations of this chapter using empirical examples from the histories of Islamic institutions and Muslim peoples. These examples serve the purpose of supporting my claim that the history of the Muslim world has known autochthonous processes of social differentiation, making it an inherent part of an emerging global modernity.

FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION AND WORLD SOCIETY

Emile Durkheim's *De la division du travail social* (The Division of Labor) built on three crucial ideas that can still help us to define modernity in generic terms at the macro level: modern society as a *fait social* (a social fact); modernization as social differentiation; and modernization as individualization (Durkheim 1964). In defining society as a social fact, as an object distinct from and greater than the sum of its parts, Emile Durkheim tried to grasp the abstract and relatively autonomous nature of modern social relations. In his definition, we encounter society first and foremost in the form of a non-palpable coercive macrostructure. Modernity appears as an almost transcendental moral, cognitive, and symbolic order (Frisby and Sayer 1986, 36–49). The emergence of modern society Durkheim perceived in terms of a sociocultural evolution, defining modernization as the gradual transformation from “mechanical” (traditional) to “organic” (modern) society. In this transformative social process, the increasing differentiation of social realms has characterized all spheres of life. From the perspective of society as a whole, this process of differentiation resembles a gradual decomposition of previously unified social functions. Among the separated social realms of organic society exists a functionally defined division of labor. Modern society, then, represents a complex and not directly observable whole of socially specialized political, economic, or educational institutions. At the same time individuals seem to be becoming simultaneously more autonomous and more dependent (Durkheim 1964). They claim autonomy as individual persons, whereas their relationships with each other are inseparably knitted into the non-palpable macrostructures of society.

Pointing to this simultaneity of autonomy and dependence in modern society, we can see Durkheim's sociology as one of the foundational stones of the intertwined sociological narratives of differentiation and individualization. These two narratives, often seen as contradicting each other, are actually closely intertwined. They both revolve around the modern idea of autonomy, an idea also central for theories of multiple and successive modernities. However, these two master narratives of sociology articulate autonomy in essentially opposing ways. In addressing the question of social order, the narrative of differentiation refers to the systemic macro level at which modern society appears as an autonomous social structure based on functionally complementary social systems. At the micro level, individualization narrates the formation of rationalist autonomous subjects, which at first glance would exclude any preexisting social institutions. Especially in the tradition of utilitarian thinking in sociology, for instance in rational choice theories, social order is not a given autonomous structure, but the result of purposeful interaction among rational actors. In this chapter, I will mainly refer to the first of these two intertwined narratives, to the narrative of differentiation. The narrative of individualization, then, I will address in my theoretical considerations in [Chapter 4](#).

Durkheim's understanding of the dynamics of modernization as social differentiation, as "the division of labor," has informed numerous authors in the sociology of modernity. Niklas Luhmann's, modern systems theory is probably one of the most rigorous applications of differentiation theory. In combining theories of social differentiation with biological theories of self-reference and the German hermeneutical tradition, however, Luhmann replaced Durkheim's paradigm of the division of labor by a paradigm of social emergence. In taking his inspiration from the self-construction of living systems such as the biological cell, Luhmann conceptualized modernization as the evolution of a plurality of complementary, but self-referential social realms whose origin and internal logics cannot be explained from the perspective of the functional demands of the social whole (Schimank 2005, 44–47). In modern systems theory, modern society is not a given coercive normative macrostructure, but is defined as an emerging self-referential and all-encompassing global system of communications. According to Luhmann, modern society integrates all world horizons within one communicative system. We can no longer make sense of modern society in terms of a corporate social actor constituted by its single parts; nor does society have an identifiable center that represents the social as a whole.³

Internally, Luhmann subdivided modern society into a number of functionally defined subsystems such as politics, economy, law, education, science, sport, intimacy, media, and religion. These subsystems of modern society operate according to their own specific communicative codes and none of them is able to represent the social as a whole. Social subsystems establish themselves through operational closure; they are autonomously producing and reproducing themselves. In borrowing from the conceptual apparatus of biology, Luhmann defined them therefore to be “autopoietic” entities.⁴ In the eyes of Luhmann, social systems consist of communicative elements which they produce themselves. They depend on inputs from their environments, but transform them into specific elements according to their own distinct communicative codes. In this way they are both autonomous and mutually dependent entities of the social. This theory of modern society based on the relative autonomy and the operational closure of social subsystems renders the convenient fusion of society with the territorially demarcated national state obsolete. According to modern systems theory, none of the subsystems, that is to say not the political system either, is able to represent society as a social whole. Consequently, Luhmann declares modern society to be world society. In defining modern society as a global system of communications, we can no longer speak of society in the plural (Luhmann 1990, 178).

In drawing sharp boundaries to their environment, according to Luhmann, social systems become entirely indifferent with respect to the communicative identity of other subsystems and to the motivations of social actors. Consequently, in modern systems theory the reproduction of social order takes place by excluding the purposeful actions of human beings (Schimank 2005, 74). The society of modern systems theory represents an “actor-less” sphere of the social. Specific binary codes guarantee this operational closure of modern society and its subsystems. These codes define the self-referential, autopoietic logic of each subsystem, and in this way they decide about the compatibility and successful continuation of communications. The legal system, for instance, operates with the binary code of legal/illegal, the scientific system with true/untrue, the political system with decision-making/nondecision-making, the economic system with to possess/not to possess, or the religious system with transcendent/immanent. In this way, communication is identified as juridical, scientific, political, economic, or religious, establishing a sharp distinction between systemic communication and communication in its environment (Luhmann 1986). Furthermore, some subsystems have developed generalized media of

communication such as power in the political system, money in the economic system, or truth in science. These generalized media coordinate and facilitate system-specific communications. They define situations as political, economic, or scientific in order to sustain the self-referential reproduction of function systems (Luhmann 1975a and 1998, Chapter 2).

Following Luhmann, modernization defines a process of sociocultural evolution in which functional differentiation becomes the dominant mode of social differentiation in a global dimension. From his theoretical perspective, modernization replaces the primacy of segmentation and stratification as the ordering principles of premodern forms of social life by social systems based on functional differentiation as the core feature of world society (Luhmann 1981, 187). This primacy of the principle of functional differentiation in world society, however, does not render forms of segmentation and stratification obsolete. They only become subordinated forms of differentiation that predominantly characterize the internal structures of global function systems. The process of decolonization, for instance, completed the transformation of the global political system from the stratified structure of empires to the segmented world order of national states (Stichweh 2010, 302). The rise of a global subsystem of politics has been accompanied by a shift in its internal differentiation from stratification to segmentation. The world system of religion, to take another example, developed its contemporary form in the course of the nineteenth century. In identifying a number of sets of authoritative traditions as “religions,” the rising global system of religion achieved its internal differentiation in a segmented structure of mutually acknowledged “religious programs” (Beyer 2006). Looking at higher education as a final example, we may interpret the increasing role of worldwide university rankings as a form of the stratification of the global system of science. Hence, in Luhmann’s theoretical design, functional differentiation does not simply take the previous place of stratification and segmentation as modes of social differentiation. Stratification and segmentation continue to play an important, but subordinated role in the historical structuration of world society as a global, functionally differentiated system of communications.

Addressing the rise of global modernity in empirical terms, we can interpret modern state formation in the Muslim world in line with these two theoretical perspectives of world society: We can observe the discursive inclusion of Muslim peoples in a global system of specifically political communication and the shift of Muslim polities from stratification to

segmentation, from empires to national states. The formally sovereign, internationally acknowledged, and territorially demarcated national state is the political form in which contemporary Muslims live (Piscatori 1986). Looking at the 57 member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), ranging from the Kingdom of Morocco in the west to the tiny, but rich Sultanate of Brunei Dar-us-Salam in the east, it becomes apparent that these national states look back on very different historical paths in establishing modern statehood. The OIC does not represent a kind of Islamic polity above national states. On the contrary, the OIC is a typical international organization in which members participate in having constituted themselves in the form of independent and sovereign national states. In international politics, some OIC members such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey are even among the most uncompromising advocates of Westphalian norms, that is to say of the core rationale of the modern state. They rigidly apply the globally acknowledged language of modern politics. This implies the non-compromising insistence on norms such as self-determination and noninterference in domestic affairs, as well as the political self-organization as national states according to the segmented character of the world political system.

In terms of the relationship between religion and politics, the OIC member states display a broad variety of institutional and legal arrangements organizing the respective populations within the internationally acknowledged political framework of the modern state. In Muslim state formation we can observe a multiplicity of historically conditioned negotiations about the boundaries between religious and political realms. These negotiations led to very different results, yet they have all been conducted in close conceptual reference to the communicative logics of the global systems of religion and politics. There is simply no empirical evidence for the claim that religion and politics are joined together in the Muslim world. Whereas republican Turkey has been characterized throughout most of the twentieth century by the rigid rules of Kemalist secularism, the clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran is legitimizing its political order by means of a specific interpretation of the traditions of Shiite Islam. Both states, however, implemented features of republicanism based on the modern political principles of popular sovereignty and the formal distribution of powers. The majority of OIC member states consider themselves as republics, which distinguish them sharply from Muslim monarchies such as Brunei, the Gulf States, Jordan, Morocco, or Saudi Arabia. Yet looking at their formal patterns of rule,

these republics expose a wide range of political systems from the one-person dictatorship of Turkmenistan to the representational democracy of the EU candidate Turkey or, more recently the Republic of Tunisia, which experienced its first free national elections in October 2011.⁵ The most populous Muslim state, Indonesia, added a specific religious component to its declaration of independence, though not an explicitly Islamic one. As one of its five principles, the concept of the Pancasila stipulates monotheism as a constitutional element of the Indonesian state. This constitutional prerogative defines all five officially accepted religions in Indonesia as monotheistic, namely Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism (Arenhövel 2005).

In South Asia, the political history of the Indian subcontinent clearly contradicts the pretensions of the inseparable unity of Islam and politics of Orientalist scholars and Islamist ideologues. The communal conflict among India's multireligious elite led to a two-state solution at independence. With the foundation of India and Pakistan in 1947, South Asian state formation attained a particularly religious connotation. Yet this attempt to transform religious into political boundaries did not solve the conflict. On the contrary, the communal tension was elevated to the interstate level, resulting in a series of wars between the Indian and Pakistani states. Furthermore, the religious definition of Pakistan's political identity as a modern national state could not prevent the secession of Bangladesh (1971), nor the dangerous political fragmentation of what remained of Pakistan. Since the establishment of two Muslim states in South Asia, they have both constantly been faced with severe domestic conflicts, which in the case of the Pakistani provinces of Sind, Belujistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas at the border to Afghanistan have assumed war-like forms (Jung et al. 2003, 215–223). These historical experiences of South Asian state formation alone are proof of the fact that in the Muslim world overly religious identities do not necessarily correspond with political loyalties. The attempt to synchronize political with religious communication within the institutional frame of a modern national state apparently failed.

The above discussion of "Islamic politics" as an inherent part of world political communication indicates that taking inspiration from Luhmann's theory does not mean fully endorsing all his theoretical assumptions. This applies to the concept of autopoiesis, the rigid operational closure of social systems, as well as to his dictum that we should no longer consider human beings to be a part of the social, but a part of society's environment (Luhmann 1987, 288). The brief examples from modern Muslim state

formation show that empirically the functional languages of religion and politics often intersect and that the historical formation of a global system of politics relied on the enactment of formal structures of communication by social actors. Conceptualizing political, economic, or religious communication in terms of self-referential discursive macrostructures provides us with heuristic instruments to organize the observation of concrete social negotiations in historical processes of modern state formation. Similar to Durkheim's concept of the social fact, modern systems theory tends to exaggerate the apartness and distinctiveness of the macro realm. Yet Luhmann's exaggerated lenses of functional differentiation serve as heuristic instruments in analytically distinguishing between, for instance, political and religious communication in the communicative mesh of social actions that we observe. The different arrangements of the relation between Islam and politics in Muslim states are proof of the historically variable ways in which social actors have negotiated this relation by ascribing communications a religious or political meaning.

When it comes to individual and collective actors, they certainly do exist and take part in the evolution of social structures. Yet they do so by generating social meanings in light of Luhmann's "fictional" structures of world society (Schimank 1988).⁶ They apply the functional logics of communicative subsystems in the form of interpretative schemes in their social actions. In this way both abstract macrostructures and human actors mutually constitute the social world. Against the exaggeration of the autonomous character of society in the Durkheimian tradition, sociologists such as Norbert Elias and Theodor W. Adorno stressed the inherent procedural and relational nature of society. In his figurational sociology, for instance, Norbert Elias interpreted modernization as a civilization process of increasing social complexity. Modern society evolves as a network of no longer perceptible connections and interdependencies of individuals (Elias 1994, 332). In Adorno's definition, modern society is a relational category, representing a social unit that is "realized only through individuals," however without being "reduced to them." Society is a concrete reality, but it is only apprehensible through theoretical abstraction, society is a "real abstraction" (Adorno 2000, 38). Rejecting a strict separation between society and individuals such as in Luhmann's theory, Elias and Adorno nevertheless underline the growing imperceptibility of social interdependence through which modern society attains a certain kind of autonomy vis-à-vis the individual. The theme of the modern simultaneity of autonomy and dependence runs through their works too.

I would claim that for constructing a generic understanding of modernity, Luhmann's radical "fiction" of a society without social actors is helpful in terms of a heuristic perspective. I employ the concept of world society of modern systems theory in Adorno's meaning of a real abstraction. Luhmann offers conceptual tools to capture social reality at the most abstract macro level. His focus on the intrinsic logic of social systems based on the communicational logic of functional differentiation provides a theoretical perspective from which we are able to understand the "syntax" of modernity. In order to connect Luhmann's theory to other sociological traditions, Alex Viskovatoff suggested introducing the linguistic distinction between syntax and semantics into social theory (Viskovatoff 1999, 507). Applying this distinction, the self-referential logic of function systems constitutes the syntax of modernity. The autopoiesis of social systems produces formal bodies of knowledge about politics, economics, or religion, which are not contained in social actors. Their discursive structures of communications and expectations represent a complex set of formal rules for the construction of a meaningful semantics of modernity. Yet these semantics of modernity appear on a different level of reality and rely on the interpretative properties of social actors. Only social actors guided by their intentions, conscious beliefs, and desires can attach concrete meanings to the syntactical structures of modernity (Viskovatoff 1999, 502–506).

Social actors produce the multiple vernacular languages of modernity. Consequently, "individuals and social systems can interpenetrate each other," but only the intentional actions of individuals attach specific meanings to the mechanical rules of the formal communications of systems (Viskovatoff 1999, 506). Social actors are aware of the communicative logics of function systems, and they use them as a general frame of reference in their social actions (Schimank 2005, 48). The brief observations made above regarding Muslim state formation illustrated this interplay of the syntax and semantics of modernity with regard to historically concrete political and religious communications. Individual and collective actors observe social reality as both concrete situations and abstract horizons of social subsystems apart from the intentional level of their social actions (Schimank 2005, 95). In order to grasp the relationship between modernity as a general condition and the rise of multiple modernities, in this sense of the simultaneity of unity and difference in modernity, we need to understand this relationship between the syntactic macro and the semantic meso and micro levels of reality. We need a metatheory that

allows us to anchor different levels of modernity in one heuristic framework and to understand the interplay among these levels.

THEORIES OF EMERGENCE AND GLOBAL MODERNITY

In this section, I will draw on theories of emergence in sketching out this necessary metatheoretical frame of reference. As mentioned earlier, Niklas Luhmann considered social systems as a kind of emerging phenomena. In *Soziale Systeme*, for instance, he described the synthesis of three selections behind communications as an emerging event (Luhmann 1987, 196). Yet Luhmann replaced the micro/macro distinction by the differentiation between system and environment. In this way, he transformed the interdependent relationship between micro and macro levels, a central feature of theories of emergence, into a relationship of mutual exclusion (Heintz 2004, 22). As a consequence of this, Luhmann's application of the concept of emergence received rather critical responses. This applies in particular with respect to his emphasis on the self-reference of communicative systems and his concomitant claim about their autopoietic nature. In Luhmann's theory the crucial question about whole-part influence remains rather blurred.⁷ Therefore, I follow in this section not Luhmann's application of emergence but refer to the broader discussion on theories of emergence.

Once developed in the 1920s, theories of emergence have more recently been discussed with regard to the cognitive sciences. In principle, we are confronted with emergence in such different complex systems as "ant colonies, networks of neurons, the immune system, the Internet, and the global economy" (Holland 1998, 2). Emergence deals with complex adaptive systems and addresses the relationship between different levels of reality. Generally speaking, the discussion revolves around the question of the relationship between these levels of reality, in particular whether higher levels emerge from the activities of lower levels (Walby 2007, 461–463). This question can concern more fundamental levels of existence – the material world, life, or the mind – which stand in conjunction with distinct scholarly disciplines such as physics, biology, and cognitive psychology (Philstrom 2002, 137). In this case, the debate takes up more general questions of the philosophy of science, in particular whether the emergence of these different levels are essentially a cause of the one physical world or whether the specific properties of a higher level are irreducible to the properties of the lower level. The first position is associated with physical monism, claiming that mental properties can be reduced to physical properties, and appears in the literature

as “weak emergence.” The second position is based on the assumption of a relative dualism between physical and mental substances and is defined as “strong emergence.” However, there exist a variety of concepts of emergentism between these two outer poles (Stephan 1999). Other debates relate to emergence within specific systemic levels such as the macro–micro link in sociology as represented in the aforementioned distinction between the syntax and the semantics of modernity. The very concept of emergence, however, is “still ill defined” (Holland 1998, 221).

In my own application of emergence, I loosely draw from the idea of strong emergence according to which some systemic properties are irreducible to and unpredictable from the behavior of their parts. This is to say we can assume that through sociocultural evolution genuine novel structures and properties can emerge (Stephan 1999, 51–53). With respect to the field of the social sciences, thinking social theory in terms of social emergence allows me to come to a multilevel description of the social world (cf. Sawyer 2005). This description refers, at a minimum, to three different levels of reality: a systemic level (macro), an intermediate level of social institutions, corporate actors, and collectives (meso), and an individual level (micro). Based on some core assumptions of the concept of strong emergence, the systemic structures of world society are then not reducible to micro dynamics at the individual level. The property of the modern principle of functional differentiation at the systemic level, this is my argument, is – in evolutionary terms – the historically contingent and not expected result of social processes of variation, selection, and self-organization at lower levels (Kaufmann 1993). Even if we attributed ontological priority to the individual level, this is to say that we consider all social forms in the end as made up of individuals,⁸ modern world society as an emerging macrostructure disposes over specific properties distinct from those of humans as social beings. The emergence of these properties is the unexpected result of social variations and their selective stabilization not predictable from the properties of lower levels. Even if micro dynamics among individuals might cause the emergence of social systems, if individual actions produced evolutionary-relevant variations and selections, individual actors must not exert any formative influence on social systems when their self-referential operation has once been established. Both social systems and individuals represent autonomous but interdependent levels of the social world (Schimank 2005, 73).

In the social sciences, methodological individualists such as Max Weber depart from the ontological priority of the individual level, interpreting social structures as resulting from “processes of

individual-to-social emergence.” Scholars in the Durkheimian tradition, instead, claim that the social structures at the systemic level exert causal power on the behavior of individual actors (Sawyer 2001, 558–560). Theories of emergence deal with the Durkheimian claim under the concept of downward causation, or macro determination. This concept rests basically on two assumptions. First, downward causation claims that higher-level entities put structural constraints on lower-level processes. Second, lower-level entities may nevertheless be considered as the “starting-point for the realization of different higher-level entities” (El-Hani and Charbel 2002, 59). Downward causation, thus, explicitly works with the assumption of “whole-part influence,” but this in a “multinested system of constraints” (Clayton 2006, 21). Taking inspiration from the work of Sawyer, I would suggest reading the concept of downward causation as a methodological rather than an ontological claim (Sawyer 2001, 558). The connection between the macro, meso, and micro levels of the social are, then, characterized by a relationship of “constitutive interdependence” (cf. Zahavi 2015). From this perspective, we should interpret the ongoing tension between individualism and structuralism in the social sciences as a methodological dispute and not as a matter of the ontological status of the social (Sawyer 2002, 537). This proposition is perfectly underpinned by Edward Tiryakian’s observation that despite their mutual unawareness of each other the two founding fathers of sociology, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, shared a good deal of academic interests and scholarly findings, although they have secured firm positions of being methodological antipodes in the history of sociology (Tiryakian 1966).

In the theoretical context of emergence, I consider functional differentiation to be a novel property that characterizes modernity at the systemic level. While the emergence of function systems has been related to lower-level activities, this constitutive interdependence among different levels of reality does not contradict the claim of relative autonomy of higher-level structures. In his concept of autopoietic systems, Niklas Luhmann probably over-emphasized the autonomy of these novel modern properties. Interpreting the autopoietic nature of social systems in terms of a conceptual ideal type (cf. Elder-Vass 2007, 424), however, allows us to combine Luhmann’s systemic definition of modernity with theories that refer to other levels of social reality and emphasize forms of social and discursive interaction between them. The theory of multiple modernities, for instance, directs us to explore the social relevance of a multiplicity of collectively shared cultural

forms that represent the wider space between the meso and macro levels. Theories of entangled and successive modernities address formative processes of the historical institutionalization of combinations of both these different cultural forms and the mutually shared domains of functional communication. In [Chapter 4](#), I will introduce theoretical tools borrowed from Max Weber, Michel Foucault, and Andreas Reckwitz in order to connect the macro level with the construction of the modern individual. In [Chapter 5](#), then, I will look more closely at the meso level of historically concrete institutions and formal organizations.

AUTOCHTHONOUS BORDER DEMARCATIONS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

This chapter began with a short discussion of the mutual assertions of Western orientalist and Islamist thinkers that the social reality of Muslims is fundamentally different from the modern West. Both consider the modern separation of the social world as alien to Islamic culture. In particular they claim an inseparable unity of religion and politics in Islam. In light of the above theoretical elaborations, I argue that this claim of a fundamental alterity of the Muslim world means its exclusion from a central narrative of modernity and from larger processes of socio-cultural evolution as such. Contrary to this position, I claim not only that the Muslim world is an integral part of global modernity, but also that we can discern the emergence of functional domains in Muslim history before colonial modernization strongly impacted on the formation of Islamic modernities. Premodern Muslim history already knew social processes that remind us of modern boundary demarcations between different functional domains. In other words, modernity as an emerging macrostructure has been visible in certain historical developments of Muslim history. I will underpin this claim through a few historical examples with a focus on the relationship between religion and politics.⁹

Premodern state formation in the Muslim world is conventionally traced back to the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The territorial expansion of the Islamic community and the internal strife over legitimate succession raised a series of crucial questions that could not be answered by the authoritative example of the Prophet alone. Consequently, different opinions about legitimate leadership have accompanied Muslim history right from its beginnings. In sharp contrast to the presumed unity of Islam

and politics, a growing differentiation between the political and religious realms was already visible in the political, social, and intellectual developments during the grandeur (800–1100) of the classical Islamic empires (Lapidus 1975). This period was characterized by the formation of pre-modern political institutions and the formulation of classical theories of legitimate rule. This first body of political theory in Muslim history justified, in flexible and pragmatic ways, historical practices of rule in retrospect. In this manner, classical scholars of Islam reacted to the absence of institutional prescriptions in the Koran and the traditions (Krämer 1999, 34). These theories of the caliphate, drawn up between the eighth and ninth centuries, reflect the transformation of the Prophet's charismatic authority into traditional forms of legitimacy. Theoretically, the Caliph shared in the charismatic authority of Muhammad and was able to guarantee the continuity of an Islamic polity in harmony with the divine will (Nagel 1981, 277).

This apparent attempt to prevent the separation of religious and political realms never reflected historical reality. At the latest with the decline of the early Islamic empires, the classical theories of the caliphate became increasingly obsolete. Since the ninth century, the system of military slavery contributed visibly to drawing boundaries between religion and state power. The class of military slaves, the Mameluks, eventually took over power in the thirteenth century, leading to the factual differentiation between religious and political authority. This differentiation of social spheres was translated into the institutional separation between the position of Caliph (leader of the religious community) and sultan (worldly ruler) (Haarmann 2001, 219). Reflecting these historical developments, classical theories of the caliphate were replaced by a political philosophy that Hamid Enayat with reference to European political theory described as “Sunni Realism.” While in Sunni Realism political authority formally was linked to the adherence of rulers to the divine order, in practice, they gained political legitimacy solely through the coercive maintenance of internal and external security. We can read these developments in premodern Islamic political theory as the emergence of the relative autonomy of the state, that is to say the evolution of a strictly political social sphere. The logic of this new conceptualization of political authority was the unconditional obedience to the rulers by the ruled. This form of a political quietism then found gradually its religious justification in the doctrines of Sunni orthodoxy (Enayat 1982; Jung 2007, 27–29).

The history of the early Islamic institution of *zakat* (alms) is another example in which we can observe processes of social boundary demarcations between religion and politics in Muslim history. Originally, the *zakat* were one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith and therewith an integral part of the revelation. Yet right from the beginning, the religiously defined obligation to give alms collided with the ruler's claim for "taxation." In this sphere of tension between the interests of political authority and the normative claims of religion, the *zakat* did not survive in its original form. Already the First Caliph, the *sahaba* (companion of the Prophet) Abu Bakr (632–634), "politicized" the *zakat* by elevating it to an official form of "taxation." In this move, we can detect a very early and indigenous tendency of Muslim political authorities to monopolize the means of taxation. In the emergence of this monopoly of taxation, Norbert Elias later identified a core feature of modern state formation (Elias 1994). Still linked to its original religious meaning, the *zakat* initially remained the only form of taxation for Muslims. However, by the thirteenth century at the latest, a more general right to taxation by the rulers was established (Haarmann 1975, 100–110). The formation of modern national states, then, implemented forms of state-imposed taxation on all citizens. Due to this modern form of "political taxation," in some countries the *zakat* regained its original status of being a religious institution. In this case, the payment of *zakat* as fulfillment of a religious duty is again left over to the individual religious consciousness of the believer.

A final case in point is the development of "Islamic law." In contemporary debate, the *sharia* is usually presented as an all-encompassing body of ritual, liturgical, ethical, and legal rules.¹⁰ In Western thought, this holistic image of the *sharia* has largely been transmitted by the academic discipline of Islamic studies. In the words of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, it became a "fashion in Western Islamic scholarship to recognize the law as fundamental." Consequently, Western scholars made the *sharia* central to the understanding of the Muslim faith (Cantwell Smith 1965, 581). The evolution of this scholarly "fashion" began in the nineteenth century. This was the heyday of the philological method, and Western scholars of Islam put their focus on the interpretation of classical texts. With the foundation of the modern discipline of Islamic studies, the vast literatures of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) became a source for both the reconstruction of Islamic pasts and the colonial administration of the imperialist present. Gradually the field of Islamic law moved into the center of the new discipline of Islamic studies. Two of the founding fathers of the discipline, the Hungarian Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1921) and

Dutch scholar Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) were pioneers in this field. Their studies on juridical texts contributed to giving the discipline a certain “legal bias,” which was transferred to the greater public in the notion of Islam as a “legal religion” (Jung 2011, Chapter 5).

Due to a lack of sources about legal practices, Western scholars tended to focus on formal juridical texts which expressed the normative ideal of early Islamic orthodoxy. As a result, they strengthened traditionalist and Islamist views that perceived in these ideal constructions of the *sharia* the “true nature” of Islam. A real correspondence between normative ideal and social practices, however, only existed in parts of personal status law and with respect to religious endowments (Rohe 2009, 172 and 177). The ideal image of a corpus of Islamic law as revealed in the *sharia* has been defective from the very beginning. The Koran is definitely not a book of law; only less than three percent of its content is concerned with what we today consider as “legal matters” (Kamali 2000, 119). In fact, the early caliphs already administered justice largely according to the socially accepted rules of customary law. In the Ottoman Empire, a factual legal dualism was firmly established. Ottoman rulers directly legislated in fields such as crime, property, warfare, or the status of religious minorities (Reinkowski 2005). This body of state legislation (*kanun*) existed side by side with “religious law” (*sharia*). This gap between the normative ideal and the legal sources has been further reflected in the Islamic legal tradition by the principle of *istislah*, legislation according to public interest and the common good (*maslaha*). This principle has provided jurists and legislators with a legal tool to expand and adapt Islamic law to changing social conditions (Coulson 1957, 51).

The development of Islamic jurisprudence was closely related to the territorial expansion and dynastic stabilization of Islamic empires. In this process, Islamic jurisprudence did not emerge as a legal discipline in the narrow modern sense. Rather, Islamic law resembled a discursive field of knowledge whose scholars claimed religious authority and perceived the revelation as their major source for judicial and ethical deliberations. Historically, Islamic jurists largely developed their ideas in a state of detachment from political authority. In this process, the institutionalization of the state-appointed position of the judge (*qadi*) and the private function of the religious legal expert (*mufti*) make visible the evolution of a certain differentiation between religious, political, and legal spheres. While the *qadi* dispensed justice in the name of the state, the *mufti* released a legal report (*fatwa*) on individual request. His task was to

respond to social, juridical, or ethical questions beyond the realm of state power. In clear separation from the state, the *mufti* drew his juridical authority from his education and public professional reputation (Schacht 1964, 74).¹¹ Apparently, in the historical evolution of Islamic jurisprudence we can also find elements of a nascent functional differentiation between religious, political, and legal communication in the Muslim world.

These historical-analytical insights from Muslim history could easily be continued with regard to other subsystems of modern society such as economics and science. The French sociologist and Islamologist Maxime Rodinson (1966), for instance, discovered elements of capitalist economics in the Islamic world previous to the imposition of a colonial world market. Based on his historical studies, Rodinson argued that the normative prescriptions of Islam as such were not able to fundamentally obstruct the development of a separate sphere of capitalist economics. From the theoretical perspective of this book, Rodinson's study deals with premodern boundary demarcations between religion and economics in the Muslim world. In a book challenging the standard narrative of the development of modern sciences, George Saliba argued that Islamic history actually experienced "a genuine original and revolutionary production" in science far beyond the so-called golden age of Islamic sciences under Abbasid rule (Saliba 2007, 21). In empirically underpinning his thesis, Saliba wrote an interesting study about the factual entanglement of different cultural traditions of knowledge in the rise of the global modern scientific system. Moreover, he emphasized the original contributions of Muslim scientists to this process.

CONCLUSION

These historical examples may suffice in supporting my general argument that the emergence of modernity in terms of a functionally differentiated world society is observable in precolonial Islamic history. We can discern a multiplicity of historical instances which, perceived in terms of sociocultural evolution, mark variations in the social fabric of the Muslim world that resemble distinct forms of functional communication. In pointing to autochthonous appearances of modern functional boundary demarcations in the Muslim world, the perspective of modern emergence makes a strong argument against perceiving modernization as Westernization per se. The systemic level of reality in world society does not have a specific origin in

time and space. The syntax of modernity, in Eisenstadt's terms the "program" of modernity, did not have its origin in Europe alone as the Israeli sociologist claimed. In terms of evolutionary variations, the rise of functional differentiation has been observable across neatly circumscribable periods of time and demarcated "civilizational complexes." It was precisely the purpose of this chapter to elaborate on a conceptual platform that will allow us to deal with modernity as a generic unity while analyzing its very different historical appearances beyond a straightforward equation of modernization with Westernization.

The theoretical sketch presented in this chapter, a conceptual arrangement based on the sociological tradition of social differentiation and some elements of modern systems theory embedded in the metatheoretical perspective of social emergence, serves me as a heuristic platform to think modernity as a generic global condition at the macro sociological level. This conceptualization can offer an abstract frame of reference for the application of theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities in order to tackle the often puzzling appearance of unity and diversity in global modernity. Looking upon modernization as an emerging social reality with different layers, the theory of world society and pluralistic theories of modernities refer to different levels of this modern social reality, levels which in linguistic terms we can label as the syntax and the semantics of modernity. While world society addresses the abstract syntax of modernity, the pluralistic theories of modernities focus on the construction of concrete semantics, of the vernaculars in which social actors attach meaning to the global modern condition.

Theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities help us to analyze the concrete historical evolution of modernity at meso and micro levels. These theories can provide analytical insights that connect the outer poles of world society with the individual. In its recourse to Islamic traditions, the Islamic reform movement, for instance, attached meaning to the abstract discourses of modern religion, politics, economics, or science. The construction of social imaginations of specific Islamic modernities did not take place in social and cultural isolation. Islamic modernities are therefore the result of close entanglements with other cultural traditions and social actors from Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The historical forms and timelines of these entanglements are thereby often at the origin of a pluralistic set of modernities within the paradigm of an Islamic modernity. Moreover, modern imaginations seem to follow a certain sequential rhythm of more general

patterns of modern social order, of successively hegemonic ideas about the relation between the autonomy of the individual and the collective as conceptualized by theories of successive modernities. While this chapter tried to elaborate a generic frame of reference for analyzing these different forms of modernity from the perspective of the macro level, I will now jump to the micro level of the individual. Employing the concept of modern subjectivity formation, the following chapter will discuss ways in which we might be able to bridge the huge gap between individual actors and the “real abstraction” of world society as a relatively autonomous structure.

NOTES

1. Regarding this exclusion of Islamic history from the major narratives of modernity, see also the critique of Reinhard Schulze (2000).
2. I apply the term “Islamist” instead of the also frequently used term “fundamentalist,” which serves much more comparative purposes than the first term. Looking at one of the many definitions of fundamentalism, the definition given by the Fundamentalist Project, it is clear that both concepts overlap. In particular the “selective retrieval” and reinterpretations of “doctrines, beliefs and social practices of a sacred past” are core features of both Islamist ideologies and fundamentalist religious interpretations. Furthermore, similar to the fundamentalist movements in the studies of the Fundamentalist Project, Islamist movements attempt to reorganize society according to the norms, rules, and values of their religious identities (cf. Marty and Appleby 1995, 1). However, other definitions of fundamentalism do not specifically refer to political action and reserve the term for the confines of religious belief systems and thus not for political but for theological disputes. This form of religious fundamentalism is also observable in the Muslim world and, in this sense, a Muslim religious fundamentalist may be, but is not necessarily, an Islamist.
3. Most often society appears as a corporate actor in its confusion with the national state such as in American society, German society, etc. In this case it is also the state and therewith politics that seems to represent society as a whole.
4. Luhmann took the biological concept of autopoiesis from Humberto Maturana and transformed it into a sociological concept. In principle the concept refers to the capability of cells to reproduce and maintaining themselves (Maturana and Varela 1980). The concept itself, however, has been heavily disputed in biology, and Maturana’s theory appears to be outdated (Viskovatoff 1999, 488–492).
5. Turkey began official accession negotiation with the EU in 2005. However, since 2007 the reform drive of the Turkish government has slowed down.

Moreover, the general relationship between Turkey and the EU has deteriorated. In autumn 2016, when this manuscript was completed, the Turkish government considering to reintroduce capital punishment, which would mean to put an end to Turkey's potential membership in the EU.

6. Schimank's description of function systems as "social fictions" follows the tradition of Max Weber in considering macro phenomena – theoretically – as social imaginations of actors. These social fictions however, which impact on social action in concrete ways (cf. Heintz 2004, 16).
7. For a critical discussion of Luhmann's systems theory in light of theories of emergence, see Lohse (2011), Elder-Vass (2007), Heintz (2004), and Wan (2011).
8. This ontological priority Luhmann would have clearly rejected, whereas the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias and Adorno's relational perspective of society as a real abstraction easily could live with it. Important here, for my theory of global modernity this ontological question tends to be rather irrelevant.
9. My argument is similar to Nicos Mouzelis' claim that key institutional elements of modernization can be found in several premodern, non-European civilizations (Mouzelis 2008, 156). However, this argument should not be confused with John M. Hobson's assertion about "*The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*" (Hobson 2004), although I share his intention of critiquing the Eurocentric perspective of considering modernity to be a creation of the West. Yet contrary to Hobson I am not looking for alternative origins, but argue that from my own theoretical perspective of modern emergence, questions about the Eastern or Western origins of modernity become obsolete.
10. A good overview of Islamic law and the relationship between the corpus of revealed "law" (*sharia*) and the subsequent evolution of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) is given in the article by Kamali (2000).
11. Unlike the mufti, the judge (*qadi*) was appointed by the political authorities and therefore often "entirely dependent upon the political authority for the execution of his judgment" (Coulson 1957, 57). Thus, the development of Islamic law as a discursive body of knowledge took place independently from that of the state, while the legal practice was strongly dominated by political authority and therefore not independent of the state.

Contingency, Modern Subjectivity, and Cultural Types: The Micro Level of Modernity

Abstract The chapter addresses the micro level of modernity with a specific view on modern Muslim subjectivity formation in the course of Islamic reform. In departing from the pervasive experience of contingency by modern individuals, I will combine the discussion about the contingent culture of modernity with theories of the formation of the modern subject. I first look at interpretative conceptualization of modern contingency as a specifically modern horizon for the individual. In theoretical terms, I then address this process of identity construction in borrowing from Foucault's definition of modern subjectivity formation. I will argue that modern subjectivity formation has been conditioned by the structural constraints of world society, that is to say by the social macro level of functional differentiation. Both levels are in a constant process of constitutive interdependence, which we are able to observe through the analytical prism of the modern subject.

Keywords Modern contingency · Subjectivity formation · Muslim subjects · Islamic reform

The chapter addresses the micro level of modernity in departing from the pervasive experience of contingency by modern individuals. From different theoretical angles, social theorists have discussed this close association between modernity and the experience of social contingency. Peter Wagner,

for instance, suggested approaching modernity analytically with respect to a number of existential questions of a typically modern kind. According to Wagner, modern individuals constantly pose questions such as on the certainty of our knowledge, the justification for a just and viable social order, or the construction of acknowledged forms of collective and individual identities. In short: What do I know? How should I live? Where do I come from, who am I, and where do I go? Modern contingency constantly confronts individuals with such existential questions. Consequently, at the micro level modernity appears as a culture of uncertainty. This uncertainty is at the core of processes of modern subjectivity formation, and modern individuals can only find temporal answers to the existential questions of modernity (Wagner 2001). Let us take a brief glance at this rise of modern contingency in a Muslim setting.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the well-known Islamic reformer Rashid Rida (1865–1935) published a series of conversations between a young Muslim and a traditionalist sheikh in his widely circulated journal *al-Manar*.¹ These fictional conversations are paradigmatic for the intellectual spirit of the Islamic reform movement in the nineteenth century. They illustrate the reformers' conscious attempts to address questions of modern contingency by critically reflecting upon religious traditions. The encounter of Rida's young Muslim reformer with a senior sheikh takes place in late nineteenth-century Egypt. In the first conversation, revolving around the general status of Muslims, the sheikh expresses his concern about the young man's sorrowful facial expression and asks him what has happened. The young man tells the sheikh about his concerns regarding the deplorable status of the Islamic community (*umma*). In light of the Koranic stipulation declaring Muhammad's *umma* to be the best of all communities, the young Muslim laments the factual status of colonial suppression, rampant poverty, and widespread ignorance under which Muslim countries generally suffer. Based on his readings of then contemporary books and journals, the young man compares the miserable condition of Muslims with the situation in other parts of the world and confronts the sheikh with questions about the reasons for this decline of the *umma*. Representing the worldview of the traditionalist *ulama* (the religious learned), the sheikh responds in a very conventional manner. He appeals to the young man not to speak negatively about the *umma* and to have trust in God's providence. The sheikh criticizes his counterpart's reliance on foreign books and journals instead of showing his confidence in the rightness of the unchangeable divine order. Should the status of the

umma indeed be in decline, then this would only indicate the closeness of the Day of Judgment. In this first encounter, the sheikh only had deaf ears for the young man's existential questions, his deep feeling of uncertainty, his observance of striking discrepancies between the divine and factual order, and his demand to actively change the situation of the *umma* (Rida 2007, 15–19).²

The attitude of the traditionalist Muslim sheikh is starkly reminiscent of the “mentality” of France's rural population so aptly described in Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen*. In this book, Weber examines the death of a “whole mentality” during French modernization in the period from 1870 until the First World War. This dying mentality was animated by a stoic belief in the unchangeable nature of an eternal order with only very limited alternatives: “The poor will always be poor, and always oppressed and exploited, teaches the wisdom of ages.” Instead of questioning and trying to change the conditions of the day one has to accept them and to endure (Weber 1976, 19). Parallel to the transformation of mentalities in rural France, a similar shift in worldviews was taking place in Egypt. In Europe and in the Muslim world, individuals were gradually beginning to reflect upon the experiences of everyday life in the light of personal expectations and visible alternatives. As the example of the young Muslim and the traditional sheikh aptly shows, this reflection took place in the context of a search for certainty in light of rising social contingency. In the nineteenth century, the world was increasingly losing its given order, assuming a more and more contingent and consequently changeable nature. In that century, not only Europeans experienced a fundamental “transformation of the world” (Osterhammel 2009).

Rashid Rida's fictional story demonstrates the discrepancies between transcendental ideals, traditionally established social roles, and profane realities. In Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen's analysis, the young man in Rida's story represents the “prototype” of a new modern Muslim activist (Skovgaard-Petersen 2001, 101). He defines him as a “consciously Muslim variety of the New Intellectual,” who appeared in the late nineteenth century in Egypt (Skovgaard-Petersen 2001, 96). In the character of the young reformist Muslim, Rida introduces a very new subject position, the idea of an autonomous, self-conscious individual actor. Against the sheikh's traditionalism, the young man called for contingency to be dealt with through social activism based on personally acquired knowledge. Eugen Weber's urban Frenchman and Rashid Rida's young Muslim epitomize the emergence of a new kind of individual in the context of the

culture of modernity. Both the formation of modern subjects and the emergence of the structural horizon of world society are central analytical perspectives in grasping this culture of modernity. How should the relationship among contingency, world society, and modern subjectivity be understood?

Sociological literature does not give a clear-cut answer to this question. The rise of pluralistic concepts of modernities, the critical engagement with postmodern theories, and postcolonial revisions of modernity, however, have brought the concept of culture back in (Dirlik 2003, 279). There is a growing tendency among present-day social theorists to discuss modernity along interpretative lines, addressing questions of modernity in terms of culture. These interpretative theories often take micro perspectives into account and criticize classical approaches to modernity for relying almost exclusively on structural paradigms. In this way, questions about modern culture and the formation of modern subjectivities intersect. Both indicate research strategies for understanding modernity from the perspective of the micro level.

In this chapter, I will combine the discussion about the contingent culture of modernity with theories of the formation of the modern subject. I first look at interpretative conceptualization of modern contingency as a specifically modern horizon for the individual. In theoretical terms, I then address this process of identity construction in borrowing from Foucault's definition of modern subjectivity formation as a complex, difficult, and idiosyncratic elaboration on oneself (Foucault 1988, 41). Combining Foucault's definition of the modern subject with elements of Max Weber's perspective on the modern individual, I will argue that modern subjectivity formation has been conditioned by the structural constraints of world society, that is to say by the social macro level of functional differentiation. Both levels are in a constant process of constitutive interdependence, which we are able to observe through the analytical prism of the modern subject. At the systemic level, functional differentiation formally orders complexity and guarantees social reproduction in the modern world order, whereas, at the same time, the modern individual experiences this structural order in terms of an increasing social fragmentation. Formalized rationality at the macro and feelings of uncertainty at the micro level are therefore nested together. I will claim that this ambiguous unity of contingency and order occupies a central place in modern subjectivity formation. The modern subject has to construct itself as an autonomous unity in being dependent on inclusion in a fragmented social

environment. In drawing on the work of the German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz, I finally introduce a typology of subsequent cultural types for the analysis of historical concrete forms of modern subjectivities. I will then demonstrate their applicability with respect to the construction of collective and individual modern Muslim identities.

CONTINGENCY AND UNCERTAINTY: THE CULTURE OF MODERNITY

Perceiving modernity in terms of contingency, the problematization of once unquestioned and self-evident ways of life moves to the center of the formation of modern subjects. In conceptual terms, contingency builds on a double negation: Nothing is impossible and nothing is necessary (Frick 1988, 18; Luhmann 1992, 96). This penetrating idea of “all that is could be otherwise,” however, should not be confused with the absence of relatively durable historical structures. At the meso level, the resilience of historically different and path-dependent social institutions such as national states, legitimate norms of social interaction, or means of economic exchange are cases in point. Grounding an interpretative concept of modernity in contingency, therefore, does not mean that everything is under constant change. Rather it emphasizes the awareness that “nothing in social life is ultimately immune to change” (Sewell 2005, 102). Modern contingency is the experience of reality against a horizon of alternatives (Holzer 2011). It is not only the confrontation with the accidental, but also the realization of choice. The individual can choose among alternatives by excluding other choices. While contingency might be a foundational experience of humanity as such (Wuchterl 2011, 10), a fundamental change in the ways in which social actors experience and deal with contingency appears in modern culture. Modern contingency combines uncertainty with the pluralism of choice. In addition, scientific explanations and philosophical reasoning challenge the previously hegemonic role of religion in dealing with contingency. Again Rashid Rida’s story of the sheikh and the young Muslim reformer perfectly illustrates this challenge.

The contingent nature of modern culture has been a central theme in contemporary social theory. In considering modernity as a form of cultural self-reflexivity, for instance, Collins and Jervis characterized the modern condition as a continuous feeling of the “homelessness of the present.” They suggested considering the “uncanny” to be a “constitutive aspect of our

experience of the modern” (Collins and Jervis 2008, 2). Shmuel Eisenstadt, to take another example, associated modernity with uncertainty generated by its inherent antinomies and contradictions (Eisenstadt 2001, 325). In his theory of successive modernities, Peter Wagner translated modern contingency into the tension between autonomy and mastery in the establishment of individual identities and social orders. Anthony Giddens defined modernity as a “risk culture” (Giddens 1991, 3), whereas Zygmunt Baumann, as already mentioned in Chapter 2, identified the contemporary world with a “liquid phase of modernity.” In this stage of modernity, according to Baumann, uncertainty has become endemic (Baumann 2007). While it might be true that we can observe an increase in the experience of ambivalence and uncertainty in recent decades, Jürgen Habermas rightly argued that these ambiguities of modernity have accompanied the “modern project” right from its beginnings. He discerned the interlacement of order and contingency in the contestation between Enlightenment universalism and the particularism of Romanticism (Habermas 1986). Indeed, Marx and Engels already described the rise of modernity in this ambiguous form. Similar to Agnes Heller, who defined the particular nature of modernity as the “complete destruction of all previous foundations” (Heller 2005, 64), Marx and Engels concluded the Communist Manifesto by referring to the universal character of economic competition (Marx and Engels 1845, 73):

It destroyed as far as possible ideology, religion, morality, etc., and, where it could not do this, made them into a palpable lie. It produced world history for the first time, insofar as it made all civilized nations and every individual member of them dependent for the satisfaction of their wants on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate nations.

This fundamental modern experience of lost foundations was one of the core themes among Muslim reformers in the second part of the nineteenth century. The script for their reform agendas was the search for new foundations in light of alternatives. In the 1830s already, the writings of Rifaat Tahtawi (1801–1873) set the stage for a stream of reformist thought in Egypt and beyond. A member of the *ulama*, Tahtawi, was the Imam of a mission that the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali (1769–1849) sent to France. From 1826 to 1831, Tahtawi lived in Paris, studying the habits, institutions, and thoughts of then contemporary French urban society. Attracted by ideas such as social progress, modern sciences, freedom of thought, and representative institutions, Tahtawi advocated a self-conscious

reformation of Egyptian society inspired by his observations in Paris (Tahtawi 2004). At the same time, in June 1826, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) crushed the rebellion of the Janissaries, the previous military backbone of the Ottoman empire, and initiated the series of reforms that later became known as the *Tanzimat* (1839–1878). Like Muhammad Ali in Egypt (1805–1848), formally still a province subordinated to the Ottoman state, the Ottoman reformers were attracted by the transformation of French society after the French Revolution. During the nineteenth century, recognition of the necessity to consciously reform the foundations of the Ottoman Empire became widespread, and French thought and institutions remained a central source for the reform endeavors of the Ottoman elite. Within this, Ottoman modernists articulated their ideas in different semantics, some of them in apologetic terms with reference to Islam, some of them by fully embracing French positivist thought. Especially among some leading Ottoman bureaucrats, scientific Positivism became the predominant mode of thought. For them, science was the solution to the challenges of social contingency. Islam in its traditional form, they perceived instead as a major obstacle to their aspirations for social reform and progress (Hanioglu 2005, 28).

As in many other parts of the world, Muslims took very different attitudes in their confrontation with modern contingencies in the context of colonial domination. These attitudes oscillated between the extremes of a straight rejection of the search for new norms, institutions, and ideas by religious traditionalists to the wholehearted affirmation of novel ideas by secularist modernists. In retrospect, however, the apologetic reaction of the Islamic reform movement had the strongest impact on further intellectual development. The Islamic reformers of the nineteenth century invented the idea of a specific kind of Islamic modernity. The reform movement combined the striving for religious and social reform with the demand for political independence from imperialist domination. From the second part of the nineteenth century, a group of Islamic reformers tried to reconcile Islamic traditions with the rise of social alternatives in these efforts. Rejecting both the extreme poles of traditionalism and modernist secularism, they advocated forms of social activism, public education, and popular choice within an Islamic framework. As already briefly discussed in the previous chapters, these Islamic reformers invented historically specific and still enormously influential semantics of Islamic modernity. They constructed the authenticity of collective and individual modern Muslim identities in close reference to

Islamic traditions (see Jung 2011, Chapter 6). The Islamic reform movement led the foundation for the Islamization of Muslim discourses of modernity in the twentieth century. On the semantic level, religious language has assumed a certain hegemony over the logics of other communicative subsystems of society.

To a large extent, this rise in specifically modern Islamic semantics coincided with the establishment of French and British colonial domination over the Arab world after the French occupation of Algeria in 1830. Muslim thinkers in Egypt and beyond faced a severe dilemma. In the context of the asymmetric power relations of nineteenth-century Imperialism, the self-confident reflection on social transformation such as by Rifaat Tahtawi came to an end. Due to the Imperialist power structure of the emerging political system of world society, it became problematic for Muslims to selectively embrace, culturally accommodate, and socially promote some of the modern achievements associated with the colonial powers of Europe. At the same time, however, they could not easily reject the political, scientific, and economic innovations they observed in Europe (Johansen 1967, 12). In structural terms, their desire for social reform was conditioned by the emergence of an increasing functional differentiation of social life. The discussions of the Islamic reform movement revolved around questions concerning the relationship of law, politics, and education to Islamic traditions. The discourse of Islamic reform evolved within the coordinates of the new communicative logics of the social subsystems of world society and addressed modern boundary demarcations among them. In the second half of the nineteenth century, for Muslim intellectuals this general discourse of modernity became coupled with a historically ambivalent attitude toward Europe. In Chapter 2, I illustrated this ambivalence with the evolution of the idea of Islam as a distinct civilization. Under the threat of European colonial domination, references to Islamic traditions, therefore, subsequently developed into a core means of political and cultural distinction to the West (Jung 2011, 230).

The above examples show the historically particular trajectories which forms of modern cultural self-reflection have taken in the Muslim world. The nineteenth century seems a decisive period of time in the emergence of patterns of modern culture, in the construction of a multiplicity of modern semantics, in various parts of the world. Coping with the experience of modern contingency, social actors developed radically novel forms of identification and social self-organization. Thereby, the increasing

feeling of uncertainty at the micro level was closely related to the emergence of new social properties at the macro level. The transformation in the modus of social differentiation at the macro level, the increasing dominance of social relations perceived in terms of functional differentiation, was closely linked to the individuals' feeling of uncertainty. How is this constitutional interdependence between the micro and the macro levels of modernity to be understood? How do functional differentiation and modern subjectivity formation intersect?

MODERN SUBJECTIVITY FORMATION: THE DOUBLE NATURE OF THE MODERN SUBJECT

In the following, I will argue that Michel Foucault's thoughts on subjectivity formation offer a valid analytical perspective in order to answer these questions. His definition of the modern subject grasps the specifically modern dualism between structural and individual levels. In defining the modern subject as both subordinated to social macro structures and relatively autonomous with regard to them, Foucault's analytical perspective allows different levels of social reality to intersect (Foucault 1986, 212). The modern subject is the simultaneous result of processes of structural subjugation and the empowerment of the individual. In his early works, Foucault tended to apply a rather strict macro perspective and reduced the modern subject almost completely to a function of discursive formations.³ In the historical context of discursive practices such as psychology, medicine, penitence, or education, a self-evident, normative, and supposedly universal idea about human beings emerged (Rux 1988, 15). In *Les mots et les choses* (The Order of Things), for instance, Foucault understood this emergence of the modern subject as a mere result of discursive structures. His scholarly preoccupation was with the discovery of the structural set of rules on which the emergence of the human subject rested (Foucault 1994). In the course of his career, however, Foucault gradually changed this position, taking the micro level and forms of social agency more seriously. Consequently, he increasingly stressed the ambiguous nature of the modern. Starting from the micro level, he began to understand modern subjectivity formation as a complex process of the elaboration of oneself. The modern individual is confronted with the task of taking itself as an "object of a complex and difficult elaboration" (Foucault 1984, 41).

From this perspective, Foucault defined modern subjectivity formation as a constant process of self-realization and self-mastery, as a complex interplay of structural conditions and human agency. The historical origin of these modern “hermeneutics of the self” Foucault traced back to “Christian technologies of the self,” in which the self became a text to decipher (Foucault 1980, 168).⁴ Contrary to the passive subject of premodern times, however, the modern subject has replaced obedience to prescriptive norms by the idea of individual autonomy. In Foucauldian terms, modernization implies a move from technologies of domination toward technologies of the self. While technologies of domination work through the coercive enforcement of authoritative codes of conduct on individuals, technologies of the self govern by autonomously monitoring, testing, and transforming us through historically specific forms of self-hermeneutics (Foucault 1990). The modern individual appears as an autonomous subject constructing its own idiosyncratic identities (Macmillan 2011, 13). At the same time, the individual is subject to the diffuse power structures of macro discourses. Foucault’s concept of technologies of the self articulates this linkage between autonomy and subjugation in modern subjectivity formation.

In a long historical process, according to Foucault, the modern subject has evolved as the paradox result of both self-elaboration and subjugation. In the language of the sociological tradition of differentiation theory, the modern subject has emerged through the interrelated processes of social differentiation and individualization. At the structural level, the idea of the autonomous subject emerges in form of a discursive exclusion from the communicative logics of the functionally differentiated subsystems of world society. At the micro level, however, this exclusion appears in form of a progressive autonomization of the modern individual. Here the modern individual assumes the form of a social actor who “retains a potential for origination, agency, and change” (Strozier 2002, 12). Adopting Foucault’s definition of the modern subject provides us with an analytical perspective to analyze the constitutive interdependence of upper and lower levels of social reality. In this way, modern subjectivity formation becomes a strategic tool in analyzing different forms of the modern subject and their concomitant semantics of modernity.

Looking at modern subjectivity formation from the perspective of methodological individualism, Max Weber described the challenges for the modern subject in a very metaphorical voice. In his words, individuals experience functional differentiation as the ascendance of a pantheon of

“old gods” in new but impersonal forms. These gods represent formally rationalized spheres of value that are engaged in an “eternal struggle” with each other about their antagonistic ends (Weber 1917). In his essay *Zwischenbetrachtungen*, Weber distinguished among five of these value spheres of the modern pantheon: economy, politics, esthetics, eroticism, and the intellectual sphere.⁵ Each value sphere is based on a self-referential ethic, and all of them are in tension with the religious sphere and its ethics of brotherliness. Similar to Islamic reformists, Weber discussed the relationship of what in Luhmann’s theoretical language are the communicative logics between social subsystems and religion. At first glance, this separation of modern value spheres “appears as man’s emancipation from the organically prescribed cycle of natural life” (Weber 1915, 356). Liberated from these prescribed identities, the modern subject appears as an autonomous actor in a world full of choices. In Eugen Weber’s empirical terms, “peasants turn into Frenchmen.” Yet, on closer inspection, Max Weber discerned behind this modern individualization a process leading to a feeling of “ever more devastating senselessness” (Weber 1915, 257). Autonomy and choice, according to him, turn into a deep feeling of meaninglessness and uncertainty in the face of an utterly contingent world.

The impersonal forces of modernity, the competing logics of autonomous value spheres, strive to gain power over the lives of individuals. In finding meaning in life, the modern subject has to juggle with their incommensurable ethical demands (Weber 1915, 356–357 and, 1917, 149). The inclusion of the individual in the social macro-sphere establishes a series of new subject positions. Social actors must relate to these spheres of “a sociality without actors” given by functional systems (Schimank 2005, 48). Yet they do so through subject positions such as citizens (politics), market participants (economy), and believers (religion), which follow their own communicative logics. Together these modern subject positions do not provide an integrated fundament for the construction of a morally integrated self. In line with this pessimistic worldview of Max Weber, Alasdair MacIntyre therefore defined modern culture as the loss of any valid rational justification for objective moral standards. In MacIntyre’s reading, the formal rationalization of modern life and the transition to autonomy leads to social anomie (MacIntyre 1981, 58). In light of the fragmented reproduction of modern society, social integration on moral grounds becomes the major challenge for the establishment of meaningful selfhoods. It is not necessary to allude to the moral pessimism of Max Weber or Alasdair MacIntyre when appreciating their analytical

point. In their assessment of modern culture, micro and macro perspectives meet. Rephrasing Weber and MacIntyre's insights in the theoretical language of modern systems theory introduced in [Chapter 3](#), these two authors depict the evolution of the autonomous character of the modern subject as an ultimate consequence of the socially disembedding nature of functional differentiation.

Social theorists have observed this process of social disembedding under the label of individualization. They have often described modernization in terms of an ever-widening gap between the individual and society. Norbert Elias criticized this assumption, the idea of a clear distinction between individual and society, as being one of the most important historically constructed modern fictions (Elias 1991). According to this fiction, the modern individual is no longer perceived to be an inclusive part of the social whole. In sharp contrast to the socially embedded individual in stratified and segmented societies, functionally differentiated modern society established itself in stark difference to the individual. From the perspective of social emergence, we can observe the evolution of two distinct but mutually dependent levels of social reality. Thus, the formation of the modern subject is based on the exclusion from society as a whole. The idea of the autonomous, rational, self-conscious, and expressive modern subject, the liberal semantics of individual emancipation, thus instead performs the role of a compensatory narrative in light of social exclusion. For the modern subject, inclusion in world society only works selectively, fragmented by the logic of specific function systems. In Weber's words, on the micro level social inclusion means succumbing to the incommensurable demands of different value spheres. For the individual, integration into world society only works as the fragmented inclusion into the communicative universes of its subsystems. Modern individuals therefore experience the increase in social complexity at the macro level of society as social alienation (Luhmann 1992, 151).

MODERN CULTURAL TYPES: THE HYBRIDITY OF THE MODERN SUBJECT

Taking up Foucault's double nature of the modern subject, the German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz developed an empirically substantiated theoretical framework about the rise of different forms of subjectivity as cultural types. Defining modern subjectivities as hybrid sociocultural

forms, Reckwitz declared them to be contingent results of social practices and orders of knowledge. In his cultural sociology, these types of modern subjectivity formation transcend the communicative logics of function systems and represent central reference points for the construction of meaningful selfhoods by individual actors. In this way critically revising the concepts of some of the theories discussed above, Reckwitz nevertheless maintains two of their essential assumptions. First of all, he describes the culture of modernity as a complex of problems due to the conscious experience of contingency. Second, he associates modern subjectivity formation, in principle, with construction processes including conscious human action (Reckwitz 2006, 77). Yet coping with modern contingency does not lead to any definite and homogeneous form of modern subjectivity. In its historical appearances, the modern subject is a hybrid. Reckwitz perceives the encounter with modern contingency as a continuous sequence of cultural conflicts among different routinized forms of bodily behavior, interpretative schemes, orders of knowledge, motivations, and emotions (Reckwitz 2006, 36). In Reckwitz' work, constant contestations about appropriate forms of the subject define modern culture. Historically specific forms of modern subjectivity, thus, emerge from these cultural conflicts. In their routinized forms, these cultural types can only achieve hegemonic positions for a certain period of time (Reckwitz 2006, 77).

In abstracting from modern European and American history, Reckwitz discerned three more general types of the modern subject that have subsequently assumed temporal hegemony in specific epochs: the classical bourgeois subject, the subject of the salaried masses, and the highly individualized subject of "postmodernity" (Reckwitz 2006, 74). These three cultural types have been central frames of reference for socially acknowledged expectations about successful processes of subjectivity formation. The emergence of these types Reckwitz observed with respect to three complexes of discourses and social practices. He identified them in the modern practices of work, in private and intimate relations (intimacy), and in the application of technologies of the self. These three complexes are contingent arrangements of institutionalized modes of behavior and symbolic orientations for the construction of meaningful individual selfhoods (Reckwitz 2006, 51–53). They transgress the functional boundaries of modern subsystems and combine multiple patterns of social practices at individual and collective levels. While subject positions such as the citizen, market participant, or believer guarantee the social inclusion of individuals

in world society, Reckwitz' cultural types refer to an intermediate structural level of integrative forms of subjectivity. His cultural types provide a framework of expectations that combines functionally separated subject positions into meaningful selfhoods. At this level, we can observe cultural conflicts about acknowledged forms of modern subjectivities in facilitating the creation of meaningful individual identities. These cultural types refer to collectively shared but constantly contested social imaginaries from which individuals in their own idiosyncratic processes of identity formation draw (Reckwitz 2006, 48).

In the final part of this chapter, I will combine Reckwitz' three cultural types with Peter Wagner's theory of successive modernities. In my own interpretation, Reckwitz's and Wagner's ideal types refer to an intermediate structural level of modernity between the syntactical level of world society and the concrete semantics of multiple forms of modernities. Together, they represent successive forms of modernities at the level of social orders and collectively acknowledged imaginaries of meaningful selves. These three cultural types serve me as heuristic instruments in observing the interplay of individual identity constructions and social orders in the course of modern subjectivity formation. In the following, I will illustrate this claim by applying these three successive cultural types to a Muslim context.

The first of these cultural types Reckwitz identified in the classical bourgeois subject. This type closely relates to Peter Wagner's order of restricted liberalism and is predominantly a subject of work. The bourgeois subject gained its autonomy and moral sovereignty through daily practices of disciplined work. Finding moral formation as a working subject, the bourgeois type assigned marriage a central role in intimate relationships. The family constituted the undisputed core institution for the development of personal relations. These two fields of social practices, work and intimacy, were combined with technologies of the self closely related to literacy. Practices of writing and reading, together with employing media such as diaries, letters, newspapers, and books, were the main instruments of the hermeneutics of the self under the hegemony of the classical bourgeois type. In combining these social practices, classical bourgeois subjectivity formation took place in contradiction to the cultural codes of both the previously hegemonic aristocracy and the popular folk cultures of the masses. In distinction to them, the hegemonic subject of restricted liberalism exposed a hybrid combination of the liberal idea of an autonomous reflexive subject with a normative conservative code of moral regulation (Reckwitz 2006, 97–274).

In his seminal book *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (1798–1939)*, Albert Hourani analyzed the life and thoughts of a number of important Arab reformers in the “long nineteenth century” under the label of liberalism (Hourani 1962). According to Hourani, intellectuals such as Butrus al-Bustani (1819–1883), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Rashid Rida (1865–1935), Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), or Taha Husain (1889–1973) combined their agendas for social reform with traits of a liberal worldview. A number of scholars have criticized Hourani for lumping together these intellectuals under the label of liberalism. In the preface to the 1983 edition of his book, even Hourani himself admitted that the title might be a misnomer and that these intellectuals were not liberals in the strict sense (Goodman 1986, 108). The already mentioned study by Samira Haj on Muhammad Abduh is a good example for this criticism against Hourani’s book. Haj argued that Abduh actually had a fearful attitude toward liberalism and did not share the normative concept of the utilitarian modern individual. Haj claimed that Abduh was in fact afraid of a liberal society in which religion and morality supposedly were banished from the public sphere. In sharp contrast to the self-reliant autonomous individual of liberalism, Abduh advocated the prescriptive authoritative role of religion in the construction of the moral self of modern Muslim subjects (Haj 2009, 98 and 109).

As a key figure in the Islamic reform movement, Abduh attempted to bridge the emerging gap between science and education by advocating their harmony with Islam. He envisaged Islamic modernity as epitomized in the educated and morally autonomous religious Muslim subject (Sedgwick 2010). Abduh embedded the practices of bourgeois working ethics in technologies of the self, which combined means of literacy with Islamic traditions. In his lifelong struggle for educational reforms, for instance, the role of the Arab language and literacy were paramount. Abduh’s reform agenda based the self-hermeneutics of modern Muslims on literacy in Arabic and the reflected adherence to Islamic norms. With the help of these technologies of the self, Abduh aimed at the formation of self-disciplined, orderly, productive, rational, and fundamentally moral Muslim subjects whose intimate relationships were anchored in marriage, family life, and religious community (Haj 2009, 118). In other words, Abduh constructed the modern Muslim subject in great approximation to the ideal type of the classical bourgeois subject of restricted liberalism. Taking liberalism in this limited and exclusivist form, the title of Albert Hourani’s book probably still makes sense.

The prescriptive norms of religion and conservative attitudes to social stratification strongly conditioned the liberal elements of Abduh's worldview. In his nineteenth-century concept of Islamic modernity, the envisaged cultivated Muslim bourgeoisie only represented an elitist minority. Many of the intellectuals behind the Islamic reform movement were still afraid of the assumed lack of self-mastery of the masses. The nineteenth-century Islamic reformers shared this social exclusivist attitude with their political opponents such as aristocratic rulers, secular modernists, and the colonial administration. Mervat Hatem, for instance, described in her study of the life and writings of A'isha Taymur this typical synthesis of hybrid visions. In 1892, Taymur triggered a first discussion of gender issues and emphasized that rulers and ruled should share the same moral codes. Yet these rather liberal ideas were compromised by her contemptuous fear of the working class. In her writings, working-class women appeared "as completely immoral because they had no shame in disregarding upper-class rules of seclusion" (Hatem 2011, 125). As in Europe, in nineteenth-century Egypt the population at large was not an integral part of the liberal worldview. On the contrary, Islamic reformers such as Abduh adhered to a kind of fundamentally restricted liberalism conditioned by conservative Islamic values and the upper-class norms of social stratification.

The transition from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, then, saw a gradual erosion of the hegemonic status of bourgeois culture and its concomitant order of restricted liberalism. In the first part of the twentieth century, a new cultural formation assumed hegemony, now including the population at large. The rise of this mass culture went parallel to the advancement of visions of organized modernity and the political containment of mass society by the national state. According to Reckwitz, this shift was largely due to three historical developments. First of all, the structural transformation of material culture and technology facilitated the rise of new forms of collectivity and mass culture. This technological change, second, was accompanied by the popular dissemination of new scientific knowledge. The new humanist disciplines of psychology and sociology, in Reckwitz analysis, contributed to the ascendance of visions of a conscious construction of society by means of social engineering. Finally, Reckwitz assigned aesthetic countermovements a key role in social change. They discovered the human body as a central object for their technologies of the self. These bodily technologies and the valuation of artistic creativity were set against the previously hegemonic bourgeois values.

Situating the center for this new cultural type in the USA, Reckwitz defined it as a peer-group-oriented form of subjectivity based on a large-scale generalization of behavior. This extroverted consumption- and group-oriented type of subjectivity superseded the previously hegemonic imagination of the rationalistic and introverted self of the bourgeois. Individual working ethics gave way to a managerial type governed by the collectively binding practices of efficient working coordination. Regarding practices of intimacy, Reckwitz discerned an erosion of the sharp distinction between private and public life that was so significant for classical bourgeois culture. The informality among peers increasingly characterized the intimate relationships of this new cultural type. Together with the more general turn toward bodily practices, he observed an increasing sexualization of marriage. Audiovisual media, modes of consumption, and bodily, artistic, and public performances moved into the center of the technologies of the self among the salaried masses. Bourgeois ideals of regulation and control were transformed into visions of the formalized and efficient coordination of social action. The subject of organized modernity claimed to be all-inclusive, advocated social adaptation, and discovered aesthetic commodities as a means for self-gratification (Reckwitz 2006, 275–440).

The Muslim Brotherhood movement appears to be a paradigmatic example for the relevance of this type in the construction of Islamic modernities in the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, when it comes to intimacy and some patterns of consumption, the Brotherhood exposed significant differences to the ideal type presented above. However, this also applies to a large extent to those cultural formations in Europe that represented alternative models of organized modernity and did not entirely follow the features of Reckwitz' construct of the salaried masses. Reckwitz abstracted his peer-group-oriented type from the historical example of American mass culture. In doing so, he deliberately neglected fascism and communism as two significant forms of organized society alternative to the liberal model of the USA (Reckwitz 2006, 29). In Italy, for instance, the regime tried to create a fascist subject whose readiness to sacrifice was directed against the "corrupt selfishness of bourgeois values" (Ferrari 2013, 154). When it comes to the Muslim world, the Muslim Brotherhood also had competitors in form of nationalist, fascist, and communist movements. In this context of conflicting cultural types, the Brotherhood performs the role of advocating a specifically Islamic version of peer-group-oriented subjectivity in competition with historical

alternatives. In which ways did Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, envisage modern Islamic mass culture?

Hasan al-Banna was a typical representative of Egypt's rising middle class. In Egypt, this new urban stratum, the so-called *effendiyya* (Commins 2005, 129), was characterized by its modern education, nationalist sentiments, and ambivalent attitudes toward Europe. The *effendiyya* took an activist stance in striving for both social and political independence (Eppel 2009). This rising middle class became the social carrier of the Brotherhood's vision to form an Islamic version of organized society in Egypt. In shifting the religious discourse from morality to the legal distinction between lawful and forbidden, the Muslim Brotherhood aimed at employing Islamic traditions first and foremost as a technology of domination. The experienced contingency of modernity had to be contained by the coercive legal means of the national state. In this endeavor, Hasan al-Banna turned Islamic law (*sharia*) into the prime symbol of moral integrity, cultural authenticity, and national independence (Krämer 2010, 114).

Inspired by the normative models of the Prophet and the first Islamic Caliphs, Hasan al-Banna was working for an Islamic social order combining faith with religious morals and social justice (Mitchell 1969, 210). In doing so, the leader of the Brotherhood was adhering to various elements of the more general cultural form of a modern society constituted of peer-group-oriented subjects. The Brotherhood's activities, forms of leadership, and public self-representation clearly reflected the shift from restricted liberalism to organized modernity. In using badges, implementing dress codes, and conducting public ceremonies and prayers, the Brotherhood adopted the extroverted performing modes of the peer-group-oriented type. In its paramilitary and boy scouting units, different physical exercises made the body center stage for new technologies of the self (Krämer 2010, 54). The modern Muslim subject of the Brotherhood was a virtuous, industrious, temperate, clean, punctual, and self-confident individual. To a large extent this image resembled the working subject of the managerial type. Firmly embedded in community life, this modern Muslim subject expressed modesty, politeness, and a firm spiritual footing in Islam (Krämer 2010, 111). The ideal social order behind al-Banna's vision was based on a form of governance in which state authorities should organize society according to Islamic principles. He wanted to construct an average type of the modern Muslim through a mixture of technologies of domination and authoritatively prescribed technologies of the self.

Since the Second World War, the spread of elements of pluralistic modernity has been challenging the various visions of organized modernity. A visible convergence of European social orders with the liberal American model has accompanied this shift from organized to pluralistic modernity. With its central features of individualized patterns of consumption, creative action, and self-reliance, this individualized third type of subjectivity fundamentally antagonized the peer-group-oriented “average-culture” of the salaried masses. Reckwitz’ “postmodern” type of subjectivity formation advocates patterns of culture in which the self is imagined in terms of the creative worker or entrepreneur. In this form of pluralistic modernity, the working subject turns into a self-reliant, dynamic, and creative entrepreneur who is constantly engaged in a number of shifting projects. Focusing on the individual, this type rejects the ideals of rational calculability, bureaucratic organization, and technical coordination of organized society. Reckwitz’ postmodern subject appreciates a highly individualized working culture in sharp contradistinction to the previously hegemonic collectivist vision of the managerial type. Similar to the shift from bourgeois culture to organized modernity, the transformation of the means of communication has played an important role in the rise of postmodern subjectivity. While the printing press was revolutionized by the new audiovisual media during the first part of the twentieth century, the post-Second World War period has experienced another technological revolution through digital media. Digital media offer the postmodern subject a whole range of new means for its hermeneutics of the self through individual bodily and consumptive practices. Intimacy has gradually developed into a medium of expressive subjectivity. Intimate personal relationships and sexuality are no longer confined to the nuclear family, enjoying new communicational, emotional, and experimental practices (Reckwitz 2006, 441–630).

It is precisely the spread of digital media that has been associated with a new Islamic movement. In the visions of this movement we can discern a certain fusion of the image of the creative entrepreneur with Islamic traditions. A key figure in the construction of this new form of Islamic modernity is the Egyptian lay preacher Amr Khaled. Born as the son of an upper middle-class family in Cairo in 1967, he first worked as an accountant. In the early 1990s, then, he began preaching. Since 2001, he has had his own television shows broadcast by satellite channels such as Iqra, Dream TV, or Orbit. Moreover, Amr Khaled has disseminated his messages to a rapidly growing audience via his extensive website. Initially

addressing the well-educated youth of Egypt's upper class, he soon gained an audience among young Muslims around the globe. In his profile, Amr Khaled represents a much broader trend of young religious lay people who compete with the religious messages of established sheiks. In contrast to them, they speak in colloquial Arabic and normally do not dispose over a formal education in the Islamic sciences (Wise 2006; Jung et al. 2014, 119–123).

The rise of this new Islamic movement is without doubt facilitated by the technological revolution through digital media. While disseminating their religious messages in drawing on the latest technologies and entertainment formats, this movement nevertheless puts itself in the historical tradition of Islamic reform. Amr Khaled, for instance, describes his activities using the historical concept of *an-nahda*, connecting them in this way with a historical period of Arab pride.⁶ However, they continue in this tradition in rather novel ways. The focus of their programs is not on religious rituals and regulations, but they combine themes such as love, forgiveness, morality, and social responsibility. They weave together well-known religious stories with issues of everyday life, furnishing the entrepreneurial, consumptive, and entertainment-oriented lifestyles of their audiences with a kind of Islamic morality (Amin 2011, 130). In Asef Bayat's words, the new Islamic movement represents a "marriage of faith with fun." These new lay preachers confirm core patterns of postmodern subjectivity while transmitting "simple ethical messages about the morality of everyday life" (Bayat 2007, 152). The new Muslim subject in this Islamic movement represents a combination of the life expectations of the young urban middle class with traits of the imaginary of the creative and self-reliant entrepreneur. Their self-hermeneutics are closely linked to the use of digital media and employ religious traditions in the construction of moral selves in rather individualized ways.

This formation of new subject positions is, for instance, visible in the identity construction of Hanin, who is working for a Jordanian developmental NGO. Holding a degree in computer science, Hanin is a woman in her mid-twenties who appears to be a devout Muslim, not least expressed by her personal dress code. She describes her professional tasks in a self-fashioned Islamic way. In terms of work, Hanin emphasizes the creative dimensions of her job, she appreciates variation in her tasks, and values her individual responsibility to take on different working projects. In her personal motivation to work for this NGO, she was not looking for a collectively defined Islamic work place.

On the contrary, she highly regards the diversity of staff in her working environment, which she considers to be an organization based on universalistic and humanistic values. The Islamic character of her work, Hanin defines on an individualistic basis. For her, being engaged in developmental aid is simultaneously living a religious way of life. The NGO becomes the location for the construction of both a modern working identity and a moral self. In living an Islamic way of life, Hanin largely relies on her own interpretation of the religious traditions, emphasizing values and principles rather than rules and rituals. She clearly represents a young pious Muslim who rejects the ideal of an organized Islamic modernity such as in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jung and Petersen 2014, 92–95).

CONCLUSIONS

In moving from the macro to the micro level, this chapter has addressed the relationship between modern contingency, world society, and the formation of modern subjectivities. In starting from the discussion about modern contingency in social theory, it posed the question of how modern individuals are coping with this contingent culture of modernity. With theoretical references to Michel Foucault and Max Weber, I declared it the task of the modern subject to turn contingency into forms of necessity, that is to say into individual constructions of meaningful holistic selves. Modern individuals are continuously constructing personal identities in the context of increasing social differentiation and conditioned by the autonomization of functionally separated realms of society. It is in this constant process of forming meaningful subjectivities that the macro structures of world society and the construction of individual identities meet. This is the place where we can observe the mutual constitution of different levels of social reality. In his later work, Michel Foucault tried to grasp this social process with the term of the double nature of the modern subject. This double nature, the simultaneity of empowerment and subjugation, is at the heart of Foucault's concept of technologies of the self. His theoretical insights into modern subjectivity formation, therefore, offer elements for an analytical framework for the observation of the intersection of the macro and micro levels of modernity.

At a different level of abstraction, the theories of Andreas Reckwitz and Peter Wagner provide us with three ideal types of concomitant forms of modern subjectivities and social orders. These abstract but globally relevant ideal types offer a second conceptual layer, which helps to

operationalize further the macro/micro intersection for empirical research. They are abstracted from acknowledged historical forms of modern subjectivities and social orders to which individual and collective actors have referred in their historical identity constructions. To a certain extent, they represent abstract blueprints for concrete elaborations of acknowledged collective and individual identities. They constitute a horizon of expectations about legitimate social orders and relating meaningful forms of subjectivity. The historical examples in this chapter, however, show that these abstract blueprints did not exist in the imagination of European actors alone. They are also fundamental cultural scripts in the individual and collective construction of Islamic modernities. They are proof for the claim that the history of the Muslim world has been moving within a context of universal time (Schulze 2000, 3), within the context of global modernity.

In conclusion, the cultural types of Wagner and Reckwitz enhance our analytical toolkit for examining modern subjectivity formation beyond those subject positions that play a role in the inclusion of modern individuals into the functionally separated subsystems of world society. Their types refer to general “cultural scripts” that transcend the boundaries of subsystems such as economy, politics, or religion and in this way connect the syntax of modernity with different modern semantics. In the next chapter, I will introduce the world cultural theory of sociological institutionalism, which offers further conceptual tools to analyze this level of abstract universalistic cultural scripts. In so doing, the focus is on the establishment of legitimate forms of modern actorhood, in particular with respect to formal organizations and social movements. In this way, sociological institutionalism plays a useful complementary role to the theories of subjectivity formation that we discussed in this chapter.

NOTES

1. These conversations were published in a series of articles from volumes 3 to 4 of *al-Manar*, which he later compiled in a book under the title: *mubawarat al-musalih wa al-muqalid* (Conversations of a Reformer and a Traditionalist, Rida 2007).
2. In an article, Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen gives a summary of these conversations which end up with the “conversion” of the sheikh asking the young man about his reform agenda (2001, 98).

3. Despite all differences between Luhmann's and Foucault's theoretical perspectives, this "negation" of the subject in Foucault's early work to a certain extent resembles Luhmann's exclusion of the modern individual from the discursive logic of communication systems.
4. Foucault assigns the historical development of Christianity a specific role in the emergence of the modern self. However, here a comparative view on the religious history of Islam, in particular on the role of the self (*nafs*) in the thinking of its "mystical" branch, Sufism, could help to overcome this Euro- or Christo-centric bias in Foucault's theory.
5. This essay was partly translated into English and appears under the rather misleading title "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions" (Weber 1915).
6. *An-nahda* represents the period of Arab awakening in the nineteenth century. The term refers to the Arab cultural renaissance and the concomitant Islamic reform movement of the nineteenth century and puts the messages of the new lay preachers in a prestigious historical context of comprehensive societal reforms. With reference to the writings of the Lebanese author and journalist Samir Kassir, who was assassinated in Beirut in 2005, Eugene Rogan described this period as an equally important source of Arab pride to the period of the early Islamic empires (Rogan 2009, 4–5).

Modernization, Organization, and Global Cultural Scripts: The Meso Level of Modernity

Abstract The chapter looks more closely at globally relevant cultural scripts of modernity and their appearances in the modern history of the Muslim world. These cultural scripts characterize the meso level of social reality such as epitomized in institutions, movements, and formal organizations. Formal organizations in particular build an important nexus between the outer poles of the macro and micro levels of modernity. I will introduce a number of conceptual tools from the Stanford school of sociological institutionalism. In a second step, this chapter briefly analyzes the processes of reform and decline in the Ottoman Empire in applying these conceptual lenses of the world cultural approach. This empirical excursion, then, leads to a theoretical contextualization of the concepts and assumptions of the Stanford school with respect to the other theories employed in my heuristic framework. The chapter ends with another empirical excursion, which applies my multilayered theoretical framework to the example of the historical construction of Islam as a modern religion.

Keywords World culture · Formal organizations · Cultural scripts · Ottoman reforms · Islam as a world religion

It is the purpose of this chapter to look more closely at globally relevant cultural scripts of modernity. These cultural scripts characterize the meso

level of social reality such as epitomized in institutions, movements, and formal organizations. Formal organizations in particular build an important nexus between the outer poles of the macro and micro levels of modernity. They are instrumental for both the social inclusion of modern subjects in the self-referential communicational spheres of function systems and the enactment of functional communication by social actors (Schimank 2005, 221–231). Luhmann’s modern systems theory alludes to this role of formal organizations in world society. According to Luhmann, formal organizations represent one type out of three distinct forms of social systems: interaction systems, organizational systems, and society. Based on specific membership structures, these organizational systems appear on the meso level between the micro level of interaction systems and the systemic level of society as world society (Luhmann 1975c). From a different perspective, formal organizations play a key role in the constitution of collective actorhood. Formal organizations represent corporate social actors facilitating processes of the mutual constitution of lower and higher levels of social reality. They are institutionalized couplings of the syntax of modernity with its different semantics. In formal organizations “world culture” and local cultures meet. With regard to the modern history of the Muslim world, the Ottoman reform process of the nineteenth century is one of the most significant examples for witnessing these cultural scripts at work in shaping bureaucratic institutions, social movements, and formal organizations.

In this reform period, the *Tanzimat i-Hayriye* (the beneficial reforms), the Ottoman Empire went through a fundamental reconstruction of its state structures. Conventionally periodized from the promulgation of the *Hatt-i Sherif* of Gülhane in 1839 until the dissolution of the first Ottoman parliament by Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1878 (Mardin 1962, 3), the *Tanzimat* period saw a transformation of the social and institutional fabric of the empire according to the communicative logics of various functional domains such as economy, education, law, and politics. The *Tanzimat* were a continuation and intensification of the earlier reform attempts of Sultan Selim III (1789–1807) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839). These early reforms already shaped the nucleus of a modern bureaucracy and made first steps toward the functional organization of government in different ministries and administrative subdivisions. In short, in the nineteenth-century Ottoman reform process, we can detect the enactment of broader globally relevant scripts with respect to both modern state formation and the construction of new subject positions.

There is no doubt that the Ottoman reforms were initially driven by the security concerns of the state elite. Since the Ottoman defeat at Vienna (1683), the empire was dragged progressively into the European power struggle. To a certain extent, the Ottomans appeared as the sixth player in the European Pentarchy of France, Great Britain, Habsburg, Prussia, and Russia. This power struggle increasingly played out to the disadvantage of the Ottoman state, leading to dramatic territorial losses and eventually to the end of the empire after the First World War. Parallel to this conflictual international environment, the Ottoman state elite was confronted with internal threats in both its Arab and European provinces. In the nineteenth century, the political integrity of the empire was undermined by the Saudi expansion toward Mecca and Medina (1806), the factual independence of Egypt under Muhammad Ali (1805–1848), the relative autonomy of Lebanon during the reign of Bashir Shihab II (1788–1840), the self-conscious modernization policies of Ahmad Bey in Tunisia (1837–1855), the Serbian revolts (1804–1806; 1815–1817), the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829), the rebellions in Bosnia and the Herzegovina (1857 and 1875), and the uprisings in Bulgaria (1876). Against this background, the state elite, represented by the court, the military, and the higher echelons of the administration, conducted reforms from above aiming at a fundamental transformation of the administrative, military, and educational institutions of the Ottoman state (Davison 1963, 6–8; Jung and Piccoli 2001, Chapter 2).

In their conscious institutional reconstruction of the empire, the Ottoman state elite was mainly following six avenues of reform, which clearly display broader scripts of the global transformation that took place in the nineteenth century (Osterhammel 2009). First of all, the reforms addressed the professionalization of the Ottoman military institutions and the separation between realms of external and internal security. Second, the reform measures aimed at creating a monetized and rationalized system of taxation, abolishing the patrimonial institution of tax farming.¹ Inspired by the administrative structure of France, the reorganization of the provincial administration turned into a third avenue of reforms, where the Ottoman state introduced new bureaucratic positions based on professional knowledge and fixed salaries. Fourth, in building institutions of formal education and state courts with secular penal, commercial, and maritime codes, the reforms increasingly aimed at the separation of educational, legal, and religious institutions. This modern differentiation of social spheres, as a fifth field of reforms, was also mirrored in the gradual establishment of functionally differentiated branches of government

taking the form of a council of ministers with specifically trained bureaucratic staff. Finally, the reformers employed first steps toward a modern division of power. They legally embedded state institutions in an Ottoman constitution and established the first Ottoman parliament (Jung and Piccoli 2001, 40).

In the context of the asymmetric power relations of the European state system, the Ottoman state elite introduced many of these new institutional and normative standards primarily in order to gain legitimacy at the international level. Yet these new standards increasingly became a central frame of reference in the domestic conflicts of the empire. The rise of the Ottoman constitutional movement and the formation of various nationalist movements among the empire's diverse ethnic and religious groups are cases in point. They constituted new types of social actors that developed within the framework of these innovative institutional and normative standards of the reform period. They were both products and enactments of a global cultural script of modernity.

From the macro-sociological perspective of this book, the Ottoman reforms clearly mirror the emergence of a functionally differentiated world society and concomitant patterns of social organization. At least formally, the *Tanzimat* enacted a shift from stratification to an orientation toward functional differentiation in the institutional structures of Ottoman society. At the same time, this shift was accompanied by social changes at the micro level, where new subject positions appeared. This becomes apparent when looking closer at the content of the *Hatt-i Hümayun*, the major reform edict at the beginning of the second *Tanzimat* period in February 1856. In the *Hatt-i Hümayun*, Sultan Abdülmecid (1839–1861) stipulated remarkable changes with regard to the status of individuals. The edict dealt with the Ottoman population as citizens, introducing new modern subject positions based on legally granted individual rights. These also applied to the non-Muslim minorities in the empire and formally guaranteed religious freedom, equal access to public schools and state employment, and nondiscriminatory tax regulations and property laws. In addition, the *Hatt-i Hümayun* comprised laws against corruption, extortion, and torture (Hurewitz 1956, 149–153). To be sure, these formal reform measures did not immediately translate into new social practices. For a long time, formal institutions and daily practices tended not to match. Yet, the *Tanzimat* established a completely new set of cultural standards, which became a central frame of reference in the social and political developments in late Ottoman society. They introduced a number of new subject positions – political, economic, legal,

religious, etc. – for the inclusion of individuals into the communicative realms of a society increasingly characterized by functional differentiation.

In the following section, I will introduce a number of conceptual tools from the Stanford school of sociological institutionalism. The Stanford school provides us with an elaborated conceptual vocabulary for the observation of the global dissemination of modern cultural scripts such as briefly described above. The research group around John W. Meyer developed a theoretical perspective of the institutional dimension of modern world culture. Their theory of world society builds on an empirically based conceptual apparatus that is complementary to the theories I have discussed so far. In my own reading, the world cultural approach of the Stanford school contributes to bridging the gap between macro and micro levels of modernity. In a second step, this chapter briefly analyzes the processes of reform and decline in the Ottoman Empire in applying these conceptual lenses of the world cultural approach. This empirical excursion, then, leads to a theoretical contextualization of the concepts and assumptions of the Stanford school with respect to the other theories employed in my heuristic framework. In this way, this chapter also has a synthetic function in bringing together the different theoretical lines drawn so far. Instead of a conclusion, the chapter will end with another empirical excursion, which applies my multilayered theoretical framework to the example of the historical construction of Islam as a modern religion.

WORLD CULTURE, WORLD POLITY, WORLD SOCIETY

The Stanford school, to a certain extent, has participated in the cultural turn in social theory. However, it has done so in a very specific way. In stark contrast to pluralistic theorizing about culture, the Stanford school does not emphasize difference, but puts its focus on the homology of global structures produced by an “overarching world culture” (Boli and Thomas 1997, 172). Sociological institutionalism defines world society through a set of pervasive world cultural principles whose enactment leads to global isomorphism regarding institutions such as national states, education systems, or administrative bureaucracies (Meyer et al. 1997). In this way, the world cultural approach shares the purpose of this book in accounting for similarities in global modernity. Moreover, it adds an extra conceptual layer to the global scripts of the three respective types of subjectivity and social order by Reckwitz and Wagner. Yet it does so based on a significant Eurocentric bias. Contrary to the argument in this

book, Meyer and his colleagues declare the legal and religious history of the West to be the sole origin of these world cultural principles (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, 108). Combining their concepts with illustrative examples from Muslim history, therefore, may contribute to correcting this rather unbalanced view of the world cultural approach.

In considering globalization as a matter of culture, the Stanford school argues against the conventional reduction of global change to a mere increase in interconnectedness and worldwide exchange. George Thomas, for instance, explicitly states that there is a world cultural context “with substance” behind globalization (Thomas 2009, 116). In departing from the segmented organization of global politics in a system of national states, Meyer and his colleagues suggested identifying this substance of globalization in worldwide models that have been continuously constructed and propagated in global cultural and associational processes. The national state is one of the most significant of these models, which define “legitimate agendas for local action at a global scale” (Meyer et al. 1997, 144–145). The Ottoman *Tanzimat* is just one historical example of the implementation of these models. With reference to Max Weber’s terminology, the Stanford school sees rationalistic models and theories based on instrumental rationality in the center of this world culture. Instrumental rationality, then, the school defines as the orientation of the means of social action toward abstract ends (Thomas 2011, 35).

From this perspective of global rationalization, world culture disposes over four crucial principles: rationalization, theorization, universalism, and individualization. In enacting these four principles, social actors gain legitimacy and produce the observable isomorphic structures of world society (Busse 2016, 37). Moreover, based on these four principles, world culture shapes legitimate forms of social actorhood that operate at individual, organizational, and/or national levels (Meyer et al. 1997, 168). Departing from the idea of the modern individual as a self-conscious actor, social and cultural environments become filled with models of actorhood representing these culturally preferred or even demanded identities in world society (Meyer 2010, 10–12). Modern formal organizations in particular are modeled according to the notion of modern actorhood as a universalized and rationalized form for social agency. Formal organizations are symbolically bounded, sovereign, and rational actors with specifically defined technical structures. They incorporate member-individuals with roles, responsibilities, and participation in decision-making processes (Meyer et al. 2006, 45). Gaining legitimacy through this

model, “every imaginable social group – economic, ethnic, political, religious, educational, medical, or scientific – is likely to claim explicitly and self-consciously to be an organization” (Drori et al. 2006, 1). The origin of these kinds of formal organizations modeled in terms of rationalized individual persons rather than corporate groups the Stanford school discerns in the nineteenth century. Boli and Thomas, for example, point to the establishment of the first not-for-profit organizations with an international focus in the latter part of the nineteenth century (Boli and Thomas 1997, 174). However, in recent decades, we can observe the radical expansion of this kind of individualist organizations on a global level. In Meyer’s analysis, the statist structures of previous organizational settings were gradually weakened under the US hegemony after the Second World War (Meyer 2004, 6). This finding largely corresponds with Wagner’s claim of a shift from organized to pluralistic modernity. According to the Stanford school, in encouraging the structuration of social life around models of formal organization, globalization has increasingly replaced forms of more traditional bureaucracies, professional organizations, and family firms (Meyer et al. 2006, 44).

Going back to our empirical example, the *Tanzimat*, we can see some of these principles of world culture and related models of organized agency at work. On the one hand, the Ottoman state elite claimed to apply some of these principles at least partly in their reform edicts. Still representing an empire, the Ottoman reformers tried to adjust the Ottoman polity to the model of the national state. The six avenues of reform described above initiated structural transformations toward this model of the modern state legitimated through invoking rational actorhood. New formal rules of efficiency, functional responsibilities, and accountability demonstrate this overarching idea of rationalization behind the reforms. The educational reforms, for instance, clearly aimed at the production of professional staff for the state administration and the military. Ironically, with their new educational standards and the social expectations that they conveyed in the new *mülkiye* and *harbiye* schools, these two training centers for the bureaucracy and the military developed into the main breeding grounds for social actors who eventually initiated the gradual deposition of the Ottoman state elite after the so-called Young Turk Revolution (1908). The political vanguard group around the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), was largely recruited from these modernized Ottoman educational institutions.

On the other hand, these rationalized global cultural models quickly turned into important standards for the formation and social orientation of new political actors beyond and often in opposition to the Ottoman state elite. Significant players among these new organizations and social movements were the so-called Young Ottomans. In 1865, this group, representing the lower stratum of the educated middle class, began to spread its ideas among the literate public. Searching for a combination of Islamic traditions with the ideals of the Enlightenment, the Young Ottomans advocated the full implementation of a constitutional order and the formation of representative institutions of government. Furthermore, their reform agenda aimed at the replacement of political loyalty to the *millet*, the religious community, by the *vatan*, the fatherland. Referring to the empire as *vatan*, the identity construction of the Young Ottomans transgressed all religious, ethnic, and regional boundaries that so far had characterized the social composition of the empire (Karpát 1972, 262–265; Mardin 1988, 31). Becoming the organizational core of the Ottoman constitutional movement, these modern social actors demanded from the Supreme Porte, the Ottoman rulers and their leading bureaucrats, a just and efficient system of taxation, freedom of press, legal frameworks for economic transactions, and transparent and accountable bureaucratic organization (Karpát 1972, 268–269). The Young Ottomans emerged within this new historical context of globally relevant cultural principles as distinctly modern social actors. At the same time, they became a major force in the future interpretation and enactment of these models and principles from which they originally emerged. The Young Ottomans are a historical concrete form of the mutual constitution of structural frameworks and social actors. Furthermore, their new vernacular of an Ottoman modernity exemplifies the construction of historical specific modern semantics based on the syntactical structures of modernity.

The world cultural approach is furnishing us with a number of useful concepts and analytical tools for a better understanding of the complex historical process behind the intertwined processes of reform and decline of the Ottoman Empire. While global principles and models inspired Ottoman leaders, they simultaneously guided the organizational make-up, worldviews, and strategic purposes of various forces in opposition to the centralization policies of the empire's state elite. This applies especially to the various nationalist movements behind the series of upheavals, rebellions, and civil wars that accompanied the *Tanzimat* period and the subsequent long reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909). Mutually

referring in their struggle to the model of the national state, the Ottoman rulers were competing with the leaders of ethnically and regionally defined nationalist movements about international recognition and legitimacy. An interesting case in point is the state formation of Egypt.

In 1811, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, massacred the leadership of the Mamluks, the traditional military establishment that for centuries controlled power in the Ottoman province of Egypt. Muhammad Ali tried to monopolize state power in his hands and made Egypt basically independent from his Ottoman overlords in Istanbul. He embarked on a conscious program to transform the economic and political structures of the country, invoking some of the emerging global cultural standards. In close reference to these world cultural models, the early Egyptian state elite engaged in a conscious reformation of public institutions with a particular focus on the military, state administration, and education. There is much historical evidence that these top-down reforms were experienced largely as rather repressive acts by the ruler and did not have beneficial effects on all parts of society. However, in this respect Muhammad Ali's reforms were not so different from other processes of modern state formation. In Europe too, state building was rarely a bottom-up process, but often an attempt at "defensive modernization," through which the political and economic elite tried to safeguard their power position by implementing institutional adjustments.²

In making Egypt factually independent from the Ottoman Empire, the interference of European powers derailed this autochthonous state-building process in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1876, Egypt's state finances came under foreign control with the establishment of the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* (Commission of Public Debt). The members of the commission were appointed by the colonial powers in order to supervise the strained public finances of Egypt. This foreign control over Egypt's state finances was only a prelude to the eventual occupation of the country by Great Britain in 1882. The immediate cause to impose direct British rule on Egypt, however, was the nationalist uprising of the officer group around Ahmed Urabi (1841–1911), which formed a parliamentary government in 1881. The Egyptian nationalist movement legitimated its action by invoking modern global principles such as state sovereignty, popular representation, and constitutional rule. It turned against both foreign domination, epitomized in the foreign fiscal control of Egypt, and the autocratic nature of domestic rule. Together with British troops, the Egyptian aristocracy suppressed the revolt in summer 1882

and leading figures of the national movement went into exile. In order to safeguard their own interests, European powers violated the normative standards of globalizing cultural institutions. Depriving these global cultural scripts of their legitimating power, they supported autocratic rulers at the expense of the nationalist and constitutionalist aspiration of Egypt's domestic political movements (Lutfi Al-Sayyid 1968; Vatikiotis 1985). From the perspective of the Egyptian nationalist movement, the universal rights of freedom of expression and self-determination were thus located "in the colony rather than the metropole" (cf. Getachew 2016, 3).

WORLD CULTURE, FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, AND PLURALISTIC MODERNITIES

The Egyptian example shows that the rise of world cultural models was not a one-way street. It seems myopic to consider them to be nothing more than a kind of Western export. Instead, the formation, application, and global legitimacy of these models were constructed in long-lasting processes of the entanglement of different social actors. That these global entanglements bear tracks of asymmetric colonial power relations does not deprive subordinated actors of their agency. Rather they express the ways in which the evolution of global cultural scripts has been conditioned by different historical experiences. Following Hans Joas, it is these historical experiences that become constitutive for intense commitments to or outright rejections of new values and norms rather than their formal justifications. In this sense, normative principles are the result of historical practices rather than the other way around (Joas 2015, 163). Egyptian state formation is just one example that shows the conflicting application, interpretation, and invocation of world cultural standards among different actors. The attempt of the Islamic reform movement to "Islamize" global cultural scripts is then a good example for their interpretation and adaptation mediated by specific historical experiences. The analysis of colonial history as the history of entangled modernities, therefore, can contribute to adding an important dimension to our understanding of the establishment of the global relevance of world cultural standards that goes beyond the rather vague concept of global diffusion put forward by the Stanford school (Strang and Meyer 1993).

The perspective of entangled modernities offers a host of examples that this diffusion of world cultural models has taken place historically in form of

intense social negotiations at various organizational levels. In *Transnational Islam in Europe*, for instance, Götz Nordbruch and Umar Ryad collected a number of cases studies on Muslim intellectuals in Europe during the interwar period. These studies examine these Muslim intellectuals as significant players in the transnational networks shaping the global political and intellectual history of the twentieth century (Nordbruch and Ryad 2014). In these ways, the approach of entangled modernity is able to liberate the world cultural approach from some of its Eurocentric shackles.

This allusion to theories of entangled modernities brings me to a more general theoretical contextualization of the conceptual apparatus of the Stanford school with respect to the other theoretical sources of my heuristic framework. More precisely, in which way is the world cultural approach of Meyer and his group compatible with the theoretical framework presented so far? In proposing concepts such as world polity, world culture, and world society, the Stanford school is criticizing both “actor-centered and functional theorizing” (Thomas 2009, 119). The first part of this critique is in particular directed against theories depicting society as made up of autochthonous individual actors, making them the sole point of departure for the analysis of social phenomena. The world cultural approach criticizes claims of the ontological primacy of individuals. Contrary to this kind of methodological and ontological individualism, the institutionalist view of the Stanford school considers the modern actor to be a “historical and ongoing cultural construction” (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, 101). Modern actors such as individuals, organizations, and national states are themselves the result of highly standardized and globally relevant scripts of actorhood and social agency, which they simultaneously enact (2000, 111). The research group around Meyer defines individual actors as “enactors of scripts rather more than they are self-directed actors” (Meyer et al. 1997, 150). Consequently, for the Stanford school, social analysis must start at the macro-sociological level of world-cultural principles such as universalism, individualism, voluntaristic authority, rational progress, and world citizenship (Boli and Thomas 1997, 171). It is this global cultural context within which modern actorhood and the self-conscious individual of modernity emerge.

This critical stand vis-à-vis actor-centered theorizing fits well the theoretical position of this book. Luhmann’s theory of world society, on which we focused in the third chapter, shares this approach of the Stanford school. Furthermore, Chapter 4 has demonstrated the mutual constitution of modern macro and micro levels of social reality. Both modern

systems theory and Foucault's concept of the double nature of the modern subject deconstruct the sovereignty of the autonomous, rational, and self-reliant modern individual as a liberal myth. According to all three theories, the modern individual is a historically and socially constructed cultural form. The higher levels of social reality exert a certain form of "downward causation" on the emergence of the modern subject. Thus, the macro level conditions social action at the micro level. Whether we talk about psychological systems (Luhmann), modern subjects (Foucault), or rational actors (Stanford school), we refer to globally relevant cultural forms, social imaginaries of the modern individual, that are inseparably connected to the structural realms of world society. In short, all three theories contribute with different perspectives to our understanding of the constitutional interdependence between the macro and micro levels of social reality.

While the perspectives of these three theoretical positions easily complement each other with respect to the relationship between macro and micro levels, the Stanford schools' critique of functionalist theories does not make it incompatible with Luhmann's theory. In principle, the Stanford school and Luhmann's modern systems theory share a concept of world society according to which social theory must account for the relatively autonomous role of a global macro structure in conditioning contemporary social developments (Meyer 2004, 5). However, both approaches differ in the ways in which they conceptualize this structural level of world society. For Luhmann, world society emerged as an all-encompassing realm of communication with no natural boundaries. Internally differentiated by self-referential function systems of communication, world society appears as a plurality of "cultural spheres" without a center. It is precisely this complementary difference, in Weber's terms the plurality of incommensurable value spheres, that according to Luhmann constitutes the unity of world society. For the Stanford school, instead, the unity of world society is defined by the pervasive influence of instrumental rationality. The various world cultural models to which the theory refers are all derivatives of this global cosmos of instrumental rationality from which, according to the world cultural approach, also functionally separated domains of social action evolve.³

In building their concept of world society on the ubiquity of instrumental rationality, the Stanford school nevertheless admits that functional differentiation runs as a pervasive structuration throughout the world (Thomas 2011, 34). George Thomas and other proponents of the world cultural approach do not reject the relevance of the paradigm

of functional differentiation in their description of modernity. On the contrary, their work is full of implicit and explicit references to functional differentiation. This is apparent, for instance, in their discussion of the role of world cultural models in social realms such as education, science, politics, or law. The differentiation of the modern world into functionally separated realms of communication actually permeates the work of the Stanford school. What it clearly rejects, however, is the idea of the autonomous character of functional differentiation as a world system. According to the Stanford school, processes of functional differentiation are not autonomous, but “occur within a context of global instrumental rationalism.” The rise of functional differentiation, thus, is not an adaptation to social complexity, but the result of the enactment of cultural scripts based on instrumental rationality (Thomas 2011, 28 and 35).⁴

In employing concepts of modern systems theory and the Stanford school within the metatheoretical framework of social emergence, I do not consider these two theories as contradicting each other. Rather, function systems and world cultural models refer to two different emerging levels of social reality with relatively distinct properties. While functional differentiation demarcates discursive horizons of modernity, world cultural models delineate fields and forms of legitimate social action within and across these discursive horizons. They constitute two different but interrelated dimensions of a global structure of cognitive orders that together provide an abstract fundament for the historically particular semantics of multiple modernities. They guarantee the cognitive unity of these semantics of modernity through mutually shared abstract concepts such as state, society, law, religion, organization, agency, or the individual. The historical construction of different forms of Islamic modernities, as discussed in the chapters of this book, has taken place in both employing and partly constructing this cognitive fundament of world society. While Luhmann’s theory serves me to grasp the most abstract syntax of modernity, the cultural models of the Stanford school offer a conceptual link between this syntax and the construction of various concrete semantics of modernity by legitimate social actors. In this way, the cultural models of the Stanford school add another abstract layer of meaning to the syntactical rules of functional differentiation.

In my own framework, world cultural models and principles represent the upper layer of the meso level to which the levels of corporate and individual actors relate. This interlacement between different levels the

Stanford school addresses with the concept of decoupling. While world cultural models of individualism and formal organization constitute two striking isomorphic forms of social actorhood, modern actors often employ them in “disconnecting model and actual behavior” (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, 112). Thus we can observe, for instance, formal commitments to egalitarian citizenship or gender equality contradicted by concrete policies (Meyer et al. 1997, 154). The Ottoman reforms are a good example for this disconnection of form and social practice. The action of modern actors is also subject to a historical context of the symbolic and material resources at hand. From this perspective, decoupling refers to overlapping cultural structures in our analysis of concrete forms of social action. The world cultural models of the Stanford school deliver a conceptually more elaborated form of what Eisenstadt called the program of modernity. His theory of multiple modernities, instead, offers insights into the way in which world cultural models become transformed into different forms of modernity with reference to “civilizational traditions” and local cultural conditions. Applying Eisenstadt’s understanding of multiple modernities, decoupling becomes a complex process in which religious and local traditions condition the factual implementation of the program of modernity. This process represents the translation of world cultural models into the meaningful semantics of local actors. Rather than being decoupled from their origin in instrumental rationality, historical social forms represent hybrid fusions of rationalized models with different layers of regional, national, and local cultures. Together, world cultural theory and theories of multiple modernities provide us with analytical tools to deconstruct this modern hybridity of historically concrete cultural forms at the micro and meso levels.

Finally, I see a fruitful communication between theories of entangled modernities, successive modernities, modern subjectivity formation, and the Stanford school when it comes to the analysis of concrete instances of modernity. The theory of entangled modernities translates the paradigm of emergence, more precisely its assumption of a social reality without precise origins, into a strategy for empirical research. At the level of social actors, we can observe the global diffusion of world cultural models in conflictual processes. The close entanglement of individual and collective actors has characterized these conflicts. The Ottoman and Egyptian examples show the ways in which these actors have drawn from different and often asymmetric power resources. Theories of successive modernities allow us to embed cultural models

in the broader context of social order. The distinction between organized and pluralistic modernity resembles the dichotomy of the Stanford school between organizational models with either a statist or an individualistic character. This applies in a similar way to Reckwitz' types of modern subjectivity formation. While the peer-group-oriented subject of organized modernity builds on models of social agency emphasizing collectivity, the highly individualized "postmodern" subject of pluralistic modernity is in line with the "cultural models of the liberal system" that have risen to hegemony in the past 70 years. In sum, my selective choice from different strands of social theory offers a multileveled heuristic grid in which we can develop further our understanding of global modernity. These different theories address social developments on different levels of social reality, making them compatible for the analysis of concrete historical processes. They allow us to juggle with very different levels of analysis, bringing together structures and agency. I conclude this chapter in briefly illustrating this combination of a multilevel theory of global modernity with the historical formation of Islam as a modern religion.

CONSTRUCTING ISLAM AS A MODERN RELIGION

In the second part of the nineteenth century, we can observe the rise of the idea of a set of world religions. In this process, a number of European scholars vehemently refused to acknowledge Islam as being among these world religions. The Dutch Protestant theologian Abraham Kuenen (1828–1891), for instance, argued that Islam remains a "national religion" of the Arabs, lacking universalistic traits in its creed. The very definition of a world religion and which corpus of traditions should belong to them were issues of a lasting controversy (Masuzawa 2005). Today this controversy almost seems to be odd. At least in public discourses, religion has attained an almost self-evident meaning and without doubt Islam counts as one of the most important among the acknowledged religions in the world. Only in the field of religious studies itself can we observe an ongoing and almost obsessive dispute about the very meaning of religion, revolving around the ontological quality, ideological nature, and universal applicability of the category of religion. Due to this scholarly dispute regarding the very concept of religion, I will start with some reflections on the concept of religion in light of my heuristic framework.⁵

In the theoretical framework of this book, it is easy to come to a definition of religion. Taking our point of departure at the macro level, religion represents one of the function systems of world society. In *Religion in Global Society*, Peter Beyer took this approach. Beyer defined religion as a modern invention resulting from historically specific structural developments (2006, 63). The modern understanding of religion developed in a historical process that Kocku von Stuckrad labeled “the scientification of religion” (Stuckrad 2014). Translated into the terminology of the Stanford school, the evolution of the modern concept of religion took place in the structural context of the four world cultural principles of rationalization, theorization, universalism, and individualization. Thus, our contemporary understanding of religion does not refer to a trans-historical ontological entity. Religion is not an anthropological constant over time, but it represents a historically specific concept in the context of global modernity.

From the perspective of functional differentiation, religion refers to a subsystem of modern society that has gained its relative autonomy, its *sui generis* character, through the self-referential closure of what we identify as religious communication. This religious communication is based on binary codes such as transcendent/immanent, sacred/profane, or blessed/cursed (Beyer 2006, 85). Consequently, at the macro level, religion as a specific discursive property of modernity evolved in a sociocultural process of conflicting boundary demarcations to other modern subsystems such as economy, law, politics, or science. In claiming a linear retreat of religion on the macro and the micro levels, simplistic secularization theories narrated this process in terms of a zero-sum game between religion and modernity. Yet religion has not disappeared in modern times. On the contrary, in turning into a function system, religion has increasingly attained a much more visible and clearly identifiable communicative form. This concept of modern religion is also discernible on the micro level.

From the perspective of the individual, Max Weber associated religion with an autonomous but not independent realm of social action. In the Weberian tradition, scholars have defined religious social action not by its ends, but by its means. Accordingly, religious social action consists in form of the specific interaction with transcendental actors (Sharot 2001; Weber 1915). While Weber identified the ends of religious action in orientations both to inner-worldly and to transcendent forms of salvation, he distinguished religious from other types of social actions by its interaction with

supernatural forces. Understanding modernization as the pervasive formal rationalization of social life, the previously discussed rise of incommensurable value spheres, Weber reduced specifically religious social action to a means of achieving salvation and redemption (1915, 490–492). In form of collectively shared belief systems, religion offers individual actors moral guidance and normative patterns to rationalize complex experiences and to put them into a “meaningful cosmos” (Weber 1948, 281). In the modern world, however, religious ethics do so in competition with the ethics of other value spheres. In a “secular age,” there are no longer mutually shared modes of thinking and moral judgments, excluding any holistic claims of religion (Taylor 2007). In sum, the modern concept of religion demarcates a specific kind of communication with the transcendental realm and implies forms of social interaction with supernatural forces.

In the historical chapters of his book, Peter Beyer showed various ways in which intellectuals from different parts of the world reinvented their cultural traditions in relative accordance with this modern cultural model of a religion. The nineteenth century was the historical stage for this reconstruction process. In a dense global entanglement, social actors from different world regions constructed a global system of world religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. This rationalization of cultural traditions took place with reference to the abstract model of religious communication. Religions, now, appeared as specific belief systems based on sets of textual, symbolic, and ritual sources. The orientation toward an isomorphic world cultural model of religion, in Beyer’s terms “religious programs,” guaranteed the global recognition of particular traditions as religions. It is precisely here that Luhmann’s systems theory, the Stanford school, and theories of multiple modernities intersect. Putting these theories together, we have analytical instruments for observing the fusion of global cognitive models, elements of the program of modernity, with historically specific traditions.

Leading representatives of the Islamic reform movement participated in this process of constructing Islam as a belief system. They systematized the cultural heritage of Islam within the new conceptual coordinates of an emerging world culture. From their deliberation, the concept of *aqida*, the dogmatic principles of the Islamic faith, emerged in the form of a modern belief system (Schulze 1990, 45). At the same time, many core terms of Islamic traditions attained specifically modern meanings. The understanding of *sharia* (“revealed norms”) in terms of positive law, the

reinterpretation of *shura* (consultation) as a form of representative government, the definition of *zakat* (alms) as an Islamic form of taxation, or the association of *riba* (usury) with interest-taking are only some significant cases in point (Jung 2016).

There is much historical evidence that Christianity was a key source behind the construction of the modern category of religion as a belief system whose communicative structures built on binary codes such as immanent/transcendent, profane/sacred, or blessed/cursed. However, this source was not Christianity as such. Rather it was a very specific interpretation of Christian traditions by liberal Protestant theologians in the nineteenth century. These Protestant revisions of Christianity themselves were strongly conditioned by the scientific, political, and economic innovations of their time. Moreover, the modern image of Christianity was constructed in a comparative perspective against the foils of the religious traditions of other peoples. Behind the emergence of a relatively authoritative world cultural model of religion, we can discern a complex process of cultural entanglement, rather than a mere imposition of a certain Christian model by imperial politics (Jung 2015). Let there be no doubt, I do not repudiate the influence of asymmetric power relations on the establishment of globally accepted bodies of knowledge. Rather, I argue that we must qualify these power relations through an analysis of the interconnectedness of historical realities. In the context of colonial domination, this implies seeing that the agency of those with inferior social power, that is to say the agency of “subaltern forces,” played a role in the formation of meanwhile globally acknowledged norms, social models, and institutions.

This issue of global entanglement is most visible at the intermediate levels of social reality. Here religious organizations and movements have transformed authoritative sets of cultural traditions into religious programs. At this intermediate level of social reality we can observe the generalization of motivations and of specific forms of social action. Social movements organize communications and social actions around specific themes. They offer templates for social actors, while participation in them remains often episodic, occasional, and does not always follow mutually acknowledged patterns of social conduct (Beyer 2006, 110). Formal models of social organization, instead, draw clear boundaries between members and non-members. They integrate social actors in specific function systems, whereas they can cut across systemic boundaries at the same time (Beyer 2006, 52). In this case, a religious organization might draw political, economic, or legal

communications into the religious realm. It is at this intermediate level where processes of coupling and decoupling among relatively autonomous social systems occur. The discourse on Islamic modernities is a good example for subsequent forms of religious organization whose communication has transgressed the boundaries of function systems. Closely resembling Wagner's three types of successive modernities, three different types of modern organizations have articulated this Islamic discourse: elitist intellectual circles, social mass organizations, and associations of rather individualistic believers. Since its invention in the nineteenth century, social actors employed the discourse on Islamic modernities in an attempt to "colonialize" other value spheres with religious vocabulary.

In political terms, the representatives of the Islamic reform movement have largely remained voices of oppositional movements to incumbent state elites. Yet this does not mean that their agenda has not impacted on the religious politics of Muslim states. On the contrary, in particular the history of pan-Islamic ideas is paradigmatic for the close interaction between nonstate actors and national states, perfectly resembling the "dialectic between world-polity and national-level organizations" in world society (Boli and Thomas 1997, 179). The history of pan-Islamism shows the way in which vague ideas of the nineteenth century developed into organized forms of an Islamic international movement. In the course of the twentieth century, international governmental organizations have gradually taken over the agenda of a transnational Islamic movement previously initiated by nongovernmental organizations of Islamic unity. The first major world congresses of Muslims in Mecca (1924 and 1926), Cairo (1926), Jerusalem (1931), and Geneva (1935) were decisive first steps toward the formation of an international Islamic organization. At the same time, they were the stage for the fundamental religious, political, economic, and social disagreements among religious scholars, public intellectuals, and national leaders such as Ibn Saud (1875-1953). The latter, the King of Saudi Arabia, extended an invitation to the Mecca conference in 1926, predominantly by appealing to Muslim unity in order to gain legitimacy for his conquest and subsequent rule over the Holy Places of Islam (Landau 1990, 238).

In the beginnings of the 1970s, the OIC was eventually established under Saudi leadership. The organization closely resembled the formal organizational type of an international organization based on national states as its members. The OIC put forward the political rationale of its member states and was not based on theological criteria. Its internal structure was

built on the separation of offices due to regional affiliations and functional domains such as education, science, technology, or politics. Later renamed the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the organization today disposes over three bodies: an Islamic summit of heads of states, a council of foreign ministers, and a general secretariat as its executive organ.⁶ The history of the Islamic international movement marks the rise of Islam in terms of a modern formal organization with global reach. The OIC is a typically modern “agentive actor” with the capacity for responsible agency for itself, for other actors, and for Islamic principles (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, 106–108).

The case of the OIC is a good example to prove the analytical utility of the conceptual tools of the Stanford school. In applying world cultural models, we understand Islamic organizations as an essential part of global history. The OIC represents Islam as a world religion through a formal organization based on the regular membership of states. This form of internationally organized Islam refers to a cultural model of religion according to which Islamic traditions have been reinvented and systematized as a belief system. On this organizational level, macro and micro developments converge. The establishment of a global system of religious communication has been accompanied by its internal differentiation into a set of world religions. This segmentation of the religious system has been facilitated by a world cultural model that in societal negotiations across the world in the end defined what counts as a religion. In this way, the “program of modern religion” has been fused with different civilizational traditions in shaping multiple religions. At the very same time, international Islamic conferences became stages for different interpretations of Islamic traditions in light of religion as a world cultural model. Collective and individual actors have constantly questioned and negotiated the legitimate Islamic form of this global model. In this way, the very interpretation of Islamic traditions has become a contested field among different social actors accounting for multiple modern semantics within Islam. There is no doubt that this modern contestation about the legitimate interpretation of Islamic traditions will continue with an open end.

NOTES

1. The sultans farmed fiefs out to the upper strata of society, opening them for both official functionaries and local leaders. At the beginning, these tax farms were only granted for a brief term; however, later the state granted the tax farmer a life interest that turned into a heritable property (Lewis 1961, 446).

2. The German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler coined the term defensive modernization in his study on the modernization of Germany. Wehler defined the term as a political strategy of the traditional elite of a country to adjust to outer constraints imposed by the dominant power of a revolutionary country, in the German case France. One purpose of this strategy is to safeguard the traditional order through reforms from above against revolution from below. Defensive modernization is the attempt to prevent major changes in the political, economic, and social power relations of a society by limited reforms (Wehler 1989, 345 and 532–533).
3. It is not the place here for a detailed critique of the Stanford school's reductionist interpretation of Weber's theory of rationalization on which the school draws. In my opinion, the Stanford school confuses instrumental rationality with formal rationality. While the first implies a rationalization of social action according to a means-end calculation, formal rationality is, according to Weber, characterized by mere calculability, by the conviction that in principle social reality is based on entirely formal rules. The latter, however, include not only instrumental rationality, but also value rationality, the belief in the formal construction of legitimate norms and values that are oriented toward ethical, political, utilitarian, or religious postulates (Weber 1920, 10). Instrumental rationality is therefore only a part of formal rationality, which, in Weber's eyes, characterized the modern rationalization process. See also the discussion in Bogner (1989, 100ff.).
4. In this argumentation, the Stanford school interprets modern systems theory through the lenses of Talcott Parsons' structural functionalism. This becomes clear in George Thomas' dismissal of the idea to perceive functional differentiation as an "objective response to complexity" (Thomas 2011, 27). Yet Luhmann does not assume that functional differentiation is a natural or effective response to the complexity of modern society (Thomas 2011, 32). At least in his later work, since his "autopoietic turn," Luhmann distanced himself from Parsons' structural functionalism. Therefore, we can interpret Luhmann's concept of world society in terms of a polytextual and emerging social structure. It is polytextual in terms of consisting of a multiplicity of subsystems that follow their autonomous communicative logics; and it is an emerging structure of sociocultural evolution that does not respond to the reproductive demands of a preestablished society as a whole. Evolutionary variations occur independently from selections and there is no causal link between variations and the conditions of historical selections (Kuchler 2003, 29). Functional differentiation is not the result of an effective division of labor, but function systems emerge through the operational closure of specific forms of communication. It is not efficiency but communicative connectivity on which the functional separation of social systems rests. In this sense, the primacy of functional differentiation in

modernity is the accidental result of sociocultural evolution (Luhmann 1987; Schimank 2005, 51 and 54).

5. For some articulated voices in this dispute, see McCutcheon (1997), Asad (1993), and Fitzgerald (2007a, 2007b).
6. The history of the Islamic international movement has been described by Reinhard Schulze (1990). For more information on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, see www.oic.org.

Conclusions: Global Sociology of Modernity and World History

Abstract The conclusions will sum up my conceptual apparatus and point to the ways in which this predominantly heuristic approach might lead to the elaboration of a more comprehensive sociology of global modernity. I will critically reflect upon my theoretical concepts in light of the illustrative historical examples from Muslim history in order to demonstrate their empirical feedback from the perspective of “analytical inductivism.” Moreover, the conclusions will very briefly indicate some ideas for future research.

Keywords Modernity · Modernities · World society · Modern Islam

The purpose of this book was twofold. First, I aimed at sketching out a global sociology of modernity. This heuristic framework of modernity is an attempt to accommodate a core assumption of classical modernization theory – the global nature of modernity – with the pluralistic perspective of the rise of a multiplicity of historically concrete forms of modernities. More precisely, I tried to reconcile a universalistic concept of modernity with the fact of modernity’s multiple historical realizations. Second, I wanted to put forward a theoretically underpinned critique of the still so conveniently applied but by far too simplistic equation of modernization with Westernization. In order to substantiate this critique empirically, I decided to illustrate my theoretical elaborations with examples from the

historical experience of Muslim peoples. Bringing Muslim history and social theory together, this book represents a synthesis of the research interests which have driven my scholarly work in the past decades. These conclusions will very briefly sum up my major theoretical arguments, point out some remaining gaps and deficiencies in my framework, and indicate possible avenues for future research.

Let me begin with a short summary of the argumentative steps of my theoretical framework. In [Chapter 2](#), I started out with a discussion of the mushrooming attempts to design new pluralistic theories of modernities. I considered the rise of these theories to be a result of the fundamental critique of the once prevalent, rather homogenizing views of classical modernization theories. I argued that, above all, theories of multiple, entangled, and successive modernities provide us with new theoretical perspectives and a number of analytical tools that go beyond thinking modernization in terms of an all-encompassing process of social convergence. They do away with the assumption that in the course of history a general model of modern society is gradually replacing so-called traditional societies. While theories of multiple modernities bring religion and tradition back in, theories of successive modernities brush off the idea of a linear development toward one specific form of modernity. Theories of entangled modernities, finally, question the diffusion of modern ideas and institutions from a European center to a colonial periphery. They emphasize the intimate connectedness of social actors with different cultural backgrounds in constructing our modern world. At the same time, these three theories allow us nevertheless to sustain the abovementioned core idea of classical modernization theories. They all make references to a certain unity among the multiplicity of different historical realizations of modernity. At least implicitly, they all refer to a generic notion of modernity in the singular. However, in this discussion of pluralistic theories of modernities, this generic notion of modernity in the singular remains largely unclear.

In [Chapter 3](#), I therefore tried to develop a useful concept of this presumed unity to which pluralistic forms of modernity seemingly allude. This chapter dealt with the “syntax of modernity,” with a set of generic “formal rules” on which the historical construction of the individual semantics of multiple modernities rests. I suggested conceptualizing a generic concept of modernity by linking sociological theories of differentiation to a metatheoretical frame of reference derived from theories of emergence. More precisely, I defined modernity in the singular as an emerging social macrostructure with the help of Niklas Luhmann’s

modern systems theory. From this perspective, the differentiation of specific functional realms of modern social relations marks the core of a social macrostructure with its own modern properties. The systemic dominance of functional differentiation represents a specific property of modernity's macrostructure. This specific property of social subsystems is not simply reducible to the properties of lower levels of the social world. From this theoretical perspective, modern society is an emerging global system, that is to say modern society is world society. Choosing modern systems theory in defining the macrostructure of modernity in the singular, however, does not imply endorsing all its theoretical predispositions. This applies in particular to the claim that function systems are of an autopoietic nature and that the social realm excludes corporate and individual actors. In my own interpretation, these claims only make sense in constructing function systems from an epistemological angle as analytical tools in terms of ideal types. The historical construction of plural forms of modernity, however, has taken place through individual and collective actors. It is social actors who enact the syntax of modernity through different historical semantics. Therefore, the highly abstract concept of world society needs a complementary perspective of social agency that departs from the micro level of the modern individual.

In [Chapter 4](#), I turned to this micro perspective. In this part of the book, I argued that modern individuals experience the, in functional terms, well-ordered macrostructure of world society as ever-increasing social contingency. Classical sociologists already discerned the socially disembedding consequences of functional differentiation. In referring back to the work of Max Weber, I described these consequences in terms of a constant confrontation and conflict of modern individuals with the incommensurable ethics of different social value spheres. In order to observe this conflictual process, I suggested combining Weber's insights with some analytical tools from Michel Foucault's theory of modern subjectivity formation. In the "double nature" of the modern subject, that is to say in it being the creator of itself while subjected to structural imperatives at the very same time, we can identify the specific property of the modern individual. Moreover, this double nature of the modern subject points to the constitutive interdependence of the macro and micro levels of modernity. From Foucault's analytical perspective we can observe the paradoxical but mutual constitution of social order and contingency. This relationship of constitutive interdependence between the macro and micro levels we can conceptualize further by combining the

respective three types of modern social orders with forms of subjectivity, which Peter Wagner and Andreas Reckwitz developed. Together these ideal types furnish us with empirically founded concepts for analyzing the intersection of structure and agency, social order and subjectivity, at the meso level. In light of these typologies, we can study the multiple ways in which corporate and individual actors construct hybrid forms of collective and individual identities.

The meso level, then, was the focal point of the fifth chapter. In this chapter, I introduced a number of conceptual tools from the world cultural theory of the Stanford school of sociological institutionalism. Moreover, I combined this set of concepts with the rest of my theoretical framework. The Stanford school has been occupied with describing world society as a universalistic form of world culture, supplying social actors with globally relevant cultural scripts. These cultural scripts are particularly visible in the social construction of both formal organizations and of various types of rational actorhood. In this way, [Chapter 5](#) gave a first tentative synthesis of the diverse elements that I took from different strands of sociological theory. World cultural theory serves me to grasp further the social complexity of the meso level and to bridge the gap between global modernity in systemic and individual terms. The conceptual apparatus of the Stanford school helps organize empirical observations and comprehend the historical construction of both syntactic and semantic vocabularies of modernity. The chapter then ended with a brief example of such an historical construction by analyzing the evolution of Islam as a modern world religion. The core argument here was that we would not understand contemporary interpretations of Islamic traditions and Islam as an organized form of modern religion without studying them in the broader conceptual and institutional context of global modernity.

Constituting predominantly an exercise in social theory, these four chapters aimed at developing a heuristic framework for a global sociology of modernity. In pursuing this endeavor, I was both pragmatic in my choice of theoretical elements and non-exegetic in their combination. I built my theoretical framework according to Bryan Turner's suggestion of strategically synthesizing elements of competing theoretical paradigms (Turner 1992). This said, I am certainly aware that each of the steps represented by the subsequent four chapters of this book could deserve more elaboration. In this specific sense, writing this book was a beginning and not an end. Consequently, my synthesis of different strands of theory remains tentative and open to revisions. In [Chapter 5](#), for instance, I took up the

critique against modern systems theory by the Stanford school in order to discuss, only in brief, the way in which I consider these two competing approaches to be complementary. However, I remain rather silent regarding a number of other questions concerning the compatibility of the theoretical approaches to which my framework relates. This applies as much to the combination of Luhmann with Foucault as to that of Reckwitz with the classical sociological tradition. Reckwitz, for instance, starts his book with a critique of classical sociological theories such as theories of differentiation, rationalization, individualization, or theories about capitalism and technological development. He presents his poststructuralist approach to the formation of the modern subject explicitly in terms of an alternative to two sociological narratives that “homogenize modernity” either in the rise of the independent individual or in the establishment of all-encompassing social discipline. These two classical narratives, according to Reckwitz, only reproduce the false dichotomy between individual and society (Reckwitz 2006, 14). With my selective synthesis of theories in this book, however, I attempt to show that Reckwitz’ critique of these classical approaches is only justified if they are applied in an apodictic way. I consider Reckwitz’ poststructuralist approach to be compatible with more traditional sociological thinking. A case in point is the theory of successive modernities by Peter Wagner. Wagner builds his theory on the conceptual dichotomy between autonomy and mastery, which closely resembles the modern narratives of individualization and discipline. Nevertheless, in utilizing them for empirical research, Wagner’s subsequent types of modern social orders and Reckwitz’ forms of modern subjectivity complement each other in a fruitful way.

More generally speaking, I derive my central argument for the compatibility of, at first glance, competing social theories from some assumptions of theories of emergence. These theories serve me especially for two purposes. First and most important in this respect, the metatheoretical paradigm of emergence allows me to associate the interpretative value of different theories by relating them to different levels of social reality. When it comes to the macro and micro levels of modernity, I think [Chapters 3 and 4](#) made this point of view sufficiently clear. The meso level, however, would deserve much more elaboration than there was space for it in this book. On the meso level, syntax and semantics of modernity merge into historically concrete forms. It is on this level where structures and actors intersect in complex and multiple ways. Furthermore, social differentiation at the macro level appears in a horizontal way, in the order of functionally

separated subsystems, while the meso level is further differentiated by different vertical levels. Consequently, this broad range of social levels represents a vast field for further theoretical and empirical research. In particular, pluralistic theories of modernities provide us with analytical perspectives and conceptual tools to facilitate research at these crucial intersections on the meso level. Theories of multiple modernities offer insights into the ways in which social actors construct historically particular semantics by drawing from a large pool of religious and other traditions. Theories of successive modernities, by contrast, help us to understand the often idiosyncratic forms in which actors combine the same corpus of traditions with different but globally relevant imaginations of social order. The development of the Islamic reform movement, in particular its diversification in the twentieth century, offers a large empirical field of research in this respect.

By taking Foucault's definition of the modern subject as an analytical starting point from below, we can address these questions of historical and social constructiveness at the meso level. The "dual nature" of the modern subject being both autonomous and subjugated is behind the assumption of a modern dichotomy between the individual and society. In the analysis of processes of subjectivation, we can dissolve this fictitious dichotomy by reading it as the social integration of the micro level with respect to higher levels of social reality. This integration takes place on the meso level. Yet the meso level is in itself subdivided into different social levels when it comes to interaction systems, networks, social movements, formal organizations, and institutions. For the study of this complex mesh of intermediate levels, the Stanford school has developed a rich conceptual pool. On these various levels, the "autonomy" of intentional social actors meets with the demands of various social structures. Here we can study the various ways in which individuals combine in the practices of everyday life their own interests and ideas with the "grand schemes" of modernity (cf. Schielke 2010). Theories of emergence, thus, help us in putting our focus on the interplay of these different levels of the social realm. Through their lenses we can articulate the constitutive interdependence of structures and actors without necessarily assigning to one of them an ontological and/or epistemological priority.¹

The second purpose for this metatheoretical turn toward modern emergentism is closely related to my decision to combine social theory with empirical material from Muslim history. In my reading, theories of emergence offer a theoretically grounded escape from the search for the origins

of modernity in time and space. In this way, social emergentism makes a strong theoretical argument for not confusing modernization with Westernization. Both the modern macrostructure of functional differentiation and the double nature of the modern subject at the micro level are emerging social phenomena without clearly identifiable origins. I tried to substantiate this theoretical argument with my empirical illustrations. When discussing functional differentiation as the unique property of world society in [Chapter 3](#), I had a closer look at the relationship between religion and politics in the pre- and postcolonial history of Muslim peoples. In these historical excursions, I argued that we could observe autochthonous processes of boundary demarcations between functionally differentiated political, religious, and legal realms in Muslim history. In addition, I alluded to literature dealing with historical processes of the differentiation of specific forms of economic and scientific communication. Finally, with respect to modern subjectivity formation, in [Chapter 4](#) I interpreted the evolution of the Islamic reform movement as a distinctively religious Muslim response to the contingency of modernity. The emergence of this feeling of contingency at the micro level I tried to substantiate with the help of Rashid Rida's story about the conversations between a traditionalist sheikh and a modern Muslim reformer. These questions of autochthonous functional boundary demarcations and modern subjectivity formation outside Europe point to a wide field for future research. It is precisely further empirical research in this direction that would feed into the theoretical assumptions of this book. Moreover, this kind of research would contribute to a better understanding of the contingent emergence of modernity in its global dimensions (cf. Knöbl 2007).

Theories of entangled modernities offer us a fruitful empirical research strategy for this endeavor of historically identifying emerging features of modernity in different world regions at different points in time. They emphasize cultural transfers among different world regions, without denying the role of social power relations in the realization of historically concrete forms of modernity. If at all, the equation of modernization with Westernization finds its explanation in this complex historical realization of modernities in which colonial power structures established various kinds of hegemonic imaginations of modernity in institutional and ideational forms. In this sense, the model of the national state, late nineteenth-century fascination with scientific Positivism, forms of organized or liberal societies, and the types of the peer-group-oriented and the entrepreneurial subject have assumed relative hegemonies in the context of asymmetric power

relations. Asymmetric power relations, however, do not exclude the formative impact of subaltern actors in shaping modernity. Forms of social power do not resemble one-way streets, and the contemporary world has been shaped by both colonizers and colonized.

In applying the perspective of entangled modernities to the historical analysis of the Ottoman and Egyptian reform processes, for instance, we saw the ways in which Muslim state builders, social movements, and intellectual circles applied global cultural scripts, participated in their interpretation, and transformed them by revealing their limitations in the context of European imperialism. These examples from Muslim history strongly support Getachew's argument that we should perceive "subaltern actors as innovative political agents rather than implementers of existing ideals" (Getachew 2016). The contemporary understanding of Westphalian norms, human rights, types of legitimate actorhood, and modern social institutions, therefore, are the result of complex elaborations among a multiplicity of social actors. Thus, the analysis of Muslim history by applying conceptual tools of the Stanford school feeds back into its theoretical framework. Historical analysis through the prisms of entangled modernities calls for reflections upon the Stanford school's concept of global diffusion. In light of this methodological process of analytical induction, we should be careful in declaring them to be the sole result of the legal and religious history of the West. The West itself is the product of cultural entanglements, as Cemil Aydin's study on the *Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* shows (Aydin 2007). Precisely a closer look at the factual entanglements of colonial history will teach us not to confuse modernization with Westernization as such. Translating the metatheoretical position of emergence into historical analysis, the discussion of theories of entangled modernities point to new avenues of research by combining a global sociology of modernity with a framework of world history.

NOTE

1. Within the framework of this book, I was not really engaged in a discussion of the ontological and epistemological disputes that have characterized the debates on emergentism. Therefore, in particular the ontological status of these different social levels remains unclear. In emphasizing the heuristic nature of my theoretical elaborations, I first and foremost stressed the epistemological value of the theoretical approaches utilized in this book. In this

way, I circumvented questions about the compatibility of, for instance, the radical constructivist concepts of Luhmann with the empirically saturated ideal types of Wagner or the Stanford school. However, as already indicated in the introduction to this book, given its scope and purpose, I would only be able to give modestly short and necessarily incomplete answers to very large and still unsolved questions. There is no doubt that especially ontological and epistemological questions with regard to theories of emergence mark one lacuna of this book that deserves future elaborations. It is precisely with this purpose in mind that I have written this book.

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